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Race, Class, and Gender in the Politics of Incarceration in the United States

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Abstract

The growth of incarceration in the United States, a symptom of the concomitant broader institutionalization of a 'carceral state', is unquestionably one of the most significant developments in the nation's history. Despite this significance, the public response to the growth and deleterious consequences of incarceration has been notably restrained. This dissertation considers how the seeming lack of public opposition to carceral growth relates to its historical concentration among relatively disadvantaged Americans, namely low-income black Americans. Through a content analysis of U.S. news media coverage of incarceration, a survey of a prominent civil rights organization advocating on behalf of black Americans, and a survey experiment on the sources of white Americans' support for incarcerating low-income black women, I show that racial, class, and gender disadvantage are intimately connected to the politics underlying carceral growth. In doing so, the dissertation contributes to research on the political sources and consequences of carceral growth, political inequality, political communications, political preference formation, and the politics of social identity in the United States.

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Anyone who knows me well enough should know that I always read and enjoy acknowledgments sections. But more seriously, finishing this dissertation was also never a guarantee, at least not from my perspective. In short, I would be remiss if I did not take the opportunity to fully and formally express my sincere gratitude for the great deal of support I received in completing this dissertation.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my fiancée, Savina Balasubramanian, without whom its completion would have been impossible and to the memory of my grandfather, David Levay (1928-2016), who passed away as it was completed and taught me to never take life too seriously.

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Chapter 1. Introduction: The Politics of Incarceration in the United States

Over the last 40 years, the number of individuals in U.S. prisons and jails virtually exploded. From the late 1970s to the present day, the number of imprisoned Americans rose by more than 500% (The Sentencing Project 2015a). By 2013, nearly 2.2 million people were incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons and over 6 million were under some form of correctional supervision (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2016; The Sentencing Project 2015a). The incarceration rate further illustrates that these increases are not simply due to increases in the total population. For example, in 1978, the total U.S. imprisonment rate was 131 per 100,000 population, while as of 2012, was 480 per 100,000 population (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013a). Although recently stabilizing, the size of America's incarcerated population size and America's incarceration rate continue to far outpace those of almost every other country in the world (The Sentencing Project 2015a).

The consequences of expansion in the nation's criminal justice and carceral system, more specifically, has been described as nothing short of "a major milestone … that arguably rivals in significance the expansion and contraction of the welfare state in the postwar period" (Gottschalk 2008 p. 236). Scholars continue to uncover various ways in which incarceration negatively affects individuals. Incarceration has negative effects on one's economic prospects and well-being, social and community ties, health, and political attitudes and behavior (Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002; Pattillo, Weiman, and Western 2004; Pager 2007; Pettit 2012; Roberts 2003/2004; Western 2006). The profound growth of incarceration unsurprisingly amplifies these individual-level effects. For example, as of 2016, an estimated 6.1 million Americans and 2.5% of the American voting age population were disenfranchised due to a felony conviction (The Sentencing Project 2016). Thus, these so-called "collateral consequences" have made it

incredibly difficult for incarcerated individuals to reintegrate into society, leading some to argue that the nation's heavy reliance on incarceration does little to deter and may actually increase crime, at least at a certain point (e.g., Clear 2009).

Importantly, there is widespread agreement that America's push for more punishment reflects socio-political factors. A number of public policy changes, namely harsher criminal punishments (i.e., lengthier and more conditions granting prison sentences) and curtailing the use of parole, directly contributed to the nation's prison buildup (National Research Council 2014). Wishing to appear tough on crime and curtail black progress from the Civil Rights Movement, political elites facilitated, if not completely led the push to adopt these policies (Beckett 1997; Enns 2016; Garland 2001; Murakawa 2014; Simon 2007; Weaver 2007; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001). The nation's prison boom was also further reinforced by key social movements, including the victims' rights, feminist, and prisoners' rights movements (Gottschalk 2006). Various political factors, such as levels of civic engagement, state spending, partisan control of legislatures and executives, and public opinion, help explain much of the state and local-level variation in incarceration rates (Barker 2009; Beckett and Western 2001; Western 2006; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001). In short, there is strong evidence that the growth of incarceration has been a truly political project.

Although its political sources and consequences have received a great deal of attention, extant research on the growth of incarceration has devoted much less attention to the political response that the issue has received. In particular, it remains unclear why it did not and continues to face relatively weak opposition (see Gottschalk 2006; 2015). To be sure, the nation's prison build-up has faced fierce resistance from some corners, particularly from women of color, as well as individuals who live in economically distressed, urban neighborhoods (Gilmore 2007;

Miller 2007). Yet, given that it is clearly such a seismic and deleterious shift, it is curious and remains critical to consider why opposition has not been more widespread.

Much research in American politics has long demonstrated that the groups affected by policy issues can have profound effects on whether and how they come to be addressed. Among others, theories of policy feedback contend that the framing of policy problems and solutions is significantly affected by the groups they target or are perceived to affect (Campbell 2012; Mettler and Soss 2004). In line with this, a long line of public opinion research shows that social groups are a central referent in both the policymaking process and the political thinking of elites and citizens alike—meaning that how they view political issues and what to do about them is often strongly linked to their attitudes about the groups perceived to be affected (e.g., Hancock 2004; Nelson and Kinder 1997). Thus, by both communicating and making salient already-held perceptions of ostensibly affected groups, the groups affected or perceived to be affected by issues can significantly shape the capacities, interests, and preferences of political actors toward those issues.

Motivated by these concerns, a major premise of this dissertation is that the development and persistence of the U.S. carceral state can be partly attributed to the fact that it most often ensnares a group that is severely marginalized by dominant U.S. society. Since at least the late 1970s, incarceration and its growth has disproportionately, if not exclusively occurred among and impacted low-income blacks (Pettit 2012; Wacquant 2009; Western 2006; Western and Pettit 2010). Figure 1.1, for example, shows that the incarceration rate among black, male high school dropouts rose more than any other group of men, including among black men. The incarceration rate among this group, for example, increased by an astonishing 27 percentage points from 1980 through 2008, yet by roughly five percentage points among black men with a high school

diploma and stabilizing among black men with a college degree (see Western and Pettit 2010). In 2014 dollars, the median pre-incarcerated income of incarcerated black men in 2004 was $17,625, while it was $31,245 for non-incarcerated black men; the median pre-incarcerated income of incarcerated black women in 2004 was $12,735, while it was $24,255 for non-incarcerated black women (Rabuy and Kopf 2015).

Figure 1.1.



Notes. Figure taken from Western, B., & Pettit, B. (2010). Incarceration & social inequality. *Daedalus*, (Summer).

Focusing on its historical concentration also brings into view that the effects of incarceration and its growth previously described have been unequally distributed. That is, the growth of incarceration has contributed significantly to inequalities of various kinds. In particular, disproportionate growth and representation of the black poor among the incarcerated population has devastated the black community, negatively impacting virtually every major outcome for blacks as a group, including income, wealth, employment, social ties, disease and illness rates, and political participation and resources (e.g., Burch 2013; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002; Pattillo, Weiman, and Western 2004; Pager 2007; Pettit 2012; Roberts 2003/2004; Western 2006). For example, more than one in seven black men in the U.S. is now disenfranchised due to a criminal record (Manza and Uggen 2006), significantly diluting the gains made by blacks due to the efforts of national black organizational activity during the Civil Rights Movement (Brown-Dean 2007). Put simply, incarceration and its growth has (re)created and legitimated the terms of U.S. citizenship and belongingness along racial and economic lines (Gottschalk 2008; Roberts 2003/2004).

As the above illustrates, incarceration and its growth in the United States is what we might consider a cross-cutting issue. Cross-cutting issues are defined as issues which "disproportionately and directly affect only certain segments of a marginal group" (Cohen 1999 p. 13). They are also defined more specifically as issues situated among or rooted in the experiences of the most economically, socially, and politically vulnerable members of marginal groups. Other examples might include AIDS and welfare. Particularly as they mobilize multiple identities that are also linked to "questionable" moral standing, a growing body of research demonstrates that cross-cutting issues frequently go politically unowned and ignored by

dominant and marginal political elites and institutions alike (Cohen 1999; Strolovitch 2007). In turn, the possibility of serious and widespread mobilization around cross-cutting issues is low.

With the above considerations in mind, this dissertation presents three loosely related empirical studies that attempt to foreground and understand how the politics of carceral growth intersects with racial, economic, and/or gender disadvantage. In the first chapter, I consider how the news media have come to define carceral growth, both in general and in relation to its racial, economic, and gender contours. Through it agenda-setting and framing powers, I argue that the news media have encouraged news media to frame incarceration in ways that fail to effectively facilitate or mobilize opposition to carceral growth. I analyze a sample of news articles about incarceration published by the *Los Angeles Times* from 1964 through 2013. I show that the amount of attention that carceral growth receives has been relatively small and mostly stable over time. When discussed, the issue has been framed narrowly as a problem of spatial and economic costs for the state and rarely in terms of racial, ethnic, class, and/or gendered patterns. In addition, articles rarely attribute causal responsibility for carceral growth to anything, and almost exclusively attribute responsibility for addressing the issue to correctional systems. The analysis, thus, suggests that the media's coverage of carceral growth has actually ignored its demographic contours and its influence extends beyond increasing support for punitive policies.

Chapter 2 explores contemporary national black political advocacy on the issue of incarceration. Many have shown that national political advocacy on behalf of groups who remain marginalized by dominant U.S. society, such as blacks, is biased against the interests of those who are disadvantaged by multiple marginal group memberships, such as low-income blacks. Through a survey of local units of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), I reconsider and extend evidence of claims that this bias leads black political

elites and organizations to devote little attention to the issue of incarceration. I find that while as a broad issue area, incarceration appears on the majority of NAACP units' agendas, it is not a top priority for very many. Additionally, compared to policy issues dealing with the front-end of criminal justice (e.g., racial profiling), policy issues dealing with the back-end of incarceration and criminal justice (i.e., correctional systems/supervision, policies directly affecting incarcerated or formerly incarcerated individuals), which are more likely to affect low-income and/or incarcerated blacks, appear much less often on units' criminal justice agendas and as a top priority. It is also apparent that units who perceive more radical, younger black organizations, namely Black Lives Matter (BLM) as making it easier for them to pursue their general policy goals are more likely to list incarceration as a top priority than those who do not. This suggests that while attention to incarceration from black political organizations remains somewhat limited, the emergence of younger, more radical black groups can serve to push pre-existing and more mainstream organizations to craft more inclusive agendas and primarily by creating novel political opportunities.

In the third chapter, I present a study of public support for the punishment of low-income black women. Although the incarceration of low-income black women has been a central feature of carceral growth, it remains poorly understood and woefully understudied. I begin to address this gap by exploring the sources of support for incarceration when it concerns this group, specifically. Specifically, I reconsider the influence of beliefs about fairness on white Americans' support for incarceration when low-income black women are in mind. I conduct an original survey experiment in which I exposed a sample of white Americans to a fictional Internet news article about a purported criminal suspect who belonged to a specific racial, economic, *and* gender identity. I find that whites' support for incarceration is strongly influenced

by beliefs about the fairness of the criminal justice system *except when the suspect is described as a low-income black woman*. Seemingly paradoxically, I further show that this suspect is perceived to experience as much discrimination from the criminal justice system as the suspects of other identities. These findings shed new and disturbing light on white public opinion and the growth of incarceration in the U.S. Going even beyond expectations, they suggest that whites might not simply deny unfairness in the system when it comes to black women who face economic disadvantage, but rather ignore and potentially justify it. More broadly, given the disproportionate effect of carceral growth on low-income black women, the findings suggest that some of the weak political resistance to carceral growth reflects the effects of the representation and perceptions of this group.

Finally, the dissertation concludes with a brief review of the main goals of this research and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2. News Media and Carceral Growth in the United States

Introduction

From the1970s to the 2010s, the number of individuals incarcerated in American jails and prisons rose by a striking 500% (The Sentencing Project 2015a). By 2013, nearly 2.2 million people were incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons and over 6 million were under some form of correctional supervision (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2016; The Sentencing Project 2015a). This expansion has also disproportionately affected groups who remain relatively marginalized by most of U.S. society, namely economically disadvantaged blacks (Wacquant 2009; Western 2006). Importantly, U.S. political elites at the federal level have begun to regularly point out these issues, calling for reforms of both the nation's reliance on incarceration and biases in its criminal justice system (e.g., Hules and Steinhauer 2015). Similarly, academic experts now agree that these trends are nothing short "of a major milestone… arguably rival[ing] in significance the expansion and contraction of the welfare state in the postwar period" (Gottschalk 2008 p. 236).

Despite growing recognition, the political response to the growth and attendant inequities of carceral punishment has been and remains restrained (Gottschalk 2015). Given the prominence of public opinion in various accounts (e.g., Beckett 1997; Enns 2016), this raises questions about the role of U.S. news media in carceral growth. News media are not only a primary source of information about crime and justice for Americans (Graber 1980; Surrette 2015), but also significantly shape public thinking (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Chong and Druckman 2007). One explanation for apparent political inaction, and, by extension, carceral growth itself, is that it has garnered little and narrow types of attention from U.S. news media.[1]

[1]As noted in the introduction, I use carceral growth throughout as a way to refer to increases in the overall size and the unequal distribution of state surveillance and control in response to ostensibly criminal behavior among the U.S. population. Although I primarily focus on physical confinement to correctional facilities, carceral punishment and

Even allowing for the possibility that news media reflect as much as they cause popular views, examining their role offers a useful lens through which the political dynamics underlying carceral growth might be examined.

Perhaps surprisingly, we know almost nothing about news coverage of carceral growth. While a great deal of research on the relationship between news media and criminal justice issues exists, it focuses almost exclusively on news coverage of crime and largely ignores news about incarceration (e.g., Beckett 1997; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). This is particularly important in light of compelling evidence that the public's views toward criminal punishment and incarceration are rather nuanced and more sensitive than commonly recognized (see Gottschalk 2008). Specifically, alternative and less punitive ways of dealing with crime (other than incarceration) enjoy widespread support among the public, especially when they are provided with information related to carceral growth, both in terms of its costs and the values it embodies (Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000).

How much and what types of attention has carceral growth received from U.S. news media? What does this attention suggest about its development and persistence? To address these questions, I conduct an analysis of news articles about incarceration published by the *Los Angeles Times* from 1964 through 2013. I analyze both the amount of attention that carceral growth receives and how carceral growth is framed in articles, namely which problems and consequences are discussed, whether its relationship with race, ethnicity, class, and gender are communicated, and who or what is most often attributed causal and treatment responsibility for the issue.

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growth does not exclusively entail physical confinement in a correctional facility and further includes, for example, individuals on parole and those whose rights have been restricted as a result of serving a sentence of carceral punishment (see Foucault 1977).

With the exception of the most recent years, I find that the amount of attention that carceral growth receives has been relatively small and mostly stable over time. When discussed, the issue has been framed narrowly as a problem of spatial and economic costs for the state and rarely in terms of racial, ethnic, class, and/or gendered patterns. In addition, articles rarely attribute causal responsibility for carceral growth to anything, and almost exclusively attribute responsibility for addressing the issue to correctional systems.

As a whole, my findings build on previous research suggesting that news media are a critical component of carceral growth. However, I offer evidence that their role extends beyond increasing support for punitive policies through distorted portrayals of crime. Specifically, I show that news media have likely failed to cover the issue in ways that would potentially stand to increase public awareness and support for alternatives to incarceration, as well as widespread reform of the criminal justice system. My findings highlight and shed light on how, despite its seriousness, the emergence and development of carceral growth has nevertheless failed to garner sustained political resistance (e.g., Alexander 2010; Gottschalk 2006). They also point to the need to better understand a critical, yet understudied aspect of carceral growth: the conditions under which the public is more likely to support, and elites to respond, to calls for alternatives to crime control other than incarceration and widespread reform of the criminal justice system.

I begin this chapter with a brief review of the importance of and extant research on news media and carceral growth in the U.S. Following this, I describe my data and framework that I use to analyze news coverage of carceral growth. I next present the results of my analysis. I then conclude with a discussion of my findings in the context of existing research on the construction of news, as well as some of the implications of my findings for our understanding and the study of the politics of carceral growth.

News Media and Carceral Growth in the U.S.

There is widespread agreement that carceral growth reflects a number of political choices (National Research Council 2014). In turn, though complex, public opinion is mostly understood as playing a pivotal role (e.g., Enns 2016). Given this, news media are surely an important aspect of carceral growth. Various studies demonstrate that as many as 95% of Americans not only consume print and/or television news media about crime and justice, but also rely upon it as their main source of information for these topics (Chermak 1998; Graber 1980; Surrette 2015). Information about crime and punishment also dominates news agendas. Print and TV news at various geographic levels cover criminal justice frequently, with studies showing it accounts for as much as one third or more of all topics covered (Bennett 2001; Dyer 2000; Graber 1980; Klite, Bardwell, and Salzman 1997; Surrette 2015). News media are one of the most important, if not only sources of information about criminal justice issues for many Americans.

Decades of research also suggest that news media are politically influential. Perhaps most notably, by devoting different amounts of coverage to political issues, news media can alter the priority that the public places upon them, a process known as agenda-setting (see Cohen 1963; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; McCombs and Shaw 1972). Survey and experimental studies, for example, show that the public ranks crime as more important when covered both more frequently and prominently by news media (e.g., Beckett 1997). Similarly, those who consume news coverage of crime more frequently are more concerned with the issue than others (Gross and Aday 2003; Romer, Jamieson, and Aday 2003). With agenda-setting in mind then, the development and persistence of carceral growth can be understood, in part, as a function of whether and how much it is covered by news media outlets.

News media can also shape how the public thinks about political issues through framing. To frame is to "select some aspects of a perceived reality… in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (Entman 1993, p. 52). Put in other words, news media provide the public with 'frames in communication' or contextual cues about issues that include "words, images, phrases, and presentation styles" (Druckman 2001, p. 227). Frames matter because they can shape the considerations, values, or beliefs that the public draws upon when thinking of political issues (i.e., 'frames in thought') and, in turn, elicit changes of opinion (i.e., 'framing effects'; see Chong and Druckman 2007). For instance, experimental studies show that the public is more likely to attribute individual-level sources to crime when the issue is framed episodically, meaning in terms of an individual act or event, than when it is framed thematically, meaning in more contextual terms, like with statistical and historical trends. In turn, they are more supportive of punitive solutions to crime aimed at individual criminals and behaviors (Iyengar 1991). Through framing, news media are important to carceral growth by potentially shaping whether and how the public thinks it can and should be addressed.

It is perhaps surprising, then, that we know almost nothing about news coverage of carceral growth. While a great deal of research on the relationship between news media and criminal justice issues exists, it focuses almost exclusively on news coverage of crime and mostly ignores incarceration.[2] For example, the distortion and over-representation of crime and violence by U.S. news media is well-documented (Bennett 2001; Surette 1998b; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Graber 1980). Relatedly, it is clear that crime is more often framed episodically by

[2] The literature on the links between news media, crime, and criminal justice policy is actually quite voluminous. This review, therefore, is not intended to be exhaustive but to capture only the most important and consistent findings of extant research.

news media through individual instances crime, especially street and violent crimes committed by the poor and working class (Bennett 2001; Iyengar 1991; Parenti 1993; Reiman 2001). Others also have repeatedly shown that blacks are overrepresented as criminal offenders and underrepresented as victims and officials of the criminal justice system; black criminal offenders are also portrayed in a more menacing and de-personalized manner than comparable white offenders (Dixon and Linz 2000; Entman and Rojecki 2001; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). These patterns are clearly important to understanding carceral growth as they heighten public concern and fears over crime (e.g., Beckett 1997), as well as support for harsher criminal punishments, particularly when criminals are perceived as black and among those who hold more negative views of blacks (e.g., Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

However, very little research on the relationship between news media and criminal justice is devoted to news coverage of the issue of carceral growth itself. Americans' views on incarceration are fairly nuanced and more sensitive than commonly assumed (see Gottschalk 2008). Even as they support incarceration as a means of controlling crime, Americans widely support an array of alternative punishments and preventive measures, such as job creation and poverty reduction (Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). Recent surveys also indicate that the majority of the public opposes increases in government spending on prisons (Cohen, Rust, and Steen 2006). Perhaps most importantly, providing more information about the costs, consequences, and effectiveness of incarceration, as well as about the compatibility of carceral punishment with personal values punishment decreases public support for imprisonment and increases support for alternative and less punitive ways of dealing with crime (see Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000, p. 43-45; also see Roberts and Hough 2005). Given apparent flexibility and sensitivity in the public's views, news coverage of carceral growth

is rather important for understanding the political response to, and, in turn, the development and persistence of carceral growth.

To be sure, a few studies explore news coverage of corrections and incarceration, which find that corrections, as well as prisons and prisoners, receive much less attention in the news than other aspects of the criminal justice system, such as courts and law enforcement (Chermak 1998; Yousman 2009). For example, Chermak (1998) finds only 17% of a sample of 1,979 print and TV news stories about criminal justice were devoted to corrections, with the rest devoted to police and court activities; just 2.3% of all stories in the sample involved prisons, such as commitments to prison, pardon requests, releases from prison, and executions.[3] As with crime, news about prisons and prisoners is also shown to be more often framed episodically through individual, extreme, and sensational events, such as escapes from correctional facilities and violent altercations (Yousman 2009). Still, news coverage of corrections and incarceration remains generally understudied and extant research does not address the more specific questions of whether and how news media cover carceral growth (see Surrette 2015).

Analyzing News Coverage of Carceral Growth

How much and what types of attention has carceral growth received from U.S. news media? What does this attention suggest about its development and persistence? To address these questions, I conduct an analysis of news articles about incarceration published by the *Los Angeles Times (L.A. Times)* from 1964 through 2013. As Figure 2.1 shows, this time period spans changes in carceral trends at the national and state levels. The figure reports the number and rate of Americans under custody of U.S. state and federal prisons from 1925 through 2012

[3] Yousman (2009) similarly finds that 54 of 56 local TV broadcasts in Connecticut included news about crime and criminal justice. Only two of these included any stories about the prison system; just 59 seconds of 33 hours of broadcasts was dedicated to the correctional system.

serving a sentence of at least one year.[4] The mid-1970s and mid-2000s are clearly critical turning points. A recent, authoritative report also shows that the imprisonment rate increased at the national level, as well as in every state in every year from 1972 until 2000, with the national imprisonment rate peaking around 2008 (National Research Council 2014).

Figure 2.1



Notes. Calculations for figure based on number of individuals serving a prison sentence of at least one year and under custody of U.S. state or federal corrections officials. *Sources*: Bureau of Justice Statistics. (1988). *Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, Yearend 1925-86*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Carson, E. Ann and Mulako-Wangota, Joseph. Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Imprisonment rates of custody population - sentences greater than 1 year*. Carson, E. Ann and Mulako-Wangota, Joseph. Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Count of custody population - sentences greater than 1 year*. Generated using the Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT)-Prisoners at www.bjs.gov. (10-Sep-16).

[4] Unless otherwise noted, I rely on custodial counts of those serving sentences of at least one year in a state or federal prisons for my analysis. Although jurisdictional counts are the preferred measure as they are more expansive (i.e., accurate), custodial counts are both more reserved and consistently available as, unlike jurisdictional counts, they have been required to be reported by correctional facilities prior to 1978.

I select the *L.A. Times* as my source for analysis primarily out of geographic considerations. Carceral growth is both more pressing and varies a great deal at the state level. For example, the rate at which Americans are incarcerated in state prisons is almost four times higher than that of federal prisons (Wagner 2014). While incarceration rates increased in every state from 1972 to 2000, overall increases also varied dramatically by state. For example, over that time period, the incarceration rate in Louisiana increased by 700 per 100,000 in the U.S. population and in Maine and Minnesota by just 100 per 100,000. Since 2000, the incarceration rate has increased in some states and decreased in others (National Research Council 2014).

Given the above, the *L.A. Times* is ideal as it is national in scope and reports on news in and for those living in a state in which carceral trends have and continue to be concerning. Figure 2.2, which provides the rate of individuals under custody of California or state and federal correction officials for at least one year, shows that growth in the imprisoned population in California largely mirrors national trends in its severity and timing. From 1977 through 2006, the number imprisoned in California increased in every year yielding an increase of over 800% over that time period; the California imprisonment rate also increased by about 500% during that time. Growth in the size of California's prison populations has actually been so serious that, in 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the state to reduce the number of individuals it houses in its prisons (Liptak 2011).

The *L.A. Times* is also a compelling choice due to California's policymaking process. Specifically, California's political system is relatively populist and employs various forms of direct citizen participation in governmental decision-making. As others have illustrated, these mechanisms have greatly impacted the state's criminal justice policies and, by extension, carceral trends (Barker 2009). For example, perhaps most famously, the California public

directly dictated the state's adoption of three-strikes sentencing through a ballot initiative held in the mid-1990s, a large source of carceral growth in California and elsewhere (National Research Council 2014; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001).[5] Given the prominence of public views in California policymaking and assuming that news media shape public views to some extent, news sources in the state have arguably played a large role in the state's carceral growth, and perhaps more so than those located in states with less populist and decentralized political systems.

Figure 2.2



Notes. Calculations for figures based on number of individuals serving a prison sentence of at least one year and under custody of U.S. state or federal corrections officials. *Sources*: Bureau of Justice Statistics. (1988). *Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, Yearend 1925-86*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Carson, E. Ann and Mulako-Wangota, Joseph. Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Imprisonment rates of custody population - sentences greater than 1 year*. Carson, E. Ann and Mulako-Wangota, Joseph. Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Count of custody population - sentences greater than 1 year*. Generated using the Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT)-Prisoners at www.bjs.gov. (10-Sep-16).

