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Elites and Identities: The Interactive Effects of Top-Down Cues and Group Memberships on Political Attitudes

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Abstract

The social groups to which individuals belong, as well as the identities that result from these group memberships, exert powerful influences on their political attitudes. Additionally, political elites offer cues that shape these same preferences—often by targeting and interacting with identities. However, there remain underexplored pathways by which elites can influence political attitudes via identities, particularly in an era of fragmented media and clarified configurations of allied social groups. In contrast to prior research that examines how political elites engage directly with social identities, I examine three distinct indirect mechanisms of elite-identity influence. First, I show that when elites highlight identities in their communications in ways that impact attitudes, these effects are contagious to individuals not directly exposed to that messaging. I combine in-person discussion groups with a survey experiment to demonstrate that elite-driven identity influence may be more extensive than previously understood. Second, I examine the effects that elite actions have on everyday individuals belonging to identity groups the elites claim to represent. Fielding a survey experiment on a sample of African-American respondents, I find that elite collaboration can improve intergroup relationships at the mass level, but a rejected coalition can result in a backlash that deteriorates intergroup solidarity. Third, I explore how political disputes between elite actors affect not only members of the identity groups to which the elites belong, but also impact third-party observers who are not directly implicated in the conflict. Such exchanges have a negative impact on attitudes toward a group whose representative initiates conflict. Together, these studies provide a more nuanced understanding of how political elites can influence public opinion via identity in a contemporary political landscape.

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to all of the friends and colleagues who have encouraged centered, and often consoled me during my time in graduate school; to my parents, Ron Rothschild and Arlynn Gottlieb, who have supported me in many ways both known and unknown to them; and most of all to my wife, Toni Rothschild, and my daughter, Matilda Rothschild, who give a fuller and deeper meaning to all of my endeavors.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

Social identities constitute a fundamental component of the human condition. Grouping ourselves and others into categories helps people to simplify and grapple with a complex social world. The identities individuals derive from these social groupings strongly inform how they understand themselves, interact with others, form attitudes and opinions, and make decisions about the allocation of resources and opportunities (Allport 1954; Monroe, Hankin, and van Vechten 2000; Tajfel 1970).

As much as in any other area of life, social identities play an important role in democratic politics. Theorists of democracy have long recognized that the nature of politics in a pluralist democracy centers on social groups. In Federalist 10, Madison argues that the key to preventing tyranny is the proliferation of many social groups with competing interests, so that a stable majority cannot impose its will on the rest of the republic. Similarly, Truman (1951) posits that overlapping and potential group memberships provide limits to the influence of the political power wielded by any single group. Importantly, the claims of these authors rest on the ability and willingness of disparate groups of citizens to work together in coalitions – if diverse groups do not collaborate and cooperate, then rather than affording protections, pluralism instead leads to governmental gridlock and factionalism. Indeed, coalitions are necessary in any pluralistic democracy to achieve goals and social identities are fundamental to such coalitional behavior. Identities inform individuals about what their interests are, as well as which groups to which they do not belong will help or hinder them the pursuit of these interests. In this way, social identities can provide a pathway to the cross-cutting cleavages favored by Madisonian pluralists (Hochschild 2003).

Indeed, decades of political and psychological scholarship demonstrates that social identities are strong drivers of political preferences and behaviors. For example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) discuss how citizens look to others in their identity groups for guidance on how to vote; more recently, Achen and Bartels (2016) suggest that identity-based processes outperform rational choice models in explaining political preferences. And yet, the processes by which identities affect attitudes are anything but simple. Identity politics is complex, in part, because each citizen possesses not one, but many social identities. These identities may be compatible with one another, but at times they offer competing lenses through which to view political issues or conflicts. Such competing identities may lead attitudes and behaviors in divergent directions, depending on which group membership is most salient. For instance, while an individual might identify as both a Democrat and a parent, these two identities may influence her attitude in opposite directions on issues such as anti-terrorism spending and prison sentencing (Klar 2013).

The extent to which, if any, particular identity influences attitudes, behaviors, and coalitions at a specific time depends upon a number of contextual factors (Druckman and Lupia 2016). Prominent among these factors are political elites, who can influence which considerations citizens employ in forming judgments in a given moment (Zaller 1992). By providing cues to the public to increase the salience of an identity, elites can increase or decrease the extent to which that identity influences opinion formation (Jackson 2011). For instance, political candidates often act strategically by priming gender in their campaign advertisements – an action which tends to increase Democratic vote share (Schaffner 2005). Elite messaging centered on social group membership thus has the potential to dramatically alter the contours of

public opinion and political behavior, including vote choice, policy preferences, grassroots coalitional behavior, and political solidarity.

And yet, despite the proliferation of recent research into how elites engage with social identities, it is worth asking how applicable these findings are in a political system characterized by severe polarization and a fragmented media environment. With the proliferation of hundreds of narrowly-tailored options for consuming media, direct elite influence on and through identities may be more limited than in the past (Bennett and Iyengar 2008). An increasingly diverse array of choices in media means that some individuals will abstain from consuming political media altogether, while those who choose to devote attention to it may have less flexible political attitudes. In such a fragmented media landscape, to what extent can elites still impact citizens through identity-based cues? Moreover, what implications does the answer to that question have for the formation and maintenance of the cross-cutting coalitions that pluralism demands? While identities can promote coalitions, pluralism can also lead to deep factionalism and gridlock (Hochschild 2003). So, to what extent can elites still influence identities and promote coalitions in our contemporary political environment? Moreover, does conflict among political elites undermine established political alliances? In short, political elites influence how political identities shape attitudes among the mass public – but to what extent, and with what impact on coalitions?

It is these questions that I address in my dissertation. At a basic level, I study unexplored dynamics of the elite-public relationship—dynamics that are more important than they may have been in prior eras. As direct elite influence on identities wanes, scholars must be attentive to the *indirect* ways in which elites can influence how identities shape political attitudes, including

those about coalitions and cross-cutting partnerships among social groups. Each of the three chapters of my dissertation addresses a different way in which political elites have indirect influence on the attitudes and behaviors of the mass public: 1) through two-step rather than direct communication, 2) by actions rather than direct messaging, and 3) among third-party groups not directly involved in political conflict. While I do not directly study a changing media environment, the focus of my dissertation is of particular importance in a polarized, fragmented political landscape.

When citizens exercise the choice to abstain from consuming political content, can elite communication nevertheless reach these individuals and influence how identities shape their preferences? The first chapter of my dissertation demonstrates that elite messaging that highlights or focuses on a specific social identity can indeed reach and affect such individuals. Prior research has shown that elites can prime identities through their communications, making those group memberships more influential in shaping individuals' attitudes. I argue that this type of elite influence is more far-reaching that previously understood. Specifically, I propose a two-step identity priming process in which elite identity priming is contagious between individuals via interpersonal communication. People who are not exposed to elite identity primes nonetheless are affected via interpersonal discussions. I find evidence for this identity priming contagion with a laboratory experiment that includes elite messages and interpersonal dialogue. The results reveal the potential of indirect elite identity influence, even in the absence of direct exposure to elite communications, and provide a framework for studying identity politics and communication more broadly.

Given that elites can still influence political attitudes through identity-based means, what implications does this fact have for political coalitions among the public? The second chapter of my dissertation argues that elites who represent identity groups and the actions they take in relation to one another have powerful influence over the willingness of everyday citizens to engage in coalitions. Specifically, interest groups and their leaders—the political elites who are perhaps best positioned to make claims on behalf of specific social groups—can offer information to the public through their actions (such as forming partnerships), even in the absence of direct communication about these actions. I therefore predict that when such interest group leaders choose to work together or reject collaboration with one another, they send important signals to everyday members of the identity groups they represent about their relationships to other social groups. For instance, a public coalition between black and Hispanic advocacy groups may impact intergroup relations between blacks and Hispanics at the mass level. I find that, in the presence of intergroup solidarity, interest group coalitions produce greater feelings of closeness with and stronger policy support for a collaborating outgroup, whereas a rejected coalition creates a backlash effect. This backlash, however, does not occur for low-solidarity outgroups. In other words, even when elites do not provide direct identity-based communications, they can nevertheless indirectly influence intergroup relations and coalitions through their actions.

Political elites, then, influence members of the identity groups they claim to represent, as well as the attitudes these group members have toward other social groups that are potential coalition partners. But, how do these elite actions affect individuals not directly represented in these elite relationships? In other words, when political elites representing specific identity

groups engage with one another, how do third-party observers react? Coalitions of social groups have become more clearly defined in American politics (Robison and Moskowitz 2019). Therefore, interactions between elites representing specific identities have clearer implications than in previous eras for individuals who do not belong to those social groups. With Ethan Busby (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Clemson University), in the third chapter of my dissertation I investigate the effects of political conflict between such elites on members of a third identity group. Drawing on balance theory, we find that individuals react to conflict between interest groups representing two liked social outgroups by developing more negative political attitudes toward the lesser-liked of the two outgroups. These effects, however, do not extend to specific candidates or policies, suggesting that a political coalition may be fairly durable in the face of conflict among two of its constitutive social groups. More broadly, we demonstrate that political elites have indirect influence on the attitudes of third-party groups, even when these groups are not directly involved in elite conflict.

My dissertation explores a set of indirect elite influences on how identity shapes political attitudes in an era when direct messaging may carry diminished effects relative to prior decades. First, social interactions can extend elite identity priming to individuals who have no direct exposure. Second, even in the absence of rhetoric, elite actions can influence the relationships between identity groups. Third, even identity groups not directly involved in elite political conflict or other such interactions can nevertheless be affected by these events. By documenting these three underexplored types of indirect elite influence, I aim to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how identities and elites contribute to democratic processes in a contemporary political landscape.

Chapter 2: Two-Step Identity Priming and the Extension of Elite Influence

Abstract: *Citizens have many politically relevant social identities, including partisanship, nationality, race, and others. These identities matter as they often shape citizens' attitudes. A long-standing question concerns which identity citizens rely upon when forming political attitudes. One factor in determining identity impacts is elite priming – if elites emphasize partisanship, citizens rely more heavily on that identity. If elites instead focus on nationality, that identity drives preferences. In this study, I argue that such elite influence may be more extensive than previously appreciated. Specifically, I propose a two-step identity priming process in which elite identity priming is contagious between individuals via interpersonal communication. People who are not exposed to elite primes nonetheless may be affected via interpersonal discussions. I offer evidence for this identity priming contagion with a laboratory experiment that includes elite messages and interpersonal dialogue. The results reveal the potential of elite identity influence and provide a framework for studying identity politics and communication more broadly.*

The question of how citizens' social identities affect their political attitudes and behaviors has long been of interest to scholars of democratic politics. Identity and its importance in shaping political judgments are at the heart of political science research as diverse as classic work on the role of race in southern electoral politics (Key 1949) and contemporary accounts of how democratic governance fundamentally ought to be understood (Achen and Bartels 2016). This scholarship has clearly established the importance of group memberships – even those that are not expressly political in nature – to the ways in which citizens relate to political processes.

Of course, citizens hold multiple, often overlapping, social identities. For example, an individual may identify with a specific political party and nationality. Which of these (or other)

identities affect attitudes depends on multiple factors. Prior research identifies two important factors in determining which social identities come into play. First, political elites can prime citizens' identities through exposure to political media (e.g., Schaffner 2005). When candidates or other elite actors highlight a social identity in relation to an issue or campaign, that identity may become more salient in forming attitudes. For instance, turning citizens' attention toward their partisanship leads to more party-based candidate evaluations, as opposed to gender- or race-based judgments. Additionally, social interactions frequently influence how identities are applied to political evaluations. The other people with whom an individual interacts, and the social group memberships they share, lead certain identities to be more salient than others (Turner et al. 1994). However, despite the established significance of both of these factors, little extant scholarship addresses the ways in which elite messaging interacts with interpersonal discussion to shape how identities are applied to political behavior. I propose a two-step model of identity priming, in which political elites prime social identities of individuals who consume political media, who in turn spread these priming effects to other individuals via interpersonal discussion. This work follows classic (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) and recent scholarship (Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2014) documenting the importance of two-step communication flows in shaping opinions and transmitting political information. I am, however, unaware of any research that applies two-step theory in a way that directly links identity, elite cues, and social interaction.

In what follows, I review the literatures on social identity, how political and media elites can prime these group memberships, and the ways in which social interactions influence identities. I use this work to develop hypotheses about how elite messaging extends through social interaction to impact identity salience and political attitudes. I then present the results of

an experiment designed to test my hypotheses. I find that elites can influence which identities are salient to individuals, even when these individuals are not directly exposed to the elite messages. These effects occur because other individuals whose identities were made more salient by elites interact with those who did not directly receive elite messages – these interactions in turn influence the "non-exposed" people. Such indirect identity effects challenge accounts suggesting that political media effects are limited to direct consumers. The results shed light on how citizens navigate multiple identities, demonstrate that the impact elites and have on identity and attitude formation may be greater than previously understood, and offer a framework for studying the interaction of media, elite messaging, and interpersonal communication in identity politics.

Political Effects of Social Identities

With the seemingly infinite number of possible considerations individuals might use in forming political opinions, it is important for citizens to have ways of organizing information and directing their attention. Social identities provide one such process for this organization. Tajfel (1981, 255) defines social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." Individuals derive their self-understandings, in part, from their memberships in groups and a desire to have a sense that others share their concept of who they are. Social identity theory posits that social groups provide these shared traits and memberships, as well as heuristics for promoting self-image and self-interest through the group (Tajfel 1981; Monroe, Hankin, and van Vechten 2000). In recognizing categories such as race and partisanship, individuals can gather information about what people like them tend to think about political issues and direct their behaviors accordingly.

The political effects of social identities are numerous. When an individual perceives a particular social identity to be politically relevant, this group membership then becomes a *political identity* (Huddy 2013). The implication is that political identities often have apolitical origins, but nevertheless help individuals to form and maintain their attitudes. Researchers have documented many ways in which identities impact political judgments. For instance, heightened American national identity leads to increased support for defense spending and lower support for immigration (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001), while those with stronger partisan identities more intensely dislike members of the other party (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2018). Other research demonstrates political effects of a wide range of identities, including race (Dawson 1995), gender (Box-Steffensmeier, Boef, and Lin 2004; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014), partisanship (Greene 1999; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015), and parental identity (Elder and Greene 2012). Salient identities can even affect accessible political knowledge (Davis and Silver 2003), while superordinate identities (i.e., broad identities shared between two or more social groups) may decrease the salience of heterogeneity to promote prosocial dispositions (Transue 2007) and reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner et al. 1993; Levendusky 2018).

Elites, Interpersonal Communication, and Identity Priming

Although identities clearly shape political attitudes, the question remains of which identity will shape any *particular* judgment. Individuals have multiple social and political identities that sometimes compete with one another. This competition means that which identity is most salient for an individual when evaluating a political issue or candidate can make a substantial difference in their attitudes and subsequent behaviors. For instance, Margolis (2018) demonstrates that evangelical Christian Republicans' opinions on immigration depend on

whether their religious or partisan identity dominates. When they focus on their Republican identity, they are relatively opposed to immigration reforms; yet, these same individuals adopt more liberal immigrations stances when their Evangelical identity is more salient.

The salience of social identities and the way individuals filter political issues through them, however, are not perfectly stable. One major factor that determines on which identities individuals rely is the messaging they receive from political elites. Iyengar and Kinder theorize that media and elite political figures can cause "changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations" (2010, 63). Because individuals have scarce attention, they use shortcuts to make choices and form preferences. *Priming* is the process by which elites influence which of these shortcuts are most accessible. Importantly, social identities are among the shortcuts that elites can prime, making these identities more forceful in individuals' evaluations of policies and candidates. When a specific identity is primed, an individual is more likely to form an evaluation through the lens of that identity. For example, priming gender identity leads women to evaluate female politicians more favorably, due to a shared ingroup membership with the candidates (Holman, Schneider, and Pondel 2015). Scholars have shown many other identities to be susceptible to priming by elites through political media, including partisanship (Kimball 2005; Klar 2013), national identity (Althaus and Coe 2011), race (Mendelberg 2001; White 2007), and religion (Harrison and Michelson 2015). Priming each of these identities shapes attitudes in distinct ways. Klar, Madonia, and Schneider (2014), for instance, show that highlighting fathers' parental identities leads them to oppose prison reforms that reduce sentence lengths.

In addition to elite messaging, interpersonal communication also affects political attitudes. Everyday social encounters affect number of political effects, including tolerance and

understanding of opposing viewpoints (Mutz 2006) and the likelihood of opinion change (Visser and Mirabile 2004). Some evidence even suggests that interpersonal communication outweighs the effects of political media in determining vote choice (Beck et al. 2002). Importantly, both psychological theory (Turner et al. 1994) and recent scholarship in political science suggest that interpersonal communication can also affect attitudes by heightening the salience and strength of specific social identities. Levendusky, Druckman, and McLain (Levendusky, Druckman, and McLain 2016; see also Klar 2014) find that when participants discuss politics in groups that are homogeneous along the dimension of partisanship, these individuals emerge from their discussions with more salient partisan identities, as well as issue attitudes that are polarized along these identities. In other words, the specific social group memberships upon which individuals base their political evaluations can sometimes depend on interactions with others who prime those identities. Moreover, in addition to priming identities, these social interactions often help individuals to perceive how their identities relate to specific issue attitudes. As Walsh (Walsh 2004) demonstrates, informal discussion among people who share an identity can create a mutual understanding of how political issues, such as same-sex benefits for employees, accord or conflict with the wellbeing of the group.

One mechanism by which interpersonal discussions may make identities more salient is through social pressure to conform to the behaviors and attitudes of other members of one's group. When social connections are formed for non-political reasons, individuals in these networks sometimes have political attitudes that differ from one another (Mutz 2006; Sinclair 2012). As individuals become aware of these differences, however, their desire to establish common social identities may lead them to adopt political preferences and engage in political

behaviors that are similar to those of others with whom they interact regularly. Social pressure helps to shape, for example, partisanship (Sinclair, 2012), which comports with other research suggesting that partisanship functions as a social identity (Greene, 1999). Moreover, this phenomenon of social pressure is undergirded by the function of positive emotions: adherence to in-group norms leads to approval from one's peers, which in turn produces positive emotions that reinforce the salient identity of that particular in-group (Suhay 2015). Alternately, social interactions may influence identity salience through the transmission of information. Some of the most important information acquisition in democratic politics comes via interpersonal communication (R. Huckfeldt 2014), often with those with whom individuals share social identities (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Receiving information pertinent to an individual's social identity – information that is more likely to come from other members of that social group – is also likely to prime that identity and lead to changes in political attitudes.

