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Dividing the Poor: Congressional Representation in Rhetoric and Policy during the New Deal

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Abstract

Existing scholarship documents the low levels of political power held by the American poor, and concomitant economic elite domination of Congress. Since the poor seldom elect lawmakers that share their *descriptive* traits, they necessarily rely on non-poor lawmakers *virtually* representing their interests. A key part of this virtual representation is how lawmakers conceptualize the poor, leading to two questions: how do lawmakers conceive of and politically construct the poor, and along what basis are the poor divided during the policymaking process? This dissertation answers these questions with a novel empirical assessment of poverty representation through rhetoric and policy in the high salience, path-breaking period of the long New Deal (1933-1946). Previous scholarship demonstrates the divisive nature of New Deal programs, but these works have not fully interrogated how the way in which the poor were represented contributed to such division. This dissertation finds lawmakers do not view the poor as a coherent economic class, but instead as an amalgam of groups with varied import across members, thereby shifting attention toward a fundamentally sociopolitical group-based analytical framework. The process of division provides mixed results, as Congress proves effective at gathering information and depicting the *breadth* of specific types of poverty across the country. However, lawmakers are much less successful at reconciling this awareness to materially address the *deepest* forms of poverty. Instead, lawmakers weigh the poor against one another, where only the most virtuous gain policy incorporation. In the critical moments when lawmakers are inclined to affirmatively construct antipoverty policy, myopia and ulterior motives—such as the needs of non-poor interest groups—inform the choice of policy design. Consequently, the perpetuation of poverty is a conscious political outcome of the praxis of poor representation, wherein expediently dividing the poor into stratified sub-groups is a central tendency in national politics.

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My struggles with poverty form a core pillar of my identity and define much of my adolescence and early adulthood. Memories of hunger, insufficient health care coverage, low self-esteem, drug dependency, evictions, repossessions, social isolation, enveloping anxiety, dropping out of high school, interacting with the juvenile criminal courts, homelessness, and hopeless desperation continue to inform my perspective, albeit in an increasingly remote manner. So it seems obvious to state it was not always clear I would have the opportunity to write a dissertation, let alone one that channeled my lived experiences into a systematic study about the politics of poverty (specifically Congressional representation of the poor during the New Deal policy process). I could have taken many other life paths, and indeed I did before I found my love for higher education. Education and the support of those around me have facilitated my ascent in life. This dissertation would not be possible without the contributions of educators, administrators, mentors, friends, and family that have illuminated a path forward. Because I am fortunate enough to have encountered many amazing people, this acknowledgement section is admittedly quite long.

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Part I:
Problem and Approach

Chapter 1

Whose New Deal?

An Introduction to the Divided Congressional Representation of the Poor

Abstract

The poor are underrepresented by lawmakers as they seek to construct policies that purport to combat poverty. Existing scholarship documents the low levels of political power held by the American poor, and economic elite domination of the legislative branch. Therefore, an important locus to understand the dynamics of poverty in America is to focus on how non-poor lawmakers conceptualize the poor as they virtually represent their interests. Two questions are key to understand the politics of poverty: how do lawmakers conceive of and politically construct the poor, and along what basis are the poor divided during the policymaking process? This dissertation answers these questions with a novel empirical assessment of poverty representation through rhetoric and policy in the high salience, path-breaking period of the New Deal. Previous scholarship demonstrates the divisive nature of New Deal programs, but these works have not fully interrogated how the way in which the poor were represented contributed to such division. This dissertation finds lawmakers do not view the poor as a coherent economic class, but instead as an amalgam of groups with varied import across members, thereby shifting attention toward a fundamentally sociopolitical group-based analytical framework. Lawmakers have few incentives to solve systemic poverty and are instead inclined to pit the poor against one another, where only the most virtuous gain policy incorporation. In the critical moments when lawmakers are inclined to affirmatively construct antipoverty policy, myopia and ulterior motives—such as the needs of non-poor interest groups—inform the choice of policy design. Consequently, the perpetuation of poverty is a conscious political outcome of the praxis of poor representation, where expediently dividing the poor into stratified sub-groups is a central tendency in U.S. national politics.

The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.

–President Franklin D. Roosevelt (D-NY), January 20, 1937

The poor have limited organizations, they are not in a position to band together and to assert their claims and rights... I do want some safeguard so we will not get into the situation where we will be dealing with influential low-income groups who have votes, and the poor widow, wash women, orphans and others who have to live in these slums are forgotten.

–Senator David I. Walsh (D-MA), April 14, 1937

It is somewhat appalling to me that every time we consider a proposition that really helps poor people, someone gets up on the floor and attacks it.

–Representative Jerry Voorhis (D-CA), June 26, 1942

I sometimes think that men of great wealth and large income in some way lack the penetrating imagination to understand the misery, the humiliation, and the degradation of people trying to live on \$20, \$30, or \$40 a month.

–Senator Sheridan Downey (D-CA), July 20, 1946

Introduction

Poverty is an enduring human development problem, frequently used as a diagnostic marker for the health of a society. In a republican democracy, this perspective is valuable at assessing how well a polity incorporates the needs of materially marginalized communities into remedial policy outcomes. Since poverty has many heterogeneous causes, including individual behavior, group culture, and macro-level structural explanations, its amelioration is no easy task, even under the best of circumstances. For the first time in U.S. history, lawmakers during the long New Deal period (here operationalized as 1933 to 1946) entered the void and undertook the task of using national resources to reduce ubiquitous penury caused by the Great Depression. However, as Senator Walsh's quote indicates, in a system run by an insulated elite stratum, the problem of poverty is further compounded by the reality that poor people have little political power and are divided in society and in the minds of lawmakers. And yet, some of the poor receive attention and policy action in national politics, even if the goals of political leaders like President Roosevelt were limited in scope to relieving—but not eradicating—poverty throughout the country.

While scholars show increasing interest in the politics of poverty, no scholarship has yet systematically accounted for how the poor are perceived by lawmakers in the representational process, and how this perception factors into policy design. The following dissertation fills this gap by tracing the representation of the poor: identifying which lawmakers speak about the poor in Congressional floor speeches, how they conceptualize the poor, and how these conceptions factor into antipoverty policy provision. This analysis focuses on the New Deal period due to the high salience of poverty in the minds of lawmakers and its centrality in structuring the policy governance of poverty reduction for the 80 years that follow. This introductory chapter examines problems in poor politics by synthesizing scholarship on the New Deal, representation, and political inequality, concluding with a chapter roadmap that highlights key findings.

This dissertation advances our current understandings of political inequality, American political development, Congress, representation, and policymaking on several fronts. The first contribution this project makes is to systematically demonstrate the logic of group-based poor representation, in which Members of Congress (MCs) eschew broad economic class-based conceptions of the poor in favor of categorizations based on occupation, demography, geography, and circumstance. Second, this is made possible through the creation of the first large-scale corpus of lawmaker speeches on the poor, extrapolated from the underutilized primary source *Congressional Record*, which uncovers the substance of how lawmakers represent hard to conceptualize, under mobilized groups. A third contribution is that this novel empirical undertaking of rhetoric yields new and rich measures of member ideologies, values, and preferences, contrasting with common roll call-based approaches that are limited in their conceptual and interpretive meaning. Fourth, the use of floor speeches as a unit of analysis differs from pooled member-based approaches in Congressional studies, simultaneously allowing for greater granularity while also aggregating into a signifier for how Congress as an institution collectively reckons with the idea of poverty. A fifth contribution is to demonstrate that lawmakers construct neither universalistic nor pure needs-based policies, but instead choose which among the poor (and special interests) to give particularized benefits.

In short, this is not a typical study of the poor or Congress but is instead the essential resource documenting and analyzing the historical record of poor representation in the 1930s and 1940s. These contributions (among others) help us better understand what happened in the New Deal, how politicians conceive of and represent the poor, and the independent role of politics in the continuation of poverty.

The Singularity of the New Deal

While scholars have critiqued the idea of periodization in historical studies (Mayhew 2005; Kersh 2005), there are several uniquely important reasons to study poverty representation during the New Deal period. First, widespread poverty in the public created conditions ripe for lawmakers to project the interests of the poor. Second, it was the critical juncture that nationalized state action on poverty—a remarkable departure from previous laissez faire and subnational approaches. Third, it provided system-defining benefits to many at-risk populations in the public, redesigning capitalism and the social contract between citizens and government in the process. Fourth, its shortcomings accordingly played out in generations of political consternation, restructuring elemental aspects of American politics in the process, from electoral competition, interest group power, citizens' relation with the state, and institutional configurations. All of these suggests the New Deal is the most consequential period within which to examine the politics of poverty.

Indeed, the New Deal is one of only two periods in all of U.S. history—with the Great Society in the 1960s—in which social policy and poverty amelioration factored prominently on the national policy agenda (Skocpol and Amenta 1995, 167). The Great Society itself was in large part a response to the failures and unfinished business of the New Deal, suggesting analyses of the politics of poverty should start in the earlier period. To understand contemporary social welfare—cash welfare, unemployment insurance, retirement pensions—one must understand the New Deal.

In the 1932 and 1934 elections, President Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats were handed several of the clearest electoral mandates in U.S. history, having campaigned on policy reforms commensurate with the crisis conditions plaguing the economy. Previously, only soldiers and mothers had statutory state or national supports, but the New Deal extended these logics forward by federalizing—but seldom nationalizing—these and other programs (Skocpol 1992;

1995). The policies that followed are well-known and significant, including the Agricultural Adjustment Act, Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, Social Security Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. Housing Act, and National School Lunch Act. “By instituting a large federal relief program and by reviving the economy,” writes historian Walter Trattner, “Roosevelt succeeded in restoring confidence in the nation’s basic institutions, thereby preventing further catastrophe” (1999, 281).

The New Deal did not just remake government, but also the whole American political economy. While path-breaking, the new regime did not solely provide public goods, but also contributed to a growth in a public-private welfare regime—a “parallel development” of public and private social provision, with the choices in the former often facilitating the growth of the latter (Hacker 2002, 279-280). Additionally, large scale industrial planning remade the country into a more geospatially and sectorally interconnected political economy in service of reshaping the global market order (Schwarz 1993). Jason Smith (2006) contends the New Deal “revolutionized the priorities of the American state, radically transforming the physical landscape, political system, and economy of the United States” through public works programs that created mass employment and infrastructural development that facilitated the post-World War II economic boom (1-4). But as we will see shortly, the New Deal has a mixed record, leaving many members of the public without lasting policy supports, entrenching some powerful interests while excluding others, and creating a legacy of uneven state development (Lowi 1979; Katznelson 2013).

Dividing the Public

Scholars of American Political Development (APD) and the welfare state have exposed several aspects of inequality in the New Deal. On a broad level, while there were numerous major victories for the poor in this period, these policies culminated in a highly fractious, uneven policy

constellation (Hacker 2002). Moreover, this period reveals a startling process of dividing the citizenry along myriad lines, including by occupation, race, class, gender, age, ethnicity and citizenship status, geography, and interest power. Notably, the tendency toward division hurts the least powerful in each discrete category, and worse, intersectional membership across categories compounds to disproportionately affect long-distressed, vulnerable populations, such as the chronically poor. However, the full details of this logic of division are not fully understood because these studies often focus on one aspect of the division, and do not synthesize the full scope of group exclusion. Therefore, this section will examine these works and highlight unresolved questions, and the next section will reassert the importance of centering on the poor—which cut across these categories—in greater detail to understand why lawmakers divided the public in this era.

Occupation

One group of scholars view the perceived bias and exclusion in the Social Security Act as a product of low administrative capacity (Davies and Derthick 1997; DeWitt 2010). Specifically, agricultural and domestic workers are not covered in the SSA because the state administrative apparatus was nascent, and it was not feasible to include every job type given the differences in wage structure and labor concentration. Moreover, industrial workers were more numerous, concentrated, and had a more regimented work schedule with potentially a single entry point into the premises where they can punch in and out, making accounting for each worker and their benefits much easier than other professions. Moreover, the Southern legislative veto altered the potential policy outcomes, and lawmakers from this region sought to maintain the existing labor order in the region (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder 1993). While these explanations are plausible, this dissertation will probe this logic further to center on why dividing the poor and workers—for

example, those in maritime, education, and government sectors—occurred so broadly within the SSA and in other policy domains. Simply put, it is not *a priori* determined which occupations gain inclusion into a policy prescription, and there might be specific evidence in poverty rhetoric and committee hearings on antipoverty legislation to uncover actor construction of the bases of exclusion.

Race

In contrast to the previous thinkers, several scholars believe the vocational carve outs of agricultural and domestic workers in SSA and other policies are thinly veiled racism used to maintain hierarchy in the Southern political order (Quadagno 1994, 21-22; Lieberman 1998; Trattner 1999, 282; Katznelson 2005). Indeed, if there was one thing that held “[S]outhern sectionalism” together across Congressional chambers, it was the “[S]outhern attitude toward the Negro [providing such a] bedrock” (Key 1949, 373). The omission of those groups was a concerted effort to covertly exclude Blacks, who were concentrated in those vocations, from gainful policy incorporation. Further, the heterogeneous New Deal Democratic coalition and single-party dominance in the South ensured egalitarian policies would face a Southern filibuster in the Senate (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder 1993; Katznelson and Farhang 2005). Therefore, as Lieberman (1998) notes, “[t]he New Deal embodied an intricate compromise between the national and inclusive impulses of Northern progressivism and the hierarchical and parochial imperative of the South” (216). In turn, these decisions contributed to disparate downstream impacts later in the century, helping to create a white middle-class that nonetheless became resentful of poor minorities once they finally had access to welfare programs.

Given America’s history of ascriptive hierarchy, especially in the South, these explanations are convincing—and yet, they many not be entirely correct. For example, the Southern

“imposition” explanation relies heavily on roll calls to show sectional difference, but roll calls are notoriously bad at conveying underlying processes, since there are many alternative policies on and off the agenda that members position their votes against. In short, roll calls are at best a coarse form of issue position-taking, but are hardly a clear indicator of advocacy level. Moreover, it is not foregone that Northerners propounded universalism, as the region was itself ideologically heterogeneous. So how did Northerners make the case for universalism? We commonly accept that non-Southern lawmakers were more racially inclusive, but is this the case when it comes to antipoverty rhetoric and policy?

Aside from the argument about administrative capacity, there is another potential explanation: non-Southerners were also disinclined to help the needy in the Black community. Indeed, that is what I find later in this dissertation, as non-Southern lawmakers do not prioritize Blackness in their depictions of the poor, suggesting at best a blind spot in their awareness, or at worst, disregard for this constituency. This suggests advocacy for racial equality at the time was not bound to advocacy for economic equality in the Black community among many MCs. Further, few non-Southern MCs made the case for universalism, and in fact attacked those that did, like Earnest Lundeen, for being too idealistic. By tracing the rhetorical framing of the poor—as this dissertation does—we can monitor the energy level and commitment of lawmakers to racial equality and poverty reduction, better contextualizing and explaining what happened and why these two strands of contemporary liberal thought (Schickler 2016) had not yet merged.

Class

Another fissure in New Deal division occurs along class lines. While class and race are intertwined, the policies propounded by New Dealers favored the middle-class experiencing momentary hardship and left behind much of the long-standing poor (and by extension, African-

Americans) (Lieberman 1998, 26). Moreover, the political incorporation of powerful working-class interests, such as organized labor, was attenuated by maintaining allegiance to conservative business interests and diminished the scope of the New Deal, divided workers, and minimized prospects for class consciousness within labor (Levine 1988, 157). Accordingly, powerful capitalists by and large decided industrial policy within the New Deal coalition.

But these depictions oversimplify the process of class division; the common division between middle- and lower-class is not how the poor have been divided within society. Instead, class division is both vertical, for example wage-earners versus factory owners, and horizontal, such as industrial workers versus agricultural labor. Moreover, there is often a special resentment for people of certain poverty conditions, such as the unemployed, criminals, and vagrants. While the basis of division will vary based on society, political culture, and secular time in world development, the poor are especially prone to social censure and division in elite conception. Indeed, class division is very common, and in an odd historical twist, the New Deal mirrored how Karl Marx divided the classes in his work, specifically contrasting the virtuosity and efficiency of the industrial workforce with the desperation and backwardness of the agricultural poor (Tucker 1978, 482). Since FDR was trying to defray revolutionary socialist tension in the U.S. during the Great Depression, it may not be a coincidence that the group most central to the New Deal's reforms were industrial workers, since incorporating them would diminish the revolutionary crisis. Overall, few scholars have focused on how the poor in particular fared through the New Deal, and one approach to begin this task is to track how MCs represent the poor in their rhetoric (including who they define as poor), while also accounting for the logic of division within the policy realm.

Gender

Ample scholarship has found the New Deal was gender-biased in creating robust policy supports for male breadwinners, while relegating women to unreliable state-based programs (Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988; Gordon 1994). In particular, Suzanne Mettler (1998) finds the policy effects of women being relegated to underfunded state-run programs like Aid to Dependent Children, while men had national supports like unemployment insurance, reshaped the citizenry for generations. In creating these policies, lawmakers used federalism and bureaucratic autonomy to facilitate division. But this research leaves several remaining questions. For one, do we see this gender disparity in the rhetorical construction of poor people? And how did lawmakers grapple with overt versus covert division, since there is evidence they did both? To hint at later findings, lawmakers often represent male characterizations in a general way or to talk about workers (based on gendered assumptions), while women are most often relegated to household depictions. In this way, there is support for the gendered nature of the New Deal, as lawmakers still conceptualized of men as requiring vocational help, and women as needing domestic help to care for children.

Ethnicity, Nationality and Immigration

Existing studies look at the Black-White and North-South paradigms, but a greater system of political division was at play, argues Cybelle Fox (2012, 7-8). This was the selective incorporation of some immigrant groups and not others. The New Deal incorporated White immigrants, but not immigrants of color. Additionally, citizenship status and nation of origin mattered heavily, as White immigrants were incorporated into work-relief programs, while Mexican immigrants were deported in part because of the actions of the social workers from which they sought help. Indeed, agricultural migrant workers “were by definition the most marginal of all American workers” with few—if any—protections under the law (Jones 1992, 170). These

findings are striking, and direct researchers to look at how migrants, immigrants, and foreigners are conceptualized in the New Deal, which requires a comprehensive group identification agenda.

Geography

Additionally, Fox believes federalism and geospatial differences in political economy mattered heavily in the construction of the New Deal (2012, 11). On this front, eminent political historian Richard Bense (1984) examines the durability of sectionalism in APD, with the important finding that sectional strife declined in Congress during the New Deal, partly as a product of the pan-regional Democratic coalition, but also due to the institution adopting a committee-based system of “closed, covert working relationships between committee members and [the] executive bureaucracy” (53). While this may have lessened sectionalism, it did not lead to equitable distribution of benefits across space. In particular, there was a geospatial divide where programs were more effective at increasing domestic spending in urban than rural areas (Fishbank, Horrace and Kantor 2005), potentially contributing to the well-observed contemporary resentment of rural citizens toward urbanites, since government is perceived to be more responsive to the latter (Cramer 2016). But broad analyses of sections (core to periphery or North and South) might miss the internal variation of poverty interest across the nation. Indeed, interest in poverty may not cleanly fit with a party or geography-based model, varying widely based on the priorities of each member. While there are instances of concentrated poverty, the members representing these areas rarely form a sizeable bloc, which paired with the general dispersion of poor people across terrain (Jusko 2017) means the political geography of poor representation could potentially take on many patterns. For example, since the South was significantly poorer than the rest of the regions, did they express antipoverty agendas at higher levels? Did poverty mean the same thing to MCs across

the country, or were they focused on specific local poverty issues? This dissertation is designed to answer these geospatial questions.

Age

Some consider the U.S. regime to be ageist, favoring security for the elderly over childhood development (Binstock 2010, 575). Indeed, Julia Lynch (2006) shows the U.S. has a low level of social spending on all age groups relative to other OECD nations, but that masks the large disparity between elderly and non-elderly social spending (182-184). The U.S. is highly skewed, spending almost 40 times as much on the elderly as the non-elderly, creating an old-age policy regime (31). Importantly, what the elderly had that the non-elderly, especially children, did not have was a very strong mobilized mass movement in the form of Townsend Clubs (Amenta 2006). But does this difference entirely explain the skew of the system? This dissertation examines whether lawmakers constructed the elderly as greater in need than children, monitoring their respective agenda share, and exposes the qualitatively different ways in which members discuss these groups (among others).

Interest Groups

In his seminal work, Theodore Lowi (1979) describes the New Deal as a critical juncture in U.S. political history, where powerful coalition partners were incorporated into the ever-expanding administrative state with little self-reflection guiding overall institutional configuration, leading to a regime best explained as “interest group liberalism.” Accordingly, this regime is less responsive to the will of the voters, instead favoring entrenched powerful interests, which forms an Iron Triangle between Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. Fitting this narrative, Bense (1984) finds this period had a “general decline in statutory specification and a corresponding rise in executive discretion” (53). One way to test this antidemocratic skew is by

looking at antipoverty policies—created for the most in need—to see if there is always an underlying coalitional interest at play. For example, labor unions were pivotal to the New Deal coalition, and yet, their responsibility is primarily to raise standards in their respective trades, which may not automatically facilitate inclusive antipoverty policies to eliminate poverty. This dissertation pursues this by examining several policy domains (pensions, housing, and nutrition), and indeed, finds support for interest group creep: secondary constituencies in the form of interest groups are ever-present in policy construction, heavily benefit from antipoverty legislation, and even alter the scope of antipoverty policies at achieving poverty-lessening goals.

What About the Poor?

These studies importantly revise the historical record to point out the inherent contradictions in the New Deal's vast expansion of social welfare and concomitant division of the public. However, these highly specialized and illuminating studies are not intended to comprehensively examine the systematic division of the public across various group constructions. Therefore, part of the task undertaken here is to synthesize this material to better understand the logic of political division in the New Deal. Additionally, this is also an opportunity to insert the glaring missing piece of poor representation into an analysis. Therefore, I argue centering on the poor, with an eye toward measuring division, will accomplish both goals of understanding the New Deal's logic of division and more broadly, the politics of poverty. Indeed, it is worthwhile to understand how conceptions of the poor may fit existing—or expose new—logics of division.

Poverty is an underlying, unobserved, cross-cutting element across these studies. And yet, it has not received the proper level of attention in the development of the New Deal that it warrants. This is curious given how much of Roosevelt's (and his coalition's) mandate was based upon vows to solve endemic poverty, and how the New Deal was a radical shift toward redistributive policies.

It is no surprise division occurs within the poor, as they are a historically fragmented, isolated, and ostracized group across time and cultures. Theda Skocpol (1995) summarizes the issues they face in the U.S. quite well: “When left to themselves, however, impoverished minorities have suffered the most from the divisions encouraged by America’s fragmented political institutions and the continuing ambivalence of most citizens about the proper—or possible—role of concentrated governmental authority in national life... the fate of the American poor will remain tied to possibilities for their inclusion in political coalitions that transcend class and race” (32-33). Moreover, division of the poor is compounded by the power of norms in restraining reformist tendencies and the limitations of administrative capacity to deliver benefits to everyone in a cost and labor efficient manner. Finally, dividing the poor is especially pernicious because of the lack of private provision for their needs, all but guaranteeing the continuance of human suffering. Consequently, the next section looks for answers by examining the nature of poor representation in policy creating body of the U.S. Congress.

Representation and the Poor

Quality representation is a central part of a functioning republican polity, such as the United States, where the interests of both majority and minority communities require some level of incorporation for the system to prove rational and just. Since the poor are among the least capable at expressing shared interests through collective action, without proper representation the American state seems ill-suited to account for the needs of the impoverished. Moreover, representational processes may filter which among the poor are deserving, and which can be ignored. Therefore, the resource deficient and heterogenous poor—arguably more than any other group—rely on elite representation to amplify their interests, and consequently, examining the logic to poor representation is a central task for those interested in the politics of poverty. This is

doubly true for the periods like the New Deal, where we see the poor receive policy benefits. How does that happen? This section helps explain how the poor are represented in American politics.

Hanna Pitkin (1972 [1967]) provides the seminal definition of political representation as when an actor (agent) is authorized by—and seeks to act on behalf of—a subject (principal) (8). The longest running debate within the representation literature centers on whether representation is based on how well an elected official does what their constituents ask of them (delegate) or whether representation is instead using one's judgment to conceive of what is best for the public (trustee) (Fox and Shotts 2009). Another debate in the approach to conceptualization and measurement of representation is between accounting for differences in how well legislators follow district-based directives (dyadic representation) or how well an institution represents the will of the governed as a whole (collective representation) (Weissberg 1978). The most popular contemporary debate assesses to what extent representation based on shared characteristics between constituents and their representatives (descriptive representation) is beneficial in itself, and further, its role in achieving favorable policies for a group (substantive representation) (Pitkin 1972 [1967]; Welch and Hibbing 1984; Whitby 1997; Rogers 2006; Grose 2011; Lapinski 2013, 19). While substantive representation is possible without descriptive representation (Swain 1993), descriptive representation facilitates direct mass-elite communication channels, increases constituent trust levels, and enhances lawmakers' ability to tie group interests to complex political problems (Mansbridge 1999; Gay 2002).

An additional orthogonal facet is known as symbolic representation, a dynamic in which a representative "stands for" a group without necessarily holding the traits of that group or accomplishing policy outcomes, and that the group acknowledges the act of that representation as a benefit to them (Pitkin 1972 [1967], 92). While descriptive representation may lead to symbolic

benefits to the public in the case of role models (111; Tate 2001), descriptive representation is not necessary for symbolic representation. For example, if wealthy lawmakers show they are attuned to the needs of the poor by articulating the details of their struggles, this act may provide the poor with a sense of voice and power.

Scholars use aspects of representational theory to identify how well a group is represented and whether they have sustainable decision-making power in politics—commonly understood as political incorporation. Political incorporation “is the process through which new groups begin to participate in politics and eventually achieve representation and influence in government” (Rogers 2006, 17). Incorporation has multiple stages, beginning first with the forging of group consciousness and political mobilization, then gaining direct membership into government (descriptive representation), and finally, feeling the effects of government responsiveness through concrete policy initiatives that favor the group’s interest (substantive representation). Although political incorporation is often studied in relation to race, ethnicity, and immigration, this project contends the concept is useful to understand government responsiveness to the longstanding American poor.

However, the process of representing the poor does not neatly fit into commonly studied paradigms of representation. Therefore, the next section reasserts the conceptual primacy of a representational theory that accounts for the process when there is a divergence between the qualities of the governed and those that execute governance.

Poor Representation is Virtual Representation


This project uniquely focuses on one understudied type of representation known as virtual representation, which occurs when a deliberative body claims to indirectly represent the public out of duty, which can occur without direct stakeholder involvement but where the body remains

accountable through internal elite competition (Schumpeter 2008 [1950]; de Grazia 1951; Pitkin 1972 [1967], 171; Eastwood 1998). This virtual form of representation, where the ideations of elites in power informs the political construction of a group, is the principal—but not only—form of representation when it comes to groups that do not have direct power and say over policy. Specifically, when non-poor elites in Congress construct the interests of the poor, they do so virtually, combining fact-finding investigations with imagined group construction to create policy.

The only known usage of the term virtual representation is by members of the British Parliament in the 18th century to claim legitimate taxing authority and satisfactory representation of American colonists, who could not vote and had no say over public policy (Greene 2011, 71). Some aspects of the theory have been investigated by historians (Langford 1988; Eastwood 1998), but very little conceptual development has occurred on this idea for several hundred years. Indeed, the dearth of attention to virtual representation is peculiar given the very idea of representation is predicated on mass authorization and interest projection, not that the representative and represented align on individual traits, which is rarely the case in complex societies where voters hold many discrete identities and characteristics. This project employs the term in a more general—but operationalized—usage to explain the process by which lawmakers that are not members of a group seek to legitimately represent that group in the policymaking process, regardless of whether that group can authorize such representation. In this way, virtual representation is arguably the most common form of representation in republics, even if it has rarely been identified by name in studies of representation.

The utility of this intervention is to offer the missing link in the process by which lawmakers achieve substantive representation for a group without providing that group descriptive representation. The two approaches to substantive representation are visualized in the simple

Figure 1.1 Two Paths to Substantive and Symbolic Representation



schematic of Figure 1.1, which also accounts for the secondary outcome of symbolic representation. Importantly, the virtual path likely encompasses most of the representational behavior of disadvantaged groups in Congress throughout American history, since the institution has rarely mirrored the demographic variety of the public. When lawmakers represent communities of which they are not members—highly likely in a large, diverse country—and yet create a policy for that community, they are doing so through a virtual lens. Where descriptive representation is essentialist and based on shared personal experiences informing lawmaker attitude, virtual representation is observational and based on perception and values. While bias exists in all political actors, virtual representation is especially vulnerable to bias because of reduced communication channels and the lack of personal connection to and understanding of the issues certain groups face. Therefore, when members virtually represent the poor, they may not do so in completely accurate terms, but may instead project their own biases onto the subject poor and legislate accordingly, creating policies that serve some of the poor and not others.

In contrast to current models of representation, virtual representation is the dominant form of poor representation for several reasons. First, there are few organizations that amplify poor

interests, and those that do are fragmented, have little power, and fade over time (Piven and Cloward 1977). Additionally, the poor have low levels of political resources, voice and participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Moreover, there are very few poor political leaders or poor people's movements in the U.S. (Skocpol 1991, 433). Finally, the poor are a dispersed minority across the U.S. political topography (Jusko 2017). These factors minimize the ability of the poor to exert direct control over their political fates or receive attention from lawmakers who are balancing many reelection demands.

Although there are isolated examples of “poor lawmakers”—those that have personally experienced poverty in their life—the poor seldom rise to national leadership levels, especially in Congress (Swift et al 2009; Carnes 2013, 8), and are historically among the most invisible constituencies in politics (Harrington 1962). This severely stymies the prospects for both descriptive and dyadic representation. Moreover, the political parties have done little to inject poor interests onto the agenda in a durable manner (Piven and Cloward 1993; Brady 2003; Miler 2018). Therefore, political incorporation of the poor takes on a more virtual form, in which elites imagine what is best for an allusive group of which they are not members. In turn, political elites with very little connection to poverty craft and negotiate policy solutions to poverty, which at best resembles a form of virtual (and possibly collective and symbolic) representation. On this front, political incorporation occurs when the poor accrue durable policy supports, skipping the step of having direct say in the governmental process.

Virtual representation, however, does not guarantee the poor are ignored—it just means staying present in lawmakers' minds is even more important than for groups that have amplified supra-institutional resources. Since the likelihood of poor descriptive representation is quite low, the poor are best served when the voices that represent them and their needs—sympathetic

politicians, labor organizations, researchers, journalists, and think-tanks—are present throughout the legislative process. Specifically, this project attempts to gauge the amount of “poor voice,” as measured in Congress by focusing on how the poor are described, and by whom, in the multiple stages of the policymaking process, from committee hearings to the language of enacted policies.

Within the context of the New Deal, the focus on virtual representation is useful in several ways. Existing theories of representation, such as descriptive representation, would focus on the congruity between public and lawmaker wealth, while conceptualizing of representation through a virtual lens shifts the analysis to the *process* of how lawmakers understand the poor. As virtual representation moves from the essential qualities of the lawmaker to the thought processes they utilize in the representational process, it forces the researcher to look at different evidence—such as rhetoric—to understand how they arrive at policy decisions. Importantly, this intervention helps piece together how politicians who were formerly reticent to act responded to crisis conditions to create supports for the poor: by collectively investigating poverty conditions, forming judgments, interrogating each other’s notions, and settling on policy solutions.

The existence of long-lasting antipoverty policies provides evidence for the political incorporation of the poor. However, since the poor are rarely conceived as a single class, the core problem is *which* poor are incorporated. Moreover, the demographic heterogeneity of the poor and disparate causes of poverty make it possible for some impoverished Americans to receive representation while others do not. Additionally, unlike new ethnic communities attempting to gain political status in a polity, the poor have, in one shape or another, *always* been present in the U.S., but they still lack significant say over the types of policies that affect their lives. And yet, even when poor Americans fail to control the levers of government through successful candidacies for office, government attention to issues of the poor is nearly constant in American politics from

the Great Depression onward. Surely this constancy is attenuated by the lack of poor politicians and organizations, but the fact that antipoverty programs exist suggests attention should be paid to how non-poor politicians construct the poor constituency as they create antipoverty policies. In this way, this work will measure degrees of political incorporation through two constitutive dimensions: agenda attention to the poor in rhetoric, and the logic of antipoverty policy design. Having examined the form of representation the poor receive, the next task is to understand how the poor fare in a politics documented to have high levels of political inequality.

Systemic Bias in Representation

Students of American politics understand endemic bias in the political system marginalizes the interests of the most vulnerable in society. Indeed, generations of scholars have convincingly found evidence of systemic bias towards economic and social elite interests within the U.S. politics (Beard 1913; Schattschneider 1935; Key 1949; Lowi 1979; Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Gilens 2012; Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012). This is largely because economic power translates into political power (Schattschneider 1960; Bartels 2008), and the poor (by definition) have low economic power, contributing to their paucity of political power.

Elite domination typifies the governance in Congress, suggesting the political system is either not structured to incorporate policy preferences equitably, or the behavior of members themselves skew outcomes (or both) (Gilens and Page 2014). Part of the problem may be that Congress is occupied with economic elite officeholders that govern in favor of those that share their station—the wealthy (Carnes 2013). Despite these longstanding biases, we have seen periods of great gains in antipoverty policies, especially in the New Deal. If elites tend to govern for themselves, on what basis did they decide who to include in the nascent welfare regime? To answer this question, we must understand the cultural component to the political construction of the poor.

Scholars in framing research have investigated the portrayal of the poor, primarily in media, and have empirically established their discernably negative conception. An incisive literature shows the poor are often portrayed in unfavorable terms based primarily on stereotypes surrounding individual failings, race, urbanity, low educational attainment, and countercultural values (Iyengar 1990; Gilens 1999; Clawson and Trice 2000; Rose and Baumgartner 2013). This stigmatization is especially pernicious in a polity that overrepresents elite interests and where the poor have muted voice, reliant on elites to benevolently propound an antipoverty agenda.

Framing and construction of the poor by powerful actors can change the collective understanding of the causes of poverty, value assessments of the poor, and instruct policy frameworks. For example, as depictions of the poor from the 1960s to 1990s moved from a debate about structural conditions to individual failings, a non-racial paradigm to an association with Blackness, and from an understanding of deservingness to an assumption of fraud, public support for antipoverty programs declined and the policies themselves became more punitive (Gilens 1999; Rose and Baumgartner 2013). During that time, Congress has varied in its collective framing of poverty, which directly influences which policies are selected to solve the problem (Guetzkow 2010). In the 1960s, lawmakers constructed the poor as “hopeless victims” from processes of community breakdown, which led to generous investment plans that instilled a positive sense of self and community (180-184). In contrast, during the retrenchment period of the 1980s and 1990s, the poor were conceptualized as maladaptive and consciously immoral, which led to paternalistic policies that used coercive policy structures to “instill the ‘right’ values” (189). There is little systematic research on the conceptions of the poor during the New Deal, but prominent norms about federalism, self-help, charity, and stigma likely funneled lawmakers toward narrowly

favoring the most positively constructed poor. Therefore, it is vital to compare the rhetorical construction of the poor with who is poor in the public and who gains policy incorporation.

Additionally, this project utilizes the tractable concept known as the social construction of target groups, which accounts for social norms, actor framing, and the vicissitudes of the policy process. Here, the judgments of lawmakers in constructing their subjects inform what and which policies are enacted, and further, creates an inert structure that may continue to influence actors and policies in the future (Schneider and Ingram 1993). Moreover, the framing of a group may directly influence the framing of policy design, which then impacts policy success at achieving original goals (Ingram and Schneider 1990). This project attempts to build on this work and document in what ways the manner of poor construction factors into what they ultimately receive.

What we know is the poor receive less than other groups and face an uphill struggle to gain effective representation. During the Populist Movement, the political habits of the main U.S. parties toward co-optation (Jusko, 2018, 75) and the relatively low levels of pivotal votes cast by low-income Americans generally left the poor underserved and electorally deficient at gaining prominent representation (168-171). Many of the poor in mid-20th century America were invisible and forgotten (Harrington 1997 [1962]). And in contemporary politics, the poor are underrepresented on substance in Congress, even if their plight has become more visible to contemporary lawmakers (Miler 2018). However, visibility varies by sub-population and MCs differ in who they choose to construct based on their ideology and policy goals. Therefore, we should—and this dissertation does—work to identify who lawmakers conceive of as poor when they use language about poverty, especially in consequential periods like the New Deal.

An Agenda in Poor Group Identification

The three preceding sections on the New Deal, representation and inequality each provide insights on the structure of poor representation. First, we saw there was an overarching process of allocation *and* division in the New Deal. Then we learned the poor are unlikely to represent themselves in politics, and thus, are products of elite construction. This process is generally virtual in nature, where lawmakers work to gather facts and construct the poor in their minds, then legislate accordingly. Finally, the inequality section exposed the elite bias against propounding the interests of the poor. In the rare cases we see action on antipoverty policies, they are a product of elite conceptualization of the needs of the poor. In sum, the New Deal crafted a divisive social welfare regime, poor people depend on elite representation for national antipoverty enactment, and MCs are typically biased against the interests of the poor.

These precepts force us to focus on the way elites construct the poor as they carry out their representational and policymaking duties. Political actors in the U.S. have a long history of utilizing categorizations such as occupation, race, and gender to divide the public (and the poor) as a means of concentrating power. Even when groups gain positive construction and inclusion, lawmakers have to decide whether to construct universalistic or needs-based antipoverty programs, either creating broad, equally-enriching policies across groups, or dedicated, targeted policies for those most in need. In general, negotiating the bounds of group membership factors heavily into social provision, since who is considered deserving among the poor may instruct policy design. This relationship between ascriptive categories and policy construction is present in historical chapters in American history, where policies have erred toward group-based provision and not more universalistic cross-class or class-based in-need policies.

To understand the politics of poverty, this dissertation examines Congress—the most consequential law-writing venue—where members receive social inputs and virtually construct the idea of an actionable poor group in policy. Additionally, identifying the *best-case* period in which the poor are likely to receive comprehensive attention and transformative policies suggests focusing on the New Deal. If the poor are divided in this period even amidst ubiquitous national poverty, it would indicate the tendency toward group-based representation of the poor in Congress.

So how do we study poor representation in the New Deal? Political scientists have recently reasserted the vitality of studying policy through a political science framework (Lieberman 1998; Mettler and Soss 2004; Lapinski 2013), but also of import is the use of language to communicate and construct narratives, and how this visible process may provide insight into what we end up seeing in policy enactment. Examining the two interconnected tracks of representation exposes lawmakers' construction of the poor through floor speech rhetoric and how they gain incorporation into high impact antipoverty policies. Additionally, this design helps us understand two traditions in APD research: rhetoric uncovers *ideational* development, while policy traces the *institutional* realm (Glenn 2006; Milkis 2014); both endogenously impact one another. This approach uncovers the nature and basis for systematically dividing the poor into favored and disfavored groups.

This design reveals the underlying logic of division of the poor, which is more ubiquitous, varied, and wide in scope than previous research has uncovered. While members may earnestly describe the poor they care about the most, this ultimately aggregates into a climate where the poor are divided into highly visible, positively constructed groups, and ignored, controversial groups that yield fewer policy supports, thereby guaranteeing the continuation of group-correlated non-idiosyncratic poverty in America.

Dissertation Roadmap

To evaluate the group-based nature to poor representation, the dissertation unfolds as follows. The motivating question in Chapter 2 is how does one systematically study poverty representation in Congress? The answer is a multi-stage, mixed-methodology, identifying first who is poor in the public during the Great Depression in order to understand how the crisis elicited a response from formerly inert institutions. The second step is to conduct conditional logic Boolean searches for poverty synonyms in Congressional floor speeches. Once this poverty speech corpus is created, the next task is to comprehensively code the passages with poverty content for who members describe as poor. The last stage is to track the representational process from committee hearings to statutory construction through a case study approach. This section demonstrates a systematic approach to understand the representational process, from who is poor in the public, to how lawmakers conceived of the poor in rhetoric, and how the poor were divided in policy.

The motivating questions in Chapter 3 are: which lawmakers talk about the poor and to what degree are there formal (Congressional chamber) and informal (party) institutional differences in representation? To answer this question, the chapter descriptively presents the first comprehensive dataset on poverty speeches in Congress. Importantly, members are divided on the initial decision of whether to speak about the poor, limiting the bounds of poverty representation in the body. As an illustration, 33.8% of members (1,314 of 3,893) gave a poverty speech in the Congress-by-Congress dataset. A different statistic that looks at whether a MC delivered a single poverty speech throughout their time in Congress puts the figure at 48.4% (618 of 1,277). The fact that a majority of lawmakers fail to even modestly engage poverty in their political rhetoric during the crisis of the Great Depression is a stunning finding. Additional key findings include the varied

temporal arc of poverty representation over time, the Senate running ahead of the House in poverty rhetoric, and parity in poverty articulation between Democrats and Republicans.

Diving deeper into sources and variation of poverty speeches, Chapter 4 examines the geospatial component of poverty representation. Specifically, the chapter employs a novel computational technique to account for the total poverty representation a geographic unit receives simultaneously through both House and Senate delegations over the 14-year period. By utilizing the intersections of changing Congressional districts, the chapter introduces a new spatiotemporal conceptual measurement called Reduced Legislative Districts (RLDs), which may subsequently be useful for scholars of Congress and public opinion to understand prevailing political culture in eras preceding scientific opinion polling. It is revealed that poverty articulation highly varies across and within region, ranging from the high interest South to low interest Northeast, with durable poverty articulation emanating from New York, North Dakota, and Louisiana. Notably, the poverty articulation map is distinct from known patterns within American political geography.

Chapter 5 examines what factors statistically correspond with poverty speeches. In doing so, the chapter transparently and deductively walks the reader through the theoretically guided process of building statistical models, highlighting important relationships along the way. Using low-n time-series modeling, it is shown lagged unemployment rate modestly predicts Congress-wide poverty speech count. Due to skewed count data, zero-inflated negative binomial models are used to expose factors that influence individual MC speech count, which include time, state, seniority, chamber, and state government revenue. Third party status does predict poverty speech rate, while Democrats and Republicans are reconfirmed as indistinguishable from one another. Broadly, these models suggest there is a level of MC responsiveness to poverty conditions in the

public, although the decision to speak about the poor remains highly idiosyncratic and personal to members.

The guiding questions in Chapter 6 are *who* do lawmakers depict as poor and *how* are the poor described. To answer these questions, I present a novel qualitative coding scheme that creates the first dataset on the occupational, circumstantial, geographical, and demographical construction of the poor according to policymaker rhetoric. Additionally, the chapter executes quantitative analyses using topic modeling, pairwise correlation, and factor analysis of speech codes to understand themes and associations in poverty speeches. We see MCs do not conceive of the poor as an economic class, but instead, an amalgam of differently stationed groups, some more deserving than others. Specifically, the general poor code is used in 1,665 speeches out of a total of 3,404 speeches, but only in 65 of those cases does the speaker fail to identify another of the 52 codes during that speech. Therefore, when MCs speak about the poor in general, they almost always *also* speak about who specifically is poor, often in group-based terms. Moreover, Congress is a sufficient fact-finding body, broadly identifying who is poor in America, but this occurs in a biased manner where MCs project preferred members of their community as poor. Indeed, it is rare for a MC to depict poor people from conditions they do not observe firsthand. This direct local constituency approach could work if *every* MC talked about the poor in their respective districts, but since a majority of MCs do not speak about the poor, it creates a higher bar for the members that do: they must present their poor *and* the poor in other districts. Overall, this chapter demonstrates MCs stratify the poor based on myriad categorizations and group membership.

Chapter 7 focuses on the members themselves to understand what it looks like to represent poor people in one's rhetorical style. Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, the chapter unveils a measurable typology of MC poverty rhetoric composed of two dimensions:

rhetorical specificity (how general or topical members are in depicting the poor) and constituency scope (how many poor categorizations members touch on in their speeches). Lawmaker case studies provide a framework to understand how constituency interpretation and member preferences inform whose poverty is projected onto the agenda space.

Moving from rhetoric to policy, Chapters 8 through 10 examine how the representation of the poor during the policymaking process for three landmark antipoverty policies: the Social Security Act of 1935 (Chapter 8), U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Chapter 9), and National School Lunch Act of 1946 (Chapter 10). Each chapter utilizes forensic primary and secondary source analyses of the multiyear legislative process of antipoverty policy creation, highlighting advocates, contending legislation, committee witness identities and statements, floor proceedings, and statutory analysis. This comprehensive approach is in service of understanding the quantity and quality of poor voice in Congress, and how and when the poor are divided on the path to selective policy incorporation. While each policy chapter employs the same systematized methodology to account for the full policy process, each case examines and contributes a unique wrinkle to the study of poor representation and antipoverty policymaking.

The SSA chapter centers on the *process of division* in a hallmark law, examining the contested and contingent process of crafting comprehensive policies that selectively incorporate and exclude the needy. An additional key finding is that rhetorical analyses indicate the ideational plane of New Deal liberalism was not ripe and independently foreclosed the potential for colorblind universalistic or justice-oriented needs-based policies.

The USHA case uncovers what happens when legislative debate is positively centered on the poorest of the poor, wherein interested lawmakers in tandem with impoverished witnesses worked to ensure the program pertained to those most in need. However, succeeding at the

representational dilemma reveals a series of earnest concomitant issues related to *problem complexity*, such as problem definition (Rocheffort and Cobb 1993), the “wickedness” of daunting social problems (Rittel and Webber 1973), and the reality that attempting to solve one problem may generate additional downstream negative externalities (Fine 2014). To understand why the political system fails to uplift the poor, one must account for the complex and challenging nature of antipoverty problem solving.

Finally, the NSLA chapter explores what happens when lawmakers make laws without the presence of the poor, spotlighting the unique form of *interest convergence* in antipoverty legislative coalitions—in this case between agriculture, the military, education, and public health interests. While this convergence gainfully breaks the status quo and spurs enactment, there are clear and unfortunate perils with this approach, particularly by creating a logic within antipoverty legislation that caters to the non-poor and undermines the policy’s impact on uplifting the conditions of the poor. More broadly, this chapter serves as the first full length legislative history of the NSLA, which unlike the SSA and USHA, does not currently have a devoted academic treatment to it.

Synthesizing the lessons of the case study chapters, Chapter 11 formalizes and presents two key tendencies in antipoverty policy construction. First, lawmakers employ four principal mechanisms as the *basis to exclude* some of the poor from policy incorporation. Two approaches show overt division: a) target group construction, which clearly demarcates the basis of qualification by nominal group identification, and b) stipulating program rules by issuing guidelines for providers. Additionally, there are two covert approaches that involve shifting the locus of conflict away from Congress: c) bureaucratic discretion (laterally shifting the locus of conflict) and d) federalism (shifting the locus of conflict downward). Each of these mechanisms

serve politically expedient purposes: by reducing the coverage level to only the most privileged poor; making policies easier to operate in their initial stages; and by providing fiscal checks for MCs weary about the growth of government. The second key tendency is the prominent role of secondary constituencies in advocating for and crafting antipoverty legislation, often to serve self-interests and not necessarily poverty alleviation. Secondary constituencies create an enigmatic tension in that they provide pivotal additional resources to pass legislation—often creating strange bedfellow coalitions—while also inserting a new incentive structure that alters (and may lessen) the antipoverty focus of legislation. The convergence of these interests in the New Deal provides several exemplars of Kingdon's (2011 [1984]) Multiple Streams Framework in which policy entrepreneurs will couple their parochial goals with a larger valence issue to capitalize on the presence of a scarce policy window.

To conclude, Chapter 12 assesses the relationship between rhetoric and policy and evaluates the quality of poverty representation among poor groups in the New Deal. Rhetoric about the poor appears to demarcate the realm of possible actions, with only a subset of depicted groups gaining policy inclusion. This is based on how positively each group is constructed and how widely lawmakers hold preference for that group. However, the study exposes an even larger chasm between those that get talked about at all and those that do not—preference and division between groups that are visible may be a lesser problem compared to those that experience the total neglect of lawmakers. For the first time in American history, the economic needs of the poor were finally represented in the halls of Congress, but beneath the monolith it is clear the poor were fragmented into sub-groups, with some—the elderly, mothers with children, white industrial workers—reaping gains while others—Black agricultural workers, “ethnic” immigrants, and Native Americans—remained comparatively ignored. Consequently, understanding the substance of poor

representation in Congress exposes a clear political role in the continuation of poverty in the United States.

Chapter 2

Methodological Approach to the Study of

Rhetoric about the Poor and Antipoverty Policies in Congress

Abstract

This chapter lays out the dissertation's organizational rationale and methodological approach to the systematic study of the politics of poverty, specifically the divisive nature to poor representation during the New Deal. Using a mixed methodological toolkit, the chapter provides a comprehensive framework to compare a) existing poverty in the public with b) rhetorical conceptions of the poor and c) antipoverty policies in Congress. Specifically, Part I attempts to construct a comprehensive vision of the American poor before and after the Great Depression using a qualitative survey of secondary materials and quantitative account of primary government statistics on income. Part II lays out the multi-pronged approach to studying Congressional rhetoric, starting first with Boolean search terms protocols to construct an original population of poverty speeches from the primary source *Congressional Record*. Analyses of rhetoric employ a comprehensive mix of quantitative (descriptive statistics, geospatial analysis, time-series modeling, and zero-inflated negative binomial modeling), qualitative (coding for the subjects of poverty speeches, descriptive history, typologies, and case studies), and hybrid (topic modeling and factor analysis) approaches. Part III lays out the approach to studying pivotal episodes of antipoverty policy construction, relying on a case selection technique that captures the most important episodes while having issue and temporal variation. This section also explains the logic of studying the entirety of the legislative process to gain leverage into how the poor are divided and potential central tendencies in antipoverty policymaking. This integrated and comprehensive agenda provides a strong foundation to understand the nature of poor representation in Congress, and how the poor are divided in rhetoric and policy.

I want the people who get this subsidy to be not the low income group but the lowest of the low income group; and we have got to make the provision very low to bring that about... Let me say that I am convinced that unless we tighten it so that only the lowest-income group—not the low-income group but the lowest-income group—can get these tenements and these subsidies, we will have a housing scandal on our hands in the future. —Senator David I. Walsh (D-MA), August 2, 1937

I suppose, of course, the demand for this type of occupancy will be among the families of lower income, and then it becomes a matter of administration to favor those of the lowest income groups first.

—Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-NY), June 16, 1936

I suggest that the word “needy” should be stricken out. I can give you several reasons why it should be stricken out. In the cities of the country you do not build schoolhouses for needy children—no; you build them for all the children. You do not build recreational facilities for needy people; all the people use the recreational facilities. Your sewers are not constructed for needy people; they are constructed for all the people. And so with your waterworks and other projects listed in this section. They are made available to the entire community, without respect to its being for the poor or the needy only. When you have a rural project, why should you say that it must be for the needy?

—Representative Gerald J. Boileau (P-WI), May 10, 1938

The reason I ask the question is that the Senator from California [Downey] has used the word “destitute,” and he has said that there are a million persons between 60 and 65 who are destitute. As a matter of fact, the word used in his amendment is “needy.” There is quite a distinction between complete destitution and need. Is it not also true that the determination of who is needy is left to the State authorities, and what the Senator proposes to do is that the Federal Government shall furnish the money and let the State authorities decide who is needy? Am I not correct in that?

—Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-VA), February 19, 1942

Introduction

The preceding epigraphs illustrate the issues lawmakers face when discussing the poor. Who counts as poor? How much demarcation is necessary to target only a subset of the poor? How do you justify such a reduction in the target population? Does legislative language lead to the lawmaker intended outcome? To understand how lawmakers conceive of and depict the poor, this chapter provides a corresponding framework to identify the role of the poor in their representational behavior. There are myriad ways to study the politics of poverty, but there has been relative difficulty in poverty scholarship to systematically tie together accurate depictions of the poor in the public with who gets talked about in Congress and who actually gets antipoverty policy supports. Therefore, the research agenda spelled out in this chapter seeks to explain the logic of how this study connects the three venues—existing poverty in society, rhetorical construction of the poor in Congress, and the creation of remedial antipoverty policies—using a broad and mixed methods toolkit. Such a comprehensive approach will allow for robust empirical portrayals of poverty representation and evaluations of the quality of representation.

The chapter is broken up into three parts. Part I presents the contours of poverty in America before and during the New Deal. This section utilizes secondary sources to qualitatively document which groups faced poverty, where in the country, and for what reasons. Although the scholarship cited in this section is for the most part published *ex post facto*, the awareness of these forms of poverty did exist at the time, meaning these incidences of poverty could have informed policymaking behavior. Indeed, some forms, like mass unemployment, surely did, while others, like racial hierarchy in the South played a much less visible role in New Deal lawmaking. Establishing the historical record of poverty in society provides a basis to compare and judge the quality of representation of the poor in Congress, both through the symbolic acts of speaking about

the poor and the substantive measures that target some forms of poverty, but not all. Explorations in subsequent chapters can all be compared to Part I of this chapter to better understand how lawmakers stopped short of solving poverty during this period.

Part II moves from the empirical description of the poor to laying out the research process to understand the rhetorical construction of the poor in Congress. The section builds off of the introduction by providing further justification for studying poverty rhetoric in Congress. The language around poverty is meaningful to better understand of group framing, target group construction, symbolic representation, lawmaker preferences, and strategic mainstays such as agenda-setting and using language to win policy debates. The section then provides an overview of the research process to understand group construction. Just as important as the text are Appendix 2A and 2B on the search term methodology and codebook to identify the poor subjects of poverty speeches, respectively. The results of this agenda form the basis of Chapters 3 through 7.

The final section of the chapter occurs in Part III. It first provides a defense for studying antipoverty policy based in substantive representation, American political development, and policy studies. This is followed by a guide to studying the full, multiyear legislative policy process. Reference is made to the essential Appendix 2C which describes the deductive case selection criteria for this dissertation and a broader research agenda to come.

Part I: The Poor in the Public

Why and How to Study the American Poor

The poor are often ignored constituency that serve as a diagnostic to determine if a democratic republic is equitable, just, and representative (Miler 2018). Additionally, studies that focus on the poor provide a basis of comparison to understand how differently situated groups and actors command power and wield influence in the American polity. Moreover, since we know

Congress occasionally acts to create antipoverty policies, it is instructive to examine the conditions in which these policies become law, especially since they are few and far between—and before the New Deal, almost non-existent. To better understand what is driving the three preceding dynamics, one must independently account for the incidence of public in society. However, there are difficulties establishing this before the main quantitative measures were employed to track poverty. That leaves researchers the primary option of qualitatively accounting for who is poor in the early-20th century America using secondary sources that examine the broad concept and discrete forms within it. This knowledge will allow for informed assessments of who among the poor is privileged enough to receive representation from lawmakers.

Before uncovering who Congress conceived as the poor during the Great Depression, it is first instructive to provide background on who America's poor were at this time. The Great Depression was the largest economic catastrophe in the nation's history, leading to roughly one-third of the public living at poverty levels. This poverty cut across many sectors, as once middle-class merchants or bankers were now reduced to penury, while those barely getting by before the collapse were reduced to vagrancy. The ubiquity of the problem, and the fact that the poor now included positively constructed, formerly self-sufficient groups, made the problem front and center for the first time in U.S. history.¹

Before the Great Depression: The Existing Poor

But importantly, many people were poor before the Great Depression. While official poverty rate figures were not calculated until the 1950s, according to Smolensky and Plotnick (1993), the poverty rate from 1900 to 1920 was generally above 60%, while that figure dipped to

¹ It is important to note data availability on who was and was not poor in the early 20th century is quite low. Poverty statistics were invented in the 1950s, with subgroup categories following in the 1960s. Therefore, this section takes a qualitative approach to identifying which groups lacked material resources before and after the Great Depression.

50% just before the Great Depression.² While the authors contend this is a conservative estimate, even if it is overstated it is important to understand that especially in rural parts of the country, many poor and middle-class families had low amounts of liquid assets. Instead, wealth was assessed based on holding property, and everyday transactions were often of the barter-style economy that proved antiquated as a modern, income-based economy took hold as industrialization and urbanization came to dominate the 20th century economy.

Given the scale of poverty throughout American history, it is puzzling national lawmakers did not take up the question of the how the state could rectify the issue. Direct state action was solely reserved for military veterans and their dependents; indirect aid took the form of small grants to states to pay some of the costs for state and county health facilities, such as sanitariums, to house “the aged, mentally ill, orphans, and tuberculosis victims” (Mink and O’Connor 2004, 20). For many groups, accepting private or public help to reduce poverty was marred with stigmas revolving around personal failings. The ideological durability of blaming the poor for their problems only started to change during the Progressive Era.

An alternative view may posit: given poverty’s ubiquity it could be lawmakers felt the government could not solve the issue, and since it is endemic, everyone would have to struggle to figure out how to escape its clutches, on an individual and community level. Nonetheless, poverty was well-known throughout society and politics, and as we move to understanding poor groups, readers may express little shock as to which in society were most affected by poverty in this era.

² Measures of poverty before 1959 are predominantly *ex post facto* calculations using macroeconomic measures such as economic growth and mean income. While the authors contend these estimates are likely conservative relative to the on-the-ground conditions of the time, it is worth maintaining a healthy skepticism about the efficacy of these figures. At the very least, they slightly complement realized first-hand accounts of economic plight in the country before the statistical revolution occurring between 1930s and 1960s.

The sections that follow highlight the poorest groups in society. But it should be noted that human development in the early-20th century was still limited, and poverty cut across every community, in one form or another. That includes traditional, churchgoing, independent white families with a working male breadwinner—they too may have experienced poverty. While the following section details the groups that faced the most egregious forms of poverty, it is in no way exhaustive of every American that faced economic hardship.

Urban and Industrial Poverty

The Second Industrial Revolution that led to America becoming a world-tier economy also contributed to debilitating health problems, like permanently disabled limbs, black lung, and blindness. Additionally, as bartering declined, credit and cash became the only forms of common transactions in a metropolitan economy, increasing incidences of hunger issues, as those at the bottom of the economic ladder had fewer ways of attaining food without cashflow. Urbanity also lent itself to slum and tenement housing, which frequently had exceedingly poor conditions and health hazards (U.S. Department of Labor 1894). Even working families were still commonly trapped in poverty, with low labor protections—like union density and a federal minimum wage—to guarantee a living wage (Mink and O'Connor 2004, 22).

Later in the New Deal, when urban poverty was addressed, for example in New Orleans and Houston, it aroused antipathy among farm owners since the relief rolls were often more financially gainful for Blacks than working in the fields (Mertz 1978, 4). Keeping people away from cities and in a permanent state of depressed poverty wages maintained a reserve workforce and forced people into jobs they would otherwise not desire. The preservation of a state neglect on these inequalities was key to the economic order at the time.

Rural and Agricultural Poverty

One of the most durable and pernicious forms of poverty is seen in the sporadically populated rural sections of the country. Rural poverty was common, characterized by its isolation and state neglect, with many people going without needed medical care and educational opportunities. Rural poverty often persists for generations, as per capita incomes are substantially lower than the rest of the nation (Mertz 1978, 2-4). Tenant farmers and sharecroppers were among the largest single bloc of the extremely poor in the nation, often working on over-tilled land and with marginal resource accrual at best (5). Aware of this, leadership in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) quickly placed many locals on relief, especially in the mountains of the Ozarks and Appalachia (2-4). But the swift and effective action created substantial backlash among those in need of cheap labor, showing that technocratic problem solving often runs into private sector and political backlash.

Rural impoverishment also foretold the following dynamics: poor housing, inadequate food, poor health care, low education opportunities, and cyclical despair revolving around crop yields and weather patterns (Taylor 2003, 30). While hunger was a constant issue for many, in contrast to urban areas, farmers commonly provided excess food to those in need, and some semblance of a meal was often included in agricultural labor work. The key factor of rural poverty is lack of opportunity to escape the cycle of poverty, with few options for employment and little if any state presence in changing conditions on the ground.

Racial and Ethnic Hierarchical Poverty

The enduring story of America is one of amalgamation of cultures from the world afar, paired with the durability of racial and ethnic hierarchy in service of class demarcation. Although not equal in their level of perniciousness, every region in the U.S. had its own unique story of

ascriptive hierarchy, where poverty was most concentrated among those that did not look like the founding fathers. This section explores how poverty was disproportionately concentrated among non-whites before (and after) the Great Depression, including Blacks in the South and North, Native Americans in the Midwest and West, and immigrants in the Northeast and West.

Blacks in the South and North

Reconstruction in the South ended before redistributionist groups like the Readjuster Party in Virginia were able to create economic reforms that would change the feudal plantation economy. This meant overwhelming poverty for most Southern Blacks, as well many white farm laborers (Payne 2013). The creation of Black Codes reconstructed the bind between ostensibly free Black sharecroppers and agricultural land, leaving little room to develop an economic livelihood, let alone accrue resources to aid migration away from the South. Large immigrant communities from Europe and Asia supplied the domestic and infrastructural workforce, but with few labor laws protecting abuse or wrongful death, were left to absorb abuse and dwell on meager wages.

Years of the United States building feudal poor in the South and more recently developed industrial poor in the North went unabated. In particular, the South historically was (and currently is) substantially poorer than the rest of the country, with relatively little initiative by local and state government to elevate a very poor population often excluded from the membership in the electorate.³ After all, political instruments—like single-party governance and widespread racial- and economic-based voter disenfranchisement—were devised specifically to concentrate power in an aristocratic land-owning class that perpetuated a rigid feudal hierarchy (Key 1949; Schattschneider 1960; Orren 1987). To some, a reserve labor force of desperate poor people was seen as a key resource to maintain high productivity and keep wages low, across both industrial

³ Although the South lagged behind other regions in terms of social supports for the public, there was some variety in state-based social welfare programs. See Green (2017).

and agricultural locations. Congress had successfully avoided addressing poverty among the populace for hundreds of years, which only changed when formerly middle-class families were thrust into indigence by the wild speculation at the end of the laissez-faire period of the 1920s. The mounting crisis had the right kind of valence constituencies to necessitate a policy response from formerly indifferent (or ineffectual) lawmakers.

In the North, concentrated Black poverty was often facilitated through housing and education policy. Cities and states in the North maintained high levels of segregation, often confining Blacks to dislocated peripheral or inner-city, slum communities. Housing covenants kept Blacks out of established (i.e., white) communities, confining Blacks to low-quality and hard to reach parts of Northern cities, like Chicago. Blacks were excluded from well-funded schools in places like Pittsburgh and Connecticut. Although the degree of human bondage in the North was less than in the South, life for a Black family, let alone a working class or poor one, was quite difficult in much of the Union. In Philadelphia, Black residents were systematically segregated in housing and excluded from gainful employment, leading low-wage, high-crime, poor health communities (Du Bois and Eaton 1899).

Native Americans in the Midwest and West

Poverty in Native American communities is and continues to be endemic and widespread. “Before the Great Depression and the Indian New Deal, ethnocidal policies devastated Native-American individuals and nations. Between 1887 and 1933, over half of the tribal land base was lost to land thieves, tax sales, and governmental sales of ‘surplus lands.’ These policies launched a cycle of poverty that continues at the beginning of the twenty-first century” (McElvaine 2004).

As is well-documented in American history, indigenous peoples were forced off of high-yield land onto nearly arid land due to generations of Indian removal efforts, followed by

generations of taking back additional allocated land for new white settlements and corporate energy and commodity extraction. Reservations were marred with poor public health standards, with indoor plumbing greatly lagging that of the larger populace. Job opportunities were scarce. The one resource was state-based educational curricula, but that often took the shape of cultural education to teach American values, not necessarily vocational training.

Immigrants in the West and Northeast

Immigrants are a durable portion of the revolving poor in America, from its founding to present day. As such, part of the traditional assimilation process for immigrants is to move to co-ethnic enclaves as families learn how to adapt to their newfound home. Unfortunately, for many recent and legacy immigrants that entailed living in central city slums with poor sanitation standards, overcrowding, and high levels of crime. Had trouble buying property. Generational mobility was in sight, but was often a struggle through poverty in the process.

Poverty Among Non-Workers: The Elderly, Youth, Women, and Disabled

There was also a particular form of poverty for those that did not fit the workfare structure of the American economy. Elderly former workers faced a volatile pension market, if they could afford the payments on the front end, and often faced injury and sickness. Therefore, they were not fit for industrial work and service fields. Many turned to the county poorhouse or poor farm, which additionally housed long-term indigent people, people with chronic health problems, and those with mental health issues. Poorhouses were generally poorly maintained and isolated from occupants' family and community, leading many poor elderly folks to choose living on the street over the dregs of the poorhouse.

On the opposite side of the age spectrum, poverty among the youth severely limited the life outcomes of those it touched, as malnutrition would leave a life of health issues ahead for these

young people. Child labor became illegal in the first Roosevelt administration, drawing a clear ethical boundary on exploitation, but possibly making children poorer (assuming they had any agency over the use of their wages). Additionally, while many in society thought it was unfortunate that children—through no fault of their own—could suffer extensively from impoverishment, and yet, the prevailing norms maintained that family and charity were the main vehicles to help young people in distress. Many states adopted mother's pensions that provided some semblance of support to those with children, but these pensions were almost inadequate to maintain survival, let alone mobility from poverty.

Women experienced a particular form of poverty based on their dependence to the male partner, often not controlling the money even though it was ostensibly pooled in the household. Additionally, independent women that sought to support themselves faced many social hurdles to gain and keep employment, when prevailing norms were that women should not be in the workforce to begin with. Instead, they should be deferential to their husbands, do as their told, and raise the children. Women that had children out of wedlock were particularly censured, with prevailing norms holding that the resulting poverty was their fault, and further, served as a necessary deterrent to force other women to maintain domesticity. A common refrain—then and now—is that abused or mistreated wives stay with their husbands because they fear a life of penury if they were to leave.

Members of society that faced health-related disabilities, such as deafness, blindness, missing limbs, or other ailments were generally constructed as deserving of help by the 1920s and 1930s. However, as with the previous groups, the most prominent methods to aid them was sporadic, small-scale charity, or admitting themselves to the poorhouse or sanitarium. In fact, society was often cruel enough to castigate anyone with disabilities for working or being visible

in public spaces, as it was untoward and repulsed those of means. These groups collectively constitute what can be considered those “outside the economic mainstream,” where dependency was a stigma, but one that was expressly reserved for them alone (Mink and O’Connor 2004, 20).

Poverty cut across many identifiers—race, region, gender, vocation—but importantly not by class (obviously, by definition). But the durability of the American class structure failed to withstand the Great Depression, and many formerly middle class, and even wealthy, members of society joined the ranks of the poor, unsure of where their next meal will come from and whether or not they will have a roof over the head come winter.


During the Great Depression: The Newly Poor

Not only was the poverty of the aforementioned long-standing poor made much worse during the Great Depression, but formerly middle-class families were now thrust into the poor lot. To better understand the enormity of wealth depletion caused by the financial collapse, Figure 2.1 visually depicts the changes in per capita income by state before the collapse in 1929 to when President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933.

Economic conditions outside of any individual community’s control had depleted wealth and security in communities urban and rural, Northern and Southern, Black and white, and across vocations. Under the male-breadwinner model of the family, the extremely high unemployment rate forced many formerly middle-class families into dire conditions. The rich became poor, and the poor managed to become even poorer, especially in the South.

The widespread nature of poverty in this era, including newly poor who did not have the same causes for their poverty, and could be seen by some as not culpable for their current state, invariably contributed to the mounting national response to the problem. As we will see shortly, the newly poor (industrial workers, merchants, white families) were very much incorporated into

Figure 2.1 Per Capita Income by State, 1929 and 1933



Data source: *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* (1948, 279). Hue intervals in hundreds.

the New Deal antipoverty regime, while the long-term, pre-Great Depression poor (immigrants, Blacks in the South, Native Americans in the West, single women) continued to face economic peril with minimal visibility to a motivated, but biased political class.

It is in this context that elected officials in the federal government changed course, from a paradigm of rugged individualism with a skeletal commitment to addressing economic-based social problems, to a modern state capable of providing a protective value the market failed to ever construct. While the collapse of the economy did not change existing norms on maintaining women in the home, it did increase the necessity that any member of the family contribute some means to the family's survival (Farmbry 2009, 130; Mink and O'Connor 2004, 21).

Mass Unemployment Across Sectors

Somewhat unique in American history, the scope of the Great Depression was so immense that not only were the extant poor made worse and blue-collar workers entered poverty status, but those seeking state redress for hardship included the white-collar class of professionals, including merchants, bankers, insurance industry workers, anyone that relied on stocks, bonds, and mutual funds for their livelihood. Formerly, middle class families with one breadwinner now faced

instability, and reorienting to a two income household was exceedingly difficult given the low fiscal solvency of businesses and prevailing norms that elevated men above women in hiring decisions.

Evaporation of Savings and Housing Stability

With incredible haste, existing wealth held by the public was eradicated during the stock market plunge of 1929. There was a run on the banks, where fortunate few retrieved part of their savings, but most were turned away due to insufficient bank-held liquidity. The tightening money supply made paying existing bills and debts more difficult, and many urban, suburban, and rural families faced eviction and foreclosure. Existing banking regulations and housing financing was insufficient to protect the average consumer from such hardship, leading to cash-poor and newly homeless families popping up in every community.

Subnational and Spatial Ubiquity

Poverty could no longer be considered a peculiar localized problem of megalopolises or the former Confederate South. The Great Depression depleted wealth across regions (U.S. Department of Commerce 1948), necessitating federal action to coordinate a response commensurate with the scale of the problem. Indeed, even formerly self-sufficient sector like farming experienced immense hardship, as by 1934, “[t]wo million farm families [were] living below the poverty level of fifteen hundred dollars per year” (Taylor 2003, 30). Homelessness in cities grew exponentially, and many formerly stable households now fought for daily survival on rationed food.

State and local governments even defaulted on debt payments due to insufficient revenue to cover debts generated by nascent subnational welfare policies like mother’s pensions, relief programs, and infrastructural development (Wickens 1969; Murray 1970; Bernanke 1983, 260;

Higgs 2008; Jonas 2012, 6). Once most citizens and governments across the states were made poor, the federal government had to take the lead in handling the emergency, potentially reversing the spread of poverty across the nation. But given the scale of poverty in this time, paired with a long-held reluctance of the federal government to combat poverty with policy, it was highly unlikely a government response would seek to eliminate all poverty. Instead, the more likely course would be to favorably construct some of the poor, and tailor policies that achieve their narrowly prescribed goals.

Taken as a whole, this section shows there is a discrepancy between the types of people that were before the Great Depression, and those that became poor because of it. A working hypothesis for this project as a whole is that lawmakers were mainly driven to solve the depression-based situational poverty, and much less inclined to solve deeply-rooted systemic poverty in the country. If this is true, it should be legible in who MCs they identify as poor, and who is included in public policy outputs.

Part II: Rhetoric on Poverty in Congress

Why Rhetoric About the Poor Matters

While rhetoric itself cannot fill an empty belly with nourishment, or pay an electricity bill, it is important to keep in mind political contestation is heavily predicated on the expression of argument, perception, opinion, and values. In particular, rhetoric is a central manner in which politicians seek to alter the scope of contestation and win support for their agenda (Riker 1962; Riker 1986). As a tool at the disposal of every politician, rhetoric is an important mechanism to manipulate reference publics into acting in accordance with the rhetorician's goals (Parker 1972; Corcoran 1979) or in defeat, give an ardent defense of one's positions to live on in posterity. That is, rhetoric affords power-interested individuals an alternative to physical and/or legal means of

coercion; instead, language is a vehicle to set the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; McCombs and Shaw 1972) and exercise influential power over the values of others (Lukes 1974; Fairclough 1989). Moreover, since language holds different understandings across lawmakers and by nature limits the translation of lived experience into communication, a divergence in conceptualization of an idea is fertile grounds for conflict and reconstitution (Wittgenstein 1922). This means there is endless agency to define and redefine how the poor are understood. Taken as a whole, the manner in which the poor are depicted by Members of Congress influences how the public and elites alike view the poor, guides terms of debate about the poor, directs attention to certain types of policy remediations (if any) to lessen poverty, and may alter how the poor themselves feel part of the process and view the legitimacy of political actors.

Framing

Within rhetoric, one device is framing, which is a central tenant of communication where a messenger rhetorically directs a receiver to “develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 104). Framing is a powerful enough device that simple exposure to a certain frame is more likely to alter the valuations of the recipient with increased repetition (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Depending on the motivation level of the receiver, certain frames will prove more dominant in directing the receiver to hold a stable value on the subject. When political elites provide contending frames, the stronger (i.e., more persuasive) frame has a better shot of altering the subject’s thoughts on the matter (Chong and Druckman 2007a).

While frames are attenuated by the values and identities of those acted up by the messenger, the simplicity and usefulness of a specific frame may serve as a heuristic for recipients when they navigate what is often a contentious, conflicted politics (Druckman and Lupia 2016, 18). Framing

is not deterministic, as “[p]eople are not fated to adopt a political position promoted by their party. Nor can people be counted upon to reason through the relative strengths and weaknesses of arguments made by competing political actors and the news media more generally” (Wagner and Gruszczynski 2016, 42). Therefore, the power of framing gives an incentive and opportunity for enterprising politicians to reorient the conception of a group or issue, but does not guarantee their success.

Political Construction

Blending framing with socially conceived norms and awareness of the policy processes, there is tractable concept known as social construction of target groups. Here, the judgments of lawmakers to construct their subjects informs what and which policies are enacted, and creates an inert structure that may continue to influence actors and policies in the future (Schneider and Ingram 1993).⁴ Moreover, the framing of group construction may directly influence the framing of policy design, which then impacts policy success at achieving original goals (Ingram and Schneider 1990). A key question not yet fully answered is how the manner in which the poor are constructed plays a factor into what they ultimately receive.

There are leads however, as scholarship has shown framing and construction of the poor by powerful actors, such as the media or political elites, can change the collective understanding of the causes of poverty, value assessments of the poor, and instruct policy frameworks. For example, as depictions of the poor from the 1960s to 1990s moved from a debate about structural conditions to individual failings, a non-racial paradigm to an association with Blackness, and from

⁴ The term political construction is used throughout this paper in lieu of social construction, since the venue is how lawmakers in Congress construct or define the social group—the poor—in a political realm. While these terms are often used interchangeably in social research, it is important to recognize members of Congress, if they choose, have agency to alter prevailing norms, connotations, and depictions about certain groups. While they may frequently fall back on the dominant social construction, I argue their act of redefinition or reification is a form of political construction.

an understanding of deservingness to an assumption of fraud, public support for antipoverty programs declined and the policies themselves became more punitive (Gilens 1999; Rose and Baumgartner 2013). It is important, therefore, to consider how the poor were constructed in what on its surface appears to be a potential best case in lawmaker sympathy toward the poor.

Symbolic Representation

Rhetoric is a core component of the symbolic politics; controlling the common and legislative understanding of symbols contributes to larger goals of attaining political power, public support, and policy enactment (Elder and Cobb 1983). Moreover, rhetoric can become a representative end in and of itself. Eulau and Karps (1977) use the terms symbolic responsiveness as that “which involves public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support in the relationship between representative and represented” (241). Pitkin (1972 [1967]) describes symbolic representation as a dynamic in which a representative “stands for” a group or idea, even if they do not hold the traits of that group (like in descriptive representation), and the group acknowledges the act of that representation as a benefit to them (92). While descriptive representation—for example, poor lawmakers representing poor constituents—may lead to symbolic benefits to the public (111; Tate 2001), descriptive representation is not necessary for symbolic representation. For example, if wealthy members of Congress show they care about the poor and are attuned to their needs by articulating the details of their struggles, this may provide that group with a sense of voice and power.

Even if politicians fail to achieve policy outputs for a group, that group may still feel representationally served by a member that articulates the identity of a group, places them on the agenda, advocates for their causes, and serves an inspirational figure or role model for the represented. It is important to understand how the manner in which MCs portray the poor may

influence the efficacy of members of the public to believe—even if only in appearance—that their lot is represented in the chief lawmaking institution in the country.

Individuals and groups that advocate for and use language directed at the poor create a specific form of uplift to those groups—by acting as their proxy in the realm of political contestation, these people propound a specific form of representation based on symbolism and aspiration. Indeed, political advocacy organizations commonly utilize symbolic practices to show a connection to the poor and working public (Helfgot 1974, 490). This extends to Congress, for when political elites—rich and poor—act to depict the material conditions of the poor, they provide a form of recognition of the poor that serves symbolic ends.

Moreover, “[s]ymbolic representation not only can lead to empowerment for group members, but also “shape the perceptions and behavior” of non-group members, such as the public at-large or other Members of Congress (Theobald and Haider-Markel 2009, 411n1). This is especially important, as once the poor gained a foothold of recognition in Congress during the New Deal, it may have inspired formerly reticent members to engage issues of poverty. While symbolic representation should never be the sole goal of policymakers, it is one manner in which they can use their station to foster trust and authorization among the poor. It is in the New Deal, that for the first time a substantial share of lawmakers decided to speak for the poor—in doing so, constructing the most publicly visible form of the poor, which begs examination for its potentially long-running effects on poverty representation.

While symbolic representation is correlated with increased support for the representative among the represented, there are limitations on how far these symbolic effects go in motivating people to increased political involvements (Lawless 2004). Nonetheless, in the absence of additional forms of satisfying members of a polity, the symbolic value of showing interest in the

struggles of people outside of Congress is more representative than an alternative where a group is utterly ignored. Since the poor spent over a century relegated to local, potentially state-level political realms, there is little doubt that it would have been refreshing to hear many MCs project the conditions of their lives onto the national arena.

Although this form of representation lacks the policy component of substantive representation and is therefore insufficient to claim *full* representation (Pitkin 1972 [1967], 111), scholars should not undervalue the potential psychological benefits to the public poor when they witness members of an elite—even aristocratic—body recognize their place in society and articulate their needs. There is inherent value in MCs acting as role models to the poor, setting poverty onto the agenda space, and potentially altering public and elite support for antipoverty programs. Moreover, the public is much more likely to monitor the symbolic aspects of politics (appearances; biography; rhetoric; tribal partisan conflict; identity) than the legalese and nuance of statutory language in policy outcomes. If we as scholars fail to understand political symbolism, we may also fail to understand what forges affinity between a typical apolitical member of the public and elected officials (Elder and Cobb 1983).

Preferences

Core to the behavioral understanding of Congressional action is identifying member interests, preferences, and ideology. While this identification dilemma has always mattered, it has taken on new importance in recent years as the body has become more ideologically polarized and partisan, leading to legislative gridlock (Binder 2003; Lee 2009). However, there is a discrepancy between how the public, pundits, and trade publications conceptualize of member ideology (often using selected key votes and public statements) and how the discipline measures it by clustering members based on every recorded roll-call. As just alluded to, preferences are often extracted from

vote measures, but these are inadequate to claim ideology, since they really capture voting similarity and dissimilarity, which is confounded by partisanship and the unknown variables of policy alternatives, policy language, and strategic choice. Moreover, ideology is itself a simplified system to make consistent the complex nature of politics, and focusing on how one conceives of the poor has great potential to cut across espoused ideology, at least in the Fourth Party System of this era. While the creation of DW-NOMINATE usefully provided evidence for a unidimensional politics (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), it is far less clear that it accurately captures member preferences or ideology (Noel 2013; Bateman and Lapinski 2016). For example, if a governing majority of Democrats vote together on a House bill that all Republicans oppose, any progressive members that vote against the legislation because it does not go far enough *left* are scaled closer to Republicans, labeling them more conservative when in reality that is the opposite of their belief systems. While this example violates the principle of single-peaked preferences, politics often vary from the rational choice expectations of political scientists in highly consequential ways—Congressional voting is one of these cases.

In several ways the key vote approach is actually more accurate than pooled approaches—primarily because of its contextual value—but even this method has a hazard since roll-calls may never expose ideology, but instead just like-minded voting based on an atheoretic and acontextual treatment of all votes and vote positions. Indeed, roll-calls occur in a larger arena where the agenda is constrained by leadership and members think in strategic terms as they work to find policy alternatives. An alternative approach is to assume members use language for a specific purpose, and code what they say to understand their preferences. While roll-call approaches are certainly more compact, they do not capture ideology even as scholars continue to use them for that express purpose.

Therefore, rhetoric may be the most obvious, and yet most ignored form of identifying the preferences, ideology, energy level, and issue commitment of politicians, even if one concedes that much of the language is instrumental or pandering. Studying the rhetoric on the poor in Congress provides an open opportunity to at the very least understand the *de facto* construction of the poor by political elites. At its maximal effect, it may also disclose the value systems and ideological commitments of historical members of the institution, in a way that vote measures simply cannot with any form of nuance. Since members can mostly speak freely during their allotted speech time, observing their language around the poor helps uncover what poverty means *to them*, and then trace how those commitments make it through or are altered in the policy process.

The rhetorical approach within this dissertation will help evaluate the form of representation the poor receive in this era by focusing on the ideational plane, which will shed light on how the poor do not equally benefit from political action even if they face a heightened level of suffering.

How to Study Rhetoric

To better understand framing, political construction, symbolic representation, and preferences, my work employs a novel, precise measure based on rhetoric, specifically as it pertains to poverty. While this approach is certainly more labor intensive, I contend it is more accurate at revealing preferences because it is contextualized, nuanced, and open-ended. Specifically, I engage the under-utilized floor speech content in the *Congressional Record* (U.S. Congress 1933-1946), wherein members are explicitly stating why they are doing what they are doing. While this could be cheap talk or an attempt to manipulate the audience (Riker 1986), merely documenting these processes is important to understand how Congressional behavior leads to policy action. Additionally, this approach is especially fruitful when floor votes fail to

materialize on important legislation due to agenda control, which expands the realm of potential observable phenomena and research questions in Congress. Even with institutional constraints, members may still find a way to make their point, which serves as an inroad to understand the representation of hard to conceptualize, low resourced groups and interests.

Moreover, my work is a departure from purely member-based approaches that populate the field to a speech-based ideational approach. A focus on speeches provides a more versatile way to monitor the aggregation of ideas and institutional function. The resulting data then presents the definitive record of what Congress has said about the poor during the New Deal policymaking process, providing rich data to assess the institution's ability to address national problems as it balances interests and pursue the public good.

One essential task to note that is *not* in the dissertation is the identification of the socioeconomic backgrounds of MCs. Specifically, having this information would allow for an analysis of whether MC descriptive representation—being of the poor—informs responsiveness to the public poor. Since there are no existing datasets on the economic micro foundations of MCs in the 1930s and 40s, a new research agenda could fill the existing chasm. I have an ongoing project that uses secondary literature to gain valuable qualitative insights into how members were understood by contemporaries, biographers, and historians that construct period pieces. Due to the unevenness to the data—not every MC has a biography—it will take quite some time to construct a dataset that provides a strong enough basis to claim representation of the MC population, which can then be analyzed. Importantly, this future project may serve as a check my main approach that uses Congressional rhetoric, as it does not rely on the official transcript, but instead various sources historians use to understand their subjects.


As it stands, the dissertation as constituted will serve as the first public repository that people can reference to understand the complex picture of what historical members believed about the poor without relying on overly simplistic vote-based interpretations of member preferences. This dataset is constructed of poverty speeches coded for their content, allowing for multiple operationalizations of the unit of analysis and a variety of gainful analytic applications.

Yielding Poverty Speeches

The numerous concepts of representation addressed in Chapter 1 are primarily assessed through the central newly constructed measurable concept of a *poverty speech*. Exactly as it sounds, the concept captures when and how members choose to engage poverty on the floor of the House of Representatives or Senate.

The dissertation employs a clear stepwise procedure to create the population of poverty speeches, which is fully articulated in the attached Appendix 2A. A brief summary of the procedure starts with the development of poverty search terms to identify poverty-related floor speeches, followed by inputting the terms in the *Congressional Record* through the HeinOnline online interface, verifying the poverty content of the speeches, then finally pulling the entries into a spreadsheet. The terms were based on a consultation with online dictionaries (See Tables 2A.1, 2A.2, and 2A.3 in the appendix) and are executed through a Boolean search. After inputting the search the resulting positive hits are vetted for their correct use of poverty content and pulled into an spreadsheet. While this process occurred independently and before the publication of their work, Miler (2018) utilizes a similar approach (23-24), although she uses fewer synonyms for poverty and omits non-people references and anything having to do with global matters. This project employs a more comprehensive set of terms and only omits entries that are not about material poverty, as would be the case in the phrase “poor performance” for a pitcher in a baseball

Figure 2.2 Hierarchy and Families of Poverty Codes



game, or someone with unfortunate luck getting caught in the rain being labeled a “poor thing.” The final corpus of poverty depictions contains 3,403 speeches for a total of 6,136,012 words.

Coding Poverty Content

Once the speech corpus is solidified, the next task is to extract meaning from them by coding their content for important poverty identities and ideas. To execute this, the project creates a unique and comprehensive 52-item codebook for subjects of poverty speeches, which is available with examples in the 30-page Appendix 2B. The codebook is intended to cover a wide breadth of topics and themes based on existing literatures on poverty (Saldaña 2013). For an overview, Figure 2.2 provides the families of the codes in an organized hierarchical chart. The major codes fall under six broad categories: demographics (e.g., age; race; gender; migration status), circumstances (e.g., natural disaster; hunger; housing needs), geography (e.g., region; density level), occupation (e.g., agriculture; military veteran; government worker), characterization (e.g., deservingness; MC personalization frame), and non-specific/general American (i.e., vague depiction of poor).

Since political speeches tend to meander as they engage new topics, a decision rule is employed that seeks to ensure codes are appropriately fixed to whomever a lawmaker deems poor. Therefore, the rule is to code for poor subjects by creating a 5-line bandwidth: the sentence in which the term is used, then two sentences before and two sentences after the triggering sentence. The maximum value for a given variable in a speech is 1, making the variable a binary to discern whether they engage the topic, not a count variable for how often they talk about the topic. Counting occurs across speeches, helping identify lawmaker interest, but within a speech the point is simply to identify topical engagement.

The completion of the coding process yielded 15,080 *manually* coded poverty speech codes ascertained from reading every single passage in which a poverty search term exists. This

comprehensive approach to breaking down political speech into its constitutive signifiers gives the project leverage to fully depict how the poor are portrayed within Congress.

Units of Measurement and Analysis

For most of the ensuing chapters the unit of analysis is the conceptualization of the poor, while the unit of measurement is floor speeches by MCs. As previously established, a poverty speech is a contiguous block of text that holds a concentration of poverty-term laden language. This means speeches vary greatly in length depending on how the passage utilizes poverty synonyms, and whether they are interrupted by other members as they give their speeches (an interrupted speech could count as more than one entry if each part has at least two poverty search terms). Chapters 3 through 6 use descriptive statistics and statistical modeling of the raw speech counts as the main basis for analysis. But these poverty speeches are easily aggregated by member to better understand member qualities and their use of rhetoric. In these analyses, as is the case for parts of Chapters 4 and 6, the unit of analysis switches to members who vary in total poverty speech count. This MC-based approach comports with common analyses of Congressional behavior in political science scholarship. Being able to move between units of speeches and units as members provides greater research flexibility and insights into different components of poverty rhetoric.

Analytical Approach

The chapters on rhetoric (3 through 7; 12) employ a diverse set of analytical techniques that span qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods approaches. To preliminarily understand meaning and contextual the era, the qualitative component utilizes narrative and meaning-centered ethnography (Chapter 4), descriptive history, and coding speeches for the poverty ideas and groups they engage (Chapter 6). The quantitative approach seeks to establish discrete measurements and

assess relations in the data. To accomplish that, the dissertation employs a variety of staples in quantitative analysis such as descriptive statistics and statistical modeling, specifically the ordinary least squares (OLS), logit, time-series, and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) modeling. Explanations of the statistical approaches is provided in Chapter 5 and its corresponding appendices. Finally, some of the analysis in the dissertation operates at the intersection of the qual and quant worlds, requiring both the judgment, discretion, and expertise of the researcher *and* the quantification of phenomena. These mixed techniques include geospatial analysis in Chapter 4 and two forms of computer-assisted content analysis in Chapter 6: topic modeling and exploratory factor analysis. The application of geospatial methods in particular is highly effective at transcending disciplinary strictures to communicate salient variation (Goodchild and Janelle 2010; Bauer et al. 2014) in poverty representation across America in the New Deal. The range of methods employed in the dissertation increases the chance of fully extracting key patterns of poverty articulation in Congress during the New Deal.

Part III: The Antipoverty Policy Process

Why Study Antipoverty Policy?

Given the elite skew within America's ostensibly democratic republic (Mills 1956; Domhoff 1967; Page and Gilens 2017), studying antipoverty policy helps us understand both lawmaker behavior and why poverty remains a permanent staple of the American polity. As Kristina Miler (2018) puts it, focusing on the representation of the poor serves as a diagnostic marker for how well the system performs at aggregating interests, including those with great need and low power. Moreover, an "intelligent" system should account for the poor and work to lessen inequality, otherwise key poverty issues will ebb and fall with attention cycles and generally lag behind their rightful place on the public agenda (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993, 111-112). A

focus on the construction of antipoverty policy will show us how lawmakers represent the interests of a community for which they are not a part, and contribute to a broader understanding of when and how antipoverty policies are more or less inclusive and effective at solving the intended problem.

Substantive Representation

While symbolic representation offers something meaningful to the representee, most scholarship on representation agrees the final and definitive marker of high-quality representation is that of substantive representation (Pitkin 1972 [1967]). This occurs when lawmakers advocate for the needs of their constituents, but even further, that this advocacy leads to policy enactment. Constituents receive tangible benefits for their lawmaker's efforts, not just a sense of alignment or being consulted. Given extant scholarship on the backgrounds of lawmakers (Carnes 2013), antipoverty policies are not constructed by descriptive representatives of the poor, but are instead the product of non-poor lawmakers virtually representing the poor. In turn, there are myriad points during the idea generation, translation, and information-seeking tasks where lawmaker bias, ignorance, or divergent interests could lead to policies that differ from what the poor would have for themselves. Studying antipoverty policy in the New Deal sheds light on how lawmakers reconcile all of these issues to create affirmative victories for some of the poor, while excluding others.

American Political Development and Policy Studies

Focusing on antipoverty policy contributes new details to the American political development and policy studies literatures.⁵ The U.S. regime is known to be especially difficult

⁵ I treat these literatures together because they both engage: sequencing and substance; process, change, and continuity in public policy and institutional configurations; and discrete episodes and elongated temporal scopes alike. Indeed, scholars in each subfield would be well served by engaging one another's conceptual and empirical frameworks to better understand the phenomena of which they study.

for affirmative social welfare policy creation due to its libertine political traditions (Hartz 1955; Esping-Andersen 1990) and high amount of veto points within the divided powers, federalized system (Immergut 1990). The history of antipoverty policy is highly contingent, morphing out of adjacent policy domains (Skocpol 1995), receiving attention only in select periods of systemic change, and subject to constant threats of retrenchment (Pierson 1994; 1996). Moreover, even when policies are enacted, they are frequently designed in a paternalistic framework that manipulates the poor to fit politician goals and the social construction of what it means to be a good citizen (Piven and Cloward 1993 [1971]; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). Using a case study approach to study a subset of influential, positive cases of antipoverty policymaking will add additional nuance to these precepts of the American lawmaking system.

The full arc of the dissertation will engage a cornucopia of rich concepts in these two literatures. From the policy studies field, this work will shed light on problem definition (Rocheffort and Cobb 1993), equity (Stone 2002 [1988]), attention cycles, agenda space, and abrupt change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2005), multiple streams, interest convergence, and policy windows (Kingdon 2011 [1984]), the stickiness of “wicked” social problems (Rittel and Webber 1973), the interconnectedness of problem solution and inadvertent creation (Fine 2014), and the process of political learning (Rose 1993). From the APD canon, this work engages the concepts of critical junctures (Key 1955; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Collier and Collier 1991; Hacker 2002), path dependency (North 1990; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004), gradual change (Thelen 2004; Rocco and Thurston 2014) including conversion (Béland 2007) and layering (Schickler 2001), drift (Galvin and Hacker 2020), and policy feedback that restructures the socioeconomic dynamics in the public (Campbell 2003; Mettler and Soss 2004). As this dissertation will convey, the peculiar—and

marginal—nature of antipoverty policies affords the researcher an unusually high variety of severable concepts to leverage in pursuit of new knowledge.

How to Study Antipoverty Policy

In many ways, antipoverty policies will often fall under the label of “toughest” cases of policymaking. This is because the actionable population has the least powerful members of society within it, and further, their representatives will be some of the most powerful people in the country. The disjuncture between the lived experience of the poor and privilege of lawmakers creates perfect conditions for what is commonly well-intentioned but misspecified or incomplete policy solutions, or worse, complete neglect. Therefore, in studying antipoverty policy it is useful to initially focus on “best” case scenarios in which we know the poor reap some benefit. This allows the researcher to assess the potential ceiling for what the poor can receive from government, while also showcasing the qualitatively unsatisfying nature to antipoverty policy—they often fail to achieve the intended goals due to an incorrect theory of the case or circumscribed policy remedy.

Therefore, the sprawling and prolific New Deal provides an exceptional starting point to understand lawmaking for the poor. The next section engages the broader case selection criteria and process, followed by a section on how to employ a granular approach to studying the legislative process.

Case Selection

While the full case selection process is articulated in Appendix 2C, it is worth quickly summarizing its contents here. Case selection throughout the dissertation relies on the qualitative school of thought, in particular, identifying “substantively importance cases” (Goertz and Mahoney 2002, 184) with some variation along the axis of “easy” to “hard” test cases (Howard 2017, 129-130) of division of the poor. While the selection process is inherently qualitative, it

initially relies on a large- N attempt to create a population of nearly all influential antipoverty policies in Congress has passed in U.S. history. From this large- N dataset (Table 2C.1), small- n case selection based on a set criteria is executed (Table 2C.2) in an operationalized form of nested analysis (Lieberman 2005). It has already been established the New Deal period was selected dually for its high profile in a variety of existing literatures and because there is reason to believe it may serve as a high water mark for poverty representation in the U.S. Within the New Deal period there is a wide variety of policy episodes from which to choose.

This study focused on attaining variation along four dimensions: date, policy topic, level of influence, and division of the poor. The selected policies of the Social Security Act of 1935 (Chapter 8), U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Chapter 9), and National School Lunch Act of 1946 (Chapter 10) accomplish this protocol. Temporally, SSA occurs in the robust and generous “Second” New Deal, USHA occurs in the “Third” New Deal and beginning of the rising Conservative Coalition in Congress, and the NSLA is technically in President Harry S Truman’s Fair Deal era, which coincided with consolidated dominance of the Conservative Coalition.⁶ The contexts for enactment diminish with time as FDR’s mandate fades and backlash takes hold. The policies are each in different policy areas, as the SSA engages pensions, labor protections, and welfare policy, while the housing act is concerned with public housing and employment, and finally the NSLA is concerned with childhood nutrition and agriculture. Moreover, while it is fair to say each of the three policies are important in their domain, the policies can be ranked by level of influence, with the SSA coming in as arguably the most important social welfare law in U.S. history, the U.S. Housing act coming in next for its use to build public housing across the country,

⁶ As Chapter 10 will show, the genesis of the NSLA predates even FDR’s time in office, but the legislative debate, policy creation, and executive implementation of adjacent programs grows each year from 1935 until its sponsorship in 1943 and final passage in 1946. It can even be argued it is the final policy of the New Deal paradigm, in what would have been FDR’s full fourth term.

and school lunches being the least influential since it's sustenance directive was proscribed to only poor schoolchildren (and not even all poor schoolchildren). Finally, each case will vary in the manner (mechanisms) and degree (level) in which the poor are divided. Careful cases selection with variation on the key outcome variable at best allows for causal assessments (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 108) and at worst enriches the conceptualization of and empirical record for how the poor are divided across cases.

Appendix 2C provides further details on the case selection process which included considerations that go beyond the New Deal, such that moving the project forward in time will encounter a new set of policy areas and circumstance that would ultimately better contextualize the uniqueness and longevity of New Deal antipoverty policies.

Forensic Account of the Policy Process

A predetermined template approach will be applied to each case in service of making them comparable to one another on a steady footing. This section will lay out the episodic method of studying the genesis, debate, construction, passage, and effects of public policies. While scholars of legislative history often implicitly conduct themselves in this manner, this dissertation labels such a granular approach a “forensic” account due to the focus on every last detail in the available record of Congressional deliberations.⁷ The formalistic and somewhat rigid method of assessing each case is intended to ameliorate the critiques of qualitative work as often lacking in measurement precision and developing findings that are unwittingly context dependent (Ragin 2008, 81).

⁷ The term forensic often connotes a form of criminology that uses scientific methods to identify clues and linkages in a crime scene. However, this particular definition is a modern redefinition of older meanings that center on the “the art or study of argumentative discourse” and/or forensics “the application of scientific knowledge to legal problems” (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forensic>). Both of these latter definitions accurately describe the attempted approach in the case study chapters.

Specifically, each case will engage the political development of policy ideas up to the point in which Congress gets serious about making a law around the issue. These historical sections will highlight subnational efforts in the related policy area, executive branch experimentation in policy provision, and how Congress has engaged similar issues in the past.

The second and longest section focuses on the legislative process, further broken down into the proposed legislation phase, committee process, and floor process. The proposed legislation highlights where the ideas for the policy came from in the polity and which members were involved in advocacy or gatekeeping on the issue. The committee process uncovers the nuts and bolts for how Congress delegates certain tasks to a subset of members who are expected to develop a record of fact-finding and stakeholder engagement. Special attention is paid to the role of witnesses in contributing to the policy debate and legislative language, particularly with respect to witness ability to serve as surrogates for the poor and center on their needs. Once the bill is reported out of committee, it then faces the bicameral floor process, expanding the scope of conflict in a way that allows for either expansion or retraction of the policy's reach. This section uses interpretive methods to understand the discourse around poverty, describes the amendment process, and uses statistical modeling to interrogate the relationship between poverty speech propensity and vote position in key roll calls.

The third section in each chapter takes a deep dive into policy language. Using the lessons of the small statutory interpretation literature, the goal here is to provide an exhaustive account of the mechanisms in each bill to better understand if negative externalities and incomplete incorporation of the poor was a product of legislative design or bureaucratic interpretation. The answer to this is important because it has the potential to shift ideas for reform from one branch to the other—either Congress needs to write better laws or the executive branch needs to execute

Congress' intent better. Of course, the truth in the New Deal is that compromise between differently situated actors and reliance on federalism necessarily limited the reach of each bill, but the section helps identify the exact circumstances where one is more to blame than the other.

Finally, each chapter uses a comprehensive scouring of secondary sources to establish the record on the respective policy's effect on the polity. Each of the selected policies contributed to a net-positive outcome for America's poor while simultaneously excluding high-in-need populations from policy provision.

From both the careful selection of multiple cases and the granular study of the legislative process, one can draw generalizations that rise above the idiosyncrasies of each case, thereby working to overcome the $n=1$ problem (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 208) and formalize the divisionary process in a way that allows for inferences about policymaking, even if they are closer to descriptive than causal (Collier, Brady and Seawright 2010, 116). The broad lessons of New Deal antipoverty policy lawmaking is presented in Chapter 11. Furthermore, the gained insights from earlier in the chapter provide a basis to fill in gaps in the existing literature and trace where the policy effects have their origin.

Conclusion

This chapter articulated the rationale and components of a multi-method historically grounded research design. The comparative framework espoused in the chapter provides a basis to evaluate the alignment and disjuncture between the existing poor in the public (covered in the chapter) with the conceptualizations of the poor Congress and poor that receive social provision in New Deal policies (in the succeeding chapters). The following chapters will track how well the identified long-standing and newly poor were incorporated into the nascent welfare state regime. This approach is the most comprehensive of any scholarship on representation and the New Deal

and uncovers how marginalized groups were represented and why the New Deal policy prescription was fragmented and exclusionary.

The ensuing focus on rhetoric (symbolism) and policy (substance) offers inroads to understand how lawmakers who by and large are not poor virtually represent the poor. Exploring the contours of virtual representation not only identifies potential issues within the representation of the disadvantaged poor, but more broadly showcases how lawmakers represent those that are not like them. After all, there is no way a lawmaker could descriptively hold all of the identities of their constituents in a diverse country, so assessing virtual representation gets at the heart of the representational dilemma at large and the nature of the American politics specifically.

Finally, since the “alphabet soup” analogy correctly characterizes the endless string of policies and agencies that came to be known by acronyms during the New Deal, the final appendix of this chapter (Appendix 2D) offers a glossary of commonly used abbreviations in the dissertation. This is a somewhat necessary resource since, for example, acronyms like the AAA, FERA, and SSA all signify a public law *and* an administrative configuration (“act” is conveniently replaced with “administration”). Unless otherwise designated, the general rule of thumb for the dissertation is that acronyms with more than one meaning generally point to the law and not the administration, but the list in the appendix highlights and disambiguates specific terminology.

The empirical presentation begins in the next chapter by highlighting the descriptive history of poverty rhetoric in Congress, with special emphasis on agenda share, chamber differences, and partisan dynamics.

Appendix 2A: Search Term Methodology

There are many potential approaches to creating a population of poverty speeches in Congress. The one adopted in this project is to use poverty-synonymous terms in a Boolean search to uncover poverty speeches in the *Congressional Record* (via Hein Online). This appendix walks through the term selection, search construction, and rules to execute the searches. Below is an overview of the step-by-step process:

1. Generate poverty search terms
2. Construct a search command
3. Engage Hein Online's Congressional documents collection
4. Select the Congressional session, starting with the 73rd Congress
5. Select the date, starting with the first date Congress is in session
6. Input Boolean search
7. Arrange responses in chronological order
8. Click "display all results" to expand results whenever applicable (otherwise there is a strong chance of missing entire entries)
9. Examine to see that two terms are in the contiguous speech text *and* that they are about material poverty
10. If two terms are present, open full speech
11. Switch from document image to text
12. Pull as much of entry as possible and input into spreadsheet (limit 32,767 characters per two poverty terms to fit a Microsoft Excel cell)
 - a. If a speech is long enough and replete with poverty terms, it is broken up into multiple chunks, given each segment has two qualifying poverty terms in its own right
13. Note the following information in the spreadsheet:
 - a. Input order (with the first entry receiving a 1, second a 2, etc.)
 - b. Member of Congress name
 - c. Chamber
 - d. Webpage link
 - e. Full text
 - f. Date
 - g. *Congressional Record* Page(s)
 - h. Congressional session
14. Repeat until every qualifying speech from the beginning of the 73rd Congress (1933) to the end of the 79th Congress (1946) is captured

The first matter to address is how to decide what terms form the basis of keyword searches. To execute this, I consulted dictionaries and thesauruses to create the term-string. The goal going into the term selection process was to find terms that were specific enough to be about poverty and yet broad enough to capture poverty adjacent concepts that arise from alternative vernacular use (e.g., descriptions using “homeless” instead of “poor”). Final decisions are made based on balancing the research goals with how dictionaries demarcate the poverty concept. The agenda employs Stryker et al’s (2006) dual imperatives of *recall* (pulling items of interest) and *specificity* (not pulling extraneous entries). For example, the term “want” accomplishes the former, but is not specific enough and thus violates the latter.

To validate poverty synonyms (Lacy et al. 2014, 794), words were selected from several major online dictionaries and thesauruses. These sources are Thesaurus.com⁸, Merriam-Webster⁹, Oxford¹⁰, Collins¹¹, and MacMillan.¹² Table 2A.1 presents the exhaustive list of poverty terms and whether they show up as synonyms in each resource. It is organized based on descending order from the most used to least used synonyms. An additional grouping of potentially important poverty terms that do show up in any of the resources are affixed to the end of the table. The following final terms in Table 2A.2 were selected primarily based on general agreement among thesauruses for what constitutes a synonym for poverty with the four exceptions: homelessness, vagranc* (vagrancy/vagrant), low(er)-class, and low(er)-income. Inclusion of these terms is meant to increase topical variety and ensure the search string is nimble across space and time.

⁸ <http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/poverty?s=t>

⁹ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/poverty>

¹⁰ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/poverty>

¹¹ <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english-thesaurus/poverty>

¹² <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/thesaurus-category/american/the-state-of-being-poor>

Table 2A.1 Thesaurus Agreement of Poverty Synonyms

Term (Selected Search Terms in Bold)	Thesaurus.com	Merriam- Webster	Oxford	Collins	MacMillan	Number of Entries
Destitute/Destitution	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	5
Penury	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	5
Beggar	✓	✓	✓	✓		4
Indigence/Indigent	✓	✓	✓	✓		4
Pauper/Pauperism	✓	✓	✓	✓		4
Privation	✓		✓	✓	✓	4
Want		✓	✓	✓	✓	4
Deficiency/Deficit	✓			✓	✓	3
Hardship	✓		✓	✓		3
Impecunious/Impecuniousness	✓	✓	✓			3
Impoverish/Impoverished	✓	✓	✓			3
In-need		✓	✓	✓		3
Insolvency	✓		✓	✓		3
Necessitousness/Necessity	✓	✓		✓		3
Penniless/Pennilessness	✓		✓	✓		3
Poor/Poorness/Poorhouse	✓	✓			✓	3
Bankruptcy	✓		✓			2
Deprived/Deprivation			✓		✓	2
Distress	✓			✓		2
Hand-to-Mouth Existence			✓	✓		2
Insufficiency	✓			✓		2
Needy		✓	✓			2
Paucity	✓			✓		2
Starvation/Starving	✓			✓		2
Straits/Straitened Circumstances	✓		✓			2
Abject	✓					1
Aridity	✓					1
Austerity					✓	1
Barren/Bareness	✓					1
Dearth	✓					1
Debt	✓					1
Depletion	✓					1
Difficulty	✓					1
Emptiness	✓					1

Table 2A1. Thesaurus Agreement of Poverty Synonyms (Cont.)

Term (Selected Search Terms in Bold)	Thesaurus.com	Merriam- Webster	Oxford	Collins	MacMillan	Number of Entries
Exiguity	✓					1
Famine	✓					1
Gutter					✓	1
Inadequacy	✓					1
Lack	✓					1
Meagerness	✓					1
Pass	✓					1
Pinch	✓					1
Reduction	✓					1
Scarcity	✓					1
Shortage	✓					1
Sparsity				✓		1
Subsistence					✓	1
Underdevelopment	✓					1
Vacancy	✓					1
Desperate						0
Dire						0
Downtrodden						0
Homeless						0
Hunger						0
Low-Class/Lower-Class						0
Low-Income/Lower-Income						0
Peasant						0
Peon/Peonage						0
Serf/Serfdom						0
Servant						0
Servitude						0
Slave						0
Tramp						0
Underprivileged						0
Vagabond						0
Vagrant/Vagrancy						0
Wanderer						0

Table 2A.2 Primary General Use and Secondary Particularistic Use Poverty Terms

Column A: General and Common Use (Search Version)	Column B: Specific Types, Less Direct, Parochial, and Archaic (Search Version)	
Poor (Poor*)	Beggar (Beggar*)	
Poverty	Vagrant (Vagran*)	Type
Low-Class/Lower-Class	Starvation (Starv*)	A
Low-Income/Lower-Income	Homeless (Homeless*)	
Impoverish (Impoverish*)	Paucity (Paucit*)	
	Impecunious (Impecunious*)	Type
	Penury	B
	Privation (Privation*)	
	Destitute (Destitut*)	
	Indigent (Indigen*)	
	Pauper (Pauper*)	
	Abject (Abject*)	Type
	Penniless (Penniless*)	C
	Deprivation (Depriv*)	
	In-need	
	Needy	

Note: In the search function, words are stemmed, then affixed an asterisk (*) to pull word variants (e.g., vagran* will yield results when *vagrant* and *vagrancy* are used).

Column A holds general and common poverty terminology, while Column B has more specific synonyms. Column B further breaks down into three types:

Entries in the Type A grouping are words that represent extreme subsets of the poor

Type B is composed of archaic words relating to poverty that are no longer in common usage in descriptions of the poor, but are included for historical portability

Parochial and less direct words are included in Type C. These are words that are synonyms for generalized poverty, but are less commonly used than those in Column A and are not as clearly demonstrative of material poverty in their common usage (e.g., *needy* could be anyone who needs something; anyone can be deprived of something)

The following terms are associated with poverty, but were ruled out for the following reasons:

- Arid* (aridity): generally pertains to the natural world, but one could imagine it being used metaphorically in Congress.
- Barrenness: also may pertain more to natural world.
- Desperat* (desperate; desperation): not specific to poor; doesn't imply anything material.

- Dire: not specific to poor.
- Downtrodden: seemingly really good term, although it implies a momentary state; removed from original search design to get under the 250 character limit in ProQuest searches.
- Exigu* (exiguity): archaic form of describing material depletion.
- Hunger: not specific to the poor, a less impactful form of starvation.
- Peasant: poor farmers that generally do not own land; would fit sharecroppers to an extent.
- Peon* (peon; peonage): could fit Southern history, but not a common word in the USA.
- Serf* (serf; serfdom) specific form of the poor (tied to the land); also not common to think of serfs in the US, outside of the South, where the creation of Black Codes essentially instantiated serfdom after slavery.
- (indentured) Servant/Servitude: servant is a common position and label in the US, and while it is a blue-collar job, it is not directly indicative of low pay; some servants make no money, while others make quite a lot (depends on the employer).
- Slave: has a direct economic power relationship, but is anachronistic after the 13th Amendment; lawmakers may still use the word slave or slavery to denote those in dire economic conditions, but given its very specific meaning it is ruled out.
- Tramp: specific type of traveling, homeless person. Not always connoting poverty, as some people are just flighty by nature.
- Underprivileged: highly common in contemporary use, not historically common. Nonetheless, was included in the original search design, then removed to get under the 250 character max.
- Vagabond/wander(er): does not have to be poor; some people choose to move a lot—they might experience poverty, but the term vagabond applies to an overlapping, non-exclusive set of people without settled homes.
- Want: useful poverty term but would yield every incidence of the word in a search function, with a vast minority even remotely close to describing poverty.

Some of these terms come up in conjunction with positive hits on the above A and B column terms and thus show up frequently in the dataset anyway. They simply do not count toward triggering a speech.

The project employs a Boolean search which uses conditional commands to execute a specified outcome. Here, a very simple Boolean search using poverty synonyms separated by an OR command extracts search results where at least *one* of the terms is present. However, the rule imposed in this project is that a speech only counts if there are *two* poverty terms in the speech. The resulting yield may miss passive mentions of poverty, but will capture the dense, *moderate*

and *high interest* poverty speeches. While Hein has no character limit, to maintain compatibility with ProQuest (used in subsequent chapters to reveal poverty legislation and committee hearings) and potentially other data repositories, the search has a 250-character limit.

Therefore, the Boolean search for poverty speeches is specified:

(poor* OR poverty OR impoverish* OR destitut* OR indigen* OR pauper* OR abject* OR beggar* OR paucit* OR impecunious* OR penniless OR penury OR vagran* OR starv* OR depriv* OR privation* OR in-need OR needy OR low-income OR low-class OR lower-income OR lower-class OR homeless*)

The goal, again, is to balance breadth (across poverty themes) and depth (specific types of poverty) of the subject, with a tractable amount results to provide a solid population of poverty speeches, but not too many so as to make the project inexecutable. Further, if I relax the requirement to a single poverty search term, the yield will be significantly larger, including more potential false positives (when a poverty-synonymous term is not used to describe poverty), making the manual process of searching, opening, reading, and copying poverty speeches too labor intensive to have a wide temporal scope.

One might ask: why go through all this effort when there are automated text parsers and Congressional speech datasets online? Great question! Automated approaches are at the point where they can scrape webpages and pull items of interest using logic-based commands—just what this project calls for. However, given both Hein Online and ProQuest’s interface, and the idiosyncratic nature of speech breaks in Congress, Python and other script commands simply do not yield the level of accuracy desired by the author. For example, the best available dataset is that of Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2018), but according to their own audit, they only have a 90% accuracy rate for speech breaks. This is problematic because the error rate is not likely evenly distributed across observations, as older Congressional documents are in worse shape and have clear printing issues (e.g., skewed pages and/or faded words and lines).

In this project, every single speech is arduously drawn directly from the text, first viewing the image, then pulling the text, then comparing the two for errors. Given the temporal focus of the project—the 1930s and 1940s—time-efficient automated approaches may make the process go much faster, but simply do not instill in me enough confidence to use them in lieu of manual transcription. Therefore, a profuse amount of time—from November 2017 to May 2018—was exhausted to extract the resulting population of 3,403 qualifying poverty speeches.

To qualify as a poverty speech, this project adopts the following decision rules:

- a) Two words in Column A, including any term repeated twice
- b) One word in Column A and one in Column B
- c) Two different terms in Column B; repeated single terms do not trigger inclusion

This is further specified in the formal logic expression:

Entry counts as a poverty speech $\equiv (A \wedge (A \vee B)) \vee (B_x \wedge (A \vee B_{\sim x}))$.

The reasoning here is that one term repeated twice in Column B is not general enough to capture the kind of phenomena the project is engineered to study (general framing of the poor). However, two different terms suggests a larger focus on poverty, not just a subset type of poverty, and therefore counts. Maximizing the number of search terms, balanced for breadth and depth, increases the likelihood of capturing a variety of speeches about poverty. This is also helpful because it is often difficult to ascertain meaning in some of these contexts (like the use of the word “poor”); triangulating with multiple words helps ensure correct identification.

Because the decision rules employed here are that a speech counts if any contiguous passage has two poverty search terms, the resulting speeches range from short passages (a few sentences) to several pages of text. While this disparity may privilege longer passages in text analysis which are more likely to hold a wide topical breadth, this approach is defensible because the rule is about clustering of poverty terms—in any shape. Furthermore, members have agency to construct their rhetoric as they choose. Indeed, it is more impressive if a very short passage

Table 2A.3 Yield by Search Term

Term (Search Version)	Number of Speeches	Proportion of Speeches
Poor (Poor*)	2,059	60.5%
Starvation (Starv*)	956	28.1%
Poverty	774	22.7%
Needy	703	20.7%
Destitute (Destitut*)	531	15.6%
In-need	532	15.6%
Deprivation (Depriv*)	505	14.8%
Low-Income	306	9.0%
Pauper (Pauper*)	245	7.2%
Impoverish (Impoverish*)	243	7.1%
Homeless (Homeless*)	165	4.8%
Privation (Privation*)	157	4.6%
Indigent (Indigen*)	119	3.5%
Lower-Income	113	3.3%
Abject (Abject*)	79	2.3%
Beggar (Beggar*)	69	2.0%
Penniless (Penniless*)	47	1.4%
Penury	42	1.2%
Vagrant (Vagran*)	10	0.3%
Lower-Class	6	0.2%
Paucity (Paucit*)	6	0.2%
Impecunious (Impecunious*)	4	0.1%
Low-Class	1	0.0%

meets the aforementioned criteria than a longer passage, since it requires a higher proportion of terms to be centered on poverty, thus forming a more cohesively poverty-based speech.

Finally, Table 2A.3 provides the final yields by each search term from 1933 to 1946 in the Congressional Record. Importantly, this is a coarse estimate, since some of these terms may not be the exact terms that triggered a positive yield. Instead, this table contains whether a poverty word appears in the speech corpus. Some of these words showed up in qualified speeches, but were not necessarily the qualifier. Every term showed up at least once, rising from “low-class” (1) to poor (2,059).

Appendix 2B: Categorization of the Poor Codebook

The rules in this codebook are used to categorize who (“the subject”) a Member of Congress (“MC”) describes as poor in a speech on the floor of Congress. Statements qualify for coding when they meet the stipulations in Appendix A: Search Terms. There are 3,404 such qualifying speeches in the 1933 to 1946 corpus.

To code descriptions of the poor, this project adopts a rule that whatever sentence an applicable search term appears in, the investigator may determine the intended subject of said term by reading up to two sentences before and two sentences ahead of the sentence with the search term. This effectively creates a five-sentence bandwidth to identify who the MC is talking about when they use poverty terminology. While a greater bandwidth may hypothetically yield more codes, it is also true that when it comes to identifying the subject of a description, the further one treads from the description, associations between search terms and subjects become less clear. Importantly, this decision rule does not expressly preclude the investigator from reading every word in every speech to glean further valuable insights, but only that they may not code for new subjects that appear outside of the bandwidth.

There are 52 codes in the codebook, but only 51 ended up applying to poverty speeches from 1933 to 1946 (LGBTQ was not triggered). This project is designed to track whether a topic comes up in a speech, and not *how often* a topic comes up in speech. When the content of a speech qualifies for a code, that speech receives a 1 for that code. Therefore, once a code is used, repeated reference to the content of that code does not result in additional coding (i.e., a 1 is the maximum value for any code in a single speech).

The codebook comports to the following format:

Family Category

Family Subcategory (if applicable)

0. Full title: single- or multi-word explanatory label of the code
 - 0.1. Variable name: Lowercase single-word label of the code as it appears in various datasets.
 - 0.2. Description: Logic and description of what constitutes membership in the code group, including examples of uses.
 - 0.3. Common terms: Words that sometimes show up when the code is present. Importantly, words are not exclusive to the code, but common when the code is applies.
 - 0.4. Conditionality: Any conditional statements that may trigger or impact the application of the code or other codes. Also includes disclaimers of when the code is or is not applicable.
 - 0.5. Exemplar: Example statement selected by the researcher that illustrates intended code use. In parenthesis is the *Congressional Record* volume number, year, and page number.
 - 0.6. Randomly-generated example: Additional statement based on a number generator—instead of the researcher’s choosing—to show potential bounds/common use of a code. The process is to sum the code count, then use a generator to choose between the min (1) and max values. The first result is selected and inputted.

Behavior and Circumstance

1. Full title: Consumers
 - 1.1. Variable name: consumers
 - 1.2. Description: Unlike other economic classes, the poor utilize nearly all of their liquidity on fulfilling basic needs, which makes them key players in a consumer economy. Therefore, this code picks up on when the poor are constructed as consumers of goods, which in practice are generally basic needs commodities (i.e., food, clothing, parking, vehicles). May touch on how the poor: cannot contribute to the market economy without sufficient supports; cannot afford to buy needed products; purchase everyday goods, such as gasoline or use roads/pay tolls; factor into discussions of purchasing power/aggregate demand; are customers of a firm; cannot pay consumption (sales) taxes; should factor into an expanding the market.
 - 1.3. Common terms: “consumers”; “purchasers”; “buyers”; “customers;” “market(s)”.
 - 1.4. Conditionality: None if statement addresses those in need of goods generally, without clear mention of severity (e.g., “poor people need butter” has no additional trigger). However, a statement like “poor people are malnourished and need butter” would trigger the consumer *and* hunger category.
 - 1.5. Exemplar: “We know that low-income people are eating about half as much as they need and want. They will buy more food and greater varieties if they have the opportunity” (*CR 86 1940, 5213*).

- 1.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 159 of 470): “The surplus commodities so obtained are distributed among State relief agencies for distribution to needy persons. Potatoes, apples, butter, eggs, milk, peas, beans, citrus fruit, onions, sweetpotatoes [sic], canned tomatoes, and rice are among the long list of purchases by the Surplus Commodities Corporation” (*CR 83 1938, 9529*).
2. Full title: Crime, Vices, and Law
 - 2.1. Variable name: law
 - 2.2. Description: Poverty is highly correlated with experiencing crime, involvement in socially censured behavior, and interactions with the American criminal justice system. Therefore, this code picks up on when the poor are associated with the legal system, involvement (as perpetrator or victim) in a crime, and as participants in controversial behavior, such as drug-use and prostitution. On the latter category, it is important to understand that crime is a social construction that varies with cultures, space, and time, meaning some of the behaviors in this category may be criminal or vices, depending on the context of the era (and the speaker’s characterization). Specifically, this code includes those poor that purportedly commit crimes, those that are driven to crime because of desperation, and the criminalization of the poor. Additionally, it includes the rare but interesting narrative that it is criminal not to abolish poverty in America when the resources to do so are present. It also captures: those that need legal services (may be criminal, civil, or may have a pending case in a lawsuit and is currently destitute); the poor as those that use the court system; poor protesters or rioters; poor jurors; victims of crime (would also trigger victim code).
 - 2.3. Common terms: “prostitute(s)”; “alcoholic(s)”; “criminal(s)”; “litigants”; “defendants”; “gambler”; “protestor/rioter”; “thieves”; “pilferers”.
 - 2.4. Conditionality: None generally. If vices are constructed as moral failing, then morality would trigger as well. If victims of crime, would also trigger victim code.
 - 2.5. Exemplar: “The record shows that the greatest number of children are in poor families in rural communities or in the families of laboring people, especially coal miners. A little while ago I read and put into the RECORD a statement issued by the Federal Government, showing that of every 10 prostitutes 9 came from rural areas, generally the children of sharecroppers, or the children of coal miners” (*CR 90 1944, 121*)
 - 2.6. Randomly-generated example (107th of 181 entries): “There is no expansion of employment in my State. If dismissals from the rolls shall continue, those who are deprived of work will be forced, perhaps, to steal in order to obtain food to keep themselves alive. I submit to the Members of the Senate that it is an unwise and unsound policy to attempt to economize on human misery and human welfare.” (*CR 84 1939, 4074*)
 3. Full title: Financial Instruments and Debt
 - 3.1. Variable name: finance
 - 3.2. Description: Discussion of the poor that touches on debt, credit, mortgages, savings, foreclosure, bonds, annuities, and stock yields. The spirit of this code is to account for how members depict aspects of debt and revenue (outside of wages) in relation to the poor.

- 3.3. Common terms: debt-ridden; bondholder; stockholder; security holders; depositors; debtor; under water
 - 3.4. Conditionality: None.
 - 3.5. Exemplar: "... one of the causes of the terrible depression which overtook this country was the conduct of thousands of dishonorable, dishonest, illegal organizations, just like this mortgage company, which were taking tribute from God's poor, robbing the investors of what they had saved up perhaps in a lifetime, robbing the orphans and the widows" (*CR 80 1936, 4666*)
 - 3.6. Randomly-generated example (33rd entry of 172): "It may be of interest for the poor stockholders to know that according to information available in 1932 the Texas Electric Service Co. made a net profit of about \$1,740,000, and of this amount sent about \$1,350,000 to the Electric Bond & Share Co. and its intermediate holding companies for so-called useless contractual services rendered. Thus the poor preferred-stockholders, the real owners of the operating company, received less than \$300,000" (*CR 80 1936, 24*).
4. Full title: Health and Disability
 - 4.1. Variable name: health
 - 4.2. Description: Associations of the poor or poverty with sickness and disability, including the poor that cannot afford medical expenses, or incidences of poverty among those that face physical disability, such as blindness, deafness, and/or inoperable limbs, among other health-related matters.
 - 4.3. Common terms: sick, unwell, blind, deaf, disabled
 - 4.4. Conditionality:
 - 4.5. Exemplar: "I should prefer receiving a poor sick man into the hospital without compelling him to pay his funeral expenses in advance. That, Mr. President, is something which, outside of Louisiana, obtains in the United States. There is only one place in the United States today where a man can go into a hospital to be treated for his last illness without having the money to guarantee the funeral, and that is in the State of Louisiana." (*CR 79 1935, 9120*)
 - 4.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 136 of 557): "There is the paradox today of idle hospital beds in struggling institutions, idle and poverty-stricken physicians, and an ever-increasing number of idle sick unable to pay for medical care" (*CR 79 1935, 12359*).
 5. Full title: Housing and Utilities
 - 5.1. Variable name: housing
 - 5.2. Description: Discussion of the poor facing unsafe, unsanitary, slum housing, not being able to afford housing in general (homelessness), and not being able to pay for basic utilities like oil, heat, electricity, and gas.
 - 5.3. Common terms: slum, slum dweller, ghetto, eviction, unsanitary environment, homeless, transient, vagrant
 - 5.4. Conditionality: If foreclosure is cited, then it triggers debt code.
 - 5.5. Exemplar: "The McLeod bill would pay off the big depositors who had large deposits in Federal Reserve banks and would completely ignore the little fellow—the depositor who today is feeling the pangs of starvation and want and cannot buy

the necessities of life or the medicine for his baby because his savings are tied up in banks whose doors may be locked forever.” (*CR 78 1934, 7093*)

- 5.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 80 of 172): “I am leading up to is this, that if one-fifth of you allow the other four-fifths to come in and vote for this bill as it reads, then you will perpetrate the destruction of an understanding now reached that risking the savings of the poor shall not be a part of the activity of a home-loan association.” (*CR 86 1940, 7322-7323*)

6. Full title: Hunger and Clothing

- 6.1. Variable name: hunger
- 6.2. Description: The poor are described as food insecure, starving, and/or malnourished; lack of access to food that provides sustenance. Additionally, this code covers descriptions of the poor as in need of clothing to stave off cold.
- 6.3. Common terms:
- 6.4. Conditionality:
- 6.5. Exemplar: “In this land of plenty, in this land of 120,000,000 people, there are today millions who are actually undernourished; there are today many thousands who really are slowly starving because they are not properly nourished. It is a question of underconsumption” (*CR 78 1934, 4081*).
- 6.6. Randomly-generated example (118th of 1,223): “Farming is the most practical of all occupations. If a man with only an academic training goes into my section of the country, or into the wheat section of the country, and tries to make a living as a farmer he will starve to death. Such a man might sit before a committee of the Senate and with his training, aided and abetted, of course, by certain members of the committee, he could evade the direct questions which were asked, and charm the press of the country with his suavity, but throw him out in a cotton field and he would starve to death. I am here today, as serious as I ever was in my life, pleading for those who have been voiceless here from time immemorial” (*CR 78 1934, 11334-11335*).

7. Full title: Natural Disaster

- 7.1. Variable name: natural disaster/emergency
- 7.2. Description: The poor are involved in (and frequently made worse by) incidences of natural disaster, such as flooding, fires, and drought, among others. The most important natural disaster of this period is the drought and overtilled land that contributed to the Dust Bowl.
- 7.3. Common terms:
- 7.4. Conditionality: Does not trigger victimization, which in this project is about actors specifically, not events).
- 7.5. Exemplar: “None of us can measure what these poor people lost in the way of broken homes and shattered lives. I am sure if we could measure the suffering and the physical privations that these persons went through and the loss of their friends and relatives, I have not the slightest doubt in my mind but that every Member of this body would vote to correct this by the passage of this measure.” (*CR 78 1934, 6065*)

- 7.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 67 of 67): “The hot, scorching sun beats down on the dry and arid wastes of South Dakota and spreads its rays into the Black Hills of the dismal destitute with the result. that sunstroke is a common occurrence... Then I went into the lowlands and found miles and miles of dry, arid wasteland, where farmers were trying to make a go of it but to no avail. I asked why the failure of crops, and was told ‘no water,’ no rain. I wondered what could be done to help these poor unfortunates. I asked one of the natives whether anything had ever been done to bring about better living conditions or to help them move to a more habitable area.” (*CR 92 1946, 793*)
8. Full title: Victimization by/Blame on Actor
- 8.1. Variable name: victim
- 8.2. Description: Descriptions of the poor whereby they are victims of discrete actors, such as unscrupulous street-level shysters, political actors that ignore the plight of the poor, or anyone that preys on the desperation of the poor. Importantly, this does not include structural factors and broad events, like the Great Depression as a whole. It is important for coding specificity that the victimizer is disclosed in specific terms, not something broad like “collapse of the economy.”
- 8.3. Common terms:
- 8.4. Conditionality:
- 8.5. Exemplar: “Mr. Chairman, are we going to put a sales tax on the candy and the soda pop of the children of the poor people of the District and exempt the big multimillionaire newspaper owners from this sales tax? This is not a bill in the interest of the underprivileged poor. This is a bill for the special-privileged rich.” (*CR 86 1940, 4870*).
- 8.6. Randomly-generated example (246th of 1,386 entries): “Under the Hoover administration, families of millions of unemployed wage earners were facing starvation, receiving some aid from uncertain local charity and inadequate State relief, while the Hoover administration was loaning billions of dollars to the banks and railroads but did nothing for the destitute.” (*CR 80 1936, 6937*).

Demographic

Age and Family

9. Full title: Children and Youth (≤ 24)
- 9.1. Variable name: youth
- 9.2. Description: Youth are associated with poverty, either in early childhood, adolescence, or young adulthood. The category is fitted to cover common associations of youth as depicted by MCs, which is frequently beyond the age of 18, but not often after 24. For this older “youth” group, common associations are to serving in the military and participants in three principal New Deal programs: the National Youth Administration (NYA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and Works Progress Administration (WPA).
- 9.3. Common terms: “child”, “children”, “youth”,

- 9.4. Conditionality: This code is often triggered with the mention of school children, which also triggers the education code.
- 9.5. Exemplar: “Who is there among us who would criticize the Government that provided food for his own children when the cupboard was bare and there was no work to be found? Who is there with a conscience in his soul and a spark of humanity in his heart who would balance a budget at the expense of starving children?” (*CR 79 1935*, 6926).
- 9.6. Randomly-generated example (458th of 579 entries): “In other words, such activities as are now under-taken by the Swedes to feed Norwegian children; to receive starved Finnish children in their homes; to maintain asylums for war orphans in France and Belgium, may no longer be permitted. I fail to see the moral right of any individual, any organization, any government, to prevent individuals anywhere from exercising their right and obligation to feed the hungry and to aid the destitute” (*CR 90 1944*, 651-652).
10. Full title: Elderly (≥ 60)
- 10.1. Variable name: elderly
- 10.2. Description: Association of matured age with poverty, such as senior citizens and the elderly. Here, the floor of the age range is lowered to 60 years, primarily because the construction of the 65 and older guideline is based on the prominence of the Social Security Act, not because there is anything essential to the age of 65. Indeed, members across parties debated the appropriate age for eligibility, with a minority of members advocating for a 60 and over criterion. Therefore, if a poor person is described—among other things—as a “62-year-old widow,” elderly applies (as does the female code).
- 10.3. Common terms: elderly, old, mature, senior citizens, aged, twilight years
- 10.4. Conditionality: None.
- 10.5. Exemplar: “Ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, let us not forget our obligation to those poor old persons who fear the poorhouse more than the average persons feared the business depression. We have passed through the worst, and we now have it behind us; but there are millions of worthy old men and women in this country who now and in the future will face a real cause of fear a hundred times greater than the fear of depressed business.” (*CR 79 1935*, 5713)
- 10.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 40 of 373): “These aged do not belong on emergency relief lists. They should, instead, be provided for under old-age-pension laws, operating in all States. To my way of thinking many of the needy aged are not now adequately or properly cared for in this country of ours. The almshouse is not a satisfactory method of providing relief for all classes of the needy. It is the lineal descendant of the workhouses and farms, which were first erected to care for the homeless and unemployed, and not primarily for the sick and the aged who inhabit them today.” (*CR 79 1935*, 2406)
11. Full title: Family Unit
- 11.1. Variable name: family
- 11.2. Description: Description of a family unit as suffering from poverty, relying on family-based terminology to establish the filial linkage between depicted groups.

- 11.3. Common terms: “family”; “mother;” “father”; “son”; “daughter”; “sister”; “brother”; “papa”; “mama”; “dad”; “mom”; “uncle”; “aunt”; “husband; “wife”; “grandfather”; “grandmother”.
- 11.4. Conditionality: Mother would trigger female code; father would trigger male code; school-aged child would trigger youth code; grandparents may trigger elderly, if there sufficient signs they are not under 60 years old.
- 11.5. Exemplar: “Those railroads and grain interests looked all over the world to find someone to aid in having me thrown out of the Senate; and they picked former United States Senator E. R. Burke, the man who now is fighting the union miners, the poor fellows with large families—so poor, in fact, that, as one of the daily newspapers said the other day, the operators certainly should give them more than they are getting.” (*CR 89 1943, 5765*)
- 11.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 398 of 550): “Mr. Chairman, it has been rather amusing to observe and listen at the opposition to this bill. How can anyone justify his position against a proposition to help assist a needy family and at the same time provide the means whereby more production for defense can be increased?” (*CR 88 1942, 845*)

Gender and Sex

12. Full title: Female

- 12.1. Variable name: female
- 12.2. Description: Associations of poverty with the female gender. Any use of female pronouns across categorizations triggers this code.
- 12.3. Common terms: woman; widow; wife; female; girl; her; lady; seamstress; maid.
- 12.4. Conditionality: None
- 12.5. Exemplar: “Then the husband dies, and after he is gone the widow is stricken from the rolls. Ah, the lips of that poor veteran are sealed by death. He cannot come back to this earth and tell that poor widow and these poor, innocent little children the names of the witnesses or the testimony that might be produced in order to service connect his case according to the rules and regulations of the Veterans’ Bureau and the laws of this country.” (*CR 77 1933, 2902*)
- 12.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 94 of 426): “We are asking you today in the Lundeen bill to take off the burden from the backs of the poor people to stop the big employers, the big money interests of the United States, from exploiting the great masses of the people. You now have the opportunity today to vote for this Lundeen bill in order to take care of the unemployed men and women of the United States, in order to take care of their dependents as well.” (*CR 79 1935, 5962*)

13. Full title: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Plus

- 13.1. Variable name: lgbtq+
- 13.2. Description: Estrangement from family is a major cause of young adult poverty, and prejudice against LGBTQ+ individuals may cause such a family schism, especially as one looks further back in American history. However, there is a dearth of research on the association between poverty and LGBTQ+ identity, which this project hopes to address. Therefore, this category captures associations of poverty

with the sexual orientation of the subject, specifically non-heterosexual identities. This code was not triggered in the data from 1933 to 1946. It is an open question whether a single MC ever depicts the plight of poor gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer individuals as poor—one I hope to touch on when the time-series is extended to the contemporary era.

- 13.3. Common terms: N/A
- 13.4. Conditionality: N/A
- 13.5. Exemplar: N/A
- 13.6. Randomly-generated example: N/A

14. Full name: Male

- 14.1. Variable: male
- 14.2. Description: Description of men/males being poor. Any male pronoun or modifier triggers the code, regardless of context. Frequently, male pronouns are the default term used to depict workers and their conditions.
- 14.3. Common terms: mister; male; men; man; him; guy.
- 14.4. Conditionality: None
- 14.5. Exemplar: “I understand that the Committee on Finance have reformed the tax bill as passed by the House; have stricken out the inheritance-tax increase—which did not amount to much, to start with, in my opinion, it was not nearly enough—and that they have taken the income-tax schedule and given it a reverse locomotion, so that, instead of going up into the higher realm, they have gone down to the lower one and propose to take a great deal more money from the common poor men than the bill was designed to get from the supposed-to-be super-rich men in this country.” (*CR 79 1935, 12890*)
- 14.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 91 of 609): “Mr. Speaker, I emphatically object to this provision. We have always provided for the veterans of wars. We must now provide for the veterans of industry. Most large industrial concerns refuse to employ persons over 45 years of age. What are they to do? How are they to find a job? How are they going to live? Are they to starve? A man of 45 is too young to be thrown on the scrap heap. Old-age pensions should begin at 60—not at 65; and let me emphasize that the bill as now drawn does not even guarantee that the State laws will pay pensions to those at 65.” (*CR 79 1935, 1461*)

Nationality and International Location

15. Full title: Foreign and International

- 15.1. Variable name: foreign
- 15.2. Description: Poor conceived as foreign individuals or masses. The poor in any non-American setting. Although this group in isolation is worthy of disaggregation, the scope of the existing project precludes that possibility here. However, it is worth noting the variance of depicted foreign groups, which includes war-torn poor in Europe (often in France, Poland, and Greece) and Asia (primarily in India and China), the poor in underdeveloped nations in the Middle East and Africa, and for certain lawmakers, the existence of poor Mexicans. Importantly, none of the foreign

poor are categorized by race and ethnicity, except for the Jewish code, which is exclusively a foreign code and is not triggered for any domestic Jewry.

- 15.3. Common terms: country names; ethnicity names; foreign(er)
- 15.4. Conditionality: Does not trigger any other codes, but may be triggered by others. For example, Jewish always triggers foreign, due to the foreign construction of that population. However, any territorial possessions in this period—even if they shortly became nations in themselves—are not accounted for here, but instead in the Territories and DC code (this primarily pertains to the Philippines).
- 15.5. Exemplar: “Now that we have given billions and billions of dollars to the protection of people upon foreign soil, why am I not privileged at least to consume a little time and to ask for a little attention to the poor Americans who have to pay for every bit of it? That is the way I feel about it. I do not feel called upon to apologize to anybody. I am merely taking up a little time on a matter which I think is in the interest of the people of the United States, and why should I not do so? All our interest has been focused over yonder, on the poor people of England and France and Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and every other alien upon the face of the earth away over in Asia; and I am trying for once, just for this brief period during the afternoon of April 1, to return our attention to our people at home.” (*CR 87 1941, 2773*)
- 15.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 31 of 532): “The poor laws of most of our States are practically modeled after the ancient English poor law system which has undergone considerable changes in the mother country. Their language, in many of our States, is almost identical with that of the Elizabethan poor law of 1601.” (*CR 78 1934, 11411*).

16. Full title: Migration

- 16.1. Variable name: migrant
- 16.2. Description: covers all types of migration, including immigration from other countries into the US and domestic migration across political jurisdictions.
- 16.3. Common terms: migrants; immigrants; drifters; vagabonds.
- 16.4. Conditionality: None. However, by sorting for migration and foreign, one can expose immigration issues. Sorting for migration and removing foreign entries uncovers domestic migration.
- 16.5. Exemplar: “Adding these people to other types of relief cases, today there are 275,362 men, women, and children dependent in one form or another on relief from the several government agencies In Los Angeles County alone. Clearly, California agriculture and industry cannot absorb the dwelling tide of destitute migrants within a short time. Most of the migratory workers are seeking agricultural employment and the field is greatly overcrowded.” (*CR 81 1937, 8476*)
- 16.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 8 of 74): “Even if these aliens are lawfully in this country, there is no reason why they should live at the expense of the Government, and, in my opinion, most of them could and would be taken care of by their relatives. This is a question of policy, and the real question is, shall we take our American people’s money for relief dole for foreigners when we are not financially able to appropriate as much as we would desire to take care of the poor and distressed Americans in need?” (*CR 80 1936, 6983*)

17. Full title: Residency Status

- 17.1. Variable name: residency
- 17.2. Description: Discussion of the poor in relation to their legal status, including visitors, residents, and citizens. This occurs in a multitude of ways, including MCs talking about taking care of the poor citizens in other states, or not wanting to employ non-citizens in public works initiatives. The diversity of the contexts involved in this code mirrors the complex issue of how belongingness is constructed in a changing legal regime.
- 17.3. Common terms: “resident”; “citizen”; “non-citizen”; “visitor”; “alien”.
- 17.4. Conditionality: None
- 17.5. Exemplar: “Because other countries preach the doctrine of hatred to aliens is no excuse for us doing likewise. The poor of our country, no matter from where they came, must be treated alike. We are passing a relief bill under the guidance of a great President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to help the needy. Let us help the citizen and alien—put them all at work. For these reasons I oppose discriminating in this bill against the honest, worthy alien. Mr. Chairman, I hope the amendment of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Lanham] is defeated. (Applause.)” (*CR 81 1937, 5077*).
- 17.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 144 of 307): “The time has come for Congress to reassert its place and its interest in international affairs, which are so likely to invalidate all our striving for domestic peace and tranquility. What profit is there in seeing that our citizens do not starve if they are ultimately to be killed by shrapnel and gas? What use to assert the Bill of Rights for civil liberties if we move in the direction of a war in which the Bill of Rights is more or less automatically suspended?” (*CR 83 1938, 5898*)

Race and Ethnicity

18. Full title: Asian/Pacific Islander

- 18.1. Variable name: asian
- 18.2. Description: Depiction of the poor as racially Asian. Only applies to general or domestic mentions; if a foreign nation is specified or implied based on context, only the foreign code applies. Importantly, in the few cases in which this code was used, the vernacular employed still calls back to a foreign country, even if the person has resided in the US for most of their life.
- 18.3. Common terms: “Chinaman”;
- 18.4. Conditionality: None
- 18.5. Exemplar: “On that confession he was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged. He was a poor, helpless Chinaman, suffering from pain, sick at heart, without friends, and perfectly willing to die to put an end to his torture. A friendly priest visited him in his cell in the District jail to comfort him. He learned Wan’s story and secured legal advice for this Chinaman, who had been sentenced to die.” (*CR 81 1937, 4562*)
- 18.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 2 of 2): “There will be no Indian princes or Hindu maharajahs, such as sit in the gallery today, who will be seeking visas under this bill if it becomes a law. Those who want to come here are the most unfortunate,

the worst off in the other parts of the world, the peons and coolies, people who have been deprived of their inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for generations untold. The Hindus who would come have no appreciation of what liberty means. What can they contribute to the up-building of our country? Why should we multiply our already many problems by augmenting our underprivileged groups?" (*CR 91* 1946, 9533)

19. Full title: Black

- 19.1. Variable name: black
- 19.2. Description: Association of poverty with African-Americans or Blackness. Only applies to general or domestic American use. Poor people in African are coded as foreign.
- 19.3. Common terms: "colored"; "black"; "African-American"; "negro"; "mulatto".
- 19.4. Conditionality: None
- 19.5. Exemplar: "Mr. President, in my State many of these poor people, both white and black, do not handle over two or three hundred dollars in cash during the whole year, due to the economic system that has been saddled on the South and which has borne us down through a long period of time. Where is the poor Negro farmer to get the \$22.50? He cannot get it, to save his life, because the meager credit facilities of the county have already been dried up by the white people who have borrowed money with which to pay their share of the fine against the county." (*CR 83* 1938, 1105)
- 19.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 48 of 75): "I do not impugn the motives of the Members here, because I am certain they feel sincerely about their position, but some of them say there is no precedent for helping these poor farmers. I am sure the farmers in New York State face an appalling condition. Down in my part of the country we have a very poor group of farming people. A greater number of them are colored than are white—as a matter of fact about 60 percent. They do not know where to turn. They are unable to get assistance." (*CR 88* 1942, 846)

20. Full title: Jewish

- 20.1. Variable name: Jewish
- 20.2. Description: Description of Jews as poor; only pertains to foreign use
- 20.3. Common terms: Jewish, Jew, hebrew
- 20.4. Conditionality: Not inherent, but frequently triggers foreign given the context of this period.
- 20.5. Exemplar: "We have rich Jews and poor Jews, Jews more blessed with this world's goods, and Jews on the brink of starvation. We have good and bad. By all means dismiss from your mind any thought that the Jews are responsible for any financial legislation which this House must enact from time to time. At this time, I wish to add my protest against any attempt to make the floor of this House the battle ground for anti-Semitic propaganda. It must not spread. Any attempt to indulge in it here should be nipped in the bud." (*CR 77* 1933, 4712)
- 20.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 27 of 34): "What is there to be investigated? Is it necessary for Britain, either alone or in cooperation with the United States, to inquire into the validity of the title to Palestine which God granted to the Jews? Is it

necessary to inquire whether Britain should now honorably redeem or dishonorably continue to violate the pledge of the Balfour Declaration? Is an investigation necessary to prove that multitudes of destitute Jews will die of starvation during the approaching winter unless they are promptly provided a home? Does anyone doubt the self-evident truth that Palestine is the only place in which this home can be established in time to save the perishing Jews from the dissolution of the grave?" (*CR 91* 1945, 11746)

21. Full title: Latino

- 21.1. Variable name: latino/a
- 21.2. Description: Association of poverty with people of Latino and/or Hispanic heritage and identity in the US. However, if they are depicted as poor outside of the US (like in Mexico), then the foreign code alone triggers.
- 21.3. Common terms:
- 21.4. Conditionality:
- 21.5. Exemplar: "But in their dealings in this country, what do they do to the so-called poor Mexicans? Those companies, the Humble Oil Co. and the Sinclair Oil Co., say we are abusing them because we want them to do the right thing by some poor laborers. Workers at the Humble Oil Co. and the Sinclair Oil Co., in Texas, filed complaints with the F. E. P. C. Those complaints were a part of a number of charges filed against those two companies and against the Shell Oil Co." (*CR 90* 1944, 6159).
- 21.6. Randomly-generated example (1st of 4 entries): "Let it be understood at the outset that this bill does not apply to seasonal labor for farmers and ranchers. It does not cover businessmen residing in the United States who make occasional visits to Mexico or Canada to look after their business or investments. It applies to the poor Mexican laborer who comes into our country day by day to work for whatever he can get and deprives some good American citizen of the job he ought to have (*CR 81* 1937, 2357).

22. Full title: Native American

- 22.1. Variable name: nativeam
- 22.2. Description: Poverty among the indigenous populations of the continental United States.
- 22.3. Common terms: "native(s)"; "Indian"; "indigenous".
- 22.4. Conditionality:
- 22.5. Exemplar: "These claims are always coming up, and they cloud the minds of the Indians. The Congress neither allows them nor repudiates them. As a rule these poor people never get a chance to go into court to have their claims adjudicated, and if something is not done in this regard, the Indians will still be at the doors of Congress asserting their claims a century from now." (*CR 90* 1944, 2528).
- 22.6. Randomly-generated example (36th of 41 entries): "Mr. President, I was Governor of North Dakota just before Senator Moses was Governor. There were 1,461 Indians off the reservation, and we could not get one dollar of Federal money or State money with which to feed them. The authorities merely said, 'Let them starve to death.' The result was that those poor Indians who got \$6, \$7, \$8, \$9, and \$10 a

month on which to live, not only had to take that miserable pittance with which to provide food for themselves and their families, but all the relatives of these 1,461 Indians came to live with them, and so in a shack with 1 room, 10 Indians would be living” (*CR 91* 1945, 5387).

23. Full title: White

- 23.1. Variable name: white
- 23.2. Description: Americans of European and Middle-Eastern descent. Does not include poor people who are citizens of and live in European nations.
- 23.3. Common terms:
- 23.4. Conditionality:
- 23.5. Exemplar: “Lee favored a ‘well digested and gradual plan of general emancipation.’ So did many other good and able southerners, and it is certain the poor whites saw no sense in fighting for Negro slavery and the benefit of the rich planters. There is every indication that even had the Confederacy won, slavery would not have lasted.” (*CR 82* 1937, 1901)
- 23.6. Randomly-generated example (41st of 55 entries): “Mr. President, I subscribe to the doctrine of our forefathers—that God Almighty created all men equal. There is no such thing as white supremacy, and the whole theory is pure poppycock, shrewdly used to disfranchise poor whites as well as Negroes.” (*CR 90* 1944, 921)

Geographic

Location

24. Full title: Subnational

- 24.1. Variable name: subnational
- 24.2. Description: Pertains to either a geographic area or subnational governmental unit, such as school districts, municipal governments, and sanitation services. Poor localities, poor counties, poor states, poor regions, poor sections, poor communities (unspecified). Prominent examples include discussion of poor states versus rich states. An attempt to capture the nuances of labeling jurisdictions and locations as poor with the federalism framework of the US, which factor heavily into resource issues in relation to poverty.
- 24.3. Common terms:
- 24.4. Conditionality: If a member says “poor states have issues” it would trigger this code only; if they say “poor states, like mine, have issues” it would trigger both this federalism code and the specific region since the clauses separate a general subnational idea and a specific place.
- 24.5. Exemplar: “We ask that the Congress help us, because we want to establish some kind of equalization fund to help the poorer States. We have established such a fund for Louisiana under our fearless leader, the late Senator Long, and today every child in Louisiana, whether he lives in a poor or rich community, can obtain the same educational advantages. We make the richer communities help the poor ones. Such a plan may encroach on State’s rights, but I am for it. I believe I could justify my position.” (*CR 83* 1938, 576)

- 24.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 187 of 332): “This law under which the Federal Government gives a larger subsidy to the wealthier State, or to the State that believes more in pensions than does the poorer State, or the State that, being rich, does not give them, does what? Its tendency is, and only is, and must be, to suck money out of the poorer States for the benefit of the richer States. In other words, beyond any doubt, taken as a general rule, the higher pensions are paid in the wealthier States; not in every case, but as a general rule.” (*CR 84 1939, 9014*)

25. Full title: Midwest

- 25.1. Variable name: midwest
- 25.2. Description: Specific mention of poverty (among people or things) in the following Census-defined locations: North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.
- 25.3. Common terms:
- 25.4. Conditionality: If a specific state is mentioned as poor, it then its region code and subnational code.
- 25.5. Exemplar: “Careful analysis shows that the new Townsend bill, in addition to a confusing supersales tax, called for a gross-income tax to be imposed upon every person in the United States receiving more than \$50 in any one month. The rate is the same on the income of the W. P. A. worker as on the income of the millionaire—2 percent. I do not believe that the poor people of the Ninth District of Iowa could afford to pay such a tax. I find, too, that the revised Townsend plan would be extremely burdensome to agriculture.” (*CR 84 1939, 6632*)
- 25.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 130 of 162): “That is one reason why I am opposed to this amendment. The Farm Security Administration has helped more than 40,000 low-income farmers in North Dakota obtain the means to continue farming. Feed, seed, livestock, and equipment have been made available to them through the rural rehabilitation program which they would otherwise be unable to obtain. The success of this program in North Dakota is attested by the progress which these families have made.” (*CR 89 1943, 3519*)

26. Full title: North

- 26.1. Variable name: north
- 26.2. Description: Specific mention of poverty (among people or things) in the following Census-defined locations: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and all states to their northeast.
- 26.3. Common terms:
- 26.4. Conditionality: If a specific state is mentioned as poor, it then its region code and subnational code.
- 26.5. Exemplar: “? Because Robert D. Kohn, Director of the Housing Authority, who ought to be thoroughly familiar with the urgent needs of New York in the matter of slum clearance and the building of decent apartments to replace ramshackle buildings—buildings, I repeat—that are unfit to house animals, much less human beings, plays with pencil and paper on an idealistic drafting board, instead of getting out practical plans that would put thousands at much needed work, and that would give proper housing to the poor and the moderately circumstanced people of New

York, not only in the East Side but in other sections of the city.” (*CR 78 1934*, 11186)

- 26.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 47 of 123): “I can well understand the feeling that the Senator from Mississippi has, and I want to reinforce what he has to say, because one does not have to go very far in the city of New York to find the most abject poverty that exists on the face of the earth, people whose clothes are ragged and who are miserably housed, although, as the Senator says, the women are handsome even so—and the women in the city of New York are as handsome as those in any part of the South.” (*CR 81 1937*, 7872)

27. Full title: South

- 27.1. Variable name: south
- 27.2. Description: Specific mention of poverty (among people or things) in the following Census-defined locations: Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and every state to their southeast.
- 27.3. Common terms:
- 27.4. Conditionality: If a specific state is mentioned as poor, it then its region code and subnational code.
- 27.5. Exemplar: “When the price of cotton falls, then there comes to us poverty, impoverishment, and bankruptcy in the South. When we have a fairly reasonable and profitable price for cotton in that section, our people are able to pay their debts, they are able to pay the interest on their mortgages, they are able to buy some food and clothing for their children, and have some reasonable comforts in their homelife.” (*CR 78 1934*, 4633)
- 27.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 109 of 313): “He comes from a State which contains the city of Detroit, the great automobile center—the great, rich city. Do Senators mean to say that the taxpayers of that city should not contribute anything in the way of income taxes to aid in the relief of a needy individual in South Carolina or in Colorado or in the State of Washington? Detroit does not live on the products coming from the soil within its city limits.” (*CR 81 1937*, 6121)

28. Full title: West

- 28.1. Variable name: west
- 28.2. Description: Specific mention of poverty (among people or things) in the following Census-defined locations: New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, and any state to their west.
- 28.3. Common terms: state names; city names; geographic signifiers; “West”; “Western”; “Northwest”.
- 28.4. Conditionality: If a specific state is mentioned as poor, it then its region code and subnational code.
- 28.5. Exemplar: “Mr. Speaker, what will happen this winter to the thousands of destitute who fled to California from other States seeking relief from the dust, drought, and depression? Federal relief aid has been curtailed; California’s relief burden is fast becoming unbearable, and impoverished thousands, living in squalor, facing hunger and disease, threaten national health and add to the possibility of a bitter and possibly violent agricultural and industrial labor conflict. Assistant W. P. A.

Administrator Aubrey Williams, while on a recent tour of western relief agencies, is quoted by a Los Angeles newspaper as saying: Care of transients—and of homeless Americans from the Dust Bowl—is strictly a State problem.” (*CR 81* 1937, 8476)

- 28.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 36 of 113): “The city of Los Angeles has a bonded harbor indebtedness of \$30,000,000. Not only would thousands of workers around this port be deprived of employment but the harbor revenues of the city would be seriously depleted, throwing additional burdens on the groaning taxpayer.” (*CR 81* 1937, 3469)

29. Full title: Territories and DC

29.1. Variable: territory

29.2. Description: Poverty in any insular possession of the US without voting representation in Congress (but not reservations, which would trigger Native American code and the region code of the reservation, if specified). During this period, includes mentions primarily of Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, Philippines, and Puerto Rico.

29.3. Common terms:

29.4. Conditionality: Territory subsumes discussion of the descriptive traits of individuals residing within the territories (e.g., poor Filipinos are labeled territorial, but not Asian)

29.5. Exemplar: “I have before me a letter from the Secretary of the Interior about Puerto Rico and our neglect of Puerto Rico and stating that unless we do something for the island of Puerto Rico our present policy will not afford any solution to the problem of relieving the destitute Puerto Ricans. We have made the Virgin Islands a poorhouse. We have kicked the Filipinos into the Pacific Ocean. We do not have brains enough to know how to take care of the outlying people who have come under the American flag and domination for one reason or another” (*CR 80* 1936, 9869)

29.6. Randomly-generated example (42nd of 70 entries): “We would feel happy if all our laborers could earn wages averaging \$1 or more per hour, but under the circumstances, considering the deplorable conditions of Puerto Rico, its unemployment and poverty, we support the amendment to the Federal wage and hour law” (*CR 86* 1940, 5148).

Density

30. Full title: Rural

30.1. Variable name: rural

30.2. Description: Specification of rural America as poor, either as a whole or just certain specified individuals. Speaks more to the idea of dispersed poor populations across large areas more than any vocational idea around farming (which falls under agriculture).

30.3. Common terms: “rural”; “sparsely populated”; “[in the] country”; “backwoods region”

30.4. Conditionality: not automatically triggered by any other code, including agriculture.

- 30.5. Exemplar: “Mr. President, lynchings do not occur in wealthy counties and in thickly populated areas. They usually occur, when they occur at all, in the rural sections, in sparsely populated communities, in the poverty-stricken areas of the United States. They usually occur in counties where there is a large Negro population” (*CR 83 1938, 1105*).
- 30.6. Randomly-generated example (49th of 115 entries): “This sum is made available for administrative expenses, loans, grants, and rural rehabilitation of needy persons in continuation of the same type of program carried on by the Secretary of Agriculture under allocations received from the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act for the current fiscal year” (*CR 83 1938, 6570*).

31. Full title: Suburban

- 31.1. Variable name: suburban
- 31.2. Description: Depiction of the poor as those that live in suburban areas.
- 31.3. Common terms:
- 31.4. Conditionality:
- 31.5. Exemplar: “These purchases are made for a number of purposes. One is to take land out of production and to convert it to different uses. Another is to provide homes and gardens and small farms and better living conditions for low-income workers from suburban communities. A third is to remove families from poor land and rehabilitate them on locations better suited for contained self-support; and a fourth is to remove stranded industrial or agricultural workers and resettle them in more favorable locations.” (*CR 80 1936, 8195*).
- 31.6. Randomly-generated example (1st of 1 entry): Only one entry—see exemplar above.

32. Full title: Urban

- 32.1. Variable name: urban
- 32.2. Description: Depiction of the poor as occupants of urban centers and cities.
- 32.3. Common terms: urbanites; city dweller
- 32.4. Conditionality:
- 32.5. Exemplar: “We cannot economize at the expense of the city’s poor in order to help the farmer. Aid which the farmer takes for granted should also be forthcoming, in case of like necessity, to industrial workers” (*CR 86 1940, 6272*).
- 32.6. Randomly-generated example (67th of 132 entries): “I am convinced that such a move would destroy the dairy business in my State and in the Nation, because the consequent jump in price to the consumer would deprive three-fourths of the needy people of the use of Nature’s most perfect and essential food. The babies and the growing children of the Nation would be the ones to suffer most, and the dairy farmer would not sell 1 quart where today he sells 10 quarts; hence, where the profit to the farmer? And to think of the injustice to the needy people in the big cities!” (*CR 82 1937, 691*).

33. Full title: Non-Specific and General American (its own category)

- 33.1. Variable name: general
- 33.2. Description: (1) This large category account for use a poverty term without designation of a group. For example, the poor are suffering and need help, where it

is not clear who is meant by poor. (2) Additionally, this code applies to mentions of the (2) American poor, specifically. (3) Additionally, this category accounts for mentions of the United States Government as poor. In essence, this is a catchall for undefined terminology, ambiguity, the poor at-large, and the poor in America. Even if other codes apply, lack of clarity on the term, or overly ambiguous discussion of the poor would trigger the code.

- 33.3. Common terms: “The poor”; “poor Americans”; “poor people”.
- 33.4. Conditionality: Any other code can make this one not necessary, but artifacts in a single sentence may trigger this code AND another code; Triggered if no code applies. If the terms “poor American citizen” or “poor American resident” are used, it denotes a national location and legal status, and therefore activates the citizenship code (both codes may apply); Taxpayers does not have its own category, so constructing the poor as taxpaying poor just goes here.
- 33.5. Exemplar: “It is somewhat appalling to me that every time we consider a proposition that really helps poor people, someone gets up on the floor and attacks it.” (*CR 88 1942, 5644*).
- 33.6. Randomly-generated example (1,030th of 1,665 entries): “The rich always have been few. Always the poor have been multitude. From the beginning the poor have carried upon their backs the burden of the world. They still carry it.” (*CR 84 1939, 6400*).

Occupation/Vocation

Blue Collar

34. Full title: Agriculture

- 34.1. Variable name: agriculture
- 34.2. Description: Poverty associated with various agricultural occupations, including: sharecroppers; factory farmers; family farmers; ranchers; tenant farmers; pastoral occupations.
- 34.3. Common terms:
- 34.4. Conditionality: If migrant worker from outside of the country, it will also trigger the migrant and foreign tags. Includes farm workers; if migrant worker.
- 34.5. Exemplar: “We want farm relief to come from friends and not from known enemies or lukewarm supporters. The farmer has been selling food and raw materials for clothing at less than cost of production. This continued impoverishment has reduced his purchasing power to the vanishing point, annihilated his land values, and increased his mortgage indebtedness to the breaking point.” (*CR 77 1933, 1215*)
- 34.6. Randomly-generated example (317th of 553 entries): “So we have probably a moral responsibility to use our efforts in correcting the very thing we have helped to build. We also have poor people here in this country—farm families, if you please, whose total gross income amounts to less than \$500 yearly for the entire family.” (*CR 85 1939, 391*)

35. Full title: Creatives

- 35.1. Variable name: creative

- 35.2. Description: Some people face poverty because they choose to pursue personally meaningful, expressive work over better compensated but menial work. Therefore, this code accounts for those employed in creative based fields, such as artists, journalists, writers, painters, inventors, playwrights, and musicians. Indeed, the New Deal itself endeavored to create mass employment initiatives for creative types, such as the Federal Art Project through the Works Progress Administration that employed painters and artists.
- 35.3. Common terms:
- 35.4. Conditionality:
- 35.5. Exemplar: “An examination of this bill will show just what it does to the American musicians. It does nothing to Mr. Petrillo but it helps impoverish American musicians. Let me give you just one instance in the bill of depriving musicians of earnings for the benefit of the broadcasting companies. The bill illegalizes payment for the use of transcription records.” (*CR 92 1946, 2822*)
- 35.6. Randomly-generated example (10th of 14 entries): “That poor man invented an endgate of that kind. He never got a dollar out of it. He had the invention patented, and he thought—probably in an exaggerated way—that it was worth a great deal of money. A representative of a big wagon factory came down to buy his right, and the inventor asked him too much money; so the big corporation which was making wagons that we have seen all over the agricultural part of the country started to make those endgates without paying any attention to the patent, and they have been making them ever since, and the poor inventor died of a broken heart. He had not any money, and he could not get anybody to fight a big corporation of that kind in a patent case” (*CR 87 1941, 5082*)
36. Full title: Energy Sector
- 36.1. Variable name: energy
- 36.2. Description: In historically impoverished parts of the country (and world) labor intensive work in energy extraction is often one of the few venues for poor people without high levels of education to make a living and potentially escape poverty. This code covers such workers, from lumberjacks to coal and precious metal miners and petroleum derricks workers. Essentially, it covers any energy extraction industry worker, up to and including the point of sale, such as gas station owners and attendants.
- 36.3. Common terms:
- 36.4. Conditionality:
- 36.5. Exemplar: “I say to the gentlemen from Kentucky that the people of Kentucky are overcharged \$8,300,000 a year for electric lights and power. But in Kentucky where these gentlemen live, those poor struggling people who go down into the depths of the earth and work all day long—and we have the same condition in Pennsylvania and other coal States—those poor people are sweltering in their homes at night because electric-power rates are so high they cannot even run fans, much less refrigerators.” (*CR 79 1935, 10550*)
- 36.6. Randomly-generated example (30th of 40 entries): “Mr. President, I wanted to call attention to the gasoline rationing for the reason that the owners of thousands upon thousands of little filling stations are being deprived of their businesses without

having any means of making a livelihood. They could not plant a crop now if they were so disposed. We allow the owners of the little filling stations, and the local gasoline handlers, to become absolutely impoverished and broken, and yet those who produce the gasoline are reimbursed by an increase of 21/2 cents a gallon.” (*CR 88 1942, 5667*)

37. Full title: Labor and Unions

37.1. Variable name: labor

37.2. Description: discussion of labor at-large; unions as allies of the poor/needed to protect poor; unions as cause of the poor; labor type not specified, including prison labor or agricultural labor. Concept of collective labor covered here as distinct from individual level workers.