[5] Until recently, California's particular version of three-strikes was the harshest in the nation. Individuals previously convicted of any felony or violent or serious crime who were convicted of a second felony or violent or serious crime had to serve at least double the amount of time that a first-time offender of the same crime would serve. Individuals with two prior convictions of any felony, violent, or serious crime, had to serve a minimum of 25 years in prison if convicted of any felony. Offenders also had no possibility of release before serving at least 80% of their sentence (see Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001).

I choose the *L.A. Times* for practical reasons, as well. As a print source, the *L.A. Times* has news content available for analysis from the entirety of the selected time period. Moreover, although print sources are less widely consumed than other types of sources, such as television, the *L.A. Times* is prominent. As of 2013, its total average circulation was 653,868, the fourth highest newspaper circulation in the nation and an increase from the prior year (Alliance for Audited Media, 2013).

As the preceding review suggests attention to carceral growth is likely to be sparse, I broadly define my population as any news-based articles whose majority of content and/or primary topic involves anything explicitly related to the usage and/or conditions of supervision as carried out by U.S. domestic, non-military state, and/or federal correctional systems. Under this definition, relevant articles can range widely, including everything from those traditionally defined as being about crime (insofar as it involves explicit reference to a punishment of incarceration for any length of time; e.g., arrests for crimes where potential of carceral punishment is made explicit) to narrative focusing on individuals living or having lived under some form of correctional supervision (e.g., life as a parolee/ex-parolee). Irrelevant articles include any focusing on incarceration or crimes punishable by incarceration outside U.S. borders or dealing with the military (e.g., reports about activities at Guantanamo, U.S. military trials, prisoners of war, etc.) and any non-news based content, including blog posts, letters to the editor, and reviews or reports about cultural products (e.g., music albums, films).

To gather my sample of articles, I searched the headlines of articles for the presence of at least one word from a list of key words and phrases which signify and were shown to capture mostly relevant coverage as defined above (see Appendix A1). As Table 2.1 shows, this initial search yielded over 23,000 articles in total. So as to keep the project manageable and allow for

over-time comparisons, as the table demonstrates, I created 10 continuous 5-year blocs of time and randomly sampled 75 articles from each bloc or 750 articles in total. With the help of some undergraduate assistants, I then coded the sampled articles for relevancy as defined above, which yielded samples ranging from 52 to 62 articles for each time bloc or 593 articles in total (see Appendices A2 and A3 for coding documentation and reliability tests).

Table 2.1

Articles about Incarceration in the *LA Times*, 1964-2013

	Initial Search[1]	Total Sampled[2]	Total Relevant[3]	% Relevant (total relevant/ total sampled)
1964-1968	948	75	62	83%
1969-1973	1,862	75	60	80%
1974-1978	2,135	75	55	73%
1979-1983	3,009	75	56	75%
1984-1988	2,557	75	60	80%
1989-1993	3,239	75	65	87%
1994-1998	2,884	75	64	85%
1999-2003	2,848	75	64	85%
2004-2008	2,699	75	52	69%
2009-2013	1,661	75	55	73%
All years	23,842	750	593	79%

Notes.

[1] Initial Search includes the total number of articles returned from searches of headlines of articles with at least one key word.

[2] Total Sampled include total number of articles randomly sampled from initial search articles.

[3] Total Relevant includes the total number of randomly sampled articles that meet the definitional criteria outlined in text (i.e., # of articles retrieved, sampled, and about incarceration as defined).

Scholars of political communication demonstrate that news media can impact public priorities through agenda-setting. This process works in relation to the amount of attention designated to an issue by news media, where the more attention given an issue, the more likely the public will view it as more important. As such, I analyze the amount of attention devoted to carceral growth in articles. I code attention dichotomously as whether an article simply mentions or identifies as a problem at any point in their text the size and/or changes in the size of the population under some form of correctional supervision (i.e., prisoners, parolees, probationers, and/or ex-offenders) and/or the rate at which individuals are brought under some form of correctional supervision (0=carceral growth mentioned; 1=carceral growth mentioned).[6]

Recall that news media also influence public thinking by providing frames of political issues; media frames can shape the process of opinion formation and, ultimately, the opinions the public holds on political issues. Entman (1993) identifies four functions or types of news frames, three of which include: 1) defining effects or conditions as problematic; 2) identifying causes; and 3) endorsing remedies or treatments (p. 6).[7] In terms of defining effects or conditions as problematic, I analyze variation in the types of consequences or problems that articles provide in reference to carceral growth or what I term 'problem definition frames.' Problem definition frames can be conceptualized such that the greater number of consequences of problems provided, and the greater the number of those included that actually call into question the legitimacy or utility of incarceration, the more likely the public will oppose it and support alternatives. Following inductive procedures outlined in Chong and Druckman (2011), I analyzed an initial sample of news articles, as well as academic research to develop and identify

[6] As noted, information about the reliability of the coding can be found in Appendix A3.

[7] The fourth function or frame type, for which I do not account in this analysis, is 'conveying moral judgment.'

a set of problem definition frames. The list of problem definition frames can be found in Table 2.2 at the end of this section, along with definitions. I code for the presence of each of the following frames dichotomously as whether an article includes any information relating to them: physical/spatial conditions, conflict/violence, economics, fairness, administration, civil rights, and public health (0=frame not included; 1=frame included).

To further capture the framing of conditions or effects of carceral growth as problematic, I analyze articles for the presence of demographic, statistical information. Apart from constituting the very definition of the issue itself (see Garland 2001), in general, communicating social problems through thematic information, such as statistics, increases the likelihood that the public will attribute sociopolitical sources and, in turn, support government intervention through public policy changes (Iyengar 1991). Additionally, when it comes to carceral growth, information about its demographic contours matters, namely patterns along racial, ethnic, economic, and gendered lines, as doing so can activate an array of group-related attitudes and behaviors that can influence both public support and resistance to the issue (e.g., Cohen 1999; Gilens 1999). As Table 2.2 also shows, I dichotomously code for whether articles provide any statistics or information about correctional supervision of any kind among and/or between particular racial/ethnic, economic, or gender groups (e.g., incarceration rate among a single racial group or between racial groups; 0=information by given demographic not included; 1=information by given demographic included).

I focus on race, ethnicity, class, and gender for straightforward reasons. Race and ethnicity are perhaps the most well-documented and persistent demographic dimensions of carceral growth (e.g., Alexander 2010). For example, in 2012, though constituting just 13% of the general population, blacks made up 36% of the U.S. prison population (Bureau of Justice

Statistics 2013). Disparities between racial and ethnic groups have also evolved over time. Western and Pettit (2010), for example, note that during the 19th century, blacks were about two times more likely and today are roughly seven times more likely to be incarcerated than whites.

Economic disparities in incarceration and its growth are also stark, arguably more so than those by race and ethnicity. Figure 2.3, taken from Western and Pettit (2010), for example, shows that since 1980, incarceration rates have risen almost exclusively among men without high school diplomas, regardless of racial or ethnic identity. For example, the incarceration rate among black men with a high school diploma increased by about five percentage points from 1980 to 2008 and remained roughly the same among black men with a college education. However, it increased by an astonishing 27 percentage points from 1980 to 2008 among black men without a high school diploma. Incarceration and its growth has been very clearly concentrated among the poor, whereby, given racial disparities, poor blacks have perhaps been the most affected group of any (also see Western 2006; Wacquant 2009).

Though less well-noted and arguably more complex, shifting gender dynamics of incarceration warrant consideration, as well. Men continue to make up over 90% of the U.S. prison population (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013). At the same time, women have arguably been more directly affected by carceral growth. The incarceration rate among women not only rose nearly six-fold from 1978 to 2012, it did so at a rate nearly double that for men (The Sentencing Project 2015b). Primarily due to its novelty, the quicker pace of incarceration rates among women is considered by some to be a key feature of carceral growth (e.g., Chesney-Lind 2002).

Figure 2.3



Notes. Figure taken from Western, B., & Pettit, B. (2010). Incarceration & social inequality. *Daedalus*, (Summer).

I account for the final two frame functions outlined by Entman (1993), identifying causes and endorsing treatment and remedies, by analyzing who or what articles mention as responsible for causing and remediating carceral growth, or 'causal attribution' and 'treatment attribution' frames. Attributions for carceral growth can be conceptualized such that the more individuals attribute responsibility for causing and resolving carceral growth to political actors or institutions, the more likely they will view it as a political issue and, in turn, depending upon the nature of the attribution, support particular kinds of policy changes more than others as solutions. For example, in the case of carceral growth, if courts or policies governing court decision-making are more often attributed responsibility for carceral growth (e.g., sentencing policies), the public may be more likely to support or view policies that alter the decision-making process or

powers of courts as the ideal solution. Again, following procedures outlined by Chong and Druckman (2011), I inductively developed a set of causal and treatment attribution frames, which can be found in Table 2.2 with definitions. I dichotomously code for whether any attributions are made directly to or with solutions associated with each of the following: law enforcement, courts, corrections, the public, and social conditions (0=not mentioned; 1= mentioned).

Table 2.2

Frames of Carceral Growth		
Frame Type	Frame	Definition/coding
Problem Definition	Physical/Spatial Conditions	Physical and/or spatial arrangements afforded to incarcerated individuals (e.g., overcrowding, etc.).
	Conflict/Violence	Tensions and/or physical altercations among incarcerated individuals and/or incarcerated individuals and actors responsible for managing them (e.g., fights, murders, etc.).
	Economics	Economics—internal (e.g., correctional spending) or external (e.g., state spending)—of incarceration (e.g., budgetary concerns, financial mismanagement, etc.).
	Fairness	Illegitimacy and/or undeserving-ness of incarceration (e.g., wrongful convictions, group biases in usage of incarceration, disproportionate harshness of punishment, etc.).
	Administration	Logistical management of incarcerated individuals (e.g., keeping updated, escapes, etc.).
	Civil Rights	Abuses and/or infringements of human and/or legal rights of incarcerated individuals.
	Public Health	Health of incarcerated individuals and/or those in contact with them (e.g., spread of diseases).
Demographic Information	Statistics	Carceral trends among and/or between particular racial, ethnic, economic class, and/or gender groups
Causal/ Treatment Attribution	Law Enforcement	Actors and institutions, and/or any powers/rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with identification of criminal activity (e.g., police activities).
	Courts	Actors and institutions, and/or any powers and/or rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with adjudication of criminal matters (e.g., court activities, sentencing policies).
	Corrections	Actors and institutions, and/or any powers and/or rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with administration of carceral punishment (e.g., parole conditions).
	Public	Society or general societal norms and/or actors/institutions designed to respond to them (e.g., public beliefs/elite reaction to or perception of public beliefs about incarceration/crime or incarcerated individuals).
	Social Conditions	Outcomes related to the general well-being of society (e.g., crime rates, poverty).

Results

I begin my analysis by exploring the amount of attention devoted to carceral growth. Table 2.3 provides the percentage of articles that mentions changes or identifies as a problem at any point the size of any correctional population and/or rate at which individuals are brought under any form of correctional supervision for each bloc. At first glance, the table suggests that attention to carceral growth has followed the issue as it has somewhat increased over time. The percentage of articles about incarceration that mentions carceral growth is significantly higher in every bloc (at least 5%) than in 1964-1968 (0%), the only time period to unequivocally precede the development of the issue.[8] Moreover, the largest amount of attention is in the most recent bloc of 2009-2013, where a full 18% of articles about incarceration mentions carceral growth, a significantly larger amount than that of almost all of the other blocs.

That said, the data do not suggest that media attention to carceral growth has necessarily been very reasonable. With the exception of the two most recent blocs, fewer than 10% of articles in a given bloc simply mention carceral growth. Additionally, although the percentage of articles mentioning carceral growth does slightly increase, it does so inconsistently and insignificantly over time. In fact, there are no significant differences in attention including and between any of the time blocs of 1969-1973 and 2004-2008. With over 90% of articles in a given bloc making no mention at all of carceral growth and similar rates of articles mention carceral growth exist in different time blocs, carceral growth has arguably garnered woefully little attention from the media, especially given the seriousness of the issue.

[8] All references to significance indicate statistically significant differences based on results of two-tailed difference-in-proportion significance tests. As tests involve multiple comparisons, the full results can be found in Appendix A4.

Table 2.3

Attention to Carceral Growth in the *L.A. Times*, 1964-2013	
Time Bloc (n)	% of Articles Mentioning Carceral Growth
1964-1968 (62)	0%
1969-1973 (60)	5%
1974-1978 (55)	7%
1979-1983 (56)	9%
1984-1988 (60)	5%
1989-1993 (65)	6%
1994-1998 (64)	8%
1999-2003 (64)	9%
2004-2008 (52)	12%
2009-2013 (55)	18%

Notes. Table shows percentage of articles about incarceration that mention changes or identify as a problem the size of any correctional population and/or rate at which individuals are brought under some form of correctional supervision.

Situating the data in the context of real world trends helps to better evaluate the amount of media attention devoted to carceral growth. Toward that effort, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 report the percentage of articles that mention carceral growth for each time bloc and respectively provide the average imprisonment rate in the U.S. and California for each time bloc and the percentage change in the imprisonment rate in the U.S. or California from the start and end year of each time bloc. Again, at first glance, the figures suggest that carceral growth has actually received a fair amount of attention, as it somewhat tracks with actual trends. For example, when media attention hits a small peak in the 1979-1983, the average imprisonment rates in California and the U.S. are higher than in the preceding time periods; the percentage changes in the imprisonment rate are also larger than in any time bloc. Additionally, when attention hits its highest points in the 2004-2008 and 2009-2013 blocs, average incarceration rates in California and the nation are also at high points.

Figure 2.4



Notes. Figure displays the percentage of articles about incarceration that mention changes or identify as a problem the size of any correctional population and/or rate at which individuals are brought under some form of correctional supervision and average imprisonment rate across all years of given time bloc. Data are custodial counts of individuals sentenced to a prison sentence of at least one year in start and end years for each time bloc. *Sources*: Bureau of Justice Statistics. (1988). *Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, Yearend 1925-86*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Carson, E. Ann and Mulako-Wangota, Joseph. Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Count of custody population - sentences greater than 1 year*.

Figure 2.5



Notes. Figures display 1) the percentage of articles about incarceration that mention changes or identify as a problem the size of any correctional population and/or rate at which individuals are brought under some form of correctional supervision and 2) the percentage change in the imprisonment rate from start and end year of given time bloc. Data are custodial counts of individuals sentenced to a prison sentence of at least one year in start and end years for each time bloc. *Sources*: Bureau of Justice Statistics. (1988). *Historical Statistics on Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions, Yearend 1925-86*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Carson, E. Ann and Mulako-Wangota, Joseph. Bureau of Justice Statistics. *Count of custody population - sentences greater than 1 year*.

However, upon closer inspection, the data yet again make it apparent that carceral growth has actually received questionable, if not much too little attention. For example, attention to carceral growth hits one of its lowest points in 1984-1988 before steadily increasing even though average imprisonment rates for California and the nation continuously increased from 1969-1973 to 2004-2008. The relative attention in 1984-1988 is particularly revealing, as the percentage changes in the imprisonment rate for California and the nation were higher than all other blocs except the preceding bloc of 1979-1983. Relatedly, during 2009-2013, carceral growth receives its most, and a significantly greater amount of media attention as average imprisonment rates stabilized and decreased by a comparatively small amount. Put in other words, carceral growth receives some of its largest (smallest) amounts of attention during times when actual changes are relatively small (large). Unequivocal changes in trends are clearly notable (e.g., first time decreases vs. increases), but one must question the pattern observed here. It seems far from appropriate that the issue of carceral growth ought to receive more attention when the national and California incarceration rates decrease by just around 5% and 20%, as they did in 2009-2013, than when they increase by over 30% and 60%, as they did in 1979-1983 and 1984-1988. This is an especially valid concern in the case of 1979-1983, where changes in trends occurred were both some of the largest and relatively novel.

I now examine articles most often frame carceral growth.[9] Figure 2.6 provides the percentage of articles which mention carceral growth that include each of the problem definition frames. The figure shows that the physical/spatial conditions frame is included in 70% of articles, a significantly larger amount than that of any other problem definition frame. That is, the

[9] Given the small number of articles mentioning carceral growth, I collapse the frame categories across time blocs for the framing analysis.

largest amount of discussion around carceral growth concerns issues of overcrowding and/or disproportionality in the amount of incarcerated individuals and space available to house them. The economics frame is also included at relatively high and significantly greater rate than the others, save the physical/spatial conditions frame; just over 40% of articles mentioning carceral growth say something about the economic burdens that it places on government and/or the role of financial mismanagement within the criminal justice system, namely corrections.

The other frames are included in articles, but much less than the above, and at indistinguishable rates from one another. Each of the other frames appears in only 15% of articles or slightly less. As a whole, carceral growth has been framed incredibly narrowly in the *L.A. Times* and in ways that are unlikely to spur public action or support for alternatives or serious reform of the criminal justice system. Framing carceral growth as a simple matter of needing to create or find more space and/or find more economically efficient ways of incarcerating ostensible criminals ignores the many other and arguably much more significant problems and consequences of the issue (see National Research Council 2014). For example, . While critical, inordinately focusing on economic and spatial costs of carceral growth does little in the way of challenging its legitimacy and effectiveness as a means of dealing with crime (see Gottschalk 2015).

Figure 2.6



Notes. Figure displays the percentage of articles mentioning carceral growth that include given problem definition frame. Categories are not mutually exclusive.

Figure 2.7 reports the percentage of articles mentioning carceral growth including demographic statistics. Given the above results, it is perhaps unsurprising that few articles—less than 16%— provide any statistics about incarceration among or between different racial/ethnic, economic class, or gender groups. Interestingly, racial/ethnic and gender statistics are provided at similar rates, 14% and 15% respectively, while economic statistics are provided in just 7% of articles. Although not a statistically significant difference, this pattern is notable given that carceral growth and its negative impacts have been felt most strongly, if not exclusively by poor Americans, regardless of race or gender (e.g., Wacquant 2009).

On one hand, rarely providing demographic information when it comes to incarceration can help to avoid reinforcing and enhancing the impact of harmful stereotypes about the relative criminality of different groups on punitive policy support (e.g., Hetey and Eberhardt 2014; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). On the other, however, doing so gives off the mistaken impression

that incarceration is equally likely and impactful among different subgroups of Americans, as well as that the U.S. criminal justice system is free of any bias. Thus, while scholars rightly criticize news media for over-representing the criminality of certain demographic groups, namely nonwhites (e.g., Entman and Rojecki 2001), it is arguably as misleading and counterproductive to almost completely ignore demographics when it comes to criminal punishment.

Figure 2.7



Notes. Figure displays the percentage of articles mentioning carceral growth that contain carceral statistics among or between different groups defined by race, ethnicity, economic class, and/or gender. Categories are not mutually exclusive.

Finally, Figure 2.8 provides the percentage of articles attributing carceral growth directly to or through sources associated with different factors. A striking 52% of articles actually fail to attribute carceral growth to anything at all—a significantly larger number of articles than that attributing causality to actual sources. 35% of articles attribute responsibility for causing carceral growth directly to courts or sources associated with them (e.g., sentencing policies), 22% to corrections, and 17% to the public. Very few articles attribute causality to social conditions (4%), such as crime or poverty, and no articles to law enforcement.

Interestingly, when it comes to responsibility for addressing carceral growth, a much smaller amount of articles, just 13%, mention nothing at all. Perhaps more surprisingly, while just 22% do so when it comes to causing carceral growth, 72% of articles attribute responsibility to corrections when it comes to addressing, a significantly higher percentage than any other; articles almost always discuss, for example, building more prisons, hiring more correctional staff, or investing in improving or altering correctional programming as ideal solutions. Apart from corrections, courts again are the only source to garner much attention in terms of treatment attributions. 30% of articles attribute responsibility for addressing carceral growth to courts, most often through solutions aimed at reforming sentencing policies.[10] Few articles attribute treatment responsibility to the public (7%) or social conditions (2%). Again, zero articles attribute responsibility for addressing carceral growth to law enforcement.

[10] It should be noted that many articles emphasizing changing rehabilitative aspects of criminal punishment (e.g., drug treatment programs) could arguably be coded as attributing responsibility to both courts and corrections. However, articles discussing solutions centered on improving rehabilitation often did so in ways that clearly attributed responsibility to one or the other. For example, articles might suggest increases in funding toward or alterations in correctional programming. Alternatively, they might suggest that criminal offenders be diverted away from prisons or correctional supervision to treatment programs and the like. Given that doing so involves changing sentencing, attribution to courts was coded in cases where rehabilitation-oriented solutions were discussed as an actual alternative to correctional supervision (e.g., drug treatment *instead* of prison). Unless also discussed in terms of the preceding, attributions to corrections was coded in cases where improving rehabilitation solutions was discussed as a supplement to or necessity of correctional supervision (rather than an alternative to or in place of it).

Figure 2.8



Note. Figure displays the percentage of articles mentioning carceral growth that include causal and treatment attributions associated with different actors and institutions. Categories are not mutually exclusive.

Taken together, these findings illustrate that the causes and solutions to carceral growth have been narrowly framed by news media, if not inaccurately and confusingly. Although a wealth of research explores and demonstrates the various causes of carceral growth (see National Research Council 2014), the issue has been most often discussed as if it exists in a vacuum; nothing in particular is highlighted consistently as spurring its development. In contrast, articles almost always and exclusively attribute treatment responsibility to corrections. Apart from disconnection from the apparent causal story most often provided, such a heavy focus on corrections ignores the reality of other proposed and viable options (e.g., sentencing reforms, shifting public views, etc.). More dangerously, the latter also somewhat reinforces carceral growth by encouraging public support for solutions that simply adjust how incarceration is carried out rather than critical examination of whether incarceration is the appropriate way of dealing with crime in the first place.

Beyond the above, perhaps most surprising are my findings with respect to law enforcement. Police are the first point of contact for anyone who ends up in the nation's carceral system, yet no articles in any time period attribute causal or treatment responsibility to law enforcement. Decades of research also clearly demonstrates that law enforcement practices across multiple governmental and geographic areas, such as racial profiling, targeted neighborhood surveillance, and use of excessive force, to name a few, are incredibly important aspects of carceral growth (e.g., Goffman 2014; Rios 2011). That said, although the data cannot directly address this question, it is possible that news coverage has responded to recent surges in political activism around police abuse toward black Americans that began around 2013 (Chokshi 2016).

Conclusion

Research on agenda-setting and framing convincingly demonstrates that news media have the capacity to shape public thinking about political issues. This is perhaps especially likely on issues such as incarceration and carceral growth where the public is less likely to hold and receptive to information. With this in mind, I analyzed a sample of news articles across a span of time covering the expansion of incarceration and from a news source located in a state in which this expansion has been a serious issue.

With the exception of the most recent years, I found that the amount of attention that carceral growth has received has been relatively small and mostly stable over time. The issue has also been narrowly framed as a matter of spatial and economic costs for the state and rarely in terms of well-noted racial, ethnic, class, and/or gendered patterns. In addition, articles frequently attribute causal responsibility for carceral growth to no particular source, while almost

exclusively attributing responsibility for addressing the issue directly to or through solutions associated with correctional systems.

We are now left with the question of what might explain these findings. To begin, news organizations face and perceive a number of institutional constraints, namely that content be simultaneously cost-efficient, consumer and advertiser friendly, and adhere to journalistic norms of objectivity (Gans 1979). Reporting on ongoing issues or conducting in-depth analyses not only demands a great deal of resources, but is also arguably less compelling and digestible for many consumers, as well as potentially leaves news organizations vulnerable to accusations of journalistic bias. As such, news media exhibits a general tendency of favoring personalized and event-driven news rather than focus on long-drawn out issues, such as carceral growth (see Iyengar 1991).

The above helps to explain both why carceral growth receives mostly similar amounts of news attention over time and considerably more and its most attention during 2009-2013. In that period, a number of novel and historic political events related to carceral growth occurred, both in California and the nation as whole. Most notably, in 2011, California was ordered to reduce the size of its incarcerated population by the U.S. Supreme Court. Also, in 2010, the federal government passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Not only was this one of the first serious pieces of criminal justice reform to be passed in decades, it was explicitly aimed at reducing drug sentencing disparities widely understood as a major driver of carceral growth, particularly as it concerns black Americans (see National Research Council 2014).

It is also critical to consider the role of criminal justice practitioners in the news production process, such as law enforcement and corrections officials. News organizations are incentivized to rely upon criminal justice officials who are tasked with gathering and interpreting

information about crime and punishment news organizations in that doing so both conserves resources and lends ideological legitimacy (Entman and Rojecki 2001; Surrette 2015). News media have also become increasingly limited in terms of legal access to those living under correctional supervision (see Sussman 2002). From this perspective, then, it is much less surprising that carceral growth is framed in ways that do not call into question the legitimacy of incarceration in theory or in actual practice, nor increase support for more far-reaching and radical reforms. Doing so arguably stands to also challenge the legitimacy and interests of those working within the criminal justice system, particularly those in corrections.[11]

Finally, reporters' familiarity with and initiative of affected individuals likely plays a role. Incarceration and carceral growth are quite clearly 'cross-cutting issues,' meaning they directly and disproportionately affect marginal group members who are the most economically, socially, and politically vulnerable (i.e., those belonging to multiple marginal groups; see Cohen 1999; pp. 13-14): economically insecure racial and ethnic minority men and women (The Sentencing Project 2015b; Wacquant 2009; Western 2006). As others show, many individuals working in mainstream news media outlets are not entirely familiar with or belong to groups impacted by cross-cutting issues and this does lead them to neglect and inaccurately cover these issues in terms of their effects on marginal groups (Cohen 1999; Gilens 1999). In addition, as they are assumed by elites as politically risky to pursue, cross-cutting issues typically receive lower levels of political activism than others, including from elites and institutions that ostensibly represent and cater to the interests of affected groups (e.g., Cohen 1999; Crenshaw

[11] See Page (2011), for example, who demonstrates the profound role of the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) in the state's prison boom.

