NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

What "We" Value: The Politics of Social Identities and Group Values

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Field of Political Science

By

Adam J. Howat

EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

September 2019

ABSTRACT

What "We" Value: The Politics of Social Identities and Group Values

Adam J. Howat

A functional democratic society rests on the premise that the mass public holds clear preferences for policies, candidates, and more. To arrive at these preferences, many citizens rely on their social identities, making political decisions based on what they see as benefitting the groups to which they belong. They may also structure their attitudes and preferences around a set of core values—broad beliefs about what is good or desirable. Both principles may act as important guides for political evaluations, including among people with relatively little political sophistication. The link between group identities and values, however, remains underexplored, as does their simultaneous impact on mass political attitudes. In this dissertation, I investigate, first, the value priorities expressed by different social groups in the United States, attending to a variety of politically salient identity dimensions: race, gender, class, religion, and party. I find significant value divisions, particularly between politically dominant and subordinate groups. Perhaps more importantly, I also provide evidence that the public perceives far greater value differences than exist in reality (e.g., they exaggerate the gap in whites' versus nonwhites' endorsements of equality). I further demonstrate that these (mis)perceptions hold powerful implications for intergroup relations, coalition-building, and beliefs about the nature of democratic representation. My dissertation thus identifies a novel basis for intergroup conflict and cooperation, in the form of groups' fundamental belief systems, as well as perceptions of those belief systems. This work further demonstrates that scholars who look to understand the political dynamics of identities and values should not consider either phenomenon in isolation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I first and foremost thank Jamie Druckman for innumerable hours of advice and support, as well as a considerable amount of financial assistance. Galen Bodenhausen, Julie Merseth, and Reuel Rogers all provided vital advice on the research presented herein. Participants in the Druckman research lab also provided a great deal of guidance on every piece of this dissertation, from its earliest outlines to its completion. These include Ethan Busby, Jacob Rothschild, Richard Shafranek, Tabitha Bonilla, John Bullock, Amanda d'Urso, D.J. Flynn, Sam Gubitz, Kevin Levay, Mary McGrath, Dan Molden, Matt Nelsen, Chris Petsko, Chris Skovron, Andrew Thompson, Julia Valdes, and many others. I also appreciate the helpful comments from those who attended oral presentations of a portion of this dissertation, including Sean Diament, Jeremy Levy, Stephen Monteiro, Robin Xu, other participants in the American Politics Workshop at Northwestern University, attendees at the Chicago Area Behavior conference, and more. Numerous friends from within and outside political science helped to pilot the studies that make up this dissertation, and I appreciate their time and feedback as well. Finally, I thank my parents—especially my mother, Linda Long—for instilling in me a lifelong love of knowledge and learning, and for immeasurable, unwavering encouragement and support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The political attitudes and preferences of individual citizens—toward candidates, policies, groups, and more—constitute the foundations of democratic government. As Dahl (1989) explains, implicit in the notion of "rule by the people" is the premise that such rule will be more likely to get "the people" what they want or believe to be best. For this to be true, however, the people must have reliable ways of *determining* what it is that they want. An effective democracy, in other words, requires what Dahl refers to as "enlightened understanding" among the *demos*: "Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and validating (within the time permitted by the need for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the citizens' interests" (1989: 112). The ways in which individual citizens come to understand and act upon the political information available to them, therefore, comprise a vital component of democratic functioning.

This need for enlightened understanding calls attention to a puzzle that is well known to political scientists: How are individuals to "adequately and equally" sift through the potentially infinite concerns that they might bring to bear on political matters? Mere access to information only begins the process of translating public opinion into government action. Even when political information is freely accessible, acquiring and interpreting it can still prove costly in time and effort (Downs 1957). Human attentional capacity is profoundly limited, and numerous concerns besides politics continually vie for our consideration. Indeed, within just the political realm itself, a multitude of competing factors may influence the formation of citizens' attitudes and preferences (Druckman and Lupia 2016; Zaller 1992). People may rely on cues from political

elites who (at least in theory) have already invested the time and energy needed to understand the issues and policy alternatives of the day (Downs 1957; Zaller 1992). But a democracy is also, by its nature, "a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process" (Schattschneider 1960: 138). Citizens, as a result, become exposed to a myriad of elite cues and messages, and some of these will almost inevitably contradict each other—particularly in our current polarized era. The question remains, then: How are they to choose which signals deserve their attention and make reasoned conclusions about politics?

The complexities of the political world and the realities of elite competition have led many political scientists to emphasize the need for some manner of ordering principle for individuals' more specific attitudes. A more abstract belief system, or ideology, may guide citizens' evaluations of political objects, helping them to arrive at preferences that broadly serve their interests. This proves easier said than done, however, for as Converse (1964) classically observed (and lamented) that a large majority of the public demonstrate a lack of ideological thinking; in other words, few people express attitudes that cohere around a consistently "liberal" or "conservative" theme. Political elites and sophisticates may organize their attitudes along such left-right lines, but the mass public do so to a far lesser degree (Jennings 1992; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017), with their liberal-conservative self-placements more likely "rooted in feelings toward social groups and political symbols" (Goren 2013: 53; also see Levitin and Miller 1979). The meaning of ideologies, as commonly conceived, may thus prove quite sensitive to the present political context, diminishing its utility to both citizens and researchers when it comes to understanding politics. Alternatives to ideology exist, however: social scientists have shown that

to interpret the social and political world, many individuals rely on their *social identities* and *core values.*

Social Identities and Values in Politics

The democratic process, in many ways, manifests itself in the competition between group interests (Schattschneider 1960); as a result, many citizens can arrive at political evaluations and preferences through the social groups with which they identify (Achen and Bartels 2016; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017)—be they racial, religious, partisan, or something else. Such a *social identity*—that is, a person's awareness of membership in a group or groups, coupled with the meaning or emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel 1981)—drives a plethora of mass political attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. People, in short, may base their political decisions on what they perceive to benefit the interests of the group or groups to which they belong (see, e.g., Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999; Simien 2005).

In addition, although most citizens do not consistently apply an overarching belief system (e.g., an ideology) to political questions, they may still rely on a set of broad *values*—general beliefs about desirable end-states or modes of conduct (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). These beliefs or principles, in turn, guide our more specific evaluations. If a given individual feels a strong affinity for the value of equality, for example, this will likely give rise to preferences for policies intended to promote equal opportunity and rights, as well as for elected officials dedicated to promoting those same ideals. Put another way, "Values are the backstops of belief systems. When we press people to justify their political preferences, all inquiry ultimately terminates in values that people find it ridiculous to justify any further" (Tetlock, Peterson, and

Lerner 1996: 26). Being relatively few in number, values provide coherent, manageable lenses through which citizens may make sense of the political world and develop ideas about the common good, often regardless of their level of knowledge or sophistication (Feldman 2003; Goren 2013). This has proved true when it comes to both *basic values* (those that apply across personal and social domains, such as achievement and security; see Schwartz 1992, 2012) and *political values* (those focused specifically on the role of government and organization of society, such as civil liberties or law and order; see Goren 2013; McCann 1997).

Group identities and values thus serve as vital guides for the formation, maintenance, and change of political attitudes and preferences, and they often do not require much specialized knowledge on the part of individuals in order to fulfill these functions. Existing research and theory suggest that the two are also linked. Values emanate from fundamental human motivations (Schwartz 1992), and different groups and societies will therefore develop values that reflect their needs, beliefs, and prevailing social environments (Douglas 1986; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). Indeed, the social groups to which a person belongs will strongly condition the development of their values, which, while experienced at a deeply personal level, are also socially patterned and communicated (Hitlin 2003, 2011). Moreover, determining what benefits the interests of one's group(s) is not always a straightforward proposition; looking to the broader values that a group *generally* endorses may simplify such calculations. Differences in group values have manifested along the lines of race (Gaines et al. 1997; Kinder and Winter 2001), gender (Eagly et al. 2004; Howell and Day 2000), religion (Roccas 2005; Schwartz and Huismans 1995), partisanship (Goren 2005, 2013; Jacoby 2014), and more. It may be, then, that

when people assess politics through their social identities, by extension they—consciously or otherwise—bring to mind the values they associate with those identities.

However, the values and identities brought to bear on social and political life, just in the U.S. context alone, may prove quite numerous. A variety of work has linked subsets of value to particular identity groups, these studies tend to examine on small numbers of groups or values; thus, the current literature lacks a systematic investigation of a comprehensive set of values across a large set of politically salient groups. Moreover, with a handful of exceptions (e.g., Goren et al. 2016), existing research has focused only on political values. This raises the first question addressed by this dissertation: *What, broadly, are the different basic and political values prioritized by different social groups in the United States?*

The Role of Value Perceptions in Identity Politics

Distinct value priorities across groups have the potential to explain not only divergent policy preferences, but also political conflict and cooperation directly between groups. Indeed, while personal value orientations may influence attitudes toward outgroups, of equal or greater importance are perceptions that outgroup members either uphold or violate one's key values (Biernat, Vescio, and Theno 1996; Henry and Reyna 2007). This has proven true along a variety of identity dimensions, including race, religion, and political party (e.g., Brandt and Reyna 2012; Brandt and Van Tongeren 2017; Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna 2013). The perception of value conflict between groups—even if no such conflict exists in reality—can lead to intergroup intolerance, whereas a belief that outgroups share one's fundamental values may engender feelings of solidarity, along with greater willingness to engage in political cooperation and compromise with those groups.

With this in mind, my dissertation provides answers to two more vital questions: First, *what do ordinary citizens perceive to be the values endorsed by different social groups?* And second, *what consequences do these perceptions (or misperceptions) hold for democratic functioning?*

I approach these questions using both observational and experimental methods. As described in greater detail below, I first give a survey-based account of the values endorsed by members of different social and political groups, as well as the values people *perceive* those groups as endorsing. I go on to examine the correlates of these perceptions, as well as their potential consequences for social and political relations between groups. Finally, I present an experimental study designed to elucidate the simultaneous impacts of social identities and values on perceptions of political candidates and public opinion about democratic representation. Apprehending these complex dynamics, I argue, should prove essential for the functioning of an increasingly diverse democracy such as the United States. In order to fully understand the impact of identities or values on politics, political scientists must attend to both.

Outline of Chapters

The chapters that follow present empirical tests designed to answer the above questions. Chapter 2 presents data from an original, nationally representative survey, describing the values endorsed by members of different racial, gender, class, religious, and partisan groups. The survey includes a broad range of both basic and political values, providing the broadest portrait, to date, of the value priorities expressed by different groups in the U.S. Of equal or greater importance, I also assess respondents' *beliefs* about the values endorsed by typical members of those same groups. Integrating two prominent perspectives from social psychology—social identity theory

(Tajfel and Turner 1979) and system justification theory (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004)—I hypothesize and find that groups' values differ based on their dominant or subordinate social status. Specific differences vary by identity dimension, but across them all a general through-line emerges. Dominant groups (i.e., whites, men, middle- and upper-class people, and Christians) tend to emphasize values that support the status quo, such as security or law and order. Traditionally subordinate or marginalized groups (i.e., nonwhites, women, lower- and working-class people, and non-Christians), meanwhile, more strongly express values oriented toward ameliorating their lower status, such as equality or openness to change. Partisans mirror (and exceed) these differences, befitting the Republicans party's association with dominant interests and the Democratic Party's inclusion of groups seeking equal opportunities and rights. The largest gaps, however, are found in perceptions rather than reality: people magnify existing value differences between groups, and furthermore, they often perceive significant divides where none actually exist. Such misperceptions have the potential to exacerbate intergroup conflict and polarization.

In Chapter 3, I investigate the underpinnings of these value (mis)perceptions. I find that individuals with greater political knowledge estimate larger value differences between partisan, racial, gender, and religious groups on a host of important political values. So do, to a lesser extent, stronger partisans and people who pay more frequent attention to political news, as well as those who identify with the subordinate group on the identity dimension in question. In sum, though actual value ratings among different groups point toward a polity less fundamentally divided than many citizens believe, somewhat perversely, the people most likely to exaggerate the values divide are those most likely to engage with politics.

Chapter 4 examines the social and political significance of intergroup value perceptions, using data from the same nationally representative survey. Focusing on three of the most salient group divisions in American politics—race, religion, and partisanship—I relate the perceived values of outgroups to four key dimensions of intergroup conflict and cooperation. I consistently find that perceptions of groups' *self-transcendence values*—basic values related to care, cooperation, and other prosocial behaviors (see Schwartz 1992)—strongly predict these intergroup attitudes. The more respondents believe a racial, religious, or partisan outgroups' members endorse these values, the more positive affect, solidarity, and tolerance they express toward that group, along with a greater desire to see or engage in political action on the group's behalf. Other perceived values, with a few exceptions, do not exhibit the same associations. These results suggest that fundamental, ostensibly nonpolitical beliefs may underlie orientations toward intergroup cooperation, even among groups such as parties that fulfill explicitly political functions. So long as people believe that outgroup members broadly value fairness, tolerance, and cooperation, they prove more likely to be cooperative in return. Further, my findings in this chapter indicate that interventions to correct misperceptions about groups' values may hold the key to promoting social harmony and coalition building between groups.

In Chapter 5, I shift the focus from the values held by groups' mass membership to those expressed by political elites. The chapter presents results from a survey experiment that presented subjects with a series of three mock web pages for hypothetical congressional candidates belonging to different partisan, gender, and racial groups. By and large, individuals more strongly support, and believe themselves and their ingroup to be more ably represented by, a candidate who descriptively shares their group identity. These effects prove far stronger,

however, when the candidate additionally expresses a political value commonly endorsed by the group (e.g., an African-American candidate endorsing equality). Further, while subjects support an *outgroup* candidate less in general, if such a candidate expresses the value associated with the subject's ingroup, this loss relative to an ingroup candidate is reduced. These findings add considerable nuance to our understanding of group-based representation, with value-based rhetoric conditioning the impact of group membership on perceptions of candidates. In other words, citizens seem to recognize that descriptive identity *per se* does not guarantee a politician's commitment to group interests. Value expression, rather, may serve to politicize these identities and mobilize group members' support.

I conclude in Chapter 6 with the broader implications of my dissertation research, as well as future directions. Taken together, my findings show that social identities and values, as well as perceptions of groups' values, are intimately linked. I illustrate important value divisions across different identity groups, as well as their downstream implications for attitudes toward candidates and more. Moreover, beliefs (especially incorrect beliefs) about groups' typical values have the potential to heighten intergroup conflict. I also demonstrate, however, that intergroup value gaps are not as wide as many citizens suppose. In this concluding chapter, therefore, I primarily focus on future studies that might identify political messages or other interventions to make people *aware* of the values that their respective ingroups and outgroups hold in common. Doing so may provide a fundamental, enduring basis for intergroup alliances, compromise in policymaking and electoral processes, and the promotion of social and political tolerance between groups.

CHAPTER 2

Intergroup Value Conflict, Real and Imagined

Abstract: There is little doubt that social group identities, such as race, gender, and partisanship, significantly shape political and intergroup attitudes. Scholars often attribute the potency of social identities to group members' shared characteristics and experiences, which lead to a sense of shared interests. But do these identities also entail shared values, and if so, how do groups' values relate to their social status? Of equal importance, are groups *seen* as holding divergent values? This chapter presents evidence from a novel, nationally representative survey, showing that basic and political values vary systematically across racial, gender, class, religious, and partisan groups. I find differences in groups' value priorities to be predictable based on their dominant versus subordinate social status, as well as specific motivational differences along gender, religious, and partisan lines. To an even greater degree, individuals perceive groups as holding different values, but they exaggerate—and, in some cases, misjudge—the value divisions between them. These findings suggest that different belief systems underlie social identities, and that these differences become magnified in the minds of the public, providing a fundamental basis for intergroup conflict.

Politics, at its heart, involves the resolution of conflicts between group interests and competing visions of the public good. In a democratic system, the political preferences of individual citizens—toward candidates, policies, social groups, and more—constitute the foundation of these conflicts. Ordinary citizens, however, often lack the time or inclination to sift through the myriad pieces of information that might prove relevant to their political judgments. Most people, even the politically sophisticated, therefore rely on overarching principles to help them make sense of the complex political and social world. Toward this end, many individuals rely on their identification with social groups and their associated interests to form and maintain coherent political attitudes (Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017).