37.3. Common terms:

37.4. Conditionality: If unions are the cause of poverty, it will also trigger the victimization code.

37.5. Exemplar: “Of course, I know the matter was taken very lightly, and I am not going to resent the fact that many of my colleagues have smiled as I have gone over the facts; but what I am submitting are the facts. The poor laboring element are on the outside, pleading for the prevailing wage. The poor laborer has not a thing on God’s earth to offer you but his heart and his hand; that is all. That goes a certain distance with some people and then, after that, it fails to go, of course, in the circumstances that naturally come about.” (*CR 79 1935, 3211*)

37.6. Randomly-generated example (104th of 138 entries): “I do not want to see it because I want to protect free labor, and I want to protect the poor unfortunates who are in the penitentiary, and give them something to do. It may not be consistent all the way through. As I stated to begin with, in theory there is no difference between making toothpicks and threshing machines. I think the principle is the same. We have to exercise some discretion. To my mind we are justified in doing so. Perhaps I am wrong, but I should not like to see all the prisoners in the United States deprived of work... ‘You have given the poor fellows in the prison a job, but you must cease doing that.’ Mr. President, if the present system should be continued, I think it would not hurt free labor in the end as much as it would to take the other course. I believe the present system should be continued in order to help agriculture and organized labor, as well as every other division of our citizens, who ought to be glad to retain the system even though it means some sacrifice” (*CR 86 1940, 12396*)

38. Full title: Machinists

38.1. Variable name: machinists

38.2. Description: Like those in energy extraction, another blue-collar profession that pays relatively high for hard labor workers is manufacturing and factory work. This subset of industrial workers primarily endeavors in metal assemblage and fabrication, such as a steel sheet and automotive workers, as well as textile manufacturing.

38.3. Common terms: “factory”; “manufacturers”; “machinists”; “fabricators”; “textile”.

38.4. Conditionality:

- 38.5. Exemplar: “I saw many things that could have been done better, but no one wanted any suggestions from a poor, lowly sheet-metal mechanic. Incidentally, I held a union card. I was not asked to join. I joined voluntarily, because I realized that the only chance the workingman has to get a fair break is by organizing.” (*CR 91* 1945, 9128)
- 38.6. Randomly-generated example (5th of 12 entries): “It means declining revenues for the merchant, the baker, and the candlestick maker. In brief, I know of no better way to spread the poverty of cotton manufacturing communities than to pass this bill. The avalanche of protests from cotton manufacturing communities a few weeks ago spurred the President to appoint a Cabinet committee to investigate the effects of the processing tax and foreign importations upon the American textile industry.” (*CR 79* 1935, 9455)
39. Full title: Maritime Workers
- 39.1. Variable name: maritime
- 39.2. Description: Fishermen/maritime workers (Maritime Workers); Dock workers; Sailors; Merchants at sea; shipbuilders.
- 39.3. Common terms:
- 39.4. Conditionality:
- 39.5. Exemplar: “My concern is primarily the condition of the Maine lobster fisherman, who is involved in one of the hardest struggles in the history of this fishery. Many of the fishermen and their families are actually destitute and on the verge of starvation...” (*CR 77* 1933, 6211)
- 39.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 9 of 11): “Of course a great wail went up from the poor shipbuilders and their lobbyists have swarmed the Capitol in an effort to restore the entire \$75,000,000. The conferees of the House and Senate have finally compromised and we were able to make a saving of \$56,000,000 in that one item. That is a sizable saving, but the poor shipbuilders still have their subsidy raised some \$44,000,000 above the amount of the appropriation last year. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that inasmuch as Congress is making a clear-cut saving of \$56,000,000 below the Budget estimate in one item that we could well afford to take the \$56,000,000 thus saved and apply it to the N. Y. A. and the C. C. C. to assist the needy and deserving youth of the land. [Applause.]” (*CR 86* 1940, 3365)
40. Full title: Transportation and Infrastructure (Private)
- 40.1. Variable name: transportation
- 40.2. Description: railroad workers/companies; Transportation workers; focus on railroads; other transit professions; Ferry operators; Commercial pilots; Bus drivers
- 40.3. Common terms:
- 40.4. Conditionality:
- 40.5. Exemplar: “I desire to give due credit to the railways for maintaining a comparatively high standard of wages and a decent standard of living for many of their employees. I am also not unmindful of the fact that the track worker is among the poorly paid employees of this country. Frequently the pay of the track worker is so low that it does not afford a decent standard of American living.” (*CR 80* 1936, 4289)

- 40.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 12 of 22): “We present for the approval of the House a measure which will assure railroad workers of comfort when the evening of life overtakes them. No longer need railroad men approach old age with the dread of poverty or in fear of want, but may continue through the closing years of life with the assurance that there will be no danger of starvation and that they will never be compelled to be in real want.” (*CR 81* 1937, 6092)

41. Full title: Vocational Training

- 41.1. Variable name: training
- 41.2. Description: The poor are often conceived as those that lack skills to survive in a changing economy. Therefore, this code is an attempt to capture when the poor are described as in need of training to facilitate their ascension from poverty (or their lack of training is the cause of their poverty).
- 41.3. Common terms:
- 41.4. Conditionality:
- 41.5. Exemplar: “There are Reserve officers at each camp, and some of the camps have a teacher in certain vocational lines. I offered an amendment authorizing teachers to be attached to the C. C. C. camps who would give instruction in vocational education long before the war in Europe started. I was not trying to impose on the poor boy—I am in that class myself and always have been—I was trying to help the poor boy; I was not trying to work a hardship on him. The plan I proposed of installing vocational teachers at many of the C. C. C. camps was not adopted except perhaps in a few instances.” (*CR 86* 1940, 8070)
- 41.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 5 of 6): “Mr. President, it is easy for a Senator drawing \$10,000 a year, living the rather comfortable life that we Senators live, rather above the hardships of the little people for whom we are trying to legislate in this measure, to say ‘Very well, let these folks find their own way.’ Yes, Mr. President, we can let them find their own way. Where will that way lead them? It will lead the masses of them to impecuniousness and to poverty. It will lead them to the bread lines. It will lead them to another W. P. A., Mr. President, where they will have to meet the humiliating conditions of a means test. It will lead them to continued poverty, to continued ill-health, to continued ill-housing. It will lead them to keep their children out of school. We as well as they will pay the price of the sacrifice to which it will condemn them.” (*CR 90* 1944, 6840)

42. Full title: Workers (General), Low Wage, and Unemployed

- 42.1. Variable name: workers
- 42.2. Description:
- 42.3. Common terms: “workers”; “unemployed/underemployed”; “working class”; “wage earner”
- 42.4. Conditionality:
- 42.5. Exemplar: “But as it is today, we have in America two different economics, governed by two different laws, and representing two different standards. In one section of our country the economic toiler is paid a living wage, though not a saving wage. In another section the worker receives starvation wages and is often so

underpaid and so badly exploited that he can hardly meet both ends and can scarcely have a real feeling of human dignity” (*CR 83 1938, 7311*).

- 42.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 416 of 934): “In other words, as the President said to us not long ago, ‘You cannot have prosperity for the industrial workers of this country, and good pay rolls, unless you have prosperity for the agricultural workers, and good farm prices.’ The two are irrevocably and inextricably linked together. What we are doing is this: We may think we are helping the manufacturer by taking the farm assets and giving them, through a third party, back to the manufacturing interests of the country; but we are not, because in impoverishing the agricultural interests we shall inevitably pauperize the industrial interests of the country.” (*CR 81 1937, 8803*)

White Collar

43. Full title: Businesses and Companies

- 43.1. Variable name: business
- 43.2. Description: Due to the cyclical nature of economic cycles, many once thriving businesses may face material hardship.
- 43.3. Common terms: proprietor; business; store; company
- 43.4. Conditionality:
- 43.5. Exemplar: “The Kentucky case was one, as he very correctly told the Senate, where there was a taxicab company in a small city, not a rich and powerful corporation—oh, no; it was a poor company, so poor that it could not pay the expenses of its attorney or pay him a fee.” (*CR 78 1934, 2239*)
- 43.6. Randomly-generated example (35th of 63 entries): “A transactions tax is a particularly vicious tax, because it bears down most heavily upon the poor. The people who have to pay the Townsend tax are the farmer, the small-business man, the working man, those on relief—in short, the 97 percent of our population who may be classified as poor or of moderate means.” (*CR 84 1939, 6390*)

44. Full title: Merchants

- 44.1. Variable name: merchants
- 44.2. Description: Those depicted as operating a commercial entity to sell goods.
- 44.3. Common terms: store owner; merchant
- 44.4. Conditionality:
- 44.5. Exemplar: “The vital question that we must answer in voting on this measure is: Shall we, in the face of national bankruptcy and at the risk of irreparable ruin, continue to provide upon the basis of our former prosperity for a small but highly deserving part of our people at the expense of tens of millions of poverty-stricken laborers, farmers, manufacturers, and merchants who have never in their lives directly received a dollar or a cent in actual money from the Treasury of the United States.” (*CR 77 1933, 442*)
- 44.6. Randomly-generated example (6th of 10 entries): “The purpose is to color oleo so that it looks like butter. That is an unfair trade practice. Mr. President, something has been said about the poor storekeeper. The Federal tax on the retailer is \$6 a year, or 50 cents a month. That is about [one and one-third] cents a day. That is all,

Senators. If the retailer sells 1 pound of oleomargarine a day and makes a margin of 4 cents he does not have any difficulty in paying his tax.” (*CR 90 1944, 273*)

45. Full title: Professionals

- 45.1. Variable name: professional
- 45.2. Description: Although this would seem to bely the material foundations of poverty, occasionally formerly wealthy individuals are labeled poor. This was the case during the Great Depression, when doctors, lawyers, bankers, entrepreneurs, and speculators were made poorer by the general collapse of the economy. This code picks up on when these white-collar groups are depicted as poor. Due to the lack of plausibility of folks in these professions truly experiencing poverty, several of the speeches with this code read as sarcastic.
- 45.3. Common terms: “white-collar”; “working professional(s)”; “doctor”; “banker”; “trader”
- 45.4. Conditionality:
- 45.5. Exemplar: “What about all the poor, indigent lawyers in this country? There are lots of them starving to death. Therefore we should set up a project and say, ‘Since you are so well schooled in the art of Blackstone, we are going to set up a lawyers’ project.’ What about all these wielders of the scalpel who cut out your appendix and who probe into the undefined depths of the anatomy? Why not say to these doctors and medicos, ‘We are going to have a project for you’?” (*CR 86 1940, 6754*)
- 45.6. Randomly-generated example (20th of 23 entries): “In these low-income groups will be found the millions of so-called white-collared employees—school teachers, clergymen, shopkeepers, salespeople, bookkeepers, barbers, clerks, and professional or semi-professional workers, not to mention small-farm operators, mechanics, janitors, caretakers, skilled and unskilled laborers, many of whom are self-employed Individuals.” (*CR 91 1945, 7326-7327*)

Government

46. Full title: Bureaucrats and Civil Service

- 46.1. Variable name: bureaucrat
- 46.2. Description: govt workers./civil service; people employed on government works projects
- 46.3. Common terms:
- 46.4. Conditionality:
- 46.5. Exemplar: “I say to you gentlemen, as you think of the civil employees of this country, with what are they going to buy, if you are not going to restore in toto the margin of purchasing power that was taken away under the provisions of Public Act No. 2? I venture to say, gentlemen, that, if the President of the United States could in a first-hand way sit at the firesides and hearthstones of America, if he could see the destitution, the grief, and despair, if he could see the anxiety and envision the misery that has gone along with the pay cut, he would not sanction the kind of rule that was introduced here for the consideration of this bill.” (*CR 78 1934, 555*)
- 46.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 182 of 212): “In North Dakota there is a little town by the name of Marion, of some 500 population. Sometime ago a man by the

name of Cleo Flugga was appointed postmaster of Marion, La Moure County., N. Dak. Like Mr. Burkhard, he has long been a capable, efficient postmaster. Then came the so-called coalition outfit to collect funds. Mr. Flugga is not a cripple as is Mr. Burkhard, but he is a poor man and he needs his job, So on the 4th day of June 1936, at the very time when this coalition outfit was shouting over the radio for clean, honest government, in order to hold his job as postmaster, as he believed, he issued his check for the sum of \$10 to the treasurer of the State Democratic Party.” (CR 88 1942, 7132)

47. Full title: Education Sector

- 47.1. Variable name: education
- 47.2. Description: Teachers, students; school districts
- 47.3. Common terms:
- 47.4. Conditionality:
- 47.5. Exemplar: “I am interested in our public schools; I am interested in our school children and I am interested in the thousands of penniless and needy school teachers of America, many of whom have not been paid for the last 8 or 9 months. They should be paid at least a portion of the amount due them, if not all of It.” (CR 78 1934, 9278)
- 47.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 93 of 204): “These are some of the advantages afforded the poor people of Louisiana under Longism. We are now providing free hot lunches for poor school children. Dependent children, the aged and blind people of our State, are receiving attention. We plan to better their condition.” (CR 86 1940, 734)

48. Full title: Military

- 48.1. Variable name: military
- 48.2. Description: Current or former military
- 48.3. Common terms: soldier; veteran; army; navy; air force
- 48.4. Conditionality: None
- 48.5. Exemplar: “Those men had their lives adjusted for them by acts of Congress determining the amount of their pensions, and, while it is meet that every citizen should sacrifice himself for the good of the United States, I see no reason why these poor people, these aged Civil War veterans, and war widows, and half-starved veterans of the World War should be compelled to give up their pensions for the financial benefit of the international vultures who have looted the Treasury, bankrupted the country and traitorously delivered the United States to a foreign foe.” (CR 77 1933, 2898-2899)
- 48.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 108 of 228): “Mr. Speaker, there are some very compelling reasons which favor the working out of some plan whereby needy unemployed veterans might be given an opportunity to realize on their adjusted-service certificates. Personally I have known of many distressing cases, cases where veterans have already borrowed to the limit on their certificates, are now unable to secure employment, and though, eligible, have not applied for relief. They are therefore not eligible for relief jobs. It seems a bit ironical that an unemployed

veteran in need should have in his pocket the obligation of his Government and lack the necessities of life for himself and family.” (*CR 80 1936, 294*)

Perspective and Characterization

49. Full title: Dependency and Stigma

- 49.1. Variable name: dependency
- 49.2. Description: Poor are described as dependent on a third party, either family/friends/neighbors, private charity, or a governmental entity. A related concept of stigmatization is also included here, which activates when the poor are described as being othered, belittled, experiencing shame and other dehumanizing aspects of not supporting one’s self. In the American context, there is a long-term ideological association between dependence on someone for something and stigma. The poor specifically are constructed as frequently dependent on others, and that this dependence decreases their sense of self-worth as they face ostracization from others.
- 49.3. Common terms: helpless, dependent, stigma, dole, shame
- 49.4. Conditionality: None
- 49.5. Exemplar: “The serious short-comings of the care provided old persons in our poorhouses and the unhappy stigma attached to these institutions has rendered them unacceptable to public-minded persons for years. Twenty-nine States and the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii have provided for State old-age assistance, commonly called ‘old-age pensions’, based on the policy that needy old persons should be maintained in their own homes rather than subjected to institutional treatment... His time of gainful employment has passed. There is a wide-spread sentiment that the assistance granted him should not carry the stigma of pauper’s relief. There is a growing feeling also that society can afford to take care of its needy aged upon a more adequate and more respectable basis than heretofore and should retire these persons from competition with younger workers seeking employment.” (*CR 79 1935, 5469*)
- 49.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 116 of 450): “Actually there is no difference between the railroad official and the man in the bread line from the standpoint of dependence upon the Government. In one case there is the mark of wealth and respectability and in the other the mark of poverty and shame. The worker is far more entitled to his relief than the railroad, the bank, or the industry is entitled to its millions.” (*CR 79 1935, 12356*)

50. Full title: Deservingness and Worthiness

- 50.1. Variable name: deserving
- 50.2. Description: (Basis for Entitlement to Help)
- 50.3. Common terms: deserving; worthy; entitled; no fault of their own
- 50.4. Conditionality: None
- 50.5. Exemplar: “I would add to these numbers which I have stated several million low-income workers the amounts of whose pay checks have not increased during the years of the present war. These facts and figures will certainly bring home to us the realization that justice, mercy, and income are not being equitably dispensed. Rising

costs of living at a rate comparable to the increased costs during other wars make the difficulties of these millions of low-income citizens more serious. Most of the low-income people today are deserving. A few years ago chiselers and small-time racketeers were to be found in considerable numbers among those requesting assistance from their Government or other sources. Today the chiselers have pretty much disappeared.” (*CR 90* 1944, 1543)

- 50.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 60 of 274): “I say refinance the mortgage on the home of that poor old man, who is bent with age, who has served his country for lo these many years, and Is one of our most worthy citizens, to the extent that he can meet his annual payments and interest, pay his taxes, and have enough to live on for the very short time that is allotted to him.” (*CR 80* 1936, 3739)

51. Full title: MC Personalization

51.1. Variable name: personalization

51.2. Description: MC ID as poor/works with poor

51.3. Common terms: I was poor; as a poor child; grew up poor; my poor mother; I know poor people because I am one. Depict others that are of the poor or have an understanding of their needs. The key here is to track the movement from the nebulous or abstract depiction of the poor to one informed by direct interaction or understanding of the poor. This is especially important when most lawmakers do not personally feel poverty, and yet are in a position to legislate poverty-lessening policies.

51.4. Conditionality: None

51.5. Exemplar: “Mr. President, let it be said that I prefer to speak for the poor people of the South... I come of the South’s poor, and, God being my helper, so long as I have the power, I will try to lighten the yoke upon their already galled necks. As long as I live I will challenge the feudal tradition in the South and those who would preserve it to continue a kind of economic slavery.” (*CR 88* 1942, 9049)

51.6. Randomly-generated example (entry 169 of 265): “My record, Mr. Speaker, whether in Congress or in private life, is like an open book. It is without blemish; it is clean and therefore unimpeachable. All efforts of political or scurrilous calumniators who would attempt to defile my good name will fail in their attempted defamation. I may be poor in the accumulation of worldly goods which fortune at any time may snatch from me, but I am rich in the reputation which attaches to my name and which will survive the calumniators long after they are buried in the paupers’ field of oblivion and are forgotten.” (*CR 86* 1940, 7889)

52. Morality and Ethics

52.1. Variable name: morality

52.2. Description: Members of Congress are compelled to help the poor, either out of simple deontological or consequentialist duty or in service of their moral/ethical systems, frequently Christian humanism and Catholicism.

52.3. Common terms: “duty”; “moral”; “responsibility”; “oath”; “imperative”.

52.4. Conditionality: None

52.5. Exemplar: “It goes without saying that we should try to avoid hasty and blundering legislation. But because we cannot please everybody is no reason why we should

not try to do our duty. It is the first duty of government to help the needy. Congress is constantly importuned to help the people who are well able to help themselves. There is no outcry against legislation to favor the rich and the powerful. But what an outcry there is if Congress shows any pitying interest in the poor and the weak!" (CR 81 1937, 9185)

- 52.6. Randomly-generated example (202nd of 341 entries): "To this might be added the further surmise that not only does poverty preclude proper medical care after sickness has set in; it also tends to facilitate the beginning of disease where, without poverty, it would not occur. In studying the duty of the Federal Government, therefore, we are, first of all, struck by the fact that some bad health is due to poverty, and that the Federal Government has never succeeded in eradicating poverty. In this aspect of the matter it would appear that the best course for the Government to follow would be to try to promote the growth of real and widespread prosperity in the United States." (CR 86 1940, 3045)

Appendix 2C: Case Selection of Antipoverty Policies

This appendix lays out the case selection process for antipoverty policies. Cases were selected in the context of a larger agenda that assesses poverty representation throughout the 20th century, specifically between the creation of the welfare state in the 1930s and its retrenchment in Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in the 1990s. Selection was primarily based on historical significance, while balancing temporal and topical variation. The first step was to identify a broad set of antipoverty policies. However, this is made somewhat more difficult since there is no consensus on what policies constitute antipoverty policies. Therefore, this case selection employed a liberal definition of antipoverty policies, such that any Congressionally approved policy that sought to or did increase poverty could count as an antipoverty measure. This criterion was further reduced to policies that could plausibly be considered social welfare in nature.

Table 2C.1 lays out the 48 policies throughout American political history that fit this standard. The table contains the policy name, date, notes about the antipoverty component of the law, and which policy area it addressed. Entries in bold denote the policy was selected to serve as a case within its policy era (New Deal, Great Society, and retrenchment period). For the New Deal, the three selected policies were the Social Security Act, U.S. Housing Act, and National School Lunch Act. The policies meet the aforementioned criteria on several fronts. First, there is variation on temporal scope, cutting across points in New Deal in 1935, 1937, and 1946. Second, there is variation on issue focus, from pensions/welfare relief/unemployment to housing to nutrition. Finally, there is variation on magnitude of the program, with the SSA as arguably most important social welfare policy in U.S. history, USHA as one of most important housing acts, and the NLSA as a lesser known, but widely felt policy among poor schoolchildren. Further details on policy substance and context are provided in Table 2C.2.

Table 2C.1 Case Selection of Antipoverty Policies, 1789-2016

#	Antipoverty Laws	Antipoverty Component	Date	Cash Transfer	Land/Housing	Family	Pension	Nutrition	Labor	Health Care	Education	Disability	Utilities	Legal	Banking
1	Veterans' Pensions	Foundation of the social welfare system in the U.S.	1789-	✓											
2	Marine Health Insurance	Used payroll tax on ship captains to fund maritime hospitals for sick sailors	1798							✓					
3	Donation Land Claim Act	cheap land to settlers incl 1/2 Native American	1850	✓											
4	Homestead Act	Dispensed occupied and unoccupied land to anyone who would have it	1862	✓											
5	Morrill Land Grant Act	Allocated land/resources to form public universities	1862	✓							✓				
6	Southern Homestead Act	Cheap land to Southerners, incl Blacks	1866	✓											
7	Timber Culture Act	Cheap if people plant trees	1873	✓											
8	Second Morrill Land Grant Act	Expanded to agricultural and historically black colleges	1890	✓							✓				
9	Enlarged Homestead Act	For non-alluvial lands, more space considering arid conditions	1909	✓											
10	Stock-Raising Homestead Act	specifically for ranching	1916	✓											
11	Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932	Created RFC which experimented with antipoverty programs	1932						✓						
12	Emergency Relief and Construction Act	Expanded powers of RFC for lending	1932						✓						
13	National Industrial Recovery Act	collective bargaining; subsistence homesteads	1933						✓						
14	Agricultural Adjustment Act	Price and quota supports for poor farmers	1933						✓						
15	National Housing Act	Created FHA and HOLC	1934	✓											✓
16	Emergency Relief Appropriation Act	Mass employment program	1935						✓						
17	Indian Reorganization Act	Provided resources and greater autonomy to tribes	1935	✓											✓

Table 2C.1 Case Selection of Antipoverty Policies, 1789-2016 (Cont.)

#	Antipoverty Laws	Antipoverty Component	Date	Cash Transfer	Land/Housing	Family	Pension	Nutrition	Labor	Health Care	Education	Disability	Utilities	Legal	Banking
18	Social Security Act	retirement pension for workers; unemployment benefits; cash transfer welfare; aid to the blind	1935	✓		✓	✓		✓			✓			
19	Agricultural Adjustment Act amendments of 1935	customs receipts used to purchase and dispense surplus commodities	1935					✓							
20	U.S. Housing Act	Public housing units, slum remediation	1937		✓			✓							
21	Small Tracts Act	land allocations in the desert	1938		✓										
22	Fair Labor Standards Act	min wage; overtime	1938						✓						
23	Social Security Amendments of 1939	Dependents and survivors' coverage	1939			✓	✓								
24	National School Lunch Act	Provided legislative authorization for free/reduced school lunch	1946					✓							
25	Social Security Act Amendments	health insurance subsidies/includes agricultural labor	1950				✓		✓	✓					
26	Social Security Act Amendments	covered self-employed	1954				✓		✓						
27	Dependents' Medical Care Act	expanded medical coverage to the families of military members	1956				✓			✓					
28	Economic Opportunity Act	Head Start; Job Corps	1964						✓		✓				
29	Food Stamp Act of 1964	Congressionally authorized food stamp program	1964					✓							
30	Higher Education Act of 1965	Pell Grants	1965								✓				
31	Social Security Act Amendments of 1965 (Medicare/Medicaid)	Established Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the poor	1965							✓					
32	Elementary and Secondary Education Act	restructured public education; financing for poor schools and poorest students	1965								✓				

Table 2C.1 Case Selection of Antipoverty Policies, 1789-2016 (Cont.)

#	Antipoverty Laws	Antipoverty Component	Date	Cash Transfer	Land/Housing	Family	Pension	Nutrition	Labor	Health Care	Education	Disability	Utilities	Legal	Banking
33	Social Security Amendments of 1967	Work Incentive Program (WIN)	1967	✓				✓							
34	Public Broadcasting Act	Established medium for free educational programming	1967							✓			✓		
35	Social Security Amendments of 1972	Established SSI disability benefits in the form of direct cash transfers	1972	✓							✓				
36	Housing and Community Development Act	created Section 8 vouchers	1974		✓										
37	Legal Services Corporation Act	Created the LSC, which provides free legal services to the poor	1974											✓	
38	Tax Reduction Act of 1975	Created a Earned Income Credit program to supplement low incomes	1975	✓				✓							
39	Community Reinvestment Act	anti-discrimination provisions; encourages banking in low-income areas	1977												✓
40	Food and Agriculture Act of 1977	Eliminated purchasing requirement in Food Stamp Act of 1964	1977					✓							
41	Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act	Created Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (use-until-gone program to help people afford utilities)	1981										✓		
42	Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981	Expanded Head Start	1981								✓				
43	Housing and Community Development Act	reverse mortgages, which are ultimately predatory	1987		✓										✓
44	Family Support Act	Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (JOBS)	1988												✓
45	Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act	Retrenched direct cash transfers	1997	✓		✓			✓						

Table 2C.1 Case Selection of Antipoverty Policies, 1789-2016 (Cont.)

#	Antipoverty Laws	Antipoverty Component	Date	Cash Transfer	Land/Housing	Family	Pension	Nutrition	Labor	Health Care	Education	Disability	Utilities	Legal	Banking
46	Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997	child tax credit	1997	✓		✓									
47	Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998	retrenchment and restructure of concentrated pub housing; Hope VI	1998		✓										
48	Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act	Created subsidies to purchase health care; expanded Medicaid	2010							✓					

Table 2C.2 Selected Antipoverty Policies in New Deal, Great Society, and Retrenchment Periods

Policy	Year	Policy Area	Significance	Longevity	President's Party	Congressional Composition
Social Security Act (SSA)	1935	Pensions; Unemployment; Disability; Cash Welfare	High	Stable	Democrat	Democratic Majority
U.S. Housing Act (USHA)	1937	Housing; Urban Planning	Moderate	Medium	Democrat	Democratic Majority
National School Lunch Act (NLSA)	1946	Childhood Nutrition; Educational Funding; Military Preparedness	Low	Stable	Democrat	Democratic Majority
Economic Opportunity Act (EOA)	1964	Employment; Jobs Training	Low	Unstable	Democrat	Democratic Majority
Food Stamp Act	1964	Nutrition	Moderate	Medium	Democrat	Democratic Majority
Medicare/ Medicaid	1965	Health Care	High	Stable	Democrat	Democratic Majority
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)	1972	Disability-based Cash Welfare	Moderate	Stable	Republican	Democratic Majority
Earned Income Credit (EIC)	1975	Taxation; Workforce Subsidization	Moderate	Stable	Republican	Democratic Majority
Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)	1981	Home Energy	Low	Medium	Democrat	Democratic Majority
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA)	1996	Cash Welfare	Moderate	Stable	Democrat	Republican Majority

Appendix 2D: Glossary of Commonly Used Acronyms

AAA	Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, amended in 1935 (not used for Agricultural Adjustment Administration)
ADC	Aid to Dependent Children, later renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
AL	American Labor Party
CCC	Civilian Conservation Corps
CES	Committee on Economic Security
CWA	Civil Works Administration
D	Democratic Party
FERA	Federal Emergency Relief Administration
FHA	Federal Housing Administration
FL	Farmer-Labor Party
FLSA	Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
FSA	Federal Security Agency
HAG	House Agriculture Committee
HED	House Education Committee
HLA	House Labor Committee
HWM	House Ways and Means Committee
HOLC	Home Owners' Loan Corporation
I	Independent (no party affiliation)
LHAs	Local housing agencies
NIRA	National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933
NLRA	National Labor Relations Act of 1935
NPL	Non-Partisan League
NSLA	National School Lunch Act of 1946
NYA	National Youth Administration
OE	Office of Education
P	Progressive Party
PWA	Public Works Administration

R	Republican Party
RFC	Reconstruction Finance Corporation
SAF	Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee
SAP	Senate Appropriations Committee
SBC	Senate Banking and Currency Committee
SEL	Senate Education and Labor Committee
SFI	Senate Finance Committee
SPE	Senate Pension Committee
SSA	Social Security Act of 1935, later amended in 1939 (not used for Social Security Administration)
SUI	Senate Select Committee on Unemployment Insurance
UI	Unemployment Insurance
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USHA	United States Housing Act of 1937 (not used for United States Housing Authority)
WFA	War Foods Administration
WPA	Works Progress Administration

Part II:
Rhetoric

Chapter 3

Rhetoric for the Poor:

Poverty Speeches and Lawmakers, Agenda Share, Partisanship, and Institutional Dynamics

Abstract

This chapter presents and descriptively analyzes the first comprehensive dataset on poverty speeches in Congress during the heightened salience case of the long New Deal from 1933 to 1946. The ensuing analyses depict agenda, member, partisan, and chamber variation dynamics over time. Poverty speeches indexed to the length of the Congressional Record are stable over time until World War II, at which point poverty begins to lag behind its former prominence on the agenda. Members of Congress (MCs) engagement with poverty aggregates into a highly skewed distribution, with two-thirds of members delivering zero poverty speeches, while the remaining third range from one to 36 poverty speeches in a single Congress. There is general parity between Democrats and Republicans on speech willingness and rate during this period, marking a potentially unique high bar in bipartisan competition over the issue of poverty. Finally, there are chamber differences in poverty representation, with Senators a) more likely to deliver a poverty speech and b) on average delivering more than double (1.62 to 0.70) the rate of speeches per Congress. The results in the chapter reveal the contours of how actors and institutions vary in whether and how often to articulate the plight of the poor.

When, oh, when, Members of this House, will we pound into the heads of our people the fact that the Government is not here but out there; that they themselves are it; and that no government ever can give to its citizens anything that it does not take from them? It is no use to deal in a lot of political demagoguery and sloshy sentimentality [on] behalf of the poor old man when you saddle another \$1,500,000,000 upon the backs of the taxpayers of this Nation, who are now stumbling under an almost unbearable burden. When you do that[,] you are the worst enemy to the poor people of this country. [Applause.]

—Representative Dewey Short (R-MO), May 21, 1937

I say to the Senate in all sincerity that there is not one Member of the Senate who is as poor as I am, but I pay my debts. I have not taken one penny from a soul in all my days. I have not sold a gallon of gasoline in my State. I have not ridden on a railroad pass. I have not sold any railroad equipment or highway equipment. But I stand before the Senate in all honesty of purpose, representing those persons in my State who sent my colleague and me to the United States Senate, and say that they are not guilty of the things of which they are accused. I want Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, to know that I have a 59-year-old sister who lives in my State. She is as poor as a church mouse. She is dependent on her other brothers and sisters and on me for her livelihood. But she is a Democrat, bless her soul. She is that kind of person who, if she had 25 cents, would buy a soup bone and make soup and distribute it around the block to her neighbors.

—Senator Dennis Chávez (D-NM), March 15, 1940

I cannot yield. This is a statement from a Democratic paper in the South. I will agree that as far as the F. E. R. A. is concerned, it was a political organization in the North and in the West and that the funds were largely used around election time for election purposes; that needy American people were threatened either to vote the Democratic ticket or starve, and they were intimidated, coerced, and practically driven right up to the polls like a lot of sheep to vote for Santa Claus.

—Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY), March 7, 1935

If any Republican can submit any feasible or better plan to help millions of unemployed than the plan that the President has submitted, I promise now that I will support it. But in the meantime[,] the millions who have tried but cannot obtain employment in private industry, who are hungry, cannot exist on political bunk, which, if you will pardon me, is the one and only thing the Republicans are offering them today, or that they have offered them. And let me remind those on the Republican side that it is not only the poor, the unemployed, and the deserving who are asking and receiving help from the Government. There is scarcely a single large industry that has not received much greater benefits for its labor-seducing and tax-evading corporations, but how they fight against aiding their former employees whom they deliberately have thrown out of work in order to embarrass the administration and in order that they may save a few shekels by later rehiring them at a reduced wage.

—Representative Adolph J. Sabath (D-IL), May 11, 1938

Introduction

Amidst emergency-level economic depression—leading to widespread poverty conditions across the country—lawmakers in the 1930s for the first time in the nation’s history determined poverty was a national issue warranting a national response. Circumstance and the promises of incoming Democratic president Franklin Roosevelt foreclosed the possibility of maintaining the status quo, in which generations of lawmakers commonly responded to letters from desperate constituents that poverty alleviation had no mandate in the Constitution nor practices of Congress, and that their redress was best served first by their families, then by friends, charity, and perhaps local and state government. Key to understanding why Great Depression-era lawmakers charted a new policy regime is to understand how many among them considered the issue of poverty and rose to speak about it on the floor. This chapter presents basic empirics on which poverty articulation during the long New Deal, with special attention to agenda share, members, partisanship, and chamber differences within Congress.

We can form a set of expectations based on previous scholarship on Congress and the party system. Congressional agendas often emulate the priorities of the public (Jones and Baumgartner 2004), but the agenda space is itself a scarce, finite resource (Kingdon 2011 [1984]) managed by strategic cartel leaders (Cox and McCubbins 2004) more interested in power and control than meaning-making. Members have some degree of agency to deviate from the set agenda in how they speak about issues, but not everyone has the same predilection toward oratory, nor are all members equally situated to be recognized during a debate (especially in the House). With these restrictive considerations in mind, members *do* speak about the issues they care about, and this chapter will provide an initial account of the prevalence of poverty on the Congressional discursive space when we retrospectively know the issue received considerable policy remediation in the

New Deal. Particular attention is devoted to chamber dynamics that indicate meaningful differences in how the House and Senate engage matters of poverty.

Moreover, measuring poverty speeches in this era of U.S. political history provides a new approach to evaluate larger dynamics related to ideological sorting and partisanship. Polarization has ebbed and flowed throughout American history (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) running high in the Civil War, 1890s, and subsequent to the New Deal and starting in the 1940s (Schickler 2016) culminating in the post-Civil Rights Act realignment from the 1970s to current day. However, the 1930s through 1960s were known for the bipartisan Washington Consensus, which was less ideologically sorted and partisan. But this occurred when the stakes of politics were becoming more legible and less sectional, culminating in the nationalization of politics (Schattschneider 1960, 76) and commensurate party system realignment (Sundquist 1983 [1973]) in the 1932 presidential election. To be sure, Democrats almost always been to the economic left of the Whig/Republican party lineage (Gerring 1998), but political scientists of this era greatly lamented the dissensus and idiocrasies of a party system with ideological liberals and conservatives in both parties (APSA 1950). All of this calls into question the degree to which either party effectively claims “issue ownership” (Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2003) over poverty at a time when Americans across identities faced impediments to material well-being. The answer is that members of both parties have an equal likelihood to give a poverty speech, and deliver said speeches at the same rate, portraying an ideational space where poverty is not clearly a partisan issue.

Descriptive Account of Poverty Speeches and Agenda Share in Congress

The search-term criteria and data generation process explained in Chapter 2 yields the population of poverty speeches during the long New Deal. These results are summarized in Table 3.1, which provides a descriptive overview of the number of poverty speeches by year, chamber,

Table 3.1 Poverty Speeches in Congress, 1933-1946

Description	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	Total
Total Speeches	134	238	398	292	310	226	391	318	165	171	158	148	229	225	3,403
CR Pages per Speech	47	53	37	37	38	43	32	44	62	57	70	66	55	48	46
House	81	160	280	231	204	131	246	192	109	106	99	79	158	122	2,199
Senate	53	78	118	61	106	95	145	126	56	65	59	69	71	103	1,204

and in relation to the length of the *Congressional Record*, which helps estimate the relative attention paid to the poverty agenda. The results presented here provide several key indicators for examination of the representation of the poor and inform intuitions for further assessment in subsequent chapters.

The first indicator to note is that there were 3,403 speeches about poverty in Congress from 1933 to 1946. This corpus of speeches captures the bounds of poverty-related rhetoric on the floors of each chamber, providing a rich dataset to assess in subsequent chapters. For now, topline assessments still prove quite illuminating. The low in this epoch is 134 poverty speeches, which occurs in the first year of the dataset, 1933. The high watermark occurs only two years later in 1935, showing poverty articulation varies widely by year. This could be for myriad reasons, including the number of days Congress is in session, economic conditions, the presence of related legislative initiatives, or the characteristics of new lawmaker cohorts. Available variables akin to these dynamics are tested through statistical modeling in Chapter 4. On its surface, it appears speech count may track with important recessionary events, but this relationship is not likely to be functionally automatic; a more accurate view might be that MC's awareness of economic vicissitudes may lag extant conditions, which is a proposition subsequently tested with time-series modeling in Chapter 4.


A second notable feature is there are nearly twice as many poverty speeches in the House (2,199) as there are in the Senate (1,204). Since there are over four times as many members in the former body, that may not be surprising. What this table shows is that the people's house collectively propounds more poverty speeches, but it is the Senate that is substantially more inclined to speak on poverty on a per member basis. This may be a product of several factors, such as ease of speaking privileges, leadership power, and differing constituencies, which create countervailing expectations across Congress.¹³ And just as speech count rises and falls, so too do the chambers vacillate between greater divergence and parity. On the former count, the House blows the Senate out of the water in 1936 with 231 speeches to the Senate's 61. In contrast, the Senate nearly reaches parity with the House in 1944, with the upper chamber offering 69 poverty speeches to the lower chamber's 79. The differences in speech totals and member speech rate warrant further investigation, which occurs later in the chapter.

Third, on average for the whole period there are 46 pages of the *Congressional Record* for every poverty speech.¹⁴ The lower the rate, the more prevalent poverty is in Congressional debates. The most prolific period is sustained from 1935 to 1940 with one poverty speech for every 32 to

¹³ Senators have greater agency in holding the floor to deliver speeches. Leadership at this time has much more control over floor privileges on the House side. And the Senate, representing states instead of districts, is often thought to hold a wider perspective on national problems, perhaps in this case encouraging them to speak about poverty more than their counterparts in the House. This dynamic resembles the debate between the representational style of instructed delegates (Pitkin 1972 [1967], 133), which usually have smaller, more homogenous constituencies where they pursue the interests of their most vocal supporters (like in the House), and national trustees (127), which have larger, heterogeneous constituencies that allow them to take a more nuanced view and use their decision-making ability to pursue universalistic interests (as might be the case with the Senate).

¹⁴ The relationship between *CR* page length and poverty speech count is analytically instructive, but the ratio between poverty speeches and page length is an admittedly imperfect basis of comparison. Poverty speeches greatly vary in length, from several sentences to hours-long filibustering diatribes. While this does not currently exist, future research could devise a better metric based on the total number of speeches in relation to the number of poverty speeches. Several teams of scholars (Burfoot, Bird and Baldwin 2011; Judd, Drinkard, Carbaugh, and Young 2017; Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy 2018) have admirably used text parsing to divide the *CR* into speech breaks, but there are still notable issues with temporal scope and/or parser accuracy. At the very least, indexing poverty speeches to *CR* page length provides an internal basis of comparison to monitor changes in the ratio over time.

Figure 3.1. Number of Poverty Speeches Relative to the Page Length of the *Congressional Record*



44 pages. The least prevalent period is during the World War II years, with a high of one poverty speech for every 70 pages in 1943.

For further elaboration, Figure 3.1 charts how the number of poverty speeches corresponds to the length of the *Congressional Record*, which is a necessary concept to understand in order to better account for how external explanations for poverty speech count—such as economic conditions—are attenuated by internal institutional realities, such as finite agenda space in variable length Congressional sessions. Without accounting for a measure of Congressional agenda space—days in session is an alternative but vaguer metric—one might incorrectly attribute an external cause to changes in the number of poverty speeches, when in reality Congress might have been in session for only four months (First Session of the 73rd Congress) or had a special session for a specific issue (75th and 76^h Congresses).

The chart displays remarkable stability of poverty speeches in relation to the larger Congressional material record. This suggests high correlation, but potentially for indeterminate reasons. Trending together may point to a third unknown factor informing both poverty attention


and agenda space. Luckily, this type of data structure allows for fairly useful internal comparisons across time. For example, after initially trailing *CR* length in the 73rd Congress, poverty speeches tack closely to *CR* length for much of this era, which is suggestive of a New Deal equilibrium of poverty issue articulation. However, we can see that poverty speeches wane in their relative share of the material record as the U.S. increases its role in World War II, and later, engineers the reconstruction of Europe and Asia. This era provides an important baseline for future comparative-historical analysis, specifically to track whether poverty loses further agenda share as memory of the Great Depression fades and Congress deals with an increasing number of public problems. After all, since the 1950s are known as a silent decade on several key domestic issues, it is likely poverty articulation on the Congressional agenda precipitously declines even further. Alternatively, this era may instill a path dependent process in which the poverty issue maintains a certain permanent level of attention within the deliberations and implementation monitoring of the chief U.S. lawmaking body, rising again only in select pivotal moments in the national debate about poverty (the Great Society in the 1960s and welfare reform in the early 1990s).

Member, Chamber, and Partisan Dynamics in Poverty Speeches

To further assess the intricacies of poverty rhetoric in Congress, this section further details member-level differences in speech propensity and number of speeches per member, as well as how chamber leads to a disparity in both speech proportion and rate. Additionally, this section explores differences—and surprising similarities—in speech dynamics among members of the Democratic and Republican parties.

As a starting point, Figure 3.2 provides the data shape through an annotated histogram that has the number of poverty speeches on the x-axis, and number of MCs on the y-axis. The underlying count data is provided in in table form in Appendix 3A. Importantly, only a minority

Figure 3.2 Histogram of MC Speech Counts per Congress



of lawmakers have poverty any speeches, with an overwhelming majority of members (2,576 of 3,893) registering zero poverty speeches per Congress. While it is startling to see empirical proof that most members do not avidly speak about the poor, this proportion may still be a high point in Congressional discursive history. Among those that do speak about poverty, the data shows a heavy skew toward few poverty speeches; of members with poverty speeches (N=1,317), 90.4% (1,191) give between 1 and 5 poverty speeches. But importantly, as the normal population of the data tapers downward, a long, low-populated tail exposes the prolific nature of a small group of highly interested members, in effect pulling the average lawmakers' speech propensity up as highly influential outliers. For example, the two highest poverty speech counts by a member for an individual Congress are the product of Senator Huey Long (D-LA), a populist insurgent who developed a political pedigree as being *of the poor* (Williams 1981 [1969]) and devoted extensive floor time to depicting the plight of the poor once he was elected to the Senate. The stories of these

high-volume poverty rhetoricians are further examined in the later chapters, first grouped by geographic area in Chapter 4, then examined by rhetorician type in Chapter 7.

More broadly, Table 3.2 holds the computations for how widely dispersed poverty speeches are across membership in Congress as a whole, by chamber, and by partisan alignment. Overall, 33.8 percent of MCs gave a poverty speech in the period from 1933 to 1946.¹⁵ The Congress-wide speech percentage disaggregates further into 30.6 percent of House members, compared to the higher figure of 47.3 percent in the Senate. Moreover, the divergence between House and Senate is not static, but grows over time: the gap between House and Senate goes from just under 10 points in the 73rd and 74th Congresses to around 20 points henceforth. On its face, it would seem the Senate becomes more captured with the poverty debate, which supports the trustee idea that the Senate is more aware of and responsive to national-level systemic problems, not just parochial one. But if that is true, it means the steady two-year election cycle in the House may not lead to more fulsome symbolic representation by those members.

In contrast, Democrats and Republicans trade off leading the pack in proportion of members giving a poverty speech, with the Republicans shifting more widely (low of 21.5%; high of 48.1%), while the Democrats are more stable around their mean. Remarkably, for this period the exact same proportion of the Democratic and Republican caucuses speak about poverty—roughly one-third of their respective memberships (33.1%).¹⁶ The parity across the party caucuses evidences a deep contestation over messaging, where both parties vie for the mantle of representing

¹⁵ The 33.8% figure is based on a pooled Congress-by-Congress dataset. Individual members count more than once if they served in multiple Congresses (e.g., if a member served from the 73rd to the 79th Congress, that single member would count as 7 of those observations). A different statistic that looks at whether a MC delivered a single poverty speech while they were in Congress puts the figure at 48.4% (618/1,277). I consider the former statistic more useful since it captures whether MCs represent the poor in each Congress—exposing variability in interest *within* single members over time—not just for the overall period.

¹⁶ If you compute the percentage to the hundredth place, Democrats take the lead with 33.14%, against 33.13% for the Republicans—as good an example as any of there being a distinction without a difference.

Table 3.2 Proportion of Members with Poverty Speeches, 73rd to 79th Congresses

Description	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	Total
Members with poverty speeches/ total members	170/550	237/550	195/557	209/562	168/563	140/555	195/556	1,314/3,893
<i>Percentage</i>	30.9	43.1	35	37.2	29.8	25.2	35.1	33.8
Representatives with poverty speeches/total House members	130/447	183/444	142/450	154/458	117/454	95/451	142/447	963/3,151
<i>Percentage</i>	29.1	41.2	31.6	33.6	25.8	21.1	31.8	30.6
Senators with poverty speeches/ total Senate members	40/103	54/106	53/107	55/104	51/109	45/104	53/109	351/742
<i>Percentage</i>	38.9	50.9	49.5	52.9	46.8	43.3	48.6	47.3
Republicans with poverty speeches/total Republicans	44/157	63/131	49/113	82/205	56/201	56/260	82/237	432/1,304
<i>Percentage</i>	28.0	48.1	43.4	40.0	27.9	21.5	34.6	33.1
Democrats with poverty speeches/total Democrats	120/387	163/406	136/427	119/349	107/354	82/290	111/316	838/2,529
<i>Percentage</i>	31.0	40.2	31.9	34.1	30.2	28.3	35.1	33.1

the poor. This dynamic seemingly belies late 20th and early 21st century politics in which the Democrats essentially own the issue of poverty, at least on rhetorical terms.

Another way to analyze poverty representation is to measure the intensity of poverty speeches among members, which Table 3.3 facilitates by reporting the rate at which the number of speeches relates to specific group membership. For the whole period, globally there is less than one speech per member serving—0.87 to be exact. But disaggregating that number shows Senators make over twice as many speeches per member as their House counterparts: on average 1.62 in the Senate versus 0.7 in the House. Oddly enough, this is countervailing evidence that the Senate may be more rhetorically responsive to extant conditions (e.g., the faltering economy) than the House, even though the House has more frequent elections and generally more accurately represents the demographics of the country. The most obvious explanation for this divergence is not electoral, but institutional—the Senate is more conducive for lengthy debate, long speeches, and rank-and-file member participation. It is a smaller body renowned for deliberation, which natu-

Table 3.3 Member Speech Rate by Party and Chamber, 73rd through 79th Congresses

Description	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	Total
Poverty speeches/total members	372/550	690/550	536/557	709/562	336/563	306/555	454/556	3403/3893
<i>Rate</i>	<i>0.68</i>	<i>1.25</i>	<i>0.96</i>	<i>1.26</i>	<i>0.60</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.82</i>	<i>0.87</i>
Poverty speeches in the House/ total House members	241/447	511/444	335/450	438/458	215/454	178/451	280/447	2198/3151
<i>Rate</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>1.15</i>	<i>0.74</i>	<i>0.96</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.40</i>	<i>0.63</i>	<i>0.70</i>
Poverty speeches in the Senate/ total Senate members	131/103	179/106	201/107	271/104	121/109	128/104	174/109	1205/742
<i>Rate</i>	<i>1.27</i>	<i>1.69</i>	<i>1.88</i>	<i>2.61</i>	<i>1.11</i>	<i>1.23</i>	<i>1.60</i>	<i>1.62</i>
Republican poverty speeches/ total Republicans	87/157	179/131	135/113	234/205	96/201	143/260	179/237	1053/1304
<i>Rate</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>1.37</i>	<i>1.20</i>	<i>1.14</i>	<i>0.48</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.76</i>	<i>0.81</i>
Democrat poverty speeches/ total Democrats	270/387	472/406	369/427	437/349	220/354	159/290	272/316	2199/2529
<i>Rate</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>1.16</i>	<i>0.86</i>	<i>1.25</i>	<i>0.62</i>	<i>0.55</i>	<i>0.86</i>	<i>0.87</i>

rally lends itself to greater speaking privileges for individual senators than their counterparts in the lower chamber. In the House, the governing rules allow its body's leadership to be stricter with time management, which is all the more imperative in a body over four times the size of the Senate.¹⁷

Holding close to the patterns in the previous table, Democrats and Republicans give a similar number of speeches per member at 0.87 and 0.81, respectively. Interestingly, as the Republicans lost seats after the 73rd Congress, the members that returned to the 74th Congress were seemingly much more committed to speaking about poverty, multiplying their previous rate from 0.55 to 1.37 speeches per member.¹⁸ But as Republicans gained seats in the 76th Congress, that

¹⁷ The role of institutional variation in membership and rules is explored further in the models of Chapter 5.

¹⁸ From this piece of evidence, a solid first hypothesis is the electorate was indeed concerned with endemic poverty and elected officials *across* parties who shared that disposition. A second hypothesis would be the remaining Republicans increased their poverty speech rate, in effect learning and adapting to electorate demands. The truth is likely some combination of the two.


number declined slightly, and in turn, Democrats spoke more about poverty, perhaps having processed the need to connect with voters lest they lose power.¹⁹

The lack of a consistent partisan divide in this period is telling, first because both metrics (proportion and rate) across parties seem to trend together, suggesting partisans are responding to a shared understanding of poverty as a problem—or at least the necessity to speak about it. Second, it mirrors the four party politics of the Fourth and Fifth Party Systems, in which both parties had sizeable left-liberal and right-conservative factions (APSA 1950; Chambers and Burnham 1967; Sundquist 1983 [1973]). It is also plausible that following a quite large electoral repudiation, Republicans internalized their disadvantage and pursued a new strategy to gain partisan advantage (Galvin 2010). In this telling, the GOP redoubled their efforts to show common voters, including the poor, that theirs was a party that vocalized the concerns of the masses, leading the Republicans to outpace the Democrats in both share of the party membership delivering a poverty speech and the rate at which they spoke about the poor in the 74th and 75th Congresses.

Overall, both parties were nearly at parity on both metrics during the New Deal, although as Figure 3.3 shows, Republicans considerably oscillate while Democrats were more static around their mean. This sets an interesting baseline to compare subsequent and more partisan periods against, especially during the era of silence on poverty in the 1950s, the high salience Great Society era in the 1960s, and later, during the social welfare retrenchment that runs from the 1970s to present day. Overall, it is unique and not entirely expected that neither party rhetorically owned the issue of poverty during the New Deal, as both parties competed to portray themselves as advocates with different theories of the case. As the epigraphs convey, Democrats being the party in govern-

¹⁹ These dynamics may be confounded by replacement effects, which could explain the changes in speech propensity. Although replacement effect is not directly measured, Chapter 5 provides analyzes how the year one enters Congress may instruct their propensity to speak about poverty.

Figure 3.3 Proportion of MCs with Poverty Speeches and Speech Rates by Party



ment had the leverage to deliver substantive benefits to the poor after Republican stewardship did not prevent the Great Depression, while Republicans were ever vigilant to portray issues in policy design and implementation as emblematic of the Democrats' mismanagement and lack of authentic interest in the poor. While neither story is entirely true or false, the party competition on poverty discourse is a positive sign the system as a whole was more oriented toward *action* than *neglect*.

More broadly, Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Figure 3.3 show most metrics in the rows rise and fall along a similar trajectory based on which column they are in. Said differently, regardless of their baseline, members in the House and Senate, Republican and Democrat, appear to respond to the same underlying logic that prompts more attention to poverty. Whether this logic is exogenous based on events or endogenous where rhetoric simply responds to legislative action is less immediately clear. We will gain more insight on that question later in Chapter 5 when we examine what causes a MC to give a poverty speech.

Conclusion

In sum, the chapter established the initial, broad trends associated with poverty rhetoric in Congress during the New Deal. Poverty speeches indexed to the size of the *Congressional Record* is generally stable in the period until world events likely displace attention to poverty during World War II. Moving this time-series forward will reveal if poverty retakes its original agenda share, loses additional agenda share (likely in the 1950s), or potentially reaches new unseen heights (potentially in the 1960s). Two-thirds of MCs do not engage in poverty discourse, setting up a situation in which a minority of lawmakers have to depict the plight of their poor and the poor of surrounding districts and the nation. The distribution of poverty speeches is left-skewed toward lower values but has a long tail wherein high poverty articulators fill the void and center debates on the poor. Additionally, there are chamber differences in poverty representation, with Senators more likely to deliver a speech and speaking about poverty at a higher clip per member than their House colleagues. Theories of representation based on electorate composition—delegate in the House versus trustee in the Senate—and variation in chamber rules offer initial hypotheses for these observations. Finally, Democrats and Republicans share the same level of interest in poverty oration as measured through the binary speech willingness and continuous speech rate during this period, marking a potentially unique high bar in bipartisan competition over the issue of poverty. Overall, the results in the chapter reveal the contours of how actors and institutions vary in whether and how often to articulate the plight of the poor as they work to deliver substantive benefits those most in need.

Diving deeper into the data, it is fruitful to consider the geospatial dynamics baked into the politics of poverty representation. After all, wealth is not evenly distributed across space, as some parts of the country are exceptionally poor, while others are quite wealthy. This begs the question:

do MCs from poorer areas speak more about poverty than the representatives of wealthier areas?

Next, Chapter 4 will examine the political cultures that inform actor poverty representation (and neglect), followed by Chapter 5's assessment of the connection between economic indicators and speech propensity.

Appendix 3A: Number of Members by Poverty Speech Count per Congress

Total number of members serving in each of the seven Congresses (73rd to 79th) binned by the number of poverty speeches they made in a single Congress.

Table 3A.1 Number of MCs by Number of Poverty Speeches in a Single Congress, $N=3,893$

Number of Poverty Speeches in a Single Congress	Number of Members with Poverty Speech Count	Number of Poverty Speeches in a Single Congress	Number of Members with Poverty Speech Count
0	2,576	19	1
1	635	20	0
2	248	21	0
3	174	22	0
4	95	23	1
5	39	24	1
6	39	25	0
7	23	26	0
8	16	27	0
9	13	28	0
10	6	29	0
11	5	30	1
12	3	31	0
13	4	32	0
14	4	33	0
15	1	34	0
16	3	35	0
17	0	36	1
18	4		

Chapter 4

Land of the Poor:

The Political Geography of Poverty Representation,

1933-1946

Abstract

This chapter examines the political geography of poverty articulation in Congress using geospatial methods of digital cartography. Moreover, the chapter presents a new methodology to better understand ideational concentration and diffusion in the polity. Using poverty speeches by member coded to district shapefiles, the chapter presents a new measurable concept—Reduced Legislative Districts (RLDs)—which uses the union of over time variation in district lines and representation to track lawmaker opinions on a more granular level than any existing approach. The results show highly idiosyncratic concentrations of poverty interest, creating a truly unique map in American politics. Poverty speeches vary widely across and within regions, with the highest concentrations in Louisiana, California, New York, and North Dakota, and low concentrations in the Great Plains and Yankee Northeast. In addition to the descriptive analyses, this chapter utilizes an interpretive approach through narrative, biography, and ethnography to showcase how members across regions conceptualize of poverty in speech content. This effort reveals the temporal, spatial, cultural, and linguistic underpinnings of poor representation during the New Deal. The significant fragmentation among members' speech propensity and target group construction across space and time considerably narrows the representational bounds of the poor, leaving a select group of members chiefly responsible for representing the experiences of the entire nation's poor people.

Therefore, the “recovery is here” ideology upon which the appropriations of only \$1,425,000,000 for unemployment relief is based is unrealistic. The dismissal of 700,000 workers from W. P. A. is based on the same artificial and wishful premise. The money-saving, cruel, chiseling devices employed by the local relief bureaus, such as in New York City, at the expense of its staff and clients, is in accord with this false policy. The New Deal relief program today is not much different from that of Herbert Hoover in 1930. Mr. Hoover attempted to solve the problem by waiting for lady prosperity to come from around the corner. The New Deal is trying it by proclaiming loudly and smilingly that she had kept her date and is now promenading with the president of the chamber of commerce along Main Street. Mr. Hoover then contended that very little should be expended for unemployment relief. The New Deal is rapidly approaching the same position.

–Representative Vito Marcantonio (R/AL-NY), June 20, 1936

We ask only that Uncle Sam will extend to us the same credit he so willingly did under the Federal Land Bank Act, where he undersigned for the bondholders who used his credit without pay; and as under the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933, where he undersigned for the farmers on miserable, poor, second farm mortgages, at this time practically worthless when it comes to collections. I speak with considerable knowledge and information along this line, because in my office at home [Hastings or Minden] it is my business to write mortgages for the Federal Land Bank and the Commissioner of Mortgages. I know that in the last summer only 1 out of 19 was granted a mortgage and I live in a good State, a fine agricultural State [Nebraska]. It has become a very miserable failure—this bright, shining light we looked forward to a few years ago that would relieve the farmers has become a desolate failure.

–Representative Charles G. Binderup (D-NE), March 5, 1935

Mr. President, let it be said that I prefer to speak for the poor people of the South... I come of the South's poor, and God being my helper, so long as I have the power, I will try to lighten the yoke upon their already galled necks. As long as I live[,] I will challenge the feudal tradition in the South and those who would preserve it to continue a kind of economic slavery.

–Senator Claude D. Pepper (D-FL), November 21, 1942

Mr. Chairman, this week the Department of Education of the State of California is requesting our State legislature to appropriate \$750,000 for the education of children of destitute citizens of other States. There are 30,000 of these children, and the financial burden they thrust upon the school districts and the State of California's fine educational system is appalling. This condition, Mr. Chairman, deplorable as it is, is merely a consequence of the shameful and inadequate treatment now provided in this Nation for the 1,000,000 destitute citizens who are “Stateless”, are forced by unbearable standards of living, poverty, health, and debt to cross State lines in an attempt to avoid starvation, and gain the bare necessities of life.

–Representative John H. Tolan (D-CA), January 19, 1939

Introduction

U.S. political history is often explained through the lens of regional struggle (Fowler 1863; Sydnor 1962; Chambers and Burnham 1967; Bense 1984; McKivigan and Harrold 1999), which although attenuated by developments in programmatic ideological parties (Poole, Rosenthal, and McCarty 2006; Sinclair 2006) and strong partisan identification in the masses (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002), remains an enduring element of contemporary political contestation (Schuknecht 2003). Since poverty is not equally dispersed across regions, urban and rural, northern and southern, one might expect poverty representation to also have a strong geospatial dynamic.

Indeed, because the poor are spread out across America, they face issues to attaining direct political power and receiving fulsome responsiveness from lawmakers (Jusko 2017; Miler 2018). A detailed account of the political geography present in poverty representation will help distinguish the degree to which members are representing their geographically bound constituencies, or alternatively, through individual initiative are pursuing their personal or ideological member goals, which may include advocating for populations outside of one's own district. This section explores the political topography of poverty representation, simultaneously accounting for the macro-regional story while exposing occurrences of intra-regional heterogeneity.

In addition to empirical assessments, the chapter also adopts an interpretive approach to discourse analysis that allows the full variation and color of poverty speeches to reach the reader, which means extensive engagement with the biography—details on the lives of members—and ethnography—cultures and values that inform meaning-making—of poverty-interested members through passages of primary source documents. These humanities-based approaches are presented in a narrative form. By providing the reader with first-hand accounts of poverty speeches, this


section takes an initial stab at content analysis and makes visible the hypothesis generation process, to be tested subsequently tested through statistical models in Chapter 5. Moreover, this chapter will document the inter- and intra-regional variation in poverty speech articulation, relative to population and Congressional seat shares, with special emphasis on the major poverty articulators in each region. Here we discover the poor are not equally served by their members across regions, and instead, poverty representation is a highly fractured process.

Political Geography of Poverty Representation

To better understand durable patterns in speeches on poverty across time and space, this chapter utilizes a series of geospatial functions in ArcGIS that cumulatively inputs overlapping layers of data and creates the union of all layers as the output. To accomplish this, I utilize the historical Congressional district maps of geographer Kenneth Martis (1982) that have been digitized by a team of political scientists at UCLA (Lewis et al. 2013). These shapefiles are then paired Congress by Congress with poverty speech data to create new coded rasters, followed by the execution of the union function to create a single map of poverty speeches from 1933 to 1946. These new districts, henceforth referred to as Reduced Legislative Districts (RLDs), provide a more granular look at concentrations of poverty representation, and additionally, help uncover whether the political culture of a geographic unit is durable across time or instead, relies more heavily on a single enterprising MC. The comprehensive national map that aggregates poverty speeches by RLD from 1933 to 1946 is presented in Figure 4.1.

Briefly, it is imperative to explain how this map operates. The baseline hue (the lightest colored area within a single state) indicates the level of poverty-related rhetoric their respective Senate delegation propounds in floor debates. The House has no bearing on this lightest shade unless that state has at-large elected representatives. This occurs when a state is small enough to

Figure 4.1 Poverty Speeches in Congress by Reduced Legislative District, 1933-1946



possess only a single House district, or when a state has multiple districts, but some are still selected through statewide elections. 15 states have at least one at-large representative in addition to their district based officials in this period.²⁰ From this baseline, variations in intra-state districts convey what House members are additionally contributing to the representation of the poor. Taken together, one may interpret the darkest areas to be the most prolific in rhetorically calling to the poor, while the lightest areas signify the lowest speech-based representation of the poor.

It is important to start with the descriptive statistics for the map. There are 15,168 RLDs, which was constructed using an intersection sensitivity of 1,000 square feet (this necessary threshold controls the size of the units, which in turn instructs how many RLDs are created; if set to zero, ArcGIS may freeze, process for hours, or entirely fail to complete the union process). The map visualization is in grayscale using one-unit interval gradations from white (low) to black (high). The highest poverty speech count in the map is 114 (Putnam County, NY, represented by Republican Representative Hamilton Fish for much of this period), while the lowest is 0 (the 1st Congressional district that covers all of eastern New Hampshire is the largest RLD failing to log a single qualifying speech even though it was represented by various people from both the Democratic and Republican parties). The mean is 49.92 speeches with a standard deviation of 31.48, while the median RLD has 44 poverty speeches. The geographically largest district holding the median value is the 1st District in western Montana.

Drilling into the substance, it is immediately apparent how the Louisiana, New York, and North Dakota delegations set the high mark for poverty articulation. Spurred by historically influential members like Huey Long (D-LA), Robert Wagner (D-NY), and William Langer (NPL/R-ND), this map conveys that just one or two lawmakers have the power to propel the

²⁰ Those states are Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.

interests of the poor onto the national stage. Given the heterogeneity of the populations in these states, their prominence in poverty articulation suggests the background of individual iconoclastic members—with unique upbringings and value systems—and their willingness to speak publicly may have more to do with poverty representation than purely an economic functionalist approach would hold.

What areas elect members that speak less about poverty?²¹ The interior states of Arkansas, Wyoming, (western) Kansas, and Iowa, as well as the more conservative Yankee Republicanism of Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine. On its face, this is leading evidence that poverty rhetoric does not fit a rich region versus poor region story, but that within each region there is great heterogeneity in propensity to give a poverty speech, where MCs representing wealthy districts in the suburbs of New York City may address poverty but a lawmaker from a poor district in the Ozarks of Arkansas may not.

As far as geospatial patterns in U.S. politics range, this map is distinctive in how it deviates from other well-known geopolitical patterns. Specifically, the political actors most interested in speaking about the poor are not necessarily clustered in certain regions, but are instead dispersed across urban, rural, North, South, Democratic, and Republican districts. Moreover, while the propensity to speak about poverty concentrates in far-flung spaces of the country—from Louisiana to North Dakota, California to New York—lawmakers have wide-ranging operationalizations of and prescriptions to the problem of poverty. Later we will address these differences in approach,

²¹ It is important to note the qualification of a poverty speech in this project is intentionally conservative, in that it creates a floor of poverty speeches that did in fact happen, instead of attempting to capture every instance of a poverty term showing up in Congress. By broadening out from requiring two search terms to only needing one, there would no doubt be many more qualifying speeches, but the tradeoff is that these speeches would likely be more peripheral or even unrelated to poverty itself. This project focused on developing a corpus of high salience, high intensity poverty speeches to understand what the most interested actors describe as they use poverty-related terms.

Table 4.1 Population and Seat Shares in Congress in Relation to Poverty Speeches, 1933-1946

	Share of US Pop., 1933 ^a	Share of Seats, 73 rd Congress	Share of US Pop., 1946	Share of Seats, 79 th Congress	Total Poverty Speeches ^b	Share of Poverty Speeches
North	28.1%	26.4%	26.9%	26%	668	19.7%
Midwest	31.2%	30.3%	30.0%	29.2%	1,091	32.2%
South	30.8%	31.1%	30.5%	31.5%	1,108	32.7%
West	9.8%	12.2%	12.6%	13.4%	524	15.5%

Data sources: Population figures from 1942 and 1946 editions of the *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*; share of Congressional seats computed by author.

Notes: ^a Rounding leads to a discrepancy in the sum of the values. See Table 4A.1 for exact values.

^b There are 3,403 poverty speeches in the total corpus, but only 3,391 are from members representing admitted states to the union. The other 12 come from the territorial delegations, which are included in later content analyses.

but for now, it is important to understand the reality of a unique interest coalition in oratorically interrogating poverty that is cross-regional, cross-class, cross-party, and cross-religion/ethnicity.

While the map shows considerable heterogeneity in poverty representation, in that it is both dispersed across space and yet defined by intra-regional variation, it is useful to disaggregate poverty speeches into regional terms. By comparing the poverty speech count by major region—North, Midwest, South, and West—to their respective population and Congressional seat totals, we may better assess the geopolitics of poverty. To help uncover these relations, Table 4.1 presents the percentage of the US population, Congressional seats, and overall share of poverty speeches by region. A different version of this table using counts instead of percentages is available in Appendix 4A.

Poverty speech counts in the Midwest and South mirror their population and seat shares, while the North is a laggard case and the West runs ahead of its population and seat shares. Importantly, poverty is not equal across regions, with the South being especially poor and leading in overall poverty articulation, while the North is the wealthiest region and underperforms relative

to its counterparts. Given the scant poverty statistics of the era, this serves as an instructive starting point to understand cross-regional variation and how poverty discourse operates.


Poverty Representation in the North

The traditional northern United States (often referred to as the Northeast but here simply referred to as the North) is historically much wealthier than the rest of the country. But importantly, as industrialization and steady immigration changed the region after the Civil War, poverty in the form of publicly visible vagrancy or the less visible working poor became serious problems requiring public action. Many of these localities and states adopted mothers' pensions and direct cash payments out of pity for the poor, but as the Great Depression wiped out considerable wealth and stability in the region, poverty finally became a systemic regional and national issue.

Poverty representation in the North is best described as a dichotomy between dedicated leadership to combat poverty by relatively few, but important, leaders, contrasted with a stark absence of poverty speeches from rank-and-file members across half of the region's states. As Table 4.1 shows, Northerners contributed 668 poverty-related speeches, but as a share of total continental poverty speeches (3,391) that is just 19.7%, lagging behind the nearly 28% of the US population that resides in the region. Disaggregating the region in Figure 4.2, we see two-thirds (418) of this count comes from MCs in just two states, New York and Massachusetts. In this way, the North is arguably the most polarized region between highly active MCs amidst general indifference to articulating a vision of the poor.

New York is the regional and national hotbed for projecting the issue of poverty through rhetoric, with 284 poverty speeches. Much of this is the product of the state's two unique senators. Arguably the most important lawmaker of this era is reform-minded Robert Wagner, the Tammany-aligned Democrat that operated with more independence than many machine politicians

Figure 4.2 Poverty Speeches in the North, 1933-1946



of the time. As the leading architect of New Deal-era federal labor and housing policies in the Senate, Wagner propounded several policies to empower workers and clear the slums to achieve “the development of safe and sanitary homes for persons of low income” (*CR 80* 1936, 9345).²²

New York was also served by the idiosyncratic Royal Copeland (D), who was arguably the foremost advocate for addressing the specific type of poverty that inhabited urban centers during the Great Depression. Unique in this period, Copeland articulated the plight of the urban poor in comparison to conditions of the rural communities and their poor. In one debate presaging the emotionally-charged urban-rural divide of later periods, Copeland prefaced, “I do not want anyone here to think that I speak as a city-born and bred person. I was born on a farm, brought up in a community of 800 people. I know conditions in the rural sections just as well as does any other Member of the Senate. Most of my relatives are farm people.” Copeland then transitioned to his main point:

I do not care how poor or underprivileged or distressed may be the people of the rural districts, there is no poverty equal to the misery imposed by unemployment upon those who live in tenement houses. There is a square mile in my city where live 500,000 citizens, men, women, and children—a half million in a square mile. Where can they get any food if there is unemployment and unrelief? Where are they to go for food? On a farm a few rutabagas or a few potatoes could be cooked or an old rooster could be parboiled, and then served up in some fashion; but in the cities there is nothing to eat but the sidewalks. (*CR 79* 1935, 3951)

While this statement could be lauded for its dedication (or pandering) to his constituents, it is a stark example of how lawmakers divide the poor into bins of more deserving and less deserving, in this case based on propinquity to food resources.

New York also had a strong measure of activity on the House side, specifically from metropolitan Representatives Emmanuel Celler (D), Vito Marcantonio (R/AL), and William

²² To maintain integral sourcing and yet maintain brevity, this project parenthetically cites the *Congressional Record* in the following format: italicized *Congressional Record* volume number (e.g., *CR 80*), followed by year of publication, then finally, page number.

Sirovich (D), and upstate Representatives Hamilton Fish (R), John Taber (R), James Mead (D), and Daniel Reed (R). Even with the abstentions of many members, New York was well-represented on the poverty rhetoric front because of the nature of the state's heterogeneous problems, the ideological commitments of its delegates, and due to having the largest Congressional delegation in the country.

In Massachusetts, Senator David Walsh (D) was known as an ardent defender of blue-collar workers, and arose to further prominence as someone who questioned whether New Deal policies—especially housing—were indeed helping the poorest among the population, or instead favored the middle class. During the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 debate, Walsh interrogated Wagner with repeated questions and offered amendments centered on how the definition of low-income in the bill may lead to local authorities ignoring the poorest of the poor. “I shall not vote for the bill,” Walsh states during a colloquy on August 2, 1937, “unless it is clear and unmistakable that the subsidy will be removed from any possibility of favoritism in its granting of subsidies. I insist its benefits reach the lowest-income group and that those of the lowest income get the tenements provided for in this measure” (*CR 81* 1937, 7987). In retrospect, Walsh is somewhat vindicated, as many New Deal policies were dispensed with some degree of local political machinations, and moreover, many poor failed to benefit from the new housing policies, which came to favor new home construction outside of the city center, where the old slums were located.

In some ways, Pennsylvania's pattern of poverty representation is a microcosm of the region, with poverty dispersed across urban and rural areas, only some of which received representation in Washington. Two Western Pennsylvania lawmakers were especially notable in their advocacy for the poor, Representatives Henry Ellenbogen (D) and Matthew Dunn (D).

Ellenbogen was a Hungarian immigrant who when speaking about poverty emphasized housing, care for the elderly, and hunger.²³ During the Social Security debates, Ellenbogen decried society's lackluster response to elderly poverty with poorhouses, "All the tragedy of life—the bitter trail of misery and empty existence—can be seen in the gnarled hands and pitifully rounded shoulders of a poor old woman. It can be seen in the faces of gray men standing in our unemployment and bread lines, only to be told, 'Too old.' We have been able to offer these aged of ours thus far only the supreme degradation—the poorhouse... we have given them the poorhouse, a place where there is no privacy, where the sick mingle with the well, where their everyday lives and smallest acts follow a regimented course" (*CR 78 1934*, 12611). Additionally, Ellenbogen was the chief House proponent of an expansive housing initiative that eventually merged into the US Housing Act of 1937, which is the subject of further examination in Chapter 9.

Dunn was raised in hardship and as the only blind member of Congress, projected the interests of the downtrodden, even going so far as to propose the aspirational "H.R. 2886—To provide \$100,000,000,000, which shall be expended to furnish employment and to end poverty in the United States" (*CR 79 Index 1935*, 758). As one of the most strident antipoverty articulators, the Representative set a powerful agenda with his rhetoric:

If the majority of Representatives in Congress and the representatives in the legislatures of other countries would be actuated by humanitarian motives instead of selfish ones, undoubtedly slum districts would be abolished; ignorance, superstition, and other social evils would banish from the earth. Poverty in the United States and other countries is unnecessary... The propaganda circulating through the Halls of Congress that if we do not cut down the appropriations and economize our country will be ruined is, in my opinion, a devilish, hellish lot of 'bunk.' I maintain that if we do not provide employment for our people we are apt to have a revolution. If a revolution is brought about, or if we become involved in a war, we will be compelled to spend billions of dollars. Why not spend the money for construction instead of destruction purposes? At least four to five billion dollars

²³ Interestingly, none of Ellenbogen's poverty speeches touch on immigrant poverty or the poverty that exists in countries around the world.

is needed right now to save the homes and furnish employment for the millions of jobless people. Treat our fellow men as we would like to be treated. Enact legislation which will promote the welfare of mankind. [Applause.] (*CR 81* 1937, 4541)

In a separate debate, Dunn and other members tried to increase the appropriation for poverty relief, offering this notion: “When 30,000,000 people are in need of food, shelter, and clothing and you refuse to vote for an appropriation which will provide those essentials, you are not doing your duty toward your fellow men.” Dunn continued, now calling out his colleagues, “Last fall when the campaign was on no candidate, whether Republican or Democrat, said to the people, ‘If I am elected to Congress, I shall vote for a measure which will reduce the appropriations and deprive you of work.’ Oh, no, every one of us did our derndest to impress upon the minds of our constituents that if they would send us to Congress we would provide adequate pensions for the aged and jobs for the jobless. Are we living up to the promises we made?” (*CR 81* 1937, 4934). Dunn was arguably a more effective rhetorician than shepherd of policies into enactment, as the logic of his appeals were very difficult to refute without appearing heartless, likely resonating in a symbolic fashion with the public poor as they followed Congressional deliberations on poverty during the Great Depression. However, no one member can prevail over a legislative body.

While Pennsylvania’s Senate delegation only contributed 19 of the 130 poverty speeches from the state, one senator stands out for his nativist views in relation to poverty. Senator James J. Davis (R)—the former Secretary of Labor for the three Republican presidents in the 1920s, an immigrant from “poor and illiterate” Welsh stock (Vought 2004, 171), and an avowed eugenicist (174) who blamed refugees’ persecution on their “unsocial” behavior (176)—rose to lay out his view of who should receive relief in a Senate speech on February 21, 1938:

I have been insisting that W. P. A. employment be extended first to American citizens in need thereof; then next to aliens who have heretofore declared their intention to become American citizens; and, finally, if funds permit, to other legally entered aliens who have not so far indicated their intention to become American citizens, with no such employment

to be extended to any alien who had illegally entered this country. Such provision became a part of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act last July 1 and has already resulted in the discontinuance of 72,000 aliens from W. P. A. rolls, thus making a place for that many needy American citizens for whose employment funds would not otherwise have been available. That provision must remain in the law as it is, unless possibly it can be made stronger. (*CR 83 1938, 2212*)

He continued speaking against an amendment to broaden eligibility for relief employment, exposing the depths of his apparently racially bigoted worldview: “In other words, the Lanham amendment would give preference to the illegally entered as compared with the legally entered, to the racially inadmissible as compared to the racially admissible, to the illiterate as compared with the literate. What an absurd situation that would be. Americans first, then legally entered aliens, if funds permit, is the policy I would have followed by the Federal Government and by all States and municipalities” (2122).

These passages uncover a very prescient aspect of poverty representation, which is whether lawmakers portray poverty solutions as zero-sum, where some win and others lose, or positive-sum, where everyone can benefit. One of the easiest and most durable means of dividing the poor is by articulating the zero-sum equation, perhaps most effectively at this time by contrasting the domestic poor with the foreign-born poor, stratifying them and attempting to turn the domestic poor against their foreign-born neighbors. Davis frames his accomplishment here as freeing up spaces for the domestic poor, but throwing 72,000 “aliens” off the rolls during the Depression appears callous—an alternative according to Dunn would be to fund more WPA projects in a positive-sum, aggregate demand framework. Here, the immigration regime was still heavily predicated on racist notions of the other, where certain Southern and Eastern Europeans (often Jews and Roma), Africans, and most Asians were seen as antithetical to the American cultural project.

Moving northward, while most old-money gentry states (except Massachusetts) registered low levels of poverty articulation, Vermont uniquely breaks this holding pattern once George Aiken (R) joins Congress in 1941. As a moderate-liberal Republican, the senator articulated a vision of poverty amelioration centered on supporting poor farmers and using subsidies or other funds to help feed the poor. While he supported retrenching Depression-era agricultural subsidies, Aiken proclaimed, “I cannot vote to deprive the very poor people of our country of even the small amounts they would receive from a general subsidy, without making every effort I can make to provide some means of insuring that they have the food they must have in order to maintain their health” (*CR 90* 1944, 1543). This rare form of poverty awareness in the Northeast—combined with previous poverty speech excerpts—is evidence that concern for poverty is less tied to the region’s political culture, and much more related to individual members’ level of compassion or interest in poverty matters.

Poverty Representation in the Midwest


As the former frontier territory and original Northwestern U.S., the Midwest also has a legacy of migration, internally from the Northeast and externally from Northern Europe, which informs the unique ideological commitments of MCs from this region. The domestic American migrants constituted one of the first waves of white flight in this nation’s history, in equal parts due to urban overcrowding, elevated housing costs, and changing cultures in the 19th century, which inspired a specific type of agrarian Yankee conservatism throughout the region. In contrast, the European migrants from Northern Europe were primarily fleeing the Revolutions of 1848—but interestingly, both the liberals (European non-royalist conservatives) and socialists settled in the same spaces of Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. The historical imprint of the Populist movement in the late 19th century also left a strong legacy on

these agrarian states that still had not completely worn down by the time of the Progressive Era and New Deal.

This blend of collectivists seeking utopia and individualists fleeing authoritarianism both buying into the American ideology of self-actualization partially explains the spatial differences presented in Figure 4.3. As we will see, there are four strong ideological, institutional, and economic legacies at play that help explain the antipoverty commitment of members from this region: populism, progressivism, urban machine politics, and various forms of conservatism.

Before digging deeper into the ideological legacies of the region, it is first important to summarize the geospatial pattern of poverty speech distribution. While the range between leading and lagging poverty projectors is narrower in this region than in the Northeast U.S., there is still substantial variation across space in articulating poverty speeches. There are 1,091 speeches from Midwestern MCs, which as a percentage of all poverty speeches slightly outpaces their seat and population shares (32.2% of speeches versus 31.2% of the population in 1933). No single state dominates the region on the scale of New York relative to its neighbors (since there are over 350 more speeches in this section), although North Dakota itself is the highest single RLD by volume, accounting for nine percent of speeches (98 of 1,091). By total speeches, Michigan has the most at 154—remarkably, 148 (or 96.1%) of these come from the House delegation, by far the most skewed chamber discrepancy of any part of the country. Notably, the diffuseness of district-based poverty speeches in the House translates into the appearance that Michigan is a poverty laggard in the region, when in fact it is not. While there are intraregional differences between high volume states in the north and low volume states in the south, overall, intra-state variation based on individual House member variation characterizes much of this map.

Figure 4.3 Poverty Speeches in the Midwest, 1933-1946



Populism was a prominent ideology in the Midwest in the late 19th century, centering on skepticism of elite power, greater mass enfranchisement, greater rights and policy supports for workers *and* farmers, and bimetallism in monetary policy to increase the money supply and thereby effectively decrease the debt burden in the public. After the broader ideology dissipated following the national election 1896 (Schattschneider 1960, 76), a particular populist strain continued in the Northern European descendants in the Upper Midwest plains of Nebraska, the Dakotas, and Minnesota (Rossinow 2008, 125). Indeed, a diverse set of radical populist reformers captured several main and third-party state organizations in this period, governing states and sending insurgent candidates to D.C. to reshape Congress (Valelly 1989). Here, collectivism was not antithetical to the dominant American ideology at the time, but simply a way to moderately tame some of the wild excesses of industrial capitalism. Populism was a pragmatic approach to continuing the American free market system.

In Minnesota, the two most notable members hailed from the economically liberal, populist Farmer-Labor Party (FLP): Earnest Lundeen with 53 speeches (second highest MC count) and Henrik Shipstead with 11. Both were prominent antiwar forces and opponents of US involvement in multinational organizations. However, on domestic policy the two senators differed: Shipstead was a typical agriculture-based moderate populist (Gieske 1979, 73) who eventually left the party to join the Republicans, while Lundeen was the author of the eponymous universalistic alternative to the Doughton-Wagner Act. The Lundeen Bill was more inclusive than the administration-backed SSA legislation by including coverage for domestic and agricultural workers. While Lundeen agitated from the left, Shipstead's use of poverty rhetoric centered on farmers and utilized a line of argument popular among anti-New Deal forces, namely that government-led social welfare policies make "the poor support the poor" (*CR 79 1935, 3357*),

presaging his switch to the Republican Party. The diversity of thought within the FLP showcases a reason for its potential success: its approach to politics was programmatic, but also emulated the big tent politics of the party duopoly.

Lundeen is a particularly important rhetorician and policymaker in the New Deal period, as arguably proffered the most forceful and effective critique of New Deal social and economic policy of any member of Congress. Lundeen believed the crisis of the Depression exacerbated existing inequalities, and that it was not enough to roll back the Depression, but necessary to reorient governmental commitments to the least served communities:

Depressions strike hardest at the poorest regions. The States which were spending the least for schools in 1930... are the States which have suffered the largest proportionate reductions in school costs... The effect of the depression has been to perpetuate and emphasize the differences in educational opportunities which already existed within and among the several States—to weaken the best features of the better school systems and virtually destroy those of the districts least able to support education. (*CR 79 1935, 7725*)

Where the New Deal frequently divided citizens into preferred and deprived classes, Lundeen provided a constant rhetorical critique of such practices, while also constructing universalistic policies of his own. “I want Members of this House to know that the Lundeen bill, H. R. 2827, is designed to help all workers, men who toil in the shops and factories and transportation lines of our country; who walk behind the plow; domestic workers, professional and office workers, and all men and women who are unemployed through no fault of their own; and it is designed to begin payment now, not later on, but now” (*CR 79 1935, 5963*). The case study of the Social Security Act in Chapter 8 uncovers why the act eventually took a divisive turn by using poverty rhetoric to uniquely showcase how few New Deal liberals supported Lundeen’s universalistic approach.

North Dakota’s concentration of 98 poverty speeches is the product of the collective efforts of three members: Senator Bill Langer (45, fifth highest for the entire period), and two at-large Representatives, Usher Burdick (31) and William Lemke (15). Each of them held membership in

the Non-Partisan League (NPL), which traditionally caucused with Republicans in Congress. The NPL was an odd mixture of socialists and fiscal conservatives, such that the 1932 platform exclusively focused on the reduction of taxes and decreasing the size of government (UND Bureau of Governmental Affairs 1979, 159), but by 1936, the party platform called for lower taxes *and* funding for schools regardless of local economic conditions, increases to the minimum wage for women, passage of the John S. McGroarty (D-CA) Townsend-style pension bill, and to “establish a state-owned industry for the manufacture of industrial alcohol to take the place of gasoline” (170-171).

Langer—a former governor of North Dakota removed because of a felony conviction while in office—came to Congress with a clear sense that not everyone benefits equally from state action. Over the course of his speeches, the member prodigiously identifies many of the groups that face poverty, including veterans, Blacks, Jews, Native Americans, farmers, men, women, parents, foreigners, the elderly, workers, and children. This form of populism centered on economics, but notably, did not insert a conservative social agenda, even if such an agenda would appeal to many of his constituents.

Usher Burdick was a prominent populist politician who focused on matters of particular importance to North Dakota, including agricultural development and Native American representation. Moreover, Burdick’s connection with poverty was as someone who first-hand witnessed it, both in North Dakota and in Washington DC, informing his behavior as a spokesperson for the neglected. “Whenever a measure of great importance comes before the people of this Congress those who wish to represent the people do not have a chance to speak at all unless they sneak in under the ropes and get that chance,” Burdick exclaimed to applause from the mezzanine, continuing “I live among the poor people at home and I live among the poor people

down here, and I know there are more out of employment today than there were 3 years ago. You have not settled this question at all. We are not asking for relief, we are asking for a chance to let our people work” (*CR 81* 1937, 4928). This surrogate approach to representing the poor blends the boundaries between virtual and descriptive representation, where directly witnessing the experiences of others informs political behavior.

Lemke was a prominent supporter (then critic) of the New Deal, supporting its general thrust but disagreeing with the limitations of the program and its perceived fiscal conservatism, to the point that once Huey Long died, Lemke ran in his stead as part of a third party Union Party movement with Father Coughlin, Francis Townsend, and Long’s Share the Wealth political organization. While the effort to unseat Roosevelt was unsuccessful, Lemke remained a strong critic of the program, using whatever reasoning was available to castigate the ruling cartel.

No one embodies the transition from populism to progressivism more aptly than Senator George Norris of Nebraska, a Republican turned Independent during the New Deal because of his weariness of moneyed interests, the “power trust,” and commitment to state action to help the common person (Lowitt 1974, 549). As a politician from the hotbed of populism in Nebraska—home to former populist standard bearer William Jennings Bryan (D)—Norris not only maintained populism as an ideology after its collapse in 1896, but merged it with the enlightened governance of the Progressive Era to forge a distinctly non-partisan identity (100, 289). Norris viewed poverty as a systemic byproduct of capitalism, and at this time, was a leading voice in the Senate to allow localities, states, and even the territory of Puerto Rico to buy and operate energy utilities in the public’s interest, proclaiming, “The people are tired of paying exorbitant prices to the Power Trust for electricity” (*CR 88* 1942, 9151). Speaking about cuts to the embattled Resettlement Administration (RA), Norris pled:

We cannot or should not compare dollars with human lives. We cannot or should not measure the suffering in our country on the basis of the dollars and cents that might be saved if we cut this man's salary or that man's salary or withheld 5 cents from the support of this needy family, or if we made a mistake and gave someone relief who, perhaps, ought not to have had it. It may be, from the tenderness of their hearts, listening to the pleas for mercy of the suffering and anguished that the Resettlement representatives overstep their duty. I do not know that this is so, but it is only natural that it should be so. But should we then complain that we are spending too much for overhead? It would not be possible to go out into the country and make selections among the needy cases without expending some overhead. That is what the Resettlement Administration mainly is doing throughout the great suffering portions of our country. They are doing a fine job. I should not want to curtail their activities in the slightest. (*CR 81* 1937, 682)

Norris had a hand in many New Deal programs, especially those involving utilities (e.g., the Rural Electrification Act), and by the time he left office in 1942 was considered one of the last “public interest” progressive Republicans (Budig and Walton 2013).

The progressive values of Norris were seemingly less widely adhered to in Nebraska, but instead were more emblematic of the political culture in Wisconsin, where the La Follette family dynasty characterized the state's politics for generations. These members of the Progressive Party continued the legacy of focusing on poverty as an interconnected social problem—a sign of sociopolitical failure, if not a humanitarian imperative. Moreover, they believed that a nominal redistribution of wealth was appropriate in a wealthy nation, primarily through the use of income taxes to provide modest social benefits. Wisconsin tallied 130 poverty speeches, 89 of which come from the House. The party leader of this era was Robert Marion La Follette Jr., who followed in his father's footsteps to hold down the left flank of the Republican caucus in Congress. As a Senator, he led the state delegation with 29 speeches and was reliable force in committee and on the floor to pursue social welfare legislation in a good government mold. Nominal Republican that still espoused progressive ideas, Reid F. Murray (R) led the House delegation with Wisconsin 16 poverty speeches. The efforts of these progressive lawmakers provided both assistance and loyal opposition to the New Deal legislative agenda, ever vigilant to deliver essential goods to the public.

While it was one of their principal goals, the progressive movement did not permanently end machine-style local governance—in fact, a new era of nationally-empowered urban machines gained prominence during the New Deal. These informal political institutions were geospatially dispersed across the Midwest and East Coast. Especially powerful were the multi-ethnic Midwestern Democratic machines in Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Detroit, as well as their older brethren on the Atlantic in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, New York, Providence, and Boston. However, MCs from these organizations did not necessarily engage in poverty arguments, and members from these cities that did were often considered machine outsiders. In Missouri (69), Ohio (146), Michigan (154), and Minnesota (127), hot spots of poverty speeches were more likely to form outside of urban centers, while Illinois (112), Indiana (100), and Wisconsin (130) had clear concentrations around their respective urban centers. While not conclusive, this is suggestive evidence that poverty representation in this era was detached from urban-rural geospatial disparities. As such, during the New Deal urban politicians were not consistently advocates for the poor, even as the same period begins the process of locally conservative urban machines devising a coherent national form of left-liberalism on economic and social issues (Ogorzalek 2018). Urbanity alone was insufficient for poverty articulation, mediated by machine culture and individual initiative.

To the extent that there were poverty arguments by representatives from urban centers, their representation was heavily influenced by city life. Thomas O'Malley (D) of Milwaukee depicts the tension of having taxpayers of one region supporting the interests of another:

“I submit, Mr. Chairman, it is unfair for us to pass legislation which compels the poor of the cities to help the poor of the farms—the blind to lead the blind. It is absolutely unfair to dip into the almost empty pockets of the people of the city for a processing tax to help the farmer to get prices sufficiently high to pay the unequal tribute to the bankers that now makes farming unprofitable. Through the processing taxes the consumer is taxed to pay the farmer a bonus to enable the farmer to raise less to charge the consumer more! If this is not

the most illogical, asinine, and cockeyed plan that could be conceived, I am unable to reason. I wonder how many of the farmers who have received processing-tax checks have actually been able to buy more than the necessities of life? I have not yet seen a statement from the Department of Agriculture as to how many farmers have been able to reduce the debts upon their farms by reason of these processing taxes. (*CR 79 1935, 9555*)

This discourse would certainly look representational by favoring one's own constituency over others, which is emblematic of the approach of other urban lawmakers of the era.

In Chicago, Adolph Sabath rose to prominence as a loyal New Dealer and became one of the longest serving MCs in Congressional history. While not an essential member of the Chicago machine, Sabath represented much of what commonly characterizes machine politicians: immigrant born, working class, and dedicated to the development policies that maximize private and public employment. Moreover, Sabath frequently identified as a champion of the poor because, “[l]ike many of them, I came from a land that had suffered much [the Czech part of the Austrian Empire], to find in the United States a country offering liberty, freedom of thought, and opportunity. All my life I have lived among the poorest of people. Because I know what it is to want, and what it means to suffer, I can never forget these people... I was ever mindful of their needs, their hardships, and their problems” (*CR 80 1936, 4944*). In this way, the lived experience of suffering informs Sabath's form of descriptive and surrogate representation of the poor. Consistent with O'Malley's passage, on price protections for farmers during the New Deal, Sabath argued urban consumers had it worse than farmers:

In view of all these facts, I hope these gentlemen from the dairy sections, like the gentleman from Wisconsin [Keefe] will not in the future cry and plead and urge subsidies and subsidies for the 'poor' dairy farmers. I maintain that farmers generally are more prosperous today under Democratic administration than they have ever been. God bless them. I am glad of it; but why should they insist upon such a high price for milk and cream and cheese that we poor people in the cities are obliged to use? I cannot understand it. (*CR 90 1944, 4800*)

With his high-status position on the House Rules Committee, Sabath provided strong descriptive representation for the poor in the people's chamber of Congress until his death in 1952.

The fourth important ideological lineage to trace in the Midwest is conservatism, and how members from the standard to extreme subsets conceptualize of the poor. Cross-spectrum representation occurs because Rust Belt and Great Plains representatives of both parties are cognizant of how industrial workers and the rural poor face extreme conditions that require awareness by lawmakers, if not full-scale national action. These conservative members tend to focus on the needs of working poor families, and generally shift the problem from a lack of governmental support to government itself creating unequal conditions. Three members encapsulate how conservatives at the time reckoned with poverty: standard conservative Thomas A. Jenkins (R-OH), ultra-conservative Frederick C. Smith (R-OH), and fascist-aligned Clare Hoffman (R-MI).

Jenkins represented downstate, southeast Ohio, and often focused on the insufficiencies of the New Deal at solving poverty and identifying who was still in need of assistance. Indeed, the member believed the ideals of the New Deal did not materialize to solve poverty, as the "President has gone on a visionary excursion into the warm fields of altruism. He forgets the cold winds of poverty and penury that are sweeping over the 'one-third' of our people who are ill-clothed, ill-housed, and ill-fed" (*CR 83 1938, 4227*). As a critic of FDR, Jenkins often constructed the poor as those that have been left out of the president's program, which to the member included veterans, the blind, those in need of infrastructure to combat social isolation, foreigners, immigrants, flood victims, taxpayers, and consumers.

In one case, Jenkins played a prominent agenda-setting part in making some New Deal legislation more inclusive, specifically with respect to assistance to the needy blind. "Without

boasting, I think I can claim credit for having been responsible for the inclusion of this title in this law,” Jenkins says about Title X giving aid to the blind, continuing “I am making mention of this because I am proud to have had a part in bringing relief to the most pitiable group among all of our unfortunates. The poet speaks of ‘chill penury.’ Poverty is cold. Probably nothing freezes up the soul and body quite as completely as does poverty. If one class of poverty is colder than another, the poverty of the man who is both poor and blind is the coldest.” Jenkins’ words on poverty often read lyrically, conjuring up the utter despair that was common during the Great Depression, finishing the speech: “There is no person in the whole American economic life so pitiable as the poor blind man or woman who holds out a rusty tin cup in an emaciated hand on a street corner on a cold, snowy day” (*CR 80* 1936, 8932). In this way, Jenkin’s form of conservatism lent itself to both criticism of the dominant liberal order, and as a constructive voice to point out inadequacies in what government pursued, if indeed poverty amelioration was a goal at the time.

Ultra-conservative Smith of Marion represented the 8th District in central Ohio. A physician by training, Smith’s views on poverty revolved around local control and attacking the earnestness of the New Deal. Concerning the management of the WPA, Smith believed devolution was in order, even if it did not solve the perceived corruption issue: “[p]olitics will still play a part in the operation of relief, even if it is turned back to the States, but it will not be as bad as it is now under Federal control. With the States in control more of the funds will go to the needy and less to the politicians,” contended Smith, citing no evidence, continuing, “I cannot vote to continue the exorbitant overhead costs, the wasteful practices, and the political exploitation of the poor that attend Federal operation of this agency [WPA]. The need for economy and conservation of our resources and integrity in Government is too great to permit me to do this” (*CR 88* 1942, 5170). It is worth noting devolving federal government programs is a constant refrain from conservatives

in Congress, but linking it with increased antipoverty outcomes has always been a tenuous claim, at best, since many states will actually insert *more* bias (often along racial or gender lines) than the federal government, while still using the same federally-raised tax dollars.

Later during the Fair Deal era, Smith argued with hyperbole, “[T]he Truman administration is determined to put an end to free enterprise, competition, and liberty and complete the establishment of a totalitarian regime like that of Hitler and Stalin” (*CR 92 1946 208*). A clearly alarmed Smith added he intended “to show that New Dealism, instead of being the great friend of the poor and the lower-income groups it so loudly proclaims to be, is indeed their worst conceivable enemy” (208). The notable distinction between typical conservatism and Smith’s brand is the lack of a constructive angle in modifying policy to be more effective—here, Smith simply wants to dismantle federal hierarchy, which has the effect of fragmenting policies to maintain subnational inequality, all while using a poverty critique to show New Dealers were not true to their word.

Clare Hoffman represented the southwestern corner of Michigan and was known for his fascist and antisemitic sympathies (Walker 1982, 153). Hoffman registered a high volume of 34 poverty speeches, often using them as a vessel to blame the federal government and labor unions for disrupting the market and creating poverty. In one instance, Hoffman took aim at liberal-propounded labor and farm policies, which relied on “fraud and deception cover... granting to departments of the Government of arbitrary power which will destroy the opportunity and the freedom of the citizen, tend to create monopoly and tend, if I may use that emotion-stirring phrase of those who style themselves progressives, ‘to make the rich richer and the poor poorer’” (*CR 82 1937, 1496*). As it turns out, the first two charges were true to some extent, as the political use of

relief grew into a national problem culminating in the Hatch Act, while the monopolization of industry still endures in present day politics (Hawley 1966).

During the leadup to WWII, he paired anti-war isolationist sentiment with accusations of Southern dependency on government:

Let the South criticize the North. But for the last 8 years, like poor relatives, the South has been living on the tax money of the North and now you want to drag us into war and let us provide the money to fight it. The gentleman from Virginia [Bland] spoke about honesty and justice. Talk about honesty! Where is the man on the Democratic side who did not promise, if elected, he would vote to keep us out of war? What about the promise of the President, your promise and mine to keep our country out of war? I am speaking now only for myself, but how can you expect a poor, dumb, ignorant Congressman like myself to know what to do. [Applause.] (*CR 87* 1941, 3674)

Hoffman's metaphysical belief in the justice of the private market and injustice of governmental action stewarded the member much more heavily to critique than policy creation.

All three conservatives use the continued plight of the poor as evidence that the big-government New Deal programs were failing to achieve their purposes and needed reorientation (Jenkins) or retrenchment (Smith and Hoffman). This is a fairly durable dynamic in American poverty politics, which is that the onus is on the reformers to fully succeed in their reform missions—anything short of total success is evidence that the status quo or past practices were actually correct. All the while, the members cast themselves as the protectors of the poor without having to offer their own antipoverty initiatives (Jenkins excluded).

Many ideological paradigms—populism, progressivism, urban liberalism, and conservatism—lead members to speak about poverty, although the rhetoric and policy solutions are invariably different. The Midwest serves as a microcosm for the national heterogeneity in thought around poverty matters, which as a social ill affords lawmakers of differing views a sincere opportunity to appeal to the downtrodden and forgotten. More cynically, oration about the poor may also be an instrument in service of larger MC aspirations.


Poverty Representation in the South

One would expect the South—as the nation’s poorest region—to verbally project poverty in the greatest numbers, and with the most geographically dispersed support. Essentially, this is true, as the region is the most internally cohesive, delivering 1,108 floor speeches that come from nearly every state and district, as showcased in Figure 4.4. While the term “Solid South” is most associated with the national level conservative bloc that advocated for the maintenance of an ascriptive social order, it would also fit a geospatial assessment of poverty rhetoric in the region. However, while Southern poverty articulation is high in count and dispersed across area, several geospatial patterns disaggregate the simple notion of a monolithic South.

Spurred by Huey Long’s populism and resultant followers after his death, Louisiana greatly stands out for the number of speeches in the region. However, at only 11% of the total region’s poverty speeches (122 of 1,108), the homogeneity of Southern propensity to speak about poverty is quite remarkable, leaving one to question why certain regions only speak about poverty around the national mean. More confounding is the depths of conservatism in this region, calling into question what these lawmakers are substantively engaging when they bring up poverty: is it just descriptive based on experience representing of the poorest region of the country, are they advocating for liberal economic policies, or are they using poverty as a defense against encroaching social reform in the region? As it turns out, all three are occurring—sometimes in a single speech—with members of the region cycling through at least two of the three motivations.

Returning to Louisiana, Long alone accounts for 66 poverty speeches—most among any MC in the entire period (1933-1946). These speeches constituted just over half of his state’s total. All the more remarkable is Long only served in *two* Congresses during this period, the 73rd and 74th, meaning he averaged a whopping 33 poverty speeches per Congress, 18 speeches ahead of

Figure 4.4 Poverty Speeches in the South, 1933-1946



the next nearest poverty articulator (Langer's 15 per Congress). Long's oratory is among the most fabled in US political history, commonly known as a demagogue prone to grandstanding, norms-breaking attacks on his colleagues by name, and commonly using his Senatorial prerogatives to filibuster both powerful social welfare reforms and unrelated matters to gain attention and try to shift the agenda. While it is true Long was unconventional, accomplished more policies locally than nationally (cf. Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein 1994) and had grandiose ambitions to be president as soon as possible, his oratory on the plight of common people across the country charted a new course for the stodgy, elitist Senate, forcing poverty onto the agenda in speech after speech.

For example, in one case Long chastised his colleagues for aiming too low in constructing relief legislation. "The great trouble with the Senator from Kentucky [Alben Barkley (D)] and those like him is that they imagine they are liberal to the American people, who are entitled to live in decency and respectability," Long—a non-aligned socialist—pressed as Barkley sat a few feet away, continuing, "and they think they have done those people a great favor when they hand them a little six- or eight-dollar dole by which they can live and barely exist in poverty and in misery; and still the Senator from Kentucky thinks he has brought blessings to his soul... as long as he doles out a little money to allow a man to live on earth in misery, and below the line of any such thing as a respectable standard of poverty" (*CR 79 1935, 7591*). Indeed, in much of Long's poverty speeches, he is much more inclined to point out insufficiencies in the policies of the dominant New Deal legislative cartel than to overtly depict his own statutory alternatives, although there are exceptions to this pattern. This dynamic likely contributed to his reputation as a demagogue and not a serious legislative leader.

Cultivating a mercurial reputation, Long inserted levity into his diatribes about creating a maximum wealth level to combat poverty, seemingly to appeal to the mass audience while also mainstreaming heretofore unthinkable ideas to appear in Congressional debates. During one of his typical filibusters, Long tried to apply the lessons of King Solomon to how government should care for the poor, even at times referring to himself in third person:

Mr. President, that is all the Government needs, right along those lines. I would rather have that today than all the articles of the Constitution of the United States. What does he say? That poverty makes a thief of humanity; and it does. We have made thieves of many of our people by impoverishing them... They say it is radical, nondescript, demagoguery. Somebody is here reading out that we ought to limit the amount of fortunes and not have anybody too rich or anybody too poor, taking up the time of Congress from this important legislation. They even accuse me of filibustering and trying to keep important legislation from being passed. Can one imagine a thing of that kind? [Laughter.] (*CR* 78 1934, 8064)

The extremity of Long's language earned him a reputation as someone considerably to the ideological left of President Roosevelt, most of the Democratic Party, and certainly Dixiecrats. This extreme flank is commonly thought to have played a role in pushing FDR and New Deal Democrats further to the left, primarily to co-opt Long's support and lessen his chances of defeating Roosevelt in the 1936 presidential election. While Long's assassination in 1935 prevented that challenge, the senator's singularly high quantity of poverty rhetoric—regardless of his motivations and policy attainment—adds another wrinkle to his legacy as a prolific representative of the poor.

After Long's tenure in Congress, his successor, Senator Allen Ellender (D-LA), picked up the populist mantle and gave 24 poverty speeches, homing in on white and rural farm family needs. While no House member from Louisiana was prolific in their representation, nine different members have speeches on poverty during this period. Behind Louisiana is the second tier of poverty articulators in the South, which includes North Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas.

Each of these states has strong Senate delegations leading the charge, buttressed by a significant portion of their respective House delegations projecting the issue further.

In North Carolina, poverty articulation is dominated by three senior, conservative, agriculture-minded Democrats, collectively accounting for 66 of the 76 state poverty speeches: Senators Robert Reynolds (31) and Josiah Bailey (20), and Representative Robert Doughton (15).

Reynolds was a staunch isolationist, racist, and fascist sympathizer who admired Nazi Germany and Mussolini-led Italy, which is not an expected profile of someone speaking heavily about poverty in Congress. Indeed, Reynolds believed the poor in America were ignored because of an emphasis on the suffering of foreigners, claiming “we have given billions and billions of dollars to the protection of people upon foreign soil, why am I not privileged... to ask for a little attention to the poor Americans who have to pay for every bit of it? That is the way I feel about it. I do not feel called upon to apologize to anybody... All our interest has been focused over yonder, on the poor people of England and France and Czechoslovakia and Rumania,” because of World War II, continuing, “and every other alien upon the face of the earth away over in Asia; and I am trying for once, just for this brief period during the afternoon of April 1, to return our attention to our people at home” (*CR 87 1941, 2773*). This is a prime example of how the poor are frequently leveraged as a justification to *not* act, instead of calling to poverty in service of an action to solve a deep public problem.

Similarly, Bailey’s overriding concerns with poverty avoid policy remediation, instead focusing on how antipoverty proponents will drag the rich down to poverty status before they solve poverty, and that further, the state is often the cause of poverty through consumption taxes. In one speech, Bailey quotes hypothetical do-gooders to portray a slippery slope: ““We do not like so many men in this country to be rich when so many are very poor. Let us use the taxing power.’”

We shall not be raising revenue. We shall be equalizing income and proposing a glorious equality in America... [leading to] a country that once was rich and happy [but is now] in deep distress and overwhelmed by poverty” (*CR 87 1941, 7303*). Again, the poor are used for negation purposes, not to propel affirmative policy forward.

Meanwhile, Doughton was the powerful Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee during the entire period under study, and his most important act in Congress was managing the Social Security Act to passage. Many of the poor he portrayed were those included in the act, specifically centering on the elderly and the stigma of poverty.

Down south in Florida, two members supply 81.6% (49/60) of the state’s poverty speeches. The most prolific member is Democrat Claude Pepper, who accounts for 39 (87%) of the 45 speeches made by the Senate delegation. Pepper is arguably the most strident New Dealer of the entire Southern United States, staking a position as an unabashed modern liberal on economics *and* social matters. Indeed, Pepper’s poverty speeches capture this template, as he casts a wide net in support of every American, regardless of race or vocation, escaping poverty with the help of the federal government. Moreover, the Senator connected his reform-minded agenda to his own experiences growing up with poverty. In one speech arguing in favor of a bill to abolish the poll tax, Pepper encapsulates his views thusly:

Mr. President, let it be said that I prefer to speak for the poor people of the South. Let it be said that I believe so much in the principle of democracy that I would not deny it to those who are downtrodden, underprivileged, or mentally and physically handicapped in the fierce struggle of modern life. Mr. President, I come of the South’s poor, and, God being my helper, so long as I have the power, I will try to lighten the yoke upon their already galled necks. As long as I live I will challenge the feudal tradition in the South and those who would preserve it to continue a kind of economic slavery. Why am I a liberal? Because the liberal tradition was born in the South. It is the fruitage of the incomparable [sic] intellect and magnificent spirit of Thomas Jefferson. It has always had its most beloved lodgment in the romantic climes of the South. (*CR 88 1942, 9049*)

Undoubtedly, this more expansive view of poverty to include long oppressed groups has to do with the rise of Black and poor white political participation during and after the war years, forming a new base of political support for reform-minded Southern MCs (Badger 1996, 75). But importantly, this oratory puts a focus on how personal interactions with poverty may unlock the minds of poverty-interested lawmakers to be more inclusive, based on the understanding that poverty's touch does not discriminate based on descriptive features or geography.

On the House side, Lex Green (D) represented the Tallahassee-based 2nd District and added 10 (66%) of the 15 House speeches from Florida. As a former educator, Green often focused on how policies affect poor children, among others: "It is true that social-security legislation now in existence has carried helpful benefits to some of the aged, the blind, needy, children, and the weak. Only a small percentage of those entitled to and in need of these benefits have been able to receive them," Green claimed in pointing out the insufficiencies of legislation he supported, while hoping to increase benefits. "This lack of assistance is caused both by the inadequacy of the legislation itself and by the various States not sufficiently matching funds" (*CR 86* 1940, 2025). While Green earnestly supported much of the New Deal, he remained a staunch social conservative, like most Southern Democrats of the time, showing poverty articulation was ingrained in and limited by prevailing norms, lessening the likelihood of systemic eradication of poverty in a perennially divided America.

Moving west, Mississippi has 97 total speeches dispersed across most serving members. However, the key story here is how the Senate delegation uses poverty rhetoric for instrumental gain. Two members stand out: James Eastland (D) with his 13 poverty speeches, and Theodore Bilbo (D) with 29. These two members arguably provide the best encapsulation of the dominant tendency in Southern poverty rhetoric, which is founded first in admitting the extreme incidence

of poverty in the region, then demanding greater state supports, and finally, using poverty as a convenient excuse to not restructure their local economies under federal stewardship.

Eastland's agenda in poverty speeches was primarily to point out his perception that the federal government had long neglected the poverty of Southern farmers, victimizing them repeatedly, and further, to encourage aggregate demand by selling farm commodities to domestic, foreign, and government purchasers. "The South has been described as economic problem No. 1—ill-housed, ill-fed, ill-clothed. It is admittedly bankrupt... Millions of farmers—the poorest of the poor, whose low standard of living is caused solely by the punitive discrimination against the South which has existed since the Civil War," Eastland states as he argues against a trade deal with Brazil, "and which low standard of living is a disgrace to and a reflection upon rich and powerful America—depend largely upon their gin rebate or the money from their cottonseed for a living during the fall season of the year" (*CR 87 1941, 6983*). Even though the Civil War concluded over 75 years before this speech, the member finds salient the reasoning that poor Southern cotton farmers are a consequence of concerted punitive policy toward South, usually because of tariffs and foreign goods importation. Here, the lawmaker uses all three calling cards of Southern poverty representation at the time: describes the pattern of poverty of the South, argues for liberal state-subsidization of agriculture, *and* uses poverty to argue against adjacent policy implementation.

In a similar vein, Senator Bilbo felt the federal government was primarily a tool for non-Southerners to coerce and undermine the South. While Eastland was a staunch segregationist in his time in Congress, no one in the history of Congress is better known for espousing white supremacist views than Bilbo. This overt racism infiltrated the Senator's understanding of poverty as well, and thus proved to be a centerpiece in his poverty rhetoric. To the Senator, poverty was a discursive bulwark against federal encroachment on social issues. And instead of understanding

that the ascriptive and class hierarchy of Southern feudalism is to blame for poor Blacks and Caucasians in the South, the lawmaker blamed poverty solely on the character of African-Americans.

A single day—May 24, 1938—as captured in the *Congressional Record*, vividly exposes Bilbo’s understanding of poverty and contemporary responses thereto. “It is imperative for the future of mankind that the superior races should always be maintained at the highest level of efficiency because the work they do for civilization determines the progress of humanity. There is an old proverb which says, ‘God created the whites. I know not who created the blacks. Surely a devil created the mongrels.’ The impoverishment,” Bilbo contended, “by interbreeding of diverse races, of civilized racial values may be spread over centuries... The individual takes into account only the small span of his own life, and, therefore, cannot appreciate the slow disintegration of the hereditary materials from which civilizations are developed.” Poverty, according to the senator, is the product of superior races degrading their genetic lot by being too socially libertine. “Invariably throughout historic time the self-destruction of the best blood of the Nation is the common factor which determines that it is bound to die. This factor accounts for the failure of every fallen civilization since the beginning of recorded time. A civilization destroyed by the impoverishment and impairment of its hereditary values can never be restored to its former life. It is dead eternally” (*CR 83 1938, 7363-7364*). This view that poverty (in general) is a product of genetic comingling belies the high incidences of destitution among whites, including the most racist and guarded of their essence in Mississippi at this time.

The senator went on to decry society allowing its elites to marry across races, arguing, “[h]eretofore it has been contended that intercourse between the Negroes and the whites, and intermarriage of the two races, was confined to the lower classes of both races, and sometimes

between the better educated groups of the Negroes and the underprivileged strata of the whites. It was never thought that any attempt to break down the barriers of tradition, or override the canons of convention would be attempted by any member of the higher classes of society” (7369), which does indicate he was aware of poor whites that did not intermarry, and yet, he seemed unaware of why they were poor.

Indeed, it seemed natural for the lawmaker to believe the New Deal itself was a conspiratorial racial project to help minorities, not to solve systemic social problems, even though in posterity it has repeatedly been shown to favor whites over other groups. “By some people, farm tenancy, social justice, slum clearance, social security, and ‘forgotten man’ are thought of only in terms of the Negro. ‘Lo the poor Indian,’ was long ago discarded and gave place to ‘Lo the poor Negro.’ The result of all this is that he has been influenced and directed by white men and white women whose judgments have been warped by emotions of sympathy and pity” (7370), which consequently creates a fall sense of value among Southern Blacks, the member worries. This example importantly highlights the priors that MCs bring to Congressional debates when they describe the poor—biases in perspective may attenuate the degree to which members adequately understand and construct policies that actually solves the issue.

In contrast to the relation between racism and poverty representation in Mississippi, Texas’ members often pursued conditions-based portrayals of the poor. With 165 poverty speeches, Texas is a high-volume poverty speech state, and while the Senate delegations accounted for 40 of those speeches (including 23 from Tom Connally and 14 from Pappy O’Daniel, the main story in Texas is the 125 speeches from House members, including Wright Patman (31), Thomas L. Blanton (20, including 18 in the 74th Congress), Maury Maverick (11), and William McFarlane (9).²⁴ All four

²⁴ Every MC from Texas between 1933 and 1946 was a Democrat.

of these members were decidedly partisan in their poverty rhetoric, questioning why Republicans allowed the Great Depression to get so bad, hurt so many poor people, and then purportedly only care about poverty once they lost power to the Democrats.

In particular, Patman represented northeast Texas and gained prominence for his consumer protection and banking legislation. On the poverty front, the member traced the Great Depression to the monetary policies of the 1920s, which led to an overextension of bonds which were “distributed all over the Nation into the hands of poor people who could not pay the remainder of their installments to the banks? Deflation of credit and money caused the bonds to go down in value, their loans at the banks were called, and these poor people were forced to lose as much as \$20 on each hundred-dollar bond,” (*CR 78 1934*, 8889). His rhetoric directly informed his remedies to poverty, which generally focused on boosting aggregate demand, protecting consumers from price gouging, and ensuring the state had a central role in maintaining market stability.

Blanton of Abilene, TX was also fiercely partisan, which colored his poverty speeches, but more interestingly were the member’s admissions that politics was expensive and essentially foreclosed the possibility of poor people representing poor people in Congress. On April 3, 1935, Blanton took the floor to speak about the financial burden maintaining his seat in Congress placed on his family, stating, “I want to say, my colleagues, that since I have been in public office I have given the best that is in me and have been getting poorer and poorer every year. I am \$30,000 poorer now than I was when I entered public life. Above a bare living for my family it is the honest truth that since I have been in public life I have spent every bit of my income in trying to bring about better conditions” (*CR 79 1935*, 4937). Later, on March 6, 1936—his final year in Congress—Blanton bemoaned, “I have to sell a piece of property every 2 years to get to stay here.

[Laughter.] I am getting poorer and poorer all the time” (*CR 80* 1936, 3396). Although the statement was met with affable laughter in the chamber, there is little reason to doubt the seriousness of Blanton’s lamentations, although it is important to point out the ability to sell property to stay in Congress suggests he was far afield from destitution.

Maverick, an upstart partisan liberal from San Antonio, eponymous leader of “Maury’s Mavericks”, and mentor to future president Lyndon B. Johnson, painted an insurgent view of poverty, as one that affects many oppressed groups, including racial minorities and foreigners, and was principally caused by a dangerous, elite aristocracy in America. “[T]hese clumsy Tories... come into Washington and, with blatancy, bad manners, and a disregard for all the social amenities, burst in among us. If we... let them get away with it, the people are going to go to Huey Long, and this same outfit will probably finance him to help break up the Democratic Party and thus... get back a Republican reactionary,” Maverick laments, underscoring the antipathy towards Republicans and skepticism to Long common in the Democratic Party in the 1930s. Maverick continues to attack the entrenched elite interests, “[t]hese people have an absolute contempt for working people. They say they do not believe in Government regulation, but want Government regulation for their own benefit or special interests; they praise southern aristocracy... The same class of people are always talking about ‘poor white trash.’ This is a cruel type of language, but I must say this—that whenever a man claims to be a southern aristocrat, you can count on it that he is ‘poor white trash.’ And, as far as that is concerned, we ought not to have any ‘poor white trash.’ Everybody ought to have a chance to make a decent living, and that is what the Democratic Party should stand for” (*CR 79* 1935, 6962).

Finally, McFarlane of north-central Texas diagnoses the prevailing ruling order as one that uses poverty as a guise to funnel benefits to special interests, while making the poor foot the bill.

“It is my prediction that the new tax bill is the first step toward a general sales tax... In other words, the new tax law has provided the first step in the drive to shift from the wealthy to the poor a greater share of the tax burden,” (*CR 83 1938, 8007*) McFarlane contended in assessing the effects of Revenue Act of 1936. Later in the speech, the member sarcastically portrays how recent changes in tax law removed taxes on expensive luxury goods, without relieving the burden of taxes on the poor.²⁵ Throughout the 1930s, the member highlights the disparity between decreasing purchasing power of the poor and the gains of well-connected corporate interests.

In Kentucky, the Congressional delegation is unremarkable in its propensity to speak about poverty, except for one major outlier: Republican John M. Robsion of the 9th district in the southeastern corner of the state. His 47 poverty speeches is the fourth highest total among MCs. Moreover, the member accounts for an extraordinary 63.5% (47 of 74) of the poverty speeches in Kentucky—the highest individual proportion of any state—which suggests Robsion did not come from a broad poverty-attentive political culture, but instead had some level of personal connection and investment in the issue. Indeed, in his capacity as a MC—and one of the only Republicans in the South—Robsion commonly took to the floor to expose the shortcomings of transformative social welfare legislation, generally focusing on pointing out which groups were left out of the equation. This often centered on poor women, children, the aged below 65, and those with physical impairments, especially the blind, as the following passage indicates:

The Republican Party, as well as myself, is deeply interested in relief for the needy. The President has promised time and again that he is in favor of appropriating sufficient money to take care of the needy of this country. This bill does not do that... There are 10,000,000 unemployed, needy workers in America, other than those on W. P. A. There are 1,500,000 of the sick, the halt, the blind, and the disabled, and most of them are heads of families. There are hundreds of thousands of needy widows with children who have been denied

²⁵ Some examples in the exhaustive listing include: “Sixteenth. The tax on furs is repealed (this is not for the benefit of the poor, in case you are in doubt). See section 701,” and, “Eighteenth. The tax on sporting goods is repealed (this is tax relief for the poor golfers, but more directly it is for the benefit of one or two companies who manufacture these goods)” (*CR 83 1938, 8008*).

work on the W. P. A. Altogether we have in addition to the 3,000,000 W. P. A. workers some 12,000,000 of other unemployed workers, needy unemployables, and needy widows... this bill... would not take care of more than 20 percent of the needy. You ignore the other 80 percent of the needy. Therefore, if you are going to take care of the needy, it will have to be in some other way... The bill favored by the President will not care for more than 3,000,000 of the 15,000,000. These 12,000,000 that are neglected and ignored have the same right to relief as the 3,000,000 who get on the W. P. A. (*CR 84 1939*, 302)

While this statement has a clear partisan bent, Robsion is consistent in lamenting the division of the poor into policy incorporated and excluded groups, calling into question the commitment level and motives of the governing antipoverty coalition. This awareness is prescient given that the durable tendency toward division is an essential dilemma in the politics of poverty.

While there is a near ubiquitous interest in poverty issues across the South, two states buck the trend with relatively low levels of poverty articulation: the (comparatively) wealthy state of Virginia and one of the nation's poorest states, Arkansas. This is best explained not as direct indicator of their respective political cultures' antipoverty vision, but instead, a reluctance on the part of their *Senate* delegations to speak about poverty.

While Virginia's House delegation had several members that spoke about poverty—most notably Clifton Woodrum (D-VA) of Roanoke—the only member of the Senate delegation to log a poverty speech is Robert Flood Byrd (D-VA), well known arch-conservative and leader of the ascendant Conservative Coalition. However, Byrd's interest in poverty was not as an advocate of the poor in federal policies, but as skeptic of New Deal policies directed at the poor. In one exchange with Senator Sheridan Downey (D-CA) over an amendment increasing state funding for the elderly poor, Byrd repeatedly voices concern that too many people will qualify for relief based on the use of the word “needy,” while Downey's cost calculations were based on the numerically fewer “destitute” population figure.²⁶ While authentically held opposition to federal spending

²⁶ Of the several qualifying statements from February 19, 1942, one stands out as most encapsulating of Byrd's views: “The reason I ask the question is that the Senator from California has used the word ‘destitute,’ and he has said that

programs based on the cost assessment is not unusual—and Byrd was certainly a fiscal conservative—throughout his six qualifying poverty speeches, the senator is always against designated antipoverty legislation, and describes the poor in an impersonal manner where they are simply instruments—not subjects—in the proffered argument. This suggests a lack of commitment to issues concerning the poor in America, which comports with the historical account of how the Byrd Organization governed the state of Virginia (Key 1949, 19-27; Patterson 1969, 10; Heinemann 1996, 122-123).

Despite Arkansas' lack of wealth, the state's Senate delegation from this period of Hattie Caraway (D), John Miller (D), John McClellan (D), and Majority Leader Joseph Robinson (D) hardly addressed matters of poverty at all. In fact, of the four members, only Robinson even logged a single poverty speech. And Robinson's perspective on poverty hardly seemed informed by his own views, as he generally spoke about the issue as it related to legislation he managed, not to increase awareness or advocate for poor constituents. By the 79th Congress, a new type of leader arose from Arkansas, in the form of J. William Fulbright (D-AR), whose poverty representation closely mirrored his unique notoriety as southern internationalist, tending to construct the poor as foreign masses in need of global help. It is worth mentioning Northwest Arkansas—the historically poor Ozark region—was seemingly well represented by Claude Fuller (D-AR), who propounded a view of poverty based on local economic conditions, specifically advocating for federal assistance to help “a poor country boy [who] crave[s] an education” but is denied one due to lack of local resources (*CR 81* 1937, 4544).

there are a million persons between 60 and 65 who are destitute. As a matter of fact, the word used in his amendment is 'needy.' There is quite a distinction between complete destitution and need. Is it not also true that the determination of who is needy is left to the State authorities, and what the Senator proposes to do is that the Federal Government shall furnish the money and let the State authorities decide who is needy?" (*CR 88* 1942, 1445). It is worth noting that like many Southern Democrats of the time, Byrd was not opposed to federal spending with immense state discretion—in fact, it is a hallmark of Southern lawmaker public policy design at the time. Instead, it is more likely he simply did not support increasing funding for poor people in their twilight years.

There are two additional dynamics worth noting. First, there is a low urban-rural divide in the South, but this is less likely an essential aspect of Southern poverty representation, and instead, more likely to be an artifact of the pre-*Westbury v. Sanders* (1964) years, in which populated cities generally went underrepresented relative to the numerous larger, but less populated rural Congressional districts throughout the nation, and especially in the South. This may partially inform why the agrarian perspective predominates Southern poverty articulation—urban perspectives are excluded by design.

Second, just like what was highlighted in the Midwest but is true across regions, members that speak about poverty the most have vastly different perspectives from one another. Even in the South the area serves as a microcosm of the nation's ideological milieu. They range from the unapologetic socialistic populism of Huey Long, ethno-nationalist, fascist sympathies of Reynolds (D-NC), Claude Pepper's (D-FL) New Deal liberalism, Robsion's (R-KY) moderate Republicanism emphasizing effectively tailored public policy, and the hyper-racialized lens of Bilbo (D-MS). While many of these members share a resentment toward the federal government—and indeed, frequently blame the North-dominated national government for their region's continued poverty—the internal variation in how they describe the poor and articulate their values suggests the South (at least in this period) was much more heterogeneous than one might expect when considering the largely single-party and pro-ascriptive hierarchy rule of the elites.

Poverty Representation in the West

With only 524 speeches, the West appears to have the lowest propensity for poverty rhetoric, but this is actually an artifact of having the lowest number of representatives. In reality, it has the highest per capita amount of speeches on poverty, outpacing its seat and population share (see Table 4.1). As Figure 4.5 illustrates, California accounts for 39.5% (207) of these speeches,

Figure 4.5 Poverty Speeches in the West, 1933-1946



while there is also a concentration of speeches in the northwest, such as in Washington's Puget Sound and very strongly throughout Montana. The interior of the West is more dispersed and muted, generally falling below the national mean for poverty speeches. As will be shown shortly, relative to their numbers, MCs from the Western United States have the greatest propensity to speak about poverty among the four regions and deal with a unique set of poverty problems. In particular, the West melds two distinct aspects of poverty dynamics: ongoing historically-informed legacies of group-specific poverty among Native Americans, and the singular event-based poverty of internal migrants fleeing the Dust Bowl.

Starting in the northwest, Washington's poverty articulation is really the product of just two MCs: Senator Homer Bone (D) and Representative John Coffee (D) who collectively contend the poor are ignored, fragmented, and disenfranchised. The general parity across space on poverty articulation is because of Bone, who accounts for 27 of the 32 (84.4%) Senate-based poverty speeches (there are 67 total poverty speeches in Washington). Bone was an avowed, self-described poor person with deep concerns over the federal government's general lack of support for the neediest members of society and the fragmented nature of poverty representation (when it occurred at all), leading him to offer strident poverty sympathizing rhetoric:

In God's name, let us try to find [some way] out for all the people, and not pick out one little group! I yield to no man in my sincere and heart-felt desire to help the small man. If there is any one thing I hope to do while in this body, it is to voice the aspirations and needs of the poor, especially those who cannot be heard; and I will do it if it is the last thing on earth I do, even if I never again see this body. I wish to be sure, however, that whatever energy God has vouchsafed to me shall be devoted, not to helping just one little group of poor, one segment of the great, sad army of the poor, but the whole army of the poor. I am not going to waste the precious energy which the Almighty has given me, whatever little reservoir of it is left, trying to protect one little, tiny, infinitesimal segment of the people. I want to try to apply remedies, so far as I can do so here, to lift a great army of people out of the slough of despond. (*CR 79 1935, 10281*)

Representative John Coffee of the 6th District around Tacoma accounts for the higher poverty speech density in the center of the state. During the Social Security Amendments debate of 1939, Coffee made a point to spell out the reason social legislation often fails to pass in the United States is “because of prejudice; because in many sections of the country the needy are not allowed to vote; because of machine politics; because of innate conservatism; because of unwillingness of many Members to embark on a new course” (*CR 84 1939, 6447*). This same list could also be applied to why some members but not others speak about the poor. But certainly it is easier to speak about the poor than to craft and pass comprehensive social welfare policies.

Moving east, Montana collectively has 70 poverty speeches, 32 from the stable Senate delegation led by Burton Wheeler (D-MT) with 21 and James Murray (D-MT) with 11, and 38 from the House side, led by Democrat James F. O’Connor’s 25 speeches. Montana’s delegation showcases a very important dynamic in poverty representation, which is how the voiceless poor desperately need supports within government, both through oratory and policy. Native Americans factor heavily into their discourse, likely a product of the high concentration of tribes in the state.

A suitable illustrative example is seen in the rhetoric of O’Connor, who represented Montana’s 2nd District in the eastern half of the state for much of this period. His speeches often center on the plight of poor farmers and Native Americans, two groups the MC believed were most vulnerable to governmental neglect and abuse, as seen in the following passage:

The first people hit are the farmers who are unorganized and who are unprotected and, of course, in [the] minority. [They] are hit first. Then next are the poor, defenseless Indians who are the wards of the Federal Government. When we took them over we said we would take care of them. We took everything they had of any value, and today, when a white man finds out that an Indian has something of value, he finds a way of taking it from him. All of the good lands that the Indians had in years [are] gone by the white man or the Government is now in possession of and owns. The Indian now has nothing but what you might call marginal land upon which scarcely anything grows. In my State we have 500 Indian families making a population of in the neighborhood of 3,000, who, for one reason

or another, have no valid claim to enrollment in recognized tribes, and who are landless and resourceless. (*CR 87 1941, 3439-3440*)

While many members focused on Native American affairs or the poor severally, few members combined both into a cohesive narrative and call to action. “There are poor over there [in Europe] all right, but we have them here in our own midst,” O’Connor asserted in October 1941, continuing, “I am thinking right now of the Indians we have robbed; Indians living in tents, living in squalor, living in poverty” (*CR 87 1941, 7787*).

During the debate about devolving resource control to Native Americans, O’Connor read aloud a letter he received from a tribal government, claiming if “the recommendations of the Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate were executed tomorrow morning, within 1 year from this date you will have Indians who will be unwanted public charges and applicants of the poorhouse in each county and State in which we find them.” (*CR 90 1944, 2529*). This is purportedly due to the patrician nature of the indigenous affairs regime that for decades limited self-determination by tribal governments—restoring it overnight, without additional assistance, may lead to mismanagement due to lack of experience. The *de facto* fluid and constantly redefined legal rights of indigenous people led O’Connor to ominously conclude matters for poor Native Americans were unlikely to change unless Congress acted in a more radical manner: “As a rule these poor people never get a chance to go into court to have their claims adjudicated, and if something is not done in this regard, the Indians will still be at the doors of Congress asserting their claims a century from now” (*CR 90 1944, 2528*). Unfortunately, the member appears to be correct, and poverty among indigenous Americans remains the highest of any group in contemporary America.

In California, Senator Downey—a leading proponent of the Townsend Club movement popularized in his state—accounted for 33 of the 37 (89.2%) poverty speeches from California’s

Senate delegation, giving the state a fairly dark baseline hue. As an orator unafraid to ruffle feathers, Downey often assailed members of the Senate for not thinking beyond what they personally know about poverty. “I sometimes think that men of great wealth and large income in some way lack the penetrating imagination to understand the misery, the humiliation, and the degradation of people trying to live on \$20, \$30, or \$40 a month,” Downey remarked in 1946. “Apparently the greater incomes men have the less they can understand destitution and degradation. I say to any Senator who is interested in the preservation of capitalism and free enterprise that he had best be about it to see that some decent, humane, sufficient social-dividend plan is worked out so that retired workers, who do our jobs for us, will not be cast into insecurity and degradation when their life’s work is done and they can do no more work” (*CR 92* 1946, 10434-10435).

On the House side, the most notable member is Jerry Voorhis (D-CA), who represented northeast Los Angeles, a unique urban-rural district, which informed his interest in both forms of population density-based poverty in his 48 speeches (third highest among MCs in this period). “I do not subscribe to the idea that the interests of the farmers of America and the W. P. A. workers of America are in conflict in the least degree,” Voorhis articulated during a debate about parity payments to farmers. “Indeed, I am convinced, on the other hand, that if we do things which will raise the standards and the income of the low-income farm groups in this country, it will be of benefit to the people in our cities who so desperately need work” (*CR 84* 1939, 3453). This unique perspective belies the larger contestation over resources—then and now—between urban and rural representatives. Indeed, in his autobiography the lawmaker claims it was his “crusade” to eliminate worker and farmer suffering alike by reforming the monetary system to rely less on interest-yielding debt—unless the debt was federalized and accrued interest was returned to borrowers

(Voorhis 1970 [1947], 162-169). Given the scale of their poverty articulation, it is somewhat surprising that Downey and Voorhis only account for 39% (81 of 207) of speeches from California, which indicates there is a strong general interest in the issue by MCs throughout the state.

Topically, migration is in many ways the story of the land that became the Western U.S., with millennia of human migrations from the land route in the Bering region of modern Russia to sea route employed by Polynesians. Modern successive waves of Spanish missionary settlements, the creation of Mexican *rancheros*, and Yankee and Southern westward movement during the 19th century of individuals looking to mine silver in Colorado and Nevada, and gold in California. More recent international immigrants, namely the Chinese, also sought to gain wealth in the new land, often constructing service industries around mining camps and participating in the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad. The latter waves of migrants engaged in displacement of and violence toward the indigenous nations that formed in earlier eras. Moreover, the ethnic heterogeneity of the region included large Native American tribes that maintained a degree of sovereignty, like the Klamath and Modoc tribes, in pockets throughout the West. Finally, years of strained, over-tilled land in the Midwest and western upper South culminated in the disastrous Dust Bowl, which led many in Kansas and Oklahoma to move westward into metropolitan Los Angeles and the Central Valley of California. All of these dynamics baked in tensions about different community visions and contributed to a growth in incidences of poverty, generally highest among Native Americans, followed by migrants, regardless of whether they were internally displaced or seeking a better life from abroad.

Balancing the tribulations of foreign immigration and internal migration makes the Western US stand out in this period, which is made more volatile when there are large domestic poor populations that are ostensibly repopulated with the poor escaping foreign lands. Much like

in the Northern region, in the West the typical anti-immigration rhetoric paints accepting the foreign poor as sign of lack of commitment to the domestic poor.²⁷ What differentiates the West from other regions is the substantially higher emphasis on *internal* migration over the typical *external* migration.

Starting in 1937, members started focusing on the migration problem and its effects on subnational governments, with Representative John F. Dockweiler (D-CA) pleading, “Mr. Speaker, what will happen this winter to the thousands of destitute who fled to California from other States seeking relief from the dust, drought, and depression? Federal relief aid has been curtailed; California’s relief burden is fast becoming unbearable, and impoverished thousands, living in squalor, facing hunger and disease, threaten national health and add to the possibility of a bitter and possibly violent agricultural and industrial labor conflict” (*CR 81* 1937, 8476). Such was the combustible nature of the confluence of events in the West, leading to pleas for federal funding to address the regional problem. “I think it is fair and proper to say that the matter of indigent migration is one in which equalization of the relief load taxes can and should be equalized,” Leland M. Ford (R-CA) suggests while pleading for federal support, continuing, “This migration of indigents has thrown a disproportionate tax load on many States which they can no longer continue to bear and pay” (*CR 84* 1939, 655).

²⁷ An example is seen in Representative Gearheart’s (R-CA) echoes of the previously examined sentiments of Senator Davis: “All of the downtrodden people of the world want to come to the United States, not the successful, the affluent... Those who want to come here are the most unfortunate, the worst off in the other parts of the world, the peons and coolies, people who have been deprived of their inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for generations untold... Why should we multiply our already many problems by augmenting our underprivileged groups? We have some people in the United States who have been deprived through no fault of their own of many of the good things of life, of an education and all of the blessings that means, but none of these, unfortunate through their condition, wants to migrate to any of the countries we are thinking about... Everybody wants to come here... Is our first obligation the uplifting of our own unfortunates? Personally, I think that is our first responsibility” (*CR 91* 1945, 9533). The lawmaker never listed a second responsibility.

These migrations were not only a California problem, but as Representative John R. Murdock (D-AZ) explains, “various groups of poor people, particularly with regard to this homeless group, driven out by drought from the Dust Bowl, [are] seeking refuge in the far Southwest. They come into the gentleman’s [Voorhis] State of California by the thousands. Many of them are going through my State. They do not all get through my State. Thousands of them stop” (*CR 84* 1939, 9330). As the problem continued for years, Murdock pointed out how intractable the problem became: “For a number of years now thousands of families have been heading westward, especially into Arizona and California, seeking new homes, as he [Voorhis] and I told the President in the spring of 1937. The gentleman will remember that in the conversation which he told the President of the many destitute farm families fleeing from the Dust Bowl and trying to get into southern California, I also pointed out that in their effort to do so they crossed southern Arizona and that many of them stopped in the warm agricultural valleys of my State. That process is going on today about as it was [then]... the need of doing something for these migrants is as imperative now as it was then” (*CR 86* 1940, 2415).

Representative John H. Tolan (D-CA) led the charge to nationalize the crisis, proclaiming “This condition, Mr. Chairman, deplorable as it is, is merely a consequence of the shameful and inadequate treatment now provided in this Nation for the 1,000,000 destitute citizens who are ‘Stateless’, are forced by unbearable standards of living, poverty, health, and debt to cross State lines in an attempt to avoid starvation, and gain the bare necessities of life” (*CR 84* 1939, 531). Eventually, this proved somewhat successful as Congressional leadership acquiesced to Tolan’s request and set up the Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens in the 76th Congress, with the express purpose to investigate migrations of poor people fleeing the Dust Bowl and coming up with an actionable solution (Abbott 1941, 121). While the

states were mostly left to their own devices save existing emergency relief funds, Tolan viewed the work of the committee as being of utmost importance: “I have lived with this problem for about a year, and it is the most interesting [i]nvestigation and the most [i]nteresting matter I was ever connected with” (*CR 87 1941, 2734*). This episode clearly showcases the difficulties of remediating concentrated poverty, made worse when poverty shifts across governmental jurisdictions, necessitating broad collective action lest localities have insufficient resources to solve the problem.

Conclusion

The preceding passages broadly illustrate central dynamics in poverty representation. In the North, we learned poverty articulation is geospatially dispersed with intra-regional and intra-state variation. It was also apparent that the poor at large may be conceived in zero- or positive-sum terms and are unfortunately often pitted against one another for relative status in the minds of lawmakers taking action on policy questions. In the Midwest, we see how the variety of ideological traditions and commitments all afford engagement with the idea of poverty, but that these differences in value also lead to a disparate understanding of the role of government in redressing poverty. Assessing the South exposed poverty representation may be functional based on ubiquitous poverty conditions, while also serving as a rhetorical device used instrumentally to achieve generous state subsidies or block systemic social reforms. Finally, in the West we see how deep historical legacies and singular events influence poverty articulation, specifically seen in the enduring economic plight of Native Americans and worries about internal migration and poverty clustering that creates a heightened impact on certain communities. Representatives of these communities than attempt to nationalize the issue in pursuit of federal assistance. These lessons

aggregate to a universal truth that poverty's heterogeneous causes and effects on groups in a large country also contributes to variable, patchwork responses by governmental leaders.

With these initial examinations in place, the next chapter assesses the factors associated with the decision to speak about the poor by Members of Congress.

Appendix 4A: Count Table on Regional Variation in Poverty Speeches

The following table (4A.1) provides the underlying counts used to compute the percentages in Table 4.1 of the main text.

Table 4A.1 Counts and Percentages for Regional Population in Relation to Poverty Speeches

	Population in 1933 (thousands)	Number of Seats, 73 rd Congress	Population in 1946 (thousands)	Number of Seats, 79 th Congress	Poverty Speeches	Share of Poverty Speeches
North	35,139	140	37,411	138	668	19.7%
Midwest	39,077	161	41,709	155	1,091	32.2%
South	38,537	165	42,439	167	1,108	32.7%
West	12,303	65	17,486	71	524	15.5%

Data sources: Population figures from 1942 and 1946 editions of the *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*; number of Congressional seats computed by author.

Chapter 5

Modeling Poverty Speeches:

Exploring Factors Associated with Speaking About the Poor

Abstract

This chapter statistically models associations in the dataset on poverty speeches in Congress during the heightened salience case of the New Deal from 1933 to 1946. There is suggestive evidence for collective representation, as the institution is rhetorically responsive to national economic conditions, such that greater (lagged) unemployment corresponds with increased speech count. Concerning individual level representation, there is evidence that spatial, temporal, chamber, partisan, seniority, and economic factors contribute to poverty articulation. For example, members are more likely to speak about the poor in the more deliberation permissive Senate, if they have high seniority, are members of third parties like the Farm Labor or Progressive Parties, and if government revenue is lower in their respective state. Taken as a whole, the findings demonstrate poverty representation through rhetoric is a heterogeneous process, even under the best-case conditions for representation during the Great Depression.

It is the first duty of government to help the needy. Congress is constantly importuned to help the people who are well able to help themselves. There is no outcry against legislation to favor the rich and the powerful. But what an outcry there is if Congress shows any pitying interest in the poor and the weak!

—Representative Herbert S. Bigelow (D-OH), August 17, 1937

Most of these [u]topian plans have been sponsored by well meaning but misguided dreamers who have been prompted by the highest and noblest of motives—that of relieving the suffering and distress of the poor. Some of [these plans] have been used by demagogues as a means for elevating themselves into high political office, by making political capital of human suffering.

—Representative J. Mark Wilcox (D-FL), January 20, 1936

Here is a measure [work hour limitations] to do something for the unemployed, to bring hope and promise and opportunity to them. I do not propose, regardless of some protests, to refrain from showing to the people of the country in this period of depression and destitution that we are thinking about the unemployed, that we are thinking about the jobless, that we desire to spread out the available jobs, and make, if possible, an opportunity to have fewer unemployed, to have fewer people penniless in this country.

—Senator David I. Walsh (D-MA), April 6, 1933

This amendment [to the SSA] is urged on the plea of poverty of the States. We are told that they are unable to give the aged peoples within their borders more than they are now giving and that therefore the Federal Government must come to their rescue. They are holding out the tin cup. But it is not alone the destruction of the 50-50 matching principle in the case of old-age assistance that is involved. If we adopt the principle in this instance, it will not be long before we shall be asked, also in the name of poverty of the States, to apply it to every other instance of existing and future grant-in-aid policy. Establish a precedent, give it some age, and you establish wisdom!

—Representative Leonard W. Hall (R-NY), June 9, 1939

Introduction

Given the previously uncovered variation in poverty speech propensity, what factors contribute to the decision of some lawmakers—but not others—to speak about the poor? Are they motivated by individual-level experiences, subnational economic and cultural dynamics, or nationwide crises (or all three)? To what extent do the different micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors differ in their correlational value? While *why* causal questions motivate this portion of the research agenda, this chapter is best understood to provide a framework and suggestive evidence to answer the aforementioned questions by identifying *which* variables relate to poverty articulation and *how much* (in isolation and relative to one another). This is because causal assessments may be obscured by the complexity of representational relationships, potential for endogeneity, confounders, and omitted variables in cross-sectional historical data, and limitations within existing available data. Therefore, this work is on steadier ground by primarily focusing on pattern identification, hypothesis testing, and theory generation. The use of quantitative modeling here creates empirical supports for two important concepts—collective and dyadic representation of material poverty—as part of a data-generation and exploratory analysis research process. This initial attempt warrants carefully selected concept operationalization and model specification that remain as parsimonious as possible, since clarity in modeling increases the synergy between initial conceptualization and output interpretation. Subsequent research on poverty representation can then make theoretical and causal assessments by testing the relationships presented here.

Chapter Roadmap

The chapter deductively works through the model building and testing process to better understand the impetus for Congress as a whole and members individually to speak about the poor. This begins with by assessing collective representation by Congress through the usage of time-

series modeling, wherein unemployment is correlated with total Congressional poverty speeches by year. The chapter then shifts to a series of models to uncover stable effects when working with messy data. This is accomplished first by assessing the relationship between, then by examining how subnational variables correlate with individual-level propensity to deliver speeches about poverty. In assessing the evidence, this section finds there is likely an association between national and state-level economic conditions and the propensity of Congress and its members to speak about poverty. It is worth reiterating this is the first study to provide a metric of poverty awareness in Congressional rhetoric, which is useful to assess institutional and individual responsiveness, but is nonetheless limited by the lack of convention on how to conduct research on this front.²⁸


Macroscopic Forces: Unemployment Rate and Poverty Speeches

Does the institution of Congress respond to economic external conditions? Given the republican form of government in the U.S., one might expect the answer is Congress *should* respond to macroscopic external forces, causing members across regions to increasingly address matters of poverty. This section tests this functional hypothesis of collective Congressional representation of the poor, specifically by using bivariate regression and time-series modeling to track the relationship of the unemployment rate on poverty speech count from 1933 to 1946.

On a broad level, it is possible to test whether Congress responds to the economic conditions in the country—specifically, whether Congress projects the plight of the poor more when the economy is in the doldrums. Unfortunately, the oft-criticized, but most relevant measure—the national poverty rate—was not invented until the late 1950s. The second most useful statistic is the unemployment rate, which became a staple of national economic vitality when the Bureau for Labor Statistics began calculating the figure in the late 1940s. Luckily, there are several

²⁸ Indeed, as far as the author knows, this is the first study that operationalizes Congressional rhetoric as a counting variable on any subject, let alone poverty.

Figure 5.1 National Unemployment Rate and Poverty Speech Count in Congress



estimates for the unemployment rate in 1930s and early-1940s (Lebergott 1948), which provide an interesting test of how responsive the whole institution of Congress is to the plight of unemployed American.

An assessment of Figure 5.1 indicates unemployment and speech count *may* trend together. This is suggestive that the institution as a whole appears responsive to economic conditions, at least as it pertains to rhetoric. The tightening correlation of this chart as time progresses also suggests there may have been a learning curve for Members of Congress to vocally articulate the plight of the poor—as they became more accustomed to paying attention to poor economic conditions, the quicker they were to escalate the needs of the public through speeches.

But looks may be deceiving. A more systematic approach is to model the relationship between the independent variable of unemployment and the dependent variable of poverty speeches. Additionally, the learning and responsiveness component to this relationship implies there may be a lag from material conditions existing, the awareness of those material conditions through mass media publications, and the ability of Congress to respond. Therefore, testing both simultaneous and lagged relationships is prudent to fully assess the nature of the relationship—if

Table 5.1 OLS Models Regressing Poverty Speech Count on Unemployment Rate

Variable	Model 1 Coefficient (SE)	Model 2 Coefficient (SE)	Model 3 Coefficient (SE)	Model 4 Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	188.60*** (40.61)	180.64*** (42.98)	167.22** (48.19)	155.33* (54.32)
Unemployment Rate	4.43 (2.78)			
Unemployment Rate (Lagged 1 year)		4.56 (2.70)		
Unemployment Rate (Lagged 2 years)			5.16 (2.93)	
Unemployment Rate (Lagged 3 years)				5.76 (3.27)
Adjusted R ²	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.14
N	14	14	14	14

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

any. Preliminary analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) bivariate regression is presented in Table 5.1.

While the IV in each model fails to reach the 0.05 level of significance, it is apparent that lags of two or three years are the best predictors, deserving of further assessment. However, given the data structure, OLS may not be the best model type, specifically because unemployment in a given time is related to unemployment in the time immediately before it—the baseline carries over. In contrast, speeches in Congress reset to zero every session, and MCs have to affirmatively construct a new corpus of poverty-related speeches. Given the correlation between x_1 and x_i in the unemployment data, a time-series model that accounts for this autocorrelation should in theory produce a more accurate estimate of the relationship between unemployment and poverty speeches.

On a theoretical level, it is difficult to imagine that if there is a relationship between unemployment rate and poverty articulation, that Congress would be so slow to respond.²⁹ Given this intuition, and in conjunction with a lag selection approach laid out in Appendix 5A, we will move ahead and examine a lag of two years, now fitting an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model to help identify if there is a significant predictive relationship at play in this era. By establishing stationarity and data smoothing, convention suggests this model should improve on the OLS approach.³⁰

Before presenting the results in Table 5.2, it is important to explain how ARIMA models work. ARIMA models include three components: autoregressors (the “AR” portion, notated as p), a differencing quantity (the “I” term for integrated, notated as d), and a moving average value (“MA,” notated as q). Specifically, p is the number autoregressive terms (lags), here set at 0 to maximize the number of observations (we do not need the AR term since the data is manually offset by two years). Additionally, d is the differencing term: when set at 1, it accounts for serial correlation by using the difference between unemployment in t_i and t_{i-1} as the predictor value for the DV.³¹ The term q is the order of the moving average, which here adjusts the estimate by taking the prediction error for the previous period (e_{t-1}). Used as a control variable to make the explanatory variable more accurate, the MA term coefficient of -1 in Table 5.2 effectively shows the model uses a moving average for the entire time-series to make its estimate.

²⁹ Time-series models are notably atheoretic, so there is a role for a researcher to decide what seems to make the most sense, given real-world dynamics and an understanding of the underlying data.

³⁰ For a detailed explanation of the time-series lag and model specification process, see Appendix 5A.

³¹ Conventionally, the $d=1$ differencing process is written as $y_t = Y_t - Y_{t-1}$

Table 5.2 ARIMA (0, 1, 1) Model Regressing Poverty Speeches on Unemployment Rate

Variable	Coefficient (SE)
Moving Average Term	-1.00 (0.27)**
Unemployment Rate with 2-year lag	5.16 (2.81)

$\Sigma^2=6032$
 Log likelihood= -76.35
 AIC=158.69
 *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Notes: There is no constant in this type of ARIMA model, commonly known as a “simple exponential smoothing model”; in order to retain 2 years of observations otherwise lost in the automated process, the data is constructed so that the lag is manually set at 2 years; specified differently, this would be an ARIMA (2,1,1) model with two fewer observations and an additional autoregressive estimate. Σ^2 is the mean squared error (lower is better); Log likelihood is how well the model predicts the outcome (higher is better); AIC is a measure of the relative tradeoffs between simplicity and goodness of fit of the model relative to differently specified models (lower is better).

Interpreting Table 5.2 indicates that for every one-point increase in the unemployment rate, Congress collectively adds five poverty speeches, although this relationship fails to reach conventional levels of significance. Interestingly, this model is evidence that OLS is not that biased in underreporting the standard errors for autocorrelated data estimates, providing an identical coefficient estimate of 5.16, albeit with a slightly narrower standard error (2.81 versus 2.93). Moreover, even though in both approaches the coefficient of two year lagged unemployment rate failed to achieve even weak statistical significance (with a p-value of 0.12), the extremely small n (14 observations) of the models suggests there *may* be a relationship between collective rhetorical representation of the poor in Congress and extant economic conditions in the country—at least, that is the case during the Great Depression and WWII eras.

Further data collection will uncover with greater statistical certainty whether this functional aspect of economic-based representation in fact exists and moreover, is stable or variable across time. At the very least, the relationship between unemployment rate and poverty speech count suggests the dependent variable as a measurement may have construct validity (i.e., the political-

economic DV of poverty speech count is related to the already in existence IV of unemployment rate). Additionally, part of the model's issues in establishing significance is that the relationship between Congressional poverty speeches and unemployment may not be temporally static. For example, Congress is slower to respond in the early years, and seemingly quicker in the later years. A wider temporal lens will expose whether the variable responsiveness is a general trait of poverty articulation, or something distinct about this period in US political history.

The next section engages an additional means of assessing correlational dynamics in poverty articulation, moving from the institution as a whole to looking at individual members.

Correlates of Individual Propensity to Give Poverty Speeches

While Congress appears to be a borderline case for collectively responding to economic conditions across the nation, the limitations in the previous section's small-*n* design leave much to the imagination. Therefore, by moving from institution to individual, we both greatly increase the number of observations and may expose in greater relief the dynamics underlying poverty articulation during the 1930s and 1940s. Leveraging greater unit heterogeneity and utilizing an array of variables, the following section assesses what factors have correlational power on an individual MC's propensity to give a poverty speech.

But first it is important to stipulate at the outset that this data is difficult to use for several reasons. First, the main dependent variable (DV) is speech count by member per Congress, such that members serving in every Congress from the 73rd to 79th will count as seven observations—one for each Congress. This is done because MCs are not internally stationary in articulating the poor; sometimes a member may speak a lot about poverty, while in subsequent Congresses they may not.³² Since poverty speech count resets to zero in each Congress, we may find some members

³² A good example of this possibility is Joshua B. Lee (D-OK) who had 3 speeches in the 74th Congress while a member of the House, then 1 speech his first Congress in the Senate (75th), followed by a sudden burst in the 76th

give a low amount of speeches in one Congress, and a high amount in another, which may relate to endogenous conditions relating to issue space and member ideology, or exogenous factors like electoral dynamics or economic conditions. Given this variability, to understand what compels a member to speak about poverty is best assessed on the individual Congress-by-Congress level.

Speech count values take on a minimum of zero and maximum of 36 (Huey Long in the 74th Congress). This data is heavily skewed, with 2,576 of the 3,893 observations holding a value of zero, while a few prominent outliers like Long and Lundeen pull the max value away from the mean. This skewness may alter the accuracy of estimates, which will be monitored moving forward. Given this messy terrain, and general abnormal distribution in count data, we should tread carefully in assessing how models perform. The chapter tries to uncover real, stable effects versus model-specific or ephemeral effects.

To execute this, the following section transparently walks through the model-building process by assessing the predictive value of different types of variables, culminating in several comprehensive models which adjudicate the relative weight of key predictor variables. Through each iterative section, we will assess model stability by adding important temporal and spatial control variables to monitor estimate changes and potential washout effects. Importantly, basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is employed on a preliminary and exploratory level to assess relative effects between variable pairings and alternatives. Although the data is skewed, undermining the expected accuracy of OLS estimates, this section employs this approach because each variable is equally affected by the same skewed outcome problem (variables do not have intrinsic differential bias) and moreover, because of the general simplicity and ease of interpreta-

Congress with 19 speeches, then back to down to 1 speech in the 77th Congress. While one may express interest in uncovering why the Senator suddenly spoke much more on poverty in the 76th Congress, no design short of ethnography could uncover individualistic, *idiosyncratic* answers for his behavior. However, by breaking up his behavior by Congress, we may uncover *systemic* explanations for variance in responsiveness across members.

Table 5.3 Congress Number Predicting Speech Count

Variable	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept (73 rd Congress)	0.67*** (0.09)
74 th Congress	0.58*** (0.12)
75 th Congress	0.29* (0.12)
76 th Congress	0.58*** (0.12)
77 th Congress	-0.08 (0.12)
78 th Congress	-0.12 (0.12)
79 th Congress	0.14 (0.12)
Adjusted R ²	0.02
N	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Note: the intercept is the estimated mean of speeches in the 73rd Congress; the mean of every other Congress is the intercept plus the variable coefficient.

tion in OLS models. Two additional statistical models that specifically account for skewed distributions are subsequently introduced.

Temporality

First, it is useful to establish how time may instruct poverty speeches. One should expect a temporal variable to predict poverty rhetoric if the institution itself responds to extant economic conditions in the country, for which the previous section found some support. Time is a notorious black box variable that picks up on the power of events, development, and learning—or literally anything else that is unobserved. Normally, that means time itself is not a *cause*, but simply a *measurement* of causes. Further, it is likely omitted variables are observed *through* the vicissitudes of time. Given its opacity, time is a poor explanatory variable, but a decent control variable to account for the unknown.

Table 5.3 presents the effect of time on the propensity of individual MCs to deliver poverty speeches in a given Congress. Notably, the variable is a factor of Congress number, not continuous

and numeric, meaning the tested relationship does not assume linearity across time, but can instead pick up on fluctuations between moments in time. From the baseline of the intercept (73rd Congress), one can add the variable coefficients to come up with the number of speeches in a given session. Members reach a high of 1.25 speeches on average in both the 74th and 76th Congresses (intercept coefficient of 0.67 plus variable coefficients of 0.58). We see the 74th through 76th coefficients are statistically different from the intercept of the 73rd Congress, while the 77th through 79th are indistinguishable from this earlier period. Although this table only reaffirms the descriptive pattern of poverty speeches assessed earlier in Chapter 3 (poverty speeches peaked in the mid-1930s), this helps us understand the contextualized climate of each Congress, which if isolated as a control, will sharpen the estimated effects of subsequent explanatory variables.

Spatiality

Along with time, space is another important factor to consider when modeling associated relationships. One should expect prevailing political culture and spatial idiosyncrasies wherein a MC was socialized and currently represents may influence their behavior in rhetorically address poverty. The following section assesses the relationships of state, census region, and census division with poverty speech count.

Starting with states, Table 5.4 presents the regression results of each of the 48 states predicting the count of poverty speeches by member (per Congress). As part of the model building process, Model 2 including the Congress effects from the previous section. Like time, state is a black box of sorts, but here it is used as a proxy for the various political cultures that exist across America (Elazar 1966; Mayhew 1986). We see states with the most uniform, homogenous poverty representation stand out in relation to New Hampshire, which is a different metric than simply states with the most poverty speeches. For example, New York has 283 poverty speeches—by far

Table 5.4 State-Based Spatial Model Predicting Poverty Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: States w/ No Controls	Model 2: States w/ Cong Control	Share of Poverty Speech Count by State's Top Speaker
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	
Intercept (New Hampshire)	0.24 (0.37)	0.03 (0.38)	Bridges: 3/7 (42.8%)
California	1.01* (0.41)	1.03* (0.40)	Voorhis: 48/207 (23.2%)
Louisiana	1.45** (0.44)	1.45*** (0.44)	Long: 66/122 (54.1%)
Massachusetts	0.87* (0.42)	0.87* (0.41)	Walsh: 27/134 (20.2%)
Michigan	0.89* (0.41)	0.89* (0.41)	Hoffman: 34/154 (22.1%)
Minnesota	1.33** (0.44)	1.32** (0.43)	Lundeen: 53/127 (41.7%)
Mississippi	1.23** (0.45)	1.24** (0.46)	Bilbo: 29/97 (29.9%)
Montana	2.02*** (0.52)	2.04*** (0.52)	O'Connor: 25/70 (35.7%)
North Dakota	3.14*** (0.53)	3.14*** (0.53)	Langer: 45/98 (45.9%)
Nebraska	1.19* (0.47)	1.18* (0.47)	Norris: 30/70 (42.9%)
Oklahoma	1.03* (0.44)	1.03* (0.44)	Lee: 28/99 (28.2%)
Washington	0.89 (0.46)	0.90* (0.45)	Bone: 27/67 (40.3%)
Wisconsin	1.29** (0.43)	1.29** (0.43)	La Follette: 29/130 (22.3%)
Congress Effects	No	Yes	
Adjusted R ²	0.03	0.05	
N	3893	3893	

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Note: New Hampshire is the reference state; states are listed if their estimate has a p<0.05 in either model.

the most of any state—and yet it does not show up as statistically significant because of the heterogeneity in speech propensity across members of the New York delegation, which is also the largest in the nation (45 seats at its apex in this period).

A further question relating to states whether they are characterized by the views of their representatives, or are representatives informed by the state's political culture? One way to gain leverage on this conundrum is to compute how much of a state's poverty speeches are the product of a single enterprising member. The lower the percentage, the more plausible it is that the state has a strong political culture equally animating dispersion across representatives; a higher percentage speaks more to the entrepreneurial members of a state advocating for the poor based on their own personal views, or potentially as a representation of a state's subculture. As the fourth

column of Table 5.4 shows, there is a wide variance on this dimension. On the high end, Senator Huey Long contributes 54.1% of Louisiana's poverty speech total, while the low end is set by Senator David Walsh, who accounts for 20.2% of Massachusetts' total count. Interpreting this, one may say comparatively, Long is more likely to have led his state's poverty articulation culture, while Walsh is more likely a product of a specific culture in his state. While this metric is not perfect, it is a useful comparative measure in conjunction with what we know about state ideological heterogeneity and historical members' relations with issues of poverty.

But there is little reason to think that political culture is solely defined by (or confined to) states—there are well-known regional/sectional differences in the country as well. To identify some of these geospatial nuances, Table 5.5 presents two types of regional variables—broad Census Region and the sub-regional Census Division—and their estimated effect on poverty speech count.

Relative to the North (with the temporal control), members of all other regions make significantly more poverty speeches, with the West's comparatively few representatives nearly doubling the baseline count of the North (0.86 versus 0.45). The lower support in the North may be a consequence of political culture, or the very high wealth the region holds, which may mean even if they care about poverty, they can handle it locally without the necessity to nationalize the antipoverty debate.

On the more granular level, there are noticeable, durable intra-regional nuances across region. The one exception is the North, which is unique in its intra-regional parity, with high volume states New York in the Mid-Atlantic and Massachusetts in New England (and relative inactivity elsewhere) balancing each other out. But every other region has variation: the western plains of the Midwest significantly deliver more speeches than New England, but the eastern Rust

Table 5.5 Regional and Sub-Regional Spatial Predictors of Poverty Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: Census Region	Model 2: Census Division
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept (North)	0.45*** (0.10)	
Intercept (New England)		0.51*** (0.14)
Mid Atlantic		-0.08 (0.14)
Midwest	0.30*** (0.09)	
East North Central		0.19 (0.14)
West North Central		0.32* (0.15)
South	0.25** (0.09)	
East South Central		0.19 (0.16)
South Atlantic		0.03 (0.15)
West South Central		0.42** (0.16)
West	0.41*** (0.11)	
Mountain		0.28 (0.28)
Pacific		0.42* (0.17)
Congress Effects	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.02
N	3893	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Note: North is the reference group (intercept) in Model 1, while New England is the reference in Model 2.

Belt part of the region does not. Most of the South is statistically indistinguishable from New England, except the huge magnitude effect of the Western South Central region (Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas), delivering an estimated average of 0.93 speeches per member, per Congress. Finally, the three states of the Pacific region explain much of the reason the West stands out nationally, delivering 0.42 more speeches than members from New England.

Importantly, spatial predictors vary in their power as estimators, with the state-based model explaining an additional variance (r-squared) not covered by time, but both regional predictors hardly help in that respect. Accounting for the effects of macro (region), meso (sub-region), and micro (state) spatial dynamics is empirically instructive and gives researchers flexibility to alter

the scope of their analysis. Later in this section, the comprehensive models will utilize the flexibility of these different spatial variables to create the best models, given modeling constraints.