To summarize, individuals hold multiple identities that affect their political attitudes. Which of these identities comes into play in any given evaluation depends upon both elite messages and social interaction. However, scholars have learned considerably less about how social interaction can condition the effects of political media containing elite cues. In the next section, I provide a novel application of two-step communication theory. I argue that to fully understand the impact of elite messaging, scholars must attend to *two-step identity priming* – a process in which individuals consume political media, experience identity priming effects from elite messaging, and then extend these priming effects and corresponding issue attitude changes to other individuals through interpersonal interactions.

Two-Step Identity Priming

Here I consider in detail the relationship between elite identity priming and social interactions, building on recent work that argues for the integration of elite communication and interpersonal discussion in the study of political behavior (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2014; Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain 2018). I theorize that identity priming effects resulting from the consumption of political media can travel from the original consumers to others with whom they interact via a process that I call *two-step identity priming*. In making this claim, I draw heavily on two-step communication theory developed by members of the Columbia school (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Katz 1957). According to these authors, certain citizens receive political ideas and information through media consumption and disperse these messages to others with whom they interact, thereby shaping their political perceptions and attitudes. For instance, Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain (2018) show that partisan media can polarize individuals who do not watch it when they engage in discussions with other individuals who have watched.[1] Such two-step communication flows amplify the effects of political media and the elite messages contained therein. Thus, a comprehensive analysis of the political effects of news media is incomplete without tracing these effects through interpersonal communication.

[1] Extant research documents other types of social and political contagions, including the adoption of emotional states of others in one's social network (Coviello et al. 2014) and downstream effects of in-person (Nickerson 2008) and social-media based voter mobilization (Aral 2012).

However, no existing research has examined whether identity primes that are communicated through mass news media can be dispersed through these social interactions. This process would take place in two steps: First, some individuals consume political news media and receive messages that prime specific political identities, as has been demonstrated in prior research. Receiving these direct identity priming messages should increase the salience of the targeted identity relative to those who do not receive such a message (Hypothesis 1) and shift attitudes relevant to that identity (Hypothesis 2). Second, these individuals engage in interpersonal interactions with other individuals who have not been exposed to the same direct priming messages. During these interactions, the primes that the original news consumers have internalized now spread to their social contacts in the same manner as would political information (e.g., via conformity or informational processes). As a result, this two-step identity priming will increase identity salience (Hypothesis 3) and shift related issue attitudes (Hypothesis 4) among the individuals who were not directly exposed to priming messages through media consumption, relative to individuals who neither receive an elite prime nor engage in group discussions. To the extent that identity priming contagion takes place, political media can have a much stronger effect on attitudes and behaviors than would otherwise be possible.

Prior research suggests that such interpersonal discussions may also affect individuals who have already been directly primed. Extant work (e.g., Levendusky, Druckman, and McLain 2016) demonstrates that when individuals are prompted to elaborate on their beliefs – i.e., think carefully about them – they tend to adopt more extreme positions. When individuals who receive direct identity priming messages anticipate discussing the subject matter in interpersonal interactions, they will likely think about what they will say and how they will defend their

positions. As a result, elaboration should lead to heightened identity salience (Hypothesis 5) and more extreme attitudes on related issues (Hypothesis 6) among these individuals, compared to individuals who receive direct priming messages but do not discuss these topics with others.

Methods

To test my hypotheses, I implemented a group discussion-based experiment between the fall of 2015 and spring of 2016. Participants were undergraduates at a Midwestern research university (N=357).[2] Using student samples is a common approach, given the logistical challenges of discussion-based experiments (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Klar 2014). Moreover, such samples have been shown to provide generalizable inferences (Druckman and Kam 2011). In accordance with the theoretical framework outlined above, I needed to both prime an identity and provide an interaction in which this prime could be transmitted between participants.

In designing the priming component of the experiment, I sought identities that would satisfy two conditions: pervasiveness in the sample and opposite effects on a specific issue attitude. Based on these considerations, I elected to focus on identification with the Democratic Party (Democratic identity) and identification as an American (American identity). First, while

[2] Participants were from a social science research pool, where each student participates for one academic term (preserving naivete among subjects). Given that individuals may have weaker political identities as young adults, the age of participants here may moderate treatment effects (see Druckman and Kam 2011). However, because participants did not know one another prior to the study, this sample creates a more stringent test of two-step dynamics – effect estimates may therefore be conservative. Further research will clarify treatment effects in other samples.

there was no way to determine *a priori* the exact prevalence or strength of these identities in the particular sample, almost all were American citizens and prior research with this student body has found a very high rate of Democratic partisan identifiers. Second, emphasizing these two identities tends to pull public opinion in opposite directions with regard to a specific, important issue area – the military. While a basic test of the process of two-step identity priming requires examining only one identity, evaluating the potential for two different identities to move political attitudes in divergent ways offers a more rigorous and robust test. On the one hand, American identity should produce greater support for a strong, well-funded military (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Theiss-Morse 2009), especially in response to a threat against the nation or its standing in the world (Hutcheson et al. 2004). Wong states that identifying with a nation leads to "a desire to further its interests and pride in its accomplishments" (2010, 122); therefore, a more salient American identity should lead participants to prefer a strong U.S. military, especially when faced with threats to the safety or international prestige of the country. On the other hand, priming partisan identity can shift attitudes on a range of issues (e.g., Kimball, 2005; Klar, 2013) and Democrats are more likely than Republicans to support decreases in defense spending and believe that the U.S. military is stronger than it needs to be (Mccarthy 2015). Partisan cues also pull public opinion toward the mainstream positions of the parties with which individuals identify (Slothuus 2010). Therefore, priming participants' identities as Democrats should lead them to place less importance on a strong military.

The experiment proceeded in two waves: In the first wave, I distributed an online pre-treatment survey between seven and fourteen days prior to each session of the experiment. This questionnaire measured demographics, including partisanship, in order to screen out those who

did not identify as Democrats. In line with prior research finding that partisan leaners hold similar partisan identities to weak partisans (Greene, 1999) and tend to behave loyally to their parties (Abramowitz and Webster 2016), I include independent Democratic leaners as Democrats in this study. Participants then signed up for a time slot to participate in a laboratory on campus. Each participant began by taking a seat at a computer terminal and was randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. In three of these conditions, participants did not interact with one another. A control group (Condition 1) received no treatment and completed only a post-treatment survey consisting of three dependent variables. First, I used six-item batteries adapted from Mael and Tetrick's (1992) Identification with a Psychological Group scale to measure Democratic (α = .81) and American (α = .77) identities.[3] These items, all on five-point scales, allow me to test how the strength and salience of these two identities changes across experimental conditions. I also measured attitudes toward the military with a question asking how important it is for the U.S. to have a strong military (with 1 being low importance and 5 being high importance).

Two other groups received a direct Democratic identity prime (Condition 2) or an American identity prime (Condition 3). In order to ensure an effective priming mechanism, I utilized texts designed to pose a threat to the identity in question. Such threat primes have been shown to elicit the strongest reactions and changes in political attitudes (Klar 2013; Klar et al., 2014). While designing intentionally strong primes might raise questions of robustness under other circumstances, the experiment in this study is most centrally concerned with the potential for priming contagion; therefore, it was important to ensure that the initial priming message was

[3] Exploratory factor analysis returned a single factor for each set of questions.

successful. The American identity prime focused on the potential importance of protecting Americans' safety and standing within the world, while the Democratic prime suggested that Democrats' political priorities might be undermined by excessive military spending. The full text of these priming messages can be found in Appendix A.

Following the identity primes, participants in Condition 2 and Condition 3 were asked to read a brief informational paragraph about U.S. defense spending – they were told it came from a major American newspaper article. This paragraph noted that U.S. defense spending increased from 2001 to 2009 and decreased from 2010 to 2014. The exact wording of this information is located in Appendix A. After reading this information, the participants filled out the post-treatment survey. In accordance with Hypotheses 1 and 2, participants receiving direct Democratic identity primes (Condition 2) should report stronger Democratic identification and lower importance of a strong military when compared to the control group. By contrast, those receiving direct American identity primes (Condition 3) should report stronger American identification and higher importance of a strong military relative to the control group.

In the remaining five experimental groups, participants engaged in small group discussions about the U.S. military. All participants in these conditions read the same informational paragraph, preceded with a statement that they would engage in a subsequent group discussion about it. Participants in Condition 4 did not receive a direct identity priming message prior to reading the information but engaged in a discussion with individuals who received the direct Democratic identity prime. Individuals in Condition 5 were similarly unprimed through direct means but discussed with participants who received the direct American identity prime. Following Hypotheses 3 and 4, individuals in Conditions 4 and 5 should exhibit

more salient Democratic and American identities, respectively, as well as report a lower or higher importance of having a strong U.S. military. Although these participants did not receive direct identity priming messages, I predict that they experienced two-step priming effects via their discussions with directly primed individuals. Comparisons of these conditions to the control group therefore constitute the primary tests of two-step identity priming.

Additionally, Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that participants who discussed with unprimed individuals after receiving a direct Democratic prime (Condition 6) or a direct American prime (Condition 7) should exhibit stronger Democratic or American identities, respectively, as well as attendant shifts in military attitudes, relative to individuals who received direct primes but did not discuss in groups. Because they were told to expect a discussion, these individuals should have elaborated on the identity prime prior to the interaction, thereby strengthening its effects. The final group of participants engaged in group discussions in which no one had received a direct prime (Condition 8). This condition allows me to rule out the possibility that group discussion alone, rather than two-step identity priming, affects identity salience and attitudes. In other words, this condition serves as a discussion placebo, ensuring that it is necessary for some members of the discussion group to be primed in order to observe the hypothesized effects.

In all discussion conditions, I prompted the interaction by asking the participants to share their views about the article with each other, as well as their reasons for holding those opinions. I used the same prompt for each discussion group, the text of which is in Appendix A. Following previous social science research using discussion groups (e.g., Druckman 2004; Klar 2014), discussion groups lasted from 3-5 minutes and almost always included 4-5

Table 1. Experimental Conditions and Hypotheses

Condition Number and Name	Direct Prime	Discussion Group Composition	Identity Hypothesis	Attitude Hypothesis
Non-Discussion Conditions				
1. Control N = 51	None	N/A	N/A	N/A
2. Democrat Direct Prime N = 38	Democrat	N/A	H1: relative to control, stronger Democratic identification	H2: relative to control, lower military strength importance
3. American Direct Prime N = 48	American	N/A	H1: relative to control, stronger American identification	H2: relative to control, higher military strength importance
Discussion Conditions				
4. Democrat Two-Step Prime N = 42	None	Unprimed/Democrat	H3: relative to control, stronger Democratic identification	H4: relative to control, lower military strength importance
5. American Two-Step Prime N = 47	None	Unprimed/American	H3: relative to control, stronger American identification	H4: relative to control, higher military strength importance
6. Democrat Prime Elaboration N = 46	Democrat	Unprimed/Democrat	H6: relative to Condition 2, stronger Democratic identification	H5: relative to Condition 2, lower military strength importance
7. American Prime Elaboration N = 43	American	Unprimed/American	H6: relative to Condition 3, stronger American identification	H5: relative to Condition 3, higher military strength importance
8. Unprimed Discussion N = 42	None	All Unprimed	N/A (discussion placebo)	

students.[4] Where possible during the sessions with both primed and unprimed participants, the groups were evenly balanced with equal numbers of each.[5] Following the discussions, participants completed the post-treatment questionnaire and were thanked and debriefed. Table 1 summarizes the treatment groups, along with the corresponding hypotheses for each condition.

Results

My experiment measures two outcomes – identity strength and the related issue attitude of military strength importance – that I propose are affected by the same treatments. I therefore report the results of a series of nonparametric combinations to draw broad causal inferences from each related set of hypotheses. Nonparametric combination, or NPC, is designed to test multiple hypotheses derived from the same theory. (For a substantive application of NPC in political science, see Dafoe and Caughey 2016.) A common practice in political science is to report separate p-values for each outcome that the researcher hypothesizes is affected by the same treatment. However, this method assumes that each of these tests are independent, while they are actually likely to be partially *dependent*. With regard to my experiment, the effect of priming an identity on military attitudes will depend, at least in part, on the impact this prime has on identity salience. NPC uses permutation tests to account for correlation between test statistics and calculates a p-value based on the joint probability of observing the full set of results under a

[4] A small number of groups were composed of either 3 or 6 participants.

[5] Equal balance was not possible in groups with odd numbers of discussants, but in no group did one type of participant (primed or unprimed) outnumber the other by more than one.

sharp null (Pesarin and Salmaso 2010). In other words, NPC helps to assess the likelihood of observing the sum of results across multiple outcomes, given a global null hypothesis that the treatment has no effect relevant to the broader theory. NPC is particularly appropriate when research designs are strong but limited in statistical power. Individual tests should be read as conservative ones, with global p-values offering broader insights into the theory at hand.

Table 2. Nonparametric Combination Individual and Global P-Values

Condition Number and Name	Comparison Condition	Democratic P-Value	American P-Value	Military P-Value	Global P-Value
2. Democrat Direct	Control	.057 (H1)	-	.058 (H2)	.008
3. American Direct	Control	-	.059 (H1)	.144 (H2)	.049
4. Democrat Two-Step	Control	.009 (H3)	-	.108 (H4)	.009
5. American Two-Step	Control	-	.045 (H3)	.060 (H4)	.024
6. Democrat Elaboration	Democratic Direct	.144 (H5)	-	.323 (H6)	.104
7. American Elaboration	American Direct	-	.001 (H5)	.291 (H6)	.009

Note: P-values are obtained from one-tailed difference-in-means tests, adjusted for multiple testing.

Following Caughey, Dafoe, and Seawright (2017), Table 2 reports for all hypotheses both a) a global p-value, and b) individual p-values (adjusted for multiple testing) for identity and military attitudes tests. I test my hypotheses with the R package "NPC" (Caughey 2016).[6] Given that my directional predictions are in line with other framing and priming scholarship (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Slothuus 2008; Chong and Druckman 2013), I use one-tailed tests. I

[6] Parallel analyses using non-NPC (i.e., independent difference-in-means) tests reveal nearly identical results, located in Appendix A.

also present three figures, one for each outcome variable (Democratic identity, American identity, and military strength importance). Each figure displays means for each condition.

Figure 1. Effects of Priming and Discussion on Democratic Identity



Note: Points are mean levels of Democratic identity in each condition, with horizontal lines representing 95% confidence intervals. The dotted vertical line is the control group mean.

First, the results provide support for the direct priming hypotheses (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Recall the predictions that those who received a Democratic or American identity prime would report higher levels of the corresponding identity, as well as lower or stronger importance of a strong U.S. military, respectively. Figure 1 shows that those who received a direct Democratic identity prime (Condition 2) displayed a higher average level of Democratic identity than the control group of .24 units (or .36 standard deviations; p=.057). These individuals also reported .38-units (or .42 standard deviations) lower military strength importance (p=.058), displayed in Figure 3. As seen in Figure 2, participants who received a direct American identity priming

message (Condition 3) similarly reported .20 units (.29 standard deviations) higher American identity (p=.059) than the control group. Additionally, Figure 3 shows that they displayed .20 units (.22 standard deviations) higher military strength importance (p=.144). While these individual effects do not meet traditional levels of statistical significance, the NPC global p-

Figure 2. Effects of Priming and Discussion on American Identity



Note: Points are mean levels of Democratic identity in each condition, with horizontal lines representing 95% confidence intervals. The dotted vertical line is the control group mean.

Figure 3. Effects of Priming and Discussion on Military Strength Importance



Note: Points are mean levels of military strength importance in each condition, with horizontal lines representing 95% confidence intervals. The dotted vertical line is the control group mean.

values of .008 (Condition 2) and .049 (Condition 3) demonstrate with a high degree of certainty that the direct priming treatments impacted these participants' identity salience and attitudes.

However, the crux of this experiment is whether direct priming effects are contagious to co-discussants via two-step communication. Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted that those who were not directly primed, but who discussed with participants who received a Democratic or American identity prime, would report higher levels of the corresponding identity and lower or higher military strength importance. These hypotheses receive strong support. Figure 1 shows that individuals who received a two-step Democratic identity prime (Condition 4) reported higher Democratic identity by .27 units (.40 standard deviations; p=.009) than the control group. They also report, as displayed in Figure 3, .25 units lower military strength importance (.28 standard

deviations; p=.108) relative to the control. Moreover, as seen in Figure 2, those who received a two-step American identity prime (Condition 5) displayed a .19-unit (.28 standard deviation) higher average American identity (p=.045). Figure 3 shows an increased importance of military strength of .28 units (.30 standard deviations; p=.060) for these individuals as well. In addition to these individual effects, the NPC global p-values of .009 for Condition 4 and .024 for Condition 5 provide strong evidence that group discussions with participants who received direct priming messages led to indirect priming effects among individuals in the two-step conditions. Thus, the data provide ample support for the two-step identity priming model.

Next, I address Hypotheses 5 and 6, which predicted that the opinions participants who received a direct identity prime *and* discussed in a group would polarize further, relative to those who only received a direct prime and did not discuss. Difference in means tests for Democratic identity and military strength importance between Conditions 2 and 7, and for American identity and military strength importance between Conditions 3 and 8, offer mixed support for these hypotheses. Although all the differences in the outcome measures are in the expected direction, the only statistically significant individual effect is on the measure of American identity between those in the American prime elaboration (Condition 7) and American direct prime (Condition 3) treatment groups. The respective NPC global p-values of .104 and .009 for the Democratic and American prime elaboration conditions suggest that interpersonal interaction may amplify the effects of direct identity primes, but the evidence is more uncertain.

To summarize thus far, direct priming messages impacted the respondents; individuals who received them exhibited more salient identities and changes in their attitudes toward the military. Moreover, participants receiving a two-step identity prime – i.e., those primed via

interpersonal communication with others who were directly primed – exhibited similar effects on their identities and attitudes. However, I document only marginal evidence that discussions amplified priming effects among those who already had received direct primes. This latter finding departs from some prior work (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain 2018), which finds that conversations can amplify framing effects. Priming effects may not strengthen through elaboration in the same manner as framing; further research will help to answer this question.

The data also provide strong evidence that the effects on individuals who discussed with primed participants were not simply due to discussion alone. Comparing the discussion placebo group to the control group permits a test of whether interpersonal interaction had any effects on its own. Individuals in Condition 8 do not differ significantly from the control in their preference for a strong military, Democratic identity, or American identity – nor does a global p-value of .991 approach statistical significance. I can therefore rule out the notion that there was any factor inherent to discussion alone that primed identities and polarized opinions about the military.