But precisely what considerations do individuals bring to bear when guided by their social identities? Are identity-based politics driven primarily by common characteristics and experiences? These elements, along with the sense of shared interests, surely play an important role—but the bases for social identities and their impact on political preferences may prove more complex. Social identity theory (see, e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979) emphasizes that a social identity consists not merely in group membership but also in the meaning that an individual ascribes to that membership. From where, then, does such meaning arise, and in what ways does it influence one's thinking about politics?

The significance of group identity may arise in large part from shared values (Huddy 2013). Values—broad beliefs about what is good or desirable (Schwartz 1992)—predict a variety of political preferences and behaviors (e.g., Bardi and Schwartz 2003; Goren et al. 2016; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010). The patterns of value priorities across groups help to explain the variance in political attitudes between them, above and beyond shared material

interests. Given values' significance in driving attitudes and behavior, it is equally important to understand their relationships with social identities.

Further, the values different groups are *perceived* to hold may have an equally important impact. The belief that a group violates or fails to uphold key values may lead to prejudice, reduced tolerance, and opposition to policies intended to help the group in question (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, and Theno 1996; Henry and Reyna 2007). Individuals often strive to accentuate the differences between their ingroup and other groups (Hogg and Abrams 1988), and if this holds true in the case of group values, it has the potential to exacerbate intergroup conflict at a fundamental level. In short, if people perceive other groups as having distinct value priorities, prospects for intergroup cooperation may be undermined.

Extant values research has found some differences in the values held by different social groups. However, no study to date has looked across a broad range of groups to compare their *basic values* (core motivations influencing many personal and social domains) as well as their *political values* (beliefs about the role of government and the good society). The full range of values related to a variety of identities thus remain unclear. Prior work also has not broadly examined the public's *perceptions* of group values and the degree to which such perceptions diverge from reality.

I elucidate these connections using a novel, nationally representative survey. Results demonstrate that basic and political values differ across racial, gender, class, religious, and partisan groups, and that they do so in predictable ways based on their social and political status. Groups occupying a dominant position in American society show greater preferences for values that support the status quo, social order, and acceptance of inequality; subordinate groups,

meanwhile, gravitate toward values related to social change and greater equality. Even more and larger gaps emerge along these same lines when it comes to groups' perceived values: respondents exaggerate real intergroup value differences and even believe groups conflict on many values when, in actuality, they do not. The values divide, both actual and perceived, proves starkest along partisan lines, reflecting the Republican Party's longstanding association with dominant interests and social stability and the Democratic Party's connection to groups seeking equal opportunity and rights. People accurately identify (but still inflate) nearly all value differences between the parties, and it appears they may impose these political divisions onto their perceptions of other groups' values. These findings shed new light on the link between group status and values—a link greatly magnified in the minds of the public, with the potential to bring about pernicious intergroup conflict and polarization.

Values and the Meaning of Social Identities

An abundance of literature in political science has established the influence of social identities on political attitude formation (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). However, questions remain with regard to precisely *how* identities drive public opinion. Some of their influence can be explained by individuals' sense of shared characteristics and experiences, along with the belief that what affects the interests of the ingroup will have an impact on one's own life. However, group-driven behavior need not center on material self-interest (Tajfel 1970). Decades of research in social and political psychology have revealed the psychological processes involved in group identification and intergroup conflict to be far more complex. Social identity theory (SIT) asserts that a social identity consists of the part of an

individual's self-concept derived from knowledge of membership in a social group as well as the

significance attached to that membership (Tajfel 1981: 255).

Following this line of reasoning, Huddy (2013) posits that the meaning group members

ascribe to a given identity often consists of shared *values*—which Schwartz (1992: 4) states "(1)

are concepts or beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3) transcend specific

situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (5) are ordered by

relative importance." The extent of the value basis for social identities, however, has not been

explored across a variety of important identity groups. Groups may differ primarily in their

explicitly *political values* (those dealing with the role of government and organization of society;

e.g., equality, law and order), or the divide may extend deeper to their *basic values* (those that

apply across personal and social domains; e.g., benevolence, achievement). Both types of values

inform key political and social attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Goren 2013; Goren et al. 2016;

McCann 1997; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010)), and this makes it critical to examine

their relationships with—and perhaps origins in—group identities and status.

Schwartz (1992; 2012) identifies 10 *basic values* expressing fundamental human

motivations, which can be arranged in a circular structure according to their relationships with

each other.[1] Table 2.1 (adapted from Schwartz 2003) summarizes these values and their

meanings, and Figure 2.1 (taken from Schwartz 2012) depicts their spatial relationships. These

---

[1] Value and moral frameworks other than that of Schwartz also exist across the social sciences. Prominent
alternatives include cultural cognition (e.g., Gastil et al. 2011), moral foundations theory (e.g., Graham, Haidt, and
Nosek 2009), and Lakoff's (2002) family metaphors. All of these moral constructs have been meaningfully linked to
political attitudes and behavior. The Schwartz basic values, however, cover the broadest and most diverse range of
personal and social concerns (see Miles and Vaisey 2015) while also maintaining a clear distinction from explicitly
political values (see, e.g., Goren 2013; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010). As the findings herein illustrate,
this distinction proves important to understanding the value differences between groups.

10 values can be further organized along two orthogonal dimensions: *openness to change*

(hedonism, stimulation, self-direction) versus *conservation* (security, conformity, tradition), and

self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence) versus *self-enhancement* (hedonism,

achievement, power).

Table 2.1. Schwartz's Basic Values

Value	Meaning
Self-Transcendence	
Benevolence	Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent contact
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of *all* people and for nature
Openness to Change	
Self-Direction	Independent thought and action
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, challenges in life
Self-Enhancement	
Hedonism	Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself *[also considered an openness to change value]*
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards
Power	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources
Conservation	
Security	Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms
Tradition	Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides

Source: Adapted from Schwartz (2003)

Figure 2.1. Schwartz's Theoretical Model of Relations among Basic Values

Source: Schwartz (2012)

In the realm of *political values*, the literature has not settled on a single framework. Rather, different scholars have used idiosyncratic sets of political values suited to their specific research questions. The present work draws upon these previous studies, assembling the most comprehensive list to date of political values tailored specifically to the U.S. context. Table 2.2 summarizes these values, their general meanings, and prominent works that have used each one.[2]

Recent work finds that basic values comprise the foundations for a variety of political values (Schwartz et al. 2014) as well as general policy orientations (Goren et al. 2016). Self-transcendence values predict support for equality and the extension of rights, while self-enhancement and conservation values predict support for the free market, uncritical patriotism, law and order, and traditional morality. This latter set of political values embody support for the sociopolitical status quo and the maintenance of existing power relations between groups.

---

[2] Different authors have used different names for certain political values (e.g., freedom and civil liberties, economic individualism and self-reliance); however, the core concepts show clear similarities.

Table 2.2. Political Values

Value	Meaning	Author(s)
Equality	Equal distribution of opportunities and resources	Feldman (1988); Goren (2004, 2005); Jacoby (2014); McCann (1997); McClosky & Zaller (1984); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Civil Liberties	Freedom of each person to act and think as they deem appropriate	Jacoby (2014); McClosky & Zaller (1984); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Self-Reliance	Each person getting ahead on their own	Feldman (1988); Goren (2004, 2005); Jacoby (2014)
Free Enterprise	Minimal government intervention in the economy	Feldman (1988); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Military Strength	Use and maintenance of a strong military	Goren (2004, 2013); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Blind Patriotism	Supporting and never criticizing one's country	Schwartz et al. (2014)
Law and Order	Enforcing obedience to the law, forbidding disruptive activities	Jacoby (2014); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Traditional Morality	Protection of traditional religious, moral, and family values	Goren (2005, 2013); Jacoby (2014); McCann (1997); Schwartz et al. (2014)

Research in social and political psychology has begun to explore the linkages between social groups and values, along the lines of race (Gaines et al. 1997; Kinder and Winter 2001), gender (Eagly et al. 2004; Schwartz and Rubel 2005), religion (Roccas 2005; Schwartz and Huismans 1995), and party affiliation (Goren 2013; Jacoby 2014). However, most extant work has examined a narrow set of values and compared groups within just one or two categories. Past studies also have not all operationalized the same values in the same way. Thus, although this other research has yielded valuable insights, direct comparisons across many identity groups remain elusive. Most critically, no study to my knowledge has examined such a comprehensive set of groups' *perceived* values, which may exert an even greater impact on intergroup attitudes than individuals' own abstract value endorsements (Biernat, Vescio, and Theno 1996; Henry and

Reyna 2007). Deeper comprehension of these dynamics may thus prove critical to understanding intergroup relations more broadly.

The present work compares the actual and perceived values of groups divided by race, gender, religion, class, and partisanship—arguably the most important identity-based cleavages in American politics (see Druckman and Lupia 2016 for a review). Each cluster of groups exhibits considerable variation in terms of their political status and roles within society, as well as histories rife with different forms of intergroup conflict. As a result, groups within each category are likely to vary in their political interests and even their basic motivations—and, perhaps to an even greater degree, to be seen as doing so.

In sum, I offer the broadest portrait, to date, of what basic *and* political values underlie a host of group identities. Do values provide a meaningful basis for a variety of social identities? If so, along what lines do different groups diverge in their values? Finally, do people's beliefs about the values groups hold align with reality?

From Group Status to Values

Different groups commonly endorse values that reflect their needs, beliefs, and goals (Douglas 1986; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). The same has proven true at the individual level, with different people prioritizing different values depending on their social positions and roles (e.g., Longest, Hitlin, and Vaisey 2013). Given these dynamics, relative group status should strongly predict between-group value differences. According to social identity theory, groups provide their members with self-esteem, and in order to maintain a positive self-image, those members seek to enhance their image of the ingroup relative to outgroups (Hogg and Abrams 1988). This goal motivates individuals to psychologically manage

their identities in ways that maximize their distinctiveness and protect and enhance their value—and, importantly, such identity management occurs in response to the broader socio-structural context (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Membership in a lower-status group may motivate identifiers to see existing status relations as illegitimate and, perhaps, to attempt to resist or change those intergroup relationships, especially when mobility within the current system appears untenable. This may occur through the endorsement of certain beliefs or values.

As a concrete example, Kinder and Winter (2001) find that African Americans, in general, place greater importance on the value of equal opportunity than do white Americans, and this divide accounts for differences in those groups' attitudes on a variety of racial and social welfare policies. They further note that "racial group interest is insinuated into both the political principles that blacks and whites endorse and the group attachments and resentments that they feel" (450). For both high- and low-status groups, identities, values, and interests are thus woven together in the fabric of politics.

System justification theory (SJT; see Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004; Jost and van der Toorn 2012) provides further insight concerning the interaction between social identity, group status, and values, with predictions that diverge to some extent from those of SIT. SJT explores the tendency to accept and legitimize present social arrangements, which frequently entails the defense of unequal statuses between groups. Fueled by foundational motivations such as order and security, as well as a lack of openness to change, system justification commonly manifests in the endorsement of system-justifying beliefs, including the Protestant ethic, fair market ideology, belief in a just world, and political conservatism (Jost and Hunyady 2005; also see Uhlmann, Poehlman, and Bargh 2009), as well as traditionalism (Federico, Ergun, and Hunt 2014).

The motivations and beliefs outlined by SJT may be usefully expressed in terms of values. Basic values as conceived by Schwartz (1992) capture the underlying motivations to justify or oppose the existing social order. Along these lines, Devos, Spini, and Schwartz (2002) find that conservation values predict greater trust in existing social and political institutions, whereas openness to change values and universalism predict less institutional trust. From these foundational values, more specific system-justifying political values—particularly opposition to equality and support for economic individualism and moral traditionalism—may then emanate. [3]

Members of both dominant and subordinate social groups display a tendency toward system justification, as believing the existing sociopolitical system to be legitimate and just tends to improve one's outlook and affective state (Jost and Hunyady 2005). In a sense, then, the motives underlying social identification and system justification cross-pressure the members of subordinate groups, counteracting the psychological benefits they might seek through identification with their ingroup. This does not mean, however, that SIT and SJT provide incompatible perspectives on intergroup behavior. On the contrary, as Kreiner, Ashforth, and Sluss (2006) contend, the two theories may complement each other because, to a large degree, they operate at different levels of analysis. While system justification motives may impel *individual* subordinate group members to accept their lower status (Jost and Banaji 1994), the

---

[3] A related perspective, social dominance theory (SDT; see Sidanius and Pratto 1999), provides similar expectations. SDT concerns the arrangement of societies into group-based hierarchies, and research within this tradition examines the ideologies that legitimize or attenuate those hierarchies. This perspective has also been linked to values—indeed, Schwartz's (1992) self-enhancement dimension correlates strongly with individual-level social dominance orientation (Feldman 2003). A variety of political values might then be considered to attenuate or enhance hierarchical group relationships, in line with system justification theory. For the present purposes, I judge that SJT provides a more fine-grained account of the discrete motivations that might drive an individual to support system-undermining or -justifying values. Thus, I employ SJT (alongside SIT) as my main theoretical lens, acknowledging that SDT would predict similar group-value patterns.

social identity model simultaneously suggests that subordinate groups *as a whole* will often create identity-enhancing beliefs in opposition to the social structure that devalues them (Tajfel and Turner 1986). I posit that such beliefs include values that delegitimize the existing system and intergroup status quo.

Thus, we should expect dominant group members to more strongly endorse values related to system justification (such as conservation, self-reliance, and traditional morality)—and although subordinate group members may be tempted to do the same as an emotional palliative, they should more often express values related to greater equality and social change (such as self-transcendence, openness, and civil liberties), while endorsing system-justifying values less than dominant groups do. I expect these value patterns to hold across racial, gender, class-based, and religious lines (however, see the next section for anticipated exceptions with regard to gender and religion). Table 2.3 summarizes the groups of interest for each identity dimension, which, in the analyses to follow, are merged into dichotomous dominant and subordinate categories. The table additionally maps groups' expected value differences based on their status, in line with the following hypothesis.

> **H1:** *All else constant, subordinate groups will rate self-transcendence and openness to change basic values, and the political values equality and civil liberties, more highly than dominant groups. They will rate self-enhancement and conservation basic values, and the political values self-reliance, free enterprise, military strength, blind patriotism, law and order, and traditional morality, less highly than dominant groups.*

Although H1 lumps a number of groups into subordinate and dominant categories, based on common perceptions of their relative status, I do not mean to imply that all these disparities

are equally large or qualitatively equivalent. With this in mind, I have additional expectations

rooted in other group-based differences, noted in Table 2.3 and detailed below.

Table 2.3. Groups Classified as Dominant and Subordinate, with Associated Values

Group Type	Dominant	Subordinate
Racial	Whites	Nonwhites
*Gender**	Men	Women
*Religious^*	Christians[4]	Non-Christians
Class	Middle class, upper class[5]	Lower class, working class
Values		
Basic Values	Self-Enhancement *(achievement, power)* Conservation* *(conformity, security, tradition)*	Self-Transcendence^ *(benevolence, universalism)* Openness to Change* *(self-direction, stimulation)*
Political Values	Blind patriotism, free enterprise, law and order, military strength, self-reliance, traditional morality*	Equality, civil liberties
For exceptions to the above patterns: *see H2, ^see H3.		

Values and Other Social Roles

Relative status is not the only driver of value differences between groups; other aspects of

a group's position or role within society exert an impact as well. This should prove especially

true with respect to women and Christians. While gender and religious groups do differ in their

social and political power, their particular needs and functions within the social system also

influence their values in ways orthogonal to dominant versus subordinate status. Along these

lines, I have several additional predictions that apply to these groups.

---

[4] "Christians" combines those identifying as Protestant and Catholic, as well as those who answered "other" for their religious identity and indicated belonging to a Christian denomination in their open-ended responses.
[5] It is certainly debatable whether the middle class constitutes a "dominant" group in the same way that whites, men, and the upper class do. The middle class, however, does occupy most of the political dialogue in the U.S. and is widely considered to be the normatively desirable class category. With this idea in mind, I combine middle- and upper-class people as the dominant class group.