Congressional Chamber

The next concept worth assessment is how chamber in Congress influences poverty speech count. The reasoning behind this the House and Senate have different historical legacies, membership size, and institutional rules (Binder 1997; Schickler 2001). The House has 435 voting members, making floor time a much more precious commodity. There are many more restrictions on speaking privileges, with majority leadership closely controlling floor time. In contrast, the Senate—as “the world’s greatest deliberative body”—is specifically noted for its largess in granting members the prerogative to speak often and at great length. In contrast to the majoritarianism of the House, individual members exert a large amount of power in the Senate, especially on speechmaking. Therefore, one should expect Senators to have more poverty speeches, simply based on institutional dynamics. This is, of course, confounded with the difference in *who* members of each body represent, with Senators having larger, more heterogeneous constituencies. Moreover, the Senate is often thought of as holding a trustee model of representation based on wide view of society, while the House is often portrayed as more parochial, holding to the instructed delegate model of representation. However, this section holds no hypothesis on which approach would escalate poverty more often into the rhetorical sphere.³³

³³ It would be easier for poor people to form a critical mass in a House district, creating a heightened necessity for a House member to address their claims. However, it could also be the case that Senators, as trustees for the well-being of the nation, may “overly” project the needs of the poor if the problem is systemic enough. The relationship of district wealth and members’ poverty speeches is testable with the right data, but those granular sources of insight are only available from the 1950s onward.

Table 5.6 Institutional Variation and Poverty Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: Chamber	Model 2: Chamber w/ Temporal Control	Model 3: Chamber w/ Temporal and Spatial Control
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept (Senate)	1.62*** (0.07)	1.43*** (0.08)	0.56 (0.38)
House	-0.93*** (0.08)	-0.93*** (0.08)	-1.01*** (0.09)
Congress Effects	No	Yes	Yes
State Effects	No	No	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.03	0.05	0.08
N	3893	3893	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

The findings in Table 5.6 reaffirm the earlier descriptive account in Chapter 3 of differences in the chambers, this time with the added benefit of powerful spatiotemporal control variables. Indeed, House membership corresponds with a reduction in poverty speeches by nearly a whole speech—an enormous result given that the average speech rate per member is 0.87. Whether this effect is a first-mover cause in speech propensity is still an open question, but at the very least it provides an important wrinkle in understanding institutional variation in poverty speech projection.

Entering Cohort and Seniority

It may also be the case that members are influenced by the circumstances in which they enter Congress, or alternatively, change their behavior as they gain seniority in their respective chambers. Both of these forces can be tracked by correlating when a member enters Congress and how many poverty speeches they give. Unfortunately, these factors cannot be disentangled using this approach. Nonetheless, measuring when an MC enters Congress might inform future avenues of research, and is therefore worthwhile to assess here.

But first, why would the point in time one enters Congress instruct their propensity to speak about poverty? The most obvious answer is the conditions in the country—namely, economic—may increase the salience of poverty to a member, who might otherwise speak less about poverty if the external stimuli did not exist. We know social environment is important for how members cooperate with one another (Dexter 1969), but it may also affect how they engage an issue. For example, newer members may be reticent to fully weigh in on ongoing debates that clearly have staunch advocates and opponents. Or alternatively, when you are socialized at a point of national recession or an era of good feelings, it may forever instruct cohorts of lawmakers.

Congress entered is operationalizable as a continuous integer or factor, both of which are employed in models presented in Table 5.7. The continuous version of the variable is a good test for seniority effects. If one believes that MCs are more comfortable in their jobs, gain privileges, and may have better working relationships with leadership, this variable works as a proxy for how their time in Congress may afford them additional speaking privileges, which they may choose to use to articulate poverty issues. Alternatively, one may view the Congress in which one entered as a socialization and contextual dynamic—it is not that seniority gives them additional privileges, but instead, that when they came to Congress and their early interactions may influence subsequent poverty articulation. In this manner, making the variable a factor maintains the distinctiveness of the social environment that joining each Congress may entail. Importantly, the continuous variable has a linearity assumption that the factor variable does not, making it a slightly more dexterous option to explain and account for variation in speech count.

In any case, Table 5.7 displays the same effect for both the linear seniority and factor cohort variables—the most senior (but relatively few in number) lawmakers that participated in Congressional debates were the ones most equipped to make multiple floor speeches on poverty,

Table 5.7 Congressional Cohort Predicting Poverty Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: Congress Entered as Continuous Numeric	Model 2: Congress Entered as Factor	Model 3: Congress Entered as Continuous Numeric w/ Controls	Model 4: Congress Entered as Factor w/ Controls
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept ^a	4.71*** (0.54)	2.75*** (0.72)	4.03*** (0.70)	2.08* (0.82)
Cohort (Numeric)	-0.05*** (0.01)		-0.06*** (0.01)	
57 th Congress		-2.57** (0.87)		-2.60** (0.88)
63 rd Congress		-1.97** (0.75)		-2.24** (0.76)
64 th Congress		-2.35** (0.77)		-2.52** (0.78)
65 th Congress		-1.57* (0.74)		-1.87* (0.76)
67 th Congress		-2.18** (0.75)		-2.42** (0.77)
68 th Congress		-1.39 (0.73)		-1.66* (0.75)
69 th Congress		-1.67* (0.73)		-2.13** (0.75)
70 th Congress		-1.51* (0.74)		-1.74* (0.75)
71 st Congress		-1.95** (0.73)		-2.14** (0.75)
72 nd Congress		-1.98** (0.72)		-2.21** (0.74)
73 rd Congress		-1.93** (0.72)		-2.18** (0.73)
74 th Congress		-1.76* (0.72)		-2.15** (0.74)
75 th Congress		-2.05** (0.72)		-2.34** (0.74)
76 th Congress		-2.07** (0.72)		-2.33** (0.74)
77 th Congress		-2.10** (0.73)		-2.27** (0.74)
78 th Congress		-2.42*** (0.73)		-2.61*** (0.75)
79 th Congress		-2.23** (0.74)		-2.61*** (0.77)
Congress Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
State Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.07
N	3893	3893	3893	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Note: the reference group in Models 2 and 4 is joining during the 55th Congress. Relationships outside of conventional levels of significance in more than one model are omitted from display

with less senior MCs making fewer and fewer speeches on average as their Congressional cohort number rises.³⁴ The summary data on the continuous variable show going from the 55th to 79th Congress, the propensity to give a poverty speech declines by over a full speech. Since members

³⁴ Another way of tracking context effects is to see how many MCs give their first speech on poverty in each Congress. For more on that, see Appendix 4B.

on average give 0.87 speeches per Congress, this appears to be a large effect. However, the R-squared is very low, and the intercept estimate is quite high. As expected, the factor version of the variable explains more variation than the continuous variable. While Congressional cohort may not be the key story to poverty representation, it appears to be a relevant one to highlight.

Partisanship

Another foundational component of American politics is the enduring role of party in how the polity is organized. Parties are groups of long-term policy demanding interest coalitions (Bawn et al. 2012) and self-interested politician-led cartels (Aldrich 1995) that use the vehicle of party to accomplish collective goals, which means they monopolize procedural power and project (or mask) ideological differences in Congressional membership (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Lee 2009). The conditions of their creation and use give them distinct governing philosophies (Gerring 1998; Noel 2013), which is related to but distinct from pure ideological considerations, even though party-centric likeminded voting is frequently used as a proxy for ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 1984; 1997).

In the 1930s and 1940s, Democrats and Republicans were in a pitched battle over the role of proper state action, often arguing in the loaded terms of impending socialism or the failures of capitalism. However, the Fifth Party System is well-understood to be one of the least partisan periods in US history, with conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans ensuring ideology cut across party on many issues (Chambers and Burnham 1967; Sundquist 1983 [1973]). Nonetheless, the expectation here would be that Democrats—as the party of FDR, distributive politics, and holding a more diverse coalition—would posture more heavily toward addressing the needs of the poor. In contrast, the Republican Party was in the process of reorienting away from—but did not completely abandon—a national platform of minimal state involvement in socioeconomics.

Table 5.8 Partisan Predictors of Poverty Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: Party Factor	Model 2: Party Factor w/ Temporal Control	Model 3: Party Factor w/ Spatiotemporal Controls	Model 4: DW- NOMINATE 1 st Dimension	Model 5: Party Unity
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept ^a	0.79*** (0.06)	0.62*** (0.10)	0.03 (0.39)	0.05 (0.39)	0.02 (0.39)
American Labor ^b	0.96 (1.02)	0.98 (1.01)	1.01 (1.00)		
Democrat	0.08 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.09)		
Farmer-Labor ^c	2.69*** (0.43)	2.59*** (0.43)	2.59*** (0.49)		
Independent ^d	5.54*** (1.18)	5.46*** (1.17)	5.18*** (1.19)		
Independent Democrat ^e	-0.79 (2.03)	-0.55 (2.02)	-0.38 (2.00)		
Progressive ^f	1.17** (0.38)	1.06** (0.38)	0.52 (0.45)		
DW-Nominate 1 st Dimension				-0.08 (0.14)	
Party Unity (Scaled -1 (Dem) to 1 (GOP)) ^g					0.05 (0.05)
Congress Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.05
N	3893	3893	3893	3818	3845

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Notes: ^a Republican is the reference group in Models 1, 2, and 3.

^b The lone member of the ALP is socialist Vito Marcantonio of New York.

^c Prominent members of the Farmer-Labor Party all hail from Minnesota, including Representative Buckler and Senators Lundeen and Shipstead.

^d The only Independent in this period is progressive iconoclast George Norris of Nebraska, although he caucused with the Republicans originally, later gaining important committee appointments by joining the Democrats.

^e The only Independent Democrat is Percy Priest of Tennessee.

^f Mostly from Wisconsin, but also California, prominent Progressives include Senator Robert La Follette Jr., and important poverty speech standouts Representatives Amlie and Boileau.

^g The unity measure is how often a MC votes with a majority of their party, scaled from -1 for the Democratic side to 1 for the Republican side. Notably, it is frequently indistinguishable from DW-Nominate's 1st dimension.

The results for different party measures are presented in Table 5.8. The models are teasing out differences in nominal party membership, the first (so-called “political-economic”) dimension of the DW-NOMINATE measure of Poole and Rosenthal, and party voting unity scores. Importantly, the two latter measures have no relation to poverty speech propensity. In contrast, party membership matters quite a bit—just not between Democrats and Republicans. Amazingly,

the two main parties are indistinguishable (as was previously empirically shown in Chapter), even with control variables that ostensibly tease out the role of location in informing member behavior. Lack of party differences is important, since the ideologies of the parties had more overlap at the time, and seemingly, were both competing to attain votes from the same bloc of poor and formerly middle-class constituents. Interestingly, third parties were generally more poverty oriented, which makes sense when you consider the Farmer-Labor Party's ideological populism or the Progressive Party of Wisconsin's espoused commitment to social transformation. While the latter group is initially statistically distinct from Republicans, the presence of a state fixed effect removes this difference, providing evidence that Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives from Wisconsin all behave similarly—the state anchors its political culture, not the parties. The broad pattern here of third parties automatically being more poverty-oriented is not always true, but in this period the additional parties were slanted to the political left—or at least, they have strong status quo critiques, which paired with social collapse, might have created the conditions to project the needs of those currently suffering in the country.

Population and Demographics

Next, it is imperative to find the right explanatory variables, and the proper specification thereof. State population is a human resource to mobilize, but also generally means more heterogeneity, including larger absolute amounts of poor people. Small states may have high poverty, but limited resources. Given these dynamics, there is no *a priori* expectation for the direction of population on poverty speeches, but it is a key variable to help refine a correlational model. Similarly, share of Caucasian or Black population may influence some outcomes, but given the association of poverty level with state Black population percentage (and the South), this effect

Table 5.9 Population and Demographic Predictors of Poverty Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: Decennial Census	Model 2: Decennial Census w/ Controls	Model 3: Logged Decennial Census	Model 4: Black & White Pop.	Model 5: State-level Yearly Census	Model 6: Logged State-level Yearly Census
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.98*** (0.05)	0.12 (0.39)	-0.92 (0.96)	0.02 (0.40)	0.02 (0.38)	-0.20 (0.63)
Population-Decennial Census (in millions)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.23 (0.21)				
Logged Decennial Population			-1.24 (1.15)			
Black Population (in millions)				-1.97 (1.86)		
White population (in millions)				-0.03 (0.30)		
Population-Yearly State Census (millions)					0.03 (0.13)	
Logged Yearly Pop						-0.30 (0.65)
Congress Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
N	3893	3893	3893	3893	3893	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

For Models 2, 3, 5, and 6, the number of significant states at p<0.05 lowers to only Montana and North Dakota.

will likely wash out with a state-based control. Table 5.9 presents several specifications of population and their effect on poverty speeches. Notably, several models employ logarithmic transformation. Researchers use transformations like logarithms when data is not normally shaped along a bell-curve distribution. Population is a quintessential example of a variable that typically has large, weighty outliers and overall skewed distributions. Again, the dependent variable of MC speeches per Congress is also skewed with over dispersion of zero values.³⁵ This fact makes

³⁵ One alternative approach is to simply add one to every speech count, which can then be logged. But given the reality that members on average deliver 0.87 speeches, such an approach gravely—in my assessment—alters the data. The

logging the DV impossible, since the log of zero is undefined. The skewness of the DV is an important factor to consider, which may result in low power to explain unobserved variance, and muted effect estimations. The overarching lesson of these models is population is not a robust predictor of poverty speeches, especially when tempered by spatiotemporal controls. With controls, no models provide significant relationships. While state-level population figures are shown to be a worse estimator than decennial federal census, the granularity of that yearly data makes it more useful as an empirically refined control, if not an effective explanatory variable.

Economic Conditions

Arguably the key question of poverty representation centers on to what extent MCs are bound by economic conditions, either personally or in their respective districts. If one adopts a historical materialist perspective, economic conditions in the public inherently structure the nature of political contestation. If this is true, the material conditions of wealth depletion should center the politics of the country around poverty and inequality. A functionalist framework depart from Marxism might intuitively expect members from poorer regions, states, and districts to propel such plight onto the national stage. And a sociological perspective could suggest that members personally dealing with poverty in their early upbringing, community, or later life could inform their interest in poverty.

Unfortunately, fulsome information on every MC's childhood development or contemporary wealth are scarce, as are district-level indicators of an area's wealth. Luckily, the *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* has state-level economic indicators for this time period, specifically per capita income (to measure citizen wealth) and governmental revenue (to measure government wealth) that provide a basis to test whether economics instructs member behavior in speaking for

resulting data may help understand relationships but would also be an inordinate abstraction from reality. We attempt to solve this in another manner later in this chapter.

the poor. Importantly, these measures are inherently related (the latter depends on the former) but conceptually differ—state income per capita is the amount of wealth the public holds, while revenue per capita is how much money the government has to spend on the public. While an initial hypothesis may be that representatives are more concerned with the conditions of the voting public, it is also true that since DC leaders often hail from and have close-knit relationships with a power elite back home, that representatives may respond to cash strapped governmental entities. In any case, the expectation here is that the poorer a populace or governmental entity, the more their representatives would speak about poverty.

The resulting models testing these hypotheses are presented in Table 5.10. In addition to the aforementioned indicators, a third relationship is tested based on the geospatial pattern of poverty representation. Since the poorest states in the South, and richest states like California and New York all figure prominently in poverty speech counts, Model 8 tests the appearance of a bimodal relationship wherein the poorest and richest states advocate for the poor. This idea is operationalized as the absolute difference between a state's per capita income and the national per capita income—great distance in either direction may positively correlate with poverty speechmaking. The expectation is that as one moves away from the national average, their representatives would speak more about poverty. The notion is that high wealth states may already have social welfare programs to fund, where nationalizing could level the competitive playing field on taxing and spending, while the poorest states that cannot afford these programs may look to the national government to supply something they cannot.

The results in Table 5.10 are mixed. On the one hand, where there are significant values, they are in the expected direction: income per capita and state government revenue per capita are inversely correlated with poverty speeches. However, the certainty in the efficacy of these relations

Table 5.10 Economic Predictors of Poverty Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: Income Coef (SE)	Model 2: Income w/ State Control Coef (SE)	Model 3: Income w/ State and Cong Controls Coef (SE)	Model 4: Logged Income Coef (SE)	Model 5: State Gov't Revenue Coef (SE)	Model 6: State Gov't Revenue w/ Controls Coef (SE)	Model 7: Logged State Gov't Revenue w/ Controls Coef (SE)	Model 8: Absolute Diff fr. Nat'l Income Coef (SE)
Intercept	1.07*** (0.07)	0.45 (0.38)	-0.16 (0.42)	0.66 (0.57)	1.05*** (0.08)	0.32 (0.41)	-0.21 (0.55)	0.07 (0.40)
State income per capita (thousands)	-0.32** (0.10)	-0.35** (0.13)	0.56 (0.55)					
Logged state income per capita (thousands)				0.60 (0.41)				
State government revenue (hundreds)					-0.51* (0.22)	-1.30 (0.68)		
Logged state government revenue (hundreds)							-0.49 (0.26)	
Absolute difference from national per capita income (thousands)								-0.14 (0.50)
Congress Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.09	0.05
N	3893	3893	3893	3893	3893	3893	3893	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

is tempered by their straddling of conventional levels of significance. Additionally, once income is logged, the direction flips to predict more state income leads to more poverty speech (although this relationship is not statistically significant). The instability in income lends credibility to the efficacy of the government revenue model. Additionally, the hypothesis that there may be a rich-state, poor-state coalition at play bears little empirical support here.

An important caveat to this data is that pooling IVs on the state level to explain individual level variation is a conservative test, due to decreased variation on the predictor side. Now knowing the hurdles facing these models to establish significance, assessing the borderline nature of their

outcomes should tilt slightly to believing the perceived effects—economics in the form of governmental revenue is on the cusp of predicting speech propensity. Although these relationships are difficult to assess, they are important explanatory variables that warrant inclusion in the more comprehensive models to come, which will better inform the efficacy of these relationships when controlling for other factors.

Comprehensive Models

Now that the importance of key variables is established, the next task to reconcile and aggregate the most vital, theoretically informed estimators into a series of comprehensive models to calculate the best estimates for potential causes of poverty speech count. Since many of the previously examined variables are collinear with one another when put together, special care is used to construct the right set of models, balancing conceptual difference with potential collinearity, which may mask or exaggerate effects, depending on the distribution of the data. The comprehensive models will ostensibly winnow down the prominent relations uncovered in the topic-based walkthrough, with only the most robust effects remaining. Results for four OLS model specifications are presented in Table 5.11.

The best approach to assess the robustness of a relationship is to compare the variables across specifications. Doing so exposes the durability of chamber, party factor, region, state, time (through Congress number), and cohort in predicting poverty speeches. Across all models, moving from House to Senate leads to an increase in poverty speech count by just under one full speech. Additionally, F-L membership yields an additional two and half poverty speeches over Republicans. Within the Midwest (Model 4), Progressives proffer more poverty speeches than their regional compatriots from the GOP. However, once Wisconsin itself is accounted for (Models 1 to 3), that effect goes away—Republicans from Wisconsin are indistinguishable from their Prog-

Table 5.11 Comprehensive OLS Models Predicting Speech Count

Variable	Model 1: Gov't Revenue w/ State Controls	Model 2: Income w/ State Controls	Model 3: Gov't Revenue & Income w/ State Controls	Model 4: Gov't Rev & Income w/ Region Controls
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.77 (1.04)	2.07* (1.04)	1.27 (1.13)	2.11** (0.77)
House	-0.90*** (0.09)	-0.90*** (0.09)	-0.90*** (0.09)	-0.92*** (0.09)
American Labor	1.15 (0.98)	1.17 (0.98)	1.19 (0.98)	1.08 (0.99)
Democrat	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)
Farmer-Labor	2.57*** (0.48)	2.53*** (0.48)	2.55*** (0.48)	2.40*** (0.42)
Independent	3.19* (1.40)	3.23* (1.40)	3.17* (1.40)	3.70** (1.40)
Independent Democrat	-0.05 (1.96)	-0.02 (1.96)	-0.04 (1.96)	-0.42 (1.98)
Progressive	0.37 (0.46)	0.38 (0.46)	0.37 (0.44)	0.91* (0.38)
State Census Population (log)	-0.42 (0.63)	-0.39 (0.63)	-0.43 (0.63)	0.15*** (0.05)
State Gov't Revenue per Capita (log)	-0.47 (0.26) ^a		-0.46 (0.26) ^b	0.12 (0.19)
State Income per Capita (log)		0.49 (0.40)	0.46 (0.40)	-0.04 (0.17)
Midwest				0.30** (0.10)
South				0.38** (0.14)
West				0.44*** (0.13)
Congress Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Cohort Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.08
N	3893	3893	3893	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Notes: ^a P-value is 0.068 ^b P-value is 0.076

ressive colleagues. Said differently, Wisconsin has more to do with elevated speech levels than do party differences. Overall, the R-squared of each model is much higher than the several models, with a high in Models 1 through 3 of 0.10. While this is low by arbitrary thresholds of convention,

it is difficult to establish substantive meaning of the metric given the messiness of the data. Less clear is if population and economic factors still hold influence.

Government revenue remains borderline significant in Model 1 ($p=0.068$), and income fails to reach significance in Model 2. Models 1 and 2 separated the two indicators because of their high collinearity (See Table 5C.2 in Appendix 5C more information), but as previously discussed, while they may be correlated they are capturing two distinct concepts. Therefore, Models 3 and 4 assess poverty speeches with both variables present. Interestingly, each estimate minimally changes, with income remaining insignificant and revenue remaining borderline ($p=0.076$). To interpret the latter variable, it is necessary to exponentiate the log of government revenue to get a point estimate, then multiply by 100 because of the data scaling. This yields a decline of 65 speeches when going from zero dollars of revenue to 100 dollars of revenue per state resident. This effect is quite large and acts as leading evidence that when taking numerous factors into account, the more resources a state government has, the less their congressional delegation speaks on the poverty issue.

Though not confirmatory, the relationship between state government wealth and poverty oratory is worth investigating and reassessing with a greater temporal scope. If this relationship is genuine, it makes sense that political elites may be more responsive to government finance needs since they are members of state-level governing coalitions and roam in similar social circles, allowing a shared knowledge of the governing conditions at the time. In contrast, it is more difficult to process a general sense of the wealth of each states' residents, especially as sampling techniques are still novel and not widely used during this era.³⁶ Moreover, politicians may not have an allegiance to the economic well-being of their state's residents, especially when only a subset of

³⁶ One possibility is to use the IPUMS database to construct a sample-based measure of state and district level poverty to more granularly detect potential material-based representational behavior by members in this era. Future extensions of this work will use this excellent source to that end.

the population is legally allowed to vote. It may be instructive for further research to build upon how politicians in DC view their home state or local governments as constituencies (Dexter 1969; Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013), which may alter how we conceive of MCs in pursuing majoritarian goals of the public.

As previously noted, the count data utilized in this study is quite messy, which was previously ameliorated through several ways of conditioning to transform and pool data. An alternative approach is to use different types of estimators besides OLS, or to change the dependent variable to be friendlier to OLS. One such approach is to use all of the same data, but use a different statistical model, such as Zero-Inflation Negative Binomial (ZINB) modeling.

ZINB models work well for skewed count data that is overly dispersed (variance is larger than the mean in DV). This approach essentially runs two different models to test the proposition that what predicts the existence of an event may differ from repeated occurrences of an event (Greene 1994; Yang et al. 2017; Desjardins 2013; Fang 2013). Specifically, the idea here is twofold: the underlying data needs corrective measures for accurate assessments, *and* the reasons for a member to speak about poverty or not may differ from reasons members speak often or little about poverty. ZINB models help with both propositions.

To model these relationship, the ZINB iteratively runs through a sequence of three models. First, a standard negative binomial is used to estimate the count of poverty speeches. The negative binomial distribution is useful because it accounts for the skewness in count data by using a distribution that holds the likelihood of an event is much lower than the non-event, and further that higher values are increasingly less likely than lower values. Based on the inclusion of covariates, the model fits expected zeros (and above) and uncovers unexpected, but real zeros to inform the next step. Second, a logit model uses covariates to predict the occurrence of unexpected zeros

against expected zeros (inflated zeros against normal zeros).³⁷ Third, a final negative binomial count model is run on only the observations in which a non-zero is considered possible, which will include some “expected” zeros and every count value above zero. Then the logit and final count model are presented in a final output.

One may take the logit segment as a test for showing interest in the issue of poverty or not, while the count segment is a test of one’s activity level on the poverty issue. Although ZINB is flexible in that the variables may vary in each model, here I attempt to use as many previously examined variables to predict either outcome, since this study has no expectation on causal differences between giving a speech at all and how many speeches one gives.

Unfortunately, the ZINB model paired with this data is limited in the types of operable variable specifications, given the more strenuous nature of the computation in the model. Inclusion of party factor, chamber, state, Census division, and cohort factor³⁷ leads to incomplete convergence in the logit segment due to insufficient degrees of freedom and/or perfect correlation. Said plainly, there is not enough variation on the values of the independent-dependent variable dyad to run this type of model and still have leverage to create an estimate for every permutation of the IV and DV. However, state name and cohort factor do compute when added only to the negative binomial count model, and not the logit zero-inflated model. Accordingly, using the best specified ZINB models may help uncover where each variable matters. This approach is exploratory and may help identify avenues for future research. Four differently specified models are presented in Table 5.12, with the negative binomial count model in the top half of the table, followed by the zero-inflated logit summary right below it.

³⁷ Importantly, unlike normal logits that predict incidences of a 1 value against a 0, this model will predict excessive zeros against expected zeros. That means the resulting coefficient estimates may flip signs, since the direction and nature of the test is altered.

Table 5.12 Zero Inflation Negative Binomial (ZINB) Models

Variable	Model 1: No Geographic Control	Model 2: Full Model w/State & Cohort (Factor)	Model 3: Full Model w/State & Cohort (Cont.)	Model 4: Full(est) Model w/ Same Variables in Count and ZI
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Negative Binomial Count Model (DV=Possible 0-36)				
Intercept	1.74* (0.72)	-0.63 (1.13)	1.02 (1.21)	1.37 (0.71)
Cohort (Continuous)	-0.03** (0.01)		-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)
State Census Population (log)	0.03 (0.05)	0.30 (0.61)	0.16 (0.61)	0.02 (0.05)
State Gov't Revenue per capita (log)	0.10 (0.21)	-0.71* (0.30)	-0.68* (0.30)	-0.14 (0.21)
State Income per capita (log)	-0.10 (0.16)	0.49 (0.43)	0.50 (0.43)	0.31 (0.23)
74 th Congress	0.62*** (0.13)	0.42** (0.15)	0.50*** (0.15)	0.56*** (0.13)
75 th Congress	0.51** (0.15)	0.63* (0.27)	0.69* (0.27)	0.47** (0.17)
76 th Congress	0.79*** (0.17)	1.03*** (0.29)	1.07*** (0.29)	0.80*** (0.18)
77 th Congress	0.09 (0.18)	0.27 (0.32)	0.30 (0.33)	0.02 (0.20)
78 th Congress	0.17 (0.19)	0.22 (0.51)	0.27 (0.51)	-0.08 (0.25)
79 th Congress	0.38 (0.20)	0.49 (0.61)	0.43 (0.62)	0.15 (0.28)
Midwest				0.54*** (0.12)
South				0.51** (0.18)
West				0.43** (0.14)
State Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No
Cohort (Factor) Effects	No	Yes	No	No
θ (log) (dispersion parameter)	-0.88*** (0.07)	-0.62*** (0.09)	-0.72*** (0.07)	-0.84*** (0.07)
Zero-Inflated Logit Model (DV=Predicting Excess 0)				
Intercept	-35.13*** (7.27)	-24.45*** (6.51)	-29.08*** (8.10)	-33.65*** (6.65)
Cohort (Continuous)	0.37*** (0.09)	0.24** (0.08)	0.30** (0.10)	0.39*** (0.09)
State Census Population (log)	1.00** (0.38)	1.29** (0.49)	1.13** (0.43)	0.66* (0.31)
State Gov't Revenue per capita (log)	-3.35*** (0.97)	-2.41* (1.05)	-3.25** (1.11)	-3.10*** (0.98)
State Income per capita (log)	1.53 (0.93)	0.36 (1.04)	1.47 (1.09)	3.04** (0.98)
74 th Congress	-1.45 (1.02)	-1.52* (0.71)	-1.47* (0.75)	-1.44 (0.75)
75 th Congress	2.22* (0.91)	1.32 (0.82)	1.74* (0.82)	1.07 (0.86)
76 th Congress	2.34* (1.02)	1.41 (0.82)	1.87 (0.96)	1.24 (0.95)
77 th Congress	2.34* (1.02)	1.20 (0.84)	1.54 (0.99)	0.62 (1.06)
78 th Congress	2.41* (1.02)	1.59 (0.83)	1.96* (0.94)	-0.02 (1.25)
79 th Congress	0.31 (1.19)	0.04 (1.23)	-0.22 (1.30)	-1.72 (1.33)
Midwest				0.55 (0.44)
South				1.63* (0.78)
West				-4.21 (21.66)
Log-likelihood	-4607	-4463	-4505	-4591
Degrees of Freedom	23	91	70	29

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Note: There are not enough degrees of freedom to do state, micro-regional or cohort controls. So even these models, which are correcting for overdispersed variance and skewness toward zero are not without their own pitfalls. These are the most comprehensive models that run, due to needing variation on every possible permutation, including excessive zero prediction, normal zero prediction, and absolute count. Needless to say, this uses a lot of degrees of freedom even among the models that do run (like Model 2 having 91 *df*).

While calculating point estimates is the traditional approach to interpreting log-odds model outputs, I will instead focus on assessing variable stability and variation compared to the OLS models. The first relationship to note is that Models 2 and 3 (the two best models in the set due to their comprehensiveness and least negative log-likelihoods of -4463 and -4505, respectively) show government revenue as a predictor of speech count becomes statistically significant at the $p < 0.5$ level for the first time in the model building process. The relationship is in the expected direction; as state government revenue rises, MCs speak less about poverty in Congress. This may be the most accurate estimate for this relationship across available models, or at least its most favorable.

The second notable dynamic is that space and time are still significant predictors for the amount of speeches one gives, but with sufficient controls, lack stable relation to excessive zeros. The opposite is true for the key explanatory variables of population, income, and some specifications of revenue (Models 1 and 4), which are highly predictive of excessive zeros, but are mostly insignificant in the count model. Specifically, holding everything else constant, having a larger state population, and at times (Model 4), higher income residents, makes one more likely to hold an excessive zero, while greater government revenue makes one less likely to hold an excessive zero. The state size finding makes sense, given larger states have more MCs and are more heterogenous, making withholding poverty speeches more likely. With some deduction, the inverse relationship between greater government revenue and less excess zeros suggests MCs from wealthier states are expected to give less poverty speeches, meaning this variable may accurately predict *normal* zeros. Admittedly, this study lacks conclusive answers for the opposite directions of positive correlation of state income level and negative correlation of government revenue in relation to excess zero, but controlling for both in a model helps identify their conceptual difference.

At the very least, the ZINB appears to be a good model choice given the variables that matter manifest differently on each side of the model, and that there are perhaps different underlying processes leading to the binary decision to speak and the count of how much to speak.³⁸ While the ZINB model is likely the best to handle data skew, its previously mentioned drawbacks in model construction encourage further analysis. Moreover, a replication of the ZINB and OLS models will help bolster any claims one would make based on them. To accomplish this verification, we can split the ZINB into two, with one model predicting how many speeches people give among those that have given a speech, and another model calculating the binary outcome of giving a speech or not.

Starting with the count model, there is some support that a logged count model using OLS performs well at estimating effects, even with skewed data. Therefore, the next model is a modified count model using the log of speech count for all members that gave a speech ($n=1,317$) as the DV. Importantly, this data will lack the correction of the zero-inflation on the binomial count in the ZINB. Nonetheless, it is useful as a basis for comparison across approaches, and further, to see if the estimates change very much across models. Table 5.13 provides the outputs for the logged DV count model.

The four models employed are exact analogs to OLS Models 3 and 4 (here as Models 1 and 2), and then two models mimicking ZINB Models 2 and 4 (as Models 3 and 4). Most of the relationships across the models remain as expected based on the previous modeling. However, cohort becomes unstable and mostly insignificant as a predictor of speech count, while income gains statistical leverage in positively predicting speeches. Government revenue remains border-

³⁸ To ensure the ZINB model is necessary—in that it is superior to a simpler negative binomial count model without the zero-inflated logit—I ran a Vuong test of model indistinguishability, which yields a t-statistic of 3.16 ($p<0.001$), suggesting the ZINB is an improvement over a regular NB.

Table 5.13 OLS Models with Logged Non-Zero Dependent Variable (Speech Count=1 to 36)

Variable	Model 1: Mimicking OLS Model 3	Model 2: Mimicking OLS Model 4	Model 3: Mimicking ZINB Model 2	Model 4: Mimicking ZINB Model 4
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.07 (2.54)	2.02 (1.27)	1.15 (2.58)	5.14*** (1.48)
House	-1.33*** (0.19)	-1.29*** (0.19)		
Cohort (Numeric)				-0.04* (0.02)
American Labor	-0.31 (1.41)	-0.24 (1.40)		
Democrat	0.28 (0.22)	0.19 (0.21)		
Farmer-Labor	3.11*** (0.85)	2.13** (0.73)		
Independent	1.23 (2.12)	2.44 (2.10)		
Progressive	-0.08 (-0.80)	0.00 (0.64)		
State Census Population (log)	-0.60 (1.45)	0.17 (0.11)	-0.52 (1.48)	0.01 (0.11)
State Gov't Revenue per capita (log)	-1.16 (0.64) ^a	-0.33 (0.45)	-1.10 (0.66) ^b	-0.16 (0.45)
State Income per capita (log)	0.84 (1.01)	0.75* (0.44)	1.23 (1.03)	0.73 (0.44) ^c
Midwest		0.64* (0.25)		0.58* (0.24)
South		0.87* (0.31)		0.93** (0.35)
West		0.57 (0.29)		0.55 (0.30)
Congress Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Cohort (Factor) Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Adjusted R ²	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.03
N	1317	1317	1317	1317

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

^a P-value is 0.072; ^b p-value is 0.092; ^c p-value is 0.096

line significant at inversely correlating with speech count level. Overall, the practice of logging a DV to decrease skew seems to hold up well against alternative approaches, although the ZINB has more tools to defray the potential of underestimating standard errors.

We can also try to mimic the logit component of the ZINB, but this time, instead of predicting excessive zeros, we can predict propensity to give a speech using the same and different variables. Although their DVs are different, if the ZINB model is correct that there is a different process for the speech decision and speech count, testing the decision on its own is a worthwhile endeavor. Also of import, although logit does not inherently correct for skew toward non-events

Table 5.14 Logit Models Predicting Decision to Give a Poverty Speech

Variable	Model 1 Mimicking OLS Model 3 w/Cohort (Factor)	Model 2 Mimicking OLS Model 4	Model 3 Mimicking OLS Model 3 w/Cohort (Numeric)	Model 4: Mimicking ZINB Model 4
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.94 (1.50)	1.60 (1.13)	2.58* (1.19)	3.95*** (0.68)
House	-0.66*** (0.10)	-0.63*** (0.10)	-0.66*** (0.10)	
Cohort (Numeric)			-0.06*** (0.1)	-0.07*** (0.01)
American Labor	14.76 (265.71)	14.43 (265.16)	14.82 (265.75)	
Democrat	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.21* (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	
Farmer-Labor	0.66 (0.55)	1.27** (0.48)	0.69 (0.54)	
Independent	12.63 (308.31)	12.67 (308.47)	13.17 (308.21)	
Independent Democrat	-11.78 (535.41)	-12.36 (535.41)	-11.90 (535.41)	
Progressive	0.51 (0.51)	1.36** (0.44)	0.56 (0.50)	
State Census Population (log)	0.00 (0.71)	0.11* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.70)	-0.01 (0.05)
State Gov't Revenue per capita (log)	-0.19 (0.30)	0.42* (0.21)	-0.24 (0.29)	0.47* (0.20)
State Income per capita (log)	0.17 (0.47)	-0.46* (0.19)	0.26 (0.46)	-0.43* (0.19)
Midwest		0.31** (0.11)		0.33** (0.11)
South		0.21 (0.16)		0.02 (0.15)
West		0.48*** (0.14)		0.38** (0.13)
Congress Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Cohort (Factor) Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No
AIC	4688.6	4757.8	4723	4865.2
N	3893	3893	3893	3893

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

(0 on DV), as the number of observations increases, the bias of the estimator does decrease substantially (King and Zeng 2001).³⁹ Several specifications of logit models are presented in Table 5.14, both replicating OLS and ZINB, and modifying them slightly to potentially uncover previously untestable relations.

Notably, the only non-geospatial independent variable that matters across models is chamber, where being in the House does decrease the chance of delivering a poverty speech. In

³⁹ The use of this citation (King and Zeng 2001) to make this point is somewhat ironic given the point of the piece is to introduce a new approach to correcting for the bias of skewed data toward non-events. However, in the process of making their point, they also estimate the level of bias in a predictive estimate given the specification of the n and percentage of zeros in the DV. According to Figure 3, when $N=3000$ and the percentage of 1s is 30%, bias is quite low (though still present) (152).

Models 1 and 3, state effects wash out economic indicators, suggesting propensity to give a speech is not about economic conditions per se, but about the social environment in which members come from or individual life story. In models with regional instead of state controls, the more money a state government has, the more likely they are to give a poverty speech. Those same models show the more income a state's citizenry has, the less likely they are to give a poverty speech. Again, these two highly collinear variables have disparate effect directions. However, the best model (Model 1 according to theory and AIC) shows no effect of either variable on the decision to speak about poverty. Indeed, this selection of demographic and economic variables do not appear to be good indicators for the speech decision.

In sum, the logged count model mostly maintained consistency with the OLS and ZINB approaches, and the logit model was consistent with the zero-inflated model in failing to show strong economic indicators of poverty speeches. To comprehensively assess the relative weight and stability of factors in poverty speeches, the following section devises an approach to account for stable effects across best-specified model types.

Evaluating Effects Across Model Specifications and Types

Conditional logic is a helpful tool to employ here to assess the stability of variables across models. Specifically, the approach laid out here is to assess the internal stability of a variable across specifications *within* a model type, then to assess variable stability *across* model types. This is accomplished by devising a threshold count for the number of models (out of four) where a variable is significant (here 0, greater than or equal to 1, or all applicable models), affixing a score to the model ("X" if no models show effect; "/" if at least one model shows effect; "✓" if all applicable models show effect), repeating the process for subsequent model types, then evaluating overall stability level (stable, mixed, or unstable) based on the variable score in the worst performing

model type (weakest link test). The summary of this qualitative meta-analysis approach is presented in Table 5.15, with the three count models on top and the two decision models below them.

Assessing stability in this deductive process helps uncover what is related to model specification, and what is related to model type. Specifications are likely to change variable impact, but for best-specified models, there should be similarity across model type (assuming each type is valid given the data structure). An unstable valuation is not dispositive of lack of relationship but does suggest further assessment is needed to make causal claims. In contrast, a mixed effect variable may indeed be true, but model types vary in how it treats the variable. Finally, a stable effect suggests near statistical certainty that there is a robust relationship between poverty speeches and the variable. Again, given the limitations of the observational data and difficult to quantify control of leadership in deciding floor speaking privileges (especially in the House), full causal assessments are not established at this time, but are worthy of future assessment.

In the count section, the dependent variables are all slightly different, with the OLS model having the largest number of observations, followed by the truncated ZINB, then finally the smaller logged positive integer DV. Several variables have consistent effects across models: House is significantly inversely correlated with speech count relative to Senate. Farmer-Labor and Independent are significantly positively correlated with speech count relative to Republicans. Regions vary in significance across models, as do states, but some aspect of them is always positively, strongly correlated with poverty speeches, relative to the reference groups in the Northeast. Finally, Congresses immediately after the 73rd are positively correlated with increased speech count, while latter ones are not.

Table 5.15 Independent Variable Stability Within and Across Statistical Models

Variable (Type)	OLS when DV=0-36 (4 Models)	ZINB when DV= Count 0-36 & Excessive 0 (4 Models)	OLS when DV=Log of 1-36 & Logit when DV=0 or 1 (4 Models)	Assessment of Effect Stability
Predicting Speech Frequency (Continuous Outcome)				
House (Binary)	✓	N/A	✓	Stable
Cohort (Numeric)	N/A	✓	/	Mixed
Cohort (Factor)	✓	✓	X	Unstable
Party (Factor)	✓	N/A	✓	Stable
State Census Population (Numeric)	/	X	X	Unstable
State Gov't Revenue per capita (Numeric)	X ^a	/	X ^a	Unstable ^a
State Income per capita (Numeric)	X	X	/	Unstable
Region (Factor)	✓	✓	✓	Stable
State (Factor)	✓	✓	✓	Stable
Congress (Factor)	✓	✓	✓	Stable
Predicting Speech Decision (Binary Outcome)				
House (Binary)	N/A	N/A	✓	Stable
Cohort (Numeric)	N/A	✓	✓	Stable
Cohort (Factor)	N/A	N/A	✓	Stable
Party (Factor)	N/A	N/A	/	Mixed
State Census Population (Numeric)	N/A	✓	/	Mixed
State Gov't Revenue per capita (Numeric)	N/A	✓	/	Mixed
State Income per capita (Numeric)	N/A	/	/	Mixed
Region (Factor)	N/A	/	✓	Mixed
State (Factor)	N/A	N/A	✓	Stable
Congress (Factor)	N/A	/	✓	Mixed

Key: ✓ all applicable models show effect; / at least one model shows effect; X no models show effect

^a Borderline cases with p-values just outside of conventional significance ($p < 0.05$); if included, governmental revenue achieves mixed status.

Less clear is the relationship of other variables to speech count, specifically population, revenue, income, and cohort. Starting with the latter, the numeric version of the variable is mixed, mattering in some models but not all, while the factor version does not matter at all in the logged(DV) model. Additionally, population has some effect in the OLS type, but none in the subsequent types. Income has an effect in at least one logged(DV) model, but none elsewhere. Finally, government revenue is marked unstable due to it not reaching the $p < 0.05$ level, except in the ZINB. However, if one relaxes the p-value threshold level to 0.1, it switches to the mixed category, suggesting the relationship is ephemeral to model specification and perpetually borderline.

Moving to the binary portion of the table, although these models are not predicting the same DV, it is instructive to understand the relationship between variables and the excessive zero or speech decision to test whether there is indeed a differential process at work (if the models all agreed, it decreases the credibility that the zero inflation is a unique process). Therefore, we might expect disagreement just based on the DV differences. However, there are a lot of similarities. House and cohort (numeric) are negatively related to speech decision, with the latter also being related to the excess zero outcome (later cohorts are more likely to be unexpected zeros). State is a significant predictor of speech decision but was inoperable in the ZINB model. The remaining variables are labeled mixed, as model specifications seem to moderate the relationship to speech decision and excessive zeros. Importantly, economic and population estimates do matter for both the excessive zero prediction and the speech decision, in contrast to the count level.

Reconciling and broadening out, it is likely chamber, party, region, state, and specific Congress are all real predictors of whether and how often an MC gives a poverty speech. The remaining variables rely more heavily on model specification to elaborate their effects on poverty

speeches. The predictors for speech count are slightly more dispersed (more spatiotemporal) than the predictors for speech decision or excessive zero.

However, even highly stable and significant variables do not unveil the whole story of poverty representation. As such, there is room to debate whether proper control for space is state or region, when state very much tracks with individual senators, better than any single variable. As an illustration of the difficulty to draw directional inferences based on state, does Nebraska inform Senator Norris to be so progressive? Does his choice to identify as an independent explains his unique views? Does neither matter and it is particular to the individual—after all, he was raised poor? Or is the causal relationship reversed in all cases (being raised poor informed his choice to move to Nebraska in the late 19th-century, or to leave the GOP and become a New Deal supporting independent Senator)? This is as illuminating an example as any between the disconnect of aggregate level average effects versus specific explanations of individual cases.

Additionally, while there is a statistical relationship between economic and population indicators and poverty speeches, this relationship is neither stable nor clear, which makes their evidentiary value insufficient to make convincing causal claims. When understood in relation to the weight given to prominent outliers, it is unlikely the wealth of the state population or state governments is the primary motivator in the decision for a MC to speak about poverty. As poverty indicators become more precise in the 1960s, we will gain leverage on how the presence of poverty—not just average wealth—may motivate a member to take up the antipoverty cause. Indeed, as Miler (2018) finds, the relationship between district poverty and member behavior is not purely linear and expected from the 1960s to early 2010s. As it stands currently, it appears national economic conditions instruct the body as a whole, but it remains to be seen whether local economic conditions instruct individual members to speak about the poor during the New deal. It

is something to monitor moving forward, but is heretofore lacking sufficient evidence to make key claims about the nature of poverty representation.

Assessing substantive effects, the best models in each approach do show government revenue is inversely correlated with poverty speech count at the weaker significance $p < 0.10$ threshold. Given the messy data, which includes state-level government revenue, which depresses the effect by decreasing variation in the IV, this is the best non-geospatial variable to assign external associational weight. If members are responding to subnational economic conditions, given the data, it is more supported to say they are responding to state government needs than state citizen needs. This may be true because lawmakers in DC come from the same power elite that generally runs their state governments, and government finance deficiencies may be more pronounced by state lawmakers than individual citizens projecting their plight upward.

Although the logical tests weigh against a relationship between government revenue and speech count, there are some reasons to believe there is a relationship. First, it is not clear or obvious that speech count would correlate with various economic indicators, since no previous study has examined poverty speeches, let alone as a countable dependent variable.⁴⁰ Second, this study presents a conservative test of economic relationship, since the predictor variables are based on state-level metrics, while outcome variable of speech count is based on individual members. Much of the variation between members is averaged with state-level pooling, lessening the likelihood a true effect would show up. This suggests when effects are present, they are likely to be true, given the more strenuous and conservative nature of the research design in stifling these effects, since it requires greater uniformity in the outcome variable to match state indicators. Third, as previously mentioned, government revenue would outpace income per capita if the threshold of

⁴⁰ If a relationship does appear between economics and poverty speeches, it would not only express a potential causal relationship, but also serve to validate the efficacy of the search term construction used in this study.

$p < 0.10$ is used. Therefore, we need to think about what p -value thresholds mean for historical, messy, pooled, over-dispersed data. And fourth, the best model in the whole set is either Model 2 or Model 3 of the ZINB, based on the maximization of theoretically informed variables and models that best correct for data skew. In these models, government revenue (with all else constant) is inversely related to poverty speech count at $p < 0.05$. At the very least, this is leading evidence to consider using this variable in relation to other exercises assessing individual representation of the poor within federalist systems.

Conclusion

This chapter undertook the first effort to evaluate factors that correlate with—and potentially inform—giving speeches about poverty on the floors of Congress. In evaluating collective representation, time-series models show lagged unemployment rate correlates with Congress-wide poverty speech count with a p -value just outside of conventional significance ($p = 0.12$). This is a modest, but positive sign, since low- n ($n = 14$) regressions are a steep climb to uncover robust relationships. For the individual-based dyadic representation (MC and their constituents), the chapter uncovered several important correlates with poverty speeches. Earlier date entering Congress and accumulated seniority positively correlate with poverty speeches. Time (Congress number or factor) and space (state) are both very strong predictors of poverty speech count. Chamber is always a strong predictor, which is explained by institutional rules and member prerogatives that afford Senators more tools to speak at length about poverty. Party does predict poverty speech rate, just not between Democrats and Republicans; Farmer-Labor identifiers have the steadiest propensity to give poverty speeches. Independents and Progressives follow suit, but are either linked to a single member (Independent), or are washed out in more comprehensive models (Progressive dwindles once Wisconsin is included). This is evidence that third parties of

the time were more poverty-interested than both mainstream parties. Economic-based indicators are not reliable across models, but the most convincing models do show that government revenue negatively correlates with poverty speech count—all else equal, the richer the state, the less likely their members are to speak about poverty

Plainly, it is clear the tough to quantify role of events and personal interest matter a lot in poverty representation. A monolithic material conditions story may work some of the time but misses a more nuanced story of poverty representation where advocates of the poverty agenda propound their interests in varied ways and for different reasons. On balance, we can say there is more evidence and statistical power to claim speeches are based more in state culture than economic indicators, given the variable measurements used in the study. The decision to speak is idiosyncratic and more member-based, but the degree to which one speaks seems more likely to be related to where a member is from, the point in time, and potentially, the economic health of their state government.

The most glaring limitation of the preceding analyses was the inability to discern whether someone was raised poor or experienced poverty in their life, not just through anecdotes but extending to the full dataset. This information would provide a basis for the quintessential test of descriptive representation of poverty. To that end, work is currently underway to extend the analyses in this chapter with an assessment of the material conditions of members of Congress. Since no existing dataset has pertinent information for the period under evaluation, this new dataset will be constructed using secondary source material in the form of biographies to identify the material conditions facing MCs. However, even this labor-intensive approach faces methodological roadblocks, as there is a dearth of biographies on all MCs. Indeed, biographies tend to focus on prominent MCs. Luckily, there is little reason to believe biographies are

disproportionately written about poor or wealthy members. Of course, wealth obviously relates to ever coming to Congress—wealth and high social strata are immensely helpful for campaign resources—but once there, there is little evidence that wealth is necessary to become a prolific lawmaker.

Finally, this chapter also provides lessons for a broader set of research design and execution matters. First, causal statistical modeling with historical data is difficult, especially before government statistics became readily available, accurate, and granular. Second, statistical modeling with skewed data may lead to cycling between outcomes across models, without a clear “winner” in terms of what effects are “true” and which are particular to model specifications and model type. Third, this situation provides strong support for the contention that researchers should either employ multi-method research or embrace qualitative methods—both approaches rely less heavily on data availability and the idiosyncrasies of statistical modeling, and instead shift the locus onto the researchers understanding of the breadth of evidence in whatever form it exists. Fifth, the likely strength of unobserved, omitted variables like leadership control over speaking privileges decreases the validity of causal claims. Here, chamber differences offer a chance for future research to more fully assess if the free-speaking Senate has a clearer causal story than the highly regulated floor of the House of Representatives. And sixth, failure of the models presented in the chapter to pinpoint economic causation presents a call to action to researchers moving forward to better understand period-specific from atemporal factors. The politics of poverty themselves are not static, as the polity adjusts from just propelling the poor into national politics into one that now actively spends money on their causes—and may even resent such continued spending moving forward.

Since poverty articulation appears so idiosyncratic, with a few prominent outliers representing the poor more than most of their Congressional colleagues combined, it is therefore fruitful to focus on *how* those select few members represent the poor. Next in Chapter 6, we explore what themes collectively arise from the contents of poverty speeches, which target groups are depicted in the speeches, and how the poor are divided into favored and disfavored subgroups.

Appendix 5A: Fitting a Time-Series Model

To fit the proper ARIMA model, best practices suggest finding the combination of p , d , and q that produces the lowest Akaike information criterion (AIC). AIC is a model selection metric that balances the relative tradeoffs between a model's goodness of fit (minimizing unexplained variance) and simplicity (since more variables artificially decreases variance, this metric penalizes a model for every additional variable). The model with the lowest AIC is generally accepted to be the most meaningful by balancing parsimony with explanatory power. The autoARIMA command in the forecast r package presents the AIC across differently specified models.

Table 5A.1 AutoARIMA Outputs

Model Specification	AIC
ARIMA(2,1,2)	78.42
ARIMA(0,1,0)	73.08
ARIMA(1,1,0)	72.86
ARIMA(0,1,1)	72.47
ARIMA(1,1,1)	74.45
ARIMA(0,1,2)	74.46
ARIMA(1,1,2)	76.45

In this case, a model with a $p=0$, $d=1$, and $q=1$ yields the lowest AIC. This type of ARIMA is known for its exponential smoothing. First, the d term turns what might be non-stationary data—which violates a core requirement of time-series analysis—into a stationary, non-trending form. This is achieved through subtracting the preceding year's unemployment rate from the next, thus homing in on differences between the figures, and with less emphasis on magnitude. Second, the q term sets the order of the moving average, which here uses the average of two years' unemployment percentages to predict one year's speeches.

Appendix 5B: First Poverty Speech by Congress

An alternative measure of collective speech intensity is to track the number of members giving their first poverty speech by Congress. Using the 73rd Congress as a baseline, Table 5B.1 provides the aforementioned statistics.

Table 5B.1 Number of MCs Making First Poverty Speech by Congress

	73	74	75	76	77	78	79
MCs with First Poverty Speech	170 ^a	+147	+62	+73	+44	+47	+75

^a Reference baseline

This approach is notable since intensity of initial poverty speeches tracks closely with which Congresses have the most poverty speeches overall. Additionally, the counts here partly track with economic conditions more broadly, as there were economic downturns in the 73rd, 74th, 75th, and 76th Congresses.

Appendix 5C: Statistical Model Building and Variable Selection

An alternative specification of cohort effects would only count a member as a single observation, regardless of how much time they spend in Congress. Table 5C.1 presents the number of MCs by Congress entered, number of speeches, and the speech rate for the cohort (speeches divided by number of MCs).

Table 5C.1 Average Number of Speeches by MCs by Year Entered Congress (N=1,278)

Congress Entered	Number of MCs	Total Speeches	Speech Rate
55 th	2	22	11.0
56 th	0	0	N/A
57 th	5	3	0.6
58 th	3	34	11.3
59 th	0	0	N/A
60 th	7	61	8.7
61 st	6	23	3.8
62 nd	11	82	7.5
63 rd	25	71	2.8
64 th	23	21	0.9
65 th	25	127	5.1
66 th	23	179	7.8
67 th	25	44	1.8
68 th	59	265	4.5
69 th	32	159	5.0
70 th	34	173	5.1
71 st	39	119	3.1
72 nd	77	244	3.2
73 rd	179	521	2.9
74 th	125	446	3.6
75 th	116	246	2.1
76 th	141	281	2.0
77 th	100	152	1.5
78 th	125	71	0.6
79 th	96	50	0.5

It appears there may be a linear relationship between joining Congress later, and giving fewer speeches over one's career. To test this, Table 5C.2 presents speech count regressed on cohort using a linearity assumption to capture seniority. Going from 55th to 79th Congress, the propensity to give a poverty speech declines by a full speech. Note, the R^2 is low, but effect size is quite sizeable—not the key story here, but a relevant one to highlight (in an appendix).

Table 5C.2 Seniority as a predictor of poverty speech rate, 1933-1946


Variable	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	3.82*** (0.75)
Year MC entered Congress	-0.04*** (0.01)
Adjusted R ²	0.01
N	1278

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Note: N=MCs that served between 73rd and 79th Congress; DV is an MC's poverty speech rate—the number of poverty speeches by a MC divided by the number of Congresses the MC served in.

During the research process, I came across the following map in the 1948 version of the *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*:

Figure 5C.1 Per Capita Income by State, 1946



Map from *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* (1948, 278).


It struck me that when comparing this map to the national poverty speech map (Figure 5C.1), it appeared as if the richest and poorest states might be the ones most inclined to speak about poverty.

Therefore, I constructed the state-level metric of absolute value difference in income from the

national mean income in a given year as a test for this top-bottom coalition hypothesis. As it turned out, there is no relationship.

Collinearity in statistical models may mute, exaggerate, or hide extant relationships in the data. Many of the variables employed in the statistical models have some level of collinearity with one another, but two most impactful are arguably state income per capita and state government revenue per capita, as the latter is ostensibly dependent on the former (whether taxation is through sales, income, or property taxes). Therefore, to check the scale of collinearity, I plotted income (x) against revenue (y) (Figure 5C.2), and separately derived a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.807, which is very high.

Figure 5C.2 Correlation of State Income per Capita and State Governmental Revenue per Capita



Therefore, this study employs models that withhold one variable to monitor the other, as well as comprehensive models that best capture the theoretical terrain for why MCs give poverty speeches.

Model Code and Full Outputs

The following section holds the *R* code for the models presented in the Comprehensive Models subsection of Part III. Additionally, in the event readers desire more detail about omitted

statistics from the presented summary tables, the raw model outputs are affixed directly under the code calling them.

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Models

```
OLS1<-lm(speeches~house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
```

```
summary(OLS1)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = speeches ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + stname +
cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79, data = HSols10)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-4.525 -0.860 -0.390 0.218 33.282
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.77105 1.04197 0.740 0.45935
house -0.90027 0.08957 -10.051 < 2e-16 ***
seniorFACTOR57 -2.43188 0.86308 -2.818 0.00486 **
seniorFACTOR58 -0.13809 1.08097 -0.128 0.89835
seniorFACTOR60 0.31127 0.82351 0.378 0.70547
seniorFACTOR61 -1.03951 0.85639 -1.214 0.22489
seniorFACTOR62 -0.86850 0.78244 -1.110 0.26707
seniorFACTOR63 -1.61205 0.75120 -2.146 0.03194 *
seniorFACTOR64 -1.69704 0.77496 -2.190 0.02860 *
seniorFACTOR65 -1.30430 0.74724 -1.745 0.08098 .
seniorFACTOR66 -0.46777 0.75016 -0.624 0.53295
seniorFACTOR67 -1.53664 0.76155 -2.018 0.04368 *
seniorFACTOR68 -1.08545 0.73496 -1.477 0.13979
seniorFACTOR69 -1.31224 0.74272 -1.767 0.07734 .
seniorFACTOR70 -1.02128 0.74215 -1.376 0.16887
seniorFACTOR71 -1.29770 0.74171 -1.750 0.08027 .
seniorFACTOR72 -1.59067 0.72925 -2.181 0.02923 *
seniorFACTOR73 -1.42749 0.72175 -1.978 0.04802 *
seniorFACTOR74 -1.43182 0.72785 -1.967 0.04923 *
seniorFACTOR75 -1.55023 0.73161 -2.119 0.03416 *
seniorFACTOR76 -1.46492 0.73320 -1.998 0.04579 *
seniorFACTOR77 -1.48489 0.73604 -2.017 0.04372 *
seniorFACTOR78 -1.77056 0.74133 -2.388 0.01697 *
seniorFACTOR79 -1.83826 0.75708 -2.428 0.01522 *
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor 1.14844 0.98369 1.167 0.24309
partycodeWRDDemocrat 0.01657 0.08949 0.185 0.85311
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor 2.56606 0.48311 5.312 1.15e-07 ***
partycodeWRDInd 3.19242 1.39494 2.289 0.02216 *
partycodeWRDInd D -0.05155 1.96038 -0.026 0.97902
partycodeWRDProgressive 0.36631 0.44512 0.823 0.41059
log(popyearMIL) -0.42293 0.63132 -0.670 0.50295
```

log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-0.46753	0.25597	-1.827	0.06785	.
stnameAL	1.23337	1.18704	1.039	0.29886	
stnameAR	0.85634	0.97762	0.876	0.38111	
stnameAZ	0.44599	0.56477	0.790	0.42976	
stnameCA	2.62049	1.75472	1.493	0.13542	
stnameCO	0.83491	0.70879	1.178	0.23889	
stnameCT	1.06817	0.91277	1.170	0.24198	
stnameDE	0.21874	0.68412	0.320	0.74918	
stnameFL	1.43095	0.97343	1.470	0.14164	
stnameGA	1.31913	1.25313	1.053	0.29256	
stnameIA	1.04104	1.12108	0.929	0.35315	
stnameID	0.52788	0.51309	1.029	0.30362	
stnameIL	1.68488	1.79812	0.937	0.34881	
stnameIN	1.83805	1.30807	1.405	0.16006	
stnameKS	0.80617	0.95523	0.844	0.39875	
stnameKY	1.39657	1.17578	1.188	0.23499	
stnameLA	2.40420	1.09112	2.203	0.02763	*
stnameMA	1.99149	1.44406	1.379	0.16795	
stnameMD	1.10449	0.95635	1.155	0.24821	
stnameME	0.35895	0.59912	0.599	0.54912	
stnameMI	2.19211	1.54913	1.415	0.15713	
stnameMN	1.54825	1.17802	1.314	0.18883	
stnameMO	1.35172	1.35938	0.994	0.32011	
stnameMS	1.71592	1.06165	1.616	0.10612	
stnameMT	2.07059	0.50939	4.065	4.90e-05	***
stnameNC	1.46040	1.32228	1.104	0.26947	
stnameND	3.10270	0.53497	5.800	7.18e-09	***
stnameNE	1.31712	0.79210	1.663	0.09643	.
stnameNJ	1.36418	1.41822	0.962	0.33616	
stnameNM	0.49145	0.54218	0.906	0.36477	
stnameNV	-0.22597	1.05654	-0.214	0.83065	
stnameNY	2.25494	2.12526	1.061	0.28875	
stnameOH	1.96916	1.72311	1.143	0.25320	
stnameOK	1.82768	1.07121	1.706	0.08806	.
stnameOR	1.29527	0.71955	1.800	0.07192	.
stnamePA	1.90766	1.93542	0.986	0.32436	
stnameRI	0.11354	0.56959	0.199	0.84201	
stnameSC	0.92775	0.98058	0.946	0.34415	
stnameSD	0.74862	0.54171	1.382	0.16707	
stnameTN	1.04314	1.20637	0.865	0.38726	
stnameTX	2.07938	1.68059	1.237	0.21606	
stnameUT	0.49174	0.54419	0.904	0.36625	
stnameVA	0.98108	1.17932	0.832	0.40551	
stnameVT	0.72110	0.57439	1.255	0.20940	
stnameWA	1.81708	0.94648	1.920	0.05496	.
stnameWI	2.25516	1.24989	1.804	0.07127	.
stnameWV	1.30658	0.95529	1.368	0.17148	
stnameWY	-0.16070	0.69448	-0.231	0.81702	
cong74	0.58396	0.12014	4.860	1.22e-06	***
cong75	0.59589	0.18987	3.138	0.00171	**
cong76	0.99960	0.21654	4.616	4.04e-06	***
cong77	0.39703	0.23164	1.714	0.08661	.
cong78	0.53862	0.27929	1.928	0.05387	.
cong79	0.87703	0.29726	2.950	0.00319	**

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 1.942 on 3808 degrees of freedom
 Multiple R-squared: 0.122, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1027
 F-statistic: 6.301 on 84 and 3808 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

```
OLS2<-lm(speeches~house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
```

```
summary(OLS2)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = speeches ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
log(popyearMIL) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 +
cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79, data = HSols10)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-4.416 -0.851 -0.388 0.214 33.358
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 2.067769 1.036679 1.995 0.04616 *
house -0.899336 0.089592 -10.038 < 2e-16 ***
seniorFACTOR57 -2.460109 0.863121 -2.850 0.00439 **
seniorFACTOR58 -0.162813 1.081072 -0.151 0.88030
seniorFACTOR60 0.283015 0.823553 0.344 0.73113
seniorFACTOR61 -1.066974 0.856551 -1.246 0.21296
seniorFACTOR62 -0.885029 0.782557 -1.131 0.25815
seniorFACTOR63 -1.648833 0.751251 -2.195 0.02824 *
seniorFACTOR64 -1.718684 0.775106 -2.217 0.02666 *
seniorFACTOR65 -1.341262 0.747309 -1.795 0.07277 .
seniorFACTOR66 -0.500191 0.750295 -0.667 0.50503
seniorFACTOR67 -1.565481 0.761600 -2.056 0.03990 *
seniorFACTOR68 -1.119158 0.735129 -1.522 0.12799
seniorFACTOR69 -1.338040 0.742867 -1.801 0.07175 .
seniorFACTOR70 -1.053086 0.742311 -1.419 0.15608
seniorFACTOR71 -1.330763 0.741878 -1.794 0.07293 .
seniorFACTOR72 -1.615638 0.729363 -2.215 0.02681 *
seniorFACTOR73 -1.452001 0.721901 -2.011 0.04436 *
seniorFACTOR74 -1.463577 0.727965 -2.011 0.04445 *
seniorFACTOR75 -1.588506 0.731660 -2.171 0.02999 *
seniorFACTOR76 -1.500710 0.733323 -2.046 0.04078 *
seniorFACTOR77 -1.523715 0.736101 -2.070 0.03852 *
seniorFACTOR78 -1.797489 0.741375 -2.425 0.01537 *
seniorFACTOR79 -1.861249 0.757132 -2.458 0.01400 *
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor 1.166585 0.984461 1.185 0.23609
partycodeWRDDemocrat 0.019262 0.089519 0.215 0.82965
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor 2.528719 0.483282 5.232 1.76e-07 ***
partycodeWRDInd 3.230409 1.395006 2.316 0.02063 *
partycodeWRDInd D -0.017039 1.960855 -0.009 0.99307
partycodeWRDProgressive 0.379556 0.445180 0.853 0.39394
log(popyearMIL) -0.387326 0.631035 -0.614 0.53939
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) 0.488536 0.398298 1.227 0.22006
```

stnameAL	1.784077	1.219923	1.462	0.14370
stnameAR	1.454566	1.022020	1.423	0.15475
stnameAZ	0.462996	0.567542	0.816	0.41467
stnameCA	2.274296	1.756452	1.295	0.19546
stnameCO	0.793423	0.708339	1.120	0.26273
stnameCT	0.819553	0.924959	0.886	0.37565
stnameDE	-0.137375	0.698883	-0.197	0.84418
stnameFL	1.595182	0.975956	1.634	0.10224
stnameGA	1.816659	1.271101	1.429	0.15303
stnameIA	1.171650	1.125865	1.041	0.29810
stnameID	0.620641	0.518178	1.198	0.23109
stnameIL	1.628248	1.799606	0.905	0.36564
stnameIN	1.892787	1.308987	1.446	0.14826
stnameKS	1.010301	0.959350	1.053	0.29236
stnameKY	1.849981	1.195609	1.547	0.12187
stnameLA	2.615877	1.105525	2.366	0.01802 *
stnameMA	1.822575	1.448543	1.258	0.20839
stnameMD	1.061358	0.958181	1.108	0.26807
stnameME	0.346351	0.599330	0.578	0.56337
stnameMI	2.041169	1.548599	1.318	0.18756
stnameMN	1.533160	1.178812	1.301	0.19348
stnameMO	1.503776	1.359885	1.106	0.26888
stnameMS	2.453694	1.115990	2.199	0.02796 *
stnameMT	2.015004	0.508713	3.961	7.60e-05 ***
stnameNC	1.839166	1.343534	1.369	0.17111
stnameND	3.339130	0.559035	5.973	2.54e-09 ***
stnameNE	1.569315	0.794140	1.976	0.04821 *
stnameNJ	1.168442	1.420643	0.822	0.41086
stnameNM	0.668791	0.570457	1.172	0.24112
stnameNV	-0.620877	1.063173	-0.584	0.55926
stnameNY	1.893160	2.130027	0.889	0.37417
stnameOH	1.903931	1.723747	1.105	0.26943
stnameOK	2.047573	1.086527	1.885	0.05957 .
stnameOR	1.181368	0.718019	1.645	0.09999 .
stnamePA	1.785064	1.935340	0.922	0.35640
stnameRI	-0.007264	0.580924	-0.013	0.99002
stnameSC	1.473238	1.015072	1.451	0.14676
stnameSD	0.958373	0.563252	1.701	0.08893 .
stnameTN	1.529775	1.222826	1.251	0.21101
stnameTX	2.273815	1.686200	1.348	0.17758
stnameUT	0.437851	0.542914	0.806	0.42001
stnameVA	1.242322	1.185796	1.048	0.29486
stnameVT	0.730549	0.575017	1.270	0.20399
stnameWA	1.564549	0.943422	1.658	0.09732 .
stnameWI	2.233804	1.250144	1.787	0.07404 .
stnameWV	1.515388	0.964507	1.571	0.11623
stnameWY	-0.334532	0.690897	-0.484	0.62827
cong74	0.528369	0.130614	4.045	5.33e-05 ***
cong75	0.148019	0.194095	0.763	0.44574
cong76	0.515945	0.185179	2.786	0.00536 **
cong77	-0.175871	0.226385	-0.777	0.43729
cong78	-0.337901	0.379454	-0.890	0.37326
cong79	-0.174012	0.486824	-0.357	0.72078

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 1.942 on 3808 degrees of freedom
 Multiple R-squared: 0.1216, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1022
 F-statistic: 6.277 on 84 and 3808 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

```
OLS3<-lm(speeches~house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 +
cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
```

```
summary(OLS3)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = speeches ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79,
data = HSols10)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-4.501 -0.858 -0.379 0.212 33.288
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)      1.27134    1.12939   1.126 0.26037
house            -0.89939    0.08957 -10.041 < 2e-16 ***
seniorFACTOR57   -2.43035    0.86304  -2.816 0.00489 **
seniorFACTOR58   -0.11948    1.08104  -0.111 0.91200
seniorFACTOR60    0.31131    0.82348   0.378 0.70542
seniorFACTOR61   -1.04692    0.85638  -1.222 0.22160
seniorFACTOR62   -0.86575    0.78241  -1.107 0.26857
seniorFACTOR63   -1.62063    0.75121  -2.157 0.03104 *
seniorFACTOR64   -1.70211    0.77494  -2.196 0.02812 *
seniorFACTOR65   -1.31416    0.74725  -1.759 0.07872 .
seniorFACTOR66   -0.47815    0.75019  -0.637 0.52392
seniorFACTOR67   -1.53978    0.76152  -2.022 0.04325 *
seniorFACTOR68   -1.09819    0.73502  -1.494 0.13523
seniorFACTOR69   -1.32038    0.74272  -1.778 0.07552 .
seniorFACTOR70   -1.03288    0.74219  -1.392 0.16410
seniorFACTOR71   -1.31031    0.74176  -1.766 0.07739 .
seniorFACTOR72   -1.59625    0.72924  -2.189 0.02866 *
seniorFACTOR73   -1.43587    0.72175  -1.989 0.04673 *
seniorFACTOR74   -1.44161    0.72787  -1.981 0.04771 *
seniorFACTOR75   -1.55986    0.73163  -2.132 0.03307 *
seniorFACTOR76   -1.47674    0.73324  -2.014 0.04408 *
seniorFACTOR77   -1.49533    0.73607  -2.032 0.04227 *
seniorFACTOR78   -1.77205    0.74130  -2.390 0.01688 *
seniorFACTOR79   -1.83592    0.75705  -2.425 0.01535 *
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor  1.18839  0.98426  1.207 0.22735
partycodeWRDDemocrat    0.01834  0.08950  0.205 0.83762
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor  2.54985  0.48329  5.276 1.39e-07 ***
partycodeWRDInd         3.17315  1.39499  2.275 0.02298 *
partycodeWRDInd D       -0.03798  1.96034 -0.019 0.98454
partycodeWRDProgressive  0.36803  0.44510  0.827 0.40837
log(popyearMIL)       -0.43072  0.63133 -0.682 0.49513
```


log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-0.45464	0.25620	-1.775	0.07605	.
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.45755	0.39857	1.148	0.25105	
stnameAL	1.58072	1.22495	1.290	0.19698	
stnameAR	1.22766	1.02970	1.192	0.23324	
stnameAZ	0.51818	0.56823	0.912	0.36187	
stnameCA	2.47118	1.75946	1.405	0.16025	
stnameCO	0.85272	0.70893	1.203	0.22912	
stnameCT	0.89169	0.92559	0.963	0.33542	
stnameDE	0.02481	0.70464	0.035	0.97192	
stnameFL	1.52137	0.97657	1.558	0.11934	
stnameGA	1.59935	1.27663	1.253	0.21036	
stnameIA	1.15704	1.12558	1.028	0.30404	
stnameID	0.61028	0.51806	1.178	0.23887	
stnameIL	1.61376	1.79912	0.897	0.36979	
stnameIN	1.88396	1.30863	1.440	0.15005	
stnameKS	0.92090	0.96040	0.959	0.33769	
stnameKY	1.66978	1.19958	1.392	0.16401	
stnameLA	2.60656	1.10523	2.358	0.01840	*
stnameMA	1.86320	1.44832	1.286	0.19836	
stnameMD	1.03943	0.95799	1.085	0.27798	
stnameME	0.38732	0.59961	0.646	0.51834	
stnameMI	2.15302	1.54944	1.390	0.16475	
stnameMN	1.61405	1.17936	1.369	0.17121	
stnameMO	1.41467	1.36043	1.040	0.29847	
stnameMS	2.15472	1.12832	1.910	0.05625	.
stnameMT	2.06608	0.50938	4.056	5.09e-05	***
stnameNC	1.73915	1.34434	1.294	0.19585	
stnameND	3.29103	0.55953	5.882	4.41e-09	***
stnameNE	1.42778	0.79791	1.789	0.07363	.
stnameNJ	1.25843	1.42115	0.886	0.37594	
stnameNM	0.69529	0.57049	1.219	0.22301	
stnameNV	-0.41469	1.06921	-0.388	0.69815	
stnameNY	2.06474	2.13162	0.969	0.33279	
stnameOH	1.93259	1.72334	1.121	0.26218	
stnameOK	2.03472	1.08624	1.873	0.06112	.
stnameOR	1.27479	0.71974	1.771	0.07661	.
stnamePA	1.87824	1.93551	0.970	0.33190	
stnameRI	-0.01684	0.58079	-0.029	0.97686	
stnameSC	1.25845	1.02198	1.231	0.21826	
stnameSD	0.92637	0.56338	1.644	0.10020	
stnameTN	1.31101	1.22868	1.067	0.28604	
stnameTX	2.23349	1.68588	1.325	0.18531	
stnameUT	0.54214	0.54593	0.993	0.32075	
stnameVA	1.13607	1.18697	0.957	0.33857	
stnameVT	0.75154	0.57498	1.307	0.19127	
stnameWA	1.74419	0.94857	1.839	0.06603	.
stnameWI	2.28729	1.25015	1.830	0.06739	.
stnameWV	1.46131	0.96472	1.515	0.12992	
stnameWY	-0.19565	0.69512	-0.281	0.77837	
cong74	0.52520	0.13059	4.022	5.89e-05	***
cong75	0.41633	0.24600	1.692	0.09064	.
cong76	0.83688	0.25880	3.234	0.00123	**
cong77	0.17633	0.30102	0.586	0.55807	
cong78	0.12052	0.45895	0.263	0.79287	
cong79	0.32817	0.56298	0.583	0.55998	

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 1.942 on 3807 degrees of freedom
 Multiple R-squared: 0.1223, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1027
 F-statistic: 6.243 on 85 and 3807 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

```
OLS4<-lm(speeches~house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 +
cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
summary(OLS4)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = speeches ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 +
cong79, data = HSols10)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-4.367 -0.876 -0.435 0.198 34.286
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)      2.11026   0.76073   2.774 0.005564 **
house            -0.91477   0.09012 -10.151 < 2e-16 ***
seniorFACTOR57  -2.29660   0.84732  -2.710 0.006749 **
seniorFACTOR58   0.06353   1.06593   0.060 0.952473
seniorFACTOR60   0.46695   0.80695   0.579 0.562852
seniorFACTOR61  -0.94521   0.82658  -1.144 0.252897
seniorFACTOR62  -0.59418   0.75540  -0.787 0.431576
seniorFACTOR63  -1.20682   0.73114  -1.651 0.098904 .
seniorFACTOR64  -1.32383   0.75629  -1.750 0.080124 .
seniorFACTOR65  -0.98097   0.72647  -1.350 0.176991
seniorFACTOR66  -0.11867   0.73064  -0.162 0.870987
seniorFACTOR67  -1.15196   0.74081  -1.555 0.120029
seniorFACTOR68  -0.67303   0.71496  -0.941 0.346580
seniorFACTOR69  -0.78193   0.72185  -1.083 0.278773
seniorFACTOR70  -0.63701   0.72244  -0.882 0.377967
seniorFACTOR71  -1.00049   0.72253  -1.385 0.166221
seniorFACTOR72  -1.24848   0.70960  -1.759 0.078588 .
seniorFACTOR73  -1.05261   0.70486  -1.493 0.135422
seniorFACTOR74  -1.02897   0.70806  -1.453 0.146241
seniorFACTOR75  -1.14706   0.71113  -1.613 0.106823
seniorFACTOR76  -1.16325   0.71290  -1.632 0.102822
seniorFACTOR77  -1.11730   0.71741  -1.557 0.119456
seniorFACTOR78  -1.42937   0.72124  -1.982 0.047570 *
seniorFACTOR79  -1.45040   0.73776  -1.966 0.049376 *
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor  1.08048  0.99295  1.088 0.276597
partycodeWRDDemocrat    -0.05596  0.08436  -0.663 0.507163
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor  2.39869  0.42322  5.668 1.55e-08 ***
partycodeWRDInd          3.70157  1.39529  2.653 0.008013 **
partycodeWRDInd D       -0.42419  1.97573  -0.215 0.830012
partycodeWRDProgressive  0.91210  0.37675  2.421 0.015525 *
```

```

log(popyearMIL)          0.15273  0.04625  3.302 0.000969 ***
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) 0.11635  0.18803  0.619 0.536094
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) -0.03517  0.16987 -0.207 0.835970
regionmacroMidwest      0.29656  0.09731  3.048 0.002323 **
regionmacroSouth        0.37914  0.14184  2.673 0.007550 **
regionmacroWest         0.43903  0.12831  3.422 0.000629 ***
cong74                   0.57596  0.12359  4.660 3.26e-06 ***
cong75                   0.24154  0.15647  1.544 0.122737
cong76                   0.57383  0.17036  3.368 0.000763 ***
cong77                   -0.06903  0.17935 -0.385 0.700320
cong78                   -0.03919  0.21866 -0.179 0.857771
cong79                   0.27290  0.24715  1.104 0.269573

```

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 1.968 on 3851 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.08823, Adjusted R-squared: 0.07853
F-statistic: 9.09 on 41 and 3851 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Zero Inflation Negative Binomial (ZINB) Models

```

zinb01 <- zeroinfl(speeches ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data = HSols10, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)

```

```
summary(zinb01)
```

Call:

```

zeroinfl(formula = speeches ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 +
cong78 + cong79, data = HSols10, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)

```

Pearson residuals:

```

Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.5961 -0.5105 -0.4240 0.1160 22.1018

```

Count model coefficients (negbin with log link):

```

Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)      1.73961    0.71674  2.427 0.01522 *
entered          -0.02921    0.00888 -3.290 0.00100 **
log(popyearMIL)   0.02836    0.04947  0.573 0.56644
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) 0.10002    0.20780  0.481 0.63029
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) -0.09577    0.15919 -0.602 0.54744
cong74           0.62293    0.12938  4.815 1.48e-06 ***
cong75           0.50643    0.15411  3.286 0.00102 **
cong76           0.79295    0.17130  4.629 3.68e-06 ***
cong77           0.08885    0.17571  0.506 0.61308
cong78           0.17046    0.19215  0.887 0.37500
cong79           0.37520    0.19881  1.887 0.05914 .
Log(theta)       -0.88323    0.06466 -13.660 < 2e-16 ***

```

Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link):

```

Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)      -35.13011    7.26879 -4.833 1.34e-06 ***

```

```

entered          0.37329  0.09146  4.081 4.48e-05 ***
log(popyearMIL)    1.00056  0.37921  2.639 0.008326 **
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) -3.34500  0.96661 -3.461 0.000539 ***
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)    1.52601  0.92968  1.641 0.100707
cong74            -1.45344  1.02386 -1.420 0.155735
cong75            2.22088  0.90941  2.442 0.014602 *
cong76            2.34126  1.01544  2.306 0.021130 *
cong77            2.08797  1.04357  2.001 0.045414 *
cong78            2.41154  1.02251  2.358 0.018352 *
cong79            0.30645  1.19039  0.257 0.796842

```

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Theta = 0.4134

Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 2

Log-likelihood: -4607 on 23 Df

```

zinb02<- zeroinfl(speeches ~ seniorFACTOR +      log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
      | entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
factorcong
, data = HSols10, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)

```

summary(zinb02)

Call:

```

zeroinfl(formula = speeches ~ seniorFACTOR + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 +
      cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79 | entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + factorcong, data = HSols10,
      dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)

```

Pearson residuals:

```

  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.71359 -0.51524 -0.41368  0.09069 12.71393

```

Count model coefficients (negbin with log link):

```

Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)      -0.628159  1.130601 -0.556 0.578486
seniorFACTOR57    -3.092210  0.915987 -3.376 0.000736 ***
seniorFACTOR58    -0.201722  0.811806 -0.248 0.803759
seniorFACTOR60    -0.206379  0.672515 -0.307 0.758938
seniorFACTOR61    -0.841384  0.736016 -1.143 0.252972
seniorFACTOR62    -0.792715  0.651862 -1.216 0.223955
seniorFACTOR63    -1.700961  0.632633 -2.689 0.007173 **
seniorFACTOR64    -2.243052  0.671883 -3.338 0.000842 ***
seniorFACTOR65    -1.525404  0.628891 -2.426 0.015285 *
seniorFACTOR66    -0.670283  0.627607 -1.068 0.285521
seniorFACTOR67    -2.004216  0.647715 -3.094 0.001973 **
seniorFACTOR68    -0.916790  0.614474 -1.492 0.135702
seniorFACTOR69    -1.383480  0.619387 -2.234 0.025508 *
seniorFACTOR70    -1.009741  0.620986 -1.626 0.103943
seniorFACTOR71    -1.481411  0.623168 -2.377 0.017443 *

```

seniorFACTOR72	-1.587120	0.610176	-2.601	0.009293	**
seniorFACTOR73	-1.447681	0.599035	-2.417	0.015662	*
seniorFACTOR74	-1.450461	0.608793	-2.383	0.017195	*
seniorFACTOR75	-1.560687	0.617916	-2.526	0.011546	*
seniorFACTOR76	-1.581360	0.618051	-2.559	0.010509	*
seniorFACTOR77	-1.624012	0.624229	-2.602	0.009278	**
seniorFACTOR78	-2.126640	0.636259	-3.342	0.000831	***
seniorFACTOR79	-1.918777	0.660043	-2.907	0.003649	**
log(popyearMIL)	0.304311	0.608704	0.500	0.617123	
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-0.713987	0.300907	-2.373	0.017655	*
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.492142	0.427636	1.151	0.249797	
stnameAL	0.705139	1.229053	0.574	0.566154	
stnameAR	0.740968	1.049972	0.706	0.480373	
stnameAZ	1.246171	0.605456	2.058	0.039567	*
stnameCA	1.032035	1.737111	0.594	0.552439	
stnameCO	0.382206	0.758752	0.504	0.614451	
stnameCT	0.280060	0.956486	0.293	0.769674	
stnameDE	1.370730	0.750676	1.826	0.067851	.
stnameFL	1.055383	0.998529	1.057	0.290540	
stnameGA	0.561615	1.274752	0.441	0.659526	
stnameIA	0.049693	1.137251	0.044	0.965147	
stnameID	1.231192	0.581096	2.119	0.034112	*
stnameIL	-0.091501	1.772352	-0.052	0.958826	
stnameIN	0.824219	1.302400	0.633	0.526834	
stnameKS	0.175461	0.978788	0.179	0.857731	
stnameKY	0.575125	1.204768	0.477	0.633096	
stnameLA	1.760709	1.099182	1.602	0.109192	
stnameMA	0.568338	1.439195	0.395	0.692917	
stnameMD	0.277613	0.983805	0.282	0.777803	
stnameME	0.043596	0.706671	0.062	0.950809	
stnameMI	0.850296	1.526781	0.557	0.577582	
stnameMN	1.448656	1.173440	1.235	0.217003	
stnameMO	0.240977	1.355875	0.178	0.858937	
stnameMS	1.478029	1.131876	1.306	0.191613	
stnameMT	2.159455	0.544928	3.963	7.41e-05	***
stnameNC	0.621631	1.333983	0.466	0.641218	
stnameND	2.795182	0.575072	4.861	1.17e-06	***
stnameNE	1.112562	0.835672	1.331	0.183078	
stnameNJ	-0.134420	1.420905	-0.095	0.924631	
stnameNM	1.442155	0.632705	2.279	0.022646	*
stnameNV	1.496993	1.100987	1.360	0.173930	
stnameNY	-0.009814	2.097907	-0.005	0.996268	
stnameOH	0.553067	1.699761	0.325	0.744894	
stnameOK	1.183032	1.087253	1.088	0.276554	
stnameOR	1.317365	0.742768	1.774	0.076131	.
stnamePA	0.087309	1.904319	0.046	0.963432	
stnameRI	-0.491238	0.748368	-0.656	0.511559	
stnameSC	0.718074	1.044091	0.688	0.491610	
stnameSD	1.501407	0.612512	2.451	0.014237	*
stnameTN	0.311738	1.233342	0.253	0.800455	
stnameTX	0.941684	1.657723	0.568	0.569995	
stnameUT	0.854119	0.628565	1.359	0.174197	
stnameVA	-0.223132	1.195142	-0.187	0.851897	
stnameVT	1.895502	0.617364	3.070	0.002138	**
stnameWA	1.315709	0.949339	1.386	0.165771	
stnameWI	1.408161	1.231791	1.143	0.252963	

stnameWV	1.006399	0.978364	1.029	0.303642
stnameWY	0.674992	0.799913	0.844	0.398764
cong74	0.420539	0.150990	2.785	0.005349 **
cong75	0.631505	0.274312	2.302	0.021327 *
cong76	1.027016	0.288303	3.562	0.000368 ***
cong77	0.267318	0.328325	0.814	0.415538
cong78	0.224228	0.510631	0.439	0.660575
cong79	0.468306	0.611632	0.766	0.443874
Log(theta)	-0.616210	0.081948	-7.519	5.50e-14 ***

Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link):

Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)

(Intercept)	-24.44683	6.50463	-3.758	0.000171 ***
entered	0.24007	0.08155	2.944	0.003239 **
log(popyearMIL)	1.28037	0.49099	2.608	0.009114 **
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-2.41279	1.04662	-2.305	0.021149 *
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.36367	1.04265	0.349	0.727244
factorcong74	-1.52438	0.71111	-2.144	0.032059 *
factorcong75	1.32399	0.69996	1.892	0.058553 .
factorcong76	1.40475	0.82112	1.711	0.087122 .
factorcong77	1.19610	0.83887	1.426	0.153913
factorcong78	1.58882	0.82923	1.916	0.055364 .
factorcong79	0.03454	1.23152	0.028	0.977625

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Theta = 0.54

Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 4

Log-likelihood: -4463 on 91 Df

```
zinb03<- zeroinfl(speeches ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + factorcong
| entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
factorcong
, data = HSols10, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)
```

summary(zinb03)

Call:

```
zeroinfl(formula = speeches ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + factorcong | entered + log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + factorcong, data = HSols10, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)
```

Pearson residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.6754	-0.5147	-0.4148	0.1069	12.2648

Count model coefficients (negbin with log link):

Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)

(Intercept)	1.021719	1.208159	0.846	0.397730
entered	-0.043653	0.009601	-4.547	5.45e-06 ***
log(popyearMIL)	0.161594	0.612942	0.264	0.792060
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-0.683742	0.295784	-2.312	0.020798 *

log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.503842	0.429774	1.172	0.241060
stnameAL	0.828112	1.236585	0.670	0.503064
stnameAR	0.841455	1.054731	0.798	0.424992
stnameAZ	1.289504	0.609606	2.115	0.034404 *
stnameCA	1.309877	1.751157	0.748	0.454456
stnameCO	0.563186	0.753176	0.748	0.454612
stnameCT	0.387986	0.969106	0.400	0.688895
stnameDE	1.331226	0.758627	1.755	0.079296 .
stnameFL	1.212297	1.007203	1.204	0.228733
stnameGA	0.829842	1.280265	0.648	0.516869
stnameIA	0.199268	1.145054	0.174	0.861846
stnameID	1.416433	0.578407	2.449	0.014331 *
stnameIL	0.393881	1.785974	0.221	0.825450
stnameIN	1.059297	1.310305	0.808	0.418840
stnameKS	0.462309	0.986629	0.469	0.639374
stnameKY	0.836080	1.209998	0.691	0.489580
stnameLA	1.827537	1.106228	1.652	0.098526 .
stnameMA	0.842093	1.450525	0.581	0.561548
stnameMD	0.604118	0.991538	0.609	0.542343
stnameME	-0.051010	0.713006	-0.072	0.942966
stnameMI	1.118189	1.538047	0.727	0.467215
stnameMN	1.487998	1.178099	1.263	0.206571
stnameMO	0.544744	1.364692	0.399	0.689768
stnameMS	1.514154	1.136139	1.333	0.182624
stnameMT	2.211030	0.554688	3.986	6.72e-05 ***
stnameNC	0.780906	1.338318	0.583	0.559558
stnameND	2.828227	0.576916	4.902	9.47e-07 ***
stnameNE	1.396710	0.837933	1.667	0.095544 .
stnameNJ	0.063406	1.432171	0.044	0.964687
stnameNM	1.349961	0.635306	2.125	0.033595 *
stnameNV	1.140080	1.110318	1.027	0.304512
stnameNY	0.601224	2.114668	0.284	0.776172
stnameOH	0.819058	1.709050	0.479	0.631762
stnameOK	1.416644	1.094405	1.294	0.195513
stnameOR	1.374090	0.749727	1.833	0.066834 .
stnamePA	0.390514	1.917801	0.204	0.838646
stnameRI	-0.586145	0.759681	-0.772	0.440371
stnameSC	0.738568	1.042418	0.709	0.478626
stnameSD	1.317276	0.617817	2.132	0.032995 *
stnameTN	0.525000	1.234636	0.425	0.670671
stnameTX	0.987785	1.664032	0.594	0.552774
stnameUT	1.064994	0.604715	1.761	0.078213 .
stnameVA	-0.081597	1.200339	-0.068	0.945803
stnameVT	1.790665	0.625793	2.861	0.004217 **
stnameWA	1.447205	0.958335	1.510	0.131012
stnameWI	1.582848	1.239981	1.277	0.201775
stnameWV	1.008237	0.981834	1.027	0.304471
stnameWY	0.506661	0.807748	0.627	0.530494
factorcong74	0.496052	0.145655	3.406	0.000660 ***
factorcong75	0.680932	0.273971	2.485	0.012940 *
factorcong76	1.064885	0.287981	3.698	0.000218 ***
factorcong77	0.303028	0.329386	0.920	0.357584
factorcong78	0.270276	0.514531	0.525	0.599384
factorcong79	0.430865	0.617062	0.698	0.485019
Log(theta)	-0.720970	0.074260	-9.709	< 2e-16 ***

Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link):

Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	-29.0831	8.0907	-3.595 0.000325 ***
entered	0.2955	0.1017	2.906 0.003656 **
log(popyearMIL)	1.1261	0.4261	2.643 0.008227 **
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-3.2478	1.1133	-2.917 0.003531 **
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	1.4698	1.0856	1.354 0.175775
factorcong74	-1.4684	0.7439	-1.974 0.048391 *
factorcong75	1.7387	0.8221	2.115 0.034441 *
factorcong76	1.8679	0.9568	1.952 0.050908 .
factorcong77	1.5418	0.9910	1.556 0.119767
factorcong78	1.9596	0.9404	2.084 0.037190 *
factorcong79	-0.2167	1.2904	-0.168 0.866638

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Theta = 0.4863

Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 2

Log-likelihood: -4505 on 70 Df

```
zinf04 <- zeroinfl(speeches ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data = HSols10, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)
```

summary(zinf04)

Call:

```
zeroinfl(formula = speeches ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 +
cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79, data = HSols10, dist = "negbin", EM = TRUE)
```

Pearson residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.6159	-0.5111	-0.4153	0.1174	22.0211

Count model coefficients (negbin with log link):

Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	1.373905	0.710697	1.933 0.05321 .
entered	-0.028307	0.008825	-3.208 0.00134 **
log(popyearMIL)	0.016305	0.054071	0.302 0.76299
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-0.140795	0.219870	-0.640 0.52194
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.307595	0.228053	1.349 0.17741
regionmacroMidwest	0.538246	0.122838	4.382 1.18e-05 ***
regionmacroSouth	0.507009	0.180325	2.812 0.00493 **
regionmacroWest	0.427908	0.136726	3.130 0.00175 **
cong74	0.564117	0.132256	4.265 2.00e-05 ***
cong75	0.467941	0.167760	2.789 0.00528 **
cong76	0.794772	0.181776	4.372 1.23e-05 ***
cong77	0.016677	0.194814	0.086 0.93178
cong78	-0.081428	0.252170	-0.323 0.74677
cong79	0.153153	0.281069	0.545 0.58583
Log(theta)	-0.843387	0.064948	-12.986 < 2e-16 ***

Zero-inflation model coefficients (binomial with logit link):

Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)


```

(Intercept)      -33.65349  6.64409 -5.065 4.08e-07 ***
entered          0.38654  0.08425  4.588 4.48e-06 ***
log(popyearMIL)  0.66316  0.30611  2.166 0.030282 *
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) -3.09665  0.88058 -3.517 0.000437 ***
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) 3.03778  0.98215  3.093 0.001982 **
regionmacroMidwest  0.54935  0.44221  1.242 0.214130
regionmacroSouth  1.63328  0.78228  2.088 0.036813 *
regionmacroWest   -4.20460  21.65560 -0.194 0.846052
cong74           -1.44318  0.75165 -1.920 0.054858 .
cong75            1.07161  0.85959  1.247 0.212524
cong76            1.24068  0.95227  1.303 0.192621
cong77            0.62309  1.06152  0.587 0.557216
cong78           -0.02182  1.24532 -0.018 0.986023
cong79           -1.71657  1.33209 -1.289 0.197528

```

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Theta = 0.4303

Number of iterations in BFGS optimization: 1

Log-likelihood: -4591 on 29 Df

Count Models with Logged Dependent Variable

```

countmodel01<-lm(countdv~house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +      log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 +
cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
summary(countmodel01)

```

Call:

```

lm(formula = countdv ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
    log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
    stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79,
    data = HSols10)

```

Residuals:

```

Min  1Q  Median  3Q  Max
-6.5075 -1.3348 -0.4768  0.6843 30.3839

```

Coefficients:

```

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)      0.071790  2.537019  0.028 0.977430
house           -1.327663  0.194110 -6.840 1.25e-11 ***
seniorFACTOR57   -2.961157  1.975883 -1.499 0.134221
seniorFACTOR58    0.033694  1.855050  0.018 0.985511
seniorFACTOR60    1.341253  1.331078  1.008 0.313823
seniorFACTOR61    0.093939  1.554871  0.060 0.951834
seniorFACTOR62    0.247456  1.310266  0.189 0.850234
seniorFACTOR63   -0.817455  1.260022 -0.649 0.516613
seniorFACTOR64    0.019201  1.442230  0.013 0.989380
seniorFACTOR65    1.464595  1.283131  1.141 0.253916
seniorFACTOR66    0.973644  1.248992  0.780 0.435809
seniorFACTOR67   -0.292112  1.325921 -0.220 0.825667
seniorFACTOR68   -0.211511  1.204372 -0.176 0.860622

```

seniorFACTOR69	0.281680	1.234103	0.228	0.819493
seniorFACTOR70	0.680481	1.229564	0.553	0.580067
seniorFACTOR71	0.334700	1.246040	0.269	0.788274
seniorFACTOR72	-0.232877	1.197175	-0.195	0.845799
seniorFACTOR73	-0.173836	1.167270	-0.149	0.881637
seniorFACTOR74	0.010537	1.189220	0.009	0.992932
seniorFACTOR75	-0.191687	1.213509	-0.158	0.874513
seniorFACTOR76	0.150843	1.220915	0.124	0.901692
seniorFACTOR77	0.185723	1.232887	0.151	0.880284
seniorFACTOR78	-0.364581	1.263845	-0.288	0.773036
seniorFACTOR79	-0.118456	1.332664	-0.089	0.929186
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor	-0.307210	1.413523	-0.217	0.827982
partycodeWRDDemocrat	0.281275	0.224051	1.255	0.209568
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor	3.111217	0.850171	3.660	0.000263 ***
partycodeWRDInd	1.228144	2.119987	0.579	0.562481
partycodeWRDProgressive	-0.082389	0.798974	-0.103	0.917885
log(popyearMIL)	-0.597735	1.451390	-0.412	0.680531
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-1.157973	0.644061	-1.798	0.072434 .
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.841599	1.012982	0.831	0.406240
stnameAL	1.987732	2.915948	0.682	0.495572
stnameAR	1.885497	2.481959	0.760	0.447591
stnameAZ	0.482583	1.441650	0.335	0.737875
stnameCA	3.844135	4.130746	0.931	0.352235
stnameCO	1.053255	1.825260	0.577	0.564015
stnameCT	1.180026	2.282540	0.517	0.605263
stnameDE	0.180609	1.823626	0.099	0.921124
stnameFL	2.872022	2.379468	1.207	0.227663
stnameGA	1.646873	3.020622	0.545	0.585708
stnameIA	1.747341	2.705669	0.646	0.518524
stnameID	0.470814	1.372768	0.343	0.731682
stnameIL	2.760466	4.215663	0.655	0.512711
stnameIN	2.641361	3.088148	0.855	0.392539
stnameKS	1.036950	2.304017	0.450	0.652745
stnameKY	3.019618	2.863374	1.055	0.291830
stnameLA	4.339771	2.626635	1.652	0.098745 .
stnameMA	2.091664	3.423340	0.611	0.541312
stnameMD	2.000527	2.377997	0.841	0.400363
stnameME	1.616455	1.761485	0.918	0.358973
stnameMI	3.010892	3.636025	0.828	0.407790
stnameMN	1.736676	2.779093	0.625	0.532147
stnameMO	2.075548	3.222782	0.644	0.519680
stnameMS	2.285589	2.669686	0.856	0.392094
stnameMT	2.534930	1.291577	1.963	0.049910 *
stnameNC	2.906203	3.183832	0.913	0.361526
stnameND	4.871374	1.372779	3.549	0.000402 ***
stnameNE	3.400841	2.006975	1.695	0.090421 .
stnameNJ	1.728246	3.386262	0.510	0.609884
stnameNM	0.865240	1.514513	0.571	0.567901
stnameNV	-0.461155	2.661748	-0.173	0.862481
stnameNY	3.435761	4.995796	0.688	0.491752
stnameOH	3.201038	4.036343	0.793	0.427899
stnameOK	2.420831	2.573372	0.941	0.347031
stnameOR	1.288756	1.740766	0.740	0.459236
stnamePA	2.662557	4.521948	0.589	0.556098
stnameRI	-0.002269	1.772054	-0.001	0.998979
stnameSC	1.351624	2.480171	0.545	0.585871

stnameSD	2.084578	1.501803	1.388	0.165373
stnameTN	2.031015	2.924254	0.695	0.487474
stnameTX	3.392874	3.934046	0.862	0.388614
stnameUT	0.628507	1.450737	0.433	0.664921
stnameVA	2.145701	2.862125	0.750	0.453586
stnameVT	1.498104	1.453867	1.030	0.303012
stnameWA	2.626094	2.264487	1.160	0.246401
stnameWI	2.742041	2.934738	0.934	0.350312
stnameWV	1.836503	2.322589	0.791	0.429263
stnameWY	-0.264258	1.984244	-0.133	0.894074
cong74	0.600231	0.312480	1.921	0.054980 .
cong75	0.874839	0.620749	1.409	0.158990
cong76	1.625385	0.644131	2.523	0.011748 *
cong77	0.244549	0.752544	0.325	0.745265
cong78	0.281606	1.189561	0.237	0.812905
cong79	0.379229	1.439106	0.264	0.792196

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 2.683 on 1232 degrees of freedom
(2576 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.1608, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1036

F-statistic: 2.811 on 84 and 1232 DF, p-value: 1.505e-14

```
countmodel02<-lm(countdv~house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 +
cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
summary(countmodel02)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = countdv ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 +
cong79, data = HSols10)
```

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-5.020	-1.364	-0.589	0.530	32.231

Coefficients:

Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	2.01583	1.26945	1.588 0.11254
house	-1.28618	0.19266	-6.676 3.65e-11 ***
seniorFACTOR57	-2.25755	1.90228	-1.187 0.23554
seniorFACTOR58	1.06644	1.72522	0.618 0.53659
seniorFACTOR60	1.42560	1.23618	1.153 0.24903
seniorFACTOR61	-0.12978	1.35404	-0.096 0.92366
seniorFACTOR62	0.48658	1.16963	0.416 0.67747
seniorFACTOR63	-0.28775	1.14848	-0.251 0.80221
seniorFACTOR64	0.25524	1.34652	0.190 0.84968
seniorFACTOR65	1.80162	1.17115	1.538 0.12422
seniorFACTOR66	1.53625	1.13130	1.358 0.17472
seniorFACTOR67	0.11332	1.19912	0.095 0.92472

```

seniorFACTOR68      0.30581  1.08258  0.282  0.77762
seniorFACTOR69      0.69511  1.11431  0.624  0.53287
seniorFACTOR70      0.94461  1.11380  0.848  0.39654
seniorFACTOR71      0.72853  1.13264  0.643  0.52020
seniorFACTOR72      0.34822  1.08637  0.321  0.74862
seniorFACTOR73      0.34264  1.06187  0.323  0.74700
seniorFACTOR74      0.64033  1.07511  0.596  0.55155
seniorFACTOR75      0.48273  1.09113  0.442  0.65827
seniorFACTOR76      0.61936  1.09908  0.564  0.57318
seniorFACTOR77      0.74899  1.12272  0.667  0.50481
seniorFACTOR78      0.04503  1.15253  0.039  0.96884
seniorFACTOR79      0.23477  1.21512  0.193  0.84682
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor -0.23784  1.40412 -0.169  0.86552
partycodeWRDDemocrat    0.19402  0.20683  0.938  0.34838
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor  2.12544  0.73092  2.908  0.00370 **
partycodeWRDInd         2.44418  2.10182  1.163  0.24509
partycodeWRDProgressive  0.00329  0.63601  0.005  0.99587
log(popyearMIL)        0.17093  0.11536  1.482  0.13867
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) -0.32510  0.45342 -0.717  0.47350
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)  0.74742  0.43766  1.708  0.08793 .
regionmacroMidwest     0.64207  0.24942  2.574  0.01016 *
regionmacroSouth       0.87004  0.36309  2.396  0.01671 *
regionmacroWest        0.56463  0.30890  1.828  0.06781 .
cong74                 0.59526  0.28972  2.055  0.04012 *
cong75                 0.38099  0.37054  1.028  0.30404
cong76                 1.04461  0.39800  2.625  0.00878 **
cong77                 -0.42938  0.42705 -1.005  0.31487
cong78                 -0.49055  0.53608 -0.915  0.36032
cong79                 -0.39423  0.59908 -0.658  0.51062

```

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 2.726 on 1276 degrees of freedom
(2576 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.1024, Adjusted R-squared: 0.0743
F-statistic: 3.641 on 40 and 1276 DF, p-value: 5.214e-13

```

countmodel03<-lm(countdv~seniorFACTOR + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
summary(countmodel03)

```

Call:

```

lm(formula = countdv ~ seniorFACTOR + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 +
cong77 + cong78 + cong79, data = HSols10)

```

Residuals:

```

Min   1Q Median   3Q   Max
-5.3187 -1.3442 -0.5860  0.5937 31.0714

```

Coefficients:

```

Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)      1.155134  2.583687  0.447 0.654890

```

seniorFACTOR57	-2.782320	2.019409	-1.378	0.168517
seniorFACTOR58	0.484386	1.688255	0.287	0.774225
seniorFACTOR60	0.363333	1.353466	0.268	0.788400
seniorFACTOR61	-0.996778	1.581670	-0.630	0.528676
seniorFACTOR62	-0.545003	1.334822	-0.408	0.683127
seniorFACTOR63	-1.756327	1.279117	-1.373	0.169977
seniorFACTOR64	-1.402742	1.457079	-0.963	0.335882
seniorFACTOR65	0.785040	1.304666	0.602	0.547472
seniorFACTOR66	0.046033	1.263327	0.036	0.970939
seniorFACTOR67	-1.822687	1.334819	-1.365	0.172346
seniorFACTOR68	-0.975386	1.224085	-0.797	0.425704
seniorFACTOR69	-1.074424	1.244203	-0.864	0.388006
seniorFACTOR70	-0.411515	1.245982	-0.330	0.741249
seniorFACTOR71	-0.975468	1.257828	-0.776	0.438182
seniorFACTOR72	-1.077955	1.216892	-0.886	0.375883
seniorFACTOR73	-1.280394	1.182968	-1.082	0.279304
seniorFACTOR74	-1.054320	1.204757	-0.875	0.381673
seniorFACTOR75	-1.398874	1.226563	-1.140	0.254306
seniorFACTOR76	-1.116598	1.228809	-0.909	0.363694
seniorFACTOR77	-0.829081	1.249942	-0.663	0.507264
seniorFACTOR78	-1.720420	1.274022	-1.350	0.177139
seniorFACTOR79	-1.132289	1.352465	-0.837	0.402639
log(popyearMIL)	-0.516760	1.480404	-0.349	0.727098
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-1.104367	0.655923	-1.684	0.092495 .
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	1.231615	1.029916	1.196	0.231988
stnameAL	2.146821	2.979735	0.720	0.471369
stnameAR	1.796473	2.536331	0.708	0.478895
stnameAZ	0.749293	1.463469	0.512	0.608744
stnameCA	3.105481	4.216242	0.737	0.461535
stnameCO	1.251399	1.860021	0.673	0.501208
stnameCT	0.651020	2.328936	0.280	0.779881
stnameDE	0.382959	1.854792	0.206	0.836458
stnameFL	2.954737	2.428905	1.216	0.224030
stnameGA	1.664594	3.086844	0.539	0.589808
stnameIA	1.402985	2.764142	0.508	0.611848
stnameID	1.013545	1.400874	0.724	0.469504
stnameIL	1.885854	4.303444	0.438	0.661304
stnameIN	2.184813	3.154013	0.693	0.488622
stnameKS	0.506431	2.352664	0.215	0.829601
stnameKY	2.948436	2.926303	1.008	0.313861
stnameLA	4.367109	2.682275	1.628	0.103751
stnameMA	1.444449	3.494150	0.413	0.679392
stnameMD	2.010284	2.424999	0.829	0.407274
stnameME	0.962688	1.799241	0.535	0.592710
stnameMI	2.145162	3.711532	0.578	0.563388
stnameMN	2.201266	2.830383	0.778	0.436878
stnameMO	1.526724	3.291229	0.464	0.642818
stnameMS	2.576755	2.727819	0.945	0.345037
stnameMT	2.626333	1.309643	2.005	0.045140 *
stnameNC	2.969676	3.253352	0.913	0.361523
stnameND	4.654115	1.402013	3.320	0.000928 ***
stnameNE	3.059671	2.043548	1.497	0.134587
stnameNJ	1.136352	3.456008	0.329	0.742359
stnameNM	1.277963	1.540806	0.829	0.407031
stnameNV	0.001115	2.705591	0.000	0.999671
stnameNY	2.434420	5.095003	0.478	0.632873

stnameOH	2.498566	4.121223	0.606	0.544448
stnameOK	2.236370	2.628333	0.851	0.395006
stnameOR	0.971051	1.778384	0.546	0.585144
stnamePA	2.001393	4.616162	0.434	0.664682
stnameRI	-0.119860	1.805682	-0.066	0.947086
stnameSC	1.886620	2.532706	0.745	0.456472
stnameSD	2.105509	1.535372	1.371	0.170519
stnameTN	1.965094	2.989178	0.657	0.511044
stnameTX	2.896255	4.018264	0.721	0.471185
stnameUT	0.695242	1.476522	0.471	0.637820
stnameVA	1.724359	2.923516	0.590	0.555417
stnameVT	1.576135	1.487136	1.060	0.289422
stnameWA	2.426084	2.309705	1.050	0.293745
stnameWI	2.193923	2.987271	0.734	0.462829
stnameWV	2.009544	2.372645	0.847	0.397179
stnameWY	0.643830	2.016132	0.319	0.749523
cong74	0.487590	0.317724	1.535	0.125129
cong75	0.710519	0.630678	1.127	0.260132
cong76	1.473411	0.653890	2.253	0.024415 *
cong77	0.052188	0.762541	0.068	0.945447
cong78	-0.063949	1.206435	-0.053	0.957735
cong79	-0.106321	1.460895	-0.073	0.941995

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 2.745 on 1238 degrees of freedom
(2576 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.1171, Adjusted R-squared: 0.06146

F-statistic: 2.105 on 78 and 1238 DF, p-value: 1.831e-07

```
countmodel04<-lm(countdv~entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data=HSols10)
summary(countmodel04)
```

```
countmodel04<-lm(countdv~entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
+ , data=HSols10)
summary(countmodel04)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = countdv ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 +
cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79, data = HSols10)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-3.026 -1.420 -0.813 0.477 33.025
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 5.136636 1.476513 3.479 0.00052 ***
entered -0.042818 0.018013 -2.377 0.01760 *
log(popyearMIL) 0.007353 0.111336 0.066 0.94735
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) -0.156866 0.447849 -0.350 0.72620
```

```

log(incomepercapitaTHOU)    0.724517  0.435144  1.665 0.09615 .
regionmacroMidwest         0.583695  0.241848  2.413 0.01594 *
regionmacroSouth           0.932316  0.348864  2.672 0.00762 **
regionmacroWest            0.553337  0.299506  1.848 0.06490 .
cong74                     0.662256  0.288279  2.297 0.02176 *
cong75                     0.420692  0.364767  1.153 0.24899
cong76                     1.136957  0.385914  2.946 0.00327 **
cong77                     -0.299805  0.416788 -0.719 0.47207
cong78                     -0.388707  0.522558 -0.744 0.45710
cong79                     -0.361431  0.580296 -0.623 0.53350

```

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 2.794 on 1303 degrees of freedom

(2576 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.03733, Adjusted R-squared: 0.02773

F-statistic: 3.887 on 13 and 1303 DF, p-value: 3.247e-06

Logistic Regression (Logit) Models

```

logit01 <- glm(logitdv ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
      log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
      , data = HSols10, family = "binomial")
summary(logit01)

```

Call:

```

glm(formula = logitdv ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
      log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
      stname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79,
      family = "binomial", data = HSols10)

```

Deviance Residuals:

```

  Min      1Q  Median      3Q      Max
-2.0086 -0.8677 -0.6569  1.1522  2.3352

```

Coefficients:

```

Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)      0.935005  1.499572  0.624 0.53295
house            -0.663673  0.100518 -6.603 4.04e-11 ***
seniorFACTOR57   -3.292043  1.284038 -2.564 0.01035 *
seniorFACTOR58   -1.178782  1.428644 -0.825 0.40931
seniorFACTOR60   -0.713838  1.191409 -0.599 0.54907
seniorFACTOR61   -1.466123  1.208213 -1.213 0.22495
seniorFACTOR62   -1.727309  1.149069 -1.503 0.13278
seniorFACTOR63   -2.382772  1.123060 -2.122 0.03386 *
seniorFACTOR64   -3.052919  1.158000 -2.636 0.00838 **
seniorFACTOR65   -3.022173  1.125575 -2.685 0.00725 **
seniorFACTOR66   -1.681573  1.122545 -1.498 0.13413
seniorFACTOR67   -2.457148  1.134496 -2.166 0.03032 *
seniorFACTOR68   -1.679809  1.110749 -1.512 0.13045
seniorFACTOR69   -2.234251  1.117199 -2.000 0.04551 *
seniorFACTOR70   -2.239859  1.116214 -2.007 0.04479 *
seniorFACTOR71   -2.510854  1.117509 -2.247 0.02465 *

```

seniorFACTOR72	-2.701947	1.106678	-2.441	0.01463	*
seniorFACTOR73	-2.353669	1.099930	-2.140	0.03237	*
seniorFACTOR74	-2.556911	1.104930	-2.314	0.02066	*
seniorFACTOR75	-2.618629	1.108645	-2.362	0.01818	*
seniorFACTOR76	-2.757454	1.110344	-2.483	0.01301	*
seniorFACTOR77	-2.900502	1.113784	-2.604	0.00921	**
seniorFACTOR78	-3.152122	1.120011	-2.814	0.00489	**
seniorFACTOR79	-3.236557	1.133968	-2.854	0.00431	**
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor	14.761152	265.714861	0.056	0.95570	
partycodeWRDDemocrat	-0.083232	0.104688	-0.795	0.42658	
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor	0.655844	0.549115	1.194	0.23234	
partycodeWRDInd	12.633139	308.305371	0.041	0.96731	
partycodeWRDInd D	-11.777135	535.411269	-0.022	0.98245	
partycodeWRDProgressive	0.508334	0.507467	1.002	0.31648	
log(popyearMIL)	-0.004209	0.709131	-0.006	0.99526	
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-0.186783	0.298215	-0.626	0.53109	
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.171314	0.467322	0.367	0.71393	
stnameAL	0.986947	1.400577	0.705	0.48101	
stnameAR	0.974158	1.190054	0.819	0.41302	
stnameAZ	1.099238	0.683452	1.608	0.10776	
stnameCA	1.415794	1.988842	0.712	0.47655	
stnameCO	0.463931	0.841806	0.551	0.58156	
stnameCT	0.751461	1.074143	0.700	0.48418	
stnameDE	0.842477	0.829150	1.016	0.30959	
stnameFL	0.698625	1.123213	0.622	0.53395	
stnameGA	1.282350	1.455416	0.881	0.37827	
stnameIA	0.479912	1.294989	0.371	0.71094	
stnameID	0.997349	0.631238	1.580	0.11411	
stnameIL	0.360794	2.042127	0.177	0.85976	
stnameIN	1.270306	1.488744	0.853	0.39351	
stnameKS	1.126552	1.104637	1.020	0.30781	
stnameKY	0.676198	1.373197	0.492	0.62242	
stnameLA	1.480711	1.261003	1.174	0.24030	
stnameMA	1.561723	1.646829	0.948	0.34297	
stnameMD	0.338453	1.110990	0.305	0.76064	
stnameME	0.166444	0.765969	0.217	0.82798	
stnameMI	1.641502	1.756041	0.935	0.34990	
stnameMN	1.898795	1.342067	1.415	0.15712	
stnameMO	0.723835	1.549935	0.467	0.64049	
stnameMS	1.962737	1.293854	1.517	0.12927	
stnameMT	1.933918	0.620468	3.117	0.00183	**
stnameNC	0.648400	1.530843	0.424	0.67189	
stnameND	1.921517	0.669386	2.871	0.00410	**
stnameNE	0.692240	0.938958	0.737	0.46097	
stnameNJ	0.489119	1.619052	0.302	0.76257	
stnameNM	1.098470	0.686340	1.600	0.10949	
stnameNV	0.678972	1.227580	0.553	0.58020	
stnameNY	0.600684	2.412619	0.249	0.80338	
stnameOH	0.898017	1.953942	0.460	0.64581	
stnameOK	1.814513	1.240336	1.463	0.14349	
stnameOR	1.794521	0.834991	2.149	0.03162	*
stnamePA	0.735170	2.190317	0.336	0.73714	
stnameRI	-0.161773	0.757492	-0.214	0.83089	
stnameSC	0.808589	1.179365	0.686	0.49296	
stnameSD	0.803211	0.682323	1.177	0.23913	
stnameTN	0.516856	1.407387	0.367	0.71344	

stnameTX	1.236556	1.907946	0.648	0.51691
stnameUT	0.919621	0.661597	1.390	0.16453
stnameVA	0.049061	1.368135	0.036	0.97139
stnameVT	1.127403	0.678318	1.662	0.09650
stnameWA	1.417446	1.086214	1.305	0.19191
stnameWI	2.077951	1.420930	1.462	0.14363
stnameWV	1.207605	1.108924	1.089	0.27616
stnameWY	-0.034673	0.881591	-0.039	0.96863
cong74	0.610330	0.150213	4.063	4.84e-05 ***
cong75	0.331641	0.288452	1.150	0.25026
cong76	0.570991	0.302281	1.889	0.05890
cong77	0.250004	0.352220	0.710	0.47783
cong78	0.080070	0.541899	0.148	0.88253
cong79	0.640590	0.662960	0.966	0.33392

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 4982.3 on 3892 degrees of freedom
 Residual deviance: 4516.6 on 3807 degrees of freedom
 AIC: 4688.6

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 12

```
logit02 <- glm(logitdv ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)
+ log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data = HSols10, family = "binomial")
summary(logit02)
```

Call:

```
glm(formula = logitdv ~ house + seniorFACTOR + partycodeWRD +
log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 +
cong79, family = "binomial", data = HSols10)
```

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-2.104	-0.883	-0.723	1.257	2.083

Coefficients:

Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	1.59812	1.12826	1.416 0.156647
house	-0.62676	0.09711	-6.454 1.09e-10 ***
seniorFACTOR57	-3.28374	1.25527	-2.616 0.008898 **
seniorFACTOR58	-1.08937	1.40218	-0.777 0.437210
seniorFACTOR60	-0.59608	1.17119	-0.509 0.610786
seniorFACTOR61	-1.54210	1.16980	-1.318 0.187416
seniorFACTOR62	-1.40806	1.11870	-1.259 0.208152
seniorFACTOR63	-1.85538	1.10080	-1.685 0.091895 .
seniorFACTOR64	-2.61397	1.13515	-2.303 0.021293 *
seniorFACTOR65	-2.63753	1.10235	-2.393 0.016727 *
seniorFACTOR66	-1.35022	1.09997	-1.228 0.219633

```

seniorFACTOR67      -2.04013  1.11051 -1.837 0.066193 .
seniorFACTOR68      -1.33806  1.08896 -1.229 0.219164
seniorFACTOR69      -1.72025  1.09442 -1.572 0.115987
seniorFACTOR70      -1.71502  1.09472 -1.567 0.117199
seniorFACTOR71      -2.14278  1.09636 -1.954 0.050649 .
seniorFACTOR72      -2.39393  1.08599 -2.204 0.027498 *
seniorFACTOR73      -1.96785  1.08168 -1.819 0.068873 .
seniorFACTOR74      -2.13497  1.08428 -1.969 0.048951 *
seniorFACTOR75      -2.22905  1.08717 -2.050 0.040332 *
seniorFACTOR76      -2.44619  1.08874 -2.247 0.024653 *
seniorFACTOR77      -2.51784  1.09310 -2.303 0.021257 *
seniorFACTOR78      -2.79468  1.09808 -2.545 0.010926 *
seniorFACTOR79      -2.82810  1.11133 -2.545 0.010934 *
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor  14.42665 265.16163 0.054 0.956611
partycodeWRDDemocrat    -0.21001 0.09472 -2.217 0.026609 *
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor  1.26922 0.48420 2.621 0.008760 **
partycodeWRDInd         12.66584 308.47068 0.041 0.967248
partycodeWRDInd D       -12.36121 535.41121 -0.023 0.981581
partycodeWRDProgressive  1.36380 0.43672 3.123 0.001791 **
log(popyearMIL)         0.11296 0.05241 2.155 0.031123 *
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) 0.41787 0.20887 2.001 0.045432 *
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) -0.46428 0.19218 -2.416 0.015696 *
regionmacroMidwest     0.30800 0.11016 2.796 0.005173 **
regionmacroSouth       0.20482 0.15994 1.281 0.200343
regionmacroWest        0.47559 0.14192 3.351 0.000805 ***
cong74                 0.66674 0.13705 4.865 1.15e-06 ***
cong75                 0.20984 0.17418 1.205 0.228318
cong76                 0.35014 0.18825 1.860 0.062889 .
cong77                 0.09537 0.19982 0.477 0.633160
cong78                 0.06525 0.24558 0.266 0.790478
cong79                 0.73280 0.27526 2.662 0.007764 **

```

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 4982.3 on 3892 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 4673.8 on 3851 degrees of freedom
AIC: 4757.8

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 12

```

logit03 <- glm(logitdv ~ house + entered + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)
+
      log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + sname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
      , data = HSols10, family = "binomial")
summary(logit03)

```

Call:

```

glm(formula = logitdv ~ house + entered + partycodeWRD + log(popyearMIL) +
     log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) + log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
     sname + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79,
     family = "binomial", data = HSols10)

```

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.8442	-0.8764	-0.6831	1.1758	2.3306

Coefficients:

Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	2.581376	1.189433	2.170 0.02999 *
house	-0.654740	0.096270	-6.801 1.04e-11 ***
entered	-0.055248	0.009294	-5.944 2.78e-09 ***
partycodeWRDAmerican Labor	14.819477	265.753755	0.056 0.95553
partycodeWRDDemocrat	0.005883	0.095666	0.061 0.95096
partycodeWRDFarmer-Labor	0.687826	0.540473	1.273 0.20315
partycodeWRDInd	13.166594	308.211229	0.043 0.96593
partycodeWRDInd D	-11.896765	535.411246	-0.022 0.98227
partycodeWRDProgressive	0.563907	0.498203	1.132 0.25768
log(popyearMIL)	-0.034924	0.698905	-0.050 0.96015
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	-0.239407	0.294179	-0.814 0.41575
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	0.260075	0.459610	0.566 0.57149
stnameAL	0.758373	1.383611	0.548 0.58362
stnameAR	0.853962	1.171636	0.729 0.46609
stnameAZ	0.997632	0.652878	1.528 0.12650
stnameCA	1.229281	1.960228	0.627 0.53059
stnameCO	0.467030	0.817683	0.571 0.56789
stnameCT	0.508685	1.058834	0.480 0.63093
stnameDE	0.579308	0.816741	0.709 0.47814
stnameFL	0.515576	1.104650	0.467 0.64069
stnameGA	1.182755	1.434172	0.825 0.40954
stnameIA	0.352714	1.276779	0.276 0.78235
stnameID	1.020898	0.612338	1.667 0.09547 .
stnameIL	0.288489	2.012645	0.143 0.88602
stnameIN	1.122579	1.467052	0.765 0.44416
stnameKS	1.112657	1.089922	1.021 0.30732
stnameKY	0.514124	1.355089	0.379 0.70439
stnameLA	1.237066	1.244827	0.994 0.32034
stnameMA	1.394859	1.623865	0.859 0.39035
stnameMD	0.237844	1.094022	0.217 0.82789
stnameME	-0.321400	0.759421	-0.423 0.67214
stnameMI	1.584899	1.730759	0.916 0.35981
stnameMN	1.680989	1.321587	1.272 0.20339
stnameMO	0.589817	1.528215	0.386 0.69953
stnameMS	1.808978	1.273439	1.421 0.15545
stnameMT	1.832570	0.608784	3.010 0.00261 **
stnameNC	0.491480	1.508472	0.326 0.74457
stnameND	1.924719	0.659658	2.918 0.00353 **
stnameNE	0.574914	0.923180	0.623 0.53345
stnameNJ	0.341839	1.596702	0.214 0.83048
stnameNM	0.796925	0.671555	1.187 0.23535
stnameNV	0.425690	1.213739	0.351 0.72579
stnameNY	0.551846	2.380307	0.232 0.81666
stnameOH	0.750452	1.925790	0.390 0.69677
stnameOK	1.676843	1.223335	1.371 0.17046
stnameOR	1.539151	0.824293	1.867 0.06187 .
stnamePA	0.619995	2.159595	0.287 0.77404
stnameRI	-0.476097	0.751451	-0.634 0.52636
stnameSC	0.727359	1.157218	0.629 0.52965
stnameSD	0.585479	0.672686	0.870 0.38410

stnameTN	0.436616	1.385383	0.315	0.75264
stnameTX	0.909958	1.881283	0.484	0.62861
stnameUT	1.023540	0.634464	1.613	0.10669
stnameVA	-0.265619	1.349825	-0.197	0.84400
stnameVT	1.053086	0.666493	1.580	0.11410
stnameWA	1.301363	1.072680	1.213	0.22506
stnameWI	1.921390	1.399270	1.373	0.16971
stnameWV	1.085503	1.092440	0.994	0.32039
stnameWY	-0.190399	0.870603	-0.219	0.82689
cong74	0.585933	0.146421	4.002	6.29e-05 ***
cong75	0.329352	0.283789	1.161	0.24582
cong76	0.550746	0.297259	1.853	0.06392 .
cong77	0.206084	0.347225	0.594	0.55284
cong78	-0.037591	0.533487	-0.070	0.94383
cong79	0.452834	0.650621	0.696	0.48643

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 4982.3 on 3892 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 4593.0 on 3828 degrees of freedom
AIC: 4723

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 12

```
logit04 <- glm(logitdv ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) +
  regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 + cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79
, data = HSols10, family = "binomial")
summary(logit04)
```

Call:

```
glm(formula = logitdv ~ entered + log(popyearMIL) + log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND) +
log(incomepercapitaTHOU) + regionmacro + cong74 + cong75 +
cong76 + cong77 + cong78 + cong79, family = "binomial", data = HSols10)
```

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.5273	-0.9148	-0.7764	1.3388	1.8819

Coefficients:

Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	3.947925	0.678273	5.821 5.87e-09 ***
entered	-0.065763	0.008527	-7.713 1.23e-14 ***
log(popyearMIL)	-0.014041	0.048111	-0.292 0.77041
log(govrevpercapitafilledHUND)	0.469283	0.200838	2.337 0.01946 *
log(incomepercapitaTHOU)	-0.427296	0.185854	-2.299 0.02150 *
regionmacroMidwest	0.331461	0.105237	3.150 0.00163 **
regionmacroSouth	0.017662	0.149815	0.118 0.90615
regionmacroWest	0.379275	0.134049	2.829 0.00466 **
cong74	0.677489	0.131747	5.142 2.71e-07 ***
cong75	0.221270	0.166274	1.331 0.18327
cong76	0.314518	0.178281	1.764 0.07770 .

cong77	0.065852	0.190023	0.347	0.72893
cong78	-0.021563	0.234585	-0.092	0.92676
cong79	0.575041	0.261686	2.197	0.02799 *

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 4982.3 on 3892 degrees of freedom

Residual deviance: 4837.2 on 3879 degrees of freedom

AIC: 4865.2

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

Chapter 6

The Poor in Their Minds:

Conceptions of the Poor by Members of Congress, 1933-1946

Abstract

The poor are often conceived in monolithic terms, belying the unequal manner the antipoverty regime incorporates certain poor groups more than others. And yet, no existing study systematically documents which groups and ideas lawmakers engage when they virtually represent the interests of the poor. Therefore, this chapter disaggregates the poor monolith to expose who Members of Congress (MCs) conceptualize when they rhetorically engage poverty. First, the chapter uses topic modeling to uncover the themes that span across poverty speeches, exposing partisan differences in what issues MCs link with poverty. To uncover greater specificity, the chapter then builds on the original poverty speech dataset with a comprehensive coding scheme to identify how poor groups are framed. This coded dataset offers a basis to evaluate the quality of poor representation when compared with who is poor in the public and which poor receive policy supports. It is revealed lawmakers are proficient at depicting the *breadth* of groups that face poverty but are notably less successful at aggregating a view of the poor that reflects the *depth* of poverty among disadvantaged groups. Moreover, evidence suggests there is a hierarchy of the poor in the minds of lawmakers, where the hungry, elderly, children, workers and farm families rise to the top, while racial minorities, migrants, and residents of territories and D.C. receive the least attention. Taken in its entirety, accounting for this fractious representational process contextualizes the nature of America's inequitable antipoverty regime.

There is nothing in this bill for the blind and the cripples unless they live to be 65 or 70 years of age. I shall vote and work to have this bill amended to include the needy blind and the needy cripples and to give to them the same rate of pension as the needy old people... Under this bill they are not considered, because they are under 65 years of age and are unable to get a dollar of this old-age pension money however needy they may be. They cannot come under the unemployment insurance provisions of this bill because they are unemployed.

–Representative John M. Robsion (R-KY), April 15, 1935

Who most needs a pension in Louisiana? The colored people are among the poorest people we have in some instances. About one-third to 40 percent of our people are colored people. They do not vote in many of the Southern States. How many of them will ever get on the pension rolls? Huh! How many do you think? I give you just one guess to figure out how many will ever get on the pension rolls unless their sons and daughters and they themselves are on the voting list. That may seem like cheap demagoguery, but I am not afraid to say it. I am one southern Senator who can tell the truth about this matter. I am not afraid to say it. I do not want a pension system that will be of help only to those who declare themselves paupers and prove themselves unable to earn a living and eligible to be put on the roll. There is only one pension that will be worth anything at all, and that is a pension which goes to everybody who reaches a certain age. Do not make it an age that is the dying age. Do not make it an age when the death rattle is sounding in a man's throat.

–Senator Huey P. Long (D-LA), June 14, 1935

[The Social Security Act] is a plan to make the poor pay for their own pensions. It is a plan to save the rich that expense... Instead of having a swarm of Government officials to keep tab on thirty millions of workers throughout their entire life, in order to make them pay for an old-age pension which will not average over \$30 a month for a man and nothing at all for his wife, what the President and Congress should have done was to enlarge the grants in aid to the States. Why keep books on people until they are 65 years of age? Why not forget them until they are 65 and then, if they are alive, pay them a decent pension out of income taxes? A compulsory insurance system supported by a tax on wages and pay rolls is necessarily applicable to only a part of the people, while the benefits are certain to be inadequate for decent old-age support.

–Representative Herbert S. Bigelow (D-OH), March 4, 1937

I do not think that most Senators really appreciate what poverty is. I know there is distress, I know there is poverty on the farm, but there is no poverty, Mr. President, comparable to the poverty of the slums. When the people in my city are impoverished, they have nothing to eat but the sidewalks of New York. In the rural sections there are means of acquiring foodstuffs. They may not be desirable from the [E]picurean standpoint, but at least they maintain life.

–Senator Royal S. Copeland (D-NY), March 10, 1938

Introduction

The three previous chapters demonstrated lawmakers are internally divided at virtually representing the poor through poverty rhetoric in floor speeches. There are temporal, spatial, partisan, chamber, and economic bases to this variation in the historical account of poverty speeches, but this behavior is not based on any single variable and suggests interest in poverty representation is highly idiosyncratic. This chapter moves ahead to address the central outstanding question: *who* among the poor do lawmakers depict when they speak about poverty during the pathbreaking New Deal period? Answering this question is of central import to the study of the politics of poverty because the choice to identify certain groups and not others (and the way these groups are framed) impacts how elites contest the image of the poor, inform the public of who is in need of state action, and construct target populations for policy remediation.

As the succeeding chapter will document, Congress is collectively adept at identifying the *breadth* of poor groups across the country, but is notably less successful at accurately capturing the *depth* of poverty among these groups.⁴¹ Since the process of articulating the image of the poor significantly varies from member to member, each favoring certain groups or characterizations over others, the sum of these divergent views aggregates into a fractious, biased political construction of the American poor. While the chapter is geared toward empirical discovery (what happened during the creation of the American welfare state) and theory building (understanding the process of virtual representation), the resulting analyses provide the basis for formulating hypotheses about why some poor receive benefits while others do not.

⁴¹ “Breadth” is defined as the number of discrete categories of the poor that are portrayed by members individually and collectively in Congress. Essentially, how comprehensively is Congress depicting the range of poor populations that exist in the public. Alternatively, “depth” is how well rhetoric reflects which groups face the most pervasive, persistent material hardships in the nation. This dimension measures the degree to which Congress is attuned to levels of poverty among differing groups, best fulfilled when the poorest members of the public receive a greater proportion of attention.

Dilemmas in Representing the Poor

To briefly step back, several key dynamics provide insights into the problematic nature of representing poor people and their corresponding interests. For one, the poor face immense structural problems in politics, as they are internally fragmented based on varying causes of their plight and yet are perceived in a nebulously broad manner (Thompson and Wildavsky 1986; Carr 2008), face social isolation (Harrington 1962) and geographical diffusion (Jusko 2017), and hold little in the way of resources to mobilize political power (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Franko, Kelly and Witko 2016). This complex sociopolitical topography is compounded further by how political representatives receive information upon which to base a conceptualization of the poor. Some MCs have experienced poverty first-hand and represent the poor in a descriptive sense through personal experience, while others must rely on secondary sources of information, such as the input of peers, expert witnesses in committee hearings, government research reports, the media, and direct constituent interaction. The sum of these bases for developing a perspective on the poor provides an opportunity for lawmakers to develop a holistic, comprehensive view of the problems of the poor, while an overly narrow reliance on few information sources risks legislating based on ignorance, preconceived biases, and stereotypical conceptions of the poor. This tension is brought into greater relief when non-poor lawmakers represent poor interests—the virtual form of representation—because their personal knowledge of poverty may be limited, requiring lawmakers to work especially hard to avoid the pitfalls of biased and incomplete group representation.

Moreover, even lawmakers with full and complete information face the dilemma of being overly general or overly specific in their portrayals of the poor, which have the hazards of insufficiently treating causes of the complex problem, or only addressing the conditions of a privileged subset of the poor. Procedural strategies like logrolling and omnibus legislation present

an opportunity for all MCs to get something for their poor, assuming they are interested in the issue and accurately describe their poor constituents. However, in practice poverty is difficult to address *in toto*, leading lawmakers (and bureaucrats and the public) to expediently divide the poor into “most deserving” sub-populations (Handler and Hollingsworth 1971; Katz 1989; Will 1993; Appelbaum 2001; Moffitt 2015; Desante 2018). This hazardous but functional approach helps MCs avoid an Arrow’s Paradox of endless cycling based on each member only portraying the poor in their districts and failing to reach consensus on who to support. Instead, members may pursue a lowest common denominator form of political representation and policy construction. Therefore, it is pivotal members strike a balance between understanding the big picture—where government policies require the least tailoring—and the nuances of specific subgroup conditions—which poses issues for how to get a majority of members on board for policy solutions—in order to satisfactorily function as representatives of the poor.⁴²

By way of example, the preceding epigraphs illustrate the enduring pattern of favoritism and fragmentation of the poor by even well-meaning, poverty-interested speakers in Congress: Robsion’s juxtaposition of the relative status of the unemployed disabled population with the more legislatively privileged elderly; Long (correctly) arguing many Black people will be shut out from the social insurance program, and (incorrectly) suggesting those that are enrolled in the program will carry an unjust stigma compared to ordinary folks; Bigelow lamenting inadequate pensions

⁴² Ideally, who benefits from poverty policy would be a function of who is poor, regardless of age, race, gender, citizenship, region, or quality of political representation. However, it is naïve to think a republican form of government with heavy ideological emphasis on individualism and federalism would ever develop such an automated system. Proponents of such an approach often face the difficult dilemma of potentially rewarding absentee or predatory local or state governments by nationalizing the costs of local problems. Then the question becomes: is it more important to maintain a sense of fairness in the political arena, or to actually eradicate poverty? During the New Deal, this was the dilemma facing Northern liberals: nationalize the costs of Southern poverty eradication, thereby empowering antidemocratic Southern politicians. Indeed, they erred toward perceived fairness and against the eradication approach.

for male workers, that further, do not include benefits for poor wives; and finally, Copeland's proclamation that urban poverty is categorically worse than the type felt in the countryside.

While there were indeed important legislative fixes that addressed some of these Congresspersons' concerns—amendments to the Social Security Act (SSA) later added modest disability and survivor's benefits by the end of the 1930s—the varied emphasis different members place on subgroups of the poor theoretically creates an issue for collective agreement on a sufficiently comprehensive solution. As these passages display, the prospects for ending poverty face an uphill battle when the poor are divided and weighed against one another based on health status and age, race, gender, and geographic location, respectively, as well as myriad other categories of sociopolitical import.

These observations lead to a quintessential puzzle in the study of political power and poverty: why are some of the poor represented and incorporated into the policy regime, while others are not, even in times of committed national antipoverty campaigns? To gain leverage on this *why* causal question, a necessary place to start is to descriptively understand the lacuna of *how* the poor are divided. Since rhetorical framing impacts public perception and support for policy remediation for poor groups (Iyengar 1990; Gilens 1999; Clawson and Trice 2000; Rose and Baumgartner 2013) and guide the parameters of policy construction within Congress (Ingram and Schneider 1990; Guetzkow 2010), documenting the manner in which Members of Congress (MCs) individually and collectively construct the poor as a group (Schneider and Ingram 1993) provides a foundation to better understand inequities in the representation of the poor. Therefore, this chapter examines who MCs depict as poor and qualitatively how they are framed in Congressional floor speeches. This endeavor provides vital insights into who lawmakers think is deserving of state help, and who is left to help themselves.

As we will see, New Deal-era lawmakers significantly divided the poor, while simultaneously constructing some of the most important social welfare policies in U.S. history. This puzzling dynamic provides an interesting venue to test the theory that the rhetorical field may correspond to the policy construction process. This idea is informed by the mixed visibility of the poor and poor sub-groups to politicians (Harrington 1962; Shipler 2005; Gurley 2016; Miler 2018), potentially impeding political incorporation. To the extent that lawmakers are aware of the poor, their rhetoric on the subject is fertile ground to understand which poor are legible and projected onto the polycscape. Specifically, this chapter investigates the hypothesis that the more a poor group appears in rhetoric the more likely they will gain inclusion in eventual policy. Contrapositively, if a poor group is hardly discussed, the expectation is that they stand little chance of policy incorporation. In short, heightened presence in rhetorical debates may be necessary, but insufficient, for a poor subpopulation to gain policy incorporation.

Collective portrayals of the poor matter because many MCs have not experienced poverty and there are few powerful interests propounding the needs of the poor, which means the antipoverty policy regime is often based on a virtual sense of who the poor are and what they need.⁴³ To understand virtual representation of the poor, one must observe the rhetorical contestation of poverty and commensurate policy responses that prevail among MCs.

Chapter Roadmap

The chapter is designed to uncover how largely non-poor members virtually represent the poor in floor speeches, with special attention to dispelling any notion of the poor as monolithic,

⁴³ Rhetoric is not always an important indicator of whether a group wins a benefit or not. For example, many powerful interest groups effectively work behind the scenes to capture MCs—be they energy companies or labor unions—and achieve policy victories in a covert manner. However, when people power and interest groups are absent, as is frequently the case with poor people, the public debate among MCs becomes a more integral venue to project disadvantaged groups into national prominence as a deserving target of state help.

documenting any stratification of favored and disfavored poor, and teasing out how rhetoric corresponds with policy on poverty matters. To address these inquiries, immediately following this section is a short note on the research design, data composition, and analytical approach, since the chapter diverges from existing Congressional studies on several important counts.

Next, Part I identifies the dominant topical themes across floor speeches on poverty—in essence, what issues come up in relation to poverty terminology. To accomplish this, the section utilizes a correlated topic model (CTM) of all poverty speeches in this period (1933-1946), and then smaller models for the two major parties, Democrats and Republicans. While the parties share many similarities in which topics are linked to poverty rhetoric, there are several notable party-specific topics and overall differences in topic frequency between the parties.

Finally, Part II turns to the individual speeches to examine the question of who among the poor MCs decide to represent. To answer this question, I present a comprehensive categorization scheme that captures the nuances of how Congress conceptualizes the poor, including objective measures of how often various groups are discussed. In addition to the descriptive summary of findings, this section employs pairwise correlation and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to assess relations between and dimensionality across codes. The results suggest there is a rhetorical hierarchy of the poor among lawmakers, with positively constructed, most deserving groups rising to the top, while neglected groups that face perennial discriminated against groups fall to the bottom. Additionally, this scheme creates a basis for comparison where subsequent chapters assess if rhetoric relates to which groups gain policy inclusion and which do not.

Notes on Research Design

Before proceeding, a few quick qualifying notes about the research design, data structure, and analytical approach in the chapter. First, the unit of analysis in this chapter is individual

poverty-related speeches, not aggregate speeches by member per Congress. Congressional studies predominantly use MCs as the primary unit of analysis; for example, by aggregating roll call votes to evaluate ideology, or co-sponsorship data to understand legislative networks, constructing 535 “observations.” However, that is not the case in this chapter, which takes the unique step of assessing important representational behavior through the 3,404 individual poverty speeches and content therein from 1933 to 1946.⁴⁴

On the data front, members may offer several poverty speeches a day, or none for an entire Congress, depending on individual behavior and structural factors. For one, MCs have many matters to tend to on a daily basis, with some more predisposed to speech-making than others. Additionally, member interests vary across topics and interact with the extant agenda of the day—frequently dictated by Congressional leadership—influencing what members choose to engage in speeches. Moreover, while members have wide latitude to interject and speak on the chamber floor, especially in the Senate, they do not necessarily have equal time. Indeed, one of Congressional leadership’s greatest tools is to delegate floor time to members, and to restrict it from others, as controlling the scope of the agenda is a foundational expression of political power (Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach and Baratz 1962). These behavioral and structural variables may skew the data in an unobserved way. Importantly, this study makes no claim as to how small or large an effect this may be. Instead, the succeeding analyses present the heretofore unaccounted historical record of what transpired in Congress when members did successfully use poverty rhetoric in a floor speech.

⁴⁴ The search terms and methodology employed to extract the poverty speeches are affixed to Chapter 2 as the 9-page Appendix 2A, which is severally available upon request. A highly abbreviated protocol is as follows: the project employed synonyms for the words “poor” and “poverty” to run Boolean searches of contiguous floor speeches in Congress through Hein Online’s interface. For a passage to count as a poverty speech, it had to have two correctly used poverty search terms (i.e., they are about material hardship and not, for example, a reference to “poor” weather).

This descriptive account is a first step to understand how the poor were represented by members in this period and provides a basis to evaluate the quality of that representation.

Finally, the analytical approach and data presentation in this chapter generally pool the speeches together across members and the underlying policy debates. A deficiency in this approach is it may miss qualitative nuances of specific debates at any given time that inform how members tie people and topics to poverty. However, a clear strength of this approach is its all-encompassing nature, which captures the macroscopic arc of poverty representation *as a whole* during the New Deal. Moreover, the speeches are coded for numerous explanatory variables, and disaggregated analyses are frequently presented to contextualize the substance of poverty rhetoric in this period.

Part I: Assessing Themes Across Speeches

Since the previous chapter statistically identified the partisan, geographic, and cultural bases to speaking about the poor in Congress and tested theories for why they partake in this endeavor, this section turns to the content of their speeches, specifically the prevailing themes that arise across poverty speeches. To claim the poor are represented in functional terms, it is not enough to show Congress responds to the poor at-large with increased speech propensity, but it also necessary to examine a) what policy issue domains Congress identifies in conjunction with poverty, and b) the relationship between poor sub-groups in the public and who is deemed poor by lawmakers to ensure Congress is comprehensive in its representational duties. Here, Part I addresses the former dynamic of topical associations, while Part II subsequently engages which members of the poor are subjects in poverty speeches.

This section first presents the broad themes that come up across all speeches on poverty to gauge what issues lawmakers tie to poverty. Second, given the previously uncovered equal

propensity of Democrats and Republicans to give a poverty speech in Congress, this section will also assess the degree to which depictions of the poor vary by partisan affiliation.

To accomplish these tasks, this study employs topic modeling (TM) without covariates using the structural topic modeling (STM) package in *R* and protocol of Roberts, Stewart and Tingley (Forthcoming) to construct a fast and descriptively valuable correlated topic model (CTM) (31).⁴⁵ Topic modeling is a useful device to understand word associations across observations in a corpus of text data, using the words that co-occur at the highest rates to form “topics” (Blei and Lafferty 2007; Grimmer and Stewart 2017). This approach is simultaneously quantitative (using word occurrences to create cross-speech correlation metrics) and qualitative (as the researcher chooses the number of topics, which instructs the substance of the output themes).

Given the interpretive and iterative nature of the method, scholars must be careful to temper the claims they make based on the approach. Automated approaches to data summary, such as topic modeling, are frequently used to interpret large corpuses of data in lieu of reading every document, or to supplement what a reader believes they are observing. In the latter case, topic modeling is useful as a triangulation approach and as a validity check. As an additional check on the method, I read every text in the study *in entirety* and encourage others to do so as well. By taking the comprehensive approach, the researcher increases the probability of accurately interpreting the outputs of the automated process, since a summary of the most common word usages alone is unlikely to fully encapsulate the underlying computational clustering process.

⁴⁵ Each type of topic model—latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), CTM and STM—use (slightly) different computations and present different metrics as outputs. For example, LDA software does not provide topic correlations to one another while CTM and STM both have that function. Additionally, running a CTM through the *topicmodels R* package takes longer and yields slightly different outputs than running a non-covariate STM through the *stm* package. Due to the improved function and capabilities, this study uses the *stm* package to essentially calculate three CTMs (STMs where the text data has no metadata covariates). For the sake of parsimony, this chapter uses the broad label of topic model and its abbreviation TM when describing the process and results.

Full Corpus Topic Model


To understand the general themes of poverty speeches in Congress, this study employs a 40 topic (K) TM on a corpus of 3,403 speeches, which leads to 22,679 scored words. The results are presented in Table 6.1, which has six columns: the thematic label is the author-constructed interpretation of what ideas best capture the word associations; high probability words are words most likely to have membership in the topic; FREX words are those that maximize having high frequency and high exclusivity to a topic; topic proportion is the topic's proportion of all topics based on the number of words in the topic, where the sum of all topics equals 100; exclusivity is a summary metric where a greater value corresponds with the topic being on average more exclusive; finally, semantic coherence is the degree to which the most probable words in a topic co-occur together, where less negative is more coherent (Roberts, Steward and Tingley Forthcoming, 11-12). Additionally, Figure 6.1 presents the topic proportions in graphic form.

The sprawling nature of the large K TM summary table requires clear, deductive unpacking. The first important element to note is the most common category entitled "Poor Needs" encompasses most of the poverty search terms employed to generate the corpus. While it is possible to exclude these common words from the analysis, this study keeps them under the principle that to fully understand the topic model, we need benchmarks and totems to provide points of comparison. For example, "Poor Needs" is the most common topic at 8.7% of the total corpus words, which is not surprising given the relation to search terms. But importantly, understanding the clustering of search terms helps explain and contextualize the upper bounds of the semantic coherence metric, since this topic is the most coherent at -14.82. This is vitally important given the relative nature of the coherence metric and will help assess the meaning of metrics for other topics.

Table 6.1 Topic Model of Poverty Speeches Set to 40 Topics, 1933-1946


Thematic Label	High Probability Words	FREX Words	Topic Prop.	Excl.	Sem. Coher.
Poor Needs	peopl, get, will, say, want, man, one	get, thing, want, talk, got, anyth, tell	8.70%	9.83	-14.82
Legis. Policy Process	bill, will, amend, vote, peopl, countri, pass	bill, amend, vote, pass, measur, legisl, will	5.86%	9.94	-25.26
Senate Speak	senat, presid, say, upon, state, may, think	senat, presid, think, say, wish, question, perhap	5.84%	9.86	-17.62
Federal Relief Efforts	relief, work, appropri, project, employ, administr, unemploy	relief, project, appropri, fiscal, roll, work, unemploy	4.74%	9.81	-35.81
House Speak	committe, chairman, member, hous, gentleman, congress, district	gentleman, chairman, committe, mitte, member, subcommitte, hear	4.50%	9.87	-33.45
Memorials	great, men, day, life, nation, human, one	love, memori, soul, etern, bless, lincoln, glori	3.42%	8.97	-20.76
Economic System	govern, will, nation, busi, econom, industri, upon	enterpris, government, ownership, opium, busi, econom, fundament	3.27%	9.42	-21.56
Unemp./Inequality	peopl, industri, nation, unemploy, problem, wealth, men	wealth, unemploy, poverti, solv, idl, machin, problem	3.10%	9.84	-31.72
Farm Finances	farm, farmer, land, agricultur, loan, program, year	farm, tenant, soil, farmer, mortgag, drought, acr	2.95%	9.79	-41.03
Taxation	tax, incom, pay, year, revenu, taxpay, will	tax, exempt, revenu, levi, taxat, income-tax, taxpay	2.91%	9.79	-52.72
Legis. Process Language	act, law, congress, state, author, provid, shall	act, approv, author, resolut, provis, section, joint	2.89%	9.83	-23.92
Economic Indicators	percent, per, year, incom, increas, total, cost	percent, figur, averag, total, estim, annum, capita	2.83%	9.94	-32.36
Parties and Elections	presid, administr, govern, year, peopl, new, nation	roosevelt, deficit, billion, hoover, budget, republican, deal	2.52%	9.71	-29.19
War (Alignment)	war, world, nation, will, state, unit, american	britain, british, neutral, hemispher, belliger, empir, england	2.44%	9.34	-39.16
Social Security (Critique)	state, pension, age, feder, govern, month, year	match, pension, needi, old-ag, age, blind, california	2.43%	9.84	-40.14
Monetary Policy	money, bank, gold, valu, dollar, bond, interest	gold, banker, currenc, silver, bank, monetari, deposit	2.37%	9.76	-49.05
Price Inflation	price, will, can, product, increas, must, good	inflat, inflationari, subsidi, rise, price, level, economi	2.31%	9.54	-37.68
Farm Commodities (MW)	price, product, farmer, pound, food, cent, milk	dairi, milk, butter, hog, bushel, meat, potato	2.28%	9.79	-44.22
Aid to Foreign Nations	peopl, food, unrra, countri, will, nation, suppli	unrra, opa, starv, food, itali, lehman, famin	2.25%	9.32	-45.19
Labor Dynamics	labor, wage, industri, worker, hour, work, employ	coal, wage, hour, miner, labor, minimum, bargain	2.24%	9.83	-39.10
Housing	hous, home, loan, build, construct, govern, new	slum, rent, loan, hous, rental, dwell, build	2.17%	9.74	-34.53
War (Military Role)	war, armi, nation, men, defens, will, world	defens, navi, armi, win, militari, war, munit	2.08%	9.64	-45.54
Education	school, state, educ, children, youth, feder, young	school, educ, teacher, colleg, youth, pupil, lunch	2.04%	9.85	-64.01
Law and Courts	state, court, constitut, right, power, suprem, congress	suprem, court, poll, qualif, constitut, unconstitut, elector	1.99%	9.77	-39.82
Political Use of Relief	polit, state, relief, administr, vote, money, use	hopkin, farley, politician, harri, polit, intimid, ticket	1.96%	9.63	-39.64
Party Ideology	parti, presid, american, republican, democrat, new, public	communist, platform, communism, plank, william, cleveland, repub	1.91%	9.30	-47.40
Social Security (Support)	social, secur, insur, state, benefit, fund, system	insur, social, retir, social-secur, secur, annuiti, benefit	1.80%	9.76	-39.38
Veterans' Needs	veteran, war, servic, disabl, soldier, world, pension	veteran, disabl, service-connect, eran, vet, soldier, bonus	1.62%	9.69	-48.84
Trade	trade, american, product, foreign, tariff, countri, world	tariff, export, trade, reciproc, foreign, domest, agreement	1.58%	9.85	-51.56
People and Places	state, north, senat, new, louisiana, dakota, south	dakota, louisiana, rhode, north, jersey, vermont, connecticut	1.54%	9.78	-69.05
Energy and Disasters	compani, power, electr, river, citi, flood, rate	electr, river, flood, dam, kilowatt, kilowatt-hour, valley	1.42%	9.69	-71.43
Foreign Affairs/War	state, nation, peopl, world, jew, govern, unit	palestin, jew, jewish, arab, greek, spain, atom	1.40%	8.92	-59.59
Farm Commodities (S)	cotton, farmer, wheat, south, price, produc, crop	bale, cotton, wheat, acreag, grower, cot, bankhead	1.34%	9.78	-60.75
NatAm & Insular Issues	indian, state, case, land, committe, unit, new	indian, tribe, theater, lett, duke, navaho, attorney	1.27%	9.26	-53.85
Medical Care	hospit, health, medic, doctor, care, servic, state	alcohol, physician, liquor, medic, hospit, patient, doctor	1.18%	9.78	-94.67
Racial Issues in South	negro, white, south, state, color, race, peopl	negro, lynch, color, alien, white, mob, antilynch	1.03%	9.75	-92.65
Territorial Issues	railroad, puerto, island, sugar, rico, railway, rate	puerto, rico, railway, rican, railroad, philippin, sugar	0.98%	9.77	-98.56
Pension Alternatives	townsend, plan, tax, pension, age, peopl, month	townsend, patent, transact, mcgroarti, plan, hoffman, elder	0.97%	9.58	-53.45
War (Foreign Actors)	poland, peopl, polish, german, american, one, nazi	polish, poland, pole, chines, japanes, nazi, chiang	0.94%	9.23	-89.17
Leftist Leaders/Ideas	man, econom, human, social, law, will, polit	olson, marx, floyd, farmer-labor, anemia, scienc, filosofoph	0.94%	9.06	-33.70

Note: Thematic label is based on the top 20 word-stem outputs from high probability words, FREX words, and score words (those words that show up the most in one topic relative to another), as well as several exemplar documents for each topic.

Figure 6.1 Topic Proportions, Full Corpus $K=40$ 

A second overarching observation of the TM outputs is how poverty at this time is interwoven with the largest issues of the era. Some of the key topics include: partisan electoral competition, monetary and fiscal policy, war, internationalism, agriculture and commodity production, health care, trade, labor management, veterans' issues, debates between capitalism and socialism, subnational issues relating to the territories in U.S. possession, indigenous issues, civil rights, and the very large presence of poverty arguments for and against the eventual Social Security Act of 1935. Additionally, many of these topics degenerate into sub-topics. For example, the three war categories span the proportion metric, but collectively account for about five percent of the words in the topic models, while the farming issues account for roughly six percent.

Third, the substance of each topic is not equal. For example, four of the top six highest proportion topics revolve around the legislative process (“Legislative Policy Process”), the termi-

Figure 6.2 Relations Between Topics, Full Model where $K=40$, Correlation ≥ 0.05 

nology that is unique to the practices and chamber norms in Congress (like starting all speeches with “Mr. President” in “Senate Speak” or “Mr. Speaker” in “House Speak”), and symbolic memorials to historical and recently deceased leaders (“Memorials”). This is an important reminder that researchers should thoroughly investigate topic construction, since the computational process is atheoretical and cannot separate substantive words from simply high use and exclusive words. The high prominence and exclusivity of these topics reveals how much time MCs spend on pleasantries, decorum, parliamentary procedure, and purely symbolic acts, even when it comes to loaded debates about how to address systemic poverty in the United States.

For further analysis, Figure 6.2 helps uncover relations between topics by capturing which topics are likely to show up in the same document.⁴⁶ Although the web of associations is complex,

⁴⁶ The correlation level is set to a low threshold throughout this study to uncover possible relations, but this should not be mistakenly perceived as strong or “real” relations. Said differently, these relationships are true in the data, but their substantive meaning in the practice of politics likely requires additional verification—low threshold correlations based on TM alone are insufficient to claim issues are intertwined. However, reading all of the corpus

since topic labels were assessed based on top words, if the clusters here make sense it lends face validity to the interpretive label-making part of the TM analytical and data presentation process. To illustrate, the left-center of the figure shows trade, farm finances, and commodities are collinear with one another, as one would expect. Moreover, all of the war topics in the center-left correlate with one another, while on the center-right the legislative policy processes relate heavily to the major social welfare policy debates on Social Security and relief efforts. Additionally, the latter term also relates to the “Political Use of Relief” topic on one side, and “Parties and Elections” on the other, showing how political machinations and work relief became enmeshed in the New Deal Congresses.

However, this graphic illustrates some peculiar relationships as well. While most macroeconomic topics relate to one another in the bottom-left and center-left, “Monetary Policy” is noticeably out of sync and is more closely related to “Parties and Elections.” Interestingly, “Veterans’ Needs” are more associated with the general legislative policy process than discussions about war, suggesting lawmakers do indeed think about current military matters depart from veterans’ issues, at least when centered on poverty. Additionally, “Aid to Foreign Nations” is not associated with any topics, even though discussions about helping the poor in other nations were frequently associated with trade, commodities, and the war effort and rebuilding process.

Indeed, “Aid to Foreign Nations” is one of only a handful of topics that stand alone (in that they correlate less than 0.05), which also includes “Education,” “Housing,” “Energy and Disasters,” and “Territorial Issues.” Native American issues are only tied to the policy process, which is significant given Congress’ historical role as the self-anointed steward for the indigenous populace. While it is hard to completely surmise substantive distinction between all high and low

documents could provide this material verification, which is why I encourage practitioners of topic modeling to also take the effort to read all of their text files.

correlated topics, we can say based on the TM that the *language* used in relation to each topic is more distinct in the low correlated topics.

Having established some general patterns in the broad TM of poverty speeches, it is now useful to move to the party-based models to expose similarities and differences in how partisans connect poverty to different contemporary issues.

Party-Based Topic Models


As previously shown in Chapter 3 and verified as statistically robust in Chapter 4, in the 1930s and 1940s roughly one-third of Democrats and one-third of Republicans delivered a poverty speech in a given Congress—a stunningly similar speech propensity that serves as an indicator of a less overtly partisan era in American politics. But digging further into the content of their speeches, it seems unlikely they would construct the poor in the same manner. The following section investigates the partisan similarities and differences in topical construction of the poor, starting first with the more numerical Democrats, followed by the Republicans.

The Democratic TM has 2,199 speeches, which sums to 18,811 scored words. Lowering the threshold from the main model ($K=40$) is prudent here because there is less data to summarize. However, the proper threshold—as is always the case—is unclear; therefore, both party models will simply run TMs with half the K of the original models, where K now equals 20. A summary of the topics with several model-specific metrics is presented in Table 6.2, while two visualizations for topic correlations are presented in Figure 6.3, the first with each node labeled and the second instead labeling the lines that bind the nodes. Notably, lower K models inherently decrease the substantive legibility of correlations between topics, so for these smaller TMs, the correlation standard lowers to greater than or equal to 0.01.

Table 6.2 Topic Model of Democratic Poverty Speeches Set to 20 Topics

Thematic Label	High Prob	FREX	Topic Prop.	Excl.	Sem. Coh.
Policymaking/Relief	will, bill, peopl, countri, can, amend, one	amend, chairman, gentleman, think, believ, want, propos	15.75%	9.76	-15.11
Poor Needs	will, peopl, man, say, get, one, thing	god, anybodi, laughter, got, anyth, thing, eat	9.12%	9.55	-17.12
Elderly Pensions/SSA	state, age, feder, pension, year, old-ag, school	old-ag, pension, age, educ, match, social, social-secur	6.35%	9.77	-47.60
Economic Policy	will, industri, nation, econom, must, can, product	econom, machin, solut, solv, fundament, capac, idl	6.14%	9.25	-26.33
Senate Matters	senat, state, presid, new, say, know, polit	louisiana, senat, hopkin, mexico, dakota, michigan, carolina	5.48%	9.56	-41.77
Relief/NatAm Issues	work, relief, project, administr, appropri, indian, state	indian, project, theater, fiscal, youth, appropri, relief	5.01%	9.56	-53.98
Taxation	tax, incom, pay, year, percent, will, increas	tax, revenu, levi, taxat, taxpay, exempt, incom	4.86%	9.54	-28.76
Farm Commodities	price, cotton, product, farmer, produc, state, will	cotton, tariff, bale, tobacco, pound, opa, export	4.68%	9.58	-35.78
Foreign Affairs/War	world, nation, peopl, state, great, unit, govern	jew, arab, palestin, jewish, british, britain, atom	4.39%	8.07	-21.49
Law and Courts	state, court, constitut, law, right, congress, bill	court, suprem, poll, constitut, qualif, voter, unconstitut	4.38%	9.64	-30.04
Farm Finances	farm, farmer, agricultur, year, land, program, famili	farm, tenant, soil, crop, farmer, acr, agricultur	4.24%	9.72	-36.74
Housing	hous, loan, bill, home, will, govern, famili	slum, rent, loan, hous, low-incom, construct, rental	4.20%	9.57	-28.56
Parties and Elections	presid, roosevelt, nation, peopl, administr, bank, republican	roosevelt, hoover, platform, republican, franklin, roos, velt	4.17%	9.15	-38.57
War	war, will, nation, armi, men, world, american	navi, philippin, defens, war, neutral, armi, win	3.83%	9.21	-37.42
Industrial Wages	labor, wage, industri, worker, hour, work, coal	coal, wage, hour, patent, railway, minimum, miner	3.32%	9.72	-39.91
Memorials/Ideology	american, committe, member, one, organ, hous, new	communist, rume, anemia, lincoln, henri, william, communism	3.19%	8.93	-52.89
Humanitarian Needs	food, hospit, health, children, unrra, medic, need	unrra, medic, lunch, hospit, alcohol, liquor, doctor	3.10%	9.46	-68.94
Veterans' Issues	veteran, bill, war, servic, will, disabl, case	veteran, disabl, certif, service-connect, soldier, vet, eran	3.06%	9.60	-53.76
Banking & Monetary	money, bank, valu, power, dollar, peopl, gold	gold, silver, currenc, banker, monetari, circul, panic	2.72%	9.74	-44.16
Southern Issues (Race)	negro, citi, white, state, percent, power, south	negro, lynch, kilowatt, kilowatt-hour, color, electr, basin	2.02%	9.35	-53.89

There are several major similarities and differences with what is captured in the whole corpus TM and Democratic-specific one. First, both TMs show high prominence and connectivity for the policymaking process with relief issues and Native American matters. Indeed, the relief legislative process accounts for 15.75% of the topic space for the Democrats as they rhetorically justified their governing decisions. War and foreign affairs are still closely linked, housing is fairly

Figure 6.3 Relations Between Topics, Democratic Model when $K=20$, Correlation=0.01

Note: Labels are an interpretive assessment of what binds topics based on top 20 probability, FREX, and score words for each topic. Solitary nodes also labeled. Correlation levels are ≥ 0.01 .

removed from other topics (as was the case previously), and farm matters are prominent and correlated with one another.

While major policies were connected to the policy process in the main TM, here the Social Security Act debate and pension discussion (“Elderly Pensions/SSA”) are severed and now constitute the most exclusive topic in the bunch (Exclusivity=9.77). This highlights the agenda-consuming role of Democratic lawmakers in shepherding the SSA through the legislative process from 1933 to 1935, and then again with its important amendments in 1939. (Notably, SSA is absent or heavily submerged in the GOP TM to follow.) Additionally, veterans’ affairs are completely severed from other policies, differing slightly from the previous minor relationship to the legislative process. Finally, taxation is a standalone topic for Democrats, where for the whole corpus it was strongly connected with economic indicators.

Overall, the results from the Democratic TM closely resemble the main corpus, which is little surprise given the scale of Democratic majorities—two-thirds of all members at the time. Moreover, the prominence of policymaking language conveys the imperatives of governance in this period of high social and economic unrest. Interestingly, policy-laden rhetoric factors more prominently in the rhetorical arena than the “Poor Needs” category, which suggests much of the

New Deal centered on moving antipoverty policy through the process, and not simply rhetorical calls to the poor and conditions of poverty. This might be a unique phenomenon to this period, contrasting with later periods that have less direct policy achievements but where poverty is still an agenda item, and is therefore worthy of future scholastic exploration.