Beyond the presence of two-step priming effects, the question remains of whether the strength of priming differs between direct and two-step processes. I document evidence of two-step priming strength relative to direct priming through a series of two-way ANOVA tests, examining the independent effects of prime *content* (no prime, Democratic prime, or American prime) and priming *method* (direct or two-step) on each outcome variable for all conditions. The analyses reveal significant main effects of prime content on Democratic identity (F_{351}=20.09; p<.001), American identity (F_{351}=25.76; p<.001), and military strength importance (F_{352}=17.23; p<.001). However, there are no significant effects of priming method on any variable. These

results suggest that respondents who received two-step identity primes through discussion experienced effects that were just as strong as those for directly-primed participants. The effects are also substantial given the nature of the dependent variables – these outcomes should be expected to resist movement.[7] Attitudes toward the military are often considered to be value-based (Schwartz et al. 2014), and most social identities are stable in their content and strength (Huddy 2001). Therefore, that the two-step treatments produce significant changes in these dependent variables constitutes substantial evidence for a two-step identity priming theory.[8]

Conclusion

The results demonstrate that the effects of political media and elite cues on identity are not limited to the individuals who are directly exposed to them. Rather, when individuals are primed to think about an issue through a particular identity, they can transmit these effects to others via a process of two-step identity priming. Such social interactions prime the same identity among individuals who did not directly come into contact with elite cues, shaping political attitudes in ways relevant to the salient identities. Through this process of social identity

[7] For more information about effect sizes, see Appendix A.

[8] In addition to the hypothesized effects, Figures 1 and 2 provide suggestive evidence that each of the identity primes affects the other identity in the study – i.e., the Democratic prime weakens American identity, while the American prime weakens Democratic identity. It is unclear whether these effects occur due to a "hydraulic" dynamic, where focusing on one identity decreases focus on another (Miller and Krosnick 1996), or whether participants perceive a tension between their partisan and national identities. More research is necessary to better understand these results.

priming contagion, political media can affect those who are less attentive and who would otherwise not be exposed to these messages. In contrast to research that shows how interpersonal discussions can limit elite influence (Druckman and Nelson 2003), when it comes to identity, social interactions serve as additional mechanisms by which elites can shape political attitudes.

By introducing a framework for understanding the interaction between elite messaging and identity priming, this study offers promising opportunities for further research. Perhaps most clearly, future work in this area can establish the exact mechanism through which identity primes are transferred to others through social interaction. Interpersonal influences on identity may be the result of social pressure to conform to the attitudes of the participants' peers (as in Sinclair 2012). It is plausible that the second stage of two-step priming would work in a similar manner. However, it is also possible that primes in this study were passed on by the transmission of information that was designed to pose threats to these two particular groups (see Ahn et al. 2014), or by yet another mechanism not considered here. Further research should measure social pressure and information retention to adjudicate between these mediational possibilities.

It will also be important to document the conditions under which two-step priming holds. For instance, how does the medium of communication affect identity priming contagion? Information tends to get distorted during two-step flows (Carlson 2017), but the medium of communication may moderate this distortion. If two-step priming relies on passing information, then certain forms of communication may be more or less effective. Additionally, if social pressure toward conformity is the driving mechanism, then face-to-face interaction would likely produce stronger effects than contact through social media or other, less immediate interaction.

Two additional elements of the present experiment suggest that the effect estimates from this study may be conservative. First, the identity primes were "sourceless" – beyond the statement that the articles in the experiment came from a major newspaper, the messages were not attributed to any specific political elite figure. Messaging coming from a named elite would likely have an even stronger impact, both through direct and two-step identity priming. Second, the homogeneity of the discussion groups was unknown to the participants. Knowledge of group homogeneity (which would be common among groups of friends, for example) may lead to stronger two-step dynamics – particularly if conformity pressures underlie the effects. Further inquiries should explore how these two factors moderate priming effects.

Finally, what other factors moderate the contagion of identity primes through social interaction? The salience of an identity would likely affect the opportunity for identity priming contagion; if a shared identity between multiple members of a social network is not sufficiently salient, it is unlikely that they would engage in discussion centered on or relevant to this identity. Conversely, salient *issues* should be *less* susceptible to the effects of identity priming contagion. Issues about which individuals have strong prior opinions are likely to be more stable and already linked with specific identities, and thereby less easily influenced by identity priming. In addition, how might different compositions of discussion groups affect the prevalence of two-step priming? In my experiment, participants were evenly balanced in discussion groups with primed and unprimed individuals. Future research should explore the effects of a priming a greater or smaller proportion of the group. Finally, examining the interaction of competing identity priming messages will be a fruitful avenue for continued scholarship. Because social

interaction often involves the confluence of multiple identities, it will be important to better understand how the competition of identity primes in interpersonal discussion is resolved.

The implications of this research relate most directly to the debate over what effects, if any, political media have. Because individuals are increasingly able to self-select into media sources that reinforce existing identity salience (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Stroud 2008), scholars might expect the effects of identity-related messages in political media to be minimal. However, if these priming messages have downstream effects on others through social networks, political media may shape political attitudes in a more extensive manner. This is especially true if, as Sinclair (2012) shows, our social networks are sometimes heterogeneous compositions of identities and attitudes. As political media sources help to define how issues are linked to identities, media consumers will in turn spread these effects to less attentive individuals that share these identities, thereby multiplying the political effects of media messaging.

My argument directly counters the assertion that the contemporary news environment is characterized by a *one*-step communication flow, where news that is fragmented and tailored to individuals diminishes the role of social interaction in disseminating information (Bennett and Manheim 2006). Bennett and Iyengar (2008) also suggest that the contemporary media environment is best characterized as a new era of minimal effects, in which exposure to news media is more likely to reinforce prior dispositions than change attitudes. While these claims may apply to those who directly consume political media, social interactions are not limited to those who share media consumption behaviors, nor does every individual attend closely to political news. These factors leave ample opportunity for identity priming effects to travel from one individual to another. While the effects of individual social interactions might be short-lived

(Chong and Druckman 2010), the ubiquity of political media and social encounters suggests the opportunity for a consistent and ongoing two-step identity priming process.

These results also speak to group polarization, in which members of a deliberating body move their opinions to a more extreme point in the direction of their original dispositions (Sunstein 2002). If deliberators emphasize considerations related to a shared identity, then they will likely prime other discussants to view an issue through the lens of that identity. As a result, messages received through political media can enter deliberation through a two-step process of identity priming, thereby producing more extreme positions as individuals focus on their shared group memberships. While politically attentive citizens may help others to stay informed in an era that allows individuals to opt out of political news, if political media are increasingly tailored towards specific identities, then two-step identity priming might contribute to an overall increase in polarization. Moreover, such indirect identity effects may spread fake news stories that are appealing to individuals with strong partisan identities (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017).

More generally, the two-step priming effects documented here reveal that studying social identity in isolation from political media and elite messaging may deprive scholars of important knowledge of the interactions among these factors. As research in this area develops, it will be essential to integrate theories of news consumption and social interaction simultaneously into the investigation of political identity. Doing so will provide a richer understanding of political behavior and the relationships between citizens and their media environments.

Chapter 3: Identities, Interest Group Coalitions, and Intergroup Relations

* Forthcoming at *Politics, Groups, and Identities*

Abstract: *Interest groups are well known for lobbying and providing information to citizens. However, no extant scholarship explores how the actions of interest groups affect intergroup relations, even though these organizations represent a variety of social identities. I argue that the decisions of interest group leaders to work together or reject collaboration send signals to everyday members of the identity groups they represent about their relations to other groups. In a survey experiment with a nationally representative sample of African-Americans, I vary whether respondents receive information about a successful coalition or a rejected coalition between African-American interest groups and organizations representing another identity. I find that when African-American interest groups successfully form a coalition with a high-solidarity outgroup (e.g., Hispanics), individuals develop greater feelings of closeness with the outgroup and express greater support for policies that benefit that group. However, when leaders of the outgroup organizations reject the coalition, it creates a backlash effect of lower closeness and weaker policy support. This backlash effect does not occur for low-solidarity outgroups (e.g., atheists). These findings suggest that interest groups are an understudied source of elite influence on identity-based perceptions, which can either promote or obstruct harmonious intergroup relationships.*

Political interest groups are potent forces in democracies. They lobby government, advocate for various social groups, and help voters understand complex issues and choose candidates (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). However, policy outcomes and voter competence are not the only metrics by which to evaluate democracies – intergroup relations also

matter. Democratic theorists have long highlighted the importance of group coalitions where citizens from one social group (e.g., African-Americans) tolerate and even work with other groups (e.g., Hispanics) (Althaus 2006). Yet, surprisingly, no extant research has studied how the coalitional actions of interest groups – and particularly interest group leaders – affect the attitudes of citizens. When leaders of one interest group opt to work with another group, do the constituents of each group develop greater closeness? When leaders instead opt to not work together, do the constituents drift apart from one another? There are reasons to think such actions matter: these interest groups represent a variety of social and political identities and the actions of their leaders likely serve as cues to citizens about how different social groups relate (and should relate) to one another.

In what follows, I draw on literatures regarding interest groups, political behavior, and social identity to generate hypotheses about how the actions of interest group leaders shape the way their constituents feel about other groups. I then present the results of a survey experiment implemented to test my predictions. I find elite actions matter for intergroup relationships. Specifically, when leaders of an interest group representing African-Americans forge a coalition with a group with whom there is high pre-existing solidarity (i.e., Hispanics), the organization's constituents come to perceive greater commonality with the other group. They also become more supportive of policies that are in the interest of the other group (e.g., African-Americans develop greater support for policies commonly linked to Hispanics). Yet, I also find that when interest group leaders opt out of working with that other group, it creates a backlash, leading to lower closeness and weaker outgroup policy support. Interestingly, this backlash effect does not occur if the other group is more distant – such as when African-American interest group leaders reject

a coalition with an atheist group or a group representing the physically disabled. Overall, the results suggest that *actions of interest group leaders* affect intergroup relations. Depending on the decisions of their leaderships regarding collaboration, interest groups can be either aids or hinderances to harmonious intergroup relationships.

Interest Groups and Political Behavior

In addition to affecting policy outcomes through direct lobbying, extant research shows that interest groups affect political attitudes and behaviors in a number of ways. Interest groups often provide direct cues by endorsing specific candidates, policies, or initiatives. For instance, when voters lack specific information about a policy or candidate they can use interest group endorsements to make seemingly reasoned choices (Lupia 1992). Existing research also shows that citizens are largely aware of such messages – when interest groups make endorsements, citizens know about them and use them to form their political judgments (Benjamin and Miller 2017). When a liberal organization endorses a policy initiative, for example, Democrats might then support the initiative while Republicans oppose it (Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009).

However, interest groups can affect citizens' preferences in ways other than direct messages. The *actions* taken by organizations also impact how citizens feel about various policies. Interest groups have limited resources of money, time, and personnel, and so the ways in which they expend these resources send signals about the impact of a proposed initiative, referendum, or legislative proposal. Moreover, such actions offer cues that are more credible than simple endorsements. While it costs little to endorse a candidate, spending money to put an initiative on the ballot or advocate for its passage is a costly action, thereby signaling a credible commitment from the interest group in question (Gerber 1999). The more resources a group is

willing to spend, the more important it must be to them and their members (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). For instance, knowing how much money the Sierra Club has spent on an environmental policy initiative will signal to voters how important the initiative is to that organization, and therefore how much of a change from the status quo it will entail.

Alas, despite scholarship demonstrating that the actions of interest groups and their leaders can shape political attitudes, political scientists have not explored the ways in which they shape relations among the groups of citizens they represent. I argue that coalitions of interest groups that represent specific identity groups can shape feelings of commonality between these groups, as well as the level of policy support members of one group extend to another. In order to understand why such interest group coalitions will produce these effects, it is important to comprehend the foundations of the identities they represent and their relation to political attitudes.

Social Identity Theory

The groups to which humans belong influence a wide range of perceptions and attitudes. An individual understands herself largely through the social categories to which she perceives herself as belonging (Tajfel and Turner 1979). These categories, or social identities, help people categorize themselves and others and therefore offer cues about how individuals ought to think and act (Walsh 2004).

Social Identity Theory (SIT) provides a framework for understanding the impact of social identity on intergroup relations, including positive and negative attitudes toward outgroups and their members. Building on the knowledge that social categorizations function as cognitive tools

to understand and navigate the social world, SIT suggests that humans make sense of their environments largely by categorizing themselves and others into social groups (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Tajfel and Turner 1979). In using such categorizations as social guidance, an individual compares the groups to which she belongs, or ingroups, to those to which she does not belong, or outgroups. The more these comparisons take place, the more that individual will perceive common characteristics and a common fate with other members of her ingroup (Turner 1975). By contrast, individuals will perceive less commonality with members of outgroups. As a result, when the status of one's ingroup is seen as protected, one feels reassured; conversely, when the status of an ingroup is perceived as unclear or under siege, a sense of threat is induced (Tajfel and Turner 1979). To the degree that individuals behave in accordance with SIT, they will not necessarily seek to maximize ingroup resources; rather, they will attempt to maximize the relative status of their ingroup compared to salient outgroups (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel et al. 1971). The motivation for such actions is based in not in an inherent preference for outgroup failure, but rather the desire to promote the status of one's ingroup (Brewer 1999).

In short, outgroups that heighten the status of one's ingroup will be viewed and treated more favorably, while those that threaten an ingroup's status will be viewed and treated unfavorably. The political implications of these tendencies are numerous. Comparative political successes or failures (for example, between parties) are a common dimension on which intergroup comparisons are made (Huddy 2001; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Therefore, these policy-based group comparisons provide an intuitive way for citizens to form political judgments about outgroups and policies related to them (Achen and Bartels 2016). For instance, individuals with a strong rural identity often dislike city-dwellers and oppose the redistributive

policies they associate with this group (Cramer 2016). Whites also become increasingly opposed to immigration as the possibility of a majority-minority population grows more likely (Craig and Richeson 2014).

Importantly, the degree to which a social identity influences any particular political attitude or behavior can vary greatly. Self-categorization theory suggests that the more salient a particular identity is in a given moment, the more an individual's behavior will be driven by the norms of that identity, including promoting the group's interest (Turner 1987; Turner and Reynolds 2012). Such identity salience is open to a number of inputs, including political elites, who can influence the application of identities through a process known as identity priming. Individuals often have multiple identities that could be applied to a political issue, but cannot consider each one simultaneously (Druckman and Lupia 2016; Klar 2013; McLeish and Oxoby 2011). Elite actors therefore have the opportunity to prime a particular identity by emphasizing its importance in their communications. For instance, female candidates can gain support among women by emphasizing gender identity in their advertisements (Holman, Schneider, and Pondel 2015).

I argue that interest groups that claim to represent particular identities – e.g., the NAACP or Human Rights Campaign – are an understudied but potent source of top-down influence on the application of identities to political judgments. As Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) note, opinion leaders tend to be most effective when they are in some way "representative" of those they influence. Elected officials have incentives to broaden their electoral constituencies as wide as possible (Fenno 1978). As a result, they are not able to make claims to represent any particular group of people. Interest groups, by contrast, necessarily make particularistic claims

on government, often for the benefit of one specific identity group. Therefore, advocacy organizations can lay claim to representing the interests of a social group in a more explicit manner than other political elites.

Interest Group Coalitions and Intergroup Closeness

How might identity interest group leaders impact the attitudes of their constituents? Here I focus on one of the most important activities such groups take: the formation of coalitions with organizations representing other identity groups. Interest group leaders often form coalitions to achieve their political goals, taking advantage of resources and networking to push for public policy (Hula 1999; Kollman 1998). Coalitions also increase visibility and facilitate lobbying, thereby demonstrating broad support among the public (Holyoke 2003). These cues increase perceptions of an organization's power, helping it to achieve policy goals (Hula 1999). The practice of coalition-building may be particularly common among organizations centered on social identities (Strolovitch 2007). For instance, consider the collaboration between African-American and immigrant advocacy groups to defeat anti-immigration legislation in Mississippi (Eaton 2011), or the coalition including women's and Hispanic organizations that secured guaranteed paid sick leave in Chicago (Doussard and Lesniewski 2017). While many coalitions are formed between likely allies, others are comprised of stranger bedfellows. The Coalition for Public Safety, for example, involves collaborative prison reform efforts among conservative organizations, such as the Faith and Freedom Coalition, and liberal interest groups, such as the NAACP (Coalition for Public Safety). In addition to securing policy goals, how might these coalitions shape the attitudes of citizens whose identities are represented by the constitutive interest groups? While interest group actions affect citizens' opinions and coalitions are a major

type of such action, there has been virtually no scholarly exploration of how these coalitions themselves affect opinions.

I argue that coalitions will impact individuals' perceptions of outgroups involved in these political collaborations. When leaders of one interest group form a coalition with an outgroup organization, it sends a signal to members of each identity group represented in the coalition. I argue that this type of coalition will lead to greater perceived commonality with, or closeness to, the outgroup. Individuals who believe they share a common political fate with an outgroup also tend to possess greater feelings of closeness to that outgroup (Craig and Richeson 2012). Political elites can affect such feelings of closeness – as Strolovitch (2007, 59) notes, perceptions of intergroup relations are often determined by political actors such as advocacy organizations who construct particular intergroup narratives by framing issues and interests in specific ways (see also Wallsten and Nteta 2011). In short, when ingroup and outgroup political organizations form a visible coalition to pursue shared goals, individuals belonging to the ingroup should feel greater commonality with members of the outgroup.[9] As interest groups collaborate with one

[9] Terms such as closeness and commonality are sometimes used synonymously with others such as "superordinate identity" or "common identity" – i.e., a broader, overarching identity that comprise multiple identity groups (Craig and Richeson 2016; Gaertner et al. 1993; Wenzel, Mummendey, and Waldzus 2007). It is possible that interest group coalitions may create such superordinate identities. However, given that the boundaries between intergroup closeness and common identities are not always clear, I focus here on closeness and reserve the exploration of superordinate identities for further research.

another, they signal a set of shared interests and common goals to those they represent. Extant research indeed finds that participating in advocacy coalitions tends to produce feelings of solidarity and linked fate between members of different organizations (Levi and Murphy 2006; Strolovitch 2007). The psychological foundations of these impacts are also present in everyday citizens who identify with the groups, even if they do not directly participate in the coalition. Individuals who view this collaboration should also develop greater support for the outgroup's political agenda. When individuals feel greater closeness to an outgroup, they tend to support policies that benefit the outgroup as well (Craemer 2008).

I thus offer a set of concrete hypotheses regarding the effects of information about the coalitional activities of identity-based interest groups. Prior research suggests that coalitions promote the perception of shared interests and challenges, thereby promoting intergroup closeness. Therefore, when identity-representative interest groups collaborate with outgroup organizations, individuals will report greater commonality with the outgroup (*Hypothesis 1a)*. This commonality should manifest as perceptions of similarity, shared values, and common interests (Conover 1984; Craig and Richeson 2012; Turner and Reynolds 2012).