First, women will prioritize care-based values (Kaufman 2002; Schwartz and Rubel 2005), just as other socially subordinate groups tend to do. But at the same time, their more vulnerable position in society—more often dependent on others, responsible for childcare and family stability, and physically smaller—should drive them, on average, to place greater emphasis on security-related values (Longest, Hitlin, and Vaisey 2013; Schwartz and Rubel 2005), as well as traditional moral outlooks (Eagly et al. 2004). Given this emphasis on security and stability, women also tend to place less importance on openness to change values (Schwartz and Rubel 2005). Thus,

> *H2: All else constant, unlike other subordinate groups, women will rate conservation basic values and the related political value traditional morality more highly than men do. They also will rate openness to change basic values less highly than men do.*

Religious identity presents an even more complicated case when it comes to predicting values. Christians, being the politically influential majority in the U.S., should exhibit different values than other religious groups. Particularly due to the prevalence of the so-called Protestant ethic in American political culture (McClosky and Zaller 1984), we should expect Christians to emphasize, alongside other dominant groups, self-reliance, free enterprise, and a degree of acceptance of inequality. But religiosity more broadly brings with it a set of values related to transcendence of one's self-interest, social order, and uncertainty reduction, as well as a de-emphasis on personal autonomy (Jacoby 2014; Roccas 2005; Schwartz and Huismans 1995). These patterns yield the following hypothesis:

> *^H3: All else constant, unlike other dominant groups, Christians will not rate self-transcendence values less highly than other religious groups.*

Partisan Value Divisions

Last but not least, I expect large partisan differences in value priorities. Given the ideological and group-based alignments of the two major political parties, these patterns will to a great extent mirror those between dominant and subordinate social groups. As Jost et al. (2003) observe, acceptance of inequality and preservation of the existing sociopolitical system has long been a hallmark of the political right, whereas the left tends to promote social change toward greater equality. Past research has documented partisan divides on a number of basic values (Goren 2013), as well as explicitly political values (Goren 2013; Jacoby 2014). Broadly, Democrats give importance to values related to equality and freedom of action, whereas Republicans put greater emphasis on values pertaining to social stability and order. I therefore expect the following:

> **H4:** *All else constant, Democrats will rate self-transcendence basic values, equality, and civil liberties more highly than Republicans. They will rate conservation basic values, self-reliance, free enterprise, military strength, blind patriotism, law and order, and traditional morality less highly.*

Intergroup Value Perceptions

The values actually held by individuals and groups have important implications for political attitudes and conflict. Just as important, however, are the values people are *perceived* to hold. Personal endorsement of a particular value may have comparatively little impact on attitudes toward a given social group, compared to the belief that a group supports or violates that value. A sense of distance between one's own values and those of an outgroup has been shown to fuel reductions in intergroup tolerance as well as diminished support for policies geared

toward benefitting that group (Henry and Reyna 2007; Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky 1990; Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna 2013).

Moreover, people tend to misperceive the values of outgroups, expecting them to diverge more sharply from those of their ingroup than they actually do (Waters 1990). This pattern appears to hold true in the political realm: Scherer, Windschitl, and Graham (2015) find that individuals tend to exaggerate the differences between liberals and conservatives when it comes to a variety of fundamental motivations, including system justification, social dominance, and the belief in a dangerous world, all of which relate closely to political values (also see Graham, Nosek, and Haidt 2012). Such misperceptions of outgroups may then exacerbate intergroup conflict, fostering negative intergroup affect and driving group members to shift their own attitudes to match the extremity they perceive (Ahler and Sood 2018; Ahler 2014). All of these dynamics align with social identity theory, which predicts that individuals will seek to maximize the differences between their ingroup and one or more outgroups (Hogg and Abrams 1988). Put another way, group members engage in a form of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) in order to enhance their ingroup's positive distinctiveness.

Thus, value-based (and often incorrect) images should prove common with regard to a variety of social groups. This expectation leads to the last of my hypotheses:

H5: All else constant, perceived value differences between groups will mirror the differences in actual values hypothesized above, but they will be larger in magnitude.

Data and Method

I test this integration of social identity theory and system justification theory, and the resulting hypotheses, with nationally representative non-probability survey[6] of American adults conducted through the research firm Bovitz, Inc. (N = 1,286; see Table 2.4 for sample characteristics), conducted in the fall of 2017. The survey included three main parts relevant to the present study. First, participants were asked their racial/ethnic, gender, religious, class, and partisan identities, measured as follows:

- "Which of the following do you consider to be your primary racial or ethnic group?" (for those who checked more than one, followed up with, "If you had to choose one group, which of the following racial or ethnic categories *best* describes you?") *[White, Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, Middle Eastern/North African, Native American, other]*

- "What is your gender?" *[Male, Female, Other]*

- "What religion do you consider yourself to be?" *[Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, not religious, other]*[7]

- "What social class do you consider yourself to be?" *[Lower class, Working class, Middle class, Upper class]*

- "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Independent, or Republican?" *[strong Democrat, weak Democrat, Independent leaning Democrat, Independent, Independent leaning Republican, weak Republican, strong Republican]* (for those who

---

[6] The sample is designed to match key U.S. Census demographics.
[7] Those identifying as Protestant and Catholic, as well as those who answered "other" for their religious identity and indicated belonging to a Christian denomination in their open-ended responses, were grouped as Christians.

selected "Independent," followed up with, "Do you consider yourself closer to the

Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither?")

Table 2.4. Sample Characteristics

Variable	Percent
Race/Ethnicity	
White	68.3
African American	13.0
Hispanic/Latino	11.0
Asian American	5.1
Middle Eastern/North African	0.2
Native American	0.9
Other	1.5
Gender	
Male	52.7
Female	47.1
Other	0.2
Religion	
Christian	61.1
Jewish	2.3
Muslim	0.8
Not religious	26.3
Other (non-Christian)	9.5
Social Class	
Lower	13.2
Working	40.8
Middle	43.7
Upper	2.4
Partisanship	
Democrat (includes leaners)	46.7
Republican (includes leaners)	35.4
Pure Independent	17.9
	Mean (std. dev.)
Age (1-5 scale)	3.13 (1.24)
Income (1-5 scale)	2.18 (1.12)
Education (1-5 scale)	3.14 (.99)
Ideology (1-7 scale)	3.95 (1.73)
Political Interest (1-5 scale)	3.20 (1.15)
Political Knowledge (0-4 scale)	2.22 (1.37)

Second, respondents rated their own basic and political values. Third, respondents went

on to rate the basic and political values they believed to be held by a set of identity groups.

Having every individual rate all of the groups of interest would produce a survey of prohibitive

length, likely to result in fatigue. To shorten the survey for any given participant and improve

data quality, each person was randomly assigned to rate values for groups of one type:

racial/ethnic, gender, religious, class, or partisan. Additionally, in the case of racial and religious

groups—for which the number of different groups within the population is quite large—

questions were limited to the four groups of greatest interest. Table 2.5 summarizes these

randomized conditions.

Table 2.5. Randomized Conditions

Condition	Rates values endorsed by…
Condition 1	Racial/ethnic groups (Whites, African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans)
Condition 2	Gender groups (men, women)
Condition 3	Religious groups (Christians, Jewish people, Muslims, non-religious)
Condition 4	Class groups (lower, working, middle, upper)
Condition 5	Partisan groups (Democrats, Republicans, Independents)

Basic values come from the Schwartz value theory (Schwartz 1992, 2012). Typically,

these are measured using the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ; see Schwartz 2003), which

asks respondents to rate their similarity to brief descriptions of people and what they consider

important. In the present survey, each basic value is measured with a single PVQ-style item,

adapted from measures used in the American National Election Study 2006 pilot. In addition, a

set of 8 political values were adapted to the same format. These items were prefaced with the

statement, "Please read each description and indicate how much these people are like or not like

you / a typical [group member]." Response options are on a 6-point scale ranging from "not like

[target] at all" to "very much like [target]." The analyses to follow use Schwartz's four higher-

order basic value dimensions, generated by averaging their constitutive individual values: self-

transcendence (benevolence, universalism), openness to change (self-direction, stimulation), self-

enhancement (achievement, power), and conservation (security, conformity, tradition).[8] Political

values (equality, civil liberties, self-reliance, free enterprise, military strength, blind patriotism,

law and order, traditional morality), given the absence of theory regarding their higher-order

structure, are analyzed individually.

The analysis proceeds in distinct sections devoted to the identity dimensions in

question—race, gender, class, and religion. Each section presents and compares the actual mean

value ratings between groups, as well as the *perceived* values of the groups of interest.[9] For all of

these mean differences, *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests). A negative difference

indicates that group in the left column rates a given value more highly on average than the group

in the right column. A positive difference denotes the opposite. Bold differences are both

significant at the .10 level or better and in the expected direction.

The Racial Values Divide

Results provide mixed support for H1 concerning the actual basic and political values of

the dominant racial group, whites, compared to racial minorities (listed in Table 2.6). As

expected, nonwhites rate openness to change basic values significantly more highly than whites

do—a hallmark of distrust in the existing sociopolitical system (Devos, Spini, and Schwartz

2002). The same holds for self-transcendence values, though the difference in that case is only a

tenth of a scale point. A significant difference also emerges for the most closely associated

political value, equality. Nonwhites not only value equal treatment and justice more than whites

---

[8] Because hedonism falls within both the openness to change and the self-enhancement dimension (Schwartz 1992), it is excluded in keeping with prior work (Goren et al. 2016; Longest, Hitlin, and Vaisey 2013).

[9] Value perceptions for groups containing multiple categories equal the average of perceptions for the individual groups—e.g., value perceptions for nonwhites average perceptions of African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans.

on an abstract level—to an even stronger degree, they widely favor societal interventions to see that greater equality becomes reality. It is worth noting, however, that both groups as a whole rate self-transcendence and equality quite highly (4.5 or higher on the 6-point scale), and the same goes for the other political expression of self-transcendence values, civil liberties, on which they do not meaningfully differ. These findings, while locating a value disparity between dominant and subordinate racial groups, also highlight the preeminence of equality and freedom in American political culture (McClosky and Zaller 1984).

Nonwhites, however, do not place lesser importance on conservation values relative to whites, and they display no differences from whites on the associated political values of blind patriotism, law and order, or traditional morality. Perhaps, although extant social arrangements frequently disadvantage them, racial minorities feel a sense of vulnerability that impels them to avoid the instability that may come with social change. This partial disconfirmation of H1 underlines that subordinate groups, too, may find motivation to system-justify.

In direct opposition to expectations, nonwhites rate self-enhancement values significantly *more* highly than do whites. It may be that, so long as they feel constrained by the present social structure, members of disadvantaged groups become driven to seek greater success and power according to its rules. SIT helps to explain this finding: Tajfel (1975) posits that members of devalued groups may seek *individual* mobility rather than elevation of the group as a whole. Such a dynamic may also explain the lack of a significant difference between whites' and nonwhites' endorsement of the related political value self-reliance. Members of both groups appear to have internalized individualistic ideals. This is not entirely surprising, as McClosky and Zaller (1984) find individualism to be another of American culture's most widespread and

enduring values (also see Feldman and Zaller 1992; Uhlmann, Poehlman and Bargh 2009). Such

agreement does not extend, however, to more system-wide notions of limited government in the

form of free enterprise; whites rate this value more highly than nonwhites, though the difference

proves small in magnitude. Finally, as hypothesized, nonwhites place significantly lower

importance on military strength.

Table 2.6. Mean (s.e.) Value Ratings by Race/Ethnicity

	Actual			Perceived		
Value	*Whites*	*Nonwhites*	*Difference*	*Whites*	*Nonwhites*	*Difference*
Basic Values						
Self-Transcendence	4.85	4.95	**.10***	4.08	4.18	.10
	(.03)	(.05)		(.08)	(.07)	
Openness to	4.17	4.43	**.23*****	4.42	4.12	-.30***
Change	(.03)	(.05)		(.06)	(.06)	
Self-Enhancement	3.25	3.63	.38***	4.59	3.96	**-.63*****
	(.04)	(.06)		(.07)	(.06)	
Conservation	4.08	4.19	.10	4.42	4.17	**-.25*****
	(.04)	(.05)		(.06)	(.06)	
Political Values						
Equality	4.51	4.80	**.29*****	3.85	4.36	**.51*****
	(.05)	(.07)		(.10)	(.08)	
Civil Liberties	4.79	4.85	.06	4.20	4.47	**.27****
	(.04)	(.06)		(.10)	(.07)	
Self-Reliance	4.38	4.25	-.13	4.72	3.81	**-.91*****
	(.05)	(.07)		(.09)	(.07)	
Free Enterprise	4.02	3.86	**-.16***	4.34	3.87	**-.47*****
	(.05)	(.07)		(.09)	(.07)	
Military Strength	4.09	3.78	**-.31*****	4.73	3.59	**-1.14*****
	(.05)	(.08)		(.08)	(.08)	
Blind Patriotism	3.30	3.17	-.13	4.58	3.38	**-1.20*****
	(.06)	(.08)		(.09)	(.08)	
Law & Order	3.36	3.29	-.07	4.33	3.45	**-.88*****
	(.05)	(.08)		(.09)	(.08)	
Traditional	3.67	3.67	.00	4.50	4.07	**-.43*****
Morality	(.06)	(.08)		(.09)	(.08)	

Turning to racial groups' perceived values, two things stand out. First, respondents vastly exaggerate a number of the actual value differences reported above, confirming H5. As Table 2.6 shows, the perceived difference on equality exceeds the actual difference by nearly a factor of two, on free enterprise by almost a factor of three, and on military strength by a factor of almost four. Second, and perhaps even more striking, respondents report numerous beliefs in large, significant between-group differences where none actually exist—nearly all in the direction of the expectations laid out in H1. On average, participants perceive nonwhites as rating self-enhancement values more than half a point lower than whites (the opposite of the actual difference), and conservation values a quarter of a point lower. Along similar lines, they see nonwhites as rating all of the system-justifying political values (self-reliance, free enterprise, military strength, blind patriotism, law and order, and traditional morality) less highly than whites, sometimes by an entire scale point, and as rating civil liberties more highly than whites even though they do not in actuality. One perception contradicts H1: respondents see nonwhites as placing *less* importance on openness to change values, when in reality they value them more.

In sum, results reveal a handful of substantive value differences between whites and racial minorities, most notably when it comes to ideas of change and equality. This finding holds to an extent for both basic values and political values, though the differences prove fairly small. Indeed, respondents perceive much larger and more numerous value divides than actually exist, across the gamut of basic and political values. Though minority groups often appear just as willing as whites to express system-justifying values, the public sees nonwhites' typical values as undermining the status quo.

The Gender Values Divide

The actual values expressed by men and women, shown in Table 2.7, also partially confirm the dominant-subordinate group dynamics described in H1. Differences prove largest when it comes to basic values. Women rate self-transcendence values significantly higher, and self-enhancement values significantly lower, than men do, more strongly prioritizing care for others over personal advancement. Further, in confirmation of H2, which concerned value differences specific to women's common social roles, women rate openness to change values less highly, and conservation values more highly, than men, suggesting greater motivations to maintain personal and social stability and security. Respondents perceive basic value differences between the genders in the same directions, but they consistently exaggerate their magnitude (by at least a factor of two and, in the case of self-transcendence, nearly a factor of five), in line with H5.

These disparities in basic values are often, but not always, accompanied by differences in associated political values. Likely flowing from the lower importance placed by women on self-enhancement, they rate free enterprise and military strength (but not self-reliance) significantly less highly than men do. In keeping with their stronger preference for conservation values, they also rate traditional morality and blind patriotism more highly than men. Perhaps most surprising, women's higher ratings of self-transcendence values do not come with similar differences on either equality or civil liberties (though, as with racial groups, we should note that both genders rate these political values quite highly overall).