1991; Strolovitch 2007). The neglect of carceral growth and its demography by news media is, thus, somewhat predictable when conceived in relation to those most affected by the issue.

As a whole, the research presented here builds on that of others' suggesting that news media are a critical component of carceral growth. As discussed, it is well-documented that news media portray crime in ways that increase support for punitive policies (e.g., Dixon and Azocar 2007; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). However, I offer evidence that the role of news media extends further. Specifically, I show that news media have also likely failed to cover the issue in ways that would potentially stand to increase public awareness and support for alternatives to incarceration, as well as widespread reform of the criminal justice system.

My findings highlight and shed light on how, despite its seriousness, the emergence and development of carceral growth has nevertheless failed to garner sustained political resistance (e.g., Alexander 2010; Gottschalk 2006). This is particularly important greater in light of evidence that the public is somewhat malleable in its views toward crime and punishment, as well as sympathetic to alternative and less punitive ways of dealing with crime other than incarceration (e.g., Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000). Indeed, even if we accept that carceral growth reflects punitive sentiment among the public (Enns 2016), where the public actually stands on issues of crime and punishment is frequently distorted and misperceived by elites and academic scholars alike (see Gottschalk 2008). Thus, my findings also point to a critical, yet understudied aspect of carceral growth: the conditions under which the public is more likely to support, and elites to respond, to calls for alternatives to crime control other than incarceration and widespread reform of the criminal justice system.

Chapter 3. National Black Organizational Advocacy and Incarceration in the United States

Introduction

The racialized nature of incarceration and its growth in the United States is well-noted (e.g., Alexander 2010). From 1980 to 2010, black Americans were incarcerated at much higher rates than whites. Moreover, the absolute difference in imprisonment rates between the groups also grew by nearly 170% (National Research Council 2014).[1] By 2012, blacks made up only 13% of the general U.S. population and 36% of those serving a prison sentence of at least one year in U.S. state and federal prisons (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013). The disproportionate growth and representation of blacks among the incarcerated population has negatively impacted virtually every major outcome for blacks as a group, including income, wealth, employment, social ties, disease and illness rates, and political participation and resources (e.g., Burch 2013; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002; Pattillo, Weiman, and Western 2004; Pager 2007; Pettit 2012; Roberts 2003/2004; Western 2006).

Interestingly, despite its racial contours, we know little about the amount and type of attention that incarceration receives from national political organizations that advocate on behalf of black Americans. National black political organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL) remain a primary conduit of political representation for black Americans, as well as significant mobilizers and shapers of black public opinion (Berg 2005; Carson 1995; Chong 1991; Dawson 1994; Frymer 1999; Harris-Lacewell 2004; McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Pinderhughes 1995a; Pinderhughes 1995b; Strolovitch 2007). Particularly as they have aimed and proven effective at

[1] Note, however, that incarceration rates among whites grew at a faster rate than among blacks during that time (see National Research Council 2014).

lessening racial inequality in the United States, the agendas and activities of these groups are critical to understanding the politicization of issues disproportionately affecting black Americans.

Previous scholarship demonstrates that internal divisions among blacks, particularly economic class, can influence the agendas and activities of black political elites and institutions. Specifically, due to limited resources and a need to present a positive public image of their constituents, black political elites and institutions are likely to privilege the interests of relatively advantaged blacks (e.g., middle-income blacks) over those of less advantaged ones (e.g., low-income blacks; see Cohen 1999; Strolovitch 2007). A long, growing line of research shows that various cross-cutting issues, issues which disproportionately affect relatively disadvantaged blacks, such as welfare, domestic violence, and AIDS, receive much less attention from the black political elite than issues disproportionately affecting relatively advantaged blacks, such as affirmative action in higher education (Cohen 1999; Crenshaw 1991; hooks 1982; Marable 1984; Reed 1999; Strolovitch 2007).

The above suggests that the disproportionate, if not exclusive impact and growth of incarceration among low-income blacks is likely to constrain national black political organizations' attention to the issue (Wacquant 2009; Western and Pettit 2010). Though garnering some interest, extant research on black politics and incarceration is limited as it has focused on the advocacy efforts of organizations at the national-level during the 20th century and, in some cases, just a few policies (Alexander 2010; Brown-Dean 2007; Forman 2011; Fortner 2015; Gottschalk 2015). This ignores the work of black organizations at the local level, as well as the localized nature and wide array of policies that constitute incarceration. Additionally, the emergence of a number of relatively progressive, black political groups since the 20th century,

such as Black Lives Matter (BLM), provides good reason and a unique opportunity to reexamine existing claims.

How much attention do black political organizations devote to incarceration and on which policies do they focus most often? To what extent does this reflect intersectional bias against representing the interests of those most affected by the issue (i.e., low-income blacks)? Do the agendas and activities and agendas of younger and more radical black groups influence the attention that mainstream black organizations devote to incarceration? I address these questions through a survey of local branches (i.e., units) of the NAACP, one of the most prominent national black political organizations in the United States. I ask units about their agendas and the issues that they prioritize most in their efforts, both generally and when it comes to criminal justice, more specifically. I further inquire about their perceptions and relationships with various political organizations who advocate on behalf of blacks and other nonwhite Americans, including BLM.

I find that the attention local units devote to incarceration is somewhat limited and exhibits intersectional bias, as well as that it is influence by perceptions of other groups. While incarceration as a broad issue area appears on the majority of units' agendas, it is not the top priority for many units. Additionally, compared to those dealing with the front-end (e.g., racial profiling), policy issues dealing with the back-end of incarceration and criminal justice (i.e., correctional systems/supervision, policies directly affecting incarcerated or formerly incarcerated individuals), which are more likely to affect low-income and/or incarcerated blacks, appear much less often on units' criminal justice agendas and as a top priority. I also find that units who perceive BLM as making it easier for them to pursue their general policy goals are more likely to list incarceration as a top priority than those who do not. This suggests that younger, more

radical black groups push pre-existing and more mainstream organizations to craft more inclusive agendas by creating political opportunities.

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of extant research on the significance and limits of mainstream national black political organizations. Building on this discussion, I review and discuss attention to incarceration from national black political organizations, as well as develop a set of expectations. Next, I describe the details of my survey and present the results. Finally, I discuss the significance and implications of this work, suggesting directions for future research.

Black Power: The Significance and Limits of National Black Political Organizations

National political organizations who advocate on behalf of black Americans through formal governmental channels have frequently challenged and proven to be critical tools for remediating racial inequality in the United States. Most formal U.S. political institutions, such as the major political parties, are designed to cater to large majorities and, thus, frequently ignore the interests of supporters who belong to marginal groups, such as blacks (Frymer 1999). Political organizations that advocate exclusively on behalf of marginal groups are therefore a primary conduit of political representation for their members (Strolovitch 2007).

Indeed, organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL) are relied upon by dominant political institutions and elites as official communicators of black interests (e.g., Smith 1981). These organizations, then, have unsurprisingly been a rather powerful player in U.S. policymaking, particularly when it comes to articulating and addressing issues affecting black and other nonwhite Americans. For example, the activities of the NAACP were pivotal to securing passage

of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. As Pinderhughes (1995a) describes:

> [Clarence] Mitchell lobbied persistently on behalf of the NAACP… He made the personal contacts that helped establish the NAACP's organizational and professional credibility, familiarize members of Congress and their staffs with the details and the framework of racial issues, and reshape the legislative environment in a manner more favorable to blacks' interests. Mitchell's efforts in this regard strongly influenced the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the voting Rights Act of 1965, and other civil rights legislation. He was known popularly among the civil rights lobby and legislators as the "101st Senator" (p. 210; also see Berg 2005).

Examples of other legislation on which the activities of mainstream national black political organizations have been crucial include the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, and the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act, to name a few (Perry 1995; Pinderhughes 1995a).

Speaking from a common experience of exclusion and oppression, black political leaders and organizations have typically acted as powerful mobilizers and shapers of public opinion both outside of and especially within the black community (Carson 1995; Chong 1991; Dawson 1994; Harris-Lacewell 2004; McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Pinderhughes 1995b). Assuming a shared desire for justice and understanding of black marginalization, black Americans "bestow upon these individuals and organizations the special status of 'authentic'" (Cohen 1999 p. 250). In turn, black organizations are given a great deal, albeit limited amount of trust and influence among the black community. That is, these organizations are perceived as both necessary and better-positioned than others to address the particular needs and struggles faced by black people.

During the Civil Rights Movement, groups like the NAACP, for example, demonstrated an incredible ability to mobilize black and other Americans through organizing numerous sit-ins, freedom rides, and voter registration drives, as well as to shift white views and increase black political consciousness (e.g., Berg 2005; Chong 1991; Haines 1988).

Nevertheless, various divisions and inequalities among blacks have not only always existed—despite and, arguably, in part, due to the efforts of black political groups during the Civil Rights Movement, some, namely economic, have also further hardened. Cohen (1999) characterizes post-Civil Rights patterns of racial inequality as a situation of advanced marginalization. Under advanced marginalization, while most formal mechanisms of black exclusion are removed, allowing some blacks access to dominant institutions and resources, partly as a result, stratification among blacks is heightened (see Cohen 1999). Indeed, it is well-documented that even as various legal forms of segregation and subordination were, for the most part, removed by the 1970s, and led to substantial growth in black wealth and income (see Landry 1987; Landry and Marsh 2011; Wilson 1978), economic polarization within the black community worsened considerably well into the 1990s (Hochschild 1995; Pattillo 1999). Advanced marginalization is perhaps an even more apt characterization today than ever before. To be sure, economic inequality between blacks and whites is at new heights—the ratio of the median net worth of white to black households reached a twenty year high of twenty to one in 2009. At the same time, 67% of wealth among blacks was still held by just the wealthiest 10% of black households (Pew Research Center 2011).[2]

[2] According to a report by the Pew Research Center (2011), in 2009, the median net worth of white households in was $113,149 and the media net worth of black households was $5,677.

Attending to internal divisions and inequalities among blacks highlights and heightens the significance of secondary marginalization—or the internal policing of the attitudes, behaviors, and public image of blacks by black political elites and institutions (see Cohen 1999). In order to retain the limited access and identification with dominant institutions that some blacks are granted under conditions of advanced marginalization, as well as dispel persistent, negative stereotypes about blacks, black political elites are more likely to disassociate from, exclude, or condemn relatively disadvantaged subsets of blacks, such as low-income blacks. These groups remain stigmatized by broader society for rejecting or diverging from dominant norms and, in turn, perceived by the black elite as a threat to the legitimacy of black advancement in the eyes of dominant group members. Put in other words, given lingering racial inequalities and limited black incorporation into dominant institutions, black political elites are incentivized to make invisible or downplay the experiences and interests of blacks whose identification with multiple marginal group identities accentuates deviation from the values and norms of dominant groups (e.g., low-income blacks, black women, LGBTQ blacks), while privileging those of blacks whose identification is perceived to more readily highlight conformity (e.g., middle-class blacks, black heterosexual men).[3]

In practice, secondary marginalization makes intersectional biases in the agendas of black political elites and institutions likely. They should reflect greater attention to issues that disproportionately affect blacks who are relatively privileged (e.g., middle-income blacks) than

[3] It is important to note that political representatives of blacks sincerely want to help their most disadvantaged constituents (see Strolovitch 2007), which both underscores the significance of dominant political structures and norms and suggests evaluating their activities in relation to such groups is valid. Additionally, mainstream black elites and organizations are not unique when it comes to secondary marginalization. As Strolovitch (2007) demonstrates, the agendas and activities of mainstream political elites and organizations who claim to represent members of various marginal groups, such as other non-white racial and ethnic groups, women, low-income individuals, and LGBTQ individuals, also exhibit these patterns.

those disproportionately affecting blacks who are relatively disadvantaged (e.g., low-income blacks)— otherwise known as cross-cutting issues (Cohen 1999; Strolovitch 2007). Consistent with this, as mentioned, there is evidence that various cross-cutting issues, such as welfare, domestic violence, and AIDS, are neglected or tend to receive much less attention from black elites and institutions than issues disproportionately affecting relatively advantaged blacks, namely affirmative action in higher education (e.g., Cohen 1999; Crenshaw 1991; hooks 1982; Marable 1984; Reed 1999. Despite claiming to broadly represent black Americans, then, black political organizations appear to prioritize only issues affecting only their better-off constituents and pursue them much more frequently than issues affecting more disadvantaged ones.

Resistance or Restraint: Incarceration among National Black Political Organizations

On the surface, there are compelling reasons to expect that national black political organizations would devote a great deal of attention to incarceration. From the 1970s to the 2010s, the number of individuals incarcerated in American jails and prisons rose by a striking 500% and, by 2012, nearly 2.2 million people were incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013; The Sentencing Project 2015). As previously mentioned, however, the racialized nature of these developments is well-documented and noted (e.g., Alexander 2010). For example, as noted, in every year from 1980 to 2010, blacks were incarcerated at much higher rates than whites and the absolute difference in imprisonment rates between the groups over that time grew by nearly 170% (National Research Council 2014).[4] Additionally, by 2012, while making up 13% of the general U.S. population, blacks made up 36% of those serving a prison sentence of at least one year in U.S. state and federal prisons (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013).

[4] Note, however, that during that time period, incarceration rates among whites grew at a faster rate than it did among blacks (see National Research Council 2014).

The above trends notwithstanding, the expansion of incarceration and the criminal justice system in the U.S. is rooted in racially discriminatory practices and racial ideologies of those identifying with both the left and right of the American political spectrum (e.g., Murakawa 2014). The disproportionate growth and representation of blacks among the incarcerated population has also devastated the black community, negatively impacting virtually every major outcome for blacks as a group, including income, wealth, employment, social ties, disease and illness rates, and political participation and resources (e.g., Burch 2013; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002; Pattillo, Weiman, and Western 2004; Pager 2007; Pettit 2012; Roberts 2003/2004; Western 2006). For example, more than one in seven black men in the U.S. is now disenfranchised due to a criminal record (Manza and Uggen 2006), significantly diluting the gains made by blacks due to the efforts of national black organizational activity during the Civil Rights Movement (Brown-Dean 2007). Incarceration and its growth has starkly (re)created and legitimated the terms of U.S. citizenship and belongingness along racial lines (Gottschalk 2008; Roberts 2003/2004).

In light of the preceding discussion, however, it is important to note that since the late 1970s, incarceration and its growth has disproportionately, if not exclusively impacted low-income blacks (Pettit 2012; Wacquant 2009; Western 2006; Western and Pettit 2010). Figure 3.1 shows that the incarceration rate among black, male high school dropouts rose an astonishing 27 percentage points from 1980 through 2008, while increasing by just five percentage points among black men with a high school diploma and stabilizing among black men with a college degree (see Western and Pettit 2010). In 2014 dollars, the median pre-incarcerated income of incarcerated black men in 2004 was $17,625, while it was $31,245 for non-incarcerated black men; the median pre-incarcerated income of incarcerated black women in 2004 was $12,735,

while it was $24,255 for non-incarcerated black women (Rabuy and Kopf 2015). Put simply, incarceration is a cross-cutting issue more directly affecting low-income blacks than their economic counterparts and therefore vulnerable to the process of secondary marginalization described above.

Figure 3.1



Notes. Figure taken from Western, B., & Pettit, B. (2010). Incarceration & social inequality. *Daedalus*, (Summer).

Interestingly, despite a considerable amount of research on race and the politics of incarceration, we still know very little about the attention that incarceration receives from black political organizations. To be sure, historical evidence demonstrates that many organizations exhibited a strong commitment and radical positions on criminal justice issues, if not incarceration exclusively, in their beginnings. For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was explicitly founded to address and centered most of its earliest efforts on eliminating racial bias in the criminal justice system. Specifically, they focused on the U.S. government's failure to prosecute racially-motivated lynchings and disproportionate prosecution and punishment of black Americans for relatively minor or nonexistent crimes (Kellogg 1967; Paden 2011). Throughout the 1940s and 50s, a broad coalition of black political groups also regularly petitioned the United Nations to recognize and indict racial discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice system as genocidal violence against blacks. During the 1960s and 1970s, various black organizations, particularly radical ones, did much to address and heighten the public salience of issues explicitly related to prisons and prisoners (Gottschalk 2006; 2015; Haines 1988; Muhammad 2011; Murakawa 2014).

In addition, their early histories notwithstanding, in line with noted shifts in incarceration trends, more recent evidence shows that incarceration has been neglected since around the 1970s. Most famously, in the widely acclaimed *The New Jim Crow*, Michelle Alexander contends that most major black organizations exhibited an "awkward silence" as black incarceration rates rose to new heights (p. 211). For example, she writes that

> …what is most striking about the community's response to the mass incarceration of people of color is *the relative quiet*... one would expect the War on Drugs would be the top priority of every civil rights organization in the country... Conferences, strategy

> sessions, and debates... Major grassroots organizing efforts... Media campaigns... All of that could have happened, *but it didn't* (p. 224, emphases added).

Brown-Dean (2007) similarly argues that felon disenfranchisement, at best, received sporadic attention from black political elites throughout much of the post-Civil Rights era. Consistent with these claims, Gottschalk (2015) shows that *The Crisis*, the flagship magazine of the NAACP, featured criminal justice issues just a half dozen times between 1980 and 2010, though three of these were dedicated specifically to prisons (also see Forman 2011 and Fortner 2015 for similar arguments).

Though suggestive, extant research on the attention that incarceration receives from black political organizations is limited. To begin, extant research consists mostly of case studies of advocacy on particular policies, as well as at particular points in time and place, such as drug sentencing legislation in New York during the 1970s or felon disenfranchisement across the U.S. throughout the 20th century (e.g., Brown-Dean 2007; Fortner 2015). However, incarceration includes everything from the rules and norms of crime control to the types of restrictions that can be placed on the rights and resources for which incarcerated individuals might be eligible (National Research Council 2014). Thus, while suggestive, the methodological and substantive approaches of extant research have left it unclear whether and how much attention incarceration receives from organizations as a broad constellation of different policies.

Most research on the agendas of national black political organizations also fails to consider the agendas and activities of state and local level affiliates. This is particularly notable where it concerns incarceration as most relevant policies are legislated, executed, and vary a great deal in their severity not only at the state, but even county and neighborhood levels (e.g., Barker 2009; Sampson and Loeffler 2010). In addition, local political organizations are much

less likely to have members with more affluent, professional backgrounds and, therefore, tend to emphasize policy priorities affecting disadvantaged groups more often than national organizations (Skocpol 2004; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Young 1992). Consistent with this, there is evidence that state and local level branches of national black political organizations sometimes devote more attention and are deferred to by their national counterparts as experts on cross-cutting issues, including incarceration (Cohen 1999; Gottschalk 2015; Paden 2011; Strolovitch 2007). Given some power over national overseers as on-the-ground mobilizers (Strolovitch 2007), state and local branches of organizations have also, in some cases, effectively pushed their national counterparts to increase the level of attention they devote to certain cross-cutting issues, as well (see Paden 2011; Strolovitch 2007).

Finally, as it remains focused on the 20th century, extant research overlooks the potential significance of numerous and more recent changes in the political environment surrounding race and criminal justice. In addition to elite consensus on the need for criminal justice reform at the federal level (Barron-Lopez 2016), the 21st century has seen a notable emergence of various black political organizations, such as Black Lives Matter (BLM) and the Black Youth Project 100 (BYP100). These newer groups typically prioritize issues facing blacks who have historically been marginalized by social justice organizations for their identification with other marginal groups, such as low-income blacks, black women, and LGBTQ blacks (Cohen and Jackson 2016; Horowitz and Livingston 2016). These groups are also relatively radical in their position and approach to criminal justice issues, such as calling for the abolition of prisons and staging public protests of various kinds (Biondi 2016), as well as enjoy a great deal of support and recognition among black Americans, particularly BLM (Horowitz and Livingston 2016). The renewed energy, diversity, and efforts of a younger generation of activists in the

contemporary movement for racial justice presents a unique opportunity to better understand potential conditions of change in the agendas of pre-existing and more traditional national black political organizations, such as the NAACP, from which most evidence and criticism of intersectional bias has been gathered and directed (e.g., Cohen 1999).

Expectations

How much attention do black political organizations devote to incarceration and on which policies do they focus most often? To what extent does this reflect intersectional bias against representing the interests of those most affected by the issue (i.e., low-income blacks)? Do the agendas and activities and agendas of younger, more radical black groups influence the amount of attention that mainstream black organizations devote to incarceration? In this section, I briefly develop a set of expectations to explore these questions.

To begin, as reviewed, the attention that issues receive from national black political organizations is shaped by the subset of blacks most likely to be affected. In this vein, incarceration can be considered a cross-cutting issue along the lines of economic class; as reviewed, low-income blacks are disproportionately affected by the issue. Research on secondary marginalization suggests that cross-cutting issues receive less attention because by definition they disproportionately affect relatively disadvantaged subsets of marginal groups. If so, then we should expect that incarceration, defined broadly as including any criminal justice related policy (e.g., police abuse, sentencing disparities, felon disenfranchisement), to receive less attention than issues we may consider to disproportionately affect relatively economically privileged blacks.[5] For example, while issues like affirmative action in higher education are intended to

[5] More specifically, I consider incarceration to broadly include any policy or issue relating to how behaviors deemed criminal and punishable with a sentence of incarceration may be identified and prosecuted by state actors and institutions, as well as how carceral punishment may be administered.

benefit all members of targeted groups (e.g., nonwhites, white women), in reality, they might be classified as more narrowly affecting more affluent group members—that is, in the absence of options and resources to make higher education more affordable and accessible, the benefits of this program are more likely to go to affluent group members who can both afford and are much more likely to pursue and earn a college, graduate, or professional degree (see Strolovitch 2007).

H1: *Incarceration (e.g., police abuse, sentencing disparities, rights of incarcerated, etc.) receives less attention from black political organizations than issues which affect economically advantaged blacks (e.g., affirmative action).*

Given that incarceration is a broad issue constituted by an array of policies, organizations may also devote more or less attention to certain policies more than others. In this regard, the most directly relevant policies arguably fall into either one of two categories based on whether they largely deal with actors within the "front-end" or "back-end" of the criminal justice system (see Forman 2011). Front-end policies can be considered those that govern the actors and institutions responsible for carrying out the identification and prosecution or affect individuals suspected of committing ostensible crimes (i.e., law enforcement, courts, e.g., police abuse, racial profiling, sentencing disparities). Back-end policies govern actors and institutions responsible for carrying out carceral punishment or affect individuals already convicted of ostensible crimes that are punishable by incarceration (i.e., corrections and legal rights of incarcerated/formerly incarcerated individuals; e.g., physical conditions of correctional facilities; felon disenfranchisement; legal restrictions on labor market opportunities for felons).

Unlike front-end policies, back-end policies are more likely to affect disadvantaged subsets of the black community. As previously discussed, low-income blacks are more likely to be incarcerated than other blacks. Moreover, incarcerated status itself acts as a source of

stigmatization and marginalization outside of and within the black community (see Brown-Dean 2007). Drawing on secondary marginalization, then, we might expect that attention to back-end policies will be lower than attention to front-end policies. To be sure, it might be the case that front-end policies receive more attention as they are arguably majority issues in that they can theoretically affect all blacks regardless of economic background (i.e., they do not only or disproportionately affect economically advantaged constituents; e.g., racial profiling). Nevertheless, greater attention to front-end than back-end policies is still suggestive of at least some degree of intersectional bias.

H2: *Back-end criminal justice policies (e.g., correctional abuse, felon disenfranchisement, felon access to social welfare and employment) receive less attention from national black political organizations than front-end criminal justice policies (e.g., law enforcement abuse, court sentencing disparities).*

The preceding section also intimated that groups like Black Lives Matter (BLM) might influence the agendas and activities of other, more mainstream black organizations; as discussed, these groups are young, relatively radical, and enjoy much public recognition and support, at least among the black community. On one hand, by employing public, confrontational tactics (e.g., protests), these groups can provide critical leverage for black organizations with stronger ties to dominant institutions by generating crises to which dominant institutions and elites feel a great deal of pressure to respond. In other words, they can provide more mainstream organizations with the opportunity to pursue and push cross-cutting issues that satisfying dominant institutional norms ordinarily prevents (see Haines 1988). On the other hand, newer and more diverse black organizations create competition. From this perspective, pre-existing and more traditional groups again might expand their agendas out of a desire or need to maintain

their resources, membership, and/or legitimacy (see Paden 2011). With this in mind, I consider one of these possibilities by testing the expectation that attention to incarceration and back-end policies is higher among mainstream organizations among those that believe groups like BLM as create opportunities for them more than those that do not.

H3: *Attention to incarceration and back-end incarceration policies will be higher among mainstream black political organizations who believe younger, more radical groups create opportunities for them than those who do not.*

Method and Data: A Survey of Local NAACP Units

I explore my expectations through a survey of local branches (i.e. units) of the NAACP. Surveys have proven a useful tool for studying the agendas and activities of political organizations. Most obviously, they effectively provide group-specific information without sacrificing generalizability, at least to a greater degree than alternative methods, such as case studies. Given this, surveys have been fruitfully employed to address a wide array of questions on political organizations, such as why they form (Gray and Lowery 1996), how they interact with other political actors and engage the policymaking process (Hojnacki 1997; King and Walker 1992), and, most important for my purposes, which issues they prioritize and why (e.g., Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Marchetti 2014; 2015a; Strolovitch 2007).