However, interest groups sometimes choose to reject collaboration in pursuit of their shared political goals, instead opting to work through parallel efforts toward the same end. In these instances, the effects of rejecting a coalition should be dependent upon extant solidarity with the outgroup, or the degree to which an individual believes their ingroup should be political allies with the outgroup and would benefit from doing so. These beliefs may stem from value beliefs (Howat 2019), perceptions of shared fate (Craig and Richeson 2016), or noticeable common political struggles (Subašić, Reynolds, and Turner 2008). The important, central

concept is a belief in the important of and an expectation of intergroup political support. The level of solidarity will affect individuals' expectations about what outgroup organizations will do when faced with the opportunity for collaboration. For high-solidarity outgroups (or outgroups with which ingroup individuals have a high degree of extant solidarity), individuals will have an expectation of shared interests between the two groups, and therefore also of collaboration when the opportunity arises. Violations of this expectation, in turn, should produce a backlash effect for not collaborating and lead to weaker perceptions of commonality. I therefore predict that when interest groups representing high-solidarity outgroups explicitly choose not to form a coalition with ingroup organizations, individuals will report lower closeness with the outgroup (*Hypothesis 1b*).

Reactions to the actions of low-solidarity interest groups should differ, however. Prior expectations of group members' behaviors can moderate or even alter responses to their actual behaviors (Jussim, Coleman, and Lerch 1987; Biernat, Vescio, and Billings 1999). In other words, individuals assign meaning to others' actions in different ways depending on the prior expectations of those actors. Low solidarity groups should not be expected to collaborate; thus, when interest groups representing low-solidarity outgroups make similar decisions to reject a coalition, there should be no backlash effect as this lack of collaboration does not signal a departure from prior understandings of shared goals, traits, and values. Instead, the demonstration of shared interests that comes with pursuing the same political goals side-by-side should lead to stronger perceptions of commonality with the outgroup (*Hypothesis 1c*). Put differently, reactions to low-solidarity interest groups forming a coalition with organizations

representing one's ingroup should not differ significantly from responses to low-solidarity interest groups rejecting a coalition, instead choosing to pursue the same policies on their own.

I also expect the changes in reported closeness resulting from elite decisions about coalitions to affect individuals' support for policies important to the outgroup. When an individual perceives greater commonality with an outgroup, that individual should be more likely to support policies for which the outgroup advocates. Therefore, when identity-representative interest groups collaborate with outgroup organizations, individuals should express greater support for policies that are identified as important to the outgroup (*Hypothesis 2a)*. When it comes to outgroup organizations rejecting collaboration with ingroup interest groups, the effects should again be contingent upon pre-existing levels of solidarity. When high-solidarity outgroup interest groups explicitly decide not to collaborate with ingroup organizations, individuals should report lower support for outgroup-oriented policies (*Hypothesis 2b*). This backlash effect for not collaborating should not occur for low-solidarity outgroups, however. When organizations representing low-solidarity outgroups reject collaboration, but nevertheless pursue the same policies, these actions demonstrate a set of shared interests that was not previously apparent. Therefore, individuals who receive this type of information should report greater support for outgroup policies (*Hypothesis 2c*).

Experiment

Participants and Group Selection

My theory centers on how members of one social group perceive members of another group in light of elite decisions about political collaboration. I opted to focus on African-Americans as the main target group – that is, the group about whose reactions to elite behaviors I

study. I obtained a nationally representative (but non-probability) sample of non-Hispanic African-American adults (N=1045) via Bovitz, Inc.'s Forthright research panel.[10] In Table 1, I compare the demographics of the sample with the 2016 American National Election Study probability sample. The table shows that my sample, while slightly younger and more female than the population, closely matches the population on ideology and partisanship. These similarities suggest that respondents in my sample were likely to respond to treatments in ways that are representative of African-Americans more broadly, providing a strong foundation for generalizability.

My hypotheses about elite coalition effects are conditional upon the level of extant mass solidarity with an outgroup – I therefore chose three outgroups. First, I selected Hispanics as a "high solidarity" outgroup. African-Americans and Hispanics share the identity dimensions of racial or ethnic minority – this is particularly true in the political domain where both groups remain underrepresented in elected offices (Lieb 2016). Moreover, the relationship between African-Americans and Hispanics has been an important factor in black political outcomes (e.g., Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1986; McClain and Karnig 1990) and will likely continue to be so as a growing Hispanic population moves to cities with large numbers of African-Americans (Jones-Correa 2011). As a result, African-Americans should have a greater propensity to feel solidarity with Hispanics (Craig and Richeson 2016): they should respond positively to coalitions among elites representing those groups (Hypotheses 1a and 2a) but negatively to rejected collaboration (Hypotheses 1b and 2b).

[10] https://www.beforthright.com/for-researchers.

Table 1. Sample Characteristics Compared to 2016 American National Election Study

Variable	**Sample Percent**	**2016 ANES Percent**
African-American	100%	100%
Female	61.7%	56.7%
Democrat	72.9%	78.9%
Republican	5.1%	8.4%
Liberal	41.4%	39.1%
Conservative	16.1%	23.1%
US-born	95.9%	92.9%
Variable	**Sample Median**	**2016 ANES Median**
Education	2-year/Associate's degree	Some college but no degree
Income	$30,000 to $69,999	$30,000 to $34,999
Age	39	41

Note: The ANES sample is restricted to African-American respondents and weighted appropriately. Independents leaning toward one party are grouped with partisans.

For my "low solidarity" outgroup, I opted to include atheists. Atheists are highly marginalized as a social group, with African-Americans being especially opposed to atheist politicians (Clifford and Gaskins 2016) and likely to say that atheists do not share their worldview (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006). As a result, African-Americans should have low extant expectations for coalitions with atheist interest groups. Incorporating this outgroup into my study allows me to test whether collaboration between ingroup elites and low-solidarity outgroup elites produces heightened closeness (Hypothesis 1a) and outgroup policy support (Hypothesis 2a). I am also able to test whether a low-solidarity outgroup's decision *not* to collaborate avoids the backlash effects of lower closeness (Hypothesis 1c) and lower outgroup policy support (Hypothesis 2c), because there is no expectation of a coalition.

Finally, I included a third outgroup – individuals with physical disabilities. I added this group because individuals generally hold positive feelings toward people with physical disabilities (Coleman 2013), but African-Americans as a social group do not share an identity

dimension with physically disabled individuals (as they do with Hispanics). Therefore, expectations of collaboration should be lower for this outgroup than for Hispanics but higher than for atheists – i.e., disabled individuals are a "medium solidarity" outgroup. Incorporating this outgroup allows me to differentiate the conditioning effects of positive affect from expectations of coalition formation when it comes to the effects of elite coalitions. I do not have any formal expectations about the differential effects of accepted and rejected coalitions with medium solidarity outgroups.

My survey included data that speak to my assumptions about solidarity. It had an item that asked about respondents' attitudes toward working with each of the three outgroups in politics. I present solidarity data from an experimental control group (N=109), which I describe in greater detail below. I operationalize solidarity with each outgroup by measuring agreement or disagreement (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) to the following statement: The problems of African-Americans and [Hispanics/physically disabled individuals/atheists] are similar enough for them to be political allies or partners. As Figure 1 shows, solidarity among African-Americans with Hispanics (5.28) is above the midpoint of the scale (4.0 out of 7.0; $p < .001$), while solidarity with atheists (2.82) lies below this midpoint ($p < .001$). Solidarity with physically disabled individuals, by contrast, does not differ significantly from the scale midpoint ($p < .15$). Moreover, solidarity with each of the outgroups in this study is significantly different from each of the other two outgroups ($p < .001$ for all comparisons). These numbers substantiate my treatment of Hispanics as a high solidarity outgroup, atheists as a low solidarity outgroup, and individuals with physical disabilities as a medium solidarity outgroup.

Figure 1. Extant Solidarity with Each Outgroup in the Control Condition



Note: Bars represent mean solidarity scale scores in the control group with reference to each outgroup. The dashed line represents the scale midpoint.

To be clear, the information presented in Figure 1 does not necessarily predict which outgroups respondents will view as possessing the greatest level of commonality with them, nor does it necessarily suggest toward which groups respondents will show the greatest levels of policy support. Rather, these pre-existing levels of solidarity suggest how individuals will respond to information about the successful formation or rejection of political coalitions between their ingroup and a specified outgroup. In other words, solidarity is a distinct concept from both perceived closeness and support for outgroup policies—both of which may have varied baseline levels that are independent from solidarity.

Political Issue

The issue on which I focus for potential elite collaboration is the 2006 renewal of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA). The renewal and the activities of political organizations in favor of it represented an opportunity for collaboration between African-American elites and other actors toward an important political goal. One of the most recognized achievements of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the VRA increased voter turnout and electoral representation among racial and ethnic minorities including African-Americans and Hispanics (Fraga and Merseth 2016; Lien et al. 2007). A 1982 amendment to the law further provided voting assistance to those with disabilities or other needs (Howard and Howard 1983). While the VRA does not specifically pertain to atheists, the broad social distrust of that group makes it plausible that its members would be concerned about renewing the law to preserve voting rights more generally. The VRA was in fact renewed in part due to the influence of a multiracial and multiethnic coalition of interest groups (Tucker 2007); thus, incorporating this topic into my experiment also heightens the external validity of the study. Each of the treatments the respondents received involves African-American interest group leaders taking action to ensure the VRA's renewal.

Design and Procedure

Individuals in the (African-American) sample were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions in a survey experiment in March 2018. Those in the control group did not read a vignette and only completed the post-treatment items described below. I randomly assigned other respondents to one of six main treatments that fully crossed each outgroup (Hispanics, physically disabled individuals, or atheists) with the decision of interest group

leaders to collaborate or work separately ("*coalition*" or "*rejected coalition*"). Respondents assigned to one of three "*coalition*" conditions read a vignette describing African-American interest groups pursuing renewal of the VRA, with organizations representing a single outgroup (Hispanics, physically disabled individuals, or atheists) directly collaborating with African-American interest groups. These vignettes were designed to look like textbook passages. In particular, the vignettes include a title summarizing the content of the following paragraph, background information about the VRA, and information about each group appropriate for a particular treatment assignment. Respondents were also asked to assess the quality and informativeness of the passages. Importantly, information that is similar to these textbook vignettes is also abundant in news stories and popular outlets (Doussard and Lesniewski 2017; Eaton 2011; Hulse 2017). The coalition conditions using such vignettes allow me to test whether coalitions between groups increase closeness and policy support.

Other respondents assigned to one of three "*rejected coalition*" conditions read a vignette in which interest group leaders representing one of the three outgroups explicitly chose not to collaborate with African-American interest groups to renew the VRA, instead pursuing the goal on their own. These conditions allow me to explore the potential for backlash effects when interest group leaders actively choose to not collaborate. I further assigned a separate group of respondents to a "*working alone*" condition, in which they saw a vignette describing African-American interest groups working on their own to pursue renewal of the (VRA) with no mention of any other political group. This condition acts a placebo test, allowing me to ensure that any effects I observe are not simply the result of mentioning the activities of African-American interest groups and are in fact due to collaboration (or rejection thereof) with other groups. Each

experimental condition is summarized in Table 2 and the full texts of the vignettes appear in Appendix B.

Table 2. Experimental Conditions

Condition	**Outgroup**	**Treatment**
Control	N/A	N/A
Working alone	N/A	Working alone
Rejected coalition Hispanic	Hispanics	Rejected coalition
Coalition Hispanic	Hispanics	Coalition
Rejected coalition disabled	Phys. disabled	Rejected coalition
Coalition disabled	Phys. disabled	Coalition
Rejected coalition atheist	Atheists	Rejected coalition
Coalition atheist	Atheists	Coalition

Following the treatments, I asked respondents to complete my main outcome measures. These items included a commonality or closeness measure, to test Hypothesis 1, that asks the respondents to answer the question, "How close do you feel in your ideas, interests, and feelings to [Hispanics/people with physical disabilities/atheists]?" This item assesses the degree to which respondents feel a sense of commonality with each distinct outgroup. (For use of similar survey items to measure commonality and closeness, see Craig and Richeson 2012; Glasford and Calcagno 2012).

To test Hypothesis 2, I measured outgroup policy support with six items, two for each outgroup. Three of these items measure support for a specific policy for which each outgroup advocates by asking the following: "Many organizations representing [Hispanics/people with physical disabilities/atheists] favor laws that [require public schools to provide bilingual education – that is, education in both English and Spanish/require states to pay for at-home care for the disabled/prevent the Ten Commandments from being displayed on public properties, such as courthouses]. To what extent do you oppose or support such laws?" These policies are

comparable in that they require public action to address a need or desire of the outgroup and include explicit cues that the policies are important to the relevant outgroup, ensuring that respondents are not just responding to policy content. Respondents expressed support on a seven-point scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly support). In addition to support for specific outgroup policies, I asked respondents to respond to the following statements: "It is important to me that policies [Hispanics/physically disabled individuals/atheists] care about are enacted." Responses again ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). From the specific and general policy support items, I created separate two-item indices of policy support for Hispanics (α=.71), individuals with physical disabilities (α=.74), and atheists (α=.79) to use in hypothesis testing.

Each variable is coded so that higher scores indicate more positive outgroup attitudes. Additionally, I measured responses to all outcome items with respect to all outgroups, so as to standardize the survey across respondents.

Results

I test my hypotheses with a series of difference-in-means tests,[11] comparing the values of relevant dependent variables in the each of the treatment groups to the control.[12,13] Due to my clear directional hypotheses, I employ one-sided tests where appropriate (see Blalock 1979). Figures 2 and 3 display mean levels of commonality with and policy support (respectively) for each outgroup in relevant conditions. The left-hand panels in these figures shows mean values of

[11] Because I conduct many related tests, I include in the appendix a correction for multiple hypothesis testing. These adjusted results offer conclusions that are nearly identical to those I present here. Moreover, I offer alternate analyses utilizing interaction-based regression models in Table A.6. The conclusions of these analyses do not differ substantially from those presented here.

[12] Although all respondents completed all outcome variables with respect to each of the three outgroups, I only present data from the "coalition" and "rejected coalition" treatment groups that correspond to the outgroups in their respective vignettes. For example, I do not analyze attitudes toward Hispanics among the coalition atheist group, nor do I present results regarding attitudes about individuals with disabilities in the rejected coalition Hispanic condition. A complete set of outcome variable means for all conditions is located in the appendix.

[13] In the appendix, I present two additional series of results: the first comparing each treatment group to the working alone condition instead of the control, and the second pooling the control and working alone conditions as the comparison point. These tests produce largely similar results with differences in the expected directions, although the atheist conditions often do not differ significantly from the working alone group itself.

closeness with Hispanics and support for Hispanic policies for the control, working alone, rejected coalition Hispanic, and coalition Hispanic conditions. The middle and right-hand panels show analogous means for each of the other two outgroups, using the coalition and rejected coalition conditions appropriate for each.

Figure 2 provides ample support for Hypothesis 1a – that coalitions between ingroup and outgroup elites lead to greater feelings of closeness with the outgroup. Compared to the control group, respondents in the coalition Hispanic condition who read a vignette about Hispanic organizations collaborating with African-American interest groups reported higher commonality by .40 units ($p < .05$). Individuals in the coalition atheist condition also reported significantly higher levels of commonality with atheists than the control group by .70 units ($p < .01$). The one exception for Hypothesis 1 is respondents assigned to the coalition disabled condition, who did not increase their reported closeness with disabled individuals compared to the control group. This lack of difference may be the result of high baseline levels of closeness with this group (5.1 out of 7.0 in the control condition) leading to a ceiling effect.

The data also supply considerable evidence for Hypotheses 1b and 1c, which state that elites rejecting coalitions lead to decreased closeness when pre-existing outgroup solidarity is high, but do not produce backlash when extant solidarity is low. Indeed, in contrast to conditions in which interest outgroup organization leaders collaborate with African-American interest groups, the effects of information about rejected coalitions were conditional upon pre-existing solidarity. As expected, when presented with information about a rejected coalition between African-Americans and Hispanics, those in the rejected coalition Hispanic condition (a high

solidarity condition) exhibit a backlash effect by reporting a significantly lower commonality with Hispanics of .38 units ($p < .05$).

Figure 2. Effects of Interest Group Coalitions on Reported Commonality



Note: Points are mean levels of commonality in each condition for the respective outgroup, with horizontal bars representing 95% confidence intervals. The dotted vertical line in each panel is the control group mean for that outgroup.

However, respondents assigned to the rejected coalition atheist treatment (a low solidarity condition) report a higher average level of commonality with atheists (.84 units; $p < .001$). As predicted, due to low pre-existing solidarity with atheists, these respondents display an effect similar to those in the coalition atheist group instead of exhibiting a backlash effect. In other words, the simple demonstration of shared interests or goals with a low-solidarity outgroup is sufficient to increase evaluations of that group, as there is no expectancy violation and therefore no risk of backlash. Similarly to the coalition disabled condition, respondents in the rejected coalition disabled condition did not differ significantly from the control group in their closeness

with physically disabled individuals. Despite the lack of effects with regard to the disabled outgroup, the data offer substantial evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. Coalitions among interest groups increase perceptions of commonality, regardless of pre-existing solidarity. However, parallel efforts toward the same political goal without collaboration produce backlash effects of lower closeness in the presence of high solidarity. By contrast, these dynamics lead to increased closeness when prior solidarity is low.

Elite relationships do not only impact perceptions of intergroup closeness – they shape support for outgroup policies as well. Figure 3 displays the results for tests of Hypothesis 2, which also receives considerable support from the data. In each condition where respondents differed from the control group in their closeness with an outgroup, they also reported accompanying shifts in their support for policies related to that outgroup. Beginning with Hypothesis 2a, which states that coalitions increase policy support for outgroups, respondents in the coalition Hispanic condition exhibit greater support for Hispanic-oriented policies than the control group by .36 units ($p < .05$). Moreover, those assigned to the coalition atheist group reported .45 units greater policy support for policies related to atheists than the control ($p < .05$). The coalition disabled treatment (along with the rejected coalition disabled treatment) again produced no effects; as with commonality, these non-effects may be the result of strong baseline support for disability-related policies among the control group (5.9 out of 7.0) compared to low baseline support for atheist policies (3.2).

Hypotheses 2b and 2c suggest that outgroup policy support will decrease through a backlash effect when solidarity with an outgroup is high but not when solidarity is low – these predictions are also well supported in Figure 3. The coalition Hispanic condition shows a

backlash effect of a rejected coalition between Hispanic and African-American interest groups, showing lower support for Hispanic-oriented policies than the control group by .33 units (albeit at a slightly more modest significance level; $p < .07$). Respondents in the rejected coalition atheist condition, however, again showed no backlash effect, exhibiting .58 units more support for atheist-related policies ($p < .01$). Despite the lack of collaboration, the demonstration of shared interests produced greater policy support for this low-solidarity outgroup.

Figure 3. Effects of Interest Group Coalitions on Outgroup Policy Support



Note: Points are mean scores on the policy support scale in each condition for the respective outgroup, with horizontal bars representing 95% confidence intervals. The dotted vertical line in each panel is the control group mean for that outgroup.