Table 2.7. Mean (s.e.) Value Ratings by Gender

	Actual			Perceived		
Value	*Men*	*Women*	*Difference*	*Men*	*Women*	*Difference*
Basic Values						
Self-Transcendence	4.77	5.01	**.24*****	3.73	4.91	**1.18*****
	(.04)	(.04)		(.08)	(.06)	
Openness to	4.34	4.15	**-.19*****	4.77	4.14	**-.63*****
Change	(.04)	(.04)		(.06)	(.06)	
Self-Enhancement	3.52	3.19	**-.33*****	4.77	4.13	**-.64*****
	(.05)	(.05)		(.06)	(.06)	
Conservation	4.04	4.21	**.17*****	3.96	4.59	**.63*****
	(.04)	(.04)		(.06)	(.06)	
Political Values						
Equality	4.57	4.63	.06	3.90	4.77	**.87*****
	(.05)	(.06)		(.08)	(.08)	
Civil Liberties	4.83	4.79	-.04	4.30	4.72	**.42*****
	(.05)	(.05)		(.07)	(.07)	
Self-Reliance	4.30	4.38	.08	4.54	4.11	**-.43*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.08)	(.08)	
Free Enterprise	4.05	3.88	**-.17****	4.45	3.99	**-.45*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.08)	(.08)	
Military Strength	4.12	3.85	**-.27*****	4.90	3.50	**-1.41*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.07)	(.09)	
Blind Patriotism	3.19	3.35	.16*	4.37	3.83	**-.54*****
	(.07)	(.07)		(.08)	(.09)	
Law & Order	3.35	3.33	-.02	4.24	3.69	**-.55*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.08)	(.09)	
Traditional	3.59	3.77	**.18***	4.22	4.22	.00
Morality	(.07)	(.07)		(.08)	(.08)	

As with whites and nonwhites, and further confirming H5, the perceived political values of the two gender groups more strongly reflect the hypothesized differences than their actual values do. This proves especially true when it comes to predictions based on women's subordinate social status. Respondents perceive women as more strongly favoring equality by almost a full point on the 6-point scale, and civil liberties by nearly half a point. In the other

direction, they perceive men as putting greater importance on a variety of system-justifying values, usually by about half a point.

Thus, women display differences from men most consistently in the realm of basic values, prioritizing care, equal treatment, and stability over self-enhancement and change. These differences, however, only translate into disparities on half of the related political values—but people nonetheless perceive women as prioritizing political values that oppose extant social arrangements.

The Class Values Divide

On the whole, class-based groups prove less divided in their actual values compared to racial and gender groups, giving mixed support for H1 (see Table 2.8). In the realm of basic values, people who identity as lower- or working-class place greater importance on self-transcendence, and less importance on self-enhancement and conservation, relative to those who consider themselves middle or upper class. However, contrary to expectations, they display lower average ratings of openness to change values. Their perceived basic values follow the expected patterns to a stronger degree, confirming H5: respondents exaggerate real differences by factors of about three to seven.

Class groups display only two significant differences with respect to their actual political values. In line with their lower ratings of self-enhancement values, lower/working-class people also rate military strength as less important than the middle/upper class. They also place less importance on law and order, as one would expect given their lower ratings of conservation values. However, divides do not emerge on the other related political values. But once again, in accordance with H5, respondents believe that class groups clash in the expected direction on

every political value, and their perceptions exaggerate the magnitude of the two actual value

conflicts by more than a factor of two.

Table 2.8. Mean (s.e.) Value Ratings by Social Class

	Actual			Perceived		
Value	**Middle + Upper**	**Lower + Working**	**Difference**	**Middle + Upper**	**Lower + Working**	**Difference**
Basic Values						
Self-Transcendence	4.83	4.92	**.09***	3.58	4.07	**.49*****
	(.04)	(.04)		(.07)	(.06)	
Openness to	4.30	4.21	-.09*	4.52	3.82	-.70***
Change	(.04)	(.04)		(.06)	(.06)	
Self-Enhancement	3.53	3.23	**-.30*****	4.57	3.62	**-.96*****
	(.05)	(.05)		(.06)	(.06)	
Conservation	4.18	4.06	**-.12***	4.27	3.92	**-.35*****
	(.04)	(.04)		(.06)	(.06)	
Political Values						
Equality	4.54	4.64	.10	3.46	4.23	**.76*****
	(.06)	(.05)		(.08)	(.07)	
Civil Liberties	4.85	4.78	-.07	3.91	4.31	**.40*****
	(.05)	(.05)		(.07)	(.07)	
Self-Reliance	4.40	4.29	-.11	4.41	3.72	**-.69*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.07)	(.07)	
Free Enterprise	4.03	3.92	-.11	4.19	3.77	**-.42*****
	(.06)	(.05)		(.08)	(.07)	
Military Strength	4.11	3.89	**-.22*****	4.35	3.81	**-.54*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.07)	(.08)	
Blind Patriotism	3.24	3.26	.02	4.16	3.67	**-.49*****
	(.07)	(.06)		(.07)	(.08)	
Law & Order	3.53	3.17	**-.36*****	4.24	3.46	**-.78*****
	(.07)	(.06)		(.07)	(.08)	
Traditional	3.74	3.62	-.12	4.12	3.92	**-.21****
Morality	(.07)	(.07)		(.07)	(.07)	

When it comes to basic motivations, members of the subordinate class grouping place

lower value personal advancement or the maintenance of the status quo. However, these

differences come with few corresponding conflicts on political values. Lower- and working-class

people care less than middle- and upper-class people about projecting America's power via

military strength, and they put less importance on the maintenance of law and order over individual freedom. But here the groups' actual political value differences end; perhaps surprisingly, they do not differ on matters of equality, government interference in economic matters, and a number of other principles that divide groups on other identity dimensions. Such a broad lack of class-based value conflict may derive, in part, from the relative paucity of class consciousness in the United States. This does not stop the public in general, though, from believing class groupings to be consistently divided.

The Religious Values Divide

As a final examination of the dominant-subordinate group values divide, I inspect the values of Christians compared to non-Christians (i.e., the non-religious plus the relatively small number of identifiers with other religions; see Table 2.4). Table 2.9 shows that, while these religious groupings prove widely divided on questions of political values, they differ relatively little in terms of basic values. Contradicting H1, Christians also do not rate openness to change values less highly than non-Christians. They do, however, put considerably more importance on conservation values—more than half a point on the 6-point scale. In addition to its relation to system justification, this finding accords with religion's role in many people's lives, providing a sense of tradition and stability in the face of uncertainty. As hypothesized in H3 regarding the value differences specific to religious identity, Christians do not value self-transcendence to a lesser degree than non-Christians; this observation aligns with Christian doctrine's emphasis on going beyond one's self-interest and caring for others.

Respondents' perceptions of religious groups partly confirm H5 when it comes to basic values. They see non-Christians as valuing self-transcendence considerably less, and self-

enhancement and openness more, relative to non-Christians (compared to no differences in actuality); of these perceived differences, only the latter runs in the hypothesized direction. Meanwhile, participants quite accurately perceive the religious divide with respect to conservation values; the perceived gap is similar in size to the real one.

Table 2.9. Mean (s.e.) Value Ratings by Religion

Value	Actual			Perceived		
	Christian	*Non-Christian*	*Difference*	*Christian*	*Non-Christian*	*Difference*
Basic Values						
Self-Transcendence	4.87	4.89	.02	4.53	3.83	-.70***
	(.05)	(.04)		(.08)	(.07)	
Openness to Change	4.25	4.27	.02	3.48	3.91	**.43***
	(.04)	(.05)		(.08)	(.05)	
Self-Enhancement	3.38	3.33	-.05	3.68	3.99	.31***
	(.05)	(.05)		(.08)	(.06)	
Conservation	4.32	3.78	**-.54***	4.67	4.05	**-.62***
	(.04)	(.05)		(.06)	(.05)	
Political Values						
Equality	4.52	4.72	**.20***	4.04	3.95	-.09
	(.05)	(.06)		(.10)	(.07)	
Civil Liberties	4.75	4.91	**.16**	3.86	4.01	.15
	(.04)	(.05)		(.10)	(.07)	
Self-Reliance	4.52	4.04	**-.48***	4.38	3.75	**-.63***
	(.05)	(.07)		(.08)	(.07)	
Free Enterprise	4.16	3.67	**-.49***	4.00	3.89	-.11
	(.05)	(.07)		(.09)	(.07)	
Military Strength	4.29	3.52	**-.87***	3.96	3.55	**-.41***
	(.05)	(.07)		(.10)	(.07)	
Blind Patriotism	3.60	2.72	**-.88***	4.26	3.37	**-.89***
	(.06)	(.07)		(.09)	(.08)	
Law & Order	3.61	2.91	**-.70***	3.94	3.43	**-.51***
	(.06)	(.07)		(.10)	(.07)	
Traditional Morality	4.13	2.94	**-1.19***	4.98	3.87	**-1.10***
	(.06)	(.08)		(.08)	(.07)	

If dominant and subordinate religious groups agree on most basic values, however, results show quite the opposite when it comes to explicitly political values. Christians and non-

Christians differ in the expected direction on every political value, strongly supporting H1. Non-Christians give significantly higher ratings to both equality and civil liberties, even though they show no differences on the associated basic values. Christians place more importance on all six political values related to system justification—the largest difference being, unsurprisingly, traditional morality at 1.2 scale points. These findings comport with and expand upon similar patterns noted by Jacoby (2014), and they likely reflect Christians' incentive as a politically and culturally dominant group to support the sociopolitical system as it stands. Respondents' perceptions of these two groups' political values, in contrast to racial, gender, and class groups, actually *under*estimate the degree of value conflict—most notably perceiving no differences on equality or civil liberties when significant gaps exist in reality.[10]

Compared to those of racial, gender, and class groups, the belief systems of religious groups appear uniquely politicized. Though Christians and non-Christians differ on only one basic value dimension—conservation—they prove significantly divided on all 8 political values. How they apply their life-guiding principles in other personal and social domains, in other words, does not directly translate into their value priorities in the explicitly political realm.

The Status-Based Values Divide in Summary

Comparisons of actual values among racial, gender, class, and religious groups inconsistently support my two primary hypotheses. Politically subordinate groups more strongly express *some* values related to greater equality, freedom, and change. In contrast, dominant groups support some values that promote their higher status and the existing social order. Such

---

[10] Comparing the mean values of religious individuals (all religions) to non-religious individuals yields similar results (see Table A1 in Appendix C). Given that Christians and the non-religious comprise by far the two largest religious groups in the sample, this finding comes as no surprise.

differences do not manifest uniformly, however, and these mixed findings provide some support for the expectations of both social identity theory and system justification theory. To note some prominent examples, whites report lower endorsement of equality than nonwhites, and the same goes for Christians relative to non-Christians; however, the same difference does not appear between genders or class groupings. Whites, men, and Christians all show a stronger preference than their counterparts for limited government intervention in the economy, but fewer differences emerge when it comes to the related value self-reliance. With respect to prioritizing law and order over individual freedom, dominant class and religious groups express higher ratings, but dominant racial and gender groups do not. Furthermore, status proves not to be the only significant predictor of a group's value priorities. Among women and Christians, other social roles and motivations come into play, leading these groups to express values that directly oppose what their status alone would predict.

Results provide the strongest support concerning the (mis)perceived values of typical group members. Respondents believe dominant and subordinate groups to be divided across basic and political values, and in nearly every case, they see the former as expressing system-justifying motivations and beliefs to a greater extent than the latter. They also correctly identify most motivational differences between gender and religious groups; however, they overestimate the degree of political value conflict between genders and underestimate for Christians versus non-Christians.

To help put these patterns in perspective, Table 2.10 provides a summary. For each identity dimension, the table notes confirmation of expectations regarding actual and perceived value differences (or, where hypothesized, the lack of a difference). To a remarkable degree,

respondents have identified the lines of value conflict that would logically emanate from dominant and subordinate group status. At the same time, however, members of those groups—although they do in fact differ on a number of important values—do not prove nearly as divided as people expect, especially when it comes to political values (except in the case of religious groups, which actually prove *more* politically divided than respondents expect).

Table 2.10. Summary of Actual and Perceived Status-Based Value Differences

Actual

Basic Value Dimensions

	Self-Transcendence	Openness	Self-Enhancement	Conservation
Race	*	*		
Gender	*	*	*	*
Class			*	*
Religion	*			*

Political Values

	Equality	CivLib	SelfRel	FreeEnt	MilStr	BlindPat	LawOrder	TradMoral
Race	*			*	*			
Gender				*	*			*
Class					*		*	
Religion	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

Perceived

Basic Value Dimensions

	Self-Transcendence	Openness	Self-Enhancement	Conservation
Race		*	*	*
Gender	*	*	*	*
Class	*	*	*	*
Religion		*		*

Political Values

	Equality	CivLib	SelfRel	FreeEnt	MilStr	BlindPat	LawOrder	TradMoral
Race	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Gender	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Class	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Religion			*		*	*	*	*

* = difference (or lack of difference) on basic value dimension or political value as predicted

What might account for these discrepancies? It may be that respondents are broadly aware of the lines of political conflict in the U.S., as represented by the two major parties. In

turn, they may map those value divides onto their mental images of the groups that make up the parties (see, e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Ahler and Sood 2018; Robison and Moskowitz forthcoming; Rothschild et al. 2019). With this possibility in mind, I turn to partisan value divisions in the next section.

The Partisan Values Divide

Table 2.11 shows mean value ratings for Democrats and Republicans. Following previous work (e.g., Bullock 2011; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Levendusky 2010), this analysis groups independent leaners with partisans, while excluding pure independents. Although neither party, in a structural sense, occupies a dominant position within the American sociopolitical system, disparities in their value ratings echo the differences between advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Democrats give significantly higher ratings to self-transcendence values, while Republicans place greater importance on conservation values, partly confirming H4. These value dimensions, notably, are orthogonal to each other within Schwartz's (1992) theory, suggesting that partisan conflict arises from something more complex than unidimensional ideological disagreement. Respondents' perceptions exaggerate the parties' differences on these values by about a factor of three, confirming H5. Moreover, although Republicans do not rate self-enhancement values more highly than Democrats in actuality, they are perceived as doing so, perhaps due to the party's association with dominant groups and interests (Jost et al. 2003).

Results also fully confirm H4 with respect to partisans' political values. Democrats rate equality nearly a point higher than Republicans do, and civil liberties by four-tenths of a point. Meanwhile, Republicans rate the system-justifying values—self-reliance, free enterprise,

military strength, blind patriotism, law and order, traditional morality—more highly than

Democrats, with an average difference of about one scale point. Again, respondents perceive

party identifiers as holding these contrasting value priorities, in line with H5—and in all cases

except free enterprise, they estimate considerably larger differences between them than actually

exist. Citizens correctly identify the value dimensions on which the parties disagree, but they

overestimate the extent of that disagreement.

Table 2.11. Mean (s.e.) Value Ratings by Party ID

Value	Actual			Perceived		
	Reps	*Dems*	*Difference*	*Reps*	*Dems*	*Difference*
Basic Values						
Self-Transcendence	4.71	5.06	**.35*****	3.23	4.35	**1.12*****
	(.05)	(.04)		(.09)	(.08)	
Openness to	4.23	4.29	.06	3.74	3.80	.06
Change	(.05)	(.04)		(.08)	(.07)	
Self-Enhancement	3.39	3.37	-.02	4.52	3.86	**-.66*****
	(.06)	(.05)		(.08)	(.06)	
Conservation	4.33	4.06	**-.27*****	4.39	3.55	**-.84*****
	(.05)	(.04)		(.07)	(.08)	
Political Values						
Equality	4.09	4.99	**.90*****	3.15	4.64	**1.49*****
	(.07)	(.05)		(.10)	(.09)	
Civil Liberties	4.63	5.03	**.40*****	3.46	4.45	**.99*****
	(.06)	(.05)		(.10)	(.10)	
Self-Reliance	4.82	4.02	**-.80*****	4.51	3.41	**-1.10*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.10)	(.11)	
Free Enterprise	4.44	3.63	**-.81*****	3.82	3.25	**-.57*****
	(.07)	(.06)		(.11)	(.10)	
Military Strength	4.77	3.55	**-1.22*****	5.01	3.53	**-1.48*****
	(.06)	(.06)		(.08)	(.10)	
Blind Patriotism	3.94	2.82	**-1.12*****	4.75	3.11	**-1.64*****
	(.07)	(.07)		(.09)	(.11)	
Law & Order	3.81	3.08	**-.73*****	4.61	3.48	**-1.13*****
	(.07)	(.06)		(.09)	(.10)	
Traditional	4.48	3.11	**-1.37*****	4.66	3.24	**-1.41*****
Morality	(.07)	(.07)		(.09)	(.10)	

Party identifiers' perceived political values closely track with the perceived values of dominant and subordinate groups. Perceived differences for racial and class groups are all significant in the same direction (though generally somewhat smaller in magnitude), and the similarities hold with just a handful of exceptions for gender and religious groups. Though these data cannot directly test this possibility, it appears plausible that respondents have imposed their (largely accurate) perceptions of partisan value conflict onto other dimensions of group identity—especially given the rise in sorting of those other groups into one party or the other (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Mason 2018).