Moving onto the GOP model—presented in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4—there are 1,055 speeches and 13,312 scored words. That is just about half as many speeches as those offered by Democrats, which creates an issue with the number of topics to assign. One approach is to lower the number of topics, while the other is have the exact same number as the Democratic model. This study chooses to standardize on $K=20$ with the understanding that this will likely decrease the strength of correlations between GOP topics. Indeed, that is the case, as the GOP TM only has 11 relationships at correlation equals 0.01 level or greater, while the Democratic model has 16. An alternative hypothesis might be that Republicans use more specific topical language and make fewer cross-topic connections, but there is insufficient evidence to make this claim at this time. Nevertheless, the GOP TM is instructive for several important reasons.

The key story in the GOP TM is the prominence of the “Political Use of Relief” which covers a whopping 10.32% of the topic space. At the time, it was alleged that national party leaders, administration members, and local Democratic Party bosses were using public work relief opportunities as leverage to ensnare desperate unemployed workers into voting Democratic, either as an incentive or as a threat. Specifically, Congressional discussion of this topic centered on three people: The head of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), Harry Hopkins, Postmaster General Jim Farley, and Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley (D-KY). These accusations were a mix of exaggerated partisan attacks on opponents (primarily on Hopkins) and legitimate investigations of abuses of power. The practice of political patronage was broadly utilized at this

Table 6.3 Topic Model of GOP Poverty Speeches Set to 20 Topics

Thematic Label	High Prob	FREX	Topic Prop.	Excl.	Sem. Coh.
Political Use of Relief	relief, administr, work, money, will, polit, appropri	relief, appropri, polit, hopkin, project, unemploy, wast	10.32%	9.20	-27.45
Farm Finances	will, farm, hous, bill, farmer, loan, home	loan, farm, home, rent, rural, farmer, big	8.78%	9.44	-20.21
Legal Issues	state, presid, court, congress, bill, right, constitut	suprem, court, constitut, judg, negro, republican, parti	7.74%	9.33	-31.67
Unemployment	will, govern, industri, nation, employ, must, problem	enterpris, unemploy, opium, problem, econom, social, employ	6.46%	9.36	-30.44
International Aid	peopl, countri, will, food, unrra, nation, world	unrra, poland, polish, starv, cross, rehabilit, red	6.07%	8.87	-43.87
Taxation	tax, bill, incom, will, pay, year, plan	tax, townsend, revenu, taxpay, taxat, taxabl, exempt	6.03%	9.49	-34.52
Farm Commodities	price, farmer, product, farm, will, agricultur, produc	dairi, cotton, pound, bushel, opa, subsidi, corn	5.64%	9.60	-43.44
Memorials and Ideals	peopl, will, govern, american, men, nation, day	lincoln, love, liberti, philosophi, dougla, god, soul	5.50%	8.27	-16.82
Monetary System	money, govern, will, debt, peopl, pay, gold	gold, currenc, reserv, silver, bond, debt, inflat	5.11%	9.51	-41.19
Veterans' Issues	veteran, state, bill, pension, will, year, age	veteran, pension, disabl, old-ag, widow, needi, age	5.11%	9.57	-43.33
War	war, will, nation, world, peopl, countri, american	japan, china, belliger, air, chines, neutral, hitler	4.61%	8.52	-18.01
Youth Development	state, school, educ, program, children, train, feder	school, educ, train, colleg, medic, youth, scienc	4.48%	9.32	-49.37
Upper Midwest Del.	senat, state, presid, said, man, one, time	trial, attorney, truman, got, newspaper, juri, junior	4.11%	9.21	-21.17
Labor Protections	wage, labor, worker, industri, work, hour, bill	wage, coal, hour, strike, minimum, labor, worker	3.82%	9.62	-42.74
Trade	nation, world, american, will, foreign, trade, state	tariff, trade, british, britain, reciproc, agreement, export	3.32%	9.05	-31.90
Wages	per, percent, incom, cost, increas, total, rate	annum, rate, total, low-incom, per, incom, figur	3.11%	9.74	-29.35
NatAm/Insular Issues	indian, govern, state, north, dakota, will, claim	indian, dakota, drought, north, claim, claimant, seed	3.03%	9.40	-24.79
Industry and Energy	will, power, presid, compani, industri, peopl, govern	util, electr, compani, lewi, stock, monopoli, platform	2.46%	9.26	-47.48
Public Health	state, hospit, project, citi, counti, river, time	goodyear, aluminum, patient, river, galling, valley, flood	2.35%	9.02	-39.79
Foreign and Territories	peopl, state, puerto, rico, unit, nation, world	puerto, rico, rican, greek, prussia, king, island	1.95%	8.96	-73.69

time and occurred well beyond the three individuals mentioned here. The key aggravating factor in this period was the new level of power the federal government had in directing jobs at a pivotal point of economic crisis. As a result of these prominent episodes, in 1939 Congress enacted the Hatch Act, which forever altered political patronage by curtailing the admissible political activities of everyone from politicians acting in their official governmental capacity down to civil servants.

Figure 6.4 Relations Between Topics, Republican Model when $K=20$, Correlation= 0.01 

Note: Labels are an interpretive assessment of what binds topics based on top 20 probability, FREX, and score words for each topic. Solitary nodes also labeled. Correlation levels are ≥ 0.01 .

The sprawling WPA—which coordinated with localities to create full employment infrastructure projects—was controversial for the entirety of its existence, and its leader, Harry Hopkins, was often singled out as a cause of impropriety and political opportunism within the organization. “[Hopkins] has amazing canniness for knowing just when a relief situation develops in a [s]tate,” Senator Lester Dickinson (R-IA) observed on May 18, 1936, continuing, “For some unexplained reason, he knows that there is a serious relief situation in Pennsylvania at the present time. The Hopkins temperament is not to let persons suffer, and so he is seeing to it that funds are being poured into the [s]tate. It so happens that the New Dealers are turning heaven and earth in an effort to carry Pennsylvania this fall. As a result, it is difficult for a motorist to move along the roads of Pennsylvania. W.P.A. workers are as thick as fleas. No politics in relief!” (*CR 80 1936*, 7440).⁴⁷

However, the political angle worked in both directions, as much of these attacks might have been politically motivated, given Hopkins’ track record of social welfare policy

⁴⁷ To maintain integral sourcing and yet maintain brevity, this project parenthetically cites the *Congressional Record* in the following form: italicized *Congressional Record* volume number, followed by year of publication, then finally, page number (e.g., *CR 80 1936*, 7440).

implementation on a local, state, and federal scale. Indeed, Hopkins was widely revered as a social worker, staunch liberal, defender of the poor, and a socialistic (at times, Soviet-sympathizing) force in the Roosevelt administration, making him a natural target for various anti-New Deal groups and politicians (McJimsey 1987; Hopkins 1999; Evans and Romerstein 2013). In the preceding remarks, Dickinson even back-handedly complimented Hopkins' commitment to ending suffering in a speech intended to chastise how the WPA operates. Indeed, frequent attacks on the WPA were in part because its programs were vital to the larger structure of the New Deal political economy (Smith 2006), arousing the antipathy of GOP opponents who lacked control over the dispensation of resources and jobs.

Postmaster Farley was a leading political force in Democratic politics, both within New York and at the federal level, as he was an instrumental figure in helping FDR gain and maintain the presidency with the New Deal political coalition of labor unions, ethnic minorities, and farmers (Scroop 2006; Sheppard 2014). Moreover, Farley used the postmaster position as a hub to dispense patronage opportunities—decisions that encouraged key public and elite constituencies to support the New Deal. However, this aroused resentment among lawmakers in both parties, who felt they were being cut out of the equation to dole out key government jobs in their home states and districts. “What can you expect when the manager of the H.O.L.C. and likewise the vice chairman of the Democratic State organization makes that kind of a statement that all of his 1,200 employees in a relief and business organization are Democrats?” asked Hamilton Fish (R-NY), one of the harshest critics of Farley (and the New Deal as a whole). Fish continued, “What can you expect but politics, and the Farley brand of politics at that. Of course, that is wrong. None of you Democrats in Congress wanted that, you do not want to continue it on that basis or any other basis except efficiency and a square deal regardless of party affiliations. It smells to high heaven” (*CR*

79 1935, 3149). Control over patronage and who received work relief continued—rightly and wrongly—to plague much of the New Deal.

Majority Leader Barkley was accused of using government workers explicitly for campaign purposes, coordinating with local Democratic bosses to arrange favorable WPA hiring decisions. Although the tools of new federal work relief increased the scale of this behavior, Barkley had a history of controversy as he was embroiled in a 1909 scandal where members of the local Democratic Party stole money from McCracken County (Grinde 1976; Libbey 2000). Although Barkley was not directly implicated in the theft, his association with the criminals and lack of awareness of the scheme hurt his public image in those years.

In 1938, Kentucky Governor Happy Chandler challenged Barkley in the Democratic primary, which saw governmental employees campaigning for each side—state employees donated to Chandler’s campaign, while federal workers campaigned for Barkley (Hixson 1982; Klotter 1996). In a speech entitled “Use of Relief Funds for Partisan Political Purposes,” Representative Bert Lord (R-NY) engages a letter from Chandler’s campaign manager Brady M. Stewart to show the misuse of relief funds was not only unethical, but it hurt the poor:

‘It has become common talk among our people that the State administrator of the Works Progress Administration in Kentucky has openly and boldly stated that he and his organization will leave nothing undone to achieve the reelection of Senator Barkley; and, accordingly, every Federal relief agency in Kentucky is frankly and brazenly operating upon a political basis. For the first time in our observation, the Works Progress Administration, which was conceived and established to feed the families of the unemployed, irrespective of the politics, race, or creed of those to be served through its directing heads, is seeking to drive hungry and destitute people to vote for a certain candidate for office. Meetings and conferences have been held in practically every county of the [s]tate by keymen in places of importance with the Works Progress Administration, at which definite instructions were given to selected agents that no one should be placed on Federal relief except upon the advice of Senator Barkley’s campaign managers in the respective counties. Furthermore, these same agents have been required to inform all those individuals who seek Federal assistance that, unless they are for the candidate for Senator whom the heads of the relief administration are supporting, there will be neither relief funds nor jobs for them.’

Mr. Speaker, this is something we never thought could transpire in these United States. The taxpayers' money is being used to put forward some candidate for office in this country... taxpayers' money is, according to this letter, being used for votes and the poor, needy people [are] going hungry. (*CR 83 1938, 7597*)

Although Barkley denied orchestrating coordination between federal workers and his campaign, the affair gained enough notoriety to precipitate the quick passage of Carl Hatch's (D-NM) stalled anti-corruption bill in the subsequent 76th Congress.

While misuse of relief resources for political purposes was a defining problem in the New Deal—although by the late New Deal period corruption in the administration of relief greatly declined (Wallis, Fishback and Kantor 2005, 26)—it is truly stunning that the largest category of GOP topics based on poverty synonym search terms would elicit an inherently partisan political category. Here, lawmakers pegged corruption as a cause of ongoing poverty, since relief was not going to those that needed it, but instead, those that supported the Democratic Party. While patronage did run through several party machines before the Hatch Act, the prominence of this topic shows the partisan nature of using the plight of the poor to score political points. Needing a strong critique of the Roosevelt administration and Democratic Party to syphon voters away from the governing coalition, Republican lawmakers seemingly believed corrupt behavior—not policy—was one of their best messages. Moreover, blaming government excess or inefficiency (often derivatively portrayed as simple corruption) for ongoing socioeconomic strife was convenient for a party that had still not figured out how to win the ongoing public debate over the role of government in guaranteeing the quality of life of its citizens. Indeed, by virtue of its co-occurrence with the creation of a social safety system, this episode is potentially the first in a durable line of refrains about waste, fraud, and abuse in the social welfare system.

There are several additional features of the GOP topic model worth pointing out. For one, farm issues become untethered, as GOP lawmakers appear to speak in differential terms about the

struggles of farm families to keep a living and home, and the related but different matter of commodity production and exportation, which is now not related to trade, but instead international aid. Indeed, farm finances are more closely related to the general discussion of wage issues, which is itself connected to labor protections. Second, war stands alone in GOP TM. In the Democratic TM, war was tied with larger issues of international diplomacy and humanitarian crises. The GOP TM puts international aid in closer correlation with farm commodities, often in terms of donating or selling surplus commodities to poor, war torn countries. Third, where the Democratic model had taxation uncorrelated with other topics, in the GOP model it is closely related to the monetary system. And finally, housing does not show up in GOP TM, suggesting Democrats centered poverty discussion more cohesively and distinctly on housing needs and policies.

Close attention to the topic models and the underlying speech data provide key insights into the nature of poverty rhetoric in Congress. First, poverty is a uniquely ubiquitous policy domain in which almost every pressing issue in the public conscience has some relation, at least within this temporal scope. Second, the parties were mostly similar on which issues relate to poverty and which issues connect with one another. This is especially clear in the large issue space allotted across parties to trade, agriculture, international aid, war, monetary and fiscal policy, and taxation. The likeliest explanation is this is a product of both bipartisan preferences and Democratic agenda control, but this study does not evaluate the relative balance between the two.

However, there are notable differences in the Democrats' more overt association with the relief policymaking process, Social Security Act, and housing. This is at least in part by virtue of Democrats holding the majority in Congress throughout this entire period, therefore allowing them to control the floor process to fit the interests of their members. Given the economic crisis and ideological movement leftward in the caucus, Democratic members wanted to usher in landmark

poverty-fighting social welfare policies. In contrast to the legislative policymaking process, Republicans are notably driven in a different direction toward speaking about the political use of relief and corruption within the ruling Democratic Party. The three TMs capture the topical asymmetry when one party governs for an extended period of time and has a discernable policy record, while the minority party acts as a check on that agenda. Here, Democrats claim to be lessening poverty through their policies, while Republicans claim the poor are not always central to—and are even taken advantage of by—New Deal programs, especially around work relief decisions.

While the topic models uncover major themes across speeches in which members employ poverty terminology, TMs alone are insufficient to systematically understand key aspects of poverty representation, such as the important dynamic of who speakers choose to identify as poor. Since the poor are historically divided and weighed against one another based on debates about who is greatest in need and most deserving of governmental action, and not all poor people receive policy supports, providing empirical evidence for the process of representation and division is a necessary step toward understanding the politics of poverty in America. To understand who is conceived of as poor, it is necessary to devise a comprehensive coding scheme that captures the nuances of group definition, which is executed in the following Part II section.

Part II: Group Representation Within Poverty Speeches

While the topic modeling approach helped expose important themes related to poverty speeches in Congress, it does not answer the most essential question about the rhetorical construction of the poor: when members talk about poverty, *who* do they designate as poor? To answer this question, this section presents coded segments of poverty speeches according to who the speaker designates as the subject of poverty. This research design provides an empirical basis

to evaluate the quality of oratorical (symbolic) representation of poor members of the public and who lawmakers politically construct in the policymaking process. Additionally, by understanding who MCs conceive of as poor, we may better assess the nature of poverty representation and antipoverty legislation in America.

Poverty Speech Codes

The virtue of qualitative coding schemes is that they facilitate the transformation of raw data into interpretatively meaningful analysis (Saldaña 2013). Notably, the method employed here deviates from topic modeling in that it solely looks within—not across—speeches and does not weigh all words in poverty speeches equally, but instead focuses on the sentences surrounding the use of poverty search terms. This forensic approach allows the researcher to better understand the prevalence of theoretically important ideas and groups in debates about poverty.

To code descriptions of the poor, this project first adopts a rule that whatever sentence an applicable search term appears in, the investigator may determine the intended subject of said term by reading up to two sentences before and two sentences ahead of the sentence with the search term. This effectively creates a five-sentence bandwidth to identify who the MC is talking about when they use poverty terminology. This is done to ensure the code corresponds to the poverty term, while also allowing for some degree of disjointedness in the coherence of a member's speech. While a greater bandwidth may hypothetically yield more codes, it is also true that when it comes to identifying the subject of a description, the further one treads from the description, associations between search terms and subjects become more tenuous and less clear. Importantly, this decision rule does not expressly preclude the investigator from reading every word in every speech to glean further valuable insights, but only that they may not code for new subjects that appear outside of

the search term-anchored bandwidth. Codes are counted by speech, but all codes in a speech may come from a single dense sentence, depending on how the member uses poverty rhetoric.

To decide what to code, this project employs a unique system based on the ways the poor are depicted from a political and sociological perspective centered on family resemblance and group-membership. Specifically, the codes fall along several categorical lines: occupation, behavior and circumstance, perspective and characterization (e.g., dependency or deservingness), demography, geography, and non-specific or general use. These codes are visually depicted in the hierarchical diagram in Figure 6.5.⁴⁸ Importantly, the following codes do not encapsulate all occurrences of a concept or demographic group in the *Congressional Record*, but only those that pertain to the subject of poverty. For example, in a general sense the elderly are discussed in more speeches than appear in the count on Table 6.5. Instead, these counts reflect a subset when these groups or ideas are discussed in conjunction with poverty-related terms. Therefore, the ensuing count is the number of times the elderly are referred to as poor. By centering on those subjects described as materially poor, these codes effectively disaggregate the poor from a nebulous monolith to multi-faceted, complex constituency and provide a basis to evaluate who is highlighted and who is ignored in Congressional floor speeches.

Finally, this paper makes no claims as to the proper, absolute number of codes that constitute good or bad representation of a poor group. Instead, the codes are useful to track single code use over time, make relative comparisons across coded groups/ideas (especially within category families), and broadly compare who gets talked about with who is poor in the public and which poor are incorporated into the antipoverty policy regime.

⁴⁸ The full 28-page codebook is affixed to Chapter 2 as Appendix 2B and is also available upon request.

Figure 6.5 Hierarchical Diagram of Poverty Codes




Table 6.4 Number of Poverty Speech Codes, 1933-1946

Code Name	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	Total
Number of Codes	557	864	1,774	1,418	1,368	941	1,737	1,440	724	781	608	707	1,112	1,049	15,080
Codes per Speech	4.16	3.63	4.46	4.86	4.41	4.16	4.44	4.53	4.39	4.57	3.85	4.78	4.86	4.66	4.43
General Code	70	134	235	154	195	134	195	124	74	65	65	54	85	81	1,665
General Code Only	4	11	10	2	8	5	5	3	0	6	6	1	1	3	65


Note: Codes per Speech uses the yearly counts of speeches from Chapter 3 as the denominator.

Starting with an overview, Table 6.4 presents summary statistics on the number of poverty codes, codes per speech, and use of a general poverty code from 1933 to 1946. There are 3,403 poverty speeches in Congress during this time, which yields 15,080 manually constructed topic codes. Codes per speech vary from a low of 3.63 in 1934 to a high of 4.86 in 1936, although it is unclear if this oscillation is substantively meaningful. The first code to note is the Non-specific/General American code (labeled General Code in Table 6.4), which captures vague use of poverty terms when a member fails to disclose who they are taking about, at least within the bandwidth the project employs. While general or vague descriptions of the poor is the most used code, showing up in 49% of the poverty speeches (1,665 of 3,403), they are seldom alone without further specification elsewhere in the passage. Importantly, that means members are not as vague in speaking about the poor as one might expect, given the complexity of the problem and general willingness of politicians to speak in platitudes and not specifics. There are only 65 speeches from 1933 to 1946 in which a MC fails to identify a *specific* poor subject. That means members are specific in 98% of the speeches (3,338 of 3,403), a positive sign that MCs that speak about poverty typically hold a detailed—if not complete—view of the poor.

The remaining pages of this section present a detailed analysis of temporal trends and the substantive meaning of the coded poverty speech data. It is first helpful to visually depict all of the speech codes in descending order of their prevalence and grouped by family, which is presented in Figure 6.6. Additionally, a table with the average mean value for each variable is presented in Appendix 6A. It is immediately apparent that there is a large discrepancy in the number of times the poor, for example, are labeled hungry and/or in need of clothing, and the number of times they are depicted as migrants, female, or residents of the western United States. While many of these categories overlap with one another as far as individual group membership is concerned—for example, an elderly veteran described as deserving and residing in the North—looking at the discrete counts helps uncover the traits MCs use to conceptualize the poor.

For more granularity, the figure breaks up individual codes into the year to which they are affixed, allowing for a visual approach to pattern recognition. For example, conceptualization of the poor as military members (including veterans) was extremely common in the 73rd Congress years of 1933 and 1934. This phenomenon is event driven, as FDR sought to tighten the belt of federal spending in solidarity with the suffering masses, he ushered passage of the Economy Bill in 1933, which limited pension disbursements to veterans (and cut government employees' salaries). Then in 1934, Congress debated repealing the Economy Bill, centering on the plight of poor soldiers. Indeed, a common refrain in the early New Deal when a lawmaker would propose expanding national social welfare policies to cover the elderly would be to respond that veterans are not even getting what they are owed, so why should another group gain a preference over them? Ultimately, the unpopularity of the cuts led to a protracted, piecemeal restoration of the benefits and wages, and the conceptualization of poor veterans waned in favor of workers, children, and the elderly.

Figure 6.6 Poverty Codes by Total Count within Family



Another important time dynamic is seen in how several codes radically change in the early 1940s as World War II steadily gains more lawmaker attention. While the general worker category is among the most popular images of the poor, after 1940 there is less agenda space for American workers as international considerations take hold. Additionally, before 1941, much of the hunger code was based on domestic nutritional needs among the poor, then during the early war years hunger is minimized on the agenda, only to roar back in 1945 as lawmakers depict the foreign poor as in need of food. Relatedly, the explosive growth of the foreign code in 1945 and 1946 came as WWII ended and rebuilding of the world commenced. In this new global moment, the consumer code also ticks up during and after the war, as lawmakers constructed poor people abroad as potential recipients—and at times, purchasers—of domestically grown commodities. With just a hint of the stories undergirding poverty representation in Congress, now we turn to examining each family of codes.

Since social welfare policies are often prescribed based on the personal descriptive qualities of the target population, one approach to understanding dynamics in poverty representation is to focus on the most fundamental demographical features of the described poor. Within the American context, this necessitates accounting for age, habitation, gender, sexual orientation, residency and migratory status, and race and ethnicity. The codes depicted in Table 6.5 are the first systematic demographic account of who national lawmakers describe as poor as they constructed what generations of social scientists have lamented is a powerful, but biased social welfare regime. Unpacking the results provides insights into the relative priorities of these lawmakers, and potentially why some types of poor people received permanent national supports (the elderly), while others were relegated to the federalized state programs (women and children) or received little redistributive government supports at all (Native Americans and immigrants).

Table 6.5 Number of Speeches with Demographic Codes, 1933-1946

Code Name	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	Total
Youth (≤ 24)	28	37	66	49	38	44	51	66	22	31	16	32	46	53	579
Elderly (≥ 60)	5	25	93	51	14	12	66	22	7	16	8	9	7	38	373
Family Unit	26	25	52	60	44	29	63	66	31	38	25	23	35	33	550
Female	30	41	57	45	25	22	37	38	16	9	16	23	32	35	426
Male	41	45	57	47	60	32	61	65	20	43	29	28	47	34	609
LGBTQ+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Foreign	11	21	30	18	22	12	29	50	42	21	25	45	124	81	531
Migration	0	1	3	4	9	3	6	15	9	7	8	3	2	4	74
Residency Status	17	20	41	28	32	19	45	29	11	20	9	12	8	16	307
Asian/P.I.	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Black	1	1	11	6	7	11	2	5	3	8	8	6	0	6	75
Jewish	2	0	2	0	0	0	4	2	0	0	1	2	17	4	34
Latino/a	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
Native American	0	6	1	8	1	3	2	4	2	1	5	2	2	4	41
White	0	1	6	4	1	8	1	3	2	9	5	7	3	5	55

Note: Race and ethnicity codes are domestic only (e.g., Chinese does not trigger Asian/Pacific Islander, nor does African trigger Black) except for Jewish, which is primarily a foreign construction in Congressional rhetoric. Some important foreign-coded ethnic mentions not captured in the above coding discuss extremely low-paid, “coolie,” serf, slave labor, ubiquitous hunger and want, and endless subjugation. Another worthwhile project may pursue understanding how Congress conceptualizes their commitment to the foreign poor, which is debated .

Starting with age, there is a clear divergence in the stability of youth across time and the trailing off of the elderly code after the passage of the Social Security Act. The persistence of youth belies internal variation in the construction of poor youth. Early in the New Deal there is an emphasis on the toll poverty takes on formative minds and bodies, where the state needs to come in and provide basic nutritional needs to ensure future generations are productive. Once youth-based New Deal policies are in place, the narrative changes to pleas to maintain New Deal programs like the National Youth Administration (NYA) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), lest the youth become idle and turn to crime and vice. Finally, in the war years poor youth are often constructed as rank-and-file soldiers fighting foreign wars, deserving of state help when they return, or alternatively, as suffering from malnutrition, too underweight to fight for the nation due to their childhood poverty. Indeed, the latter narrative was a central theme by advocates—

especially in the military—for the National School Lunch Act (NSLA) of 1946, which provided free school lunches to children of low economic means.

In contrast, elderly is most clustered around major policy developments in pensions, such as the Social Security debates of 1935 and 1939. As later analyses will demonstrate, they are the group most likely to be designated “deserving,” as the elderly *earned* their benefits, while the young have yet to earn it. Representative Coffee (D) of Washington spells out part of this logic: “They [the aged] demand a decent national old-age pension, not based upon a pauper’s oath but as a reward for being veterans in the struggles of life. They are battle-scarred from economic contests and feel that in the richest country on [E]arth the specter of homelessness and poverty should be permanently eradicated from their lives. I subscribe to this feeling” (*CR 84 1939, 6447*). While the justification to ameliorate youth poverty relies more heavily on forward thinking and humanitarian imperatives, the elderly benefit from a broadly understood demonstrated value to society through past economic productivity.

At this time, it is important to reiterate gaining policy incorporation is not purely about reaching a critical threshold in speech presence, but also about the type of construction of the group, political coalition capable of propounding their interests, and the right overall policy creation conditions, which are typically few and far between (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), especially for the poor. Therefore, insofar as rhetoric may matter for political incorporation, the evidence presented here suggests it is not about frequent or constant presence (as is the case for youth), but concentrated spurts (as is the case for the elderly). Alternatively, it is easier to interpret the *lack* of rhetorical group exposition by MCs as a low baseline that is unlikely to lead to a successful policy regime for the most marginalized poor.

Family roles factor heavily into the construction of the poor, as the American ideology around poverty has often revolved around a family's ability to take care of its own members. Indeed, the "Family Unit" code—employed whenever MCs describe filial roles including but not limited to mother, son, sister, and grandpa—is stable over the whole period. However, disaggregating the family into gender roles tells a different story. Women are often constructed as housewives and mothers, while men are constructed as breadwinners and workers. One key reason why male almost always outruns female—especially in the 1940s—is because men are often portrayed as the default poor working person, or as a "poor" soldier fighting on behalf of the nation.⁴⁹ Women are not treated with as much nuance or variety, either relegated to the home or service industries like laundering clothing. This domestic versus vocation gender basis fits existing understandings of gender norms before and during the idea of the nuclear family. Importantly, the poor are never described as LGBTQ+, which makes sense for this period of social development, although it is unclear if the poor are every conceived in these terms, even in contemporary politics.

The subject of foreign and international poverty gains attention as news of the carnage of WWII spurs MCs of all persuasions to speak about the plight of war victims. A subset of this group are Jews, most frequently described as war-ravaged, reduced to penury, and needing a home—with widespread support among MCs to make that place Israel. This stands as a unique period in history where American lawmakers broadly eschew the stereotype of Jews as wealthy, which is and has always been a vast oversimplification of a heterogenous ethnoreligious group (Levine and Hochbaum 1974). However, more often foreigners are constructed in pejorative terms, frequently denigrating the governments and poor in Mexico, China, and India.

⁴⁹ For the poor soldier label to count as a poverty speech, there needs to be evidence in the speech text that the individual was indeed materially poor, e.g. came from a poor background, or is poorly compensated currently, to count as a poverty speech. It is not enough to say "these poor soldiers" which could just mean unfortunate, not materially deficient.

And indeed there was a backlash to the globalization of the scope of poverty focus in Congress, as best exemplified by a long speech made by Senator Robert Reynolds (D-NC) in 1941: “All our interest has been focused over yonder, on the poor people of England and France and Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and every other alien upon the face of the earth away over in Asia; and I am trying for once, just for this brief period during the afternoon of April 1, to return our attention to our people at home” (*CR 87 1941, 2773*). While Reynolds did frequently speak about poverty, this particular episode is likely an example of using the poor as an instrument to bolster one’s argument, in this case in service of isolationist foreign policy.

Importantly, the migration code captures all forms of migration, including intra- and international migration—sorting the foreign code exposes the migratory form. Interestingly, the coding scheme uncovers migration speeches are just as likely to focus on internal migration from Oklahoma and Kansas into California and Arizona as it is to focus on foreign migrants heading to the United States. Indeed, the Dust Bowl alone accounts for 16 of the 74 migration-inclusive speeches, while foreign migration accounts for 33. The residency code captures mention of the poor with citizenship status, including state of residency, green card holders, and undocumented persons in America. The code on its own is not immediately revelatory in this period, but its association with other codes and future importance to the debate about social welfare make it an important marker to note.

On race there are several important stories here. First, race is infrequently discussed over the course of this 14-year period, showing the general aversion of lawmakers to engage the topic, let alone tie it to poverty. Overall, there is one race-related speech for every 16 poverty speeches (212 of 3403)—a starkly low figure in a country with a history of ascriptive hierarchy along socioeconomic lines (Du Bois 1935; Smith 1993). While Blacks (75), Whites (55) and Native

Americans (41) receive some attention in the record, for each group this only corresponds to a few mentions *per year* in Congress. In particular, Native American poverty has among the least widespread support of any group, mostly depicted by a handful of dedicated Northern Plains Republicans and Western Democratic lawmakers that have sizeable reservations in their districts.

Second, Asians (2) and Latino/as (4) receive extremely low levels of representation save the occasional Western lawmaker depicting their plight vis-à-vis poverty. This demonstrates the continuation of a racial paradigm where Black, White, and Native American were the only widely understood racial categories, indicating how entrenched colonial-era thinking on race was among governing elites well into the mid-20th century. But interestingly, White lawmakers do feel compelled to address the plight of ethnic-minority Jews due to their widespread persecution during WWII in Europe. Whether this is part of the project of constructing Whiteness from the late 19th century to mid-20th century, a broadening of ethnic tolerance, or just using a persuasive plea to challenge a foreign power (Germany) is not entirely clear from the speeches.

Finally, while Black poverty is the most used racial code, as we will see later, the story is quite complex, as the White categorization is strategically used to counterweigh efforts to discuss Black-specific poverty. This neutralization of Black poverty, and the many poverty-interested lawmakers pursuing a color-blind approach in constructing age or gender-based group policies, *de facto* served the status quo of White co-ethnics benefitting from state policy more than non-Whites. This is exacerbated further as these social policies prove effective and inflate the racial-wealth gap following WWII (Katznelson 2005; Rothstein 2017).

Since the poor are also a geographically defined group, with patterns of durable concentrated poverty in the rural South (namely in the Black Belt, Ozarks and Appalachia) and developed Northern metropolises alike, this project codes where the poor are described as residing.

Table 6.6 Number of Speeches with Geographic Codes, 1933-1946

Code Name	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	Total
Midwest	6	7	21	11	23	8	21	13	7	10	14	5	5	11	162
North	7	5	12	11	23	13	24	8	5	2	2	4	2	5	123
South	7	15	43	22	37	28	42	30	11	26	16	13	6	17	313
West	6	6	6	13	13	2	21	8	7	9	4	7	4	7	113
Territories/D.C.	0	2	6	11	5	3	3	14	1	4	4	5	5	6	69
Subnational Unit	16	19	37	15	24	24	65	41	14	11	23	6	13	25	333
Rural	4	4	9	14	12	9	10	14	11	9	2	2	11	3	114
Suburban	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Urban	9	7	13	19	22	5	18	7	4	4	2	5	7	8	130

Note: Here, rural is a very specific qualifier; many of the ideas around rurality are seen in the Agriculture code in Table 6.7, which includes, for example, “poor farm families” which does not show up as coded rural.

Table 6.6 provides the year-by-year results for census region, territorial status, subnational unit (i.e., impoverished state governments, local governments, school districts, etc.), and density.

The most immediately notable pattern is the degree to which the South dominates in conceptions of poverty, with 313 speeches compared to 398 for the other three regions combined. This number is high for two reasons: Southern oratory and inter-regional agreement. As Chapter 3 conveyed, Southern lawmakers deliver a greater share of poverty speeches than what corresponds to their population share, indicating Southern MCs were attuned to their region’s disproportionate poverty levels and responded to the populism in the electorate at the time (Caughey 2018). When these lawmakers speak about poverty, they paint the region as largely poor, purportedly due to the federal government’s attacks on the Southern way of life since the Civil War. Moreover, if the central government was not undermining the Southern way of life, this narrative argues, D.C. lawmakers simply ignored the plight of Southern poor people. Specifically, the spikes around 1935 and 1939 are explained by the pleas of Southern lawmakers to alter the funding formula for the Social Security Act, which required 50-50 federal-state matching funds to unlock the maximum amount of national resources.

Members of each region tend to talk about their own constituents as poor, but the most notable exception to this tendency pertains to the Southern poor: members across regions agree poverty is ubiquitous in the South, with 87 out of 313 (27.8%) Southern poor speeches coming from non-Southerners. Interestingly, nine speeches use all four regional codes. One of them is Senator Royal Copeland (D-NY), who states MCs of all regions will now help the South escape poverty if they will support his mission to eliminate urban poverty. “Mr. President, it is no reflection on the South that there is poverty; it is no reflection on the North or the East or the West; it is a reflection upon our Nation at large,” Copeland states, continuing “If we can work out here some way of solving this great social and economic problem, I am sure that those of us who come from the North and the East will join those from the South in helping to find a solution” (*CR 77* 1933, 4158-4159). Overall, Southern poverty is one of the most clearly articulated and legible associations in New Deal-era poverty rhetoric.

Another important secular dynamic is the peaking associations between poverty and the Western U.S. from 1936 to 1939, which centers on migration—specifically, economic and ecological migrants leaving Dust Bowl ravaged parts of the Great Plains and High South. Like the South, this western movement of impoverished populations did receive the attention of non-Western members, as they contributed 43% (49 of 113) of total Western poverty speeches. The cases of Southern and Western poverty show two distinct strands of poverty: perennial and concentrated, and event-driven and transient, respectively.

Unfortunately, the absolute poorest parts of the nation received the least representation at this time: the territorial possessions of the United States. Places like the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, Hawaii, and Alaska had non-voting representatives in the House, but oddly enough, these non-voting delegates only account for 14 of these speeches—the remaining 54 come from

congresspersons in the continental states that have some level of interest in territorial conditions. Within this category of citizens without voting members, Washington D.C. also receives the attention of MCs, specifically when they depict walking by the homeless in the nation's capital.⁵⁰

The subnational categorization covers incidences in which MCs depict a poor state, county, city, or community, which admittedly condenses a lot of material together. However, the aggregated category does speak to the important nature of governance in the U.S., where federalism makes states and counties clients of the federal government, especially during the great expansion of federal spending during the New Deal. Earlier in the time-series, the subnational code was used most to describe impoverished state governments that needed cash infusions, while later in the 1930s and 1940s it was employed for myriad topics including poor school districts and state governments that could not afford state-matching requirements for federalized social welfare policies. Within this constellation, urban issues are most connected to the housing debate and widespread, visible displacement of the masses onto the streets of urban centers. Alternatively, rurality was primarily used in two ways: originally to counter the nascent urban plight narrative in the 1930s, and later, to argue the New Deal was biased and ignored rural suffering, creating an early policy-informed basis for the powerful rural resentment towards urbanites (see Cramer 2016 for how pernicious this resentment becomes in later generations). Importantly, the idea of the suburb was not prominent on the national stage yet, with much of this period pre-dating the

⁵⁰ Representative Amlie (WI-P) offers a compelling reflection on the role of Congress in the District's issues with poverty: "I was struck just this morning in reading the opening paragraph of an article in the Washington Post: A woman, 'employable', with four little children huddled in one room without food; an aged couple, also dubbed 'employable', moving in with a young son who has a wife and baby to support also from his \$16 a week; a father, mother, and two children living in one room and sleeping in one bed; these were a few of the actual cases described at yesterday's meeting of the committee on the citizens' mass meeting in behalf of the unemployed. I venture to assert that a person need only walk down Pennsylvania Avenue from the Capitol to the White House to be accosted by more destitute, down-and-out people than he would be along any street in any city of comparable size in the United States; and yet this condition exists in the District of Columbia where we, the Federal Congress, are the governing body. That is the record that we, as the board of aldermen of this city, have made in discharging our duties" (CR 81 1937, 3039).

suburban boom of the 1950s, let alone the development of a distinct form of suburban poverty (Murphy 2010; Kneebone and Berube 2013).

One of the most consequential manners of dividing the poor is through vocation, where the state decides certain groups are worth supporting or are either undeserving or too actuarially difficult to support through policy, as may have happened with the Social Security Act (DeWitt 2010). Several dynamics, as presented in Table 6.7, stand out. First, poverty is most often associated with workers in general, indicating the workfare paradigm of the United States is supported by a strong rhetorical infrastructure as well. Additionally, this suggests lawmakers like to speak broadly about workers, but are more reticent to designate a specific type of worker. In particular, agricultural workers stand out as the most articulated subgroup of the working poor. Both receive stable, high levels of attention until the environment surrounding WWII takes hold, which in addition to changing the policy focus of Congress also corresponds with a time of near full employment in the economy.

Concerning those with governmental employment, the starkest development is the decline in viewing the poor as veterans of the armed services. Initially, poverty among veterans receives a large amount of attention (nearly half of the codes show up in the first three years) because of the austerity measures of the Economy Bill in 1933, which limited dispensation of veterans' pensions. A common narrative at the time is the people that fought for the country are denied benefits, but Congress is debating giving new benefits to historically uncovered groups (workers; children; the elderly). Depictions of the civil service as poor also coincide with the austerity of Economy Bill, but hit their peak in 1939. This is primarily due to the prevalence of debates centered on ending relief programs in which the government directly pays workers' salaries. Finally, those in the public education sector receive similar attention to those in bureaucratic and military work, but the

Table 6.7 Number of Speeches with Vocation/Occupation Codes, 1933-1946

Code Name	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	Total
Agriculture	18	48	66	58	51	34	42	56	36	54	26	19	25	20	553
Creatives	0	0	0	1	0	3	4	0	2	1	0	0	1	2	14
Energy Sector	1	2	9	6	5	3	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	3	40
Labor & Unions	4	15	15	19	18	6	13	14	4	5	4	6	7	8	138
Machinists	2	1	3	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	12
Maritime	1	0	0	3	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	11
Infrastructure	3	1	2	3	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	22
Vocation Training	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	6
Workers (General)	43	63	129	108	96	74	125	100	43	24	17	24	36	52	934
Businesses	1	9	15	3	4	2	2	5	2	2	4	3	7	4	63
Merchants	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	10
Professionals	0	0	2	1	1	2	0	3	1	1	4	4	2	2	23
Bureaucrats	8	6	8	18	18	15	50	28	17	16	6	5	10	7	212
Education	4	13	11	17	10	15	22	27	8	29	13	12	11	12	204
Military	42	27	34	15	6	4	6	21	4	6	10	12	12	18	217

code shows minimal peaking, except for the period in 1942 when a national education bill was debated (and ultimately failed).

Within the private sector, there is relatively little specification outside of worker or agricultural workers. Artists, playwrights, and painters (grouped together as “Creatives”) receive little overall attention, but when they do, it is in relation to the New Deal’s full employment policies that supported those involved in the creative arts. Miners and oil workers in the energy sector, as with workers in manufacturing, fishing, and infrastructure receive little overall attention as well. When they are specified, it is typically by a MC portraying the needs of their district: a miner in West Virginia, factory worker in Pennsylvania, a fisherman in Massachusetts, and railroad workers in Ohio. General laborers and union members receive some heightened representation in this period, but the total figure of 138 is a much smaller share than one might expect given the very high importance of labor to the New Deal governing coalition (Plotke 1996). Finally, the poor as those in need of vocational training and retraining was not a prevalent

characterization in this period, even as the Roosevelt Administration planned for an industrial-skewed economy of the future. Paradoxically, while blue-collar workers are one of the most common depictions of the poor, they are often depicted in general terms, failing to capture all of the nuance of a large, diverse economy.

One of the most unexpected results from this empirical undertaking is the degree to which formerly wealthy members of the public are depicted as poor during the Great Depression and select episodes of the New Deal. White-collar professionals like doctors and lawyers, and self-employed merchants were described as poor, usually because their clients had no money to pay for their services. Even more than those groups, MCs portrayed businesses and corporations as too poor to operate, afford taxes, or supply jobs to the unemployed. While none of these categorizations rank highly in total count, it is an oddity to this period that I presume (and will test in the future) does not show up in any substantial number in subsequent periods.

The poor are also frequently constructed in terms of how they behave and the conditions in which they find themselves, including what they need to survive and thrive at any given time. Therefore, Table 6.8 presents depictions of the poor based on their construction as consumers of goods (“Consumers”), people who interact with the civil or criminal legal system by virtue of vagrancy, drunkenness, drug use, theft or prostitution (“Law”), those that holds bonds, annuities, mortgages, and debt (“Finances”), those in need of health care, housing, and food and clothing, and finally, the conditions causing their poverty, including natural disasters or bad actors that make victims of the poor.

Starting with the poor constructed as consumers, there is a functional argument at play here that serves humanitarian needs while abiding by American workfare and aggregate demand of Keynesian thinking. It is clear there is a time trend in the data, as consumer is stable until the

Table 6.8 Number of Speeches with Behavior and Circumstance Codes, 1933-1946

Code Name	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	Total
Consumers	12	6	40	33	35	27	35	39	28	33	24	44	54	60	470
Law	3	11	15	22	39	11	18	16	10	4	8	9	9	6	181
Finances	5	6	21	13	9	4	8	19	10	27	15	6	11	18	172
Health/Disability	30	33	81	51	34	29	47	41	21	23	13	28	70	56	557
Housing/Utilities	6	32	59	68	78	35	60	42	26	19	12	17	51	41	546
Hunger/Clothing	44	86	156	115	102	81	122	105	50	43	43	66	127	83	1,223
Natural Disaster	0	4	8	9	17	3	7	7	1	5	1	1	3	1	67
Victimization	20	27	125	115	113	87	183	145	104	85	78	90	128	86	1,386

1940s, then consumers move from domestic to foreign as agriculturally interested lawmakers believed the valence of humanitarianism provided a profit opportunity for their commodity producing constituents. While some lawmakers were concerned about the poor's lacking resources to buy butter or children's clothing, the narrative of the poor as consumers helps some lawmakers appear receptive to poverty amelioration without actually caring about poverty. Instead, the antipoverty regime of the New Deal is understood to be intractable, so members representing select interests view the positive valence of antipoverty framing as a way to entrench their interests within the prevailing governing norms.

Throughout this period, there is an interesting construction of the poor as criminals, purveyors of vice, and especially vagrants. Indeed, the time trend showing a peak in 1937 is not based around any particular event, but ongoing problems on vagrancy and transience from Dust Bowl survivors, desperate urban conditions, the general lack of the legal assistance to poor people in America (an area of interest for Senator and future Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black), and incidences of need-based theft. Luckily, this conversation is nuanced and not purely demagogic toward the poor.

For example, in 1937 Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) encapsulates how poverty in the South—here among the Black population—may lead some to a life of crime (which then leads to an additional crime of lynching):

It is very obvious to anyone that when the price of cotton is low the Negro, who is generally the victim of the lynching passion, is more idle than he would be if he were occupied, has less money to spend, and less means with which to gratify his legitimate aspirations; and in a time of severe impoverishment the pinch of hunger and the suffering of nakedness and of little shelter perhaps may drive him to an attitude of mind that will make him commit crimes which do arouse the passions of communities to such an extent that they will take the law in their own hands. But give the Negro a fair wage, give him a fair price for the commodity he produces, send him to school, put decent clothes on him, put him in a decent home, and give him sanitary conditions for his residence, and you will find that Negroes will not commit crimes which result directly in the aroused passion that brings about lynching. (*CR 82 1937*, 167)

In this way, the poor are both the perpetrator and victim of crime, although it is important to point out Claude Pepper's structural understanding of poverty is somewhat tarnished by the fact that he filibustered the national antilynching bill earlier in the year. Instead of outlawing lynching, Pepper suggests the problem of racist mobbing is best solved when all people's economic needs are satiated. Although this passage is specific to the South, it is indicative of a larger narrative that sought to cast the New Deal as an opportunity to restructure the American economy to increase vocational opportunities for long-marginalized communities, even if it did not entirely reshape sociopolitical inequality.

The financial instruments and debt category encapsulates an interesting set of changes among the poor as it relates to debt. Originally, in the 1930s debt was a consequence of the Great Depression, and according to the most common refrain in this category, it affected widowed bondholders and farm families the most. By the 1940s, however, this category is populated with speeches in which families are insecure because their breadwinner is abroad fighting in the war, which led to decreased liquidity and mounting debt.

The health, housing, and hunger labels are three of the top ten most used poverty codes. Starting with the health and disability code, in the early period it was used to describe sick people experiencing systemic poverty, as there were few governmental resources for the poor that provided access to a doctor and basic health exams. The indigent, blind, deaf, elderly, maimed, and ill were forced to rely on charity, which was often insufficient to adequately relieve their suffering. Since workfare was the paradigm of American social welfare, much of the contestation in this category was over who can work, and if they could not, what resources should be made available to them. This category peaks around debates on Title X in the Social Security Act, which provided federal funds for states to provide aid to the blind. However, by 1945 this category centered more on a health care debate around federal spending to build hospitals, that in turn could help some of the sick poor. Rarely were the sick poor linked to debates about national health insurance, although that debate was more common in the two years immediately after this time-series ends.

Housing instability is one of the most durable issues of poverty across the world. Here, the housing and utilities category encompasses discussion of the poor in need of housing, shelter, sanitary facilities, and access to modern utilities, like heat and electricity. There is a concentration of the code during the federal housing debates of the late-1930s, specifically the Robert Wagner (D-NY) led U.S. Housing Act (USHA) of 1937. The issue then gains prominence again as lawmakers consider expanding housing stock for GIs returning from the war in the mid-1940s.

Arguably the most elemental form of poverty, the hunger and clothing code captures mentions of the poor that need sustenance to survive and clothing to get through winters on the streets. While it does peak around the Social Security Acts of 1935 and 1939, overall it is a fairly durable portrayal of the poor. Like other codes, over the course of the time-series it moves from

domestic (1930s) to foreign (1940s), as large swaths of the world lose stable access to food during the war while the U.S. is dealing with maintaining commodity prices amidst overproduction. Indeed, the memory of agricultural surpluses during the Depression stirred reluctant lawmakers to pursue new strategies of aid to Europe (Matusow 1967). Therefore, the construction of the foreign poor as hungry facilitated lawmakers to expand markets to export domestic commodities. The only major exception to this foreign pattern in this period is the debate around the National School Lunch Act in 1945 and 1946. Its successful passage was partly a product of the same foreign-market interested lawmakers securing a domestic foothold for the government procurement of agricultural commodities, which are then dispensed to needy school children through a state-federal partnership.

Two additional codes account for the reasons for one's poverty: natural disasters and bad actor behavior leading to the victimization of the poor. On the former count, there were several major natural disasters in this period: dust storms in Kansas, New Mexico, Colorado, Texas, and Oklahoma; the Ohio River overflowing of 1937 in West Virginia; flooding around Billings, Montana; and fires, such as the one in Minnesota in 1931. Almost all the portrayals of the poor as facing natural disaster come from the issue-projecting behavior of their own elected officials. In addition to mother nature, individual actors and institutions may have caused poverty in this period, such as Wall Street speculators, grifters selling farmers cloudseeding equipment, and the government itself. For example, several lawmakers even blamed the New Deal for poverty—as the program atrophied, the state itself became the problem. Even Democrats often used this kind of language to showcase their exasperation with the New Deal's high-tax antipoverty regime. "Taxes have always been, are now, and always will be, the means of oppressing the poor, and it cannot be avoided," contended Josiah W. Bailey (D-NC). He continued, "Yet it is spread abroad

all over the country that the [g]overnment is getting a lot of money and distributing it and that the poor people are getting the benefit of it. The poor people are bearing the burden of it, and they always will” (CR 83 1938, 500).

The final set of categorizations revolves around the perspectives of lawmakers and the types of framing characterizations they make in bringing up poverty in Congress. These codes—presented in Table 6.9—monitor the following ideas: who lawmakers deem as dependent on others to maintain themselves (“Dependency”), the idea of who is deserving of help (“Deserving”), whether lawmakers personalize their speeches to talk about incidences of poverty they or someone they know have experienced (“Personalization”), and the use of moralistic rhetoric and argumentation in connection with a duty to help the poor (“Moralism”).

Starting with dependency, there are two strains to this idea—one positive, one negative. The first centers on the potential role of the state to help those who cannot fend for themselves, a positive argument about the conditions at-risk populations, like the elderly or disabled, face in daily life. This narrative was more common in the earlier years, particularly 1933 to 1935. The less savory alternative is the moral hazard of creating dependency, in which lawmakers are reticent to step in because the population will get used to not working for their livelihood. Here, both codes are equally at play, corresponding to one’s ideology and support or opposition to proposed social welfare legislation. Even prominent New Dealers worried about complacency among the unemployed, which explains the preponderance of low productivity work-relief programs instead of direct cash payments to the poor. The rise in stigmatic dependency narratives correspond with specific policy debates about relief programs and larger worries about what “being on the dole” does to a citizenry. However, these fears lessened with time, as evidence of people continually

Table 6.9 Number of Speeches with Perspective and Characterization Codes, 1933-1946

Code Name	'33	'34	'35	'36	'37	'38	'39	'40	'41	'42	'43	'44	'45	'46	Total
Dependency	20	19	84	50	32	24	60	47	19	16	13	19	22	25	450
Deservingness	1	13	34	36	19	16	60	32	10	15	5	12	9	12	274
Personalization	0	6	20	29	27	13	48	35	13	18	8	12	16	20	265
Morality & Ethics	1	12	35	32	36	24	56	30	14	10	13	18	32	28	341

seeking work even after receiving relief convinced lawmakers in the tenability of a workfare regime with modest social supports.

Deservingness is one of the most pivotal rhetorical constructions of the poor in American social welfare history. If a population is constructed as deserving among enough lawmakers, they are more likely to receive state aid. Deserving groups tend to have already provided value to the state and society (retired, disabled workers; veterans) or are those that cannot provide such value to the world by virtue of their station (children) or physical impairment. The deservingness peak in 1939 is most related to Congressional debates about ending many social spending programs, where here, lawmakers say the people targeted by these programs are worthy recipients, mostly revolving around young workers who benefit from direct government employment. While analyses later in the chapter test this proposition, anecdotally it appears the elderly are perceived as the most deserving population of this entire period, consistent with the view that America has an eldercare-skewed welfare state (Lynch 2006). This suggests the winning argument in workfare capitalism revolved around demonstrated economic contribution to the economy, where the elderly are owed support if ever the state were to act on anyone's behalf.

The personalization category captures when MCs tell their personal story of lived poverty, or at the very least, depict portrayals of poverty experienced by someone they know. Additionally, this category provides a potential alternative metric to MC's prior vocation to uncover some aspects of descriptive representation of the poor. Like the other variables in this category,

personalization narratives peak in 1939, largely due to the argumentation around amendments to SSA. One of the most common forms of personalization is to explain the personal hardship of MCs and their families during their formative adolescent years. One such example is Senator Pappy O'Daniel (D-TX), who talked about memories of his mother's poverty: "The milk which the cow furnished, together with the eggs, the butter, and the chickens, represented the only sources of revenue which the family had for use in buying books and clothes for the children so that they could go to school. My mother was poor and she worked out her life in poverty and hard drudgery for her children" (*CR 92 1946, 9848*). Personal accounts of one's poverty like this passage deserve greater attention in the study of poverty politics, as members use one's past or current experiences to claim license in a policy debate—both for and against proposed antipoverty legislation.

The morality and ethics code accounts for when members use moralistic philosophical or religious claims about the normative imperatives to help the poor. Therefore, this code captures the use Christian language about Jesus and secular humanist arguments about the duty to help the most vulnerable. A key change in the category is its use in the 1930s for domestic imperatives, where there is a duty of government to help the poor during the Depression, while later in the 1940s it is the right thing to do to help the foreign poor recovering from war-based decimation. Notably, moralism is not employed in this period as a reason *not* to pursue poverty amelioration strategies, which is likely to change in subsequent periods where poverty is a more partisan issue. Additionally, it is unclear that moralism relates to any given group designation but may instead be a broader style MCs utilize to cast their arguments in a positive valence.


Laying out the descriptive aspects of each code help unpack temporality and change in the conception of the poor by MCs in Congress. While lawmakers between the two major parties have the same propensity to speak about the poor, stunningly they also have roughly the same amount

of codes per speech—Democrats use 4.45 codes per speech while Republicans use 4.39. As the topic models showed partisan differences in poverty themes, there may also be partisan differences in code use. Therefore, Figure 6.7 arrays the poverty codes by how slanted they are toward each party, with Democratic codes further to the left, and Republican codes further to the right.

Additionally, the chart breaks down the parties into their most important internal divisions—Southern and non-Southern Democrats, as is common in the Congressional studies literature, but also Midwestern and non-Midwestern Republicans, which is much less common. Disaggregation along these lines is helpful because the Southern wing of Democrats and Midwestern Republicans forged the backbone of the governing Conservative Coalition from the late 1930s to the 1980s, based primarily on shared agricultural interests (Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier 1979) and later, social conservatism (Lowndes 2008). However, in this period, the Midwestern GOP was actually the vanguard for universalistic antipoverty rhetoric and challenges to moderate New Deal policies. As these more radical members, like Wild Bill Langer (R/NPL-ND), Usher Burdick (R-ND) and George Norris (R/I-NE) gave way to conservative members in the 1940s and 1950s, the populist-progressive strain of the party eroded, leaving a pastoral rural wing and a more liberal metropolitan wing, both of which were happy to align with Southern Democrats to challenge the dominant New Deal coalition.

Several aspects of this chart confirm the party priorities highlighted in the topic models. Victimization is slightly more characteristic of Republicans, as are discussions of veterans, professionals (white collar), and the Midwestern poor. On the last count, the Midwest was largely the only region that held off the Democratic landslides in Congress during FDR's early tenure in office. One reason for this resilience might be how attuned these lawmakers were to the public's appetite for reform and the issue of poverty, while Republicans in other regions held a closer

Figure 6.7 Poverty Codes Arrayed by Proportion of Party Use



Note: With 1,304 Republicans and 2,529 Democrats serving in this period, if partisans used a code equally, the Democratic share would be 65.98%. The dashed line demarcates the chart such that codes to the left are proportionately more Democratic, while those on the right are more Republican; third parties are omitted.

affinity to the laissez-faire Republicanism of the previous decade. Additionally, GOP lawmakers are more prone to depicting poverty among groups that reside in overseas territorial possessions *and* foreign nationals, which complicates the expected anti-internationalism of its members at the time. A more accurate view of the GOP at this time may be isolationist on matters of war and intervention, but a seemingly prominent commitment to internationalism on humanitarian needs and markets.

In contrast, the skewness toward Democrats on Housing corroborates the standalone nature of housing in the Democratic TM and seeming absence from (or sublimation within) the GOP TM. Additionally, Democrats talk more about the urban and rural/farming poor, and dominate in depicting the poor as residing in the North, West, and South. While Republicans generally avoid discussions of urban poverty, the dawning Conservative Coalition of Southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans dominates the agriculture category, suggesting their shared interest in agriculture was not limited to farm families and commodity development, but also to addressing—at least rhetorically—the needs of poor people in that sector. Said differently, if these regional players agreed on any antipoverty policies, it would likely revolve around agricultural and rural needs, not the urban issues that were largely absent from these lawmakers' districts.

In general, it appears Democrats in this era are more willing to racialize poverty, but this occurs by amplifying the circumstances of both the dominant racial group (Whites) and prominent historically marginalized minorities (especially Native Americans and Blacks). This peculiar terrain of racializing in service of hierarchy on the one hand (Southern Democrats), and color-blindness in service of egalitarianism on the other (Northern Democrats and Republicans), presents a difficult political terrain to manifest racial justice in the country, thereby limiting the prospects to solve entrenched, systemic poverty in this period.

While partisan associations with topic codes offer insights into the types of poor in the political arena, the following section digs deeper to understand how poverty codes relate to and appear with one another in individual speeches. This comprehensive portrayal of the nexus of poverty rhetoric will expose the key strains and help make sense of the many categorizations of the poor in Congress.

Correlations Between Codes

To understand associations between poverty codes, this section first uses pairwise correlation to establish the strength of binary relations, then uses factor analysis to understand the most important correlations across all 52 poverty codes. First, pairwise relations using correlation coefficients are a basic and widely used approach to data summary, and importantly, help verify that codes pool together in a cogent manner. Specifically, the Pearson's correlation coefficient (ρ) captures the magnitude and direction of a relationship by computing the pair's covariance divided by the sum of their standard deviations, such that 1 is perfect positive correlation, 0 is no correlation, and -1 is perfect negative correlation. This simple process adds credibility to the claim that the data have face validity and are not (solely) the product of researcher coding bias. As we will see shortly, there are several historically consequential associations between individual codes.⁵¹

Agriculture is most associated with rural ($\rho=0.17$), South (0.11), and financial instruments like debt (0.13). This is a testament to the message discipline of Southern Democratic lawmakers in propounding a predominantly homogenous view of their region's poor. These lawmakers contend the hardest hit members of their communities were self-sufficient farm families that could

⁵¹ To streamline the analysis presentation, the correlation table is not in the main text but is instead available in Appendix 6B, abbreviated to only display relationships with a significance level of $p < 0.01$ and a correlation coefficient of less than or equal to -0.1 or greater than or equal to 0.1.

not afford farm equipment and may be overextended on loans based on the equity they acquired when the farm was producing well. The reasons for their suffering range from drought, to decreased consumer markets during the Depression, to government favoritism of larger, factory farm operations, although the hierarchical behavior of Southern MCs contributed to the rise of the latter trend (Johnson 2011). To Southern Democrats, this is the valence population that deserves the most attention; an idyllic continuation of the yeoman ideal in Jeffersonian folklore.

Additionally, Southern lawmakers explain the association between the White and Black variables (0.65), which is the single strongest statistical relation in the dataset, and the South with Black (0.27) and White (0.25) poverty, respectively. In their political maneuvering, Southern lawmakers openly divert conversations about poor Blacks towards a broader discussion of poor people in the South, generally to include poor White people. This is used to diminish the normativity of antiracism, oddly moving toward an equating stance of “everyone is suffering.” The diversion from Black poverty toward Southern and/or White poverty occurs most heavily during the debates about the federal anti-poll tax bill that failed to pass in the late-1930s and early-1940s.

There are several other important non-Southern associations. Elderly and to a lesser extent residency status are the only demographic categories associated with dependency (0.20; 0.10) and deservingness (0.15; 0.12), respectively. This is leading evidence that the aged were indeed rhetorically constructed as the most desperately in need of state assistance—dependent on others for help and deserving because of their past service to the economy. It also conveys a relationship between the poor as citizens and deservingness, but the residency code is very heterogeneous and further examination is necessary to make a more exhaustive claim.

There are several other noteworthy associations in the data. First, natural disaster (flooding, fires, drought, and the Dustbowl) is associated with the Midwest (0.20) and West (0.13)—the

plight of poor folks in the former leading to migration to the latter. Second, education is strongly associated with youth (0.31) since schools provided short-term services and long-term opportunities to poor children. Third, descriptions of urban poverty are uniquely tied to the North region (0.26). Fourth, family is associated with female (0.18), showcasing the prevailing norms about motherhood and domesticity. Unpacking the family unit shows female strongly correlates with male (0.36) and youth (0.44), suggesting narratives around poor families often tie each constituent group together within it. And finally, foreign is associated with hunger (0.26) and Jewish (0.23), which speaks to the strength of events such as World War II in structuring how the poor are conceived in Congress. All of these relationships make sense and begin to explicate the codes into the larger venue of narratives MCs constructed during the New Deal.

Further associations between codes are gleaned from an expansion out from binary to a multiple correlation approach to simultaneously understand associations of several codes and the strength of these groupings. This pooling technique may capture broader themes, while introducing ideas of exclusivity and dimensionality to the analysis. Specifically, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is a useful approach to accomplish this goal, which accounts for variable commonality to unobserved, latent variables (termed factors). EFA takes a multiple correlation matrix and collapses the data into the fewest dimensions that explain the most variance. Underlying (unobserved) factors bind topics together by the individual variable's correlation to the composite (or index) factor. Since the factor process is iterative, the factors compete with one another to "pull" variables from the dataset, meaning each factor impacts the data availability to the next. This is a stricter data reduction strategy than Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which does not rely on an exclusivity (also known as uniqueness) assumption, and instead simply computes how much each variable severally correlates with each generated component (the equivalent of a

factor) (Basilevsky 1994). I use EFA to reduce the data to only the most important, “weighty” associations of variables, though both approaches may be fruitful with this data. As with pairwise correlation, this approach is instructive to bolster the validity of what researchers may already observe, but adds the potential to expose important new relationships as well. The results of the factor analysis are presented in Table 6.10.

Factor loadings are interpreted like correlation coefficients, where the value given for a variable is a correlation statistic to the factor (instead of to another variable). Convention holds that an Eigenvalue—a measure of total explained variance by a single factor—of 0.7 is high enough for confirmatory-based research claims. However, this project dwells mostly in exploratory research, which has a lower accepted threshold of 0.4. This factor analysis had 28 factors, of which 11 were greater than $EV=0.30$. For the sake of parsimony, only the top seven factors are presented here.

Diving into the substance, the strongest factor (Factor 1 with an Eigenvalue of 1.5) appears to combine the groups lawmakers construct the most positively and deserving, uncovering potentially the lowest common denominator among members’ preferences. We see the highest loadings here are from women (0.54), men (0.35), and youth (0.61), and they further associate with issues of health (0.30), education (0.26), family (0.37), and the elderly (0.24). Importantly, this factor picks up on deservingness (0.18) and dependency (0.18), suggesting these are the groups most widely supported to gain state policy supports. One statement best exemplifies the types of arguments lawmakers made in tying these groups together into a cohesive whole. Representative Young (D-OH) constructed the family by tying the elderly in “honorable poverty” with the “children of destitute widows” thusly: “[Before state-level mothers’ pensions] Children were sent to children’s homes and the mother to work. This blighted the lives of children and brought misery

Table 6.10 Factor Analysis of Topic Code Use

Variable	Factor 1 EV=1.50	Factor 2 EV=1.39	Factor 3 EV=0.91	Factor 4 EV=0.82	Factor 5 EV=0.66	Factor 6 EV=0.56	Factor 7 EV=0.47
Agriculture		0.20	0.20		0.28		
Asian							
Black		0.67	-0.28			0.11	
Bureaucrat	0.13			-0.18	-0.10		-0.11
Business				-0.12	0.13	0.19	0.12
Consumers							
Creative							
Dependency	0.18				-0.16		0.16
Deserving	0.18				-0.22		
Disaster			0.26	0.11			
Education	0.26	0.16				-0.10	
Elderly	0.24				-0.32		0.21
Energy						0.10	
Family	0.37				0.15		
Female	0.54	-0.15	-0.15		0.10		
Finance					0.20		
Foreign		-0.17	-0.20	0.46	0.13		
General	-0.19	-0.11		-0.12		0.15	
Health	0.30	-0.11		0.22			
Housing			0.10	0.22	0.14		
Hunger	0.16	-0.21	-0.11	0.29		0.19	
Jewish			-0.10	0.26			
Labor				-0.10	0.11	0.28	
Latino							0.10
Law	0.10					0.10	
Machinists				-0.11		0.16	
Male	0.35		-0.10	-0.16	0.11		
Maritime							-0.10
Merchant				-0.12	0.11	0.16	
Midwest		0.13	0.33				
Migrant			0.24	0.21			0.11
Military	0.13					-0.17	
Morality		-0.11		0.16	-0.12		
NativeAm				0.11			
North	0.10	0.11	0.21		-0.10		-0.30
Personalization			0.10				
Professional				-0.11		0.12	
Residency	0.14		0.18		-0.16	0.13	0.13
Rural		0.11	0.17		0.11		
South	0.15	0.42	0.14				
Subnational		0.11			-0.20	-0.15	0.15
Suburban							
Territory							
Training							
Transportation							
Urban			0.18				-0.32
Victim						0.14	
West	0.10	0.11	0.33	0.11			
White		0.65	-0.29			0.11	
Workers	0.17	-0.13		-0.17		0.28	
Youth	0.61		-0.14		0.12	-0.11	

Note: Eigenvalues (EV) measure the amount of variation accounted for by each factor; displayed loadings are ≤ -0.1 or ≥ 0.1

to the mother. Instead of cruel separations of mothers and children, we now have the enlightened system of mothers' pensions, with regular payments to mothers to take care of their children. The family is kept together... No State that has adopted mothers' pensions has returned to the old inhuman methods. I urge the same principle for the needy aged who, after a lifetime of industry, effort, and struggle at 60 become in need of assistance from the Government or from public or private charities" (*CR 79 1935, 5594*).

Empirically, these are indeed the groups that lawmakers construct as target populations for social welfare policy during the New Deal, even if some (largely male workers) receive direct national programs while others (women with children) receive hybrid federalized state programs (Mettler 1998). Additionally, this is suggestive evidence that the aforementioned groups carry the most positive valence and consensus support, as much of the social welfare regime today resembles one dedicated to serving the needs of the family unit. The power of a family-based narrative in service of a family-based workfare regime with some social supports seems to be the underpinnings of this category. Finally, the relation between the rhetoric of this first factor and the outputs of the New Deal strongly suggest rhetoric and policy track together, although the issue of causal directionality between the two is unclear.

Just as fascinating is the second factor, with an Eigen value of 1.39, which captures the aforementioned Southern discussion of White and Black poverty. On the one hand, these associations are sometimes used to benignly show poverty cuts across races. For example, Representative Edward Cox (D) of Georgia stated, "Down in my section of the country it is the poor people, the poor [W]hite and the Negroes that grow tobacco" (*CR 79 1935, 11809*). "I contend that the language of my amendment simply provides that all the money any of the Southern States

shall receive shall be expended dollar for dollar equally for poor [W]hite and for poor [B]lack children” (*CR 89 1943, 8559*), Bill Langer offered in a separate illustrative example.

However, this association is most commonly leveraged in a pernicious manner to neutralize racial egalitarian arguments that challenge the status quo in the South. Several expository examples showcase this point. Senator Theodore Bilbo (D-MS), although claiming to oppose the poll tax, arose in opposition to a federal bill to eliminate the poll tax, stating: “Many persons think that by repealing the poll tax we are paving the way for the Negro to vote. If one reads the hearings, he will find that the whole ‘racket’ is about the poor Negro. The proponents of this measure wish to provide a way for him to vote. The bill would be worth as much to the poor [W]hite people of my State as to the Negroes. In fact, it would enfranchise about 200,000 [W]hite persons in my State.” (*CR 88 1942, 8883*).⁵²

In another policy debate, Senator Richard Russell (GA) expressed his opposition to the Fair Employment Practices Act in racial neutralization terms:

The Senator [H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey] may say that the Negro has not always had his rights and I will agree with him, but by and large, he has not been deprived of any economic rights in the South, merely because our people are poor. For every poor colored man the Senator can point out I can show him a poor [W]hite man who does not earn any more than the Negro. We have all been a poor people because in the economy of this Nation we have not had the opportunity the Senator’s people have had. We have been discriminated against as a section more than there has been discrimination in employment. I do not want him to leave the impression that those who are opposing this bill are opposed to an equality of education for the Negro or that we are opposed to the Negro having equality of economic opportunity, because when the Negro has that in my State it helps to add to the sum total of wealth of the State and brings to it revenue which is needed. But when it comes to an organization such as this, which, under the guise of economic opportunity would attempt to force social equality on the South, and impose that kind of

⁵² Several days later, on November 19, 1942, Senator Bilbo, again arguing against the anti-poll tax bill, said his home state of Mississippi just needs more time to build a White majority like Northern states, then they can safely eliminate the poll tax: “Not until the last census did the [W]hite population show any excess over the Negro in Mississippi. The Negroes have been in the majority in Mississippi until the last census. Give us a little more time and we will improve that situation” (*CR 88 1942, 8967*), i.e., when the African-American vote is less threatening and decisive.

government upon us, I must resist it with every power at my command.” (*CR 92 1946, 376-377*)

These examples show a significant amount of representation of the poor African-American population in this period was not in service of elevating their plight, but instead, to neutralize arguments that may infringe on Southern sovereignty. Unfortunately, ubiquitous local poverty is used by these lawmakers as cover to maintain racial hierarchy.

The Southern Democratic domination of the White-Black association begs the question: where are Northern liberals in both parties on pernicious, centuries long Black impoverishment? Stuningly, only 27 of the already low 75 Black-coded speeches come from members outside of the South. (The non-Southern speeches come from 19 individual members, while the 48 Southern speeches come from 21 members.) One possibility explaining the dearth of Northern liberal rhetorical interests may simply be that they did not tie poverty and Blackness together at this point, caring severally about each, but not adjoining them together in a systematic, coherent, policy-relevant manner. Those non-Southern MCs that did address Black poverty seemed aware of the Southern strategy to divide and exclude the poorest of the poor, often depriving one’s own constituents of a pension, especially in the South. One such example is seen in the case of Representative Daniel Reed (R-NY), who claimed in relation to the Social Security Act amendment debates, “We know there are a lot of States that will not act. Some States can run horse races and spend millions of dollars in gate receipts in many of the so-called poor States, but they cannot do anything for their old people. Why? Because they fear that some old-colored grandmother might get a little extra old-age pension and then have the whole group around her move in, in order to live on the pension. That is the truth behind this legislation and it is about time the scheme should be exposed” (*CR 92 1946, 10756*).

An alternative is that Northern MCs made a strategic choice not to speak about poor Blacks so as not to arouse public and institutional actor responses that may make any economically egalitarian policy gains difficult. In the public, it is well known there was a strong aversive racism in the North before, during, and after this period. Lawmakers may fear their constituents will turn on them if they appear too friendly to African-Americans when many were suffering during the Depression. In the institution, politicians may worry about “tipping off” racist actors in a complex, time-consuming legislative process, where maintaining a governing coalition was of utmost importance. This project is not designed to capture the covert politics that may have occurred behind the scenes, but it does document Northern liberals were less likely to talk about Black poverty than Southern lawmakers who were chiefly concerned with feudalistic racial hierarchy, and not rectifying years of structural poverty in the Black community.

A final potential explanation is that egalitarian MCs believed a color-blind approach would still encompass long-oppressed groups. Whether this is due to incorrect assumptions or observations, the high levels of poverty among pastoral, cash-crop, and domestic workers alone should have made these members question the efficacy of the dominant biased particularist approach to poverty amelioration. Ultimately, the lack of non-Southern poor Black representation suggests the race-correlated exclusion from such policies as the Social Security Act and Fair Labor Standards Act was not only because of Southern domination of the Democratic coalition (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder 1993; Lieberman 1998; Katznelson and Farhang 2005) or the Roosevelt administration’s emphasis on limiting the scope of coverage to ensure feasibility in implementation (Davies and Derthick 1997; DeWitt 2010). Instead, a third potential explanation for exclusion is that non-Southern liberals simply did not tie racial injustice with economic inequality in this period, suggesting the market for universalistic social welfare programs among

non-Southerners, let alone Congress as a whole, was considerably lower than previous scholars have understood. The finding that only a minority of liberal lawmakers in this period held views akin to those espoused in modern American left-liberalism puts in greater relief the historically consequential entanglement of the two ideological strains immediately after the prolific New Deal period (Gerring 1998; Noel 2013; Schickler 2016).⁵³ Chapter 8 explores these competing and overlapping explanations for exclusion in greater detail by centering on the essential case of the Social Security Act. Though the New Deal administrative policies more fulsomely benefitted Northern and urban Blacks, lawmakers in this era were wholly incapable of breaking rural Black legacy poverty in the South (Sitkoff 1984).

The remaining five factors are less weighty, but still carry discernable meaning in the context of poverty representation. The third factor captures state level issues of migration, disaster relief, and agricultural calamity across regions, but most pronounced west of the Mississippi River. The fourth factor picks up on the construction of the foreign poor, which are frequently hungry and Jewish. While Jewish is not often used overall, it is foreign in nature in every instance—a high correlation which explains what the factor is picking up on. One example is when Representative Thomas Lane (D-MA) linked Jewish plight to the need for a homeland, “We are trying the Nazis for their crimes against humanity, but what solution do we offer to the victims who wait? What victims? The Jews, who were the first and the most appalling sacrifice exacted by the Fascist terror. Over 1,000,000 of these victims wait, suffer, and starve while we, the victors, dally with diplomacy. These victims are not wanted even in the countries we helped to liberate. They must move on, to somewhere. That refuge is their ancient homeland—Palestine” (*CR 91* 1945, 9684).

⁵³ Indeed, when given the opportunity to cast a vote for the universalistic alternative to SSA—the Lundeen Bill (H.R. 2827) that covered all vocational categorizations—only 52 House Representatives voted in the affirmative (*CR 79* 1935, 5969). Those House members largely hailed from the group of proto-modern liberals known as Maury’s Mavericks, which drew heavily from third parties and main party outcasts (see Mihelich 2001).

The fifth factor centers on agricultural issues, such as Southern farm families that may lose their homes due to debt, or farm youths with little vocational opportunities. Relatedly, the sixth factor picks up on the overall workfare argumentation of the period, running the gamut of different vocational categorizations that show up together. Finally, the seventh factor appears to pick up on subnational issues pertaining specifically to California, which involve Latinos, migration, dependency, elderly, and businesses in need of liquidity. Interestingly, the Western code was not included in the factor, even though one of the most common refrains from Californian and Arizonan lawmakers was the severe economic strain these migrants placed on local public health entities and the public budget. To lawmakers of disparate ideologies, like conservative John Tolan (D-CA), moderates Thomas Ford (D-CA) and John Murdock (D-AZ), and liberal Jerry Voorhis (D-CA), much of what they are all shared were desperate pleas for the federal government to provide financial assistance to their changing localities.

Conclusion

The New Deal took the pivotal step of establishing the superstructure of the American social welfare regime, but in the process incorporated impoverished members of the public in a biased and uneven manner. This paper fills out the picture of what happened in greater relief and points to potential explanations for this fragmented antipoverty regime by breaking down the poor monolith and exposing how lawmakers conceived of and categorized the poor as MCs went about their representational duties during this period.

First, the chapter employed topic modeling to analyze the 3,404 speeches in the novel poverty speech dataset, revealing the interconnected nature of poverty with the dominant issues of the time, including domestic relief, agriculture, monetary and fiscal policy, war, migration, and foreign policy. There were many similarities in issue interests between the two main political

parties, but Democrats had a distinct emphasis on governance and policymaking—especially the Social Security Act—in their poverty-laden rhetoric. In contrast, Republicans proved capable at operating as the loyal opposition to check the perceived excesses of the majority party—and politic for partisan gain—by tying poverty to political corruption and the misuse of relief funds. These models offer a positive depiction of a political class that is functioning in a textbook manner, with the majority designing antipoverty policies to help needy members of the public while the minority ensures the policies are carried out in the best public interest, which contrasts mightily with the contemporary politics of legislative gridlock where malignant partisanship only gives way to narrowly tailored, interest-group policymaking.

To expose greater detail, the chapter presents a 52-variable coding system that importantly disaggregates the overly general poor monolith for the first time. Positively, members are overwhelmingly specific in their depictions of the poor, as only 2% of poverty speeches fail to identify a poor group or subject area. While Congress collectively imagines the poor in wide-ranging ways that touch on nearly every type of poverty and poor group in the nation at the time, lawmakers are much less successful at adequately representing the degrees of poverty as experienced by poor subgroups. Instead, we see there is a hierarchy of the poor, in which some types of categorizations, like workers and the hungry, receive significant attention, while others, like Blacks, Native Americans and migrants receive very little. Factor analysis indicates the factors that captured the greatest share of variance were those that had codes mirroring who actually received policy supports in this era, centering on the workforce and family unit, including mothers, children, male workers, and the elderly. This is strong support for the important role of political rhetoric: not only does rhetoric relate to policy, but in this period rhetoric and policy correspond

in a linked, directional manner, such that on balance, the more a group is depicted, the more support they receive in eventual policy construction.

Moreover, the rhetorical analyses in this chapter show members were insufficient in their representational interest to end systemic legacy poverty in America, best exemplified in the paltry emphasis on racial and ethnic material equality. Instead, we see lawmakers generally agreed on a color-blind, vocation-based lowest common denominator form of poverty representation in which the poor that receive aid are the poor that have demonstrated, understood value to *all* of society—namely current and former workers and those that cannot or should not work. Notably, the themes and categorizations suggest the New Deal antipoverty regime was not an attempt to eliminate poverty through universal or needs-based policies, but instead centered on a third option: biased particularism, in which only the most virtuous, least controversial poor received state help. Many long-standing poor receive no (or marginal) supports, to be forgotten for a generation, while others experience the first successful government-led effort in upward mobility of the poor into the nascent middle class. This comports with a view of the New Deal as an attempt to roll back the event-based Great Depression, short of eliminating generational poverty.

As a whole, this chapter depicted the nuances and context of representation in rich detail, tracking it on a daily basis from the early New Deal period of 1933 to after World War II in 1946. It documents the ideational plane that members developed as they imagined the actionable poor and negotiated policies to rectify human suffering. Unfortunately, substantively the chapter uncovers the many opportunities for the representational process to break down against the poorest of poor, as the varied district constituencies, preferences of members, external events, and grueling multi-year legislative processes combine into a prohibitive political arena for marginalized interests to hold attention and reap direct policy supports.

In sum, this chapter initiated the vital task of disaggregating the poor monolith in service of understanding who lawmakers conceive as poor when they—as largely non-poor political elites—virtually represent the substantive interests of the poor. By centering on the speeches MCs deliver, the chapter provides a systematic, descriptive account of the historical record of poverty issue dynamics in Congress, exposing the themes, groups, and characterizations bound to poverty rhetoric. This empirical effort creates a basis to determine favored and disfavored categorizations of the poor. Uncovering how lawmakers conceive of the poor and politically construct target populations enhances our understanding of the politics of poverty and American state development. Later chapters use this knowledge to further interrogate to what degree the rhetorical construction of the poor resembled the poor in the public and the poor that are incorporated into policy outputs.

To help ground what poverty representation looks like in practice, and whether there are central tendencies or approaches that broadly encapsulate poverty representation, the next chapter shifts the analytical unit to the members themselves. Specifically, the chapter assesses how MC speechmaking falls into certain bins—or types—of poverty-interested rhetorical behavior.

Appendix 6A: Average Poverty Code Use

The following table holds the mean values for each code across the 3,403 speeches. Since every speech was capped at a maximum value of 1 on any variable, these means also convey the proportion of speeches that have a certain code (e.g., the agriculture code is used in 16.25% of speeches).

Table 6A.1 Mean Value for Topic Codes

Code Name	Mean Value	Code Name	Mean Value
Agriculture	0.1625	Male	0.1790
Asian	0.0006	Maritime	0.0032
Black	0.0220	Merchant	0.0029
Bureaucrat	0.0623	Midwest	0.0476
Business	0.0185	Migrant	0.0218
Consumers	0.1381	Military	0.2444
Creatives	0.0041	Morality	0.1002
Dependency	0.1322	Native American	0.0121
Deserving	0.0805	North	0.0362
Disaster	0.0197	Personalization	0.0779
Education	0.0600	Professionals	0.0068
Elderly	0.1096	Residency	0.0902
Energy	0.0118	Rural	0.0335
Family	0.1616	South	0.0920
Female	0.1252	Subnational	0.0979
Finance	0.0505	Suburban	0.0006
Foreign	0.1560	Territories/D.C.	0.0206
General	0.4893	Training	0.0018
Health	0.1637	Transportation	0.0065
Housing	0.1605	Urban	0.0388
Hunger	0.3594	Victim	0.4073
Jewish	0.0100	West	0.0332
Labor	0.0406	White	0.0162
Latino	0.0015	Workers	0.2745
Law	0.0532	Youth	0.1701
Machinists	0.0035		

Appendix 6B: Correlations Between Poverty Codes

Table 6B.1 presents one of the simplest approaches to understanding relations between codes, which is to calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient for each binary relationship, then summarize the data in a correlation

Table 6B.1 Pairwise Correlation Coefficients

	Agriculture	Asian	Black	Bureaucrat	Business	Consumers	Creative	Dependency	Deserving	Disaster	Education	Elderly	Energy	Family	Female	Finance	Foreign	General	Health	Housing	Hunger	Jewish	Labor	Latino	Law	Machinists	
Agriculture	1																										
Asian		1																									
Black			1																								
Bureaucrat				1																							
Business					1																						
Consumers						1																					
Creative				0.10			1																				
Dependency								1																			
Deserving									1																		
Disaster										1																	
Education			0.11	0.11							1																
Elderly							0.20	0.15				1															
Energy					0.13								1														
Family														1													
Female												0.15	0.18		1												
Finance	0.13															1											
Foreign																	1										
General	-0.15													-0.11			0.11	1									
Health											0.18		0.10	0.14			0.13		1								
Housing																				1							
Hunger																		0.26	0.18	0.10	1						
Jewish																		0.23		0.15		1					
Labor																							1				
Latino																								1			
Law																									1		
Machinists					0.14																						1
Male													0.13	0.36												0.11	
Maritime																											
Merchant					0.11																		0.10				
Midwest										0.22																	
Migrant		0.16																									
Military													0.11				0.12		0.13								
Morality								0.10													0.13						
NativeAm																											
North																											
Personalization																											
Professional																											
Residency							0.10	0.12			0.10																
Rural	0.17																										
South	0.11		0.27								0.10																
Subnational											0.13	0.15															
Suburban																											
Territory																											
Training																											
Transportation																											
Urban																				0.10							
Victim																											
West									0.13																		
White			0.65								0.10																
Workers				0.12														-0.11			0.10		0.15				
Youth											0.31	0.10			0.44			-0.10	0.21		0.12						

Chapter 7

Poverty Styles:

Varying Approaches to the Rhetorical Construction of the Poor

Abstract

Since the poor are depicted in wildly different terms across lawmakers, it is important to understand how members themselves have individual *styles* of poverty rhetoric. Here, a style is the unique manner in which a lawmaker associates themselves with poverty ideas and groups. To explore the idea of style, the chapter first examines topic code use and variance in representational priorities by spotlighting high-volume poverty articulators and leaders in specific topic code use. The chapter then documents the varying dimensions to poverty representation by offering a conceptual typology of poverty rhetoric composed of two dimensions: *rhetorical specificity* (i.e., a higher ratio of specific to general terminology) and *constituency scope* (i.e., how many aspects of poverty a member recognizes). The rhetorical specificity dimension arrays from broad *generalists* to specific *topicals*, while constituency scope ranges from narrow *parochials* to comprehensive *universalists*, with both measures cutting across one another and forming four subtypes. The chapter then ties concepts to empirics by translating the typology into a quantifiable measure. Overall, the large-n analyses and illustrative case episodes of lawmaker rhetorical style provide a framework to understand how constituency interpretation and member preferences inform whose poverty is projected onto the agenda space.

We who are for the W. P. A. are accused of being so for votes. Yes, of course. You who are against the poor, you are not for votes, are you? Oh, no. Of course not. Maybe. The fact is we are both angling for votes because as a matter of fact in a republic every policy is of necessity decided by political action. We are for the poor. That is our avowed policy. You are for the rich, but such is not your open nor avowed policy. That is the difference.

—Representative Kent Keller (D-IL), March 31, 1939

Something ought to be done now... so that the poor tenant or the sharecropper can be helped and not be charged extra by the big folks or by the corporations who have a hundred or 200 farms in one State, as they are now charging them. Why not help the poor man, the poor tenant, or the poor sharecropper?

—Representative Fred Gilchrist (R-IA), April 3, 1939

Mr. President, a moment ago I said that the poor man—and by that I mean the common man, the average farmer, the small merchant, and the laboring man—did not have much chance. That is true. During the short time I have been a Member of this body several instances have arisen to prove that statement. I remember that one day when we were considering a tax-bill to raise \$160,000,000 of revenue, it was proposed that we place a use tax of \$5 on every car. That measure was enacted into law. I voted against it, as did 31 other Senators. The distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. La Follette] made a magnificent speech against it, but it passed. What is the result? A rich man may have an automobile costing \$20,000, and a poor sharecropper in the darkest part of North Dakota or Mississippi may buy an old 'jitney' for \$15 so that he can go to town on Sunday afternoon. Call him a hired man, a hobo, or an I.W.W., if you will. Those poor people are called many names. All they are good for is to do the hard work, anyway.

—Senator Bill Langer (R/NPL-ND) December 16, 1943

Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated the wide variation in who lawmakers depict when they use poverty language in their political rhetoric. In aggregate, these depictions culminate in a skewed depiction of the American poor, favoring color-blind constructions of valence groups, like workers, the elderly, and youth, over most-in-need groups that have experience systemic, generational poverty, such as Native Americans, African-Americans, and immigrants. While the collective conception of the poor is quite skewed, it is founded in how individual lawmakers choose poverty subjects. Indeed, lawmakers each have distinct manners of style in how they conceive of and depict the poor. This chapter explores these styles and

Scholars have previously used styles to categorize lawmaker representational behavior and their connection to their constituents. Specifically, political scientists have focused on how MCs present themselves to their constituents (Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974; Grimmer 2013) and “styles” of leadership (Cooper and Brady 1981) and broader behavior while in Congress (Dexter 1969; Bernhard and Sulkin 2018).⁵⁴ These forms of expressive representational behavior also pertain to rhetoric (Tetlock, Hannum and Micheletti 1984), and will be further articulated in the application of styles to the subject of poverty articulation.

Goffman’s (1959) seminal work in sociology depicts how humans engaging in social behavior are creatures akin to actors portraying themselves to an audience in a play, limited by their roles and available tools to effectively communicate. Fenno (1978) claims lawmakers do this too, and that their “presentation of self” is an attempt to indicate how lawmakers intend to represent their constituents (54). To build and maintain popularity, in turn, members adopt unique and coherent “home styles” that appeal to the idiosyncrasies of their districts and constituents (Fenno

⁵⁴ The use of the term style has also been gainfully employed in presidential studies (Barber 1972; Greenstein 1982; Lammers and Genovese 2000) and studies of the federal courts (Haynie 1982; Tetlock, Bernzweig and Gallant 1985).

1978). As Grimmer writes in the dissertation (2010) form of his book (2013) on homestyle and representation, “Through the issues legislators raise when they communicate with their constituents they define the kind of representation they offer to their constituents” (2010, 34).

Moreover, since reelection is the preeminent goal of lawmakers, they must cultivate legislative pedigrees that facilitate electoral success, such as advertising their efforts, claiming credit for popular initiatives, and taking positions on important issues, all of which may occur through discursive communication (Mayhew 1974). In D.C., categorizing behavior by styles is a helpful way to observe varied and dominant tendencies of how lawmakers spend their time, whether it is constructing policy, raising money, or speaking directly to the press and the public. In Bernhard and Sulkin’s book *Legislative Style*, they uncover several key types of legislator styles, including policy specialists (31.4% of MCs), party soldiers (26.7%), district advocates (26.2%), party builders (11.9%), and ambitious entrepreneurs (3.7%) (43). All activities occur in all lawmakers, but MCs favor some activities over others. Finally, representational style is inherently rhetorical, and this rhetoric structures how constituents evaluate and hold to account their representatives (Grimmer 2013). In short, analyzing styles helps scholars and the public better understand how members use their time and what their priorities are in Congress.

Within the context of poverty, members form unique styles for two coexisting purposes. The first is to show the poor (and reference publics) in their respective districts they are attuned to their plight, and are therefore responsive representatives. This marketing of one’s activities is central to the public understanding what a lawmaker believes and does with their time. The second purpose is more personal: MCs verbally disclose the impoverished populations they care about and understand. As the associational models in Chapter 5 showed, most explanatory predictors fail to have weighty correlations with poverty speech count. A difficult to test working hypothesis

posits members truly pursue poverty representation because they have a personal stake in the matter, either because they grew up poor or are simply more empathetic to the plight of others. This distinction between political constituency and personal values is important to understand why some lawmakers entirely ignore the poor (they themselves or their voters may not care about poverty), while others advocate for poor groups that have a negligible presence in their district. Simply put, when members speak about the poor, they attempt to both portray their priorities to their constituents *and* shape the terms of problem definition and solutions on the legislative agenda. By examining the idiosyncrasies of how MCs do invoke the poor in political debate, we may better understand the representational and policy process of poverty politics.

This chapter seeks to empirically measure poverty representational styles by accounting for *who* MCs emphasize as poor and *how* they describe their conditions. To execute this, the chapter first examines which lawmakers most talked about the poor, termed “high-volume poverty articulators”. From this exploration, we see how the most prolific poverty rhetoricians prioritize similar and disparate images of the poor within their discourse. Then secondly the chapter examines the leaders in each form of poverty captured in the topic codes. Third, the chapter conceptualizes the dimensions of poverty rhetoric styles and offers a two-dimensional typology consisting of *rhetorical specificity* (i.e., a higher ratio of specific to general terminology) and *constituency scope* (i.e., how many aspects of poverty a member recognizes). Finally, using the speech codes, the chapter establishes a quantitative measure for these dimensions with the full set of 618 poverty-interested lawmakers. MCs of the New Deal have clearly discernable poverty styles that inform how they construct and advocate for the poor.

High-Volume Poverty Articulators

Since poverty representation is undertaken principally by a subset of modestly to very interested lawmakers, it is valuable to start an examination of style with the most prolific poverty articulators in Congress. By virtue of their prolificity, we can get a better sense of how many—or few—poverty conditions even the most interested lawmakers can plausibly call to in their speechmaking. To that end, Table 7.1 provides the top 20 lawmakers with the most poverty speeches from 1933 to 1946. The cast of characters have a strong presence in the previous and following chapters, and is composed of 11 Senators, eight House members, and one member (Lundeen) who served in both chambers. As previously mentioned, Huey Long (D-LA) is an incredibly skewed outlier with 66 speeches for an average of 33 poverty speeches in only two Congresses. Lundeen (FL-MN) is the only other member above 50 speeches, while four more had 40 or more speeches (Voorhis, Robsion, Langer, and Wagner). The list descends to the 20th ranked member, Royal Copeland (D-NY), with 27 speeches for an average of 9 per Congress. Only Long, Lundeen, and Wild Bill Langer (NPL/R-ND) average more than 10 poverty speeches per Congress. The high counts for these members is a stark contrast with the two-thirds of MCs that give zero poverty speeches in their time in office during the New Deal.

Aside from speech propensity, the table also provides a count for total topic codes the MC uses in their speeches. A low code use rate implies a more myopic focus on certain forms of poverty, while a high rate conveys a broader lens in poverty oratory. Long does not lead on this metric, but instead John Robsion (R-KY) takes that mantle, with 314 total codes and average of 6.68 codes per speech, both highest in the period. Indeed, on March 10, 1936, set the discrete record for most topic codes in a single speech with 16 speech codes in a single speech on the Works Progress Administration. The only other member averaging more than five speech codes

Table 7.1 Top 20 Lawmakers with the Most Poverty Speeches, 1933-1946

Member Name (Party-State)	Chamber	Poverty Speeches	Speeches per Congress	Topic Codes	Codes per Speech	Top 3 Topic Codes
Long (D-LA)	Senate	66	33	273	4.14	General; Hunger; Victim
Lundeen (FL-MN)	Both	53	13.25	260	4.91	General; Hunger; Worker
Voorhis (D-CA)	House	48	9.6	197	4.1	General; Consumer; Worker
Robsion (R-KY)	House	47	7.83	314	6.68	General; Victim; Children
Langer (NPL/R-ND)	Senate	45	15	286	6.36	Victim; Men; Women
Wagner (D-NY)	Senate	41	5.86	154	3.76	Housing; General; Family
Pepper (D-FL)	Senate	39	7.8	186	4.77	Victim; General; Hunger
Sabath (D-IL)	House	36	5	180	5	Hunger; General; Worker
Hoffman (R-MI)	House	34	5.67	173	5.09	Victim; General; Worker
Downey (D-CA)	Senate	33	8.25	167	5.06	General; Worker; Victim
Tydings (D-MD)	Senate	32	5.33	132	4.13	Victim; General; Hunger
Reynolds (D-NC)	Senate	31	5.17	160	5.16	Hunger; Men; General
Burdick (R-ND)	House	31	6.2	139	4.48	Victim; Hunger; General
Fish (R-NY)	House	31	5.17	124	4	General; Worker; Hunger
Patman (D-TX)	House	31	4.43	111	3.58	General; Victim; Hunger
Norris (R/I-NE)	Senate	30	6	128	4.27	General; Victim; Men
Bilbo (D-MS)	Senate	29	4.83	161	5.55	South; Victim; Family
La Follette (P-WI)	Senate	29	4.14	97	3.34	Victim; General; Agriculture
Johnson (D-OK)	House	28	4	138	4.93	Deserving; Dependence; Agr.
Copeland (D-NY)	Senate	27	9	116	4.3	Urban; North; Hunger

Notes: Ties for third most used code are broken by selecting the code with the least overall use. Pooled figures include members of the House and Senate. Not all members served the full duration of this timespan (most notably Huey Long only served until his death in 1935 and still has the most poverty speech entries).

per speech is Langer with an average of 6.36 and total of 286, both second only to Robsion. The member with the fewest total codes and lowest average is Robert La Follette Jr. with 97 and 3.34, respectively. Even high propensity MCs vary in how many groups they represent in their speeches, suggesting a high speech count (interest) is not sufficient for comprehensive representation (awareness).

The rightmost column gives further details on *who* and *what* these MCs depict in their speeches. There are several images of poverty that constitute a central tendency among this group, specifically the general code (vague mentions of poverty without identifying anything else), the

victimization narrative, and hunger. Ever MC in the list uses at least one, but of more, of those in their top 3 except one person: Representative Jed Johnson (D-OK). Johnson's top 3 are the most idiosyncratic of the bunch, expectedly focusing on agriculture, but also portraying the poor in terms emanating from deservingness and dependency. Other unique findings include Voorhis' focus on the poor as valuable and ignored consumers, Langer's emphasis of poverty pertaining to both accepted genders at the time, Wagner's emphasis on housing (a product of his floor leadership in the USHA debate of '36 and '37, Bilbo's focus on the South and family unit, La Follette's emphasis of agriculture, and Copeland's centering on urban and Northern poverty. While members clearly prioritize their own constituencies in portraying the poor, there is a high level of commonality in the aggregated profiles of each poverty articulator.

Finally, it is important to showcase that in this period speaking about the poor was not exclusive to party identification or political ideology. Both party caucuses had membership of various ideologies, such as socialists (Langer; Long; Lundeen), progressives (Norris; La Follette), liberals (Burdick; Copeland; Patman; Voorhis), moderates (Robson; Tydings; Downey), conservatives (Taft; Johnson; Fish), and fascists (Hoffman; Reynolds). This heterogeneity of ideology across chambers and parties, and the dispositional willingness of members on the left and right to speak about the poor, created an environment conducive to amplifying the interests of the poor through vigorous debate and policy outcomes. Even if the members disagreed on policy solutions, the robust debate facilitated a constant agenda presence of the poor on the minds of lawmakers. Therefore, even if members like Representative Hoffman believed over-taxation was the primary impediment to the poor achieving upward mobility, while others like Senator Norris viewed nationalization of energy utilities as key to increasing the quality of life for the poor, their

willingness to engagement in rhetorical projection of the poor fostered an environment of sustained attention to their plight.

Code Use and Variance in Representational Priorities

Centering on code use exposes both topical commitments and hints at lawmaker style. To address the former, one way to ascertain different priorities in poverty speeches is to anchor on the codes themselves, and rank members according to code use. Such an approach is provided in Table 7.2, which lays out the top 3 members who use each of the top 40 codes. Given the often vague narrative of poverty in America, it is quite surprising that members are overwhelmingly specific in who they identify as poor in America. That said, Long's leadership on poverty oratory also involved general calls to the power, leaving him with the most general code use at 47 of his 66 speeches. While members such as Lundeen, Voorhis, Robsion, Wagner, Downey, and Fish commonly talk about the poor at-large, at some point in a contiguous speech they will often more specifically define who they consider as poor in America. The two clearest outliers who use vague language in often undefined terms are Rep. Patman of Texas and Robert La Follette Jr of Wisconsin, who fail to define the poor roughly one-fifth of the time.⁵⁵ The precision of members of Congress in identifying the poor during the New Deal is a promising metric of dedicated representation of the poor, even if members tend to favor the needs of *their* poor over those of other members.

As members become more specific in their depictions of poverty, they begin to veer away from one another and focus on their poverty style, composed of the ideas and groups that are most preferred in their political discourse. This is evident in the behavior and circumstance panel on the top of the table. For example, both Voorhis (20) and Sabath (10) talk about the poor as valuable

⁵⁵ This compares to the global average of roughly one-ninth of the time.

Table 7.2 Top 3 MCs by Code Use (Top 40 Most Used Codes)

Behavior and Circumstance							
Consumers	Crime, Law and Vices		Financial Instruments and Debt		Health and Disability		
Voorhis (D-CA)	20	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	6	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	7	Robsion (R-KY)	18
Sabath (D-IL)	10	Colden (D-CA)	5	McKellar (D-TN)	7	Long (D-LA)	15
Langer (NPL/R-ND)	9	Norris (R/I-NE)	5	Lee (D-OK)	6	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	14
Housing and Utilities	Hunger and Clothing		Natural Disaster		Victimization		
Wagner (D-NY)	27	Long (D-LA)	34	Wheeler (D-MT)	3	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	31
Lundeen (FL-MN)	11	Lundeen (FL-MN)	30	Jenkins (R-OH)	3	Robsion (R-KY)	31
Tydings (D-MD)	9	Robsion (R-KY)	18	O'Connor (D-MT)	3	Hoffman (R-MI)	24
Demographic							
Children and Youth	Elderly		Family Unit		Female		
Robsion (R-KY)	23	Downey (D-CA)	16	Robsion (R-KY)	19	Robsion (R-KY)	23
Langer (NPL/R-ND)	14	Robsion (R-KY)	13	Voorhis (D-CA)	15	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	15
Johnson (D-OK)	11	Long (D-LA)	9	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	14	Walsh (D-MA)	12
Male	Foreign		Migration		Residency Status		
Langer (NPL/R-ND)	20	Voorhis (D-CA)	12	Reynolds (D-NC)	5	Lundeen (FL-MN)	9
Long (D-LA)	14	Reynolds (D-NC)	10	Murdock (D-AZ)	5	Robsion (R-KY)	9
Reynolds (D-NC)	13	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	10	Tolan (D-CA)	4	Copeland (D-NY)	6
Black	Native American		White		General		
Ellender (D-LA)	8	Johnson (D-OK)	5	Ellender (D-LA)	7	Long (D-LA)	47
McKellar (D-TN)	7	O'Connor (D-MT)	4	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	6	Lundeen (FL-MN)	39
Bilbo (D-MS)	6	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	4	Bilbo (D-MS)	5	Wagner (D-NY)	25
Geographic							
Subnational Unit	Midwest		North		South		
Connally (D-TX)	11	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	13	Copeland (D-NY)	12	Robsion (R-KY)	20
Russell (D-GA)	11	Burdick (R-ND)	6	Wagner (D-NY)	4	Ellender (D-LA)	14
Taft (R-OH)	10	Lundeen (FL-MN)	6	Gross (R-PA)	3	Bilbo (D-MS)	14
West	Territory		Rural		Urban		
Murdock (D-AZ)	5	Coffee (D-WA)	4	Robsion (R-KY)	4	Copeland (D-NY)	14
O'Connor (D-MT)	5	Marcantonio (R/AL-NY)	4	Sirovich (D-NY)	3	Sabath (D-IL)	7
Ford, Leland M. (R-CA)	4	Amlie (P-WI)	3	Russell (D-GA)	3	Wagner (D-NY)	5
Occupation							
Agriculture	Energy Sector		Labor and Unions		Workers (General)		
Langer (NPL/R-ND)	13	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	4	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	5	Lundeen (FL-MN)	28
McKellar (D-TN)	12	Guffey (D-PA)	3	Smith (R-OH)	4	Downey (D-CA)	19
Johnson (D-OK)	11	Keller (D-IL)	3	Hoffman (R-MI)	4	Voorhis (D-CA)	17
Business and Companies	Bureaucrats and Civil Service		Education Sector		Military		
Keller (D-IL)	3	Pepper (D-FL)	7	Ellender (D-LA)	8	Robsion (R-KY)	13
Bailey (D-NC)	2	Sabath (D-IL)	5	Bilbo (D-MS)	6	Long (D-LA)	10
Cannon (D-MO)	2	Robsion (R-KY)	5	Keefe (R-WI)	5	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	8
Perspectives and Characterization							
Dependency and Stigma	Deservingness and Worthiness		MC Personalization		Morality and Ethics		
Long (D-LA)	14	Johnson (D-OK)	13	Robsion (R-KY)	8	Robsion (R-KY)	9
Johnson (D-OK)	11	Bilbo (D-MS)	8	Langer (NPL/R-ND)	7	Lundeen (FL-MN)	7
Burdick (R-ND)	10	Jenkins (R-OH)	7	O'Connor (D-MT)	5	Wagner (D-NY)	7

consumers who can contribute to the economy if given the opportunity. This approach is a strategic choice that relies on principles of aggregate demand that suggest poor people fully utilize their

liquid assets more than any other group, which means focusing policy on what the poor want but cannot afford will pay dividends to the larger economy. Others, including Langer, Norris, Long, and Lundeen talk about the legal issues facing the poor face. In one case, Norris—long considered one of the most progressive members of the Senate—focused on the balance between giving prison inmates the opportunity to work, but doing so in a way that does not hurt the poor that might otherwise do similar jobs. Langer (7) and McKellar (7) shift gears to frequently talk about indebtedness and lack of financial flexibility for the poor. Robsion (18), Long (15), and Langer (14) emphasize sickness and disability in their narratives, often in service of creating a more robust federal health regime. On housing, Wagner (27) is singularly prolific. As previously mentioned, many MCs talk about hunger and lack of clothing among the poor, but Long and Lundeen do it on a scale no other members reach at 34 and 30 speeches, respectively. And finishing that section, an ideologically peculiar convergence occurs between Robsion, Langer, Pepper, and Hoffman as they commonly speak about the poor as victims of individuals, structures, or government action (or lack thereof).

Moving to demographics, Robsion focuses heavily on how poverty affects the young (23) and old (13), while Senator Downey focuses most heavily on the latter (16) as the home state Senator to the Townsend movement for old-age pensions. Robsion (19) and Voorhis (15) often address family unit poverty. Reynolds, Norris, and Bone speak about poor men frequently, as do Robsion and Langer, but they additionally pay special attention to the impoverishment mothers and female workers face. Voorhis, Langer, and Reynolds portray foreigners as quite poor, although they differ on whether to send them aid for altruistic reasons (Voorhis), for profit to the agricultural industry (Reynolds), or to ignore them altogether (Langer). Ellender, Bilbo, and McKellar talk severally and jointly about poverty in the white and black communities, usually to counter the

narrative that only black people are poor in the South (or in Bilbo's case, to shift the emphasis off of racism—of which he is an ardent proponent—onto classism). The second highest emphasis on white is by Bill Langer as he advocates passage of poll tax abolition amendments and bills (5 of his 6 white-coded speeches pertain to this topic). MCs from states with large indigenous populations—Langer, Burdick, Johnson, and O'Connor—claim to propound the interests of poor Native Americans, but traditionally fail to win the sympathy of their colleagues.

Many members take a subnational frame, not surprisingly focusing on their home region of the country. The only members that commonly speak about the poor in a specific region other than their own are Copeland of New York and Langer of North Dakota, who in addition to their respective regional engage the high degree of poverty in the South. Moreover, Copeland is seemingly the only member that balances both regional perspective on poverty with population density-based poverty, admitting rural poverty is problem he personally battled growing up, but further posits there is nowhere near the level of suffering that exists in urban centers, especially New York City. As Copeland says, even a poor farmer can find food, but there is no such luxury in a concrete metropolis, while Sabath adds farmers are doing quite well with artificially scarce quantities of high-priced commodities during the Great Depression—a price the urban poor cannot afford and thus go without essentials such as milk.

Many MCs often depict poverty as an occupationally and geographically informed construction. For example, members from agricultural states—Long, Langer, Pepper, Burdick, Johnson, McKellar—and one mixed density district—Voorhis—ably project the narratives of poor farmers and their families, who are isolated and desperate for supplies, loans, and markets. Interestingly, the member with the most speeches about poor coal and ore miners is not from Appalachia, but is Langer of North Dakota, who adroitly describes the lack of labor protections,

food, and resources to support larger than usual mining families of the nation. Relatedly, Langer and his Farm-Labor ally Lundeen project unions as an anti-poverty institution, while Hoffman of Michigan views unions as a cause of poverty, since it increases the price of labor. These members, as well as Voorhis, Downey, Hamilton Fish of New York, and David Walsh of Massachusetts, often frame their arguments about poverty around dislocated and/or underpaid workers that are struggling to survive during the national crisis. Led by Claude Pepper, MCs Lundeen, Robsion, and Bone address the poverty of underpaid civil servants in the localities (mostly teachers) and federal government (mail carriers and clerical bureaucrats).

In contrast to popular narratives of malicious, politicized, graft-based New Deal federal government, these members point to the everyday government worker that has faced pay cuts and layoffs as part of the Economy Bill when FDR assumed the presidency. Voorhis, Pepper, Hoffman, Bilbo and Johnson (and notably Senators Ellender and Russell who are not shown in the above figure) commonly speak on impoverished school facilities, districts, and students, which in the late-New Deal period was part of a larger unsuccessful effort to nationalize the costs of primary and secondary education in America. Some of the most strident anti-poverty rhetoricians (Long, Lundeen, Robsion, Langer) were joined by Patman in their resentment of cuts to pensions of military veterans from the aforementioned Economy Bill, which these members thought was callous and actually increased poverty among a group that historically served as the most deserving for social welfare supports in the country.

Speaking of which, members commonly construct the poor in value-judgment terms based on circumstances, members' biases and moral systems, and members' upbringing. Long, Robsion, Downey, Burdick, and Johnson focused on ideas around dependency more than other members, but not in a monolithic manner. These members typically used dependency as a reason people

should get *more* help, since they had few other avenues for help, especially the Native American populations in Burdick and Johnson's districts. In contrast—and especially in the late New Deal period—Langer and Downey became very critical of policies they once supported because it created a dependency that purportedly frayed the fabric of an industrial economy, and worse, people were becoming dependent on an *insufficient* dole. Constructing the idea of deservingness was an especially common endeavor for Johnson, Bilbo, and Rep. Jenkins of (R-OH), and centered on those that deserve help because they had been thrust into circumstances “through no fault of their own.” Importantly, this standard is still used in political debates about the poor as a way of dividing the poor into acceptable recipients of help while partitioning those with perceived culpability for their actions from receiving benefits. Moral duty to help the poor was another line of argumentation among MCs—especially, Lundeen, Robsion, and Wagner—where either personal faith or an understanding of government responsibility instructed these members make the case for helping the poor. Finally, among the most affecting manners of speech in service of the poor are those in which an MC personalizes what poverty means, either by talking about personal upbringing and contemporary circumstances (Bone, Pepper, Sabath) or by telling stories of named individuals whom they know (Reynolds, Langer, Robsion). By infusing personal appeals into their respective chambers of Congress, when an MC personalizes their rationale for addressing some aspect of poverty, it lends credibility that the problem is real and that their solution is based in experience.

Knowing which members speak the most about poverty, and with which poverty codes helps us get an initial understanding of the idea of a poverty rhetoric style. Data visualization is a particularly useful approach given the variety of lawmaker styles and high amount of poverty codes in this research agenda. Figure 7.1 introduces a schematic with topic codes arrayed by family

Figure 7.1 Schematic for Rhetorical Styles and Issue Emphasis





Figure 7.2 Collective Rhetorical Style and Issue Emphasis in Congress, 1933-1946



along the circumference of a circle, with code use number rising from the center outward as a radius. The collective style of Congress is presented in Figure 7.2, which conveys the macroscopic

data patterns presented earlier in Chapter 6. Specifically, we see MCs often construct the poor in general terms, as hungry and in need of clothing, as victim's of bad actors/institutions, as workers, and situated within geographic conditions. We do not see very much infill for racial minorities, various vocational categorizations, and territories. While collective representation of the poor addresses every single type of poverty except LGBTQ+, the interest in each form varies showcases the privileged constructions from the more neglected forms.

Using this pooled radar diagram as a reference, we can assess how members contribute and deviate from this paradigm. The two-page Figure 7.3 provides the radar chart for each of the top 20 highest poverty articulators, as well as members 21 through 24 (Bone, McKellar, Walsh, and O'Connor, respectively). Showcasing earlier depictions of each member's top three codes and expanding out to every code MC's used, we see a rich visual mosaic of different priorities in poverty representation. Long's depiction of general poverty is literally off the charts, but one can also see his cycling between less used depictions as well, especially in the behavior and circumstance family of codes. Lundeen's chart looks very similar to Long's, but includes more emphasis on victimization and less on occupational types. Voorhis, Robsion, and Langer all depict a wide variety of poverty types, including a greater emphasis on demographics. Members like Wagner and Reynolds visually appear more narrow due to their patterns looking like straight lines, indicating they focus very heavily on the types of poverty that most move them to speak (or that they engage poverty the most in the context of certain policy debates that structure the agenda). Overall, these amoeba-like representations of rhetoric show the stability in portraying general poverty, victimization, and hunger, while also showcasing the different emphases of lawmakers regardless of how many speeches they give—the shape of the representation is qualitatively different from one another.

Figure 7.3 Rhetoric Style and Issue Emphasis among MCs with the Most Poverty Speeches




Figure 7.3 Rhetoric Style and Issue Emphasis among MCs with the Most Poverty Speeches (Cont.)



While the visual depictions of poverty discourse are interesting on the eyes, they may capture *too much* to speak to rhetorical stylings beyond simple topic codes. Since MCs select which codes to emphasize and which to ignore, it is useful to use this decision to reduce the codes to a zero sum, lower dimension conceptual account. To that end, the next section of the chapter collapses the codes to the most essential elements that separate MCs from one another as oratory and projectors of impoverished interests. First the section examines the definition, meaning, and conceptual boundaries of poverty rhetoric types, followed by an empirically informed proof of concept, thus in part reconciling what would be qualitative and quantitative approaches to the conceptualization of poverty styles (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 127-128).

Poverty Rhetorician Typology

MCs come to Congress with a variety of differences, including their personal lives, skillsets, goals, and constituencies. Some members are lyrical speakers while others work the cloakrooms for strategic ends. So too do MCs vary when speaking about the poor. We have previously seen the very concept of a poverty speech is not engaged by most MCs, and even MCs that engage poverty will not always deliver a poverty speech—there are non-poverty issues that Congress must also tend to. But when speaking of the poor, some think of the most vulnerable in the nation, while others carve up the poor based on personal values or what serves their local electoral needs. To capture types of poverty styles, this section distills lawmakers down to fit a simple 2x2 schema that uncovers differences not just in *who* lawmakers depict, but *how* they represent the poor through persuasive language construction.

The first dimension of the types revolves around the issue orientation of each member. As previously noted, MCs frequently employ both vague and specific language in describing the poor. In aggregate, these dialectically occur together over the course of a speech, showing members call

to the idea of poverty in generic but emotionally rousing terms, and spell out specific angles of poverty. However, MCs are not all the same in how general they depict the poor—which might be akin to hollow language or demagoguery—and when they get specific—which appears more informed. Therefore, this first dimension revolves around the construct of on one end generalized poverty and on the other specific forms of poverty. This issue orientation relies on the idea of *rhetorical specificity*, where some MCs are more prone to vague language while others focus on specifics. Folks that skew toward general mentions of the poor are termed *generalists*, while those that focus narrowly on select groups or issues are known as *topicals*. While specificity could be seen as an unequivocal good in the representation of the poor and show issue expertise, general discussion of poverty could be useful in its own way, especially at generating emotional arguments (often made by show horse lawmakers), even if they are devoid of direct solutions, mechanisms, or target populations.

The other dimension to monitor is how many poverty ideas MCs depict in their speeches. While some members focus exclusively on a single type of poverty, like an agricultural MC may do by highlighting the plight of impoverished farm families, others may depict a wide range of the poor in the U.S. and around the world. This narrow versus broad lens informs the second dimension of *constituency scope*, in which some members are more *parochial* while others are more global, or *universalistic*. Even if members often articulate a general view of the poor, they may still engage a variety of impoverished groups when they speak. And similarly, even if members are topical in who they portray, there is still room to anchor on one or cycle between groups/ideas. In this way, the concepts are severable and should yield members in each of the four potential quadrants. The next section operationalizes these ideas to see if the constitutive dimensions to poverty rhetoric style are valid and measurable.

Measuring Representational Styles

To construct a measurable typology, this section extracts tendencies from the speech count and speech topic data. To measure the generalist to topical spectrum in rhetorical specificity, the study computes a value by subtracting the number of general codes a MC uses from their highest non-general topic code. The expectation is that members speak generally about the poor more than any other code, so only a subset would score high in rhetorical specificity as operationalized here. The resulting range for the lawmakers of the era with at least one poverty speech ($n=614$) dips to -13 for Huey Long, suggesting a heavy general skew, and rises to Bill Langer's +22, indicating his aforementioned preference to depict the poor as victims displaces his vaguer mentions of the poor. In short, some MCs are generalists, while others are topicals.


To measure constituency scope, which ranges from parochial to universalistic, the study uses the simple approach to count the number of topic codes each MC addresses at least once in their poverty speeches. The floor is one used code (every poverty speech will qualify for at least the general code) and ceiling of potentially 52, although we know only 51 codes are used in this era (LGBTQ+ does not yet show up in Congressional discourse). Lower figures denote a member focuses on only a few images of the poor, while a higher figure shows the MC calling to a wider variety of poverty conditions in the world. Computing the calculations leads to a low end of the range contains members that only used a single speech code in their speeches about poverty, while Wild Bill Langer again takes the high end of a range with 41 used topic codes—an impressive indicator of the member's broad awareness of poverty.

Before proceeding to the results, a few epistemological stipulations are in order. First, the researcher decision to code a specific set of poverty codes informs the typology. While this seems obvious, it is important to note because the poverty style concept becomes dependent on the

formulation of the research agenda, and is therefore not independent of decisions made throughout the research process. Second, constituency scope is likely correlated with speech count—more speeches allows for more topical coverage, even if the member holds a general orientation on specificity. Third, rhetorical specificity may also be conditional on speech count in the following way: as one has more speeches, they could differentiate more as long as they are consistent. However, the direction they take is unrelated to speech count (e.g., Long and Lundeen developing generalist tendencies, while Langer and Ellender pursue their topics in greater number). Fourth, rhetorical specificity is a conservative test of a MC's generality and commitment to a certain discrete category. An alternative, more liberal measure could sum all non-general codes and weigh them against the general code. That measure would have a much larger skew toward topical orientation, but would be more correlated with the constituency scope category. The approach taken here allows for greater independence in the two categories. To better understand concept severability, embeddedness, and dependency of the two dimensions of poverty styles with speech count, Appendix 7A presents the results of correlational tests.

The results of the typology measurement are presented in the annotated Figure 7.4. The x-axis holds the rhetorical specificity dimension, while constituency scope is on the y-axis. The first important visual feature is that while the two dimensions are not correlated with one another, there is a heteroskedastic-looking funnel, where as constituency scope increases, divergence is greater on rhetorical specificity. This is not a major issue because as previously mentioned MCs can veer in either direction. Moreover, the figure does not tell the whole story, as it does not show concentration of more than one member per dot, giving the appearance of greater funneling than show up in the data. The only potential problem is the less separation on lower constituency scope values may crunch members together who if they gave more speeches would be further apart.

Figure 7.4 Style Type Measurement Through Rhetorical Specificity and Constituency Scope



Interpreting the figure, we see members do sort into different parts of the quadrant. Langer scoring highest on both dimension is a clear outlier in the upper-right, while his poverty-interested brethren of Long and Lundeen sort into the high scope but general upper-left. Substantively, Wagner's +2 on rhetorical specificity based on interest in housing may be more meaningful than Hoffman or Langer's great specificity relying on the victimization frame. This is because housing is used less often than victimization, and that further, not all codes are the same. Wagner's devotion to housing led to several policy enactments, while Hoffman and Langer's interest in portraying the poor remained largely a rhetorical device. Moreover, consistent with earlier assessments of partisanship and ideology, placement on the grid cuts across political ideology. It may be interest-

Table 7.3 Subtypes of Poverty Articulation

		Constituency Scope	
		Low	High
Rhetorical Specificity	General	General Parochials: Lemke (R/NPL-ND) Kenney (D-NJ)	General Universalists: Long (D-LA) Lundeen (FL-MN)
	Topical	Topical Parochials: Stearns (R-NH) Gilchrist (R-IA)	Topical Universalists: Langer (NPL/R-ND) Ellender (D-LA)

ing to see how future politicians in more polarized climates adhere to this heterogeneity, or begin to homogenize over time. Also important to exam how district interest heterogeneity may impact the perspective of lawmaker (consistent with Voorhis where he is, but c.f. Lundeen's homogenous district).

Finally, with the two-dimensional data for every member, we can now fit MCs into a 2x2 table to uncover subtypes to poverty articulation style. Importantly, the MCs depicted here are exemplars, meaning they fit the categories well, but may not equally represent tendencies of their compatriots. Such an attempt is provided in Table 7.3, which uncovers four clear subtypes. *General Parochials* include Lemke and Kenney who when they speak about the poor tend to use vague language and center on a narrow subset of the poor. *General Universalists* included Long and Lundeen, two well-known leaders in poverty articulation that often speak in general terms, but will cycle through different depictions of poverty in depending on the context. The bottom-left holds the *Topical Parochials* of Stearns and Gilchrist who both use specific language about

poverty, but only a small subset of potential poverty ideas—generally agricultural-related forms. Lastly, *Topical Universalists* like Langer and Ellender are the most comprehensive orators, both speaking specifically about the poor *and* addressing a wide variety of poverty-related ideas.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a conceptual and empirical framework to better understand how representing the poor through floor speeches takes the form of different styles. There are several ways to distinguish members: how much they talk about the poor, which ideas they call to when speaking, and the relative emphasis on some rhetorical devices over others. All of these contribute to the idea of poverty rhetoric style, although the chapter provided a bounded version of style that picked up on rhetorical specificity and constituency scope as theoretically compelling areas to orient lawmakers as they conduct representational behavior. On one dimension, some members speak generally about poverty while others engage specific poverty topics. On the other dimension, members vary in how many groups they engage when speaking of the poor; some focus on narrow subset, while others engage a multitude of forms. Importantly, dyadic representation may be good or bad within each type depending on one's constituency. A narrow view may accurately depict local conditions in a homogenous district, while a wide view would best serve heterogeneous communities. Moreover, a specific view honing in on the most egregious forms of poverty may provide high quality representation, even if it ignores other forms of poverty. However, since lawmakers do not all share the burden of representing the poor, from a national trustee perspective, those members that are both universalistic and topical would seem best equipped to symbolically escalate the plight of the poor, while also setting up each group for actionable policy remediation.

Appendix 7A: Testing Dependency of Rhetorical Specificity and Constituency Scope on Speech Count

Severability and dependency are very important in the construction of discrete concepts and variables that are specific enough to be differentiable. We lose interpretive meaning when analysis is conducted using two measures that are too alike—which the text established is not a problem here—or that correspond to an omitted third variable that predicts one of the measures of interest. This latter potential problem is what this appendix investigates. To test whether MCs have an equal opportunity to place general or specific on rhetorical specificity and/or high or low in constituency scope, this appendix correlates the two indicators with speech count by member.

The first test is performed between rhetorical specificity and speech count. As Figure 7A.1 shows, there is no relationship between how many speeches a member gives and how specific they are in describing the poor. MCs can be as specific or general as they wish regardless of how often they speak.

Figure 7A.1 Correlation Between Rhetorical Specificity and Speech Count





Figure 7A.2 Correlation Between Constituency Scope and Speech Count



In contrast, speech count does appear to predict constituency scope in Figure 7A.2, although the logarithmic model captures the initial high slope turns to a diminishing yield as speech count increases. The more a member talks about poverty, the greater likelihood they address disparate forms of poverty—high activity on poverty oration and broad awareness track together. However, it is not clear if high awareness informs high activity, or that by virtue of speaking a lot, a MC has the ability to engage more poverty issues. An alternative measure to examine in the future that may disentangle the embeddedness of speeches within scope could be to divide the former by the latter, creating a rate, but this measure runs into issues since it penalizes members for not engaging new groups, even if they have portrayed a variety of impoverished groups. That is why the paper relies on the absolute count of ideas engaged, even with its dependency on speech count.

Part III:

Policy

Chapter 8

Unripe Liberalism:

The Ideological Limitations of New Dealers and a Reassessment of Exclusivity in the Social Security Act of 1935

Abstract

Why were agricultural and domestic workers—among the poorest vocational categorizations, correlating with minority racial and migrant laborer communities—excluded from the Social Security Act? The extant literature on this question points to two leading explanations: the pivotal role of Southern Democratic senators in blocking racially egalitarian policies in service of maintaining ascriptive labor order, or the agenda-setting role of high-ranking leaders in the Roosevelt administration in limiting the scope of the nascent social welfare state to increase the chances of its successful implementation. Importantly, these explanations are not entirely exclusive and both provide insights into the nature of the New Deal regime. However, utilizing a forensic account of the legislative process with a focus on the representation of poor subgroups and an operationalized form of the poverty speech dataset from 1933 to 1946, this chapter provides evidence for a third heretofore unaddressed explanation: economically and socially liberal politicians in this era had not yet associated racial oppression with poverty status. Indeed, liberal non-Southern politicians were not the staunch advocates for all of the poor that one might expect, but instead generally favored depicting the poor in parochial and often colorblind, valence terms. Accordingly, the failure to provide universalistic, non-discriminatory social welfare policies was as much a product of rank-and-file Congressional liberals' narrowmindedness as it was the product of pivotal Southern senators and administration's risk avoidant strategy. This argument is an important revision of the historical record and more accurately captures what was possible during the New Deal period. Positively, MCs agreed to expand the pension program to cover non-elderly target populations—especially women, children, and the blind—but negatively, MCs also envisaged a consistent pattern of exclusionary policymaking. The evidence suggests fragmenting the poor and colorblindness in representation—past and present—fail to alter the dynamics of systemic, legacy poverty in the United States.

Until recently older people were supposed to find a refuge in what are known as “poorhouses” or “almshouses.” These still exist in some States, including Pennsylvania. Here is how the New York State commission, in its 1930 report, described conditions in poor or almshouses—pages 395-398: Worthy people are thrown together with moral derelicts, with dope addicts, with prostitutes, bums, drunks, with whatever dregs of society happen to need the institution’s shelter at the moment; sick people are thrown together with the well, the blind, the deaf, the crippled, the epileptic; the people of culture and refinement with the crude and ignorant and feeble-minded... Of the large industrial nations, the United States is the only one without an adequate system of old-age security. The poorhouse, with its unspeakable horror and degradation, with its separation of husband and wife, must be abolished. Men and women of older years who, after a lifetime of toil and hard work, have become dependent through circumstances beyond their control are entitled to spend their later days in peace and security in their own homes. Modern industrial conditions demand modern laws for the security of old people. The time has come for the establishment of fair and adequate old-age pensions. Let us keep up the fight for it... it is a fight which in the end we shall win.

—Representative Henry Ellenbogen (D-PA), February 20, 1934

State governments whose powers are unlimited except for the specific limitations in their constitutions have always taken upon themselves the care of their own poor and indigent peoples. Under our theory of constitutional government it is conceivable that this duty should be exclusively that of the State governments. Unless we are to become a nationalized government rather than a union of States, it must always be within the province of the States primarily to take care of individuals.

—Representative Chester C. Bolton (R-OH), April 19, 1935

They are not relief provisions, and they are not going to bring any relief to the destitute or needy now nor for years to come. It is more of your compulsory, arbitrary program. You are saying to a specified class of wage earners, not all—for, as I have said, you are not giving these benefits to the needy at all—but you are saying to the wage earner, “We are going to force you to pay a tax to buy an annuity from the Government.”

—Representative Daniel A. Reed (R-NY), April 18, 1935

[W]e could pay a substantial pension to the aged of our country without forcing the impoverished States to tax their citizens [to] pay a share of the inadequate pauper’s old-age pension, as is proposed in the security bill. We could then give them a pension instead of a promise!

—Representative John Hoeppe (D-IN), May 2, 1935

[B]ut apparently it makes a pretense to carry out the principles I have advocated. While it does not actually do so, nevertheless it is not a bill that I should oppose, except for being a void. What I am trying to show to the authors of the bill is this: You want a pension bill enacted, and I want a pension bill enacted. This bill does not propose to enact a pension bill. We have here a pauper’s oath proposal which, if it ever amounts to anything, will operate in many States in a way that is fatally defective. Therefore, what I am saying to Senators is this: On Monday I shall come in here [to] propose that we provide an old-age pension of \$30 a month. Payable to whom? To every man and woman in the United States who is over 60 years of

age who has an income of less than \$300 a year... The bill does not propose to do enough. How would I do it if it were left to me? Would I tax the pay roll of the man who is working? No; because the workingman is not getting today enough money to live on... I shall not strike out one of the benefits proposed by the bill. I shall only add to them, and provide that in order to get the money to pay them we shall levy a tax of 1 percent upon all persons who own wealth and property in the United States which is more than 100 times greater than the average family fortune.

—Senator Huey Long (D-LA), June 14, 1935

Mr. Chairman, this amendment which I have offered is worthy of the most careful consideration... It provides for an appropriation of \$10,000,000 for aid to the poor and needy blind of our whole country. This is the most deserving class of people that we know anything about and I am appealing to the sense of fairness of the Democratic leaders to permit their membership the freedom to vote as their conscience dictates for once at least. My friends, I ask you, who comes under the glance of your eye that needs assistance any more than the poor blind man that holds out the tin cup on the street corner? Who is it that elicits your sympathies more than the poor blind beggar? I am sure that you agree with me that there is no affliction worse than blindness when accompanied with poverty. All my life I have maintained that there should be no poor blind. In this great land of plenty we should see to it that no man afflicted with blindness is compelled to beg for his morsel of bread or for the pennies with which to buy his food. In this bill relief is extended to the aged and to the crippled children and to the mothers, but the poor blind man is the forgotten man.

—Representative Thomas S. Jenkins (R-OH), April 19, 1935

I want Members of this House to know that the Lundeen bill, H. R. 2827, is designed to help all workers, men who toil in the shops and factories and transportation lines of our country; who walk behind the plow; domestic workers, professional and office workers, and all men and women who are unemployed through no fault of their own; and it is designed to begin payment now, not later on, but now; and I say to you gentlemen of this House that we are asking for only \$10 per week minimum and \$3 per dependent, and that is all. That is the minimum. Oh, you may say, what about the maximum. The maximum is the average wage of the community in which they live, which averages less than \$100 a month, as shown by official Government labor statistics. Why gentlemen of the administration were talking here yesterday about \$85 a month as not an unreasonable amount.

—Representative Earnest Lundeen (FL-MN), April 18, 1935

Mr. Speaker, this bill, which throws the protecting arm of a Nation's affection around our worthy old folks, is the acme of humane legislation. Looking backward to the beginning of our history I see three great human achievements standing out like majestic mountains above the surface of lesser and trivial things. These are: 1776—A declaration that all men are born equal and the establishment on that principle of a great Nation dedicated to liberty. 1863—A proclamation that banished human slavery forever from American soil. 1935—The enactment of legislation to make life serene as the shadows lengthen and to emancipate our worthy aged from the slavery of want and poverty.

—Representative Louis Ludlow (D-IN), April 19, 1935

Introduction

The Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935 is widely understood to be the single most important piece of social welfare policy in U.S. history. Its creation and subsequent amendments raising payment levels are the leading explanation for the reduction in elderly poverty over the 20th Century. However, the policy as enacted is also one of the leading examples of division in the welfare state, specifically seen in the vocational exemptions to qualifying for the national pension program. It established a poverty-lessening pension system for retired workers, unemployment insurance for current workers, and grants to states to establish cash welfare to mother's with children and the needy blind. As comprehensive as the policy was, it had glaring holes in coverage, excluding domestic, agricultural, government, railroad, and educational workers from the pension system. Several of these vocational groups are among the poorest types of work categories and closely mirror the composition of Black, Latino and immigrant ethnic minorities in the nation.

To understand the purposes for this exclusion-based approach to path-breaking antipoverty policy construction, this chapter examines the complete policy process in Congress from 1933 to 1935, including competing bills, committee hearings, floor proceedings, amendments, roll calls, and statutory language. Through this meticulous approach it is revealed poor voices were prominently included in the legislative arena, and yet, lawmakers collectively eschewed more progressive coverage schemes to divide the poor in several meaningful ways. The chapter adjudicates between two existing explanations for this restricted approach—the pivotal role of hierarchical Southern Democrats in Congress and an administration most concerned about feasible policy implementation—and offers a third alternative explanation: the ideational limitations of New Deal liberalism. As such, the incidence of racial exclusion can be understood as a product of non-Southern liberals severally caring about poverty reduction and to a lesser extent racial justice,

but not yet reconciling the two strains into a coherent ideology. Simply put, left-liberalism had not ripened into its modern, universalistic form at this juncture, limiting the generosity of and inclusivity within the SSA.

To understand division in the act, it is prudent to understand how the confluence of coalition maintenance, modest administrative goals, gatekeeping actors within the formal institutions of government pair with dominant ideas in the polity to divide the poor. Specifically, the lack of non-Southern representation of poor racial and ethnic minorities suggests exclusion in New Deal policies was not only about Southern legislative power and the administration's emphasis on feasible policy implementation, but is also a product of non-Southern Members of Congress (MCs) failing to connect racial injustice with systemic poverty. By codifying these divisions, lawmakers fragmented the poor, propelling the industrial worker out of late-life poverty, but leaving domestic and agricultural workers with few state supports—and ongoing poverty to this day. By centering on the poor, this chapter gains added leverage to assess larger issues of division within the New Deal. Lessons from this analysis suggest scholars not only account for the interests and strategies of key actors in the policymaking process, but look further into the ideational plane in the political arena to better understand the track of eventual legislation and viability of counterfactual proposals. Indeed, the available evidence suggests the unsatisfactory outcome on SSA still pushed the upper bounds of what the constellation of what the historical moment, politicians, and state capacity could instantiate at the time.

Roadmap

The chapter unfolds in two parts. The initial focus is exposition on the literature about New Deal exclusivity, including the two dominant explanations in the extant literature. Then the paper offers the logic for a third explanation, and provides a period-wide assessment of the lack of

modern left-liberal majorities in Congress that connected poverty with racial injustice. The chapter argues the third explanation is the most weighty, but also shows each perspective provides a value-added to the full view of the historical record. Taken as a whole, the section demonstrates the New Deal faced myriad headwinds to ever adopt a universalistic social security law. Further evidentiary collection and assessment of each strain occurs in the examination of the long arc of the policy process.

The second part drills down into the legislative process, taking a step back to examine the genesis of poor laws in the colonies to the rise federal taxing power and veterans pensions, and mother's pensions at the state level. With the historical setting in view, next is the legislative process, which highlights competing legislative approaches to pensions, committee hearings, and the floor process for the SSA. The chapter then assesses the policy language itself to ascertain the divisive product of the legislative process, then moving to the policy's effects before concluding remarks on the policy episode. Since there are copious deep dives on the SSA legislative process (Douglas 1936; Witte 1962; Derthick 1979) and policy impacts, the chapter will center most on filling in wholes in the debate around the SSA, while spotlighting the substance of representation of America's poor through the indispensable omnibus legislation.

Accounts of Exclusivity in the SSA

What explains the exclusivity in the SSA? Why did the bill somehow especially neglect the marginalized members and communities within the U.S. including racial minorities, women, and rural communities (Quadagno 1994; Lieberman 1998; Mettler 1998; Katznelson 2005)? The literature offers two competing explanations for the most important singular cause, while this research provides a third alternative. They are addressed sequentially, and further synthesize throughout the chapter.

Explanation One: Southern Democratic Pivotality and Veto Power

The most prominent explanation centers on the pivotal role of Southern Democrats in determining the legislative agenda within the Democratic coalition. First, the Southern wing of the party was more socially conservative with a legacy of ascriptive hierarchy in how the polity organized its social and economic systems (Smith 1993). These racist values defined the Southern system and homogenized the types of leaders that could rise up in the political ranks. The lack of two-party competition in the Solid South made Southern Democrats the center of the party and allowed MCs from the area to accrue high amounts of seniority (Key 1949; Schattschneider 1960), leading to Southern Democrats holding a disproportionate amount of committee chair positions in both chamber of Congress. This especially holds in the case of the SSA, as the chairs overseeing the referred legislation were Representative Doughton (D-NC) leading the House Committee on Ways and Means (HWM) and Senator Pat Harrison (D-MS) helming the Senate Committee on Finance. With this pivotal role within the governing party and point in Congressional history, Southern Democrats could effectively gatekeep legislation from passing through a committee and reaching the chamber floors. Moreover, these MCs were the pivotal (median) block in both chambers, lying between more progressive Northern New Deal liberals and the conservative side of the GOP.

In short, racially conservative but New Deal supporting Southern Democrats had the ability to force new social welfare legislation into their ascriptive paradigm. Lieberman (1998) contends there was intentionality in the exclusivity of the SSA Title II provisions, specifically to ensure labor remained cheap and society hierarchical in a South undergoing secular changes. Specifically, the use of vocational exemptions instead of overt racial language was a sophisticated use of color-blind racism to achieve overt racist ends. This was part of a larger two-pronged process to maintain

inequality by making the legislation more exclusive (making Title II on old-age pensions have vocational carveouts) and denationalizing the legislation (making Titles III on unemployment and IV and V on aid to dependent children state-level programs with wide discretion) (38). In a broader framework, Katznelson and Farhang (2005) contend their “research strongly supports Lieberman by demonstrating a common pattern across the entire range of key New Deal legislation” (12n40).

In addition to shaping the legislation, the literature documents this pattern includes their success at vetoing some of the most progressive machinations of the New Deal coalition, particularly on labor policy (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder 1993; Katznelson and Farhang 2005), primarily through the committee system, and as a backstop, the legislative filibuster in the Senate (Wawro and Schickler 2006; Koger 2010). Since Southern and Northern Democrats were united early, but then strayed apart as the New Deal turned left in the mid-1930s (Farhang and Katznelson 2005), SSA stands as a pivotal in which the Southern wing acquiesced to policy change once they put their imprint on the bill.

There are, however, several problems with the “Southern Imposition” explanation. First, the other vocational exemptions in SSA do not as neatly fit a pastoral labor hierarchy narrative, as government workers, university staff, non-profits, and mariners were excluded too. These were overwhelmingly white professions at the time—although Black wealth would accrue in the mid-20th century because of concentrations of Black workers in the civil service, especially in D.C. Moreover, these occupations were less concentrated in the South than in other regions of the country. Second, while Huey Long’s Share the Wealth policies were filibustered in the Senate, the use of that mechanism cannot explain why the House did not pass universalistic alternatives to SSA, like the Lundeen Bill. The constellation of Northern liberal Democrats, Republicans, and third party members could have bypassed the committee system in the House through the use of

discharge petitions to pursue universalistic policies. However, Northern Democrats do not take this approach on economic policies (Pearson and Schickler 2009, 1245) until the ascendent Conservative Coalition took over in 1937 (1254). A third supra-institutional limitation of this approach is covered in the succeeding second school of thought.

Explanation Two: Modest Goals of the Roosevelt Administration

While Southern Democratic lawmakers have left their indelible mark on the U.S. history, within the bounded New Deal there is a prominent second explanation for what transpired in the SSA: the preferences and strategy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. In particular, the emphasis on limiting the scope of coverage to ensure feasible tax collection and success in implementation (Davies and Derthick 1997, 222-223; DeWitt 2010, 52). The idea is that recordkeeping would be easier to implement in industrial settings: by virtue of their high numbers and concentrated point of entry into the workplace, compliance and monitoring for industrial workers was inherently much higher than the small scale, sparse, seasonal, and idiosyncratic nature to agricultural and domestic labor.

Moreover, the logic here is that developing new social welfare superstructure whole cloth is replete with challenges, and for even the most progressive bleeding-heart liberal, an emphasis on starting off with a successful rollout could beget further success in the future. Limiting the scope of a policy to ensure its success and minimal backlash (thereby decreasing the chance of retrenchment) has some validity. This combination of idealism and pragmatism explains how the president's Committee on Economic Security—which was stocked with the most progressive members of the administration, including Chairperson and Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, and Federal Emergency Relief Administrator Harry Hopkins—could design and endorse. DeWitt (2010) argues it was indeed the recommendation of

the committee staff to create the vocational carveouts, which was overruled by Hopkins and Perkins, only to be adopted in House Ways & Means at the behest of Treasury Secretary Morgenthau (52). The agenda-setting power and pragmatism of the CES gave it credibility and resulted in its form of legislation becoming the chief vessel for elderly pensions in Congress.

Furthermore, there is broad agreement that FDR's approach to governance was fiscally conservative in the First New Deal (1933-1934), and remnants of this disposition continued into the more progressive Second New Deal (1935-1936). The conservatism/moderation of the New Deal is well-documented (DeWitt 2010). The president's fiscal conservatism led him to disfavor federal commitments that distributed funds too widely, even if he nominally spoke in favor of equalizing the distribution of wealth (Schieber and Shoven 1999, 25). His staff understood this, and the CES supported a federalized, hybrid system because of FDR's support and its likelihood to survive constitutional tests at the SC (Leuchtenburg 1963, 130).

Indeed, the systemwide perspective a president must hold to effectively govern explains some degree of the timidity or risk aversion in the CES version and ultimate complexion of the bill. Embedded in the explanation of the Roosevelt administration restraint on the bounds of policy is a non-ideological explanation: the U.S. Constitution itself limited social welfare expansion (Hart 1994). After all, the Supreme Court ruled several pivotal pieces of New Deal legislation as unconstitutional before and during the formulation of Social Security.⁵⁶ The strategic choice to use the commerce clause, 14th Amendment, or police powers as a rationale for norm-breaking legislation each contribute to new forms of unpredictable litigation from a hostile high court. The

⁵⁶ This Constitutional limitation argument could even form the basis of an independent fourth explanation for the shape and substance of New Deal policies. However, this study's focus on the legislative process disables it from making strong claims with independently collected evidence of the efficacy of the argument. Therefore, the Constitutional limitation argument is embedded within a psycho-strategic assessment of the how the administration navigated the broader policymaking/policy-affirming apparatus.

Roosevelt administration's balance between satisfying the demand for structural change while still maintaining a stable governing system lent itself to less ambitious forms of legislation, especially once key initiatives were held as unconstitutional.

As with the first explanation, this contention has its own limitations. The primary issue is that FDR "allowed Congress a free hand" to legislate as they liked as long as something materialized in the end (Beard 1935). While Roosevelt held the power of the singular power of the bully pulpit, his respect for Congressional prerogatives at this point—before the efforts to primary hostile party compatriots—suggests there was a degree of agency in which Congress could deliver a more progressive statute and the president would acquiesce.

The preceding explanations need not be mutually exclusive. There is, of course, potential to synthesize the two as opportunity severally and jointly, competing with and bolstering one another at different stages of the legislative process and cycling on specific provisions or daily considerations. There were undoubtedly numerous communications between Southern Democrats (the most pro-Democratic Party part of the country) and FDR and his advisers. Synthesizing the two perspectives is more likely to explain what happened in the New Deal than each perspective severally. This synthesis could include the administration acted as first mover based on their understanding of state infrastructural power and potential political coalition maintenance issues, independently researching the issue and consulting their Southern wing about specifics. In this way, staking a side between the two explanations is not altogether useful, save for being able to point to a specific point in which one explanation holds more weight than the other. However, the two perspectives combined are inadequate to fully explain the design of the SSA—a third option focused on New Deal liberals fills this void.

Forging a Third Explanation: Ideational Limitations of Rank-and-File New Deal Liberals

The throughline critique of both the Southern pivotality and administration's moderation explanations is that non-Southern MCs (and aligned with maverick Southern populists) could have pursued a universalistic version of the SSA by outnumbering the Dixiecrats and forcing FDR to consider vetoing generous supports to the public. Therefore, one must consider why these non-Southern liberals did not choose this path, and instead aligned their actions with the president and Southern Democrats

In *Racial Realignment*, Schickler (2016) argues the realignment that culminated in the progressive left-liberal Great Society Democratic Party that believed in both economic supports and racial justice started in the New Deal. Specifically, a process of unified front grassroots organizing between civil rights advocates and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) changed the nature of the coalition, which paired with turnover in elections, set in motion the diffusion of a coherent left-liberal ideology. While this correction to the Carmines and Stimson (1989) elite transmission model is historically useful, for the purposes of this chapter, Schickler's chapter entitled "Race: The Early New Deal's Blind Spot" (27-44) provides special dividends. The chapter highlights how early New Dealers did not propel civil rights on the agenda, nor express interest in civil rights positions. While the analysis just pertains to civil rights issues, I argue this "blind spot" on race extends to issues of poverty representation, and it is doubly pernicious when race and class intersect, which uncovers the limited ideological progressiveness in the dominant New Deal liberalism.

There are two principal sources of evidence to support the contention that New Deal liberals were themselves a limiting factor in the scope of SSA inclusivity; one uses vote analyses and the other use Congressional rhetoric. In the absence of clear measures of ideal preferences for

historical figures, the approach here to is triangulate and circumscribe the bounds of New Deal liberal thought. The section that follows will move between the two markers to proffer the larger argument.

It is important to understand the partisan and geographic complexion of the House in the 74th Congress. There were 329 Democrats that served in the 74th Congress, of which 132 came from Southern states. That leaves 197 non-Southern Democrats, which paired with the 10 Progressive and Farmer-Labor representative and handful of progressive Republicans like Vito Marcantonio (R/AL-NY) nearly constitute an outright majority. Additionally, Southerners were not monolithic, as several rose in support of the Lundeen bill (as the floor process section will show). Southern Democrats and the GOP could block the legislation if they were completely unified, but they were not yet in alignment during the three years (1933-1935) in which the SSA was on the agenda.

First, there is underutilized evidence that an overwhelming amount of Democratic MCs did not support universalism in policy making. When universalism was on the table, it was consistently voted down by the whole body. The House Committee on Labor supported a universalistic approach by endorsing the Lundeen bill, but MCs from Ways and Means, the chamber as a whole, and the Senate were all resistant to it. Moreover, New Deal liberals consistently divided the poor across policies according to notions of deservingness. Race was one of many categorizations lawmakers used to divide the masses, but it was not the only one; division of the public also occurred along gender, occupation, age, form of disability, and geographic location lines.

The leading evidence here is a pivotal floor effort by Earnest Lundeen, Labor Committee Chair Connery (D-MA), Maury Maverick, and “Maury’s Mavericks” to amend the SSA to hold vocationally inclusive language. On April 18, 1935, Connery offered Lundeen’s language as an

amendment, but the measure was voted down on division 52 ayes to 204 noes—14 short of a chamber-wide majority voting against. Connery then demanded tellers, and the tellers reported out 40 ayes and 158 noes (*CR 79 1935, 5969*). Roll calls were forbidden under the adopted debate rule, so we do not know who voted which way⁵⁷, but it is clear New Deal liberals were for whatever reason not motivated to rise in the House and support the Lundeen universalistic bill. These administration friendly liberals were not inclined to second guess the administration's preferred bill, or the logic of having a exclusionary SSA regime fit with their preferences. Notably, there were no filibuster mechanism in the House, which helps point to what could have occurred in the Senate had this bill come to the floor for a vote. This anecdote reveals modern left-liberals constituted a vast minority of the Democratic Party, bolstered somewhat by liberal Republicans and third party members, but the group never constituted a majority in any setting outside of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Labor (HLA). The main confounder with this evidence is the Lundeen bill not only had inclusive vocation coverage, but also created citizen's councils to dispense unemployment benefits. Because there is more than one variable that changes with the bill, it is difficult to impute that opposition to the amendment was solely about the universalism. Therefore, a different approach gains further leverage on the ideational commitment of New Deal liberals.

The novel poverty speech data used throughout the dissertation sheds further light on the intersection of poverty and race. While the focus of the chapter is on the SSA, zooming out to greater rhetorical field of the period from 1933 to 1946 helps us understand how lawmakers conceived of poverty. Of the 3,403 poverty speeches in the era, only 75 (2.2%) depict the poverty

⁵⁷ Based on who was in attendance and spoke in favor of the amendment, four score MCs largely hailed from the group of proto-modern liberals known as Maury's Mavericks, which drew heavily from third parties and main party outcasts. See Mihelich (2001).

Table 8.1 Speech Count by Binary Racial Content ($N=3,403$)

	No Black Content	Black Content
No White Content	3,315	33
White Content	13	42

in Black America. Stunningly, Southern lawmakers make 48 of the 75 Black poverty speeches. And when Black poverty is brought up, a majority of time it is nullified by pairing it with white poverty, as shown in Table 8.1. As the table shows, white poverty is three times more likely to be brought up in the presence of discourse on Black poverty than when Black poverty is not being discussed. This is a strategic rhetorical device Southern lawmakers employed to get do-gooders off of their back about issues related to Jim Crow, the poll tax, and lynchings.⁵⁸

The Southern Democratic domination of the White-Black association begs the question: where are Northern liberals in both parties on pernicious, centuries long Black impoverishment? Stunningly, only 27 of the already low 75 Black-coded speeches come from members outside of the South. (The non-Southern speeches come from 19 individual members, while the 48 Southern speeches come from 21 members.) It would seem Schickler's "blind spot" for New Dealers also extends to Republicans, at least when poverty intersects with Blackness. One possibility explaining the dearth of Northern liberal rhetorical interests may simply be that they did not tie poverty and Blackness together at this point, caring severally about each, but not adjoining them together in a systematic, coherent, policy-relevant manner. Those non-Southern MCs that did address Black poverty seemed aware of the Southern strategy to divide and exclude the poorest of the poor, often

⁵⁸ An irony is many of the associations between poverty and Blackness are by Southern Senators as they filibuster various pieces of civil rights legislation. It somehow takes gumming up the works to project poor Blacks onto the Congressional agenda.

depriving one's own constituents of a pension, especially in the South. One such example is seen in the case of Representative Daniel Reed (R-NY), who claimed in relation to the Social Security Act amendment debates, "We know there are a lot of States that will not act. Some States can run horse races and spend millions of dollars in gate receipts in many of the so-called poor States, but they cannot do anything for their old people. Why? Because they fear that some old-colored grandmother might get a little extra old-age pension and then have the whole group around her move in, in order to live on the pension. That is the truth behind this legislation and it is about time the scheme should be exposed" (*CR 92* 1946, 10756).

An alternative is that Northern MCs made a strategic choice not to speak about poor Blacks so as not to arouse public and institutional actor responses that may make any economically egalitarian policy gains difficult. In the public, it is well known there was a strong aversive racism in the North before, during, and after this period. Lawmakers may fear their constituents will turn on them if they appear too friendly to African-Americans when many were suffering during the Depression. In the institution, politicians may worry about "tipping off" racist actors in a complex, time-consuming legislative process, where maintaining a governing coalition was of utmost importance. This project is not designed to capture the covert politics that may have occurred behind the scenes, but it does document Northern liberals were less likely to talk about Black poverty than Southern lawmakers who were chiefly concerned with feudalistic racial hierarchy, and not rectifying years of structural poverty in the Black community.

A final potential explanation is that egalitarian MCs believed a color-blind approach would still encompass long-oppressed groups. Whether this is due to incorrect assumptions or observations, the high levels of poverty among pastoral, cash-crop, and domestic workers alone should have made these members question the efficacy of the dominant biased particularist

approach to poverty amelioration. Ultimately, the lack of non-Southern poor Black representation suggests the race-correlated exclusion from such policies as the Social Security Act and Fair Labor Standards Act was not only because of Southern domination of the Democratic coalition (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder 1993; Lieberman 1998; Katznelson and Farhang 2005) or the Roosevelt administration's emphasis on limiting the scope of coverage to ensure feasibility in implementation (Davies and Derthick 1997; DeWitt 2010). Instead, a third potential explanation for exclusion is that non-Southern liberals simply did not tie racial injustice with economic inequality in this period, suggesting the market for universalistic social welfare programs among non-Southerners, let alone Congress as a whole, was considerably lower than previous scholars have understood. The finding that only a minority of liberal lawmakers in this period held views akin to those espoused in modern American left-liberalism puts in greater relief the historically consequential entanglement of the two ideological strains immediately after the prolific New Deal period (Gerring 1998; Noel 2013; Schickler 2016).

What we do know is racial rhetoric is a miniscule subset of total poverty speech rhetoric. It is also clear race was a fairly tertiary factor in antipoverty debates for all members. There were qualitative differences in rhetoric in how minority Northern progressives like Lundeen approached universalism, poverty-interested liberals examined poverty with low racial content, and how Southern Democrats use poor Blacks in a larger poor South framework. The latter groups attempts to own the issue of racial disparities as the only ones who truly care only worked because Northerners fail to engage the issue. The governing Northern liberal and progressive Republican alliance on racial matters did not tie racial justice to poverty amelioration, even as many of them worked to ban poll taxes and lynching or enact path-breaking antipoverty policies severally in the same era.

Table 8.2 Placing Members into Ideological Types in the Mid-New Deal

	Racial Liberal	Racial Conservative
Economic Liberal	Minority Modern Left-Liberals (Lundeen; Bone; Wagner)	Pivotal Southern Populist Democrats (Bankhead; Russell)
Economic Conservative	Northeastern Republicans (Lodge; Fish; Luce)	Rural and Southern Democratic Conservatives (Austin; Hastings)

Notes: Economic dimension ascertained from position on NIRA, FLSA, and the U.S. Housing Act; racial liberal based on stance on antilynching bill.

Finally, the ideological dissensus allowed for a certain amount of preference cycling across pieces of New Deal legislation. Table 8.2 provides exemplars for a 2x2 categorization of the racial and economic ideological spectrum. On racial liberalism, Northern Democrats and the GOP would often align, while on economic liberalism the Democratic Party as a whole supplied enough votes to enact policies. Importantly, there was no real coalition for egalitarian, universalistic policies that transform long-term poverty into gainful solutions via modern left-liberalism—the minority of lawmakers that supported the Lundeen bill never reach above 52 votes in the House.

Civil rights were not that important to liberals of this period (generally thought to be true, as Civil Rights was kept off of the Congressional agenda for a generation at that point, Dyer anti-lynching bill is the only exception). Still a GOP issue throughout the 1920s. Civil rights did matter to certain proto-modern liberals, but they had not tied this to the economic-in-nature policies yet. Both of these suggest the problem was not solely in the South, but also a larger issue of where Northern Democratic and Republican liberals were on solving systemic poverty in the Black, Native American, Mexican, and immigrant communities at this point.

Ideology makes consistent an inconsistent world by linking issues with one another. With this in mind, it is clear New Deal liberalism (North or South) did not link racial justice with

antipoverty policy, as seen in the scant overlap between these sets wherein Black poverty is given discursive attention. In this way, the existing ideational plane was not ripe for universalist policies, even aside from the administration's emphasis on feasible policy implementation and Southern senators holding a veto over New Deal legislation. The ideological plane was simply not ripe for universalistic or justice oriented approaches to solving systemic poverty in the New Deal era. Instead of thinking that either the Southern veto or modest administrations doomed the SSA to exclusion, we must synthesize the two perspectives with a third ideational perspective centered on Congressional liberals.

Political Development of Social Security in the U.S.

Since the Social Security Act had numerous provisions dealing with several subpopulations of the American poor, its genesis is in part found in the earliest days of Colonial America, before the United States even existed. Moreover, the deficiencies of the federalized system of antipoverty programs paired with the historical downturn in the Great Depression is what created the new for a firm set of federal policies. The long process of developing state infrastructural power and nationalizing subnational programs culminated in the Social Security Act.

The first types of assistance to the poor were built on Elizabethan poor laws. These forms of poor assistance were especially prominent in the Puritan-founded communities, especially Massachusetts Bay Colony and Massachusetts the state. Poor laws were a form of public charity that supported the most positively constructed and marginalized social groups, including widows, orphans, the disabled, infirm, and elderly. If someone did not fit into this list, they would not qualify for help.

Poor laws fall into four primary types. The first was known as the contract system, in which families received direct cash payment from local governments to subsidize the costs of housing

the dependent poor. The second approach was known as the auction system, wherein the lowest bidder was paid by the government and acquired a poor person to use for labor in return for providing bare essentials. This system had the perverse effect of ensuring the poor would end up in the worst possible situation, since the lowest bid would likely be insufficient to ensure healthy living conditions and the absence of abuse. This system was cheaper than the third approach known as the poorhouse and it maintained the sociocultural valuation of private help. Poorhouses, in contrast, were locally funded institutions that either put poor people to work in fields or to develop small-scale fabrication. In some cases, the houses for the invalid would not require work. In the time of the SSA, poorhouses (as Ellenbogen portrays in his epigraph) came to be seen as cruel and counterproductive, as it grouped too many poor regardless of their situations in a concentrated, unhealthy setting. The final form of nascent antipoverty policy was outdoor relief, which involved direct transfers of money, food or clothing, short of housing. It became more common in later years (late-18th and 19th centuries) and is considered the first form of direct welfare. In all, some form of this local government/private charity policy suite was in effect from the 17th to 20th centuries (Trattner 2006 [1974]).

While states, counties, and localities looked after some of the general poor, Congress experiment with group-specific social welfare policies as early as 1798. It is in this year that the legislative body instantiated *An Act for the Relief of Sick Seamen* (5th Congress Ch. 77), as a form of worker protection against disease and hazard on the ocean seas. The law was based on a British system of a single maritime hospital, but expanded it further to allow any sailor to receive free medical care at designated maritime hospitals, regular hospitals, or to receive doctor visits if the former two options were not available. To pay for this law, Congress enacted the first form a payroll tax by withholding 20 cents per month, per head on a vessel, to be paid by a ship captain

and subtracted from sailor wages before dispensation. The program was not voluntary, but instead compulsory, with failure to comply being grounds to deny a ship the ability to dock in U.S. ports. Some argue this law and the maritime hospitals it created form the basis of public medical care that developed in the next two centuries. What we know for sure is it was the first time Congress experimented with social welfare by focusing on a specific target group to create a sector-specific benefit paid for through a payroll tax (Rao 2015). Arriving nearly 140 years later, the SSA took the exact same approach to covering certain vocations to create pensions and unemployment insurance through deducted workers' earnings.

Starting around the same time, Congress granted pensions to individuals upon petition to government, and entire classes of individuals if they served in the U.S. military. These Revolutionary War pensions created an infrastructure to give working class families some support when a breadwinner became too infirm to work in later life. Of particular importance Skocpol (1995) argues Civil war pensions greatly expanded the generosity and state infrastructure of these pensions by including survivor's benefits for widows and children of veterans. The state of "soldiers and mothers" created the imperative that to receive a national benefit, one must have proven their service to the nation. As industrialism took hold in the late 19th century, this imperative was transformed to also cover industrial labor as contributed to the nation's prosperity just as soldiers guaranteed the nation's freedom and security.

For those that could not work due to age (with recent prohibitions on child labor) or norms (i.e., women), states increasingly adopted mothers' pensions to be administered by counties (Teles 1996, 26-34). The success of these programs broke down the stigma against governmental support for the poor and was seen as a way of providing the opportunity for upward mobility as women could tend to the domicile, while children could go to school. Moreover, they served as a template

that could be nationalized, as occurred in the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921 which provided funds to states for maternity and child care funds to (the law expired in 1929). The steady adoption of mother's pensions remains one of the leading examples of policy diffusion throughout the states and upwards into Congress.

By the time the Great Depression evaporated lifelong savings and cast millions of Americans into poverty, the conditions were ripe for structural change. FDR campaigned a new system of enlightened governance that was legislatively concerned with the material welfare of the public. Moreover, there was a constellation of state-level programs to nationalize, and the federal government had a sizable bureaucratic footprint to deliver authorized benefits. The only remaining factor to develop was mass sentiment concentrated on a specific benefit. On this front, Francis Townsend's movement and "clubs" cultivated a social movement with a specific selective benefit in mind: pensions that cover the cost of living for retired workers. No more should the elderly have rely solely on family and public/private almshouses—the state will guarantee a quality of life for those that built the modern United States.

The Townsend club movement created a massive pressure campaign directed at elected officials. They built local constituencies, achieved state-level action, and helped forge the shared identity of elderly people in need of national-level action (Amenta 2006). Indeed, this force was building consciousness as social insurance had been publicly debated since in the U.S. since the 19th Century, when countries like Germany implemented similar policies under Otto von Bismarck. The Townsend plan of living wage pensions is considered across countries to be a moderate, reform-minded alternative to large-scale restructuring endemic to a socialist revolution since it comported with a capitalist model by incentivizing lifelong work.

In particular, academics and social reformers in the Progressive Era began pushing for social insurance as a moral and functional imperative, primarily to aid against the life-altering nature of industrial work causing disability, enfeebled retirement, and unemployment (Monroe 1897; Willoughby 1897; Rubinow 1904; Henderson 1909a; Henderson 1909b; Seager 1910; Squier 1912; Rubinow 1913; Willoughby 1913; Woodbury 1917; Lindsay 1919; Epstein 1922; Cohen 1924; Epstein 1928). Moreover, labor advocates took to pushing SSA as another important step in the government correcting what the market failed to achieve (Berkowitz 2003, 4-5).

When the policy finally reached national level debate, its substance was ripe for debate much more than the question of whether to act or not. Indeed, there was a bipartisan consensus to create a public pension system. The goal with social insurance legislation was to provide against misfortune, “not to reduce the inequalities of income that persist through good times and bad” (Derthick 1979, 255). The administration was more concerned with the emergency of economic collapse and system failure, than class conflict and fixing deeply entrenched inequalities among social groups. Unfortunately, the Townsend Plan—which will be explained shortly—was seen as an unrealistic choice for being too generous, but the Townsend movement did create visible public pressure that helped passage of the different-in-kind SSA (Béland 2005, 71). The resulting policy created the institutional structure for national, often federalized social welfare programs. For the first time, these policies incorporated individuals not affiliated with the military, though importantly, the development veteran’s benefits in the 19th century provided a bureaucratic superstructure to deliver benefits.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Ironically, this new program regime was often portrayed as predatory toward veterans, reallocating their earned benefits to those that did not serve the nation in such a vital patriotic manner. An important example illustrating this point is the debate and aftermath of the Economy Bill of 1933, which cut federal employee pay and veterans’ pensions to lower the federal government’s footprint to match—at least symbolically—the suffering of the masses in society.

Legislative Process History

With the positive background conditions set for policy change, MCs spent extensive time researching and debating myriad policy instruments. The entire legislative process is summarized in Figure 8.1's flowchart, which captures the supra-institutional inputs on the process (italicized) and direction of Congressional procedure until passage of the Doughton-Wagner Act in early August and FDR's signature on August 14, 1935. Of the three case studies in the dissertation, the SSA process is the most wide-ranging, involving members from across the nation proposing their own version of how they envision socioeconomic security for workers—and potentially non-workers. The timetable ranges from four years if one starts with the Dill-Connery elderly-only pensions, to just under three years from the sponsorship of the eventual legislative vessel by ever-present Senator Robert Wagner, or under a single year if one begins from when President Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Security (CES) began researching the issue and reported a legislative design to Congress.

This legislative policy process section will first outline the competing pieces of legislation and their sponsors. While every bill had some form of elderly pension, they varied in important ways for who—if anyone—else to cover, as well as the different approaches to raising the requisite revenue to pay for the program. With these policy detailed, the next section engages the committee process of developing a record of facts and positions of interested stakeholders. Pension policy debates pulled in a wide swath of experts from public health groups, policymakers, and witnesses that testified to their own need for further national support. The final part of the legislative history engages the floor process of debate, amendment, and passage. SSA and its peers dominated the legislative calendars of both the House and Senate, especially in the first year of the 74th Congress.

Figure 8.1 Social Security Policy Process



Source: Adapted from the "Index to the Proceedings and Debates," *Congressional Record* 76 (1932), 77 (1933), 78 (1934), and 79 (1935). Note: as printed, some steps are simultaneous or redundant, but appear linear based on the pagination of the *Record*.

Proposed Legislation and Their Sponsors

Instead of covering every proposal in detail, this section will depict the leading alternatives from which MCs selected their favored form. The four most prominent bill groups⁶⁰ were the Dill-Connery agenda-setting initial bills, the McGroarty led Townsend movement proposal, Lundeen-Frazier universalistic language, and eventually successful Wagner-Lewis unemployment bill. Each bill group covered a different amount of target groups, had varying levels of benefits, and paid for the legislation through different means.