I focus on the NAACP for various reasons. To begin, given the localized nature of incarceration and needed variation for exploring the role of perceptions of more radical groups (i.e., H3), the NAACP is methodologically useful as it is a more mainstream organization (i.e., it is relatively well-incorporated into dominant political institutions) that consists of numerous local units. According to its website, the NAACP maintains roughly 1200 local branches, with a

local unit in almost every state in the country.[6] Units are registered as 501(c)(4) organizations, which, according to the Internal Revenue Service, are civic leagues or associations operated for the promotion of social welfare that are legally permitted to lobby elected officials as much as they want, so long as it pertains the organization's mission.[7] The most recent NAACP bylaws state that the purpose and aims of local units are to "improve the political, educational, social, and economic status of African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities" and "to seek legislation and policies at the local level, or at other levels if requested by the State/State-Area Conference or National Office, which advance the programs and policies of the Association" (NAACP 2014). Although somewhat notorious for being incredibly bureaucratic and hierarchical (Paden 2011), local NAACP units also often diverge and can shape the agendas and activities of other units, as well as national and state branches (see Cohen 1999; Gottschalk 2015; Paden 2011). Given that local NAACP units engage in policy advocacy at the local level that might also differ from that of national and state branches, examining their agendas usefully expands previous research which, as discussed, has typically focused on only national-level priorities of the NAACP and other black political organizations.

The NAACP is also a compelling choice in light of its history and ideological leaning, as well. The organization was formed to promote racial status issues specifically in response to racially discriminatory practices and outcomes of the U.S. criminal justice system and, as intimated, guided much of the organization's activities up until the 1970s (Gottschalk 2015;

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[6] The NAACP has at least one local unit located in every U.S. state, including Washington, DC. North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont are the only states where no local units exist and, as such, are represented through either a nearby state or regional branch (see http://www.naacp.org/find-local-unit/).

[7] National NAACP is registered as a 501(c)(3) organization. 501(c)(3)s can engage in some of the same types of political activities as 501(c)(4)s. However, 501(c)(3)s are barred from partisan political activity (e.g., endorsing candidates, donating money to campaigns) and must follow more procedures and face more restrictions in terms of the amount of activity. Nevertheless, the NAACP prohibits its state and local branches from participating in partisan activity (see http://action.naacp.org/page/-/Election%20Year%20DOs%20and%20DON'Ts.pdf).

Kellogg 1967; Paden 2011). In comparison to others, namely the National Urban League, the NAACP has a reputation for being relatively liberal (see Cohen 1999). Thus, despite being relatively mainstream, we can reasonably expect that the advocacy of the NAACP might and should include incarceration.

That said, some may raise concerns over the contemporary health or relevance of the NAACP. While it has faced a number of chronic financial and political difficulties, particularly since the 1970s, the NAACP nevertheless remains one of few and the most prominent national black political organizations in the country today.[8] Indeed, less than 4% of national political advocacy groups are aimed at representing the interests of any identity-based group (e.g., blacks, women, etc.) and roughly 5% of those explicitly aim to represent blacks and/or African-Americans (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Strolovitch 2007). Furthermore, the NAACP still garners a great deal of political attention and respect. For example, the organization continues to attract meetings with presidential candidates, as well as other elected officials (e.g., Chozick and Kaplan 2016). Potential shortcomings aside, the NAACP is one of very few organizations of its kind that retains some power to push issues onto political agendas.

With the help of an undergraduate assistant, I constructed an estimated population of units by searching the official and social media websites of national, state, and local NAACP offices of the NAACP for as many local units as could be identified.[9] Table 3.1 shows that I identified 1210 unique units. I then randomly selected 1,000 units for obtaining contact information. Through online searches, I obtained a working e-mail address for 385 units, a phone

[8] For example, in 2014 the NAACP reportedly faced financial difficulties. At the same time, from 2008 through 2013, the organization more than doubled its number of donors and increased revenue by 10 to 30 percent each year. Many local units in existence that were at risk of closing also remained open (see Anft 2013; Pitts 2014).
[9] To be included, a unit only needed to be linked to a specific locality (i.e., availability/accuracy of contact info was irrelevant at this stage).

number only for 283 units, and a mailing address only or no information at all for 332 units. As participation was to be solicited via e-mail, I included only units for which an e-mail address could be obtained in my contact sample (344 units).[10] Table 3.2 demonstrates that the contact sample is somewhat geographically representative of the estimated population. For example, with few exceptions, the percentage of units contacted from each Census region and the relative order of these percentages mostly part mirrors that of the estimated population.[11]

Table 3.1

Population and Sample Sizes of Local NAACP Units

	Number of units
Estimated Population[1]	1210
Initial Sample[2]	1000
Total Initial Sample with w/Mailing or No Contact Information	668
Total Initial Sample w/Only Phone Information	283
Total Initial Sample w/Working E-mail Address	385
Total Initial Sample to Formally Decline Participation	41
Contact Sample[3]	344
Final Sample[4]	45

Notes.
[1]Estimated population includes all units that could be identified regardless of availability of contact information.
[2]Initial sample is a random sample of 1,000 units from Estimated Population.
[3]Contact sample includes units eligible for contact and that did not formally decline or prohibited from participation. It also includes only units for which the e-mail address could be confirmed as working.
[4]Final sample includes units completing the survey.

[10] One state branch prohibited its 41 local units from being contacted and are excluded from the contact sample.
[11] Census Regions are used to capture demographic and sociopolitical differences across localities without expanding the number of categories so as to become unhelpful, as well as to better ensure the confidentiality of units that eventually participated.

Table 3.2

Final Sample of Local NAACP Units

Census Region	Estimated Population	E-mail Sample	Final Sample
SAC (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)	34.4%	25.9%	26.7%
ESC (KY, TN, MS, AL)	15.2%	9.9%	11.1%
WSC (AR, LA, OK, TX)	13.7%	13.9%	15.6%
MAC (NJ, NY, PA)	11.7%	17.4%	13.3%
ENC (IN, IL, MI, OH, WI)	10.2%	11.3%	6.7%
PAC (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)	5.4%	7.3%	6.7%
WNC (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)	4.3%	5.5%	11.1%
NLD (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)	2.8%	3.8%	2.2%
MTN (AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT, NV, WY)	2.4%	4.9%	6.7%
Total N	1210	344	45

Note. Census regions reflect official categories as defined and used by the United States Census Bureau (see https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf).

I recruited units and conducted the survey from the beginning of May 2016 through the end of July 2016. Following standard procedures, the process began by sending each of the 344 units a personalized (e.g., Hello NAACP [location]), introductory e-mail from my personal university e-mail address to simply solicit interest; [12] the message informed units of myself, the goals and importance of the survey, confidentiality of participation, and my contact information (see Appendix B1 for recruitment materials).[13] I followed up with units who responded to this message with interest by providing more information about the survey, as well as an Internet link

[12] I aimed to avoid a perception of the message as spam and to enhance the probability that units would respond.
[13] Although all data is reported anonymously (i.e., no responses can be linked to an individual unit), I asked units for the zip code and state in which they are located, both as a way to keep track of participation and for potential research purposes.

at which they could find and complete the survey.[14] Throughout the recruitment and administration period, units who agreed to participate received regular reminders with a deadline and link to complete the survey. Units who did not respond at all received two additional e-mails that each contained the details of the survey, the survey link, and a deadline.

Table 3.1 shows that 45 of the 344 units in the contact sample actually completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 13%. Though this response rate is relatively for a survey of political organizations (see Marchetti 2015b), it is reasonable given the mode of recruitment and administration (i.e., both over the Web; see Couper 2008).[15] Table 3.2 also shows that the final sample is also still mostly geographically representative; the percentage of units from each U.S. Census region remains similar and follows the same order in terms of size as that of the estimated population of units. In any case, the main factor influencing response rates in surveys of political organizations is the time that staff members can devote to tasks outside of their main responsibilities and, as such, is simply out of researchers' control (see Smith 1997).

I included measures and methods to examine each of the hypotheses. In order to evaluate attention to incarceration versus issues disproportionately affecting economically advantaged constituents, I asked each unit to first identify up to five specific policy issues of any kind on which they worked in the previous year. Then, I asked units which of the five issues they listed is currently a top priority. While the former provides a more basic measure of attention (i.e., is a given issue on the agenda at all), the latter provides captures the highest possible amount of

[14] All but two units, including those responding to the initial message by phone, opted to complete the survey over the Internet. In just two cases, I conducted the survey over the phone. It was identical to the Internet survey, save for mode. As response rates are typically low, it is a common and necessary practice in research on political organizations to conduct surveys in multiple modes (see Marchetti 2015b).

[15] Published studies of interest groups report response rates no lower than 20% (see Marchetti 2015b), while response rates for web surveys generally fall anywhere between 10%-15% (see Couper 2008).

attention or commitment that a given issue may receive from units (see Marchetti 2014).[16] Following previous work, I then code responses in terms of whether they disproportionately affect more economically advantaged constituents or are related to incarceration.[17] For each issue unrelated to incarceration, I follow others and simply considered whether, in theory, middle-income constituents are more likely to be impacted by the issue than low-income constituents (see Marchetti 2014; Strolovitch 2007). For example, affirmative action in higher education or tax rates for small business owners would be coded as economically advantaged constituent issues. As specified previously (see H1 above and footnote 5), for an issue to be categorized as incarceration, I considered whether it was explicitly related to how state actors and institutions may identify and/or prosecute behaviors deemed criminal and that are punishable with a sentence of incarceration, how carceral punishment is administered, or that directly impacts the rights and resources of incarcerated and/or formerly incarcerated individuals. For example, racial profiling and felon disenfranchisement would each be classified as incarceration.[18]

I followed the same procedures as in the above to evaluate the attention that front-end and back-end policies receive (see H2), though in a more specified manner. Following questions about their more general agenda, I then asked units to identify up to five specific criminal justice policy issues on which they worked in the previous year. Each unit was then asked which of the five criminal justice issues listed would they say is currently their top priority. I then coded each

[16] An alternative approach would be to ask units about a list of circumscribed issues according to the coding typology I used. However, this can introduce potentially significant biases—both the degree to which and diversity of policies that units might prioritize could be distorted and understated by this method (see Marchetti 2014; 2015a). Most obviously, units might prioritize incarceration policies, just not the ones included in the survey. Moreover, given the focus on advocacy directed at state and local governments, inattention to an issue could simply reflect its irrelevance for a particular geographic area (e.g., Maine does not disenfranchise citizens who are incarcerated at any point).

[17] This process was somewhat subjective. Nevertheless, as noted, it is in line with the procedures of others and, and as the examples illustrate, was fairly straightforward for most issues.

[18] This broad conceptualization actually allows the category of incarceration to be understood as synonymous with criminal justice.

listed issue in terms of whether it relates primarily to the front-end or the back-end of incarceration. For the former, I considered whether a given issue related exclusively to outcomes and procedures of law enforcement and courts (i.e., front-end) or of corrections and the experiences and rights of incarcerated/formerly incarcerated individuals (i.e. back-end). For example, racial profiling and sentencing disparities would be classified as front-end, while abuse of prisoners and felon disenfranchisement would be classified as back-end incarceration issues.

Finally, to evaluate whether perceptions of younger, more radical groups as creating opportunities increases mainstream organizational attention incarceration (H3), I asked each unit to indicate how much they agree that the agendas and activities of various groups make it easier for them to pursue their own policy goals. Pursuing policy goals was specified to units in terms of their ability to recruit members, raise funds, and/or achieve desired policy outcomes. The list of groups included two relatively prominent, young and more radical black groups previously discussed, Black Lives Matter (BLM) and the Black Youth Project 100 (BYP100).[19] Units were also asked this question in reference to the following, other groups: National Urban League, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, National Council of La Raza, League of United Latin American Citizens, and Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund.

The survey also asked units about the size of their budget, the importance of advocacy to their activities, the portion of their budget devoted to policy advocacy, the importance of different issue areas for their political advocacy (e.g., criminal justice, education), the size of their membership, and the demographic composition of their membership, constituency, and intended advocacy beneficiaries (see Appendix B2 for full survey).

[19] Each of these groups has received some coverage in national news and while few in number, has local branches in various parts of the country. Note, however, that I analyze only responses to these questions about BLM. Many more units, though not all of them, had not actually heard of BYP100.

Results

To provide some context, I begin by examining units' perceptions of their constituencies and intended beneficiaries of their policy advocacy. Unsurprisingly, Figure 3.2 shows that most units identify blacks and African-Americans as a primary constituency and, to a lesser extent, low-income individuals. For example, almost 100% of units indicated that blacks and African Americans make up at least 50% of their constituency and roughly 60% indicated low-income individuals as such. However, units clearly do not view incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals as much of a constituency as these other groups; just 33% of units indicated that 50% or more of their constituency is composed of incarcerated/formerly incarcerated individuals.[20]

In contrast, despite differing in terms of perceived numerical representation, each of the aforementioned groups' needs and interests are mostly viewed by units as equally central to their agendas and activities. As Figure 3.2 shows, at least 70% of units reported that they respond a lot or a great deal to the policy concerns of each of the aforementioned groups. Figure 3.3 further shows that with the exception of immigration, criminal justice, civil rights, poverty/economics, and health and human services are similarly ranked as highly important concerns among most units. Taken together, even while incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals do not constitute a primary numerical constituency for many units, most units at least hope, if not claim to advocate on behalf of this group as much as other groups who do.

[20] In part, this might be explained by the fact that prisoners can and do form their own NAACP units. While I do not explore this particular consideration, I return to the potential, more general significance and need for future research on NAACP prison branches in the concluding section.

Figure 3.2



Notes. Data in first column reflect percentage of units responding that group makes up about half or more of their constituents. Data in second column reflect percentage of units responding that they address the policy concerns of each group either "a lot" or a "a great deal." Sample size varies from 39-44.

Figure 3.3



Notes. Figure reports mean response of units to the question: "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is 'very unimportant' and 5 is 'very important,' how important is each of the following issue areas to the activities and political concerns of your unit?" Sample size is 44.

With their intentions more firmly established, I now turn to H1 that units devote less attention to incarceration than they do to issues impacting economically advantaged constituents. Most units provided very broad responses to when asked about issue they worked on in the previous year. That said, no issues that units provided could reasonably be classified as disproportionately affecting blacks who are better off economically. Virtually all of the issues provided could be considered closer to majority issues in that they can theoretically affect blacks of all economic backgrounds equally, albeit not necessarily in the same ways, such as voting rights (i.e., see Strolovitch 2007). In this sense, the data do not exactly show evidence of intersectional bias per se, at least not along economic lines, nor that incarceration receives less attention in general *because* of intersectional bias. However, this could also be an artifact of the open-ended nature of the questions.

Given the nature of the responses, Figure 3.4 displays the percentage of units mentioning issues related to incarceration or that could be categorized as falling into categories based on the important issue areas of units analyzed previously: economic well-being, civil rights, health and human services, and immigration (see Figure 3.3).[21] Economic well-being includes all policies or issues affecting socioeconomic advancement (e.g., affordable housing, work benefits, equal pay). Civil rights includes all policies or issues relating to the social and political rights afforded to individuals (e.g., voting rights, general discrimination). Health and human services includes policies or issues affecting health and social well-being (e.g., education, health care) and

[21] I used these categories as units' responses varied significantly in terms of the level of broadness. For example, some units listed issue areas, like civil rights, while others listed slightly more specific civil rights issues, such as fair voter registration laws.

immigration is self-evident. Note, again, that incarceration is conceptualized broadly, as well, and can be taken to mean criminal justice issues (see previous sections).[22]

Figure 3.4 shows that a majority of units, 66%, listed at least one incarceration-related issue or policy as something their unit worked on in the previous year. Additionally, incarceration was listed more often than some other issue areas. Economic well-being issues were mentioned by 58% of units and only 3%, or one unit, mentioned immigration. However, incarceration was not the most frequently listed issue. Much higher percentages of units listed issues related to health and human services (92%) and, unsurprisingly, civil rights-related issues (71%). Looking at units' current top priorities, provides a similar picture. The percentage of units listing something related to incarceration as a current top priority—20%—is not the lowest nor is it the highest. 17%, 13% and 0% respectively listed health and human services, economic well-being, and immigration-related issues as top priorities. A much larger 50% of units listed issues relating to general civil rights and discrimination, the highest percentage of any issue.

Thus, the data provide somewhat mixed evidence. No unit listed an issue disproportionately affecting economically advantaged constituents, a large majority of units have something related to incarceration on their agenda, and incarceration is a top priority for more units than some other issue areas. However, incarceration is listed as an agenda item by a much smaller percentage of units' agendas than some other issues and as a top priority much less than

[22] In some cases, units listed issues that may not be traditionally viewed as related to incarceration, such as increasing the racial diversity of law enforcement. As issues such as these could be said to deal or are intended to affect the identification and prosecution of crimes punishable or the nature and administration of incarceration, they were still coded as related to incarceration. Additionally, areas not exclusively about incarceration or criminal justice, but that were specified explicitly in relation to incarceration in some way, such as the school to prison pipeline, were coded as such. In this sense, the analysis provided is a somewhat conservative test; it could be argued that such a broad conceptualization overestimates attention to incarceration.

general civil rights, most often voting rights. As a broad issue, then we might say that incarceration receives uneven attention from local units.

H2 states that policies dealing with the back-end of incarceration (i.e., corrections/rights afforded to incarcerated individuals) receive less attention from organizations than those dealing with the front-end (i.e., police/courts). On this, the data are much more straightforward. Figure 3.5 shows that while over 80% of units listed at least one front-end policy issue when prompted to list five criminal justice issues on which they worked in the previous year, just 60% listed at least one back-end policy issue. Additionally, and even more revealingly, 71% of units listed a front-end policy as a top priority for the unit, while only 29% listed a back-end policy. Back-end incarceration policies quite unequivocally receive less attention from units than front-end policies.

Figure 3.4



Notes. Figure displays percentage of units listing incarceration on general agenda and listing different policy issues as top priority. The total of 38 reflects the fact that 6 units did not list any issues on which they worked in the previous year. The total of 30 reflects the fact that 14 units did not list a top current priority.

Figure 3.5



Notes. Figure displays percentage of units listing front-end incarceration policy and back-end policy on criminal justice agenda, as well as percentage listing each policy type as a top priority. The totals of 33 and 21 reflects the fact that some units either did not list any criminal justice issue on which they worked in the previous year or provided a response that was too broad or vague to categorize (e.g., criminal justice, racial disparities).

Finally, H3 posits that perceptions of newer, relatively progressive black organizations as creating opportunities increases attention to incarceration from more mainstream organizations. As reviewed, the typical agendas, positions, and tactics of more radical groups can place pressure on dominant institutions and elites that more mainstream organizations can then use as an opportunity to expand their agendas and positions to include issues affecting their relatively disadvantaged sub-constituencies. Figure 3.6 reports the percentage of units agreeing and disagreeing that Black Lives Matter (BLM) makes it *easier* for them to pursue their policy goals (i.e., to recruit members, raise funds, achieve desired policy outcomes) and that listed incarceration as a general top priority or a back-end incarceration policy as a top criminal justice priority. The figure shows that 29% of those agreeing that BLM makes it easier for them to pursue policy goals listed incarceration as a top priority, while just 13% of units disagreeing or

neither agreeing nor disagreeing did so. Interestingly, similar percentages of those agreeing and disagreeing, 31% and 29% respectively, listed a back-end incarceration policy as a top priority. Thus, while competition may also play a role, it is also the case that the agendas of mainstream black organizations are shaped by groups like BLM, in part, because they create new political opportunities.

Figure 3.6



Notes. Figure displays percentage of units either agreeing or disagreeing that Black Lives Matter makes it easier and more difficult to pursue policy goals that listed incarceration and back-end incarceration policy as top priorities. Agree includes units agreeing and strongly agreeing; disagree includes units neither agreeing nor disagreeing, disagreeing, and strongly disagreeing.

Conclusion

Given considerable impact on disadvantaged subsets of black Americans—low-income and/or incarcerated blacks, a number of scholars have noted concerns over potential biases against prioritizing incarceration among black political elites and institutions (e.g., Alexander 2010; Brown-Dean 2007; Forman 2011; Fortner 2015; Gottschalk 2015). In an effort to update and extend this research, I found that local units of the NAACP, one of the most prominent national black political organizations, do devote their attention to incarceration—the issue is

clearly on their agendas in some form or another. At the same time, however, I found that few units consider the issue to be a top priority. Relatedly, while policy issues dealing with the back-end of criminal justice, which disproportionately affect relatively disadvantaged blacks (i.e., low-income and/or incarcerated blacks), appear on the majority of units' criminal justice agendas, front-end policy issues are clearly take precedent. Thus, the evidence presented is consistent with claims that the black political response to incarceration, at least as it concerns elites and institutions we may consider to be more mainstream, has been shaped by a process of secondary marginalization in which elites' concerns over their resources and the public image of blacks prevents them from pursuing the issue.

Perhaps more optimistically, the evidence presented also builds on more recent work that suggests secondary marginalization and intersectional bias are conditional (Marchetti 2015a; Paden 2011). Specifically, I found that local units who perceive Black Lives Matter as making it easier for them to pursue policy goals devote more attention to incarceration than those who did not. This is consistent with previous research showing that other, more radical black political groups can push the agendas of more mainstream organizations to better reflect the interests of their most disadvantaged constituents by creating political opportunities (e.g., Haines 1988). It also suggests that strengthening the diversity of black political institutions might be a critical means of further advancing racial equality.

To be sure, there are some fairly significant limits to this study. The small sample of units and low response rate of the survey warrants caution in generalizing to other NAACP units; there may be important differences between participating and non-participating units, as well as participating units and state and national offices. My sole focus on the NAACP raises also questions over the representativeness of the findings as they pertain to the agendas and activities

of black political organizations more broadly. Even assuming that these findings apply to a particular subset of black organizations (i.e., more traditional, mainstream ones), in keeping with some of the motivations for this study, the black political community has always been diverse, a fact that has arguably become even more relevant since the end of the 20th century with the strength and salience of groups like BLM. In short, understanding the U.S. political response to incarceration, among other issues, clearly demands studying a wide array of black political institutions and elites at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., local, state, and national levels).

In addition to the above, the analysis was descriptive and, as such, does not fully consider other factors that are likely to influence a given unit's agenda. In the spirit of going local, for example, whether a particular unit focuses on incarceration or a particular type of policy might be related to the severity of punitive policies, the partisan composition of the executive and legislative bodies, the size of the black population, the black incarceration rate, black-white incarceration disparities, and levels of black political incorporation and competition in a given locality, to name just a few.

Finally, some of the measures employed in this analysis are admittedly narrow. Attention was measure simply as whether it was on the agenda or a top priority of a given unit. Informative as this may be, it says about the types of activities in which units actually engage—that is the quality of attention that incarceration receives. In this vein, previous research demonstrates that cross-cutting issues like incarceration, even when they receive attention, are more likely to be pursued through individualistic and service-oriented actions, such as providing employment or health services, rather than more policy-oriented ones, like lobbying legislators and pursuing litigation (Cohen 1999; Strolovitch 2007). Additionally, the measure of perceptions of other groups may simply capture ideological affinity. There are also more interesting, if not more

accurate ways that the influence of newer black organizations might be gauged. For example, given that the Internet is the preferred mode of mobilization and activism among these groups and black youth more generally (see Luttig and Cohen 2016), Twitter hashtags or other social media data that indicate support for these groups in a given locality may do a much better job of capturing their relationship with the agendas and activities of political elites.

In an address to the NAACP in 2015, U.S. president Barack Obama described the country's prison system as "one aspect of American life that remains particularly skewed by race and by wealth, a source of inequity that has ripple effects on families and on communities and ultimately on our nation" (The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2015). Obama's comments on the links between race, class, and incarceration are somewhat unique for their candor. Despite considerable increases in attention to reforming the criminal justice system, however, political elites, including Obama, rarely employ such explicitly racial and classed terms when discussing America's carceral system (e.g., Gottschalk 2015). While it remains an open question, as a critical source of political representation for those most affected by the issue, black political organizations can and likely will play a pivotal role in pushing racial and class biases in America's criminal justice system at the forefront of debates over reform.

Chapter 4. The Intersectional Underpinnings of Incarceration in the United States: Beliefs about Fairness and White Americans' Carceral Preferences

Introduction

Much of the unprecedented growth in the size and rate of incarceration in the U.S. stems from policy changes at multiple governmental levels, namely harsher and more uniform criminal sentencing laws (National Research Council, 2014). Given the prominence accorded to public opinion in most accounts of U.S. policymaking (see Shapiro, 2011 for review), Americans' support for incarceration—their carceral preferences—are, in turn, a crucial component of carceral growth (also see Beckett 1997; Enns 2016).

Though well-studied, extant research on public opinion about incarceration largely overlooks the punishment of low-income black women. Low-income black women have represented one of, if not the fastest growing group among the U.S. incarcerated population (The Sentencing Project 2015b). In line with this, the expansion of the U.S. criminal justice system has been intimately linked with policy changes disproportionately affecting low-income black women, namely more severe drug sentencing policies and the contraction and increasing punitiveness of the social welfare system (Bush-Baskette 1998; Wacquant 2009). For example, the number of black women incarcerated for drug offenses in the U.S. increased by a remarkable 828 percent from 1986-1991, an increase roughly two times higher than for black men and three times higher than for white women (Bush-Baskette 1998). In short, while a defining feature of the growth of incarceration in the U.S., we know very little about the sources of public support for the incarceration of low-income black women.