Indeed, it seems quite possible that, when it comes to individuals' personal value ratings, their other identities become confounded with their partisanship. Giving support to this notion, I estimate OLS models regressing value ratings on all five identity dimensions (controlling for age, education, income, political interest, and political knowledge).[11] Results show that, overall, partisanship relates the most consistently to values, followed closely by religious identity. The full model results are presented in Tables A2, A3, and A4 in Appendix C. In brief, coefficients for identifying as a Democrat rather than a Republican prove nearly identical in their size, and fully identical in their significance level, to the mean differences presented in Table 2.11. Meanwhile, many differences between other groups are reduced in size, and a few particularly salient value differences drop out of significance altogether (e.g., nonwhites no longer value free enterprise less, non-Christians no longer value equality more). These results reemphasize that, by

---

[11] Random assignment prevents testing a parallel possibility in the realm of perceived values. As noted previously in Table 2.5, individuals who rated the values of typical partisans did not also rate those of other kinds of groups.

and large, respondents have correctly identified the locus of value-based conflict in American society—suggesting that they have imputed partisan value polarization onto associated groups.

Discussion

The results presented above indicate that broad value-based conflict does exist in the U.S. along myriad political, social, and even personal value dimensions, between a variety of identity groups. Across racial, gender, class, and religious dimensions, politically dominant groups generally support values that promote their higher status and the existing social order, whereas subordinate groups emphasize values promoting greater social equality and freedom. Support for these hypothesized differences remains mixed across identities, however, with only religious and partisan groups displaying consistent divisions in members' self-rated values—and this comports with prior work (Jacoby 2014). By this metric, the degree of cultural conflict in American society appears real but limited.

However, the breadth of the "culture war" may be equally or better assessed by the extent to which the mass public *perceives* group memberships as connected to different value priorities. Conflict need not arise from real differences in groups' belief systems. People may display reduced tolerance and support for outgroups simply because they believe those disparities exist (Brandt and Van Tongeren 2017; Henry and Reyna 2007; Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky 1990; Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna 2013). My findings demonstrate that value-based intergroup conflict is far greater in scope than group members' self-ratings alone would suggest. People seem to recognize the divergent value priorities that *should* flow from groups' relative status, even when those differences do not manifest in reality.

Indeed, the expected differences in groups' actual values do not appear uniformly. While results show a clear general pattern, in which dominant groups more strongly endorse system-justifying values while subordinate groups do the opposite, two important caveats stand out. First, system-justifying ideology proves multifaceted, in that a group which expresses values in support of existing economic arrangements will not necessarily prioritize values related to preserving social order or moral traditionalism (or vice versa). Second, while disadvantaged groups often profess beliefs geared toward ameliorating their lower status (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Kreiner, Ashforth, and Sluss 2006), these may take a variety of specific forms. Status-based value disparities manifest in broadly similar but qualitatively different ways along different identity dimensions. By disentangling different system-justifying and -undermining values, this finding also lends support to the compatibility of social identity theory and system justification theory: subordinate groups may seek to delegitimize the intergroup status quo through certain beliefs, while contributing to system justification through others. Relative group status also turns out not to be the only predictor of value differences; other motivations and social roles prove relevant as well. Women and religious groups emphasize basic values related to equal treatment and care for others, as well as stability and security, but this does not consistently translate into more concrete political value priorities.

The strongest and most consistent value differences emerge along partisan lines. Befitting the political left's alignment with a diverse set of disadvantaged groups and the right's association with entrenched interests (Jost et al. 2003), Democrats prioritize equality and civil liberties, while Republicans more highly rate a set of political values related to maintenance of the economic and social status quo. Value differences extend even to partisans' core, ostensibly

nonpolitical goals and beliefs: Democrats more strongly emphasize self-transcendence values, expressing a broad motivation to promote the wellbeing and equal treatment of others. Republicans, meanwhile, place greater importance on conservation basic values, suggesting greater than average needs for security and uncertainty reduction. Partisan value divisions thus reflect fundamental psychological needs—and the extensions of those needs into explicitly political terms. Respondents prove adept at identifying these divisions (though they overestimate their magnitude), suggesting wide awareness of the fundamental lines of political conflict in the United States. Furthermore, their perceptions of partisans' values strongly resemble their beliefs about dominant and subordinate group values. Perhaps, based on their images of the groups that make up the two parties (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Ahler and Sood 2018), respondents assume those groups to be divided along the same lines. This coheres with Mason's (2018) observation that, as partisan sorting on other identity dimensions has increased, interparty conflict has spread from the political realm into other social domains.

Whatever the reasons, the central conclusion remains the same: respondents believe dominant and subordinate groups differ with respect to system-justifying and system-undermining values to an even greater extent than they diverge in reality. These findings, in some respects, present a hopeful picture of intergroup relations. Prominent groups in American society believe themselves to be more fundamentally divided on than they actually are, suggesting there exists some untilled common ground on which to cooperate and build political coalitions. On the other hand, perceptions of intergroup value conflict may become self-fulfilling prophecies. Incorrect beliefs about groups can have dangerous social and political consequences (Ahler 2014; Ahler and Sood, 2018), driving and reinforcing intergroup antipathy.

CHAPTER 3

Political Engagement and Perceived Intergroup Value Conflict

Abstract: Research on partisan and other intergroup conflict in the U.S. has begun to investigate perceptions of ideological, affective, and other forms of polarization. I contribute to this work with an examination of perceived differences between partisan, racial, gender, and religious groups on a set of eight core political values. A substantial amount of real value conflict exists between groups, especially partisans; however, people also greatly overestimate the degree of such conflict. These exaggerated perceptions prove strongest among the politically aware, as measured with political knowledge, and to a lesser degree among strong partisans. Thus, the people most engaged with politics seem prone to perceive the greatest conflict over fundamental principles, with the potential to exacerbate real value conflicts as these individuals polarize further.

Few political topics have received more attention in the last decade than polarization. Polarization comes in many forms, including ideological (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008), affective (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2019), and cultural (e.g., Jacoby 2014). While debate continues over the degree of different kinds of polarization, scholars have also begun to investigate *perceptions* of polarization between groups. For example, citizens believe Democrats and Republicans to be more divided on a variety of policies than they actually are (Levendusky and Malhotra 2016b). People also misperceive who belongs to the different parties, overestimating, for example, the proportion of African Americans that make up the Democratic Party by about a factor of two, and the proportion of "the 1%" belonging to the Republican Party by a factor of almost 20 (Ahler and Sood 2018). Such misperceptions may then intensify conflicts if people react to these imagined differences and become more extreme in their own views.

I extend work on group (mis)perceptions by focusing on *perceptions of group values*. Groups fundamentally differ when it comes to values (e.g., Goren 2005, 2013; Kinder and Winter 2001), and these differences have been cited as roots of the "culture war" in the U.S. (Jacoby 2014). Yet we know little about how citizens perceive the values held by different groups. If they see groups as even more divided on values than they are, such beliefs could exacerbate intergroup conflict.

I examine perceptions of political values across partisan, racial, gender, and religious groups. In doing so, I find clear evidence of misperceptions: people generally believe that groups differ on values to a greater degree than they actually do. This proves particularly true among politically engaged individuals, as measured by political knowledge. To a lesser extent, I find similar magnification of group value divisions among strong partisans. Thus, the very people

who are most in-tune to politics also seem to be the most prone to perceive exaggerated conflict. This could ultimately generate an unfortunate spiral in which elites and opinion leaders miss opportunities to foster intergroup cooperation and tolerance.

Polarization, Engagement, and Perceptions of Value Conflict

The degree of ideological polarization among the American mass public remains a matter of debate (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008). What is clear is that citizens have affectively polarized, expressing more dislike of the outparty (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar et al. 2019). At the same time, ostensibly nonpolitical groups have become more associated with one party or the other—for example, racial minorities with the Democratic Party and Christians with the Republican Party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Ahler and Sood 2018; Rothschild et al. 2019). This sorting of partisanship with other social identities helps to explain recent decades' rise in interparty animus, not merely in the political domain but in American life more broadly (Mason 2018; Robison and Moskowitz forthcoming).

This raises the question of how people perceive conflict between not only the parties, but the groups that make up their coalitions. Recent research indicates that people's perceptions magnify the extent of partisan conflict. For example, Levendusky and Malhotra (2016b) find that individuals tend to believe Democrats and Republicans to be more divided on a variety of political issues than they actually are. Ahler (2014) notes a similar pattern with respect to liberals and conservatives. There remains, however, a more fundamental dimension on which these groups may be divided, in the form of *political values*—broad beliefs about the role of government and how society should be organized (Goren 2013; McCann 1997). Political

behavior scholarship indicates that groups' values conflict along partisan, racial, and religious lines (Goren 2005, 2013; Jacoby 2014; Kinder and Winter 2001): for example, Democrats and associated groups more strongly emphasize equality and civil liberties, whereas Republicans and related groups more strongly endorse values such as limited government and traditional morality. Given the public's tendency to exaggerate group differences on other dimensions (Ahler 2014; Ahler and Sood 2018; Levendusky and Malhotra 2016b), there is reason to believe that they also magnify gaps in the values held by different politically salient groups.

The political information environment should reinforce these perceptions. Although most news reporting is critical of polarization, media also tend to portray partisan divisions as based in divergent values (Robison and Mullinix 2016). The availability of exemplars (often elites) in the political information environment engenders more extreme images of prototypical group members, which then distort people's overall assessments of a group's characteristics (Ahler and Sood 2018; Bordalo et al. 2016). This phenomenon helps to explain people's tendency to overestimate, specifically, differences in groups' values or motivations (e.g., Scherer, Windschitl, and Graham 2015). Individuals connect a group with a certain value and, through an availability heuristic, exaggerate the degree to which group members endorse that value relative to other groups.

H1: All else constant, individuals will perceive groups' value ratings as diverging to a greater extent than they do in reality.

This tendency should be further amplified by exposure to political media. Coverage of polarization leads individuals to believe the parties are more polarized on issues, and it generates stronger dislike for members of the outparty (Levendusky and Malhotra 2016a). Exposure to

media framing, which portrays partisan conflict as centered on fundamental value divisions (Robison and Mullinix 2016), may lead citizens to think that the parties—as well as other politically relevant groups—differ far more in their values than they do in reality.

Exaggeration of intergroup value divisions should, therefore, prove most pronounced among the politically aware. Past work indicates that political awareness, including news recall, is best measured using political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Price and Zaller 1993). The media environment highlights differences between partisan and other groups, but internalizing these ideas requires the ability to process the relevant information. Individuals with greater knowledge of politics should more frequently be exposed to political conflicts and debates and more likely to employ the resulting cues (Hetherington 2001; Lenz 2012), and they should more often apply value-based reasoning to political issues (Goren 2004; Kam 2005). This will make them more likely to perceive large value differences between the groups in question.

H2: The tendency to exaggerate group value differences will prove stronger among those higher in political knowledge and who report greater attention to political news.

In addition, stronger partisans exhibit higher levels of polarization (e.g., Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) and perceive greater distance between the Democratic and Republican Parties (Hetherington 2001; Westfall et al. 2015). More generally, individuals with more extreme views often project that extremity onto others (Goel, Mason, and Watts 2010), and stronger identifiers with a group may be prone to maximize in their minds the differences between their group and outgroups (Hogg and Abrams 1988). I posit that these associations will extend to perceptions of partisan values. Furthermore, owing to increasing connections between the parties and their component groups in the minds of voters (Green,

Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Mason 2018), strong partisans will be inclined to see greater value differences between ostensibly nonpolitical groups.

  H3: *Stronger partisans will exaggerate group value differences to a greater degree than weaker partisans.*

Data and Method

  I test these expectations using data from a nationally representative non-probability survey (N = 1,286), conducted in the fall of 2017. Respondents were asked to rate eight political values: *equality, civil liberties, self-reliance, free enterprise, military strength, blind patriotism, law and order,* and *traditional morality*. This list draws upon a wide range of work (Feldman 1988; Goren 2004, 2005, 2013; Jacoby 2014; Schwartz et al. 2014) and is intended to capture a comprehensive range of potential value conflicts in the U.S.

  Each respondent was then randomly assigned to rate the same values with respect to typical members of partisan, racial, gender, or religious groups. Each value was measured using a single item following the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) format introduced by Schwartz (2003). Wordings for these and other items are in Appendix A.

  For each of the eight values, I calculate the absolute differences between respondents' value ratings of Democrats and Republicans, as well as associated groups (nonwhites versus whites, women versus men, non-Christians versus Christians).[12] The larger the difference, the more value conflict a respondent perceives between the two groups in question.

---

[12] Value ratings for nonwhites average ratings of African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. Those for non-Christians average ratings of Jewish people, Muslims, and the non-religious.

The survey assessed respondents' political knowledge (the number out of four factual questions correct) and their attention to political news (a 5-point scale from "none at all" to "a great deal"). Partisanship was measured on a 7-point scale, folded into a 1-4 scale ranging from pure independent to strong partisan. The regression analyses that follow control for race (i.e., white or nonwhite), gender, religion (i.e., Christian or non-Christian), age, education, and income. Finally, the race, gender, and religious models incorporate a single item measuring strength of identification with the corresponding identity group, gauging disagreement or agreement on a 7-pointt scale with the statement "I identity with my [racial group/gender/ religious group]" (see Postmes, Haslam, and Jans 2013).

I begin with a descriptive look at actual and perceived group values, first by computing the difference in means between group members' self-ratings. I then compare actual difference to perceived differences, uniformly finding large exaggerations. These perceived value differences then constitute the dependent variables in the OLS models that follow.

Actual and Perceived Value Differences

Table 3.1 provides value differences, both actual and perceived, between partisan, racial, gender, and religious groups. For each pair of groups, the first column lists the absolute difference in means between group members' self-rated values. The second column presents mean perceived value differences between the groups (i.e., the absolute value of one group rating minus the other).

Substantial real value differences exist, especially along partisan lines. Democrats' and Republicans' average personal value ratings often diverge by nearly a scale point, sometimes more. Groups associated with the parties tend to differ less often and to a smaller degree; only a

few of the actual value gaps between Christians and non-Christians approach the magnitude of difference between partisan groups.

Across groups, respondents perceive far larger value differences than those that actually exist. They exaggerate most partisan differences by a factor of two or three, with all perceived gaps exceeding two scale points. Though respondents believe there are smaller differences between other groups (a little more than one scale point in most cases), the exaggeration proves much greater. Their perceptions often magnify actual differences by a factor of *five or six* (e.g., nonwhites' versus whites' ratings of equality), and where no substantive difference exists, people report beliefs that the groups strongly diverge (e.g., women's versus men's ratings of self-reliance). In sum, descriptive statistics consistently support H1.