Clarence C. Dill (D-WA) offered the very first comprehensive pension bill in the form of S. 3037 in 1932, and it was treated like a pure pension bill and went to the House Committee on Pensions (HPE). Dill offered the bill again in the following year, and by 1934, got HLA Chair Connery to sign on as a cosponsor. The bill is most important for its agenda-setting function to address the issue through a federal-state shared paradigm. However, it was limited purely to the elderly target population, which left other MCs the task of using the opportunity to cover more needy groups. As Brown (1936) noted contemporaneously:

The Dill-Connery Bill for federal aid to state old-age assistance programs proved a most valuable basis for the formulation of Title I. This bill, however, provided for a federal subsidy of but one-third of state appropriations for old-age assistance. The staff recommended that this ratio be increased to one-half. It also recommended that the length of residence requirement permitted in approved state plans be lowered. It proposed, as in the Dill-Connery Bill, that state plans should be mandatory on all sub-divisions within the state, and that the age limit be fixed at 65-at least after a brief number of years. These and many other recommendations found their way into the Act. (188)

Moreover, there was no direct pay for in the bill; it simply appropriated existing money from the Treasury to help states create pension programs. Schlesinger (2003 [1958]) writes the bill was influential in forcing the hand of the slow to act administration to engage the issue, although they

⁶⁰ I use “groups” here because MCs offered their legislation more than once, and usually got a co-sponsor after initially going it alone.

avored the Wagner-Lewis design (303): Dill Connery; admin slow to act; hand forced, supported Wanger-Lewis.

After initially having difficulty getting a MC to sponsor the plan, Francis Townsend got John S. McGroarty (D-CA) to offer H.R. 3977 in 1935. The bill adopted the approach Townsend laid out in his pamphlets, summarized thusly:

The basic idea of the Townsend Plan was that the government would provide a pension of \$200 per month to every citizen age 60 and older. The pensions would be funded by a 2% national sales tax (more precisely, a “transactions tax”). The Plan provided that a 2% tax would be levied “on the gross value of each business, commercial, and/or financial transaction,” to be paid by the seller. There were three eligibility requirements to received benefits under the Plan: the person had to be retired; “their past life is free from habitual criminality;” the money had to be spent within the U.S. by the pensioner within 30 days of receipt. Thus, there were no contributions required from the beneficiaries. (DeWitt 2001)

The design of the bill to include a national sales tax had alienated progressive and conservative lawmakers alike, leading to attacks that the bill was regressive in nature. While the revenue generation was regressive, the benefits themselves were seen as unrealistically generous—the most of any proposal—no matter how necessary they were to lifting the elderly out of poverty. While Townsend’s bill proved unsuccessful, his ability to mobilize the public and state politicians to focus Congress on elderly retirement stands as a one of (if not) the most successful lobbying efforts in American history.

The third main alternative was the fabled Lundeen bill, offered by the socialist Farmer-Labor representative from Minnesota. Lundeen was known to be “solidly behind the president” on economic issues (Smith 2007, 374), but in this case, his preferences were far above what the president could apparently tolerate. H.R. 2827 and later 4120 was intended to “alleviate the hazards of old age, unemployment, illness, and dependency, to establish a Social Insurance Board in the Department of Labor, to raise revenue, and for other purposes.” Also initially having trouble gaining a co-sponsor, eventually fellow Plains socialist Lynn Frazier (NPL/R-ND) offered a Senate

companion to the legislation. In contrast to other legislation that was either solely focused on the elderly or broader, but riddled with exclusions, the bill did not have vocational exceptions, did not require a reserve fund, and had a pay-go provision that was eventually incorporated in Doughton-Wagner bill. However, all of its provisions pertained to some form of labor management, including paid maternity care “eight weeks previous and eight weeks following childbirth” (2)—a policy the U.S. still does not have. The language on page 3 of the bill itself about taxation and eligibility of the bill itself are instructive:

Further taxation necessary to provide funds for the purposes of this Act shall be levied on inheritances, gifts, and individual and corporation incomes of \$5,000 a year and over. The benefits of this Act shall be extended to workers, whether they be industrial, agricultural, domestic, office, or professional workers, and to farmers, without discrimination because of age, sex, race, color, religious or political opinion or affiliation. No worker or farmer shall be disqualified from receiving the compensation guaranteed by this Act because of past participation in strikes, or refusal to work in place of strikers, or at less than average local or trade union wages, or under unsafe or unsanitary conditions, or where hours are longer than the prevailing union standards of a particular trade or locality, or at an unreasonable distance from home.

The progressive taxation in the form of extracting revenue from wealth in the form of inheritance and high income, paired with the extremely pro-labor and inclusive language staked out the legislation as the most universalistic of any at the time.

It is little surprise that it was supported by range of progressive groups, but this ran afoul of the administration’s preferences. This is because the Lundeen bill eschewed the “budget-balancing orthodoxy” of the Roosevelt administration (Valelly 1989, 168-169). Additionally, in a “boldly decentralizing stroke the Lundeen Bill provided that local workers’ and farmers’ councils would administer these unemployment compensation funds to unemployed workers” (168). A friend to radicals within the labor movement “[t]he Unemployed Councils, controlled by the Communist party persuaded” Lundeen to offer benefits at prevailing wages (Schlesinger 2003 [1958], 295). The bill never received a standalone vote, but instead received a voice vote that failed

to pass, leading to the unceremonious demise of the vanguard legislation (169; Wolf, Pederson and Daynes 2001).

The final bill grouping centered on the efforts of the leading lawmaker in the New Deal period: Democratic Senator Robert Wagner, Sr. of New York. However, the bills the member authored evolved drastically over time. The original bill was not about retirement pensions, but instead grew out of Wagner's concern with disability caused by industrial accidents. As workman's compensation gained traction in the late 1920s, Wagner next moved to the issue of displaced workers (Huthmacher 1968, 80). Wagner authored two bills on the subject in 1930; one preferred by the American Association for Labor Legislation to create an grants-in-aid program to fund unemployment insurance, while the other created an unemployment system paid for in part by a mixture of employers, employees and the government through tax remittances (81; 174). While these measures were not acted upon, they built legislative awareness and public consciousness of the issue.

Of vital historical importance, when Wagner reintroduced an unemployment bill in 1934 (S. 2616), it included exceptions for what qualifies as "employment" that closely mirror the eventual language in SSA (2). This differed from an earlier version of the bill—S. 5350 from December 15, 1930—which had no exemptions. Figuring out why Wagner added exemption language in the intervening years is of utmost importance to understand the nature of exclusivity in the SSA. There is evidence from the Select Committee on Unemployment Insurance for a comparative rationale to exclusion, as few countries incorporated those populations into their UI programs (SUI 1931; S. Rept. 962 1932, 20). But this committee was operated by three Northerners: Chair Felix Hebert (R-RI), Otis Glenn (R-IL), and Wagner. Wagner released his own report ahead of the committee publication arguing industrial UI helps agricultural interests through

generating aggregate demand (S. Rept. 629 1932, 26); he does not counter or propose a position on eligibility by sector. As it stands, the exemptions for agricultural and domestic labor were not borne of Southern machinations or the moderation of the FDR's administration, but were part of the designs of one of the most progressive *and pragmatic* senators of the era. Administrative feasibility was indeed a primary consideration as the second school of thought correctly identifies, as the IRS later weighed in against full inclusivity (DeWitt 2010, 52). However the locus of attention predates analyses in those scholastic works. It further adds evidence to the argument of this work by showcasing the limited nature to New Deal liberalism as seen in its most prolific lawmaker.

Finally, in 1935, Wagner had reconciled a series of interconnected problems in employment to author S. 1130—a 64-page bill that merged the unemployment system with a retirement plan and maternal and child welfare. This nine-title bill was the most comprehensive social welfare legislation to that point in U.S. history, forming the basis for how CES investigated the idea of socioeconomic security and served as the original blueprint for the enacted Social Security Act.

The resulting Wagner-Lewis-Doughton vessel became H.R. 7260: “To provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes.” Given the more generous depictions of the McGroarty and Lundeen bills, it is little wonder “opposition to the measure centered not in conservatives but in congressmen who argued the measure was too parsimonious.” Leuchtenburg (1963) continues:

The Townsendites rallied behind a proposal, filed by Representative John McGroarty, the poet laureate of California, for monthly pensions of \$200. They failed to win approval for their proposition, but they impressed Congress with the need to adopt some kind of legislation which would quiet the demand for old-age pensions. After voting down the McGroarty bill and the yet more radical demand of Earnest Lundeen of Minnesota for costly unemployment benefits to be distributed by elected committees of workers” the House passed the Doughton-Wagner bill. (131-132)

While the Lundeen bill did not exclude any workers, it also failed to provision care for non-workers, making the SSA policy as settled oddly enough the most inclusive of types of poverty among any bill alternative at the time. Therefore, the problems with the bill were not which domains it engaged, but how it did so through overt exclusions, federalism, and bureaucratic autonomy.

Each bill was referred to a different hosting committee, as the Dill-Connery bills went to the Senate’s Committee on Pensions and HLA, while Lundeen’s bill went to Labor, Wagner’s went to Senate Committee on Finance (SFI), and Doughton’s companion went to the HWM. Who controls the bill has a major impact on what voices get projected through committee witnesses and the final disposition of the legislation. The next section assesses

Mini Congress: The Committee Process

As just mentioned, the chairperson and ranking member control who shows up in a committee. With the ability to shape the investigatory record, these power players have an incentive to find witnesses that justify their existing views. However, the optimistic informational model of Congress (Krehbiel 1991) would suggest committees—when functioning properly—branch out to find the necessary facts in order to chart a path that leads to the most effective public policy.

Whether it is due to bias or conventions within committees, the witnesses that testified before House Ways and Means/Senate Finance were considerably different from those that

testified before the House Labor.⁶¹ The latter committee, run by advocate Connery, consulted a wide variety of stakeholders, including the poor, while the former two focuses more heavily on actuarial experts and politicians. To some, the inclusivity of the HLA proceedings was a high watermark for opening up the institution to the identities and perspectives of the masses:

The hearings in 1935 that were held before the Labor subcommittee on the Lundeen Bill are a remarkable historical document, “probably the most unique document ever to appear in the Congressional record,” at least according to the executive secretary of the IPA. Eighty witnesses testified: industrial workers, farmers, veterans, professional workers, African-Americans, women, the foreign-born, and youth. “Probably never in American history,” an editor of the *Nation* wrote, “have the underprivileged had a better opportunity to present their case before Congress.” The aggregate of the testimonies amounted to a systematic indictment of American capitalism and the New Deal, and an impassioned defense of the radical alternative under consideration. (Wright 2018)

Indeed, out of the several hundred witnesses, only one domestic worker testified in the whole process—Rosa Rayside of Domestic Workers Union—and she came before HLA (HLA 1935, 635). The downtrodden and vocational members exempted from Doughton-Wagner, like ag and railroad workers, consistently endorsed the Lundeen bill throughout the hearings process, leading the HLA to favorably endorse the measure by reporting the bill out with no changes (H. Rept. 418 1935).⁶²

The issue for the Lundeen bill, aside from its radical nature, was its lack of sufficient support from power players and secondary interests across the board: the Democratic establishment, party leaders, and administration all opposed it, as did business, big unions, and the Townsend folks. In contrast, Wagner’s bill was jointly constructed with labor groups, the Roosevelt administration, and due to Wagner’s endless capacity for compromise, committee

⁶¹ For more on the differences in who testified before Ways and Means and who came before Labor, see Appendix 8A.

⁶² With such an unlikely victory, Lundeen immediately went to the floor to show his bill had institutional legitimacy and public support: “LABOR COMMITTEE HEARINGS REVEAL MERITS OF LUNDEEN WORKERS’ BILL The Committee on Labor, which held hearings on the Lundeen bill, H. R. 2827, reported the measure favorably and without amendment and recommended the passage of the bill.” (*CR 79 1935, 5965*)

members on both sides of Congress. The Lundeen bill's lack of changes and Wagner's numerous ones proved to a fortuitous sign for putting the bill into alignment with the preferences of the lawmakers. Once Chair Doughton reported the now Doughton-Wagner⁶³ bill favorably out of committee, the fractured conflicts across chambers and committees boiled over into one massive debate about social insurance in the United States in each chamber's floor proceedings.


Committee of the Whole: The Floor Process

The floor process was factitious throughout the consideration of the Social Security Act and peer legislation. Indeed, bills were reported to the floor favorably, and even passed the Senate in the case of the Dill bill, only to have the process restarted. The constant back and forth between competing legislation across committees, chambers, and branches gives the SSA debates the distinction of being unusually serpentine, even by the normally quixotic legislative process. This section will first depict the broad rhetorical construction of the poor in Congress during and around the SSA debates, before second proceeding to highlight ways in which MCs debated and tried to alter the bill's substance.

The ideational plane of poverty representation in the early New Deal built year over year until the passage of the SSA in 1935. Figure 8.2 provides an overview of pertinent poverty speech codes that relate to SSA, specifically the elderly, youth, workers, hunger, health and disability, and the usage of a victimization frame for the poor. Each of the six categorizations peak in 1935 compared to the two years preceding and following the SSA. The elderly code provides the stark-

⁶³ DeWitt's (2010) explanation of how Doughton gained the eponymous bill branding privilege is worth highlighting: "David Lewis was chosen by the Roosevelt administration to introduce their bill in the House because he was viewed as the leading subject-matter expert on the Ways and Means Committee, owing to his work on other liberal reform legislation, often in concert with Senator Robert Wagner of New York. What happened is that Lewis introduced the bill and then Chairman Doughton, feeling his prerogatives abused, forced the clerk of the House to alter the record to show that Doughton had submitted the bill earlier than Lewis, and hence, Doughton was listed as the official sponsor of the bill." (65n12). Hence, Doughton is the better-known figure in Congressional history, even if Lewis was a pioneer in advocating for the agenda.

Figure 8.2 Poor Group Construction during the Social Security Act Policy Process



est example of the collinearity of agenda space, rhetorical use, and policy enactment. In the years preceding the SSA, amendments of 1939, and amendments of 1946, the elderly code increases in use, peaking with enactment, then quickly receding from the agenda. The other codes display a similar crest and trough but on a less exaggerated scale. Altogether, the chart shows the high salience groups of the era roughly corresponded with the provisions of the SSA.

Within the bounded confines of legislative debate, Democratic leadership in the House had a history of reporting restrictive rules from the House Committee on Rules that limited the visibility of member positions by proscribing certain forms of votes, like roll calls, to instead rely on voice vote, division, or tellers. While there was a thorough amendment process, the adopted rules stacked the deck against upstart progressives inserting language from rival bills into the SSA, or expanding the generosity and target groups of the legislation. Opposition was most apparent from the left, and even Southern MCs articulated support for more generous provisions a la the

Lundeen bill, especially once all of the alternatives were voted down.⁶⁴ Indeed, when given the opportunity to cast a vote for the universalistic alternative to SSA—the Lundeen Bill (H.R. 2827)

⁶⁴ Representative Johnson provides an excellent, if lengthy summary of the competing legislation, their contents, and issues facing the body and American people. “Mr. Chairman, for almost a week we have listened to the debate on this important social-security bill. This afternoon we listened to the matchless address delivered by my personal friend Dr. Sirovich, of New York. In my opinion, it is one of the greatest speeches delivered on the floor of this House in many a day. The gentleman who just preceded me, Mr. Buck, of California, has also made a very valuable contribution to this discussion. And, at the beginning of this debate, we heard the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, as well as other able members of his committee, explain the provisions of this bill, which is in fact three or four bills in one, as it proposes to legislate on several different yet somewhat related subjects. I find this bill a sort of meager dole to the aged, wrongly called “old-age assistance “ or “old-age security.” Let me say at the outset that a bill that provides maximum Federal participation of only \$15 a month and requires the State to match in whole or in part, as this bill does, in order for the citizen to receive a mere pittance should not be classed as old-age security. [Applause.] Other provisions of the pending bill relate to unemployment insurance, Federal assistance to the States for crippled children, vocational rehabilitation, child and maternal welfare, and public-health services. Still another provision provides for old-age benefits, or old-age insurance. This is separate and apart from the old-age-security provision and would not be placed in operation until 1942. Funds would be provided by contributions of those who participate. All of these are gestures in the right direction; but if I know anything about the sentiment of this House, few Members are really satisfied with many of the provisions of the pending bill. It will not be my purpose to discuss this bill section by section, nor to go into the many provisions of the bill, but to confine my remarks largely to title I, which has to do with old-age security. Just a year ago this week, in discussing the Dill-Connelly old-age-pension bill that had then been reported to this House for consideration, but which never came to a vote, I expressed my views briefly on the subject of old-age security. As pointed out then, I have been deeply interested in this subject for many years. I also mentioned the fact then that the first speech I ever made on the floor of this House was on the subject of pensions. In discussing the Dill-Connelly bill, I said in part: I submit that we are facing a problem that society alone, through the government set up to protect the weak from the strong, and to enable us to enjoy the fruits of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness “, can adequately meet. I am no new convert to this theory. I have been advocating protection for our aged for many years, even during the era of “rugged individualism “, when this problem had not attracted the attention of the public and when it was opposed by many well-meaning persons. I also pointed out in that speech that an increase of 11 percent in the income-tax rates would alone provide the necessary funds for the modest pensions proposed in that bill. I suggested at that time that this House should materially increase the estate tax, gift tax, corporation tax, and surtax or excess-profits tax. It is absurd to say that this great, rich Government cannot adequately take care of its aged men and women, who, through no fault of their own, find themselves without means of support. As stated a moment ago, the pending bill is a gesture in the right direction, but it is at best only a gesture. If given an opportunity, I propose to offer several amendments to this bill. Frankly, I am getting tired of having our committees hand us these bills with a solemn warning that the measures must be passed without the changing of the dotting of an “i” or the crossing of a “t.” You may recall that when the committee recently brought in the McSwain bill, proposing to curb war profiteering, which in its original form overlooked conscripting the financial resources of the country or conscripting anything except the young manhood of America in time of war, we were solemnly told that we should accept that bill exactly as written, and woe be unto the Member who had the audacity to try to amend it. But I took the same position on that bill as I do on this. It will be recalled that this House took charge of that measure and put teeth in it. This body made a real, constructive, drastic, and far-reaching measure out of that bill before it was sent to the Senate. In my judgment, we ought to operate on the pending measure in a more drastic manner than this body did on the McSwain bill. [Applause.] Mr. Chairman, I have introduced a bill (H. R. 2802) that was prepared in collaboration with the Old Age Security Association of Grady County, Okla. I have no pride of authorship, but it is much more fair and more equitable than title I of the pending bill. At least two of my colleagues from Oklahoma, Representatives ROGERS and GASSAWAY, have bills pending before the committee, both of which are more liberal, more progressive, and much fairer to our aged citizens than is this bill. But neither of these bills has had favorable action by the committee. The Lundeen and the McGroarty bills have been discussed at some length on the floor of this House. Both have splendid provisions, and both have their weaknesses. But let me call your attention to the fact that if the Lundeen bill were passed, it would be financed by that class able to pay and would not heap additional burdens on the backs of the working class. Section 4 of the Lundeen bill reads, in part, as follows: Further taxation

that covered all vocational categorizations—only 52 House Representatives voted in the affirmative (CR 79 1935, 5969). Those House members largely hailed from the group of proto-modern liberals known as Maury's Mavericks, which drew heavily from third parties and main party outcasts from across the nation, including the South (Mihelich 2001).

That said, MCs worked very diligently to “liberalize” the provisions of the bill to rise above a pauper's pittance (Douglas 1936, 108-110). Most of these efforts were unsuccessful, including an attempt to include survivor's/dependent's benefits and coverage of those with disabilities, but neither of these were included until updated SSA policies in 1939 and 1956, respectively. Others tried to remove the matching funds on state-level, arguing these hurt the poorest states and would necessarily lead to insufficient benefits. In particular, this would exclude a number of Southern states from real care, because of the higher incidence of social and governmental impoverishment in the region. This was yet another example, to some, of federal government othering and ignoring

necessary to provide funds for the purpose of this act shall be levied on inheritances, gifts, and individuals and corporation incomes of \$5.000 a year and over. This provision should be broadened to include the taxing of stock exchanges, as provided in my bill, and substituted for or added as an amendment to the appropriate section of the pending bill. This Congress cannot afford to pass this bill without providing some means of financing it. I think it is generally conceded that the \$49,750,000 provided in the pending bill to finance old-age-security provisions for the first year is entirely inadequate. The weakness of the Townsend plan, that has been changed and modified several times, and which is now estimated will pay \$50 a month instead of \$200, is undoubtedly its sales-tax provision for financing it. The proposal of a tax of 2 percent on every transaction is not only impractical but would play into the hands of the special interests and add additional burdens on the poor. I have consistently fought a Federal sales tax for years; but even worse than a general Federal sales tax is a turnover sales tax as proposed in that bill. Canada tried that to its sorrow and soon abolished it. As I pointed out on this floor in speaking in opposition to the sales tax as advocated by Herbert Hoover in 1932, there is no question but that such a tax is ultimately passed on to the consumer. A general sales tax is robbing Peter to pay Paul, and when Peter and Paul are both poor men, both ground down by heavy personal and real estate taxes, as well as by tribute paid the tariff-protected corporations, low wages, and starvation prices for farm products, I hope that some other way can be found to raise the revenue needed to take care of our obligations to our needy and deserving old people. On the other hand, the McGroarty plan, as modified, has some splendid provisions and represents the progressive ideas of millions of people who are determined to do something worth while for our aged citizens. The bill I have submitted to this Congress for consideration would lower the age limit to 60 years, with a further provision that dependent citizens over 50 years of age, who are disabled and unable physically to provide a living for themselves and families, should receive Federal assistance. Neither provision can be found in this bill. My bill provides for a minimum pension of \$30 a month, but there is no minimum provided in this bill. This measure, if passed, will not pay a dollar to our old people unless the States wherein they reside match the Federal Government on a 50-50 basis. I submit that if the Federal Government owes a duty to care for our needy and dependent old people it should not be contingent on where those citizens happen to reside. In other words, if a State is bankrupt or for any other reason failed or refuses to do its duty by our aged citizens, why should the Federal Government hide behind the cloak of the State's failure to participate in this program?" (CR 79 1935, 5803-5804).

the plight of the South. The duty, they argued, was to individual relief, and not state relief, but the latter format won the day—the federalized system remained in the bill. Efforts were repeatedly made to lower the age minimum from 65 to 60 (at a time when life expectancy was closer to the latter), but these too were defeated. Members of the alternative proposals all offered high monthly stipends and sought to increase the pension to up to \$120 a month, from the paltry \$15, which many members considered a “pauper’s dole”. This effort failed. Finally, many stakeholders advocated for health care insurance coverage, but this was ruled out because of strident opposition from the American Medical Association (Witte 1962, 206).

The funding mechanism also faced opposition from across the political spectrum. Some argued the payroll tax made the poor pay for the poor. While not as regressive as a flat sales tax, earners currently feeling the strain of low wages for long work would be further pinched, transferring wealth from the younger to older poor. While these rhetorical appeals were particularly tractable, they nonetheless failed to lead a majority of the body to change directions. The logic of a self-contained social safety net prevailed, purportedly making it harder to retrench benefits if workers themselves contributed to the fund.

The one case in which House members succeeded still occurred through a failed vote that nonetheless discursively carried the day. MCs—in particular, Robsion (R-KY) and Jenkins (R-OH)—repeatedly chastised the bill’s architects for ignoring one of the most visually affecting forms of poverty: the needy blind begging for charity on the street in the heart of winter. While the measure was unsuccessful by a 100 to 54 margin, it was later included in the Senate markup of the bill (Douglas 1936, 109-110). Of all the episodes the dissertation covers, the rhetorical appeals on behalf of the blind genuinely seemed to move the needle toward inclusion when none of the bill’s architects initially advocated for such a position. Once the provision was included,

members were subsequently excited to claim credit for their hard-fought and successful agenda-setting, as Jenkins demonstrates here:

Without boasting, I think I can claim credit for having been responsible for the inclusion of this title in this law. I am making mention of this because I am proud to have had a part in bringing relief to the most pitiable group among all of our unfortunates. The poet speaks of 'chill penury.' Poverty is cold. Probably nothing freezes up the soul and body quite as completely as does poverty. If one class of poverty is colder than another, the poverty of the man who is both poor and blind is the coldest. There is no person in the whole American economic life so pitiable as the poor blind man or woman who holds out a rusty tin cup in an emaciated hand on a street corner on a cold, snowy day. (*CR 80* 1936, 8932)

This example of expanding policy coverage was all too rare in New Deal legislation, but serves as an illustration that it is possible to persuade onlookers to adopt more inclusive policies toward the poor.

The Senate debate was more amicable and consensus-driven. This is in part due to the intervening role of the Senate Committee on Finance interdicting the legislation before it reached the floor. The SFI received the passed House bill and made several key changes, including by adding Title X coverage to the needy blind (Douglas 1936, 115). Indeed, a hallmark of Wagner's legislative style is his willingness to accept the suggestions of his colleagues while making his countervailing views known, and always protecting the most essential components of the bill.

The final vote in the House had overwhelming majority of 372 to 33 on April 19, 1935. Opposition came from both left and right, including authors of two principal alternatives, Lundeen and Celler (D-NY). Once the Senate marked up the bill, they too passed it by a skewed margin of 77 to 6 on June 19. To reconcile the bills the chambers entered into two prolonged rounds of conference committees, finally settling on a version they could both live with in early August. President Roosevelt signed the measure on August 14, giving himself very tangible proof of his initial election rhetoric to support his oncoming reelection in 1936.

Overall, the voting patterns and especially the bill's substance convey the final measure was indeed the conservative alternative among the existing legislation, much like as is the case in the next chapter's coverage of the U.S. Housing Act. That said, for such comprehensive legislation to reach a high level of consensus within a body that had recently rejected nearly all new forms of social provision is a remarkable testament to the gravity of conditions at the time and years of work to gain legislative buy-in. With the bill codified, its language would now take on independent effects in reorienting the polity and redefining the American free enterprise system.

Policy Language Analysis

The statutory language for the Social Security Act is one of the most consequential—and overt—cases of dividing the poor in public policy. However, assessing the law requires a nuanced understanding of the ways in which division is at times necessary or prudent, and moreover, substantively good or bad. On the positive front, the law itself provides wide coverage of types of poverty that are not inherently linked—old age, unemployment, cash transfers to poor families, maternal and child health, and aid to the blind. This literal form of division through the several titles in the bill is also a side of comprehensiveness. The negative side shows up when investigating key provisions that exclude classifications of people within the titles (especially Title II). Therefore, this section will first go through the bill to highlight how it remedies or neglects the poor, then makes an assessment on the role of division within the statute.

The statute starts with its title, H. R. 7260, intended “To provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes.” Following this, the bill goes on

to use the word “except” 30 times, indicating a high amount of caveats that qualify general policy statements.

Soon after in Sec. 2 (b) (1) a minimum age of 65 is set as program guidance, but states have the ability to go as high as 70. The major exemptions of the bill only pertain to the federal old-age pensions, which is found in Section 210 and excludes from eligibility: agricultural workers, domestic workers, government workers (government pensions already existed in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) from 1920 onward), mariners, railroad workers (who got their own policy in the Railroad Retirement Act of 1935, and those in science, education, and non-profit work (625).

Overall, the policy is meticulously crafted, but the decision of who to include or exclude was never made out of equity considerations, but instead combined prevailing norms of deservingness with ideas about administrative feasibility. In that way, it was never likely to be the final step in completing a just system of social insurance, but was a modest first step to get the U.S. into the business of managing the welfare of its citizens.

Policy Effects

Although many groups suffered during the Great Depression, not all groups in-need gained inclusion into the policy apparatus, and those that did had particularistic, “targeted” programs for each group. The Social Security Act of 1935 is the preeminent example of this. It created Aid to Dependent Children (for children), Social Security retirement pensions (for retired workers), and unemployment insurance (for currently dislocated workers), singling out (and reifying the conception of) deserving, vulnerable populations in the form of widows or single-mothers with minor children. Within a single bill, the policy provided robust, multi-group framework to cover Mother’s and dependent children, sick and disabled (to an extent), the unemployed, aged, and aid

to the blind. And yet, it excluded several groups, some of which gained inclusion quickly—survivor’s benefits to wives and children until 1939—while others took a generation—the disabled, and agricultural and domestic workers in the 1950s.

Conceptions of the poverty that impacted women and children portrayed the groups as desperate, sympathetic, incapable of self-care, and victims of external processes, such as economic calamity or parental failure. In contemporaneous and subsequent media accounts, the policy was portrayed as helping the neediest in society—white women and children—which closely mirrored the policy’s intent and execution (Teles 1996, 25; Gilens 2003, 101). Moreover, the widespread belief at the time was that women (and children) should not have to work to survive (Farmbry 2009, 130), which was a marked shift from the late-19th century era of child labor, and preceded the legitimacy of the female worker—although that would soon change. The strength of norms in this case speaks to the larger dynamics of why certain groups gain policy inclusion.

The racial disparities of the program are well documented, even if the evidence suggests it was not entirely intended. In particular, AFDC participants were overwhelmingly (over 75%) white early in its existence, which illustrates how SSA was forged not to eliminate poverty, while later modifications of the law reached closer to that goal (but then made public acceptance of the program more tenuous) (Teles 24-25). “Clearly, at the genesis of the ADC program,” writes Teles, “its assistance was intended for and enjoyed by whites overwhelmingly” (25). The modest requirements in the law elevated decision-making to states, on the way to nationalization of the program, specifically for the purpose of avoiding local biases (33). Purpose of act to supplement state funding in how they solve the problem, but not nationalize it or mandate treatment/discrimination standards. This suggests empowering states was the most viable approach

at the time to have greater uniformity. This secular time answer still entrenched inequalities of the time, but they could have been worse otherwise.

As a product of being in the long-considered consensus category of the at-risk public, poor mothers and their children received direct cash transfers from state-county administered welfare offices. The policy effectively put federal spending supports behind existing and modified subnational programs, commonly called the Mothers' Pensions programs (Aizer et al. 2016). Over time, the program was expanded, especially during the Great Society. In that period, federally subsidized aid to families led to the addition of 3.3 million people to welfare rolls by the late 1960s to around 6 million, and which subsequently doubled to 12 million total AFDC recipients by 1972 (Iceland 2006, 124; Teles 1996, 20). Setting the conditions for future turmoil, the massive influx of people receiving benefits was no longer seen as a solution to a problem, but a problem in itself. And yet, enrollment in AFDC (classic welfare) has always dramatically lagged those that are eligible for the program, either due to lack of awareness, the perceived stigma, or denial by street-level bureaucrats wielding case-by-case discretion (Burton 1992, 7). As early as 1967, Robert F. Kennedy called for "welfare dignity reform" that would lessen social worker "raids" on AFDC recipients, frequently used to make sure there were no men in the house (Schmitt 2010, 185)

The program was initially insufficient to provide very much relief (Tynes 1996) and by 1950, only half of the workforce was covered. By 1975, most workers covered by the 25 subsequent amendments to the program from 1935-1973 (Laursen 2012, 18). Key among them was the cost-of-living adjustments in 1950, which proved highly effective at eradicating elderly poverty since most retirement income was not indexed to inflation. Indeed, the non-contributory Old-Age Assistance program was immediately more popular than the pension component of SSA because it only required an elderly person to demonstrate poverty living (Berkowitz 2003, 5). But

the success at elderly issues highlighted the nature of the bill and its successors as an intergenerational transfer from existing workers to elderly and children. The program was increasingly stacked toward the elderly, even as evidence increasingly pointed to childhood poverty as a worse problem (Gratton 1997). In this way, the SSA is an important representation of intergenerational government-managed wealth transfer from young to old, without sufficient alternative policies to help the young. Middle classers did benefit as the policy fit into the labor force maintenance regime during Great Depression. By allowing workers to retire, it decreased labor supply, thereby increasing wages and promoting fuller employment.

The case also serves as an illustrative example of compromise legislation, seen in the regressive taxation to fund the program, but progressive dispensation of benefits—a bargain designed to create consensus (Derthick 1979). Derthick contends the SSA not typified by group-based winners and losers (252), but nonetheless finds those not originally covered in the program faced major impediments. The reasons for lack of coverage were: custom (agriculture and domestic workers were generally left out of employment laws (263); feasibility in administration; because farmers did not want to be part of the program, as Doughton would included farmers if asked to be included (264); individualism and anti-socialism ideology that including everyone was tantamount to accepting socialism in US (264). This last explanation is a bit odd since supposed anti-socialists were ok with industrial workers—the most radical occupational group—having a piece of socialism.

In short, the racism of the bill is true, but the administrative choice and state capacity issues at the hold greater weight. The racism led to underinvestment in existing poor, while the vocational exemptions made collection easier, propelling some poor out of poverty while leaving others to watch from the sidelines.

Conclusion

All three strains—administrative leadership on feasibility, Southern conservatism, and the liberal blindspot on connecting poverty to race, as well as a general lack of support for pure universalism like the Lundeen Bill—occurred and played a part in the outcome. Of all of them, there is the least support for the racial order thesis, while the worries about feasibility are ever present in committee deliberations.

The exact order still requires more investigation, but this study indicates it starts as early 1934 with Wagner's unemployment bill. The administration agreed to the model and constructed a policy it thought most feasible for passage into statute and implementation, and rank-and-file liberals *and* Southern Democrats fell into line to support the administration backed bill, not the Townsend Act or Lundeen Bill. In this way, the first movers in Congress put the issue on the administration's agenda, which then recommended a favored policy back to Congress, which garnered the support of liberals and conservatives across the party spectrum. Only upstart "Mavericks" from the fringes of the Democratic, Republican, Farmer-Labor, and Progressive Parties put up a fight, and the total apex of their numbers only reached 52 on any single universalistic policy, although they did succeed in voting the Lundeen Bill out of HLA.

In addition to the power of the Southern filibuster and the relatively conservative scope of administration-designed policies, the chapter reveals a third explanation for exclusionary social policy: economic and social liberalism had not yet merged into a consistent ideology among lawmakers of this period, as rank-and-file liberals severally cared about civil rights and antipoverty policy, but did not tie the two together into a coherent form of poverty representation. Instead, Southern Democratic lawmakers dominate matters of race-related poverty as a defense mechanism to decry Northern oppression, regional inequality, and to protect against the encroachment of a

heavy-handed federal government on their way of life. This political strategy turned the tables from Southern complicity in generational hierarchy to instead suggest non-Southerners have long ignored Black and White poverty alike. This lack of coherent “modern” left-liberalism among non-Southerners suggests there was simply minimal appetite for universalistic policies among a majority of lawmakers. This important revision to the historical understanding of this era considerably revises the maximal policy bounds downward, and reasserts the path-breaking nature of the New Deal as it occurred—warts and all—might in fact be one of the most progressive potential outcomes given the constraints and beliefs of those in power at the time.

A potential fourth option might also hold some weight: if members indeed held modern left-liberal values, there is a fourth option based on party discipline that would posit House and Senate Democratic leadership effectively whipped votes against universalistic approaches. Jenkins’ quote in the epigraph gives some insight into his view that the opposition party in control of the agenda was preventing members from expressing their true preferences. This fourth option combines the Southern dominance and administration’s proscribed goals into a single aligned approach: both entities wanted to restrict the generosity of the legislation in providing livable benefits to numerous target populations.

The upshot for why any of this matters is that the history of the SSA is partially—but not principally—a story of social and economic exclusion. These are due to the correlation between and merged streams of systemic lineages of slavery and serfdom in agricultural and domestic labor, especially in the South, and the difficulty to (from the outset) create a sufficiently vast social safety net system. Instead, avowed progressive liberals like Harry Hopkins and Frances Perkins suggested a powerful, but narrowly tailored pension, unemployment, and disability system that matched the current and future industrial economy. Moreover, subsequent amendments to the

Social Security Act in 1939, 1946, 1952 and 1956 expanded coverage to all types of workers, and did so with conservative Southern Democratic support. While Southern Democrats certainly wanted to exclude Black agricultural workers from powerful national programs in service of maintaining doctrinaire white supremacist hierarchy, their pivotal votes were not necessary for the observed outcome. A cautious administration, with wide support of Northern and urban Democratic liberals in the House and Senate, was enough to guide the exclusionary SSA to passage.

Had the administration held a more maximal position, they could have crossed the South and chipped away at a filibuster, but at a permanent cost to their legislative cartel moving forward. And in the absence of administrative support, New Deal liberals could have rallied together with progressive Republicans and third party identifiers to find 218 votes to utilize a discharge position, thereby bypassing party leaders *and* Southern Democrats. They certainly had votes to spare since the eventual SSA passed with 372 votes.

The SSA is as weird an antipoverty episode as it was pivotal since it used the valence of the elderly to help the young and mothers. Odd example of dividing the poor to use the valence of the most positively constructed group to help out still positive, but less germane group gain policy incorporation. There is nothing topically that links the elderly to the blind and mothers with children any more than the deaf, although the unemployment provision does fit the industrial labor planning field (“to protect labor in its old age”). The groups that gain incorporation into the bill are a clear indicator of who lawmakers considered most deserving of state help. Elderly pensions were the initial vehicle to create an entire welfare state.

Finally, the full examination of the legislative process here and the copious ways in which the poor were divided does beg a question: is division of the poor necessary for political success,

legislative enactment, and policy effectiveness? The answer to all three appears to be a contingent “yes”, although necessity might be too heavy a word. Certainly watering legislation down and confining its scope makes it more tractable. If the public is not fully able to monitor the policy process, the politics of it may become obscured. Legislative aspect of it are the clearest, as created a lowest common denominator form of social provision is more likely to get lawmakers to the left of it to support than a maximal position would get conservative support. On the policy effectiveness dimension, building capacity was an important initial need, but it was really the subsequent amendments that gave the policy its teeth to combat broad swaths of poverty in America. One wonders if the amendments adopted in the following 20 years after enactment had been included in the first place, how different would the composition of America’s poor have been? We’ll never know, but what is clear is the policy represents the haphazard, insufficient, and biased American social safety net system. Even in its flawed state, it is still one of the most important developments in the nation’s history.

Appendix 8A: List of Witness for Social Security Act and Related Hearings

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
1	WITTE, Edwin E., Exec Dir, Committee on Economic Security , p. 2.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	2	
2	PERKINS, Frances, Sec, DOL; Member, Committee on Economic Security , p. 172.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	172	
3	HOPKINS, Harry L., Fed Relief Administrator, Fed Emergency Relief Admin; Member, Committee on Economic Security , p. 213.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	213	
4	LATIMER, Murray W., Chm, RR Retirement Bd; Chm, Subcommittee on Old-Age Security, Technical Bd, Committee on Economic Security , p. 219.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	219	
5	BROWN, J. Douglas, prof, economics, Princeton Univ; Technical Staff, Committee on Economic Security , p. 239.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	239	
6	LENROOT, Katharine F. , Chief, Children's Bur, DOL , p. 262.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	262	
7	ROCHE, Josephine , Asst Sec, Treas Dept , p. 307.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	307	
8	WALLER, Clifford E. , Dr. , Asst Surg Gen, PHS , p. 315.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	315	
9	CUMMING, Hugh S. , Dr. , Surg Gen, PHS , p. 328.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	328	
10	HANSEN, Alvin H. , Economist, State Dept; Chm, Subcommittee on Unemployment Insurance, Committee on Economic Security , p. 372.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	372	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
11	GREEN, William, pres, AFL, p. 384.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	384	
12	LEISERSON, William M., Chm, Natl Mediation Bd; Member, Technical Bd, Committee on Economic Security, p. 397.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	397	
13	JOLLY, Robert, representing Amer Hosp Assn, Catholic Hosp Assn, and Protestant Hosp Assn, p. 421.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	421	
14	GRIFFIN, Maurice F., Rev., representing Catholic Hosp Assn, p. 437.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	437	
15	TUNSTALL, Alfred M., Mrs., dir, Ala Child Welfare Dept, p. 445.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	445	
16	MOULTON, Harold G., representing Brookings Instn, p. 450.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	450	
17	CZERWONKY, Hugo E., DC, p. 456.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	456	
18	LEE, John J., supvr, div of civilian vocational rehabilitation, Mich Dept of Public Instruction, p. 463.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	463	
19	NORDLIN, George, Member, Advisory Council on Economic Security; also representing Fraternal Order of Eagles, p. 471.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	471	
20	MARSH, Benjamin C., representing People's Lobby, p. 478.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	478	
21	MOTT, James W. (Rep, R-OR), p. 483	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	483	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
22	ABBOTT, Grace, Member, Advisory Council on Economic Security; prof, public welfare, Univ of Chicago; editor, Social Service Review , p. 493.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	493	
23	FOLKS, Homer , sec, NY State Charities Aid Assn , p. 499.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	499	
24	KEPECS, Jacob , pres, Child Welfare League of Amer, p. 500.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	500	
25	WALKER, Alfred, Dr. , chm, bd of health, Jefferson Cty Medical Soc , p. 503.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	503	
26	FREEMAN, Allen W. , Dr. , prof, public health, Johns Hopkins Univ; Member, Advisory Committee on Public Health, Committee on Economic Security , p. 505.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	505	
27	ADAIR, Fred L. , Dr. , prof, obstetrics and gynecology, Univ of Chicago; Member, Advisory Committee on Child Welfare, Committee on Economic Security , p. 511.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	511	
28	GRULEE, Clifford G. , Dr. , prof, pediatrics, Rush Medical Coll; Member, Advisory Committee on Child Welfare, Committee on Economic Security , p. 514.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	514	
29	BALDWIN , Harris T. , Mrs. , vp, legislation, Natl League of Women Voters , p. 521.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	521	
30	LANGWORTHY , B. F. , Mrs. , pres, Natl Congress of Parents and Teachers , p. 524.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	524	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
31	PETERSON, Olivia, representing Minn Dept of Health, p. 526.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	526	
32	LYON, George M., Dr., Huntington, WVa, p. 527.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	527	
33	SMITH, Lillian R., Dr., dir, bur of child hygiene and public health, Mich Dept of Health, p. 530.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	530	
34	MURPHY, J. Prentice, representing Philadelphia Children's Bur, p. 532.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	532	
35	KNOPPEL, R. J., vp, Intl Soc for Crippled Children, p. 541.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	541	
36	ABERCROMBIE, T. F., Dr., representing Conf of State and Provincial Health Authorities of North Amer, p. 544.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	544	
37	BENNETT, George E., Dr., representing Md League for Crippled Children, p. 545.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	545	
38	SWEENEY, Joseph, pres, Cuyahoga Cty, Ohio, Child Welfare Bd, p. 546.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1936	546	
39	LITTLE, R. M., dir, rehabilitation div, NY State Educ Dept, p. 547.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1937	547	
40	Hicker, H. D., chief of the Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation of California, Telegram	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1938	551	
41	Clark, R. R., supervisor of rehabilitation, State of Illinois, telegram	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1939	552	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
42	EPSTEIN , Abraham , exec sec, Amer Assn for Social Security , p. 552.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1940	552	
43	WEINSTOCK , Louis , representing Natl Committee on Unemployment Insurance , p. 584.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1941	584	
44	BENJAMIN , Herbert , representing Natl Council for Unemployment and Social Insurance , p. 587.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1942	587	
45	HAYNES , George E. , exec sec, race relations dept, Fed Council of Churches of Christ , p. 597.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1943	597	
46	LEWIS , David J. (Rep , D -MD) , p. 610	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1944	610	
47	BROWN , M. L. , Ohio sec, Fraternal Order of Eagles; chief, Ohio Old Age Pension Bur , p. 619.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1945	619	
48	PARRAN , Thomas , Dr. , NY State health commr; chm, exec bd, Amer Public Health Assn , p. 644.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1946	644	
49	BIERRING , Walter , Dr. , representing AMA , p. 649.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1947	649	
50	ANDERSON , H. B. , Sec, Citizens Medical Reference Bur , p. 652.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1948	652	
51	FORSTER , H. Walter , vp, life insurance and pension div, Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc , p. 663.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1949	663	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
52	WILSON, bert, representing pension fund, Church of Disciples of Christ, p. 675.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1950	675	
53	TOWNSEND, Francis E., Dr., pres, Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd, p. 677, 1726.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1951	677	
54	HUDSON, Glenn, Oakland, Calif, p. 699.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1952	699	
55	Graham, Frank P., chairman a(lvisory council	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1953	712	
56	REYBURN, Samuel W., representing Natl Retail Dry Goods Assn, p. 761.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1954	761	
57	HUTZLER, Albert D., representing Natl Retail Dry Goods Assn, p. 772.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1955	772	
58	LASSER, David, representing Workers Unemployed Union of NY and Provisional Natl Committee of Unemployed, p. 783.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1956	783	
59	KETTLE, William, Mrs., representing Natl Consumers League, p. 790.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1957	790	
60	CHRISTMAN, Elizabeth, representing Natl Women's Trade Union League, p. 792.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1958	792	
61	HALL, O. J., Jr., representing Philadelphia Local Action Committee, p. 795.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1959	795	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
62	HOUSTON , Charles H. , representing NAACP , p. 796.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1960	796	
63	KERR , J. P. , representing Assn of Drainage and Levee Distrs of Ill , p. 798.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1961	798	
64	MAYER , Charles C. , representing End Poverty in Civilization Soc , p. 806.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1962	806	
65	MCGUIRE , Louise , representing Natl Assn of Classroom Teachers , p. 813.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1963	813	
66	DAVIS , Susan L. , DC , p. 815.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1964	815	
67	AMTER , I. , representing Natl Unemployment Council , p. 816.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1965	816	
68	ELLENBOGEN , Henry (Rep , D -PA) , p. 819	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1966	819	
69	WHITEHEAD , Ralph , representing Amer Fedn of Actors , p. 825.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1967	825	
70	MASON , E. W. , representing Progressive Study Club of DC , p. 832.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1968	832	
71	HATHWAY , C. A. , representing Communist Party, USA , p. 845.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1969	845	
72	REEDER , Sherwood L. , representing US Conf of Mayors , p. 849.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1970	849	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
73	MCGERVEY, William P., author, Pittsburgh, Pa, p. 855.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1971	855	
74	FORD, Clarence E., act commr, social welfare, NY State, p. 861.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1972	861	
75	MORGENTHAU, Henry, Jr., Sec, Treas Dept; Member, Committee on Economic Security, p. 897.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1973	897	
76	Altmeyer, A., Jr., Second Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1974	908	
77	LAMB, Beatrice P., representing Natl League of Women Voters, p. 912.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1975	912	
78	DONNELLY, James L., representing Ill Mfrs Assn, p. 916.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1976	916	
79	HUGGINS, George A., member, exec committee, Church Pensions Conf, p. 917.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1977	917	
80	VAN KLEECK, Mary, representing Inter-Professional Assn for Social Insurance, p. 921.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1978	921	
81	PATMAN, Wright (Rep, D -TX), p. 939	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1979	939	
82	COLLINS, Samuel L. (Rep, R -CA), p. 945	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1980	945	
83	HASTINGS, Daniel O. (Sen, R -DE), p. 947	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1981	947	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
84	BURNHAM, George (Rep, R -CA), p. 965	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1982	965	
85	SMITH, Howard W. (Rep, D -VA), p. 973	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1983	973	
86	EVANS, George D., representing Organization for the Abolition of Poverty, p. 980.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1984	980	
87	FOLSOM, Marion B., Member, Advisory Council on Economic Security, p. 989.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1985	989	
88	WILLIAMSON, W. R., asst actuary, Travelers Insurance Co; Actuarial Consultant, Committee on Economic Security, p. 1009.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1986	1009	
89	Kelley, C. G., Cleveland, Ohio, letter	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1987	1019	
90	EMERY, James A., representing Natl Assn of Mfrs, p. 1020.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1988	1020	
91	MOORE, O. Otto, representing Townsend Clubs of Colo, p. 1037.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1989	1037	
92	PETTENGILL, Samuel B. (Rep, D -IN), p. 1062	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1990	1062	
93	STUDEBAKER, John W., Commr, OE, p. 1070.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1991	1070	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
94	Woodruff, Lion Roy O., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, brief	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1992	1075	
95	HARBISON, A. L., Tulsa, Okla., p. 1079.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1993	1079	
96	HALSELL, H. H., Lubbock, Tex., p. 1081.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1994	1081	
97	Armstrong, C. M., Schenectady, N. Y	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1995	1083	
98	COLMER, William M. (Rep., D -MS), p. 1084	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1996	1084	
99	DOUGLAS, Paul H., Univ of Chicago, p. 1086.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1997	1086	
100	Baldwin, Louise G., National League of Women Voters	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1998	1091	
101	Cass, C. D., representing the American Transit Association, letter	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1999	1091	
102	Burns, Dr. Evelino M., Columbia University	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 2000	1092	
103	Crumbine, S. J., representing the American Child Health Association, letter	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 2001	1097	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

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104	Howett, Harry H., Lansing, Mich	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 2002	1097	
105	Miller, James Ragland, Hartford, Conn., letter	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 2003	1097	
106	DOANE, Robert R., dir of research, Amer Business Surveys, p. 1100.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	1100	
107	MCCLELLAN, John L. (Rep, D -AR), p. 1127	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	1127	
108	McCollum, E. V., Johns Hopkins University, letter	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	1128	
109	Gourley, La-vrence Ii., representing the Anierican Osteopathic Association, brief	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	1129	
110	McCulloch, Frank W., representing the Chic~ago Workers' Committee on Unemployment	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	1136	
111	REED, Charles B., representing Ill Medical Soc, p. 1137.	Committee on Ways and Means. House	Jan. 21-26, 28 - Feb. 2, 4-8, 12, 1935	1137	
112	WAGNER, Robert F. (Sen, D -NY), p. 1	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
113	WITTE, Edwin E., Exec Dir, Committee on Economic Security , p. 31, 187.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	31	
114	PERKINS, Frances, Sec, DOL , p. 99.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	99	
115	GREEN, William, pres, AFL , p. 141.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	141	
116	JOLLY, Robert, representing Amer Hosp Assn, Catholic Hosp Assn, and Protestant Hosp Assn , p. 255.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	255	
117	LEISERSON, William M., Chm, Natl Mediation Bd; Member, Technical Bd, Committee on Economic Security , p. 259.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	259	
118	BROWN, J. Douglas, prof, economics, Princeton Univ; Technical Staff, Committee on Economic Security , p. 281.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	281	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
119	GRAHAM, Frank P., pres, Univ of NC; Chm, Advisory Council on Economic Security , p. 291.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	291	
120	LENROOT, Katharine F., Chief, Children's Bur, DOL , p. 337.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	337	
121	ROCHE, Josephine , Asst Sec, Treas Dept , p. 374.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	374	
122	CUMMING, Hugh S. , Dr. , Surg Gen, PHS , p. 408.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	408	
123	UNDERWOOD , Felix J. , Dr. , health officer, Miss Dept of Health , p. 411.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	411	
124	FALK, I. S. , Dr. , Member, Public Health Committee, Committee on Economic Security , p. 419.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	419	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
125	WALTER, Mark M. , chm, legis committee, Natl Rehabilitation Assn , p. 424.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	424	
126	HUGGINS, George A. , member, exec committee, Church Pensions Conf , p. 428.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	428	
127	PENCE, Owen E. , representing gen bd, YMCA , p. 434.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	434	
128	ANDREWS, John B. , sec, Amer Assn for Labor Legislation , p. 439.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	439	
129	LAMB, Beatrice P. , representing Natl League of Women Voters , p. 442.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	442	
130	SHELTON, Frederick , Mrs. , representing natl bd, YWCA , p. 444.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	444	

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Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
131	HANSEN, Alvin H., Economist, State Dept; Chm, Subcommittee on Unemployment Insurance, Committee on Economic Security, p. 447.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	447	
132	EPSTEIN, Abraham, representing Amer Assn for Social Security, p. 458, 491.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	458	
133	HAYNES, George E., exec sec, race relations dept, Fed Council of Churches of Christ, p. 479.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	479	
134	STORY, H. W., vp, Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co; representing Wis Mfrs Assn, p. 516.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	516	
135	POTTER, Ellen C., Dr., representing Natl Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, p. 522.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	522	
136	ANDERSON, H. B., sec, Citizens Medical Reference Bur, p. 540.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	540	

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Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
137	DAVIS , Susan L. , DC , p. 549.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	549	
138	FOLSOM , Marion B. , asst treas, Eastman Kodak Co; Member, Advisory Council on Economic Security , p. 553.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	553	
139	HOUSTON , Charles H. , representing NAACP , p. 640.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	640	
140	KAHN , Dorothy C. , representing Amer Assn of Social Workers , p. 647.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	647	
141	REEDER , Sherwood L. , representing US Conf of Mayors and Amer Municipal Assn , p. 658.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	658	
142	FORSTER , H. Walter , vp, life insurance and pension div, Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc , p. 659.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	659	

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Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
143	REYMOND , M. H. , Binghamton, NY , p. 669.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	669	
144	PECKHAM , Frank L. , vp, Sentinels of the Republic , p. 677.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	677	
145	CZERWONKY , Hugo E. , DC , p. 680.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	680	
146	MCCORMACK , A. T. , Dr. , commr, Ky Bd of Health; member, committee on Fed relations, Conf of State, Local and Fed Health Authorities of US , p. 680.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	680	
147	HARRINGTON , John , representing Ill Mfrs Assn , p. 685.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	685	
148	GRULEE , Clifford G. , Dr. , prof, pediatrics, Rush Medical Coll; Member, Advisory Committee on Child Welfare, Committee on Economic Security , p. 691.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	691	

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Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
149	LYON , George M. , Dr. , Huntington, WVa , p. 693.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	693	
150	REISS , Oscar , assoc prof, pediatrics, Univ of Southern Calif Medical School , p. 697.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	697	
151	BALDWIN , Harris T. , Mrs. , vp, legislation Natl League of Women Voters , p. 698.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	698	
152	WOLFE , James H. , Mrs. , DC , p. 698.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	698	
153	REYBURN , Samuel W. , representing Natl Retail Dry Goods Assn , p. 702.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	702	
154	HUTZLER , Albert D. , representing Natl Retail Dry Goods Assn , p. 711.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	711	

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Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
155	ANDREWS, Elmer F. , commr, NY State Industrial Commission , p. 713.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	713	
156	BANNERMAN, Mary T. , committee on legislation, Natl Congress of Parents and Teachers , p. 721.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	721	
157	IRWIN, Robert B. , Amer Fdn for the Blind , p. 726.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	726	
158	CARRIS, Lewis H. , Natl Soc for the Prevention of Blindness , p. 730.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	730	
159	STUDEBAKER, John W. , Commr, OE , p. 731.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	731	
160	TYSON, Francis D. , prof, economics, Univ of Pittsburgh , p. 737.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	737	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
161	LATIMER, Murray W., Chm, RR Retirement Bd; chm, Subcommittee on Old-Age Security, Technical Bd, Committee on Economic Security, p. 744.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	744	
162	HALL, Helen, pres, Natl Fedn of Settlements; Member, Advisory Council on Economic Security, p. 767.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	767	
163	OGBURN, Charlton, counsel, AFL, p. 771.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	771	
164	MCCULLOCH, Frank W., representing Chicago Workers Unemployment Committee, p. 775.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	775	
165	SINCLAIR, S. Mervin, pres, Execs of State Commissions and State Agencies for the Blind; member, Pa Commission for the Blind, p. 778.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	778	
166	WATTS, L. L., member, Va Commission for the Blind; also representing Amer Assn of Workers for the Blind, p. 778.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	778	

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Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
167	LATIMER, H. R. , Pa Assn for the Blind , p. 780.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	780	
168	MORROW, L. C. , editor, Factory Mgmt and Maintenance magazine; representing Natl Publishers Assn , p. 787.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	787	
169	YARROS , Rachelle , Hull House, Chicago, Ill , p. 816.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	816	
170	FILENE, Lincoln , William Filene's Sons Co , p. 820.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	820	
171	ELBERT, Robert G. , Member, Unemployment Insurance Committee, Industrial Advisory Bd , p. 825.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	825	
172	SNOW , W. A. , representing Associated Gen Contractors of Amer , p. 861.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24- 25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	861	

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Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
173	KOLB, J. F., dir, industrial relations, Natl Metal Trades Assn , p. 862.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	862	
174	LATSHAW, Stanley , representing Natl Publishers Assn , p. 872.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	872	
175	HOOKEER, Elon H. , pres, Hooker Electro-Chemical Co; also representing Mfg Chemists Assn and Chemical Alliance , p. 876.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	876	
176	WEBSTER, William R. , bd chm, Bridgeport Brass Co; also representing Conn Mfrs Assn , p. 897.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	897	
177	KELLOGG, Paul H. , editor, Survey and Survey Graphic; Vice Chm, Advisory Council on Economic Security , p. 900.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	900	
178	KULP, Clarence A. , Univ of Pa , p. 907.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	907	

Table 8A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances (Cont.)

Order	Name, Title, and Affiliation	Committee	Date Range	Page	Notes
179	HARRIMAN, Henry I. , pres, Chamber of Commerce of US , p. 913.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	913	
180	PECK, Lloyd A. , gen mgr, Laundryowners Natl Assn , p. 918.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	918	
181	EMERY, James A. , representing Natl Assn of Mfrs , p. 921.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	921	
182	GALL, John C. , assoc council, Natl Assn of Mfrs , p. 931.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	931	
183	SARGENT, Noel , economist, Natl Assn of Mfrs , p. 940.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	940	
184	MARSH, Benjamin C. , representing People's Lobby , p. 961.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	961	

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185	TAYLOR, Lea D., representing Ill Committee on Social Security, p. 974.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	974	
186	WILLIAMS, Ernest W., DC, p. 976.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	976	
187	WEIR, Joseph P., DC, p. 988.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	988	
188	ANDREWS, George R., Rev., exec sec, Amer Eugenics Soc, p. 1003.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1003	
189	BURCH, Guy I., dir, Population Reference Bur, p. 1004.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1004	
190	TOWNSEND, Francis E., Dr., pres, Old Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd, p. 1015.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1015	

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191	CLEMENTS, Robert E. , sec-treas, Old-Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd , p. 1051.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1051	
192	MARVIN, Cloyd H. , pres, George Washington Univ; chm, spec committee on economic security, Amer Council on Educ , p. 1071.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1071	
193	ABBOTT, Grace, Member, Advisory Council on Economic Security; editor, Social Service Review; prof, public welfare, Univ of Chicago , p. 1080.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1080	
194	CHANDLER, George B. , representing Ohio Chamber of Commerce , p. 1102.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1102	
195	JACKSON, Henry E. , pres, Social Engineering Inst , p. 1109.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1109	
196	BENJAMIN, Herbert , representing Natl Jt Action Committee for Genuine Social Insurance , p. 1145.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1145	

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197	GORDON, David, sec, committee for unemployment insurance, NY State AFL, p. 1192.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1192	
198	BROWDER, Earl, representing Communist Party, p. 1217.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1217	
199	AMTER, I., representing Natl Unemployment Council, p. 1222.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1222	
200	CRONHEIM, Nathan, representing Philadelphia Local Action Committee and Philadelphia chapter, Interprofessional Assn, p. 1235.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1235	
201	ICKLER, Philip, lecturer, p. 1235.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1235	
202	DOANE, Robert R., representing Old-Age Revolving Pensions, Ltd, p. 1243.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1243	

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203	PARKER, Lovell H., Chief of Staff, Jt Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation , p. 1247.	Committee on Finance. Senate	Jan. 22, 24-25, 28, 30 - Feb. 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 1935	1247	
204	BROWN, Elmer , chm, Natl Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance; member, No 6, Typographical Union , p. 13.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	13	
205	MITCHELL, Broadus , assoc prof, political economy, Johns Hopkins Univ; member, Md Gov's Committee on Unemployment Insurance and Relief, p. 31.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	31	
206	GILMAN , Joseph M. , prof, economics, Coll of City of NY , p. 50.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	50	
207	BENTZLEY, Lewis C. , representing exec committee, Farmers Natl Committee for Action , p. 73.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	73	
208	VAN KLEECK, Mary , chm, Interprofessional Assn for Social Insurance , p. 83.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	83	
209	RICE, Elmer , representing Authors League of Amer , p. 101.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	101	

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211	BLOOR, Ella R. , representing exec committee, Farmers Natl Committee for Action , p. 129.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	129	
212	SENTMAN, Robert M. , natl pres, Fedn of Architects, Engrs, Chemists, and Technicians , p. 136.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	136	
213	STRONG, William , representing Unemployment Council of DC , p. 142.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	142	
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218	PICKARD, Walter L., representing unemployed Textile Workers of NC, p. 195.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	195	
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223	BRIEHL, Fred, representing exec committee, Farmers Natl Committee for Action, p. 270.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	270	
224	WOOD, Norris, representing Unemployment Council, Philadelphia, Pa, p. 276.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	276	

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226	HILL, T. Arnold, exec sec, Natl Urban League, p. 326.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	326	
227	DRUMMOND, David, representing Water-Front Unemployed Council, Baltimore, Md, p. 328.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	328	
228	STEWART, Maxwell S., assoc editor, The Nation, p. 330.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	330	
229	RAND, Jack, representing Metal Workers Industrial Union, p. 337.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	337	
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236	KADE, William, representing Natl Exec Workmen's Sick and Death Benefit Fund, p. 367.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	367	
237	MCCULLOCH, Frank W., chm, Chicago Workers Committee on Unemployment, p. 369.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	369	
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240	PEARL, Frieda , representing United Council of Working Class Women , p. 386.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	386	
241	YOUNG, Reuben S. , representing Interprofessional Assn for Social Insurance , p. 388.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	388	
242	HOWARD, Joseph , representing local No 23, Woodlawn, Amalgamated Assn of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers , p. 392.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	392	
243	FAIRCHILD, Mildred , asst prof, economics, Bryn Mawr Coll , p. 397.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	397	
244	MCDONOUGH, John , representing Western Pa Committee for Social and Unemployment Insurance , p. 409.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	409	
245	BUSH, C. H. , representing Mass Action Committee on Unemployment Insurance , p. 411.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	411	

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247	WITTNER, L. H. , representing Natl Equal Wealth Soc , p. 423.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	423	
248	FINAN , Joseph, representing United Mine Workers of Amer, p. 427.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	427	
249	MISCHELL, Theodore , exec sec, Natl Fraternal Advisory Committee for Unemployment and Social Insurance , p. 435.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	435	
250	GOLD , Theresa E. , representing Brotherhood of Shoe and Allied Craftsmen , p. 438.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	438	
251	VANECEK, John J. , representing Czechoslovak br, Ohio Assn for Unemployment Relief , p. 443.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	443	
252	GREENFIELD, E. C. , exec chm, Small Home and Land Owners Fedn of Ohio , p. 446.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	446	

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254	ROTHSTEIN, Dave, representing local No 765, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paper Hangers of Amer, p. 457.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	457	
255	JACKSON, James C., representing exec committee, Natl Student League, p. 460.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	460	
256	BEDACHT, Max, gen sec, Intl Workers Order, p. 463.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	463	
257	DE ROSA, Frank, pres, Organization of Italian-Amer Descendants, Cleveland, Ohio, p. 467.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	467	
258	ROGERS, Frank, representing Cleveland Committee for Unemployment Insurance, p. 471.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	471	
259	MCNUTT, Waldo, sec, Amer Youth Congress, p. 476.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	476	

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261	MIZARA, Roy, Assn of Lithuanian Workers, Inc, p. 488.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	488	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House
262	MAYER, Charles C., representing Epic Soc, p. 491.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	491	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House
263	HANNAN, James, representing unemployed miners of Rank and File Unemployed League and Unemployed Council, Wilkes-Barre, Pa, p. 511.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	511	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House
264	SQUIRE, Brown, representing post No 197, Amer League of Ex-Service Men, p. 514.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	514	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House
265	CROSBIE, Paul P., natl hq, Amer League of Ex-Servicemen, p. 519.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	519	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House
266	JOHNSON, Elmer, representing Chicago br, trade union committee for unemployment insurance, AFL, p. 522.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	522	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House

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268	TRAGER, Frank N., chm, People's Unemployment League of Md; also Natl Provisional Committee of Organized Unemployed, p. 531.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	531	
269	BLACKWELL, James, representing People's Unemployment League; chm, Eastern Fedn of Unemployed Organizations, p. 537.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	537	
270	KROON, Richard M., representing local No 37, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paper Hangers of Amer, p. 538.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	538	
271	MCDONALD, J. E., chm, Natl Committee of the RR Brotherhoods, p. 544.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	544	
272	HARTWELL, Albion A., exec sec, Interprofessional Assn for Social Insurance, p. 581.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	581	
273	BELLAMY, Edward, Mrs., Chicopee, Springfield, Mass, p. 604.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	604	

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275	JOHNSON, Reginald A., exec sec, Atlanta Urban League, p. 610.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	610	
276	EVANS, Ida M., representing Radio and Metal Workers Industrial Union, p. 614.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	614	
277	GEBHARDT, Richard, Dir of Emergency Relief for Transients, DC, p. 621.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	621	
278	RAYSIDE, Rosa, representing Domestic Workers Union, NYC, p. 635.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	635	
279	EATON, James O., rehabilitation officer, Veterans Natl Rank and File Committee, p. 637.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	637	
280	DAVIDOW, Michael, representing Unemployment Councils of Greater NY, p. 643.	Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	643	

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282	EARNSHAW, Bellamy, Springfield, Mass, p. 674.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	674	
283	ANDREWS, George R., exec sec, Amer Eugenics Soc, p. 686.	Subcommittee on Unemployment, Old Age, and Social Insurance; Committee on Labor. House	Feb. 4-8, 11-15, 1935	686	
284	REAGH, Russell R. - Principal Statistician, Actuarial Work, Department of Treasury	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	1	
285	PERKINS, Frances - Secretary, DOL	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	8	
286	WINSHIP, Blanton - Governor, Puerto Rico	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	23	
287	MACLEAN, Angus D. - Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	31	

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289	BURKE, Vincent C. - Assistant Postmaster General, Department of Post Office	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	137	
290	LATIMER, Murray - Chairman, Railroad Retirement Board	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	137	
291	ERB, Irving E., Department of Treasury	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	137	
292	BELL, D. W., Department of Treasury	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	166	
293	LEWIS, David J. (Representative, D -MD)	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	207	
294	LATIMER, Murray - Chairman, Railroad Retirement Board	Committee on Finance. Senate	May 7-8, 15-17, 1935	222	

Chapter 9

When Centering on the Poor is Not Enough:

The Curious Case of United States Housing Act of 1937

Abstract

The U.S. Housing Act (USHA) of 1937 contributed to millions of Americans receiving higher quality taxpayer financed housing. However, by creating an overly restrictive target population and devolving administration to localities, the act inadvertently reinforced existing inequalities in the public. Specifically, the policy carved up the poor to favor prevailing norm-constructed, potentially temporarily poor families to the detriment of needy low-income individuals and those without any income. Importantly, the poor in blighted areas were frequently dispossessed of their domiciles (“slums”) without the replacement stipulated under the law. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by showcasing how the nature of the problem, good intentioned but flawed representational process of MCs, favor toward slum clearance in committee hearings, and larger interest agglomerations skewed the policy away from comprehensive but potentially middle-class favoring housing policy to a narrow needs-based approach that was easily coopted to serve local governmental and private development interests. As is the case throughout the New Deal, the policy was designed to in part serve several powerful secondary interests—construction, realty, and subnational governments looking for new powers—which limited reach to the target populations. However, just as important is how the left and antipoverty advocates were internally divided in their remedies for the problem, showing even good faith, well-informed lawmaking may fail to solve systemic poverty issues in America. The chapter uniquely illustrates that even when virtual representation is fulsomely centered on the needs of the poor, successfully overcoming the problem of representational bias and neglect brings to the fore a new series of complex problems, particularly those related to problem definition, the wickedness of social problem solving, and that one problem’s resolution contributes to the generation of a new problem.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and Senator Wagner, I am a mother of the slum area, and I am speaking for many, many thousands of mothers like myself who cannot come here personally. When I speak I speak for them all. We live in houses that should have been condemned perhaps 25, 30, or 40 years ago. We are not living there by choice; we are living there by necessity.

—Ida Harris, Lower East Side Public Housing Conference, June 4, 1935

To supply [quality] housing and to eliminate what has become known as “slums” by private enterprise or private capital is out of the question. I do not believe there is any conflict of opinion on that. There are a great many obstacles and difficulties in the execution of such a plan. All sorts of opposition is present. It would be difficult to find anyone who will come here and say, “We are in favor of slums and the old type tenement.” Usually they do not say that. You will find most people say, “Oh, yes; we are in favor of housing authority and Federal aid.” But when it comes right down to the point of actually the building and construction of a different type of house then we are confronted with all types of opposition. And it is the same way when the “semicolon boys” get busy.

—Fiorella La Guardia (R-NY), Mayor of New York City, June 4, 1935

[I]f we are to set up the barest minimum of physical standard, there will have to be a strong and powerful Federal agency, set up on a permanent basis, to construct, invest in, and otherwise promote the production of new medium and low-cost dwellings on a nonspeculative profit basis. Subsidies will have to be provided in many instances.

—Catherine Bauer, Executive Secretary, Philadelphia Labor Housing Conference, AFL, June 6, 1935

Our cooperative thrift and home-financing institutions are not opposed to measures designed to clear slums and blighted areas and to assist in the housing of worthy underprivileged families. We do feel, however, that such legislation should be... so limited as to confine the benefits to the persons and families who are in need of public assistance.

—Raymond Harold, Treasurer, Worcester Home & Equity Coop Bank, May 1, 1936

The Government has no business, in my judgment, to build homes except for slum-clearance purposes and to take care of the poor.

—Senator David I. Walsh (D-MA), June 4, 1935

[NYC] is one of the very few [jurisdictions] ready to act under the decentralization part of the program, but the enabling acts permitting the set-up of such authorities are only found in 20 of the 48 States. So that instead of this being a bill which would result in Nation-wide activity and in something being done toward improving housing conditions in every State—and there is no State in the Union that does not need it—it would result in the whole of these benefits being concentrated for the first few years in a handful of States which have been most advanced in developing local authorities.

—Dr. Edith E. Wood, Vice President, National Public Housing Conference, April 24, 1936

It would seem to me that the bill before you today is perhaps more limited than it needs to be. I am quite sure that it was not intended to be limited to the work of slum clearance, and yet it is possible to interpret it in such a way that it would be thus limited.

—Frances Perkins, U.S. Secretary of Labor, June 5, 1935

Introduction

As New Dealers moved from one problem domain to the next, they recurrently encountered issues of family displacement and concentrated poverty in the form urban slums. Suffering and neighborhood blight were not confined to this stereotypical view, but the emphasis on industrial planning naturally led lawmakers to examine and act upon unsanitary housing that contributed to poor health outcomes and premature deaths in America. Moreover, since developing housing stock could solve social welfare, employment, and infrastructural issues, it could be argued there were broader non-poverty imperatives that made the policy worthwhile to the governing New Deal coalition.

This chapter examines the role of poverty representation in the keystone of New Deal housing policy: the United States Housing Act (USHA) of 1937, also ironically known as the Wagner-Steagall Act.⁶⁵ This policy built on earlier efforts that focused on home financing by offering new federal guidelines, authorization, and loans/grants to local “public housing agencies (PHAs)” for slum eradication and to build new low-income public housing (Sternlieb and Listokin 1987, 21). Most importantly, the government decided to implement a powerful *public* housing component to national housing policy that would simultaneously complement private actors through stimulus and contracting while also providing coverage to poor folks that the private market proved incapable of adequately sheltering.

While the policy was on balance more of a success than a failure, a prodigious literature documents the reasons for the shortcomings of the bill. Scholars such as Fish (1979), Mallach (1984), Vale (2000; 2002), Schwartz (2015), Trounstone (2018) have examined the housing act

⁶⁵ The irony comes from Henry B. Steagall’s (D-AL) multiyear stonewalling of the bill during 1935 and 1936 before coming on board in 1937 (Huthmacher 1968, 215, 224). The naming rights are a product of Steagall chairing the committee of jurisdiction that ultimately favorably reported the bill, thus depriving its true House sponsor, Henry Ellenbogen (D-PA), of his name being imprinted on his hallmark legislation for posterity.

policy process and its effects. Additionally, Vale (2013) and Lowry (1987) center their scholarship on how the policy impacted the poor in particular—in generally unfavorable terms. Together, this literature reveals slum clearance initiatives were fully funded while urban renewal was never fully implemented. There was nothing in the legislation to ensure localities did both to receive funding for them severally. Moreover, the resulting housing stock catered to working class families, but frequently left housing insecure individuals without options as administrators viewed the family unit as the most stable in-road to reach lower-class applicants and maintain stability in the development. How then, is this a product of the robustness representation and qualitative conceptualization of the poor?

To answer this question, the chapter builds upon a smaller literature within housing studies that explores the coalitional and representational aspects of policymaking. Timothy McConnell's full legislative history *The Wagner Housing Act* (1957) provides the seminal statement on *what* happened and *why* through meticulous archival work and interviews with lawmakers and private groups vying for policy control. This resource is further complemented by recent scholarship focused on the New Deal legislative process and coalitional politics (Radford 1996; Hunt 2005) that shows the poor and their advocates played a powerful role in the legislative process of the law, including through the favoring of families and decentralization of administration.

Importantly, while the shortcomings of the bill are well-documented, this literature indicates the complexity of the problem and how the progressive forces pushing for policy instantiation were internally divided on the answers to the plight of the poor. Senator David I. Walsh in particular sought to ensure benefits went only to the poor due to documented cases of middle-class bias in Public Works Administration (PWA) policies, but this emphasis on class as whole still allowed for disparate treatment within class based on norms. Additionally, the reliance

on “New” and “Cooperative” Federalism structures exacerbated inequality within the poor, particularly between positively constructed families and neglected individuals, due to the lack of central control over eligibility. In this way, one could imagine a projection of the preferences of the poor and their advocates *still* led to increased inequality and lack of full incorporation.

This chapter specifically explores and confirms this latter school of thought by centering analyses on the poverty discourse. In it is revealed this policy case may provide the highest quality poverty representation of any policy domain of the era. The poor themselves are present throughout the hearings and almost all witnesses portray themselves as surrogates for the poor (many even articulate the plight of racial and ethnic minorities). The key points of conflict are mostly a consequence of the complexity of the problem itself, different theories of the remedy from honest broker actors, and a lack of existing templates to simply nationalize. In this way, the chapter offers new empirics to bolster existing scholarship while providing an application of unused theoretical and conceptual bases to understand why the policy simultaneously housed millions of poor Americans but exacerbated extant—and created new forms of—inequality.

In particular, the policy studies literature on problem definition (Rochefort and Cobb 1993), the “wickedness” of solving complex social problems (Rittel and Webber 1973), and the occurrence of unintended consequences in adjacent areas when solving a discrete problem (Fine 2014) provide leverage to assess how successful representation of the poor could still manifest in suboptimal policy outcomes. As the chapter will explore, the issue of public housing is connected to myriad issue domains and difficult problem areas, including land use and speculation, taxation, work relief, infrastructure, home design and construction, concentrated poverty, social sorting, governmental capacity, constitutionality, federalism, migration, norms and values, group culture, and private market incentives. Of special consequence is the disjuncture between the imperative

for affordable housing and the costs of creating housing, which left millions of lower- and middle-class Americans living in dilapidated, crowded, older housing stock. New private construction was generally confined to higher income developments, an artifact of 20th century America that still has reverberates in contemporary planning with the rise of luxury high-rise development in neglected city centers. With the benefit of hindsight, it appears quite implausible for government to solve such large-scale capacity, incentive, and value problems in its first attempt to provide housing for the poor. In this way, a policy that houses millions but fails on some counts is still a major victory, but one that must be repeatedly amended—much like the Social Security Act—to continue to perfect its specifications and sure it provides an equitable service to the public.

Since there is already a superb legislative history on the USHA (McDonnell 1957), the chapter will move quickly on the legislative details to instead center on the role of poverty representation and heretofore neglected conceptual development to explain the outcome. It begins with the story of land use and housing in the U.S., followed by an account of the bill sponsorship, committee, and floor processes. The chapter then examines the policy language and its effects before concluding on what this episode teaches us about making pathbreaking laws for the poor.

Political Development of Public Housing Policy in the U.S.

A history of housing policy in America must necessarily address the land on which residences sit. Federal investments in land acquisition and domicile creation have their origin in the expansionist nature of America's colonial tradition and march west, predating the formal establishment of the U.S. Congress. Moreover, if a nation finds itself replete with land, allocating it can serve as an early form of antipoverty policymaking to folks that cannot purchase their own plots. Before the nation's adoption of the Constitution, the Continental Congress passed the Northwestern Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787 to set parameters for settling the newly acquired

Northwestern Territory. These guidelines included the size of the land, procedures for acquisition, and pricing per acreage. This early form of distributive politics fostered a middle-class dream of subsistence homesteading, but with a catch: to guarantee your legal right to the land, you had to be willing to clear the land by killing current occupants.

As land became more scarce and housing more impacted in the original Atlantic colonies, the federal government began a century's long effort of heightened incentives to move people to "unsettled" territory in the country's interior. One approach was for Congress to authorize private donations and sales to specific individuals through the private bills calendar. This piecemeal strategy could not accomplish largescale planning and had the appearance of parochialism for favored constituents. Therefore, Congress developed a comprehensive policy instrument: homestead and land grant acts.

Land grant acts work quite simply to give out free or cheap land to anyone that is eligible and is willing to develop the land to a specified level. Congressional debates about granting land to people along the frontier people go as far back as 1803, when settlers in Mississippi petition for modest portions of federal land (Dick 1970, 126). The first enacted law took shape 40 years later, entitled "An Act to appropriate the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, and to grant pre-emption rights" (5 Stat. 453) in 1841, which gave settlers in recently organized states a legal right to their occupied claim. The sale of public lands in these states would be split between the federal and state governments, serving as a key revenue source for nascent early American governments. The law stipulates applicants "shall hereafter make a settlement in person on the public lands... which... shall have been, surveyed prior thereto, and who shall inhabit and improve the same, and who has or shall erect a dwelling thereon." Developing a household and physical structure are key components to land grant and homestead acts. Additionally, naturalized citizens (i.e., white people)

who were male head of households or widows were eligible so long as the “Indian title had been at the time of such settlement extinguished”, which is an intentionally nebulous wording that allowed consensual buyouts *or* contract termination based on U.S. nullification of indigenous land claims. Land grants served as an instrument to expand the nation’s jurisdictional footprint and infrastructural power. Therefore, the U.S. has always been involved in housing, balancing land scarcity after the Revolution in the former colonies with abundance in the west after the Northwest and Louisiana Purchases.

The second grant act was the Donation Land Claim Act of 1850 (31st Congress Ch. 76), which paid for surveying and settling in Oregon Territory. The law was selectively inclusive as it included Indian “Half-Breeds”—the only time the children of an indigenous person were incorporated into this policy realm—but not African-Americans. Moreover, the policy stipulated residency and cultivation requirements, and a four-year minimum of occupying the land. Here the federal government began laying the groundwork for being able to control what qualifies as suitable, developed housing, even if such provisions often went unenforced (despite several provisions of the statute with specific mention to enforcement). This connection between land and building structures grew with time, and two domains would become increasingly linked.

The most well-known land grant is the Homestead Act of 1862 (12 Stat. 392), which played a significant role in the movement of Americans—white and Black—into the West. Applicants had to follow all existing preemption, donation, and grant acts, which included residency, settlement, and cultivation, all attested through an affidavit that they qualified. Plots would go for no more than \$1.25 per acre to acquire unsold public lands. Each of the aforementioned land grants served a secondary purpose of settling the west with free persons to limit the expansion of slavery. The key prohibition in the 1862 law was an overt eligibility criteria that citizens actively involved

in rebellion were permanently disqualified from the law, meaning most Southerners were either confined to their current region or would have to pay unsubsidized prices to move west. As high-minded a strategy as it may be to encircle the slaveholding South and provide benefits to pro-Union Americans, to execute the law still required the resettlement or genocide of indigenous peoples who were not consulted on such preemption of their ties to the land. Unfortunately, this is as good an example as any that there are no clean hands in America's westward march.

The following 50 years saw targeted grants of land within specific geographic regions or topographies for settlement. Furthering the marginalization of pro-slavery Confederates, the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 sought to provide cheap land to white and Black tenant farmers in the liberated South. The remaining acts dealt with specific topographical impediments that required further inducements to successfully populate the area: the Timber Culture Act of 1873⁶⁶ required planting a set amount of trees on acquired land; the Kinkaid Act of 1904 incentivized settlement in the semi-arid western plains; the Forest Homestead Act of 1906 opened up forest reserves for limited settlement; the Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 granted additional land in areas considered inhospitable for commodity-based farming; and finally, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 offered larger plots for ranching.

The culmination of these efforts throughout the nation's history was to use the law to socially engineer human settlement across the geographically diverse continent. The idea of public housing before the 20th century simply meant public land with compulsory development requirements. Unfortunately, these laws even failed at their intended purpose, as the impoverished

⁶⁶ One section of the timber law is emblematic of how much Congress micromanaged land use in these acts. "SECTION 4. That each and every person who, under the provisions of an act entitled 'An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain' approved May twentieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, or any amendment thereto, having a homestead on said public domain, who, at the end of the third year of his or her residence thereon, shall have had under cultivation, for two years, *one acre of timber, the trees thereon not being more than twelve feet apart each way, and in a good, thrifty condition*, for each and every sixteen acres of said homestead, shall upon due proof of said fact by two credible witnesses receive his or her patent for said homestead" [emphasis added].

could not afford even the cheapest acreage, and “[o]f some 500 million acres dispersed by the General Land Office between 1862 and 1904, only 80 million acres went to homesteaders. Indeed, small farmers acquired more land under the Homestead Act in the 20th century than in the 19th.” (National Archives 2022). Even if these laws had succeeded, their logic played off of the Jeffersonian yeomen ideal of family farms well into the Second Industrial Revolution. Such an antiquated notion of planning would not benefit the masses as urbanization continued rising. Soon, the nation’s leaders would have to shift federal policy away from anachronism and toward where people were naturally and increasingly settling—cities.

As time went on and industrialization took hold, urban settlement played an increasingly vital role in governmental planning. At this point, localities—as creatures of the states—used zoning and modest regulations to govern when and how city residents occupied spaces. However, efforts for regulation lagged behind private settlement patterns, leading to the rise of slums and tenements high population city centers, often occupied by recent immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities, those with physical disabilities (the infirm and aged), and people from fragmented homes, such as orphans and widows. Hunt (2009) argues the public debate about housing sanitation goes as far back as the Civil War (17), revolving around poor housing leading to poor health and crime. The immigrant poor specifically needed good housing to sustain larger city quality. This stirred debate among academics and local reformers for how to fix slum conditions (18-19). In no jurisdiction was this problem and activism more apparent than in New York City, where local activists lobbied for the state to enact the first anti-slum legislation in the form of the Tenement Act of 1895. Importantly, new housing was not part of the policy, instead favoring regulations on permissible housing developments. Reducing the prevalence of slums need not be related to *providing* resources for quality housing stock.

These initial subnational efforts to end slum living, and later, provide Americans with adequate sanitary housing, were spurred on by generations of Progressive era politicians, housing activists, reformers, and interest groups. These actors sought to nationalize the lessons from private planned communities and nascent housing authorities intent on tackling the issue of housing quality and unsafe living conditions. One archetype to use was the template created by Daniel Hoan, Socialist Mayor of Milwaukee. In 1921, the city undertook a public housing initiative called the Garden Homes projects—the first such effort by a locality in the U.S. While the pilot project ended in 1923, it had shown ideas of modern living, mass housing, and mixed occupancy (individuals; single- and multi-family) developments were possible, but that creative and long-term capital investments were necessary to keep the operation running. Only the federal government had such resources to will such a plan into reality.

While national housing policy has its roots in land use and allocation, the modern version of it arose through its linkage with public works and full employment policies. Still reeling from the shock of World War I, President Warren G. Harding (R-OH) task Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (R-CA) with investigating long-term relief plans to act as automatic stabilizers in the event of a recession. Hoover convened the President's Conference on Unemployment on September 26, 1921, which came up with a series of work-relief proposals. While Hoover unilaterally implemented a process of further study through the Bureau of Unemployment within his Commerce Department, no proposals from the enterprise became law. At the same time but for different purposes, Hoover also founded the Better Homes in America (BHA) movement, which sought to increase housing quality. As Jim Greer (2014) writes, this movement's approach later contributed to the federally endorsed process of mortgage and investment redlining (206).

Showing similar interest in employment and relief planning, Robert F. Wagner (D-NY) began to the issues with industrial planning and the construction of housing. In 1928—predating the Great Depression—Wagner offered a bill to create a national employment system apparatus that would use public works as the primary mechanism to fight economic downturns. While this proposal failed to become law, it guided the Congressional agenda toward comprehensive, multifarious approaches to mass employment. All the while the subnational housing reform movements went national, but both the inside and outside game needed focusing event.

When the Great Depression occurred in late 1929, its effects reverberated throughout every sector of the nation's political economy. For housing in particular, it led to a near collapse of mortgage market and contributed to a liberal upsurge in energy, creating narrow window for housing reform (Patterson 1967, 194). However, pressure for housing reform did not come from the longstanding poor, but instead, those made poor in Great Depression. These folks once knew better conditions, but now lived in blighted communities. Ideal policy would inhibit those with means to quality housing and those poor enough to be on the dole (Vale 2000, 182). A formidable coalition of progressive anti-slum advocates and housing planners (known as *housers*) devoted to modern housing mobilized to break the *laissez faire* tradition of the country (Hunt 2009, 15).

The opportunity structure was ripe for foundational change within the American political system, and once again, Wagner was the leading Senate legislator to guide the sea change. First, Wagner now succeeded where he once failed by reintroducing a version of the 1928 law (now S. 5776), which finally passed in 1931. Although this specific law went underutilized under Hoover's administration, it enlarged the footprint of public works and relief planning in the federal government.

Following Franklin D. Roosevelt's (D-NY) election to the presidency, the floodgates opened for centrally designed but federally administered policies for the betterment of the general welfare. Representative Henry B. Steagall (D-AL) sponsored and managed the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) of 1933 into enactment, which in creating the Home Owners Loan Corporation used the power of the federal government to facilitate low-interest loans and refinancing to keep people from losing their homes. Next, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933—in part authored by Wagner and later found unconstitutional—contributed two discrete additions to the national housing portfolio. First, NIRA created the Public Works Administration within the Department of Interior (DOI), which under the tutelage of Secretary Harold Ickes created public housing initiatives for the poor and non-poor alike. Second, within the bill was provision for subsistence homesteading for tenant farmers. This policy succeeded to a greater extent than earlier homestead policies as it actually reached the poorest Americans, but its place in secular time meant it was the last attempt of its kind, giving way to the administration's urbanization strategy and larger efforts toward concentrated public housing. Finally, the National Housing Act (NHA) of 1934 (also known as the Better Housing Program) created Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which provided a structure to provide affordable, amortized loans to the public (Sternlieb and Listokin 1987, 21). Collectively, these efforts showcased the federal government's central role in land management, public works, funds infusion, and housing as a social good nearing human right status.

However, the pragmatic formation and market-orientation of these policies limited their scope and efficacy—and even caused harm and backlash. For one, the policies themselves were not constructed to solve underlying problems with the system, but simply to rationalize the system to serve Americans better. “[M]ost housing reformers—and even the most liberal members of

Congress—were ideologically predisposed to a capitalist economic system tempered by progressive regulation”, Hunt (2009) argues, continuing “[t]he main thrust of New Deal liberalism was to maintain social order by restraining the worst in capitalism, not by replacing it” (20). Additionally, framing the New Deal around market failures was a double-edged sword (22): positively, it opened a window to legitimately act in the public interest, but negatively, that limited the scope of action to something akin to bandaging and not surgery. Throughout the housing debates of the 1930s, FDR favored lower cost initiatives for the ‘34 and later ‘37 bills due to worries about the budget, which limited what was attainable (Radford 1996, 179). FDR had a tendency to play coy with housing policy, slowly moving from uncertainty about need for housing programs to debating the nature of the program before settling on tacit endorsement (Fish 1979, 214). Additional problems were manifest. The NHA came to be seen as favoring the interests of banks over borrowers while also ushering the widespread practice of racially-correlated redlining across the nation. The promising PWA was overly-centralized and favored those in the middle class, creating resentment (Hunt 2009, 23) that matched those of the despised Resettlement Administration in (Fish 1979, 218).

These tribulations set the tone for the debate around the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. Increasing state capacity to problem solve was moderated by innate conservatism or pragmatism, limiting the antipoverty impacts of key legislation. The courts further curtailed policymakers’ choice set in *U.S. v. Certain Lands in the city of Louisville* by ruling that only localities and states had eminent domain power to take land for housing purposes (Hunt 2009, 23). This systemwide and developmental perspective provides some context to understand why lawmakers in Congress with the best of intentions might still divide the poor in practice because of the ideological and legal terrain in which they operated. Housing advocates had to fashion just the right policy to


provide an essential need to the poorest Americans, while still getting the law passed, implemented, and withstanding legal challenges.

As Fish (1979) puts it, there were three stages to the national public housing process. The first stage was to identify the problem—in this case, overcrowding and unsanitary housing with no natural light (210), paired with affordability issues for the broader public. This was achieved when interest groups, movements, and subnational politicians successfully articulated the problem in a way that captured national attention. The second stage of the problem was to determine if the issue was large enough so to affect wide swaths of society. The Great Depression put into stark relief issues of housing inadequacy, and even after national policies were implemented, new affordable construction was very much lagging for all but the wealthiest Americans. The third and final stage was to create responsible institution (211). For this last objective, Members of Congress (MCs) had to determine how best to solve the problem, and under which decision-makers jurisdiction. Powerful interests such as the National Association of Housing Officials, National Public Housing Conference, and Labor Housing Conference had successfully rallied public support to create consensus, raise issue salience, and pressure on lawmakers to act (212-213)—now it was Congress' turn.

Legislative Process History

Moving the locus of conflict into Congress forced actors to contemplate a series of weighty questions before the body could devise an adequate policy instrument to the complex problem. For one, whether and how much the government should directly build public housing? Would there be role for private contractors, and if so, at what rate? Or should the government underwrite private developers, and if so, at what level of profit and security? Another is should the government limit the profit in these enterprises, and similarly, should it provide funding to non-profit or “limited

Figure 9.1 U.S. Housing Act Policy Process



Notes: Italicized texts and dashed lines designate Congressional legislative precedent or supra-institutional developments across the nation. Sources: Adapted from CRs 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 and their indices, Senate and House reports, and committee hearings.

dividend" entities? Finally, who should the housing be for: the poor as a whole, only the poorest of the poor, middle-classes who currently struggle with the market, families, and/or individuals? Even when one (importantly) resolves to help the poorest find housing of better stock, there are myriad logistic, planning, and principled matters to design a new, more equitable government-involved housing system in America.

This reality in part informs the arduous path the USHA took to become law. As Figure 9.1 summarizes, the initial versions of the bill were offered in 1935, but only the Senate took action

for the next two years. In that time, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor (SEL) held numerous hearings researching the bill and providing modifications, eventually favorably reporting the bill out of committee on June 1, 1936 (S. Rept. 2160 1936). On June 16, the Senate even managed to pass the bill, only to see it die once again without action in the House committee process. Finally, in 1937 with new bills offered in both chambers, the House joined the Senate in hammering out the final details of the legislation through hearings and floor process, the law passed with overwhelming margins, and the USHA was signed into law by Roosevelt on the first day of September. Like SSA and NSLA, the process from initial proposals to passage took shape over a three-year period.

Proposed Legislation and Their Sponsors

Entering the problem-solving void were two lawmakers of quite different pedigrees: Robert Wagner (D-NY) and Henry Ellenbogen (D-PA). The previous chapter covered Wagner's prominent role as the Senate author of the Social Security Act. This is in addition to being the chief legislative author of some of the most important New Deal policies, contributing to his reputation as arguably the most prolific lawmaker of the 20th century.⁶⁷ While Representative Ellenbogen does not have the same historical notoriety, housing policy was his specialty. This is perhaps a product of being a Hungarian immigrant interested in reforming American housing to build upon the strengths of the old country. Each of these lawmakers authored separate bills with different internal logics in the Second Session of the 74th Congress in 1935 and initially represented competing visions put forth by special interests, but the differences were eventually resolved by merging the bills into a consensus policy. Also of import, these two principal architects intersected

⁶⁷ Indeed, Wagner's engagement with so many issues pulled his attention away from full investing in the housing bill during the 74th Congress.

on the publicly evocative problem of immigrants living in slums—Wagner spent his childhood in a slum (Fish 1979, 214), while Ellenbogen was an immigrant. This anecdote lends support to idea that lawmakers may have to experience some degree of lived experience on a problem to be spurred to write legislation that will fix those problems.

Due to his upbringing and influence as a lawmaker, housing advocates strategically targeted Wagner to sponsor their bill on the Senate side. Specifically, Wagner was approached by the reform-minded National Public Housing Conference (NPHC) led by President Mary K. Simkhovitch (also Vice Chair of the NYC Housing Authority and Director of Greenwich House) and Secretary Helen Alfred. This makes clear sense given their geographic proximity to one another, but moreover, they roamed in the same New York high society and activist reformer communities, making Wagner a readily available target. To the delight of NPHC members, the Senator proposed S. 2392. On the House side, the group ventured outside of New York to successfully convince labor-aligned Reuben T. Wood (D-MO) to offer the house version (H.R. 6998) of the bill. The central tenants of the bill included creating a new Division of Housing within the Department of Interior, the new director had discretion to select projects, cooperation with localities was necessary for authorization, and the federal government could not exceed 30% of the costs for any given project.

However, the bill faced immediate issues in both chambers. Initially Wagner could not devote full attention to issue even when agreed to introduce the bill since he was working to pass the Social Security Act and Fair Labor Standards Act at the time. The bill's language focused on stimulating economic activity through the building trades, but many existing interests viewed the effort as more threatening to private enterprise than empowering. Since the New Deal was so

expansive, private actors without full information may rightly feel infringed upon. Due to this conception, Wagner took to the radio to explain his support for the measure:

The object of public housing, in a nutshell, is not to invade the field of home building for the middle class or the well-to-do which has been the only profitable area for private enterprise in the past. Nor is it even to exclude private enterprise from major participation in a low-cost housing program. It is merely to supplement what private industry will do, by subsidies which will make up the difference between what the poor can afford to pay and what is necessary to assure decent living quarters. (McDonnell 1957, 135)

Even pro-housing advocates were skeptical of with the initial draft of the bill because the federalized structure gave localities too much discretionary power (which ended up being true) (Radford 1996, 184-185).

Given the variety of housing activists at the time, advocates did not have to put all of their eggs in Wagner's basket. In particular, Executive Secretary Catherine Bauer of the Philadelphia Labor Housing Conference, American Federation of Labor, viewed the NPHC bill as deeply flawed and wholly insufficient to rise to the immense task of rectifying America's housing woes. Bauer's plan was informed by cutting-edge European modernist housing, particularly the Bauhaus settlements in Germany, which were cheaper *and* better housing than what the American private sector could provide for the lower and middle-class. The goals were to support families who in good as well as bad times cannot afford to pay prices that the private sector requires for decent housing. Moreover, this approach would more directly compete with extant real estate interests for market share. To execute this more ambitious and progressive bill, Bauer successfully convinced Ellenbogen to sponsor the bill.

The original 1935 Ellenbogen bill, H.R. 7399, was notable for several key components. First, it included the first mention of an *independent* US Housing Authority, which was in part eventually subsumed into the Wagner bill but later stripped during the floor process. Additionally, the legislation would have allowed directing grants to cooperatives and non-governmental entities.

As Gail Radford (1996) puts it, the bill was doubly advantageous because it had “more authority at the federal level, but simultaneously allowed for more nongovernmental participation...” by local interested actors, including non-profits (185). This dose of central power and local flexibility would be key for those that needed housing to find at least one route that achieved their end while bypassing entrenched profit-seeking real estate interests. As we will shortly see, because this coalition envisioned middle class units, they actually threatened these interests enough to countermobilize using a discourse around *helping* the poor à la the more conventional needs-based Wagner bill. Moreover, instead of the emphasis being on slum clearance as was the case in the Wagner bill, this process would happen later when slums could be acquired for less money. Finally, the initial public investment would be recouped when the public builds affinity with the new approach, then supports ongoing projects based on their manifest success through private investment and support for taxes that directly pay for the program.

Critics of the Bauer approach thought her designs were too elitist, and ironically given her critiques of the NPHC, were not in touch with problems of the day (Hunt 2009, 21-22). Indeed, the Ellenbogen bill initially went nowhere in the House. Issues stemmed from Ellenbogen being a relatively junior member in the lower chamber⁶⁸, the lower chamber’s concentrated power structure that lowers member agency, and the committee referral process (which is covered in depth in the next paper section). Because of the necessity to act and manifest impediments, Wagner and Ellenbogen merged their bills and offered S. 4424 in early April of 1936.

The new reconcile bill was arguably the best of both world. The Housing Authority was independent and had significant central authority to dispense funds, the right to approve plans, site

⁶⁸ When Ellenbogen joined the 73rd Congress in 1933 he faced a peculiar challenge: he was still an unnaturalized Hungarian citizen needed additional years to naturalize. This meant he could not even cast a vote on the House (Hunt 2009, 25). However, this was rectified by the time he sponsored the Bauer legislation.

location, and contract costs. Localities, in turn, were tasked with proposing and planning the housing projects, building them through local construction capacity, and administering the logistics of the ongoing completed projects. This maintained the novel effort to create local housing authorities as a common unit of governmental planning within the federalist system. Even though European housing inspired the Bauer side of the coalition, the housing subsidies in bill were even *more* generous than those of the old country (Hunt 2009, 26-27). The project construction subsidy was made even more generous than the Bauer bill by capping federal coverage of the costs at a whopping 85%. Instead of a onetime capital infusion, the national annual contribution subsidy would be paid for debt service loans through yearly contribution in cash. This financing system collectively gave localities the ability to create low-income housing without a cash outlay (27) and kept prices down.

However, the bill's language and effects were still ambiguous in parts. For one, the slum eradication and displacement was mostly agreed upon by key actors, but its externalities were not fully realized. As Vale (2013) writes, "clearance entailed sorting out the poor so as to purge the poorest and reward upward mobility" (320). The law was premised on rents covering operating costs, which meant those without means to pay rent would ruin the program if allowed in—hence their exclusion (320).

Additionally, the target population was still not clearly defined in the legislation, with different actors favoring the poorest, upper poor, or all housing insecure (including the middle class). In crafting the bills, MC discourse focused on the goal of reaching the bottom one-third of public, but there was no directive for how far down to go (Hunt 2009). In keeping with their emphasis on recently poor over the long-term poor, the FDR administration was satisfied with reaching the top of the bottom. But the new reconciled bill opened the door for middle-class

housing with a variable approach to establishing eligibility. This approach was indeed a middle ground between the social reformers and construction advocates, simply expanding coverage to keep all parties happy. Labor in particular was pushing for more middle class housing to be included in the bill, which would ostensibly employ their members at prevailing wage scales. However, this is also an example of the interests of labor and the poor might diverge, as resources that could go to the latter will be devoted to ensuring the former interest is sated.

In keeping with how Lowi (1979) depicts with interest-group liberalism, you cannot expect sectoral leaders of economies of scale to represent everyone under them; labor representing the poor fundamentally misjudges one of the most *proximate* groups to be a *proxy* for a group, when they are not, but neither were other large and influential organized interests. As Sternlieb and Listokin (1987) write:

Amid this activity there were warning signals in congressional hearings and public statements of the administration that indicated the limitations on housing as a priority. Although President Roosevelt spoke forcefully of a nation, one-third of which was ill-housed, the basic legislation was passed on the grounds of fostering jobs and economic recovery [the building trades made up a disproportionate amount of unemployed Americans, necessitating 1934 Act]... the objective of alleviating housing conditions was far from hidden, but it was necessary to build a broader constituency primarily interested in jobs and economic reinvigoration. Even the 1937 Housing Act, which authorized the public housing program, basically was sold under the same rubric of job stimulation and economic growth. (18-19)

As is commonly the dilemma in antipoverty politics, members themselves and key witnesses would have to consciously center on the poor, while channeling the energy of adjacent interests, without constructing policies that hurt the former to the benefit of the latter.

Finally, the last issue facing enactment of any permutation of the Wagner-Elzenbogen bills was the administration's lukewarm support for the legislation. For one, FDR did not want to stump for housing in election year (Fish 1979, 215), even as Wagner wrote the popular housing platform adopted at the Democratic National Convention (McDonnell 1957, 235). Despite consistent

lobbying by housers and Wagner's prodding, the administration would not spotlight the legislation and FDR did not make any forceful proclamations in support of the legislation. Due to the administration's aloof disinterest or strategic balancing of agenda priorities, positive action would require bill sponsors, interests committee members, and advocates and organized interests had to do the heavy lifting. These forces converge in a single space during the multi-year committee hearing process.

Mini Congress: The Committee Process

This section will examine the committee process through which the USHA traversed. The organization focuses on three components of the committee process: how members of the committees of jurisdiction engaged broad issues of housing and more narrow issues of poverty; the demographics of witnesses—specifically to proximity to poverty—and their contribution to the debate of ideas; and the amalgamation of the seen and unseen actors into coherent interest coalitions. The totality of statements, questions, and debates indicates the poor experienced a comparatively high level of representation throughout the committee hearing process. Lawmakers consistently sought to understand the experiences of the poor, clearly interrogate the ideas of eligibility through a lens of centering on the poor, and ultimately pursued a policy that was ostensibly consistent with the poor and their advocates expressed in public debate.

But before entering the tripartite schema, it is first important to understand how the way in which a bill finds its way to a committee greatly shapes its contents and outcome. Committees are skewed microcosms of Congress organized around a governmental topic; a combination of self-selected interested lawmakers, junior members without much seniority to have full agency, and gatekeepers intent on maintaining the programs that benefit their favored constituencies. USHA

case specialist Timothy McDonnell (1957) adroitly explains the significance of the general referral process for the trajectory of the legislation, before getting into the dynamics which this legislation:

The assignment of a bill to a committee is one of the most important actions in the legislative process... a committee chairman or a few members of a committee can prevent a bill from reaching the floor... Since a bill such as this housing bill comprehended a number of provisions, it would not be absolutely determined to the jurisdiction of one committee; and if it could be steered into a sympathetic committee, the chances of its passage would be greatly improved. (93-94)

If advocates for the housing act could somehow control which committee received jurisdiction over the bill, it could help the prospects. Moreover, having two chambers to work through meant if they got an unfavorable committee on one side, they could still advance the ball in the other. As it turns out, that story of two chambers is exactly what happened.

On the Senate side, Wagner displayed the kind of strategic success that made him so influential in the body. When he offered the bill, the Senator expressly articulated his reasoning for not sending it to the first committee that came to mind, but instead an adjacent one that had legitimate authority to dispose of the legislation; he did not mention the natural disposition of this committee to social welfare legislation (McDonnell 1957, 93; Fish 1979, 214) “Mr. President,” Wagner states on March 26, 1935, “I introduce the bill [S. 2392], and although it involves an appropriation, nevertheless, because it deals with the subject of housing, I am going to ask that it be referred to the Committee on Education and Labor” (*CR 79 1935*, 4419). As McDonnell articulates it, “[t]he advantage of having Senator Wagner sponsor the legislation was very evident in this instance, where he requested, and John N. Garner, president of the Senate, followed his request, that the bill go to a sympathetic committee where it would be given immediate consideration” (94). McDonnell depicts the scene well, stating:

Wagner was using some of the strategy that made him such a successful legislator. The Committee on Appropriation [SAP] was a more conservative committee than the Committee on Education and Labor. Besides, [SAP] had just given a large appropriation

to the president for the work-relief bill which provided \$450,000,000 for housing construction by the PWA Housing Division [49 Stat. 48 1935], and so this committee would be inclined to let the bill die. [SEL] had a number of so-called New Dealers in its membership, and it would be much more interested in holding hearings and making a favorable report. Senators Hugo Black [D-AL] and James Murray [D-MT], together with Robert La Follette [P-WI], could be counted on to fight for public housing. Senator David I. Walsh... was chairman of the committee. He was not a New Dealer, but he would support legislation which he thought would benefit the workers. (93)

Wagner's calculus involved: not overloading a committee that already had a lot on its plate and already felt it addressed some part of the issue; preempting hostile actors based on their preferences; and finding a bipartisan set of allies to manage his legislation. SEL would naturally hold closer views to Wagner, even if he was not on the committee, because of the nature of those that self-select to join the committee.

While SAP was unquestionably a more conservative committee than SEL, McDonnell misses another alternative would be to send the bill to Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (SBC), on which Wagner was a senior member. Typically, members would want their own bill referred to their own committee as a way of being able to advocate for it, monitor its developments, and control its content. SBC recently held hearings to evaluate appropriations and tweaks to the National Housing Act of 1934 (SBC 1935). As the section on members will soon show, SEL (summarized in Table 9.2) was substantially more poverty-oriented than SBC (available as Appendix A) suggesting the former was a much more fortuitous venue for the bill. In short, referral to a favorable committee of jurisdiction allowed for immediate and steady action on the legislation than the "conservative" SAP and his SBC, neither of which were conducive for antipoverty policy.

What transpired on the House side gives some credibility to this argument about the power of referral. In McDonnell's telling, the NPHC's chosen House sponsor Wood failed to lobby Speaker Joseph W. Byrns (D-TN) "that the really important features of the bill were the labor and industrial recovery provisions" (94-95) which would steer the bill to the Committee on Labor

(HLA). This “bad mistake” (94) led to the bill being referred to the Committee on the powerful but competitive tax writing Committee on Ways and Means (HWM), which did not take any action on the bill. Experiencing a similar dismal outcome, the Ellenbogen bill was referred to “ultraconservative” Committee on Banking and Currency (HBC), which had managed housing legislation in recent Congresses, but where Chairman Steagall at the time either did not care for the bill or outright opposed it (McDonnell 1957, 95), allowing it to die in 1935. While the administration’s lack of guidance hurt the bill overall, it also gave Ellenbogen the idea in 1936 to *claim* the administration supported the bill, hoping the loyal Steagall would get on board. However, this failed as well, and the bill once again died committee. All the while the bill had moved through the SEL through successive hearings, markups, a favorable committee endorsement, and passage on the Senate floor. It is clear the disparate outcome of the two bills had much to do with the committee referral process, although the counterfactual is difficult to observe in this case.⁶⁹

Members

This section assesses the predilection of MCs on potential committees to advocate for the poor, including how much and in what ways they engaged poverty in the hearing process. First, I provide new a measurement to interpret if indeed SEL was a superior vessel, followed by member-level analysis of activity in the committee, and ending with exemplars of member speeches and questioning.

As Table 9.1 conveys, SEL members had broad interest in articulating poverty matters in the floor process. Five members had above three speeches per Congress—constituting high volume articulation—while nine of the 16 members on the committee roster in this era spoke more about

⁶⁹ It is worth noting it is likely easier to steer the referral process in the smaller Senate than the raucous House due to their differing sizes and rules. Both Wood and Ellenbogen failing to get the committee they wanted year over year give credence to this idea, although comparing anyone with Wagner is quite difficult. Had had Wagner been in the House, would he have succeeded at getting the bill to the House Committee on Labor?

Table 9.1 Members of the Senate Education and Labor Committee (SEL), 74th and 75th Congresses

Member Name	Conference Committee	Poverty Speech Count, 73 rd -75 th Cong	Poverty Speeches per Congress Served. 73 rd -75 th Cong	Vote on Byrd \$ Limit per Unit Amdt (8/4/37)	Vote on Logan Housing Prog in Interior Dept Amdt (8/6/37)	Vote on Passage of S.1685 USHA (8/6/37)
Walsh (D-MA), Chair (74th)	✓	13	4.33	N	N	Y
Copeland (D-NY)	✓	27	9	N	NV	NV
Trammell (D-FL)		4	2	N/A	N/A	N/A
Black (D-AL), Chair (75th)		13	4.33	N	NV	Y
Murphy (D-IA)		1	0.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
Thomas (D-UT)	✓	1	0.33	N	N	Y
Murray (D-MT)		1	0.33	N	Y	Y
Donahey (D-OH)		0	0	Y	NV	NV
Holt (D-WV)		3	1.5	Y	N	Y
Pepper (D-FL)		6	3	N	N	Y
Ellender (D-LA)		10	10	N	N	Y
Lee (D-OK)		1	1	N	Y	Y
Borah (R-ID), Ranking Member	✓	13	4.33	NV	Y	Y
Metcalf (R-RI)		1	0.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
La Follette (P-WI)	✓	5	1.67	N	N	Y
Davis (R-PA)		5	1.67	Y	Y	Y

poverty than the 1.62 poverty speech average for the Senate at this time (511 speeches for 316 Senators from the 73rd to 75th Congress), and only Victor Donahey (D-OH) failed to deliver a single poverty speech. Importantly, the two most powerful committee members, Chair Black and acting Chair (later permanent Chair) Walsh both have 13 poverty speeches in the three sessions—4.33 speeches per Congress—from the start of the dataset to enactment of the USHA. This marker is fortuitous given the power of committee leadership to run their domain; it is exponentially better to have a chair shepherd a cause than a backbencher. The other two advocates McDonnell argues Wagner selected to benefit his cause have less speeches, with Murray delivering a single poverty speech in this timeframe (0.33 per Congress) and La Follette with only 5 (1.67 per Congress).

While Murray is nearly absent from each component of this research, he was a well-known pro-labor liberal leader within Congress (Spritzer, Prawitz, Greenspan and Kozlowitz 2003), and La Follette becomes a major articulator of the poor in subsequent Congresses, reaching a total of 29 speeches for an average of 4.14 for the whole dataset from the 73rd to 79th Congresses. Finally, although members were willing to support structural amendments to lower the cost per built unit and rehousing the housing authority in the DOI, it is notable not a single member of the committee voted against final passage of the bill—an unusual level of unanimity on such a momentous piece of legislation, even considering the biases of the committee of jurisdiction.

In contrast, Table 9A.1 in Appendix 9A indicates SBC—which was managing HOLA and NHA changes when USHA was introduced—had comparatively fewer poverty articulators, showing less broad support. While Wagner’s home committee was inhospitable, he himself is a significant outlier with 32 poverty speeches for an average of 10.67 per Congress. Two additional members—Reynolds (D-NC) and Bankhead (D-AL)—had an average of three or more speeches, six committee members were above the mean of 1.62, while nine of the 20 had zero poverty speeches. While the majority of eligible members supported eventual passage of the USHA, three members (Glass; Byrnes; Steiwer) opposed the measure.

Overall, the SEL had four named advocates from Wagner, three additional poverty articulators early in their tenure of office, and Wagner himself was allowed to attend most meetings—even ending up with a higher attendance rate than many standing committee members. All of this indicated Wagner’s gambit to send the bill to a committee on which he did not serve ultimately paid dividends at keeping the legislation on the agenda until the lower chamber felt compelled to act. Of course, there is the potential for endogeneity here, as what we might take to be a sign of a more favorable committee could instead be an artifact of controlling the substance

of the legislation itself since the committee crafted it to fit each of their potential issues. Non-committee members simply would not have this capability, even if they were interested in policy action. But additional evidence for domain-specific committees holding different preferences is manifest when one compares the SEL to the House side.

The progress on the Senate side could not overcome unfavorable dynamics on the HBC, where a distant chair and unnatural advocates for poverty contributed to killing the bill in two successive sessions before finally succeeding in the first session of the 76th Congress in 1937. To gain empirical leverage on committee hospitability, Table 9.2 present the members of the committee during the period when they finally held hearings on the matter (75th Congress). Only three of the 24 members could be considered high volume poverty articulators: Hamilton Fish (R-NY) with 5.67 speeches per Congress, Wright Patman (D-TX) with an average of five speeches, and Fred Crawford (R-MI) with 3.5 speech on average. Ten members exceed the House's 0.81 average speech propensity inclusive of the 73rd to 75th Congresses, including all six Republicans on the committee. Eight of the 24 members never delivered a poverty speech. There are very likely worse committees for antipoverty programs, but in comparison to the stacked SEL, HBC's poverty-interested lawmakers did not constitute a majority of the committee's membership. Additionally, HBC was a more partisan affair, with a supermajority of Democrats supporting the bill's passage, and supermajority of Republicans opposing the measure. But importantly, the two Republicans on the conference committee were the only two Republicans that supported the bill—evidence that conferees may be selected for their disposition to the bill and/or that by virtue of holding decision-making roles, their values manifest in the bill.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ This later possibility is less likely since a) each side gets to choose their party's representative to the conference and b) here the two most senior minority members were selected, which is consistent with how senior status generally gives an actor the first right of refusal to reconcile legislation across the chambers. In this case, Democrats too sent their most senior members to the conference.

Table 9.2 Members of the Housing Banking and Currency Committee (HBC), 75th Congress

Member Name	Conference Committee	Poverty Speech Count, 73 rd -75 th Cong	Poverty Speeches per Congress Served, 73 rd -75 th Cong	Vote to Recommit the Bill w/ Instr. (8/18/37)	Vote on Passage of S. 1685 USHA (8/18/37)
Steagall (D-AL), Chair	✓	1	0.33	N	Y
Goldsborough (D-MD)	✓	1	0.33	N	Y
Reilly (D-WI)	✓	0	0	Y	Y
Hancock (D-NC)		1	0.33	N	N
Williams (D-MO)		5	1.67	N	Y
Spence (D-KY)		1	0.33	N	Y
Farley (D-IN)		1	0.33	N	Y
Meeks (D-IL)		0	0	NV	NV
Kopplemann (D-CT)		3	1	N	Y
Kennedy (D-NY)		2	0.67	N	Y
Ford (D-CA)		6	2	N	Y
Brown (D-GA)		0	0	N	Y
Clark (D-ID)		0	0	NV	Y
Patman (D-TX)		15	5	NV	NV
McKeough (D-IL)		0	0	N	Y
Evans (D-NY)		0	0	N	Y
Transue (D-MI)		0	0	N	Y
McGranery (D-PA)		0	0	N	Y
Wolcott (R-MI), Ranking Member	✓	4	1.33	Y	Y
Fish (R-NY)	✓	17	5.67	Y	Y
Gifford (R-MA)		3	1	Y	N
Luce (R-MA)		5	2.5	Y	N
White (R-OH)		1	1	Y	N
Crawford (R-MI)		7	3.5	Y	N

In the committee hearings there was a sizable disjuncture between avid participants and less vocal members (as well as members not attending hearings). The most active Senators during the hearings were Walsh (by far), Wagner, Donahey, James J. Davis (R-PA), and Allen Ellender (D-LA). Even when Black was chair, he, Murray, and La Follette were not very involved in engaging witness testimony. Indeed, in the three years of gathering witness testimony, most of the facilitation and questioning was carried out by Walsh with a few interjections by others. The House

side was oddly more diffuse compared to the Senate, with the most active members facilitating the process including Chair Steagall, Frank Hancock (D-NC), Ranking Member Jesse Wolcott (R-MI), Clyde Williams (D-MO), and James McGrannery (D-PA). In the second tier of still significant engagement are Michael Reilly (D-WI), T. Alan Goldsborough (D-MD), Martin Kennedy (D-NY), and Robert Luce (D-MA). Since the Senate acted first and over the course of three years, their directives were comprehensive in nature, mostly dedicating to demonstrating the need for federal action, consulting stakeholders, and examining plausible templates and paradigms to initiate a public housing program. In contrast, by the time the House got involved it was clearly a referendum on whether to greenlight the Senate vetted legislation.

The most relevant discourse on the Senate side was identifying the target population, including how to determine what level of need was congruent with larger social, economic and political imperatives. Both of these efforts showcase the outsized influence of Walsh on the ultimate disposition of the bill.

Bolstered by both poverty-focused advocates and business interests, Walsh successfully restricted policy's constituency to the *idea* of only "the lowest income group." While Bauer advocated for housing all Americans facing unaffordability and dilapidation, Walsh had more traditional views on government action, succinctly summed up as "The Government has no business, in my judgment, to build homes except for slum-clearance purposes and to take care of the poor" (SEL 1935, 23). In a floor speech during the passage of the 1936 bill, Walsh explains his grave worries in greater detail:

Therefore, so far as I am concerned, I have insisted and I now insist that the Government has no business whatsoever unless we are to abandon private property rights and home ownership in building homes for persons in the low-income group, except for those in the group of very lowest incomes, except for those whose incomes are so small that they live in hovels, in unsanitary, in unhealthful, in crime-breeding communities and localities. So far as I have had any share in drafting this bill, I have insisted again and again that whatever

money is spent, whatever activities the Government undertakes in this direction, we must confine ourselves to slum clearance, and to persons who live in slums. I even went so far as to seek to have written into the bill a provision that only persons with incomes of less than \$500 a year should be permitted to reside in the houses which are to be built by grants from the Government[.] (*CR 80 1936, 9558*)

Moreover, when government had acted, Walsh was ceaselessly focused on how the bias within PWA demonstration projects that “built better houses, but they were not for the poor” (SEL 1935, 23). In short, Walsh’s key advocacy gave him license to curtail the expansiveness of the bill, limiting it to slum clearance and the poorest Americans. To Walsh, testimony by Bauer and Perkins contending—and later being proven correct—that the bill might only cover slum clearance and not new housing developments would be a virtue, not a bug. In so doing, he satisfied both conservative forces in society *and* centered the policy on those most in need.

But once this target group was established and the policy was curtailed from a near-universalism to a limited needs basis, lawmakers still had to extensively debate one another and inquire with witnesses about how to *determine* and *measure* an income threshold. This process was essentially never resolved, as (emblematic of other member efforts) Walsh was still asking witnesses for help in creating such a definition as late as 1937:

Senator Walsh: You think we ought to give discretionary power to administer this act so that the local authorities could come to the United States Housing Authority, and we ought to give them discretion to say as to the low income, whose is and whose is not under that definition?

Mr. Vinton: I think the Federal Government would have to watch that very carefully.

Senator Walsh: I am very glad to hear you say that. Most of the talk has been about the low income, which is very wide in its definition. I want to repeat again that the first person I want to see put in the Government subsidized tenements in New York State or Boston, or anywhere, is that man who has the lowest income, the largest family, and is just struggling to make a living and lives in those slums.

Mr. Vinton. I think the purpose of public housing should be to serve the lowest income groups which it can reach; and tenants should be selected, as I believe they have been selected, from among those who are inadequately housed now. (SEL 1937, 140)

Walsh's criteria of lowest income, biggest family, and current slum dweller was pretty close to the eventual program implementation, although the policy effects section later in this study highlights research that shows many slum occupants were displaced and not rehoused. And as we just saw, Walsh strongly supported an enumerated income limit in the codified law. But since the cost of living varied so heavily across jurisdictions, it made it difficult at the time to set an annual income threshold.⁷¹ So instead, lawmakers pursued the practical decision to leave the language vague and rely on program administrators instead of micromanage from D.C. Importantly, FHA would not determine the threshold, but it was ultimately left to localities to assess need.

Overall, members sincerely investigated all of the issues related to housing in the 1930s. However, MCs did not discuss their own experiences with poverty or housing insecurity. The closest to this happening occurred with Representative Everett Dirksen's (R-IL) testimony as a witness, but only to say slums were not purely bad, especially in a criminal sense: "I have examined into that whole matter and somehow or other when I hear about the criminal aspects of slums, and so forth, I am not unmindful of the fact that the most fragrant pond lilies come out of the mire, that Al Smith came from the East Side. It is a moving force. You will always have some crime, and you will have it on the 'gold coast' as well as in the slums" (HBC 1937, 92). Although not a full member of SEL but present throughout the process, not even Wagner articulated his personal experience growing up in a slum. Therefore, witnesses had to provide the lived experience of slum living.

⁷¹ And as time went, government statistics became more granular and readily available, allowing for indexing according to local conditions, such as home values and the price of rent. But again, in contemporary public housing localities still control procedural matters related to thresholds and eligibility.

Witnesses

The witnesses called to testify before committees of jurisdiction represented nearly all interested stakeholders in federal housing policy, including slum residents, social reformers, opposed business interests, and technical experts from housing authorities across levels of government. Most of the witnesses appeared before the Senate, since they led on investigating the issue and bill by holding hearings in 1935, 1936. In total, there were 95 invited in-person witnesses⁷², of which 24 testified more than once from 1935 to 1937, and seven testified before both the Senate and the House. and early 1937, followed by the House holding their lone period of hearings in mid-1937.


This section unfolds in three phases. First, it broadly depicts witness occupational sectors, their relation to government employment, gender identity, and disposition toward representing the poor. Second, it will explore the key advocacy efforts by the major bill authors, the presentation of problem empirics by technical experts, and the topics of debate between actors. The key tensions in the debate were twofold: slum replacement advocates versus proponents of low-income housing on new land, where advocates agreed to both, but Congress and localities most concerned with former; and the inertial ideological belief that state should not compete with private market, which for generations contributed to lower quality housing that was at best temporary in nature (Hunt 2009, 16). Moreover, advocates frequently testified to the association between poor housing and poor health conditions (McDonnell 1957, 105-106). Finally, the section will showcase the compelling words of the five individuals that descriptively represent the poor. This firsthand account of the lived experience with poverty is a powerful education for non-poor lawmakers.

⁷² Not all of the invited witnesses attended in person, at times having their statement read into the record in lieu of appearance or sending a replacement to represent their views.

The facets of witness demographics are summarized in the panels of Figure 9.2, which will be assessed starting in the top-left quadrant. Interested parties in housing legislation came from a diverse set of occupational sectors. Realty has the largest single plurality at 15, followed by subnational housing administrators, national housing administrators, and social welfare advocates with 10 each. Consolidating likeminded groups together, we see a tripartite division, wherein public health officials, religious leaders, labor, social welfare advocates, and slum residents form a powerful liberal bloc (~33), realty, banking, insurance, and construction form the more conservative side (~26), and housing officials and elected politicians fill the middle (~20). Somewhat peculiarly, while United Mine Workers leader John L. Lewis had his statement read into the House record, no labor witnesses appeared before the HBC in person. This may be evidence of gatekeeping from a hostile Southern lawmaker (Steagall), and is emblematic of larger tension between organized labor and representatives of the Southern labor order. Quite fortuitously for the bill, the liberal bloc was consolidated in support of action, most housing authorities sought new powers or federal resources, and the conservative bloc was internally divided, with some realty and construction witnesses favored policy action so long as it was limited to only the poorest of the poor and had no impact on middle-income Americans. The remaining anti-action realty folks simply believed the Constitution forbade a federal housing law.

In the federal system of the U.S., subnational governments are powerful lobbying organizations. This reaches new heights during the New Deal, in which an enlarged government with entrepreneurial agency heads became powerful sources of knowledge and direction for Congressional efforts. As the top-right panel shows, during the USHA hearings just over one-third of witnesses were employed by a government. This disaggregates into national and subnational elected officials, movers and shakers in the Roosevelt administration, and subnational housing

Figure 9.2 Descriptive Traits of and Poverty Representation by Committee Witnesses (N=95)



authorities from across the country. Government employees provided both experience with housing programs and technical details with a general predilection toward advocacy, either because it gave them a larger portfolio or because they selected into governmental sectors in which they truly believe. Examples include representatives of the US Public Health Service and Resettlement Administration (RA) espousing the virtues of government housing planning, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, in conjunction with organized labor, advocating for a provision requiring all projects use union labor, Secretary Ickes' desire to maintain housing

programs within his DOI, which although it was removed in the Wagner-Ellenbogen bill, was ultimately readded due to Senate floor amendment. The working relationships and legitimacy that governmental actors confer on the process undoubtedly helps ease worries about new Congressionally authorized programs.

Gender and social welfare policy are strongly linked throughout U.S. history, with both women's organizations advocating for greater governmental provision in social policy to solve longstanding issues, and women being positively constructed as able targets of state action. As a sign of the growing power of women in the non-governmental sector gaining access to the halls of power, four women were the principal architects of the original dueling bills—Simkhovitch, VP of NPHC Edith E. Wood, and Alfred with Wagner; Bauer with Ellenbogen. However, as the bottom-left panel shows, these four women were joined by seven others to constitute only 11 of the 95 witnesses; 84 were men. But this group of 11 women were among the most essential witnesses. Gender differences were evident in the proceedings, as every woman supported the bill or wanted amendments that improved its reach and effectiveness at serving the poor. Moreover, all five poor witnesses testifying about their experiences were women, a product of both local activism and perhaps offering a strategic device to make the poor more sympathetic and to focus on ideas of maternity, domesticity, and the family unit.

The poor representing themselves in the policymaking process is all too rare throughout American history, but fortunately, the USHA process was promising on several fronts. For one, there was descriptive representation of the poor articulating their experiences, excerpts of which are presented later in this section. Second, almost every witness addressed issues of poverty and income scarcity in their testimony, with only 12 of the 95 witnesses having no poverty content in their words. As Miler (2019) correctly points out, surrogates—those that speak about and pursue

the issues of the poor—are a vital part of the representation of the poor. Non-poor lawmakers, witnesses, and interests practice virtual representation of making present what is a) absent and b) not directly experienced by themselves. In the housing hearings, nearly everyone speaks about the poor, and even those that do not—who often provide technical details—might change their testimony so as not to repeat those that came before them (sequence matters in hearing testimony). Overall, the bottom-right panel shows 87.4% of witnesses addressed poverty, slums, low-income, and low-wage—a marked success! Somewhat astonishingly, even those in the realty sector often served as surrogates. However, that could be a product of the terms of debate that were settled through Wagner’s bill title, with witnesses faithfully engaging on its terms. Importantly, speaking about the poor is not a measure of intent or level of activity, but is simply a binary measure of whether someone speaks of poverty, the poor, or low-income folks at all in their testimony. Indeed, it does appear to be a dialectical situation in which interest was high in salient low-cost housing, but this support was often diffuse—the rhetorical plane may appear vacant of conflict but the policy details are in endless flux for multiple years. That said, superficial interests aside, this is surely a high point of the poor receiving significant, consensus level attention, in which the policy debates on centered on their needs.

This section will now engage how witnesses contributed to the investigative record through the content of their testimony. To start, the Ellenbogen aligned witnesses provided an expansive approach to understanding and defining the problem of housing. “The housing problem in the United States”, Dr. Edith E. Wood suggested, “is economic in its origin. It has been aggravated by the depression, but in no sense caused by it. It is found in cities of all sizes, in villages, rural districts, and on the farm (SEL 1935, 53).” Bauer explicitly positioned herself as not being

principally focused on slums, since the crux of the housing issue in America is much more expansive:

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am not here to talk about the terrible slums. The word “slum” (although day before yesterday was a notable exception) almost invariably implies some vague area in which present company, thank heaven, have never lived; the word “slum dweller” almost always means “them”, not “us.”

But I want to discuss here a much larger and perhaps more immediate aspect of the housing problem—one which affects you and me and every consumer and producer in the country...

The thing I desire to stress here today is the utter failure of one of our basic industries—the business of producing new dwellings for family occupancy. (87-88)

In this way, the issue of housing has much to do with the lack of private interest in new development and suitable domicile replacement, as housing stock continues to get old and more dilapidated as it is reused. In further addressing the comprehensive nature of the problem, Bauer also addressed the deficiency of scale that the Wagner version and general orientation of the New Deal took toward minimal redress with a target group instead of broad structural reforms:

A great many people now believe that governmental agencies should engage in a few “model” housing experiments here and there, but very few people realize the enormity of the problem, and the urgency with which it confronts us. We still tend to think of “housing” as something affecting only a very special and limited group known as “slum-dwellers”—it should be remarked here that a “slum dweller” invariably means somebody else—or as a new frill of reform promoted by social workers and a few otherwise unemployed architects, or as a temporary problem which would tend to solve itself if once we had achieved “recovery”. (SEL 1935, 84).

The critical juncture of the Great Depression may have created conditions ripe for political change, but the underlying problem was much deeper and ingrained in the profit-seeking nature of private real estate development. Focusing on slum residents would not fix this problem.

One key critique of American housing development emanated from both radicals, reformers, and policymakers: the role of speculation in creating unaffordable home prices. Bauer testifies to the deleterious role of speculation on the nature of the housing problem:

The direct results of this fact are (1) that residential construction is a highly speculative and fluctuating luxury trade-the first to fall off at even the smell of depression-instead of being what it obviously should be-a basic staple of production; (2) that under present conditions our actual consuming power of the products of the building industry is extremely low in relation to our needs and our capacity to produce; and (3) that there is absolutely no visible mechanism for systematic replacement of old dwellings, a factor which increases in importance every year that our cities and our slums grow older. The whole speculative nature of our methods of producing new dwellings in the past has added immeasurably to the cost of housing and has meant that almost every family-not merely the impoverished slum dwellers received bad value for the money he expended on shelter. Neither rent nor monthly payments represent value received in terms of actual materials and labor. (SEL 1935, 84-85)

Mayor of New York City, Fiorello La Guardia (R-NY), addressed these issues in his testimony, as did radical Marxist Benjamin Marsh, Executive Secretary of the People's Lobby. Both agreed speculation is pivotal, but the former did not believe it can be tackled through federal legislation, while the latter said the problem could not be solved short of addressing speculation.⁷³ Wood on not solving speculation and wealth disparities, but at least trying something:

It would not be reasonable to expect builders or landlords to operate at a loss. Perhaps some day better planning of our duties, writing off imaginary land values, a change from speculation to, safe investment in real estate, building and mortgage-lending policies, a better distribution of income, or the arrival of the millennium may change all this. But in 1935, as in 1925 or 1915, the only way the lower third of our self-supporting population can have homes of what we like to call the "American standard " is to consider them as a public utility and supply them through some form of public agency on a no-profit and in many cases on a subsidized basis. (SEL 1935, 56)

⁷³ Marsh's testimony is notable for two reasons: his antagonistic form of oratory (and interruption), and his view the housing problem, which was the most extreme of the witnesses. If you are going to have reasonable housing for wage earners, you have got to use a little common sense. I hope you will permit me to talk a little common sense, after what you have listened to recently. I know it is unusual in Washington, but it is not entirely illegal, as far as I know. You simply cannot rehouse the working classes under the Wagner bill. You have got to let the city of New York do its plain duty. Yesterday, as the mayor was going out, I asked him why he did not go after the land speculators in New York. He said, 'Well, you will have to change the Constitution.' You do not have to change the Constitution to transfer taxes on buildings to land values. So I have written to the mayor of Pittsburgh; which does tax land values far more than buildings. They tried to make the rate 5 to 1, and for some time it has been 2 to 1, and I asked him to inform Mayor LaGuardia [sic] what he could do under the Constitution in the State of New York. It is useless, let me repeat, for anyone to come to Washington and ask for land subdivision to land speculators. When the city of New York relieves itself of the control of land speculators, bankers, and the investing classes and not before, will it be in a position to solve the housing-problem" (SEL 1935, 144).

And Wagner's core orientation toward reformism—not radicalism—and legislative feasibility—not ideal policy—meant he would not take on that interest.

The key component of speculation, housing scarcity, and perverse incentives in the private sector, led the Bauer school, including labor, to advocating for including the middle class into the eventual policy apparatus. Bauer explains the logic well in her testimony:

Dr. Wood, who testified yesterday, has ably demonstrated, and her conclusions have been checked by numerous later analyses, that almost nothing new was built in the 1920's—during the peak years of the building boom—except for the upper third income group. That means that two-thirds of our population is always outside the new market for the product of the residential building industry; that industry has not, and apparently on its present basis cannot, produce anything at a price which families in the middle and lower income groups can pay. Today, of course, the potential market is very much smaller. The bottom income level which private enterprise can reach is probably somewhere between \$1,500 and \$2,000; but, if the Financial Survey of the Real Property Inventory is a fair index, half of the families in the 64 cities covered had total family incomes in 1933 of less than \$950. Probably not more than the top fifth or sixth could pay the price or rental of a new dwelling.

Instead of providing a bulwark when the depression started, this supposedly “basic industry” was one of the first to break. The bottom dropped out of its inflated book values, and there has been almost no new production of dwellings during the past 5 years.

The vast majority of our population, then, is permanently forced to live in handed-down dwellings, very many of them in “run-down” or blighted neighborhoods if not in outright slums. Whatever their needs or desires, they are outside the housing market. (SEL 1935, 88)


By confining the problem to a definition based on scarcity and market failure, structural reforms were effectively ruled out of the legislative choice set.

To further make the case for how the poor and middle class were being squeezed into bad housing, representatives of the New York-based Housing Study Guild, Milton Lowenthal and Henry S. Churchill (testifying severally) provided the most compelling and wide-ranging data on the housing crisis in America. This information was prepared with the dual purpose of providing the best available data and projections with ease of interpretation for interested actors. Several of

these resources are presented as a panel in Figure 9.2. The infographics distill several important components of the housing crisis into easy-to-understand chunks. First, between 1929 and 1934, annual family income dramatically declined, shifting the bimodal distribution of income downward, where by 1934 most families made less than \$1000 per annum. Given this low-income crunch, the authors calculated the monthly graduated subsidy a family would need to live in “minimum standard”. The poorest families—those below \$1000—would essentially need a full subsidy of \$30 provided by the government to afford passable private sector housing. Housing costs are then contextualized within a larger accounting of household expenses to include clothing, food, and extraneous costs. Poorer families making less than \$1000 would need housing supports to merely reach a subsistence level; an additional sum would be needed to reach a “minimum decency” standard. Finally, the last panel shows the differences in rent between speculative financing through private ownership, limited dividend entities at 6% return, and housing as a public utility with an interest free 2% amortization. Each one is less costly than the last, with the limited dividend entities laying out full costs ahead of time and capping their rate of return. However, to truly lower costs, government operation is superior, nearly halving the speculative financing figure for monthly rent.

Bolstering the empirical presentation of the contours of the problem, governmental witnesses provided technical details about the coverage of existing governmental programs on housing the needy. Witnesses from DOI/PWA, RA, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), and FHA. Figures from the latter agency, visually summarized in Figures 9.3 and 9.4, show the deficiency of the structures created through HOLA, NIRA, and NHA within the First New Deal. Families making under \$1000 were not cared for through the home mortgage market. This is very well expected given this market historically served middle class interests (although


Figure 9.3. Housing Study Guild Infographics on Income, Home Affordability, and Subsidies



Source: Senate Committee on Education and Labor hearings on June 6, 1935, pages 62, 69, and 76; presented here as a panel, but each figure is page-wide in the record.

this changed with the movement to homeownership constituting the American Dream, and the subsequent expansion of subprime variable rate mortgage lending in the late 20th century). Even if the poor were not completely shut out from mortgage coverage as evidenced by the 2% of borrowers from the lowest bracket, they simply did not constitute a sizeable portion of those now

Figure 9.4 Home Mortgage Usage by Income Level



Source: Data from the FHA Division of Economics & Statistics, December 1936 (HBC 1937, 75).

covered with federally backed amortized home mortgages. Hence, existing programs were not doing the job at providing for those in the most desperate conditions and a more direct vessel became necessary.

Even though the administration provided witnesses that documented the problem and openly advocated for policy change, and witnesses in front of the committees of jurisdiction did not openly oppose the bill, one of the leading sources of resistance was the Roosevelt administration. As Hunt (2009) notes: “the greatest threats to its inner workings and ultimate passage emanated... from powerful institutions from within the Roosevelt administration,”

specifically the FHA, which viewed the new Housing Authority as a competitor to its power, and from Interior, where Secretary Ickes wanted to maintain housing power. The FHA criticized public ownership of properties, but was willing to expand loans to low-income homes, which in turn activists opposed because FHA subsidization could bolster the speculation-based overpricing of units. Ultimately, the FHA relented and endorsed Wagner bill. Ickes got on board once the conflict grew into an adjacent area when Wagner killed a PWA funding bill, but he did succeed in getting the program to be housed in DOI (26).

Business groups would be expected to oppose much of this legislation, especially if it directly takes away market share on profitable housing stock. This turns out to be true for some but not all of the business-oriented witnesses. Major opposition to the bill came from the Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), U.S. League of Building and Loans, and the National Retail Lumber Dealers Association (NRLDA) (Radford 1996, 188). Their most effective anti- arguments were a combination of ideological and material—the *laissez faire* system is good for public and if government gets involved, it will prove so effective that no one will buy private homes anymore (189). However, not all business leaders that testified shared the existential dread of competing with government. James G. Couffer of the Blythe & Company banking group believe the law could prove useful as long as it was limited in scope:

It has been stated that such investment would be in competition with private investment made in this same field. It is my opinion, however, that as long as public housing is confined to those persons whose income makes it impossible for them to pay the rent required by private housing, that there would be no conflict, the two activities would work together, and in so doing would be able to actually strengthen the individual investment. (SEL 1936, 110)

The logic here is that the target population of the policy is already not a major source of revenue for developers, so helping them would not cause an economic shock. This view was consistent with Walsh's goals, and if that allowed the bill to pass, Wagner would also be amiable to this

approach. Overall, the internal fragmentation of both the administration and business community and a provided an opening for member initiative, social movement activism, and public opinion to form a powerful cudgel to smash opposition en route to passage. In this particular case, the poor themselves were included in the collective effort.

Turning to the final portion of the witness section, the presence and voices of destitute Americans during the committee and floor processes provides a powerful perspective that lawmakers may not typically engage. During the USHA deliberations, five self-identified poor Americans testified to their dire experiences and the need for governmental action. Despite its comprehensiveness, McDonnell's (1957) legislative history only has a single paragraph (106) and a footnote (346n21) on the presence of these poor Americans, necessitated greater depth in this study. Four of them were part of a mobilized group of New York slum residents who were tired of being unseen or unheard. "[T]he Lower East Side Housing Conference of New York testified in favor of public housing before the Senate in 1935," writes Parson (1985), "and then gave further emphasis to its demands with a 500-strong demonstration of women from the New York slums. They besieged the Capitol with signs reading 'My third child died fighting pneumonia in a windowless room', 'Our children may be the next to burn', and 'Death takes no holiday in the slum'" (33). This rare example shows the poor mobilizing, demonstrating in numbers, showing emotional fervor, and gaining access to committee halls to testify about their experiences and contribute to the solution of their plight. Leading a delegation of 37 slum residents, John Volpe⁷⁴ organized the group and interfaced with the committee. Only a subset of those traveling to DC were allowed to speak to their vital experiences that are endemic to their communities.

⁷⁴ It is important to note there is insufficient evidence in the committee record and beyond to assess whether Volpe was poor himself, so he is not counted among the five poor witnesses.

The first three impoverished witnesses appeared on the first day of the SEL investigation, June 4, 1935. Ida Harris, a homemaker from the lower east side, testified with force and resolve to expose the committee to the struggles in the slums:

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and Senator Wagner, I am a mother of the slum area, and I am speaking for many, many thousands of mothers like myself who cannot come here personally. When I speak I speak for them all. We live in houses that should have been condemned perhaps 25, 30, or 40 years ago. We are not living there by choice; we are living there by necessity. (SEL 1935, 20)

The conscious representation of a neglected group puts in stark relief how rare it is, save a member or witness here and there, to see this lived experience in Congressional debates. Harris went on to depict not getting sunlight in her unit, overcrowding, communal bathrooms, washing in washtubs, fire hazards, and unsanitary conditions. She then made her plea:

We want better homes for low rentals, so that we may live like human beings and be able to raise our children to become useful citizens, something that we cannot do if we haven't got decent and clean homes to raise them in. We want better homes for low rentals, rentals that we will be able to pay according to our husband's earnings, and God knows they earn very little now.

We also want houses in the neighborhood that we live in now. We cannot afford to move away too far as the cost of transportation takes away from our children money that we may need for necessities. We ask in the name of humanity to give us a chance to live in better houses for our children. It is very, very bad to live in these houses, and I heard our chairman say that sanitation is something that must be enforced. I am very sorry I differ with you. You cannot enforce sanitation in houses that have been erected 50, 60, or 75 years ago. There is nothing to enforce there. (21)

The interconnectedness of issues relating to employment, transportation, and generational justice show much of a person's life chances start at home—good homes are necessary to create healthy people. “As a mother of the lower East Side,” Harris concluded, “I appeal to you that something should be done for the forgotten family on the lower East Side of New York City. Thank you” (22).

Next spoke Rosa Beleter, testifying to the disparate treatment of the poorest in New York versus those included in recent modern housing initiatives (funded by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation). In colloquy with Wagner, she portrays being displaced from the area with the new developments onto the other side of the street that had much older housing stock:

Mrs. Beleter: We got pushed out from one side of the street to the other. I live in a place that is 75 years old. The toilets were in the yard, but now they brought them in the house. It is an old chicken house.

Senator Wagner: Does any sunlight get into your bedroom?

Mrs. Beleter: No sunlight at all, unless we light the electric light. That is all the sunlight that we get. If there are windows, they face a wall on the other side of the window, and there is a big stable in front of the other windows. There is no sunlight whatever.

Senator Wagner: There is nothing could be done to that house which would bring sunlight into it; it is too low?

Mrs. Beleter: No; unless we have better houses. I wish you people would build better houses for the poor people on the lower East Side. (23)

Firsthand evidence of public works housing contributing the perpetuation of struggle by the least fortunate contributed to the imperative for reform and remediation.

The third of these initial witnesses was Sheba Ziprin, a homemaker and laborer. She was the least interrupted of the first day's witnesses, providing an account of the daily struggles slum living had cast upon her. It would be a disservice to summarize this emotionally arresting, variegated testimony, so it is provided here nearly in full:

The Chairman [Walsh]: Your views are similar to the views already expressed?

Mrs. Ziprin: I represent the younger group of mothers.

The Chairman: How many rooms in your tenement?

Mrs. Ziprin: Four rooms.

The Chairman: What rent do you pay?

Mrs. Ziprin. \$27.50, coal flat, a wooden stairway, vertical fire escapes, a fire trap. If I should go away—I am forced to go out and work, and when I leave the babies behind with my mother, who is an old woman, who some several years ago met with quite a severe accident, when she fell two stories into the yard—and if the children are left in her care, under her protection, can you imagine what it means if a fire should break out in the building, Mr. Speaker, with my babies there in danger?

If you remember, 2 years ago on the East Side there was a terrible outbreak of fires and 81 lives were sacrificed, lives of children, fathers, and mothers. I do believe, I will tell you truthfully, that I am glad that the fathers and mothers perished with the children, because if their children had died and they had been left alive what good would it have been for them to remain alive? I see arms that had once been filled, because I have lost a child of my own, and I know what it is to listen for the child's patter of feet, and when it is gone then I think life is quite useless.

Now, I want to come back to this subject. These people as a group have asked me to say that we wish to go on record as being in support of Wagner slum clearance bill, because this bill, as proposed by Senator Wagner, is considered by us as the very first step in the erection of this permanent low rental housing movement for working people with small earnings. The bill definitely recognizes housing as a social problem that has to be faced by our Federal Government.

This delegation that you see gathered here offers a direct challenge to the people who have continuously stated that the slum dwellers themselves are not interested in bettering the housing conditions. Each delegate coming up here, it has meant personal sacrifice to each one. It has meant two or three dollars in loss of wages to the fathers, and it has meant that the younger mothers have had to leave their babies and infants in the care of neighbors. Evidently the people are for it if they come up here and plead for it.

America, as you know, is looked upon by the entire world as the most progressive Nation, yet you know Europe has done wonders with their housing programs, but in our own housing program for the low-income groups we have been medieval in providing at least the safeguards for housing, for decency, and health. Fire has destroyed hundreds of lives. Disease has killed thousands of children and adults. You go into rooms where children fight pneumonia, as my baby fought it, and they die because of improper air, because of improper sunshine, and they are taken from us. There are invalids that the public institutions cannot take, they are incurables, and yet they have to lie there year after year on the beds, just lie there stiff on their backs without any change.

Now the real-estate groups have failed to keep faith with us in the many, many years that they have had the power to build and to improve the buildings and prove their good intentions by showing that they mean to give something to the people who are living in their homes, but they have failed us.

Therefore, we as citizens, think we cannot appeal to any one [sic] but to the Government, to whom we owe our allegiance, to whom we give our loyalty at all times. You must step in and take up the problem for our protection.

The greatest fear in our homes is the fear of children growing up. My younger boy is 10½ years old and already he is being estranged from the home. I realize the problem, that there is a barrier erected in the home because the home is not attractive to him. It may be clean, I have a beautiful piano, but he will not practice because his fingers freeze. When I ask him to practice he say, “Mother, I do not want to practice; my fingers are too cold.”

[...] You can have all the education in the world, because that is all we have been getting, is education, but that cannot bring the toilet into the house, that cannot give us anything that is not there.

My own personal experience is this: When I was a little girl I remember living at 194 Monroe Street. That building has since been condemned. There were 16 families living in that house and out of the 16 families we all had to go down to the one toilet in the yard. I will never forget that experience. It is quite vivid in my mind. We had to wait there in the slush and snow during the winter months. There was a line there, and as the result of it, I had an attack of acute appendicitis. I could not wait there, I had to run to school. And then the sink was in the hall and in the winter it was always frozen. We had to stand with a candlelight and coax a few drops of water to come through. This may be picturesque for others, but in reality it is not picturesque.

Now, we feel that a home should be safe enough and decent enough so no barrier should spring up between the children and ourselves, so they will not become strangers to us, because the home, after all, I believe is the only place that can mold the child into a decent, wholesome character, into a fine citizen, and if they have to go out into the street and leave the home because they are old enough to realize the existing indecencies, then first the streets claim them and then, you know, the jails claim them and that is the end of the road.

It is a very dark picture. We are all afraid of that picture at least our younger mothers. We want a chance to see that our children are our own; that they are safe for ourselves and not for the jails. I thank you. (23-25)

There is no indication of the reactions of lawmakers in the committee transcript, as Walsh transitioned to asking Volpe about the group, but it is clear from this testimony that a government that does tend to such suffering would be derelict in duty and complicity in maiming and death. The interconnectedness of slum conditions and socially costly outcomes should be the purview of government, and by the New Deal, much of the bulwark against state action had begun to give way.

Still in front of the SEL but two years later, on April 15, 37, Anna Schein gave her testimony. At the time, Walsh clearly did not want to hear more of the same, but as a courtesy allowed her to give her testimony. Schein stated:

We need not repeat the many arguments for a national low-rent housing bill. The slums throughout the cities and rural areas of the United States speak much more effectively than any words. Our [Lower East Side Housing Conference] views we have expressed before this committee in June 1935 when hearings upon the first Wagner housing bill were being held.

We do want to stress the urgency of immediate action. In New York City we just have gone through a terrible winter, a winter that was full of suffering and death for slum dwellers, a repetition of previous winters, although intensified by the continued aging and dilapidation of the old buildings in which almost 2 million human beings live. And year by year this terrible condition continues to grow worse and worse.” (SEL 1937, 180)

In articulating the problem this way, Schein provided a new discourse that shows for one, the issue cannot be contained without action, and two, the problem grows more serious with each passing year. Legislative inaction would imperil families that could otherwise be uplifted. By 1937, this committee is well aware of that point, having already passed the bill through the Senate as a whole a year earlier.

The inaction on the House side ended in 1937 with their full set of hearings. Mrs. Roscoe Conklin Bruce, a Black building manager from Harlem, testified in front of the HBC on August 6, 1937—the only poor witness that committee publicly engaged. “I am very glad, indeed, Mr. Chairman,” Bruce opens, “to have this opportunity of appearing before this committee as representative of the 12,000,000 American citizens who are in the lowest-income bracket of our group.” (HBC 1937, 288). Bruce went on to provide additional information on particular issues with Black poverty and housing inequality, which as Chapter 6 showed, is not a common discourse in the halls of Congress during the New Deal:

As you know, the Negro is in the lowest wage bracket. They have attempted to purchase homes. In fact, the present-day home ownership has been rather costly for the Negro and I

am inclined to think that home ownership is a concept predicated upon moderately high earning power of a stable nature, and the Negroes, restricted as they are, not only to certain communities in the municipality, but also to certain jobs in that municipality—and we find that true throughout the country, and to certain levels in those jobs—are unable to pay, in the majority of instances, what is known as the economic rent. I might say here also that on the same basis yellow fever in the steerage does not stay there, and that is not said as a threat, but merely as a warning. It is impossible to separate Negroes, segregate them in at certain section, and not have the whole community suffer by reason of the delinquency and lower standards which are there, particularly the lower standards of living. (288-289)

She then went on to describe the failures of private capital to provide adequate housing for those in the lowest economic brackets. The incentives were simply not there to reach that population by providing maintenance and better housing. Representative McGranery (D-PA) then went on to ask Bruce a series of questions on the incidence of sleep shifts situations, differences in white versus Black slums, the scale of the problem (local or national; Bruce contended it was the latter), crime statistics, whether most slum dwellers would work (she said yes), if \$4000 would be sufficient to develop low-rent housing in NY, and whether the policy should include people making less than \$700 a year, or if they should be left to charity (290-293). In responding to all of these questions, Bruce proffered detailed statistics from tenement, sociological, economic, and criminology studies across the country to support helping the poorest of the poor, which help Black America and other struggling populations. Moreover, she thought a cost limitation on construction of \$4000 might just reproduce the harmful conditions of slums in a newer form. In all, Bruce's testimony was comprehensive and developed, dispelling any defensible notion that the "blind spot" to the New Deal policymaking endeavor was due to lack of exposure—if the policies did not cover African Americans, it would be by choice, not ignorance.

The myriad contours of knowledge that witnesses sketched out for the committee likely led to as close to full information lawmaking as was possible for a discrete issue in this era. Witnesses provided descriptive representation by articulating their lived experience of being poor

in the slums, broader information on the national scale of housing insecurity, details about existing housing programs, and endorsements of policy instruments. These combined efforts articulated the problem, necessity to act, and path forward. Lawmakers and witnesses, combined with their less visible benefactors constituted powerful interest coalitions, some of which were more successful at steering the policy process than others.

Interests

While a very superficial categorization of the interest coalitions here reveals some normal cleavages in American politics—labor versus big business; local versus federal actors; universalists versus promoters of needs-based policies—the agglomeration of interests is notable here because of how parts of each achieved their goals in tandem with adjacent interests. The movement from expected coalitions to amalgamated ones shows no one group dominated the policy outcome, but instead the admixture of each group's priorities contributed to the final near-consensus bill.

The initial interest coalitions are quite clear, as evidenced by the sectoral occupation figure earlier in this section. The first formed interest was within New York City social reformist circles, which included Wagner, advocates from the NPHC, social workers, and social movement activism that gained access to Congress to provide poor witnesses to testify on their behalf. This first group focused most on the issues of slums and less on new housing development, which some argue remained a consistent throughline from policy formulation to implementation years later. This camp could be seen as progressive for focusing on the poorest, or moderate for not pursuing more universalistic policies. The second camp was composed of modernists like Bauer, Ellenbogen, other social reformers, architects, educators, and proponents of the middle class. They too could be seen as progressive for the social uplift they were most interested in achieving, or as being

bourgeoisie for devoting state resources to both those suffering immense misery and others facing inconvenience. Labor straddled each of these two camps, with labor members contributing the design of both the Wagner and Ellenbogen bills, but also supporting expanding coverage to the middle-class to ensure higher employment in the building trades and higher aggregate demand.

Another major interest was composed of real estate owners and developers, conservative construction firms, banking, insurance, and private economic consultants. These interests generally dominated the earlier housing debates of the New Deal (Thurston 2018, 63), and might have expected similar success here. While did not achieve their ideal goals of no policy action, they did succeed at limiting the bill to only the poorest (65)—a major blow to the interests of a labor force that could have been employed through governmental channels and the potential target population of lower-middle class families. It is frankly difficult to disentangle whether lobbying made this occur, or whether the openly shared ideology of Walsh and business groups toward moderate free enterprise and anti-socialism was sufficient to lead to this outcome.

The final clearly delineated interest was composed of subnational actors, including local politicians and bureaucrats from housing authorities. The most important goal for them was to receive federal money with as few strings attached as possible to allow them to clear the slums as they wish and proceed to plan neighborhoods according to local needs. By all accounts this group won the day and accomplished their policy design, if not the preferred spending allotment. The section on policy language will seek to discern whether the success of subnational actors at reaping benefits was a product of explicit language, or from the *lack* of language regulating their decisions.

Ultimately, the dexterity of each group to blend the boundaries between them is what is remarkable about role of interests in the USHA policy process. Each gained and lost on key objectives, contributing to a consensus policy that was politically tenable, but not nearly as

comprehensive as the most activist lawmakers or witnesses wanted. The final interest coalition included actors from every preceding group, including the poorest Americans, interested private developers, local governments in search of greater resources, Walsh's balancing between labor needs and fiscal conservatism, and Wagner's openness to finding the best possible policy—including by enduring criticism of his 1935 bill only to impartially incorporate those views into his subsequent revisions⁷⁵—that had a chance of actually becoming federal law. This serves as an odd example of the interests of the poorest being propounded by conservative business interests, in part because the latter proffered witnesses to *support* the legislation in part to *limit* the scope of the policy. Means testing provided a discernable victory to limit the bill from creeping up toward near universalism. This meant the biggest losers in the fight were folks like Bauer—whose advice on a comprehensive housing approach went by the wayside—Perkins—who wanted guarantees for union labor which did not manifest and further worried the bill would be interpreted to skew heavily toward slum clearance—and Dr. Wood—who worried about inequality by jurisdiction with the selected decentralization approach.

With the final favorable committee markups in from the SEL on July 23 and HBC on August 13, the bills reached the floors of each respective chamber. While the floor process did lead to substantive changes in the bill, the core parts of the law remained intact, likely a product

⁷⁵ Wagner's pragmatism may let down the most extreme advocates for structural reform, but from a legislative effectiveness perspective, there are few members in Congressional history more open to withstanding criticism and changing core parts of their preferred legislation than the Senator from New York. In one instance, proponents of the Ellenbogen approach demurred over parts of Wagner's bill (SEL 1935, 123-124):

American Federation of Hosiery Workers Director of Research, John W. Edelman: "The one thing which I would like to offer in the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman, is a study or an analysis of the two bills, the one which was drafted by Congressman Ellenbogen with the Labor Housing Conference [H.R. 7399], and the bill of Senator Wagner [S. 2392]. The last thing I ever thought I would do is to question Senator Wagner' legislative judgment.

Senator Wagner: "You go on and do it. I invite constructive criticism, as you know."

The Chairman [Walsh]: "The Senator introduced the bill because of the need he and his colleagues felt there was for it, and invites any constructive criticism and any suggestions which you care to submit."

Senator Wagner: "I am for the bill, but those who are associated with me and myself want to have emerged the best bill possible to reach the objective."

of the methodical way in which diverse interests were reconciled to create the 1937 version of the bill.


Committee of the Whole: The Floor Process

The floor process for the USHA was initially lengthy and stalled in the leadup to the Senate passing the 1936 Wagner-Ellebogen bill and House failing to act. For the third year of Congressional consideration in 1937, both chambers acted on the legislation, with the Senate holding one week of floor debate from July 31 to August 6 after a favorable committee report (S. Rept. 933 1937), then sending the passed version to the House, which was debated via special order through House Resolution 320 and passed on a single day, August 18. To examine the floor process, the section unfolds to cover three imperative components. First, a broad depiction of the poverty content of floor speeches is presented, followed secondly by a portrayal of the amendment process in both chambers. The third and final section assesses roll call vote patterns to better understand variation in support for the eventual policy.

Speeches

The content of poverty speeches related to housing identifies several underlying issues, including unemployment, state and local governmental economic struggles, poor health, consumerism, and urbanity. The line graph in Figure 9.5 shows the relationship of these poverty speech codes to the most prominent housing pieces of legislation before, during, and after the debate of the USHA. Unsurprisingly, housing issues gain attention through the NHA and USHA policy periods—peaking during the 1937 USHA debate—then generally taper off save the rise again in the 1939 USHA appropriations debates. Urbanity too reaches its peak during the USHA debates, which is evidence of lawmakers across regions depicting urban issues, at least during 1937 and 1939. Part of this is informed by rural lawmakers fearing the benefits would only go to

Figure 9.5 Poor Group Construction during the U.S. Housing Act Policy Process



cities—and NYC in particular (Fish 1979, 216). Health is a less common discourse in floor speeches on poverty in 1937 than in committee hearings on housing. Finally, the subnational label includes location mentions—such as specific cities or states in which poor people reside—but also includes governmental units on the state and local level. These units provide to be one of the main constituencies, clients, and beneficiaries of the bill.

The contours of both floor debates mirrored one another, as well as earlier committee sessions. They centered on target population construction, program costs, and the sweet spot of federal-locality engagement. To repeatedly justify the endeavor, Wagner continued to focus lawmaker attention on slum residents and the requirement that slums be eradicated in order for new housing to be developed. In one colloquy with Homer Bone (D-WA) on August 2, the two Senators worked through the logic of the bill:

Mr. Wagner: In other words, a project consists of two things, namely, to clear the slums, and to build units to house those who have lived in the slum dwellings.

Mr. Bone: In other words, as a condition to the grant or loan, the slum buildings in that section must be demolished?

Mr. Wagner: That is correct.

Mr. Bone. Of course, as I well realize, we could not attempt to demolish all the slums in a city in order to get rid of them.

Mr. WAGNER. No; this refers merely to the slums in the project that is involved.

Mr. BONE. In other words, in the particular area we are endeavoring to help, adequate provision would have to be made to eliminate the old slums there before the new buildings would go up.

Mr. WAGNER. Exactly; and it would be necessary to provide for the slum dwellers. (*CR 81 1937, 7989*)

The slum removal and replacement requirement would naturally limit the program's scope and make it appear surgical in implementation.

Similar to the process of selecting then defining the lowest income group, the floor debate too had to select then devise a criteria for what constitutes a slum. Later on the same day as the previous anecdote, Senator James Pope (D-ID) questioned Wagner about what communities would count for coverage under the bill:

Mr. POPE. There is one place in my own town [likely Boise] which is called a cardboard town. The small buildings are constructed out of cardboard, tin cans, or slabs which may be picked up, or anything else which will make some sort of habitation, and yet they are not really unsanitary. They are not dangerous to health and safety, but they are simply poor dwellings where people live.

Mr. WAGNER. This bill would not apply there, Mr. President, because we are not rehousing everybody who has a low income, but only persons of low income who live in unsanitary and unsafe and unhealthful conditions which are detrimental to morals, to health, and also to safety.

Mr. POPE. Then, in the Senator's judgment, the emphasis should be placed on safety, health, and morals in any situation?

Mr. WAGNER. Oh, absolutely! The definite objective is to safeguard people of that character. (*7989*)

This passage shows the attempt to not just help the poor, but the poor in a very specific context of slum living. Other poor experiencing housing issues would not be covered under the policy, at least as Wagner depicts it. In some ways, this was Bauer's nightmare scenario: replacing on a subset of poor housing in certain communities, not even all of it, and definitely not the general low quality housing stock that even middle-classers inherited.

The final disposition of the bill as being extremely skewed toward one type of poverty in only certain conditions is likely a product of Chairman Walsh's dedication to making sure the program only served the folks he deemed most in need. During the floor debate for the 1936 debate, Walsh spoke in favor of passage but with a clear warning:

I desire now, before the bill is passed, to say that I think it will be a great calamity if the administrators of this measure fail to rent these properties to the poorest of the poor, to the scrubwoman with her children who is earning only three or four hundred dollars a year. If we are going into the business of renting these homes to persons with incomes of \$1,000 or \$1,200 or \$1,500, as against the class to which I refer, we are going into a field that is unfair to the taxpayers, and points directly to public ownership of all properties; we are going into a form of socialism; we are going into a situation which means that ultimately all tenement properties will be owned, rented, and managed by the Government. (*CR 80 1936, 9559*)

As became clear during the floor debates and amendment process, the view toward limiting the bill to only the "poorest of the poor" satisfied conservative interests and created a prevailing coalition. But in so doing, the federal government's ability to broadly change the material suffering of Americans was also limited. Indeed, among others, Walsh led an effort to amend the bill to further limit its reach, taking the committee version and winnowing it down further in both the House and Senate.

Amendments

Moving from rhetoric to policy substance, the amendment process included further committee recommended amendments, technical fixes, and important changes in kind.

McDonnell's 453-470 index identifies 11 important proposed amendments, including one by President Roosevelt to the 1936 bill. Of these, Fish (1979) claims there were four central amendments, including the William King (D-UT) ban on demonstration projects (direct federally created projects), one of Walsh's amendments on slum clearance, Harry F. Byrd's (D-VA) effort to limit construction, and M. M. Logan's (D-KY) amendment putting the Housing Authority in Interior (216). Unlike the first two, the Byrd and Logan amendments received recorded roll-calls in the Senate, so their substance will be engaged here, but their legislative coalitions will be further assessed in the passage section. This section will also spotlight additional failed amendments that do not figure into the proceeding analyses, but show meaningful chamber and committee preference differences. Amendments ran the gamut of issues including non-substantive technical fixes, substantive alterations to program eligibility criteria, limitations in the breadth of programs in the policy, changes in administrative authority and control, changing the unit cost level, stipulating necessary conditions to unlock appropriations, and altering the financing of the program. Nearly all of the successful amendments were restrictive in nature.

Though not part of the housing floor amendment process proper, Roosevelt's insistence on scaling back the bill to come on board with endorsing the legislation did change the eventual scope of the legislation. Roosevelt's advisers within the administration successfully sought the following changes: a reduction of the appropriation from \$51 million to \$10 million; removal of any provisions relating to the RFC; put Housing authority employees under civil service regulations; shortening the initial appropriation of loans by a year; and entirely removing eligibility of "limited-profit housing agencies" from the bill—a major blow to the modernist camp (McDonnell 1957, 190-191). The amendments were incorporated into the reconciled vessel of S. 4424, which although it passed the Senate but failed to become law, did become the template for the following

Congress' successful S. 1685 vehicle. In all, to gain the administration's support, Wagner, Walsh, and Ellenbogen had to sacrifice core aspects of the legislation to ensure the remaining portions became law.