Finally, there is no outgroup for which the working alone condition differs significantly from the control group – this is true for both outcomes of closeness and outgroup policy support. These results suggest that the effects I document are not simply due to African-American interest

groups taking action on the VRA – they are instead direct results of the interactions between elites representing African-Americans and the various outgroups.

In sum, the results of my experiment show that elite coalitions have substantial effects on the attitudes individuals have toward everyday outgroup members. When elites such as interest group leaders from one's ingroup and an outgroup choose to collaborate in pursuing political goals, everyday members of these social groups develop greater closeness and support policies important to outgroup members. When they explicitly choose not to work together, however, likely allies suffer a backlash effect. In other words, unmet expectations of collaboration may hurt intergroup relations more than when elites simply have no interactions at all. This backlash effect does not arise for unlikely allies, however, perhaps opening the door for improvements in intergroup relations with groups with which ingroup elites are unlikely to collaborate directly.

Conclusion

The results of this study demonstrate that elite actions matter for intergroup relations. The decisions that interest group leaders make about forming or rejecting coalitions offer cues to the individuals they represent about how to relate to one another. When ingroup organization leaders collaborate with outgroup elites, individuals develop greater closeness with and policy support for the outgroup at large. When high-solidarity outgroups reject a coalition, this creates a backlash effect that leads to lower outgroup closeness and policy support. For low-solidarity outgroups, however, there is no equivalent threat of backlash – even rejecting a coalition and pursuing goals in parallel offers intergroup benefits for groups with low extant solidarity. The effects of an outgroup's political goals and actions, then, depend on the pre-existing expectations of that group.

Establishing the importance of elite coalitions to intergroup relations offers several opportunities for further inquiry. For instance, how do different identity groups respond to elite coalitions? For minority groups, political successes may require working together with other groups in a way that is not necessary for groups in positions of greater power. Identity groups that perceive a greater importance of coalitions may respond more strongly to the dynamics identified above, offering greater benefits from successful coalitions and sharper punishments for rejected collaboration. Additionally, do the actions of various types of political elites affect intergroup relations in different ways? Elected officials work together to create policies and garner support for their initiatives, but these collaborative efforts are often framed differently than those among interest groups. Future research can determine whether these collaborations can affect intergroup relationships as interest group coalitions do.

The type of issues on which interest groups collaborate may also moderate their impacts on intergroup relations. In the present study, I examine the impact of jointly pursuing voting rights protections. However, coalitions formed around distributive or economic issues may provoke additional feelings of intergroup competition rather than commonality (see Wilkinson 2017), which in turn interfere with the intergroup benefits that I document here. Similarly, what are the limits of the types of outgroups that can enjoy benefits from collaboration between organizations? Outgroups that are too liked or disliked may be immune to the effects I identify here, but more research will be needed to determine these boundaries. Future research ought to also further investigate the connections between the identity-related results I document here and coalition-building strategies. Identity and strategic policy concerns are difficult to untangle, given the reciprocal influences between policy and identity. However, increased perceived

closeness may not be necessary for elite actions to improve policy support under all circumstances. Additional work in this area can clarify the specific relationships between these concepts.

Additionally, the reader may note that the specified hypotheses enjoy support most consistently for Hispanics and atheists as outgroups, and less so for physically disabled individuals. It is possible that attitudes about populations who are perceived to be particularly vulnerable may be less susceptible to the effects of successful and rejected coalitions. More generally, the boundaries of which groups to which the theory of this paper most readily applies ought to be clarified in future research.

This study suggests there are previously understudied connections between political elites and social identities in the mass public. More precisely, I document a new dimension of the politics-to-identity link, in which political identities and the attitudes they impact are subject to broader contextual influences (Silber Mohamed 2017). Social identity theory states that individuals use their group memberships to make sense of the world, including questions of politics and relations to other groups. Direct endorsements from ingroup elites have been shown to impact outgroup candidate evaluations (Benjamin 2017). However, little research until now has identified ways in which social identity heuristics engage with elite actions to affect attitudes about everyday group members. Group attachments, pre-existing relationships between identity groups, and the actions of elites representing these groups interact to engender feelings of closeness or distance, as well as increased or decreased support for outgroup policies. Therefore, interest groups can be both aids and hinderances to positive intergroup relations. Moreover, my results extend knowledge about interest group influences in that they deal with coalitional

actions, rather than just endorsements. The findings also suggest a potential pathway for interest groups representing political minorities to enlarge their political power, where working alone may leave them underrepresented. Identifying shared interests with other disadvantaged groups can help not only to secure immediate policy goals, but also to garner support from the other group for future endeavors. Finally, by highlighting previous instances of successful coalitions, narratives around past cooperation may also strengthen future political alliances.

Chapter 4: Effects of Political Conflict among Outgroups

* With Ethan Busby, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson University

Abstract: *Politics often involves complex combinations of groups aligning on various sides. How do these relationships affect citizens' opinions? Particularly, what happens when one observes groups of which they are not members engaging in conflict or coalition? We address these questions by drawing on balance theory. We hypothesize that individuals react to conflict between two liked outgroups by adopting more negative attitudes towards the less-liked group. We test our predictions with two survey experiments – one conducted on a convenience sample and one with a nationally representative sample. Study 1 indicates that when a liked group and a disliked group clash, individuals do not change their evaluations of these outgroups – their prior opinions persist. By contrast, when political conflict involves two liked outgroups, individuals adopt more negative affect for and express lower solidarity with the lesser-liked group. We confirm these findings with Study 2, where we observe similar behavior. We also discuss the limits of these effects, which do not extend to evaluations of specific candidates or policies. Our results suggest that intergroup conflict can do more than just shift attitudes among those involved; it also impacts third-party observers and potential allies.*

> The outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it. That is, the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion
> E.E. Schattschneider (1960, p. 2).

A great deal of research in political science considers political attitudes, behaviors, and participation to be a product of feelings towards various social and political groups (Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kam 2009). This group-focused perspective need not assume that

groups are all that matters in politics, but it emphasizes that attitudes towards groups shape power dynamics and politics. Thus far, this research largely explores the political importance of an individual's relationship with a single social group (whether that be a group to which the individual belongs or a social outgroup).

However, politics involve numerous groups who have different relationships with one another. Moreover, these relationships are not static. While many long-standing coalitions exist in American politics, the boundaries and dynamics of these coalitions shift over time in response to the emergence of newly salient issues (Ray, 1999) and the development of new issue information (Visser, 1994). The group environment of politics constantly shifts, and understanding these changes can provide crucial insight into the scope of political conflict (Schattschneider, 1960) and the attitudes of the public at large. Despite this, little extant scholarship documents how changing relationships among social groups (and therefore among potential coalition members) affect the attitudes of third-party observers.

Drawing on balance theory from psychology, our research uses two experiments to build on group-based research by exploring how complex networks of groups shape political attitudes and how existing coalitions may be affected by internal conflicts. Our first study focuses on how shifting relationships between outgroups create changes in attitudes about those groups and support for policies that focus on those groups. We find that political conflict between two previously liked outgroups leads to a devaluation of one of these groups, along with lower political support for that outgroup. However, and in keeping with balance theory, we find no such effects as a result of political conflict between a liked outgroup and a disliked outgroup. Our second experiment, conducted with a more diverse sample, replicates Study 1 and considers

a wider range of political outcomes. Through these studies, we apply psychological theories to an important political phenomenon to better understand group-based attitudes and provide insight into how group-based coalitions form and fall apart in the fluid world of politics.

Social Groups and Intergroup Conflict

Social groups are among the most influential forces in democratic politics. Individuals use the groups to which they belong —their "ingroups"—and the personal meanings they attach to these group memberships to understand and navigate everyday life (Tajfel 1981). In addition to providing a sense of shared traits and community with others, social identities offer heuristics to promote self-image and self-interest (Monroe, Hankin, and van Vechten 2000). As part of this heuristic process, individuals rely on their ingroup memberships to make judgments about politics. For instance, black racial identity often leads African-Americans to support co-racial candidates (Dawson 1995), and religious group memberships can impact attitudes about immigration policies (Margolis 2018).

Importantly, the relationships between social groups also structure political attitudes and behaviors. In particular, conflict between one's ingroup and an outgroup—a group to which an individual does not belong—affects attitudes toward the outgroup and about policies related to it. Key's (1949) foundational study demonstrated that Southern whites voted for segregationist candidates at higher rates in areas with greater interracial contact. Similarly, perceived conflict over resources between native and immigrant groups can drive attitudes toward immigration (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998) and structure African-Americans' attitudes toward Latinos (Gay 2006). Even partisan polarization may be best understood as conflict between party-based identity groups (Mason, 2018).

However, the behavioral research on political intergroup conflict focuses almost exclusively on how this conflict affects the attitudes and voting behaviors of members of one of two groups in a dyadic conflict. In other words, scholars know relatively little about the ways in which a political dispute between two social groups can impact individuals who belong to neither group. And these types of outgroup conflicts are ever-present as most individuals affiliate with a relatively small subset of groups. For example, consider a 2017 dispute between individuals identifying as Jewish and those associated with the LGBTQ movement. Jewish participants in a Chicago gay pride parade were asked to leave the event because organizers said their rainbow Star of David flags made other marchers feel unsafe (Politi 2017). While extant research speaks to the impacts of this event on the political attitudes of Jews and LGBTQ individuals, what about those who observed or learned of the dispute but identify with neither of these groups (e.g., non-Jewish, non LGBTQ individuals)? This question could be asked about many other political conflicts - those between French and English-speaking Canadians, Palestinians and Israelis, the historically fraught relationship between unions and African-Americans (see Frymer 2008), and other current political struggles.

Balance Theory and Outgroup Conflicts

There is good reason to believe that citizens attend to political groups to which they do not belong. Individuals offer discernibly different evaluations of outgroups (Bartels 2005) and can categorize these outgroups under broader labels such as party coalitions (Robison and Moskowitz 2019). However, existing studies do not offer predictions about how such events affect individuals who belong to neither group involved in the dispute.

Balance theory offers insights into the effects of intergroup conflict on third party observers. At a basic level, people maintain networks of ideas and beliefs in their minds, connected through various types of associations (Festinger 1957). Because human beings have a psychological need for balanced states, individuals are motivated to resolve tensions within networks of relationships (Heider 1958) and are particularly averse to uncertainty about the connections between social groups (Hogg 2000). Therefore, individuals are motivated to have a coherent understanding of the sociopolitical world that accounts for both a) the relationships between themselves and outgroups, and b) the relationships between multiple outgroups. In keeping with this perspective, Figure 1 and Figure 2 both represent balanced states, with a positively charged system of connections—either positive attitudes towards and between the groups in question, or some other arrangement that maintains an overall positive charge. Under these conditions, individuals do not experience heightened uncertainty or dissonance and are not motivated to shift their underlying evaluations of the groups in the network. Liked outgroups like each other (see Figure 1) and disliked groups are disliked by preferred groups (see Figure 2). This creates a stable group environment, where groups potential coalition partners (and enemies) can be relied upon to behave predictably.

Figure 1. Balanced System with Positivity Between and Towards Outgroups



Figure 2. Balanced System with Positivity Towards One Outgroup and Negativity Between Outgroups



The dynamics change, however, when something like Figure 3 occurs. In this circumstance, people feel dissonance and tension as two groups they like dislike one another. This state, and the uncertainty that accompanies it, motivates individuals to begin to change their views to push the overall network towards Figures 1 and 2. This shift is not necessarily immediate - that is, people do not instantly devalue a group they previously considered an ally - but over time and with repeated messages, such dramatic change can occur.

Figure 3. Unbalanced System with Positivity Toward Two Outgroups



Political scientists have used balance theory to account for shifting attitudes toward countries (Moore 1978) and candidates (Shaffer 1981); however, this theory has not yet been

applied to political relationships between social groups and coalition partners. Broadly, we expect that shifting political dynamics between two groups will affect the attitudes that third-party citizens have toward these groups. Changing relationships disrupt the balance of the connections between oneself and other groups, and individuals should react to this change in a way that works to restore balance to the overall network.

In general, this should occur by changing the positivity and negativity people feel towards relevant groups. Specifically, individuals should resolve these psychological tensions in the way that requires the smallest adjustment (Festinger, 1957). In the case of political conflict between outgroups, this adjustment should take the form of becoming more negative toward the group about which they feel less positively initially. These changes should also have political consequences: because positive and negative feelings predict perceived closeness (Berry, Willingham, and Thayer 2000) and closeness to a group predicts levels of policy support for that group (Craemer 2008), changes in these connections should also shift relevant policy attitudes.

To test these balance theories, we explore how attitudes shift when two outgroups are presented as in conflict with one another. In particular, we emphasize the kind of conflict represented in Figure 3—when two liked outgroups (and potential coalition partners) engage in conflict. While there are numerous combinations of affect in the actual group environment of politics (like those represented by Figure 2), we consider the liked-group scenario as a test of balance theory in this area and due to its implications for collaboration, compromise, and coordination across groups. In other words, we seek to understand how potentially successful political coalitions may be undermined by internal conflicts in ways that extend beyond the effects on individuals who are directly involved. In such situations, balance theory suggests

individuals should respond to the imbalance by adopting more negative attitudes in their feelings towards the less-liked outgroup, with the positive charge on that connection Figure 3 becoming weaker and eventually negative. Summarized, we expect that:

> *H1*: When one liked outgroup creates a conflict with a different liked outgroup, affect and policy support for the least liked of the two outgroups should decrease.

Balance theory suggests an explicit focus on conflict that upsets the balance of individuals' views of various groups and themselves. However, these are not the only kinds of conflict that occur in the political world—liked groups come into conflict with disliked groups as well as liked groups. This would be represented with the structure shown in Figure 2—one group is liked, the other disliked, and conflict between the groups is consistent with the individuals' feelings towards each group. In this case, the balance in the network is maintained, rather than disrupted, when conflict between the groups occurs.

To more thoroughly evaluate the propositions of balance theory, then, we consider this scenario, where conflict between outgroups should not introduce an imbalance. This allows us to establish if the changes observed from H1 arise from balancing or to some other mechanism—such as an increase in general negativity or a desire to avoid conflict. H2 indicates the balance theory prediction in reaction to the conflict presented in Figure 2.

> *H2*: If the effects in H1 are due to a process of balancing, similar effects should not occur when a liked and disliked group come into conflict.

To evaluate these hypotheses, we designed two experiments that build directly on one another. We discuss Study 1, implemented on a convenience sample, and Study 2, conducted

with a diverse sample of American adults, in the sections that follow.

Study 1

Design and Procedure

The first test of our hypotheses relies on a survey experiment in which we manipulate whether individuals are exposed to conflict between two outgroups, and if so, whether this conflict occurs between two liked groups or between a liked group and a disliked group. We fielded this survey experiment on a sample of 287 undergraduate students at a private Midwestern university. Participants completed our study in 2018 as a requirement for credit in a political science course. Figure 4 provides a graphical summary of the flow of this experiment. Each respondent began by answering a detailed set of demographic and attitude questions to determine various group memberships of each respondent (see Appendix C for details). Table 1 describes the composition of our sample for Study 1.

Following the demographic and attitudinal items, respondents completed a "drag-and-drop" group sorting task, in which they placed up to 20 social groups[14] into five categories based on how they felt about the groups: *very negative*, *somewhat negative*, *neutral*, *somewhat positive*, and *very positive*. For this sorting task, we removed any groups to which participants belonged based on their responses to the previous demographic and attitude items (see the bottom-right

[14] These groups included Muslims, gays and lesbians, transgender individuals, Jews, African-Americans, Immigrants, union members, gun owners, Hispanics, senior citizens, scientists, feminists, welfare recipients, atheists, environmentalists, pro-lifers, conservatives, liberals, alt-right supporters, and evangelical Christians.

corner of Figure 4). Intentionally, this design means that participants rated only outgroups in this task. We elected to use a categorical sorting task, rather than feeling thermometers, because feeling thermometer scores do not objectively map onto affective categories such as "highly liked" or "somewhat liked." Moreover, there can be differences in how respondents place liberal and conservative groups on feeling thermometer scales (Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989). Separate pilot tests indicated that this sorting task could be easily understood and completed.

Figure 4. Study 1 Design



Table 1. Study 1 Demographics

Category	Percent in Sample
Female	51
White	61
Liberal	83
Moderate	12
Conservative	5
Average age in years	19

After the sorting task, we then randomly assigned each respondent to one of the three experimental conditions: Liked/Liked Conflict (LLC), Liked/Disliked Conflict (LDC), or the control group. For each respondent, we randomly selected outgroups to pipe into the subsequent treatments and outcome items from the categories of groups that corresponded to their treatment assignment.[15] In the LLC condition, we randomly selected one group labeled as very positive and one group they labeled as somewhat positive. For respondents assigned to the LDC condition, we randomly selected one very positive group and one somewhat negative group. For respondents in the control group, we selected one very positive group, one somewhat positive group, and one somewhat negative group. Importantly, this treatment design required respondents to sort at least one outgroup into the necessary categories for their treatment assignment; failing to do so prevents us from directly applying balance theory and the hypotheses discussed earlier. As a result, respondents who did not sort at least one outgroup into each of the necessary categories for their assigned treatment were not shown any treatment stimuli and did not complete the rest of the survey.[16] For example, a respondent who did not rate any outgroups as very positive and then was assigned to the LLC treatment group would have no highly-liked group to include in

[15] We analyze all respondents in a condition together, regardless of the specific groups selected for their treatments. This is similar to the "least-liked group" approach to studying political tolerance (e.g., Sullivan et al., 1981).

[16] See the Appendix for comparisons of those who completed the sorting task and the entire sample.

their treatment. They would then be removed from the study after the treatment assignment step.

Table 2. Vignette Examples

	LLC vignette	*LDC vignette*
Action by very liked group	"...lobbying the Illinois state government for increased legal protections. Due to several recent instances of discrimination and intimidation of [Liked group] by political opponents, these organizations have called for state-funded programs to raise awareness about these issues and provide police protection and legal counsel."	
Response by other group **Bolded statements show differences between the conditions.**	**"Although they are often considered to be political allies of** [Liked group], [Somewhat liked group] have largely opposed funding such programs, stating that they would be a waste of money. "**People sometimes think we're natural allies, but folks don't realize their politics are largely incompatible with ours**," explained the leader of a prominent [Somewhat liked group]. "[Liked group] always want a leg up; our job is to ensure that they don't get an unfair advantage over [Somewhat liked group] and others." ... [Somewhat liked group] interest groups from across the state have begun to facilitate public ad campaigns and neighborhood canvassing drives to oppose [Liked group]'s proposals."	**"Often at odds with** [Liked group], [Disliked group] have largely opposed funding such programs, stating that they would be a waste of money. " **We're not really natural allies, and their politics are largely incompatible with ours**," explained the leader of a prominent [Disliked group]. "[Liked group] always want a leg up; our job is to ensure that they don't get an unfair advantage over [Disliked group] and others."... [Disliked group] interest groups from across the state have begun to facilitate public ad campaigns and neighborhood canvassing drives to oppose [Liked group]'s proposals."