Table 3.1. Actual and Perceived Political Value Differences between Groups

Value	|Democrats – Republicans|		|Nonwhites – Whites|	
	Actual Mean Difference	*Mean Perceived Difference*	*Actual Mean Difference*	*Mean Perceived Difference*
Equality	.90	2.33	.29	1.36
Civil Liberties	.40	2.15	.06	1.13
Self-Reliance	.80	2.21	.13	1.34
Free Enterprise	.81	2.29	.16	1.12
Military Strength	1.22	2.08	.31	1.46
Blind Patriotism	1.12	2.33	.13	1.61
Law & Order	.73	2.05	.07	1.32
Traditional Morality	1.37	2.24	.00	1.20
Value	|Women – Men|		|Non-Christians – Christians|	
	Actual Mean Difference	*Mean Perceived Difference*	*Actual Mean Difference*	*Mean Perceived Difference*
Equality	.06	1.27	.20	1.30
Civil Liberties	.04	.94	.16	1.32
Self-Reliance	.08	1.08	.48	1.26
Free Enterprise	.17	1.04	.49	1.13
Military Strength	.27	1.66	.87	1.47
Blind Patriotism	.16	1.13	.88	1.53
Law & Order	.02	1.17	.70	1.38
Traditional Morality	.18	1.05	1.19	1.36

Predicting Perceived Value Differences

As noted previously, this tendency to magnify group value differences should not

manifest uniformly. Because news media often frame political conflict in terms of fundamental

value differences (Robison and Mullinix 2016), and exposure to such media leads individuals to

believe polarization is more severe than it actually is (Levendusky and Malhotra 2016a), people

who are more politically aware should perceive greater value differences. This relationship

should prove strongest when it comes to beliefs about partisan differences, but similar

associations should occur for other groups as well.

The plots below display OLS coefficients for political knowledge, attention to political

news, and strength of partisanship (all rescaled 0-1). Full results for these models are provided in

Tables A5-A8 in Appendix C.

As Figure 3.1 shows, greater political knowledge relates to perceiving greater distance

between typical Democrats and Republicans on every political value. Moving from lowest to

highest knowledge is associated with a gap in perceived values at least one point larger on the 6-

point scale, providing strong initial support for H2. Attention to news exhibits a similar but less

consistent pattern; the coefficients rarely exceed one point, and almost half fall short of

traditional levels of significance. Finally, stronger partisans tend to see larger value differences

between party supporters, but the coefficients are smaller and only prove significant with respect

to self-reliance, free enterprise, and military strength, giving mixed support to H3.

Figure 3.1. Predictors of Perceived Partisan Political Value Differences

Point estimates are OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.

Turning from partisans to groups associated with the parties, these same variables prove more modest and less consistent in their relationships. Figure 3.2 plots the coefficients for perceived racial value differences. Political knowledge again proves the strongest predictor, with coefficients between half a point and a full point. This relationship proves significant for only five of the eight political values, however (equality, self-reliance, free enterprise, military strength, and blind patriotism), and attention to news is predictive for only two (equality and traditional morality). Stronger partisanship is linked with seeing modestly larger differences between whites and nonwhites on self-reliance and free enterprise.

Thus, although political awareness relates to perceiving greater value conflict between racial groups, this relationship appears weaker than it does for perceptions of partisans. This

makes sense given the preeminence of partisanship among politicized identities and in media

coverage of polarization.

Figure 3.2. Predictors of Perceived Racial Political Value Differences

Point estimates are OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.

Interestingly, respondents who do not identify as white also demonstrate greater

propensity to see value differences between racial groups. This occurs only in connection with

equality, civil liberties, and free enterprise, but it is nonetheless suggestive. Perhaps members of

historically subordinate groups more readily see differences between themselves and the

dominant group—particularly concerning values that bear upon their rights and economic

wellbeing.

With respect to gender differences, shown in Figure 3.3, similar patterns emerge. Greater

political knowledge relates to perceiving significantly greater gaps on a number of values

(equality, civil liberties, self-reliance, military strength, and law and order). The same does not

hold for attention to news, however, and contrary to expectations, stronger partisanship occasionally relates to believing the genders are *less* divided on values. In a manner similar to nonwhites, women, relative to men, prove more likely to perceive inter-gender differences on four of eight values, particularly equality.

Figure 3.3. Predictors of Perceived Gender Political Value Differences

Point estimates are OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.

Finally, Figure 3.4 presents results for perceived value differences between Christians and non-Christians. Here, again, political knowledge acts as the most consistent predictor; more knowledgeable respondents estimate greater differences between religious groups on half of the political values, including civil liberties as well as what one might term culturally conservative values (blind patriotism, law and order, and traditional morality). Attention to media shows virtually no associations, however, and partisan strength relates to larger perceived differences

only for free enterprise and traditional morality. Non-Christians, meanwhile, perceive a handful of larger differences as well, most notably on civil liberties.

Figure 3.4. Predictors of Perceived Religious Political Value Differences

Point estimates are OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.

Discussion

The results described above suggest a polity less fundamentally divided than many citizens believe. Real value differences exist between politically salient groups, but to a far greater degree, people *perceive* divergences in groups' political values. Their misperceptions double, triple, even quintuple actual value differences, or they imagine substantial differences where none exist in reality, overwhelmingly supporting H1.

Individuals higher in political knowledge—and, to a lesser extent, those who consume more political news—report greater perceived value differences between a variety of politically relevant groups, overall giving strong support to H2. These people appear to have internalized

media narratives concerning polarization, overestimating intergroup differences not just on policy, but on fundamental principles. Unsurprisingly, these connections prove strongest and most consistent when it comes to perceived value conflicts between supporters of the two parties, the most central actors in virtually any polarization narrative. I find significant echoes of the same pattern, however, with regard to groups commonly associated with the parties.

All of this suggests that polarization coverage, which tends both to exaggerate partisan conflict (Levendusky and Malhotra 2016a) and to frame that conflict in terms of core values (Robison and Mullinix 2016), has magnified value-based divisions in the minds of the public. These perceptions extend beyond political parties to ostensibly nonpolitical groups, perhaps because partisanship and other identities have grown more intertwined in recent decades (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Mason 2018). Indeed, at least when it comes to subsets of political values, stronger partisan identifiers view both the parties and these other groups as more divided, partly confirming H3.

Further work remains to be done in light of these findings. First, what are the consequences of these value misperceptions—do those who perceive greater divisions express higher levels of affective polarization or take on more extreme views? Second, does media exposure indeed cause misperceptions about group values, or do those who exaggerate value gaps also tend to become more politically engaged? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, how can these misperceptions be corrected, and does doing so help to ameliorate different forms of polarization?

CHAPTER 4

The Role of Value Perceptions in Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation

Abstract: Democratic politics, at its core, consists of competition between group interests. What brings groups into social and political conflict with each other, and what may instead drive them to cooperate or become allies? This chapter presents evidence from a nationally representative survey, finding that groups' perceived values—that is, their general beliefs about what is right or desirable—relate to a broad array of intergroup relationships. Individuals who perceive racial, religious, and partisan outgroup members as supporting *self-transcendence* values (values related to care, cooperation, and other prosocial behaviors) express more positive affect, solidarity, willingness to engage in political action, and tolerance with respect to those groups. The magnitude of this association exceeds those of other perceived basic and political values, even when it comes to explicitly political attitudes or target groups. Thus, fundamental, ostensibly nonpolitical beliefs about outgroups' prosocial intentions may underlie intergroup conflict and cooperation.

Competition between group interests drives democratic politics (Schattschneider 1960). Identification with social groups, in turn, drives many mass political attitudes and behaviors (Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). In pursuit of their political goals, groups may come into conflict with one another, or they may find common interests on the basis of which to cooperate. What underlies these intergroup relationships, especially those that persist over time? Beyond the shared objectives of a given moment, what makes group members perceive other groups as likely opponents or allies?

Scholars across the social sciences have investigated the underlying causes of intergroup conflict, including competition over group status (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999) and individual-level tendencies toward ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2009). Group-based divisions may extend even deeper to fundamental notions of what is right or desirable. Differences in core values predict many group-based policy attitudes (e.g., Goren et al. 2016; Kinder and Winter 2001), and perhaps to an even greater extent, the values that different groups are *perceived* as holding strongly influence people's attitudes toward them (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, and Theno 1996; Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky 1990). More generally, misperceptions of outgroups' characteristics have been linked to increased intergroup hostility (Ahler 2014; Ahler and Sood 2018). Social and political conflicts may thus arise from differences in belief systems—both real and imagined—between groups.

Extant work has, surprisingly, not systematically explored *which* specific values, relative to others, most significantly relate to a variety of orientations related to intergroup relations. What personal values, and what perceived outgroup values, are most strongly associated with attitudes toward those outgroups? I argue that the key values are what Schwartz (1992) terms

self-transcendence values—those dealing with care, cooperation, and other prosocial behaviors. This set of basic values—rather than other basic or political values (e.g., openness to change, individualism)—should primarily relate to intergroup conflict and cooperation.

I test this expectation with a nationally representative non-probability survey that measures individuals' own basic and political values, as well as their beliefs about the values held by members of racial, religious, and partisan outgroups—three of the most important group-based divisions in American politics. Individuals who personally give higher ratings to self-transcendence values often express more positive attitudes toward racial (but not religious or partisan) outgroups. A far more consistent pattern emerges with respect to perceived group values: the more respondents believe that a given racial, religious, or partisan outgroup endorses self-transcendence values, the more positive affect, solidarity, collective action intention, and tolerance they express. With a few exceptions, other values—and perceptions of those values—exhibit inconsistent relationships with intergroup attitudes.

The next section identifies and contextualizes three of the most important group divisions in modern American politics—political party, race, and religion—which are the focus of my study. I then review research on the relationship between values and intergroup attitudes, identifying a set of understudied outcomes expressing orientations toward conflict or cooperation with outgroups. I provide an overview of the Schwartz value framework and emphasize the importance of outgroup members' perceived values, before laying out my expectations that self-transcendence values—especially outgroups' perceived endorsement of such values—will relate most strongly to intergroup attitudes. My findings suggest a story of group-based threat (or lack of threat): All groups react more negatively when they perceive others as having less prosocial

motives. Thus, deeply held, ostensibly nonpolitical beliefs—more than the explicitly political—may underlie intergroup relationships in both social and political domains.

Social Groups in American Politics

The recognition of social groups' fundamental importance dates back to foundational political behavior scholarship (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960), and recent work (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017) reaffirms the power of social identities to drive political behavior. Tajfel (1981) defines a social identity as the part of an individual's self-concept derived from their membership in a social group, along with the significance they attach to that membership. Social identity theory (SIT; see Tajfel and Turner 1979) asserts that any number of group memberships may take on this significance—but in the realm of American politics, three identities have long been especially influential: partisanship, race, and religion.

Party affiliation, of course, bears most directly on political behavior and preferences. Political science scholarship often conceives of parties as "instrumental" collections of group-based or ideological interests, but a growing body of work has observed that partisanship in the current era functions as a social identity in its own right (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Greene 1999, 2004; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Along similar lines, research in political psychology has continually found that interparty conflict often results not from issue-based or ideological disagreement, but from a more personal dislike of those who support the opposing party (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar et al. 2019; Mason 2018). Perceptions—often incorrect—of what groups make up the parties, their traits, and their character have the potential

to exacerbate such partisan divisions (Ahler 2014; Ahler and Sood 2018; Rothschild et al. 2019). Party supporters' perceived values likely play a role as well.

Meanwhile, an enormous volume of work has chronicled the centrality of race to political conflict in the U.S. (e.g., Dawson 1994, 2001; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Differences in values across racial groups partly explain their divergent political preferences (Kinder and Winter 2001). Moreover, as discussed in greater detail in the next section, perceptions that racial groups—especially African Americans—violate important American values have been linked to racial animus (Sears and Henry 2003, 2005; Brandt and Reyna 2012).

Religious identification, too, has long exerted great influence over politics in the U.S. (McClosky and Zaller 1984; Uhlmann, Poehlman, and Bargh 2009), and its impact seems to have grown as religion and partisanship have more closely aligned. Although the nation's above-average religiosity may at times serve as a uniting force, growing religious (and non-religious) diversity also appears to be deepening group divisions, not merely in terms of politics but also fundamental worldviews (Chapp 2012; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Oliver and Wood 2018).

Thus, all these dimensions of identity present the potential for value-based conflict—or, should groups perceive that they share values in common, intergroup alliances. A host of values have yet to be examined, however—including values not explicitly political in their focus. Racial and religious divisions extend beyond the expressly political into all manner of life domains (e.g., Allport 1954; Putnam and Campbell 2010), and a growing body of work in political psychology suggests that the same is true of party affiliation. Mason (2018) observes that as racial, religious, and partisan identities have come into closer alignment, partisan conflict has bled into nonpolitical domains. Though these three social categorizations have clear qualitative

differences, SIT suggests that group identities, and the intergroup processes they generate, share fundamental dynamics in common. Could the same values therefore influence intergroup relations between all of these identity groups?

Intergroup Attitudes and Values

Research on group dynamics has often focused on policy preferences with group-based implications (e.g., Brandt and Reyna 2012; Davidov et al. 2008, 2014; Kinder and Winter 2001). Less attention has been paid to what individual-level beliefs drive people's attitudes toward conflict and cooperation between the groups themselves. This is important since, after all, people's dispositions toward intergroup relations may exert a considerable impact on what policies are proposed or enacted in the first place. Furthermore, as Mason (2018) demonstrates, the relationships and divisions that politicized identities foster may propagate beyond the realm of politics into all manner of social domains.

Past research (e.g., Kinder and Kam 2009; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) has often examined intergroup sentiment through measures of general *affect*. While such metrics provide valuable insights, they are relatively coarse. Other work has conceptualized three more specific intergroup orientations more directly relevant to intergroup behaviors. The first is *sympathy* or *solidarity*, beliefs that one has feelings, interests, and values in common with the group; such beliefs may lead to the second, orientations toward *political action*, including the desire to see the group's interests represented and the motivation to participate on the group's behalf (Klandermans 1997; van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). Third, individuals may express greater or lesser *tolerance* toward an outgroup; this includes expressly political tolerance (the extension of political rights to a group; e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1993) as well as social tolerance

(willingness to live in proximity and have contact with the group; e.g., Mason 2018). These four

dimensions of intergroup relations—*affect*, *solidarity*, *political action intentions*, and

tolerance—comprise the dependent variables of interest in the present study. Importantly, such

relatively abstract attitudes have been linked to concrete collective action behaviors, including in

the political realm (e.g., Klandermans 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Subašić, Reynolds,

and Turner 2008; van Stekelenburg 2013).

While many factors may explain these orientations, I expect values—both one's own and

the perceived values of outgroup members—to predict all four. Values, as defined by Schwartz

(1992: 4), "(1) are concepts or beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3)

transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (5) are

ordered by relative importance." Personal values, as well as outgroups' perceived values, exert

important influences over intergroup conflict and cooperation. Group members' perceived values

have been linked to feelings of solidarity with a group (Subašić, Reynolds, and Turner 2008), as

well as positive affect and tolerance (Brandt and Van Tongeren 2017; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995;

Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna 2013). This relationship should hold even when accounting for

other important variables, such as the strength of one's own group identification. However, it

remains less clear which values, relative to others, matter most.

The theory of values developed by Schwartz (1992) identifies 10 broad, basic values that

derive from the individual and social motivations common to all human beings. Table 4.1

(adapted from Schwartz 2003) describes these values, and Figure 4.1 (taken from Schwartz

2012) depicts their relationships to each other; items intended to measure each value are

provided in Appendix A. As shown in the figure, these individual values may be combined into

two orthogonal, higher-order dimensions: *openness to change* (independent thought, feeling, and action) versus *conservation* (social stability and resistance to change), and *self-transcendence* (care and concern for others) versus *self-enhancement* (individual gains at the expense of others). The Schwartz values have been linked to a variety of social and political attitudes and behaviors, including policy preferences and voting (Bardi and Schwartz 2003; Goren et al. 2016; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010)—but, again, no research to date has examined their simultaneous relationships to a broad array of attitudes related to intergroup conflict and cooperation.