Drawing on the concept of intersectionality—an analytical approach which assumes and examines how various forms of disadvantage overlap and mutually constitute one another (e.g.,

Crenshaw 1991; McCall 2005)—I contend that public support for the incarceration of low-income black women is a unique product reflective of their location at racial, economic, and gender disadvantage. Constructions motivating welfare and crime policies have consistently centered low-income black women as innately criminal and responsible for black criminality and poverty (Jordan Zachery 2008; Roberts 1997; 2012). At the same time, the experiences of low-income black women continue to be marginalized from public understanding of the relationship between incarceration and unfairness in the criminal justice system (Crenshaw 2012). This unique combination, I argue, facilitates a view of low-income black women as particularly unsympathetic and perpetually legitimate targets of criminal punishment.

My argument has important implications for existing research on the relationship between punitive opinion and beliefs about fairness among white Americans. This research shows that beliefs about fairness affect whites' support for incarceration to the same extent when they perceive criminal suspects to differ by racial identity (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). In contrast, based on my argument, we might expect conditions under which this relationship actually changes. Specifically, beliefs about fairness should be *less* influential on whites' views when they perceive criminal suspects and offenders as black, low-income, *and* female. That is, differences in support for incarceration between whites who believe the criminal justice system is fair and those who believe it is unfair should be much smaller when low-income black women than when other groups are in mind.

I test this expectation with an original survey experiment in which I exposed a sample of white Americans to a fictional Internet news article about a purported criminal suspect. The experiment randomly and simultaneously varied the racial, economic, *and* gender identities of the suspect in each article. I find that whites' support for incarceration is strongly influenced by

beliefs about the fairness of the criminal justice system *except when the suspect is described as a low-income black woman*. Additionally, I show that despite the apparent irrelevance of fairness when the low-income black woman is in mind, whites nevertheless perceive this suspect to experience as much discrimination from the criminal justice system as suspects of other identities.

These findings shed new and disturbing light on white public opinion and the growth of incarceration in the U.S. Going even beyond expectations, they suggest that whites might not simply deny unfairness in the system when it comes to black women who face economic disadvantage, but rather ignore, if not justify it. As such, it also calls into question whether de-racialized frames of fairness in the criminal justice system are always a more effective means of building white support for reforming criminal justice policies (see Hetey and Eberhardt 2014; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). Such framings may still be ineffective, if not damaging insofar as they concern policies and practices which may be perceived as disproportionately affecting low-income black women. More broadly, given the disproportionate effect of carceral growth on low-income black women, the findings suggest that some of the weak political resistance to carceral growth reflects the effects of the representation and perceptions of this group.

I begin the chapter with a brief review of the centrality of low-income black women to the growth of incarceration. I then briefly review the concept of intersectionality and public discourse about low-income black women in the context of crime and welfare to develop an argument and expectations of white public support for incarceration. Next, I describe the details and results of my survey experiment. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the study's contributions to existing research on Americans' support for incarceration and carceral

expansion, contemporary efforts aimed at building public support for reforming the U.S. criminal justice system, and directions for future research.

The Incarceration of Low-Income Black Women in the U.S.

While a variety of demographic groups have now been greatly affected (see Gottschalk 2015), carceral trends illustrate that low-income black women have arguably been affected by the growth of incarceration more than most other groups. Although men continue to make up over 90% of the state and federal prison population, since the early 1980s, the number of women in U.S. state and federal prisons has increased at a rate roughly 1.5 times faster than that of men (The Sentencing Project 2015b). There are, however, clear racial disparities among women, with black women having been especially affected. As of 2013, black women represented 21% of the female state and federal prison population. The incarceration rate among black women was also over two times higher than for white women (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014a; 2014b). And, as with men, incarceration has risen mostly among low-income black women more than their economic counterparts (Rabuy and Kopf 2015; Richie 2012; The Sentencing Project 2015b). As of 2004, the pre-incarcerated median income of incarcerated black women in 2014 dollars was roughly $11,520 lower than the median income of their non-incarcerated counterparts, a difference larger than those for incarcerated and non-incarcerated women belonging to other racial groups (Rabuy and Kopf 2015).[1]

Policy changes identified as key to carceral growth have also disproportionately affected low-income black women (i.e., they help explain much of the trends described). In particular,

[1] Note that from 2000 to 2009, the incarceration rate among black women decreased since 2000 and increased considerably among white and Latina women (Mauer 2013). Nevertheless, as recent as 2011, black women remained 2.5 times more likely to be incarcerated than white women, and as of 2013, constituted 22% of women sentenced to state or federal prison for at least one year (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014a; 2014b; The Sentencing Project 2015b).

though rarely identified as such, changes in drug sentencing policy most directly affected and explain almost all of the increase in the incarceration of low-income black women. For example, as noted, the number of black women incarcerated for drug offenses increased by 828 percent from 1986-1991, an increase roughly two times higher than for black men and three times higher than for white women (Bush-Baskette 1998). It is also worth pointing out that changes in social welfare policy and spending have been linked to more punitive criminal justice policies (Beckett and Western 2001; Wacquant 2009). As Wacquant (2010) describes, the social welfare and carceral system have worked "jointly to invisibilize problem populations—by forcing them off the public aid rolls, on the one side, and holding them under lock, on the other—and eventually push them into the peripheral sectors of the booming secondary labor market" (p. 199). Thus, as they make up a disproportionate share of welfare recipients, and figured prominently in political debates surrounding welfare policy (Gilens 1999; Hancock 2004), low-income black women are arguably located at a key nexus of carceral expansion.

Interestingly, although being such a defining feature of carceral growth, the sources of public support for the incarceration of low-income black women remains vastly understudied. To be sure, a large literature examines and illustrates the effects of public images and discourse about crime that are heavily racialized. This research illustrates that U.S. news coverage of crime repeatedly associates criminality with blackness by over-representing blacks among lawbreakers, underrepresenting blacks as criminal victims, and portraying black lawbreakers more menacingly (i.e., in need of restraint) than comparable white ones (Dixon and Linz 2000; Dixon, Azocar, and Casas 2003; Entman and Rojecki 2001; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000).[2] Political communications,

[2] TV news media, especially at the local level, are one of the most important sources of information about crime for Americans, particularly whites (see Gilliam and Iyengar 2000). It is also important to note that, in contrast with

namely electoral campaigns, also regularly employ black racial cues when raising the issue of crime, such as visual imagery and subtle verbal references to blackness, that effectively construct crime as a problem largely facing and more often committed by blacks (Mendelberg 2001; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005b). Finally, even under comparable circumstances, blacks are more likely than whites to be arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated, as well as much more likely than whites to report having negative experiences when in contact with various actors and institutions of the criminal justice system, such as police and courts (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; National Research Council 2014).

Leveraging the strengths of experimental survey methods, researchers have shown that this heavy racialization has also affected Americans' support for punitive policies. When criminal suspects are perceived to be black, white Americans' are more supportive of harsher criminal punishments and their support is more strongly shaped by their attitudes about blacks (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Dixon and Azocar 2007; Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley, 2005a; 2005b; Peffley and Hurwitz, 2002; Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997). Specifically, when criminal suspects are perceived to be black, those with more anti-black attitudes are much more supportive of harsher criminal punishment than when suspects are white, while those with more positive views of blacks are less supportive.[3]

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blacks, whites are underrepresented among lawbreakers and overrepresented among victims in TV news coverage of crime (Dixon and Linz 2000; Dixon, Azocar, and Casas 2003).

[3] Anti-black attitudes have been measured in various ways: affectively (i.e., evaluations of how much blacks elicit different emotions, such as sympathy; e.g., Johnson, 2008), cognitively (i.e., evaluations of how much blacks conform to different traits, such as laziness; e.g., Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman, 1997), and socio-culturally (i.e., evaluations of blacks' representing or subscribing to some set of ideological values, such as 'the American Creed'; e.g., Bobo and Johnson, 2004).

Of equal importance is how racial perceptions shape beliefs about the fairness of the process by which outcomes of the criminal justice system are reached and their relationship with support for criminal punishment (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Tyler 1988).[4] In general, beliefs about fairness strongly influence public views of criminal justice actors and policies—those who believe the criminal justice system is unfair are typically much more skeptical of law enforcement officials, less likely to comply with the law, prefer stronger punishments of criminal justice officials who commit wrongful behaviors, and, most importantly, less supportive of punitive crime policies, such as incarceration (e.g., Tyler 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005a; 2010).[5]

However, given the racialization of crime described above, white and black Americans differ widely in their views of fairness. Whites have a more sanguine and do not view fairness in racial terms as much as blacks, meaning that whites are much more likely to view the criminal justice system as fair, both in general and in its treatment of blacks. As a result, despite considerable evidence of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, unlike blacks, whites are not more concerned about fairness and fairness is not more influential on support for punitive policies when they perceive criminal suspects to be black (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010. For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (2005a) find little difference in the effect of beliefs about fairness on support for police searches of criminal suspects between whites who were exposed to a news story about a black suspect and whites who were exposed to

[4] These are beliefs about procedural fairness and are conceptually distinct from those about distributive fairness—the degree to which the distribution of outcomes is thought to be fair (see Tyler 1988).
[5] Note that findings on policy opinions are based on research on beliefs about distributive fairness (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). However, I argue that it is safe to assume that more general beliefs about procedural fairness affect policy opinions as described, as they are strongly correlated with one another and there is evidence to suggest this is the case (see Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

a news story about a white suspect. In contrast, given experiences and perceptions of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, when they perceive criminal suspects to be black, blacks' support for punitive policy is influenced more strongly by their views of fairness.

Though edifying and extensive, extant research is still rather limited. Specifically, research on sociopolitical discourse and images of crime and their subsequent influence on Americans' punitive preferences focuses heavily, if not exclusively on constructions and perceptions of black men (Anderson 1995; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005a; 2005b; Mendelberg 2001; Peffley and Hurwitz 2002; Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Rome 2004; Russell 1998).[6] For example, most experimental surveys of support for punitive policies manipulate the racial identities of only male suspects (e.g., Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996). In doing so, researchers make at least one of two problematic assumptions: 1) the racialization of crime in American political culture only involves black men and/or 2) manipulating factors that coexist with race, such as class and gender, should not affect their findings or conclusions. Put in other words, scholars ignore how multiple, overlapping identity characteristics may be linked to criminality in the broader public sphere and Americans' minds (i.e., racial, gender, and class characteristics) and, in fact, implicitly assume this already (i.e., black men as uniquely criminalized). In doing so, they offer very little in the way of understanding or assume that public support for the punishment of low-income black women operates similarly or, more disturbingly, is irrelevant.

[6] To be sure, this is not to suggest that focusing on black men is unwarranted or that enough attention is devoted to this group. Rather, the point is that the experiences of women, as well as low-income individuals have been unnecessarily erased in the study of U.S. crime opinions.

Cultural Images, Public Discourse, and the Politics of the Incarceration of Low-Income Black Women

Intersectionality is an analytical approach which begins from the general premise that various social categories are overlapping and mutually constitutive (see McCall 2005). A key insight from intersectional approaches is that the marginalization of individuals who belong to multiple groups that are relatively disadvantaged (i.e., racial and gender disadvantage; e.g., black women) is often times a unique product of their location at multiple points of advantage. As the term suggests, Crenshaw's (1989) seminal work likens discrimination to an accident at a traffic intersection: "Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them" (p. 149). In more concrete terms, the result, then, is that groups like black women, for example, might experience discrimination or be perceived in ways that are similar to other women or black men, but more often that reflects either the sum or product of their racial and gender identity. Drawing on intersectionality, then, suggests that low-income black women are likely to be constructed in unique ways in public discourse and images surrounding crime. In addition, the experiences of low-income black women are vulnerable to marginalization by political elites. As such, I consider, as well as discuss some of the factors producing these dynamics in what follows. In doing so, I shed further light on how we might understand the source of public support for incarceration as it concerns low-income black women.

An important and logical starting point for examination is *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (heretofore referred to as *Moynihan*). *Moynihan* is a 1965 federal policy report authored by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, labor undersecretary for the Johnson and Kennedy

administrations. In an effort to understand the sources and impacts of black poverty in urban areas, *Moynihan* drew on a long line of ideological constructions and images of black women used throughout American history primarily as a way of justifying slavery (see Collins 1990; Davis 1981; Jordan Zachery 2008; Roberts 1997). Put simply, employing frankly racist, sexist, and individualist understandings of poverty, *Moynihan* explicitly connected crime among the black community to a matriarchal family structure and the failures of low-income black mothers to properly parent and control their children, particularly boys.[7] According to *Moynihan*, the prevalence of black female-headed households directly contributed to black crime rates because it represents a perverse overpowering and denial of black men their "proper" role as breadwinners.[8] As illustrated below, the governmental legitimacy of *Moynihan* undoubtedly helped it elevate the prominence of these damaging ideas and images of low-income black women in public discourse and policy debates as it concerns both crime and welfare (Hancock 2004; Gilens 1999; Jordan-Zachery 2008; Roberts 1997).

Indeed, following the release of *Moynihan*, and, in part, as a response to surging activism among low-income black mothers working against their continued exclusion from U.S. social welfare policies, negative depictions of poor black women and public scrutiny of their decisions increased considerably. Multiple analyses, for example, show that welfare recipients came to be widely depicted as "welfare queens" by political elites and the news media around the mid-1960s

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[8] For example, *Moynihan* (1965) notes, "Ours is a society which presumes male leadership in private and public affairs. The arrangements of society facilitate such leadership and reward it. A subculture, such as that of the Negro American, in which this is not the pattern, is placed at a distinct disadvantage." The report further explains that "the very essence of the male animal, from the bantam rooster to the four star general, is to strut" and, thus, because "Negro families in the cities are more frequently headed by a woman" black neighborhoods suffer from higher rates of crime and poverty. To be sure, Moynihan rightfully details the harmful effects and role of slavery and racism on black Americans. However, the report ultimately argues that cultural dysfunction among poor blacks, defined primarily as matriarchal family structure, is most important. Indeed, the report uniquely devotes a full section to the latter, labeling it a "tangle of pathology" (see Moynihan 1965).

(Gilens 1999; Hancock 2004). Framing poverty as a matter of individual deficiency, the welfare queen depicts welfare recipients specifically as lazy, hyper-fertile black women living in impoverished urban areas and who also manipulate the U.S. welfare system by birthing numerous children out of wedlock (Hancock 2004). This image directly led to decreases in whites' support for welfare (Gilens 1999; Foster, 2008), as well as encouraged a view of black women needing economic assistance as "calculating parasites, *deserving of harsh punishment*" (Roberts 1997, p. 18, emphasis added). Consistent with this, when U.S. social welfare policies were reformed in 1996 under President Bill Clinton, it ultimately entailed tightening eligibility requirements for receiving assistance, such as marriage requirements, and novel punitive sanctions when recipients when they deviated those requirements (Wacquant 2009).

While the politics of welfare did much to construct low-income black women as a source of criminality, and to a lesser extent criminalize them, as the role of drug sentencing legislation in their incarceration suggests, public attention to crack cocaine addiction during the 1980s and early-1990s criminalized them perhaps even more directly. Ostensibly due to concerns over the effects of crack usage among pregnant mothers on their unborn children, national attention to drug addiction at this time heavily focused on crack usage among "crack mothers" (Beckett and Sasson 1998; Humphries 1999; Jordan-Zachery 2008; Reeves and Campbell 1994; Roberts 1997; Stabile 2006).[9] As with the welfare recipients, the image of the crack mother portrays crack addicts as mostly low-income black women who are overly aggressive and sexual, reliant upon

[9] At the time, it was believed that babies born to mothers addicted to crack cocaine would be neurologically damaged at birth and, in turn, require a great deal of state resources to support and be at great risk of criminal behavior when reaching adulthood. However, many claims about the effects of crack usage by pregnant mothers on their children were based on a number of unscientific studies that have since been proven erroneous by further research. In addition, despite the almost exclusive focus on drug addiction among black women, it was evident even early on that white mothers were more likely to use drugs during pregnancy than black mothers (see Jordan-Zachery, 2008).

and manipulative of state resources, and unable and unwilling to parent their children (Jordan-Zachery 2008; Roberts 1997). Unlike other types of drugs less available to low-income individuals and when it concerned individuals of other identities (e.g., powder cocaine, white men and women), crack addiction among low-income black women was overwhelmingly framed as a matter of individual deficiencies (Beckett and Sasson 1998; Humphries 1999; Reeves and Campbell 1994; Stabile 2006). As a result, and as in the case of welfare, the image of the crack mother stimulated the public and U.S. state to respond by criminalizing the sale and usage of crack and to a much greater extent than other drugs (Bush-Baskette 1998; Jordan-Zachery 2008). The federal government, as well as many states, instituted mandatory and longer prison sentences for possession or sale of smaller amounts of crack cocaine than for other drugs, which as noted, explains much, if not all of the increased incarceration of low-income black women (Bush-Baskette 1998).

Turning toward the politicization of incarceration and its growth, the position of low-income black women at a location of racial, economic, and gender disadvantage suggests that their experiences are especially likely to be marginalized. This is largely due to exclusion from dominant institutions and a process known as secondary marginalization—the internal policing of attitudes, behaviors, and public image of members of marginal groups (see Cohen 1999). In order to retain the limited access and identification with dominant institutions that some group members are granted, as well as to dispel persistent, negative stereotypes about group members, political elites working on behalf of these groups are more likely to disassociate from, exclude, or condemn the behaviors of relatively disadvantaged subsets of the group. Members of these groups, thus, remain stigmatized not only by broader society for rejecting or diverging from dominant norms, but also, in turn, are perceived by the elites who claim to represent as a threat to

the advancement and legitimacy of group members in the eyes of dominant groups. Thus, with secondary marginalization in mind, it is critical to note that low-income black women are a relatively disadvantaged subset among low-income individuals, blacks, and women. As a result, even while incarceration may receive political attention, the experiences of low-income black women are likely to be excluded, in part, because the representation they receive from groups who work on their behalf, for example, black or feminist political organizations, are likely to engage in the process of secondary marginalization described above.

Consistent with this, those working within the mainstream American antiracist movements have rightly and tirelessly contested problematic discourses that reinforce stereotypes of black male criminality and the incarceration of black men. However, they have been mostly silent when it comes to black women (see Crenshaw 2012).[10] Similarly, after years of neglect, national political elites finally have begun to highlight inequity and unfairness toward blacks in the criminal justice system, yet also in an incredibly gendered fashion. For example, speaking to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in 2015, President Barack Obama affirmed that "the statistics on who gets incarcerated show that by a wide margin, it disproportionately impacts *communities of color*." He noted and specified further that "*the bottom line* is that in too many places, *black boys and black men, Latino boys and Latino men experience being treated differently under the law*" (The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2015, emphasis added). Insofar as elites are concerned with carceral growth in relation to women, who again represent the fastest growing group among U.S. incarcerated populations (The Sentencing Project 2015b), with few very important exceptions (Crenshaw

[10] As noted, this is not to suggest that the focus on black men is unwarranted, but rather to highlight the relative erasure of women of color.

2012; Richie 2012; Roberts 2012), they typically focus on the experiences of women who are partners or mothers of incarcerated men and/or ignore the role of race and class in shaping women's own contact with the criminal justice system. In sum, even despite being affected by policy changes widely touted as unfair and discriminatory (i.e., drug-sentencing), low-income black women have been mostly excluded from public understandings of carceral growth and unfairness in the criminal justice system.

Expectations: The Intersectional Underpinnings of Carceral Preferences

With the preceding discussion in mind, I argue that the incarceration of low-income black women is a product and form of marginalization that results from their location at an intersection of racial, economic, and gender disadvantage. Specifically, I contend that low-income black women have been constructed and their experiences marginalized in ways that lead the public to view them as perpetually legitimate and unsympathetic targets of criminal punishment. As the preceding section makes apparent, low-income black women occupy a complex and unique position in the politics of crime and criminal justice: they are hyper-visible when it comes to public discourse and portrayals of crime and poverty, yet substantively erased when it comes to the politicization of fairness and discrimination in the U.S. criminal justice system. They are portrayed as more threatening and individually responsible for crime than whites, albeit similarly to that of their male peers. That said, unlike black men, black women, and low-income black women, in particular have rarely been understood as victims of an unfair and discriminatory criminal justice system. This combination, in turn, likely encourages indifference, if not justification of criminal punishment when it applies to low-income black women, even if it results from unfair and discriminatory practices.

This argument has obvious implications for our understanding of the role of fairness in support for incarceration laid out previously. Recall that, in general, extant research finds that the relationship between beliefs about fairness and support for incarceration among whites is shown to be mostly unchanged when suspects are black (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).[11] In other words, given a de-racialized understanding of fairness, altering the racial identities of criminal suspects apparently does little to alter the influence of beliefs about fairness on whites' opinions. However, if we accept my argument that the punishment of low-income black women is viewed less sympathetically than that of other groups, we should actually expect quite the opposite. Specifically, perceiving criminal suspects as black *should* alter the relationship between beliefs about fairness and support for incarceration among whites, but only when they are also low-income and female. In this case, concerns over fairness should be tangential for whites as they form their support for incarceration. If so, beliefs about fairness should be significantly less influential on support for incarceration among whites when criminal suspects are perceived as low-income black women than when perceived as belonging to other groups:

H1: *Beliefs about fairness are less influential on whites' support for incarceration when they perceive criminal suspects as black, low-income, and female than when they perceive them as belonging to other groups—differences in support for incarceration between whites who believe the criminal justice system is fair and whites who believe it is unfair should be insignificant only when suspects are black, low-income, and female.*

[11] To be sure, my argument has implications for black public opinion, as well. As I do not directly explore those here, I consider them more fully in the concluding section of the chapter.

Data and Method

I test my hypothesis with a survey experiment implemented with Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online labor market that has been increasingly used to study public opinion (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). I recruited and administered my survey to 930 MTurk workers, 712 of whom self-identified as white (see Appendix C1 for recruitment information).[12] The basic demographics of the sample show that the sample is much younger, more highly educated, and less conservative and Republican than a nationally-representative sample of whites who completed the American National Election Study over the Internet in 2012 (see Appendix C2).

Although not entirely representative, my sample is well-suited for the questions at hand. A growing body of research demonstrates that MTurk samples effectively replicate experimental effects observed among population-based samples (e.g., Mullinix, et al., 2015). Additionally, compared to samples that are designed to be nationally representative of white Americans, the sample is less anti-black and less likely to attribute poverty to individual work ethic. The sample also does not appear to differ much in their beliefs about the fairness of the criminal justice system (see Appendix C2). Thus, given that anti-black attitudes, economic individualism, and a perception that the criminal justice system is fair are each associated with higher support for punitive policies (Kornhauser, 2015; Peffley and Hurwitz, 2010), the sample makes for a harder test of my hypotheses—the basic characteristics of the sample suggest that, in general, the sample should be less supportive of incarceration.

[12] Participants were paid $0.50 for participation in the survey. More information on recruitment and survey procedures can be found in Appendix C1.

Participants began the survey by reading a brief, fictional news article about a purported criminal suspect who was described in racial, economic, and gendered terms.[13] Participants were randomly assigned to an article in which the suspect was identified as belonging to a specific race (black/white), class (low-income/middle-income), and gender (man/woman) (e.g., middle-income white woman). Participants could also be assigned to a control group which provided no demographic characteristics about the suspect.

Table 4.1 provides the number of participants assigned to each condition. The sample sizes range from 64-97. Appropriate statistical tests indicate that randomization was relatively successful (see Appendix C2). To be sure, the results reported are robust to the inclusion of variables controlling for potentially important demographic differences.

Figure 4.1 provides a sample treatment. As shown, articles described the arrest of an individual for possession of unspecified drugs after local authorities allegedly discovered the drugs during a stop for a minor traffic violation. Articles further noted that the suspect was awaiting sentencing and if found guilty of the crime, could face up to a year or more in prison. In addition to the impact of drug sentencing on black women, drug possession was chosen as the crime because Americans have become much less supportive of criminal punishment for drug usage in recent years (Pew Research Center, 2014). Thus, the treatments allow for a sensible and harder test of my hypotheses in that individuals should they should not prime punitive attitudes to the same degree as other crimes commonly used, such as murder (Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000).

[13] As noted later in the text, participants were informed about the fictional nature of articles and images.

Table 4.1

Experimental Design and Conditions				
	Black		White	
	Low-income	Middle-income	Low-income	Middle-income
Man	**Low-income black man** (n=79)	**Middle-income black man** (n=81)	**Low-income white man** (n=97)	**Middle-income white man** (n=67)
Woman	**Low-income black woman** (n=64)	**Middle-income black woman** (n=85)	**Low-income white woman** (n=97)	**Middle-income white woman** (n=66)
No race, class, or gender identity provided (n=76)				

Figure 4.1
Sample Experimental Treatment

Illinois woman charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois woman was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in her vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chelsea Johnson, a low-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near her home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, she could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

I visually manipulated the race and gender of suspects in mind by including a purported mug shot within the articles. I manipulated race only visually so that the treatments would mirror actual news portrayals and to be consistent with previous research on race and white public opinion (Mendelberg, 2001; Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000). The mug shots featured a visibly black male, black female, white male, or white female.[14] Although there is not pre-test data to confirm, the photos were selected with age, facial expression, hair color, eye color, skin tone (for models of different gender, but same race), and clothing style in mind. The sizing and perspective of the photos are also mostly identical (see Appendix C3 for all treatments).[15]

To maintain realism, I manipulated gender further by including gendered names and pronouns when referring to suspects, although all suspects shared the same last name. All male suspects were named "Timothy Johnson" and all female suspects were named "Chelsea Johnson."[16] Finally, to reduce the potential confounding effects that a visual manipulation of economic class might introduce, the economic class of suspects was manipulated only verbally through a description of the suspect as being either a low or middle-income resident of the

[14] Mug shots were digital stock head shot photos purchased and edited as needed (e.g., background coloration, size and contents included in photo, pixilation, etc.).