Participants in the LLC treatment group were then told that they would read an article about some political organizations related to the groups they rated in the previous task. We then presented a vignette about a conflict between interest groups representing a highly-liked group and a somewhat-liked group. In this article, the somewhat-liked group expresses opposition to programs combatting discrimination against the highly-liked group. Participants in the LDC treatment group received a similar prompt and vignette, but with a conflict between groups

representing a highly-liked and a somewhat-disliked outgroup. The full texts of these treatments are located in Appendix C. Table 2 shows key elements of the vignette for both the LLC and LDC conditions. Lastly, those in the control group did not receive a vignette.

Table 3 summarizes the three experimental conditions in Study 1. Comparing the LLC and Control conditions allows us to evaluate H1. Comparing LDC to the Control group is our test of H2.

Table 3. Study 1 Conditions

Condition	**Conflict Outgroup 1**	**Conflict Outgroup 2**
1. Control	N/A	N/A
2. Liked/Liked Conflict (LLC)	Highly-liked outgroup	Somewhat-liked outgroup
3. Liked/Disliked Conflict (LDC)	Highly-liked outgroup	Somewhat-disliked outgroup

Outcomes

Following the treatments, respondents completed a set of dependent variables. Respondents assigned to the LLC and LDC conditions completed each of these items with respect to the two outgroups discussed in their assigned vignette. Those in the control group answered questions about three randomly selected groups: one highly-liked, one somewhat-liked, and one somewhat-disliked.

We began with two manipulation check items to assess whether the treatments induced the intended perceptions of conflict among outgroups. We asked respondents to characterize the relationship between the two groups in their vignette on a 1-5 scale, from very negative to very positive. Respondents also completed modified feeling thermometers, where they reported a score from 0 to 100 of how each outgroup feels about the other outgroup.

Following these manipulation checks, we measured respondents' affect toward each outgroup with standard feeling thermometer items. We then measured solidarity toward each outgroup by asking respondents to disagree or agree (on a 5-point scale) with five statements about solidarity and common cause with the groups.[17] We later combine these five items into a single solidarity scale for each group ($\alpha = .81$ for the somewhat liked outgroup, $\alpha = .83$ for the somewhat disliked outgroup).

Lastly, we included three zero-sum dependent variables about the outgroups. First, we asked participants to imagine the government had to choose between programs that helped each of the outgroups from a respondent's assigned treatment. They then rated whether the government should help one group or the other, or somewhere in between (1-7 scale). Next, we asked about a hypothetical situation in which organizations representing both groups wanted to hold a demonstration in the same location, but without enough space for both. Respondents were asked if they would fully support one group, fully support the other group, or somewhere in between (on a 1-7 scale). Finally, we asked respondents to allocate $1,000 of hypothetical money between organizations representing each of the two outgroups. The full text of these outcome measures can be found in Appendix C.

Results

When it comes to perceived relationships between the two groups in a conflict, our treatments worked as intended. Respondents in the LLC condition perceived the relationships between the two outgroups to be significantly more negative than those in the control group

[17] See Appendix C for exact wording.

(2.33 compared to 3.29; $p < .001$), as did those in the LDC condition (1.65 compared to 2.12 in the control; $p < .01$). Moreover, respondents placed the conflict-creating outgroup lower than the control on the modified feeling thermometers in both the LLC (41.6 compared to 59.3; $p < .001$) and LDC (23.8 compared to 34.4; $p < .01$) conditions. This suggests that subjects perceive the relationships between the groups as intended, a critical condition for our predictions.

We next test our hypotheses on the outcome variables using nonparametric combination, or NPC. NPC allows researchers to test the effects of a treatment on multiple, related outcomes while taking account of the dependency between these tests. For our purposes, this method acknowledges that we are testing the impact of outgroup conflict on multiple dependent variables derived from the same theory. NPC offers two main components: First, it adjusts the p-values of individual statistical tests to account for multiple testing. Second, it offers a "global" p-value that corresponds to the likelihood of observing the sum of results across outcome variables under the assumption of a sharp null hypothesis of no effect (see Caughey, Dafoe, and Seawright 2017; Pesarin and Salmaso 2010). As robustness checks we also test our hypotheses with traditional two-tailed difference-in-means tests, which offer nearly identical conclusions. Table 4 and Table 5 display the p-values from each type of hypothesis test.

Table 4. LLC Hypothesis Tests (Attitudes about Somewhat-Liked Group)

Dependent Variable	**LLC Mean**	**Control Mean**	**NPC P-Value (adjusted)**	**Non-NPC P-Value**
Feeling Thermometer	66.0	74.3	.03	.01
Solidarity	4.06	4.6	.04	.02
Funds	344.0	409.0	.15	.15
Government Help	3.35	3.8	.09	.07
Demonstration	3.09	3.5	.21	.17
Global P-Value	-	-	.009	N/A

Note: P-values come from two-tailed difference in means tests comparing the LLC condition and the control.

In Table 4, we present results from comparing attitudes about the somewhat-liked group among the LLC condition and the control group. Respondents in the LLC condition exhibit significantly more negative affect toward the somewhat-liked group than those in the control ($p < .05$), as well as significantly lower solidarity ($p < .05$). When it comes to our zero-sum items (distribution of funds, help from the government, and demonstration support), we observe effects that are in the expected direction but do not meet standard significance levels. The global p-value suggests that it would be very unlikely to observe this full set of results if the treatment has no actual effect. Lastly, we observe no significant effects of the treatment on evaluations of the highly-liked outgroup—these are not presented in Table 4 as they all show statistically insignificant differences. This result suggests that respondents reduce dissonance by focusing on the least-liked of the two groups, rather than simply responding with general negativity toward both groups in the vignette. This finding supports H1 and the processes involved in dissonance reduction and balance theory.

Table 5. LDC Hypothesis Tests (Attitudes about Somewhat-Disliked Group)

Dependent Variable	**LDC Mean**	**Control Mean**	**NPC P-Value (adjusted)**	**Non-NPC P-Value**
Feeling Thermometer	31.0	33.9	.70	.33
Solidarity	2.22	2.2	.76	.92
Funds	90.2	81.8	.69	.77
Government Help	2.3	2.1	.52	.42
Demonstration	2.0	1.9	.76	.65
Global P-Value	-	-	.52	N/A

Note: P-values come from two-tailed difference in means tests comparing the LLC condition and the control.

By contrast, Table 5 suggests that a political conflict between a highly-liked outgroup and a somewhat-disliked outgroup does not significantly impact attitudes. We observe no significant

changes in attitudes toward the somewhat-disliked group (or toward the highly-liked group) in the LDC condition as a result of the vignette. These null findings suggest that because the respondents already had negative attitudes toward the somewhat-disliked group, the conflict vignette did not create dissonance. Therefore, there was no need to adjust attitudes about or political support for either of the groups. This finding accords with H2 and supports the role of balance theory in these evaluations.

In sum, Study 1 suggests that political conflict between two groups that an individual sees positively creates dissonance, offering support for H1. This dissonance is resolved by adopting more negative attitudes toward the lesser-liked of the two groups. By contrast, political conflict between a positively-perceived group and a negatively-perceived group does not produce any such effects. This supports H2, suggesting that the effects of conflict between a liked outgroup and another outgroup depend on an observer's affect toward that second group. The bottom line is that this is some of the first evidence that relationships between outgroups can have consequential effects on those who are not part of either groups – group conflict spills over into general opinions beyond those of group members.

Study 2

Two factors motivated us to conduct a follow-up study to the experiment described above. First, while undergraduate student samples can provide reliable causal inference (Druckman and Kam 2011), we are interested in replicating our findings on a representative sample. This replication offers an additional opportunity to test our hypotheses in a way to estimate the size of these treatment effects on the general population. Given the sample size of Study 1, it also helps us ensure that low power is not interfering with our conclusions. Second,

questions remain about how the effects of Study 1 apply to other political outcomes. It is unlikely that these processes affect every kind of political evaluation and choice; however, Study 1 included only a limited range of political variables and leaves questions about the boundaries of these effects.[18]

Design and Expectations

To address these points, we fielded Study 2 in the summer of 2019 on a nationally diverse sample through Bovitz, Inc's.[19] We draw from the same theory underlying Study 1 in our design and expectations for Study 2. Given the null results with regard to the liked/disliked treatment in Study 1, we focus on the liked/liked conflict and did not include the liked/disliked condition. A flowchart for the design of Study 2 appears in Figure 5. This experiment began in the same manner as Study 1, with respondents completing nearly similar demographic and attitudinal items and sorting tasks from the previous experiment.[20] At this stage, subjects who did not sort groups required for the treatments—i.e., at least one group into both the highly-liked and

[18] The Study 1 procedure removed individuals who did not provide key group sorting responses *after* the randomization to treatments. This may weaken the causal inferences we can make from Study 1. The only significant predictor of dropout is that those receiving the treatments are less likely to be white than the overall sample.

[19] See https://www.beforthright.com/for-researchers for more information.

[20] In addition to the items in Study 1, respondents in Study 2 reported whether they identify as alt-right, have been employed as a scientist, have been employed as a law enforcement officer, or have been enlisted in the military.

somewhat-liked categories—were taken to the end of the survey and were not included in the treatment assignment. Table 6, below, describes the demographics of our sample for Study 2.[21]

Figure 5. Study 2 Design



Table 6. Study 2 Demographics

Category	Percent in Sample
Female	45
White	67
Liberal	39
Moderate	33
Conservative	28
Average age in years	46

[21] See Appendix C for comparisons between those who completed the sorting task and the entire sample.

Respondents who did sort the required groups (approximately 60 percent of the sample) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, a control condition and condition with conflict between two liked groups. With these conditions, we repeat the portion of Study 1 dealing with the effects of a conflict between a highly-liked outgroup and a somewhat-liked outgroup. This design allows us to reduce the possible number of comparisons between treatments and maximize the power within the conditions key to our expectations and theory.[22]

In the control group, subjects did not see a vignette and simply moved on to the subsequent dependent variables. In the treatment condition, subjects were presented with a scenario where a somewhat-liked group came into conflict with a highly-liked group. The vignette was nearly identical to the one used in the LLC group in Study 1, with only minor changes to the story to make it sensible to a national sample – the full text of this vignette can be found in the Appendix. With these treatments, we again test H1 from Study 1.

Outcomes

Following the treatments, subjects completed a series of outcome measures, comparable to those used in Study 1. Specifically, we use the same two manipulation check items from Study 1. Following these manipulation checks, we again measured respondents' outgroup affect with standard feeling thermometers and solidarity toward each outgroup with the same five statements. As with Study 1, we combined these items into a single solidarity scale. Because they

[22] In addition to these treatments, we included two treatments connected to the mechanisms of balance theory. We do not include these conditions as we have concerns about their effectiveness and they do not influence the causal inferences from the conditions discussed here.

showed no statistically significant treatment effects in Study 1, we omit most of the zero-sum items in Study 2. We retain, however, the item regarding government-funded programs due to its policy implications, suggestive level of statistical significance in Study 1, and as a way to evaluate our choice to remove most of the zero-sum questions.

We also introduced a series of new items. The first asks about voting for candidates endorsed by the group in the conflict. We asked, "If a group representing [GROUP] endorsed a candidate for mayor in your hometown, would you be less likely or more likely to vote for the candidate?" The purpose of this item is to more directly relate these processes to more concrete political choices, rather than abstract attitudes.

In addition, we included two items about potential coalitions. The first asks subjects if they agree or disagree with the following statement: "People like me are better off when they work together with [GROUP] in politics." The second asks subjects who they would work with to solve a problem in their community. Specifically, "Imagine you wanted to organize people to advocate for a cause you care about. Which of the following types of organizations would you turn to for help?" Subjects then viewed a list of groups, identical to their list from the ranking task, and chose up to three. Both of these items are intended to capture willingness to explicitly work politically with the groups involved in the conflict.

Finally, we asked a short series of questions about perceived distance from a respondent's party. Given the strong associations individuals have between social group coalitions and political parties (Robison and Moskowitz 2019), tensions within those coalitions may impact one's own feelings toward their party. Outgroup conflicts among liked groups may weaken third-party observers' own perceived closeness to their party. On the other hand, individuals may be

motivated to defend groups toward which they feel very positively by emphasizing loyalty to their party coalitions. Using slider bars, subjects placed themselves, their highly-liked group, and their somewhat-liked group on a continuum from "very close to the [Democratic/Republican] Party" to "very far from the [Democratic/Republican] Party." Pure independents did not see these items as the format and substance of the question do not correspond clearly to that partisan group. The Appendix contains the text of these outcome measures.

Results

As in Study 1, we compare the treatment group to the control using NPC. 392 respondents were randomly assigned to the treatments and are used in the analyses that follow. As in Study 1, we first assess the two manipulation checks about perceptions of the relationship between the groups involved in the conflict and the modified feeling thermometers about groups feelings towards one another. We again observe that subjects in the treatment condition (who observed a conflict between two liked groups) perceived the relationship between those groups as more negative (2.50) than those in the control group (3.53; $p<0.001$) and placed the conflict-creating outgroup lower on the modified feeling thermometers (44.5 compared to 65.6; $p<0.001$).

We next test our hypotheses on the outcome variables using the same NPC discussed in Study 1. Table 7 presents these results for the full sample for most of the outcome measures. Table 8, in contrast, shows the same estimates for those who saw the party placement item; as this table excludes pure independents, the sample used in this table is smaller than in Table 7.

As indicated by this table, we see a consistent set of reactions to conflict between the two liked groups (global p-value of 0.001). Feeling thermometer ratings, feelings of solidarity, and willingness to include the somewhat liked group in a coalition all decrease significantly as a

result of the conflict between the groups. However, we observe no significant change in support for a mayoral candidate endorsed by the somewhat liked group, government policies helping the somewhat liked group, or the placement of the somewhat liked group relative to respondents' own political party.

To evaluate the predictions of balance theory more thoroughly, we also consider how the treatments do or do not influence attitudes towards the liked group. We find a similar pattern with these data as in Study 1 – observing the conflict has no impact on feelings of solidarity, government help, including the group in a coalition, or placing the liked group with respect to one's political party. We do see a substantively small and marginally significant decrease in feeling thermometer ratings and a decrease of support for the mayoral candidate endorsed by the liked group. Given the way that the mayoral item operated for the somewhat-liked group, we expect that this new item added to Study 2 is tapping into more complex dynamics than we anticipated and merits further exploration elsewhere. In general, we see the same attitudes towards the liked group in the control and treatment conditions, as in Study 1.

Table 7. Study 2 Attitudes about Somewhat-Liked Group

Dependent Variable	**LLC Mean**	**Control Mean**	**NPC P-Value (adjusted)**	**Non-NPC P-Value**
Feeling Thermometer	67.5	76.0	.004	.001
Solidarity	3.92	4.32	.01	.002
Government Help	3.39	3.6	.27	.27
Support for Mayor	4.72	4.87	.23	.21
Include group in coalition	0.20	0.35	.008	.005
Global P-Value	-	-	.001	N/A

Note: P-values come from two-tailed difference in means tests comparing the LLC condition and the control.

Table 8. Study 2 Attitudes about Somewhat-Liked Group (Excluding Independents)

Dependent Variable	LLC Mean	Control Mean	NPC P-Value (adjusted)	Non-NPC P-Value
Feeling Thermometer	67.5	76.0	.03	.001
Solidarity	3.92	4.32	.03	.001
Government Help	3.39	3.6	.82	.53
Support for Mayor	4.72	4.87	.53	.19
Include group in coalition	0.20	0.35	.07	.006
Placement to party	55.3	55.8	89	0.89
Global P-Value	-	-	.001	N/A

Note: P-values come from two-tailed difference in means tests comparing the LLC condition and the control.

Overall, we find additional support for our balance theory focused hypotheses: when individuals observe conflict between two liked outgroups, they respond to that conflict with more negative evaluations of the less-liked group of the two. These effects extend beyond a single variable but have limits – this conflict shifts feeling thermometer ratings, solidarity with the less-liked group, and the willingness to include that group in an actual coalition to solve local problems. Observing this kind of conflict therefore seems to have the potential to change general feelings towards and actual collaborations with outgroups involved in that conflict. When it comes to attitudes involving larger and more complex political factors (e.g., partisanship, vote choice, and specific policy preferences), we fail to observe the same effects. In other words, while attitudes toward an outgroup may become more negative, and an individual may see that group less as a strong ally, individuals do *not* appear to punish that outgroup via reduced government benefits or withholding electoral support. Stronger or repeated treatments may be necessary to influence these kinds of stronger, more crystalized attitudes about the outgroup. The consequences of observing this type of political conflict, then, have more interpersonal, community, and grassroots implications than national consequences. Given the importance of

collaboration at the local and community level, however, even these kinds of effects have important political and civic implications.

General Discussion

Citizens have coherent attitudes about the social groups to which they do not belong and understandings of how these groups relate to one another. Moreover, our work shows that as the relationships between these outgroups change, third-party individuals respond by altering their political attitudes. In Study 1, we demonstrate that when a political dispute arises between two groups toward which a third-party observer feels positively, that individual is likely to develop more negative attitudes toward the less-liked of the two groups. In keeping with balance theory, however, such political conflicts do not produce a change in attitudes when a third-party individual feels negatively toward one of the outgroups. We confirm these findings in Study 2 with a separate sample and a larger set of political outcome measures, finding that this type of conflict can reduce feelings of solidarity with the lesser-liked group and depress respondents' willingness to include that group in coalitions.

More work needs to be done to explore how relationships between groups, modeled in a more complex and realistic way, influence politics. For example, why we fail to observe treatment effects on some of our more concrete outcomes in Study 2 remains a mystery. Additional studies applying stronger messages about group conflict may be able to produce more universal changes. Vignettes that describe conflict between a political outparty (such as the Democratic Party for Republican respondents) and a social outgroup may also tap into more powerful dynamics and have other interesting effects, given the importance of partisan identities in the contemporary United States.

For both pragmatic and theoretical reasons, our experiments emphasized a specific kind of outgroup conflict. In both Study 1 and Study 2, the somewhat-liked group was the one creating the conflict with the liked group. Under different circumstances, one may perceive a more positively-valenced group to initiate this conflict; future studies should consider how the present findings apply to a wider range of political situations. And while we have not explored conflict between two disliked groups, that too might disrupt the balance of one's mental network albeit in more complex ways than we have outlined here. We therefore see our findings as a first illustration of the value of balance theory in understanding group conflict and collaboration.

The mechanisms underlying balance theory should also be more thoroughly documented. We observe, in two separate studies, reactions consistent with the balance theory and unsupportive of other explanations. However, we are not able to directly measure the dissonance that should prompt the negative evaluations we observe.