Table 4.1. Schwartz's Basic Values

Value	Meaning
Self-Transcendence	
Benevolence	Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent contact
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of *all* people and for nature
Openness to Change	
Self-Direction	Independent thought and action
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, challenges in life
Hedonism	Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself *[also considered a self-enhancement value]*
Self-Enhancement	
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards
Power	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources
Conservation	
Security	Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms
Tradition	Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides

Source: Adapted from Schwartz (2003)

Figure 4.1. Schwartz's Theoretical Model of Relations among Basic Values

Source: Schwartz (2012)

Existing literature also conceives of a wide variety of political values. Distinct from basic values, which people apply across a variety of life domains, political values deal specifically with the role of government and the organization of society (Goren 2013; McCann 1997) and may independently predict intergroup attitudes in the political realm. Schwartz et al. (2014) further note that, though the two kinds of values are conceptually distinct, the more general basic values underlie and structure a person's political values. Past research has not established a common set of political values; rather, different studies have measured subsets relevant to their particular research questions. The present work uses a set of 8 political values intended to capture the breadth of political value conflict in the U.S. To simplify the analyses that follow, and drawing on insights from system justification theory (see Jost and Hunyady 2005), I group these values into two broad dimensions: *system-undermining* values and *system-justifying*

values.[13] Table 4.2 provides a summary of these values and the sources from which they are

drawn; specific items are listed in Appendix A.[14]

Table 4.2. Political Values

Value	Meaning	Source(s)
System-Undermining		
Equality	Equal distribution of opportunities and resources	Feldman (1988); Goren (2004, 2005); Jacoby (2014); McCann (1997); McClosky & Zaller (1984); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Civil Liberties	Freedom of each person to act and think as they deem appropriate	Jacoby (2014); McClosky & Zaller (1984); Schwartz et al. (2014)
System-Justifying		
Self-Reliance	Each person getting ahead on their own	Feldman (1988); Goren (2004, 2005); Jacoby (2014)
Free Enterprise	Minimal government intervention in the economy	Feldman (1988); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Military Strength	Use and maintenance of a strong military	Goren (2004, 2013); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Blind Patriotism	Supporting and never criticizing one's country	Schwartz et al. (2014)
Law and Order	Enforcing obedience to the law, forbidding disruptive activities	Jacoby (2014); Schwartz et al. (2014)
Traditional Morality	Protection of traditional religious, moral, and family values	Goren (2005, 2013); Jacoby (2014); McCann (1997); Schwartz et al. (2014)

Existing studies, however, have not examined a comprehensive range of basic and

political values. It therefore remains an open question which values, relative to others, most

strongly inform intergroup judgments across different types of groups. I posit that Schwartz's

(1992) self-transcendence values will exhibit the strongest and most consistent relationships with

intergroup attitudes, compared to other basic and political values. Although considerable

variation in value ratings exists between individuals, these values typically receive the highest

---

[13] The two scales exhibit good reliability (Cronbach's alpha ≥ .70) across personal and group value items.

[14] Different works have labeled political values differently (e.g., freedom and civil liberties, economic individualism and self-reliance); however, the core concepts remain highly similar.

ratings across groups and cultures. Schwartz and Bardi (2001), surveying samples from over 50 countries, consistently find the first of these, benevolence, to be on average the highest-rated value, with universalism either second or third across their samples.[15] Fischer and Schwartz (2011) find similar consensus across countries, citing fundamental human needs for cooperation and supportive relationships. Self-transcendence values, in other words, are *prosocial* values, likely to be given high importance by the members of any group, and Schwartz and Sagie (2000) find this to be even more true in developed, democratic nations such as the United States. In turn, the perception that an outgroup falls short on these values likely engenders more negative evaluations of that group (Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky 1990).

The primacy of self-transcendence values extends beyond intergroup affect to a variety of concrete attitudes and policy preferences. Goren et al. (2016) connect self-transcendence values to more liberal stances on immigration (also see Davidov et al. 2008, 2014) and aid to African Americans. Past work has also linked self-transcendence values to greater readiness for outgroup contact (Sagiv and Schwartz 1995)—a form of social tolerance. The relationship of these values to a comprehensive set of intergroup attitudes, however, remains to be seen. Personal self-transcendence values should predict a plethora of more positive attitudes, both general and specific; those with a more prosocial orientation should prove more open to contact and cooperation with individuals less like themselves.

> **H1:** *Higher personal ratings on self-transcendence values will relate to greater favorability, solidarity, collective action intention, and tolerance toward outgroups.*

---

[15] Self-direction rounds out the average top three basic values in their data.

While individuals' own abstract endorsement of certain values may impact their policy preferences and other attitudes, intergroup attitudes depend to an equal or greater degree on perceptions of the target group's values. Scholarship on racial attitudes has long recognized this reality: symbolic racism (e.g., Sears and Henry 2003, 2005) and related theories assert that anti-black attitudes arise from the perception that African Americans violate important cultural values, particularly individualism. This belief serves to legitimize anti-egalitarian attitudes, fueling decreased support for, to give just a few examples, affirmative action policies and diversity in educational and workplace settings (Brandt and Reyna 2012). In this way, perceptions that a group fails to uphold one or more values may underlie or justify negative attitudes toward them. Biernat, Vescio, and Theno (1996) more generally demonstrate that people perceive outgroup members as less supportive of their core values (also see Eicher, Pratto, and Wilhelm 2013), and that these beliefs strongly predict prejudice toward those outgroups even after accounting for conservative ideology. Perceived value conflict has additionally been found to drive negative intergroup attitudes along religious and ideological lines (Brandt and Van Tongeren 2017; Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna 2013).

The belief that a group falls short in its endorsement of self-transcendence values should therefore correlate with less affinity toward that group, to a greater degree than perceived differences on other values. Not only do nearly all individuals highly prioritize these values; their beliefs along these lines also measure, in essence, group members' perceived tendency to be good, responsible members of society (Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky 1990). People should thus prove more willing to coexist and cooperate with outgroup members when they believe that group endorses self-transcendence values because, simply put, self-transcendence captures the

fundamental tendency to be cooperative and tolerant in return. Groups' perceived endorsement of this important value dimension should therefore increase feelings of solidarity with an outgroup and, in turn, willingness to support or engage in political action on behalf of the group (Subašić, Reynolds, and Turner 2008; Subašić, Schmitt, and Reynolds 2011). On the darker side of the above dynamic, the belief that a group falls short on prosocial values can exacerbate intergroup conflict (Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky 1990), decreasing favorability and tolerance toward a group—but this possibility remains to be tested with respect to a variety of racial, religious, and partisan groups.

> *H2: The higher a typical group member is perceived as rating self-transcendence values, the greater favorability, solidarity, collective action intention, and tolerance the perceiver will express toward that group.*

The observational data described below cannot, of course, ascertain the *causal* relationship between these variables. It may be that people attribute prosocial values less to groups they already dislike, or that they do so in order to rationalize preexisting political attitudes toward those groups. However, as noted previously, perceptions of group characteristics have been found to causally influence attitudes toward those groups (Ahler 2014; Ahler and Sood 2018). Moreover, because values underpin a wide variety of more specific attitudes, it stands to reason that both personal and perceived values serve as foundations for orientations toward outgroups. Along these lines, Biernat, Vescio, and Theno (1996) suggest that group value perceptions may play a greater role in intergroup attitudes than does group membership *per se*. Finally, Henry and Reyna (2007) observe that, when it comes to more specific group-based political attitudes (e.g., policy preferences), value perceptions prove more important than general

affect toward the group in question. Taken together—though, again, these data cannot dispositively adjudicate the causal direction—past work suggests that beliefs about outgroups' values drive people's social and political orientations toward them, rather than the reverse.

Data and Method

I investigate these dynamics using nationally representative non-probability survey fielded in the U.S. by the research firm Bovitz, Inc. (N = 1,286) in the fall of 2017.[16] Participants were first asked to indicate their racial/ethnic, religious, and partisan identities. Specific questions were as follows:

- "Which of the following do you consider to be your primary racial or ethnic group?" (for those who checked more than one, followed up with, "If you had to choose one group, which of the following racial or ethnic categories *best* describes you?") *[White, Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, Middle Eastern/North African, Native American, other]*

- "What religion do you consider yourself to be?" *[Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, not religious, other]*[17]

- "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Independent, or Republican?" *[strong Democrat, weak Democrat, Independent leaning Democrat, Independent, Independent leaning Republican, weak Republican, strong Republican]* (for those who

---

[16] More information is available at the company's website (http://bovitzinc.com/). Bovitz randomly selected, from their pre-recruited online panel, respondents who matched the sample criteria (i.e., quotas to match sample demographics as closely as possible to the U.S. Census) based on their preexisting profiles. The firm recruited these respondents via email invitations.

[17] Respondents identifying as Protestant and Catholic, as well as those who answered "other" for their religious identity and indicated belonging to a Christian denomination in their open-ended responses, were grouped as Christians.

selected "Independent," followed up with, "Do you consider yourself closer to the

Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither?")

Next, respondents rated their own basic and political values, followed by the perceived

values of a set of groups. Basic values are ordinarily measured using the Portrait Values

Questionnaire (PVQ; see Schwartz 2003), which asks respondents to rate their similarity to brief

descriptions of people and what they consider important. In the present survey, each basic value

is measured with a single PVQ-style item, adapted from measures used on the American

National Election Study 2006 pilot. The set of 8 political values listed previously in Table 4.2

were adapted to the same format. Respondents rated their own similarity to the people described,

as well as the similarity of "typical" group members to those same descriptions (see Appendix A

for specific wordings). All value ratings were on 6-point scales. Individual basic value items

were averaged to create Schwartz's (1992) four higher-order dimensions: self-transcendence,

openness to change, self-enhancement, and conservation.[18] Political values were averaged into

the system-undermining and system-justifying dimensions described previously.

Questions about group values, as well as attitudes toward those groups, were randomized

to improve data quality, as pilot testing suggested that rating more than four groups would lead

to respondent fatigue. Randomly assigned subsets of participants therefore rated the basic and

political values of typical racial group members (white Americans, African Americans, Latinos,

Asian Americans; N = 231), religious group members (Christians, Jewish people, Muslims, non-

religious people; N = 255), or partisans (Democrats, Republicans; N = 266).

---

[18] Because hedonism overlaps two of these dimensions (openness to change and self-enhancement), it is excluded
from these scales, following prior work (e.g., Goren et al. 2016; Longest, Hitlin, and Vaisey 2013).

Table 4.3. Sample Characteristics

Variable	Percent
Race/Ethnicity	
White	68.3
African American	13.0
Hispanic/Latino	11.0
Asian American	5.1
Middle Eastern/North African	0.2
Native American	0.9
Other	1.5
Gender	
Male	52.7
Female	47.1
Other	0.2
Religion	
Christian	61.1
Jewish	2.3
Muslim	0.8
Not religious	26.3
Other	9.5
Partisanship	
Democrat (includes leaners)	46.7
Republican (includes leaners)	35.4
Pure Independent	17.9
	Mean (std. dev.)
Age (1-5 scale)	3.13 (1.24)
Income (1-5 scale)	2.18 (1.12)
Education (1-5 scale)	3.14 (.99)
Ideology (1-7 scale)	3.95 (1.73)
Political Interest (1-5 scale)	3.20 (1.15)
Political Knowledge (0-4 scale)	2.22 (1.37)

The strength of respondents' identities was measured using a single-item measure of social identification developed by Postmes et al. (2013; also see Reysen et al. 2013), adapted for the present study to read "I identify with my [racial group/religious group/political party]" and answered on a 7-point scale from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Respondents also answered a set of other variables expected, based on prior work, to relate to the dependent

variables of interest: education, income, age, ideology, political interest, and political knowledge (the number out of four questions correct). Table 4.3 presents sample characteristics.

Finally, participants answered questions about their attitudes with respect to the relevant groups, meant to tap general affect toward the group, feelings of solidarity with the group, desire for political action on behalf of the group, and tolerance toward the group. Affect was measured with a single item—"How unfavorable or favorable do you feel toward [group]?"—on a 7-point scale from "extremely unfavorable" to "extremely favorable." Solidarity, political action, and tolerance were measured with scales averaging several related items, all answered on a 7-point scale from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Question wordings for these items are below; for all wordings not in the main text, see Appendix A. Next to the name of each scale is the range of Cronbach's alpha values across all target groups asked about in the survey.[19]

- *Solidarity* (alpha = .92 - .96)

  o "I have a lot in common with a typical [group member]."

  o "My ideas, interests, and feelings are close to those of [group]."

  o "The values and life-guiding principles of [group] are similar to my own."

  o "I feel solidarity with [group]."

- *Political Action* (alpha = .84 - .93)

  o "[Group] should gave greater representation in government."

  o "The government should take action against discrimination toward [group]."

  o "I am willing to engage in political action alongside [group]."

---

[19] Confirmatory factor analysis indicates a unidimensional structure for each of these sets of items.

o "If I had the opportunity, I would join an organization that advocates for the interests of [group]."

o "If I had the opportunity, I would participate in a demonstration on behalf of [group]."

- *Tolerance* (alpha = .87 - .91)

o "[Group] violate my core values and beliefs."

o "I would be upset if a [group member] moved in next door to me."

o "[Group] deserve any harassment they receive."

o "[Group] should not be allowed to organize for political purposes."

o "[Group] should be banned from running for public office."

To assess the relationships between values (both personal and perceived) and these intergroup outcomes, I perform a series of OLS regressions, using one's own values and the perceived values of the group in question to predict favorability, solidarity, political action intention, and tolerance toward the group. Because my hypotheses concern attitudes toward outgroups, I limit the sample in each model accordingly (e.g., whites' attitudes toward each nonwhite group, non-Muslims' attitudes toward Muslims). Control variables include strength of ingroup identification along the relevant dimension (racial, religious, or partisan), as well as gender, education, income, age, political interest, and political knowledge. Racial and religious models additionally control for partisanship (on a 7-point scale from "strong Democrat" to "strong Republican"). Perhaps most importantly, all of these regressions also control for traditional liberal-conservative ideology, conceptually related to but distinct from both basic and political values (Feldman 1988; Jacoby 2014; Kilburn 2009).

Personal Values, Value Perceptions, and Outgroup Attitudes

Full OLS results are presented in Tables A9-A18 in Appendix C. Here, I focus on key tests of my hypotheses, presented in figures that plot the regression coefficients for respondents' own basic values and the basic values they attribute to the groups in question. For the sake of clarity, and because political values show few consistent significant relationships across groups and dependent variables, I exclude them from the figures but, where relevant, discuss their associations in the text.

Interracial Attitudes

Beginning with racial/ethnic outgroups, Figures 4.2a and 4.2b present the relationships between personal and perceived values and the intergroup attitudes of interest. Personal endorsement of self-transcendence values (benevolence, universalism) relates to more positive attitudes toward two groups (affect and solidarity for African Americans; affect, solidarity, and action for Asian Americans). A one-point increase on this value dimension is associated with roughly a quarter-point increase, providing partial support for H1.

Figure 4.2a. Values and Attitudes toward African Americans and Latinos

Figure 4.2b. Values and Attitudes toward Asian Americans and Whites

The target group's perceived values show a more consistent pattern: Every additional

point by which whites believe a typical Latino endorses self-transcendence relates to

significantly greater favorability and tolerance toward Latinos as a group (the result for solidarity is in the expected direction but is only significant at the .10 level). For Asian Americans, significant associations emerge with respect to both affect and solidarity. An even stronger pattern appears when it comes to nonwhite respondents' perceptions of whites; rating a typical white American a point higher on self-transcendence values relates to a half-point increase or more on affect, solidarity, and action attitudes (but not tolerance—rather, whites' perceived conservation values relate most strongly to this outcome). Results therefore predominantly support H2.

Interestingly, a different pattern emerges when it comes to African Americans: conservation values (security, conformity, tradition) prove more strongly predictive than self-transcendence values. Higher personal ratings of conservation values among whites relate to less favorability and solidarity toward African Americans (along with a marginally significant reduction in political action intentions). At the same time, the perception that African Americans themselves more strongly endorse conservation values predicts more positive affect and greater solidarity with them. In other words, white individuals more concerned with safety and social stability tend to view blacks more negatively, and the opposite proves true among those who believe African Americans place greater value on those things. These findings may stem in part from longstanding stereotypes of African Americans as dangerous, violent, or radical.

One other pattern among white respondents appears noteworthy. Higher personal self-enhancement values (achievement, power) relate to a small decrease in tolerance toward African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans (though in the last case, the coefficient falls short of significance). Regardless of how they perceive these groups' values, whites who more strongly

value their own advancement show lower willingness to have social contact with or extend political rights to nonwhites.