The Senate led the entire policy process, so it would be expected that their amendments would also set the agenda for Congress as a whole. Continuing the administration's bidding to decrease the scope and gain further direct control over the bill, several Senators, followed by HBC Chair Steagall in the House, offered amendments to alter who controls the program and how far the program could go. In every case, Secretary Ickes was gaining more and more influence over the policy. Marvel Logan (D-KY) agreed to sponsor the administration proposed amendment to move the program from an independent housing authority to a subsidiary agency within the Department of Interior. This policy was debated for two days in the Senate and passed by a narrow 40 to 37 margin. This amendment would have been more contentious to pass on the House floor, so when the bill reached the lower chamber Chair Steagall worked with the administration to embed it within the committee's correcting amendments, which had to be accepted as a package at the initiation of debate (302-305). Steagall then continued the administration's efforts to limit spending by forcing localities to pay 20% of the totally project cost (Hunt 2009, 31; McDonnell 1957, 353). Senator King proposed a ban on demonstration projects, like the PWA had been doing, which would give the federal government more power to circumvent state authorities and to create more ambitious programs. While Ickes administered the original demonstration program, he had come to oppose it to maintain a more limited, decentralized housing portfolio. The amendment prevailed without debate—and without Wagner objecting. Consistent with Wagner's affable approach to amendments, it was not clear to witnesses how this hurt his cause. But this was a defeat for Wagner and public housers, who although divided, supported the provision to maintain

a united front (301-2). The final key victory for the administration was proposed by Majority Leader Barkley, which gave the president the ability to approve or disapprove of any project made by the authority, which passed without objection (338). All of these changes show the administration was resistant to the program, and only acquiesced if it meant the program would be considerably curtailed from its most ambitious forms.

Due to absences at key moments of committee markups and floor debates, Walsh pursued two key additional changes that he believed were essential for the bill to reach the poorest of the poor: linking new construction to equivalent slum clearance and lowering the income cap on the income to rent ratio for program eligibility. “The background of the Walsh amendments was also a part of his personal political philosophy and his personal experience with public housing”, McDonnell explains, since “Senator Walsh saw that the public housing constructed in Boston with PWA funds was not for the benefit of the poor working people living in the slums. After the construction of the new modern housing these workers continued to live in the slums, and middle-class people moved into the new PWA housing projects. The people in the middle class were the only class of people who could afford to pay the rents that were charged in the projects because of their high construction costs and small subsidy. Walsh was personally convinced that this PWA program was a misuse of government funds” (333). Throughout the committee process, Walsh articulated his interest in creating such assurances, at one point exclaiming “I do want some safeguard so we will not get into the situation where we will be dealing with influential low-income groups who have votes, and the poor widow, wash women, orphans and others who have to live in these shuns are forgotten” (SEL 1937, 79).

To accomplish the first goal of slum clearance, Walsh offered the equivalent construction rule on August 3. The effort was to amend Section 10 by adding the following language:

Provided, That no annual contributions shall be made, and the Authority shall enter into no contract guaranteeing any annual contribution in connection with the development of any low-rent housing project involving the construction of new dwellings, unless the project Includes the elimination by demolition, condemnation, and effective closing, or the compulsory repair or improvement of unsafe and insanitary dwellings situated in the locality or metropolitan area, substantially equal in number to the number of newly constructed dwellings provided by the project.” (*CR 81 1937*, 8097)

Any locality that wished to simply build new housing and ignore the current slums would be prohibited from receiving money under the act. Moreover, localities interested in doing both would be limited by how many slums were eradicated, creating a naturally limited reach for the bill. After short questioning from Wagner, the amendment passed without objection (8098).

Somewhat countering this, in the House’s lone day of debate, Brent Spence (D-KY) offered one of the only expansive amendments of the entire floor process. The amendment delinked slum clearance to some extent by qualifying equivalent elimination requirement—potentially expanding coverage to more housing insecure people. The amendment specified distressed localities would be able to build new housing if only replacing existing units would maintain or exacerbate dangerous and unsanitary overcrowding. Everyone speaking at this juncture—George Dondero (R-MI), Wolcott, Steagall, and Ellenbogen—supported its addition, which passed without division (*CR 81 1937*, 9280). An oddly unanimous moment in what would have been a more contentious debate in the Senate.

Walsh’s other effort to lower the income to rent ratio from five to one to three or four to one failed in the Senate, again based on seeing PWA housing not help the poor, necessitating an income limitation amendment. His floor speech showcases forward-looking thought process:

I am going to make it three or four. I want the people who get this subsidy to be not the low income group but the lowest of the low income group; and we have got to make the provision very low to bring that about. Take a tenement the rent of which is \$25 a month, this bill would permit a man who gets \$124 a month, if he had the political pull or influence with the authorities, to get into one of these houses and enjoy a subsidy as against the poor washerwoman with only \$50 or \$60 a month income. I know the Senator from New York

[Wagner] and I are absolutely in accord as to the fundamental principle, but there is a difference as to how far we ought to go. The Senator from New York is disposed to be a little more liberal to the authority than I am. That is the only difference between us. Let me say that I am convinced that unless we tighten it so that only the lowest-income group—not the low-income group but the lowest-income group—can get these tenements and these subsidies, we will have a housing scandal on our hands in the future. (*CR 81 1937, 7986*)

Opponents of Walsh thought he only cared about bottom 5% of poor (Hunt 2009, 29). However, while Wagner initially brought up the amendment, but then proceeded to not call the question for its enactment (McDonnell 1957, 323). Wagner's sympathies were closer to Bauer and Ellenbogen's, favoring a higher cap to cover more of the poor, including the upper poor and potentially even the lower middle class. Wagner would acquiesce to a lower ratio if it helped the bill pass—consistent with his pedigree as master floor manager—but his heart was not with pursuing the full realm of Walsh's amendments and the bill was reported out of the Senate without the adjustment Walsh desired.

Here, the House committee of jurisdiction stepped in to mark up the Senate bill to lower the amount to four to one, thus achieving Walsh's goal. A non-committee, junior member, without much floor time, Ellenbogen used his one shot at an amendment to try to raise the ratio back to the Senate committee bill from four to one to five to one for a family of four and under; six to one for a family above four persons (*CR 81 1937, 9269*). However, both Chair Steagall and Ranking Member Wolcott opposed the measure, and the question was put to the House. The Congressional Record only says "The amendment was rejected" but does not specify how—likely voice vote—and it is unclear why Ellenbogen would not ask for tellers, division, or a recorded vote (9270). Perhaps Ellenbogen was cognizant and respectful of the time constraints in debate, or alternative, might have thought there would be another chance to raise the ratio in conference—which ultimately did occur.

The House debated further restrictions to eligibility criteria, this time not based on income, but citizenship status. While anti-immigrant debates occurred in the Senate (McDonnell 1957, 324-325), they had failed to lead to policy change. However, once the venue switched the House, Francis Case (R-SD) made a show of immigrants getting more benefits than citizens, and thus, the policy language had to be changed to only benefit hardworking and deserving American citizens. His amendment was simple: add “citizens of the United States” to the eligibility criteria, which passed by voice vote (*CR 81* 1937, 9266). Unhappy with such an affront, recent immigrant Ellenbogen opposed the measure and demanded division, but the amendment still passed 76 to 64 (most members not voting). Representative James Lanzetta (D-NY) then asked for tellers, but in a rare move, tellers “were refused” (9267). While the effort to restrict the legislation prevailed in the lower, chamber, the final version did not have the clause where Case wanted it, creating grey area that will be examined in the policy language analysis section.

Another change Steagall and more conservative members sought was to ensure local buy-in, including by finding additional financing, by amending the Senate provision that allowed for capital grants (really low-interest loans stretched out over 60 years) up to 100% of construction costs from the federal government to the locality. Steagall made this change by reporting out the House committee version in lieu of the Senate version. To make sure cash and asset poor localities were not de facto barred from joining the program, Representative Voorhis (D-CA) pushed back by offering an amendment to the new House bill that restored the Senate provision (9278), but this effort was defeated (9279). Trying his hand at creating greater access to housing, Representative Peter J. De Muth (D-PA) offered an amendment to allow the Authority to grant loans to individuals, but after a point of order by Rep. Clyde Williams (D-MO), the Speaker ruled that the amendment was not germane to the debate because it changed the nature of the bill, and thus could

not receive a floor action (9279). In both cases, despite the effort of their advocates, poorer localities and poor individuals were left with fewer options to secure housing within the narrow confines of the bill.

The key incisive moment to further rein in the remaining costs of the program occurred in the Senate when Senator Byrd offered his amendment on August 4. Byrd sought a \$4,000 cost per unit, which McDonnell (1957) argues the “presents an interesting study of the genesis of a limiting amendment to a bill” (326). Background and ideology explain the effort, for Byrd had seen costs on Rex Tugwell’s experimental RA housing in Virginia reach what the Government Accountability Office estimated to be \$7,909.35 per unit cost. This was much higher than Byrd thought prudent for governmental housing—if there was to be any at all (327). After vociferous debate between the Byrd-Walsh proponents and Wagner’s opposition for several hours, the amendment passed 40 to 39, with 16 not voting (*CR 81* 1937, 8196). Realizing this could mean the program could not function in major metropolitan areas, opponents of the amendment, led by Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) sought to reconsider the vote, leading to additional debate. Realizing his victory might be short-lived if opponents persuaded non-voters to join the cause, Byrd offered a motion to lay on the table McCarran’s motion to reconsider, which was successful by an even wider margin of 44 to 39 (12 not voting) (8368). Yet, in an odd turn, the House amended committee bill did not have the provision, claiming “[t]his provision appears to be too rigid because of the varying conditions existing in different parts of the country, and may be unworkable in many large cities under present conditions” (H. Rept. 1545 1937, 6). Representative Hancock offered an amendment to set the cost limitation at \$4000 for a unit, or \$1000 per room, whichever was lower (9267). In a further oddity, the partisan dynamics flipped in the House, with Hamilton Fish (R-NY) rising to oppose the amendment, noting it meant development could not occur in New York

city (9269), which was further echoed by Rep. McGranery. The House version of the amendment was rejected 59 to 77 (9269).

The final set of floor amendments were considered to be technical fixes. In the Senate, these were recommended by the committee and led on the Senate floor by Wagner and in the House by Steagall. These were mostly clerical changes relating to dates. However, in the House, McDonnell (1957) considers Wolcott's amendments "perfecting" in nature (383), but it is important to note their potential for consequence. Cumulatively they linked all mentions of low-cost housing with slum clearance, seemingly to make sure they are never severed, lest low-cost housing occur without clearing the slums. The measures were agreed to without objection (*CR 81 1937*, 9281), reasserting through more implicit means Walsh's essential goals.

In the end, the floor amendment process greatly curtailed the program in myriad ways. Non-profit, low-profit, cooperatives, and federal demonstration projects were all killed through amendments. Moreover, localities actively planning new housing developments were not excited about the slum clearance requirement in the legislation, but they did appreciate the new authority (Radford 1996, 189). Indeed, the slum clearance provision eventually becomes a favorite provision for localities more interested in gentrification and luxury development than providing for the poor. Additional changes to revert language, harmonize the bills, and set uniform definitions occurred in a single day of conference committee, which reported its ecumenical reconciliation to both chambers with a favorable endorsement on August 20, 1937 (H. Rept. 1634, 1937).

Passage

The final legislative language passed the House and Senate on August 21, but did so without roll calls, instead utilizing unanimous consent. This would be peculiar in the contemporary era, where approving a conference report is another crack to defeat legislation—hence, the

reduction of conference committees altogether. To fully assess the enacting coalitions for key amendments and passage, this section examines key recorded roll calls throughout the process. These roll calls are the Byrd and Logan Amendments and Final Passage in the Senate, and the Motion to Recommit and Final Passage in the House. These votes are summarized in Table 9.3, which disaggregates the count into party caucus and regional crosstabs, uncovering greater granularity in inter- and intraparty divisions. The section then examines how poverty speech propensity may inform vote position by proffers further analyses through Linear Probability and Logit models.

Starting with the Senate, the Byrd Amendment passed 40 to 39 using the recipe that came to typify the Conservative Coalition in subsequent years: division among the Democrats that is exploited for conservative victories by nearly uniform Republican support. However, it was not solely Dixiecrats that joined the GOP cause, as both Southern and Northern factions of the Democrats split nearly evenly (43.5% and 40.5% in favor, respectively), although neither region provided outright majorities to curtail the bill their own party cartel put forth. This vote to restrain the costs of the program remains an early example of how internal divisions between liberals and conservatives within the Democratic Party foreshadowed a broader disintegration of the New Deal coalition and realignment in American politics.

In contrast, the Logan Amendment saw both parties more evenly split, with 47.5% of Democrats and 68.8% of Republicans in favor. In both votes, Northern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans lag their partisan compatriots. And again, the divided governing Democrats made Republicans the pivotal decision-makers. However, the divisions here are seemingly less ideological than a spending measure (Byrd Amendment), since the choice to house an agency within a standing department or create an independent entity is an instrument to a goal. Liberals

Table 9.3 Inter- and Intraparty Variation in Key Senate and House Roll Calls

Senate									
	Byrd Amendment Limiting Building Costs			Logan Amendment Giving Department of Interior Policy Control			Passage of the Bill		
	Yeas	Nays	% of MCs Yea	Yeas	Nays	% of MCs Yea	Yeas	Nays	% of MCs Yea
Full Roll Call	40	39	50.6%	40	37	51.9%	64	16	80%
Democratic Caucus	27	38	41.5%	29	32	47.5%	57	8	87.7%
Southern Democrats	10	13	43.5%	12	12	50%	19	8	70.4%
Non-Southern Democrats	17	25	40.5%	17	20	45.9%	38	0	100%
Republican Caucus	13	1	92.9%	11	5	68.8%	7	8	46.7%
Midwestern Republicans	4	1	80%	3	2	60%	5	0	100%
Non-Midwestern Republicans	9	0	100%	8	3	72.7%	2	8	20%
House of Representatives									
	Recommit the Bill to Committee with Instructions			Passage of the Bill					
	Yeas	Nays	% of MCs Yea	Yeas	Nays	% of MCs Yea			
Full Roll Call	140	221	38.8%	275	86	76.2%			
Democratic Caucus	59	220	21.1%	244	38	86.5%			
Southern Democrats	16	86	15.7%	68	33	67.3%			
Non-Southern Democrats	43	134	24.3%	176	5	97.2%			
Republican Caucus	81	1	98.8%	31	48	39.2%			
Midwestern Republicans	39	0	100%	19	17	52.8%			
Non-Midwestern Republicans	42	1	97.7%	12	31	27.9%			

could internally disagree, as could conservatives. Ultimately, the splits here show Senators favored Wagner's subsidiary approach to Ellenbogen's independent housing authority.

The final roll call to assess in the Senate is passage of S. 1685, which passed with 80% support (64 to 16). On balance, Democrats were much more in favor, while a majority of Republicans opposed the bill. However, the intraparty splits show greater variety: Every Northern Democrats supported the bill, while 70.4% of Southern Democrats voted for the measure. The

GOP splits are even starker, with every Midwestern Republican supporting the bill, but non-Midwestern Republicans opposed passage, eight votes against to two votes in favor. This shows the vote was not clearly ideological as much as partisan, as the heterogeneous Democrats overwhelmingly supported the measure. One can chalk this up to housing being a central plank in the 1936 Democratic platform and the consensus form of lowest common denominator negotiations on the Senate floor—both products of Wagner’s prowess as a leader in the party organization and party in government. In short, regional considerations matter less than party for the two amendments, but actually explain more than party alone when it comes to passage.

The House side only had two recorded roll calls for the entire floor process: a failed motion to recommit the bill to committee and successful passage of the House modified version of S. 1685. As is the case with most motions to recommit, most of the separation is a product of the inter-partisan schism, where the minority party will try to defeat a bill by sending it back to the committee of jurisdiction with instructions on necessary changes to pass. Typically, the changes are just the auspices to say something is wrong with the bill, instead of outright articulating general opposition to an entirety of a measure. Usually a motion to recommit would simply be the inverse of the motion to pass the bill, but in the case of the USHA, 54 members (30 Republicans; 24 Democrats) voted to recommit then switched to voting for passage. This unique incidence allows researchers to interpret the votes severally, instead of reducing them down to a single decision for parsimony’s sake. Such an analysis occurs here, where the GOP voted 81 to 1 (98.8%) to recommit, joined by 59 (or 21.1% of) Democrats. Disaggregating the Democratic count, we see an odd occurrence in which non-Southern Democrats ran ahead of their Southern counterparts in supporting the motion to recommit, 24.3% to 15.7%, respectively. A potential explanation for this is provided shortly in the modeling section.

Passage looked remarkably similar in the House as in the Senate. 86.5% of House Democrats supported the bill, while a minority of 39.2% Republicans did so; both figures are comparable to their Senate counterparts at 87.7% and 46.7%, respectively. Also consistent with the Senate, Midwestern Republicans were more supportive of the measure than their non-Midwestern brethren, while non-Southern Democrats supported the measure 176 to 5 (97.2%), running ahead of the Southern Democrats' figure of 67.3%. Oddly, many Southern Democrats opposed recommitting the bill, but also opposed the bill itself—a sign that either these members would support procedural hurdles to help the party but stop short of violating their preferences, or that they simply wanted to end consideration of the measure without having to support it. Party and geography—a proxy for political culture—continue to matter, regardless of chamber.

To better understand the factors involved in vote choice, this section assess the role—if any—of poverty rhetoric (operationalized as poverty speech count and average propensity) on the binary outcome variable of vote decision. The point of these models is to tease out the connection between a symbolic form of representation (language) and a more tangibly substantive form (policy preference), thus evaluating the link between performance and policy in the representation of the poor. These analyses primarily rely on Linear Probability Models (LPMs), which are simple to interpret: the intercept coefficient is the baseline predicted probability for voting yes while holding poverty speeches constant, then a one unit increase in the labeled independent variable leads to the reported coefficient change in probability from the intercept value. Finally, p-values from more conventional logit modeling are provided as a robustness check.

Again starting with the Senate, Table 9.4 summarizes the LPM outputs, which only show statistically significant findings for the Byrd Amendment construction cost limitation. In Model 1, the probability of supporting the amendment controlling for poverty speeches is 57% ($p < 0.001$).

Table 9.4 Linear Probability Models Regressing Roll Calls on Poverty Speeches in the Senate

Variable	Model 1: Byrd Amdt	Model 2: Byrd Amdt	Model 3: Logan Amdt	Model 4: Logan Amdt	Model 5: Passage	Model 6: Passage
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.570*** (0.067)	0.586*** (0.068)	0.569*** (0.068)	0.568*** (0.070)	0.824*** (0.054)	0.808*** (0.056)
MC's Poverty Speech Count, 75 th Congress (Min=0; Max=18)	-0.029 [†] (0.017)		-0.025 (0.018)		-0.012 (0.015)	
MC's Average Speech Count per Congress, 73 rd to 75 th Congress (Min=0; Max=10.67)		-0.047* (0.023)		-0.031 (0.026)		-0.005 (0.020)
Adjusted R ²	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
N	79	79	77	77	80	80

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.10

Notes: The exact p-values for poverty speech count in Model 1 is 0.098 and speech average in Model 2 is 0.045. The p-values for these model specifications run as a logit are 0.113 and 0.061, respectively.

The first IV of poverty speech count only in the 75th Congress is intended to gauge poverty interest only in this shows a decrease of 2.9% (p=0.098) for every poverty speech a MC gave. From min of zero to max of 18, that is a decrease of 52.2%, giving a probability of 4.8% for the highest poverty articulator. In this case, that is Senator Wagner himself, who deeply opposed the measure as it would essentially prohibit construction in NYC. An alternative specification is provided in Model 2, which uses average speech count for each Congress from the 73rd to 75th. This would indicate *general* interest in poverty beyond just *momentary* interest in the Congress in which the bill passed. With each one-unit increase in poverty speech average, chance of supporting the Byrd Amendment lowers from 58.6% by -0.047 (p=0.045). The maximum average of 10.67 again belongs to Wagner in this early New Deal period, and his probability of supporting the amendment decreases to around 8%. In both models, speaking in greater number about the poor decreases the probability of supporting the Byrd Amendment, although only average speech count maintains

conventional levels of significance in the logit robustness check models. This makes interpretive sense since the cost limitation would reduce housing quality, or worse, make construction in high population metropolises cost prohibitive, thus denying the poor any housing.

For reasons previously covered, there is no such equivalent expectation for the Logan Amendment, since it is a pure administrative question; there is insufficient evidence to suggest advocates for the poor would want independent agencies over departmental control. Both approaches can be retrenched or cut off from funding, while the double-edged sword of politically manipulation in departments or lack of responsiveness in independent agencies could both harm or help the poor. Thus, the non-significant relationship between alternative specifications of poverty speeches and vote decision on the Logan Amendment comports with the dynamics of the legislative debate and substance of the amendment.

Finally, poverty articulation has no bearing on voting yes to pass the Senate version of the bill, which in both Models 3 and 4 already has a very high baseline intercept above 80%. This is peculiar and may demonstrate the possible detachment of symbolic representation from substantive representation. However, if the bill ended up being a centrist approach to the policy, it could have attracted individuals who did not specialize in poverty rhetoric, while alienating other proponents who would want to go further. However, looking at the leading articulators on the no side (Josiah Bailey (D-NC), Tom Connally (D-TX) and Millard Tydings (D-MD)), they cannot be depicted as individuals unsettled with the policy not going far enough. Instead, these are conservative politicians that often appeal to the poor in a discursive manner that seeks to unshackle the poor from governmental interference. The leading advocates for the poor did vote for the bill, but enough poverty panderers opposed it for the models to show no effect. Qualitative content

analysis of these members shows a non-effect in a model is actually a divide between in earnest poverty articulators and opportunistic governmental skeptics.

The House side had fewer roll calls, none of which cover substantive amendments. Table 9.5 presents LPMs for the Republican-led Motion to Recommit and Democrat-led question on passage. Interestingly, only the Motion to Recommit holds a statistically significant relationship with either IV specification of poverty speech. Each increase in poverty speech count for the 75th Congress in Model 1 raises the probability of supporting the motion by 7.4% ($p < 0.001$) from the baseline of 33.4% ($p < 0.001$). This means the highest articulator in the House to vote, Voorhis, would be expected to have a perfect 100% probability with his 9 poverty speeches. After failures to make the policy more progressive, he did indeed support recommitting the bill. Using the average poverty speech propensity, each one-unit increase in average leads to a 7.7% ($p < 0.001$) increase beyond the 32.9% ($p < 0.001$) intercept. Voorhis again leads the pack with an average of 9 (since he was in his first Congress), now giving him a 102.2% chance of supporting recommitting the bill, showcasing the occasional problem of LPMs predicting impossible values.⁷⁶

Disaggregating the divergence in the motion to recommit and passage of the bill provides an interesting story. The first is that non-committee members finally had an opportunity to change the substance of the legislation, but the floor is notoriously tough for insurgents to gain agenda actionable space (as the De Muth attempted amendment shows). The coalition to recommit the bill was a cartel of progressive Democrats, poverty-interested Republicans, and partisan Republicans. The aforementioned 24 Democrats that voted to recommit *and* pass the bill include high poverty articulating liberals such as original bill sponsor Ellenbogen, ardent antipoverty agenda-setter

⁷⁶ The highest House articulators by single Congress and average were did not vote on the motion to Recommit. These would be Charles Binderup (D-NE) with his 15 poverty speeches and John M. Robsion (R-KY) with an average of 13.5 poverty speeches.

Table 9.5 Linear Probability Models Regressing Roll Calls on Poverty Speeches in the House

Variable	Model 1: Motion to Recommit	Model 2: Motion to Recommit	Model 3: Passage of Bill	Model 4: Passage of Bill
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.334*** (0.029)	0.329*** (0.030)	0.778*** (0.026)	0.759*** (0.018)
MC's Poverty Speech Count, 75 th Congress (Min=0; Max=9)	0.074*** (0.019)		-0.022 (0.017)	
MC's Average Speech Count per Congress, 73rd to 75th Congress (Min=0; Max=9)		0.077*** (0.021)		0.004 (0.018)
Adjusted R ²	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00
N	361	361	361	361

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.10

Notes: The exact p-values for poverty speech count in Model 1 and speech average in Model 2 are both <0.001. The p-values for these model specifications run as a logit are also both <0.001.

Matthew A. Dunn (D-PA), independent progressive Maury Maverick (D-TX), and liberal upstart Voorhis. In the cases of Ellenbogen and Voorhis, the members offered amendments to increase the income-to-rent threshold and local loan-taking power, respectively, only to have both measures defeated on the floor. Perhaps, they thought, recommitting would provide more time to move the bill closer to the more progressive Senate version. The highest articulating Republicans, like Usher Burdick (R/NPL-ND) and Fish, supported the party line on recommitting, but then switched to support passage. It is important to note that many of the Republicans who held on across election cycles in the New Deal era also espoused awareness of impoverished Americans, giving them a greater share of the minority party as shown in Chapter 3. For them, the vote to recommit was both a partisan affair and one to potentially improve the bill using their lone procedural power on the House floor. In this way, the poverty-interested lawmakers were sorted into the no vote camp on recommitting, but by shifting into the yes camp for passage, they joined low articulating

Democrats, leading to a non-statistically significant difference between yeas and nays in passage. Overall, this disjuncture may be evidence of the bill being on balance a conservative approach, which is consistent with Patterson's (1967), contention that watering down the USHA was first victory of the ascendent conservative coalition (155), hobbling the program for years to come by lowering the expected appropriation from \$1 billion to half that amount (Daniels 2015, 336). Ultimately, the voting for the bill was a simple calculation that it did more good than harm in pursuit of providing help for the poor in America.

President Roosevelt received the final version of the bill—called the Wagner-Steagall Act even though the latter was largely unsympathetic to the original bill (Fish 1979, 217)—on August 23, adding his signature to what became Public Law 75-412 on September 1. With that, the three-year debate on public housing for the poor came to an end. The final piece of legislation was no one's preferred product and had components from all stakeholders, which paired with non-Congressionally guided bureaucratic implementation, makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for policy outcomes. Such is often the case in Congressional outputs, making predicting how the bill will impact the public even harder. One place to start is the final policy language, using tools of statutory interpretation to assess successes and deficiencies in the law's stated purposes of providing sanitary housing conditions that instill morals in the poor.

Policy Language Analysis

The comprehensive housing policy known as Public Law No. 75-412 of the 75th Congress, 1st session, Chapter 896, is also indexed as 50 Stat. 888 in the *U.S. Statutes at Large*, and contains 30 sections and reaches a length of 12 pages. To focus on the relation between housing policy language and the representation of the poor, this section centers on two key questions related to how the policy came to divide the poor (favoring families over individuals) and the efficacy of

antipoverty policy (at rehousing the proscribed target group of slum residents). First, is the statute created in a way that explicitly or implicitly favors slum eradication without the same guidance for rehousing ex-slum residents and constructing new gainful housing? Second, is the target group clearly laid out as being family based to the detriment poor individuals, or did the favoritism to the former emanate from norms (seen both in debate and implementation, but not statutory language) at the time? Additional dynamics that may bear on the lives of housing insecure individuals are addressed as they come up in the statute.

First, the bill's title articulates the intentions of the bill's architects:

AN ACT To provide financial assistance to the States and political subdivisions thereof for the elimination of unsafe and insanitary housing conditions, for the eradication of slums, for the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, and for the reduction of unemployment and the stimulation of business activity, to create a United States Housing Authority, and for other purposes. (U.S. Congress 1935a, 888)

Thus, the objectives for the bill are clear: provide resources (i.e., money) to governmental units through a federalism model to end unsanitary housing conditions, including slums, and to then create new high-quality housing for *low-income families*, while severally (with the insertion of an additional "and") also stimulating employment, business development, and last, to create the Housing Authority to govern the policy (and the customary "for other purposes"). Already in the title alone, there is direct evidence of favoritism to the family unit with at least one employed individual (establishing income) over individual impoverished folks and people without income, indicating the answer to question one can be found in a good faith and literal reading of the statute. The policy simply appears designed for the model productive domicile, and not anyone who finds themselves living alone. In contrast, slum clearance and new housing creation appear materially linked, although the former receives two discrete clauses, while the latter receives one. suggesting

we need to read further to see if the favor toward slum clearance was a product of other provisions or simply the choices of how to implement the policy.

Getting into the bill's mechanisms, Section 1 then declares the new policy of the U.S., reiterating the above bill title, but adding the nature of an "acute shortage" of housing and adding geographic inclusion of both "rural or urban communities". This section then reinserts original title language in the 1935 Wagner bill about public health and morals (to replace housing "injurious to the health, safety, and morals of the *citizens* of the nation" (888). Importantly, this section contains the only mention of citizens in entire bill, still suggesting the policy is only for full citizens, but giving no additional stipulation of eligibility based on that criterion elsewhere as Representative Case successfully put in on the House floor, but that was altered in conference.

Section 2 then addresses the pivotal matter of defining terminology. In this case, the bill's authors lay out 13 definitions: "low-rent housing", "families of low income", "slum", "slum clearance", "development", "administration", "Federal project", "acquisition cost", "non-dwelling facilities", "going Federal rate of interest", "public housing agency", "State", and "Authority". In order, "low-rent housing" stipulates sanitary living conditions within the reach of poor families, further including the rent-income ratio, finally fixed at five to one for families of four or less and six to one for families of five or more. Importantly, these costs include utilities ("heat, light, water, and cooking fuel"), which in practice would raise the rent/income cap to cover more of the poor. Individuals are again omitted, this time in the very construction of the domicile itself. "Families of low income" come from the "lowest" income group and cannot be tended to with quality housing by private forces alone. "Slum" is broadly defined as "any area where dwellings predominate which, by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, are detrimental to

safety, health, or morals”. This fairly inclusive definition would allow the replacement of myriad low quality housing stock. Finally on the key nexus of families, income, and slums, “slum clearance” is specifically defined “demolition and removal” of the defined slums, which by omission would exclude repair and renovation, increasing the scale of policy reach in the construction trades since drastic overhaul is required by law.

Section 2(5) defines “development” to include everything necessary for construction from financing to building the new units, but nothing beyond the point of “physical completion”. However, the very next sentence of “Construction activity in connection with a low-rent-housing project may be confined to the reconstruction, remodeling, or repair of existing buildings” undercuts the prohibition in the previous sentence. To reconcile the two, it seems the law now provides for “reconstruction, remodeling or repair” but only as standalone projects—you cannot develop a new property, then subsequently repair it. This is confusing phraseology that is at once expanding the policy beyond new construction, but creating an odd disconnection between initial construction and rehabilitation. Development contrast with “administration” in Sec. 2(6), which covers the operation and financing of projects *following* their physical completion. A “Federal project” is one that is owned by the Authority (later defined), while “acquisition cost” is the amount a “public housing agency” (later defined) “prudently” spends on a project. The policy covers non-building developments through its definition of “non-dwelling facilities”, which covers “streets, sidewalks, and sanitary, utility, and other facilities”. This is a positive sign that the bill covers a broader swath of necessary community development initiatives than just the four-walled building.

The final set of definitions are quite straightforward. “[G]oing Federal rate of interest” is the most recent interest rate on a bond of at least 10 years. This is important for the financing side of the bill, but is hard to understand how many alternative definitions there could be for a federal

interest rate. The key term of “public housing authority” includes any subnational governmental entity “or public body” other than the Authority itself, meaning governments can implement the policy through normal channels (state legislature; city hall) or through special entities and districts. Finally, “State” includes the 50 states, D.C., and all “Territories, dependencies, and possessions”, meaning unless otherwise stipulated, the policy covers developments throughout the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, but potentially the only occupants would be U.S. citizens. The last definition is for “Authority”, which is the U.S. Housing Authority subsequently created in Section 3 of the bill. Together, the definitions are fairly clear, designating the target population, manner of construction and administration, and universal nature to the location of projections.

Sections 3 through 8 lay out the high level organization of the new U.S. Housing Authority (HA). Starting with Section 3, it is housed within the DOI, the administrator is in total control following appointment by the president and confirmation in the Senate, serving a five year term at \$10,000 salary and only to be removed for cause. Every employee of the new agency must only work for the HA and not have conflicts of interest on the projects in which they work. Employees are covered in Section 4, which stipulates civil service protections and guidelines for most employees. However, the administrator may appointment non-civil service covered advisors as they see fit. Still in Section 4 but not of the same topic, the president is granted power to give any federal land to the new agency as long as it is for housing or slum-clearance projects (890). This may still be a dormant power within the statute that could provide for a mass housing program on federal lands, which is never discussed in mainstream housing debates from the 1930s to present day. Section 5 lays out location, title, seal, franking privileges, and legal considerations for the new public corporation. Additionally, all grants and loans through the HA are exempt from taxation in posterity. Section 6 holds provisions on the spending authority of the HA, favoring

American made products or contractors in the U.S., and requiring the president to approve all spending decisions of the Authority. Finally, Section 7 grants the Authority the ability to disseminate housing material to the public and requires the Authority to report to Congress on an annual basis, while Section 8 gives the Authority the ability to create and alter rules and regulations insofar as they are necessary to effectuate the law. This last section is the one that was amended in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 that created a robust public housing voucher program.

Section 9 begins a riff on how to finance public housing and slum removal projects. The methods take two principal forms: capital grants (loans) in Section 11 and annual contributions in Section 10, both of which require local contributions of 10% of the total costs. Loans are to be repaid at the federal interest rate plus 0.5% over the course of not later than 60 years, with some discretion left to the Administrator. Stipulations for annual contributions are laid out in Section 10, which now says there must be an initial 20% match by localities to unlock any funds, which is exactly what Steagall added to the House committee reported out bill. The 10% minimum in Section 9 and 20% minimum in Section 10 are not harmonized, likely requiring amendment in future Congresses.

Additionally, Section 10(a) has the Walsh language conditioning aid on each project for new construction having an associated slum reduction component, although the Spence inspired language now reads slum clearance must be “substantially equal in number” to new development, followed by Spence’s amendment allowing for deferring slum clearance projects if tethering the two works against the efforts to decrease overcrowding. It would seem, therefore, that there was room to pursue new housing, but that the safest terrain for a jurisdiction would be to primarily operate in slum clearance areas. 10(b) lays out the requirement that contributions must be in service

of keeping the units low-income in character—again, not allowing for subsidizing middle class units—while also stipulating flexibility in the Authority drafting regulations to effectuate the foregoing. Contract length is detailed in 10(c), where no contract can run over 60 years, and any over 20 years can be revisited by the Authority in year 10 and every five years thereafter. Section 10 ends with subsection (c) specifying where funding for the contributions comes from and (d) setting a maximum individual contribution to any project at no more than \$7.5 million once the policy is fully implemented in 1939.

As an alternative to annual contributions, Section 11(a) describes the alternative capital grant system in which localities petition the Authority to use in lieu of Section 10. It reiterates previous clauses on the slum clearance linkage to new housing construction, while retaining the discretion to break this requirement if new housing is required to decrease overcrowding. Capital grants, according to 11(b), cannot exceed 25% of the acquisition/development costs, creating yet another cap that may not be harmonized with previously articulated enumerations. Section 11(c) repeats the language in 10(d), while 11(d) parallels 10(c), with the only difference being capital grants can rise from \$7.5 to a one-time \$10 million allotment. A non-parallel provision in the form of Section 11(e) allows the president to use any sum of money allocated for unemployment relief to the Authority to specifically pay labor costs, provided it does not exceed 15% of a project's development costs. This provision demonstrates the original justification of industrial planning policy did receive standalone attention in the policy's final language. The final part of this section is 11(f), which creates a separate matching criteria of no less than 20% of development costs to unlock federal funds, but this contribution can come from cash, land, services, or tax remission/exemption (894).

Section 12(a) strongly encourages “disposal” of federal projects by selling the developments after they are completed, or by leasing out their operations to third parties. An important stipulation is that whenever sale or lease does not transpire, the Authority should complete all projects and may temporarily administer the project. The language is again couched in terms of reducing nationwide unemployment, showing the social good of public housing is the not the legal rationale Congress uses to insert itself in new policy terrain. 12(c) elaborates further to mandate sales can only go to PHAs, maintaining the governmental administration to the program. Moreover, the Administrator sets the price of the sale, which once completed makes the project eligible for contributions and grants under Sections 9, 10, and 11. 12(d) described how leasing of a project works (the PHA pays for all of the required upkeep and maintenance, while the section concludes with (e) giving the Authority the ability to set the rental price at a sufficient level of maintain the self-sufficiency of a project, but that additional payments can be made to keep the “low-rent character of such project” (894).

The powers of the Authority are articulated in Sections 13 through 16. Starting in 13(a), the Authority has the power to foreclose on properties it administers, purchase private land in service of the declaration of policy, and reacquire previously sold off properties through bidding, regaining administration of completed projects. This is a powerful tool to maintain standards in the low-cost housing developments and gives the federal Authority a flexible land-use toolkit. These tools are somewhat blunted through Section 13(b), which stipulates no rights of entities are to be abridged by the Authority’s actions, setting up either unilateral remediation by the Authority or battles in the court system. One approach to indemnify localities is in (c), which allows the Authority to pay sums in lieu of taxes, but that shall not exceed a would-be property tax maximum. While this is another instrument, when or why it is to be used is not specified in the law, meaning

it is really up to the benevolence of the Administrator, or potentially to be used as an out of court settlement. Final provisions in Section 13 allow the Authority to acquire an unlimited amount of insurance on properties (d), acquire and sell any land not involved in low-rent housing (e), and borrow against properties (e).

Notwithstanding other requirements, the Authority is permitted to modify any and all agreements to which it is a party in Section 14. Sections 15(1) and (2) further expand the power of the Authority to guarantee the low-cost and slum clearance, respectively, nature of its projects by revoking or breaking contracts if any provision therein is violated by the PHA that received Section 9 funding. The same is provided for any PHA accepting Section 10 money in 15(3). 15(4) reserves the ability of the Authority to insert any conditions that carry out the larger mission within its contracts, with the peculiar expansive and specific caveat that contracts could have a provision requiring local housing agencies to maintain “open space[s] or playground[s]” (896). That is a positive provision for environmental and social justice, since it is typical for low-income urban communities to lack well-maintained recreational and park spaces. Section 15(5) includes the Byrd Amendment language limiting unit costs to \$4000 or \$1000 per room, which reads in a way that indicates either marker could cap the project (you cannot go beyond either). However, there is a special carveout that reads “except that in any city the population of which exceeds 500,000” [costs] cannot exceed \$5000 overall or \$1250 per room. Roughly one dozen cities had a population around that figure in the 1930s, but clearly the impetus for it was most centered on ensuring NY with its sky-high land values could still join the program. Further limitations are laid out in 15(5)(a) that “projects will not be of elaborate or expensive design or materials, and economy will be promoted both in construction and administration” and in (b) which sets as the maximum

development cost whatever the prevailing average private sector development costs for a building that meets the construction and labor standards of the law (896).

Relating to that last clause, Section 16 begins “In order to protect labor standards—”, again owing to the New Deal coalition and success of labor to become a constituency of the bill. The section goes on to lay out subsections (1) through (6), which collectively comport the bill’s requirements with another New Deal labor legislation of the time, including hours limitations and worker’s compensation. And additional proviso in (2) requires paying prevailing wages in a locality to a host of job categorizations. Finally, (6) requires all contractors to report their payroll roster to the Department of Labor. Many of the key labor protections of witnesses from unions and Secretary Perkins herself seem embedded in the final codified bill.

Although previous sections clearly deal with financials, the statute labels Sections 17 through 21 “Financial Provisions”. Section 17 grants the Authority \$1,000,000 of capital stock, an initial appropriation of \$26 million to be paid by Treasury in Section 18, and which the president oversees in Section 19. Section 20 is more comprehensive, in (a) empowering the Authority to issue up to \$500 million in bonds from 1937 to 1939, but unlike the grants and loans to localities, these bonds have a minimum 4% yield. These bonds are exempt from all forms of taxation in (b), carry the full faith of the U.S (c), count as collateral for any transactions by involved parties (d), and can be marketed to the public (e). Ending the topic area, Section 21(a) indicates the Authority’s money can be kept in the Department of Treasury or a Federal Reserve Bank, that the Federal Reserve is to take a custodial role in the handling of the resources (b), that the Authority can be designated a financial agent of the government (c), and oddly for this section, that no state can receive more than 10% provided for by the act (d) (898). This is a particular limitation on New

York state that offsets some of the witness espoused worries that early adopters would hog all of the resources.

The statute concludes with various penalties in Sections 22 to 30. Financial crimes on the federal books, like larceny and embezzlement, all pertain to this act (Sec. 22), entering into a contract with the HA for non-disclosed self-enrichment is also prohibited (Sec. 25), and violators for false representation are to be fined no more than \$1,000, jailed for a year, or both (Sections 23 and 24). Section 26 bars all entities from using the Authority's name or likeness in advertising or operation or face a fine. The act also contains a full supremacy clause in Section 27 for all housing issues (and beyond), with the bill's language superseding any statute or executive order on the books. D.C. receives special attention in Section 28, which allows the president to allocate USHA money to the Alley Dwelling Authority to effectuate the housing quality provisions of the Alley Dwelling Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-307; 48 Stat. 930). In Section 29 Congress smartly includes a severability clause, such that if any part of the act is found invalid/unconstitutional, Congress' intent is that the remaining provisions remain in effect. The act concludes with Section 30, which simply confers the short title citation of the law as the "United States Housing Act of 1937."

With this plain and analytical reading of the statute, the policy effects laid out in the next section of the chapter clearly emanate from the construction of the law. Congress balanced specificity with discretion in a way that would still likely achieve the intent of the bill's architects. The language consistently centers on low-income families in such a way that anyone implementing the policy and prioritizing housing to applicants would do the same, much to the detriment of non-income earners and low-income individuals. The bill was focused principally on slum clearance, then on new housing development, making the eventuality of the former being favored over the latter quite predictable. The divisions that emanate from the two guiding questions for the policy

language analysis both have their origin in the statute's construction, borne of norms and the New Deal's preference of family unit-based policy provision. While many New Deal policies leave a lot of discretion to the bureaucracy—often a key actor for where the poor are divided—this law appears fairly anchored on its most important items—families and slums. One additional way to assess level of Congressional direction is to monitor key terminology, notably that “‘May’ is usually precatory, while ‘shall’ is usually mandatory” (Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett 2006, 389). The key point of non-Congressional decision-making is in the high degree of local control, which contributed to disparate treatment by group and across locality. In the case of the USHA, the former term is used 132 times, while the latter is utilized in 70 places, showing a greater skew toward bureaucratic discretion, but with a substantial amount of guidance from Congress. Ultimately, the policy is well-constructed to achieve its core objectives, did indeed help millions of Americans, but like other policies of the era, is not intended to comprehensively deal with housing the poor. Instead, the most privileged poor families received help, and the scale of developments was artificially limited by the emphasis on slums over new development.

Policy Effects

It is difficult to claim the USHA was not a successful policy, having housed generations of millions of Americans who might otherwise be homeless, living in slums, or experiencing other forms of housing insecurity. However, the manifest success of the policy does not mean it provided equitable coverage to all the poor in need of housing assistance. Indeed, scholarship has shown deficiencies in the law have contributed to a host of disparate impacts, inequities, and negative externalities. The most important of these problems relate to: the limited scope of an insufficiently comprehensive housing policy to tackle the housing problem; the reliance on a decentralized federalism model that led to geospatial, racial, and class-based inequality in program participation

and implementation across jurisdiction; the policy's projection of secondary constituencies—like prevailing wages in construction that raised program costs and localities favoring slum clearance as a vessel to displace the poor without rehousing—above the needs of the poor; dividing the poor in a way that led to lack of coverage for those without income and individual workers; program design leading to downstream political currents that harmed program or broader social welfare viability.

It is first helpful to provide a top-level assessment of the act. The USHA led to the construction of 170,000 dwellings in 260 communities across the United States (Vale 2013, 11), which led to the aforementioned housing of millions of Americans. 89% of these developments occurred on slum land, while the remaining 11% were on vacant lots (11). For each new unit, one slum unit had to be eliminated, which was more likely, or repaired, which did not occur as much (Fish 1979, 218). Even if it failed at solving the overall housing problem, the bill did usher in a new form of social provision. Bradford Hunt goes so far as to argue the policy was a watershed moment conveying a new commitment to public welfare (Hunt 2009, 15-16)

However, the limited scope of the bill blunted its potential for transformative impact, specifically in the amount of housing stock created, low quality of such housing, and lack of access for the poor to get housed. The discourse around temporary market failure leading to a growth of slum housing and the inability of poor to afford decent housing became the main justification for enactment, but importantly, this was also a limitation on the scope of the eventually agreed upon policies (Hunt 2009, 19; Lowry 1987, 94). Specifically, the previously discussed “equivalent elimination” clause of the bill meant new stock with the potential to reach demand would never be created. Instead, the bill favored more narrow slum replacement. This in effect meant government could not use its market-distorting potential to drive housing prices down for the bottom end of

the market, as housers had desired (Patterson 1967, 190). While Walsh intended this stipulation to ensure slum clearance, which he considered the main source of social peril, it ended up helping real estate interests because of the de facto limitation new housing (Hunt 2009, 29). Since Section 10(a) had the Spence Amendment language which allowed new construction if solely replacement was insufficient to house the poor, it does suggest that if administrators were limiting construction to only replacement units, they a) did not have major slum issues, b) did not petition the federal government, or c) were rejected in their attempt to build new housing stock.

Housing quality also took a hit as a consequence of how the bill was written and implemented. Walsh's experiences with the PWA and Byrd's with the RA led to the Byrd Amendment's cap on costs did end up lessening the quality of the housing, which paired with the slum clearance mandate, ensured the eventual housing would be too expensive for the really poor, but too unsavory for the mobile, temporarily poor sets of people. This set up a transient nature to the use of the program. And as expected, this language led housing advocates down, leading to lower quality housing than those created during the PWA housing initiative (Radford 1996, 177). Patterson (1967) describes the "markedly diminished physical standard" of the buildings (191), and that administrator decisions ensured housing would be unappealing through room size caps and the selection of bleak architectural designs. This meant the new units would "forever be poor people's housing"—if they could afford it (192).

Housing access was severely truncated due to these construction cost limitation, lack of use of subsidy authority, and the rejection of a voucher program. The emphasis on slum clearance meant acquisition costs of existing plots and buildings might price people out of the eventual development, while eating up scare funding. This is because the bill forever linked unit construction costs with rent prices. The previously mentioned fear of cost overruns led

contemporaries to worry the poor could not afford the eventual product, so they stipulated cost limitations and gave the HA authority to provide additional subsidies. However, as it turned out, the initial U.S. Housing Authority Administrator to preside over the policy, Nathan Straus, did not use such authority. By one account, Strauss was an ardent antipoverty advocate and reformist who wanted new housing to predominate over slum clearance, and simply failed to win the day (Biles 1990, 33). However, Vale (2013) depicts Strauss as more conservative in the mold of his boss, Secretary Ickes, believing those without income were supposed to be covered by relief agencies—it was not the mission of US Housing Authority to take care of these people. Additionally, Straus thought direct subsidies, instead of subsidized construction, were untenable, violating “American tradition” (11). Moreover, there was debate about housing vouchers—what later became Section 8 vouchers—and not just public housing construction during the 1937 housing debates. This did not come to fruition until 1970s, but would have afforded the program wider flexibility to help displaced people (Schwartz 2015, 227). Wagner was aware of this truth during Senate debates, but despite its potential to make a positive impact, the goal in this initial foray into public housing was not solve the housing needs of all of the impoverished, but simply to address the current slum problem (Vale 2000).

One of the most important limiting aspects of the law was its reliance on an intentionally decentralized approach to governance utilizing federalism structures. The positives of this approach were to give greater flexibility to localities to tailor programs to their populations’ needs. The disadvantage, as Riker (1964) exhaustively documents, is that federalism locks-in and guarantees inequality across jurisdictions by giving granting veto power to subnational governments. While it may be politically tractable, it comes with the substantive costs of Americans experiencing vastly different policy regimes by jurisdiction. The policy design gave

local authorities the decision to apply to join program (Fish 1979, 218), meaning not all of the poor would be served if the politicians tasked with serving them denied such a responsibility. Once they choose to join the program, there were relatively few restrictions, providing an extreme case of broad statutory guidance. In that system, USHA dispenses funds and has the right to approve plans, including site location and project costs. Localities get to plan, build, and administer the completed project. In short, the bill was the first legislation to create public housing projects, but accessibility varied widely across jurisdictions (Tucker 1990, 239), and the policy lock-in of the 1937 paradigm still prevails today with government funded, locally owned projects (Mitchell 1985, 187).

While this conferred maximal flexibility to fit varied local conditions, it also exacerbated prevailing forms of prejudicial social organization, such as ironically contributing to redlining. In its own way, the law inadvertently contributed to mass segregation in American cities, fostering the more overtly racialized form of poverty we see today (Massey and Denton 1993). The Act actually went against existing privileged approaches in the early New Deal era to provide housing to those who could not otherwise afford home ownership in good economic conditions, but nonetheless allowed further segregation through the vessel of local control (Trounstein 2018, 122). This is consistent with Jim Greer's (2014) depiction of redlining not being a product of intentional lawmaker racism, and potentially not even trade groups, but that an emphasis on housing stock and modernizing living standards lent itself to building new domiciles instead of repairing existing units. This had the effect of clearing slums, giving localities the ability to reengineer where people of color and low income families live within a city, increasing racial and class segregation. Whether the racism was intentional or not, Greer does provide sufficient evidence that lawmakers inherited and used a degree of boilerplate lawmaking that translated existing interest group and social movement activity and converted it into statute, in the process absorbing movement and

societal biases and giving their preferences governmental backing. What this means is Congress inherited the existing biases in the politics and planning of housing and did not sufficiently *counteract* such biases. All of this is consistent with Lowi's (1979) depiction of the New Deal as overly reliant on the most influential organized lobbies to ostensibly represent the sectoral needs of the people. But this reliance on economies of scale to deliver expertise and policy provision exacerbated existing inequality to create upward mobility for some poor families, while excluding poor individuals, exacerbating segregation, facilitating mass suburbanization, and disinvestment from cities.

One area of clear federal-local interest overlap was in slum clearance, but importantly, certain interests were served better than the poor by an emphasis on the slums. The key secondary constituencies during this episode include construction, urban planners, and realty interests. On the former, job market development retained the first line in the purposes section of the original Wagner Act. Moreover, following the endorsement by construction unions, wage protections were inserted into the bill, which raised construction costs above the market rate in some cases, which did not serve a direct antipoverty purpose (Mallach 1984, 49). Specifically the act incorporated the Davis-Bacon Act requirement for union pay scale, had further protections to increase contracted worker pay, which increased costs of housing, and moreover, did little other than the artificial construction caps to alter entire industry developed working under a maximum cost model, both of which hurt affordability (49, 54n61). While this approach likely helped keep construction workers out of poverty through continued employment, it did not serve those needing housing in the same way. The lack of structural guidelines serves as evidence that housing construction was a preminent goal, not necessarily keeping the housing costs low. This is a good example of how

labor interests at times diverged from the needs of the poor, even if the former was a leading surrogate of the latter.

Those interested in urban planning and realty gained new tools to clean out the blighted slums, while not necessarily replacing them with low-income housing. Equivalent elimination limitation in the law ensured the poor could not afford new housing units, since either newly created or rehabilitated projects would be priced “beyond the reach of the poor” (Vale 2013, 320). Additionally, such a tool would later make cities more appealing in the face of suburbanization by raising property values through displacement. Moreover, many cities failed to find housing for displaced slum dwellers, discriminating against those on relief and the destitute (Vale 2011, 83). The net effect of the law was to provide an instrument to clear communities by eliminating slums, and less to provide new housing for poor people.

Furthermore, the construction of the target population for policy remediation was proscribed, making the policy neither universalistic nor purely needs-based. Specifically, the policy aimed to help working poor families, a narrow subset of the American poor at the time. It is plain that the policy was simply not intended to support the poorest members of society, despite Walsh’s discourse and sincere orientation to that end. Instead, the program targeted the submerged middle class due to circumstances in the economy. It denied people based implicitly on race, and overtly on family size, citizenship status, and instability in the ability to pay rent. The family type would fit the dominant norms of the era, rigorously screened to favor certain family types (namely poor urbanite families with two parents and steady income, avoiding those with “unpleasant social histories or living habits” (Fish 1979, 220). “[E]ntry to public housing”, Vale (2013) writes, served as an affirmation of worthiness, not as an admission of desperation.” (11). The emphasis on

deservingness oddly focused attention on the temporarily hard up, experiencing low pay, but in a transitional phase back up the income ladder—not the stable poor (Vale 2000, 182).

Vale (2002) further depicts the centrality in creating a self-sustaining system that limited the reach to the poorest:

These early ‘housers’ saw the projects as the modern alternative to slums—enclaves of sturdy construction and carefully vetted households. Instead of cold-water flats and dark alleyways, public housing promised central heating, modern appliances, and wide-open spaces. Congress premised the whole system on the ability of tenant rents to cover operating expenses, and local authorities dutifully stocked the new projects with families who could afford to pay for this privilege. City officials built public housing to reward the worthiest among the temporarily poor, those who passed muster as good citizens and good investments. (5)

The policy worked because local authorities had discretion on income levels (which were still federally approved) and which tenants were allowed in buildings (which was not federally managed). Gaining access to housing did not guarantee stability, as even the privileged occupants—the working poor and elderly—were subject to evictions if they failed to pay their rent or violated norms of building (Lowry 1987, 95). In effect, the rent structure “excluded all but the working poor” (Vale 2011, 320). When localities favored families during implementation, they were simply comporting their practices with the tenets of Congressional debate and statutory language (Tucker 1990, 260) Before and after settling on this particular group, there were frequent efforts to expand housing to middle-income Americans in the bold envisioned by Bauer, which both more adequately addressed the housing problem and appealed to local officials who desired to generate more revenue, effectively occurred, just without clear intention on the part of the bill’s architects.

Only a full generation later did Senator Edward Brooke (R-MA) successfully amend the program via the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969. These amendments created a 25% of rent income cap and more equitable equivalent *construction* provision, wherein any

demolished slum had to be replaced with a new building with at least the same occupancy capacity (HUD 2014, 7). Both of these provisions aligned the program more with the discourse of the original legislative debates, finally helping the poorest gain access. However, the greater inclusivity of the poor coincided with the racialization of public housing and white flight to suburbs, which has proven a durable pattern in geospatial race-wealth disparities.

In addition to not equitably serving the different interests involved, the policy fell into a trap leading to the negative externality of local resentment against developments because of their tax exempt status. For example, Steagall's 20% local matching requirement purportedly forced localities to throw in resources to fill the void and unlock federal funds. However, after the bill's passage, the most used work around where localities could create tax exemptions, which more than covered the subsidy amount, de facto concentrated the tax burden on local businesses and sales taxpayers. Wood and Bauer foresaw this would create local resentment within active small business circles and further, that localities would misuse tax exemption. Ickes also foresaw this eventuality (SEL 1935, 93), leading to the provision that allows in-kind payments to localities in lieu of taxes in Section 13(e). However, the unpredictable nature to these sums could not substitute for steady tax revenue. All of these fostered inhospitable conditions working at the margins of the nascent anti-tax movements and contributing to the impetus for the second clearing of these communities when public housing buildings were torn down across the country from the 1970s to 1990s.

All of this culminates in a policy with clear winners and losers, that on balance helped many of the poor, but also neglected many others. The key winners were (newly) lower-income families, the construction industry, localities seeking new tools for planning, and private realty. The losers were local taxpayers, slumlords, single individuals (no matter how poor), modernist

housing reformers, and the poorest of the poor. There is still some scholarly debate about how this policy could do so much good and bad at once, and who to blame for its complex nature. Hunt 2009 challenges the conventional wisdom that conservative amendments did not kill the bill's aspirations, as 1960s scholars write [including McDonnell 1957]. Instead, infighting within the progressive reformer camp and implementation by progressive administrators made the law more conservative in practice due to the desire to be frugal (15-16, 32-33).⁷⁷ It is difficult to confirm or refute this argument, as both explanations are true: reformers like Walsh were sincerely interested in helping the poorest, but their solutions were limited by their innately conservative, anti-socialist ideology. Moreover, when Walsh's ideas reached the floor, it was clear he was getting more support from the conservative side of the Senate than from the liberals. While witness testimony and floor debate show progressives were divided on their theories of the case—especially on the issue of whether to expand the policy to the non-poor, which may solve more of the housing problem but potentially lead to harm for the poor—conservatives did help to water down the legislation by picking Walsh's—and not Wagner's—side on the legislation. Moreover, federal authorization could not restrain local implementation, which contributed to inequality, but the statute itself did not cause this nor did it prohibit it from occurring.

The U.S. Housing Act of 1937 was on balance a moderate success and continues to serve as the centerpiece of federal public housing policy. Although the program has grown over time, with over 3,300 PHAs currently working within the space, the total number of covered households

⁷⁷ The abstract to Hunt's (2005) article "Pyrrhic Victory?" depicts his argument well: "Historians have wrongly portrayed the 1937 Housing Act, which established a permanent public housing program in the United States, as hopelessly compromised by amendments originating from real estate and conservative interests. With a close analysis of the legislative record and archival material, this article argues that most of these amendments originated from divisions among Progressives or from Senator David I. Walsh (D-MA), who wanted to serve the poor and clear slums. The 1937 Housing Act should be viewed as a Progressive bill that weathered the legislative process surprisingly well. Furthermore, public housing's later struggles cannot be blamed on a law emasculated at its origination. Instead, historians should more carefully examine the implementation of the law as well as its Progressive assumptions" (195).

has declined to just over a million in 2020 (HUD 2020). Within the broader housing policy suite, it has worked alongside forerunner policies in the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 and National Housing Act of 1934, and as well as subsequent amendments and new approaches in the Housing Act of 1949, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Housing Act of 1968, and Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. The last law is notable for amending the USHA by expanding housing programs for the impoverished beyond the restrained public housing projects, now including state-subsidized private housing through Section 8 vouchers. While the program clearly had flaws, most New Deal policies were incomplete cracks at the apple, requiring subsequent tinkering through a process of maintaining the policyscape (Mettler 2016).

Conclusion

With the totality of the policy process in the rearview mirror, we can now assess what this episode tell us about the representation of the poor and antipoverty policy process? The most important lessons one can derive from the USHA policy process are twofold: the paradoxical nature to fulsome by myopic poverty representation and the long odds of ever delivering inclusive antipoverty policy. In this case, lawmakers clearly centered on the poorest of the poor—arguably more than in the SSA or NSLA—but in so doing, further divided the poor into the deserving and actionable target group (poor families), and the long neglected, most marginalized poor (individual low-income wage earners and the poor without income). Furthermore, a focus on the poorest ostensibly targets the right people to achieve social justice and appears to be sincere virtual representation, but in the game of political strategy, turns out to be a tool conservative forces can use to curtail the welfare state, relegating potential universalism to needs-based policies. On this front, the way in which advocates for the poor and conservative political actors converge in the USHA is instructive. Because the U.S. legislative process is so onerous and tenuous, it at times

becomes politically necessary to employ a theory of federalism that without sufficient safeguards makes nationwide solutions to poverty nearly impossible. All of this suggests substantively representing the poor is an incredibly difficult political task.

While centering on the lowest income or poorest of the poor is immediately pleasing to poverty advocates and scholars, it has a seamier side as a potential hazard—it can also be an additional tool to effectively divide the poor. In the USHA process, severing the poor from the middle-class was a central tendency across proponents of the Wagner bill and skeptics of the public housing enterprise, including business, realty, and anti-tax forces. Only the Ellenbogen-Bauer aligned folks, which were vastly outnumbered by everyone else, held a view that was inclusive of both poor and moderate income families. But to Walsh's credit, no doubt PHAs would favor higher earners over the poorest—as they did—providing some support for the idea of restricting the policy to the lowest wage earners. However, this dilemma presents a broader open question for advocates of an antipoverty regime: is it better to concentrate benefits to the most vulnerable, thus reducing cross-class political coalitions and constituencies, or is more prudent to create universalistic benefits that may serve non-poor constituencies more ably than the poorest?

The truth is there is no correct answer to this problem, where the needs-based versus universalism spectrum usually gives way to a third biased particularism approach, in which both resources and target groups are restricted. While the discourse centered on the poorest of the poor, the policy still managed to help the sliver of poor families that were recently impoverished or upwardly mobile. All of these problems make tangible the difficulty of legislating on behalf of the poor—even the best-intentioned lawmakers engaging in consultations with the poor themselves can still lead to incomplete solutions. Eradicating poverty, in this case through its manifestations

in housing dilapidation and affordability, in a large, diverse nation is a highly unlikely outcome even in the best of converging dynamics.

Moreover, the issues that arise severally within and from the disjuncture between Congressional direction and bureaucratic implementation suggest the political practices and federalism governance of the U.S. are not conducive to comprehensive problem solutions. In the legislative process, Senator Walsh actively sought to limit the flexibility of local bureaucrats to favor upper-lower or middle class families due to his understanding the PWA projects. Yet, according to housing scholars, street-level decision-makers *still* discriminated against the poorest. One explanation is that Walsh's chosen instrument of the income-rent ratio as the primary mechanism to bind decision-makers (complemented with additional language articulating a policy of targeting the poorest) was simply insufficient to achieve his goals.

An alternative approach would have been to lay out a sequential eligibility criterion, in which applicants with the lowest income at an initial screening have the highest priority—maybe even a guarantee—for housing. Only after admitting the poorest of the poor—without any rejections—would PHAs be able to move up the income ladder, from those with zero income to the five-to-one earners. Such an approach belies the goals of late New Deal lawmakers to decrease D.C. edicts, federal control, and one-size-fits-all policies that hamstring bureaucratic discretion and local control. However, this alternative approach simply does not fit with the New Deal *modus operandi*, although it would fit in with the greater federal power in the Great Society.

It is therefore important to temper expectations from and blame on lawmakers, as it is also possible that there was *nothing* federal lawmakers could devise that would force administrators to care for the poorest of the poor. Local governments through their PHAs may simply opt to not join the program instead of being forced to target the members of society experiencing the greatest

amount of material deprivation, but that may not fit the normative values of politicians and planners.

The unique circumstances of the USHA legislative process also shed light on the *limitations* of expecting poor people to have the answers to their own plight. While legislating in the absence of the poor forces lawmakers to rely more on imagination and abstract notions of policy remediation, which are prone to bias and incomplete understanding, consulting the poor still has the potential to lead to incomplete policies. Importantly, and in contravention of existing research on the Wagner housing bills, one cannot solely blame local governments or special interests for the resulting emphasis on slum clearance and secondary emphasis on rehousing: residents of slums themselves pled to eliminate the slums.

The poor that live in the slums spoke to the necessity of eliminating the slums with forceful language that at times resembled discourse that could come out of the mouths of non-poor residents who abhorred the blight but did not care for the poor. When the poor spoke on their conditions, there was only secondary mention of rehousing guarantees. Their first order of business was to describe the slums, which lent itself to a shoot first, assess second framework of leading with slum eradication, then seeing what could be done on rehousing. The incomplete implementation of a holistic policy is potentially a product of emphasizing the lowest common denominator of slum clearance that all witnesses espoused, while minimizing the less discussed rehousing part of the bill. This is not to blame the poor witnesses for what transpired; their eloquence and vivid depictions grounded the debate on the immoral way governments had allowed the poor to live. Their experiences gainfully informed collective understanding and covered blind spots, but was insufficient in and of itself to provide a mechanistic solution. Had they offered one, it might appear

closer to the Ellenbogen than Wagner bill. In this way, descriptive representation may provide a greater value-added to problem diagnosis than it does to problem solution.

Several theories and concepts in policy studies also help situate some of the struggles of the USHA. First, the way in which parties define a problem is both informed by and informs policy solutions (Rocheft and Cobb 1993). In this case, problem definition was hotly contested between folks that viewed land speculation as the main issue (Marsh; La Guardia; Wood), others who lamented the lack of forward-thinking and comprehensive cross-class housing planning (Bauer; Ellenbogen), or those that limited their attention to the moral and physical degradation of the slums (Wagner; Walsh). The latter camp won out discursively and controlled the policy design, marrying morality, fiscal conservatism, limited governmental aims, and narrow problem to focus to create a focused law that addressed only one component of the housing problem in America.

Part of the contentiousness in problem definitions and solutions is a product of problem complexity, which Rittel and Webber (1973), warn is especially high for “wicked” social problems. Wicked problems have many causes, their conditions change over time, and a solution in one part could become a downstream problem in another. By limiting the issue to slums, lawmakers increased the probability of solving their discrete problem—and not the *housing* problem—but even with this narrower scope, the problem of the *slums* was not entirely fixed. One approach of simply demolishing the slums could end the slum problem, insofar as there aren’t any of them anymore. But lawmakers had broader goals than this, and rehousing was a paramount concern as well. The wickedness of slum clearance is that current occupants remain in need of housing, and an insufficient program of rehousing everyone displaced just shifts the geographic location (and potentially density) of the problem. Even when rehoused, former slum residents still likely face additional forms of poverty (low education; low income; food insecurity; lack of health

care access) that inform social disorder, perpetuating certain forms of suffering and blight that were contained in slums. In this way, slum eradication may fail in any case that is short of universal housing programs, either through a myopic focus on slum clearance without adequate rehousing requirements or by rehousing former slum residents without providing additional tools to achieve upward mobility.

In the USHA we also see the occurrence of unintended consequences in adjacent areas when trying to solving a discrete problem. Fine (2014) describes a chaining process in which a social problem “solution generates the recognition of another social problem” (5). In this case, increasing housing access facilitated greater separation within the poor between those with jobs and families, and those without. The separation between those within the boundaries of the American workfare state’s paternalistic coverage and lack of care for those that face difficulties finding and maintaining work grew. A second negative externality corresponds with the rising impact of pernicious urban renewal and redlining. A policy that appeared to be an unequivocal good compared to the status quo ultimately contributed to a larger structure of housing inequality in America by imbuing local actors with the power and resources to pick and choose who to move and where (Trounstine 2018).

The last policy process concept that clearly pertains to the USHA is Kingdon’s (2011 [1984]) policy window framework, particularly the idea of solutions in search of problems (172). The needs of the poor became a useful tool for some interests, which used policy coupling to merge their ideas into the legislative vessel. This occurred in multiple directions, including by construction interests seeking to increase sectoral employment, local governments using housing and poverty as a tool to gain further power, realty interests trying to see a rise in property values (and later successful at trying to limit the policy to only the poorest), “Housers” using the needs

of the poor and context of the Great Depression to spur their long-term policy agenda on a mass housing and modernization platform. All of these are consistent with assertion that interests with a solution are in search of a problem and opportunity window to affix their interests. However, this becomes a negative case for the last group, since their efforts to adopt European style housing programs was ultimately unsuccessful. Frankly, it may be the case that housing interests were coupled with industrial employment imperatives to use the poor as a discourse. In that way, it is not shocking that construction interests made out well in the legislation—their needs were centered to provide a justification to provide social welfare to the poor. The last important site of coupling is the successful use of fiscally conservative discourse and policy ideas to control what representing the poor meant by the end of the policy process. But overall, the USHA is predominantly an antipoverty policy. Despite the coupling and disparate benefactors of the bill, its terms were always centered on a poverty-based problem remediation.

On a broader level, the policy fits into a moderate form of market distorting policies during the New Deal, fitting Karl Polanyi's (1944) "dual movement" of the state expanding to match the ever-growing market. As with other central New Deal policies, government both newly entered a sector while only incorporating some of the most marginalized members within an impacted sector. Here, to ensure market viability, the state had to provide market regulations to decrease certainty and supply policy provision to one of the least profitable populations: low-income renters. By previously devising housing policies that guaranteed private mortgages, the government continued to effectively create surety that profits would befall companies one way or another even if borrowers/renters could not afford to pay. But both the NHA and USHA Subnational governments benefitted from the new powers and often aligned with local real estate interests to

form a potent financial, political, and policy monitoring force to reconstruct human settlement in metropolitan America.

Finally, the USHA case study provides further evidence that the New Deal was not calibrated to solve poverty. While poverty is a definitive wicked problem, there are markers one can use to measure level of inclusivity and comprehensiveness. The approach taken here was to construct a model target population from upper low-income families—the top one-third of the bottom “one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished” (Roosevelt 1937).⁷⁸ Therefore, even when policies are centered on the poor, there are typically group divisions and solutions that limit how far the policy goes toward solving the broader issue of poverty. In the SSA it was the exclusion of entire classes of workers, relegating some to nascent state-level programs, and minimal disability provisions; in the USHA, it was the decision to only house the working poor, while entirely ignoring the poor that could not afford monthly rent or have yet to start a family. Whether intentional or not, the execution of the New Deal consistently shifted attention to potentially middle-class families experiencing momentary penury due to the sustained effects of the Great Depression, and not many of the long suffering poorest of the poor. And yet, the attempt

⁷⁸ From FDR’s Second Inaugural Speech: “I see a great nation, upon a great continent, blessed with a great wealth of natural resources. Its hundred and thirty million people are at peace among themselves; they are making their country a good neighbor among the nations. I see a United States which can demonstrate that, under democratic methods of government, national wealth can be translated into a spreading volume of human comforts hitherto unknown, and the lowest standard of living can be raised far above the level of mere subsistence. But here is the challenge to our democracy: In this nation I see tens of millions of its citizens—a substantial part of its whole population—who at this very moment are denied the greater part of what the very lowest standards of today call the necessities of life. I see millions of families trying to live on incomes so meager that the pall of family disaster hangs over them day by day. I see millions whose daily lives in city and on farm continue under conditions labeled indecent by a so-called polite society half a century ago. I see millions denied education, recreation, and the opportunity to better the lot of themselves and their children. I see millions lacking the means to buy the products of farm and factory and by their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions. I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.” It is important to note of the three types of poverty FDR depicts—housing, clothing, food—only the housing initiative became law, and as this chapter showed, it did not cover some of the most housing insecure Americans.

to uplift *any* poor is positive secular development and testament to the difference in thought and deed of lawmakers of this era of America's political history.

Appendix 9A: Consideration of Counterfactual Senate Committee Referral

As noted in the text, bill sponsor Senator Wagner strategically manipulated the referral process to send his bill to a committee he was not on—Education and Labor—instead of his Banking and Currency (SBC) committee that dealt with the 1934 National Housing Act. History bears out the wisdom of this choice, as a) the bill ultimately passed and b) Table 9A.1 shows poverty articulation was considerably lower on the inhospitable SBC than favorable SEL, with only two SBC members (other than Wagner) with 3 or more poverty speeches per Congress. More-

Table 9A.1 Members of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee (SBC), 74th Congress

Member Name	Subcommittee Investigating Updates to HOLA and NHA	Poverty Speech Count, 73 rd -75 th Cong	Poverty Speeches per Congress Served	Vote on Byrd \$ Limit per Unit Amdt (8/4/37)	Vote on Logan Housing Prog in Interior Dept Amdt (8/6/37)	Vote on Passage of S. 1685 USHA (8/6/37)
Fletcher (D-FL), Chair		0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Glass (D-VA)		0	0	NV	NV	N
Wagner (D-NY)	✓	32	10.67	N	N	Y
Barkley (D-KY)	✓	4	1.33	N	Y	Y
Bulkley (D-OH), Subcommittee Chair	✓	0	0	N	Y	Y
Gore (D-OK)		4	2	N/A	N/A	N/A
Costigan (D-CO)		0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Reynolds (D-NC)		9	3	Y	Y	Y
Byrnes (D-SC)		4	1.3	NV	Y	N
Bankhead (D-AL)		10	3.33	NV	NV	NV
McAdoo (D-CA)	✓	1	0.33	N	NV	Y
Adams (D-CO)		4	1.33	Y	Y	Y
Maloney (D-CT)		0	0	Y	N	Y
Radcliffe (D-MD)		0	0	Y	N	Y
Norbeck (R-SD), Ranking Member		1	0.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
Townsend (R-DE)	✓	0	0	Y	N	NV
Carey (R-WY)		0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Couzens (R-MI)		0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Steiwer (R-OR)	✓	7	2.33	Y	Y	N
Cutting (R-NM)		4	2	N/A	N/A	N/A

over, while only one of 16 SEL members (6.25%) never delivered a poverty speech, that figure rises to nine of 20 (45%) SBC members. Finally, every member of SEL voted for passage of the bill, while SBC contained three members (Glass, Byrnes and Steiwer) opposed the bill. By all conventional vote measures and poverty speech indicators, SEL was the superior committee to favorably act on and report out the bill.

Appendix 9B: Witness Testimony on the Public Housing Proposals, 1935-1937

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
		President, National Public Housing Conference; Vice Chairman, NYC Housing Authority; Director, Greenwich House				
1	Simkhovitch, Mary K.	On behalf of Dr. Hugh Cumming, U.S. Surgeon General	✓		6/4/35; 4/21/36	First witness; long-time advocate; suggests MCs do not know how bad housing conditions are in country;
2	Mountin, Dr. Joseph W.	Senior Statistician, US Public Health Service	✓		6/4/35	Surgeon General is in the hospital
3	Britten, Rollo H.	Editor, United Mine Workers Journal of the UMW	✓		6/4/35	Housing not the only problem; other issues with poverty, lack of health education; (depiction consistent w/ wicked problem)
4	Searles, Ellis	Rabbi, Har Sinai Congregation, Baltimore, MD; Vice President, National Public Housing Conference; Member, Social Justice Commission, Central Conference of American Rabbis	✓		6/4/35	Supports the bill; will help least skilled, average workers, and those in the "lowest scale of industrial occupations"
5	Israel, Edward L.		✓		6/4/35; 4/22/36	We are wasting money on social issues (crime; public health) if we do not tackle housing; not in favor of public works framing; advocates for slum clearance and cheap enough housing for the poorest residents; covers Black poverty and insecurity is the worst of any group

Notes: SEL is the Senate Committee on Education and Labor; HBC is the House Committee on Banking and Currency.

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
6	Johnson, Reginald A.	Washington Representative, National Urban League	✓		6/4/35	Focus on the needs/issues of African-American residents, particularly in cities; migration and demographic change; Blacks occupy large abandoned houses meant for rich people in the past, now subdivided among several families per domicile; provides examples; national program will externalize burden from solely wage earner into a community planning issue; in depicting structural racism and demographic changes, mostly avoids mention of class until he brings up the white-black wage gap; ends by discussing individual "low wage earner" being relieved of a collective and large-scale problem; Delegation of 37 members of conference; only himself and 3 others allowed to testify; a lot of interest in lower east side in NYC, claims other areas would have similar interest if program existed;
7	Volpe, John	Lower East Side Housing Conference, NYC	✓		6/4/35	Descriptive representation! "I am a mother of the slum area, an dl am speaking for many, many thousands of mothers like myself who cannot come here personally. When I speak I speak for them all. We live houses that should have been condemned perhaps 25, 30, or 40 years ago. We are not living there by choice; we are living there by necessity" (SEL 1935, 20); portrays desperate living environment, like no steam and no windows;
8	Harris, Ida	Lower East Side Public Housing Conference, NYC	✓		6/4/35	Portrays getting pushed out of one side of the street where new housing was built into older bldgs on the other side of the street; little choice in where they reside; no sunlight; advocates for government to build better housing for the poor;
9	Beleter, Rosa	Lower East Side Public Housing Conference, NYC; Representing Housing Committee of Hamilton House	✓		6/4/35	Represents younger mothers; children not safe with invalid mother in case of fire;
10	Ziprin, Sheba	Lower East Side Public Housing Conference, NYC	✓		6/4/35	For any bill that increases jobs in the building trades; discusses population increases in cities due to job availability has created conditions for exploitation of desperate families
11	Williams, J. W.	President, Building Trades Department, AFL	✓		6/4/35	Technical aspects about how local authorities engage the federal government to plan housing initiatives; cost estimates; coordination
12	Post, Langdon	Tenement House Commissioner; Chairman, NYC Housing Authority	✓		6/5/35; 4/20/36; 4/21/36	

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
13	Hackett, Horatio B.	Assistant Administrator, Public Works Administration	✓		6/5/35; 4/25/36	
14	Wood, Edith E.	Vice President, National Public Housing Conference	✓		6/5/35; 4/24/36	Written books on housing; excellent at articulating causes and scale of problems. presents data and infographics on income depletion since Great Depression and family housing needs; pg 69 on subsistence subsidy and decency minimum; expands housing debate to many other areas, a sign that housing is seen specifically in antipoverty terms and within a larger antipoverty agenda
15	Lowenthal, Milton	Representative, Housing Study Guild (NYC)	✓		6/6/35	Correspondance in lieu of appearing; favors the policy broadly and bill in particular, but worries it is too focused on--and limited to--slum clearance; "It would seem to me that the bill before you today is perhaps more limited than it needs to be. I am quite sure that it was not intended to be limited to the work of slum clearance, and yet it is possible to interpret it in such a way that it would be thus limited" (81). USE!!; thinks the bill is not properly specified as a work-relief program; no mention of minimum wage standards for construction workers; 4/21/36: still has reservations about the bill's design, but thinks it is necessary and useful
16	Perkins, Frances	U.S. Secretary of Labor	✓		6/5/35; 4/21/36	Authored the Ellenbogen bill; had issues with the Wagner bill, specifically Walsh's intention to limit housing to the poor; as a labor representative, supported upping the ante to cover middle-class as well, which would boost construction and union jobs (example of labor not being the best advocate for the poor, although they were the most incorporated into the New Deal of anyone moderately interested in poverty); supported public housing but took issue with bill design;
17	Bauer, Catherine K.	Executive Secretary, Philadelphia Labor Housing Conference, AFL	✓		6/6/35; 4/24/36; 4/14/37	Ickes says keep it in a dept, not indie agency; also claims Ellenbogen bill is superior in many ways to the Wagner bill, and that reconciling the two will create the best possible legislation; wants to change provision that limits dealing with non-profit or low-profit entities, which he believes are helpful instruments to help with the housing problem; lays out 7 primary objections
18	Ickes, Harold L.	U.S. Secretary of the Interior	✓	✓	6/6/35; 4/20/36; 8/5/37	

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
19	O'Grady, Reverend John	Dean, Catholic School of Social Work; Secretary/President, National Conference of Catholic Charities; Vice President, National Public Housing Conference	✓		6/6/35; 4/25/36	
20	La Guardia, Fiorello H.	Mayor, NYC; President, US Conference of Mayors	✓	✓	6/6/35; 4/15/37; 8/3/37	Says everyone agrees that the slums should be replaced, but when proposals are considered or implemented, suddenly opposition arises from various actors; claims opposition is not even from stakeholders or impacted parties, but on constitutional grounds; spends considerable time on the issue of land value
21	Alfred, Helen	Secretary, National Public Housing Conference of NY	✓		6/6/35; 4/23/36; 4/15/37	Provides letters of endorsement of housing initiatives from mayors of Detroit, Omaha, and Louisville, and Chair of the Cleveland Metro Housing Authority.
22	Robbins, Ira S.	Counsel, NY State Board of Housing Director of	✓		6/6/35; 4/24/36	
23	Edelman, John W.	Research, American Federation of Hosiery Workers, Philadelphia	✓		6/6/35	Comparison of Ellenbogen and Wagner bills (124); prefers Ellenbogen;
24	Churchill, Henry S.	Representative, Housing Study Guild (NYC)	✓		6/6/35	(Not in ProQuest); technical revisions to the bills; picks up on the lack of definitions, limited authority for national director, and unnecessary linkage between slum clearance and low-income housing; the latter two might be at cross purposes and need to be de-linked
25	Pedersen, Jacob O.	President, Bronx Borough Taxpayers League; Council of Real Estate Associations	✓		6/6/35	Opposed to the bill

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
26	Isaacs, Irving A.	Counsel, Bronx Borough Taxpayers League Executive Director, Bureau of Jewish Social	✓		6/6/35	Opposed to the bill; denies premise that low-cost housing and slum clearance are in any way related to one another
27	Lurie, H.L.	Research/National Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds President, Real Estate Owners Association, 9th and 12th Wards of NYC	✓		6/6/35	(Not in ProQuest, likely because he was not able to attend in person, but was invited); supports the bill;
28	Eidt, Charles W.		✓		6/6/35; 4/29/36; 5/11/37	No need for public housing; when government tries to provide subsidized housing, it actually increases costs; new construction will never satisfy housing low-income people; to help them, we must rehabilitate older housing which can produce low rents that are affordable to people w/o means Does not solve underlying issues with land assessment; potentially a critique from the left, but unclear; underlying bill is about giving free credit to oligarchs connected with the president; recommends following approach of British Labor Party to commandeer materials when speculation drives up prices; bill is too timid to succeed; discretion to states will mean workers are not housed; proposes substitute bill (language starts on pg 145); Ellenbogen bill is superior in giving govt the power to act; doesn't blame Wagner, since he did not write the bill (Bauer did); 4/25/36: continues to note land speculation is the main problem, and the bill will not solve it; probably the most hostile witness in the lot; calls the poor "mendicants" (SEL 1937, 177) that "somebody has to pay for", then gets shutdown for speaking out of turn; Marxist and anticapitalist who spoke at many hearings in his years as a lobbyist (https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/haskell/1954/06/lobbyist.html)
29	Marsh, Benjamin C.	Executive Secretary, People's Lobby	✓		6/7/35; 4/25/36; 4/15/37; 5/11/37	
30	Chambless, Edgar	President, Roadtown Foundation	✓		6/7/35	Explains how Roadtown has built low-cost housing

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
31	Sentman, Robert M.	National President, Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians; Committee on Rents and Low Cost Housing, DC Central Labor Union	✓		6/7/35; 4/24/36	Bill does not go far enough; could support more robust legislation than USHA; interest in low income is about construction workers having a low income, not the poor that inhabit the housing
32	Wagner, Robert F.	U.S. Senator, NY	✓		4/20/36	Bill author and lead advocate in Senate; has waited throughout the hearings to put other witnesses ahead of his testimony
33	Clas, A.R.	Director, Housing Division, Public Works Administration Chair, Housing Committee, AFL;	✓		4/20/36	Background in realty and construction; explains current PWA program logistics
34	Bates, Harry C.	President, Bricklayers, Masons, and Plasterers Internal Union	✓		4/20/36; 4/15/37; 8/6/37	Supports the bill
35	Bohn, Ernest J.	Member, Cleveland City Council; President, National Association of Housing Officials	✓	✓	4/21/36; 8/5/37	Provides mayoral endorsements of the bill; local needs
36	Green, William	President, AFL	✓		4/21/36; 4/14/37	
37	Ryan, John A.	Reverend, National Catholic Welfare Conference	✓		4/21/36	

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
38	Tippy, Dr. Worth M.	Executive Secretary, Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America	✓		4/22/36	Supports the bill even though he would have liked it to be “stronger”; focus on children, health, and morals; no class content
39	Miller, Neville	Mayor, Louisville, KY	✓		4/22/36	Conveys endorsement of the bill by US Conference of Mayors and additional letters from mayors all over the country; presents series of maps that show the concentration of crime, disease (TB), relief cases, and hospital use in a single district of the city
40	Wilson, S. Davis	Mayor, Philadelphia, PA	✓		4/22/36	
41	deHoll, John C.	Chair, Housing Authority, Birmingham, AL	✓	✓	4/22/36; 8/6/37	
42	Couffer, James G.	Representing Blythe & Co	✓		4/22/36	“In my opinion, it means that private capital can be drawn into the investment field of low-rent better housing under the terms of this bill” (SEL 1936, 109); private industry benefits from the subsidization in the bill, which makes developing low-rent properties potentially profitable instead of cost prohibitive; limiting assistance to only those that cannot afford sanitary housing is consistent with free market goals, but expanding further will harm the latter
43	McAvoy, Daniel E.	Chair, Home Mortgage Advisory Board	✓		4/22/36	
44	Fahey, John H.	Chair, Federal Home Loan Bank Board	✓		4/22/36	Talks more about existing programs; supports the bill; only mention of class is in relation to building trades
45	Stern, Alfred K.	Chair, Illinois Housing Board	✓		4/23/36	
46	Stern, J. David	Publisher, Philadelphia Record and NY Evening Post	✓		4/23/36	
47	Stokes, Anson P.	Chair, DC Committee on Housing	✓		4/23/36	

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
48	Holden, Thomas S.	President, NYC Building Congress President, Hillside Housing	✓		4/23/36	
49	Straus, Nathan	Corporation; Member (not representing), NYC Housing Authority	✓		4/23/36; 4/15/37	Operates a “limited dividend housing corporation” in NY
50	Zink, John H.	Construction League of the US Vice President,	✓		4/23/36	Represents building trades; emphasis on low-income only in relation to that target population
51	Carroll, John	Massachusetts State Federation of Labor President, Operative Plasterers and	✓		4/23/36	
52	Colleran, Michael J.	Cement Finishers International Association; Member, Housing Committee, AFL	✓		4/23/36	Contentends housing is simply part of the public works agenda that has already been established
53	Grimm, Peter	Resident, NYC Resident, Louisville, KY;	✓		4/24/36	
54	Stewart, A. Joseph	Real Estate (not representing), Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. Former President, Thompson-Starrett Company	✓		4/24/36	Appointed by mayor of Louisville to investigate housing projects and conflicts btwn gov’t and private housign developers; claims slum clearance proposals are more popular than low-cost housing; became clear to him that private enterprise could not carry out the goals of low-cost housing;
55	Horowitz, Louis J.	Chair, New Orleans Committee on Housing	✓		4/24/36	
56	Williams, Colonel L. Kemper	Secretary, NAACP	✓		4/24/36	Most concerned with slum clearance; background in banking; Appointed by Ickes; org is publically authorized advisory entity with no decision-making power
57	White, Walter		✓		4/24/36	Explains racial disparities in housing needs; anti-Black zoning

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
58	Johnson, Howard	Social Service Representative, State Housing Authority of NJ; on behalf of Fred W. Ehrlich, Chair of the State Housing Authority Technical Director/Deputy Housing Administrator, FHA Director, National Association of Housing Officials; Representative, Chicago Housing Authority	✓		4/24/36	
59	Colean, Miles L.	Secretary, National Association of Real Estate Boards, Chicago, IL	✓	✓	4/25/36; 8/3/37	
60	Woodbury, Coleman	President, Roland Park Company	✓		4/25/36; 4/15/37	Explains local initiatives and buy-in
61	Nelson, Herbert U.	Real Estate, Kansas City, MO	✓		4/29/36	
62	Mowbray, John M.	Real Estate, Cincinnati, OH	✓		4/29/36	
63	Nichols, J. C.	Secretary, National Retail Lumber Dealers Association	✓		4/29/36	Very technical testimony on construction costs and planning
64	Schmidt, Walter S.		✓		4/29/36	
65	Carnahan, Frank		✓	✓	4/29/36; 8/6/37	

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
66	Kruesi, Walter	Economic Consultant on Housing, Welfare Council, NYC Treasurer, Worcester Home & Equity Coop Bank; Director, District Number 1, US Building and Loan League	✓	✓	4/29/36	Against the bill; unconstitutional and unnecessary
67	Harold, Raymond P.	Resident, Philadelphia (PA)	✓		4/29/36	Not opposed to helping to house “worthy underprivileged families” (SEL 1936, 363)
68	Fisher, Wager	Director, Housing Division, Public Works Administration of the Interior Department	✓		4/29/36	
69	Gray, Howard A.	Works Administration of the Interior Department	✓		4/14/37; 4/15/37	Technical testimony; provides analysis of difference between 35 and 36 Wagner bills
70	McDonald, Stewart	Administrator, FHA	✓	✓	4/14/37; 8/3/37	Under questioning, answers the act can cover any residential areas in the country, not just the big cities; urban is any area with concentrated residential housing; supports limiting income of family to 1.2k max, otherwise the law “would not [cover] the class of people which should depend on the Government for help” (HBC 1937, 46).
71	Myles, James M.	Vice President, Operative Plasterers and Cement Finishers International Association	✓		4/15/37	Appearing on behalf of MJ Colleran; represents builders
72	Morrison, Herbert S.	Parliament Member and Leader, London City Council	✓		4/15/37	Provides the perspective of a European with purportedly more advanced public housing systems; mostly technical in nature;

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
73	Vinton, Warren J.	Research Chief, Suburban Resettlement Division, Resettlement Administration	✓		4/15/37	Testifies on additional housing programs in the RA; believes the program is centered on the most housing insecure, not a privileged clientele less in need
74	Scott, Byron N.	U.S. Representative, CA	✓		4/15/37	
75	Haldane, Bernard	Representing City-Wide Tenants Council, NYC	✓		4/15/37	Testimony was to introduce other witnesses; no substantive message
76	Phillips, Donelan J.	Chair, City-Wide Tenants Council, NYC	✓		4/15/37	
77	Schein, Anna	Representing Lower East Side Public Housing Conference, NYC	✓		4/15/37	
78	Palmer, Charles F.	Chair, Techwood Homes, First United States Slum Clearance; Former President, National Association of Building Owners and Managers	✓		4/15/37	
79	James, E. Stewart	Realtor, NYC	✓		5/11/37	recommends paying private entities directly, not going through housing authorities
80	Winters, Henry	Representing Council of Real Estate Associations of NYC and Bronx Borough Taxpayers League	✓		5/11/37	Opposed to the bill because it violates the Constitution and states can handle the problem themselves

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
81	Duke, Charles S.	Former President and Representative, DC Board of the National Technical Association President, United Mine Workers/Council of Industrial Organizations Director of Economics and Statistics, Federal Housing Administration Deputy Administrator, Federal Housing Administration	✓		5/11/37	
82	Lewis, John L.			✓	8/3/37	Statement in lieu of appearance; interesting Chair Steagall is the one who put the statement in the record; endorses bill;
83	Fisher, Ernest M.			✓	8/3/37	Proposes adding language that for every new building created, and old one has to be demolished or repaired; has visited 12 countries across the globe to see how public housing programs are constituted
84	McGehee, Charles C.			✓	8/3/37	Never speaks, just brings up a chart
85	Dirksen, Everett M.	U.S. Representative, Illinois		✓	8/4/37	Claims he was tasked by the chair to concoct amendments to the bill; brings up favor toward large "Harvard" style expensive PWA housing units, but that housing issues also pertain to subsistence homeheads and Resettlement admin activities. Supports action b/c a) construction unemployment remains high and b) lack of housing stock/families stuck in apts;
86	Ellenbogen, Henry	U.S. Representative, Pennsylvania Secretary, American Federation of Housing Authorities; Executive Director, Municipal Housing of Schenectady, NY		✓	8/4/37	Explains why he has sponsored the bill; how he worked out compromise measure; is willing to make any sacrifices to enact the bill
87	Frisbie, Miles R.			✓	8/4/37	

Table 9B.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	SEL	HBC	Dates	Notes
88	Bodfish, Morton	Executive Vice President, US Building & Loan League, Chicago, IL		✓	8/5/37	
89	Clabaugh, Samuel F.	President, Protective Life Insurance Co; Director and Chair, Special Committee on Housing, Chamber of Commerce of U.S.		✓	8/6/37	Does not support government building sanitary homes for the poor, since it can never scale up to the level to provide such security, and will instead disincorporate private actors from improving their own housing stock
90	Beiter, Alfred F.	U.S. Representative, New York		✓	8/6/37	
91	Goman, Josephine	Secretary, Detroit Housing Commission		✓	8/6/37	
92	Bruce, Mrs. R.C.	Resident, New York City		✓	8/6/37	Descriptive Rep: comes from lowest income group; talks about Blacks being the poorest; has thought long and hard about how to solve the conditions of the slums; p. 288 block quote; hopes the House adopts an amdt to make the units more than just a dormitory
93	James, R. Darwin	Chair, New York State Board of Housing		✓	8/6/37	Opposes the push to remove Sec. 9 which authorizes funds to limited profit housing groups; claims amdt is proposed by building and loan interests that would stand to lose profit if the provision remained intact; public interest differs from this interest, so keep the provision; claims building and loan assoc do not do wide scale planning necessary to achieve the bill's stated purposes; only limited profit authorities have the planning and incentives to follow this through; testifies to how both systems work in NY state
94	Reimer, Mortimer	Secretary, National Lawyers Guild		✓	8/6/37	wants an amdt striking Subdivision B of Section 4, which exempts lawyers from competitive civil service requirements; wants competitive system
95	Mayer, Charles C.	Monetary Authority, Washington D.C.		✓	8/6/37	offers an amdt on financing the project; keep the bonds in Treasury and do not grant private lenders the appropriations from the bill

Appendix 9C: Model Code

```
countbyrd<-lm(Sbyrd ~ countdv, data=USHADone)
summary(countbyrd)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = Sbyrd ~ countdv, data = USHADone)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.5670 -0.5381 0.4330 0.4475 0.7505
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.56698 0.06666 8.506 1.08e-12 ***
countdv -0.02887 0.01723 -1.675 0.098 .
```

```
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 0.4974 on 77 degrees of freedom

(478 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.03516, Adjusted R-squared: 0.02263

F-statistic: 2.806 on 1 and 77 DF, p-value: 0.09799

```
averagebyrd<-lm(Sbyrd ~ average73to75,
data=USHADone)
summary(averagebyrd)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = Sbyrd ~ average73to75, data =
USHADone)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.5860 -0.5306 0.4140 0.4456 0.6670
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.58599 0.06786 8.635 6.06e-13 ***
average73to75 -0.04743 0.02326 -2.040 0.0448
*
```

```
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 0.4933 on 77 degrees of freedom

(478 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.05126, Adjusted R-squared: 0.03894

F-statistic: 4.16 on 1 and 77 DF, p-value: 0.04481

```
countlogan<-lm(Slogan ~ countdv, data=USHADone)
summary(countlogan)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = Slogan ~ countdv, data = USHADone)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.5689 -0.5440 0.4311 0.4560 0.6550
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.56890 0.06766 8.408 1.99e-12 ***
countdv -0.02487 0.01835 -1.356 0.179
```

```
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 0.5001 on 75 degrees of freedom

(480 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.02392, Adjusted R-squared: 0.0109

F-statistic: 1.838 on 1 and 75 DF, p-value: 0.1793

```
averagelogan<-lm(Slogan ~ average73to75,
data=USHADone)
summary(averagelogan)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = Slogan ~ average73to75, data =
USHADone)
```

Residuals:

```
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.5678 -0.5268 0.4322 0.4527 0.7402
```

Coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.56781 0.06973 8.143 6.36e-12 ***
average73to75 -0.03080 0.02547 -1.209 0.23
```

```
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1
```

Residual standard error: 0.5014 on 75 degrees of freedom

(480 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.01913, Adjusted R-squared: 0.00605

F-statistic: 1.463 on 1 and 75 DF, p-value: 0.2303


```

countspassage<-lm(Spassage ~ countdv,
data=USHADone)
summary(countspassage)

Call:
lm(formula = Spassage ~ countdv, data =
USHADone)

Residuals:
Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.8240  0.1760  0.1760  0.2001  0.3810

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.82397    0.05363   15.365 <2e-16 ***
countdv     -0.01206    0.01460   -0.826  0.411
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4033 on 78 degrees of
freedom
(477 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.008667,    Adjusted R-
squared: -0.004043
F-statistic: 0.6819 on 1 and 78 DF, p-value: 0.4115

averagespassage<-lm(Spassage ~ average73to75,
data=USHADone)
summary(averagespassage)

Call:
lm(formula = Spassage ~ average73to75, data =
USHADone)

Residuals:
Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.8079  0.1921  0.1938  0.1998  0.2453

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.80790    0.05546   14.568 <2e-16 ***
average73to75 -0.00499    0.02023   -0.247  0.806
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4049 on 78 degrees of
freedom
(477 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.0007797,    Adjusted R-
squared: -0.01203
F-statistic: 0.06087 on 1 and 78 DF, p-value: 0.8058

countrecommit<-lm(Hrecommit ~ countdv,
data=USHADone)

```

```

summary(countrecommit)

Call:
lm(formula = Hrecommit ~ countdv, data =
USHADone)

Residuals:
Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.7789 -0.3342 -0.3342  0.5917  0.6658

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.33424    0.02855   11.708 <2e-16 ***
countdv     0.07410    0.01864    3.976 8.48e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4782 on 359 degrees of
freedom
(196 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.04218,    Adjusted R-
squared: 0.03951
F-statistic: 15.81 on 1 and 359 DF, p-value: 8.479e-
05

averagerecommit<-lm(Hrecommit ~ average73to75,
data=USHADone)
summary(averagerecommit)

Call:
lm(formula = Hrecommit ~ average73to75, data =
USHADone)

Residuals:
Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.6868 -0.3546 -0.3290  0.5943  0.6710

Coefficients:
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.32901    0.02978   11.049 <2e-16 ***
average73to75 0.07668    0.02062    3.719 0.000232
***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4795 on 359 degrees of
freedom
(196 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.0371,    Adjusted R-
squared: 0.03442
F-statistic: 13.83 on 1 and 359 DF, p-value:
0.0002317

```

```

countpassage<-lm(Hpassage ~ countdv,
data=USHAdone)
summary(countpassage)

Call:
lm(formula = Hpassage ~ countdv, data =
USHAdone)

Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.7776 0.2224 0.2224 0.2224 0.4182

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.77762 0.02548 30.518 <2e-16 ***
countdv -0.02176 0.01660 -1.311 0.191
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4262 on 359 degrees of
freedom
(196 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.004764, Adjusted R-
squared: 0.001992
F-statistic: 1.719 on 1 and 359 DF, p-value: 0.1907

averagepassage<-lm(Hpassage ~ average73to75,
data=USHAdone)
summary(averagepassage)

Call:
lm(formula = Hpassage ~ average73to75, data =
USHAdone)

Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-0.7781 0.2205 0.2387 0.2415 0.2415

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.758521 0.026594 28.523 <2e-16
***
average73to75 0.004187 0.018293 0.229 0.819
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4272 on 359 degrees of
freedom
(196 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.0001459, Adjusted R-
squared: -0.002639
F-statistic: 0.05239 on 1 and 359 DF, p-value:
0.8191

```

```

###
###LOGIT ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR SIGNIF
MODELS:
###SBYRD & HRECOMMIT

###

logcountbyrd<- glm(Sbyrd ~ countdv
, data = USHAdone, family =
"binomial")
summary(logcountbyrd)

Call:
glm(formula = Sbyrd ~ countdv, family =
"binomial", data = USHAdone)

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.300 -1.244 1.059 1.086 1.678

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.28413 0.27455 1.035 0.301
countdv -0.12833 0.08096 -1.585 0.113

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to
be 1)

Null deviance: 109.50 on 78 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 106.58 on 77 degrees of freedom
(478 observations deleted due to missingness)
AIC: 110.58

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

logaveragebyrd<- glm(Sbyrd ~ average73to75
, data = USHAdone, family = "binomial")
summary(logaveragebyrd)

Call:
glm(formula = Sbyrd ~ average73to75, family =
"binomial", data = USHAdone)

Deviance Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-1.340 -1.228 1.023 1.082 1.529

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.3744 0.2863 1.308 0.1910
average73to75 -0.2196 0.1173 -1.872 0.0613 .
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

```

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 109.50 on 78 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 105.16 on 77 degrees of freedom
(478 observations deleted due to missingness)
AIC: 109.16

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

```
logcountrecommit<- glm(Hrecommit ~ countdv
, data = USHAdone, family = "binomial")
summary(logcountrecommit)
```

Call:

```
glm(formula = Hrecommit ~ countdv, family =
"binomial", data = USHAdone)
```

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.7184	-0.9007	-0.9007	1.3400	1.4821

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	-0.6926	0.1267	-5.465	4.63e-08 ***
countdv	0.3183	0.0864	3.684	0.00023 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 482.12 on 360 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 467.02 on 359 degrees of freedom
(196 observations deleted due to missingness)
AIC: 471.02

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

```
logaveragerecommit<- glm(Hrecommit ~
average73to75
, data = USHAdone, family =
"binomial")
summary(logaveragerecommit)
```

Call:

```
glm(formula = Hrecommit ~ average73to75, family =
"binomial",
data = USHAdone)
```

Deviance Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-1.5550	-0.9326	-0.8907	1.3435	1.4943

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	-0.71976	0.13318	-5.405	6.5e-08 ***
average73to75	0.33732	0.09839	3.429	0.000607 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 482.12 on 360 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 468.69 on 359 degrees of freedom
(196 observations deleted due to missingness)
AIC: 472.69

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

Chapter 10

The Strange Bedfellows of Antipoverty Policy:

Interest Convergence in the National School Lunch Act of 1946

Abstract

In contrast to the Social Security and U.S. Housing Acts, the National School Lunch Act was debated and passed in an otherwise inhospitable legislative climate for antipoverty policy. In the 1940s, the governing Conservative Coalition in Congress and global crisis of World War II decreased the salience and viability of new domestic social welfare programs. However, spurring its passage and informing its policy design, the NSLA was buoyed by a peculiar—and potent—interest coalition of military officials, agricultural interests, education reformers, and public health leaders. While these strange bedfellows of antipoverty policy had serious internal divisions, their combined efforts proved effective to deliver policy enactment. And yet, as is often true in antipoverty policymaking, political expediency coincided with a division of the poor into unworthy hungry adults who lost existing food stamp coverage and positively constructed needy children. Further, the policy was not calibrated to reach all poor school children, as it relied on actor discretion at state Boards of Education, operated through a separate-but-equal Jim Crow paradigm, and limited reach to children at schools with inadequate facilities and staffing. This chapter takes a forensic approach to trace the long arc of the policy process by focusing on the role of legislative leaders, the design of competing legislation, content analysis of witness testimony, rhetoric-roll call statistical modeling, and an analysis of the statutory language. Consistent with previous cases in other policy domains, the evidence shows a central tendency of politicians to divide the needy poor into policy incorporated and unincorporated groups while serving adjacent non-poor constituencies as they create imperfect vessels that ultimately do benefit many poor Americans.

When we adjourned, Mr. Chairman, I was speaking about our base, which is about 16,000,000 examined [recruits], and I think the best I can do for the committee is to point out that these lists of physical defects which we have here are of many kinds, so-called mental, so-called emotional, so-called educational and physical. From what study we have made I would say that 2 or 3 percent of them only are specified as malnutrition and rickets and a few things that are almost wholly connected with nutrition; but while there are 2 or 3 percent of those nutritional defects specified as such by examiners, there are 40 or 50 or 60 percent, perhaps, of rejections that are rejections in which at least nutrition or feeding has much to do with the rejection.

–Maj. Gen. Lewis Hershey, Selective Service, March 27, 1945

It is the view of the War Food Administrator that this program is primarily, and in the long-term of years, a program to provide a market for farmers. The fact that it aids children, that it encourages good nutrition programs, that it embraces the nutrition of children is an incidental effect, however desirable.

–Lt. Col. Ralph Olmstead, War Foods Administration, February 15, 1944

Of course, I believe very firmly that this program ought to stay in the Department of Agriculture. I think it is going to be discontinued by Congress in a year or two if it is not connected with the disposition of surpluses.

–Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), May 2, 1944

We would like to see provision made in title II of the bill for the use of funds for purchase of equipment as well as for personnel since it is our experience that some schools now are unable to take advantage of the Federal program because they cannot get the necessary equipment to prepare the lunches.

–Eleanor Fowler, Secretary Treasurer of CWA-CIO, May 4, 1944

In this discussion the main question is the health of our children, so that they will be better able to absorb the education provided for them to fit them for democratic living. This main purpose cannot be secondary to anything. One cannot justify Federal assistance to school lunches on the claim that it will aid farm markets. The program may have begun that way but from now on feeding of hungry children is the main feature. If education is given free in the public schools, then food must now be given to enable the hungry children to absorb the education provided, or else it is thrown away.

–Mrs. Harvey Wiley, General Federation of Women's Clubs, May 2, 1944

Introduction

With the onset of World War II, international issues thoroughly displaced the legislative push to further develop the antipoverty regime. Moreover, whatever attention was left for domestic initiatives faced resistance from the dawning governing coalition of conservatives in both major parties, effectively ending Franklin D. Roosevelt's (D-NY) New Deal and limiting the promise of Harry S Truman's (D-MO) Fair Deal. However, even in this inert context, a subtle but important policy development manifested like an oasis in the desert: the creation of federal school lunch supports for needy students.

The National School Lunch Act (NSLA) of 1946 was the first dedicated national statutory program to provide resources to localities to ensure poorer students had access to nutritious lunches while at school. Existing scholarship documents that while the program is widely successful as it evolved through generations of tinkering and tuning, the policy as originally written left decision-making to local authorities to evaluate the economic standing of each individual student. In turn, this policy design choice led to insufficient equitable access to school lunches across jurisdictions. Moreover, the policy enforced the aspirational but fictitious separate-but-equal paradigm at the behest of Southern lawmakers, which meant many Black students in poverty conditions failed to receive the same resources of their white counterparts. And finally, even after pitted intra- and inter-chamber debates, the modest appropriations to help schools develop facilities to serve food to children largely went unfunded in subsequent years, entrenching an inequality between truly poor schools with many poor students and wealthier schools with relatively few, but oddly privileged poor students.

Leading scholars on the history and politics of nutrition programs and school lunches (Robin 1968; Gould 1972; Demas 2000; Levine 2008; Poppendieck 2010; Rutledge 2016; Ruis

2017), document two consistent, vital findings. First, that agricultural interests piloted the legislative ship and received disproportionate benefits from the program in comparison to other interested parties. Second, that the full antipoverty scope of the policy design was not fulsomely implemented until the 1960s, acutely seen in Congress' decision not to fund the much-needed facilities improvement grants for poorer schools to provide healthy meals to children. Indeed, extant scholarship causally links the two findings: because agricultural interests deviated from antipoverty interests, the powerful former group received full benefits without necessarily tending to the marginalized interests of the latter. This chapter confirms and extends these findings on several fronts, leading to several important—and novel—contributions to the study of the NSLA, Congress, public policy, and American statebuilding.

First, this work will confirm and extend the current literature by situating the moment within a larger historical-comparative research design in which the NSLA is assessed concurrently with the SSA and USHA to systematically suss out larger dynamics across and idiosyncrasies within cases. Additionally, unlike the other two case studies in this dissertation, there is no existing dedicated book-length treatment of the legislative process for the NSLA. As Chapters 8 and 9 cover, the Social Security Act (Douglas 1936; Witte 1962; Derthick 1979) and U.S. Housing Act (McDonnell 1957) both have dedicated forensic treatments. Instead, while the aforementioned school lunch texts are seminal resources, they have different objectives than understanding the NSLA policy process. Importantly for this research, none of the SSA, USHA, or NSLA works focus on the politics of poverty, namely the representation of the poor, even if they provide essential insights into how the poor can be ignored in policies created to benefit them.

Second, none of these works use the analytical techniques commonly used in contemporary qualitative and quantitative political science—particularly legislative studies—which include a

focus on original empirical documentation, statistical modeling, discourse analysis, and ethnography. This chapter's emphasis on systematic empirical assessment provides more granular analysis than the excellent but broad historical narratives in previous works. Through a sequential assessment of internal Congressional process dynamics, including interbranch relations and the substance of committee witness contributions, the chapter traces the arc of the policy development from the formative ideational plane to societal effects of policy implementation. Moreover, efforts are made to pursue conceptual development on several fronts, including by focusing on poverty rhetoric, symbolic and substantive representation of the poor, antipoverty coalition formation, and the antipoverty regime. In total, employing a holistic, varied, and advanced analytical framework that exploits a heightened level of thick descriptive history and empirical rigor offers the most comprehensive assessment of the school lunch poverty process.

Third, this chapter builds upon the existing literature on the NSLA by creatively applying theory and rigorously tracing the sequential policy process history of the program to understand key generalizable dynamics that remain underexamined in existing policy studies scholarship. Particularly, the chapter treads new ground by focusing on how the configuration of antipoverty interests involved in the process resulted in the important but flawed public policy output. Special attention is devoted to understanding *interest convergence*, where potentially hostile groups join forces to spur policy enactment. While both previous case studies on SSA and USHA had unique interest agglomerations, the NSLA arguably had the most peculiar, perhaps as an artifact of its moment in Congressional and U.S. history. To gain purchase on this curiosity, the chapter gainfully employs Kingdon's (2011 [1984]) multiple streams framework (MSF) to assess the confluence of these varied dynamics. This application arguably provides the quintessential illustration of what he calls the "policy window and joining streams", in which the problem,

political, and policy streams merged, leading to a unique opportunity window for school lunch policy enactment. While there is previous scholarship severally on school lunches and policy windows, no one has made these analytically rich conceptual connections until now.

The objectives are to understand a series of interrelated questions. First, how were the poor conceptualized throughout the policy debates and how did this conceptualization factor into the ultimate policy design? Were the poor divided, and if so, along what lines? Which interest groups were politically active on the topic and how did their involvement influence the process? How did the aggregation of factors informing the answers to the previous questions contribute to the NSLA's passage after the New Deal proper during the Conservative Coalition?

Special efforts are expended to assess the amount of poor voice in the legislative process by focusing on leading advocates in the form of Members of Congress, committee witnesses, and interest coalitions. This chapter employs a comparative-historical methodology to understand potential outcomes in the policy choice set and the political development of the issue over time. The data generation process relied on several primary sources, namely sponsored legislation, committee hearing minutes, Congressional reports, floor proceedings, and the index to proceedings in Congress. Analyses employ descriptive history, discourse and content analysis, and ethnography to understand the goals, strategies, and contributions of key actors as they design and shepherd the NSLA into passage.

It is revealed the poor receive a muted form of representation throughout the official proceedings on school lunch. A minority of advocates for school lunch center the debate on what is best for poor youth, while most participants use the valence of poor children to pursue ancillary objectives revolving around non-poor interests and/or controlling the locus of decision-making power. When the poor are discussed, they are initially divided between undeserving hungry adults

who lose food stamp coverage and the more positively constructed malnourished children who gain permanent statutory support. Children are further divided based on location, school wealth, and in a veiled manner, race. The lack of fulsome representation of the lives of poor children, which very few Members of Congress (MCs) or witnesses imagined or explained, mirrors the eventual uneven incorporation of the nation's poor youth into the policy design.

Bolstering current scholarship with new conceptual depth, much of the impetus for the creation of the program was indeed due to powerful *secondary constituencies* not centered on poverty reduction, specifically the successful aspirations of agricultural representatives to enshrine federal government purchase of surplus commodities, and military leadership concerned that childhood malnutrition among soldiers contributed to decreased military readiness and effectiveness in World War II. While the latter group proved effective at framing the debate, the evidence suggests the former's goal of securing a domestic commodity consumption market was the primary impetus for program instantiation—feeding school children was an unobjectionable mechanism to achieve this goal. Indeed, this work provides new evidence for *how* and *why* agriculture dominates the policy process throughout. This is seen in: the genesis of original program in the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) Amendment of 1935; USDA's foothold on managing the program for a decade; the grip of Congressional agricultural committees on policy jurisdiction; pro-ag committee witnesses being more unified than the divided rival education camp; the role of lead advocates and the legislative coalition prioritizing the interests of agriculture; the eventual policy's selected framing and substantive orientation around agricultural markets; and the lack of follow-through on the non-food aid provisions of the bill. This culminates in an irony of the law: the success of hunger (and poverty) eradication was simply unnecessary for agricultural interests to reap permanent benefits, which helps to proffer a structural and incentive-based

explanation for why the policy did not go further to ensure all poor children had nutritional meals in school.

In the coalition but less successful were the educational reformers and public health experts that argued for a robust nutrition curriculum and a dedicated bureaucracy free of the internal conflicts of interests that allegedly marred the USDA. While these folks constituted a plurality of committee witnesses, they were ultimately unsuccessful at altering the status quo and had to settle for joining the bandwagon on the road to eventual passage. Moreover, this case uncovers the growing importance of intra-governmental actor competition in an era of expanding governmental infrastructural power. Government-affiliated witnesses offered vital technical expertise while advocating for their vision of the program, exposing fissures between the legislative and executive branches, chambers of Congress, and executive branch bureaucracies. These secular developments and the convergence of these diverse interests confoundingly aided the bill to become law *and* contributed to its incomplete incorporation of poor children across the nation.

Instead of using the positive valence of poverty to strictly pursue self-interests, it is accurate to portray these secondary constituencies as pursuing self-interests by instantiating a flawed but altruistic program for the poor. This paradigm of solving non-poverty problems while addressing some aspect of poverty is peculiar and risky due to its multiple poverty and non-poverty objectives. However, in this case, the approach overperforms expectations given the complete lack of poor person input in the process. This episode is, therefore, an illuminating example of poverty politics where the poor are peripheral. This conclusion adds to the evidence from the previous case studies that dividing the poor into preferential groups and coupling with powerful policy-demanding interests may be the unfortunate cost to getting any antipoverty programs within the Congressional policymaking process and larger American political culture of this era. Indeed, passage of the

NSLA served as an unlikely victory in an age of hostility toward the national government and social welfare, and marks the last major antipoverty policy enacted on the federal stage until the Great Society of the 1960s.

Political Development of School Lunch Policy in the U.S.

The genesis of school lunches as a public policy has its roots in the early Progressive Era when local governments in Philadelphia and Boston began pilot “penny” lunch programs for students in need. Formerly, meals for poor students were relegated to the domain of private charity, much like other antipoverty measures (Gould 1972, 3). The broader hygiene and home economics movements, along with academics studying the effect of malnutrition on student performance, elevated the profile of school lunches in the 20th century (Levine 2008, 18-24). While school districts across the country adopted pilot school lunch programs, state and federal level policy remained out of reach for what was not long before considered the purview of private spaces.

This changed in World War I, as the federal government began to seek out and employ nutritionists to guide food conservation and balancing diets, at home and abroad. Under Herbert Hoover’s tutelage as War Foods Administrator, school lunches were employed in Europe as a part of a larger relief effort for America’s allies (35-36). This global pilot program demonstrated the U.S. government’s ability to study and implement the logistics of food production, acquisition, transportation, and preparation, even if political interest for the food program was only limited to extreme episodes, such as global war.

The Great Depression of the late-1920s and 1930s mobilized the country to adopt a warlike response to lessen endemic suffering and penury. Now as president, Hoover worked with Congress to pass the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932 to creatively encourage lending to dilapidated and long neglected communities across the country. With this new tool, Hoover’s RFC

supplied loans to several towns in southwest Missouri to support labor costs—as a form of work relief—to prepare school lunches (Gould 1972, 2). This important step marked the federal government’s initial involvement in supporting local school lunch programs, although the reasoning was hardly centered on hungry students themselves. What started as a work-relief initiative—further expanded to cover more localities under President Franklin D. Roosevelt through the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA)—soon crossed over to the purview of one of the most durable and ascendent interests in U.S. politics: agriculture.

The idea of school lunches gained national policy focus primarily as a means to dispose of federally purchased surplus foodstuffs, and later, to maintain a domestic consumer market for farmers (Sandler 2011, 33). The Great Depression not only opened the door for new social welfare policy, but it precipitated action on the looming sense that the agricultural economy was falling behind the industrial economy—relief measures were one way to bolster demand for agricultural products (Ruis 2017, 112-113). In addition to the RFC, Hoover supported the Agriculture Marketing Act of 1929, which created the Federal Farm Board empowered to purchase as much as \$500,000,000 in surplus agricultural goods. This law served as a precursor to the more ambitious Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, amendments of 1935 (which included Section 32 commodity purchasing authority), and subsequent technical amendments in 1938 after the Supreme Court ruled in *United States v. Butler* (1936) that the original AAA was unconstitutional.

Of particular importance for school lunches is Section 32 of the AAA Amendments of 1935, “under which 30% of the gross receipts from U.S. customs duties we reapplied to removing price-depressing surplus foods from the market” (Gould 1972, 3). The need to maintain price supports required purchasing commodities, but unlike earlier in the New Deal when some of these

purchases, such as milk, were discarded without an end user, this provision became the primary vessel for an emboldened executive branch—operating through the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—to experiment with new forms of social provision. Specifically, this dedicated funding stream was independent of—and in addition to—annual Congressional appropriations, which gave USDA leadership resources to pursue novel initiatives (Gaus, Wolcott, and Lewis 1940, 198). Cultivating poor families (including both adults and school children) as target consumers satisfied the contemporary needs of farmers and non-farmers alike. Throughout this era, the USDA scaled up the program to cover more interested localities, which in turn gave the department a strong “foothold in the school lunch program that continues today” (3).

A final measure—wholly ignored in existing scholarship—was the untitled Act of June 28, 1937 (50 Stat. 323), which provided additional authority to continue commodity purchases and expressly allowed the use of farm products for relief and donation purposes. In sum, these agricultural policies expanded and fully nationalized the costs of surplus commodity purchases while supporting further executive branch experimentation with the pilot food “stamp” plan, expanding school lunch initiatives, and other forms of food donation and relief.

But a key secular change made policy continuity tenuous and new policy enactment entirely anathema: the rise of the Conservative Coalition in Congress. Following the increasing tensions between the progressive orientation of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Second” New Deal (1935-36) and an increased willingness by the president to take on reactionary forces in the South, a cartel of conservative Southern Democrats grew emboldened to challenge the president. The emotional and intellectual leader of the revolt was Josiah Bailey (D-NC), who assembled the “Conservative Manifesto” in 1937 to unite Congressional conservatives across party and chamber (Patterson 1967, 198). The rhetoric in the manifesto revolved around curtailing state expansion

and increasing the opportunity for profit in the business sector (Moore 1965, 34), but its adherents also had hostility to any new spending or social policies, and a desire to reign in executive power.

In addition to Bailey, leading figures in the Senate included Walter George (D-GA), Harry F. Byrd (D-VA), Carter Glass (D-VA), Millard Tydings (D-MD), and Richard Russell (D-GA), who formed strategic partnerships with the GOP, led by “Mr. Republican” Bob Taft (R-OH) (Moore 1965; Patterson 1967, 279; Manley 1983, 226). The House side was coordinated through Republican Minority Leader and eventual Speaker Joseph Martin (R-MA), who worked with Howard Smith (D-VA) and Eugene Cox (D-GA) to create a Northern conservative Republican-Dixiecrat governing coalition (Patterson 1967, 307; Manley 1983, 232).

The group gained power as internal fissures in the Democratic Party came to the fore and through the replacement of liberal or administration-friendly Democrats with Republicans in the backlash midterm election of 1938 (Patterson 1967, 289-290). The coalition developed a successful modus operandi that carefully managed the politics of a continued economic crisis but still popular incumbent president in office. With comparatively low numbers and power (17), the GOP pursued the same strategy in the Senate (107-108) and House (307), wherein Republicans would maintain a low profile, let Democratic lawmakers fight amongst themselves, only engaging once signaled to vest their unadvertised votes behind the conservative bloc to form the decisive margin. This approach was successful at reorienting the legislative agenda and governing power away from New Deal liberals, and it would take one of their own—Senator Russell—to shepherd a solitary social welfare policy through Congress in this period.

The bipartisan consensus against social provision was not the only threat to commodity purchase-based executive branch experimentation with school lunches and the relief-focused food stamp plan. What further complicated the picture was the global crisis of World War II, which

shifted attention from domestic to foreign policy. Moreover, the mobilization of U.S. forces into Europe and Asia tightened the domestic labor market, creating full employment conditions that made relief programs appear counterproductive when greater workforce participation was sorely needed. But the war reoriented the terrain to create new opportunities as well: immediate strain on supply chains and international trade, surplus commodities without a destination late in and immediately after the war, and the need to raise future generations of well-nourished soldiers combined to sharpen the need for government management of the food supply.

To that end, Congress and the executive branch entered into a prolonged negotiation over which programs to continue, and at what funding levels. In 1943, Christian Herter (R-MA) in the House (H.R. 2997) and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (R-MA) in the Senate (S. 1260) proposed legislation authorizing the War Food Administrator to use Commodity Credit Corporation funds “in such amounts and in such a manner as may be determined by him” to supply food stamps to individuals making less than \$1000 per year (\$1,200 for a household) (1-3). Perhaps reflecting the political culture of Massachusetts and its long history of comparatively generous poor laws, these international focused moderate Republicans linked winning the war with managing the domestic food supply to ensure equitable access to food among the poor. In both cases, the bills were referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency, which did not act upon the proposals.

Trying a different approach, Senators George Aiken (R-VT) and Robert La Follette Jr. (P-WI) offered S. 1331 in the 78th Congress to support a modified form of the food stamp program in the form of a food allotment system, but this carrot was combined with the stick of limitations on executive power and a prohibition on subsidies for agricultural products. While these provisions threatened much of the status quo, a key motivating idea in the legislation was to provide ongoing support for poor adults and children alike. Congressional Democrats, led by conservatives, and the

administration found these approaches unpalatable, and instead opted to craft their own proposals than follow three junior moderate Republicans and an avowed Progressive, respectively. In taking this path, they decided to entirely eliminate a beneficiary group (hungry adults) while potentially curtailing spending on hunger amelioration altogether.

Forcing the issue, the House Appropriations Committee stripped funding for food stamps *and* school lunches, saying there was no legislative authorization for the program (*New York Times* 1944).⁷⁹ Faced with the prospect of losing the ability to feed *any* hungry Americans, the administration had to choose whether to pursue the food stamp plan or school lunches. It was reasoned that if any adults were not currently working, phasing out the stamp plan would be an incentive to get a job (or starve). In this way, adults were understood to be able-bodied, less in need, unworthy, and less deserving than children that cannot take care of themselves and that may become future soldiers for the nation. Given the choice, the administration favored devoting the food supply to the positively constructed hungry youth of America. To secure continued funding for their preferred initiative, the administration agreed with Congress and ended the food stamp program. In turn, the idea of food stamps does not return to the federal stage again until the 1960s.

However, even with the food stamp program eliminated and after providing a one-year \$50 million appropriation for 1944 due to the Senate's insistence, the House Cardinals (as

⁷⁹ There is some disagreement over which actors instigated ending the food stamp program. Most of the evidence in Congressional testimony and floor speeches suggests it was because Congress had lost support for a program they had never expressly created. This is supported by the testimony of Ralph Olmstead, who claimed the administration acquiesced to Congress' request to end the food stamp program (HAG 1944, 56). However, one witness to the episode (Donald Montgomery, then Consumer Counsel at the UAW-CIO) asserted in a Senate committee hearing on January 25, 1944 that executive branch leadership was behind the effort: "When I left the Department of Agriculture at the beginning of 1943, I made as much noise as I could on the fact that the Secretary of Agriculture, the War Food Administrator Claude Wickard, was about to discontinue the stamp plan we then had. The noise was not effective, and the stamp plan was discontinued in March of last year [1943]. Then along in the spring we found that the Food Distribution Administration under Mr. Chester Davis at that time was about to go further and discontinue the aid they had been giving to school lunch programs. Again the C.I.O. made as much noise as it could and got consumer organizations concerned with that move. Those organizations, through the good offices of Senator Russell and others, were able to prevent that action against the welfare for needy families and children of the country" (SAF 1944a, 81-82). Overall, available evidence suggests Wickard's actions were likely a response to appropriators pressing the issue.

appropriations subcommittee chairs are known) again threatened to end all food aid programs in 1944 unless several conditions were met: first, that permanent substantive legislation authorized a school lunch program; second, that USDA be given discretion on expenditures; and third, and end to ongoing milk relief programs, such as those in New York City, for non-students (H. Rept. 571 1943, 16-17). In response, WFA Administrator Marvin Jones directed his team to seek Congressional authorization for a permanent school lunch plan to avoid program interruption and decrease ongoing conflict with Congress.

While the initial committee hearings to better understand the problem, program, and solution were occurring, Representative John W. Flannagan (D-VA) sought a workaround by offering a floor amendment to H.R. 4278 (concerning animal, pest, and plant control) that would authorize school lunch funding indefinitely (*CR 90* 1944, 2287). The amendment was voted down on division—not a recorded roll-call—with 54 ayes and 136 noes (2331). Proponents for the amendment were mostly from the Agriculture Committee or liberal Democrats, while opposition was composed of conservative Democrats and most Republicans in attendance (plus a heavy amount of absenteeism as is usually the case when a question is settled through division).⁸⁰ House managers had no choice but to send the measure to the Senate without school lunch funding.

The upper chamber taking up the marketing of agricultural commodities legislation was the last opportunity to save the program. There, influential Senator Taft claimed the program was unconstitutional and should not be extended indefinitely. Fortunately, Taft reached a compromise

⁸⁰ While there is no recorded vote, one can piece together a subset of proponents, opponents, and ambivalent folks based on who spoke and how they depicted their views. Those speaking in favor were mostly from the Agriculture Committee and include: Flannagan (D-VA); Voorhis (D-CA; claiming we only hear about debt when there is something for poor people in the country); Sabath (D-IL; not on Ag); Phillips (R-CA); Hope (R-KS); Rizley (R-OK); Murdock (D-AZ); Carrier (R-KY). Speaking against the amendment: Smith (R-OH); Gwynn (R-IA); Lambertson (R-KS); Mason (R-IL); Bell (D-MO); Whittington (D-MS); Rowe (R-OH); Hoffman (R-MI). And members that did not support the measure now but said they could another time: Andresen (R-MN); Calvin D. Johnson (R-IL); Dondero (R-MI) (*CR 90* 1944, 2321-2331).

with Senator Earnest McFarland (D-AZ) that curtailed the program to be a wartime-only initiative that sunsets after 1946 (3850-3851). As was true throughout the NSLA policy process, a discourse and rationale based on military imperatives kept the program alive. Moreover, this two-year extension bought advocates additional time to make their case to colleagues without disrupting executive and local efforts to scale up the program to reach more students.

The fairly muted and careful opposition to extending the program shows MCs were often indifferent to the program; not yet sufficiently caring about the problem, instinctively opposing something perceived as new, unvetted, or unwanted. Therefore, lawmakers had to forge a convincing case to prove there was a need for such a program. A dedicated policy of its own; not continuing appropriations or riders to unrelated bills. Resolved, a subset of interested lawmakers initiated comprehensive committee investigations across chambers with key witnesses and deductive questions to build a fact-based record of merit and need to win over reticent colleagues.

Legislative Process

As with most social welfare legislation in America, the process of investigating the policy, writing the legislation, and passing it through Congress took years. Figure 10.1 distills this process into a flowchart that depicts supra-institutional antecedent events (in italics) and the serpentine legislative process. Many members across chambers sponsored legislation to create a statutory school lunch program, but members varied in their motivations and approach to codification. The first wave of lawmakers, led by Jerry Voorhis (D-CA) in the House and Robert La Follette Jr. in the Senate, could see food relief programs were at risk as early as 1942. However, these two lawmakers were unsuccessful at attracting attention to their legislation in the committees of jurisdiction—House Agriculture (HAG) and Senate Agriculture and Forestry (SAF)—which were

Figure 10.1 School Lunch Policy Process



Sources: Adapted from *CRs* 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 and their indices, Senate and House reports, and committee hearings.

unaccustomed to promoting social welfare legislation. More importantly, the two members were not in good standing with the governing Conservative Coalition on domestic policy.

This changed when following the food stamp program curtailment and the threat to school lunches in 1944, an ideologically diverse second wave of lawmakers, including New Deal legislative leader Robert Wagner (D-NY), joined the cause. But unlike in SSA and USHA, Wagner was not the conduit that ultimately delivered school lunches. Of pivotal importance, this new wave included SAF Chair Ellison D. Smith (D-SC), SAF subcommittee Chair Allen Ellender (D-LA), appropriator and leader of the Conservative Coalition Senator Russell, and soon-to-be HAG Chair Representative Flannagan. This peculiar cabal of conservative Dixiecrats sponsored the most

tractable legislation, chaired all of the pertinent committee hearings, managed the bills on the floor, warded off deleterious amendments, and generated a successful bicameral compromise measure that passed the House by an overwhelming margin (276-101 on February 21, 1946) and through the Senate by unanimous consent (on February 26). The bill went to conference committee with most of the same actors from the committee and floor processes, then passed both chambers without objection (May 23 in the House; May 24 in the Senate). Legislative leaders' interest in the issue remains idiosyncratic, but their prominent position within the larger polity undoubtedly forged a buffer that made it harder for opposition to the school lunch act to coalesce and apply the dominant retrenchment era logic to this solitary new social welfare policy.

Altogether, from the creation of local school lunch programs to their nationalization in statute took over 50 years. Within Congress, the legislative process took four years from Voorhis' initial proposal in 1942, or three sessions (about two calendar years) from the second wave proposals of early 1944 to gain codification with President Truman's signature on June 4, 1946. This is roughly analogous to the elapse of time in both the SSA and USHA cases, pointing to a central tendency timetable in social welfare policymaking in this era. But while enactment may appear inevitable in retrospect, the messy process of gathering facts and constructing a winning public policy narrative took time and care. Specifically, managing the dual tracks of designing the most effective policy while gaining the greatest actor buy-in required interrogation of and debate between competing proposals.

Proposed Legislation and Their Sponsors

House of Representatives

The most vocal advocate for a national school lunch program in Congress was California Democratic Representative Jerry Voorhis. The member represented a unique eastern Los Angeles

County district that had urban, suburban, and rural sections, informing his pedigree as one of the few members of Congress that depicted varied density-based forms of poverty in his 48 poverty speeches (third highest total of all MCs in this period). The program would help many of his constituencies from the poor in neglected urban areas to struggling produce farmers further in the periphery. An avowed New Dealer falling “roughly” into the “very progressive” camp (Voorhis 1970 [1947], 20), Voorhis furnished key agenda-setting rhetoric and legislation, often guided by an emotional energy and familiarity with the program’s operations across the country that made for compelling oratory. Indeed, in his biography, Voorhis wrote “just three bills which were passed during my ten years’ service—the Wage-Hour Act, the Farmers’ Home Administration Act, and the [NSLA]—were ample compensation for all the hard work, worrisome days, and deep disappointments that filled those years. And of these three acts, the one I care about the most is the School Lunch Act” (159).

The evidence bears this out, as his H.R. 6914 of 77th Congress in 1942 was the first bill to create a permanent, expressed authorization for the program. In this initial iteration, the bill would strengthen the 1935 amendments to the AAA to “divert from the normal channels of trade and commerce agricultural commodities and products thereof, by the payment of benefits or indemnities or by other means; or increase the utilization of such commodities and products, through benefits, indemnities, donations, or by other means, among persons in low-income groups; or distribute such commodities and products through school-lunch and child-feeding programs” (2). Importantly, this would seem to grant the secretary of agriculture not only support for school lunch programs, but also additional child nutritional support programs *and* direct food relief to poor adults. Disappointingly, the bill died in the House Agriculture Committee without action.

Continuing the uphill battle, Voorhis took a different approach when he offered H.R. 2160 in 1943. Instead of codifying the status quo, the MC proposed a \$200 million appropriation to move the program into the social welfare-centric Federal Security Administration, which managed the Social Security program and educational initiatives. The theory here is that moving the program out of USDA would better center the program on the needs of school children themselves. Moreover, this allowed Voorhis to bypass the Agriculture Committee and instead try the House Committee of Education. However, the chair was anti-New Deal conservative Southern Democrat Graham Barden (NC), and Voorhis was not even a member of the committee—two very inhospitable dynamics. While the death of these two bills marked the end of Voorhis’ bill sponsorship on the issue, he continued his advocacy in the ag committee and on the floor, albeit in a supporting role. “No doubt the School Lunch program had many more effective champions than I,” Voorhis suggested in his memoir, “but I am sure it had none more devoted” (Voorhis 1970 [1947], 144).

On the House side, Voorhis could be referring to John Flannagan. Perhaps a stronger “champion” by virtue of his station if not his direct interest, Flannagan was a senior member and rising Chair of the Agriculture Committee. He would assume the role of Robert Doughton (D-NC) on SSA or Henry Steagall (D-AL) on USHA in managing the House committee process *and* the floor process for the ultimately successful bill. Representing the rural westernmost part of Virginia, Flanagan’s support for school lunches was first and foremost centered on cultivating commodities markets, but in his rhetoric he often used national defense as the main argument (Rutledge 2016, 72). This creative discourse veiling material interest is emblematic of how agricultural interests saw an opening during WWII to solidify subsidies without having to center debate on their particular goals (72).

Flannagan uniquely ends up managing all of the competing school lunch legislation by the 79th Congress. The MC initially offers his own H.R. 2673 in 1945, housing the program in USDA, but with an important addition that is eventually stripped from the law: provision for lunches in childcare facilities. While this provision was ultimately removed for most Americans, limiting the nutritional and hunger-lessening impact of the bill, the childcare coverage was still included for Puerto Rico in the final bill, partly offsetting the smaller appropriation of funds to the territory.⁸¹ As a courtesy, Flannagan also offered H.R. 3143 to better understand the compromise Russell-Ellender bill. Once hearings were complete, the chair proffered a clean H.R. 3370 as a compromise measure that ultimately served as the vessel to pass school lunches through Congress. While 3370 nominally became law, its substance was truly hammered out in the upper legislative chamber.

But before turning to the Senate, it is worth noting a couple representatives who pursued school lunches entirely through a lens of agricultural support—and made that clear in their bills’ titles. Victor Wickersham (D-OK) and Gerald Landis (R-IN) offered identical legislation (H.R.s 4281 and 4288, respectively) on February 29, 1945, “to authorize the disposition of excess Government food stocks and related products” (1). “To dispose of excess food, wherever located,” the bill would “transfer, without reimbursement, to such Government agencies as he may designate, for use by such agencies, including but not being limited to distribution for domestic or foreign relief purposes, school lunch, or child-feeding programs” (5). The purpose is about surplus

⁸¹ This peculiar exception may be an artifact of the dual track path of relief legislation for Puerto Rico, a historically poor island that had a series of crop failures, natural disasters, and ongoing sovereignty and support issues that characterize federal government-territorial relations. Led by Dennis Chávez (D-NM) in the Senate—the chamber’s lone Latino member—S. 981 in the 78th Congress provided ongoing relief, including a robust school lunch program, to Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The legislation died on the House floor after being reported favorably out of committee. Along with the moderate Chávez, the Senate cosponsors were quite diverse along ideological lines: liberal Homer Bone (D-WA), Dixiecrat Allen Ellender (D-LA), mainline conservative Bob Taft (R-OH), and Klan-supported, idiosyncratic anti-communist Ralph Brewster (R-ME). Since this vessel failed, pinning it to the successful school lunch bill guaranteed Puerto Rico could continue operating its program, which was heavily dependent on childcare centers. However, it remains unclear why the Virgin Islands lost childcare center coverage.

commodities, but the tandem's approach of empowering the War Foods Administrator to provide free goods for both domestic and international relief is quite liberal. The bill appropriated \$50 million, which is what the administration was originally asking for, and left decision-making power to the trusted executive branch. While you would assume the administration would appreciate such friendly terms for the executive branch, the ship on this paradigm had sailed, eschewing the only intra-chamber bipartisan proposal. The most powerful lawmakers and the administration agreed to move forward only supporting subsidized school lunches and not those on relief.

Senate

By convention, the House is traditionally where legislation originates, especially those concerning spending. But while it was true one House member (Voorhis) was ardently agenda-setting on the issue, much of the ongoing financial support during the controversy over the program and intellectual debate about policy design was occurring in the Senate. This unconventional dynamic was in part a product of some of the chamber's most powerful actors exerting influence to maintain and expand the school lunch program.

The first member of Senate to sponsor a school lunch bill was none other than Robert Wagner, leader of the upstart urban liberals (Huthmacher 1968) and arguably the most prolific lawmaker in the New Deal period. Lead sponsor of the Social Security Act and the U.S. Housing Act, Wagner had a history of bucking convention and initiating social welfare legislation from the upper chamber. On this issue, Wagner offered S. 1721 in early 1944 to codify the existing executive branch program with minimal changes. This status quo bill would keep USDA in charge but give them additional money and discretion to pursue "school canning and gardening projects" (2). And in contrast to the bills coming from Southern Senators, it would allow the federal

government to deal directly with local schools—as it had controversially been doing—bypassing the potential hazard of states that may have different priorities for who should get resources (Levine 2008, 80). Unfortunately, by this period the iconoclast’s health started to wane, causing numerous absences from Congress. And whenever he was present, he had to focus attention on defending his policy legacy against retrenchment from the Conservative Coalition, not guiding new policies into fruition (Huthmacher 1968, 335-338).

Unexpectedly, those filling the void were not new upstart liberals, but instead, three dyed-in-the-wool conservative Southern Democrats. The most senior—and perplexing—of these lawmakers was Ellison “Cotton Ed” Smith. A farmer specializing in cotton by trade, Smith was a firebrand segregationist with a myopic devotion to agriculture and racial hierarchy.⁸² However, he had a history of passively supporting social welfare legislation from the Progressive Era into the New Deal (Hollis 1970, 235). Serving in the Senate since 1909, by the mid-1940s Smith had accrued significant seniority and power as the chair of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry

⁸² Additionally, Smith pursued a particular grievance form of politics that ran deep within Southern conservatives and populists alike. An example is seen in one particular angry speech lauding the farmer and Southern identity and lamenting the power of industrial workers and mismanagement by the administration: “Are we going to attempt to preserve the agricultural production of America, or are we going to turn farm workers loose and take our chances? [...] The fundamental question is, what is essential to the winning of the war? The *sine qua non* is food. Without it an army cannot fight... I hope this body will vote to provide that every farmer working on a farm and producing will be permitted to remain unless he himself elects to get up and go elsewhere. Mr. President, the main reason for depletion of the farms and the bringing about of this terrible condition is the determination on the part of those controlling the administration that the farmer shall not get a just price for his products. Earlier today the Senator from Maryland read some figures showing the wages the farmer receives as compared with the wages received by the industrial employees. The whole question depends upon whether groups are organized to vote or are not. If I could organize the farmers as completely as the industrial workers are organized, and get them to say ‘We are not going to vote for this or that candidate,’ a different condition would prevail... Columnists and public writers were referring a short time ago to the ‘farm bloc’ and the ‘greedy farmer.’ Why should he not be greedy? God knows he has been starving from the days of Adam until now. He has never been given a chance... Congress has passed many laws. In passing laws let us make them so clear that a fool can understand them. Fools do not understand many of the laws we have passed. We pass laws, but the administrator of the laws reads into them anything he wants to. We have degenerated to such a point that we are nothing more than an appropriating committee. We appropriate and the other man spends. I want to talk on the subject from the standpoint of an impoverished practical farmer... Shall we assume the responsibility of providing enough labor to produce the required quantity of food? We cannot do so unless we pay attention to those who are qualified farmers. Except for those who come from the farms, there is not a Member of the Senate present who knows how to operate a farm, or work on one...” (CR 89 1943, 1797-1798).

Committee for over a decade. Given this pedigree, Smith presents one of the biggest mysteries of this era, as he was not known to advocate for antipoverty programs, let alone show compassion to those that suffer (beyond white farmers).⁸³ The available evidence suggests Smith's goals matched those of Representative Flannagan, which were to support farmers by using the opportunity of the war to couch victory in terms of food production needed to win. "The fundamental question is, what is essential to the winning of the war? The *sine qua non* is food. Without it an army cannot fight," Smith proclaimed in a floor debate in 1943 (*CR 89* 1943, 1797). This is the exact convergence of interests that could lead someone to support school lunches without caring about poverty, and shows the power of external events in shifting the possibilities of political action. Jeopardizing his ability to shepherd school lunches to passage, Smith first lost a Democratic primary to Olin Johnston in 1944, then died before his term was up, leaving his junior co-sponsor to take the helm.

Allen Ellender is a less unidimensional figure than Smith, emulating the unique political culture of Louisiana in this era. Originally hostile to Huey Long (D-LA) and Longism, Ellender learned to negotiate the bounds of skeptical but allegiant support for the former governor and senator en route to succeeding Long in the Senate following his assassination in 1935 (Becnel 1996, 37-42). An ardent supporter of New Deal surplus commodity policies (130), Ellender's

⁸³ In many ways, Smith shares an oratory style with Senator Bilbo (D-MS). Although the former (12) lags behind the latter (29) in number of poverty-related speeches, the duo use most occasions to link poverty with virtue and chide the North for meddling in Southern affairs. An example of this occurred during a debate on antilynching legislation: "I cannot conceive how any man from the South or any honest man from the North can vote to support this piece of legislation [antilynching bill]. It used to be the boast of some of my colleagues here that in their youth they had to eat the hard bread of poverty and destitution; but the hardships of their youth became the golden ships of their manhood and mature years; the hard grilling of necessity was the gracious mother of their future success. There is an old Latin adage that has never been improved upon: *Ad astra per aspera*: 'To the stars through struggling.' We never will amend that" (*CR 81* 1937, 7882). He never fully squared the circle in making an overt point, but this passage would seem to imply that African-American suffering in the South was good for their future prospects. A most peculiar line of reasoning, since the company line at the time—often espoused by Senator Russell (D-GA)—was that white Southern lawmakers actually take better care of the Black population in the region than do their Northern counterparts.

broader politics are difficult to label and were known to vary across issue domains, generally fitting a Louisiana form of pragmatism and conservative populism. A constitutive dimension of this political culture was to support childhood education in the form of free textbooks, busing, and cafeteria food (131). These dynamics of local political culture helpfully situate why the Smith-Ellender proposal in 1944 (S. 1824) followed Voorhis' early lead and sought to move the program from USDA into FSA, with specific oversight by the Commissioner of Education in the Office of Education (OE). If social welfare was to be provided, it would be through the schoolhouse.

While Smith's affirmative interest in education remains unclear, Ellender viewed USDA as having interests that may diverge from those of hungry school children, since haphazardly sending surplus commodities (like onions and grapefruits) to schools might not be what the children need to grow strong (Ruis 2017, 140). Therefore, in addition to greater attention to which foodstuffs end up in schools, the proposal also sought to facilitate the creation of nutrition education programs that augmented the food itself. Since USDA did not have a clear nutrition education program in its current enterprises, this gave cause to shift the program. And fitting the desires of Ellender and other Southern Democrats, S. 1824 expressly fit a state-level gatekeeping model, in which participation was voluntary and federal leadership was proscribed in its ability to bypass state authorities (Levine 2008, 77). Since education has always been one of the least nationalized policy domains, directing the program through the federal education bureaucracy ostensibly posed less of a threat to subnational actors, since the OE levers of compulsion paled in comparison to those of USDA.

Yet, even though the policy was more education-centric, it was still referred to Smith's Agriculture Committee, giving the senior senator and his protégé control over the process. In

contrast, when Representative George Outland (D-CA)⁸⁴ offered the exact same companion legislation to Smith-Ellender in the House—(H.R. 4777)—it was referred to the Committee on Education. Both S. 1824 and H.R. 4777 lapsed when the 78th Congress adjourned, leaving Ellender without his Senate and House co-sponsors. In the 79th Congress, Ellender solitarily drew up S. 503, which had two new clauses of import. First, there was language on facilities improvement, implying federal support for schools other than on food aid, which was a major advancement sought by advocates. Second, and less savory, was the inclusion of a new separate-but-equal clause that tied the allocation of resources to white and Black schools in proportion to their population by state, but this provision was stripped in the House in creating H.R. 3370 (H. Rep 684 1945) for being *too generous* to Blacks (Ruis 2017, 149). But within three months of offering S. 503, in May of 1945, Ellender combined forces with his chief rival, crafting a compromise measure and forming a potent combination in the upper chamber.

The most important figure in the politics of school lunches is also one of the most powerful senators of the 20th century: Richard B. Russell. Like Smith and Ellender, Russell was an avowed

⁸⁴ Outland's speech on May 9, 1944, introducing his bill deserves attention for its cogency in contextualizing the need for lunches from a non-agricultural perspective. "Mr. Speaker, a few weeks ago in this House we voted to discontinue Federal assistance to the school-lunch program throughout this Nation [March 7; Flannagan's failed amendment to H.R. 4278]. I believed at that time, and I still believe, that this action was most unfortunate. Throughout America there are thousands upon thousands of school children who are underfed, and to whom the school-lunch program, inadequate as it was in many instances, was truly the bright spot in the day. Despite the general rise in our national income, thousands of families have relatively less than ever before, and the need for Federal aid to States and communities to continue the school-lunch program is as great, if not greater, than it has ever been. Because many mothers are employed in war industries, an increasing number of children are coming to school with an inadequate breakfast and without any provision whatsoever for lunch or with one that has been poorly selected. Transportation, rationing, and other wartime difficulties have complicated the problem still further. Without financial aid from the Federal Government, comparatively few schools can provide noon lunches for all children needing them. Not only from my own congressional district, but from all over the country have been coming earnest requests that legislation be enacted to provide for an adequate school-lunch program as an integral part of the services of our school system. Parent-teacher associations, community councils, and many other organizations vitally interested in the health of our future citizens are urging such action. To this end, I am introducing today into this House a bill designed to meet this need, one which I hope will not only provide for a continued lunch program, but one which will be administratively sound from an educational standpoint. I earnestly request that my colleagues study this proposed bill, and sincerely hope that it will meet with speedy, favorable action on the part of this body" (CR 90 1944, 4193). Notably, the speech does not use a nutrition education framework either, even though that is supposed to be the impetus for the bill's design. Continued hardship and the war effort are the key justifications for the program.

segregationist with articulated interests in representing those that toil in the fields of Georgia's farms. Russell believed lessening rural poverty would promote the economic welfare of the entire state, and the senator worked to direct as much money as possible into the state (Levine 2008, 76). "Of all his battles for the farmer," Robert Caro (2002) writes, "Russell was proudest of his fight for a national school lunch program which would aid farmers by reducing the country's huge agricultural surpluses while providing nourishment for needy children" (181). School lunches provided the perfect nexus of helping the poor by melding his interests in agriculture and education (Russell 2011, 167). On the latter issue, Russell believed the program would promote public school attendance and engagement (Levine 2008, 76-77). For these reasons, the senator kept the program alive for nearly a decade by pushing the issue of funding from his powerful position on the Senate Appropriations Committee (Caro 2002, 181).

To effectuate a permanent program, Russell proposed S. 1820 in March of 1944, and in May found a partner in the House when Chester Holifield (D-CA) offered parallel legislation in the form of H.R. 4742.⁸⁵ The policy melded Wagner's continuation of USDA controlling the program, with the Voorhis and Smith-Ellender use of OE within the FSA, although the appropriation to OE was modest and only intended provide auxiliary support to the states. Since Russell was more junior than SAF Chair Smith and SAF subcommittee Chair Ellender, he had to balance a conciliatory attitude with compelling arguments for why his preferred approach had merit. This was difficult when his legislation was taken to be a rubber stamp for pilot program

⁸⁵ Holifield represented a fairly conservative, agriculture-based district encompassing Orange and Riverside Counties, but was later known for his expertise on atomic energy policy. The MC often tied economy-wide conditions with in-class learning, perhaps believing the program would help as a safeguard against larger socioeconomic struggles caused by unemployment. The following passage is not principally about school lunch, but shows how the MC makes connections between these larger issues: "Widespread unemployment interrupts the education of a great many young people. A large proportion have to drop out of school to help support the family, particularly in the higher levels. And even at the primary and secondary levels, standards and facilities are greatly reduced as school funds are diverted to relief needs or dry up as a result of tax delinquencies and shrinking tax bases. Youth who are weakened and dulled by malnutrition and disease and unhappiness at home are not receptive students" (*CR 91* 1945, 11849).

with problems, while others appeared to be the reform advocates. Ever vigilant of his reputation and propriety as a lawmaker, in one hearing Russell made clear the policy design was his construction, and not handed to him by USDA:

I want to say for the record that the Department of Agriculture did not draw S. 1820. I drafted that bill myself, and some of the deficiencies that you [Bess Goodykoontz of the FSA] have alluded to doubtless grew out of my ignorance of the program. I have followed it very closely and handled it on the floor for about 4 years in the agricultural appropriation bill, but the Department of Agriculture did not draft that bill. I never consulted with anyone connected with the Department of Agriculture before I introduced it, so I think I should say for the record that the Department of Agriculture did not draw this bill. (SAF 1944b, 29)

The central goal of 1820 was to expand the existing program with as minimal a disturbance as possible—a pragmatism that undoubtedly helped its legislative prospects.

As primary source Table 10.1 shows, the contending bills are replete with dimensions of conflict. First, which agency would run the program? USDA in Wagner and Russell, or FSA in Smith-Ellender? Second, how would the federal organization engage subnational actors? Would they be able to directly contact schools as Wagner's (and perhaps Russell's) bill permits, or would State Boards of Education act as gatekeepers à la Smith-Ellender? Third, each appropriated a different amount of money to the program, ranging from Smith-Ellender's \$50 million (the amount the administration requested) to Wagner's \$80 million in 1945—uncapped in subsequent years—with Russell's initially starting at \$68 million, then rising to as much as \$100 million. Fourth, how are funds apportioned? The Wagner bill leaves it to the discretion of the USDA chief, Smith-Ellender uses a ratio between children and adults, while Russell proposes a formula that balances childhood population with level of state wealth. Fifth, would states have to match federal funds to unlock any of the money (Smith-Ellender), a subset of OE funds (Russell), or not match at all (Wagner)? This decision may harm poorer states that do not have budget space for the new program, while it may also be a mechanism to ensure program viability by securing local buy-in

Table 10.1 Contending Senate Bills Proposing a School Lunch Program

	Wagner bill, S. 1721	Russell bill, S. 1820	Smith-Ellender bill, S. 1824
Purpose.....	"It is declared to be the policy of Congress to provide * * * an adequate supply of food for the maintenance, expansion, and operation of school lunch and milk programs * * * and to effectuate this policy to make provision for the payment of necessary expenses.	"It is declared to be the policy of Congress * * * to assist in providing an adequate supply of foods for the maintenance, expansion, and operation of school lunch and milk programs." Money is granted also "for the purpose of providing and training such technical and supervisory personnel as may be necessary in the efficient operation of local school-lunch and school-milk programs."	"For the purpose of assisting each State to establish and maintain, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, school lunch programs to provide lunches and nutrition, instruction incidental thereto for children while attending school."
Amount of money appropriated for fiscal year ending June 1945.	\$80,000,000 of funds available to Secretary of Agriculture.	\$65,000,000 to Secretary of Agriculture; \$3,000,000 to U. S. Office of Education.	\$50,000,000 to be administered by State departments of education through U. S. Commissioner of Education.
Amount of money appropriated for succeeding years.	"Such sum as may be necessary"	To Secretary of Agriculture: "Such sum as may be necessary, not exceeding \$100,000,000 for any one fiscal year." To U. S. Office of Education, \$3,000,000.	\$50,000,000.
Provision for matching funds with States.	No matching basis is specified in the bill.....	No matching basis is specified in the bill for funds administered by the Department of Agriculture. Funds allotted to States through the U. S. Office of Education must be matched by State out of its education funds.	During first year program is in operation State, county, and local school system must contribute at least 30 percent of funds spent on school-lunch program. In succeeding years they must contribute half of total expenditures.
How administered.....	"The Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized, after conference with the school authorities of States and of cities, to maintain, expend, and operate school lunch and milk programs, and to provide food and milk for consumption by children in schools through payments to schools, or to board of education or other authorities or agencies exercising jurisdiction over schools, to provide for the purchase and distribution of food and milk, and for the development of community and school canning and gardening projects, and by such other means as the Secretary may determine to effectuate the declared policy of this act. * * * In effectuating the provisions of this act, determination by the Secretary of Agriculture as to what kinds and forms of foods and milk shall be provided and as to what operations and costs shall be taken into account in determining program costs shall be final."	"The Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authorized to enter into agreements with the school authorities of States to provide food and milk for consumption by children in schools and through payments to schools, or to boards of education or other authorities or agencies exercising jurisdiction over schools, to provide for the purchase and distribution of food and milk for such children. * * * Where such agreements cannot be entered into with the school authorities of any State, the Secretary is authorized to enter into agreements for such purposes with the school authorities or agencies exercising jurisdiction over schools, within such State." "The United States Commissioner of Education is hereby authorized and directed to cooperate with the State school authorities in establishing, maintaining, expending, and making more efficient the operation of such programs."	"The sums made available * * * shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the United States Commissioner of Education, State plans for assisting schools to develop and operate effective school-lunch programs."
Provision for educational activities.	None.....	None.....	"A State plan for assisting schools to develop and operate effective school-lunch programs shall include provisions for making available well balanced school lunches and nutrition instruction incidental thereto."
Provisions for apportionment of funds to States.	Distribution of funds is left to the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture whose decision is final.	Money channeled through the Department of Agriculture shall be apportioned to the States by the Secretary of Agriculture on the basis of school enrollment and need: "Provided, That if any State does not participate in the program * * *, such funds may be reapportioned, on the basis of school enrollment or of need, to such other States as the Secretary may determine." Money channeled through the Office of Education shall be apportioned to the States on the basis of school enrollment and need.	Money shall be apportioned to States in relation to the ratio between the number of children of school age and the number of adults. See table of allotments to States, below.

Source: Testimony of Sidney Hall before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. 1944. "School Lunch and Milk Programs." 78th Congress, 2nd Session, May 2. This primary source table appears on pages 10 and 11.

for a robustly funded federalized program. Sixth, could any of the money go towards labor and operating costs? Russell's bill allows such expenses. Notably, none of these bills initially had language on equipment and facilities that many poor schools desperately needed. And seventh, should there be a nutrition education program, as existed in Smith-Ellender, and who should control the curriculum? Would receiving money be stipulated on also providing nutrition education?

A fascinating aspect of these tensions is the cross-pressure between the two Southern Democratic proposals. Russell centers on the dominant agricultural constituency, but has an orientation toward national power. In contrast, Smith-Ellender is favored by liberal educational

reformers, but operates in a state's rights manner. Given the backgrounds of the lawmakers, neither bill perfectly fits what might be considered a Southern Democrat's dream of focusing on agriculture with minimal federal intervention. These mounting conflicts, among others, were interrogated in the lengthy committee and subcommittee hearings.

Fortunately, the conditions for reconciliation were apparent throughout committee the process. Chief among them, comity among members that turns bonds of trust into productive policymaking (Uslaner 1993). In this case, the Southern senators had many shared interests and had built comradery over the years, more often from opposition to civil rights (Lieberman 1998; Schickler 2016) and labor (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder 1993; Chen 2009) legislation than expressed interest in a new social welfare program. "I want to express my appreciation to the chairman, Senator Ellender" Russell proclaimed in committee on May 4, 1944, "for the very fair and impartial manner in which he has handled this hearing" (SAF 1944b, 235). "Thank you," Ellender responded, "That is always my desire and my intention" (235). Russell must have appreciated Ellender's signaling throughout the process that crafting the best policy was the ostensible goal of the hearings, with Ellender suggesting, "Doctor [Howard Dawson], judging from your statement, I would conclude that out of the two bills[,] one good bill might be worked out" (97).⁸⁶

Having completed their hearings and with Ellender's cosponsor no longer around, the duo reconciled their legislation and received full committee backing to propose S. 962 on May 7, 1945. The new measure was informed by members questioning expert witnesses and would serve as the

⁸⁶ Later in the hearings, a witness asked whether the Wagner bill was also under consideration. When he was informed it was referred to HAG, Ellender stated, "in writing up a bill we can use the Wagner bill as a basis or the Smith-Ellender and Russell bills, and take from each as we go along. The hearing now being had is simply for us to gather information so as to indicate to us which bill is best and which parts of these bills are best. After we have concluded, we will get our heads together and maybe take from each bill" (153).

substantive model legislation. The bill now had two titles: the first explaining how USDA would lead a program of food and non-food aid; the second laying out a nutrition education program directed by the Commissioner of Education. While the bill pleased many stakeholders, not all witnesses or members were satisfied, and working to protect its core parts was difficult as it worked through both chambers.

Mini Congress: The Committee Process

Congressional committees have an outsized impact on the institution's decision-making processes (Fenno 1973, 280), from agenda-setting through issue amplification or gatekeeping, building a record of stakeholder engagement and the need for action, and drafting the substance of legislation. This is especially true the earlier you look in American history, although the movement toward bypassing committees started with strengthened leadership prerogatives under Speaker Thomas Reed (R-ME) in the 1890s (Brady and Cooper 1981; Schickler 2001), culminating in the present-day era where leadership bypasses committees at will (Rohde 1991; Curry 2015). However, during the New Deal—especially under Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) starting in the 1940s—committee chairs regained agenda and decision power to pursue their goals, be they advancing legislation or gatekeeping legislation from reaching the floor (Brady and Cooper 1981, 419). Of course, this benefitted members from the Solid South, who were able to accrue seniority with less risk of party competition than their non-Southern colleagues (Key 1949; Caro 2002, 90). In this particular case, what many consider a vice became a virtue, as powerful Southern lawmakers held considerable sway to push school lunch legislation.

As previously shown, almost all school lunch legislation was referred to the Southern Democrat-dominated agriculture committees of the House and Senate. These committees are known to have a penchant for distributive politics, in which members make concerted efforts to

deliver benefits to farming constituencies (Jones 1961; Ripley and Franklin 1976, 76-79) in a way that cuts across partisan and ideological commitments (Hurwitz, Moiles and Rohde 2001). The combination of the powerful agriculture committees and subcommittees (Ripley and Franklin 1976, 78-79), organized lobbies (Hansen 1991), and large executive bureaucracies effectively create an autonomous subgovernment inert to outside influence (Lowi 1973, 185-191). In this way, ag committees would be predisposed to supporting almost any conduit that subsidizes agricultural production, even if it may defy the larger institutional drift towards curtailing New Deal policies.

According to the HAG subcommittee chair, Representative Stephen Pace (D-GA), the core task at hand for the committees of jurisdiction was to codify scores of executive branch pilot programs into statute, of which school lunch was one (HAG 1944, 1).⁸⁷ To assist in this effort, committee members invited government and non-government witnesses to collectively assess how current social provision does and does not achieve espoused goals and contribute to positive real-world results. But a key game of strategy enters the equation, since the chair and ranking member—in consultation with their respective parties—have the ability to not only proffer technical witnesses, but to select witnesses that support the achievement of member goals. In this case—and quite unusual in Congressional history—every witness before the committees supported the establishment of a national school lunch legislation, suggesting not only supra-institutional support, but that committee leadership favored policy enactment.⁸⁸ In total, these hearings uncover the official goals of committee members, witnesses, and collective interest coalitions.

⁸⁷ The primary source material for these initial House Committee on Agriculture subcommittee meetings (“hrg-1944-hag-0010_from_1_to_75” in ProQuest) are heavily faded and damaged, obstructing a functional use of OCR. Luckily, a creatively angled read of the document exposes much of the text. However, the page numbers are often obscured throughout the document. Therefore, for this document alone, I reference the page number in the collated pdf and if legible, the printed page number in brackets.

⁸⁸ While this research confirms previous accounts that every committee witness supported permanent school lunch legislation (Voorhis 1970 [1947], 153; Ruis 2017, 140), a more fine-grained forensic content analysis of witness testimony reveals one witness—Frank Whalen—had personal reservations. Whalen testified to convey NYC school district support for the program, but in the course of his testimony reveals he personally opposed the program in

Members

Member interest and participation levels varied widely. Overall, a relatively small number of members participated in hearings, and even smaller amount *actively* participated. From those that did, this section first presents their articulated goals and interests. Then branching out beyond this small group, the section presents discourse and roll-call analysis to better understand how central poverty matters were to House and Senate agriculture committee members and their views on variations of the proposed school lunch plan. The evidence indicates member questions were overwhelmingly technical in nature, either to understand program operations or to better assess sociotropic need, with a near absence of depicting the lives of poor children.

Subcommittee Chair Pace convened the first dedicated hearing for the school lunch program on February 15, 1944. The initial hearing was intended to educate members about existing program operations and the choice set of policies the administration was willing to support. Pace impartially managed the hearings to uncover the record of school lunches and how USDA and FSA would manage the program, either together or severally. Foreshadowing his role in the full committee hearings, Voorhis acted as curator, helping to guide witnesses to explain the virtue in their plans and reorient discussions away from controversy (53 [44]). Senior Democrat William Poage (TX) said he could support a child nutrition program, but that the current arrangement using Section 32 unfairly redistributes wealth from farmers toward urban areas, which was both factually incorrect (2/3 of spending in the current program went to rural areas) and revealed his unwillingness to tie a social program to an agricultural one (he voted no on passage) (18).⁸⁹

normal times, and only acquiesced now to a) represent his organization and b) saw the need for a temporary program during the war years.

⁸⁹ Poage seemed to construe the surplus commodity purchasing program as a redistribution program benefitting city slickers, when all accounts are that it was a subsidy for products the market did not fully demand. “The thing I resent is the practice that has grown up over this country of charging everything to the farmers. Here we provide \$50 million for school lunches, of which more than half will be spent in the large cities, of course...” (18). Almost all of that \$50 million would go toward commodity purchases, especially when non-food aid was omitted from the legislation under

Members of the Republican minority were most concerned with program logistics as well, but made clear they favored local control as much as possible and USDA management if any federal bureaucracy had to be involved. This makes sense since members of this committee would have established relationships with USDA. Those members voiced concerns over a new FSA proposal that centers the program around nutritional needs (38 [29]), and expressed concerns about discrimination between families and stigmatization of recipients, but witnesses explained these considerations were actually handled at the local level—ostensibly what the GOP of this time would have wanted (67 [52]).

Overall, this initial hearing had little position-taking and almost no attention to the lives of poor children. The overarching messages were about agricultural commodities with some discourse on nutritional health within the WWII military readiness paradigm. Instead, the endeavor was often a cold assessment of how the program worked and whether there was sufficient predicate for Congress to act.

After a year of minimal progress, the full House Agriculture Committee convened on March 23, 1945, to consider Chairman Flannagan's newly introduced H.R. 2673 and the Senate's Russell-Ellender compromise as H.R. 3143. The meeting fit the previous pattern of focusing on program operations, but now with expanded stakeholder input, the issue of establishing a new educational program to complement the meals received greater attention. Unfortunately, members struggled with how to create such a program—a stalemate that led to it being stripped from the policy entirely. On the nutrition side, member preferences cut across party and ideology, with some rural Democrats opposed and several Republicans pushing to reorient the program as a childhood

consideration. This is a peculiar level of confusion that likely speaks to larger urban-rural resentment, irrespective of the factual matters here. It is possible this is an older debate where some, but not all, farmers oppose tariffs, and the tariff funds were financing the commodity purchases and school lunches.

health initiative. Moreover, members did not uniformly favor all of one bill over another, but instead weighed specific provisions as they sought to create a successful compromise measure.