These studies have important consequences for the study of political behavior, as well as political coalition formation and maintenance. Even when shifts in political relationships do not involve groups to which a citizen belongs, these changes do not go unnoticed. Balancing processes lead citizens to devalue previously-liked groups that conflict with other positively-viewed groups, which affects solidarity and preferences for political partnerships. These reactions mean that social and political groups that become involved in conflicts risk political alienation to a greater degree than previous research would suggest. Intergroup conflict may also threaten party coalitions by weakening ties with multiple groups, even those not directly involved in disputes. Our work provides important insights into the role of group-based politics in more complex—and therefore more realistic—environments.

One troubling consequence of these processes is the potential impact on disadvantaged groups. Marginalized social groups like the poor, the disabled, and racial and ethnic minority groups often garner positive feelings by many in American society. However, if these groups come into political conflict with groups that are *better* liked as a result of various privileges (e.g., the middle class, the wealthy, whites), those marginalized groups may suffer a penalty that more advantaged groups do not. Merely observing political conflict, therefore, may serve to reinforce disparities between already unequal groups.

Elites may also play off of these dynamics in the way they choose to portray conflicts. Elite actors, including politicians and media outlets, often discuss conflict and tensions between different segments of American society. The results of these experiments suggest that discussing this conflict has rippling effects across the public and that observing conflict is not without political consequences. Further research may benefit from examining the ways in which conflict is used as a political tool by strategic elites for influencing the attitudes and behaviors of third-party observers. Overall, though, it is clear that studies of social groups need to attend not only to the effects of groups' behaviors on their members but also to the impact of this behavior on citizens who stand outside of such groups.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In an era of both proliferating demands on one's attention and increasingly well-defined coalitions of identities in partisan politics, it is perhaps more crucial than ever to take account of the impact of social group memberships on political attitudes and behaviors. Using a variety of experimental methods—including small group discussions, survey experiments, and respondent-specific randomization—my dissertation documents evidence for three previously understudied, indirect influences that elites have on how such identities are applied to political judgments among the mass public. First, elite messaging can prime identities even among those who do not directly consume political media as a result of social interactions with individuals who are more attuned. Second, even in the absence of direct communications, elite actions can indirectly shape intergroups relations among everyday individuals they claim to represent. Third, political conflict among elite actors affects not only the social groups directly implicated in those disputes, but also individuals belonging to third-party social groups that have no direct involvement. Together, these findings highlight the ways in which elites can continue to influence preference formation despite the increasing difficult these actors may have in reaching citizens directly.

Particularly in an era of fragmentation, one may rightly note that many, if not most, individuals will not follow the activities of interest groups and other elites very closely. However, it is not necessary for an individual to be closely attuned to collaboration or conflict among political elites to be influenced by those elite interactions. As the first chapter of my dissertation shows, social interaction is an effective mechanism by which knowledge of elite cues centered on group membership can spread to less engaged individuals. A small number of

knowledgeable, engaged social group members can amplify the cues elites offer to a far larger group of people.

What are the implications of elites shaping issue preferences and intergroup attitudes in the ways I have documented? On the one hand, these indirect identity-based influences offer citizens a set of convenient tools to understand the political environment without expending much effort. However, existing political science research documents considerable divergences between the preferences of the public at large and political elites of various kinds. Elites may therefore focus their rhetoric disproportionately on identities important to them, pursue coalitions different from those prioritized by the mass public, or clash over issues less salient to everyday citizens. Nevertheless, the cues they provide will influence the application of identities to attitudes, raising questions about the quality of representation elites offer to the public. If elites direct scarce cognitive resources away from real or perceived interests among those they claim to represent, the they fail to serve their democratic purpose.

Finally, elite cues exert neither wholly positive nor completely negative influence on intergroup relations. As the latter chapters of my dissertation underscore, elites can both unite and divide everyday social group identifiers, including those belonging to historically marginalized groups. At least to a certain extent, the relationships among the mass public mirror those of the elites they look to for cues, whether those relationships are constructive or conflictual. However, some patterns of intergroup relationships may be more durable and less malleable by elites. Continuing scholarship in this domain should continue to map out the complex relationships between elite cues, historical factors, and their joint and competing influences on intergroup attitudes.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Experimental Materials

Below, I provide the materials used in the experiment I describe in the main text of the paper. These materials include 1) the identity priming (or control) materials provided to the participants, 2) the informational paragraph about defense spending, 3) the discussion prompt I used for the discussion group conditions, and 4) the measures for all outcome variables (Democratic identity, American identity, and military strength importance).

Primes

No prime:

> Please read the following brief overview of a political issue taken from a major newspaper [in preparation for group discussion].

American identity prime:

> There are a number of political and social issues that Americans are faced with today. Many citizens worry that America's standing in the world is under threat. In a world with numerous unstable regimes and those who might wish to do harm to the United States, many are concerned about continuing cuts to our defense budget. They fear that an inadequate defense budget will make it difficult for our country to ensure its own protection, as well as the protection of our allies abroad. With this in mind, please read the following brief overview of a political issue taken from a major newspaper [in preparation for group discussion].

Democratic identity prime

> There are a number of political and social issues that Americans are faced with today. Many citizens worry that principles embodied by their political party are under threat. They are concerned that if certain issues are not appropriately addressed, their political views and their party's agenda will be endangered. For example, many Democrats believe that military spending is coming at the cost of Democratic priorities such as education, health care, and addressing climate change. With this in mind, please read the following brief overview of a political issue taken from a major newspaper [in preparation for group discussion].

Defense Spending Information

Following a period of successive increases in military spending from 2001 to 2009, the United States Congress has cut military spending each year from 2010 to 2014. These cuts have decreased both the absolute amount spent on the military and the amount spent in terms of its overall percentage of the budget. Some people argue that it is important for the U.S. to have a strong military to protect itself and its allies. In contrast, others argue that the U.S. should concentrate more of its resources domestically. Accordingly, some Americans believe that our country spends too much money on the military, while others believe it spends too little.

Discussion Prompt

"So, you've all read something similar about the US military. Now, I'd like you to each take a turn, in whatever order you'd like, to share your views on what you've read with the other members of your group. In particular, do you think we should increase or decrease how much we spend on the military? Or, how important is it for the US to have a strong one? More importantly, what are your reasons? If you don't want to share your views, just say pass. After

each person has had a chance to speak, take up to five minutes to have an open discussion about your thoughts, respond to what others have said, and bring up any other issues that you think are relevant."

Post-Treatment Questionnaire Items

1. *Identity Strength Measures*

   Now, please say whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.

   a. When someone criticizes [Democrats/Americans], it feels like a personal insult.
   b. [Democrats'/Americans'] successes are my successes.
   c. When someone praises [Democrats/Americans], it feels like a personal compliment.
   d. If a story in the media criticized [Democrats/Americans], I would feel embarrassed.
   e. I don't act like a typical [Democrat/American].
   f. I have a number of qualities typical of [Democrats/Americans].

   [1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree]

2. *Military Strength Preference*

   a. How important is it for the U.S. to have a strong military?

   [1=Not important, 2=Slightly important, 3=Moderately important, 4=Important, 5=Very important]

Effect Sizes and Sensitivity Analyses

Table A.1 displays the Cohen's *d* effect size documented in the experimental data for both outcome variables in every hypothesis. Using a series of sensitivity analyses, I also report the predicted effect size required to obtain statistically significant effects with a power level of 0.8. This table shows that most of these individual tests were underpowered, demonstrating the importance of using nonparametric combination (NPC) analyses to test my hypotheses.

Table A.1. Observed and Predicted Required Effect Sizes by Hypothesis

HYPOTHESIS	DEPENDENT VARIABLE	CONDITION	COHEN'S *D*	REQUIRED *D*
H1	Democratic identity	Democrat Direct	.363	.607
H2	Military strength		.434	
H1	American identity	American Direct	.309	.569
H2	Military strength		.231	
H3	Democratic identity	Democrat Two-Step	.483	.590
H4	Military strength		.316	
H3	American identity	American Two-Step	.351	.572
H4	Military strength		.330	
H5	Democratic identity	Democrat Elaboration	.240	.621
H6	Military strength		.064	
H5	American identity	American Elaboration	.619	.595
H6	Military strength		.142	

Note: The "Required *D*" column reports the predicted effect sizes, obtained from sensitivity analyses, required to detect significant effects with a power of 0.8.

Alternative Hypothesis Testing Method

Table A.2. below displays p-values obtained from traditional independent difference-in-means tests. While the p-values corresponding to these individual tests differ marginally from the NPC analyses I present in the main body of the paper, the broader findings are quite similar. Both direct and two-step identity priming affects identity salience, for both Democratic and American identity (Hypotheses 1 and 3). Each of these priming methods also appear to shape attitudes about the importance of military strength, albeit with more marginal statistical significance (Hypotheses 2 and 4). As with the NPC analyses, the evidence is weaker for any

elaboration effects stemming from experiencing a direct identity prime and then discussing in a group (Hypotheses 5 and 6).

Table A.2. Unadjusted P-Values

Condition Number and Name	Comparison Condition	Democratic P-Value	American P-Value	Military P-Value
2. Democrat Direct	Control	.048 (H1)	-	.023 (H2)
3. American Direct	Control	-	.064 (H1)	.127 (H2)
4. Democrat Two-Step	Control	.011 (H3)	-	.080 (H4)
5. American Two-Step	Control	-	.043 (H3)	.053 (H4)
6. Democrat Elaboration	Democratic Direct	.140 (H5)	-	.386 (H6)
7. American Elaboration	American Direct	-	.002 (H5)	.251 (H6)

Note: Unadjusted p-values are obtained from one-tailed difference-in-means tests.

Appendix B

Treatments

The experimental treatments to which the respondents were exposed are shown in full below. Each respondent, except for those in the control group, read the same introductory text. Respondents then were shown a supposed American history textbook entry, with information varying by experimental condition. Those in the control group read none of these texts at all, instead only completing the questionnaire containing the outcome variables.

Introductory text:

Thank you for participating in this survey. We first ask you to read an excerpt from a widely used American history textbook. We will then ask you about the excerpt as well as some other questions about yourself and your opinions.

Working Alone:

African-American Organization Leaders Work to Renew the Voting Rights Act

The Voting Rights Act (VRA) was originally passed in 1965 to prohibit racial and ethnic discrimination in voting. When it came up for renewal in 2006, leaders of African-American organizations were at the forefront of efforts to renew the law. These leaders argued that the act needed to be renewed to protect the wellbeing of African-Americans who continued to face persistent discrimination. With this in mind, African-American interest groups deployed resources and came up with strategies to ensure renewal of the act. The VRA was renewed in July of 2006.

Rejected Coalition:

African-American and [Hispanic/Physical Disability/Atheist] Organization Leaders Work Separately to Renew the Voting Rights Act

The Voting Rights Act (VRA) was originally passed in 1965 to prohibit racial and ethnic discrimination in voting. When it came up for renewal in 2006, leaders of African-American organizations were at the forefront of efforts to renew the law. These leaders argued that the act needed to be renewed to protect the wellbeing of African-Americans who continued to face persistent discrimination. This sentiment was shared by leaders of [Hispanic/physical disability/atheist] organizations, who were particularly concerned about [ethnicity-based discrimination/wheelchair-accessible voting booths/religious tests for voting].

These [Hispanic/physical disability/atheist] organization leaders, however, chose not to work with African-American groups – they instead independently deployed resources and strategized separately to ensure renewal of the act. Political experts say this lack of collaboration is characteristic of the broader relationship between African-American and [Hispanic/physical disability/atheist] interest groups. The VRA was renewed in July of 2006.

Coalition:

African-American and [Hispanic/Physical Disability/Atheist] Organization Leaders Work Together to Renew the Voting Rights Act

The Voting Rights Act (VRA) was originally passed in 1965 to prohibit racial and ethnic discrimination in voting. When it came up for renewal in 2006, leaders of African-American organizations were at the forefront of efforts to renew the law. These leaders argued that the act needed to be renewed to protect the wellbeing of African-Americans who continued to face persistent discrimination. This sentiment was shared by leaders of [Hispanic/physical disability/atheist] organizations, who were particularly concerned about [ethnicity-based discrimination/wheelchair-accessible voting booths/religious tests for voting].

These [Hispanic/physical disability/atheist] organization leaders partnered to work with African-American groups – they shared their resources and strategized together to ensure renewal of the act. Political experts say this collaboration is characteristic of the broader relationship between African-American and [Hispanic/physical disability/atheist] interest groups. The VRA was renewed in July of 2006.

Complete Outcome Variable Means

In the main text of the paper I report only the means for the relevant outgroup for each outcome variable. However, as noted above, respondents completed questions pertaining to each outgroup for each dependent variable. I therefore report the means (and standard deviations) for each variable in each condition in Table A.1 and Table A.2 below.

Table A.1. Full Closeness Means by Condition

Condition	Hispanic Commonality	Disabled Commonality	Atheist Commonality
Control	4.69 (1.64)	5.06 (1.73)	2.97 (1.89)
Working alone	4.69 (1.75)	5.06 (1.91)	3.44 (1.89)
Rejected coalition Hispanic	4.31 (1.47)	5.30 (1.59)	3.18 (1.82)
Coalition Hispanic	5.07 (1.54)	5.08 (1.74)	3.17 (1.78)
Rejected coalition disabled	4.55 (1.42)	4.98 (1.64)	3.23 (1.80)
Coalition disabled	4.88 (1.50)	5.09 (1.59)	3.22 (1.79)
Rejected coalition atheist	4.74 (1.38)	5.16 (1.58)	3.81 (1.82)
Coalition atheist	4.97 (1.42)	5.14 (1.58)	3.67 (1.76)

Note: Cells are condition means, with standard deviations in parentheses.

Table A.2. Full Policy Support Means by Condition

Condition	**Hispanic Policy Scale**	**Disabled Policy Scale**	**Atheist Policy Scale**
Control	5.00 (1.66)	5.94 (1.23)	3.18 (1.94)
Working alone	5.06 (1.57)	5.93 (1.40)	3.47 (1.82)
Rejected coalition Hispanic	4.67 (1.60)	5.87 (1.24)	3.50 (1.97)
Coalition Hispanic	5.36 (1.28)	5.70 (1.40)	3.13 (1.66)
Rejected coalition disabled	5.00 (1.49)	5.76 (1.26)	3.53 (1.86)
Coalition disabled	5.11 (1.52)	5.80 (1.42)	3.53 (1.69)
Rejected coalition atheist	5.02 (1.58)	5.96 (1.16)	3.76 (1.69)
Coalition atheist	4.92 (1.53)	5.59 (1.25)	3.63 (1.57)

Note: Cells are condition means, with standard deviations in parentheses.

Correction for Multiple Hypothesis Testing

Because my experiment involves multiple tests of related hypotheses, I follow Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) in controlling the false discovery rate (or rate of type I errors). The Benjamini-Hochberg procedure first involves ranking the p-values from each test, where a rank of 1 is assigned to the smallest p-value, with increasing ranks for larger p-values. Then, one compares each of these p-values to a Benjamini-Hochberg critical value, using the formula

$$P_i \leq \frac{i}{m} q,$$

where P_i is the original p-value, i is the rank of the original p-value, m is the total number of hypothesis tests, and q is the false discovery rate chosen by the researcher. One can then reject the null hypothesis for the test with the largest p-value that is smaller than its corresponding critical value, as well as for all tests with p-values that are ranked higher.

Table A.3 Benjamini-Hochberg Corrections

Hypothesis Test	**P-Value**	**Rank**	**(i/m)Q**
atheist closeness (parallel)	0.000314	1	0.008333
atheist closeness (coalition)	0.002105	2	0.016667
atheist policy (parallel)	0.007884	3	0.025
atheist policy (coalition)	0.02812	4	0.033333
Hispanic closeness (parallel)	0.0309	5	0.041667
Hispanic closeness (coalition)	0.03406	6	0.05
Hispanic policy (coalition)	0.03936	7	0.058333
Hispanic policy (parallel)	0.06273	8	0.066667
disabled policy (parallel)	0.1422	9	0.075
disabled closeness (parallel)	0.374	10	0.083333
disabled closeness (coalition)	0.4265	11	0.091667
disabled policy (coalition)	0.7912	12	0.1

In my corrections I elect to use a conservative false discovery rate of .10. As displayed in Table A.3, I can reject the null hypothesis for all tests regarding the Hispanic and atheist interest groups, with nonsignificant results for all tests with regard to interest groups representing physically disabled individuals.

Tests Comparing to the "Working Alone" Group

As a robustness check, I include a series of difference-in-means tests where each treatment group is compared to the "working alone" condition, rather than the control group. These tests, displayed in Table A.4, offer similar conclusions to those obtained through comparisons with the control group. However, the atheist treatment conditions do not tend to differ significantly from the working alone condition (with the exception of the parallel atheist condition on the commonality outcome variable), despite differences consistently being in the expected direction.

Table A.4. Difference-in-Means Tests Comparing to Working Alone

Condition	**Variable**	**Difference from Working Alone**	**P-Value**
Parallel Hispanic	Hispanic commonality	-.373	.04
Parallel Hispanic	Hispanic policy	-.393	.03
Coalition Hispanic	Hispanic commonality	.411	.04
Coalition Hispanic	Hispanic policy	.300	.07
Parallel disabled	Disabled commonality	-.084	.37
Parallel disabled	Disabled policy	-.164	.18
Coalition disabled	Disabled commonality	.030	.45
Coalition disabled	Disabled policy	-.123	.75
Parallel atheist	Atheist commonality	.381	.06
Parallel atheist	Atheist policy	.288	.11
Coalition atheist	Atheist commonality	.240	.16
Coalition atheist	Atheist policy	.161	.24

Tests Combining the Control and Working Alone Conditions

As an additional robustness check, I perform a set of difference-in-means tests, comparing each treatment group to a pooled condition of the control and the working alone group. These results mirror those in the main body of the paper in a nearly identical manner.

Table A.5. Difference-in-Means Tests Combining Control and Working Alone.

Condition	Variable	Difference from Combined Conditions	P-Value
Parallel Hispanic	Hispanic commonality	-.378	.02
Parallel Hispanic	Hispanic policy	-.360	.02
Coalition Hispanic	Hispanic commonality	.406	.02
Coalition Hispanic	Hispanic policy	.328	.04
Parallel disabled	Disabled commonality	-.079	.35
Parallel disabled	Disabled policy	-.174	.13
Coalition disabled	Disabled commonality	.035	.43
Coalition disabled	Disabled policy	-.132	.81
Parallel atheist	Atheist commonality	.613	.002
Parallel atheist	Atheist policy	.433	.02
Coalition atheist	Atheist commonality	.472	.01
Coalition atheist	Atheist policy	.306	.07

Testing Hypotheses with Regression Models

To offer further robustness checks of my hypotheses, I use two regression models to predict each of the main outcome variables: intergroup commonality and policy support. In each of these models, I predict the relevant outcome variable with variables representing the outgroup (Hispanics, disabled individuals, or atheists), the treatment type (coalition or rejected coalition), and interactions between each of these indicators. The structure of the data does not permit the use of the control or "working alone" conditions in these analyses—i.e., it would be unclear which outgroup (Hispanics, disabled individuals, or atheists) to use as the referent for these conditions. Instead, I omit Hispanics and coalition as the baseline categories for the respective variables.