[15] Treatments initially included photos of either a man or woman with the skin colors respectively manipulated, but I found this to be a problematic approach.

[16] The last name was selected based upon the most recent publicly available data from the U.S. Census on the most common last names in America across different demographic groups; over 60% and 30% of Americans with the last name Johnson are white and black, respectively (Word, et al. 2014). I selected the first names based upon an extensive data on the names of black and white children and the education levels of their mothers (D. Figlio personal communication, September 28, 2015); black children make up roughly 20-25% of those in the data named Chelsea and Timothy, respectively; the education level of mothers with children of these names are also respectively very close to the average education level of all children in the sample.

fictional town where the crime was said to have occurred (i.e., Lakeville, Illinois).[17] In general, manipulation checks indicate the treatments performed well (see Appendix C4).[18]

Participants began the survey by reading their assigned news article, which they were told was recently published on a national Internet news website. Participants then answered a series of questions evaluating the suspect, including measures of the main dependent variable: support for incarceration. Support for incarceration was measured with agreement that the suspect should be sentenced to prison if found guilty on a scale of 1-7 (7= strong agreement) and preferred number of years the suspect should serve in prison if found guilty on a scale of 0-5 (0= no years or probation; 5= 10 years or more).[19]

Fairness beliefs were measured with agreement that the police, the courts, and the criminal justice system treat people fairly and equally, respectively on a scale of 1-5 (5= strong agreement).[20] To avoid inadvertent priming (see Mendelberg 2008), I follow others and ask these questions were asked post-treatment (e.g. Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Although this introduces the possibility that responses to these items might be influenced by the treatments, this is somewhat addressed by asking participants a series of unrelated demographic questions just prior to asking about fairness beliefs. In addition, as noted below, at least two of the

[17] Although an explicit reference to the economic background of a criminal suspect in a news article is somewhat conspicuous, the manipulation was relatively conservative and arguably more ideal than potential alternatives. For example, more commonly used expressions of economic identity I could have employed, such as references to welfare or residence in public housing or a particular type of neighborhood could be confounded by a number of other factors these terms bring to mind, namely race (see Gilens 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005a). Lakeville was chosen for being relatively neutral (i.e., unlikely to be associated with any particular demographic group) and realistic (i.e., it is a real name of towns in many states, though not in Illinois).

[18] With the exception of gender in the control conditions, healthy and similarly-sized majorities of participants in every condition accurately recalled the respective, race, class, and gender of the suspect they read about (see Appendix C4).

[19] Recall that articles informed participants that the suspect could face a prison sentence of more than one year. The response categories for this question included no years or probation (0), 1 to 2 years (1), 2 to 5 years (3), 5 to 10 years (4), and 10 years or more (5).

[20] Participants were asked about each of these actors separately.

questions about fairness asked participants about the fairness of criminal justice actors in the area where they live specifically.[21]

Finally, participants answered a series of questions unrelated to crime and criminal justice measuring their general racial, class, and gender attitudes. Following this, at the end of the survey, participants were debriefed; they were informed that neither the article nor the photographs were real, as well as given the opportunity to rescind their responses after finding out this information if they desired (see Appendix C5 for survey items).

Results

Although I offered no expectations about the direct effects of suspect identity, I introduce the data by first considering this possibility. Figure 4.2 reports the mean level of agreement that the suspect should be incarcerated if found guilty for each experimental condition. Given that most participants preferred none or less than 2 years for a prison sentence, Figure 4.3 below displays the percentage of participants who prefer the suspect serve a prison sentence of any length (i.e., anything other than no years or probation). Both figures order the conditions from highest to lowest support for each measure.[22]

The figures show that there are virtually no significant differences between the conditions on either measure. Though perhaps surprising, this is consistent with general theories of group-based priming which argue that identity-based cues merely serve to enhance the influence of group-based attitudes on opinions rather than directly affect them (see Mendelberg 2001). That said, participants are consistently and significantly less supportive of incarceration when the

[21]Note that beliefs about fairness do significantly differ between some of the conditions. However, the values for these variables for those in the low-income black woman condition are not significantly different from any of the other conditions. In addition, beliefs about fairness are not significantly related to experimental condition. See Appendix C2, Table C2.3 and Table C2.4.

[22] See Appendix C Table C2.5 for full distributions of response for both dependent variables.

suspect is a middle-income white woman (m=3.39; se=0.26): there are significant differences in the mean levels of agreement and preferred prison sentence length between this condition and virtually all of the others. Though speculative, this suggests that longstanding ideologies surrounding crime and middle-class white womanhood likely play a more significant role in the formation of punitive preferences than recognized (see Stabile, 2006). For example, in addition to stereotypes that blacks are violent and lazy (see Peffley and Hurwitz 2010), concerns over protecting white women from black criminality may also underlie whites' public support of criminal punishment when they have black male suspects in mind.

Figure 4.2



Notes. Figure shows 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4.3



Notes. Figure shows 95% confidence intervals.

I now turn to my primary hypothesis that beliefs about fairness are less consequential for whites' support for incarceration when it concerns low-income black women. I run a single regression model in which agreement with incarceration (0-7; 7=strong agreement) and preference for a prison sentence (0-1; 1= prefer prison sentence) are modeled as a function of treatment (0/1; 1=received treatment), beliefs about fairness (a scaled index variable ranging from 0-1; 1=very fair), and an interaction terms consisting of a dummy variable each treatment and beliefs about fairness. The model includes controls for racial, gender, and class attitudes (each scaled indexes ranging from 0-1; 1=most anti-black, most individualistic/negative toward the poor, and most gender inegalitarian) and interactions terms of each of these and treatment (see Peffley and Hurwitz, 2010).[23] Given the hypothesis, I first omit and report the results with the low-income black female condition so it serves as the basis of comparison.

[23] Because randomization was mostly successful, controls are not strictly necessary. Including additional controls also does not alter the results reported here (see Appendix C6).

Table 4.2 reports only the coefficients for the interaction terms of the given condition and beliefs about fairness from the model. If my hypothesis is correct, we should expect each coefficient to be statistically significant—this would indicate that the effect of beliefs about fairness for the given condition significantly differs from their effect in the low-income black female condition. The table shows that there is partial support for my hypothesis—some of the coefficients reach statistical significance, particularly when it comes to preferring a prison sentence of some length. The coefficients are also consistently larger and significant for both of the black male conditions across both dependent variables, indicating that beliefs about the fairness of the criminal justice system have a much stronger relationship with support for incarceration when suspects are thought to be black men of any class than when a low-income black woman. This provides some evidence that the politicization of racial fairness in the criminal justice system has been powerful, but also incredibly gendered—white Americans at least only think of black men when they think of unfairness and bias in the criminal justice system.

Table 4.3 reports the results of the same models, except with the control condition omitted. In this case, we can get a sense of the differing effect of beliefs about fairness between the control condition, in which no demographic information about the suspect was provided, and all of the others. Table 4.3 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between any of the conditions and the control, except for the low-income black female condition. Consistent with expectations, the coefficients for both dependent variables are statistically significant and negative (b=-1.37; se=0.55; b=-4.04; se=1.73), indicating that beliefs about fairness are significantly less influential for those who read about a low-income black female condition than for those who read about a suspect with no demographic information provided.

Table 4.2

Beliefs about Fairness and Support for Incarceration—Black, low-income female baseline

	Agreement with incarceration	Preferred sentence length
Black, low-income female (baseline impact)	0.77 (0.55)	-0.46 (1.17)
Control—no demographics	1.37* (0.79)	4.04** (1.3)
Black, low-income male	1.32* (0.79)	6.19*** (1.91)
Black, middle-income male	1.52** (0.75)	3.55** (1.58)
Black, middle-income female	1.14 (0.77)	2.07 (1.59)
White, low-income male	0.69 (0.74)	3.95** (1.63)
White, low-income female	1.29* (0.76)	4.67*** (1.72)
White, middle-income male	0.56 (0.78)	2.36 (1.67)
White, middle-income female	1.29 (0.85)	4.33** (1.90)
N=685		

***p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.10.

Notes: Entries are ordered probit and logit regression coefficients from single models predicting agreement with incarcerating the criminal suspect and preferred length of sentence. Each dependent variable is modeled as a function of experimental condition, racial resentment, gender egalitarianism, economic individualism, system fairness, and interactions between condition and each of the latter four. Coefficients are for interaction term of given condition and beliefs about fairness. Models omit low-income black female condition rendering it the reference category.

Table 4.3

Beliefs about Fairness and Support for Incarceration—Control baseline

	Agreement with incarceration	Preferred sentence length
Control—no demographics (baseline impact)	2.14***	3.58**
	(0.57)	(1.27)
Black, low-income female	-1.37*	-4.04**
	(0.55)	(1.73)
Black, low-income male	-0.05	2.15
	(0.81)	(1.09)
Black, middle-income male	0.15	-0.49
	(0.76)	(1.66)
Black, middle-income female	-0.23	-1.97
	(0.78)	(1.67)
White, low-income male	-0.67	-0.08
	(0.74)	(1.70)
White, low-income female	-0.08	0.63
	(0.77)	(1.79)
White, middle-income male	-0.81	-1.68
	(0.79)	(1.74)
White, middle-income female	-0.07	0.29
	(0.85)	(1.97)
N=685		

***p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.10.

Notes: Entries are ordered probit and logit regression coefficients from single models predicting agreement with incarcerating the criminal suspect and preferred length of sentence. Each dependent variable is modeled as a function of experimental condition, racial resentment, gender egalitarianism, economic individualism, system fairness, and interactions between condition and each of the latter four. Coefficients are for interaction term of given condition and beliefs about fairness. Models omit control condition rendering it the reference category.

I consider my hypothesis further by running regressions and examining the effect of beliefs about fairness for each experimental condition separately (i.e., can we be sure that beliefs about fairness have an effect in each condition and how much?). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report the results of a series of regression models in which I again model agreement with incarceration (0-7; 7=strong agreement) or preference for a prison sentence (0-1; 1= prefer prison sentence) as a function of beliefs about fairness of the criminal justice system (0-1; 1=very fair) within each condition (i.e., one model for each condition). Each model also includes controls for racial,

gender, and class attitudes (0-1; 1=most anti-black, most individualistic/negative toward the poor, and most gender inegalitarian).

The tables illustrate that beliefs about fairness are statistically and positively related to agreement with incarcerating the suspect in the models for every experimental condition (i.e., those who perceive the justice system as more fair are more agree with incarcerating the suspect than those who view it as less fair), *except for the condition in which the suspect is a low-income black woman*. That is, the results indicate that we cannot even reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between beliefs about fairness and agreement with incarcerating the low-income black woman (b=0.71; p=0.20) or preferring a prison sentence of some length (b=-0.46, se=0.69).[24] This disturbingly suggests that beliefs about fairness may actually be completely, rather than simply less consequential for whites' support for incarceration, when criminal suspects are specifically low-income, black, and female.

Interestingly, the attitudinal variables included do not consistently influence agreement or preference for a prison sentence in any of the conditions; the coefficient for anti-black attitudes fails to reach statistical significance in all of the conditions, while beliefs about poverty and the poor, as well as gender egalitarianism reach statistical significance in only one or two. Although these particular findings slightly contrast with those of previous research, the results otherwise clearly support expectations: beliefs about the criminal justice system are strongly linked with whites' support for incarceration, but not when they perceive the suspect to be a low-income black woman.

[24] Interestingly, however, the coefficient for beliefs about fairness also fails to reach statistical significance in two other conditions—when the suspect is a middle-income black woman and a middle-income white man (b=1.60, p=0.14; b=1.90, se= 0.11, respectively). Nevertheless, beliefs about fairness are consistently inconsequential (i.e., across both measures) only when the suspect is a low-income black woman.

Table 4.4

Beliefs about the Fairness of Criminal Justice System and Agreement with Incarceration

	Low-income black woman	Control	Low-income black man	Mid-income black man	Mid-income black woman	Low-income white man	Mid-income white man	Low-income white woman	Mid-income white woman
Fairness Beliefs	0.71 (0.56)	2.28*** (0.58)	2.37*** (0.60)	2.67*** (0.54)	1.76*** (0.56)	1.61*** (0.50)	1.53*** (0.57)	1.99*** (0.54)	2.09*** (0.67)
Racial attitudes	0.68 (0.78)	0.38 (0.68)	0.42 (0.59)	-0.37 (0.66)	0.01 (0.69)	-0.46 (0.52)	0.41 (0.61)	-0.16 (0.61)	-0.83 (0.71)
Class attitudes	0.68 (1.22)	1.82** (0.91)	-0.09 (0.83)	-0.26 (0.88)	-0.61 (0.92)	1.45* (0.79)	0.75 (0.86)	0.24 (0.80)	0.37 (0.88)
Gender attitudes	0.36 (0.97)	-1.31 (0.97)	-0.34 (0.54)	2.37*** (0.70)	0.74 (0.71)	0.27 (0.59)	-0.57 (0.96)	0.17 (0.65)	1.48* (0.83)
N	60	72	78	79	81	94	64	91	66

Notes. Entries are ordered probit coefficients. Dependent variable is agreement that suspect should be incarcerated on a scale of 1-7 (7=strong agreement). All independent variables scaled 0-1, where 1 indicates believing justice system is fair, higher anti-black sentiment, higher individualistic/negative sentiment toward the poor, and higher gender inegalitarianism. Results robust to OLS.

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***= p<0.01

Table 4.5

Beliefs about the Fairness of Criminal Justice System and Preferred Prison Sentence

	Low-income black woman	Control	Low-income black man	Mid-income black man	Mid-income black woman	Low-income white man	Mid-income white man	Low-income white woman	Mid-income white woman
Fairness beliefs	-0.46 (1.17)	3.58*** (1.27)	5.73*** (1.51)	3.08*** (1.07)	1.60 (1.09)	3.49*** (1.13)	1.90 (1.19)	4.20*** (1.26)	3.87*** (1.50)
Racial attitudes	0.20 (1.61)	-0.58 (1.56)	2.14 (1.38)	-0.44 (1.37)	1.92 (1.42)	-0.59 (1.15)	2.00 (1.35)	0.08 (1.31)	1.20 (1.54)
Class attitudes	3.28 (2.72)	4.29** (2.17)	-2.52 (1.96)	1.14 (1.87)	-0.88 (1.86)	3.06* (1.78)	1.19 (1.82)	1.52 (1.86)	-2.73 (1.98)
Gender attitudes	3.35 (2.09)	-0.64 (2.09)	-1.47 (1.55)	2.83* (1.48)	1.74 (1.49)	0.74 (1.40)	-1.47 (2.09)	1.71 (1.60)	3.76** (1.89)
N	60	72	78	79	81	94	64	91	66

Notes. Entries are logit coefficients. Dependent variable is whether suspect prefers a prison sentence of any length (1) or no years in prison or probation (0). All independent variables scaled 0-1, where 1 indicates believing justice system is fair, higher anti-black sentiment, higher individualistic/negative sentiment toward the poor, and higher gender inegalitarianism. Results reported robust to OLS.

*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***= p<0.01

Although I found that beliefs about fairness have a null effect on whites' views in the low-income black female condition, further comparisons are useful. A key question that can be addressed is what difference it would make if beliefs about fairness actually mattered in the low-income black female condition. Toward that effort, Figures 4.4-4.7 provide the predicted probability of agreement with incarceration and preference for a prison sentence across the fairness beliefs scale for each experimental condition. The figures report the predicted probability of agreement (1=slight, flat, or strong agreement) or preference for a prison sentence (1=prison sentence of any length) calculated using binary logit models. Each model predicts agreement or preference for prison sentence as a function of experimental condition and interactions of each condition with beliefs about fairness, racial, class, and gender attitudes. The models omit the control condition and thus, the probabilities reported represent the marginal effect of being at the minimum (0), mid-point (0.5) and maximum (1) values on the fairness scale for individuals in the given condition relative to the control and while holding the other variables at their means. I provide two figures for each measure, one displaying only conditions in which the suspect was white and another displaying conditions in which the suspect was black.

To reiterate, I am concerned with how much of difference beliefs about fairness make where we can be confident that they have an effect. The figures illustrate that beliefs about fairness can make a big difference. For example, Figure 4.5 shows that when the suspect is a middle-income white man—the condition in which beliefs about fairness have their smallest effect—those who perceive the criminal justice system as very unfair are over two times less likely to agree with incarceration (25%) than those who perceive the system as very fair (59%). In the same figure, one sees that when the suspect is a low-income black man—the condition in which beliefs about fairness have their largest effect—those who perceive the criminal justice

system as very unfair are roughly sixteen times less likely (5%) to agree with incarceration than those who perceive the system as very fair (85%) to agree. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show similar findings for preference for a prison sentence—those who perceive the system as very unfair are anywhere from three to eighteen times less likely to prefer a prison sentence of some time than those perceiving it as very fair.

Figure 4.4



Figure 4.5



Figure 4.6



Figure 4.7



Thus far, I have provided no direct evidence that whites are indifferent toward or justify discrimination in the criminal justice system toward low-income black women. Although I cannot directly answer this question with my data, participants in each condition were asked two questions useful for this purpose: how likely is it that the suspect was treated fairly and equally by the police and how likely is it that the suspect will be treated fairly and equally by the courts (1= very unlikely; 5= very likely). As such, I can assess whether there are differences in perceptions of discrimination toward suspects of different identities.

Figure 4.8 below displays the means of an index variable composed of responses to the perceived discrimination items described above in order from lowest to highest likelihood (1= very likely that the suspect was/will be treated fairly and equally by police and courts). If my argument is correct, then the mean likelihood that the low-income black woman was/will be

treated fairly should be similar to or lower than for the other conditions (i.e., she should be perceived either as likely or less likely to be treated fairly compared to others). Otherwise (i.e., if the likelihood that the low-income black woman was treated fairly is higher), rather than rationalizing discrimination toward low-income black women, my findings could instead reflect a (mis)perception that low-income black women face less discrimination than others.

Figure 4.8



Notes. Figure shows 95% confidence intervals.

Consistent with my argument, Figure 4.8 shows that the perceived likelihood of being treated fairly and equally is mostly similar across the conditions. Most importantly, the mean likelihood that the low-income black woman was/will be treated fairly (mean=0.51) is significantly different from only three conditions—the low-income white male (mean=0.61; p=0.03), the middle-income white female (mean=0.61; p=0.03) and middle-income white male conditions (mean=0.62; p=0.03). Moreover, in these cases, the mean perceived likelihood for the low-income black female condition is *lower*—indicating that she is perceived as less likely to be treated fairly and equally (i.e., to face more discrimination). In conjunction with the other results, this provides some evidence that whites apparently disregard unfair treatment from the criminal justice system when forming their support for incarceration of low-income black women.

Conclusion

The incarceration of black women, who are also most often low-income, is undoubtedly constitutive of carceral growth, more broadly. Yet, the punishment of low-income black women has received remarkably little attention from academics, political elites, and the public alike. To better understand the sources and consequences of this dynamic, in this chapter, I drew on the concept of intersectionality. Through an experiment focusing on how the relationship between racial, economic, and gender identities shapes whites' support for incarceration, I found support for the argument that low-income black women are viewed uniquely as particularly unsympathetic and unlikely victims of discrimination from the criminal justice system. Specifically, the analysis showed that whether or not criminal punishment is the result of unfairness appears to be relatively inconsequential when it concerns low-income black women.

These findings shed new and disturbing light on white public opinion and the growth of incarceration in the U.S. Rather than simply reflect denial of racial unfairness in the system (see

Peffley and Hurwitz 2010), when it comes to black women who face economic disadvantage, whites' views may be more about justification or rationalization. As such, insofar as policies may implicate or be associated with low-income black women, this suggests that framings of fairness in the criminal justice system that de-emphasize race may still not be an effective means of building white public support reforming and making criminal justice less punitive.

More broadly, the research presented underscores the significance of cultural discourse and policy changes impacting low-income black women to the expansion of the criminal justice system. In particular, while understood as a key to welfare politics, my findings show how the public representations and understanding of black women are also central to the politics of crime. This is also consistent with research illustrating how the criminal justice and welfare systems are intimately linked with one another (e.g., Wacquant 2009). In addition, representation and perceptions of low-income black women are important to consider in relation to weak opposition to carceral growth. The disproportionate effect of carceral growth on low-income black women not only reinforces the findings presented here,

Nevertheless, a significant limit of this research is its exclusive focus on white Americans. Thus, it remains unclear whether and how these findings might apply to other groups, namely black Americans. As noted, given differing experience with the criminal justice system, blacks' beliefs about fairness are particularly sensitive to racial cues—when their racial identification is made salient (e.g., when criminal suspects are perceived to be black) beliefs about fairness become significantly more influential on their views (Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). That said, concerns over how the conditions and decisions of low-income black women reflect on blacks as a group that leads to the exclusion of the experiences of this group from the dominant frames of unfairness in the criminal justice system may also reduce the role of fairness

in blacks' views toward incarceration; when suspects are perceived to be low-income black women, fairness may matter less because they may be perceived as either being less affected or as responsible for their own outcomes.

As a whole, however, the need for a politics more sensitive and attuned to the most marginalized by U.S. society is clear. As Crenshaw (2012) notes, carceral growth has in part been made possible by the presence of a number of beliefs which presume dysfunctional black women in need of discipline. Until this is more broadly recognized, interested stakeholders may never fully grasp the sources and consequences of expanded criminal punishment in the U.S., nor how to effectively respond.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

The expansion of incarceration the U.S. is well-noted. This dissertation sought to better understand the politics surrounding this issue. Specifically, I conducted three empirical studies that helped to shed light on the political response to substantial increases in the usage and harshness of carceral punishment in the United States. The overarching and rather simple argument linking these studies together is that who issues affect or are perceived to affect profoundly influences and is influenced by the politics that surround them.

Through a content analysis of U.S. news media coverage of incarceration, a survey of a prominent civil rights organization advocating on behalf of black Americans, and a survey experiment on the sources of white Americans' support for incarceration, I showed how the intersection of incarceration with racial, class, and gender disadvantaged is intimately connected to its underlying politics. Taken together, each of these studies contributes to research on the political sources and consequences of carceral growth in the U.S., political inequality, political communications, political preference formation, and the politics of social identity. More to the point, the research presented further suggests that the political response to the buildup of the nation's prison system has likely been restrained by its disproportionate impact on black Americans who are economically disadvantaged. Pre-existing beliefs and representations of this group, as well as their reinforcement and re-legitimation by criminal punishment, has influenced the degree and type of attention that incarceration receives from political institutions, as well as the extent to which it is viewed as problematic by the public.

It should go without saying that understanding the politics of incarceration remains of the utmost importance. To see why, we need only reconsider the facts offered at the outset of this project. Stated again, incarceration has incredibly negative effects on individuals' economic

prospects and well-being, social and community ties, health, and political attitudes and behavior (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002; Pattillo, Weiman, and Western 2004; Pager 2007; Pettit 2012; Roberts 2003/2004; Western 2006). These so-called "collateral consequences" have made it incredibly difficult for incarcerated individuals to reintegrate into society, leading some to argue that the nation's heavy reliance on incarceration does little to deter and may actually increase crime, at least at a certain point (e.g., Clear 2009). The profound growth of incarceration unsurprisingly amplifies these effects. As of 2016, for example, an estimated 6.1 million Americans and 2.5% of the American voting age population were disenfranchised due to a felony conviction (The Sentencing Project 2016). Indeed, the sheer scale at which the nation incarcerates its citizens has been shown to have altered electoral outcomes, the accuracy of the collection and interpretation of social data used for policymaking, and the costs and burdens placed on state and federal governments (see Gottschalk 2008).

Given its concentration among groups significantly marginalized by American society, the growth of incarceration has also contributed significantly to inequalities of various kinds. In particular, disproportionate growth and representation of the black poor among the incarcerated population has devastated the black community, negatively impacting virtually every major outcome for blacks as a group, including income, wealth, employment, social ties, disease and illness rates, and political participation and resources (e.g., Burch 2013; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2002; Pattillo, Weiman, and Western 2004; Pager 2007; Pettit 2012; Roberts 2003/2004; Western 2006). Carceral growth has (re)created and legitimated the terms of U.S. citizenship and belongingness along racial and economic lines (Gottschalk 2008; Roberts 2003/2004). To summarize, incarceration and its growth have been detrimental to the well-being of incarcerated individuals, the communities form which they come, and U.S. society more broadly.

Insofar as scholars remain concerned with understanding the political roots of incarceration, researchers would do well to look beyond the usual suspects. Much research in political science has been preoccupied with the role of political elites and members of the public who belong to dominant groups (i.e., whites) in criminal justice politics. In addition, institutions and actors associated with "formal" institutions tend to be more central. As a result, however, they have essentially ignored and removed the political agency of seemingly less powerful groups who are actually affected by the issue, as well as underestimated the impacts and relevance of alternative forms of participation and modes of expression, such as online organizing and grassroots mobilization.

With the above in mind, perhaps the most fruitful direction for future research is to seriously examine de-carceration. In other words, it is time to ask how the nation might reduce its reliance on carceral punishment and the role of politics in facilitating or hindering this process. Scholars continue to rightly document the seriously damaging consequences of incarceration. Yet, we know much less from this work about the kind of politics that can address some of these injustices and move the issue forward. Considering this question will likely involve attending to and shedding further light the ways in which the politics of the criminal justice system actually operates in tandem with those of seemingly unrelated domains, such as social welfare and the foster care systems (see Roberts 2012, for example). And as others have recently suggested (Soss and Weaver 2016), and as the studies in this dissertation demonstrate, doing so demands centering the experiences and voices of the communities who are most affected.