Like Pace before him, Flannagan carried out the proceedings in an ecumenical manner that tried to minimize partisan machinations.⁹⁰ By this point, Flannagan had invested himself into supporting the program and shepherding it through the House, and his advocacy for the program's merit was clear. However, the chairman had concerns over the level of influence the federal government could exert on states and localities, and these worries were shared by a sizable bipartisan group of lawmakers. Pace perceived USDA would have the ability to force localities to do things they do not want (HAG 1945, 267). Thomas G. Abernethy (D-MS) and Poage claimed to be open to voting yes (69), but had hostile questioning about the current administration. Ranking Member Hope (R-KS), who otherwise supported expanding the program to have more options than just surplus commodities, nonetheless lamented, "The thought that was in my mind was that we should work through the educational departments of the States. But it is set up here in Washington in the hands of the Department of Agriculture and then worked down through the educational departments of the States" (121).

Highly active August H. Andresen (R-MN), outwardly hostile Cliff Clevenger (R-OH), and moderate John J. Phillips (R-CA) all echoed these points in subsequent comments and posed questions that showcased fears about excessive centralization within D.C.⁹¹ To bridge the divide,

⁹⁰ This even extended to policing how "political" witnesses would veer in their testimony, lest they jeopardize poisoning the well and stirring up opposition to the bill. From HAG (1945, 118):

Dean Justin: "Then you come to certain aspects—and I hesitate to mention this[—]but Kansas does often vote the Republican ticket, and we often have a man in the office of public instruction who is not of the faith. I do not know whether the political aspect is as powerful as it would sometimes appear to be."

The Chairman (Flannagan): "What has that got to do with the program? If we mix politics with it[,] we are never going to have a program."

Dean Justin: "Politics is evidently already in."

The Chairman (Flannagan): "I just do not understand that..."

⁹¹ Clevenger was particularly concerned about D.C. dictating all matters of public life to the rest of the country. After one rant, Representative Worley used levity to bring in an adjacent issue of great hostility (HAG 1945, 8):

members arrived at a consensus view that states and localities were autonomous to enter into the program in the first place. It seems members were oriented to creating a federalized program that decreased national power, but that also required local buy-in. In this way, the matching requirements were now a mechanism to facilitate partnership, and antipoverty advocates who opposed such a provision no longer had sufficient numbers to hold the line. Representative Harold Earthman (D-TN) explained the need for matching: “You cannot make a thing uniform if people do not want it. There were two counties that did not want it because it was a little trouble. I think they now want it, because they saw what we did. I think we are in a period of education. I think the Federal Government has done a great thing in enabling slow communities to take this plan up, but I certainly am in accord with the others here, that the Federal Government should be relieved by supplementary funds coming in from the local communities, and I think it can only succeed if those funds come in, because they have got to pay for some of it” (115).

Even with this compromise measure full of safeguards against federal tyranny, Rep. Hope remained worried the program will only expand over time, following the track of other appropriations he had witnessed in his 19 years in Congress (75). In the same vein of expanding government, Representative Harold Cooley (D-NC) somewhat facetiously begged the question of if the federal government gets involved with child nutrition now, what is to keep Congress from going all in and providing “dental care, medical care, and hospital care for these underprivileged

Mr. Worley: “The gentleman wouldn’t be interested in putting in an FEPC [Fair Employment Practice Committee] amendment on page 3?”

Mr. Clevenger: “Not at all.”

Mr. Worley: “That is good; some would.”

Mr. Clevenger: “I am afraid that some of the people who are seeking to do good for a large segment of our people are simply building up a lot of resentment and racial hatred, and that following that there will be a violent crop to be reaped.”

It is worth noting Clevenger was against equal protections across the board, but Worley actually supported civil rights, so his apparent relief was also a joke.

children of America” (29)?⁹² In total, most members expressed some level of concern for federal overreach,⁹³ emblematic of the era in which they were operating, but quite at odds with the fortuitous outcome of the eventual legislation.

With good reason, the technical and ideological debates would naturally obscure the degree to which members can rhetorically call to poor students. After all, rhetoric is useful for agenda-setting, but crafting policy requires a line-by-line deduction of how a policy is carried out, ostensibly to benefit a group whether or not they are expressly accentuated. That said, several members did imagine what students may feel or experience based on receiving a free lunch. For some members, this manifested by depicting concerns about self-esteem and stigma. Clevenger stated, “I want them [the students] to feel they are eating their own food, that their parents or somebody contributed, that they are not a public charge” (6), while Earthman wanted to discuss how to keep children from realizing which among them are on free or reduced lunch (127). While feelings of low self-worth and social ostracization are important parts of the psychological harm that comes with poverty, within the politics of poverty, the discourse around stigma has historically been leveraged to *not* pursue antipoverty policies and instead allow people to pursue the dignity of overcoming hardship on their own.

⁹² While members did not want to get into a debate about health care, a short colloquy between Flannagan and Voorhis shows how the members entrepreneurially tied a variety of issues to the policy in front of the committee—include health care (30):

The Chairman: “Don't you think, if we improve the dietary standards, we would get rid of a lot of dental bills and doctor bills in the future?”

Mr. Voorhis: “I know we would. I could give you a personal example of that. I think it is a substitute for a great deal of dental and medical attention that otherwise would be necessary. I believe it would also be true, Mr. Chairman, along the line Mr. Cooley was mentioning, at the present time we do have a considerable improvement in the health of the people of this country. But I don't think it follows that all the people of this country, at least all the children, are getting what they really need in a balanced diet, even today.”

⁹³ Representative Gillie was one of the few MCs more concerned about the degree of local discretion. The member visited a lunchroom in his district and witnessed students being charged different rates. Since there are lunches of different values, it is unclear whether this was disparate treatment based on the students. Without proposing a direct solution, this potential problem could be solved by setting standards at a level above the individual school (HAG 1944, 302).

Two members challenged their colleagues to think beyond commodity purchases and school lunch program logistics. Reid Murray (R-WI) was one of the only members to emulate the line of thinking public health witnesses espoused throughout the process when he proclaimed, “I am interested in the school lunch, and its aim should be the welfare of the children, and forget all the other angles involved in it... In other words, what I am trying to get at is we have got to have either one objective or another objective. If the objective is the welfare of the children, we should procure the best food at the lowest possible price we can secure it for” (159). While some in Congress might have been receptive to this line of thinking, it is unlikely they would be present for House Agriculture Committee meetings at this time, although Voorhis in attendance and Ellender in the Senate likely agreed but simply avoided this discourse out of expediency.

Personal stories of encountering poverty are rare but important to inject into the political ethos to shine a light on blind spots non-poor lawmakers may not see. Only once in the series of HAG meetings did a MC personalize in this way. That moment occurred when Representative Orville Zimmerman (D-MO) interrupted a technical question and answer to interject a lived experience component. The MC decided to play the role of a witness, relaying his experiences in childhood to educate his colleagues about what hungry students go through in America:

I just want to relate my experience as a school child in a one-room country school, where we had boys and girls from medium well-to-do families and then some who came from the hills and places where they didn't have enough to eat, and I can think back to girls and boys who didn't get enough to eat, and we knew it as we saw them open their little boxes. It was really so skimpy we felt sorry for them. Sometimes these children wouldn't have enough and they would ask us, 'Can I have a piece of your pie' Or they would say, 'If you are going to throw something away, will you give it to us? Will you let us have it?' That condition exists, gentlemen, all over this country. You can't find a district hardly where you don't find some of these children. Those are the children I am speaking of, and that group of people represents, I think, a lot of these boys who came up for service in the Army when our country needed them and, as a result of malnutrition from the day they started school on up, they were unable to qualify and they were sent back home. So I think there is a place where we can do something for our country. And I know of no better plan or program than the one that has been suggested. I know personally of many boys and girls

who evidence weakness, lack of flesh, they were thin—they wanted to go to school, and they did, but they simply didn't have enough to eat to sustain themselves and do what the other children were doing. (8-9)

This raw depiction of want and desperation led Representative Ross Rizley (R-OK) to immediately proclaim “I don't want the gentleman from Missouri to conclude from my remarks that I am trying to keep the children from having something to eat. That is not it at all,” before laying out more technical concerns about who makes decision on need (9). This passage is the only time in committee hearings of either chamber a lawmaker personalized on this level. Moreover, it is an important example witnessing and internalizing the impoverishment of others, leaving a lasting impression in some who do not themselves experience poverty.⁹⁴ Moreover, while the member did focus on the lived experience of poor children, he still managed to tap into the discourse of malnutrition hurting national military preparedness, further showing the dexterity of that persuasive frame.

Throughout the two months (March to May) of interrogating the existing program, receiving input from interested stakeholders, envisioning the best policy, and then considering what can pass both chambers, Voorhis was hard at work trying to manage the process without having any agenda control. He developed the record by strategically guiding witnesses to be helpful in providing facts and positive stories, while also answering questions for members (almost always unprompted). But chief among his activities, Voorhis was willing to compromise on any individual provision as long as it accrued MC support and preserved the essence of the program.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ This is consistent with contemporary research that indicates having poor friends and engaging in discussions with them increases support for government efforts to reduce class inequality (Newman 2013).

⁹⁵ An example of Voorhis being flexible is that he wanted to expand the program to cover childcare centers, which members opposed, then tried to save the Puerto Rico provision, which again members opposed (HAG 1946, 269). Mr. Voorhis: “To make my own position clear; I don't want to insist on anything being put in the bill, but what I want to get at is the basis for opposition to including these institutions [childcare centers]. Personally, I would like to see them included, but I am not going to insist on that, if there is strong opposition to it, and if it will hurt the bill to do it.”

Even though he currently favored an FSA approach closer to S. 1824, he previously authored legislation to keep the program in USDA, and ultimately just wanted members to become comfortable enough with this policy to make it permanent.

Playing a similar role in the Senate, Russell began investigating school lunches through the Appropriations Bill of 1944 in the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAP) in May 1943. Chairing the subcommittee meetings, one of the programs Russell had to negotiate was school lunches, but members ranged from ambivalent about the necessity for such a program at the time to outwardly hostile. In the latter camp, future bill sponsor Senator Smith inexplicably prodded the WFA team, “Don’t you think the furnishing of funds to feed the children is a fine socialistic tendency?” before asking more questions about why the government thinks it can do a better job of feeding children than parents (SAP 1943, 524). Less incendiary skepticism was more qualified, with moderate Clyde Reed (R-KS) expressing general interest, saying he had previously considered offering standalone legislation with Senators La Follette and Tydings (269-270). Reed’s main reservation at this point was that students from middle and upper-class families should not get free lunches too. But for “those who cannot afford to pay for it,” Reed declared, “I am willing to go as far as anyone to help them” (281). Consistent with committee members, Russell had his own concerns with the current program structure since there were no surplus commodities at this point in the

The Chairman: “Mr. Voorhis, I believe we will have trouble passing this bill if we leave child-care centers in it, because no one knows just what that covers.”

Mr. Rizley: “Mr. Chairman, I think we must not lose sight of the fact that this is a school-lunch program bill. If you are going into child-care centers and other agencies, agencies of that nature, you are going to have a relief bill here, instead of a school-lunch bill. That would be the objection, Mr. Voorhis, that would be raised, as I anticipate it.”

Mr. Voorhis: “I expect it would.”

The Chairman: “Mr. Pace moves that we leave child-care centers out.”

Mr. Pace: “Strike out lines 16 to 20.”

Mr. Voorhis: “You don’t think we ought to hear some of these people, like the Puerto Rico delegate, on that matter?”

Mr. Pace: “I am not going to vote for a bill that sets up child-care centers in Puerto Rico and not in the United States. I don’t think anybody could talk to me long enough to change my mind on that.”

Ultimately this provision got in to the final bill, owing to the Senate’s interest in the matter, even though that was the body that Puerto Rico had no representation within.

war. Therefore, Russell suggested FSA start carrying out the program, since it was not directly benefiting farmers at the time.⁹⁶ This is at odds with his later preferred structure and show how contextual factors—the greater need for a domestic market for surplus goods later in and after the war—shaped this member’s preferences. Overall, Russell notably did not chide or pressure members as he led the appropriations team, still managing, year over year, to fund the program as he prepared for a longer-term solution.

To that end, Senate hearings on school lunch occurred from May 2 to 5, 1944, to better understand the merits of the three competing pieces of legislation. There was notably a lower variety of conflicts between members in the Senate, since committee members were self-selected proponents of the policy and Russell and Ellender provided a sufficient knowledge base on the national side of the program, allowing the committee to focus on the local side of the equation. Aside from reconciling the bills, the key task for these members was to build a factual basis of need to favorably win over skeptical colleagues among both chambers’ non-agriculture committee members. In contrast to the House, the Senate left the mission of building the record entirely to a

⁹⁶ The viewpoint was conveyed in an exchange where Russell asked the WFA if they had sufficient authority to carry out a school lunch program through using only Section 32 authority. Deputy Administrator at the War Foods Administration, Roy Hendrickson, said the lack of surplus goods in the country made the school lunch program “a straight nutritional program.” In turn, Senator Russell mentioned the current dilemma he was entertaining: “There is one thing which disturbed me about it. I have always been very much interested in this program, and I am for it now. But it seems to me that this school lunch program, as it is today, not involving the question of surplus, ought to be in the Federal Security Agency or somewhere else other than the Department of Agriculture. And it further occurs to me that you are going rather far afield in taking these funds set up by section 32 for the purpose of agriculture in this country and expending them in the school lunches. I am for the program. I don’t want to see it stopped. I think it has been most helpful. But to take these tariff receipts set aside for the farmers, to balance in, a small degree the burden the farmer has always borne as a result of the tariff, and then to utilize these funds on school lunches, it seems to me that just doesn’t fit into the agricultural bill. Certainly over a period of years, all this money ought not be charged up against the farmer. Every time you come in, you say the bill contains so much money as compared with last year, and all this money is for the farmer. And we used to have to explain or to try to, about the Public Roads and the Weather Bureau, and now we are building up this organization [school lunches] here, to take two-thirds of the sections 32 funds” (SAP 1943, 523). This dynamic is likely what Representative Poage was worried about, and a potential explanation for why some agriculture-minded MCs would oppose such a program.

SAF subcommittee, only using the full committee to report out an eventual bill in 1945. Stuningly, the whole Senate side of the process was based on the work of five senators.

Aside from subcommittee Chair Ellender and Senator Russell, the members of the subcommittee were Ranking Member Arthur Capper (R-KS), Senator Aiken, and reform-minded Carl Hatch (D-NM). All three expressed some level of support for the program, although Capper was the most skeptical of the lot, perhaps owing to his more conservative ideology and ties to GOP leadership. In his questioning, the senator passively brought up worries about program benefits going toward urban areas—a legitimate but unfounded concern—and oddly supported including language banning alcohol in school lunches—and illegitimate worry considering the lack of a single anecdote about this occurring (SAF 1944b, 162). In contrast, Aiken was a much stronger proponent of governmental provision of food, and his only objection was that FSA should not be in charge of the program due to his poor experiences with the agency when he served as governor of Vermont. The senator alleged FSA had a poor reputation across the country, which in turn could jeopardize passing a school lunch program through Congress (28).⁹⁷

Among subcommittee members, Hatch was the least oriented toward affirmative advocacy, instead playing a role well-suited for his skillset: neutral fact finder. Most of the senator's engagement was technical in nature, although he broke this pattern to express skepticism about the need for Capper's anti-alcohol language. More presciently, Hatch was one of the few MCs that

⁹⁷ “What I am really getting at, Miss Goodykoontz, is this: I have had a lot of experience as Governor of the State with qualifications set up by the Federal Security Agency, and some of the people that they supplied were utterly hopeless and they had to recall them,” Aiken claimed. “They just could not get along and accomplish anything, and I know they have had some of these experiences in practically every State in the Union, and it has created more or less hostility to this Federal Security Agency and the present head of it. Whether he is responsible or not, we have got to recognize that it is there and it does increase the difficulty of getting a bill of this nature through the Congress. I am sure every member of this committee is [...]—speaking for myself, and I think the rest of the committee agree with me—strongly in favor of the school-lunch program, but suppose that it turned out that it was simply impossible to get this Department of Agriculture educational bill through the Congress, would you then approve S. 1820, which was introduced by Senator Russell, rather than have no school-lunch program at all? I don't think we ought to hesitate on that, not for a second. It is not a perfect program, in agriculture, but we have got to look at facts” (SAF 1944b, 28).

brought up race in either chamber; generally, when the issue is brought up, it is due to witness initiative. Almost as a non-sequitur, Hatch asked Chief of the Civilian Food Requirements Branch of WFA, Norman Gold, “Have you encountered any racial problems?” to which Gold responds, “No”, then the committee moved on to a different topic (176). Overall, discussions of race are noticeably muted or entirely absent in school lunch hearings. It is an open historical question whether this is due to disinterest and neglect, aversive racism, or a concerted strategy to protect the legislative viability of a social program—or some combination of all three.

The remaining bulk of the hearings were dominated by Russell and Ellender interrogating one another’s proposals via witness questioning. While the largest plurality of witnesses came from the education sector (covered shortly in the witnesses section), the majority of MCs and witnesses expressed unease with several components of the Smith-Ellender proposal. For one, there was concern that implementing 1824 would lead to service interruption for several reasons. When Ellender asked WFA Deputy Director of Distribution, Lieutenant Colonel Olmstead, if the language of 1824 gave him authority to continue commodities purchases, Olmstead shockingly said it was doubtful given the uncertainty of the new plan (68). Second, when Russell asked Solicitor of the WFA, Robert Shields, if the FSA could veto specific commodity purchases by USDA, Shields said it could, which would hurt farmers. Ellender’s rejoinder was that under his bill the USDA decides what is considered nutritious, but the witnesses had a strong status quo bias (80). Third, unlike the USDA, the FSA’s Office of Education did not have any existing field staff to carry out the program (182). In contrast to 1824, the only major critique of 1820 made by Ellender and supporting witnesses was the worry that if the program stayed wholly in USDA, the impulse to favor surpluses over nutrition will create dissonance that may harm childhood nutrition

(213-214). It is clear from these member-witness dynamics that the comfort of path dependency strongly favored Russell's legislation.

But since he previously favored an FSA approach in SAP hearings, Russell explained why keeping the program in USDA and increasing the funding level beyond the administration's request was necessary:

Of course, I believe very firmly that this program ought to stay in the Department of Agriculture. I think it is going to be discontinued by Congress in a year or two if it is not connected with the disposition of surpluses, but I don't think you have got anywhere near enough money in S. 1824 to accomplish the program you [Bess Goodykoontz] have outlined. I am in favor of the Department of Agriculture handling this program, but if the committee and Congress think that it should go to [the FSA], certainly it ought to be amended to make the limitation \$100,000,000 [like his bill]; \$50,000,000 is not going to make a start in 1 year, buying equipment and employing all these supervisors and people you are talking about. I think you may curtail the program a little further, instead of increasing it, if you keep the maximum limitation at \$50,000,000. (23)

Simply put, the strategy of delivering a social program through an agricultural paradigm presented the best opportunity for passage and policy lock-in. This is also why Russell disfavored provision for facilities grants, since it's non-agricultural substance may in turn jeopardize the bill's passage (206). To Russell, the principal alternative measure of 1824, with its new bureaucracy and underestimation of costs, combined with proposals to add other program benefits, posed considerable legislative risk and jeopardized sabotaging the program.

Russell's dedication to holding the line on minimal operations changes was a strategic calculation to overcome existing external conditions in the public that made policy passage difficult. In another exchange with Bess Goodykoontz, Assistant Commissioner of Education in Office of Education, the two share assessments of where the public mood and lawmaking branch were on the issue of expanding the federal government footprint on school lunches:

Miss Goodykoontz: I have been out on field trips recently, and if I sense the current feeling in regard to the participation of Federal agencies in any local program accurately, it is going to take the best efforts of all of us to get any program through.

Senator Russell: I agree with you heartily. It is going to take all that all of us can do to get any kind of a program this year. You cannot judge the attitude of Congress by the attitude of this subcommittee. This is a friendly subcommittee, but there is a very violent opposition in the Congress to any program at all next year. I think, that is the reflection of some of the public opinion throughout the country in regard to it. (33)

While a novice may presume the subcommittee reflected the chamber, it turned out this interested subset of full committee members were actually the program's advocates, and one should not generalize based on these members. Both the public, subnational political actors, and their representatives in Congress had grown weary of federal bureaucrats telling locals how to manage their affairs. In Russell's mind, much like that of Voorhis', this meant political feasibility—not optimal policy design—was the primary consideration in devising end-product school lunch legislation.

The path to political expediency also came with the need to move as quickly as possible. Throughout the hearings, subcommittee Chair Ellender prodded witnesses to provide documentation to bolster their claims. Such information ran the gamut from commodity purchase figures by WFA to reports on the impact of school lunches on childhood health and educational attainment. One illuminating exchange occurred when Columbia University Professor Mary D. Bryant informed lawmakers about several studies that showed school attendance had increased among those students that received free school lunches in New York City and Youngstown, OH. Jumping at the opportunity to gain such valuable evidence on program effectiveness, Ellender repeatedly prompted the witness to remit any documentation to the committee:

Senator Ellender: It would be of benefit to have that presented. Would you do so?

Mrs. Bryan: I can get it. I will send it in. It was a little school, but it illustrates my point that where you have some real information that you can get together, it is greatly beneficial to have it. Let us make a study of this thing. Then I think we should make a study of the scholastic[s] of the pupils in school who are on the school lunch and those who are not. We have had thousands of school principals say that they study better and learn better and so

forth. All right. Let us take some standards on which the psychologists will agree, set up some representative tests, or something of that sort. Let us find out just what type of benefit it is, the extent to which it is a benefit, and so forth, and so on.

Senator Ellender: I would like to have that now so as to make it possible to pass the bill. If you can give us something along that line, Dr. Bryan, we would appreciate it.

Mrs. Bryan: It is a question of personnel. You see what would happen if we had that record of 6,000,000 children over all of these years. Can you visualize the benefit that we would be able to see then directly?

Senator Ellender: We would like to have those things now. Now is the time.

Mrs. Bryan: I would not want to see a blunder now by failing to make provision for the keeping of suitable records on this thing. Of course, it also offers great opportunities for research of a very careful and accurate type in child nutrition. (227)

It is amusing that Dr. Bryan—true to form for an academic—continued to engage the substantive points she was making about the usefulness of studies to better understand the manifest benefits of a national school lunch program, while the lawmaker Ellender had an express sense of urgency. Developing a defensible record that fits the legislative calendar was of paramount importance.

The preceding section depicted the interests and goals of MCs that actively participated in the hearings. But this turns out to be a small fraction of both chambers' agriculture committees, let alone the full bodies. To better understand the hospitality of the agriculture committee to advocate for poor children, the next section broadens out by assessing overall interest in poverty matters and member positions on key school lunch roll calls within the respective chambers.

Table 10.2 presents descriptive statistics on the 35 members that served on the House Committee on Agriculture during the four years (1943-1946) of the 78th and 79th Congresses. The first column reveals Democratic members of the committee were almost all from Southern or Midwestern states, with the lone exceptions of Voorhis and Representatives Pagán and Piñero (who are from Puerto Rican parties but caucused with Democrats in Congress). The Republicans

Table 10.2 Members of the House Agriculture Committee (HAG), 78th and 79th Congresses

Member Name	Subcommittee of Jurisdiction	Conference Committee	Poverty Speech Count, 73 rd -79 th Cong	Poverty Speeches per Congress Served	Vote on Powell Non-Discrim Amdt (2/21/46)	Vote on Passage (2/21/46)
Fulmer (D-SC), Chair (78 th)			8	1.33	N/A	N/A
Flannagan (D-VA), Chair (79 th)	✓	✓	6	0.86	N	Y
Kleberg (D-TX)			1	0.17	N/A	N/A
Cooley (D-NC)		✓	6	0.86	N	Y
Zimmerman (D-MO)		✓	0	0	N	Y
Pace (D-GA), Subcommittee Chair	✓	✓	5	1	N	Y
Poage (D-TX)	✓		4	0.8	N	N
Grant (D-AL)			1	0.2	N	N
Cannon (D-FL)			0	0	N	Y
Wickersham (D-OK)	✓		2	0.67	N	Y
Voorhis (D-CA)	✓		48	9.6	N	Y
Granger (D-UT)			2	0.67	N	Y
McCord (D-TN)			0	0	N/A	N/A
Gathings (D-AR)			1	0.25	NV	NV
McMillan (D-SC)			0	0	N	Y
Worley (D-TX)			0	0	N	N
Abernethy (D-MS)			1	0.33	N	N
Clements (D-KY)			0	0	Y	Y
Earthman (D-TN)			0	0	N	Y
Pagán (C-PR)			2	0.67	Ineligible	Ineligible
Piñero (PD-PR)			0	0	Ineligible	Ineligible
Hope (R-KS), Ranking Member	✓	✓	2	0.29	Y	Y
Kinzer (R-PA)			0	0	Y	Y
Gilchrist (R-IA)			10	1.67	N/A	N/A
Andresen (R-MN)	✓	✓	6	1	N	Y
Johnson (R-IL)			0	0	Y	N
Murray (R-WI)			16	4	Y	Y
Clevenger (R-OH)			0	0	N	N
Gillie (R-IN)			1	0.25	Y	Y
Hall (R-NY)	✓		2	0.5	Y	Y
Rizley (R-OK)			3	1	N	Y
Hill (R-CO)			0	0	Y	Y
Phillips (R-CA)	✓		0	0	Y	Y
Hoeven (R-IA)			0	0	Y	Y
Farrington (R-HI)			0	0	Ineligible	Ineligible

Notes: Order of appearance is based on party and seniority. N/A signifies a member was no longer in Congress during the vote. Ineligible members were in Congress, but were territorial delegates without voting privileges. NV means a member was absent or paired their vote, and thus were not included in the final voting tally.

on the committee are more geographically dispersed across every region other than the South. The columns on subcommittee and conference committee membership reveal the role of strategy in replacing members from the fact-finding to compromise venues. Democrats altered the allocation formula between phases, going from a 5-4 Democrat to Republican split in subcommittee to a 4-2 Democratic dominant conference. In so doing, Democrats removed one opponent of school lunches (Poage), but incredibly took original sponsor Voorhis off the conference committee delegation. This may be a product of his junior status relative to his newly appointed peers (Cooley and Zimmerman), Southern Democrats showing favor to those of their kind, or a play to moderate their conferees by removing the most progressive member of the committee. In contrast, Republicans kept the same members from their subcommittee to conference, just selecting their most senior members (Hope and Andresen) to continue along.

The two columns on total poverty speech count and poverty speeches per Congress provide an empirical basis to determine the level of interest in poverty among HAG members. As previously shown, the average number of poverty speeches per House MC per Congress is an unimpressive 0.7. Here, 10 members are above mean, while 25 are below. Another metric is that for Congress as a whole, from 1933 to 1946, 48.4% of MCs gave at least one poverty speech. In this committee, 57% (20 of 35) of MCs gave at least one speech. The most extreme outlier is Voorhis with his 48 poverty speeches (at just under 10 per Congress served), followed by Murray and Fred Gilchrist (R-IA), with 16 and 10 speeches, respectively. While the committee appears somewhat disinterested in poverty, that disposition was also endemic throughout Congress, and on balance, the committee of jurisdiction for an antipoverty policy could have been worse.

The final two columns account for how eligible committee members voted on two key roll calls: the Powell anti-discrimination amendment and final passage of the NSLA. The Powell

amendment sought to bar states and localities that discriminate based on race, ethnicity, and religion from receiving funds under the new law. Surprisingly for this era, it passed the House 258 to 110, with 62 not voting (*CR 92 1946, 1540*). Chamber-wide, there was a clear partisan difference in support for the amendment, with Republicans in support and Democrats divided, with the latter group either supporting discrimination or viewing the amendment as a poison pill that jeopardized passage (the line between the two is unclear). While the majority in the ag committee opposed the amendment, the partisan pattern holds, with every Democrat except one—Earle Clements (KY)—voting against the amendment, while most Republicans supported the provision except Andresen, Clevenger, and Rizley. On passage, the House moved the legislation to the Senate with a vote of 276 to 101, with 3 “present” and 50 not voting (1542). The committee is slightly ahead of the chamber-wide proportion, with eligible committee members supplying 21 yeas, 6 nays, and 1 absence. A starker contrast is seen in the members of the original subcommittee overwhelmingly supporting passage of their work by an 8 to 1 margin. Overall, the level of poverty interest reflected larger chamber dynamics, but HAG members supplied a disproportionate number of votes for passage, providing preliminary evidence that the distributionist compulsion among HAG members provided some impetus to act beyond preexisting interests in lessening hardship for the poor.

Now turning to the Senate, 26 senators had membership on the Agriculture and Forestry Committee during the 78th and 79th Congresses. As Table 10.3 indicates, membership was more heterogeneous across region, likely a product of the larger constituencies that were more likely to include some rural areas compared to homogenous House districts. Also in contrast to the House, the Senate maintained the same proportion of Democrats to Republicans between subcommittee and conference, and only one member was replaced for conference, with the more senior John H.

Table 10.3 Members of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee (SAF), 78th and 79th Congresses

Member Name	Subcommittee of Jurisdiction	Conference Committee	Poverty Speech Count, 73 rd -79 th Cong	Speeches per Congress Served	Vote to Cut Approp from \$100M to \$57.5M (2/26/46)	Vote to Cut Title II of Bill (2/26/46)
Smith (D-SC), Chair (78 th)			12	2	N/A	N/A
Wheeler (D-MT)			21	3	N	N
Thomas (D-OK), Chair (79 th)			6	0.86	N	N
Bankhead (D-AL)		✓	16	2.29	N	N
Caraway (D-AR)			1	0.17	N/A	N/A
Hatch (D-NM)	✓		1	0.14	NV	NV
Bilbo (D-MS)			29	4.83	N	N
Gillette (D-IA)			2	0.4	N/A	N/A
Ellender (D-LA), Subcommittee Chair	✓	✓	24	4.8	N	N
Lucas (D-IL)			1	0.25	NV	NV
Stewart (D-TN)			2	0.5	N	N
Russell (D-GA)	✓	✓	24	3.43	N	N
Connally (D-TX)			23	3.29	NV	NV
Downey (D-CA)			33	8.25	NV	NV
Hoey (D-NC)			0	0	N	N
Moses (D-ND)			0	0	N/A	N/A
Capper (R-KS), Ranking Member	✓	✓	5	0.71	N	Y
Shipstead (R-MN)			11	1.57	NV	NV
Willis (R-IN)			5	1.67	Y	N
Aiken (R-VT)	✓	✓	16	5.33	N	N
Nye (R-ND)			3	0.5	N/A	N/A
Millikin (R-CO)			1	0.33	Y	Y
Bushfield (R-SD)			3	1.5	Y	Y
Wilson (R-IA)			0	0	NV	NV
Butler (R-NE)			1	0.33	Y	Y
Cordon (R-OR)			0	0	Y	Y

Notes: Order of appearance based on party and seniority. N/A signifies a member was no longer in Congress during the vote. NV means a member was absent, and thus were not included in the final voting tally.

Bankhead II (D-AL) taking over for Hatch. That left decision-making to three Southern Democrats (Ellender, Russell, and Bankhead), and in times of bipartisanship, the three Democrats plus Aiken.

On poverty speech propensity, SAF members significantly outrun HAG members, even when accounting for chamber differences in speech tendencies. The average amount of poverty speeches per Senator, per Congress, during this era is 1.62. Here, SAF members came closer to parity between high and low propensity members, with 10 higher than the mean and 16 below it.

Using the Congress-wide 48.4% figure for percentage of MCs with at least 1 poverty speech, SAF is extremely skewed toward poverty interest, with 22 of the 26 members (84.6%) having a poverty speech. While no SAF member reaches Voorhis' prolific totals, Senate poverty speechifying was more evenly distributed across the committee, led by Sheridan Downey's 33 speeches, followed by Bilbo (D-MS), Ellender, Russell, Connally (D-TX), and Wheeler (D-MT), all above 20 speeches each. This suggests members of the Senate's ag committee were well-versed in poverty issues, potentially—but not necessarily—holding substantive interests in helping the poor and helping to explain why the Senate—not the House—took the lead in crafting the policy language.

The key votes on the Senate side were both last minute amendments initiated by Senator Taft. The first amendment was to lower the maximum appropriation from \$100 million to \$57.5 million, a figure closer to the program's current expenditure level. Senators opposed the measure, with 21 yeas, 50 nays, and 25 not voting (1626). The second attempt to alter the program was to remove Title II on nutrition education from the bill entirely, which on this occasion failed with a similar margin of 25 to 47, with 24 not voting (1628). There is almost no variation in how SAF members voted on either amendment, even though they are substantively distinct.⁹⁸ Reflecting a more partisan alignment, no Democrats favored the amendments, joined consistently by Senator Aiken. No member with more than 5 poverty speeches supported these amendments, showing a strong correlation between issue position and poverty interest. Moreover, the committee's 5 yeas and 11 nays are only slightly more supportive of the motion than the chamber-wide share, which paired with the existing propensity for poverty rhetoric suggests distribution politics in the Senate—in contrast to the House—provided no apparent value-added beyond what is explained by senator interest in poverty alone. That said, subcommittee membership does explain which

⁹⁸ Ranking Member Capper is the only exception, voting against cutting the appropriation, but then supporting the effort to eliminate Title II on education spending (*CR 92 1946, 1628*).

Republican committee members favored the policy—perhaps a product of their direct role in investigating the school lunch initiatives.

While MCs are the official representatives of the people, they are not sole voices in the legislative process—they can strategically employ witnesses to serve as additional (unofficial) voices of the American public. These auxiliary individuals and groups help members comprehend a population they may not understand, which is an especially important task when non-poor lawmakers virtually represent poor constituents. While this practice is an imperfect proxy for mass sentiment—since committee members choose who to allow to testify—it nonetheless introduces extra-institutional opinions into insular Congressional policymaking processes. Aside from a democratic access perspective, lawmakers use witnesses to help forge a defensible record of fact-finding to weigh pros and cons as they devise a rationale for their choice of policy design.

Witnesses


Beyond being personally compelled to run for office or the more widespread practice of authorization at the ballot box, calling witnesses to testify is a key institutional mechanism to facilitate public input into the People's Branch. This collaborative construction of the public record can occur in an open, expansive forum, or be confined in such a myopic way so as to foreclose potential outcomes. In the case of the NSLA, the legislative coalition maintained a fairly static policy structure from introduction to passage, but this dynamic was actually bolstered by substantial support from witnesses that prioritized continuity of current operations over policy reformulation. To reiterate, chairpersons and committee members choose the witnesses that come before a committee, so they would reasonably produce witnesses that support their agenda. In this case, general policy support among committee members across the partisan divide was commensurate with pro-school lunch witnesses.

While public support for policy enactment is insufficient for it to occur, the eventual fortuitous outcome of the school lunch plan was foreshadowed by the uniform support for adoption by all 50 of the committee witnesses. As Appendix 10A shows, 13 of these witnesses testified only in the House, 26 in the Senate only, and 11 witnesses testified in both chambers. While the witnesses displayed unusual consensus in supporting policy enactment, there were qualitative differences in their rhetorical framing and funding priorities.

Broadly, the relative balance of voices in front of the committee helps expose a degree of public influence in Congress. Moreover, a focus on committee witnesses reveals how nascent New Deal era sub-governments congealed around shared goals, where MCs and witnesses work together to proscribe conflict into terms that benefit their agendas. In this case, those witnesses all supported action on school lunch policy, but disagreed on the primary constituencies, mechanisms of delivery, and boundaries of the policy. The presence of witnesses and variation in their testimony helps uncover several important aspects of the antipoverty policymaking process, particularly three questions. First, what are the descriptive traits of witnesses who are interested in poverty? Second, which organizations are interested enough to send witnesses and how do they fit into the larger New Deal policy coalition apparatus? And third, how do these individuals and organizations depict the needs of the poor in their testimony?

Starting with the descriptive traits, the committee fact-finding process benefitted from a diverse slate of witnesses when one considers the bounded nature of school lunches for children. Using organizational affiliation to code vocational sector, the top left panel of Figure 10.2 shows the educational sector constitutes a plurality with 23 witnesses. This makes sense given the location of this policy's social provision within the schoolhouse. The next most common vocation is formed by the 12 agriculture witnesses, which is in part a consequence of the interests of the committee

Figure 10.2 Descriptive Traits and Favored Legislation of Committee Witnesses (N=50)



and current status quo executive program running through USDA. The remaining one-third of witnesses (15) come from a dispersed array of vocations including the military, public health, labor, religious groups, social welfare and community organizations, and subnational governments.

The top right panel captures whether witnesses work for the government or private and non-profit sectors. Government witnesses dominate the process at 31, while non-government

witnesses number 19. This is a product of two interrelated dynamics: Congress needing more information from the administration on how the program is currently operated, which fosters an unusual level of interagency competition over which bureaucracy should manage the program—USDA and WFA or FSA and OE. This is because throughout the long arc of federal school lunches, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman did not have clear preferences on policy design, but instead simply wanted the codification of any school lunch policy that can receive Congressional endorsement. Therefore, they sent warring factions of agency leads and technical experts with competing visions up the Hill, positively respecting Congressional deliberation while providing an epistemological realm out of which Congressional leaders ultimately selected the best configuration.⁹⁹ While both sets of witnesses have obvious reasons for their policy positions—WFA was within USDA, while the Office of Education was attempting to ramp up into a full-fledged federal department, which it later became—the peculiar strategy shows the federal administration did not have a clear directive from the top, and instead sent witnesses to assist in Congress simply statutorily authorizing any permanent and semi-functional school lunch program.

This was true from the very beginning, when Ralph Olmstead and Norman Gold of the War Food Administration both testified in favor of continuing the status quo through USDA, framing the program as inherently agricultural and not about public health or education. “It is the view of the War Food Administrator that this program is primarily, and in the long-term of years, a program to provide a market for farmers,” Olmstead claimed in an early House subcommittee hearing. “The fact that it encourages good nutrition programs, that it embraces the nutrition of

⁹⁹ Senator Ellender seemed especially cognizant of how interagency competition works—and it is not something he wanted to deal with. “The Federal Government you know, it is all the Federal Government; and what I don't like about some of our departments here is there is not enough cooperation; certain ones impinge on each other although they take funds to operate from the same pocket, they seem to want to fight each other... That is something we don't seem able to control” (SAF 1944, 158-159).

children is an incidental effect, however desirable” (HAG 1944, 13). Olmstead even went so far as to implicitly suggest that the function the program serves would bear on whether it should even be permanently codified:

Now, if [it is] correct in thinking that the school lunch program actually does provide in the long pull a new market, an aid to agriculture in the development of an extended outlet for its product, then we believe this authorization ought to be approved. If, on the other hand, the school lunch program is a relief program primarily, or if it is an educational program, the action might be different. But, frankly, we are unable to see how in the post war years, or even right now, when we have a surplus of agricultural commodities in a given community, or given producing area, the Federal government can undertake or even share the responsibility for procuring it, unless it can at the same time provide a rational and defensible outlet for those commodities. You simply cannot just buy them and let them rot. (72 [57])

Pro-USDA governmental actors were supported by risk averse witnesses like Executive Secretary of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council in Chicago, Joseph Meegan, who were concerned changing which entities administer the policy could imperil existing program operations, and thereby hurt poor children (HAG 1945, 150). These witnesses were natural allies of members of the ag committee that were less concerned with social problems and more interested in farm policy. By providing a rationale and logistic support for keeping the program in its least expansive form, MCs could credibly claim they had administration support to fend off the risky ideas of interloping social reformers when the current program fulfills the needs of stakeholders.

In contrast, John Studebaker and Bess Goodykoontz of the Office of Education advocated to move the program into the nascent federal education bureaucracy. Their argument was that if Congress wants the program to be a social safety net program, it should be housed in the same bureaucracy (FSA) that was then managing Social Security. This argument was bolstered by additional witnesses in the education sector, such as State Supervisor of Home Economics in Maryland and representative of the American Home Economics Association, Elizabeth Amery, who believed both bureaucracies could have a role, but that OE would naturally have more insights

into establishing an “educationally sound program” (HAG 1945, 106). These government and non-government actors faced an uphill climb to get ag committee members on their side, since a) it appeared the committee would lose oversight over a key program within their subgovernment, and b) in contrast to the House Educational and Labor Committees and Senate analog, ag MCs are clearly less natural allies to public health and education reformers. In this way, the decision to refer school lunch legislation to one committee or another facilitated which constituencies received the most attention and the form of the eventual policy reported to each chamber’s floor.

Ultimately, Chairman Flannagan grew tired of the endless interagency competition (HAG 1945, 256), and in April of 1945 forced WFA’s Shields and Studebaker of the Office of Education to work together to create a bill they could both support. Such a compromise was agreed to, resulting in a two-title bill that included severable control over different parts of the program, although it was stacked toward USDA. This new reconciled language was subsequently returned for further Congressional deliberation and assent (259).

The bottom left panel summarizes an analysis of witness gender. Name, title, and pronoun use in testimony form of the basis of this categorization. In an era where norms about the proper role of women within society contribute to very few women MCs, there are, in contrast, 18 women that testified before Congress on school lunches. Given extant scholarship that documents women are historically more politically interested in social welfare policy and often hold more generous issue positions on such matters (Swers 2002; Miller 2008; Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2013), this expansion of the policymaking process to include non-elected women voices fundamentally reshapes the ideological plane, introduces distinct lived experiences, and likely facilitates a more robust awareness of the struggles of poor children via more typical caregivers. Moreover, since none of these women are elected officials and only a small subset were appointed within

government, they skew towards advocacy efforts in their testimony, in contrast to technical expertise provided by in-government male witnesses.

Finishing up the panels in Figure 10.2, the bottom right panel attempts to match witnesses with their preferred bill. This is based on overt statements in support of either the named or numbered policy alternatives. Because this is not a granular match of testimony with bill language content, there are a greater number of “unclear” categorizations (11) than would be explained by the impartial stances of technical witnesses. Additionally, some of the advocacy-based witnesses refused to take a stance on their preferred vehicle to parlay their apparent lack of bias to bolster the merits of their testimony. In any case, although the education sector witnesses were the largest bloc, preferences between the Smith-Ellender (17) and Russell (16) bills were nearly at parity. Six witnesses preferred other legislative vehicles, either the bypassed Wagner bill (1), Wagner and/or Russell (2), Smith-Ellender and/or Flannagan (2), or Flannagan’s two-title House bill (1).

Using the cross-tabulation of each of these panels uncovers greater clarity on sources of support for different policy designs. Starting with the backgrounds of the witnesses, of the 13 witnesses with full or partial membership in the agriculture vocation, a majority (7) supported Russell’s bill, while one supported Flannagan’s and five were unclear. None supported the education-based initiatives. In contrast, of the 25 witnesses with full or partial membership in the education vocation, a majority (13) supported only Smith-Ellender and two more supported Smith-Ellender and/or Flannagan (one supported Wagner and four others were unclear). However, the education witnesses were not monolithic like the agriculture witnesses, with five witnesses from educational groups supporting the agriculture-based Russell bill. Therefore, a key signifier of imminent success for Russell’s plan was the united support of the smaller agricultural forces and division within the larger education crowd.

Another approach is to disaggregate based on preferred policy vessel. 19 witnesses exclusively or in part preferred Smith-Ellender, of which a supermajority of 15 came from the education sector and four came from public health and religious organizations. In contrast, of the 18 witnesses that exclusively or in part supported Russell's bill, only a minority of seven came from the agriculture, with the remaining 11 coming from labor, community organizations, education, and government. So in addition to the unified force of agriculture and split within education, pro-Russell witnesses formed a more diverse coalition than that of Smith-Ellender. In total, the combination of status quo bias, the entrenched power of agriculture, divisions within program reformers, and the ability to attract support from the non-agricultural witnesses provide clear markers of Russell's advantage in maintaining a USDA program over the potentially riskier, but reasonable transition of the program into the newer social welfare and education bureaucracies.

The aforementioned categorizations help explain the substantive goals of each witness and employing organization. Since the administration was most interested in any policy enactment and was otherwise agnostic on the issue of bureaucratic ownership, they furnished mostly technical experts aware of the program history and logistics on current operations. We see this when witnesses provide background on current proceedings, such as when Olmstead laid out the facts of Congress requesting to end the Stamp Plan (HAG 1944, 71 [56]), and consequently by Norman Gold explaining how the end of the Stamp Plan contributed to an expanded distribution of commodities to schools (1944 SAF, 176). Of equal importance, executive branch officials often brief MCs on how an esoteric or vague clause of a statute is being employed; in this case, expanding the bounds of a basic commodity purchasing program to solve socioeconomic issues.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ An example of this is seen in how Norman Gold helps MCs better understand how the implementation of Section 32 created an opportunity to provide school lunches, even if MCs had not imagined that eventuality when approving the statutory language. One exchange makes this clear (HAG 1944, 59-60):

However, some of these bureaucrats felt emboldened to entrepreneurially gain a portfolio item, bringing them closer to the behavior of advocacy-based witnesses.

There are several dominant strains of advocacy discourse among witnesses. Among government-employed witnesses, one of the chief tasks was to demonstrate the need for affirmative Congressional action. No witness experienced greater heresthetical success at reshaping the expected response to a new social program in an austere era than Director of the Selective Service, Major General Lewis Hershey. Hershey made the rounds in different committees of jurisdiction throughout the war to brief lawmakers on the Army's observation that excess deaths and rejection from enlistment were in part a consequence of malnutrition-related diseases. When he finally testified in a forum dedicated to school lunch legislation, Hershey remarked:

When we adjourned, Mr. Chairman, I was speaking about our base, which is about 16,000,000 examined, and I think the best I can do for the committee is to point out that these lists of physical defects which we have here are of many kinds, so-called mental, so-called emotional, so-called educational and physical. From what study we have made I would say that 2 or 3 percent of them only are specified as malnutrition and rickets and a few things that are almost wholly connected with nutrition; but while there are 2 or 3 percent of those nutritional defects specified as such by examiners, there are 40 or 50 or 60 percent, perhaps, of rejections that are rejections in which at least nutrition or feeding has much to do with the rejection. (HAG 1945, 37)

Mr. Gold: "... all of us around this table have been working with this legislation that you have given us since it has been on the books. We have worked through all phases of this legislation, and I think you will agree with our understanding of the agricultural problem and it is two-fold: one is the problem of immediate surplus that must be handled at once, and the other one, from an agricultural viewpoint, is the more significant problem, and that is fundamentally to build up a big market, so that when the war demands are not there, or there are shifting schedules, there will always be a good, strong agricultural market in this country. This school lunch program was devised entirely with reference to that... to build up permanent markets, because there will be 6 to 8 million kids who will make a market for us."

Mr. Flannagan: "Are you asking us to make this surplus commodities thing permanent?"

Mr. Gold: "The language in Section 32 does not mention surplus commodities. It does say 'encourage domestic consumption by diversion from normal channels of trade,' and we are trying to build up this school lunch program as a permanent agricultural [program]."

Mr. Flannagan: "That is the construction you place on Section 32? If it is, I am frank to say to you that I don't think a single member of this committee ever entertained such a view."

Mr. Voorhis: "Oh, I did."

Mr. Flannagan: "Well, I didn't."

Here, Hershey expands the problematization of hunger to also impact military readiness, which turns out to be both an unusual and effective rhetorical connection. While the specific numbers range between studies, Hershey's decision to minimize the two to three percent figure of rejection directly *listed* as malnutrition in favor of the more ambitious 40 to 60% where malnutrition might have played a role indicates either an earnest assessment on his part, or potentially, an effort to exaggerate malnutrition in a way that gets MCs to notice. Notably, military officials tend to avoid domestic policy disputes and generally stick to what they know or can prove, so weighing in favorably here with such heavy-handed claims likely contributed to successful policy enactment.

From there, public health officials bolstered the military readiness argument with further nuance—it was not just hunger, but a lack of well-balanced diets. School lunches could solve these problems of provision and substance by providing well-rounded, fulsome meals to impoverished students. In particular, Surgeon General Dr. Thomas Parran provided scholastic resources and anecdotes from across the nation on how incidence of children with poor nutrition led to lower attendance, grades, and body weight, and higher rejection rates from military.¹⁰¹ While low in numerical representation before the committee, military and public health officials working in tandem expanded the ideational plane of debate on school lunches by proffering persuasive evidence of need, while projecting surety in the value of federal investment moving forward.

¹⁰¹ In addition to reports from local school districts, Parran furnished the leading public health research at the time to the committee. A report by the Committee on Diagnosis and Pathology of Nutritional Deficiencies, Food and Nutrition Board (1943) showed one-third of poor families in America were experiencing disease from malnutrition. Another piece by Ciocco, Klein and Palmer (1941) proved valuable. While Ciocco et al. do not employ statistical measures of differences in outcomes, but their raw data on cohorts over time suggests there was a relationship between health level in childhood and viability for military enlistment as an adult. This excerpt summarizes the findings: “The physician’s judgment on the state of nutrition was found on the school examination records of 323 selectees. Of 232 whose nutritional state was considered good or excellent, 47.5 percent were rejected for military service 15 years later. However, among 91 children whose nutrition was regarded as fair to poor, 70.3 percent were later found unacceptable for Selective Service. Such a large difference between the two percentages would seem to indicate that the childhood state of nutrition was definitely associated with the development of defects that 15 years later disqualified the adult for Selective Service” (2372).

Another point of contention between witnesses and MCs was whether the bill would include grants to cover facility improvements to ensure poorer and rural schools could participate in the program. Continuing the theme of executive branch officials deciphering the bill's meaning for MCs, WFA Administrator Marvin Jones pointed out that Section 4 of Flannagan's H.R. 2673 prohibited non-food aid, which was offered in passing to allay Rep. Clevenger's worries about endless concentration of decision power in D.C. (HAG 1945, 7). While that MC might have been satisfied at the lack of capital improvements in the bill, at least nine witnesses made the need for facility improvements front and center to their advocacy efforts. These folks claimed that if facilities grants were not included, many of the most disadvantaged students and communities would not be able to participate, further entrenching inequality. Moreover, several of these witnesses were from FSA/OE, such as OE Commissioner Studebaker and Assistant to the FSA Administrator, Harry Rosenfeld, who both continually tried to get members of the HAG to understand the imperative nature of this provision (320). Granted, they also argued their home agencies should manage this particular provision, so discerning self-interest from public good may have been difficult for some skeptical lawmakers. Overall, these witnesses succeeded in getting facilities grants into the bill, but throughout the policy process it appeared to be an afterthought to members of the committee, perhaps explaining why this provision was not funded by Congress until the mid-1960s.

Other witnesses upheld the orientation of the Progressive Movement tradition, specifically focusing on the need to provide nutritional education alongside the provision of nutritionally balanced meals. One of the leading witnesses who researched this area was Dora Lewis, Chair of the NYU Home Economics Department, who testified that providing a curricular adjunct to foodstuffs could redound to community level changes on two fronts. First, reformers in this camp

believed proper nutritional education could end poor nutritional choices among students, even if larger material needs may still ensue. Second, it was asserted students would take schoolhouse lessons home to help their parents make better nutritional decisions (41-45). This obviously lent itself to the Ellender framework, but the path that provided nutritional education through OE was ultimately not carried through into the final bill. While there was no requirement school lunches had to be nutritious, during implementation USDA did provide guidance through the construction of the food pyramid system, but these guidelines ran short of what pro-nutrition education proponents envisioned and put forth in their advocacy efforts.

Witnesses also offered insights into questions of federalism, particularly around the level of local involvement in the national program. These debates spawned from MCs' concerns that national-level generosity would discourage local involvement, creating a moral hazard of dependency and practical hazard of weak institutionalization. According to Joseph Meegan, this worry was insufficient to warrant federal disengagement. Meegan walked lawmakers through how he advocated for and ultimately passed a school lunch law through the Illinois state legislature (SAF 1944b, 133-134; HAG 1945, 142-143). Subnational units wanted to get into this domain, the argument went, but simply needed more resources to be fully effective. Beyond his advocacy for a dedicated federal statute for school lunches, Meegan also worried about program interruption if a new paradigm was adopted, leading him to favor an expansion of the status quo blueprint (which ultimately prevailed). The totality of his testimony was powerfully persuasive; indeed, Representative Voorhis claims in his memoir that no single witness did more to champion and push through the NSLA than Meegan (Voorhis 1970 [1947], 154).

MCs and federal officials wanted to create a structure of shared buy-in by instituting a matching grant requirement. Proponents of this approach included every witness from the

administration that voiced an opinion on the matter, including Surgeon General Parran and WFA Administrator Jones. But numerous opponents of a federal-state matching requirement argued this mechanism would discourage cash-strapped states from utilizing the program in the first place, declining federal money out of fiduciary necessity. This, in turn, would punish some of the poorest pupils and communities in the entire nation.¹⁰² After all, the successes in Illinois might have been due to an especially active social reform movement and receptive legislature. In less hospitable environments, some states might just decline to participate. Ultimately, the matching requirement made it into the final bill, but the formula was modified to decrease the matching burden on the poorest states, which directly benefited the programs lead sponsors in the Senate as Southern states were much poorer than the rest of the nation.

Throughout the proceedings, several important witnesses tried to re-center the agenda towards the material needs of the poor. Among the most overt witnesses on this front were Surgeon General Parran, Elizabeth Amery, and M. Searle Light, Director of the Connecticut Department of Education, who each argued the committee should spend less time focusing on markets and surplus commodity management, and more time doing what it takes to meet the needs of hungry schoolchildren. Articulating and addressing their interests should be the primary objective of the hearings. Oddly, these folks were bolstered by a member of the USDA team—Special Assistant to the Agricultural Research Administrator, Louise Stanley—who broke with the company line in claiming “Any nutrition program must be based on plans for food production and distribution considered in terms of human need” (SAF 1944b, 81). Ultimately, “In this discussion the main

¹⁰² Opposition to matching came from an eclectic group of witnesses, including: Harold Dawson, Director of Rural Service in the National Education Association; Grace Gosselin of the United Neighborhood Houses of NYC; M.F. Dickinson, Board Member of the National Farmers Union; Anna Berenson, Legislative Representative of United Auto Workers/CIO; Eleanor Fowler, Secretary Treasurer of the Congress of Women’s Auxiliaries/CIO; Professor Mary Bryan of Columbia University’s Teachers College; and Agnes Winn, Assistant Director of the Legislative and Federal Relations Division at the National Educational Association.

question is the health of our children, so that they will be better able to absorb the education provided for them to fit them for democratic living. This main purpose cannot be secondary to anything”, argued Mrs. Harvey Wiley of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, continuing “One cannot justify Federal assistance to school lunches on the claim that it will aid farm markets. The program may have begun that way but from now on feeding of hungry children is the main feature. If education is given free in the public schools, then food must now be given to enable the hungry children to absorb the education provided, or else it is thrown away” (SAF 1944b, 49). The efforts of these witnesses and a select subset of lawmakers to rhetorically expose the plight of poor students was ultimately overshadowed by the much larger logistics debates about program details and the role of government in agricultural production. Nonetheless, the content of these diversions into poverty representation are instructive.

When witnesses spoke of the poor, they imagined four overlapping categories of students. First, there was an emphasis on poor children who lack parental supervision due to the latter’s overextension on job demands. Second, poor students were depicted as lacking in nutritional literacy, although the problems of this class were not unlike other economic classes—dietary habits of most Americans in the 1930s and 1940s were dependent on locally available goods that led to imbalanced consumption habits. Third, poor students were depicted as severely underweight to the point where they could not learn in schools, and consequently, attain quality jobs. And finally, poor students were imagined as worthy targets of governmental investment because they would be the future soldiers of America—an especially promising framing of a disadvantaged group in an era of global conflict that took attention away from domestic policy.

By the end of the official proceedings, the 50 in-person witnesses were bolstered by an additional 70 letters and telegrams entered into the record, all in support of program (SAF 1944b,

235-250). This universal acclaim likely benefited the prospects for passage. However, overall there is relatively little description of the poor among witnesses, although witnesses did run ahead of the committee members in engaging in that representational behavior. Instead, there was a greater focus on school children, broadly constructed, many of whom were in need of a balanced nutritional diet across demographics. In this way, school lunches are not just an antipoverty program or vessel for agricultural interests, but an opportunity for education and public health reformers to *also* use the valence of the poor to pursue laudable, but somewhat ancillary objectives in elevating the health status of school children, and potentially, their family members in the shared domicile. What this culminates in is a process focused on technical matters and little on the lived experiences of poor. Therefore, it is important to assess some of the unspoken undercurrents guiding the process in the form of interest coalitions. In particular, how the dominant agricultural interests accomplished their directives by making reticent committee members come on board in the construction and passage of a new domestic market program in an otherwise conservative era.

Interests

MCs and witnesses help us understand the key interest coalitions involved in the NSLA. From the committee process specifically, one can determine the relative strength of different (visible) interests (Schattschneider 1935). Here, *interests* are a broader term than just *interest groups*, defined as an amalgamation of members of the public, mobilized pressure groups, elected members of Congress, and the executive branch bureaucracy pursuing coherent goals. The key interests present in the policymaking process were agriculture, educators, public health reformers, the military, labor, and community organizations. While these groups successfully unified to support enactment of a Congressionally authorized school lunch program, their goals were not the same. Instead, they competed with one another to shape the substance of the bill, and some interests

benefited more (agriculture) than others (education). But before moving to these groups, what complicated matters in this policy episode was the fragmentation of national government into interests within themselves, warring against one another by enlisting mobilized interests to bolster their aspirations, all the while introducing new dimensions of conflict.

Inter- and intra-branch governmental actor competition existed in three principal areas: between the legislative and executive branches, between chambers of Congress, and between executive branch bureaucracies. On the first count, Congress wanted to rein in executive pilot programs that were perceived to have lacked statutory authority (or were even alleged to be unconstitutional by some critics). Congress successfully eliminated WFA experimentation in food stamp relief, moving the ball to center on ongoing negotiations about whether and how to proceed with a school lunch plan for children. Only when influential gatekeepers in the form of committee chairs became interested in the program did the two branches begin to align in their interests.

Second, chamber politics factored heavily into conflict, as major Senate sponsors wanted a new bureaucratic arm in the Office of Education, while the House managers and rank-and-file repeatedly rebuffed the upper chamber in thwarting a growth of new governmental bureaucracies. Since Article I Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution lays out the power of revenue generation resides in the House, senators had less leverage to secure long-term appropriations and authority for their constituencies and pet projects (i.e., establishing new educational agencies).

Finally, Interagency bureaucratic competition was a hallmark of this legislative process, especially between the entrenched War Foods Administration (WFA) within the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the expanding Office of Education (OE) within the Federal Security Administration (FSA). It is in this bureaucratic competition that one sees the lay of the land in terms of interest coalitions.

The two interests most in direct competition with one another were agricultural and education. Agricultural interests benefitted from the support of the independent, well-resourced USDA, as well as a leading senate appropriator of Senator Russell, natural but reluctant support from Smith and Ellender, and general fealty from both committees of jurisdiction presiding over the school lunch legislation. Moreover, USDA had long been captured by key farm interest groups (Lowi 1979, 83), due to rural constituencies holding highly specialized, coherent, and homogenous districts (84). Indeed, all of the major agricultural interest groups supported the legislation, including the National Farmers Union, American Farm Bureau Federation, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and National Grange (*CR 92 1946, 1536*).¹⁰³ The subgovernment was cohesive and key actors held positions at each node of the iron triangle when it came to the NSLA.

In contrast, educational reformers did not have as powerful of a federal bureaucracy for their needs, but instead had the once independent (in the late 1860s) but now subsidiary Office of Education, formerly of the Department Interior and recently moved to the Federal Security Administration during the New Deal. The transient arc of this bureaucracy fits the historically ingrained hesitance of federal lawmakers to get involved in educational policy, which to this day remains primarily driven by state level decisions. On the more favorable side, education benefitted from more numerous witnesses than agriculture, had Smith and Ellender advocating for an

¹⁰³ Of these influential organizations, only the NFU sent a witness to either the House or Senate, one M.F. Dickinson. Toward the end of his remarks, he diplomatically argued to keep the program in USDA: “In conclusion, I want to make it plain that the National Farmers' Union does not take sides in whatever conflicts and contests for control of the school-lunch program may be going on between Government agencies, nor do we condone inaccurate or misleading statements that may have been made. We have the highest regard for other people's organizations who, on this issue, have come to feel that the program should be administered by another agency. We respect their motives and intent in reaching their decision and we regret having to differ. Because we feel strongly that the United States Department of Agriculture—and during the war period, W. F. A.—is better equipped in experience, training, and personnel than any other agency to do this work, and because we feel transferring in whole or in part to another agency would be a wasteful duplication and result later in conflict and loss of efficiency, we are required by the logic of our own conviction to adhere to, and to support before your committee, our belief that the school lunch program should be continued in the United States Department of Agriculture and, during the war period, in the War Food Administration” (*SAF 1944, 189-190*).

interagency approach, and had the support of the FSA bureaucracy. Notably, the role of poverty was not central to either interest, as agriculturally inclined MCs and witnesses focused on markets, while educators focused on the wellness of children, but not necessarily *poor* children.

Another key interest was the public health nexus of appointed bureaucratic leadership and reform-minded members of civil society. The former emanated around the Surgeon General and Public Health Service, while the latter came from public health advocacy organizations that spawned during the Progressive Era, but had comparatively fewer national as opposed to state-level policy victories. Indeed, the national public health system was too nascent to provide leverage for a health-focused approach to school lunches, although witnesses in this camp did speak to the health needs of poor children and later reaped victories as the state-building project continued throughout 20th century.

Arguably more successful at propounding a public health narrative were the small but influential military witnesses that entered the policy debate. These select leaders were particularly successful at framing and conflict displacement, as seen in their abilities to switch from the default austerity in post-New Deal era narrative to the essential need for investment in future military readiness. This creative heresthetical approach provided the winning discourse for the day, culminating in social provision of nutrition benefits to increase the eligible troop deployment pool in subsequent conflicts. Moreover, military dedication to nutrition was in some part a product of the decision to create a War Foods Administration in 1943, which proved immensely consequential. In particular, enmeshing food procurement and delivery within the military chain of command for purposes of necessity and expediency built relationships between the military and agricultural establishments. This agriculture-military bureaucratic entanglement created a promising structure to continue the long-held pattern of developing the American state by

expanding the superstructure of waging war and converting its purposes to fulfill domestic policy imperatives (Schattschneider 1969, 32-33; Skocpol 1995; Katznelson 2002). The agriculture-military nexus in the school lunch policy process remains one of the most effective and peculiar alignments in the history of antipoverty policy provision.

Labor, through CIO affiliates, continued to serve as the representatives of the poor in the New Deal regime. However, labor only managed to get two witnesses seated in front of the committee: Legislative Representative of United Auto Workers/CIO, Anna Berenson, and Secretary Treasurer of the Congress of Women's Auxiliaries/CIO, Eleanor Fowler. While it is unclear why this occurred, one explanation is that the chairs and ranking members of the committees of jurisdiction were not known allies of labor and might have even disfavored projecting voices from this community. This is credible given depictions of labor as being a corrupting force, a particularized Northern interest, and/or the industrial sector accruing investments that aggrieved rural agricultural interests. Additionally, given labor's role in veering the party leftward into modern left-liberalism during the New Deal (Schickler 2016), it is plausible Southern Democrats did not want to build the hearing record through their intra-party rivals to power. Alternatively, they could have assumed it would jeopardize the valence of the process in an inhospitable era for labor advocacy. A final explanation is that labor was an insufficient representative of poor people. This explanation is consistent with Lowi's (1979) depiction of the failures of monopolistic firms to represent the needs of the public in the interest-group liberalism model of the New Deal. On balance, this latter explanation holds less sway in this context since the content of the two witnesses was more in line with depicting the needs of the poor than any heretofore mentioned interest. Instead, it appears likely Southern Democratic gatekeeping

committee chairs tried to minimize the visibility of labor in the proceedings, although whether their reasons are for political expediency or due to malevolence is unclear.

The final important interest to address is the role of community organizations and their leadership to demonstrate the need for a school lunch program. Arguably with more success than the labor witnesses, community group leadership provided a voice for the people that was palatable to partisan or ideologically rigid lawmakers. Their unaffiliated, non-partisan approach demonstrated there was local buy-in, which worked well to persuade conservative lawmakers that this initiative was a not a big government renegotiation of the social contract. This accomplishment is especially remarkable given their scant numbers of witnesses.

Overall, there was no clear antipoverty-centered interest, likely because such few of those organizations have ever existed, let alone during the New Deal. Interest in poverty had to come from numerous sources, often with more than one goal than to tend to the poorest children of the nation. While the basic success of the program speaks to the viability of virtual representation in constructing antipoverty policies, the lack of lived experience in the representational process—with a few exceptions noted earlier—contributed to a policy that inadequately resolved the issue of child hunger, while satisfying the demands of adjacent non-poor interests.

The committee process as a whole provides a vivid example of how the Speaker's act of referring bills to committees shapes both their prospects for enactment and the qualitative substance of the legislation. In the committee of jurisdiction, members become advocates and jurors, amplifying or contesting what external stakeholders wish the body would act upon. In this case, educational interests were overwhelmed with opposition in the ag committees, especially in the House. And even if their views prevailed, the best case would be for the bills to be (re-)referred to House and Senate education committees for further action, as the ag committees were never

likely to authorize legislation that did not directly serve their established interests or match the preferred governmental bureaucracy over which they conduct oversight. Ultimately, it seems Senator Ellender was persuaded by the argument that the potential for service interruption and interagency squabbling posed a serious problem moving forward. Agencies “want to fight each other... That is something we don’t seem able to control” (SAF 1944b, 159). By blending the status quo design with permanent social provision, agricultural interests won the day; consolidation in USDA maintained their exclusive fiefdom, permanently intertwining nutritional deficiency with the surplus goods market.

With well-researched policy language and witness support, MCs constructed an arsenal designed to withstand interrogation by hostile non-committee members on the chamber floors—addressed in the next section—on the path toward creating a winning coalition and successful policy implementation.

Committee of the Whole: The Floor Process

Throughout Congress—but especially in the House—majority leadership maximizes use of the power to regulate the floor agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). This involves controlling which issues reach the floor, what topics are germane to debate, who is recognized to speak on said issues, and dictating the rules on scheduling and amendments. Since agenda space is scarce, party leaders, floor managers, advocates, and enterprising politicians need to make the most of every moment on the floor. On the House side, Speaker Rayburn was in charge during the entire NSLA debate. Rayburn was known to leave it to committee chairs to run their operations, including by managing floor time and corralling enacting coalitions (Cooper and Brady 1981, 419-420). This approach was more decentralized than the immediately preceding eras. In turn—and

despite Majority Leader Alben Barkley's (D-KY) strong leadership style (Congressional Quarterly 1976, 236; Matthews 1960, 124)—the House resembled the Senate's diffuse power dynamics,

In both chambers, floor managers—Flannagan in the House; Russell in the Senate—had a delicate dance to shepherd the policy to passage. First, they had to navigate uncertain speech and debate time, ensuring they controlled the valence of the discourse while still acknowledging the views of participating members. Second, they had to offer the final slate of committee-proposed amendments (often technical fixes), ward off deleterious poison pills, and relent on changes that could facilitate the bill's passage in the chamber and full body. Finally, they had to whip votes to secure a majority enacting coalition. All of this required a dexterous combination of delicate care and decisive action.

Following an informational model (Krehbiel 1991), an essential task for rank-and-file advocates like Voorhis was to educate lawmakers about the need for the program and why proposed legislation should be furthered in Congress. Later, with the positive endorsement by the committees of jurisdiction, an additional informational task for Flannagan, Russell, and Ellender was to educate non-committee members about the designed bill's merits. To observe this edifying process, the next section depicts the lay of the land of poverty rhetoric in the early to mid-1940s, with particular attention to the dominant discursive frames by program proponents and opponents. This is followed by sections on the amendment process, in which non-committee members experienced mixed success at altering a bill they could not control at earlier stages. Finally, the floor process section concludes with a depiction of the passage process and analyses of important roll calls to better understand systematic explanations of the bill's outcome.


Speeches

The floor debate about school lunches was in part of product of a larger spatiotemporal and ideological climate. Therefore, the exact discourse of MCs on the floor of the House and Senate is not *tabula rasa*, but instead conveys responses to context and entrepreneurial linkages between ideas to justify the Congressional authorization of a federal school lunch program. This section starts with broad depictions of the content of poverty-related speeches in Congress during the school lunch act policy process, then proceeds to a forensic, day-by-day account of the discursive turns advocates employed to win over the apprehensive legislature.

To start, Figure 10.3 broadly conveys important changes in poverty discourse as captured in floor speeches during the long arc of the school lunch debate. The figure tracks six important subsets of poverty rhetoric: those centered on children, foreign populations, agriculture, consumers, health, and hunger. Additionally, the figure includes annotations of important policy developments which show the conversion of an agricultural support program into a full-fledged social welfare program devoted to poor children.

Beginning in the first year of this study's time-series, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 passed with a relatively low amount of poverty discourse, which was a specific product of a shortened Congressional session and low poverty projection in general. As hunger and health gain salience as other social welfare programs—mainly the Social Security Act of 1935 and SSA amendments in 1939—drive the agenda, the imperative AAA Amendments of 1935 create the Section 32 authority to pilot school lunches as surplus commodity purchasing and work-relief program. Depictions of both hunger and agricultural poverty peak in this period. Congress further expands food relief to individuals in the lesser-known act from 1937. As depictions of poverty dwindle as the onset of global war receives greater Congressional attention, the debates around

Figure 10.3 Poor Group Construction during School Lunch Policy Process



agricultural appropriations in 1942 serve as a turning point to begin the process of Congress fulsomely debating a dedicated school lunch policy. From this point on, agricultural poverty takes up less and less of the depictions of the poor, transitioning instead to the foreign poor, hungry Americans at large, children, consumers, and those with failing health. It is notable the agricultural poor are not prominent in the floor discourse on school lunches—as it was in committee—even as the program greatly benefited both their vocational livelihoods and well-being of children in rural schoolhouses.

Several important discursive dynamics emerged in relation to poverty in the 1940s that deviated from the decade immediately preceding it. First, hunger gained further prominence in discourse. In the period from 1942 to 1946, speeches that engaged the hungry poor constituted 40% of all poverty speeches (362 of 913). Hunger remains the leading type of poverty among the six measures. Moreover, starting in the 1940s, hunger was divided between the rising salience of the foreign poor during WWII and children in need at home.

Rising with the employ of hunger as a narrative was childhood poverty, which is depicted in 19.5% of poverty speeches (178 of 913) from 1942 to 1946. The share steadily rises in the period to a peak of 23.6% (53 of 225) in 1946, the year of the most robust NSLA debates and its passage. As Chapter 6 covered, since lawmakers make proficient use of the breadth of potential characterizations of the poor, hunger and children gaining a 40% and 20% share, respectively, is a fairly high concentration.

Importantly, even though the school lunch act served to lessen child-based and hunger-based poverty conditions, these two issues were not always centered in Congressional commodity purchasing rhetoric in this era. For example, there was debate in February of 1944 about supplying food to poor consumers, but the debate was entirely devoid of appeals based on children and hardly addressed hunger and starvation. Instead, lawmakers depicted a general need to help the public, specifically with purchasing power and freedom from potential want.¹⁰⁴ Earlier periods where the poor and food were linked centered on the desperate condition of malnutrition and starvation across the country. Framing those that need food as being dutiful consumers, and not impoverished recipients of aid, fits the late-war period, where stirring aggregate demand was pivotal to transitioning the US out of the war economy as the specter of recession loomed around the corner.

Synthesis of this type mirrored ancillary debates in which the same inclination for maintaining production demand was used to justify feeding the war-torn populations in Europe and Asia, especially in 1945 when the foreign poor nearly overtook hunger as the most used depiction in floor speeches. But a key difference is the use of vivid language to depict the desperate

¹⁰⁴ Specifically, debates on February 10th and 11th centered on the Bankhead Bill and Aiken's food allotment plan, but in potentially addressing issues of hunger members more often called to eligibility of poor families to receive aid. The families themselves were rarely depicted as hungry, just low income. Much of the remaining debate was about agricultural commodities, supporting farmers, and the role of the government in constructing commodity price controls (*CR 90* 1944, 1458-1609).

need for food among people who have had everything destroyed around them. The language around domestic hunger was noticeably more tempered. In an interesting turn, isolationist politicians—generally no friends to social welfare programs either—begin to rationalize that if we are to provide foreign aid for the hungry abroad, we may as well provide domestic supports.¹⁰⁵ Those MCs weary of the global concern about hunger worked to displace the existing conflict with a reintroduction of the native depiction of hunger. Reorienting to domestic politics initially gave advocates of increased domestic aid an opening to create new policies, but these isolationists had other goals in mind: shifting to a domestic focus was the first step to negating global considerations, but they then moved to an overt position of being against all aid once they succeeded in altering the agenda space. Once again, the valence of serving the poor is used for negation to displace existing conflicts on issues that serve the strategic goals of MCs. Concern about poverty is therefore unnecessary to find utility and success in the employ of poverty rhetoric.

Noticeably, children and consumers begin trending together—with consumer being more used than children—starting in the 1940s. It turns out this connection has less to do with entrepreneurial politicians figuring out how to portray hungry youth in a deserving manner, and more to do with the language of Section 32 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act Amendments of 1935, which expressly encouraged using customs receipts to increase domestic consumption of surplus commodities. Because the program grew out of this language, lawmakers in later years

¹⁰⁵ One speech by Rep. Alvin O’Konski (R-WI) serves as a strong example, lamenting the attention to the suffering of people around the world and contrasting that with neglect toward the elderly at home: “It appears that the Members of this House are more worried of the welfare of the people outside of the United States than they are concerned about our own people within the United States. We talk of starvation and deprivation everywhere else in the world, but we close our eyes to the starvation and the deprivation right here at home. For right here at home today, right now, we have hundreds of thousands of people who are just as bad off as some of the people in other parts of the world that we are so concerned about. I am talking about our old people who today, with the high cost of living, do not even get enough to keep body and soul together. All they are getting from us is slow starvation allowances. And it worries me terribly to see the attitude of this House in the frame of mind where they literally want to give this country away to somebody else and at the same time close their eyes to the deprivation and starvation here at home” (*CR 89* 1943, 1762).

referred to poor children as consumers consistent with the 1935 AAA. This is an interesting and heretofore unstudied example of policy feedback creating new interbranch politics—a bill’s language leads to executive branch experimentation, which then informs Congressional discourse.

Moving on from the summary of poverty speeches in Figure 10.3, existing scholarship (Ruis 2017, 141) depicts the floor debate centered on three principal questions. First, were there enough hungry children to warrant a permanent public health program? Second, was the program a good vehicle to support agriculture? And third, was federal government justified in entering into what some might see as a subnational dilemma? Answering those questions was a key task of program advocates. However, according to Voorhis’ memoir, settling those questions was insufficient, since three more arguments were espoused in opposition to the bill. For one, it allegedly undermined the American home by shifting responsibility from the domicile to the government. Second, a resulting moral hazard would lead parents to feel less responsible for children’s welfare. And third, this was a grave interference by the federal government into local schools (1970 [1947], 145-146).¹⁰⁶ Cognizant of the questions lawmakers had and the types of arguments opponents would proffer, one particular speech by Voorhis is worth unpacking in depth to better understand how a policy Congress was ready to eliminate became an unlikely bipartisan consensus bill in a hostile era. While one cannot precisely determine how much individual or collective rhetoric reshapes hearts and minds, the following speech is a robust example of how lawmakers at least make the attempt to break the stasis in advocating for the poor.

On April 9, 1942, Voorhis rose to offer the first school lunch bill (H.R. 6914). In the process, the member laid out the contours of discourse that ultimately took hold in persuading the

¹⁰⁶ The third question Ruis brings up has more to do with *whether* the federal government should be involved at all, while the third critique that Voorhis depicts is *how* the federal government would overstep, after already assuming involvement. This overreach would occur, allegedly, through federal bureaucrats telling local officials how to manage their students and curricula.

body to pass a later version of the bill. Indeed, the language of the 15-minute speech—excerpted in part here—serves as a microcosm for the entire Congressional debate on school lunches.

Voorhis begins his speech by stating the purposes of the bill, firmly grounded in expanding existing agricultural practices: “Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today a bill to amend section 32 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The effect of the amendment is to authorize the appropriation of funds [in addition to customs receipts]” for the school lunch program (*CR 88 1942, 3429*). The member continues:

This piece of legislation... would leave the Congress in a position, which it is not now in[,] to decide what amount it felt was necessary to be had for the purposes of commodity distribution, the stamp plan, the school-lunch program, and the program of supporting farm prices against the possibility of surpluses destroying that price structure. It would remove all that program from complete dependence which it now has upon 30 percent of customs receipts, however much that may be. (3429)

Here, Voorhis is making clear several things. First, the program is currently hampered by the 30% customs cap, limiting its reach to the hungry, which also hampers Congress’ control over the appropriation level. Second, he lays out the four purposes of the bill: two agricultural (commodity distribution; price supports) and two social welfare (the stamp plan; school lunches). At this time, Voorhis was still a proponent for the stamp plan, which support food insecure adults, but then for the rest of the speech he only talks about the worthy child population.

Next, Voorhis sets up why his bill is a needed addition to the list of U.S. statutes. He situates the historical moment as one of duty to the common good for America’s collective defense in the face of formidable adversaries.

America is at war. She is in the very middle of the only total war in all history. Realization of all that means, of the terrible magnitude of the task that lies ahead of us, of the deprivation and suffering to be endured—all these are being borne in upon our people. When the course of a people’s destiny changes so drastically, as has that of America since Pearl Harbor it is inevitable that there will be confusion in our minds. Some things we have struggled hard to gain must, for the time being, be given up. Special group interests must

universally give way to the common defense and general welfare, to use the words of the Constitution... (3429)

This turn sets up a pragmatic give-and-take approach, where Voorhis can claim we cannot do all of the utopian things idealists would want in their government, but we can do the most essential. In this case, that is school lunch. Moreover, by tying a less controversial aspect of constitutional governance—national defense—to a perennially debated provision—general welfare—Voorhis is preemptively undercutting anyone that would say the measure is un- or extraconstitutional.

He then offers the military imperative argument, tying America's steadfast resolve at war with the domestic need to improve the health of future soldiers—the children:

WHAT GENERAL HERSHEY SAID¹⁰⁷ And just in case anyone might contend that this proposal of mine is not of importance to winning the war, I want to call attention to a statement of General Hershey, Director of Selective Service before the National Nutrition Conference on May 27, 1941. Here is what he said: It has been estimated that perhaps one-third of the men rejected (for physical unfitness) was due either directly or indirectly to nutritional deficiencies. In terms of men[,] the Army today has been deprived of 150,000 men who should be able to do duty as soldiers. This is 15 percent of the total number which have been physically examined by the Selective Service System. It is perhaps of little use to speculate on what should have been done by our schools, by parents, by health bodies, or by the Government. It is a condition we should recognize as dangerous, and which we should take immediate, positive, and vigorous measures to correct. (3429)

Hershey's estimates provide Voorhis with the ammunition he needs to tie the war effort with school lunches. Moreover, he is unconcerned with where blame lies in relation to weakened readiness, and instead wants to focus attention on what is actionable—his bill.

Next, he merges military-need with public health expertise. In particular, saying there is scientific backing for how to solve malnutrition and win the next war, all in one measure. He continues:

I heard the Surgeon General of the United States only the other night state that this school-lunch program has been the most basically helpful step in improving the health of the

¹⁰⁷ Capitalized text denotes a subject header in Congressional speeches.

American people that has been taken by our Nation. I know there are a lot of things we cannot do during this war. I know there are many things we must and should go without. I know that many expenditures of Government will have to be cut down, but I submit there is one basic policy we ought to pursue, and that is the policy of seeing to it that there shall be no malnutrition in our country at the present time, at least among the children. If there is one thing most necessary to the strength of our Nation, most helpful in preventing tuberculosis and other diseases, it is a good diet for our children. HOW MANY UNDERNOURISHED SCHOOL CHILDREN DO WE HAVE? There are undernourished children among the generation of tomorrow in our country. There are about 9,000,000 of them. This is just 9,000,000 more than there ought to be and 9,000,000 more than there need to be. For an expenditure of between \$60,000,000 and \$90,000,000 of Federal funds we can make it true that there will not be one... (3429-3430)

Such lofty expectations of policy success are clear hyperbole, but Voorhis is doing his best to at least suggest this bill provides a large amount of utility with a relatively small per pupil investment of between 6.67 and 10 dollars per student. And importantly, even though his bill covers all food assistance programs, he hints that children are the most important target population.

Next, he moves on to economic need—the chief cause of widespread malnutrition. Without any committee hearings, the member is independently pulling together disparate evidence to prove the dire situation many face on a day-to-day basis.

[...] [A] number of studies on the adequacy of diets have been made. One of the most significant is the Nation-wide survey conducted by the Bureau of Home Economics of the Department of Agriculture in 1935-36. It was found at this time that 27 percent of the families in the country had good diets, 38 percent had fair diets, and 35 percent had poor diets... The National Resources Committee's report, Consumer Incomes in the United States—1935-36—shows that 32 percent of all families in the United States had incomes of less than \$750 per year, and nearly half—47 percent—had incomes of less than \$1,000. Further reference to the Bureau of Home Economics study discussed above will establish a strong supposition that 75 percent of these low-income families had inadequate diets. Again, this indicates that more than one-third of the families in the country have inadequate diets because they cannot afford better diets. (3430)

One can see Voorhis is well-versed in the details of both school lunches and larger issues of poverty in America. Having given 48 speeches on the subject of poverty—of which this is one—this is leading evidence that consistent interest in rhetorically depicting the poor comes from an

awareness of and interest in their problems—it is not just emotional demagoguery to win the votes of the unwashed masses.

Next, Voorhis lays out how his program will solve the multitude of issues he just laid out. And importantly, it is not a new program without proven results, but instead, one that has a track record of years of success:

SCHOOL-LUNCH PROGRAM What then shall we do about it? Fortunately a method and program has already been tried out and found to be good. It is ready to our hand if we will take it and use it with the vigor it and the children of America deserve. I am introducing today an amendment to section 32 of Public Law No. 320, to permit the Department of Agriculture to continue and expand its aid to school-lunch programs for undernourished children... As you know, Public Law No. 320 was passed as an aid to agriculture. It provides, among other things, that the Secretary of Agriculture shall encourage the domestic consumption of agricultural commodities by getting them to persons in low-income groups. Under this legislation the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation and its successor, the Surplus Marketing Administration, have purchased agricultural commodities when a surplus situation threatened the price structure. There have been times when prompt action by this agency has been the one thing that has saved the markets for some farm commodities from complete demoralization. One of the ways—and I personally think the most important one—in which the Surplus Marketing Administration has used these commodities is in the school-lunch program. (3430)

Once more, the member comes full circle to the issue of agriculture. What allowed the pilot programs to function was a commodity support program. This program can continue and expand them with new permanent markets of hungry children. Essentially, no one is worse off by making current practices permanent and better funded.

While the speech goes on a bit further than the following excerpt, the last important passage conveys the convergence of several politically potent forces: active parents, teachers, community leaders, farmers, moral duty, winning the war, and taking care of America's own. These groups and ideas form the basis of a strong ideational and actor coalition in times of policy change, but even stronger when they already reap a direct status quo benefit. If Congress fails to act, that would constitute de facto retrenchment. Voorhis argues:

The Surplus Marketing Administration is now besieged by anxious teachers, parents, and interested people of every sort who fear that under the emergency program, Federal aid for school lunches will be curtailed or cut off completely. The tone of the letters leaves no doubt that lunch programs will have to be completely abandoned in many areas if this aid is denied. Of course, the poorest communities, which are least able to do anything for themselves, will be the hardest hit. I do not want to see this splendid work curtailed; rather, I think because of the war, we must expand it to the point that there is not one hungry child in the land. One of the four freedoms, for which we are fighting, is freedom from want. The farmers of America are being asked to produce not only enough food for America and her fighting forces but also enough for the people of many other lands as well. What can we say to millions of our own undernourished children if we take away from them their one decent meal a day? (3431)

If these constituencies and efforts are not being tended to by their elected leaders, a case could be made that new representative politicians who will support the program should come into office. After all, MCs are nothing if not single-minded—and proficient—seekers of reelection (Mayhew 1974). Toward the end, and years before the narrative gained traction, Voorhis plays off of America's growing global footprint to play to a nativist crowd. If we are going to support the people of other nations, the argument goes, the least we can do is support our own. And who deserves more help than children who simply need the food to survive, learn, and one day give back to the great nation?

While excerpting so much of a single speech seems quite verbose, it is a truly remarkable speech. It lays out the main contours of how advocates would motivate the policy. It offers empirical supports for the need. And it couches the policy within other entrenched interests, such as national defense and agriculture, that could allow reticent lawmakers to jump board with an antipoverty program even without caring about the poor. Although Voorhis himself admits the NSLA had stronger boosters than himself—the policy ends up taking on Richard Russell's namesake in some references—more than any Member of Congress he laid the rhetorical and

ideational groundwork to create a permanent social welfare program in era of allergy-like reaction to such positive forms of governmental action.

While no members were as comprehensive as Voorhis in painting the full picture of program need, the “heavyweight” program advocates in the Senate adopted Voorhis’ language and filled in important holes by tying additional issues together and allaying worries about a new social program. In the Senate floor debates of 1944, Senator Bushfield (R-SD) disagreed with Russell’s depiction of mass denials based on malnutrition. In response, Russell qualified what he is trying to have the Senate visualize, in quite stark terms:

Mr. President, I am not here contending that we have any condition of starvation in this country such as that I saw in Calcutta, India, where the authorities were picking up people from the streets in the morning and throwing them on trucks and carrying them outside, burning the corpses of those who starved to death in the streets. Of course[,] I have not contended we have any such condition of starvation as that in this country. But I also have some evidence. The Selective Service examinations, according to a statement I have, show that 3.2 percent of the registrants have had specific nutritional defects, such as beriberi, scurvy, pellagra, malnutrition, night blindness, and under-nourishment. Those people were actually suffering from some disease caused by poor dietary conditions. (*CR 90* 1944, 3845)

Here, Russell plays off of the foreign narrative and some degree of American exceptionalism. Again, he ties the need for the program to military imperatives for victory, which necessarily a product of the health of children. Notably, it is useful for him play to a broader audience than just bleeding-heart liberals, since they do have not have majority status in either chamber—and also because Russell is not one himself. Russell understood what discourse could work on his colleagues as a member in good standing with the governing Conservative Coalition.

In a separate debate a year later, newly minted co-sponsor Ellender depicts the wide coalition supporting the bill’s enactment. When introducing the new compromise Russell-Ellender Bill on February 8, 1945, Ellender argues:

All groups concerned with the welfare of children—doctors, educators, nutritionists, child-care agencies, and the leaders of parent groups—have long pointed to the urgent need for an organized program to provide well-planned lunches at school. Many thousands of children, especially those attending the schools from poorer homes, have always had an insufficient supply of food—insufficient in quantity and in essential nutritional elements, or both, causing malnutrition with its dire effects upon mind and body. At the hearings on school-lunch legislation, held by a Senate committee last May, Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General, United States Public Health Service, pointed out that surveys of the situation almost invariably have shown that malnutrition in this country, despite its wealth, is not only widespread, but serious. This, he emphasized, has resulted in retarded growth of children, in increased susceptibility to disease, in retardation of the mental development, and in the production of an adult population much less healthy than we reasonably should expect. He reported that in the opinion of the medical staff of the Selective Service one-half of all men rejected for the draft were rejected because of poor nutrition in childhood, which resulted in lack of physical development and other defects. (*CR 91* 1945, 924)

Fresh from comprehensive committee hearings, Ellender is able to establish the severity and durability of the problem. Kids are becoming less competitive across the board, from learning in the schoolhouse to physical fitness. This impacts many core commitments the government otherwise engages, and thus should act. Uniquely suitable, school lunches would serve as a nexus that rectifies a series of important, interconnected public problems.

With the ideational plane and terms of debate set on a promising footing, debate on *why* and *whether* to act gave way to *how* to act. The ostensible consensus bill that unified advocate lawmakers now had to withstand scrutiny from enterprising members that sought to either reshape the committee endorsed bill, or poison the well in service of sinking the bill altogether. Such volatility is a hallmark of an open amendment process.

Amendments

As is often the case, the amendment process for the NSLA was a mix of minor technical fixes, diversions into left-field, and seismic reconfigurations of the policy blueprint. In all, there were 22 discrete amendments, 23 if you include a roll call revote on the Powell amendment a day after it passed by division, or up to 28 if you include substitutes, consolidations, and amendments

to amendments (*CR 92* 1946, 1451-1479, 1484-1508, 1534-1542, 1608-1628). The amendment process had two principle impacts on the substance of the bill: it succeeded in providing a funding parity stipulation in racially segregated communities (Powell Amendment); and much to the chagrin of educational reformers, support for nutritional literacy programs through the Office of Education were entirely stripped from the bill (Andresen Amendment). However, leadership was successful at warding off further deleterious amendments, such as funding sunsets and cuts, as they carefully shepherded the bill to passage.

The process began on February 19, 1946, with the House agreeing to House Resolution 495, which set the rules for immediately considering the Flannagan Bill (H.R. 3370) (1451). The powerful chair of Agriculture Committee and lead author of the House bill acted as the sole floor manager in the chamber. While Flannagan succeeded in getting the policy passed, in his quest to reach the goal line the MC also sacrificed core aspects of the prospective statute.

The early amendments were non-controversial, all adopted without division, tellers, or roll calls. The first amendment was offered by Edwin Arthur Hall (R-NY), which sought to ensure the government only supported non-profit enterprises. This comported with sponsor intent and was adopted (1472). Flannagan himself offered the second, third and fourth amendments, which were technical in nature by changing dates (from 1946 to 1947) and making funding streams clearer (1472, 1479). The fifth amendment, proffered by Flannagan, seems benign, but does make clearer local authorities determine their nutritional needs, not some other agent like the Secretary of Agriculture (1479). This amendment passed as well. Finally, Flannagan offered the final amendment of the first day's debate, again changing a date to from 1946 to 1947 (1479).

The second day of debate on February 20 was more momentous—and contentious. First, Representative Ellsworth Buck (R-NY), buttressed by ag committee member Andresen (R-MN),

offered an amendment to stipulate that only state/local money spent on food acquisition would count toward the matching requirement (1484). At first glance, this amendment would simplify what constitutes matching while also ensuring that commodity purchasing remained central in policy design. However, Flannagan opposed the measure and Voorhis articulated the reasoning, as this change would likely hurt poorer schools that would currently have to spend on something, but is not limited to food (1484-1487). Instead, the amendment would bar “as part of their contribution the salaries that [schools] pay to people who prepare these lunches; [schools’] necessary expenses for equipping the lunchroom and other things of that character” (1486). Fortunately, the amendment was defeated (1488), allowing greater flexibility for schools to fulfill their requirements to unlock needed resources.

The next amendment—eighth overall—was proposed by Rep. Abernethy of the ag committee. Abernethy’s proposal would end all dedicated Congressionally directed funding for the program in 1951, forcing states to take over the program costs, but still buttressed by ongoing diversion of customs receipts through Section 32 of the AAA of 1935 (1488). The argument was simple: if states like the program, they will find the money to support it. Representative Malcolm Tarver (D-GA) first articulated the opposition, saying this was a backdoor way of ending the program, and if Abernethy were more forthright, he would articulate he is against the program now as it stands (1488).¹⁰⁸ Everett Dirksen (R-IL) joined in opposition to argue ending the program in 1951 will just put Congress back in the position of once again relitigating the policy under the duress of looming program interruption (1489). Finally, Flannagan protested the amendment, saying a) the rising matching requirement will require local buy-in, and b) that you cannot have a sustainable school lunch program on surplus commodities alone, since they are unpredictable in

¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Abernethy articulated opposition to the bill in committee and voted against final passage of the bill.

nature and never well-rounded enough in aggregate to provide a balanced meal (1491). But unexpectedly, the amendment passed on division, 98 to 84. Not satisfied to lose the vote and jeopardize the whole enterprise, Flannagan demanded tellers, which likely bought enough time to page members from hallways and offices to successfully ward off the hostile amendment by a vote of 127 against to 124 in favor (1491).

The ninth amendment in the House was the Powell Amendment, which barred resource discrimination based on descriptive traits of students and schools. What freshman Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) was attempting was to ensure that funding would reach Black students and Black schools in the South. Without direct statutory protection, it was argued, anti-Black subnational officials would deprive this population of needed supports. Such an antidiscrimination provision was included—verbatim—in Senator Ellender and Russell’s bill (S. 962) from the First Session of the 79th Congress (1493), but this provision was stripped from the Flannagan’s clone of the bill in committee and not included in the subsequent marked up and reported version that reached the House floor. Powell had earlier tried to get it back in, but leadership thought it would decrease support for the bill, so he withdrew his amendment to keep the bill moving (Ruis 2017, 150-151). This earlier episode was another clear indication that political expediency and minimal changes to status quo were goals of main proponents of the bill, as they provided the safest path toward enactment.

However, sensing his chances to act were fleeting, and that perhaps the amendment could pass, Powell offered robust language on the floor, which read:

No funds made available pursuant to this title shall be paid or disbursed to any State or school if, in carrying out its functions under the title, it makes any discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin of children or between types of schools or, with respect to a State which maintains separate schools for minority and for majority races, it discriminates between such schools on this account. (*CR 92* 1946, 1493)

The amendment was later to be followed—but this never materialized—with a second amendment to define minority races: “Sec. (c). The term ‘minority races’ means any race or racial group that constitutes a minority of the population of the continental United States” (1494).¹⁰⁹ Notably, even without the follow-up clause, the proposed language is much broader than just an anti-Jim Crow measure, as it protected children from immigrant families and ethnic minorities, particularly Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans across the country.

The amendment set off a firestorm and sparked four dimensions of conflict on the House floor. First, Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture Chair Tarver, and later Voorhis, asserted there was no record of any discrimination in the program to date. Therefore, the amendment is moot and just causes controversy (1494). In particular, Voorhis did not impugn Powell’s motives, but noted the optics of the debate were detracting from the legislation itself, creating a cloud of controversy where none existed (1506).

Others, such as Reps. Sam Russell (D-TX) and Poage, contended this amendment would actually mean Southern schools get nothing, which would hurt white and Black kids alike. Specifically, Rep. Russell pointed to the exact language on segregated schools as being ambiguous, potentially leading the courts to claim Congress intended to bar such funds from any state with segregated schools (1495). This worry, according to Powell, was unfounded and would not be the case (1495). This line of thinking was further bolstered with the rhetorical support of Flannagan, who just before this moment had been overruled for trying to end debate. Flannagan noted that pro-segregation Senators Ellender and Russell designed the language itself and believed it preserved the peculiar Southern institution while materially benefitting both white and Black students (1498). To mediate between the parties, Rep. John Hamlin Folger (D-NC) proposed an

¹⁰⁹ This definition was disclosed under questioning by Rep. Francis Case (R-SD), who inquired whether Indian children would be protected under this amendment. Rep. Powell claimed they would be (1494).

amendment to the amendment which would strike all the words after “or national origin of children”, essentially barring discrimination of any kind (1496). Powell endorsed this change, and the amendment was modified—for the moment.¹¹⁰

A group of supposed integrationists viewed this moment as an opportunity to create federal pressure to end segregation. Representative Harold Knutson (R-MN) claimed that if the full Powell amendment was adopted, he would support the bill, but if the Folger amendment to the amendment was adopted, he would oppose the bill (1497). That is because the meat of the amendment was found in the threat to eliminate funding for Southern states—just as MCs from that region worried. To Knutson and Rep. George Bender (R-OH), the leverage of this threat could work to end segregation in schools. Steadfast in this belief and seizing the moment, Bender proposed a substitute amendment to accomplish this goal in overt fashion:

No funds appropriated under the provisions of this act shall be apportioned to any State wherein there is maintained under the laws of such State separate schools for the education of children of different color, or wherein there is exercised any racial discrimination or segregation of pupils on account of color. (1495)

“I am sure this is what he [Powell] must have had in mind,” Bender claimed. “Let us say exactly what we mean” (1495-1496).

Like the charge of Southern Democrats worried he was trying to deprive them of funds, this arm-twisting to desegregate was not Powell’s intention either. “The purpose of my amendment is not in any way to alter existing educational patterns”, Powell asserted, “The purpose of my amendment is to assure that where there are separate schools or even where there are not separate schools, the money allocated for the school-lunch programs shall be allocated fairly to all people without regard to race, creed, color, or nation of origin” (1496). As a rejoinder, Bender asked,

¹¹⁰ In conference committee, Senators Ellender and Russell changed the language again to be clearer on matters of segregation, specifically to ensure separate-but-equal was not considered discrimination. This is covered in the section on policy language analysis.

“Does the gentleman approve of existing patterns?” “I do not,” Powell—one of only two African-American MCs with William L. Dawson (D-IL)—responded, “but that is not the subject before the House now” (1496).¹¹¹ Later in the debate, Powell made clear, “I am interested only in seeing that the school-lunch money is apportioned to all people, majority and minority. That is the only purpose I have now. If the gentleman [Bender] is serious about changing the school pattern, I will go with him, but not on this bill” (1498).

And finally, some onlookers believed this was intended to be a poison pill to sink the whole bill and stop further social welfare expansion (Levine 2008, 86). This is partly true as many eventual nays on passage voted for the Powell amendment, but it was not the architect’s intention. Powell supported the bill, and simply wanted the language reset to its original orientation. After additional back and forth to facilitate moving forward, guided by Majority Leader John McCormack (D-MA) and Representative George A. Dondero (R-MI), the House eventually accepted the Folger amendment to the original amendment, rejected Bender’s substitute amendment, and passed the Folger-Powell language on division, 114 to 48 (*CR 92* 1946, 1498). This, however, would not be the end of debate on the Powell Amendment.

But before the day was through, members returned to the less emotional, mundane technical changes as the bill was being read to the House. In particular, Flannagan proposed two more amendments. The tenth overall changed language to remove references to the WFA—a temporary bureaucracy—and instead vest its role in the permanent USDA (1499). The other, eleventh, amendment changed another date to 1947 (1499-1500).

¹¹¹ This was followed by a vitriolic conflict between the two members, accusing one another of “trick[s]” and “bad faith.” Evidently, the two had bad blood over a similar dispute during debates about the Fair Employment Practices Committee and “work-or-fight bill” earlier in the year (1496).

The twelfth amendment was more substantial—and remains underexamined in historiography on school lunches. Representative Clare Boothe Luce (R-CT) noticed in House Report 684 from the previous year that the definition for childcare centers expressly excluded orphanages or other similar institutions that “take complete care of the child over an extended period” (1503; H. Rept. 1945, 7).¹¹² Believing this left a vulnerable group without a deserved benefit, Luce’s amendment would revise the definition of child-care centers to include “nonprofit foster homes and orphanages” (*CR 92* 1946, 1501). Members of the committee, such as Flannagan, Wickersham, and via Wickersham, Murray and Voorhis, supported this change and even believed it was already in the bill (1501). The amendment was agreed to (1506), but then disappears in conference committee when all provision to childcare centers is eliminated.

The final amendment of day two, and thirteenth overall, was the fateful attempt to remove the newly developed programs in Title II, administered through the controversial Office of Education. At the time, Title II included an assortment of deemed essential programs, including facilities improvement grants, nutrition education programs, and grants-in-aid to state Departments of Education. In an era of open antagonism of perceived big government, this was the most controversial component of bill, and one that paid the clearest price for the era in which it was offered.

Agriculture Committee member, staunch conservative, and supporter of school lunches, August H. Andresen proposed the thirteenth and final House amendment to completely eliminate

¹¹² From the report: “The agencies, organizations, or institutions which may qualify as nonprofit child care centers under this section, and thereby receive funds for a lunch program operated not for profit, are nonprofit community centers, settlement houses, children’s homes, child aid centers, child day-care centers, playgrounds, boys’ or girls’ clubs, summer camps, or similar centers, institutions, or organizations devoted to the care and training of children; but the term ‘nonprofit child care center’ does not include an orphanage, children’s home, boarding school, or similar institution where the institution is obligated to take complete care of the child over an extended period” (7).

Title II from the bill (1506). The member explains the costs of new bureaucracy and federal power are too steep a price to pay, and removing Title II would not jeopardize continuing school lunches:

I have moved to strike title II from this bill, because this title in the school-lunch bill creates a new department in the Bureau of Education. Irrespective of the splendid objectives of the proposal, the time is at hand when we should oppose any proposal to establish new agencies in the Federal Government. Instead of creating new agencies, we should abolish or curtail many existing agencies in order to eliminate waste and extravagance in government.

The elimination of title II of the bill does in no manner interfere with the school-lunch program established in title I of the bill. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. If you vote to strike out title II of the bill, the school-lunch program will be carried on as provided in title I in the exact language set forth in the bill, with an authorization of \$50,000,000. (1506)

Andresen's discourse here is impactful on several fronts. For one, it shows the committee itself was not united in what it sent to the floor. This creates seeds of doubt and ambivalence in members deferring to committee members for informational cues. Second, the rhetoric is perfect for the era, providing a tractable ideological framework for conservatives to cut aspects of the bill, while still supporting the valence policy of helping children. In short, Andresen's approach here gives license to undercut sponsor and leadership's ideal points on the policy.

Engaging in colloquy with Andresen, MCs line up to claim to support school lunches, but that they will have no choice but to vote against the bill if Title II is included. Rep. George Gillie (R-IN), a member of the ag committee, is "convinced that it [feeding children] is a local problem and should be handled entirely on that basis" while decrying the "Commissioner's discretion" with the \$15 million dollar appropriation (1507). Less afraid of Title II as a whole, Rep. James Geelan (R-CT) takes issue with Subsection 3 of Section 203 because it "grants unwarranted power to the Commissioner of Education... [to deny funds] to any school other than a public school" (1508). At this point, time expires for the day, but members continue along the same track on February 21.

Resuming the airing of the grievances, Members ran the gamut on complaints about Title II. First, Walter Judd (R-MN) decries "Title II sets up a new program different from anything we

have ever had before” (1535). Following up, Charles Robertson (R-ND) claimed to support the school lunch program, but argued “it must forever remain free from Federal direction” (1535). Rep. Tarver next claimed “Title II is not essential” and “the chances of the enactment of the legislation would be materially improved if title II should be stricken” (1535). Rep. Cleveland Bailey (D-WV) derisively claimed “this is a new venture in Government” (1536), while William Cole (R-MO) argued “[t]he time has come for us to get rid of Government bureaus rather than create new ones” (1536). This line of thinking continued with Rep. Frank Carlson (R-KS) claiming it was “no time to expand Federal agencies” (1539), which echoed Rep. Joseph O’Hara’s (R-MN) earlier statement that “[Title II funds will be] sugar-coated bait that is going to be the effort on the part of the Bureau down here in Washington to take over control of our State public-school systems” (1490). Paul Stewart (D-OK) said he would vote for the bill if the Powell-Folger amendment is removed and Andresen’s is approved, because “[Title II] will put the nose of the Federal Government under the tent, so to speak, giving them entrée toward prescribing policies and curricula of our State schools” (1537). Oddly antagonistic, Spread-the-Wealth William Lemke (NPL-ND) stated: “I am in favor of the school lunches, but I am against the extension of bureaucracy... [and] certainly opposed to building up an education bureaucracy... that would prescribe... how children should be dressed, or how they should eat...” (1537).

Hearing member after member claim to support the crux of the legislation but threaten to withhold support if Title II remained in the bill forced advocates to make a choice: defend the proposal and risk alienating potential allies, or relent and jettison the title for political expediency, thus watering down the comprehensive nature of the designed bill. Agriculture Committee Ranking Member Hope pursued the first route. Hope defended the proposal against the hysteria, claiming members should actually read the bill and see if the purported takeover of state education

systems could emanate from its provisions. Moreover, Hope argued, the design of Title II mirrored provisions in other federal-aid projects (1537). For Hope, the value of Title II was a unique moment of the government *finally* supporting rural schools in particular, which would be aided in delivering meals through the facilities grants in that title. In a creative rhetorical turn, Hope then portrayed opponents of Title II as being city-slickers, unconcerned with the needs of the forgotten (or never heard) children in country schoolhouses (1538). This argumentation was bolstered by John S. Wood (D-GA), who claimed proponents of the amendment were not genuine in their critiques, but that instead, the amendment was a ploy to whip up antagonism against the bill as a whole (1538). Unfortunately for advocates of education reform in the bill, full-throated opposition to the amendment was otherwise quite muted.

Taking the pragmatic, politically expedient track, powerful New Dealers and committee chairs defended Title II, but seemingly preemptively provided cues—and ultimately support—for moving forward without it. Specifically, key figures lined up to argue that decreasing the dawning opposition to the legislative package was likely necessary to ensure continued program operations. Surprisingly, Dean of the House and powerful Chair of the Rules Committee, Adolph Sabath (D-IL) took to the floor to contend it was in the “best interests of all concerned that we adopt the amendment... In that way, way we can eliminate some of the opposition that comes from those who are insisting upon States’ rights.” The esteemed member continued on to claim “Opposition based on some idea that this bill infringes on States’ rights does not exactly ring true”, then laying out other policies that were approved, are popular, and do very similar things as the provisions of Title II (1535).¹¹³ But this early signal to get rid of the title portended further erosion on that front.

¹¹³ Sabath’s speech leaves little doubt he understood the inconsistency and bad faith endemic in MCs using the state’s rights arguments. “We have appropriated billions of dollars for agricultural assistance to the States, and we heard nothing then about threats to States’ rights. We have made appropriations for farm highways, secondary roads, community canning plants, to improve creeks, for flood control, to prevent soil erosion, to bring electricity to the

With some trepidation, leading sponsors and advocates followed Sabath's lead. Long-time proponent Voorhis articulated the value of Title II, but importantly conceded that Title I is the centerpiece of the legislation that will allow continued operations, regardless of the disposition of Title II (1538). The stunning final nail in the coffin of Title II was delivered by none other than deft sponsor, Agriculture Committee Chair, and floor manager, John Flannagan:

Mr. Chairman, I want to be perfectly frank with the membership. While I think we need title II in order to have a well-rounded school lunch program, yet if title II is going to be the means of crucifying between six and ten million boys and girls of America, of taking from them a hot school lunch, then I say take it out, because with this title deleted we will have the same school-lunch program under title I that we have today. (1540)

As he expressed, Flannagan felt compelled to make the call as floor manager to split the baby and remove Title II to preserve the continued federal funding of ongoing lunch programs. Thenceforth, there was no further contestation. Without division or the yeas and nays, the amendment was adopted. While this moment did conclusively end the role of the Office of Education in any school lunch policy, several important provisions of Title II were revived under the purview of USDA stewardship in conference committee.

The final business in the House's floor process was to revisit the issues of the hot-button Powell-Folger Amendment. Stewart revived his earlier threat to vote against the bill unless the newly adopted non-discrimination language was removed, and therefore, requested another vote

farms, to feed hay to elk and deer and corn to migratory birds, for irrigation and reclamation projects and for dams, for fertilizer, and even for aiding in the cost of labor. Most of these appropriations have been on the same kind of cost-sharing basis that is provided in this bill to feed little children. Some have been outright grants or clear nonparticipating appropriations... It seems to me, sometimes, that the gentlemen who have such reverence for States' rights only remember that reverence when human rights are in question. When we are considering legislation or appropriations to benefit property rights, they do not seem to think of States' rights; but when we are talking about a bill to make it possible to make better citizens by feeding them while they are children, and by teaching them about food values and food preparation, this States'-rights issue suddenly becomes very important... We have aided the corn growers, the tobacco growers, the cotton growers, the peanut growers, the cattle growers, and even the cattle feeders. But when it comes to feeding hungry children on the city streets, or in village lanes, and providing aid in procurement of nourishing food for them, then this argument of States' rights is dragged out, dusted off, and brought on the floor" (*CR 92 1946, 1535*). While he might have won the argument on its merits, the eminent chamber leader's pragmatism led him to the understanding that every lawmaker faces at some point in the maturation: every now and then you have to concede a battle to win a war.

on the matter (1540-1541). The amendment passed (again), this time by a division of 156 yeas to 67 nays. Oppositional Representatives Oren Harris (D-AR) and Clare Hoffman (R-MI) demanded the full yeas and nays, which gave all sides time to bring more members to the floor, but still led to the amendment passing a third time, now by a whopping 258 to 110, with 62 members not voting. The opposition to the amendment was composed of several prominent economic liberals, showcasing the durable rift over social liberalism that held back the universalistic forward reach of the New Deal—now well into the second half of the 1940s. Chief among this group were future Senate Majority Leader and President, Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX), lead House sponsor of the Social Security Act, Bob Doughton, liberal Wright Patman (D-TX), critic of the limitations of the New Deal, William Lemke, and surprisingly, chief school lunch proponent, Jerry Voorhis.¹¹⁴

But despite its virulent opposition, the amendment was broadly popular and made it into the final statute. Moreover, this amendment was unusual for several reasons. First, it was a pro-racial equality measure in an era that historically ignored or was hostile to the issue. Second, it

¹¹⁴ Of particular note is Voorhis' vote against the non-discrimination clause, which is quite perplexing since he otherwise stands out in this era as a uniquely holistic and broad progressive voice. In a speech during House debates, Voorhis explained his logic as, "Mr. Chairman, I did not support the [Powell] amendment that was adopted because I believe it was not at all necessary, and because I was fearful that the controversy and misconceptions arising from it might hurt the bill" (*CR 92* 1946, 1506). Going into further detail in his memoir, Voorhis summarized the episode thusly: "An 'anti-discrimination' amendment was adopted, though this was quite unnecessary particularly from the point of view of 'minority' groups since there had never been even a charge of discrimination against them in all the years of the program, and whatever 'discrimination' there may have been had all been in their favor" (158). The "in their favor" remark might just be an artifact of which demographics happened to be in the schools that adopted meal programs. By the mid-1940s, surely he should have understood statutory discrimination in federal social welfare policy. It is unclear at this time if Voorhis was more antagonistic of civil rights or viewed this amendment as solely a potential poison pill, but it is clear from his writing that he is not concerned with discrimination in the administration of federal programs on the local level, which is naïve at best, or worse, an intentional turn on his part. It is notable that in his book—including when discussing the Southern labor system (90)—and his 48 poverty-related floor speeches in this study, the stalwart progressive has *no* specific references to ethnic minorities. Indeed, Voorhis appears to be the archetype for the emblematic and consequential blind spots of New Deal liberal lawmakers of the era, at least in effect if not intent. Moreover, this may be an example of how individual colorblindness and indifference contribute to larger racist governing structures by perpetuating through new policy creation old patterns of discrimination. But to be charitable, he could have viewed the non-discrimination clause as a poison pill that could kill one of his prized policy achievements, leading him to develop emotional baggage relating to the episode. After all, Voorhis wrote in his memoir that the final version of the school lunch act "was a much better measure, from my viewpoint, that I had dared to hope for" (158).

was an early victory for freshman member from Harlem (Powell), who years later became one of the most powerful progressive voices in the House. Third, the success of this battle emboldened Powell to take a similar tactical approach to agitate about racial equality in subsequent decades, especially on education spending bills.¹¹⁵ With the acceptance of this final House amendment, the chamber proceeded to pass their version of the bill, which will be analyzed in detail in the next paper section.

But before that, it is important to turn to the upper chamber to examine the remaining nine floor amendments. In contrast to the House process, Senate managers succeeded in fully defending the bill from enterprising floor actors interested in changing the substance of the legislation.

Proceedings in the Senate begin with Russell—the floor manager—bringing up the bill for consideration on February 26. Without objecting, but hinting he might down the line, Senator Taft explained he thought consideration of the bill was abrupt given how recently the House passed their version of the bill. He further requested that the Senate use two days, not just the 26th, to debate, amendment, and potentially pass the bill. Russell responded the bill is essentially the same design as is seen in the annual appropriations that have passed the Senate each of the last four years, and that senators are by and large well-versed on details of the program. Moving the process along, Russell made clear a single day should suffice to make sure every Senator is heard on points of clarification or objections.

Like the beginning of the House process, the first five amendments in the Senate were proposed by the committee for housekeeping purposes. Specifically, the first, second, fourth, and

¹¹⁵ Powell's prolificacy with challenging federal legislation that either did not address discrimination or that operated through a separate-but-equal paradigm continued to push cleavages between upstart Northern liberals taking over the party and Southern conservatives protecting the Solid South subnational authoritarian enclave. Indeed, Powell's amendment to an educational spending bill in the mid-1950s is used as a classic example of Arrow's Paradox and strategic voting in William Riker's *The Art of Manipulation* (1986, 114-128). In that episode, however, the amendment ultimately did serve as the feared poison pill, killing the entire funding bill.

fifth amendments revolved around changing dates, removing superfluous clauses, and adding clarifying punctuation (1608-1610). The third amendment was still technical in nature, but more consequential than the others, as it defined private school eligibility as being contingent on non-profit status, then articulated how dispensation and matching would work if a state is barred from giving public funds to a private school. In the event of such a prohibition, the Secretary of Agriculture would directly dispense resources to those schools—bypassing state agencies—and individual schools would be required to meet the requisite matching obligation. Both the allocation and local cost figures were based on the number of pupils in the school that are aged 5 to 17. Additionally, any money allocated to these schools would come out of the total allocation to a state based on the expected number of pupils within the state—money is tied to students, not organizations (1609). All five amendments were adopted without objection.

Next, Russell guided the Senate through the history of Congress' role in the program, the merits of the program, and three questions that the Senate should collectively resolve on the floor today. First, should the program gain statutory backing? Second, is \$100 million (double the House's figure) the correct appropriation? Third, should Title II remain in the bill? Russell argued the answer to all three was 'yes', and incidentally, each question structured what ensued with the question of passing the bill and recorded roll calls on the spending amount and Title II (1610-1611). This was followed by an extended colloquy between Taft and Senators Russell and Aiken, with the former prodding the latter over the economic theory undergirding spending money to dispense surplus commodities to needy children. Surely, closely watching such a debate would educate the very senators Taft was concerned would not understand the logic of the program or bill.

During the colloquy, Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) noticed that the language of the third amendment might allow local non-profit schools to avoid making the matching requirement if the USDA Secretary so chose. Reading the language, Saltonstall highlighted private non-profits were “subject to the same conditions as are authorized or required... by the State... including, *but not restricted to*,” the matching requirement. Such a clause could give private schools an advantage over compelled public schools. The senator’s keen eye was rewarded with passage of this sixth amendment (1613).

The most interesting amendment unique to the Senate was a series of three changes consolidated into one package by Senator Forrest Donnell (R-MO). His was an effort to comport the bill’s language and design to the evolving legal regime around Congressional spending authority. As Donnell understood it, the bill was unconstitutional unless it tethered a dedicated revenue stream to its dedicated outlays. This is because using the general fund for specific purposes would run afoul of Donnell’s strict interpretation of the general welfare clause in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In his argumentation, Donnell uniquely interpreted the *United States v. Butler* (1936) decision not as the great expansion to Congress’ tax and spend authority that it had come to be known as, but instead, as proof that Congress must do both taxing and spending at the same time to qualify as “general welfare”. To be helpful with this legal conundrum, the senator drafted a new section (207) to create a special school lunch revenue stream to match the appropriation that could not be spent on anything else. If left not completely spent, funds revert back to Treasury. This strict interpretation of the Constitution as affording only explicit powers belied generations of Congress using its necessary and proper power to effectuate its duties, which was brought up by Senators Claude Pepper (D-FL) and Barkley. In whipping against the amendment, Barkley further claimed this would be a slippery slope to tread down, as it would create precedent that

every time Congress created a law with benefits to the public, it would also have to create a revenue stream, which would be prove untenable. Donnell was ultimately not rewarded for his efforts, and this seventh omnibus amendment was ultimately rejected (1618-1622).

The eighth amendment was proposed by Taft, who was attempting to limit the annual appropriation to only \$57 million. This was still \$7 million higher than the House bill, as it sought to match accruing expenses from the most recent appropriation. Taft argued the full \$100 million was not based on cost estimates, but simply a generous guess of what it would cost to scale up the program. Instead, the senator believed with more local buy-in through charging students a few more cents per meal, every school child could be fed with the smaller appropriation. This would purportedly accomplish the dual goals of the program while putting the United States' economic house in better shape as it recovered from the overspending of the New Deal and \$50 billion cost of World War II (1622-1625).

Objections to this amendment were strong and varied. Senator Russell engaged Taft's thinking along the way, mostly to challenge the idea that the current appropriation is even enough now, let alone as more schools participate in the new enacted statute (1624). Senator Edward Robertson (R-WY) claimed wealthier states, like Taft's Ohio, might be able to find subnational sources of revenue to contribute a greater share, but western states, in particular, would have trouble developing revenue streams for such a purpose (1624-1625). Senator Aiken, Taft's ideologically distant but nonetheless party compatriot, agreed with Robertson, noting children's health is "the last thing with which we should deal in a miserly manner" and that "[t]he health of the children in the poorer States, the low-income States, is certainly of vital importance to every person in the United States, whether he lives in a poor State or in a rich State" (1635).¹¹⁶ In a last

¹¹⁶ Taft's response to both Aiken and Robertson was that the averred poor states were not actually so poor. Wyoming, for example, had a greater per capita income than the average income in the U.S. in 1940. "Then the senator from

ditch rhetorical effort, Taft tried to portray the bill's authors as the extreme ones by increasing the appropriation by "nearly 100 percent" when he wanted to continue the status quo. This and the previous attempts at persuasion were not successful, and the Senate voted down the amendment with a recorded roll call, 21 in favor to 50 opposed (25 not voting) (1626).

Following this defeat, Taft offered the ninth and final amendment on the Senate floor to strike Title II from the bill. Mirroring the successful Andresen Amendment that passed the House without so much as a recorded vote, momentum suggested the amendment would likely prevail. To begin debate, Taft outlined the provision's creation of an "entirely new" relationship between the federal government and states, in which the former would deploy "nutrition experts" to monitor and direct the consumption habits of students in the latter. Importantly, Taft said the amount of the appropriation was of no consequence—\$15 million—because states could raise that by themselves, but instead, the larger issue would be the new bureaucracy and federal overreach (1626). Once again, Aiken interjected to read Title II, pointing out there was no direct power of the OE to impress any program on the states and localities, but that they simply would be the ones to approve proposals by subnational units that were fiscally solvent and devoted to nutrition education. Local officials—not the Commissioner of Education—would decide the substance of such a nutritional education initiative (1626).

Senator Ellender next rose in opposition to the amendment to give a lengthy explanation of the necessity of the title. Tellingly, this was the only moment Ellender, instead of Russell, led the defense of the bill's provisions. It was, after all, a creation of the Smith-Ellender attempt to move most of the program into the Office of Education. Now it was incumbent on him to defend

Vermont [Aiken] had no right to turn toward me every time he mentioned a poor State", Robertson quipped to audible laughter in the chamber (1625).

the wisdom of such a multi-pronged and holistic strategy to feeding *and educating* the children of the nation. Ellender made three principal arguments for keeping the provision (1628).

First, for a robust nutrition education, funding is necessary to hire program directors and supervisors, which currently number up to 600, but could rise to 10,000 when every jurisdiction joins the program. The federal government could uniquely offer compensation and training (via “research, planning conferences, demonstrations, [and] publications”) for states to use for this highly localized purpose. Second, as many as 100,000 large schools will need helping staffing cafeterias to deliver the meals. Once workers are found, they will need training on sanitary food handling techniques, which the OE is uniquely positioned to provide in the form of an information subsidy with training materials. Third, many schools lack facilities to deliver the meals, but the federal government could invest as little as \$100 or \$200 dollars per school on basic equipment needs to help thousands of students benefit from the program. This framing of necessity, paired with Aiken’s reading of the bill showing there was no direct federal control over content, were more robust, coherent, and detailed defenses of Title II than the discourse that was offered in the House.

With the conclusion of Ellender’s speech, the question on agreeing to the amendment was called, with yeas and nays requested. The amendment fared slightly better than the funding restriction amendment preceding it, but still only garnered 25 yeas to 47 nays (24 not voting). Title II survived the Senate’s floor process, potentially giving its contents a chance to make it into the final bill since the two chambers now had different measures that had to be reconciled.

To that end, the last procedural task was for Russell to call up the House Bill (H. 3370), amend it in the nature of the substitute by removing its contents and inserting the final amended Senate bill (S. 962), then insist upon this new version of the bill to go to conference committee.

This maneuver was uncontroversial in the upper chamber, and the final Senate version was read a third time, passed without objection, and conferees were appointed (1628). While 3370 was originally a slightly modified copy of 962, it had changed so substantially that the Senate architects would hope to maintain their priorities and still construct a policy that can pass both chambers.

This amendment episode also illustrates bicameral differences in the constitution of the ruling Conservative Coalition. In the House, the Conservative Coalition successfully united to remove Title II, but overall, Democrats united in support of the bones of the legislation through Title I. In contrast, the Coalition was fully fragmented in the Senate, which devolved to a mostly partisan affair on Taft's amendments, except *Republicans* like Aiken and Willis (R-IN) seemed sincerely interested in the policy and further bolstered the numbers within the NSLA legislative coalition. As Patterson (1967) notes, when Democrats held together, it created the conditions for the dominant Conservative Coalition to occasionally get rolled. All of this contributed to a favorable context for Congress to provide a new long-term social program.

In all, debate and amendments took place over three days in the House (February 19 through 21) and a single day in the Senate (February 26). This is a testament to the strength of the arduous, multi-year committee process, the memory of previously failed floor proceedings, and sterling floor leadership by respected gatekeepers within the Democratic Party. By accommodating self-identified proponents of the bill to eliminate Title II, leadership ensured a majority passage coalition could bring the bill to the finish line.

But it is important to take stock of how relatively few amendments centered on the needs of poor children. The only exceptions were the Powell Amendment that successfully sought to protect poorer students of color and immigrants, and the Luce Amendment which put the needs of disadvantaged children without parents—who might not even be students—in this vessel to receive

food aid. Not surprisingly, both of these MCs being more concerned for social welfare could be a product of their descriptive traits and underrepresented backgrounds (Whitby 1997; Swers 2005; Carnes 2013; Miler 2018), with Powell being Black and Luce being a woman. Every other amendment in the white male dominant chambers was either technical without any normative component, or decidedly oriented to take cares of *less* of the needs of hungry poor children in America. It is also possible the negative orientation of proposed amendments was a product of the policy as written (and ultimately passed) being consensus-driven and perhaps as generous as this Congress could have mustered. This is conceivable given the methodical and time-consuming nature of the committee process, difficulty to legislate for the poor in general, and instantiating this law in a context of antagonism toward and looming retrenchment of social programs.

Passage

The entire floor process in the final year of debating school lunches only had four full roll calls. This section examines these pivotal votes to understand cleavages in the party coalitions. Specifically, this section first examines the four roll calls—the Powell Amendment, passage in the House, and Taft’s two Senate amendments on lowering the appropriation and cutting Title II—to identify regional and partisan dynamics guiding member positions. Next, this section turns to modeling the relationship between poverty speeches and votes to alter or approve the program. This analysis provides insight into whether poverty rhetoric is just talk or serves as a symbolic representational form that is ultimately related to substantive representation. Finally, the section concludes the policy process by accounting for developments during the conference committee that hammered out a single compromise bill, the unanimous passage of that conference bill in both chambers, and President Truman signing the bill into law.

Table 10.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the four roll calls in which members' names are associated with an issue stance. Notably, the variety of the four roll calls illuminates different dimensions of conflict in this era: the House engaged a social dimension issue and passage of the bill's language, while the Senate engaged an outright spending level preference measure and a complex nexus of federalism and bureaucracy, then passed the bill by unanimity. Unfortunately, comparisons of chamber effects are difficult here, not just because of the lack of a shared anchoring vote, but because the House votes emanate from *affirmation*—adding to or passage of the bill—while the Senate votes address matters of *negation*—taking away components of the bill.

The first vote is the Powell Amendment, which passed 258 to 110 (62 not voting), representing a 70% level of support among voting MCs. Nearly all of the disagreement on this measure was contained within the Democratic Party, as this amendment split the party exactly in half, with 51% supporting its adoption. Stunningly, there is almost no difference between the level of support among Non-Southern Democrats and all Republicans, all hovering in the low to mid 90% range, while only 15% of Southern Democrats supported the non-discrimination language. While Southern Democrats had seniority and could gatekeep policies in committee, once a social issue hit the House floor, the Solid South could be decisively outvoted by the rest of the chamber. This is a key difference between the population-based House and state-based representation in the Senate that contributed to Southern senators utilizing the filibuster as a veto point (Farhang and Katznelson 2005). Overall, the roll call on this amendment is a vivid illustration of the nascent, generational civil war for the heart and soul of the party that characterized the decades from the '30s to '60s.

Table 10.4 Inter- and Intraparty Variation in Key House and Senate Roll Calls

House of Representatives						
	Powell Amendment Barring Discrimination			Passage of the Bill		
	Yeas	Nays	% of Voting MCs Yea	Yeas	Nays	% of Voting MCs Yea
Full Roll Call	258	110	70.1%	276	101	73.2%
Democratic Caucus	104	100	51.0%	164	45	78.5%
Southern Democrats	17	93	15.5%	67	44	60.4%
Non-Southern Democrats	87	7	92.6%	97	1	99.0%
Republican Caucus	154	10	93.9%	112	56	66.7%
Midwestern Republicans	79	4	95.2%	55	31	64.0%
Non-Midwestern Republicans	75	6	92.6%	57	25	69.5%
Senate						
	Taft Amendment to Cut Size of Appropriation			Taft Amendment to Cut Title II from the Bill		
	Yeas	Nays	% of Voting MCs Yea	Yeas	Nays	% of Voting MCs Yea
Full Roll Call	21	50	29.6%	24	47	34.7%
Democratic Caucus	4	38	9.5%	6	36	14.3%
Southern Democrats	3	18	14.3%	2	19	9.5%
Non-Southern Democrats	1	20	4.8%	4	17	19.0%
Republican Caucus	17	12	58.6%	19	11	63.3%
Midwestern Republicans	9	5	64.3%	12	3	80.0%
Non-Midwestern Republicans	8	7	53.3%	7	8	46.7%

Note: Analysis excludes members who did not vote or voted “Present”.

On passage of the final bill, the pattern of one Democratic faction resembling Republicans continued—but this time, it was Southern Democrats mirroring Republicans. The final vote on passage was 276-101, with three members voting “present”, and 50 NV, for a 73% support level. Showing the convergence of social and economic liberalism, 99% of non-Southern Democrats supported the bill. In contrast, Southern Democrats and Republicans on balance supported enactment, but did so with support levels from ranging in the 60s. When Southern Democrats and Republicans were of like minds, the Conservative Coalition could potentially unify, but in this

case, it was not to stymie a law from passing, but they were just less enthusiastic than their Northern Democratic peers. Notably, there was a fair amount of attrition by Republicans from the Powell Amendment to final passage, with about one-third of Republicans across regions who supported the amendment voting against passage. It is unclear whether this is due to a principled form of Republican conservatism, which was still pro-racial equality but economically traditionalist, or strategic voting to throw a poison pill in the mix that could jeopardize the bill's passage. While the previously mentioned cleavages were hallmarks for the post-New Deal era, the level of consensus behind statutorily authorizing school lunches is quite remarkable.

While the story of the House is the division within the Democratic majority, the Senate side shows a clear divide along party lines and a degree of fragmentation among Republicans. While both of Taft's amendments failed to gain much approval, ranging from 29 to just under 35% support, they did uncover some important dynamics in Congress. For one, while Democratic leadership in the House felt compelled to give up Title II without a recorded vote (or even division), the Democratic Party in the Senate and non-Midwestern Republicans felt compelled to keep the measure. One could chalk this up to the stereotypical, founding era notion that emotions tend to run high in the lower chamber, while the upper chamber takes a more tempered view of policymaking. But ironically, instead of the cooling saucer working against social change—as is usually the case—the upper chamber actually worked to muffle the violent response in the House to Title II's fairly non-threatening approach to aid localities with information and equipment. The second revealing aspect of these votes is to show that four party politics—liberal and conservative factions in both parties—worked differently in the House and Senate. While the trichotomous Northern Democrat, Southern Democrat, and Republican portrayal of this era is accurate for the House, such a view overstates and obscures the regional and ideological cohesion of Senate

Republicans, where manifest fissures existed between conservative Midwesterners and the more moderate non-Midwesterners.

These roll calls also provide an additional opportunity to test the relationship between overt poverty interest in floor speeches and how members vote on antipoverty policies on the rare occasions in which they reach the floor. While Chapter 5 tested relations and possible predictors of poverty speeches as a dependent variable, now is the moment to use the novel poverty speech measure as an independent variable. Specifically, modeling their relationship can uncover whether rhetorical emphasis on the poor translates into support for policies that help the poor through their struggles. In short, this is a unique test of the relationship between symbolic and substantive representation.

To assess these relations, this section employs a series of Linear Probability Models. While LPMs remain controversial in certain social sciences—but not others—repeated analyses have shown the substantive differences between a simple LPM and a logit model are minor (Hellevik 2009; Mood 2010). Therefore, to better understand the relationship between poverty speeches and expressed preferences on key roll calls, I next present several LPM models that are cross-validated against logit models—both model types provide consistent effects sizes and significance.¹¹⁷

As shown in Table 10.5, only one measure of interest—poverty speeches in the 79th Congress—has a positive statistical relationship with vote preference on the Powell Amendment and passage of the NSLA. This is the easier of the two operationalizations to relate to these votes, since members talking about poverty in this Congress might very well be talking about this specific issue. A poverty speech in the 79th Congress increases the probability of voting for the Powell

¹¹⁷ While LPMs are more readily interpretable, they do run the risk of providing slightly overestimated p-values. That is the case here, but the advantage of interpretability and the fact that the p-values are still in the same bin interval (e.g., $p < 0.10$ or $p < 0.05$) outweighs the potential drawbacks of this model. All code is available in Appendix 10B.

Table 10.5 Linear Probability Model Regressing Roll Calls on Poverty Speeches in the House

Variable	Model 1:	Model 2:	Model 3:	Model 4:
	Powell Amendment	Powell Amendment	Passage of Bill	Passage of Bill
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.681*** (0.027)	0.685*** (0.027)	0.710*** (0.026)	0.723*** (0.026)
MC's Poverty Speech Count, 79 th Congress (Min=0; Max=7)	0.033 [†] (0.020)		0.035 [†] (0.019)	
MC's Average Speech Count per Congress, 73rd to 79th Congress (Min=0; Max=9.6)		0.028 (0.022)		0.015 (0.021)
Adjusted R ²	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00
N	368	368	377	377

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.10

Notes: The exact p-value for poverty speech count in Model 1 is 0.064 and for Model 3 is 0.064. The p-values for these model specifications run as a logit are 0.101 and 0.069, respectively.

Amendment by 3.3% and passage of the NSLA by 3.5%. From min to max, that suggests MCs at the top of the speech distribution would reach a 90 to 95% probability of supporting these measures, respectively. It is also important to note the intercepts in the models are within a few percentage points of the observed rate, which paired with the R², suggests poverty speeches did not explain much of the reason people voted for the measures. This is because while there was overwhelming support for the policy, only around 120 of the MCs voting on these measures have poverty speeches in this Congress, and the remaining roughly 250 had no poverty speeches. This shows members can support antipoverty policies without ever articulating poor interests on the floor of the House.

While one IV specification (speech count in the 79th Congress) mattered for both votes in the House, Table 10.6 conveys an orthogonal story in the Senate. The amendment to decrease the appropriation from \$100 million to \$57.5 million is explicitly economic in nature, and yet, poverty rhetoric has no statistical relation to the subject. In contrast, moving to the role of the federal

Table 10.6 Linear Probability Model Regressing Roll Calls on Poverty Speeches in the Senate

Variable	Model 1: Taft Appropriation Amendment	Model 2: Taft Appropriation Amendment	Model 3: Taft Amendment on Title II	Model 4: Taft Amendment on Title II
	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Intercept	0.314*** (0.064)	0.353*** (0.072)	0.409*** (0.064)	0.445*** (0.073)
MC's Poverty Speech Count, 79 th Congress (Min=0; Max=18)	-0.019 (0.022)		-0.042 [†] (0.022)	
MC's Average Speech Count per Congress, 73 rd to 79 th Congress (Min=0; Max=15)		-0.041 (0.034)		-0.073* (0.036)
Adjusted R ²	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.05
N	71	71	72	72

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.10

Notes: The exact p-values for poverty speech count in Model 3 is 0.065 and for average poverty speech in Model 4 is 0.041. The p-values for these model specifications run as a logit are 0.086 and 0.052, respectively.

government to supplement subnational educational policy, *both* specifications of poverty speeches have an inverse relationship—the expected direction for these Senate votes—with supporting the amendment. For every poverty speech delivered in the 79th Congress, the probability of supporting the removal of Title II declines by 4.2 points from the 40.9 baseline. Using the average poverty speech propensity as a proxy for general interest beyond the current policy moment shows a one unit increase in the average leads to a decline in support probability from the 44.5 baseline by 7.3 points. Indeed, a Senator with 6 or more poverty speeches is predicted to have a near-zero probability of voting to remove Title II. Regardless of how one operationalizes interest in poverty, Senators high in that value are much more likely to defend the essential spending supplements in Title II against removal. Indeed, saving this provision would help meet the disproportionate needs of the poorest students in the poorest schools and states.

Following the contentious votes in the House and Senate, both chambers appointed conferees to hammer out the final identical bill to pass both chambers of Congress. As previously mentioned, the conferees were mostly the same committee and subcommittee members that presided over the fact-finding and floor management stages. The only exceptions were the addition of three new members (Cooley and Zimmerman from the House; Bankhead from the Senate) who had minor footprints on the policy until that point. When they finally reported back their changes in May, they had reconciled much of the interchamber, technical, and ideological issues that characterized earlier debates.

The first major change was that instead of reconciling the House's ideal spending point of \$50 million with the Senate's figure of \$100 million, the conferees simply agreed to set no limit in the appropriations (H. Rept. 2080 1946, 6). That default perspective empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to spend as much or as little as they wanted on the program, assuming Congress maintained appropriations for the program. Freedom to spend came with de facto built-in annual negotiations, which presents a hazard given how Congress' priorities change over time. A more minor change was that the conferees awarded greater administrative expenses to USDA, rising from 3% to 3.5% of total expenses (7). Unfortunately for hungry children and their advocates, childcare centers were entirely stripped from the bill (except in Puerto Rico) (6). This rendered Luce's pivotal anti-food insecurity floor victory on orphanages and foster homes moot.

To reconcile one chamber removing Title II while the other expressly rejected such a change, the conferees simply moved much of Title II into Section 5 of the new one title bill. However, they did so by completely removing any OE involvement and by eliminating any reference to nutritional literacy programs. Title II's non-food aid was maintained at the \$10 million level, but a new definition limited "non-food aid" to only equipment; no help for personnel, such

as directors, managers, and cafeteria staff (6-7). It is somewhat cunning to put most of the Title II provisions into USDA's purview while removing the educational program. It still accomplished many of the original directives, but allowed antagonistic folks to think they had permanently defeated Title II's contents. It is also possible opposition was primarily about the OE and local control. If true, providing resources to localities did not pose the same level of threat as an encroachment that empowered a new educational bureaucracy to provide information for local curricular decision-making.

Additionally, the matching formula became much more generous. Instead of the 1:1 federal-state ratio lasting just for one year (1947), it was revised to now last four years ('47-'50). Moreover, the permanent cap was set at one federal dollar for every three local dollars, which was an improvement from the prior cap of 1:4 (7). These are victories for poorer states that likely originates from the more generous Senate side of the conference table.

Finally, the conferees adjusted Powell's non-discrimination language. Now the language would explicitly allow separate-but-equal with direct reference to what happens for states with segregated schools. In those cases, a "just and equitable" standard of dispensation would be adopted. This change had the principal impact of making sure the South's segregation system could not be legally challenged as a prohibited form of discrimination according to an interpretation of the statute (7). Instead, this language moved potential conflicts in the courts to the adjudication of the "just and equitable" criterion—a nugatory threat in comparison to widespread ineligibility.

Once the House and Senate agreed on the compromise conference committee version, both chambers adopted the bill within days, without objection or relitigation. By the end of May, the NSLA was presented to President Truman for his assent. Such approval was granted in early June, and the policy became law.

In his June 4th speech commemorating the bill signing, Truman highlighted several important aspects of the law. First, he noted it creatively helped both farmers and people in need of food. Second, he signaled the imperative for the law, but that it also *a priori* divided the hungry into children versus everyone else. He had designs to eventually feed everyone:

TODAY, as I sign the National School Lunch Act, I feel that the Congress has acted with great wisdom in providing the basis for strengthening the nation through better nutrition for our school children. In my message to Congress last January, I pointed out that we have the technical knowledge to provide plenty of good food for every man, woman, and child in this country, but that despite our capacity to produce food we have often failed to distribute it as well as we should. This action by the Congress represents a basic forward step toward correcting that failure. In the long view, no nation is any healthier than its children or more prosperous than its farmers; and in the National School Lunch Act, the Congress has contributed immeasurably both to the welfare of our farmers and the health of our children. Under previous school lunch programs made possible by year-to-year authorizations we have been able to provide as many as six million children with nutritious lunches at noon. This has laid a good foundation for the permanent program. In the future, increasing numbers will benefit—and on a permanent basis. (Truman 1946)

The perspective of accomplishment in this era is actually quite understated, as it was the only new social welfare policy to come out of Congress in the 1940s. And moreover, it stood a good chance of remaining on the books for years to come. As leading advocate Voorhis (1970 [1947]) wrote in his memoir: “I believe the simple reasonableness of that act, if not its basic humanity, will prevent any Congress—even the most conservative—from repealing it” (159). This ended up being true as the same concept (path dependency) that guided Congress to put statutory supports behind a popular executive branch experiment continued to encourage appropriations of the statutory program.

If the policy proved durable—if underfunded—what were the main contents of this unique public law? The next section takes a forensic approach to understanding the contours of the law to better situate its successes and failures in reaching millions of hungry school children for the next 70 years.

Policy Language Analysis

What did members, organized interests, and the poor receive for the hard-fought battle to pass the NSLA? And in what ways did the policy design adhere to paradigmatic forms of group construction and delivery of earlier New Deal legislation? This section answers these questions by examining the statutory language in Public Law 79-396, later indexed as 60 Stat. 230 in the *U.S. Statutes-at-Large*. Of particular usefulness, forensic investigation of the primary source document provides a basis to evaluate how much of the division of the poor and delivery problems the program encountered were a product of either policy design or policy implementation beyond the letter of the law. As the section will show, the forms of division in the policy are less explicit on the target group construction front than the other two policies—largely due to the *a priori* elimination of non-school children from food relief altogether—but importantly, the policy language still favors a delivery system that privileges non-poor constituencies and some poor groups over others.

At only 5 pages long, this public policy is comparatively shorter than the two other case studies in this research (SSA is 25 pages, while USHA is 12 pages). As previously noted, Title II providing funds to the Commissioner of Education for policy delivery was stripped, leaving the final policy with only one title (not labeled), broken into 11 sections, all under the purview of USDA. However, oddly enough there is no Section 1, as the document moves from the enacting clause to Section 2, so in reality it only has 10 sections.

Section 2 articulates the priorities of the policy, laid out in order of importance: from a national security imperative first, followed by childhood health, then finally agricultural supports. This clause conveys the everlasting impact of the initial military witnesses in creating a rhetorical framework that uniquely delivers social provision to bolster *future* military readiness. And

somewhat deceptively, the commodity purchasing component is labeled last, when indeed that interest stood to gain the most from a permanent purchasing mandate regardless of how well the policy apparatus delivered the products to schools and children.

Section 3 makes clear the contest between the Department of Agriculture and Office of Education for operational control was firmly won by the former: the Secretary of Agriculture is the only national-level actor with decision-making power over spending and certification—there is no OE involvement whatsoever. Additionally, the \$100 million appropriation limitation was stripped in conference, which meant the secretary potentially had an unlimited allocation from Treasury. However, the lack of a *minimum* appropriation meant Congress affirmatively had to allocate funds for the program (or aspects of it) every year; if Congress failed to do so, the only safeguard here is the president reallocating other funds to the program.

Part of the spending guidelines and the apportionment formula are laid out in Section 4. It mandates the secretary must spend a minimum of 75% of authorized funds on grants to states and commodity purchases. This key provision shows most of the spending in the policy is on food, thereby guaranteeing a permanent domestic market for commodity producers. There is much less emphasis on ensuring schools have facilities to use such products, although provision is ostensibly made for these purposes in Section 5. The funding formula is based on an index variable of the number of kids aged 5 to 17 in a state and the difference in per capita income from national mean income by state—as a proxy for poverty level—then divided by the same index but calculated for the nation as a whole. This approach balances population size with direct need, a common calculation in public policies throughout American history. However, this allotment formula obviously leaves out small children and perplexingly, 18-year-olds that may be in high school. While the bill does not ban states from providing lunches to children outside of this range, they

will only receive money in accordance with this demographic group. Finally, even though delivering lunches through childcare facilities was stripped from the Flannagan Bill, Section 7 has a unique carveout allowing children in Puerto Rico to receive meals in schools *and* childcare facilities, as long as the latter are certified by the territorial governor.

Although Title II was originally stricken on the House floor, the conferees created a new Section 5 in the final bill that appropriated \$10 million to the USDA Secretary—not the Commissioner of Education—to provide non-food assistance. While this is a victory for poorer schools that did not have facilities to handle and prepare the commodities they stand to receive, this provision no longer explicitly supports cafeteria management, clerical staff, service workers, or physical plant management. While the USDA chief has wide latitude in other parts of the law, Section 11(d)(4) defines “Nonfood assistance” as *equipment* used “in storing, preparing, or serving food” (234), potentially meaning the secretary was barred from approving requests that were necessary for a school to link their equipment operation to the food delivery—human labor.

In contrast to the proscribed authority on non-food assistance, the Secretary of Agriculture has full authorization to purchase and furnish food to “states and schools”—not just money for purchases—in Section 6. Showing a lineage with previous agriculture legislation, this provision is in part modeled after the AAA amendments of 1935 and 1937 authorization of relief donations from commodity purchases in USDA. This is yet another provision that ensures commodity purchases are maintained, potentially even without a defined beneficiary. This again displays the asymmetry between clear guidance to purchase agricultural goods in t_1 and more opaque delivery process to ensure children receive the food in t_2 . Finally, the clause on “states and schools” is ambiguous, but implies the federal government can continue having direct relations with local

schools, not just state boards of education, in contravention with the “state’s rights” component of the Smith-Ellender proposal and concerns of rank-and-file members of the House.

The manner of payments to the state educational agencies and matching fund requirements are further detailed in Section 7. The program eschews a complete national funding scheme for lunches and non-food aid, instead supporting a federalized approach that requires local buy-in to unlock funds. Specifically, states must match, dollar for dollar, the federal disbursement from 1947 to 1950. But this formula changes over time to make the states incur a heavier burden in funding the program, such that from 1951 to 1955 states have to spend \$1.5 for every federal dollar, and from 1956 onward states must spend \$3 for every federally allocated dollar. In effect, the federal government agrees to help develop the program, but unless a state can shoulder most of the cost moving forward, the program dissolves. Given the Congressional debates, this formula ends up being on the more generous side of likely outcomes, since there were proposals to sunset federal funding entirely after the initial few years, thereby depriving school children of lunches in states where federal funds provide both a) the seed money to ensure a minimum level of functionality in the program and b) encouragement for state lawmakers to appropriate funds instead of ending the program entirely. Of course, opponents of any matching who wanted to ensure poor states, localities, and schools could participate regardless of cash on hand would deem the formula self-defeating for the purposes of promoting adolescent health.

But as previously noted, the matching requirement level is decreased by the percentage the state per capita income is below the per capita income for the country. As it turns out, that formula helps a majority of states contribute less than the full matching formula. A new assessment of the raw data in Exhibit B of House Report 684 (1945) shows the WFA expected 31 of 50 states to pay less than a 1:1 contribution (9-10). The 31 states included two from the Northeast (the richest part

of the country), seven in the West, eight in the Midwest, and *all* 14 states in the South. The state with the lowest contribution percentage is Alabama, required to spend 42 cents for every federal dollar. In general, this shows the policy was functionally directed at the poorest states, but that the Southern Democratic MCs were also serving their own interests by funneling money to their areas. Oddly enough, this means the Southern Democrats were seemingly more successful at funneling federal money southward using the malnutrition paradigm in the Conservative Coalition era than they were in attempts to federalize the cost of public education in the erstwhile liberal era beforehand. Both policies benefit the poor, but only the school lunch proposal provided a monetary yield for powerful interests (i.e., agriculture) outside of the South.

Section 7 also addresses in more detail non-food assistance and what constitutes matching. Specifically, Section 7(2) mentions non-food aid in the context of payments to the states, suggesting such grants would be commonplace in the programs operations. State and local spending on supplies, facilities, and equipment count towards matching. Moreover, this particular policy construction means the federal government is never reimbursed for incurred expenses, meaning the policy itself is neither predatory on subnational governments, nor is it revenue neutral. Instead, the requirement for local matching is just a mechanism to encourage local involvement in scaling up the policy.

States unlock USDA funds and resources in Section 8. In particular, USDA has to work through state Departments of Education, who then reimburse locals for program costs according to how many lunches have been served under the policy. The reimbursement formula is based on the number of free or reduced meals the school served multiplied by the value of the tiered meal plan (A, B or C) in the state. For maximum return, this seems to encourage serving as many meals as possible, especially the costlier ones that include a hot meal and milk, like Type A. In turn, if a

school district can find local producers for their non-donated foodstuffs to decrease transit costs, they might even generate a revenue profit which, while coming close to running afoul of Section 9's non-profit requirement, could theoretically be used on personnel not otherwise covered in the act. Finally, it remains unclear to this point if the lack of language on federal to local coordination should be taken as implicit sanction or a prohibition on direct federal to school contracts.

However, Section 10 makes it a bit clearer that the federal government seems to have the ability to directly contract with *some* schools. If states are not allowed (or fail) to dispense funds/goods to non-profit private schools, this section gives USDA the ability to directly contract with these schools. Those schools are still required to meet all matching requirements, but their ability to reap taxpayer paid benefits without being public institutions is a major victory for their advocates. Indeed, in some ways this privileges private school students over public school students, if for no other reason than the touchy subject of federal-state coordination is effectively bypassed with clear notation in the law, while local public schools must petition the state government to liaise with federal authorities on their behalf.

Sections 9 and 11 collectively deal with program requirements, prohibitions, and definitions. Section 9 requires participating schools to serve meals that meet the minimum nutritional guidelines set by the Secretary of Agriculture. Moreover, these meals are to be provided to students at a free or reduced rate, as determined by local authorities assessing each child's need. Additionally, the school lunch program as a whole must be run in a non-profit manner, but this legislation does not define "non-profit" except when defining "non-profit private school" in Section 11(d)(3). Elsewhere in Section 9, participants are encouraged to use commodities the USDA considers "in abundance", with the section also reinforcing that USDA is able to make surplus purchases and donations in the mold of AAA Section 32 authority.

Of central importance, Sections 9 and 11 have the two non-discrimination clauses of the legislation. Section 9 proclaims there must be no physical separation of program beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries within a single school. Continuing a perennial theme in the politics of poverty, this provision revolves around worries of stigmatizing poor children: non-beneficiaries will bully or ostracize recipients and/or participants will internalize a feeling of inferiority. In either case, there is potential to do mental harm than cannot be recouped through physical nourishment. This problem was examined in-depth during the committee process, as MCs inquired with administrators about how they maintain the privacy of recipients. Witnesses assured lawmakers that beneficiary status is typically only known by the student's teacher and school administration, and that students themselves might not even realize they are receiving a free or reduced lunch.

The other non-discrimination measure is found in Section 11(c), which bars sending resources to states unless there is "just and equitable" allocation to white and non-white schools alike. On its face, parity of funding sounds like a good thing. However, this is an unfortunate example of how the conference committee made the bill's language more regressive than the House passed bill. The original language as adopted in the successful Powell amendment states: "No funds made available pursuant to this title shall be paid or disbursed to any State or school if, in carrying out its functions under this title, it makes any discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin of children" (*CR 92 1946, 1496*). That is a strong anti-discrimination clause in an era that otherwise discarded civil rights in favor of expediently delivering colorblind racist but economically liberal policy.

Worried this language could potentially bar states that maintain racially segregated schools from receiving funds—which could in practice potentially harm both poor white and non-white children—the Southern Democratic architects of the bill revived the separate-but-equal paradigm

from Ellender's solo-authored bill (S. 503) and inserted it in conference committee. The modified provision reads: "If a State maintains separate schools for minority and for majority races, no funds made available pursuant to this Act shall be paid or disbursed to it unless a just and equitable distribution is made within the State, for the benefit of such minority races, of funds paid to it under this Act." This provision ostensibly protects "minority races", but it does not define "just and equitable", nor does it disclose which actor determines the "just and equitable" dispensation of funds. If left to local or state officials, the separate-but-equal paradigm would logically devolve into separate-and-unequal. The other alternative is to let the Secretary of Agriculture decide, but a single person's discretion here is not likely a solid foundation of equity. Moreover, this form of legislative design harkens back to the late-19th century, in which such policies as the Second Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890 use a separate-but-equal paradigm to create state-operated agriculture and mechanics public universities and separate Black colleges and universities. Both the 1890 law and the school lunch act helped many poor people and people of color, but that does not change their racially divisive construction paradigm. In this way, the National School Lunch Act continues—into its sixth decade—the national largess in supporting Jim Crow.

Taken together, the law creates a distinction between not allowing discrimination *within a single school* (as barred by Section 9) and discrimination *between schools* (as prohibited in Section 11), but then implicitly creates a permissive structure that allows schools to discriminate with who they admit as pupils. Once admitted, no *further* discrimination is allowed. The solution for states and school districts to enforce racial hierarchy while still getting federal funding is to make sure to have homogenous schools; kicking out students of color into a neighboring school closely adheres to letter of this law.

Finally, Section 11 also lays out a recordkeeping requirement for each school. In a win for local autonomy advocates and major defeat for educational reformers and public health experts, this section also includes a prohibition on the federal government requiring any curricular changes to qualify for the benefits of this legislation. Nutrition advocates were hoping to teach children about proper nutrition in the classroom too, but the only education that logically follows from this act is developing good eating habits when schools provide USDA compliant meals. To some, this behavioral intervention might still redound to the benefit of the family unit, but the cumulative educational component would lack an understanding of *why* these food items are valuable in a well-rounded diet. The last notable provision in Section 11 is subsection (d)(1) that defines “state” to include territories, which are only treated differently on expenditure caps in other areas of the legislation (Sections 4 and 5).

Overall, the statute divides the poor in several ways. First, instantiating the school lunch program into law left food insecure adults with no more Congressionally intended funding and an administration that acquiesced to no longer experiment with the stamp program. Second, by only supporting children in school, it left out children in daycare and other care settings like orphanages from receiving foodstuffs or funding. Third, it provided a framework to maintain Jim Crow separate-but-(un)equal, which given the differences in existing facilities meant even with funding parity—a big *if*—the program would fail to meet the needs of poorer Black schools. In this way, the program continued the racism of earlier New Deal programs, but switched from a symbolic and colorblind racism (vocation as a marker for race) to an overtly colored approach that simply promised funding “equity” in a racially organized society. Finally, the matching requirement did mean poorer states or states with economic problems, such as budget deficits, would face hurdles

to receive direct benefits, especially as the matching requirement shifted to place a greater share of expenses on localities in downstream years.¹¹⁸

Policy Effects

Commonplace hunger in the land of plenty created politically advantageous circumstances to create the school lunch program, which now ended the destruction of surplus commodities by diverting these foodstuffs to schools (Ruis 2017, 115). This is a quite remarkable since Congress as a whole did not view food insecurity as enough of a standalone problem to create a full nutrition program for all Americans (115). Overall, the policy is born out of state's rights fights, differences between the parties, and the specter of socialism (115), making its passage an unlikely success. Its design and flaws can be seen as the culmination of rising trends in national politics. As Levine (2008) writes, “[the] lingering, if not intensifying, distrust of federal authority combined with the realities of racial and economic equality to make it difficult for law makers to craft a truly universal or egalitarian school lunch program. Indeed, the question of which children would receive lunch, who would decide, and what role state and local officials would play in that process revealed fundamental splits in the post-war American political agenda” (88). Given these conditions, was the policy a success?

Upon first blush, it looks quite successful. According to the USDA (2017), around 7.1 million children participated in the NSLP in its first year.¹¹⁹ These figures rose over time, reaching 22.4 million in 1970 up to 31.8 million in 2010. In terms of total lunches, USDA recently served over 4.8 billion lunches in fiscal year 2019 (USDA 2021). The policy has clearly served many in need and like other social welfare programs, has incrementally scaled up over time to deliver more

¹¹⁸ Of course, the matching requirement was calibrated to subsidize the poorest states—including every Southern state—but it still required some state-level support to unlock any federal funds.

¹¹⁹ Poppendieck (2010) finds a much lower figure for the number of students served than the USDA, at only 2 million poor children served under the program (58).

equitable benefits to needy schoolchildren. As Ralston, Treen, Coleman-Jensen and Guthrie (2017) put it: "... school meal programs reduce food insecurity among children. Child nutrition programs also contribute to diet quality and academic performance for children from low-income and food-insecure households" (i). There is less food insecurity due to the program, as shown by the seasonality of rising food insecurity during summers (Nord and Romig 2006). Moreover, Poppendieck (2010) claims the content of these meals were healthier than many other foods in the lunchroom, while also being better quality foods than what a poor person could otherwise afford (122). While Hinrichs (2010) finds the program has had a minimal impact on overall health, there is a consistent positive impact on educational attainment (483). No matter its flaws, these are undeniable successes due to the passage and implementation of the NSLA.

But drilling down into specific areas reveals a grayer picture of success. Since military leadership—and President Roosevelt in 1941—provided a novel discursive frame of using school lunches to shore up military readiness (Weaver-Hightower 2011, 52-53), it is worth checking to see if the NSLA had the desired effect of increasing enlistment and lessening rejections. Unfortunately, it remains unclear if the NSLA helped with military readiness. Insufficient manpower was not the principle issue for future military conflicts in the generation following WWII (and the Korean War). Instead, the use of a widespread draft supplied plenty of enlisted soldiers in Vietnam, but the strategic issues with occupation and counterinsurgency are what led to the failed campaign. Subsequently moving to an all-volunteer military after Vietnam did pose issues for readiness, but here the problems were a) enticing individuals to enlist and b) the changing standards of the military. Contemporary problems leading to a remarkable 71% ineligibility rate among 18 to 24 year-olds emanate from a lack of educational attainment and endemic obesity (Spoehr and Handy 2018). Indeed, military leadership has been advocating for more nutritional

content and less junk food in school lunches for a decade now, often calling back to the reason the NSLA was established in the first place (Maxey, Bishop, Goodman and Browning 2020). In short, the military raising its standards and changes in the health profile of Americans pose challenges to assess the impact of the NSLA on readiness. While the military readiness narrative helped secure passage, the policy was principally meant to help farmers (Weaver-Hightower 2011, 53).

Scholars of agricultural politics, antipoverty programs, and nutritional history generally agree the bill was most successful at achieving its primary objective: not feeding poor children, but tending to the Congressionally powerful agricultural interests. The bill was part of a larger dual-pronged project to create long-term domestic and foreign markets after WWII for agricultural commodity producers. Moreover, its construction guaranteed federal purchase of commodities, but then had very loose requirements that the food actually makes it students. The policy as passed provided per meal reimbursement for each free or reduced lunch meal served, while also having a non-food assistance program to help schools buy equipment. In turn, USDA directly buys surplus commodities (dairy; beans; fruits) and dispenses them directly to participating schools (Gould 1972, 6). In this paradigm, producers could potentially be fine with commodity purchases, then their immediate destruction, as was the case with milk surplus management (and resulting protests) in early 1930s (White 2015, 66). Moreover, agriculturally minded MCs could be fine with not appropriating facilities grants, since none of that money benefited their primary constituency. However, using the valence of hungry children provided a durable “public good” argument that was also a less brazen than an interest-based subsidy.

Moreover, the power relations between the bill’s architects reflected changes in the agricultural industry: the most powerful got their way in government. Specifically, the program administration was biased towards buying from wealthy farmers, as the program minimally

compensated poorer farmers (Demas 2000, 18-19). This cultivation of guaranteed markets favored industrial farms that acted as economies of scale, capable of delivering a steady volume of goods. This policy continued the New Deal-era pattern of shifting increased power to large, consolidated food producers away from family farms (Saloutos 1974, 403; Choate 2002, 20-21), while constructing farm policy—like the AAA—that disproportionately serve commercial and not labor interests (Finegold and Skocpol 1995).

A. R. Ruis (2017) strongly contends the policy was not about solving nutritional problems, but almost entirely directed to help agricultural interests secure a demand base for their products, lest they decrease production or destroy crops. Since the farm lobby had the most power of any involved interest, Ruis argues, the bill granted full authority to USDA, putting the political terrain firmly on the side of ag, and not student nutrition (146). By removing key social welfare components of the bill and leaving only the agricultural supports, the bill passed, with social reformers, civil rights activists, and public health advocates all in agreement that it was better than nothing (154-155; Levine 2008, 84). “This legislation purported to address both the food problem and the farm problem, but the two agendas were not equally represented”, Ruis (2017) writes, “Malnutrition and hunger became little more than a justification for what was otherwise an agricultural price-protection measure. Concern about malnourishment had propelled the development of school meals programs, but it was agricultural economics that ultimately secured permanent federal funding for them” (114).

We can see this in how Section 32 funds were used to buy surplus commodities, and how insiders at USDA understood the program. Summarizing a Senate report, Gould (1972) mentions three principle issues with the program. First, “[i]t was not known what surpluses would be available until they were produced”; second, “[t]he surplus usually was not a type that children

could consume to any greater extent than what was already being supplied by federal sources”; and third, “[s]ince the surplus was only an addition to the menu, schools did not save any money that could have been used to purchase more nutritious foods” (8). Moreover, “The Section 32 program, school food authorities claim, was quite frankly for the benefit of the farmer, not hungry children” Gould writes. “And this farmer-food industry orientation of the school lunch program still persists, many critics contend. One of the most scathing criticisms of the school lunch program was published by Rodney E. Leonard, who served from 1967 to 1969 as administrator of USDA’s consumer and marketing services. The thrust of his criticism was that USDA’s natural constituency was not needy children, but big farmers and food manufacturers” (8).

Indeed, the decision to house the program in USDA has contributed to its contentious brand of agriculture politics, instead of standing as a clear antipoverty program in its own right, begging the question “is it a program to help farmers or to help children, or can it do both?” (Weaver-Hightower 2011, 54). This dissonance purportedly impaired the anti-poverty mission in the school lunch program, which did not fully manifest until the Great Society because the Department of Agriculture deferred to other federal bureaucracies to handle social welfare measures (Levine 2008, 108-109). Here, the nominal anti-poverty program was instead run as an ag support measure for a full generation, failing to substantially alleviate impoverished conditions for millions of poor children. In the end, the NSLA “was ultimately an agricultural protection measure far more than a nutrition education or children’s health initiative” (Ruis 2017, 157).

Problems in adequately serving hungry children spawned from a series of problems program design and implementation. The most important of these issues were: the eligibility criteria and non-definition of need; ambiguous discrimination language; issues with matching costs and facilities grants; and existing geospatial inequality.

By limiting eligibility to children ages 5 to 17, young children, 18-year-olds still in high school, and adults were excluded from needed assistance. This gap neither served the military readiness imperative nor agricultural interest needs, suggesting it was either out of practicality in service delivery, or innate ideology that led to a reduction in policy impact. Moreover, the decision to leave defining need to the states, local bureaucracies, and individually empowered teachers ensured the policy would not uplift practices beyond the existing level of biased social organization.

While the bill made it impermissible to discriminate against recipients of food aid by treating them differently from other students, they were legally allowed to discriminate with respect to who actually gets the free or reduced lunch. In conducting a literature review on the impact of school lunches, Gould (1972) identifies a consistently brought up issue across interested groups:

[One] influential study [was] *Their Daily Bread*, a 1968 survey sponsored by five women's organizations—Church Women United, YWCA, National Council of Catholic Women, National Council of Negro Women and National Council of Jewish Women. It pinpointed four inadequacies: [one of which was] The lack of uniform national standards for determining the eligibility requirements for a free lunch created inequity and acted to deny to many children the lunch Congress had guaranteed them. (9)

As Poppendieck (2010) writes, this was the biggest flaw in the entire law; it relied on local authority discretion to evaluate merit, specifically who was assessed for “reduced charge” or “inability to pay”, both of which were left undefined in the law (59).

The peculiar combination of permission and prohibition in discrimination ended up bolstering the status quo. The emphasis on anti-discrimination—instead of anti-segregation—language protected students in only the most hollow of senses (Levine 2008, 84-85). In turn, there were many documented cases of discrimination against would-be recipients—despite Voorhis downplaying the potential for this occurrence—leaving many poor children without a meal (Robin

1968). Moreover, the aggregate impact of the bill's reliance on local discretion led to racial minorities and the poorest children often receiving cold lunches, while wealthier and whiter students received hot lunches (Ruis 2017, 156-157). However, this is less about individual bias in the schoolhouse, as the evidence suggests this had more to do with macroscopic issues of school funding levels and facility quality.