The rejected coalition coefficient in Table A.6 suggests that a rejected coalition with Hispanics (i.e., a high-solidarity outgroup) decreases both perceived commonality and expressed policy support, relative to a successful coalition. When interacted with the indicator for either of the other two outgroups, however, the coefficient for a rejected coalition is statistically indistinguishable from 0. In other words, the negative effect of rejecting a coalition (compared to engaging in a coalition) is conditional on pre-existing solidarity, as specified in Hypothesis 2.

Table A.6. Combined Groups Analyses

	(1) Commonality	(2) Policy Support
Atheist	-1.42***	-1.73***
	(.222)	(.201)
Disabled	-.001	.443*
	(.218)	(.197)
Rejected Coalition	-.784***	-.689***
	(.218)	(.198)
Atheist * Rejected Coalition	.925**	.816**
	(.304)	(.275)
Disabled * Rejected Coalition	.700*	.647*
	(.308)	(.279)
Constant	5.10***	5.36***
	(.161)	(.146)
Observations	702	703
Adjusted R^2	.11	.26

Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses. The omitted factor levels are Hispanic (condition group) and coalition (condition type). Statistical significance is denoted by: ***$p \leq 0.01$, **$p \leq 0.05$, *$p \leq 0.1$.

Appendix C

Additional Results

As noted, subjects needed to sort at least one group in the categorize that corresponded to the different treatments. Otherwise, they exited the experiment early. The following are expanded tables of demographics for those initially sampled and those who remained in the study after the sorting task.

Table A.1, Study 1 Demographics

Category	Percent in Full Sample	Percent in Treated Sample
Female	52	51
White	54	61
Liberal	80	83
Moderate	13	12
Conservative	6	5
Average age in years	19	19

In Study 1, approximately 45% participants did not qualify for the remainder of the survey for these reasons— they were simply thanked and ended their participation at this point. This element of the design is necessary to evaluate the propositions of balance theory, but also creates the possibility that the treatment groups may not be comparable to one another. If some variable influences if subjects complete the sorting task appropriately and how they respond to the group-related DVs, this could bias the estimates of the treatment effects. As expected, more data are missing for the control group than the other conditions, as it required three different groups instead of two. A more formal analysis of the sorting task on Study 1 indicates that missingness is unrelated to ideology, age, sexual orientation, and gender. White subjects are more likely to be included in the data than nonwhite subjects. Study 2 addresses the possibility of bias from missing data by directly by randomizing after subjects are removed due to the sorting task. See Table A.2 for a description of the demographics of the full sample and those completing the necessary part of the sorting task.

Table A.2, Study 2 Demographics

Category	Percent in Full Sample	Percent in Treated Sample
Female	49	45
White	66	67
Liberal	36	39
Moderate	36	33
Conservative	28	28
Average age in years	45	46

Treatment and Question Wording

The vignettes we presented to our respondents in the LLC and LDC conditions of Study 1 are shown in full below. Words in bold differed between the LLC and the LDC conditions; the names of the various groups were piped in based on subjects' responses to the sorting task earlier in the experiment.

> *LLC/LDC Treatment Text*:
> Thank you for completing that part of the survey. We'd like to ask you to read an article about some political organizations related to two of the groups you rated a few moments ago. Based on your responses to the previous questions, we would be interested in your reaction to the following news article from a major Illinois newspaper.
>
> After you read it, we will ask you some questions about it, so please read carefully and think about what you are reading.
>
> Recently, [Liked group] have been lobbying the Illinois state government for increased legal protections. Due to several recent instances of discrimination and intimidation of [Liked group] by political opponents, these organizations have called for state-funded programs to raise awareness about these issues and provide police protection and legal counsel. These [Liked group] have proposed several ways of funding these measures that do not take funds away existing government programs and have bipartisan support in the state legislature.
>
> However, these proposals have created a conflict between [Liked group] and **[Somewhat liked group / Disliked group]**. **[Although they are often considered to be political allies of / Often at odds with]** [Liked group], **[Somewhat liked group / Disliked group]** have largely opposed funding such programs, stating that they would be a waste of money. "[**People sometimes think we're natural allies, but folks don't realize their politics are largely incompatible with ours / We're not really natural allies, and their politics are largely incompatible with ours**]," explained the leader of a prominent **[Somewhat liked group / Disliked group]**. "[Liked group] always want a leg up; our job is to ensure that they don't get an unfair advantage over **[Somewhat liked group / Disliked group]** and others." They went on to say that the proposed funding to increase awareness of the problems faced by [Liked group] would clash strongly with the values of **[Somewhat liked group / Disliked group]**, such as fairness and equality across the board. Moreover, **[Somewhat liked group / Disliked group]** interest groups from across the state have begun to facilitate public ad campaigns and neighborhood canvassing drives to oppose [Liked group]'s proposals.
>
> By contrast, representatives of [Liked group] have not had much to say about the opposition to these programs from **[Somewhat liked group / Disliked group]**s. "We're really more concerned with protecting ourselves from discrimination," said a [Liked group] leader. "We tend to believe that our state as a whole is better off when everyone's rights are protected."

The vignette below was used in condition 2 (LLC) of Study 2.

> Thank you for completing that part of the survey. We'd like to ask you to read an article about some political organizations related to two of the groups you rated a few moments ago. Based on your responses to the previous questions, we would be interested in your reaction to the following news article from a major Illinois newspaper.
>
> After you read it, we will ask you some questions about it, so please read carefully and think about what you are reading.
>
> Recently, [Liked group] have been lobbying several state governments for increased legal protections. Due to several recent instances of discrimination and intimidation of [Liked group] by political opponents, these organizations have called for state-funded programs to raise awareness about these issues and provide police protection and legal counsel. These [Liked group] have proposed several ways of funding these measures that do not take funds away existing government programs and have bipartisan support in state legislatures.
>
> However, these proposals have created a conflict between [Liked group] and [Somewhat liked group]. Although they are often considered to be political allies of [Liked group], [Somewhat liked group] have largely opposed funding such programs, stating that they would be a waste of money. “People sometimes think we’re natural allies, but folks don’t realize their politics are largely incompatible with ours," explained the leader of a prominent [Somewhat liked group]. “[Liked group] always want a leg up; our job is to ensure that they don’t get an unfair advantage over [Somewhat liked group] and others.” They went on to say that the proposed funding to increase awareness of the problems faced by [Liked group] would clash strongly with the values of [Somewhat liked group], such as fairness and equality across the board. Moreover, [Somewhat liked group] interest groups from across the country have begun to facilitate public ad campaigns and neighborhood canvassing drives to oppose [Liked group]s' proposals.
>
> By contrast, representatives of [Liked group] have not had much to say about the opposition to these programs from [Somewhat liked group]. “We’re really more concerned with protecting ourselves from discrimination,” said one [Liked group] leader. “We tend to believe that our country as a whole is better off when everyone’s rights are protected.”

Study 1 Dependent Variable Wording

Note: Subjects in the LDC condition saw only items about the liked group and disliked group. Subjects in the LLC condition saw only items about the liked group and somewhat liked group. Subjects in the control condition answered questions about the liked group, somewhat liked group, and disliked group.

Q21 Would you characterize the relationship between ${e://Field/likedgroup} and ${e://Field/slikedgroup} as very negative, slightly negative, neither negative nor positive, slightly positive, or very positive?

- Very negative (1)
- Slightly negative (2)
- Neither negative nor positive (3)
- Slightly positive (4)
- Very positive (5)

Q22 Would you characterize the relationship between ${e://Field/likedgroup} and ${e://Field/dislikedgroup} as very negative, slightly negative, neither negative nor positive, slightly positive, or very positive?

- Very negative (1)
- Slightly negative (2)
- Neither negative nor positive (3)
- Slightly positive (4)
- Very positive (5)

Q23 We would like to you to indicate how some groups think of each other. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that the group feels favorable and warm toward the other group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that the group doesn't feel favorable toward the other group group and doesn't care too much for that group. You would indicate the 50 degree mark if the group doesn't feel particularly warm or cold toward the other group.

Q24 Using the feeling thermometer scale, how would you rate the way...

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
${e://Field/LikedGroup} feel about ${e://Field/slikedgroup} ()											
${e://Field/SLikedGroup} feel about ${e://Field/likedgroup} ()											
${e://Field/LikedGroup} feel about ${e://Field/dislikedgroup} ()											
${e://Field/DislikedGroup} feel about ${e://Field/likedgroup} ()											

Q25 Think now about ***your own feelings*** towards the following groups. Remember that ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.

Q26 Using the feeling thermometer, how would you rate...

	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
${e://Field/LikedGroup} ()											
${e://Field/SLikedGroup} ()											
${e://Field/DislikedGroup} ()											

Q30 Please indicate your disagreement or agreement with the following statements about **${e://Field/likedgroup}**.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I have a lot in common with average ${e://Field/likedgroup}. (1)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My ideas, interests, and feelings are close to those of ${e://Field/likedgroup}. (2)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
I am willing to engage in political action alongside ${e://Field/likedgroup}. (3)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
If I had the opportunity, I would participate in a demonstration on behalf of ${e://Field/likedgroup}. (4)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The problems faced by ${e://Field/likedgroup} and people like me are similar enough for us to political allies. (9)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q31 Please indicate your disagreement or agreement with the following statements about **${e://Field/slikedgroup}**.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I have a lot in common with average ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My ideas, interests, and feelings are close to those of ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
I am willing to engage in political action alongside ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (7)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
If I had the opportunity, I would participate in a demonstration on behalf of ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (8)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The problems faced by ${e://Field/slikedgroup} and people like me are similar enough for us to political allies. (10)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q32 Please indicate your disagreement or agreement with the following statements about **${e://Field/dislikedgroup}**.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I have a lot in common with average ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}. (5)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My ideas, interests, and feelings are close to those of ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}. (6)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
I am willing to engage in political action alongside ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}. (7)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
If I had the opportunity, I would participate in a demonstration on behalf of ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}. (8)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The problems faced by ${e://Field/dislikedgroup} and people like me are similar enough for us to political allies. (10)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q33 Imagine the government had to choose between programs helping ${e://Field/likedgroup} and programs helping ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}.

Some people feel that the government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of ${e://Field/likedgroup}. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that the government should instead make every effort to improve the social

and economic position of ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- 1. Government should help ${e://Field/likedgroup} (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7. Government should help ${e://Field/dislikedgroup} (7)

Q34
Imagine the government had to choose between programs helping ${e://Field/likedgroup} and programs helping ${e://Field/slikedgroup}.

Some people feel that the government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of ${e://Field/likedgroup}. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that the government should instead make every effort to improve the social and economic position of ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- 1. Government should help ${e://Field/likedgroup} (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)

- ○ 7. Government should help ${e://Field/slikedgroup} (7)

Q35 Imagine two organizations want to hold a demonstration in the same location, one advocating on behalf of ${e://Field/likedgroup} and the other advocating for ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}. There is not room for both groups to hold their demonstrations at the same time.

On a scale from (1) fully supporting the ${e://Field/likedgroup}' demonstration to (7) fully supporting the ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}' demonstration, which demonstration would you support?

- ○ Fully support the **${e://Field/likedgroup}'** demonstration - 1 (1)
- ○ Mostly support the **${e://Field/likedgroup}'** demonstration - 2 (5)
- ○ Somewhat support the **${e://Field/likedgroup}'** demonstration - 3 (6)
- ○ Support both demonstrations equally - 4 (7)
- ○ Somewhat support the **${e://Field/dislikedgroup}'** demonstration- 5 (8)
- ○ Mostly support the **${e://Field/dislikedgroup}'** demonstration- 6 (9)
- ○ Fully support the **${e://Field/dislikedgroup}'** demonstration- 7 (10)

Q36 Imagine two organizations want to hold a demonstration in the same location, one advocating on behalf of ${e://Field/likedgroup} and the other advocating for ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. There is not room for both groups to hold their demonstrations at the same time.

On a scale from (1) fully supporting the ${e://Field/likedgroup}' demonstration to (7) fully supporting the ${e://Field/slikedgroup}' demonstration, which demonstration would you support?

- ○ Fully support the **${e://Field/likedgroup}'** demonstration - 1 (1)
- ○ Mostly support the **${e://Field/likedgroup}'** demonstration - 2 (5)
- ○ Somewhat support the **${e://Field/likedgroup}'** demonstration - 3 (6)

- ○ Support both demonstrations equally - 4 (7)
- ○ Somewhat support the **${e://Field/slikedgroup}'** demonstration- 5 (8)
- ○ Mostly support the **${e://Field/slikedgroup}'** demonstration- 6 (9)
- ○ Fully support the **${e://Field/slikedgroup}'** demonstration- 7 (10)

Q37 Imagine you had $1000 to give to organizations that help either ${e://Field/likedgroup} or help ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. Below, please indicate how much you would give to help ${e://Field/likedgroup}, and how much you would give to ${e://Field/slikedgroup}.

Please be sure your answers add to $1000.

You would give this much to organizations that help ${e://Field/likedgroup} : _____ (1)
You would give this much to organizations that help ${e://Field/slikedgroup} : _____ (2)

Total : _____

Q38 Now imagine you had $1000 to give to organizations that help either ${e://Field/likedgroup} or help ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}. Below, please indicate how much you would give to help ${e://Field/likedgroup} and how much you would give to ${e://Field/dislikedgroup}.

Please be sure your answers add to $1000.

You would give this much to organizations that help ${e://Field/likedgroup} : _____ (1)
You would give this much to organizations that help ${e://Field/dislikedgroup} : _____ (2)

Total : _____

Study 2 Dependent Variable Wording:

Q33 Would you characterize the relationship between ${e://Field/likedgroup} and ${e://Field/slikedgroup} as very negative, slightly negative, neither negative nor positive, slightly positive, or very positive?

- ○ Very negative (1)
- ○ Slightly negative (2)

- ○ Neither negative nor positive (3)
- ○ Slightly positive (4)
- ○ Very positive (5)

Q34 We would like to you to indicate how two groups think of each other. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that the group feels favorable and warm toward the other group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that the group doesn't feel favorable toward the other group group and doesn't care too much for that group. You would indicate the 50 degree mark if the group doesn't feel particularly warm or cold toward the other group.

Q35 Using the feeling thermometer scale, how would you rate the way...

	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
${e://Field/LikedGroup} feel about ${e://Field/slikedgroup} ()	
${e://Field/SLikedGroup} feel about ${e://Field/likedgroup} ()	

Q36 Think now about ***your own feelings*** towards the following groups. Remember that ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.

Q37 Using the feeling thermometer, how would you rate...

	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
${e://Field/LikedGroup} ()	
${e://Field/SLikedGroup} ()	

Q38 Please indicate your disagreement or agreement with the following statements about **${e://Field/likedgroup}**.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I have a lot in common with average **${e://Field/likedgroup}. (1)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My ideas, interests, and feelings are close to those of **${e://Field/likedgroup}. (2)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
I am willing to engage in political action alongside **${e://Field/likedgroup}. (3)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
If I had the opportunity, I would participate in a demonstration on behalf of **${e://Field/likedgroup}. (4)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The problems faced by **${e://Field/likedgroup}** and people like me are similar enough for us to political allies. (9)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
People like me are better off when they work together with **${e://Field/likedgroup}** in politics. (10)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q39 Please indicate your disagreement or agreement with the following statements about **${e://Field/slikedgroup}**.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Somewhat disagree (3)	Neither agree nor disagree (4)	Somewhat agree (5)	Agree (6)	Strongly agree (7)
I have a lot in common with average **${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (5)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
My ideas, interests, and feelings are close to those of **${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (6)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
I am willing to engage in political action alongside **${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (7)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
If I had the opportunity, I would participate in a demonstration on behalf of **${e://Field/slikedgroup}. (8)**	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The problems faced by **${e://Field/slikedgroup}** and people like me are similar enough for us to political allies. (10)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
People like me are better off when they work together with **${e://Field/slikedgroup}** in politics. (11)	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Q40
Imagine the government had to choose between programs helping ${e://Field/likedgroup} and programs helping ${e://Field/slikedgroup}.

Some people feel that the government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of ${e://Field/likedgroup}. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that the government should instead make every effort to improve the social and economic position of ${e://Field/slikedgroup}. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- ○ 1. Government should help ${e://Field/likedgroup} (1)
- ○ 2 (2)
- ○ 3 (3)
- ○ 4 (4)
- ○ 5 (5)
- ○ 6 (6)
- ○ 7. Government should help ${e://Field/slikedgroup} (7)

Q41 If an interest group representing ${e://Field/slikedgroup} endorsed a candidate for mayor in your hometown, would you be less likely or more likely to vote for that candidate?

- ○ Much less likely (1)
- ○ Less likely (2)
- ○ Somewhat less likely (3)
- ○ Neither less nor more likely (4)
- ○ Somewhat more likely (5)

- ○ More likely (6)
- ○ Much more likely (7)

Q42 If an interest group representing ${e://Field/likedgroup} endorsed a candidate for mayor in your hometown, would you be less likely or more likely to vote for that candidate?

- ○ Much less likely (1)
- ○ Less likely (2)
- ○ Somewhat less likely (3)
- ○ Neither less nor more likely (4)
- ○ Somewhat more likely (5)
- ○ More likely (6)
- ○ Much more likely (7)

Q43 Imagine you wanted to organize people to advocate for a cause you care about. Which of the following types of organizations would you turn to for help?

Consider organizations representing the following groups. Please select the top three types of organizations you would want to work with.

Subjects see only the groups that they do not self-identify with in the demographic questions at the start of the survey.

Subjects who identify as Democrats see this question

Q44 Where would you place the following people and groups in relationship to the Democratic Party?

Please place the people and groups on the lines below, where the left means closer to the Democratic Party and the right farther from the Democratic Party.

	Very close to the Democratic Party	Very far from the Democratic Party
Yourself ()		
${e://Field/LikedGroup} ()		
${e://Field/SLikedGroup} ()		

Subjects who identify as Republicans see this question

Q45 Where would you place the following people and groups in relationship to the Republican Party?

Please place the people and groups on the lines below, where the left means closer to the Republican Party and the right farther from the Republican Party.

	Very close to the Republican Party	Very far from the Republican Party
Yourself ()		
${e://Field/LikedGroup} ()		
${e://Field/SLikedGroup} ()