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Appendix A

Appendices for Chapter 2

Appendix A1: Sampling Details

ProQuest was selected for gathering articles as it proved to be the only source providing content from the *L.A. Times* across the selected time period, at least free of charge. However, it became apparent that ProQuest does not consistently apply subject terms to articles in its databases. It was first decided that articles would be gathered by searching article text for the presence of key words and phrases. The list of key words was developed iteratively. First, I independently developed any terms directly signifying or related to the usage, conditions, and/or experience of supervision as carried out by correctional systems. Second and lastly, I randomly sampled articles that included the presence of at least one of the terms from the initial list and identified any potentially useful words and phrases from those articles that met relevancy criteria. See Table A1.1 for the final list of key words and phrases used to gather articles.

An additional limitation of ProQuest's databases is that one can only search either the entire text of articles or the headline for the presence of words and phrases. To determine which part of the text would be ideal for gathering my population and sample, I conducted preliminary searches and identified the overall amount of articles returned, as well as the proportion of articles returned that would be relevant for my purposes. Table A1.2 provides the data from these searches. The table shows that searching the entire text of articles for only two of the most explicit key words returns a large number of articles (208) but of which too small a proportion are relevant (44%). Alternatively, searching article headlines for my full set of key words returned both a large number of articles (392) and a high proportion of relevant articles (80%). To better ensure the search quality and keep the project manageable, I opted to gather my population and sample of articles by searching article headlines for the presence of at least one of the key words and phrases provided in Table A1.

Table A1.1

Key Words and Phrases Used to Gather Articles

Behind bars	Inmate
Criminal punishment	Inmates
Felon	Parole
Felons	Parolee
Felony	Parolees
Imprison	Prison
Imprisoned	Prisoner
Imprisonment	Prisons
Imprisons	Probation
Incarcerate	Probationer
Incarcerates	Probationers
Incarceration	

Table A1.2

Initial Search Data

Search parameters	Total # of Articles	% of Relevant Articles
Publication: *L.A. Times* **Dates**: January 1, 2013-December 31, 2013 **Keywords used**: Incarceration Imprisonment **Keyword placement:** Anywhere in text	208	44% (91)
Publication: *L.A. Times* **Dates**: January 1, 2013-December 31, 2013 **Keywords used**: Behind bars Criminal punishment Felon Felons Felony Imprison Imprisoned Imprisonment Imprisons Incarcerate Incarcerates Incarceration Inmate Inmates Parole Parolee Parolees Prison Prisoner Prisons Probation Probationer Probationers **Keyword placement**: Headline only	392	80% (315)

Appendix A2: Coding Procedures and Materials

All 750 sampled articles were manually coded by myself and three undergraduate assistants. Coding was completed with an online survey in which coders answered the same questions for each article they were assigned to code. Articles were made available for all coders in printed and in digital format as needed. Each sampled article (i.e., 750 articles) was coded for basic details (e.g., title) and relevancy. If a coder deemed an article relevant, they then coded the article further for the information of interest. The general instructions, as well as instructions and questions asked for the coding of each variable analyzed in text are provided below.

General Coding Guidelines

1. Background information: I am currently working on a project about the politics of incarceration in the United States. This specific study examines how news media portray those who experience incarceration. To do so, we will be coding news media content. It will take some time to become familiar with the typical article format and the coding items. Thus, at first, coding may be relatively slow but will it become easier and quicker as you proceed.

2. Preliminary steps: Before doing any coding, you should familiarize yourself with these coding instructions, coding criteria, and examples, as well as the coding instrument. If anything seems unclear or you have any questions, please contact me.

3. General coding process: First, I will provide a sample of news articles to you, as well as a link to a Qualtrics survey that you will use to code articles. Note that you should complete one survey for each article. Next, you should read and code each article one at a time. Read each article and the index information carefully and in its entirety before coding it (multiple times if necessary). Be sure that you understand each article before you begin a survey for it. After you feel that you have a good understanding of the article, begin the survey to code it. Carefully read each question as it appears on your computer screen. Make sure that you are confident of your response for each question before moving on to the next question. You can and should use these sheets, the article, and the index information while coding, as well. See the next page for more details about the coding survey.

4. In general: This document also provides some coding criteria and examples. However, there is almost always a subjective element to coding. Just use your best judgment and be as consistent as possible across articles. Additionally, note that as we code and as the project develops the coding is subject to change. In this regard, you should approach coding as a collaboration with me. If you feel that something is missing or that something about the coding is not working as best as it could, please let me know.

How to Code Articles

1. Read one article and the index information for the article in their entirety. Make sure that you understand what the article is about; read it multiple times and take notes if necessary. Be sure that you read the text of the actual article and the indexing information

that accompanies each article. Lastly, some articles, typically older ones, will be scans of originally published materials and may be difficult to read and/or code. If you need another copy of an article for this reason or any other reason, please contact me at K.Levay@u.northwestern.edu.

2. Once you have finished reading the article and feel that you have a good understanding of what it is about, open the survey on your computer using the following link:

   https://weinberg.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0PPkOMFWNEeJ7Hn

   If you lose this link or it is not working properly, e-mail me at K.Levay@u.northwestern.edu.

3. Read the initial instructions of the survey. Next, you should click the button to proceed to the coding questions.

4. Read and respond to each question individually and carefully. As you respond to each question, you should consult the coding instructions and both the article text and the index information. Additionally, when applicable, provide as many responses as possible for a given question. In other words, you should mark or write in as many responses as are relevant/necessary to answer the question as fully as possible. Alternatively, if the information for a question about an article is missing or inapplicable, leave that question blank and skip to the next one.

5. You will be able to return to questions that are no longer on the screen if you need to edit your response in some way. To do so, simply click the back arrow below the currently displayed question. Similarly, while you should always try to code each article in one sitting, if you must stop coding in the middle of an article or do not how to code something about an article, you may save your survey progress and exit. Once you are ready to code the article again, you should then be able to pick up the coding for that article where you last left off.

6. Once you have reached the end of the survey, you should receive a message that your responses have been recorded.

7. Once it is clear that your responses have been submitted and you want to continue coding, begin again with Step 1 on this page.

Variable Coding

Article Relevancy:
Articles with any one of the qualities listed below, should be considered irrelevant.

- *Non-U.S. Focus: any articles that are focused on individuals facing, currently serving, or having already served a sentence of incarceration in any facility not operated by the U.S. federal or state prison system. For example, an article about the*

incarceration of an American by the Iraqi government should be irrelevant. Similarly, coverage of prisoners in facilities which are not exclusively run by some U.S. state or the U.S. federal government is irrelevant.

- *Not print news-based: any articles that are not available in print format, are not news-based, or do not put forth the views of the media source and/or its staff are irrelevant. For example, the following are not print news-based and should be counted as irrelevant: letters to the editor, blogs, obituaries, reviews (e.g. book reviews), cultural events/ reviews, event schedules, and corrections to previously published articles.*
- *Little or ambiguous discussion of usage or conditions of incarceration: any articles whose majority of content is not about anything relating to incarceration as a response to crime or the circumstances of incarceration should be irrelevant. Additionally, when applicable, it must be clear from articles that incarceration is actually a potential punishment or punishment that has already been handed down for a criminal offense.*

Example headlines of irrelevant and relevant articles:

- *RELEVANT: 'Feds step up pressure for jail reforms; U.S. seeks oversight of mentally ill inmates in L.A. County, citing a sharp rise in suicides.'*

- *IRRELEVANT: 'U.S. soldier freed in swap with Taliban; Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, held captive since 2009, is released in a deal aided by Qatar.' REASON FOR IRRELEVANCY: Non-US focus.*

Please determine whether the article is irrelevant. If the article is **irrelevant**, please select **any/all** of the reasons listed below to indicate why. If the article is **relevant**, please move on to the next question.

1. Article has non-U.S. focus.
2. Article is not news-based.
3. The majority of content does not deal with and/or is ambiguous about the usage or conditions of incarceration.
4. Some other reason (please explain).

Attention to carceral growth:

I am interested in whether the article mentions anything about the size or rate of growth of any correctional population as a problem or issue. By that, I mean whether articles make any identify as a problem or mention any changes in the size (e.g. raw numbers or percentages) of any correctional population (e.g., prisoners, parolees, probationers, ex-offenders). This can come in either in the form of textual or numerical description.

Does the article mention anything about the size and/or rate of growth of any correction population?

0. No
1. Yes

Demographic information:
Articles may provide information about the size or rate of correctional supervision either among or between different racial, ethnic, economic, or gender groups. For example, an article may discuss the percentage of the prison population that is black and white or the rate at which black Americans are incarcerated. This can also come in the form of textual description.

Does the article mention anything about the distribution and/or rate of growth of any correctional population by race and/or ethnicity?

0. No
1. Yes

Does the article mention anything about the distribution and/or rate of growth of any correctional population by economic class?

0. No
1. Yes

Does the article mention anything about the distribution and/or rate of growth of any correctional population by gender?

0. No
1. Yes

Problem definition:
The size or changes in the size of some correctional population may be identified as a problem or discussed in terms of a number of different consequences. For example, growth in the incarcerated population might be described as over-utilizing the state's resources (i.e., economic considerations) or as a condition in which the rights of incarcerated individuals are abused (i.e., human rights considerations). Listed below are various problems and/or consequences with descriptions that articles may or may not identify. For each one, please indicate if the article mentions it or not (0=not mentioned; 1= mentioned)).

Physical spatial conditions: inadequacy of physical and/or spatial arrangements afforded to incarcerated individuals (e.g., overcrowding, etc.).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Conflict/Violence: tensions and/or physical altercations among incarcerated individuals and/or incarcerated individuals and actors responsible for managing them (e.g., fights, murdered, etc.).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Economic: economic costs—internal (e.g., correctional spending) or external (e.g., state spending) of incarceration (e.g., budgetary concerns, financial mismanagement, etc.).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Fairness: illegitimacy and/or undeserved incarceration (e.g., wrongful convictions, biases in usage of incarceration, disproportionate harshness of punishment, etc.).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Administration: logistical difficulties in management of incarcerated individuals (e.g., keeping files updated, escapes, etc.).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Civil Rights: abuses and/or infringements upon the rights of incarcerated individuals (e.g., violations of human or legal rights of incarcerated, etc.).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Public health: health of incarcerated individuals and/or those in contact with them (e.g., spread of diseases).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Casual Attributions:

I am interested in whether and who is assigned responsibility for causing changes in the size and/or rate of correctional supervision among the general or any more specific U.S. populations, as well as the problems they may or may not pose. Different actors may be mentioned as contributing to the size or rate of incarceration or sources which are associated with or under the control of these actors. Each of the below provides a list of actors or institutions that may be mentioned in an article as a cause. Please indicate whether each actor/institutions or any sources which can be associated with them are mentioned in the article (0=mentioned; 1= not mentioned). Also please note whether the article mentions no causes at all.

Law enforcement: actors and institutions, and/or any powers/rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with the identification of criminal activity (e.g., police activities).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Courts: actors and institutions, and/or any powers and/or rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with adjudication of criminal matters (e.g., court activities, sentencing policies).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Corrections: actors and institutions, and/or any powers and/or rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with administration of carceral punishment (e.g., parole conditions).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Social conditions: outcomes related to the general well-being of society (e.g., crime rates, poverty).

2. Not mentioned
3. Mentioned

Public: society or general societal norms and/or actors/institutions designed to respond to them (e.g., public beliefs/elite reaction to or perception of public beliefs about incarceration/crime or incarcerated individuals).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

None: article provides no causes at all

0. Some cause is provided
1. No causes are provided

Treatment Attributions:

I am interested in whether and who is assigned responsibility for addressing or remediating changes in the size and/or rate of correctional supervision among the general or any more specific U.S. populations, as well as the problems they may or may not pose. Different actors may be mentioned as necessary to change or make more appropriate the size or rate of incarceration or sources which are associated with or under the control of these actors. Each of the below provides a list of actors or institutions that may be mentioned in an article as a treatment (i.e., a/responsible for solution). Please indicate whether each actor/institutions or any sources which can be associated with them are mentioned in the article (0=mentioned; 1= not mentioned). Also please note whether the article mentions no treatments/solutions at all.

Law enforcement: actors and institutions, and/or any powers/rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with the identification of criminal activity (e.g., police activities).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Courts: actors and institutions, and/or any powers and/or rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with adjudication of criminal matters (e.g., court activities, sentencing policies).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Corrections: actors and institutions, and/or any powers and/or rules governing actors and institutions, tasked with administration of carceral punishment (e.g., parole conditions).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Social conditions: outcomes related to the general well-being of society (e.g., crime rates,).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

Public: society or general societal norms and/or actors/institutions designed to respond to them (e.g., public beliefs/elite reaction to or perception of public beliefs about incarceration/crime or incarcerated individuals).

0. Not mentioned
1. Mentioned

None: article provides no solutions or hold any actors responsible for resolving issue(s).

0. Some solution provided

No solutions are provided

Appendix A3: Coding Reliability

I assessed the reliability of the coding by having two undergraduate search assistants independently code an identical random sample of 75 articles from the initial population. In all cases, the coding variable is dichotomous (e.g., 0=not about incarceration; 1= about incarceration). Unfortunately, however, as the coding process constantly evolved and resources were limited, I calculated and provide estimates for only some parts of the coding framework. Given all coding concerned nominal variables, appropriate reliability statistics include the percentage of agreement between the coders and the percentage of agreement correcting for the possibility of agreement by chance. For a given article and when possible, I analyzed whether the coders agreed on the presence or absence of a given variable in the framework. Table A3.1 provides inter-coder reliability estimates for those parts of the coding included in this chapter as permitted. Where possible, the results meet or exceed typical standards of reliability (e.g., Neuendorf 2001).

Table A3.1

Reliability of Coding Framework

Variable	% Agreement	Kappa (standard error)
Relevancy (i.e., article about incarceration)	87.5%	0.72 (0.12)
Carceral growth (i.e., article mentions carceral growth)	86.5%	0.70 (0.11)
Racial/ethnic carceral trends mentioned	100%	0.79 (0.14)
Economic class carceral trends mentioned	94.2%	0.78 (0.10)
Gender carceral trends mentioned	100%	0.79 (0.12)
Male incarcerated individual mentioned	83%	0.69 (0.12)
Female incarcerated individual mentioned	98%	0.81 (0.14)
White incarcerated individual mentioned	100%	0.78 (0.12)
Black/African American incarcerated individual mentioned	98.1%	0.79 (0.14)
Hispanic/Latinx incarcerated individual mentioned	96.2%	0.69 (0.13)
Other racial/ethnic minority incarcerated individual mentioned	96.2%	0.71 (0.14)

Appendix A4: Full Statistical Test Results

Table A4.1

Difference in Proportions Test Results: Attention to Carceral Growth between Time Blocs										
Time bloc	1964-1968	1969-1973	1974-1978	1979-1983	1984-1988	1989-1993	1994-1998	1999-2003	2004-2008	2009-2013
1964-1968	NA	0.05* (0.03)	0.07** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.05)
1969-1973	0.05* (0.03)	NA	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)
1974-1978	0.07** (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	NA	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)
1979-1983	0.09** (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	NA	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
1984-1988	0.05* (0.03)	0 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	NA	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)
1989-1993	0.06** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	NA	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.12** (0.06)
1994-1998	0.08** (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	NA	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.10* (0.06)
1999-2003	0.09*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	NA	0.02 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
2004-2008	0.12*** (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	NA	0.07 (0.07)
2009-2013	0.18*** (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.12** (0.06)	0.10* (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	NA

Notes. Table reports results of two-tailed, difference in proportion significance tests which test whether each difference is statistically significant. Standard errors reported in parentheses. NA= not applicable; *=significant at 0.10 level; **=significant at 0.05 level; ***=significant at 0.01 level.

Table A4.2

Difference in Proportions Test Results: Problem Definition Frames of Carceral Growth							
Frame	Physical/ Spatial Conditions	Conflict/ Violence	Economics	Fairness	Administration	Civil Rights	Health
Physical/ Spatial Conditions	NA	0.52*** (0.09)	0.26*** (0.10)	0.59*** (0.08)	0.54*** (0.09)	0.59*** (0.08)	0.54*** (0.09)
Conflict/ Violence	0.52*** (0.09)	NA	0.26*** (0.09)	0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)
Economics	0.26*** (0.10)	0.26*** (0.09)	NA	0.33*** (0.08)	0.28*** (0.09)	0.33*** (0.08)	0.28*** (0.09)
Fairness	0.59*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)	0.33*** (0.08)	NA	0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Administration	0.54*** (0.09)	0.02 (0.07)	0.28*** (0.09)	0.04 (0.06)	NA	0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)
Civil Rights	0.59*** (0.08)	0.01 (0.05)	0.33*** (0.08)	0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	NA	0.04 (0.06)
Health	0.54*** (0.09)	0.01 (0.05)	0.28*** (0.09)	0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	NA

Notes. Table reports results of two-tailed, difference in proportion significance tests which test whether each difference is statistically significant. Standard errors reported in parentheses. NA= not applicable; *=significant at 0.10 level; **=significant at 0.05 level; ***=significant at 0.01 level.

Table A4.3

Difference in Proportions Test Results: Demographic Information about Carceral Growth			
Demographic	Race/ethnicity	Economic class	Gender
Race/ethnicity	NA	0.07 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)
Economic class	0.07 (0.06)	NA	0.09 (0.06)
Gender	0.02 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	NA

Notes. Table reports results of two-tailed, difference in proportion significance tests which test whether each difference is statistically significant. Standard errors reported in parentheses. NA= not applicable; *=significant at 0.10 level; **=significant at 0.05 level; ***=significant at 0.01 level.

Table A4.4

Difference in Proportions Test Results: Causal Attributions for Carceral Growth						
Actor/Institution	None	Law enforcement	Courts	Corrections	Social conditions	Public
None	NA	0.52*** (0.07)	0.17* (0.10)	0.30*** (0.09)	0.48*** (0.08)	0.35*** (0.09)
Law enforcement	0.52*** (0.07)	NA	0.35*** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.03)	0.17** (0.06)
Courts	0.17* (0.10)	0.35*** (0.07)	NA	0.13 (0.09)	0.30*** (0.08)	0.17* (0.09)
Corrections	0.30*** (0.09)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.13 (0.09)	NA	0.17** (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)
Social conditions	0.48*** (0.08)	0.04 (0.03)	0.30*** (0.08)	0.17** (0.07)	NA	0.13** (0.06)
Public	0.35*** (0.09)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.17* (0.09)	0.04 (0.08)	0.13** (0.06)	NA

Notes. Table reports results of two-tailed, difference in proportion significance tests which test whether each difference is statistically significant. Standard errors reported in parentheses. NA= not applicable; *=significant at 0.10 level; **=significant at 0.05 level; ***=significant at 0.01 level.

Table A4.5

Difference in Proportions Test Results: Treatment Attributions for Carceral Growth						
Actor/Institution	None	Law enforcement	Courts	Corrections	Social conditions	Public
None	NA	0.13*** (0.05)	0.20** (0.09)	0.59*** (0.08)	0.11** (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)
Law enforcement	0.13*** (0.05)	NA	0.33*** (0.07)	0.72*** (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07* (0.04)
Courts	0.20** (0.09)	0.33*** (0.07)	NA	0.39*** (0.09)	0.30*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.08)
Corrections	0.59*** (0.08)	0.72*** (0.07)	0.39*** (0.09)	NA	0.69*** (0.07)	0.65*** (0.08)
Social conditions	0.11** (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	0.30*** (0.07)	0.69*** (0.07)	NA	0.04 (0.04)
Public	0.07 (0.06)	0.07* (0.04)	0.26*** (0.08)	0.65*** (0.08)	0.04 (0.04)	NA

Notes. Table reports results of two-tailed, difference in proportion significance tests which test whether each difference is statistically significant. Standard errors reported in parentheses. NA= not applicable; *=significant at 0.10 level; **=significant at 0.05 level; ***=significant at 0.01 level.

Appendix B

Appendices for Chapter 3

Appendix B1: NAACP Survey Recruitment

344 units received an initial e-mail to solicit interest in participation in the survey. Then, responsive units (either by phone or e-mail) then received at least two-follow-ups providing more details about the survey and a link and deadline for actual participation and completion. Follow-up reminders with similar content were sent as needed. The messages can be found below:

Initial Message

SUBJECT LINE: Interested in important work of NAACP (location of unit)
Hello NAACP (location of unit),

My name is Kevin Levay. I am a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University working on a research project about the very important work of local units of the NAACP. I am writing to see if one person at your unit who is able and willing to participate in a brief, confidential survey about the unit's agenda and activities. In addition to helping complete my degree, the survey provides a unique and fantastic opportunity to inform others about the essential and significant work of local units.

I am happy to provide more information about my project, as well as answer any questions or concerns you might have. I can be reached via e-mail at [e-mail] or phone at [phone number]. Please do not hesitate to get in touch!

Thanks so much,
Kevin

Follow-up

Thank you for responding so promptly and your interest!

You are welcome to complete the survey via the Internet or telephone and it should take roughly 25 minutes. The goal of the survey is to simply capture the breadth and diversity of the activities and agendas of local NAACP units. The survey contains fairly basic questions about both administrative details for your unit (e.g., budget) and the activities and issues of focus for your unit. Responses will be kept confidential-- neither you nor the identity of your unit will be linked to responses. You are also free to exit the survey or skip any questions at any time. Finally, participating units will receive a copy of the survey results if they desire.

Assuming you are interested in participating, please let me know and I can provide you with a link to the survey or schedule a time for completion of the survey over the phone. I am also more than happy to address any questions or concerns you may have at this point over e-mail at [e-mail] or phone at [phone number].

Thanks!
Kevin

Participation Follow-up

Great. Thank you for participating; it is greatly appreciated!

I would greatly appreciate if you could complete the survey by ***[deadline].*** *A link to the survey is here: [survey link]*

If you decide you'd rather complete the survey over the phone, please let me know as this is still possible. And of course, you can also contact me by e-mail or phone with any remaining questions or concerns.

Kevin

Non-responsive Units

As needed, units who did not respond received e-mails with similar content as that of responsive and participating units. Depending upon the point of non-responsiveness (i.e., non-response to initial e-mail, non-response to follow-up), the introductions of messages were simply amended as needed (e.g., *I am writing to follow up on my previous request for your participation in a survey of local units of the NAACP that I am conducting to complete my doctoral dissertation. So far, many units have responded to my request, but I want to be sure that I hear from as many units as possible so that I can fully recognize all of the important work of the NAACP!)*

Appendix B2: NAACP Survey Instrument

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. **Remember that all of your responses are confidential and will not be linked to you or your unit.** You may also choose to skip questions or exit the survey at any time.

In answering questions, please do your best to answer on behalf of your unit as accurately as possible. You will notice questions that ask about members and constituents. To be sure:

- **Members** are people who are formally associated with your unit by signing up for information and updates from your unit, volunteering time or resources, and/or paying membership dues.
- **Constituents** are people who your unit represents but who may not have any formal ties with your unit.

Thank you for your time and assistance; it is greatly appreciated. If you should have any questions or comments about the survey, you may contact Kevin Levay at [e-mail].

We would like to begin by asking some general questions about your unit. Remember that we are interested in knowing about **your local unit**, so please answer all questions with this in mind. If you are unsure of the answer to a particular question, please try and answer as best as possible.

1. What is your official position or designation at your unit? [text entry]

2. Please provide the state and zip code in which your unit is located as instructed below.

   State (e.g., AL): [text entry]
   Zip code (e.g., 11111): [text entry]

3. What is the approximate budget of your unit for the current year? Please enter this value using numbers only.

   [text entry]

4. **Members** are people who are formally associated with your unit by signing up for information and updates from your unit, volunteering time or resources, and/or paying membership dues. Roughly speaking, how many individuals are **members** of your unit? Please enter this value using numbers only.

   [text entry]

5. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "few to none" and 5 is "almost all," about what proportion of your **members** would you say belongs to the following categories?

	Few to none 1	Less than half 2	About half 3	More than half 4	Almost all 5
Asian Pacific Americans					
Blacks or African Americans					
Latino/as or Hispanics					
Whites or Caucasian Americans					
Elderly people					
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender people					
Immigrants					
Individuals with criminal convictions, such as prisoners or formerly incarcerated individuals					
Women					
Poor and/or low-income people					

6. **Constituents** are people who your unit represents but who may not have any formal ties with your unit. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "few to none" and 5 is "almost all," about what proportion of your **constituents** would you say belongs to the following categories?

	Few to none 1	Less than half 2	About half 3	More than half 4	Almost all 5
Asian Pacific Americans					
Blacks or African Americans					
Latino/as or Hispanics					
Whites or Caucasian Americans					
Elderly people					
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender people					
Immigrants					
Individuals with criminal convictions, such as prisoners or formerly incarcerated individuals					
Women					
Poor and/or low-income people					

7. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "very unimportant" and 5 is "very important," how important is **influencing public policy at the local, state, and/or federal level** as part of your unit's mandate and activities?
    1. Very unimportant

2. Unimportant
3. Neither unimportant nor important
4. Important
5. Very important

The remaining questions ask about the policy advocacy of your unit. If you previously indicated that influencing public policy is not that important to your unit's mandate and activities, please imagine that it is important. **That is, please answer the remaining questions in the survey *as if* influencing public policy is important to your unit's mandate and activities.** Again, all responses will be kept confidential and will not be linked to you or your unit.