To unlock federal funds, states and localities needed to “match” federal contributions with the requisite amount of subnational spending. As previously covered, the disbursement of funds is based on number of children in the state and the per capita income of the state, such that poorer states received national funds through a reduced state matching rate (Demas 2000, 17). On its face, this makes sense as it targets poverty where it occurs, meaning the South was supposed to disproportionately benefit.¹²⁰ But while the formula favored poorer areas, there still had to be local supports for the program to function. This became a major problem as time went on. As Gould (1972) writes:

Since its inception, the National School Lunch Program has required states and localities to match federal funds, with \$3 from states and localities to every \$1 of federal money. But, with the implicit sanction of Congress, states were allowed to count children's payments for meals as part of the matching funds, which effectively removed much of the incentive for states to allocate their own revenues to the school lunch program. By 1953, for example, only 10 states were contributing their own revenues other than for administrative expenses. The burden thus fell largely on the children themselves—those who were able to pay full price or at least a reduced price. (7)

States had an increased burden to match federal funds as time progressed, which instead of being made up through school district funds, was made up from payments by eligible students (Demas

¹²⁰ There is also a claim that the South and its people were bigger proponents of school lunches, hence their advocacy efforts and hard-fought accrual of a favorable funding formula. In the Senate hearings, M.J. Gordon, Chief of the School Lunch and Food Preservation Division of the Civilian Food Requirements Board in WFA claimed: “There are a number of things I believe, Senator Ellender. In some States, particularly in the South, as a whole, they are a whole lot more progressive than in other parts of the country. I think they see the needs of school lunches, and they do more to develop school lunches and develop community canning. There was much more interest there; they are showing a great deal more interest in the home program, So, we have a very fine program in virtually every State in the South” (SAF 1944, 185).

2000, 17). During the factfinding process, Congress' myopic focus on *whether* subnational governments would contribute anything never went further to examine and demarcate *how*.

This cost shifting onto the students themselves meant, at best, that high-income students were subsidizing low-income students. At worst, it meant administrators had an incentive to shift poorer students from entirely free meals to reduced or full priced meals. Otherwise, no poor students would receive the benefits of the program. But as Gould (1972) points out, there was another perverse incentive in the allocation formula:

The Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs estimates that in 1960 the cost breakdown was as follows: federal funds--20%; state and local funds--25%; and children's lunch payments--55%. Another basic flaw in the 1946 act, according to many school food authorities, was its apportionment formula, a combination of the total number of school-age children in the state and the per capita income of the state. Although this took into account the financial need of the state, it actually led to inequities. The Senate committee gives this example: Two states with similar per capita incomes and an identical number of schoolchildren would get the same amount of federal funds. But if state A had only 25% of its children in the lunch program, while state B could cover 75% of its children, state A could obviously reimburse its participating schools at a much higher rate. 'In short,' the committee added in a recent report, 'the 1946 formula favored a low participation rate.'

Again, this calls into question how states would direct their funding. Since they had broad discretion, they could favor not participating at all, cost cutting through showing a subset of schools favor, or trying to cover all students but with greater burdens on individual schools to chip in. Since politics frequently devolves into a game of trading favors, favoring a subset of schools could be a potent tool for clientelist oriented politicians to gain support. In turn, solving hunger would not be the sole goal of lawmakers and administrators as they put the policy into practice.

Matters were further compounded with per pupil spending depreciation, the product of both budgetary restraints and increased enrollment in public schools (Hinrichs 2010, 483). As spending pinches grew, it is important to highlight the lower program participation rate did not mean a select group of privileged but poorer schools received funding. Instead, it turned out wealthier schools

with good cafeteria facilities who had *some* poor students were the primary beneficiaries. Moreover, poor kids in rich schools might be served because of the payments of their peers, not because of the generosity of the program. This is an illustrative example of the relative privilege of being poor in a rich area—while you might not fit in, there are more resources to support upward mobility. In contrast, poorer schools did not have this subsidy luxury, and frequently found it financially impossible to provide the necessary lunches (Poppendieck 2010, 59).

The issues with local spending and matching were further exacerbated by how the facilities grant program was stewarded by Congress. Recall, the hard-fought gains in the Section 5 facilities grants were intended to help disadvantaged schools play some degree of catchup. But stunningly, Congress denied appropriations of Section 5 funding for a remarkable two decade period from 1947 to 1966 (59). So even if a school could match, the federal government provided no avenue to assist in the development of facilities to acquire, store, prepare, and serve the lunches. This is a classic example that the fight for social welfare provision does not end with the codification of a new law—Congress still has to cobble together appropriations coalitions to promulgate the spirit of the law and guide it into daily practice.

In short, the poorest school districts faced several challenges. They did not have proper facilities to prepare the food, and even if they had facilities, they often faced a prohibitive inability to match (Demas 2000, 19). As Poppendieck (2010) puts it, either poor kids paid full price or they did not eat, a paradox haunting schools trying to unlock program benefits. And when government provided assistance, it was not to those most in need. “Ironically, it was the wealthy suburban schools which were being subsidized by the federal government more heavily”, Demas (2000) notes, “since they could afford to have facilities for a lunch program in place” (19). In turn, the program really benefitted the wealthy and middle classes the most (60). This still accomplished

some semblance of expanding nutritional access across the country, but did so in a manner that neglected those most in need of that very nutrition. In this way, the bill fell far short of the ambitious goals of its lead advocates.

The geospatial dispersion of benefits particularly clustered in wealthy and suburban school districts; schools of a different makeup were essentially shutout. In particular, urban areas and the South were especially underserved and hard-hit by the inability to afford meal costs and not having adequate facilities (Poppendieck 2010, 58-60). This is a stunning result since the programs biggest proponents were Southern Democratic senators and Northern “modern” urban liberals. Moreover, despite its separate-but-equal provision, the program failed to help poor students in segregated cities and the countryside of the South, as well as the newly re-segregated urban North (Sandler 2011, 34). As formerly poor white families moved into nuclear family comfort due to New Deal policies and the post-WWII economic boom, Black and Latino inner-city poor suffered with few tangible gains from the initial implementation of the NSLA (34).

Overall, division of the poor was as a clear and predictable output of this policy design. Put simply, resource poor schools could not afford to participate in program (Ruis 2017, 150). The paradoxically privileged poor (most likely white) in wealthy areas (suburbia or uptown) received the greatest marginal benefits, while the rural poor across races and urban children of color did not gain inclusion. The policy as implemented created a path by which the minority poor blended in with the majority middle class in heterogeneous schools, while the poor that were most lumped together continued to struggle and fell further behind. All of this led to startling results: the policy served wealthier areas better than poor areas, exacerbating the era-defining geospatial wealth inequality borne of white flight suburbanization and urban tax base depletion.

Moreover, consistent with the espoused worries of lawmakers and despite the non-discrimination provisions, concerns over stigmatization may have manifested in some cases. According to Poppendieck (2010): “The biggest problem is the stigma that comes from being different, from being marked as poor, from being unable to pay in a culture that places excessive value on being able to pay” (190). While this and the other previously documented problems likely have some merit, it is worth describing my own experiences in the program to provide a concrete case.

As a low-income youth, I was enrolled in the school lunch program from elementary school to my last days before dropping out of high school. By the 1990s, the program was readily available across jurisdictions and covered all poor and many non-poor students with whom I grew up. In contrast to the depictions of stigmatization, the program was discrete in both the mixed-income and wealthier parts of Los Angeles County in which I went to school. We used different colored punch cards in the 90s, and electronic pins in the 2000s. As far as students who ate cafeteria food, we did all eat the same contents and sit in the same area, regardless of program enrollment. There was, however, a difference between the foodstuffs of students that brought their lunch to school and those that did not. Kids with lunch pails had bologna sandwiches, Lunchables, Gushers, and Capri Sun, sometimes grapes and oranges—essentially, designer food. In contrast, I ate sloppy goat cheese pizza slices, microwaved burritos, fries, and chocolate milk—to paraphrase Senator Copeland (D-NY), non-Epicurean sustenance. But this was the only noticeable difference—students who get lunch at school and students who bring their lunch to school—which had very little to do with the program and more to do with parental involvement in nutrition.

Importantly, the program did fill a void in my daily caloric intake. I would not have eaten during my 8 hours in school if not for that free hot meal at noon. But the lack of a systematic

educational supplement made it so I did not understand why I was eating food that I did not like. From the instantiation of the program in the 1940s, to the reforms in the 1960s, and my use of the program in the 1990s/2000s, USDA did invest in *some* degree of nutritional education through its informational brochures and posters on display in the cafeteria. But unfortunately, these materials were based on the iffy science of the 1970s food pyramid. This paradigm was in all likelihood a rationalization of eating what farmers grow than any sort of nutritionist-led development. But even with that, often the food I ate seemed unrelated to the food pyramid, or just covered two of the five blocks (often dairy and carbohydrates, plus maybe a meat). All I knew was I could eat this or eat nothing. Many days I chose the latter. Maybe with an integrated nutritional education, I would have learned sooner what a brain needs to function properly throughout the day and potentially even bring those habits home, like educational and public health reformers advocated for in committee. Instead, I did not appreciate the food at the time, even as I was wholly dependent on it for sustenance.

As an adult, however, I am eternally grateful for this essential program. After years of inequitable service provision—either by inadvertent design, malice, or incompetence—the program in its current shape does have a wide reach, filling a critical void in the lives of millions of hungry American children. As Mrs. Harvey Wiley argued in committee, “If education is given free in the public schools, then food must now be given to enable the hungry children to absorb the education provided, or else it is thrown away” (SAF 1944b, 49). By the 21st century, the program admirably fulfilled this prescient imperative.

Conclusion

This unique episode in American social welfare history provides insights into five principal fields of study. First, the study lays out how the poor are represented in a high salience antipoverity

policymaking environment, including by highlighting how MCs and committee witnesses depict the poor and substantively act on their needs. Second, the way in which interest coalitions of advocates for the poor and non-poor secondary constituencies congeal to motivate policy enactment is spotlighted. Third, the study chronicles the entire policy process in showcasing how the unique moment in Congressional history provided an opportunity to construct social welfare provision for individuals who cannot vote—children—in an era otherwise hostile to such legislation. Fourth, this examination sheds light on how dominant theories of Congressional organization each explain an important component of this understudied historical example. And fifth, a focus on the school lunch policy process sheds light on the how the New Deal period built on and contributed to the long arc of American statebuilding, but did so in a manner consistent with federalist and Jim Crow principles.

Representation of the Poor

The chapter uncovered a dialectical pattern in which there was simultaneously discussion of the poor and their needs, but the conversation itself was not centered on this group (which deviates from the descriptive and substantive forms of representation in the previous cases of the SSA and especially USHA). The committee hearings were comparatively more centered on the needs of the poor than the floor debates, which frequently called to higher order issues of global war, debt, and antipathy toward government instead of having the presence of mind to think about the needs of the poor. While some MC and witness advocates shared personal stories of interaction with hardship, overwhelmingly the debate was over technical details about program operation and the role of competing agricultural, public health, and educational interests in shaping the contours of the policy. Enough policymakers rightly realized malnourishment contributed to a weakened national defense, but this new valence was mostly used to guarantee continuation of a program

primarily meant to boost domestic agricultural markets. Provisions to help the poor receive nutritional education—that could lead to a lifetime of sound food choices—were stripped, while some provisions that made it into the bill then went unfunded (particularly facilities grants to poor schools). Such a barebones policy construction might simply be par for the course when legislating for groups without political power.

Moreover, when the poor were the focal point of discussion, they were positively constructed but frequently divided based on depictions of need and deservingness. Early on, Congress and the administration agreed to decrease involvement in diminishing hunger among adults, and instead, focus on children. Here, adults have less need and are less deserving because they can work. Indeed, the entire debate around the NSLA only had one or two mentions of hungry people not included in the policy, and usually it was a rhetorical device to justify spending on children—the *lack* of universalism becomes merit in a needs-based framework. In turn, children are more deserving, aid by a new need paradigm because of national security imperative. While poor children were often linked to poor families, the hypothesized feedback mechanism to reach poor adults (child-to-parent education on food habits) did not manifest. While poor states (particularly in the South and West) factored into the debate and resulting allocation formula, the non-funding of Section 5 facilities grants hurt these folks. Finally, there was little discussion of poor farmers, but they are still a target group and have beneficiary status in the policy. However, one has to wonder if discussion of poor framers throughout the New Deal era was simply rhetorical cover to funnel benefits to increasingly powerful and consolidated agribusiness. Indeed, tenant farmers and sharecroppers, despite efforts in the Roosevelt regime, lost significant market share to growing corporate and industrial farms.

The chapter also sheds light on how the rhetorical construction of the poor may have material impacts by a) constructing symbolic representation of groups and ideas and b) conveying genuine interest in the needs of the poor. Rhetoric may or may not be hollow—but its use is intentional and strategic. In a politics where the public may not understand who holds their material interest, rhetoric provides one approach to indicate congruence between a lawmaker and an individual, group or interest. As is clear in Voorhis' prescient 1942 speech offering the first school lunch plan, the act of defining the terms of debate can factor into how actors engage the poor. Setting the agenda and terms of debate in a compelling manner that helps members understand the need to help the poor likely does contribute to substantive representation of a group with low levels of descriptive representation. Provisional evidence for this contention is further seen in the statistically significant relationship between poverty speeches and recorded vote position. This is specifically seen in the House with poverty speech count being associated with support for the Powell amendment and passage of the bill, and poverty speech count *and* average speech propensity correlating with opposition to stripping Title II from the bill in the Senate. In short, articulated interest in poverty appears to have predictive value on substantive roll calls.

On the bright side, there appeared to be wide stakeholder engagement on this policy area, showing antipoverty policymaking excels at consulting a variety of interested parties. Executive branch departments and agencies experimented with policy provision, educated members about their experiences, and advocated for best practices in helping MCs codify the program. For their part, a select group of MCs spent years debating one another to get the program funded, developing strong buy-in from upstart and entrenched interests, and crafting arguments that ultimately prevailed upon the body. And committee witnesses all agreed this is arguably the best possible use of federal funds. Witnesses were more overtly friendly to the poor than MCs, but even a majority

of the witnesses pursued alternative agendas separate from decreasing suffering of poor children. This illustrates an emergent dynamic in which centering on the poor is different than caring about the poor; the latter may—oddly enough—be accomplished without the former.

Overall, the chapter makes clear poor children were an often remote, albeit sympathetic group for lawmakers to call to for a positive valence, all the while undermining the viability of the program at ameliorating widespread malnourishment in the country. The NSLA is an excellent example of how antipoverty programs are seldom centered on the poor themselves, and how enterprising actors politically mobilize the image of the poor to fulfill parochial objectives—in this case, securing a domestic market for surplus and non-surplus agricultural staples. Importantly, the altered incentive structure that undermined the antipoverty impact of the policy did not itself ruin the program, but instead provided a vehicle for later lawmakers to use in service of achieving the stated goals of the program. Consistent with the paradoxical interest group liberalism paradigm of New Deal social welfare policies, the political forces that positively contributed to policy enactment simultaneously blunted the efficacy of the policy to greatly transform the lives of the poorest Americans.

This is how antipoverty policies are frequently constructed: diffuse policy coalitions with some interest in helping the poor offer their support in return for reaping their own benefits in the policy.

Antipoverty Coalition Formation

Since the poor have low visibility (Harrington 1962), are seldom a majority of the voters in any geographic district (Jusko 2017), and rarely become lawmaking members of Congress (Carnes 2013; Miler 2018), it is important to assess how the issues of the poor factor into larger—at times winning—coalitions. In this case, the legislative leaders were Southern Democrats,

bolstered by technocrats from a supportive administration, which divided the prevailing Conservative Coalition to deliver benefits for the poor *and* long-standing policy demanding interests. In so doing, lawmakers would work to construct a minimum winning coalition (Riker 1962) that ensured passage, but that avoided the peril of making the policy too diffuse to work. The key, it seems, is to strategically balance the needs of powerful interests as you work to support those with the least power. Indeed, the former act as gatekeepers for the latter.

It is worth highlighting how unique it is that the leaders of the NSLA coalition represented the South. As eminent scholar V.O. Key (1949) puts it:

[...] the South must depend for political leadership, not on political parties, but on lone-wolf operators, on fortuitous groupings of individuals usually of a transient nature, on spectacular demagogues odd enough to command the attention of considerable numbers of voters, on men who have become persons of political consequence in their own little bailiwicks, and other types of leaders whose methods to attract electoral attention serve as substitutes for leadership of a party organization. (16)

In general, this meant Southern Democrats were more independent of the national Democratic Party, hence their willingness to split from the party and govern with minority Republicans in the Conservative Coalition. Party discipline and programmatic politics, for these operators, meant very little if bipartisanship fulfilled their local pedigree better. But in the case of the NSLA, the “fortuitous groupings” of a “transient nature” saw interests converge between men of consequence (Russell and Flannagan), demagogues (Smith before he died),¹²¹ and lone-wolf operators (Ellender).¹²²

¹²¹ Indeed, in Smith’s last poverty speech before his passing, he argues the plight of the farmer is entirely due to the federal government, eggheaded urbanites, and the emphasis on the industrial economy. He then effectively threatens everyone with political violence if the farmer is not tended to. What makes this demagogic is it is not those groups that hold power over the provision of resources to poor farmers, but Congress itself. By pointing to those groups, he is simply deflecting blame onto out-groups that his supporters already resent (*CR 89* 1943, 1797-1798).

¹²² Ellender was originally oppositional to Longism in Louisiana, but in this case, channeled it for one of the few redistributive ends the senator ever supported.

Available evidence shows Richard Russell, in particular, was principally concerned about the poor, but knew the selling point to the wider Congress would have to work through a support for the poor valence covering an essential agricultural interest imperative. This is strategically adroit and speaks to the necessity to frame antipoverty programs in terms of satisfying a wider swath of constituencies than only those in desperate material need. There was simply more support in Congress for the surplus program through USDA than a nutrition program for children. While one of Russell's earlier quotes lays out this fact, it is easy to attack the messenger for either insincerity or emphasizing pragmatism over need. But Russell was on to something, which is the key price of cobbling together an enacting coalition for the poor is the maintenance of secondary constituencies.

However, this political expediency approach has drawbacks. Making sure every child was fed was clearly secondary to ensuring surplus goods were purchased. In practice, the former was not necessary for the latter, as food waste continued to be a problem for USDA and needy populations, but would mean little to producers who were already compensated for their commodities. If localities did not want to dispense food, private sellers still offloaded the product. This perverse incentive structure provides the strongest existing hypothesis to explain why the program had to be modified so many times in the following 40 years.

So how did the confluence of who were the legislative leaders and what interests were tended to in the bill help to the split the durable Conservative Coalition (which goes on to continue governing for 40 more years)? It is seemingly a product of the nature of the issue, which lent itself to the distributive form of politics that has historically characterized the agriculture committee and cut across partisan and ideological commitments. But just as importantly is the fact that the policy disproportionately benefited the South with its ongoing impoverishment. This allowed leadership

of the region to support antipoverty programs with the cover of simply serving their constituencies, thus not jeopardizing their conservative bona fides. Moreover, by taking a leadership role in crafting the policy, Southern Democrats were able to control the bounds of the program to not be too generous or restrictive, negotiating a careful line to ensure the program became law and at least served some of the poor.

Policymaking Process

The representational and coalitional dynamics call to larger aspects of the policymaking process in Congress. In particular, the role of context, political opportunities, and available policy choices. Of special utility to examine these facets, this section will briefly explain Kingdon's (2011 [1984]) "Policy Window and Joining Streams" framework (165), then gainfully apply it to the NSLA.

In 1984, John W. Kingdon sought to explain why certain ideas gain traction and become law in what often appears to be an unwieldy, unjust policymaking regime in Congress. Since agenda space is scarce, change is rare, and not everyone reaps benefits, this framework helps us better understand the collective outputs of the chief lawmaking body in the U.S. Key to this framework is acknowledging the independent role of three intersecting "streams", which create an opening, known as a "window." These windows are rare—often measured in generational intervals—and must be seized upon.

The first stream is the problem stream, which exists when a "condition" becomes bad enough that it requires affirmative governmental action (109). The most prominent problems tend to be external issues, such as focusing events or crises, which contribute to the overall context in which political actors mobilize. The second stream is the political stream, which revolves around what is salient in the public mood and the exact configuration of political forces that shape debate

and make decisions. The final one is the policy stream, which is composed of competing solutions floating around a “primeval soup” waiting for vessels for enactment (116). In an interest group polity, there are policies for everything, but they only gain traction when they affix to the problem and/or political stream. Policy entrepreneurs use coupling (of their pet issue with the tractable issue) and spillover (use of existing power to extend gains into new domains) in a logrolling paradigm. Kingdon synthesizes the interconnected parts into a macroscopic dynamic in clear terms:

In the policy stream... solutions float around in and near government, searching for problems to which to become attached or political events that increase their likelihood of adoption. These proposals are constantly in the policy stream, but then suddenly they become elevated on the governmental agenda because they can be seen as solutions to a pressing problem or because politicians find their sponsorship expedient. (172)

The application of this theory illuminates what exactly happened in the NSLA policy process, while providing a nifty example to show Kingdon’s depiction of the policy process has wide historical applications.

There were three conditions that required assessment to decipher whether they were actionable within the problem stream. First, the lack of military readiness due to malnutrition contributed to excess deaths and high amounts of rejection rates. If winning wars was something important to American policymakers, this is as actionable a problem as they encounter—and an especially effective topic coming out of WWII. The second potential problem was the issue of surplus commodities with few markets to serve as outlets. Relief for farmers in the form of surplus commodity purchases were considered temporary measures. Farmers needed permanent foreign and domestic markets for their goods, or they would face financial losses and/or have to resort to destroying stock to keep prices high. Finally, the third potential problem was the ongoing lack of food access among Americans. However, for this condition to become a problem, it required

narrowing down the actionable target group to just hungry adolescents, with the problem of adult food insecurity constructed as either transient or a choice among individuals unwilling to work. These problems are all elevated to national issues and converge into a single problem stream with military leaders portraying the need for children to be fed for national security purposes, which is fulfilled by food producers selling their goods to a government that then allocates foodstuffs to the target population.

The political stream was simultaneously unfavorable and favorable for policy enactment. On the negative front, federal New Deal policies had grown out of repute, and new ones were almost nonexistent in 1940s with the rise of the antagonistic Conservative Coalition and agenda displacement from domestic to foreign with WWII. However, some positive developments occurred that far outweighed the negative barriers. For one, the end of war allowed more space for domestic policy on the Congressional agenda. Second, interested actors in this case were in powerful positions as committee chairs (Russell; Smith and Ellender; Flannagan) in good standing with prevailing legislative order (Conservative Coalition). This afforded reeling New Dealers atypical support to win on a new policy front, even if it meant sacrificing something closer to comprehensive universalism in the form of the Stamp Plan. Third, military and agricultural interests supported policy action. These powerful boosters who were generally not involved in social welfare causes channeled their prestige from other areas into a powerful spillover effect on behalf of childhood nutrition. All of these political factors overwhelmed and minimized existing antipathy to new social welfare provision, creating a fortuitous climate for the NSLA.

Finally, within the soupy policy stream lay answers to problems specific and vast, looking for suitable problems to solve that had a good chance of enactment. In this climate, there was a perfect nexus of federalized program templates to nationalize. Specifically, members had to decide

whether solving the agricultural, military, and nutrition issues required a mass food allotment plan, or something more tailored. Unfortunately for hungry adults, the food allotment plan was bargained out of existence. But fortunately, the school lunch program for impoverished students was more targeted and could still solve the larger problems with political buy-in from key players and interests. This policy solution gave agricultural leaders an opportunity to claim a humanitarian purpose while using state purchasing power to guarantee a revenue stream, regardless of market conditions. Domestic surplus commodity purchases by the government was an existing policy program at risk of entropy, now in desperate search for a new problem with which to couple. With hungry children ill-prepared to join the military, they found it. In total, this is perhaps the best example and application of the framework, and yet, these connections are not made in existing policymaking scholarship or school lunch historiography.

Additional factors beyond Kingdon's framework also provided fortuitous conditions for NSLA passage. Executive branch experimentation to carry out the will of Congress in t_1 leads to pilot programs. This provides a template for Congress to judge on effectiveness and necessity dimensions in t_2 , instead of solely basing decision-making on prospective benefit and unknown externalities. This template makes it easier to create a new statute. Thus, interbranch dynamics facilitated favorable movement in this case.

Moreover, this case is consistent with a punctuated equilibrium model. As Baumgartner and Jones (1993) note, because policy achievements for any given group are rare and stretch years in between successful enactment, groups often have to form heterogeneous coalitions for one great push. That is what occurred in this case and helps to explain the strange bedfellows in the NSLA. Initially supported by well-meaning progressive lawmakers, educational reformers, and public health officials, the program gained traction only once agricultural interests pushed for permanent

authorization with the strong support of the national security apparatus. Once a critical mass of well-positioned interests converged, new antipoverty policy was possible even amidst a governing Conservative Coalition that was generally hostile to *any* new, sustained social welfare expenditures.

Overall, this episode highlights the tradeoffs between program specificity and political expediency. The convergence of two distinct powerful interests—military leadership reporting back that malnutrition hurt the war cause and agricultural interests looking to expand and enshrine state purchase of surplus commodities—helped to spur passage, but also helps to explain the program’s deficiencies. Since the military helped with the rhetorical plane, but had nothing to do with ongoing provision of the policy, their ability to monitor implementation was minimal. In contrast, the agricultural interests were heavily invested in monitoring as they reaped a direct payment, but their interest in childhood nutrition was secondary at best. Neither powerful interest was known to participate heavily in social welfare policy except for in national crisis. This, in part, allows for such divisive antipoverty policies, in that they are vehicles for other causes and/or their benefactors are not fully involved in policy implementation. Ironically, what facilitates passage of a policy in Congress may also contribute to its poor specification and implementation, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the policy to help all poor children.¹²³

Congressional Organization

Tracking the legislative process of school lunches also sheds light on how Congress is organized to proficiently handle public problems. In particular, we can see the three dominant

¹²³ This seemingly paradoxical relationship between forfeiting the most effective parts of a proposed policy to secure passage is not likely unique to the NSLA. In general, Congress’ emphasis on compromise and reducing opposition accomplishes short-term goals of passage, tends to lead to underfunding, may be intentionally vague to allow multiple actors to think they are incorporated into the policy, and allows harder decisions to be made down the road—potentially away from Congress in the in the administrative apparatus (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993 [1968], 60-61).

theories of Congressional organization—the distributive, informational, and partisan logics (Shepsle and Weingast 1994)—all do some work to depict aspects of the policy process in this historical case.

The program benefited from the distributionist tendencies of the agriculture committees in Congress (Jones 1961; Ripley and Franklin 1976; Hurwitz, Moiles and Rohde 2001). There was a willingness to create a social good even in an era of few to no other notable social policies because they were used to doling out benefits, although not necessarily for this population. In particular, poverty interest among House ag members was quite low—except for Voorhis—showcasing a value-added in which ag membership led to more support for an antipoverty policy than what would naturally befit those members. The same assessment is less clear for the Senate, where ag committee members were already leaders in poverty articulation. Moreover, this is one of the few times in Congressional history that the ag committees churned out a *redistributionist* logic by subsidizing poor students and poor states with general customs and tax revenue reallocation. In an era when Congress was predisposed towards disapproving of redistributionist policies, the distributive agriculture committee might have been the last hope, creating a unique incentive structure to siphon off would-be antagonists to join the cause. However, the distributionism of ag members did not necessarily ensure a functioning antipoverty program. Indeed, as long as there was a market for surplus goods, Congress as a whole did not feel it necessary to ensure the program functioned properly with the necessary facilities grants and program audits until the program was redesigned in the 1960s.

Informational processes (Krehbiel 1991) of gathering facts in committee and educating non-committee members on the chamber floors permeate the entire episode. In particular, Senators Russell and Ellender were exceedingly careful in enlisting witnesses to appear, engaging in

deductive questioning, and directly leading conversations in committee with witnesses and on the chamber floor for the crucial purpose of shaping the contours of debate. By manipulating the established fact record and getting witnesses to express rationales for their views on competing legislation, they constructed a justification and potentially built a coalition of support to pass their legislation. And while informational theories tend to focus on members, and it is clear that witnesses appear at the behest of committee members, witnesses also hold agency to construct their testimony in a manner that highlights their priorities on target populations, legislative objectives, and policy design, thus exposing MCs to salient and actionable information that they further debate internally.

Finally, depictions of Congress as the product of how partisans wield power (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005; Binder 1997) have an unusual application here in an era otherwise known for low partisanship. It was unusual Democratic Party unity that allowed the legislative coalition to overcome the Conservative Coalition. By controlling the referral, committee, and floor processes, the party successfully maintained a static policy design that kept the party together. The only potential “roll” in the entire process was on Title II in the House, although without a roll call (*CR 92* 1946, 1540) we do not know how it split the Democrats, ostensibly leading to a GOP-favored outcome. The NSLA debates show all three contemporary logics of Congressional organization pertain to the pathbreaking New Deal era.

American Statebuilding and the Long New Deal

Finally, the episode provides insights into how the late New Deal/Fair Deal furthered the process of building the American state on several notable fronts. In particular, the NSLA policy process provides examples of four major concepts in American Political Development: path dependence (Pierson 2004), feedback (Campbell 2003; Mettler and Soss 2004; Mettler 2005),

conversion (Thelen 2003; Béland 2007), and exogeneous shocks (Hacker 2002). Moreover, it developed the state in a hybrid approach that married core 1930s New Deal ideas with four trends: decentralized federalist approaches, the workfare pseudo curtailment of subsequent eras, a nationalization of the Jim Crow paradigm, and the development of powerful constituencies *within* governmental bureaucracies that fight amongst themselves to build portfolios by controlling policy provision.

On the path dependence front, the program existed in one form or another since the early 1930s, which created inertia to keep it. Members had to balance continuing the program's successes in the many schools that already had a local-federal relationship with building capacity to serve the majority of schools not yet involved in the program. Any new ideas were weighed against the existing approach, meaning there was a notable bias towards continuing things as they were, which limited the imaginations of MC and witnesses. Finally, this path dependency contributed to the inability of Congress to cut annual appropriations to an executive-led program, vote against instantiating the program, and retrench the statute after enactment. In all, path dependence is observable in the ideational plane and cognitive processing of decision-makers (present bias; fear of changing an existing program), institutional choice (continuation of USDA institutional patterns and practices), and political considerations (the inability to curtail a program that already had beneficiaries).

This all suggests a core part of social welfare development should be well-resourced executive branch experimentation with new forms of social provision—specifically popular ones that can take hold to create a feedback mechanism that provides accruing gains years later. Here, feedback is present in the resistance to move the program from USDA to OE, since USDA had already developed a direct constituency of subnational politicians, community leaders, teachers,

and student families. And moreover, these aforementioned groups only became more powerful to mobilize in service of protecting the policy as the footprint grew year over year, moving from a departmental initiative to a Congressionally backed one. Hence, the static nature of the policy throughout years of debate.

This is also an archetypical example of conversion, by taking a commodity purchasing program to support farming and remaking it a redistributive social welfare benefit for needy children. Aided by entrepreneurial uses of the surplus commodities, the program grew into its own direct benefit program. This conversion partly explains the unique strange bedfellows interest group coalition of agriculture-military-education-public health, as the latter upstart interests attempted to coopt or seize the legacy former group's program. The full conversion of originally a work-relief program, then a surplus program, into a social welfare program did not culminate with passage, however, as it took another generation to wrestle the policy focus away from farmers and more onto children. In all, the arc of this conversion process spanned from 1930s to 1970s. More broadly, this episode provides some insights into how the cross-cutting needs of the poor could be tended to by creatively growing out of adjacent policy areas. An emphasis on conversion will potentially allow a greater diversity of old and new interests to occupy the same space at a pivotal point of justifying and moving a bill toward passage.

More broadly, this episode shows the Great Depression mentality had subsided, as evidenced by the decreased support for legislatively authorized or executively piloted poor adult relief programs. The need was no longer about economic dislocation, but how to support a healthy adolescent population if parents are not around because they were both at work. This fit a paradigm revolving around how to ensure the U.S. would be successful in future military engagements. In the NSLA case—unlike SSA and USHA—the precipitating event was World War II, not the Great

Depression. The second shock in part explains how the Conservative Coalition in Congress could authorize such a program—the rationale was not purely a cause of social do-gooders, but instead a clear story about national security that was impaired by a lack of nutritional fitness among America’s young people. World War II, not the Great Depression, led to the first durable Congressional efforts devoted to fighting hunger in the U.S.—but only for children. The scarcity of surpluses and demand for workforce labor in the early 1940s depreciated any rationale to create family-based nutritional program. This is a marquee example of how events shape how Congress generates antipoverty policies. Leading architects in the lawmaking class are necessary but insufficient to accomplish enactment. It is the widely shared ideational plane among members that sunk family assistance and elevated school lunches, paired with a novel policy coalition of agriculture, military, and educational reformers—likely the only domain in which these interests converged in U.S. history.

U.S. social policy is often a product of subnational experimentation elevated through the structures of federalism. This positively works at compiling a record of pilot programs to be nationalized once large external shocks provide the opening. However, Congress also has a long history of hastening such developments by providing resources to subnational units with few stipulations on program guidance. In fact, working the channels of federalism was especially tenable in the hostile Conservative Coalition era because, in part, pre-New Deal “New Federalism” mainstreamed what Kimberley Johnson (2007) terms “intergovernmental policy instruments” (IPIs). Using IPIs in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress developed its administrative capacity by frequently providing resources for states to further pursue distributive, regulatory, and even redistributive policies. Indeed, the policy design of the NSLA maintained a purely voluntary

form of the cooperative federalism model that only required states adopt best practices *if* they chose to get involved at all.

Moreover, the policy was consistent with the rising imperatives of the workfare state paradigm (Bertram 2015). To many elder New Dealers and insurgent conservatives, this was the last social welfare policy they would vote to enact. If any program sealed the safety net, it would be a children's program that eschews a mass feeding program. In this way, children are severed from parents in provision—developing further out from the state of “soldiers and mothers” (Skocpol 1992)—mainly because the former cannot work, while the latter must.

Another important component of the statebuilding effort here is the remarkable pattern of policies that ameliorate suffering and contribute to upward mobility simultaneously following a Jim Crow separate-but-equal paradigm. Since the leaders of both the House and Senate's school lunch legislative coalition were all Southern conservative Democrats (Smith; Ellender; Russell; Flannagan), they would very likely only be comfortable with a program that comported to their way of life. The NSLA is, therefore, a Jim Crow vision to solve the suffering of adolescent hunger and malnutrition. Segregation might have only been a *de jure* social sorting pattern in the South, but the willingness of a majority of Congress to funnel needed aid through a separate-but-equal paradigm was deeply entrenched into cross-regional patterns and practices of collaboration. This is seen as early as the Second Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890 creating Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and extends to the National School Lunch Act of 1946. Anything too universalistic or that challenged the social order would be killed in Congress depriving the nation's poor students of a college education or food, respectively. In this way, Jim Crow was a *national legislative* process that perversely facilitated social welfare development in times of otherwise intractable political climates.

It is also notable how autonomous bureaucracies and interagency competition contributed to the outcomes related to the NSLA. With the development of the administrative state in the late 19th century (Skowronek 1982; Johnson 2007) and exponential growth during the 1930s (Lowi 1985), agencies helmed by entrepreneurial leaders (Sheingate 2013) could experiment with new programs (Carpenter 2000) to further expand the infrastructural power of the state (Mann 1984). Here, that experimentation occurred within the RFC, CWA, FERA, WPA, USDA, and WFA, who were engaging local actors to develop school lunches across the country. Then USDA/WFA and FSA/OE began to compete to control the final statutory policies, expanding the realm of potential frameworks to adopt. Indeed, there is still room to debate the wisdom of housing the program in USDA versus the OE. On the one hand, keeping the surplus component contributed to policy longevity within and amidst a less favorable policy environment with the takeover of the Conservative Coalition. The program was never retrenched and remains one of the only marginally impactful social welfare policies Congress created in the 20-year period from 1940 and 1959. However, the program failed at supporting poor children across the country until the 1960s amendments altered the program to put greater emphasis on reaching the poorest children and areas. Through a process of underfunding the facilities grants, the poorest schools were not able to fully utilize the range of nutritional content offered in the program. However, through a generation's long process of conversion from a stable agricultural subsidy program into a vital social welfare program, the NSLA matured into a stable and popular program for the poor.

In conclusion, there were several key problems with the NSLA: not centering representation on the poor; the role of secondary constituencies in reaping benefits under the valence of the poor; and malperformance in program design and execution. Notwithstanding these issues, given the headwinds against gainful antipoverty policy enactment in this era it is difficult

to sincerely argue the NSLA was not an immense victory. The creative use of coupling a social program with a powerful entrenched interest created a cross pressure in enough marginal members to gain enactment. This speaks to the legislative genius of Jerry Voorhis' discourse, Allen Ellender's pragmatism, and Richard Russell's savvy dedication. If the cost to creating governmental supports for the materially disadvantaged requires unsavory methods and compromise with actors many in contemporary times would find repugnant, that cost may be worth bearing. The table stakes to get anything in the 1940s likely ensured the policy would have deep flaws. Frankly, it might be the best potential outcome in that environment. In this light, it is truly a wonder school lunches became the law of the land, and a durable staple in the lives of disadvantaged children across America—including myself—for much of our formative adolescent years.

Appendix 10A: Witness Testimony on School Lunch Proposals, 1944-1945

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
1	Olmstead, Ralph W.	Lieutenant Colonel, Deputy Director of Distribution, War Food Admin	✓	✓	2/15/44; 5/3/44	Explains admin's main goals (agr 1 then nutrition 2a and ed 2b); in charge of food procurement and distribution for war effort; explains how food gets from Fed to St/Loc; current surpluses hurt commodity prices, gov't has to buy them, need a target to send them (U.S. children to replace foreign populations)
2	Smith, S. R.	Representing War Food Administration	✓		2/15/44	Key operations person on current AAA '35 Sec 32 program; technical in nature
3	Studebaker, John W.	Commissioner, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency	✓		2/15/44; 4/18/45; 5/10/45; 5/22/45	Offers FSA school lunch legislation, which moves much of the existing program from Dept of Ag into OE of the FSA (which handles SSA at the time); testifies on logistics
4	Gold, Norman L.	Chief, Civilian Food Requirements Branch, War Food Administration	✓	✓	2/15/44; 5/4/44	Expertise on point rationing in program; program uses institutional points, not individual family points; WFA has good relationship w/ OE, can coordinate regardless of legislative design; program originated in communities, not fed gov't; USDA interest not exclusively about surpluses; guidance provided to schools about what products are available, schools decide to accept, then USDA provisions goods; in 1824 USDA is advisory, prefer 1820; current dynamic is really two progs: 1) national purchasing program of surpluses to states and 2) reimbursement program for schools that furnish low/no-cost lunches; reimbursement more common approach; reimbursement amts by meal type (A, B and C); voucher certification process; \$ not most imp part; fed is "prime mover" to keep program functioning; USDA spending \$40 mil in current year: \$35 mil on reimbursement, \$5 mil on direct shipping; admin cost is 4%; schl lunch increase a product of discontinuing aid to needy families; goals are to create a permanent market for surplus ag; policy process; logistics; goals (secure market for ag goods)

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
5	Hall, Sidney B.	Professor of School Administration, George Washington University		✓	5/2/44	history of sch'l lunches; issues at stake; advocacy for plan, specifically S. 1824 better for children; exp as former St Superintendent of schools in VA
6	Goodykoontz, Bess	Assistant Commissioner of Education, Office of Education		✓	5/2/44	technical expertise; funding formula; states should be in charge of program; nutritional education is key
7	Gaumnitz, Erwin M.	Assisting Goodykoontz (prev assoc w/Office of Price Administration and Agricultural Adjustment Administration) State Superintendent of Education, NC; legislative committee of the National Council of Chief State School Officers		✓	5/2/44	Knowledge of cost estimates of the program
8	Erwin, Clyde A.	Chairman, Home Economics Department, New York University		✓	5/2/44	experience starting and overseeing rural school lunch program; support for program; long commutes for students; parents not around due to war effort; supports Office of Ed handling prog under S.1824 (shared understanding); role of fed govt to make lunches cheap enough; exs of programs no set up thru Office of Ed that were problematic for local officials (WPA; NYA); need integration, current Ag config does not accomplish that
9	Lewis, Dora	Chairman, Home Economics Department, New York University		✓	5/2/44	Experience administering rural and urban school lunch programs; conveys AHEA endorsement of S. 1824; center on nourishment and nutritional education; emphasis on parental involvement; relation to home ec curriculum

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
10	Woods, Ralph H.	Director of Vocational Education, KY		✓	5/2/44	Operations of current program on state level; widespread poverty in rural state; goals: 1) nutritious meals for every child 2) develop good food habits 3) good table manners 4) habits of cleanliness; current payments too slow and not enough trained staff/equipment/facilities (federal need); local funding issues S: Conveys GFWC resolution in support of school lunch program with an approp of no more than \$50 million annually; opposition to federal administration of funds; feeding children is priority over farm markets and surplus commodities, regardless of show program started; support 1824's emphasis on ed and thinks farmers will develop surpluses in areas schools need (not just that schools would take excess cabbage and stuff they don't want); H: reiterates past principles; disapproves of 2673 b/c it is too centered on farmers and funds too centralized in D.C.; support Ellender's S.503
11	Wiley, Harvey	Representing General Federation of Women's Clubs	✓	✓	5/2/44; 3/29/45	Urban perspective; NYC schools support continuing current program under USDA as is (either 1820 or 1824 is fine); personal view is not in favor of school-feeding progs, but thinks they should continue during war and until parents understand proper nutrition; lack of awareness on good nutrition; schl lunch decreases sickness and increases attendance Knowledge of local spending (mostly on labor/facilities) to match federal expense; local criteria to receive free lunch (cmte in each school); no observed stigma since students don't who is on free lunch; federal matching is not a disincentive for local overmatch spending; key problem is not food supply, but food preparation--req to get kids to eat; nutritious lunches have the effect of educating the whole community on food purchases; rural need is greater
12	Whalen, Frank P.	Assistant Superintendent of Schools, NYC		✓	5/2/44	S: Program needs to re-center on the need of children first, not markets or surpluses; fund states according to need; program must be part of larger educational initiative; data on level of nutritional deficiency; poor nutrition linked to 30% increase in rejection from Selective Service; favors state matching and ed admin of 1824; learning capacity related to nourishment; H: supply data on how many students are economically needy
13	Watson, Lucille T.	State Director, School Lunch Programs, GA		✓	5/3/44	
14	Parran, Thomas	Surgeon General, Public Health Service	✓	✓	5/3/44; 3/26/45	

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
15	Shields, Robert H.	Solicitor, Department of Agriculture, War Food Administration	✓	✓	5/3/44; 5/9/45; 5/10/45; 5/24/45	Background on current program, need for legislation; AAA only allows for surplus purchases, w/ WWII consistent school nutrition program difficult and legally tenuous; sch lunch absorbs excess physical stock and keeps prices stable; 1820 more flexible, 1824 requires more interagency coordination
16	Stanley, Louise	Special Assistant to the Agricultural Research Administrator, USDA		✓	5/3/44	History of USDA's involvement in school lunches dating back to 1916; worked with home ec and rural women to provision technical guides; knowledge of USDA's state and county level workers/projects
17	Chatfield, George N.	Member, NYC Board of Education	✓	✓	5/3/44	S: urban perspective; childhood nutrition is key for employment/military readiness; fed must be involved to ensure national security and strong economy in the future; NYC's use of surplus commodities since 1932; difficulty w/ facilities and standardizing food prep/output; commodities need to be supplied in proportion w/ student consumption; wholesale purchaser side; supports keeping the program in USDA (1820); H: conveys NYC board of ed endorsement for 2673; program goes beyond farmers and children to the health of the nation; national involvement is essential, as private and non-profit groups cannot fill the void alone; 700 schls currently use prog Presents the extent of malnutrition among children, role of school lunch, and previous nutrition initiatives; lunch program can help solve: low SES, low nutritional knowledge, and habits developed in childhood; more cost/labor effective than home provision; increases learning outcomes; how USDA creates balanced nutrition guidance; types of meals (A, B and C); USDA supplies <i>some</i> of what they consider a balanced meal, community does the rest; collaboration w/ rural Extension Service
18	Stiebeling, Hazel K.	Assistant Chief, Bureau of Human Nutrition and Home Economics, USDA		✓	5/3/44	Rural needs; NEA supports 1824; legislation should a) move program into the Office of Education and b) program should be outright grants by fed, not on matching basis (eventual bill does neither); should not bypass state gov'ts; allocation formula should be in law; private schls should qualify; offers specific amtds; program administered to avoid stigmatization; high ratio of children to adults corresponds with low per capita income; priority for surplus commodities; 1/4 of public has insufficient incomes to properly feed children; nutrition is key to health, healthy is key to productive capacity, and productivity is key to eliminating national debt--need to invest now
19	Dawson, Howard A.	Director, Rural Service, National Education Association		✓	5/3/44	

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
20	Light, M. Searle	Director, Connecticut Department of Education; also representing Association for Childhood Education		✓	5/3/44	Military underpreparedness has been an issue since WWI, not fully resolved b/c of a lack of a unified national policy; currently no single federal policy centered on children; surplus commodities receiving too much attn relative to children--have to choose which to prioritize; current plans too paternalistic, little agency for children to develop discernment; communities struggle w/ labor and equipment/facilities
21	Jane, Alice E.	Director, Dietetics, Union Memorial Hospital; Chairman, legislative committee, American Dietetic Association	✓	✓	5/3/44; 4/18/45	Hard to have nutrition education w/o food and balanced cafeteria lunches; imperative to use surpluses to keep costs down; offers example recipes; everyone should drink milk; adult maladies a product of childhood practices; urban: poor diet most concentrated in poor people (92% v. 41% in high income); rural: milk/eggs seek high prices, so little remains in the community to consume; both: more often lacking in fruits/veggies than protein; pro-1824
22	Leonard, Eunice H.	Vice President and Chairman, Community School- Lunch Project, National Congress of Parents and Teachers		✓	5/4/44	Program started for surplus disposal, but must now move to ensuring student nutritional needs; testimonials showcasing need for state/local control of program; support Office of Education running program, endorsing 1824; disapproves of Ag Secy level of power in 1820; evidence current program not serving enough needy students; most of the cost of program comes from local communities, not USDA; evidence of local resentment against USDA bureaucrats; currently rural does not benefit as much as urban; 9,000,000 American children malnourished
23	Meegan, Joseph B.	Executive Secretary, Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, Chicago, IL	✓	✓	5/4/44; 3/30/45	S: Illustrates need for school lunches and school-community org coordination in poorer multiethnic immigrant Chicago; deficiency of wages and hot foodstuffs in the home; thinks USDA flexibility w/ locals works well, will only worsen if program is moved to Office of Ed; favors 1820; logistics of school lunch applications; testifies on state-level legislation; fear of/skeptical toward nat'l ed dept; evidence of health benefits to current participating children; H: was told by Sen. Brooks (IL) to get state-level aid to help show Congress there was subnational buy-in, now reports to H he has done just that; prevailing coalition was community group + labor + clergy; personally wrote IL law and shepherded passage on final legislative day of session; 96 of 102 IL counties hv schl w/ prog; meal types; children vote for prog in anecdote "if it is up to the children, they will have it" (HAG 1945, 148)

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
24	Kearns, Carroll D.	Superintendent, Farrell School District, PA; Member, State Board of Public Health		✓	5/4/44	industrial area where all family members work, children left alone/low nutritional guidance; evidence of need for schl lunch program to continue to fill the void; program operations; program promotes resistance to TB, which disproportionately impacts communities of color; program should remain in USDA (1820); make all school types eligible
25	Father Murphy	Parish of Sacred Heart, Sharon, Pa		✓	5/4/44	supports 1820; issues w/ federalism; level of access for non-profit parochial schools; questions how to join program if local officials protest; supports direct relationship between Feds and indiv schls
26	Dupre, Ernest E.	Mayor of Woonsocket, RI		✓	5/4/44	Conveys local gov't and public support for current program in RI; oppose moving program to OE in FSA (1824) b/c of excessive centralization, standardization, and decreased utilization of surplus commodities and distribution capacity; community effect of current program (defense production up; workers happier; children healthier); lack of teachers/staff core problem w/ switching to education-based model; teachers discretely select students for free lunch (1/3 of current lunches in Woonsocket); presents testimonials in support of SQ
27	Washam, Frank O.	Director of Lunchrooms, Board of Education, Chicago, IL; Joint Committee of National School Cafeterias and School Directors Conference of Food Service	✓	✓	5/4/44; 3/28/45	Fed aid necessary to meet needs of students; schools key location for nutritional education; w/o Fed aid states unlikely to invest in schl lunches; malnutrition product of poverty and low knowledge on nutrition; extensively quotes Dr. Parran; presents varied research on need/effectiveness; ok w/ either bill, but USDA doing fine currently; inquires about state of S.1721; \$50 million in 1824 not enough--go for \$75 million first 3 years, then reduce over time; do not rely on Sec 32 customs receipts; schls need help w/ clerical staff; H: info on operations in IL; experimental studies showing health benefits/weight gain of program; legal issues unless fed gets involved; national program will encourage more local/state buy-in
28	Gosselin, Grace	United Neighborhood Houses of NYC		✓	5/4/44	represents several other NY area soc wcl groups; asked to represent hungry/malnourished children of America who need schl lunches; wartime and general need; against transferring program out of USDA and state-matching reqs (1824); endorse 1820; children eat most on Monday; any program better than none; key is competent program administration; emphasize food/surplus over education

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
29	Howard, Clinton N.	Executive Superintendent, International Reform Federation; Editor, Progress Magazine Chief, School Lunch and Food Preservation Division, Civilian Food Requirements Board, War Food Administration		✓	5/4/44	As Christian org. support passage of school lunch program; what Jesus says about food; richest nation can support hungry children; 1820 is more specific to food and milk, while 1824 (Smith-Ellender) is ambiguous; worried about localities providing alcohol, coffee, coke to minors
30	Gordon, M.J.			✓	5/4/44	1820 uses language that mirrors current WFA approach; costliest part of prog admin is overhead and the claims review/certification process; info on regional offices; number of participating children, program cost, cost per meal; history of prog; inter-gov't coordination; movement of program beyond surpluses and out of welfare agencies into ed depts (w/ agencies lacked manpower to cont. prog); trouble w/OE is it does not have field staff; variety of state-level financing schemes
31	Dickinson, M.F.	Board Member, National Farmers Union		✓	5/4/44	Every hungry child has a right to a school lunch, esp. during a war; maintain WFA/USDA program (1820); farmers need a permanent domestic market or goods rot; supports weighing nutritional needs of children on same footing as surplus disposal; evidence USDA has technical expertise to ensure nutritional value; transfer of prog duplicative, waste of resources; school lunch market amounted to \$96,595,000 in 1944; WFA needs to play lead role until war is over; prog delivers balanced nourishment to under-privileged children that would otherwise not receive it; matching req hurts poorest; strengthens democracy by creating equal opportunity
32	Berenson, Anna	Legislative Representative, United Auto Workers/CIO		✓	5/4/44	Conveys union's endorsement of USDA's current program (1820); advocate for program to become part of educational curricula in schools; fighting over jurisdiction not worth jeopardizing program; lawmakers short-sighted by not extending program when 43% of selective service registrants have nutrition-related deficiencies; Ag Cmte supports prog; changing prog during war is a bad idea; prog should reach every child regardless of SES; do not favor matching; 1824 too diffuse, some states won't fully participate; amend 1820 to include equipment and make sure OE does not duplicate WFA/USDA work; prog helps working mothers who will likely continue working after war

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
33	Fowler, Eleanor	Secretary Treasurer, Congress of Women's Auxiliaries/CIO		✓	5/4/44	Members overwhelmingly support school lunch program; program helps women concentrate on work; legislation should help children regardless of the resources of locality/state; no discrimination b/c of race or religion; prefer 1820 over 1824; more \$, accounts for need, and no matching reqs; no discrimination between children that can pay and those that cannot; amend to incl. support for equipment and personnel or some schools will be left out Favors school lunch program; previously testified on inadequate nutrition across the country at hearing for national food allotment plan (1331), presents again here; most families do not meet minimum dietary reqs; extreme malnutrition in poorest children; school lunch should be part of larger nutrition program; need markets to use crops; USDA has 75 years of exp working w/ states on food, program should stay put (1721/1820); child-adult ratio in 1824 is good, per capita income would be better; bill should incl one-time facilities grants S: School lunch worthy endeavor/effective for food production and distribution; wartime food prog and peacetime ag market; disturbed by efforts to move program from USDA/WFA, risks distribution of surpluses; fed role is mostly on reimbursement for locally purchased goods; both rural and urban distribution; program is a proven method to accomplish multiple goals; as MC wrote Sec. 32 of AAA '35; farmers need restitution, for equality's sake; favors 1820 but is being diplomatic; OE should not distribute food; attempts to reconcile 1820 and 1824; does not want fed gov't in education business; H: WFA limited w/ lack of authorizing legislation; unstable year to year, states nervous to buy-in; endorses H.R. 2673, but should emphasize nutrition more; has imp need-based formula and matching reqs; if schools participate in receiving food, they cannot discriminate between paying and nonpaying children
34	Tolley, H.R.	Chief, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, USDA		✓	5/5/44	
35	Jones, Marvin	Administrator, War Food Administration	✓	✓	5/5/44; 3/23/45	
36	Miller, Watson B.	Assistant Administrator, Federal Security Agency		✓	5/5/44	Not there in person; chiefly concerned with formalizing a haphazard process and representing federal agencies that are ready to implement the program; OE has been involved in school lunch publications since 1909; supports moving program out of USDA, attaching evidence of educators and lawmakers that also support such a change; current program uneven across states; 1824 does not create a heavy-handed central education system, but empowers local control through state depts of education

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
37	Bryan, Mary D.	Professor at the Teachers College, Columbia University; also of the Food Service Directors Conference		✓	5/5/44	Has researched feeding in schools and trained teachers for 20 years; recounts developments in the history of school lunches in the past 50 years; supports surplus purchases, but children must come first; program has contributed to children making smarter decisions; school lunch program alone is insufficient for proper nutrition, need education to reshape how people eat, which in turns reshapes the commodity market; USDA should lead an interagency cmte; loosen matching req or program will be under-utilized S: Started local school lunch program through WPA; explains how the program works; difficulty reaching rural areas; children gaining weight; 20% of children in district do not pay and no documented discrimination; prefers direct relationship w/ fed gov't as state might be an impediment (1820 better than 1824 on that dimension); conveys school board's support for SQ program; H: increases academic achievement; currently workers are provided accident insurance, but they do not qualify for SS unless Congress passes such legislation; student-brought lunches are unsound, usually soda, candy and cake; w/o fed involvement, prices will double and nutrition will decline; permanent program will lead local/state gov't to help w/ nutritional ed and facilities; supports H.R. 2673, claiming other proposals will harm existing programs; P.E. teachers decide need; other counties will join program if Cong provides steady funding
38	Cooper, William P.	Director, Allegany City (MD) School Lunch Program	✓	✓	5/5/44; 3/29/45	
39	Kerr, Robert S.	Governor, OK		✓	5/5/44	OK residents and politicians support a permanent school lunch program; explains coordination between local/state and WFA; supports continuing the program as it is currently operated; subnational institutions pay \$2 for every \$1 received from federal gov't
40	Sebrell, William H.	Medical Director, U.S. Public Health Service; Chief of the Division of Physiology, National Institute of Health	✓		3/26/45	Expert on malnutrition diseases; poor nutrition endemic in schools; in-depth studies on widespread anemia w/ large rich-poor and racial disparities across the country; dental problems; every study of school children shows malnutrition; school lunch can solve many of these issues; program will help families develop good habits; 3 causes of malnutrition: poverty, ignorance and indifference; schl lunches are on the road to solving poverty

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
41	Hershey, Lewis B.	Major General/Director, Selective Service System	✓		3/26/45; 3/27/45	Medical rejections and malnutrition of recruits hurt military readiness; selective service medically examined 16 million Americans, at least 3.5 million deemed unfit (14.3% of whites, 30% of Blacks), and between 40 and 60% of rejections due in part to malnutrition; more info on WWII rejections than WWI and higher health standards in WWII; upper Midwest has least malnutrition; anecdotally, military gets underweight people to gain weight; regardless of incidence of war, we need a healthy population; there is a limited role for federal leadership NEA supports continuing and expanding program for health, national security, economic vitality, and educational outcomes; program should be administered through education agencies (OE); farmer's surplus needs have changed, should now reorient to childhood development; federal gov't should pay for most of the program; HR 2673 fails to mention any educational entities
42	Winn, Agnes	Assistant Director, Legislative and Federal Relations Division, National Educational Association	✓		3/28/45	AAUW interested in program for education and child welfare aspects; org did not support any Senate bills; oppose matching req, poorer states should pay less; funding should be need-based; now support Ellender's S. 503; amends to Ellen Richards' org! HR 2673 should include minimum nutritional guidance, equalization between urban and rural to help the latter, and equitable distribution to racial minorities; run through state ed agencies; ensure excessive commodity dumping does not occur; distributed surpluses should not decrease cash allotment; supports two title bill to support state facilities/equipment (2763 only has one title) Represents nutrition specialists, food service admin; teachers, supervisors, workers, and homemakers; conveys org support for federal program as long as it is "educationally sound"; WFA doing a good job, but Cong should not entrench weaknesses into new legislation; want nutrition education provision in bill, which is missing from 2673; want provision in 2673 that states there is no req to hire any specific personnel to receive funds removed and replaced w/ req to hire home economist to supervise; bill has no training support provisions; change program to center on children, not surplus food; funding formula too vague, make explicit; do not discriminate based on location or ethnicity; USDA and OE should both have a role
43	Ware, Caroline G.	American Association of University Women	✓		3/29/45	
44	Amery, Elizabeth	State Supervisor of Home Economics (MD) and Representative, American Home Economics Association	✓		3/29/45	

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Dates	Notes on Content
45	Bowie, Gertrude	Supervisor of School Cafeterias in Montgomery County, Rockville (MD)	✓		3/29/45	Supervises urban and rural school lunch programs; provides evidence school orgs all agree localities need federal help to maintain good program; need logistical help with food storage, meal prep, and equipment; everyone--including farmers--benefits from children learning to like a variety of foods; need a stated nutrition ed component to build stable demand or program will falter; supplying commodities alone is not enough to make program a success; locality autonomy important; county supervisors should administer rural prog; program currently serving students w/o stigma, but personnel training is biggest weakness in SQ; providing help w/ training/facilities does not hamper autonomy Testifies to improvement in children's health; emphasizes rural improvement; need an educational program to facilitate family-wide nutritional literacy; rural education should go through Extension Service (or a similar type of federalism approach); rural areas have lower response rate on surveys about program; current prog works better in urban areas; st ed depts are only bureaucracy that can reach rural area; no state-level equivalent to WFA, which currently works with st nutrition cmte and county school superintendents; prog should have \$15 million for ed and \$50 million for food purchases/aid; to get buy-in of ed officials need to go through st ed depts; Public Health Service should be involved too Org principally concerned about child welfare; school lunches promote good health; PTA involved in issue for 25 years, doing the best they can, but federal legislation is needed to train program supervisors w/i schools; nutrition curriculum is vital; favor S. 503, which only uses surplus is state's request them; need determined by states/localities; surpluses are a secondary consideration; program should run through point person in EO; w/o nutritional ed not fixing core problems in charge of program for yr; involved 2 yrs; WFA w/i USDA; asst to Gold before he left; prog run to expand agr comm and improve nutrition; HR 2673 "would enable us to operate just about the same as we are operating now"; Fed needs to work with locals, not just states b/c a) delay in pmnts to schls b) state depts of ed do not operate progs, local schls do; doesn't matter if chldrm attd pub or priv schl
46	Justin, Margaret	Dean, School of Home Economics, Kansas State College, Manhattan (KS); Chair, state nutrition committee	✓		3/29/45	
47	Leonard, Mrs. Paul	Chairman, National Congress of Parents and Teachers	✓		3/29/45	
48	Ockey, W.C.	Chief of School Lunch and Distribution Bureau, War Food Admin	✓		4/16/45; 4/17/45; 5/10/45	

Table 10A.1 Witness Information, Dates and Locations of Appearances, and Notes on Testimony (Cont.)

Order	Witness Name	Title	HAG	SAF	Date(s)	Notes on Content
49	Anderson, A.W.	Chief, Division of Fisheries, Department of Interior	✓		4/18/45	oversees WFA operation on fisheries overseen by Secy of Interior; US will need to provide food to wartorn areas; necessary to continue and expand program to dispense with commodities (and help people); urges amending HR 2673 to incl fish products
50	Rosenfield, Harry N.	Assistant to the Administrator, Federal Security Agency	✓		5/22/45	Addr Title II which funds personnel, facilities, and nutrition ed (what later went underfunded); needs to be re-written to cover non-pubs and provide pmt of salaries to management personnel; conveys they attempted to write/amend bill to fit existing program (Congress wants exec branch to write the legislation); mostly technical expertise, some advocacy

Notes: Order is the order in which a witness testifies in front of Congress on these proceedings. HAG is the House Agriculture Committee. SAF is the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee. Date(s) indicate when testimony was given to these committees.

Appendix 10B: Model Code

```

###LPM House
##session speech only predicting passage
SpeechPredictingPassage<-
lm(Hpassage~countiv
    , data=NSLAuse)
summary(SpeechPredictingPassage)

Call:
lm(formula = Hpassage ~ countiv, data =
NSLAuse)

Residuals:
    Min     1Q   Median     3Q      Max
-0.9184 -0.7103  0.2550  0.2897  0.2897

Coefficients:
(Intercept)  0.71029  0.02561  27.74 <2e-
16 ***
countiv      0.03469  0.01864  1.86
0.0636 .
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*'
0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.442 on 375
degrees of freedom
(179 observations deleted due to
missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.009144,
    Adjusted R-squared:  0.006502
F-statistic: 3.461 on 1 and 375 DF, p-value:
0.06363

##average speeches predicting passage
AvgSpeechPredictingPassage<-
lm(Hpassage~average
    , data=NSLAuse)
summary(AvgSpeechPredictingPassage)

Call:
lm(formula = Hpassage ~ average, data =
NSLAuse)

```

```

Residuals:
    Min     1Q   Median     3Q      Max
-0.8087 -0.7232  0.2692  0.2768  0.2768

Coefficients:
(Intercept)  0.72322  0.02589  27.933
<2e-16 ***
average      0.01509  0.02068  0.729
0.466
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*'
0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4437 on 375
degrees of freedom
(179 observations deleted due to
missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.001417,
    Adjusted R-squared: -0.001246
F-statistic: 0.5321 on 1 and 375 DF, p-
value: 0.4662

##
SpeechPredictingPassage<-
lm(Hpassage~countiv
    , data=NSLAuse)
summary(SpeechPredictingPassage)

Call:
lm(formula = Hpassage ~ countiv, data = NSLAuse)

Residuals:
    Min     1Q   Median     3Q      Max
-0.9184 -0.7103  0.2550  0.2897  0.2897

Coefficients:
(Intercept)  0.71029  0.02561  27.74 <2e-16 ***
countiv      0.03469  0.01864  1.86  0.0636 .
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

```

Residual standard error: 0.442 on 375 degrees of freedom
 (179 observations deleted due to missingness)
 Multiple R-squared: 0.009144, Adjusted R-squared: 0.006502
 F-statistic: 3.461 on 1 and 375 DF, p-value: 0.06363

```
##count predicting powell
AvgSpeechPredictingPowell<-
lm(powellamdt~countiv
    , data=NSLAuse)
summary(AvgSpeechPredictingPowell)
```

Call:
 lm(formula = powellamdt ~ countiv, data = NSLAuse)

Residuals:
 Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
 -0.8774 -0.6809 0.2864 0.3191 0.3191

Coefficients:
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
 (Intercept) 0.68088 0.02673 25.477 <2e-16 ***
 countiv 0.03276 0.01959 1.672 0.0953 .

 Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4573 on 366 degrees of freedom
 (188 observations deleted due to missingness)
 Multiple R-squared: 0.007584, Adjusted R-squared: 0.004872
 F-statistic: 2.797 on 1 and 366 DF, p-value: 0.0953

```
##avg predicting powell
AvgSpeechPredictingPowell<-
lm(powellamdt~average
    , data=NSLAuse)
summary(AvgSpeechPredictingPowell)
```

Call:
 lm(formula = powellamdt ~ average, data = NSLAuse)

Residuals:
 Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
 -0.9532 -0.6847 0.2954 0.3153 0.3153

Coefficients:
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
 (Intercept) 0.68467 0.02708 25.284 <2e-16 ***
 average 0.02797 0.02177 1.285 0.2

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.458 on 366 degrees of freedom
 (188 observations deleted due to missingness)
 Multiple R-squared: 0.004489, Adjusted R-squared: 0.001769
 F-statistic: 1.65 on 1 and 366 DF, p-value: 0.1997

```
###Logit House
```

```
logcountpredictingPowell<- glm(powellamdt ~
countiv
    , data = NSLAuse, family =
"binomial")
summary(logcountpredictingPowell)
```

Call:
 glm(formula = powellamdt ~ countiv, family = "binomial", data = NSLAuse)

Deviance Residuals:
 Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
 -1.9940 -1.5083 0.8147 0.8793 0.8793

Coefficients:
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
 (Intercept) 0.7510 0.1270 5.914 3.34e-09 ***
 countiv 0.1816 0.1106 1.642 0.101

 Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
 0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)

Null deviance: 448.92 on 367 degrees of freedom
 Residual deviance: 445.85 on 366 degrees of freedom
 (188 observations deleted due to missingness)
 AIC: 449.85

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

```
logcountpredictingHpassage<- glm(Hpassage ~
countiv
    , data = NSLAuse, family =
"binomial")
summary(logcountpredictingHpassage)
```

Call:
 glm(formula = Hpassage ~ countiv, family = "binomial", data = NSLAuse)

```

Deviance Residuals:
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-2.1369 -1.5695  0.7576  0.8307  0.8307

Coefficients:
  Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)  0.8866    0.1298   6.830 8.51e-12 ***
countiv      0.2148    0.1182   1.818 0.0691 .
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to
be 1)

Null deviance: 438.20 on 376 degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 434.31 on 375 degrees of
freedom
(179 observations deleted due to missingness)
AIC: 438.31

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4

###LPM Senate

SpeechPredictingCut<-lm(taftfundscut~countiv
, data=NSLAuse)
summary(SpeechPredictingCut)

Call:
lm(formula = taftfundscut ~ countiv, data =
NSLAuse)

Residuals:
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.3235 -0.3235 -0.2864  0.6765  0.8251

Coefficients:
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.32350    0.06355   5.091 2.95e-06 ***
countiv     -0.01857    0.02172  -0.855 0.395
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4605 on 69 degrees of
freedom
(485 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.01049,    Adjusted R-
squared:  -0.003853
F-statistic: 0.7313 on 1 and 69 DF, p-value: 0.3954

AvgPredictingCut<-lm(taftfundscut~average
, data=NSLAuse)
summary(AvgPredictingCut)

```

```

Call:
lm(formula = taftfundscut ~ average, data =
NSLAuse)

Residuals:
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.3527 -0.3321 -0.2703  0.6473  0.8430

Coefficients:
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.35267    0.07199   4.899 6.12e-06 ***
average     -0.04120    0.03417  -1.206 0.232
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4582 on 69 degrees of
freedom
(485 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.02064,    Adjusted R-
squared:  0.006444
F-statistic: 1.454 on 1 and 69 DF, p-value: 0.232

SpeechPredictingT2<-lm(taftcuttitleii~countiv
, data=NSLAuse)
summary(SpeechPredictingT2)

Call:
lm(formula = taftcuttitleii ~ countiv, data =
NSLAuse)

Residuals:
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.4085 -0.4085 -0.2837  0.5915  0.9244

Coefficients:
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.40848    0.06440   6.343 1.92e-08 ***
countiv     -0.04161    0.02216  -1.878 0.0646 .
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4711 on 70 degrees of
freedom
(484 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.04795,    Adjusted R-
squared:  0.03435
F-statistic: 3.525 on 1 and 70 DF, p-value: 0.0646

AvgPredictingT2<-lm(taftcuttitleii~average
, data=NSLAuse)
summary(AvgPredictingT2)

Call:

```

```
lm(formula = taftcuttitleii ~ average, data =
NSLAuse)

Residuals:
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-0.4451 -0.3982 -0.2262  0.5549  0.9015

Coefficients:
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.44506   0.07253   6.136 4.5e-08 ***
average     -0.07295   0.03506  -2.081  0.0411 *
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.4686 on 70 degrees of
freedom
(484 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.05824,    Adjusted R-
squared:  0.04478
F-statistic: 4.329 on 1 and 70 DF, p-value: 0.04114

###Logit Senate

logcountpredictingT2<- glm(taftcuttitleii ~ countiv
, data = NSLAuse, family =
"binomial")
summary(logcountpredictingT2)

Call:
glm(formula = taftcuttitleii ~ countiv, family =
"binomial",
    data = NSLAuse)

Deviance Residuals:
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-1.0593 -1.0593 -0.7269  1.3002  2.3580

Coefficients:
  Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.2842   0.2976  -0.955  0.3396
countiv     -0.3040   0.1770  -1.717  0.0859 .
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to
be 1)

Null deviance: 92.982  on 71  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 88.405  on 70  degrees of freedom
(484 observations deleted due to missingness)
AIC: 92.405

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 5
```

```
logavgpredictingT2<- glm(taftcuttitleii ~ average
, data = NSLAuse, family = "binomial")
summary(logavgpredictingT2)

Call:
glm(formula = taftcuttitleii ~ average, family =
"binomial",
    data = NSLAuse)

Deviance Residuals:
  Min    1Q  Median    3Q   Max
-1.1091 -1.0041 -0.6718  1.2473  2.0966

Coefficients:
  Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -0.1629   0.3260  -0.500  0.6174
average     -0.4036   0.2079  -1.942  0.0522 .
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'
0.1 ' ' 1

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to
be 1)

Null deviance: 92.982  on 71  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 88.213  on 70  degrees of freedom
(484 observations deleted due to missingness)
AIC: 92.213

Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 4
```

Chapter 11

The Logic of Division:

Mechanisms for Exclusion in the Antipoverty Policy Process

Abstract

Examining the Congressional policymaking process for the Social Security Act of 1935, U.S. Housing Act of 1937, and National School Lunch Act of 1946 exposes important aspects of how the poor are represented in antipoverty policies. This paper synthesizes the key lessons of these three case studies to formalize central tendencies in the creation of antipoverty policies during the New Deal. First, the chapter presents the four prominent modes of division present in the statutory language of antipoverty policies. Second, it highlights the ubiquitous presence of secondary constituencies (i.e., non-poor groups that seek policy remediation) in the policy process, simultaneously aiding the prospects of passage and lessening the antipoverty focus of each policy. Third, the chapter uncovers the convergence and cycling of various interests in New Deal the policy process, where each major policy push is steered by a slightly different issue coalition. The chapter concludes with a broader depiction of the New Deal policy regime and its orientation toward ameliorating the hardships caused by the Great Depression, but not solving deeper-seeded forms of systemic poverty in America. Indeed, this paper suggests the continuation of poverty is in part a product of politics and the policy process in Congress.

[T]here are many States in such deplorable financial condition in the midst of this panic that they cannot pay even this pittance, pitiably and utterly inadequate, as provided in the administration bill [Social Security Act]. I want Members of this House to know that the Lundeen bill, H.R. 2827, is designed to help all workers, men who toil in the shops and factories and transportation lines of our country; who walk behind the plow; domestic workers, professional and office workers, and all men and women who are unemployed through no fault of their own; and it is designed to begin payment now, not later on, but now...

—Representative Ernest Lundeen (FL-MN), April 18, 1935

Even today there are practically 70 percent unemployed in the construction industry. So this proposed legislation [U.S. Housing Act] has also the objective of attempting to help an industry which is still in a depressed state; and by igniting this fuse of construction for families of the low-income group, I think we are going to start a very stabilized boom in the construction industry, and thus reemploy a great many of the workers who for 4 long years have been treading the sidewalks seeking employment.

—Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY), June 15, 1936

This bill [USHA] would not apply [to all poorly built homes], Mr. President, because we are not rehousing everybody who has a low income, but only persons of low income who live in unsanitary and unsafe and unhealthful conditions which are detrimental to morals, to health, and also to safety... It is the lowest-income group that we are trying to reach, and at the same time to clear the slums, because they are a constant menace.

—Senator Robert Wagner (D-NY), August 2, 1937

In the first place, the food situation seems to me to be basically different from the furnishing of medical and dental care. Without arguing the point at all, the fact of the matter is that in normal times we have an abundance of foodstuffs in our country, grown by our own farmers, and one of the primary problems of these farmers is an improvement in the consumption of food. I think that is the best single approach to an answer to the agricultural problem—improving the dietary standards of the people. And this [National School Lunch Act] would contribute to that.

—Representative Jerry Voorhis (D-CA), March 26, 1945

Introduction

The long New Deal is arguably the most important period of social welfare development in U.S. history. And while the gains made in this era lifted many out of poverty—especially the elderly and male industrial workers—the welfare state it constructed was highly divisive and exclusionary, treating some needy populations with greater fidelity and others with utter neglect. Existing scholarship has admirably explored discrete facets of this puzzling division of the public, but no work has yet reconciled the overarching logic across groups and policies. This work attempts to bridge the chasm and explain the New Deal’s underlying exclusionary logic by centering on representation of the poor—specifically, how lawmakers and issue coalitions mobilized to construct three nascent federal antipoverty policies across issue domains: Social Security Act of 1935, U.S. Housing Act of 1937, and National School Lunch Act of 1946.¹²⁴

To accomplish this task, this project utilizes primary source-based content analysis, with special attention to committee hearings, floor speeches, and statutory language to illuminate the three previously mentioned cases. This rich well of data is further supplemented by the expertise of key secondary sources. Since major political decisions are often made outside of the prying eyes of the public, it is a notably stringent standard to document the active, visible process of division in the official transcript. If a forensic examination of Congressional documents does reveal the logic of division, this paper contends such evidence would be compelling enough to explain why Congress helped some poor people and not others, and more broadly while the New Deal pursued particularist social welfare policies.

¹²⁴ This chapter reconciles the broad lessons derived from Chapters 8 to 10 on each discrete policy. Therefore, much of the direct empirical supports (speeches, witness testimony, amendments, sponsored bill alternatives, and sections of policy language) are referenced, rather than presented, in this chapter.

The primary theses of this chapter are twofold: first, the antipoverty state New Dealers constructed was never intended to solve poverty, but only to provide *some* federal supports to previously ignored in-need populations. In this way, dividing the public as a whole, and poor in particular, was an expedient way to change the status quo with maximal lawmaker buy-in. Second, it turns out antipoverty policies are not solely predicated on serving the interests of the poor. Instead, antipoverty policies are frequently vessels to serve non-poor secondary constituencies, who use the positive valence of ending poverty to achieve their own ulterior goals. Somewhat paradoxically, these secondary interests positively contribute compelling arguments and resources to motivate policy enactment, while simultaneously displacing the poverty-fighting focus of these policies. These findings comport with Theodore Lowi's (1979) depiction of the drawbacks of "interest group liberalism" and help uncover why the New Deal lessened suffering caused by the Great Depression while largely failing to solve systemic poverty in America.

To explicate these points, the chapter first formalizes and presents the four dominant modes of division in policy language, synthesizing existing scholarship with new insights gleaned from statutory analysis of the three policy cases. The second section presents the specific bases for excluding some of the poor from important policies and which secondary constituencies are present in each episode. The next section explains the broader pattern of interest convergence in successful New Deal policies. Finally, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the intentionality and limits of New Deal social welfare policy.

Modes of Division in Poverty Statutes


Lawmakers are very creative at devising different methods to restrict access to newly created programs—the New Deal is not exempt from this pattern. Previous scholarship (Lieberman 1998; Mettler 1998; Katznelson 2005) has documented specific policy designs that lend

themselves to excluding important constituencies in America. Reading the statutes for SSA, USHA, and NLSA, there appears to be similar modes of division that occur across New Deal social welfare policies.¹²⁵ This section formalizes four primary approaches that policymakers used to cut needy populations out of policies ostensibly meant to help in-need populations. For ease of understanding, Figure 11.1 visually depicts these mechanisms.

The first important detail to note is that there are overt—Congress dictates program guidelines—and covert—Congress passes the buck to another body to decide beneficiaries—modes to divide the public. Within in the New Deal, there are two principal approaches to dividing the poor in antipoverty policy: write overt exclusion into the statute or maintain nominally universalistic language that devolves decision-making decisions to the states. Significantly, lawmakers straddle overt and covert approaches to exclusion and division to serve specific purposes. For example, Congress may spell out which groups are included/excluded from a policy to exert greater control over the administration of policy. But with this approach comes direct blame for a policy inadequately supporting every member of a needy group. In contrast, covert approaches to exclusion remove dicey decisions from the policymaking calculus, potentially increase intra- and inter-chamber buy-in, and most importantly, create plausible deniability if/when the public or political actors grow disenchanted with the execution of a policy. Covert division is a way of minimally changing the status quo, by not challenging local and state power cartels. When there is less agreement and greater contention, actors may shift towards covert means of establishing program protocols.

¹²⁵ A mode of division is the instrument with which lawmakers employ as they construct particularist, pseudo-needs-based, non-universalistic policies.

Figure 11.1 Modes of Division in Policy Language



Target Group Construction

Within the overt branch, the first and most direct mode of division is to legibly describe program beneficiaries and excluded groups through the construction of target groups (Schneider and Ingram 1993). The most famous (and consequential) example of this occurs in Title II, Section 210 of the SSA, which lists agricultural, domestic, maritime, government, charity, religious, educational, and animal husbandry workers as ineligible for federal old-age pensions. This essentially leaves the poor in industrial and service industries to benefit from SSA, while dooming the aforementioned groups to continued penury when they retire. Elsewhere, Title I, Section 2 sets the age requirement of eligible retirees for state-level old-age pensions at 65 (or up to 70 until 1940), even though lawmakers throughout the legislative process persuasively argued many workers die well before these age ranges. Title IV, Section 406 on Aid to Dependent Children sets the eligible age at under 16 to qualify, which is a peculiar paradigm since youth may go to work

earlier in life, and yet, have to retire later as well. Even Section 2 of the U.S. Housing Act uses this first form of division by using a very generous 5 to 1 income-to-rent ratio for an individual and 6 to 1 ratio for family to determine eligibility for low cost housing. This, in effect, favors lower middle-class families, not the “lowest income group” that lawmakers stipulated was the target population of the policy.

Rules and Guidelines for Providers

The other overt mechanism is to provide rules and program guidance that naturally leads to—or at the very least condones longstanding—disparate treatment of different poor groups. The NSLA provides several good examples: Section 4 of the act allocated 75% of customs receipts to state-run school lunch plans, while capping the territorial possessions of Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands to no more than 3%. Section 11 ostensibly allocates equal funds to segregated White and Black schools, but in reality, the funding was never equalized and violation was not punished, adding this policy to others that furthered the federal government’s complicity in Southern Jim Crow laws. Additionally, Section 1003 of the SSA, which concerns aid to the blind, conditions federal aid on state spending levels, which most hurts the poor in states with low financial resources to spend on new social welfare programs.

Bureaucratic Autonomy and Discretion

On the covert dimension, punting key decisions away from Congress and into the bureaucracy effectively allows for variable treatment based on the values and goals of agency leadership and street-level managers. Sections 10 (contributions to maintain low cost housing) and 11 (capital improvement grants) of the USHA both give the Housing Authority administrator wide latitude to favor projects along myriad lines *other* than what is in the best interest of the poor that live in slums. SSA Title VI Section 602 gave the Surgeon General broad discretion to approve

almost any plan that increases public health in a state, even if the approach is discriminatory within the state's population. Unlike other sections of the SSA, there are no stipulations for equal funding in all jurisdictions or due process for individuals denied aid by actors carrying out the plan.

Federalism

Finally, the last covert mechanism pushes decision-making authority down to state and local leadership to choose which among the needy deserve their help. Reliance on federalism to execute federal directives leads to *de facto* exclusion based on the foreseeable variation in bureaucratic implementation. The further down the federal ladder (national-state-local), the more particularist, anti-universalist, and punitive social policies become in practice (Handler 1987; Teles 1996, 33). For example, Section 9 of the NSLA leaves local education boards and/or state officials to determine which students qualify for school lunches.¹²⁶ Section 402 leaves it to states to decide the criteria for which families with dependent children receive funds, as long as they are provided hearing to appeal a rejection and do not deny support to children who resided in the state for at least 1 year. This last provision blends overt rule stipulation with covert discretion with minimally consequential antidiscrimination clauses. Indeed, these categories are not mutually exclusive, as each policy has an assortment of clear legislative language on target populations, rules, bureaucratic discretion, and federalism.

This approach controls the scope of conflict, shifting decision power downward, while motivating the laws to change existing conditions by supplying new federal resources. Moreover, relying on federalism fits existing norms about the proper role of each level of government and

¹²⁶ The only stipulation noted in the statute is that “no physical segregation of or other discrimination against any child shall be made by the school because of his inability to pay.” While this is a sign Congress was authentically concerned about censure and stigma related to receiving free or reduced lunch, this clause specifically says you cannot discriminate against those who receive a lunch, not that you cannot discriminate in determining who receives a lunch.

politically expedient because what it sacrifices in desired federal guidance is offset by being able to just pass the policy at all.

While group definition is inherently divisive, bureaucratic discretion and devolution of authority to subnational units are not, at least not in an explicit fashion. However, lawmakers are well aware of existing inequalities across jurisdictions and biases within jurisdictions. The choice to not write in powerful, universalistic requirements in antipoverty policies is a choice based on political expediency: it gets marginal “state’s rights” members on board by not jeopardizing their power structure back home, while still providing antipoverty advocates with direct resources for their communities to utilize. Specifically, the separate but (un)equal provisions in the NSLA did not force segregation, but they operated off of the principle that Southern jurisdictions would need this provision to either support the law’s passage and implementation. One can easily deduce from this policy instrument that the school lunch program would likely benefit poor whites more than poor Blacks. Even if a policy is colorblind, it does not mean equal access—in fact, colorblind policies generally just entrench the existing unequal status quo, further facilitated by diffuse federalism. While Congress became less heavy-handed with overt discrimination in social policy in the years following the SSA and USHA, the relative success of these policies and precision of division left a lasting mark on generations of impoverished Americans who were left behind by the federal government.

With the modes of division (i.e., instruments of division) revealed across key social welfare policies of the New Deal era, the next task is to identify the broad goals in dividing the poor and the role of additional non-poor groups in the policy process.

Bases of Exclusion and Secondary Constituencies

This section examines the forces that contribute to dividing the poor in social welfare policies, selectively incorporating some while excluding others. The first is the basis of exclusion, which captures the motivations for and dimensions of dividing the poor. The second concept is the role of secondary constituencies that do not represent the needs of the poor, but nonetheless participate in the antipoverty policymaking process.

The Basis of Exclusion

Having a tool is useless unless that tool has a purpose. As this analogy indicates, Congress having the tools of the modes of division does not matter until those actors are motivated to use them to achieve a stated goal. Modes of division are used to entrench the basis for exclusion—that is, the instruments of power come into the equation after lawmakers understand which groups they want to exclude from social policy.¹²⁷

One prominent example of the basis of exclusion is the Roosevelt administration's modest goals in ushering in a new social welfare system in America. Here, exclusion in statute is purportedly based on feasibility to create a durable, effective system. The reasoning is that collecting taxes and maintaining documentation will be more difficult in the agricultural and domestic sectors than in industrial and service sectors. If this is a correct, the basis for exclusion is administrative capacity. Alternatively, if the main reason for dividing the poor in old-age, unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent children is to neglect the poorest of the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and women in service of a feudal labor order and gender norms, the basis of exclusion would be descriptive traits of the groups, not administrative capacity. But in reality, the

¹²⁷ The basis of exclusion is defined as the substantive dimension along which the poor are divided into incorporated and unincorporated poor groups (e.g., along racial, gender, geographic lines). While the mode of division provides an answer to *how* the poor are instrumentally divided, the basis of division identifies on *which* characteristics the poor are divided and potentially *why* lawmakers divide the poor.

process is messier and harder to pin down, complicated by the fact that actors may have different intentions and still arrive at the same policy design.

Secondary Constituencies

If one assumes antipoverty legislation is primarily intended to serve the needs of the poor, that is not the *only* policy-demanding group that benefits from these policies.¹²⁸ A consistent pattern across New Deal social welfare legislation—and perhaps most large pieces of legislation that pass Congress—is the presence of non-poor, powerful organized interest groups throughout the policy process. These “secondary constituencies” may support aid to the poor, or just as likely, are entrepreneurially looking for opportunities to advance their own agenda through any successful vessel.

Importantly, the valence of helping the poor creates cover for these groups to pursue their own parochial agenda. Moreover, even when policies are altered to provide benefits to other interests, opposing such legislation puts members in the difficult position of appearing callous and uncaring towards the suffering of needy populations. By expanding antipoverty legislation to cover the problems of groups other than the poor, it may increase the buy-in of lawmakers and interests as they push for successful passage of legislation. This is due to the fact that now lawmakers that do not particularly care about the suffering of the poor, or who are reticent to expand the scope of government action into new areas, nonetheless have alternative incentives to pursue nominally antipoverty policies. These members may instead be motivated by, for example, decreasing unemployment, expanding markets for agricultural goods, eliminating slums in their districts, assisting local governments and school districts acquire new resources from the government.

¹²⁸ It is also possible that each of these policies were always intended to solve multiple problems, or perhaps were not intended to solve poverty at all. This project assumes antipoverty policies are indeed intended to serve the poor, then examines ways in which that goal is lessened by the emphasis on auxiliary interests.

Additionally, the poor do not often interact with lawmakers, rarely mobilize to advocate for their interests on the national level, and when they do, their pressure campaigns do not last very long (Piven and Cloward 1977). Therefore, antipoverty legislation may be especially vulnerable to interest capture that may alter—and lessen—the poverty ameliorating focus of legislation. There is a clear tension between providing direct, effective poverty relief to needy populations and loading up on the preferred policy instruments of select non-poor interests. The vicissitudes of the legislative process often encourage logrolling, pork barrel and omnibus legislation that satisfies all parties and creates incentives to pass legislation, but when this route is pursued in service of winning legislative coalitions it might also divert resources away from the very constituency that these policies are intended to help.

In sum, secondary constituencies provide some of the impetus to pass the bill even if it insufficiently solves poverty. In turn, antipoverty policies are not solely about—or necessarily centered on—solving poverty. Instead, they provide a vehicle to achieve ancillary goals through a positive valence that is hard to argue against—helping the poor.

Compounding Forces of Division

Along the policymaking process, the interests of the poor incur successive waves of fragmented representation, resulting in fragmented (and insufficient) antipoverty policies. First, lawmakers decide the policy domain in which to address some aspect of policy, never arriving at a comprehensive antipoverty policyscape or robust direct cash transfer program. Then within each issue domain (e.g., nutrition), lawmakers construct the target group beneficiaries, which further divides the poor *within a single policy area* (e.g., hungry children and not hungry adults). Along the policy creation process, even those *within the target group* are divided by preferred characteristics in an effort to create policies that only serve the most worthy poor (e.g., poor

Table 11.1 Bases for Exclusion and Secondary Constituencies in Select Antipoverty Policies

Policy	Year	Policy Area(s)	Key Dichotomy in Target Group Construction	Basis for Exclusion	Secondary Constituencies
Social Security Act (SSA)	1935	Employment/pensions/disability/cash transfer/public health	Those that have worked vs. those that have not	Administrative capacity; vocational/racial; age; residency requirements; gender norms	Labor force development; unions; private pension insurers; states
U.S. Housing Act (USHA)	1937	Housing	Those that can pay rent vs. those that cannot	Fragmentation through federalism; broad language w/ discretion; income status and eligibility formula	Labor force development; construction industry; city gov't/urban planners; labor unions; realty; banking
National School Lunch Act (NSLA)	1946	Nutrition	Hungry school children vs. hungry adults/non-attending youth	Age; federalism; broad language w/ discretion; race; disparate school facility capacity	Agriculture; national defense; school districts

Note: key dichotomy is what lawmakers determine is a sound way to divide the struggling poor into those they wanted to help and those less worthy of immediate support.

students in wealthy schools with cafeteria facilities benefit more than the poor in dilapidated schools). Finally, non-poor interests join the policy battle, inserting their own parochial needs, which at times displace the direct interests of the main policy beneficiaries (e.g., agricultural purchases were made even if the food was not fully dispersed to hungry children). For ease of understanding, this deleterious process is depicted in Table 11.1.

Starting with the Social Security Act, an early separation occurred between those that have and can continue to work, and those that cannot. For the former group, they received pensions (Title II) and/or unemployment insurance (Title III) while they look for other work. In contrast,

non-working poor were not given any supports unless they had children or were blind (Title X).¹²⁹

Then, even among poor groups considered worthy, some received federal supports, such as Title II which granted a pension to retired workers, while Aid to Dependent Children in Title IV was provided resources for state level programs that greatly varied in generosity. While it is unclear the extent to which secondary interests contributed to incomplete incorporation of the poor in SSA, the policy did have several major non-poor constituencies. Labor unions fought for unemployment insurance and the administration favored the policy as part of an overall labor force development policy. Private pension companies were nearly wiped out in the Great Depression, and while they lost significant swaths of market share with the policy's enactment, the remaining industry now catered to wealthier individuals and employers who could pay higher premiums. Finally, states themselves became a secondary constituency as they sought to national the cost of mother's pension and state-level pension plans. While the Social Security Act remains the most comprehensive discrete social welfare policy in U.S. history, it instantiated a highly stratified support system that varied in generosity based on occupation, gender, race, age, citizenship and residency status, and geographic location.

For the U.S. Housing Act, the first division of the poor was to predicate eligibility for housing on a steady income stream. That meant the poor who were unemployed would not have the resources to get into newly created public housing units.¹³⁰ Moreover, the income to rent ratio was more generous for families than individuals, and both formulas were high enough to include those within the middle-class, resulting in the poorest of the poor *not* receiving robust housing assistance across jurisdictions. Key secondary constituencies of realty developers, mortgage

¹²⁹ SSA was later amended in 1939 to include survivor's benefits, slowly branching out from the worker-only model.

¹³⁰ Section 8 housing assistance for low and no income individuals and families was not created until the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.

backed banking interests, public planners, and local governments were given new resources and powers to remove unprofitable structures and pursue urban renewal, without fully accounting for what happens to the displaced, which was left to local authorities to figure out. This policy continued the theme of encouraging labor force development, especially in the construction sector, and incentivized demolishing existing low cost housing in favor of new domiciles without protections fully requiring the rehousing of the displaced. While this act did spur housing development projects across the country, it failed to adequately serve the needs of the most vulnerable, even as it was sold for the very purpose.

The National School Lunch Act grew out of executive branch grants to localities to supply lunches to hungry children. Above all else, these pilot programs were intended to create jobs and distribute surplus commodities. The program expanded as the Agricultural Adjustments Act amendments of 1935 set aside customs revenue to purchase domestic commodities, which were distributed in greater supply to an increasing number of schools, families, and individual adults. By the time Congress was debating school lunches in the 1940s, both Congress and the executive branch determined the cessation of food provision to individuals and families, starting the process of narrowing the country's dedication to fighting hunger to only hunger among children. While members did hope to serve all school children, the statute was designed in a way that required annual facilities grants to support poorer schools develop the capacity to deliver meals. This provision (Section 5) went unfunded until 1966 (Poppendieck 2010, 59); in the intervening years, the poor in wealthier and newer schools benefited more from the policy than the poor in older inner-city and rural schools. While the secondary constituencies of military leadership and agriculture combined to form a very unusual—and effective—legislative alliance, the only interests that consistently benefited from the program in its first 20 years were large agriculture

producers who had their commodities purchased even if not all of them were distributed to the needy population. The NSLA “was ultimately an agricultural protection measure far more than a nutrition education or children’s health initiative” (Ruis 2017, 157).

When you add target group construction that already divides the poor into those that should receive help and those that should not to an internal process of eligibility-based carve outs and secondary constituencies with distinct interests of their own, there is little wonder why so many Americans remain poor after important social welfare policies are enacted. Overall, division serves the purpose of minimizing fears of spending costs, moral hazards relating to “handouts,” all while constructing a lowest common denominator of “worthy” poor that a majority of members are comfortable helping through policy enactment.


Issue Streams, Interest Convergence, and Coalition Cycling

The final important component of antipoverty policy regime construction is the role of policy issue streams and interest convergence. Consistent with the Lowi depiction of the New Deal as being effectively captured by large sectoral interests, each of the cases under examination in this paper occurred when several powerful interests combine efforts to propel successful passage of antipoverty policy. But these interests’ relationship to fighting poverty may be tenuous. Instead, they might already have a solution (their preferred policies) in search of a problem to latch onto in pursuit of policy enactment. According to Kingdon (2011 [1984]), “In the policy stream... solutions float around in and near government, searching for problems to which to become attached or political events that increase their likelihood of adoption. These proposals are constantly in the policy stream, but then suddenly they become elevated on the governmental agenda because they can be seen as solutions to a pressing problem or because politicians find their sponsorship expedient” (172). In this way, the agglomeration of different interests into a single legislative

coalition may not naturally flow from similar views on a policy matter. Instead, they form a strange bedfellows coalition to reap any net positive benefit, no matter the underlying policy realm. While it does seem likely that these interests positively contribute to the chance of policy enactment, they also alter the very nature of these antipoverty programs and fight one another for dominance in shaping public policy. As Schattschneider (1960) notes, “Political conflicts are waged by coalitions of inferior interest held together by a dominant interest. The effort in all political struggle is to exploit cracks in the opposition while attempting to consolidate one’s own side” (67). For the three policies under evaluation, each interest is fighting to become the dominant interests that reaps the greatest benefit.

Figure 11.2 visually depicts how issue streams converged to form heterogeneous interest coalitions on the SSA, USHA and NSLA. The first important thing to note is the multifaceted nature to New Deal interest coalitions. Reformers concerned about citizens with disabilities, Townsend Club old-age pension activists, labor unions, proponents of the existing family unit norms, public health professionals, and states and localities rallied together to push for transformative social welfare legislation. Each group had distinct goals embedded within the many titles and sections of the final act. In creating the USHA, unions, proponents of keeping families together, public health activists and social reformers, localities in need of greater powers to reshape their cities, realtors, and banking interests pushed an incomplete, but nonetheless important policy into passage. Finally, the NSLA has arguably the most peculiar interest coalition with the alliance between public health experts, state and local educational institutions, agriculture in search of domestic markets, military leadership looking to bolster nutrition to have a larger and more capable fighting force, and educational reformers interested in expanding in-school nutritional education. These three cases illustrate lawmaking during the New Deal fit a pseudo-corporatist model in

Figure 11.2 Issue Streams and Interest Convergence in Three New Deal Antipoverty Policies



Note: the asterisk/node signify the main the beneficiary of the corresponding antipoverty policy.

which each major shareholder was treated as the representative of a sizable group of the public, therefore deserving of policy remediation, finally followed provisioning poor relief in the form of the lowest appealing factor to these interests.

The second major takeaway of the figure is the interest coalition cycling that goes on across policy domains. This is suggestive evidence that to succeed in antipoverty policymaking, one needs to get a sufficient number of complementary, discrete interests on board, and perhaps center on one dominant interest for the most effective argument for passage. And importantly, this is consistent with how the Democratic Party has governed for the preceding 90 years, with its commitment to “equal and exact justice” to all factions by providing new distribution and redistribution policies to maintain electoral support and party cohesion with a diverse coalition (Skowronek 1997, 161).

A third important takeaway is which interests form the core of each policy coalition. What spurred on social security was the dual forces long-term penury for the aged in America with the short-term calamity of the Great Depression, leading to national pensions and state-level

unemployment insurance, respectively. In the USHA, local imperatives to manage the growth of slums led to the federal government providing new resources for urban renewal with very little stipulation on rehousing the displaced poor. This contributed to cities beginning the process of gentrification and forcing the poor out into the periphery. Finally, agricultural interests reaped the greatest benefit on school lunches, since their domestic, government-back market was guaranteed, while the option to participate in the program was left up state education officials. Each of these illustrate the dominant governmental philosophy of cooperative federalism characterizes each of the most important antipoverty programs of the era.

SSA, USHA, and NSLA are consistent with several theories of the policy process and policy change. First, these cases are consistent with a punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), where policy achievements for any given group are rare and stretch years in between successful enactment, groups have to pile on for one great push. This explains the strange bedfellows in New Deal policies, and especially the school lunch legislation. Initially supported by well-meaning progressive lawmakers, educational reformers, and public health officials, the program gained traction only once agricultural interests pushed for permanent authorization with the strong support of the national security apparatus. Once a critical mass of well-positioned interests converged, new antipoverty policy was possible even amidst a governing Conservative Coalition that was generally hostile to any new, sustained social welfare expenditures.

Second, these cases fit a national interaction model where states and the federal government interact with one another as they produce public policies (Berry and Berry 1999). As most states adopted Mother's Pensions and had local Townsend clubs, pressure on the federal government to standardize approaches grew, culminating in SSA. Similarly, as more states and localities adopted penny hot lunch programs and entered into agreements with the Dept of

Agriculture for surplus goods, the necessity for specific federal authorization of the school lunch program grew into the NSLA. In both cases, state experimentation (with or without federal support) created a constituency for powerful new policies that reshaped the federal government's role in provisioning social welfare goods to Americans.

On a broader level, when streams of issue coalitions intersect, they may produce policy-delivering cartels. The New Deal is arguably the beginning and peak of such an agglomeration of policy demanders and politicians interested in social provision. Or put differently, the dire conditions of the Great Depression and World War II, paired with the positive valence of social provision to help those in need during the New Deal, carried into power and into law interests that might not have otherwise accomplished their long-standing goals. In this way, we can think of critical junctures of social welfare expansion as the product of external events and the convergence of powerful actors and interests, striking a near-perfect environment for creating and expanding the social welfare system. This view also helps us understand why the policies of this era were not universalistic and indeed, highly divisive: the goals were not centered on solving underlying material deprivation and socioeconomic hierarchy. Instead, the goals were to maximize the policy bounds of an inherently skeptical majority of lawmakers in the policymaking process, creating pilot programs that serve *some* purpose to ameliorate poverty, while elevating deeply-held existing priorities.

Conclusion: Assessing the New Deal Policy Prescription

As it turns out, this study indicates there are many *more* reasons for division of the public—and the poor—than any single scholarly work has uncovered. These processes are ubiquitous throughout the policy process. Lawmakers preemptively limited how many poor people served as target groups for policy assistance, then further divided this group through eligibility requirements,

program rules, and creative use of shifting decision authority to bureaucrats and subnational actors. All the while, powerful non-poor interests sought inclusion into antipoverty policies to serve their long-term parochial needs. The fractious form of representation by lawmakers and competing policy-demanding interest were clearly difficult to reconcile.

But importantly, the altered incentive structure that marginalized the antipoverty impact of these three policies did not itself ruin these programs—instead, these policies provided a vehicle for lawmakers (mainly during the Great Society) to subsequently reorient to achieve the stated goals of each program. Consistent with the paradoxical interest group liberalism paradigm of New Deal social welfare policies, the political forces that positively contributed to policy enactment simultaneously blunted the efficacy of each policy to greatly transform the lives of the poorest Americans.

Overall, while exogenous conditions such as the Great Depression and World War II provided some hospitable impetus for major policy change, this era was still chained to the dogma that government can only go so far in helping the public. In particular, the administration and liberal leadership in the Democratic Party did not want to go so far as to create universal programs, exhibited by their rallying against universalistic policies offered by the more radical lawmakers in both the major and third parties. In essence, the universalists lacked sufficient numbers to form even a majority force in either party, let alone in both chambers of Congress. The Democratic Party was not yet ripe with Northern antipoverty *and* antiracist modern left-liberals, while the Republican Party was at an impasse on forming a publicly supported governing philosophy. To the governing New Deal coalition at the time, creating a limited and administratively viable social provision system was more important than comprehensiveness or fairness.

Even with these limitations, the importance of this epoch cannot be overstated: the New Deal was first time the national government incorporated individuals not affiliated with the military into the social welfare system, building off the veteran's benefits in the 19th century provided an bureaucratic infrastructure to deliver expanded benefits (Skocpol 1992).¹³¹ The policy constellation was tailored to tame certain aspects of capitalism and revert the economic collapse, and insufficiently geared toward solving poverty among the long-standing suffering poor in America. Indeed, the New Deal not only failed to solve poverty equitably, but oddly enough it contributed to greater wealth inequality between marginalized groups, as agricultural workers failed to win policy protections and formerly black dominated professions in the civil service were given to newly unemployed Whites (Ruis 2017, 149).

Even amidst these manifest failures, it seems we are lucky to have any antipoverty policies. These lawmakers should be lauded for their accomplishments in breaking with most of the past and earnestly working to create policies that to this day remain fairly stable. However, the fact that many of the leading proponents of these measures felt they had to divide the poor in order to gain some semblance of working policy is an indictment on the state of American politics before and during the New Deal. While lawmakers bucked tradition and inserted a prominent place for the state in guaranteeing the public's general welfare, by executing this new directive in wholly contemporary norms of deservingness and fiscal restraint, lawmakers contributed to continued material deprivation in many long suffering communities across the country.

¹³¹ Ironically, this new program regime was often portrayed as predatory toward veterans, reallocating their earned benefits to those that did not serve the nation in such a vital patriotic manner. An important example illustrating this point is the debate and aftermath of the Economy Bill of 1933, which cut federal employee pay and veterans' pensions to lower the federal government's footprint to match—at least symbolically—the suffering of the masses in society.

Part IV:
Synthesis

Chapter 12

The Era of Ascendance and Division:

Assessing the Representation of the Poor in Rhetoric and Policy in the New Deal

Abstract

The New Deal unquestionably advanced the overdue cause of providing for America's poor. However, as the preceding chapters and additional analysis in this chapter showcase, MC representation contributed to an incomplete policy prescription to solving the poverty. On the rhetorical plane, MCs recognized disparate forms of poverty, but did not focus on the most insidious and sticky forms of poverty. In the policy construction, norms-based favoritism of specific paternalistic ideas of deservingness contributed to policy construction that consistently divided the poor into incorporated and unincorporated groups. Additionally, this chapter provides a macroscopic assessment of the stratification of the poor and impact of the New Deal at elevating key poor subpopulations out of their daily plight. Synthesizing the findings on the rhetorical and policy planes provides a nuanced picture of the representation of the poor during the New Deal: the divisionary process in rhetoric does visibly correspond with certain facets of policy exclusion. Put simply, language and policy often track together. However, rhetoric and policy are frequently orthogonal to one another, as the translation process from idealistic rhetoric to specific policy design creates an ideational-praxis disjuncture. Frequently, decision-making on policy design has the effect of dividing the poor through the instruments of policy delivery, in addition to moments of statutory exclusion. This suggests even when a majority of MCs agree to help the poor, different theories of how to best execute the policy contributes to disparate representational quality and program effectiveness. The record suggests malice, lack of care, or the maintenance of hierarchy are not the only issues in this era, but instead, an outwardly well-intentioned but narrowly focused incremental solution set obviated the reach of the nascent antipoverty regime. In total, the dissertation documents few lawmakers in positions of power were seriously interested in ending poverty in America, but given the countervailing prevailing norms and political dynamics, the resulting antipoverty regime was likely closer to a best than worst potential outcome.

Appropriations should also be made for reforestation, soil erosion, airports, parks, playgrounds, development of our natural resources, the saving of the farm lands, and also for the development of medical, surgical, dental, biological, astronomical, geological, and all other arts and sciences which will promote the welfare and happiness of mankind. The money which would be appropriated to carry out the construction program herein mentioned would be returned to the Government with interest. End poverty in the United States.

—Representative Matthew A. Dunn (D-PA), June 20, 1936

The one serious obstacle in the way of this program, upon which the hope of democracy depends, is fear of debt. That fear must be removed. If that fear were removed, we could beat the depression and win our war against poverty. And I am convinced not only the fear but the necessity of increasing public debt can be done away with by a simple, sensible application of... sound monetary principle.

—Representative Jerry Voorhis (D-CA), January 10, 1940

One of the most insidious ways of holding slavery was that of appealing to the avarice and hatred of the poor whites. Writing in DeBow's Review, 1860, Editor DeBow said: The nonslaveholder knows that as soon as his savings will admit he can become a slaveholder, and thus relieve his wife from the necessities of the kitchen and the laundry, and his children from the labors of the field. Precisely the same appeal is made to poor people today all over the Nation. If the poor man will only join a company union, keep his mouth shut, be docile, and save long enough, he is promised that he can exploit his fellow man. The truth is, such propaganda is low hypocrisy. My people have told me of the indignities heaped on the poor whites before the Civil War—how even the slaves were allowed to taunt the 'poor whites.' When a boy, I can remember the Negroes speaking with contempt of the 'po' white trash.' And the poor whites were taught to hate the Negroes—a system of 'checks and balances' based on hate, helping to perpetuate a miserable system.

—Representative Maury Maverick (D-TX), December 18, 1937

I am for Government economy, but not for Government economy in the bread and butter of the people. I submit that the most fundamental thing that has caused such recovery as we have had up to this time is the fact that it has been the policy of this administration to bolster the basic purchasing power of the poorest farmer, the poorest wage earner, and the unemployed people in this country. I hope that will continue. I hope we will not make the same mistake as was made at the last period of recovery, when every effort was made to cut income taxes and no effort was made to deal with that problem of unemployment which everybody confesses then existed.

—Representative Jerry Voorhis (D-CA), January 26, 1937

Glittering generalities and bombastic boisterousness about one's patriotism do not prove that what he is championing is best for his country. Because a man has come from humble beginnings on the sidewalks of New York it does not follow that he is now allied with the poor and the exploited.

—Representative Fred H. Hildebrandt (D-SD), January 27, 1936

So, insofar as the large populous States of the Nation are concerned, a poor man will find it difficult, as a result of the economics of the case, to become or remain a Member of the Senate of the United States. I should like to have membership here made possible for the poor man; I should like to make it possible for a poor man to come here and enjoy a career here if he could.

—Senator James M. Mead (D-NY), February 17, 1942

We have so much of all of the staple necessities of life that this administration has put forward a program to limit our production of foodstuffs. This program is in operation in spite of the fact that we have millions without proper food, proper clothing, and proper homes. On one side of this imaginary line we have hungry, unclothed, unhoused millions; on the other we have in abundance or the possibilities of the things they need. These millions cannot get the things they need and of which, we, as a Nation, can produce more than enough for all. The job to bring relief to these millions is so simple that we have failed to understand what to do. We have been looking for some complicated formula; we have absolutely shut our eyes to the evidence all around us. The solution of relief is right before us, and still we either do not have any ability to perceive and interpret, or we purposely do not want to admit that we have blundered so long.

—Representative Usher L. Burdick (R/NPL-ND), June 19, 1937

Mr. Speaker, I am one of the many millions in this country who dream of the day when social security will be a reality for all our people. I want a program which wipes out once and for all crushing poverty in a land of plenty and the fear of hunger in a land which produces abundance. I want people—all people—not just those in a few favored occupations, to face the future secure in the knowledge that they are protected against the time when they can no longer earn their living either because of age, disability, or lack of suitable job opportunities and that their dependents will have some security in case of their premature death. I want for them, as for myself, the freedom from fear and the sense of personal dignity that springs from assurance that a decent minimum level of existence is theirs as a matter of legal, moral, and social right even when circumstances outside their control make it no longer possible to earn a living... That is the kind of security I want for myself and for my constituents and for all the people in this country regardless of where they happen to live. I know that we do not have that kind of social security now and we are not going to get that kind of social security this session.

—Representative Helen G. Douglas (D-CA), August 2, 1946

Introduction

The preceding chapters collectively uncovered the parallel path of how the poor were conceptualized and stratified in rhetoric and subsequently divided in and inequitably incorporated into public policy. This chapter will reconcile these findings with additional macroscopic and group-based analyses to cast judgment on the quality of the representation of the poor during the New Deal. As the preceding epigraphs depict, the atmospherically high hopes for the New Deal manifested into a pathbreaking policyscape of gainful social welfare policies. But as time wore on, the glaring deficiencies in the program became more present in the minds of lawmakers, with the aspirations of upstart antipoverty advocates circumscribed around the imperatives of political compromise. Despite the regime's centrality in American politics from the 1930s to 1970s, subsequent generations had to grapple with the unresolved and internally conflicted components of the watershed era.

Overall, the available evidence suggests the New Deal successfully legitimized the issue of poverty as a national problem that required the attention of lawmakers. Numerous Congressional policies dedicated efforts to reducing the impact of poverty on society. However, vigilant lawmakers and several generations of scholarship—including this agenda—have identified the domestic program's myriad shortcomings. As the country's first attempt to address systemic poverty, it would seem unlikely the issue would gain agenda space and be solved in one fell swoop. In this way, contextualizing where the country, state, government, polity, and political class were in this era helps explain—but not excuse—the deficiencies in the antipoverty program.

Rhetoric and Poverty

Political scientists differ in how much explanatory power rhetoric—or persuasive discourse—has on political outcomes, ranging minimalist depictions of no importance whatsoever

to maximalist views that rhetoric uncovers the most essential parts of political conflict. This study concludes the truth is somewhere between these extremes and therefore well worth studying in many circumstances, as rhetoric is purposeful and impactful, but that there is a disjuncture between political language and policy design. In his introduction to a special issue on rhetoric and public policy in the journal *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, Robert Assen (2010) writes “rhetoric engages advocates and audiences alike to frame public problems and identify policy solutions” (5). The language and symbols we employ in political debate necessarily proscribe the realm of ideas for how to address pressing issues (Elder and Cobb 1983; Rochefort and Cobb 1993). Deft political actors can improve the chances of achieving political success by employing heresthetical techniques that include controlling the terms of debate (Riker 1986). That is because, as Paul E. Corcoran writes in his book *Political Language and Rhetoric* (1979), rhetoric “defines social status and articulates the exercise of power” (37). Who is depicted and in what way necessarily contributes to their position within a polity.

As the rhetoric chapters (3 through 7) of the dissertation conveyed, the poor are neither equally nor equitably depicted by Members of Congress in the New Deal years. Lived experience, local conditions, and interest in the issue all dictate who among the poor is visible to MCs, while biases, norms, and interest level (again) inform who is depicted. Chapter 2 showed the “old” poor were joined with “new” mass poor, which necessitated state action, but also contributed to lawmakers adopting an approach that favored the new poor, thereby forfeiting efforts at poverty eradication. Chapters 3 and 4 showed the variance in articulation across and within regions, and the empirical reality that a minority of MCs spoke about poverty. Specifically, about one-third of representatives on a Congress-by-Congress basis, and just under one-half of members serving between 1933 and 1946 gave a solitary poverty speech. That deficit makes maintaining issue

attention and agenda space difficult, let alone cultivating majority antipoverty policy coalitions. The inability of all lawmakers to project the conditions of their poor increased the likelihood of constructing a biased product. Time-series modeling in Chapter 5 showed a potential relationship between unemployment and collective representation in Congress, but individual level factors—beyond third-party membership, state, seniority, and chamber—associated with poverty articulation reveal an idiosyncratic relationship. The topic modeling in Chapter 6 revealed even if members of both parties spoke about the poor, they are divided in their themes, making it tough to find agreement. Later in Chapter 6, manually coded speeches revealed the poor are characterized by a multiplicity of exclusive and overlapping traits, which is a positive finding for institutional awareness of a group, but the high variance in relative attention contributed to a lowest common denominator approach to poverty solving instead of focusing the poor constituents that are most vulnerable. Finally, Chapter 7's depiction of poverty rhetoric styles showed poverty articulation crosses all ideological, partisan, and regional divides in 1930s and 1940s America. It is therefore likely that MCs have differing motivations for engaging the poor, as some depict the poor to propel their material interests, while others use the poor for political advantage and symbolic depiction.

The qualitative construction of poverty in this era is illuminating. For one, the poor of this era are constructed in mostly positive terms, belying the retrenchment era denigration and resentment of the poor. In particular, workers—current, former, and unemployed—are considered the key deserving group to help because it is conceived that they pull their own weight for the most part. Next, dependent groups—elderly mothers with children and the blind—are constructed well in nascent regime. Instead of thinking about positive or negative valence of the poor, this dissertation points more towards those who care to speak and represent the poor, and those that do not. In the New Deal era, the overwhelming valence of the poor is positive, and one might suspect

this continues to be the case for much of American history. The negative depictions of the poor occur in elite pundit discourse and media conceptions, but MCs might not be the ones creating this pernicious climate of stereotypes, resentment, and animosity. To the extent that MCs want to challenge relief for the poor and consider them non-deserving—or a source of problems—they adopt heavily coded language in the 1960s and beyond, while still appearing to support changing extant conditions. In this way, choosing to portray the poor in speeches often appears with a positive valence. Instead of thinking about the negative construction of the poor, this dissertation suggests we take a step back and monitor those members of Congress that seek to represent the poor—then consider *how* they do that—in contrast to the majority of members that do not make it their business to engage the plight of the poor.

Additionally, the discursive plane of poverty politics is often centered on other political dynamics than simply the causes and fixes of poverty. There is often an association with larger ideological and interest goals of members, showcasing the strategic nature of poverty the employ of rhetoric. One of the best examples is from the late-1930s in which Republicans constructed the poor as victims of corrupt Democratic bosses using relief to ensure success at the ballot box. While this narrative is grounded in reality, the causes of poverty are seldom because of political machinations vis-à-vis relief dispensation. Instead, this approach is just a convenient way to underscore a legitimate concern, score political points against opposition party, and look as though one is a representative of the poor.

Since taking the floor to speak on any subject is relatively easy—although easier in the Senate than the House—and provides a relatively low bar as far as possible constituent maintenance activities, if members are so reticent to portray the poor equitably on the floors of Congress, we should not be surprised that when political power is exercised elsewhere in the

policymaking process, it leads to incomplete policy design. This biased representation makes it even harder for activists, mass movements, the media, experts, and even party leaders to guide comprehensive, inclusive antipoverty legislation into existence. And the policies that do gain traction and become law, as important as they are to the construction of a nascent social welfare system, are likely to fragment the poor and prove insufficient to end poverty in America.

Policy and Poverty

The case study chapters of the Social Security Act of 1935 (8), U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (9), and National School Lunch Act of 1946 (10) revealed the contingent, yet predictable process of winnowing down the target population to only the most deserving. In no way were any of the three policies either needs based or universalistic, but instead fit a meso category of biased particularism in which low means was insufficient to gain incorporation—being the *right* poor is what mattered most.

Tracking the long arc of the legislative process revealed the painstaking efforts MCs undertake when legislating for the poor. The successive sequences of first committee members being less generous to the poor than committee witnesses, followed second by hesitant non-committee members attempts to water down the committee approved legislation on the floor proved deleterious to the poverty reach of each bill. To get anything enacted, bill sponsors and floor managers often acquiesced to the demands of ultimatum wielding “proponents” of the bill. Indeed, the legislative leaders overall did a fairly good job at protecting the most essential components of a bill while sacrificing other provisions as a token of compromise. This incremental logic helps congressional action by minimizing systemic change. And as was the case throughout the episodes, if the agenda is controlled by the conservative side of the Democratic Party, passage

was probable. Enactment—not problem-solving—was the ever-present goal of these lawmakers, as something was better than nothing.

Moreover, the synthesis of the policy chapters that occurs in Chapter 11 revealed the four central tendencies to statute construction that lead to selective group inclusion. The most prominent and consistent methods include overt eligibility limitations and rigid program guidance, and covert shifting decision-making to the bureaucracy and allowing states to effectively have subnational vetoes over federal policy. The asymmetry of how many hurdles need to be overcome to for effective antipoverty policy versus the numerous approaches to program limitations in favor of the status quo suggests the American policymaking system rarely has enough consensus among lawmakers, nor are the institutions configured to facilitate solving poverty issues. Instead, dividing the poor based on benefits bolsters existing divisions and resentments among the poor, elevating some into policy incorporation by jettisoning others. The cruelty of the approach ends up serving as a rationale to help the subset of the poor that become the target population.

Ultimately, the scholars that emphasize the role of race (Quadagno 1994; Lieberman 1998; Katznelson 2005; Katznelson and Farhang 2005) are correct that this seems to be an ever-present story of this era. New Deal failed to solve poverty equitably, often contributing to greater inequality between races as formerly black dominated professions in the civil service were given to newly unemployed whites (Ruis 2017, 149). However, they are not fully correct on why. Southern lawmakers may have been pivotal committee chairs and voters, but what I expose is the role of *non-Southern* lawmakers in failing to make the case for racially *and economically* inclusive social welfare policies, which is consistent with Schickler's (2016, 44-45) depiction of the limitations of New Deal liberalism and resulting realization of modern liberalism in the following era. The macroscopic design of the fragmented (Pierson 1995) and divided (Mettler 1998; Hacker

2002) welfare state is seen in and undergirded by a process of divided poor. What one can hope for after lawmakers slice and dice the poor into actionable and ignored, is that they happen to fall into enough policy intersections so as to benefit from the large, disjointed social welfare system of the United States.


Reconciling Poverty Rhetoric and Antipoverty Policy

Rhetoric and policy are seldom analyzed together in a single study, likely in part due to demarcated disciplinary boundaries and convention, as well as the serious matter of how difficult it is to tie rhetoric with policy in the absence of a robust canon of theoreticians or empiricist that document the relationship. This dissertation assessed rhetoric to understand the conceptualization of the poor in an open, public forum, then sought to compare this discourse to policy composition. This section articulates the empirical connection between rhetoric and policy, while also highlighting issues of omitted variables and unclear directionality that pose challenges to make definitive causal claims about the relationship.

Rhetoric about a target group is positively correlated with policy initiatives on related topics. There is often a two to three year rhetorical buildup before—and immediate decline in rhetorical prominence after—policy is enacted on an issue. The endogeneity between speech and issue prominence makes it difficult to claim rhetoric is a forerunner—and proxy for pressure—to policy passage. Indeed, MCs may sense an issue is building momentum, and be more willing to deliver a related speech on the floor.

To illustrate this rhetoric-policy linkage, Figure 12.1 visually depicts the relationship between several speech codes—children and youth, elderly, health and disability, housing and utilities, and hunger and clothing—and the three major antipoverty policy cases of the SSA, USHA, and NSLA covered in earlier chapters. (For descriptive purposes, the SSA amendments of

Figure 12.1 Speech Codes and Major Antipoverty Policy Enactment, 1933-1946



1939 are also included.) The stories that emanate from the figure are straightforward. First, elderly builds until it peaks in the year of its corresponding pensioner program in 1935, falling immediately after, then peaking again in the first round of SSA amendments in 1939—then falling again. Depictions of the poor in need of housing rise until they peak with in the year the USHA passes, then fall until the 1940s housing debates start up. The hunger and children codes rise with debates about SSA (since the policy covers some aspects of childhood development), fall off, then rise again and peak just before the passage of the NSLA.

Collectively, each issue area and policy marker show the association of mounting target population rhetoric with policy enactment, although it is important to note a definitive causal story cannot be extracted from this evidence alone. It should not be surprising that group projection reaches its apex around policy debates that concern the topics that help a group. The deeper question is what critical mass of speech concentration—as a proxy for the pressure environment—

leads to policy enactment, or what the causal direction is between speech and policy. Members may simply speak more about a poor group when they perceive Congress is about to act with a policy output. Indeed, it is unclear whether greater MC interest in a group or issue, as expressed through floor speech rhetoric, leads to policy enactment, or if leadership grants floor debate time to a policy once they perceive sufficient support exists among members for passage (a la Cox and McCubbins 2005). In the latter case, MC rhetoric is ostensibly bound to the agenda, passively commenting on and reflecting upon the day's pressing debates. While it is true that leadership controls the allocation of floor time (and in the House, at times even who speaks), members do have wide latitude to tie any idea to an existing floor debate as rules around germaneness only require nominal reference to ongoing debates. However, this simplistic credit-claiming scenario grossly understates the amount of internal contestation that Congress undergoes in debating and constructing public policy. Floor speeches are first and foremost a low-cost, high-visibility tool for MCs to advertise their views, set the agenda, and convince reference publics of the efficacy of their conceptualization of the poor (and their needs).

Another explanation is that a potent omitted variable, such as social values or political culture, informs *both* how much MCs talk about a group *and* incidences policy enactment. What informs one informs the other. Even if this is the case, which is to some degree likely, the new measures of rhetoric provide a richer picture of the context in which policy is enacted. From this rhetoric-policy linkage, one can add additional datapoints to continue building the definitive record representational behavior in Congress. While it may seem obvious to some readers that depictions of the poor and antipoverty policy enactment empirically trend together, this is the first study that documents this important ideational-institutional relationship in robust fashion. This framework is also able to evaluate *disconnection* between rhetoric and policy, and/or measure if a certain amount

of rhetorical space is necessary for policy change, promising revelatory stories as the time-series is moved ahead into the mid-century.

Moving beyond topical association and disaggregating into group construction provides an opportunity to highlight cases in which rhetoric appears to have some agency in shaping policy, and when the two seem orthogonal to one another. On the former count, there is anecdotal evidence that MC rabbleroising on the House floor altered the SSA program to force in a Title X on aid to the needy blind. Members repeatedly attacked the bill for not covering some of the most vulnerable in society until it the bill's architects included the provision. What followed was members like Representative Robsion (R-KY) and Jenkins (R-OH) both claiming credit for the provision. Another example is the USHA citizenship requirement under the auspices of helping only domestic, rightful poor. Committee members did not put the provision in the bill, but after an onslaught of attacks on the floor, member after member rose to support the limiting amendment. This is a strong example of splitting the poor to avoid either purely needs-based or universalistic benefits. Finally, the economic correlation with social status led to Representative Powell (D-NY) to propose his equal funding amendment to help all poor children regardless of stratified Jim Crow laws. The language around helping the neediest students necessarily requiring some stipulation of funding parity prevailed over the lower chamber, leading to what some, like Voorhis, had feared would become a poison pill for the bill. In each of these cases, the floor members used persuasive language to reframe the debate in a way that made their position more tenable than the status quo supported by the bills' lead floor managers. In these select cases, we see clear evidence that the rhetoric runs ahead of the policy change. The key test here revolves around the counterfactual of whether the amendments would have been adopted without any discourse, if for example,

preferences alone were enough to lead to the changes. Since we cannot observe this counterfactual, the cases remain compelling evidence for the agency and impact of rhetoric on policy.

Importantly, Congress is capable at projecting up who is poor in the United States, but has a tendency toward doing so in a biased manner that alters collective Congressional conception of the poor from that of extant society. Based solely on rhetorical subject choice, one would expect Congress to devise a combination of lowest common denominator policies that ostensibly help all poor people—short direct provision welfare; government public works employment projects—while tailoring more generous policies for the most favored classes of the poor—Social Security for the elderly and mothers with children (and later widows); entrenched subsidies for agricultural commodities; food aid abroad; unemployment for industrial workers. As the chapters show, these expectations derived from the aggregation of group identification in poverty speeches generally bear out in the policies of the era.

In other parts of these policy episodes, we can see rhetoric and policy are orthogonal to one another—the terms of debate do not clearly mirror the manner in which the policy divides the poor. Since the policies employ a series of covert divisive approaches to carving up the poor, the Congressional debate on demographic groups and target populations may simply miss how the policy does not tend equally to everyone. There was scant debate about the perils of having local teachers and administrators decide who among the children is poor enough to get free lunch. Or any awareness during passage that Congress might not fund the facility grant provision of the NSLA, which contributed to many poor schools not engaging the program until the 1960s. While there was extensive debate about the poorest of the poor families getting the new public housing in the USHA debates, the corresponding directions in the law still left those decisions to the local housing units. Indeed, Senator Wagner seemed aware that the local entities would have to decide

who to house, but was trying to accommodate his colleague Senator Walsh by entertaining further instructions. These and other technical aspects of the bill do convey a disjuncture between how we debate policy creation and the resulting legalese statute that take on a life of its own.

It will always be difficult to document if rhetoric has a strong independent effect on the policy process, short of a member claiming they changed their vote based persuasive argumentation. Instead, what rhetoric gets us towards is the hidden power of agenda-setting. We see this broadly in how rhetoric tracks with topics on the agenda, such that if leaders feel it is time to push a specific policy area of antipoverty policy onto the floor, members will address that area on its substance. A more specific example is how children become constructed as consumers in the NSLA debates. Importantly, this is less a product of enterprising politicians tying children and consumerization together in a new manner, and instead a product of the AAA encouraging domestic consumption, which the executive branch then used to deliver benefits to children (and adults before that program was curtailed). These two examples—Congressional leadership controlling the subject of debate and the executive branch experimenting with policy provision—provide suggestive evidence that rhetoric is a reflection other power relations in the federal government. While this may let down folks—such as myself—who do believe rhetoric does have independent effects, the value of studying rhetoric in Congress at the very least provides inroads to explore veiled forms of power and institutional dynamics that structure ideational conceptions.

In this way, it is less common to buck the germane hot topic and discuss poverty as a MC sees it, or that an MC tries to redefine the poor in new and creative terms. While there are important examples of entrepreneurial framing of the poor—especially in the long-winded Senate—they pale in comparison to what is on the agenda in Congress and potentially the sociotropic transmission of American conceptions of the poor into the Congressional deliberation process. Only the fiercest

poverty advocates, like Robsion, Lundeen (FL-MN), Voorhis, or Langer (NPL/R-ND), have the oratorical skills to stay on topic *and* expand the scope of their poverty representation.

Overall, it does appear as if a high level of rhetorical representation was necessary for a group to gain inclusion into the New Deal state, but that prominence was also insufficient to guarantee inclusion. In the case of the poor in this era, it is much better to be discussed than ignored, but the fickle nature in which lawmakers select who to incorporate in a policy means you are never assured substantive benefits, even after the law is passed.

Evaluating the Quality of Poverty Representation

Part I of Chapter 2 used secondary sources and limited governmental reports to identify the groups most impacted with impoverishment before and because of the Great Depression. With those groups in mind, this section assesses how well the poor were represented by lawmakers in the New Deal antipoverty regime. Are the poor represented accurately to account for their socioeconomic internal variation? The literature derived hypothesis would always point to answer of “no” in every period. However, in New Deal much of the distressed population is covered by effective policy action, providing some an opportunity to see how representing the poor works in best case situations. A focus on each dimensions of representation uncovers the nuances of New Deal poverty representation.

Delegate Versus Trustee

Instructed delegates project the direct articulated desires of their geographically constrained constituency, while national trustees take a broader view of representing the needs of everyone in society—not solely their constituents or voters. The drawback to the trustee approach is that the interests of the nation may conflict with one’s district, creating the appearance of not representing the people that put a MC in office. With these definitions laid out, it is clear Congress

in the New Deal varied greatly in the forms of representation, lacking in the delegate approach while performing slightly better at the trustee model.

On the positive side, there is some evidence that a delegate model holds for certain MCs. By and large, members from the South (Pepper; Ellender) do articulate poverty at a high rate, commensurate with their region's higher poverty levels than the three other major regions. MCs in the House and Senate with high indigenous populations in their constituencies, especially in the upper Plains (Langer; O'Connor), are some of the *only* ones who articulate the plight of Native American material deprivation. Urban lawmakers (Sabath; Marcantonio) that choose to speak about poverty frequently depict cosmopolitan form of poverty that revolves around housing and food insecurity. In one case, Representative Voorhis depicts both worker and farmer plight, reflecting his large hybrid urban-rural Northern Los Angeles County district. Overall, as expected, House members were closer to delegates of narrower interest sets, while Senators acted to construct a more holistic view of the American poor as interested trustees.

However, many members from poorer districts did not engage issues of poverty whatsoever. The dearth of fulsome delegate representation is admirably filled by the most interested members (Robson; Wagner; Langer; Lundeen), often in the Senate, who sympathize with the material deprivation of the poor no matter where they live. These trustees worked to expand the visibility of poor subgroups and supplied needed votes to make the New Deal antipoverty regime more equitable to all of the poor. The seamier side of the trustee model is that MCs might have pursued paternalistic, coercive, and less generous approaches to representing the needs of their constituents that what would be ideal for the latter group. This is because lawmakers employing the trustee model use their *judgment* to represent the public, not just what the public tells the MC to do. On balance, the delegate model performs less well than the trustee model,

although members who failed to speak about the poor would have failed on both counts, even if poverty was not an issue in their electorate.

Dyadic Versus Collective

Dyadic representation—the 1:1 relationship of representing members of one’s community—is generally lacking in the New Deal. As previously mentioned, between one-half and two-thirds of MCs do not engage poverty, even in the high salience Great Depression. Moreover, some members from notoriously poor areas, like the upper South and Arkansas in particular, fail to lead on the issue of poverty. Dyadic representation is always difficult to pull off since there are many interests within a district, and a MC is unlikely to be able to serve them all. Complicating matters, aside from identity match there is another problem wherein MC vary greatly in who they imagine to be their constituents (Dexter 1957).

When MCs do speak about the poor, the dominant tendency is toward parochial, localized representation where members project preferred members of their community as poor. The previous wide-perspective superstar trustees notwithstanding, it is rare for a MC to depict poor people from conditions they do not observe first-hand. This direct local constituency approach would work better if *every* MC talked about the poor in their respective districts. Aggregating these piecemeal depictions of the poor could potentially work in a log-rolling paradigm, but again, only if everyone portrayed their own marginalized groups. Then with full information, members would reconcile commonalities across jurisdictions. But since some members do not speak about the poor, it creates a higher bar for the members that do: they must present their poor *and* the poor in other districts. To some extent there is a lowest common denominator approach to the New Deal, but the problem is the New Dealers used the LCD from an incomplete picture of the poor. The

concentric reduction in scope of representing the poor shows the difficulty of aggregating interests when not everyone is portrayed by their members.

Overall, Congress was more successful at collective representation of the poor, reaching nearly every group in the comprehensive codebook. In a diverse legislative body, members can represent the identities, interests, and values of non-constituents. This overlap allows for leeway in who MCs choose to promote—others can pick up the slack. In the New Deal, this collective perspective goes far to make up for some of the deficit in dyadic representation, but again shows antipoverty advocates have to work doubly hard to portray their poor and the poor in other parts of the country. The most well-versed among them are capable at portraying the plight of the people, but they still only have one vote. Such is the problem with the poor being represented by a minority of lawmakers spread throughout the country—they cannot constitute a governing majority for policy enactment. Fulsome depiction would be insufficient for policy remediation. Anything short of the robust poverty representation by the highly active minority of MCs could have led to a corresponding antipoverty regime that would have been even more biased than how it turned out.

Descriptive

Descriptive representation—MCs sharing the traits of their constituents—on the issue of poverty was quite low in the New Deal. In fact, politicians tend to come from wealthier backgrounds across time and space in American political history, so the idea of a poor lawmaker is an elusive and rare concept. However, there are notable examples of a few but notable MCs that express their personal experiences with poverty in this period from 1933 to 1946. These members include Thomas L. Blanton (D-TX), Usher Burdick (NPL/R-ND), John Dingell Sr. (D-MI), Wesley E. Disney (D-OK), Claude A. Fuller (D-AR), Adolph J. Sabath (D-IL), Fred J. Sisson (D-NY), and Charles V. Truax (D-OH) in the House. On the Senate side, Homer Bone (D-WA),

Dennis Chávez (D-NM), Walter F. George (D-GA), Huey Long (D-LA), Pat McCarran (D-NV), Kenneth McKellar (D-TN), Glen H. Taylor (D-ID), and Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT) all portrayed themselves as being poor as children or in adulthood.

However, the range of experiences that inform each member's personalization of poverty complicate an idea of collective consciousness or linked fate. In one case, a member may have lied about his own poverty to either cynically rise in politics or positively cultivate a sense of representation among the powerless (or both). According to his family members, Huey Long—the leading poverty articulator of the era by a mile—exaggerated or made up his personal bouts with poverty (Williams 1981 [1969], 10). This illuminating example showcases how descriptive representation of the poor differs from racial or gender representation, since poverty is not an ascriptive trait—it can ebb and flow within a person's life. Moreover, it can be concealed from others, meaning the external community pressure dimension of the identity is fleeting. Indeed, politicians that find it useful can lie about their proximity to poverty without immediate censure from onlookers. In this way, the presence of descriptive representation of the poor is both rare and internally fraught with issues of authenticity, degree of severity, life cycles, episodic versus systemic engagement, and salience to the individual's identity.

While this study is premised on the well-documented “white collar government” in Congress (Carnes 2013), there was one potential inroad to assess descriptive representation in this era: the MC personalization speech code. In this code, MCs talk about their own poverty, or poverty they have witnessed in others. This is not a perfect proxy for personal experience, but it is an available tool to use in search of relations in poverty representation. Unfortunately, provisional modeling of MC's that have personalization narratives about poverty had no statistical bearing on their poverty speech willingness and count. The section on future research in the conclusion

explains how collecting and coding different data sources on MCs' lived experience may better assess the role of descriptive representation and poverty representation.

Finally, a strong contingent of committee witnesses consistently serve as representatives for the poor, either by descriptively holding the identity, as was the case in SSA and USHA hearings, or by serving as surrogate advocates for the voiceless and excluded, as occurred in all three policy cases. Congress as a whole improves as a representative body the more it consults with the communities they govern, and committee witnesses in particular provide a clear value added to understand problems, propose solutions, and increase awareness of potential pitfalls in devising antipoverty policy for the poor.

Symbolic

Of all the forms of representation political scientists study, symbolic representation might have been the New Deal's greatest strength. While the policy outputs that constitute substantive representation are more essential for material well-being, as the previous scholarship and the dissertation have amply documented, the policy prescription of the New Deal was biased and incomplete. In contrast, the symbolic dimension to representation was potent, (comparatively) ecumenical, and potentially even dominant in this era.

One way to assess symbolic representation is to account for how much of the debate agenda was dedicated to poverty. On this front, the struggles of the poor held a stable and sizeable presence on the Congressional discursive plane throughout the era. Poverty issues were debated frequently, and the substance of the debate indicated members present were authentically interested in the issue.

Another way to measure symbolic representation is the valence that is given to the poor—positive or negative. Belying the negative valence that takes off in the 1960s, the poor during the

Great Depression were almost always positively portrayed. Their struggles were legitimate and poor people were characterized as hard workers dealing with systemic troubles well beyond an individual or community's control. The only caveat here is the foreign poor and poor without full legal status in the states were clearly relegated to sub-actionable level in debates. This positive valence to the poor showcases the key dichotomy in the New Deal was not positive or negative portrayals, but instead, *any* portrayal versus those who simply neglect the poor altogether.

Another operationalization of symbolic representation is to assess how broadly members engaged the issue of poverty. On this count, neither party in the duopoly "owned" the issue of poverty on the discursive plane. Both parties portrayed themselves as advocates for the poor, which in part explains why the solutions to poverty ranged from eliminating all taxes and curtailing government, to spending one trillion dollars on eliminating all forms of poverty. This competition over the idea of poverty spanned region, party, and ideology—the first and (likely) last time this was the case. Moreover, the competition over the idea likely contributed to shaping the policy actions of MCs in the era, as simply claiming to represent the poor without any substance would leave a politician's side open to accusations of playing politics with the poor.

Since taking the floor to speak on any subject is relatively easy—although easier in the Senate than the House—and provides a relatively low bar as far as possible constituent maintenance activities, if members are so reticent to portray the poor equitably on the floors of Congress, we should not be surprised that when political power is exercised elsewhere in the policymaking process, it leads to incomplete policy design. This biased representation makes it even harder for activists, mass movements, the media, experts, and even party leaders to guide comprehensive, inclusive antipoverty legislation into existence. And the policies that do gain

traction and become law, as important as they are to the construction of a nascent social welfare system, are likely to fragment the poor and prove insufficient to end poverty in America.

Substantive

Although symbolic representation—and the psychological benefits of being represented and agenda-setting that comes with it—is an important aspect of projecting the interests of the poor onto the national stage, the government has the means to alter actual occurrence of material deprivation. Acknowledging the plight of some members of society is a start, but to evaluate whether the poor are well-represented during the New Deal, one needs to account for how the poor benefit from policy enactment.

Fortuitously, The New Deal is one of two periods (with the Great Society) in which the substance of poverty representation was not theoretical or hypothetical, but manifest and plentiful. That does not mean there was not copious amounts of conflict and a high level of division between the poor, but the levers of power had produced sizeable benefits that continue to inform America's antipoverty state in the 21st century. Table 12.1 showcases how the poor were elevated and divided within categories between preferred and relegated groups. The dichotomization of the table highlights the tendency of New Deal laws process of creating target groups by incorporating and denying benefits to the poor along descriptive or situational features.

Whites had greater access to social welfare provision than Black or brown Americans, as did males over females, urbanites to rural residents, and citizens over non-citizens. Industrial workers had preference over agricultural labor due in part to functional purposes, where much of agricultural labor was seen as outmoded given the rise of industrial economies of scale. Marx and Weber both help explain why the poor in the rural America were more readily ignored—pejorative view of them and their value to the economic system. The manner in which disability was carved

Table 12.1 Unequal Dichotomies in New Deal Social Provision

Category	Group 1	Sign	Group 2	Reason
Race	White	>	Black	SSA vocational exclusion; separate but equal clause in NLSA; discrimination in housing practices by FHA
Gender	Male	>	Female	Within single household, hiring priority for federal jobs and relief goes to male
Region	Urban	>	Rural	Housing policies principally geared toward cities and suburbs; employment protections concentrated in high-density industries; cf. subsidies benefitted rural farmers at the expense of food insecure city dwellers
Occupation	Worker	>	Non-worker	Policies activate once work is had; non-working welfare small scale at time
Occupation	Industrial Labor	>	Agricultural/ Domestic Labor	Programs designed with protections for industrial workers: SSA excluded ag and domestic, while FLSA did not apply minimum wage to ag and domestic
Legal Status	Citizen	>	Non-citizen	Statutory exclusion from policies, including work relief; cf. white non-citizens were incorporated into some work-relief programs early in the New Deal
Health	Blind	>	Deaf	Title 10 of SSA geared towards blind; no help for deaf
Health	Able-bodied	>	Disabled	Disability coverage dropped after CES researched issue; not included until 1950
Age	Elderly	>	Children	Direct federal program for elderly in Title II of SSA <i>and</i> grants to states for old-age assistance in Title I of SSA, while children only receive grants to states in Title IV
Age	Hungry Children	>	Hungry Adults	NLSA provides lunches for students; hungry adults gain and lose benefits as limited executive branch pilot program is cut by Congress

up to cover the elderly and blind, but not the deaf highlights the lack of coherence in the public health regime. And the preference of the aged over the youth continued the long of arc of the U.S. government deciding it is more worthwhile to invest in human capital after those folks had demonstrated their value to society. Long-term investments in children were apparently less defensible to members of the governing class. Moreover, workers were generally favored over those that could not work, although the initial decision to provide any benefits to the latter group is an important secular development in U.S. history. Finally, the food insecure were divided

between deserving children and undeserving adults; if the latter group wanted to eat, they should work. This division of the poor is present to some degree in every New Deal statute, indicating modest program goals, circumscribed financial commitments, and biased norms guided much of the New Deal policy process, even if the New Deal itself was a watershed moment of departure from the *laissez faire* earlier years.

It is further possible to evaluate how New Deal policies impacted different groups in a rank-ordered list. Table 12.2 presents such a rank by grouping disaggregated, intersectional poor subgroups by the level of their policy benefits. The highest end is groups with gainful benefit, followed by groups with mixed benefits, then finally, groups with insufficient benefits. The table also provides a broad indicator of how prominent the subgroup was in Congressional rhetoric and an explanation of the policies that impacted each group. While this list is more holistic than perfectly quantified, there does appear to a credible relationship between rhetorical prominence in the agenda and the level of group benefits. The three groups that cleaned up the most in the New Deal were white male industrial workers, elderly former workers, and food insecure white children in fledgling suburbs. Membership in those groups constitutes a strong basis for benefits as both lawmakers and administrators prioritized their needs above others. Women, children, farm families, the blind, and Black industrial workers received a level of benefits, but these were less than the top echelon and were frequently relegated to either relief agency employment or state-level social welfare systems. Finally, Native Americans, immigrants, agricultural labor, domestic workers, the deaf, non-workers, Black children in the South, and those in need of medical care received little to no policy benefits.

Managing the competing demands on the political system was supremely difficult in the era, as helping in one direction could mean backlash in another. Not subgroup showcases this more than the New Deal's rural and agricultural policies. The favoritism of factory farms over family farms was not purely about captive politics to powers within a sector, but also an approach to ensuring entities that received

Table 12.2 Political Stratification of the American Poor

Tier	Intersectional Group	Rhetorical Prominence	Policy Focus
Groups with Gainful Benefits	White male industrial worker	High	Unemployment benefits; work relief; preference in hiring among family members; do not face discrimination; social security later; FLSA minimum wage and benefits now
	Elderly former worker	Medium	Social security now; FLSA minimum wage
	Hungry white suburban children	High	NSLA, without needing Sec. 5 funding
Groups with Mixed Benefits	Widower	Medium	Survivor's benefits
	Working female	Medium	Unemployment; not given hiring preference in government work
	Women with children	High	ADC (benefits low at time; not all states opt-in)
	Hungry white urban children (nationally); urban black children (North)	High	School lunch (assuming school has developed cafeteria)
	Blind	Medium	Blind aid in Sec X SSA
	Black industrial worker (North)	Low	Unemployment benefits; some work relief; some preference in hiring; face local discrimination
	Family farms	High	Stable subsidies; surplus purchases favor (and heavily develop) factory farms
Groups with Insufficient Benefits	Native Americans	Low	Native American New Deal granted increased sovereignty and control over local resources; low tangible monetary benefits
	Immigrants	Very low	Often excluded from work relief; excluded from SSA
	Agricultural workers	Medium	Excluded from SSA
	Domestic workers	Very low	Excluded from SSA
	Deaf	Low	No direct government benefit
	Non-workers	Low	New Deal workfare limited help to people unwilling/unable to work
	Black children (South)	Low	School Lunch program operated in separate but (un)equal paradigm
	Sick people	Low	No direct government benefit; indirect through Section VI of SSA, assuming states chose to use them for this purpose

governmental supports provided a strong value-added—in this case, factory farms could guarantee a large amount of foodstuffs to then channel into the mouths of the poor. Even so, this era could be the beginning of farm populations feeling unincorporated into the welfare state, which boils into open elite resentment against the continuance of the New Deal program. This resentment is justified since the SSA did not include farm workers. However, the resentment also misses the ways in which rural interests were advantaged, such as through price fixing to artificially subsidize commodity prices and increase farm values. Moreover, there was a strong executive program of assisting the tenant farmer program, although this policy was not as vast as some other New Deal policies. In the end, the New Deal was a mixed bag for all target populations, not just rural populations, but the rural resentment that elites fomented on Congress evolved into anti-government skepticism and continues to this day. Much of the genesis of this political dynamic relates to the difficulty to create a system that delivers services to the countryside without forced population relocation to urban centers.

Creating a superstructure with this level of hierarchy meant reformers were constantly trying to add groups to existing programs, which provided successful over a generational level of scope. But as previously mentioned, date of incorporation into policy factored heavily into long-term prospects—early incorporated groups joined the middle class, while late incorporated groups struggled with poverty for years if not generations to come. The reality is that very few poor people were made worse off because of the New Deal. However, people's relative positions in society could have become worse as a product of the biases in the New Deal—if you were not incorporated in these policies, you would fall behind everyone else who was.

Finally, the substantive representation of the poor did not culminate in either a universalistic nor needs-based approach. The New Deal's approach to provision was much more

biased and parochial, wherein the poor are divided into actionable, deserving groups that reap benefits from fairly successful programs, while many in the poor are excluded or receive insufficiently funded benefits. This clientelistic approach to dealing with the poor all but ensured poverty would remain a national issue, with some unincorporated groups potentially gaining coverage, but many poor remaining on the outside looking in.

Virtual

The asymmetry of non-poor lawmakers representing the poor as they create antipoverty programs is replete with potential issues, from ignorance and neglect to bias and incomplete policy instruments. In this era, non-poor lawmakers did successfully devote time and energy to researching the plight of the poor, thinking very carefully about the appropriate solutions to insidious social problems. The months spent in committee hearings investigating the issues and debating ideas, following by months on the floor defending the policies from those that seek to sabotage their work is ample evidence that antipoverty leaders of the era held a steadfast commitment to tangibly lessening poverty. In particular, the study reveals the extreme care lawmakers took in the committee process to fully engage stakeholders to learn about problem construction and issue resolution. Aided by competent and generous witness testimony from surrogates of the poor, the information plane was nearly complete in each of the three policy episodes—insufficient policy design and negative externalities cannot be attributed to lack of information. The study provides added evidence that the information processing model of Congress (Krehbiel 1991) holds a high measure of accuracy, at least in the New Deal period. Therefore, lawmakers deserve immense credit for even attempting to help the poor, let alone creating what remains the superstructure of America's antipoverty regime.

While it is difficult to claim the insufficiencies in the federal response are a product of MCs not experiencing poverty themselves, it is clear that the governing majority in Congress never supported complete poverty eradication programs. For whatever reason, these members supported modest, incremental reforms to the capitalist system that would yield results for many of the poor, but not everyone. The record suggests lawmakers' good intentions to help were partially offset by their adherence to prevailing norms and dedication to political expediency. Leading antipoverty advocates commonly critiqued the New Deal policy prescription for its insufficiency, but these actors were rarely joined by governing New Deal liberals in their quest for universalism.

The neglect of the poor by roughly half of the body implicitly showcases how poverty is an idiosyncratic public problem to non-poor MCs. Even among those that do speak, there is a high level of variation in how often they speak and who they imagine. A small subset of lawmakers make poverty one of their major issues and (figuratively) run laps around their colleagues. This aggregates into a picture where Congress is clearly a sufficient fact-finding body, broadly identifying who is poor in America. But the identification of the poor does not automatically translate into policy solutions. When Congress fragments the poor to this extent, it requires members reconcile disparate accounts into comprehensive, inclusive policy which seldom materializes.

On a positive note, lawmakers in this era set a baseline of working representation for the poor that carried on for some time. The biased nature of the representation, however, begs the question of whether investment from more representatives would lead to better incorporation, or given the makeup of Congress, whether more attention would even matter. This train of thought moves the question away from collective information—Congress being naïve to the problems—toward an emphasis on the mobilization of bias and the raw political power of the members each

representing a subset of the poor. In total, universalism and a commitment to solving poverty is simply not a popular point of view held in these plural deliberative bodies.

Overall, this era may prove to be the high point in poverty representation in Congress, but that does not mean the quality of representation was unconditionally good. On the positive side, Congress is surprisingly good at avoiding generalities and platitudes when discussing the poor, and instead amplify the interests of specific groups within the poor that are facing economic hardship, often with first-hand or empirically based accounts of their plight. Collectively, this aggregates into a nearly complete demographic picture of who is poor in this period. However, less positive is that MCs that do speak about the poor tend to gravitate to certain valence poor populations—families and workers—or the poor to middle-class members of their specific community, while two-thirds of members do not even articulate the poverty of their districts. Worst of all, MCs use the broad sympathy generated for the poor as a rhetorical strategy to propel a favored, privileged constituency constructed as poor into policy favor. On the one hand, Congress is good at capturing the breadth of poverty across constituencies, but not at sufficiently tailoring their representation to account for the relative depth of the poverty different groups face.

Even in an era of increased attention, Congress represented the poor and constructed antipoverty policies in a fragmented manner that calls into question whether eliminating poverty was the collective goal of lawmakers. Instead, what was created was a highly effective, but wholly inadequate system of social insurance for “most deserving” members of the poor, and very little for those on the outside. The era sets an important barometer to contrast with the years to come, when economic conditions were not as widely dire, but nonetheless, poverty persisted at significant levels. Party parity showed underlying commitment of lawmakers of varying ideologies and interests to accomplish something that benefits the lives of their poorer constituents.

Unfortunately, the bipartisan attention to the issue of poverty—let alone effective bipartisan solutions to ameliorate the issue—dwindles with time, and future analyses could document the precise moment when the Republican Party gives up the rhetorical concern for the poor. Political expediency and the ideological commitment to federalism—no matter how well-meaning or justified at the time—have fragmented the poor in utilitarian terms: by sacrificing universalism and lowering the bar from solving to reducing poverty, lawmakers have instantiated a system in which poverty is a perpetual, accepted problem in the nation.

Collectively, these parts indicate poverty representation in America is heavily fragmented in all directions: the nature of poverty is both dispersed and concentrated, leading to different pressures to address the problem. A minority of lawmakers speak about the poor, suggesting interest in the issue is just short of a durable, critical mass. And finally, those depicted as poor vary the MC giving the speech, which aggregates into a skewed portrayal of the poor that lessens the chance of either comprehensive solutions or policies tailored to those most in need. The inherent and deliberate fragmentation of the political poor creates a system in which the poor are divided and pitted against one another in the quest for exclusive policy supports. The poor may be the most divided constituency in American politics.

And yet oddly enough, the poor at-large were represented better in this period than almost any other time in American history. However, two things can be true at once, and so while poverty received ample attention, poor subgroups were not equitably represented in rhetoric or policy in this era. While the Great Society is likely to provide a more fair and just depiction of each group and corresponding policy action, its quick retrenchment in comparison to the New Deal suggests the earlier period might be the most impactful period of poor representation. The fact that New Dealers could reach the pinnacle of representation and still be so divisive serves as an indictment

on the unjust broader manner in which the poor are mistreated throughout American political history.

Conclusion: Poverty, the New Deal, and Beyond

This study bolsters existing scholarship that has correctly deemed the New Deal biased in its policy construction by age, race, gender, and geography, but adds that previous scholarship misses the common strain across categories: the least materially fortunate in society were systematically marginalized and excluded from the new regime. The primary goals and execution of the New Deal were to attenuate the effects of the Depression on the formerly middle-class by creating new structures of state aid to help people overcome momentary hardship—not to solve long-standing poverty. When policymakers constructed this new regime, they failed to comprehensively reconcile their wide awareness into policy, instead directing legislation toward a lowest common denominator subset of the identified poor. In the instances when policies were more far-reaching on mobility, they generally fell prey to contemporary prevailing norms of deservingness, indicating a major failure of the legislative program was its inability to transcend deeply entrenched systemic oppression in the United States.

The primary contribution of this work is to show the poor are heavily divided in the policy process by lawmakers. This is due to each lawmakers' varying interest in the issue and differing account of who is poor, and then among them, who deserves help through policy action. The inability to reconcile these disparate views leads to a suboptimal antipoverty politics that devolves into passing policies that center on lowest common denominator among a majority lawmakers, privileging some poor and prioritizing the needs of secondary constituencies. New Deal is not only a case of racially oriented state-building, but also an example of predicating state policies on dividing those in need among on another, specifically the poor into recently poor due the Great

Depression, and existing poor, a legacy of America's feudal order. Moreover, the racist and classist strains in the New Deal serve the purpose of appealing to different power elites: maintaining the racial order was a principle goal of most Southern Democrats, while restraining the state's aid to the poor was in service of ideological precepts like individualism and market-driven anti-socialist capitalism common among Northern Republicans. The high correlation between poverty and ethnic minority populations allowed lawmakers to craft policies that effectively excluded the poorest citizens from benefitting from New Deal policies without having to own up to it. While it is true that New Deal policies directly contributed to some poor joining the dawning middle class polity, it is equally true that across policies, many poor were left behind and their status (relative to some of their peers) actually declined. In this way, the New Deal contributed to greater wealth inequality within those of low economic means. Moreover, the orientation of the state in this era toward poor fragmentation inserts a political explanation for the durability of poverty within the United States.

Furthermore, the dissertation provides evidence that the division of the masses was not just racism, but a broader process of classicism and general cycling out-groupism. If it was just racism motivating much of the New Deal, why, for example, were the cash transfer programs decentralized and given very little guidance compared to the old-age pension aspects of SSA? Why did the U.S. Housing Act exclude non-working poor from program inclusion? Why did the facilities development clauses in the National School Lunch Act lack funding for 20 years after passage? The common strain in all of these dynamics is the poorest of the poor—across regions, race and ethnicity, and age—were not sufficiently thought about or targeted in policy construction. Racism *is* a central component of New Deal social welfare policy, but it is not *the only* important bias in how these policies came to exist.

On a positive note, in the period during and immediately after the Great Depression, the poor in America are overwhelmingly positively constructed. The idea that the poor are demonized does not accurately characterize this period in poverty representation, although it is more likely to in subsequent periods of retrenchment and social discord. However, the idea of the pauper is not positively constructed, as lawmakers go out of their way to paint the pauper's life as stigmatic and impossible to condone. Furthermore, by virtue of requiring some poor to express their poverty verbally or in legal documents is seen as putting "the good poor" into the negatively constructed "bad poor" category. While some lawmakers seek to help the pauper regain a semblance of normal living, calling to that label is more often used as a subtle manner of undermining giving state aid, since its recipients would likely become dependent, a drag on society, and develop low self-esteem.

Since dwelling on how the valence of the poor as a whole is less fruitful in this period, the greater question is how lawmakers reconciled who is poor in society with who they deem worthy of initial state explorations into social welfare. Here, lawmakers clearly err on portraying the poor that most people agree need help—widows, the elderly, mothers with children, youth, industrial workers, agricultural families, foreigners, and the hungry. Gaining less support, but arguably as poor (or poorer) are domestic workers, Native Americans, Blacks, migrants, and many forms of disability. The decision to selectively incorporate all of the poor into the new regime was a clear product of the "innate conservatism" Senator Bone spoke of, which allowed for an upwardly mobile system for some and malignant neglect of others.

Poverty is frequently the consequence of insufficient occupational opportunities to earn a living. On this front, the New Deal was extremely successful at managing to propel the public from a state of 30% unemployment to a full employment regime that pulled in women, ethnic minorities, and youth in reconstructing American society for environmental conservation, energy

development, infrastructure. While sufficient for poverty amelioration, this approach is starkly inferior at poverty eradication. Long-standing ascriptive hierarchy in the South, oppression and neglect on Native American reservations, and a view toward immigrant assimilation as first to withstand suffering while working, then later to gain state supports, were all preserved under the New Deal regime.

The New Deal is one of the few times the plight of the public was quickly turned into polity-wide changes in social and economic policy. But this opening to change did not greatly disturb the underlying, widely held American doctrines of individualism, localism, and racism. Venerable social historian Michael B. Katz expounds the contradictions in the New Deal social welfare regime:

The limits of the early American welfare state glare so brightly they deflect attention away from the magnitude of the New Deal's achievements... It modified but did not erase archaic distinctions between the worthy and unworthy or the able-bodied and impotent poor; it created walls between social insurance and public assistance that preserved class distinctions and reinforced the stigma attached to relief or welfare; in no way did it redistribute income or interfere with welfare's role in the regulation of the labor market and the preservation of social order. (Katz 1996, 254-255)

Moreover, "Collectively, these 'New Deal' programs were targeted toward people who had either lost their jobs or who were not expected to work under then-prevailing societal norms, such as the elderly, disabled, and mothers raising children" (Falk and Spar 2015, 8). Importantly, newly created poverty was largely solved through the workfare regime, but the bias against the old poor maintained, and poverty itself would remain a permanent problem—at the very least, now it was a legitimate *national* problem

The manner in which the poor were divided spanned tensions on and stages within the policymaking process. There were four principal reasons for division in this era: political expediency (i.e., the Southern veto power/vote-gathering hypothesis), policy effectiveness (i.e.,

the administration's worries about spreading the nascent state too thin), triage to return society to pre-Depression status quo (the new poor hypothesis; existing poor a state problem), and cultural values of the specific era (those that do/do not fit workfare paradigm).

Additionally, there were concrete limitations of science of administration and administrative capacity at time, which necessarily foreclosed the level of reform/revolution that one could realistically expect lawmakers to achieve. One can reasonably believe that the state must first develop the infrastructural power to delivery benefits before it can effectively deliver said benefits to the public. In turn, if a program is rolled out and falls on its face, the political backlash could undermine the longevity of such a program. However, since policy critical junctures or windows are rare, a good case can be made that prescribe as many benefits as possible through the law, temper expectations among the public, and use administrative levers to expand program deliver over time.

Issues of federalism also blunted the efficacy of New Deal policies. The approach to policy design that often included a system of matching funds was used as leverage to gets states and localities to act in accordance with—and take responsibility for—a pro-social welfare agenda. Additionally, lawmakers were skeptical of nationalizing social welfare, not just because of ideological commitments, but because lawmakers from wealthier states did not think it just to reward authoritarian Southern lawmakers for they neglect—if they did not want to exhaust their political power to support the poor, why should lawmakers in other jurisdictions? This line of argument ultimately carried the day. The problem, however, was that the poorest states could usually only match a paltry level of federal supports, while richer states could have extensive benefits even without federal funding. This inequitable system foreclosed the possibility that poverty would be solved across the nation, and instead, exacerbated geospatial inequalities.

And even hard fought policy victories, part of the problem is that New Deal policies were frequently not fully funded by subsequent Congresses, especially once under the control of the Conservative Coalition beginning in 1937. Backlash against the perceived excesses of government overreach and mounting perception of scarcity led to a subtle retrenchment of underfunding and curtailing new social welfare initiatives. Importantly, New Dealers themselves and the Roosevelt administration frequently supported cutting expenditures.

And yet, it stands as an indisputably large progression in the United States polity's movement toward creating economic supports for disadvantaged populations. Although lawmakers did not intend to greatly reorient wealth distribution, the program created an infrastructure that subsequently led to thousands of programs targeting low socioeconomic status individuals. And yet, an unforeseen outgrowth of the creation of this heavily biased social welfare regime was that it contributed to an exacerbation and reorientation of existing social inequalities, leaving millions of poor people to dwell in continued poverty while some firmly entered the middle class. Scholars need to understand the paradox of New Deal liberalism serves as a microcosm for the larger centuries long social inequities and continued progressive development of a polity founded on the principle that inequality serves a functional political purpose to maintain hierarchy within a nominally liberal society. The New Deal failed to transcend the existing paradigm of limited government action *and* extant political inequalities. While the basis of, and justification for, hierarchy has changed, it's durability continued to characterize American politics and society after the critical development of the US welfare state.

Moreover, some historical revision on the sequence of state development is in order. The conventional conception of the New Deal as major expansion in social provision, followed by a cooling period under Truman and Eisenhower where very few new advancements were made.

While it certainly true the output was much higher in the New Deal than following eras, we should think in more nuanced terms: the New Deal greatly expanded public commitments to social welfare, but it did so in a biased manner, and the subsequent period was influential in making those commitments fairer and more equitable by raising benefit levels and expanding program eligibility to more ecumenically cover the American population. The steady process of amending to the Social Security Act to add much needed coverage for widows and widowers, disability coverage, and changes to vocation eligibility, and later, cover agricultural workers occurred in less hospitable climates. While new policy enactment—save for smaller programs like the Dependents’ Medical Care Act that expanded health care coverage to military dependents in 1956—was indeed rarer following the New Deal, the process of correcting the earlier period’s ills took generations of updating.

Avenues for Future Research

There are myriad paths for future research along the vein of this research, of which I spotlight four. The first is to move the time-series forward to understand ebbs and flows in poverty representation over time. How much did interest in poverty alleviation wane following the enormous task of reconstructing the world order after World War II? There is an open, underexamined question of what constitutes poor representation in the quiet 1950s—is there any poverty representation in the halls of Congress? Was there a path dependence in maintaining supports for these groups, while only rarely incorporating neglected impoverished groups into the policy domain? The moving forward, was the New Deal the high water mark in antipoverty focus, or was it surpassed in the Great Society’s emphatic “War on Poverty”? Or even more perversely, could the poor actually be more present on the agenda in the era of retrenchment from the 1970s

onward? Situating the New Deal within a broader temporal framework will definitively address the uniqueness and lasting impact of the era.

The second task is to concoct a design that gauges members' experiences with poverty to better assess the expected descriptive-substantive connection in Congressional representation. I have begun this time-consuming path by collecting Congressional biographies to one day cods for evidence of material struggle. Using that information as a predictor is a promising design to better understand if there is a functional relationship between experiencing poverty and portraying it in Congress. As it stands, the evidence in this dissertation does not find such a relationship, but instead uncovers the idiosyncratic pattern in which members from varying backgrounds choose whether and when to engage the issue of poverty.

Third, to better assess systemic demands on the antipoverty regime, an alternative path for researchers is to add more variables to the equation of floor speeches and policy outcomes. Such as constituent letters, interest group activity, interviews with lawmakers, media portrayals, personal memoirs, think tank memos, and a wider array of economic reports. While this study was chiefly calibrated to study Congressional processes, Congress does not operate in a vacuum and may or may not respond to outside forces.

Finally, the study advances the cause of assessing rhetoric and policy together. Future work can continue down this path by continuing to think deeply about how to test the theory that rhetorical framing corresponds with substantive representation (or shapes policy outcomes). The disjuncture between language and statute is not an easy one to reconcile, but it is a worthwhile endeavor for students of political representation.

In closing, many of the New Deal programs have proven essential in lessening the overall incidence and effects of poverty in the United States. We see this in the relationship between Social

Security spending and decreased elderly poverty (Engelhardt and Gruber 2004) and the school lunch program in elevating poor children's educational attainment (Hinrichs 2010). Moreover, much of the division within these policies was rectified in subsequent amendments to legislation—adding survivor's benefits to SSA in 1939; adding subsidies to Section 8 of the US Housing Act; the creation of federal income eligibility standards to qualify for free school lunches (Gould 1972, 6). While the refinement of these policies is a testament to the ability of the federal government to learn from challenges and update programs, the initial division of the poor for normative reasons or political/administrative expediency left generations of potential recipients in poor standing to benefit from state policy. Further, the division of the poor in this nascent genesis period may have set a template for how to marginally combat poverty without committing full resources to eliminate its existence equally among all Americans. And yet, somehow this may be the beginning and the ceiling of poverty representation, since this period of very high salience focused attention on addressing endemic poverty caused during the Great Depression. Despite its divisive representation and policymaking, the conditions for fulsome, comprehensive policies for the poor have not been as fortuitous since the New Deal.

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