8. Roughly speaking, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "little to none" and 5 is "almost all," about what proportion of your unit's budget is allocated to activities aimed at influencing public policy at the local, state, and/or federal levels?
    1. Little to none
    2. Less than half
    3. About half
    4. More than half
    5. Almost all

9. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "very unimportant" and 5 is "very important," how important is each of the following issue areas to the activities and political concerns of your unit?

	Very unimportant 1	Unimportant 2	Neither unimportant nor important 3	Important 4	Very important 5
Poverty and economic justice					
Civil rights and civil liberties					
Criminal justice					
Health and human services					
Immigration					

10. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "not at all" and 5 being "a great deal," to what degree does your unit address the policy concerns of each of the following groups?

	Not at all 1	A little 2	Some 3	A lot 4	A great deal 5
Asian Pacific Americans					
Blacks or African Americans					
Latino/as or Hispanics					

Elderly people					
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or transgender people					
Immigrants					
Individuals with criminal convictions, such as prisoners or the formerly incarcerated					
Women					
Poor and/or low-income people					

11. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "never" and 5 is "very frequently," how often does your unit use each of the following activities when pursuing its policy goals?

	Never 1	Rarely 2	Sometimes 3	Often 4	Very Frequently 5
Directly lobbying legislators					
Directly lobbying executive leaders and agencies					
Grassroots lobbying of legislators, such as letter-writing or e-mail campaigns					
Working with executive agencies to draft, enforce, and/or administer regulations, rules, or guidelines					
Pursuing litigation by filing suits in courts					
Filing amicus curiae briefs in lawsuits brought by other groups or individuals					
Organizing public demonstrations, marches, protests, boycotts, strikes, and/or pickets					
Participating in public demonstrations, marches, or protests organized by others					
Issuing press releases, talking with media, and/or running advertisements about your position on issues					
Entering into coalitions or working with another local, state, and/or national-level branch of the NAACP					
Entering into coalitions or working with other organizations (i.e., organizations other than NAACP)					

Giving testimony at legislative and/or executive agency hearings at the local, state, and/or federal levels					
Presenting research results or technical information to policymakers					
Serving on governmental advisory commissions or boards					

12. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "none" and 5 being "a great deal," **how much attention does your unit devote to the agendas and activities of** each of the following?

	None 1	A little 2	Some 3	A lot 4	A great deal 5	Haven't heard of this organization
National Urban League						
Black Lives Matter						
National Council of La Raza						
Black Youth Project 100						
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund						
Southern Christian Leadership Conference						
League of United Latin American Citizens						

13. In general, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "strongly disagree" and 5 is "strongly agree," **how much do you agree that pursuing policy goals is made *more difficult* for your unit by the activities** of each of the following? For example, how much do you agree that recruiting members, raising funds, or achieving desired outcomes on its policy goals is harder for your unit because of the agendas, positions, or activities of each of the following?

	Strongly disagree 1	Disagree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Agree 4	Strongly agree 5	Haven't heard of this organization
National Urban League						
Black Lives Matter						
National Council of La Raza						
Black Youth Project 100						

Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund						
Southern Christian Leadership Conference						
League of United Latin American Citizens						

14. In general, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "strongly disagree" and 5 is "strongly agree," **how much do you agree that pursuing policy goals is made *easier* for your unit by the activities** of each of the following? For example, how much do you agree that recruiting members, raising funds, or achieving desired outcomes on its policy goals is easier for your unit because of the agendas, positions, or activities of each of the following?

	Strongly disagree 1	Disagree 2	Neither agree nor disagree 3	Agree 4	Strongly agree 5	Haven't heard of this organization
National Urban League						
Black Lives Matter						
National Council of La Raza						
Black Youth Project 100						
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund						
Southern Christian Leadership Conference						
League of United Latin American Citizens						

15. In no particular order, please list up to **five specific policy issues** that your unit has worked on **in the past year**. Please enter each issue on a separate line as provided.
    a. Issue 1 [text entry]
    b. Issue 2 [text entry]
    c. Issue 3 [text entry]
    d. Issue 4 [text entry]
    e. Issue 5 [text entry]

16. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "very inactive" and 5 is "very active," how **active** is your unit **today** on each of the issues you listed?

	Very inactive 1	Inactive 2	Neither inactive nor active 3	Active 4	Very active 5
[Issue 1]					
[Issue 2]					
[Issue 3]					
[Issue 4]					
[Issue 5]					

17. Which of the issues you listed would you say is currently your unit's top priority?
    a. Issue 1 [text entry]
    b. Issue 2 [text entry]
    c. Issue 3 [text entry]
    d. Issue 4 [text entry]
    e. Issue 5 [text entry]

18. In no particular order, please list up to **five specific criminal justice policy issues** that your unit has worked on **in the past year**. ***You may include issues you listed previously, but please list only issues that your unit explicitly views as relevant to its activities concerning criminal justice policy goals here***.
    a. CJIssue 1 [text entry]
    b. CJIssue 2 [text entry]
    c. CJIssue 3 [text entry]
    d. CJIssue 4 [text entry]
    e. CJIssue 5 [text entry]

19. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "very inactive" and 5 is "very active," how **active** is your unit **today** on each of the criminal justice issues you listed?

	Very inactive 1	Inactive 2	Neither inactive nor active 3	Active 4	Very active 5
[CJIssue 1]					
[CJIssue 2]					
[CJIssue 3]					
[CJIssue 4]					
[CJIssue 5]					

20. Which of the criminal justice issues you listed would you say is currently your unit's top priority?
    a. CJIssue 1 [text entry]
    b. CJIssue 2 [text entry]
    c. CJIssue 3 [text entry]

d. CJIssue 4 [text entry]
e. CJIssue 5 [text entry]

21. Thank you for your participation in this survey. If you have any questions or comments you may contact Kevin Levay at [e-mail].

    If you would like to receive a copy of the results of the survey, please enter a full e-mail address into the text box below where it can be sent.

    [text entry]

Appendix C

Appendices for Chapter 4

Appendix C1: Experimental Survey Recruitment

As noted, participants were recruited using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. The survey was designed and accessible from the Qualtrics survey building program. The survey was advertised to all workers with the following description:

Complete a short (6-8 minute) research survey about the news and current social and political issues. Once you complete the survey, you will receive a code to paste into the box below to receive your reward. This project is supervised by James N. Druckman in the Department of Political Science, Northwestern University. The Northwestern IRB Study Number is STU202114.

The only requirement for participation was an IP address based in the United States.

If workers opted into the survey, they could simply click a link opening the survey. Participants then read consent information, which included payment information, as well as the nature, risks, and benefits of participation. If they provided consent, participants then read introductory information instructing them that they would need to first "read a news article that was recently published to a national news website" before moving on. Upon completion, participants received a number generated by a randomized algorithm, which they were instructed to input into their Amazon information so that they could receive payment. As noted, all participants who met these requirements and completed the survey were paid $0.50.

Appendix C2: Sample Composition, Randomization Checks, Distribution of Responses on Dependent Variables

Table C2.1

Basic Demographic Characteristics of Sample

	Experimental Sample (n=703-712)	2012 ANES Internet sample (n=2,395-2,577)
Age (mean number of years)	36.6 sd=12.1	49.2 sd=16.2
% Female	51.3%	51.4%
% with college degree or higher	54.7%	32.9%
Median household income (U.S. dollars)	40,000-59,999	55,000-59,999
% South	38.8%	37.7%[a]
% Democrat	43.6%	27.9%
% Republican	20.9%	35.8%
% Independent	31.4%	33.0%
% Other political party	4.1%	0.3%
Ideology (mean on scale of 1-7; 7= extremely conservative)	3.4 sd=1.7	4.3 sd=1.5

Note. Unless otherwise noted, all data include only white American citizens and exclude participants who provided no answer or Don't Know option for a given variable. Additionally, unless otherwise noted, all comparison data include only participants completing the American National Election Studies 2012 Time Series Study over the Internet and are weighted to be representative of the general U.S. population. 'sd' denotes standard deviation for statistic.

[a] Figure based on most recently available data from the U.S. Census.

Table C2.2

Relevant Attitudinal Characteristics of Sample

	Experimental sample	Comparison sample
Anti-black attitudes (mean on racial resentment scale of 0-1; 1=most racially resentful)	0.50 sd=0.29	0.68[a] sd=0.23
Gender egalitarianism (mean on scale of 0-1; 1=most egalitarian)[b]	0.74 sd=0.19	0.83 sd=0.13
Class attitudes (%agreement or that/place higher importance that individual work needed to advance economically)[c]	53.2%	71.9%
Criminal Justice Fairness Beliefs (%agreement that justice system treats people fairly and equally)[d]	44.8%	44.3%

Note. Unless otherwise noted, all data include only white American citizens and exclude participants who provided no answer or Don't Know option for a given variable. 'sd' denotes standard deviation for statistic.

[a] Figure based on data from participants who completed the American National Election Studies 2012 Time Series Study over the Internet; figure is weighted to be nationally representative of U.S. general population.

[b] Data for scale for experimental sample based on responses to a subset of the 13 items composing the gender egalitarianism scale developed by Winter (2008) Figure for comparison sample based on data from Winter (2008), and include responses to the full set of items and nonwhites; data not collected from a population-based sample.

[c] Data for experimental sample based on agreement (strongly agree/agree) that poor people can get ahead with hard work. Data for comparison sample based on data from the General Social Survey and include those who agree that hard work is more important than luck and help to getting ahead; data for comparison sample is weighted to be nationally representative of white Americans.

[d] Figures based on response to single item asking extent of agreement that the 'justice system in this country treats people fairly and equally. Comparison figure based on data from nationally-representative sample of white Americans reported by Peffley and Hurwitz (2010). Note that experimental sample could choose agree nor disagree, while comparison sample could not.

Table C2.3

Sample Characteristics by Experimental Condition

	Control	Low-income black man	Low-income black woman	Mid-income black man	Mid-income black woman	Low-income white man	Low-income white woman	Mid-income white man	Mid-income white woman
Age (mean)	37.1	34.9	37.7	36.6	38.9	36.7	36.8	34.1	36.5
% female	43.4%	45.6%	56%	60.4%	51.8%	49.5%	44.8%	52.2%	62.1%
% college degree or higher	61.3%	54.4%	48.4%	54.3%	44.7%	62.5%	58.3%	52.2%	53.0%
Median HH income	$40,000-$59,999	$20,000-$39,999	$40,000-$59,999	$20,000-$39,999	$20,000-$39,999	$40,000-$59,999	$40,000-$59,999	$40,000-$59,999	$40,000-$59,999
% South	42.1%	36.7%	43.8%	41.3%	30.6%	38.1%	38.1%	43.3%	37.9%
% Democrat	48.7%	31.7%	46.0%	43.2%	40.0%	42.3%	44.3%	50.0%	50.0%
% Republican	16.2%	27.9%	19.05%	14.8%	25.8%	22.7%	23.7%	18.2%	16.7%
% Independent	29.7%	35.4%	26.9%	38.3%	30.6%	30.9%	29.9%	30.3%	28.8%
% Other party	5.4%	5.1%	7.9%	3.7%	3.5%	4.1%	2.1%	1.5%	4.6%
Ideology (mean)	2.9	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.7	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.2
Mean no. of days/wk. consume TV news	2.4	2.9	3.1	2.2	2.76	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.3
Racial attitudes (mean)	0.48	0.54	0.47	0.48	0.53	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.53
Gender attitudes (mean)	0.24	0.28	0.24	0.26	0.29	0.22	0.28	0.27	0.27
Class attitudes (mean)	0.46	0.47	0.43	0.44	0.48	0.43	0.47	0.46	0.46
Beliefs about fairness (mean)	0.53	0.54	0.51	0.45	0.52	0.55	0.47	0.51	0.49

Note. Two-sided t-tests indicate that beliefs about fairness significantly differ between the middle-income black male condition than those in every condition, except those in white female ones. Significant differences also exist between some conditions in mean levels of gender egalitarianism, as well as in age and gender composition. However, as Table C2.4 illustrates, none of these variables significantly predict treatment assignment.

Table C2.4

Randomization and Balance checks

	Pearson Chi^2	ANOVA	Multinomial Logistic Regression
Age		F=1.03 p-value=0.41	
Gender	Chi^2=11.17 p-value=0.19		
Education	Chi^2=19.39 p-value=0.73		
Income	Chi^2=34.21 p-value=0.73		
Southern residency	Chi^2=4.39 p-value=0.82		
Partisanship	Chi^2=18.41 p-value=0.78		
Ideology	Chi^2=43.35 p-value=0.66		
TV News consumption	Chi^2=51.71 p-value=0.64		
Racial attitudes		F=0.83 p-value= 0.58	
Gender attitudes		F=1.29 p-value= 0.25	
Class attitudes		F=0.60 p-value=0.77	
Beliefs about fairness		F=1.43 p-value=0.18	
All variables			Chi^2=114.95 p-value=0.22

Table C2.5

Overall Distribution of Dependent Variables

	% of participants in sample
Agreement with Incarceration (n=712)	
Strongly disagree	18%
Disagree	19%
Slightly disagree	12%
Neither agree nor disagree	11%
Slightly agree	13%
Agree	18%
Strongly agree	9%
Prison sentence length (n=712)	
Selected prison sentence of any length	47%
Selected no prison time	53%

Appendix C3: Experimental Survey Treatments

Figure C3.1 Control condition

Illinois resident charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois resident was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in their vehicle during a traffic stop.

The suspect, a resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near their home.

The suspect is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, the suspect could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.2 Low-income black male condition

Illinois man charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois man was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in his vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Timothy Johnson, a low-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near his home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, he could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.3 Low-income black female condition

Illinois woman charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois woman was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in her vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chelsea Johnson, a low-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near her home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, she could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.4 Middle-income black male condition

Illinois man charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois man was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in his vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Timothy Johnson, a middle-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near his home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, he could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.5: Middle-income black female condition

Illinois woman charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois woman was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in her vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chelsea Johnson, a middle-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near her home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, she could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.6: Low-income white male condition

Illinois man charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois man was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in his vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Timothy Johnson, a low-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near his home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, he could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.7 Low-income white female condition

Illinois woman charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois woman was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in her vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chelsea Johnson, a low-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near her home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, she could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.8 Middle-income white male condition

Illinois man charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois man was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in his vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Timothy Johnson, a middle-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near his home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, he could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Figure C3.9 Middle-income white female condition

Illinois woman charged with drug possession

By WILLIAM MILLER
NOVEMBER 2, 2015 9:00AM

An Illinois woman was arrested last night after local authorities discovered drugs in her vehicle during a traffic stop.

LAKEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chelsea Johnson, a middle-income resident of Lakeville, was reportedly stopped for a broken tail light near her home.

Johnson is expected to be arraigned later this afternoon. If found guilty during trial, she could be sentenced to more than a year in prison.

Appendix C4: Experimental Survey Manipulation Check

Table C4.1

Percentage of participants correctly recalling race, class, and gender of suspect			
	Correctly recalled race	Correctly recalled class	Correctly recalled gender
Control	94.7%	96.1%	39%
Low-income black man	100%	73.4%	98.7%
Low-income black woman	96.9%	73.4%	100%
Middle-income black man	96.2%	62.9%	98.7%
Middle-income black woman	100%	63.5%	97.6%
Low-income white man	98.9%	74.2%	100%
Low-income white woman	98.9%	75.2%	98.9%
Middle-income white man	100%	67.1%	100%
Middle-income white woman	100%	64.6%	100%

Appendix C5: Main Experimental Survey Items

Support for incarceration

Support for incarceration was measured with two items adapted from Peffley, Shields and Williams (1996). Response options provided below with each respective question.

1. *How much do you agree that [the suspect in the case/Timothy/Chelsea] should be sentenced to prison if they are found guilty of the crime?*
   Response options: strongly disagree, slightly disagree, disagree, neither agree not disagree, slightly agree, agree, strongly agree
2. *Suppose that [the suspect in the case/Timothy/Chelsea] discussed in the news story is found guilty of the crime. If you were the judge in the case, how many years in prison do you think [the suspect/Timothy/Chelsea] should serve, if any?*
   Response options: no years or probation, less than 1 year, 1 to 2 years, 2 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years, 10 years or more

Beliefs about fairness

Beliefs about fairness were measured with three items adapted from Peffley and Hurwitz (2010). Response options for each item included: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. Responses to each item scaled into an index ranging from 0-1 (0=very unfair; alpha= 0.89).

1. *The courts in your area can be trusted to give everyone a fair trial.*
2. *The police in your area can be trusted to treat everyone fairly and equally.*
3. *The justice system in this country treats people fairly and equally.*

Class attitudes

Class attitudes were measured using four items listed below based upon previous research on beliefs about stratification (e.g., Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Response options for each item included: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. Responses to each item scaled into an index ranging from 0-1 (0=least individualistic; alpha= 0.79).

1. *Poverty is mostly the result of personal irresponsibility of poor people.*
2. *Poor people could get ahead if they just had more discipline.*
3. *If poor people put in more effort, they would get out of poverty.*
4. *Poverty is mostly due to a lack of lack of ability and talent among those who are poor.*

Gender attitudes

Gender attitudes were measured using a subset of four items listed below from the sex role egalitarianism scale developed by Winter (2008). Response options for each item included: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. Responses to each item scaled into an index ranging from 0-1 (0=most gender egalitarian; alpha= 0.74).

1. *A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after home and family.*

2. *When both husband and wife work outside the home, housework should be equally shared.*
3. *Fathers are not as able to care for their sick children as mothers are.*
4. *The husband should be head of the family.*

Racial attitudes

Racial attitudes were measured using the standard four items listed below composing the racial resentment scale (see Kinder and Sanders, 1996); response options for each item included: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree. Responses to each item scaled into an index ranging from 0-1 (0=least racially resentful; alpha= 0.92).

1. *Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.*
2. *Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.*
3. *Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.*
4. *It's really a matter of people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.*

Appendix C6: Experimental Survey Robustness Checks

As some of the conditions do differ by demographic factors, I re-ran models that produced the results in Tables 4 and 5 with a number of controls, including: age, sex, education, income, southern residence, partisanship, ideology, and media consumption. Tables C6.1 and C6.2 below show that the results are unchanged when controlling for these factors.

Table C6.1

Beliefs about the Fairness of Criminal Justice System and Agreement with Incarceration

	Low-income black woman	Control	Low-income black man	Mid-income black man	Mid-income black woman	Low-income white man	Mid-income white man	Low-income white woman	Mid-income white woman
Fairness Beliefs	0.78 (0.67)	2.32*** (0.72)	2.73*** (0.68)	2.27*** (0.71)	1.62*** (0.61)	1.11** (0.50)	1.46** (0.67)	1.82*** (0.63)	2.42*** (0.83)
Racial attitudes	0.91 (0.84)	-0.28 (0.87)	-0.03 (0.68)	-0.27 (0.79)	0.16 (0.79)	-1.23** (0.62)	0.84 (0.68)	-0.24 (0.73)	-1.21 (0.84)
Class attitudes	1.59 (1.44)	2.17** (1.16)	0.02 (0.90)	0.85 (1.08)	-1.10 (1.01)	1.64* (0.79)	0.74 (1.04)	1.22 (0.88)	1.35 (1.09)
Gender attitudes	-0.16 (1.27)	-2.27* (1.24)	-0.54 (0.77)	3.86*** (0.84)	0.57 (0.88)	-0.36 (0.69)	-1.67 (1.25)	0.15 (0.73)	2.53** (1.05)
Age	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Sex (1=male)	-0.45 (0.32)	-0.17 (0.13)	0.24 (0.26)	-1.24*** (0.31)	-0.18 (0.25)	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.59* (0.31)	-0.31 (0.26)	-1.01*** (0.34)
Income (1-6; 6=120,000 or more)	0.18 (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)	-0.18 (0.10)	0.16 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.16)	0.09 (0.21)
Education (1-5; 5=graduate/ professional training	-0.06 (0.19)	0.13 (0.19)	0.15 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.16 (0.16)	0.17 (0.17)	0.52* (0.29)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)
South (1=resides in southern state)	-0.17 (0.30)	0.33 (0.29)	0.29 (0.28)	-0.28 (0.29)	0.22 (0.27)	0.45* (0.25)	-0.05 (0.56)	0.06 (0.26)	0.27 (0.29)
Republican (0/1)	-0.08 (0.70)	0.74 (0.67)	-0.20 (0.51)	0.56 (0.59)	-0.21 (0.55)	0.39 (0.50)	-0.05 (0.56)	-0.67 (0.48)	-0.61 (0.66)

Independent (0/1)	0.39 (0.45)	0.39 (0.38)	-0.23 (0.33)	-0.34 (0.38)	-0.66 (0.41)	-0.15 (0.31)	-0.05 (0.38)	-0.25 (0.37)	0.31 (0.42)
Other party (0/1)	-0.14 (0.65)	0.15 (0.67)	-0.89 (0.68)	-1.46 (0.91)	-1.10 (1.04)	-2.28*** (0.88)	-6.48 (276)	0.69 (0.97)	-0.41 (0.77)
Ideology (1-7;7=extremely conservative)	0.03 (0.18)	0.13 (0.16)	0.11 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.17)	0.12 (0.15)	0.24* (0.14)	0.04 (0.13)	0.11 (0.12)	0.03 (0.16)
TV (no. of days/wk. consuming TV news)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)	0.13** (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)
N	58	69	76	76	81	93	62	89	66

Note. Entries are ordered probit coefficients. Dependent variable is agreement that suspect should be incarcerated on a scale of 1-7 (7=strong agreement). Relevant attitudinal variables scaled 0-1, where 1 indicates believing justice system is fair, higher anti-black sentiment, higher individualistic/negative sentiment toward the poor, and higher gender inegalitarianism. Other variables coded as indicated in table. Omitted/reference partisanship category is Democratic.
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***= p<0.01

Table C6.2

Beliefs about the Fairness of Criminal Justice System and Preferred Prison Sentence Length

	Low-income black woman	Control	Low-income black man	Mid-income black man	Mid-income black woman	Low-income white man	Mid-income white man	Low-income white woman	Mid-income white woman
Fairness beliefs	0.05 (1.49)	4.58** (1.79)	5.91*** (1.78)	2.63* (1.63)	1.56 (1.28)	2.99** (1.33)	2.58 (1.64)	4.07*** (1.55)	6.70** (2.69)
Racial attitudes	0.59 (1.82)	-1.13 (2.21)	1.83 (1.67)	0.89 (2.06)	1.19 (1.74)	-0.88 (1.37)	3.99** (1.89)	0.24 (1.69)	3.62 (2.70)
Class attitudes	5.05 (3.31)	5.14* (3.08)	-4.07* (2.32)	2.44 (2.08)	-0.29 (2.22)	3.32* (2.01)	3.29 (2.51)	3.51 (2.44)	-7.99** (4.07)
Gender attitudes	4.77 (3.15)	-2.78 (2.81)	-0.92 (1.91)	5.92*** (2.08)	3.16 (2.02)	0.19 (1.81)	-2.61 (3.13)	1.66 (2.03)	10.92** (3.67)
Age	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.001 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.04)
Sex (1=male)	-1.25 (0.78)	-1.05 (0.80)	0.58 (0.67)	-2.23*** (0.77)	-0.76 (0.56)	-0.12 (0.56)	0.26 (0.75)	0.20 (0.65)	-3.98*** (1.49)
Income (1-6; 6=120,000 or more)	-0.16 (0.26)	0.41 (0.27)	0.32 (0.25)	-0.24 (0.27)	-0.28 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.20)	-0.37 (0.28)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.61 (0.30)

Education (1-5; 5=graduate/ professional training	0.11 (0.43)	-0.24 (0.43)	-0.39 (0.42)	0.66 (0.45)	0.26 (0.35)	-0.22 (0.40)	1.39*** (0.54)	-0.10 (0.38)	0.47 (0.55)
South (1=resides in southern state)	-0.92 (0.73)	0.43 (0.70)	0.39 (0.67)	-0.42 (0.73)	0.89 (0.59)	0.39 (0.58)	0.62 (0.77)	0.58 (0.62)	0.90 (0.82)
Republican (0/1)	2.23 (1.75)	0.67 (1.61)	-0.99 (1.23)	1.33 (1.64)	1.14 (1.20)	1.79 (1.34)	-0.46 (1.47)	-1.28 (1.21)	3.32 (2.37)
Independent (0/1)	0.37 (0.97)	0.24 (0.88)	-1.37 (0.82)	-0.68 (0.94)	0.76 (0.84)	0.57 (0.66)	-0.57 (0.96)	-0.69 (0.92)	0.69 (1.29)
Other party (0/1)	-1.37 (1.64)	0.24 (0.88)	X	-1.25 (2.03)	X	X	X	0.08 (3.04)	X
Ideology (1-7; 7=extremely conservative)	-0.31 (0.39)	0.16 (0.37)	0.23 (0.32)	-0.21 (0.41)	-0.18 (0.33)	-0.10 (0.33)	-0.18 (0.33)	0.07 (0.29)	-0.25 (0.43)
TV (no. of days/wk. consuming TV news)	-0.23 (0.19)	-0.17 (0.16)	0.14 (0.14)	0.26* (0.15)	0.05 (0.12)	0.08 (0.13)	0.08 (0.17)	0.25 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.17)
N	58	69	72	76	79	89	64	61	63

Note. Entries are logit coefficients. Dependent variable is whether suspect prefers a prison sentence of any length (1) or no years in prison or probation (0). Relevant attitudinal variables scaled 0-1, where 1 indicates believing justice system is fair, higher anti-black sentiment, higher individualistic/negative sentiment toward the poor, and higher gender inegalitarianism. Other variables coded as indicated in table. Omitted/reference partisanship category is Democratic. X indicates that variable predicts perfectly and observations were dropped.
*=$p<0.1$, **=$p<0.05$, ***= $p<0.01$