Inter-Religious Attitudes

Turning to attitudes toward religious outgroups (see Figures 4.3a and 4.3b), these show little support for H1, as personally held self-transcendence values exhibit almost no relationship. However, groups' perceived endorsements of such values show significant associations with attitudes toward all four target groups, providing strong support for H2. The belief that Jewish people or Muslims give greater weight to self-transcendence values (among those who do not identify with those religious groups) relates to increased positive affect, solidarity, and political action intentions (as well as tolerance toward Jewish people), with some coefficients approaching half a point on the 7-point scale. A similar pattern emerges when it comes to religious individuals' perceptions of non-religious people's values, although in this case self-transcendence values show a significant relationship only with affect and solidarity. Non-Christians' views toward Christians appear to operate in much the same way—perceiving Christians as more strongly committed to self-transcendence values is associated with more positive affect and action intention (and, at a more modest level of significance, solidarity).

Figure 4.3a. Values and Attitudes toward Jewish People and Muslims

Figure 4.3b. Values and Attitudes toward Non-Religious People and Christians

One last pattern across religious groups stands out: The belief that these groups more strongly emphasize self-enhancement values relates to more negative intergroup attitudes among

non-identifiers. The association appears strongest with respect to Muslims, significant across all four dependent measures, but similar results emerge for favorability and solidarity (and, at the .10 level, action) toward Jewish people. However, with regard to attitudes about non-religious people, only tolerance reaches significance, and none reach traditional significance levels when it comes to attitudes toward Christians. It seems that when one perceives members of a religious minority as more focused on their own power or success, this correlates with a number of more negative intergroup attitudes. In an indirect way, these results provide further support for my core hypotheses: self-enhancement values diametrically oppose self-transcendence values (Schwartz 1992; also see Maio et al. 2009); thus, it makes theoretical sense that perceived self-enhancement values would have the opposite relationship with intergroup attitudes.

Taken together, the results for interracial and inter-religious attitudes reveal quite consistent patterns across social groups. The perception that a group endorses widely recognized prosocial values relates to more positive affect, a stronger sense of ideas and experiences in common, greater desire to see or engage in political action, and greater tolerance with respect to that group—and these relationships hold whether the group occupies a generally dominant or subordinate position within society. To a lesser extent, and only in the case of some groups, personal endorsement of those same values is also associated with more positive intergroup attitudes. Other basic values, as well as political values, show far less consistent associations with the dependent variables. It thus appears that even expressly political intergroup attitudes relate primarily to beliefs and ideals that extend beyond the political realm.

Interparty Attitudes

What of identities with explicitly political functions? Figure 4.4 presents model results for interparty attitudes (i.e., Republicans' views of Democrats and vice versa)[20], and the pattern proves strikingly similar to those for racial and religious groups. The greater the extent to which Democrats (Republicans) see Republicans (Democrats) as endorsing self-transcendence values, the more they express positive affect, solidarity, and favorability toward political action alongside or on behalf of the outparty. However, this perception does not relate in a significant way to outparty tolerance. Perhaps surprisingly, when these basic value perceptions are accounted for, outparties' perceived political values show almost no significant relationships with the dependent variables (see Tables A17 and A18 in Appendix C for details).

That being said, personally held political values do show a few relationships with interparty attitudes. Republicans who more strongly endorse system-undermining values (equality, civil liberties) report significantly more positive affect toward Democrats, and those who more highly rate system-justifying values (self-reliance, free enterprise, military strength, blind patriotism, law and order, traditional morality) express more negative affect and less political action intention. At the same time, Democrats higher in system-justifying values display, though only at a marginally significant level, greater favorability and solidarity toward Republicans. In sum, it appears that endorsement of political values associated with the outparty (see Goren 2005, 2013; Jacoby 2014) relates to more positive attitudes toward that party—and, at least among Republicans, stronger emphasis on the inparty's typical values relates to a subset of

---

[20] Independent "leaners" are grouped with partisans, following prior work (e.g., Bullock 2011; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Levendusky 2010), with pure independents excluded.

more negative views of the outparty. Political values, however, do not approach the consistent associations of perceived self-transcendence values.

Figure 4.4. Values and Attitudes toward Partisans

These results align with notions of partisanship as a social identity in its own right, analogous to race, religion, and others (e.g., Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Greene 1999, 2004). Despite parties' ostensibly political rather than social focus, attitudes toward outpartisans appear to operate in much the same way as evaluations of racial and religious outgroups. People who believe that members of the opposing party uphold prosocial values express a host of more positive attitudes—both social and political in their focus—toward those individuals. These observations accord, as well, with research on affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Mason 2018). Partisan conflict may arise less from ideological disagreement than from something more fundamental: the belief that outpartisans fall short of the basic image of a "good" (i.e., prosocial) person. Conversely, when respondents perceive outpartisans as endorsing self-transcendence values, they show markedly greater willingness to cooperate with them, even in the political domain.

Policy Implications: Perceived Outgroup Values and Immigration

Do the dynamics presented above also relate to policy preferences? I explore this possibility in the realm of immigration. At least when it comes to certain outgroups, preferences on immigration to a large degree embody the broad intergroup attitudes described above, reflecting individuals' willingness to have social and political contact with outgroup members, as well as confidence in their ability to assimilate. Thus, it seems likely that the same value perceptions described above play a role in the formation of immigration policy attitudes.

At the end of the survey, respondents were asked, on a 1-5 scale, whether the number of immigrants into the U.S. should be decreased a lot, decreased a little, kept the same, increased a little, or increased a lot. Figure 4.5 presents the results from two OLS models, using the same

sets of independent variables described previously, with this immigration item as the dependent variable (see Tables A19 and A20 in Appendix C for full results). Both models include respondents' own values, and the first incorporates perceived Latino and Asian American values, while the second instead uses perceived Muslim values. These three groups represent those most likely to come to mind when respondents think of immigrants to the United States.[21] The race-based model is restricted to white respondents, while the religion-based model excludes Muslim respondents.

In both cases, the target groups' perceived values relate to immigration preferences in a way that virtually mirrors the association with less policy-oriented intergroup attitudes. The greater the degree to which white respondents see Latinos as endorsing self-transcendence values, and the more non-Muslims see Muslims as supporting the same, the more pro-immigration preferences they express. (Perceived Asian American values—not shown in the figure—do not have significant associations.) In addition, higher personal support for system-justifying political values predicts lower support for immigration in both models.

These results suggest that images of certain outgroups' basic values—again, particularly their endorsement of prosocial values—bear substantially on an individual's immigration preferences. Personal support for the status quo, embodied in support for a set of system-justifying political values, shows a strong relationship as well. But when it comes to perceived group values, the social appears to matter more than the political.

---

[21] Unfortunately, random assignment prevents the inclusion of all three groups' perceived values in one model.

Figure 4.5. Attitudes toward Immigration and Perceived Outgroup Values

Discussion

Examining the perceived values of outgroups, and the relationships between those perceptions and intergroup attitudes, reveals a clear, remarkably consistent pattern. Across racial, religious, and partisan groups, the perception that an outgroup more strongly endorses self-transcendence values nearly always relates to more positive affect, greater solidarity, a stronger propensity toward political action, and greater tolerance (or some subset of those attitudes) with respect to that group. This association persists even when controlling for respondents' self-professed values and their perceptions of the outgroup's political values—all of which display less consistent or no relationships to the attitudes of interest. Even when it comes to intergroup preferences and behaviors of an expressly political nature, these ostensibly nonpolitical beliefs exhibit strong, significant relationships, while personal and perceived political values only sometimes do. Outgroups' perceived support for prosocial values, which the vast majority of people and cultures consider to be of high importance (Schwartz and Bardi 2001; Fischer and Schwartz 2011), may underlie a host of attitudes related to intergroup conflict and cooperation.

These observations are, of course, not meant to dismiss the importance of individuals' own values. Indeed, personal value priorities have been linked to a variety of attitudes about politics and policy (Davidov et al. 2008, 2014; Goren 2004, 2013; Goren et al. 2016), and they often differ among groups (Jacoby 2014; Kinder and Winter 2001). My findings with regard to immigration attitudes reflect this enduring reality. In addition, personal value ratings often show associations with broader interracial attitudes. Self-transcendence values predict a subset of more positive attitudes toward African and Asian Americans among whites, though it remains unclear why the same relationship does not emerge for attitudes toward Latinos. Additionally, whites

who more highly rate self-enhancement values express less tolerance toward all non-white groups; it seems those who feel particularly sensitive to their group's social and political dominance are less willing to have contact with or extend rights to subordinate groups. The apparent non-impact of personal self-transcendence values on attitudes toward other types of groups does not come as a total surprise—Schwartz (2007) finds that people and societies vary considerably in their application of these values, particularly universalism, to their orientations toward outgroups.

As Henry and Reyna (2007) emphasize, the impact of personal, abstract endorsement of values may matter less for attitude formation than the belief that other people or groups uphold or violate important values. My results suggest that this dynamic persists across a gamut of intergroup attitudes and behavioral intentions, and taken as a whole, they give cause for both optimism and worry. Even between groups known to hold some notable, divergent value priorities, the belief that the outgroup endorses near-universally recognized prosocial values remains the strongest predictor of positive outgroup attitudes. My findings suggest that the "culture war" observed by Jacoby (2014) has some bearing on intergroup conflict and cooperation, but in a far less consistent manner than simple beliefs about outgroups' prosocial value orientations. Indeed, once differences in personal values are accounted for, ingroup members appear to have more positive feelings toward and greater willingness to cooperate with outgroups, provided they expect outgroup members to be cooperative in return.

On the other hand, increased cooperation between groups seems to rely on the *recognition* of these common intergroup motivations. Misperceptions of outgroups are quite common, in terms of their demographic composition as well as their values (Ahler and Sood

2018), and such incorrect beliefs may prove self-reinforcing, exacerbating conflicts (Ahler 2014; Eicher, Pratto, and Wilhelm 2013). It remains to be seen from where these misperceptions originate, and how easily they can be corrected.

A good deal of work also remains to be done in order to better understand these value-based intergroup dynamics. Most notably, these observational data cannot speak to the causal ordering among the set of psychological variables examined here. It appears quite plausible, based on extant theory about intergroup attitudes and perceptions, that beliefs about outgroups' values drive ingroup members' attitudes toward them. However, the opposite may also prove true—those with more negative preexisting attitudes toward outgroups may be inclined to believe they fall short of prosocial expectations. Future research should seek to disentangle these causal pathways and, in the process, perhaps uncover ways to ameliorate misperceptions and promote greater harmony between groups.

CHAPTER 5

Social Identities and Democratic Representation:
How Value Rhetoric Conditions Identity Politics

Abstract: Social identities strongly shape political attitudes. They do so, in part, by providing cues—such as when a voter opts for a candidate who shares his or her racial, gender, or partisan identity. This identity preference often reflects the presumption of shared values—but how does a candidate's actual expression of values affect voters? I address this question with a novel theory and experiment. I hypothesize and find that candidates can enhance their support among ingroup members by explicitly championing their group's stereotypic values (e.g., an African-American candidate endorses equality). That said, when candidates reference counter-stereotypic values, they lose support from their ingroup while at the same time garnering support among outgroup voters (e.g., a Democratic candidate references traditional morality and loses Democratic support but gains Republican support). These findings accentuate the relevance of value *rhetoric* on vote choice and how such rhetoric conditions the practice of identity politics.

In a representative democracy, citizens primarily exert their will through the people they elect to office. How, then, do individuals develop their perceptions of and preferences between political candidates? The social groups with which voters identify, particularly their party affiliation, often play an important role in their decisions (Achen and Bartels 2016; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). What exactly gives such social identities their political power? Mere descriptive representation, in which a politician belongs to the same group(s) as a voter, may prove sufficient to engender greater support for that candidate. However, existing theory suggests that an identity is more likely to become politicized when members feel a sense of shared values (Huddy 2013)—that is, their core beliefs about what is right or desirable.

When a candidate expresses values in line with those commonly endorsed by the relevant group, does this enhance the impact of identity on voters' perceptions? Conversely, when that candidate endorses a value that is *atypical* for the group, does this attenuate the benefits of a descriptive identity match? I predict that value rhetoric *shapes* voters' use of identity-based cues: a value expression congruent with an identity (e.g., a Republican candidate invoking traditional morality) enhances its effects on ingroup members' candidate evaluations, whereas the expression of a counter-stereotypic value (e.g., an African-American candidate emphasizing self-reliance) diminishes the impact of that identity.

I test these expectations with a survey experiment that presents respondents with hypothetical candidates belonging to different partisan, gender, and racial groups and expressing different political values. By and large, respondents more strongly support, and see themselves and their ingroup as better represented by, a candidate who descriptively shares their group

membership. However, they express even more positive views with respect to a candidate who additionally expresses a value commonly endorsed by the group. Likewise, when a candidate who belongs to the outgroup endorses that same value, such a counter-stereotypical message often reduces their loss in support relative to an ingroup candidate. Taken as a whole, this study shows that the perception of shared values—as communicated by candidates—conditions the impact of shared identities on candidate choice. Scholars should therefore incorporate both phenomena into theories and discussions of democratic representation. In other words, what candidates say—not merely the groups to which they belong—matters, and the power of identity as a heuristic may prove contingent upon value-based rhetoric.

Candidate Selection and the Nature of Representation

Political scientists and democratic theorists have long debated the nature of representation. A multitude of conceptions exist, perhaps most prominently "delegates" versus "trustees"—respectively, those representatives who carry out the expressed will of their constituents and those who rely on their own judgment about what is best for the polity (Pitkin 1967). More recent scholarship has complicated this dichotomy. Mansbridge (2003, 2011) puts forth what she calls a "selection model" of representation, in which constituents elect representatives who are generally reliant on their own judgment, but who also broadly share their preferences (also see Rehfeld 2009). Her model thus offers a "middle way" between the delegate and trustee models, building on observations from Kingdon (1981: 45): "The simplest mechanism through which constituents can influence a congressman is to select a person initially for the office who agrees with their attitudes." The selection model shifts the focus away from representatives' actions in office toward the basis on which they are chosen in the first place.

This raises an obvious question: on what criteria are representatives selected? Mansbridge (2003) explains that voters may select a representative on a variety of grounds, including shared self-interested goals, shared background characteristics, and adherence to a particular set of principles. These observations bring to the fore another of Pitkin's (1967) dichotomies: "descriptive representation" (sharing demographic characteristics with constituents such as racial, gender, or partisan identity) versus "substantive representation" (shared goals between representative and constituents such as policies or broad values). These two forms often relate to each other, with representatives generally more motivated to pursue the interests of those with whom they share certain features (e.g., Mansbridge 1999, 2003; Whitby 1997)—but this motivation does not necessarily hold across the board. A group member in a position of power is by no means guaranteed to work toward the betterment of the group as a whole (Grofman 1982; Mansbridge 1999). Conversely, group membership is not *required* to stimulate responsiveness to that group's political needs—plenty of elected officials have been seen as going against their group's interests (Grose 2011; Swain 1995).

To have a chance at representing their group, members must of course be elected. Thus, just as important as the policymaking realities of descriptive and substantive representation are constituents' *perceptions* of their prospective representatives. A shared group identity such as race or gender (an indicator of descriptive representation), particularly among groups traditionally underrepresented within the political system, surely plays a pivotal role. But group memberships—even those such as partisanship that people nominally choose—are relatively fixed. The social and political *meaning* attached to a group membership, however, may vary in the form of, among other things, values (Huddy 2001, 2013; Tajfel 1981). Thus, the political

power of an identity may depend upon the presence or absence of shared values (a signal, broadly construed, of substantive representation) between candidate and constituents.

Does descriptively sharing an identity with a candidate increase support and perceived representation (and are the candidate's values inferred based on this identity)? Does a shared identity, when combined with an expression of common group values, exert a greater impact on these outcomes than identity alone? If the candidate does *not* share an identity with prospective constituents, but expresses the values that their group favors, does this alone increase support (i.e., is the value message seen as credible)? Finally, if the candidate shares a group identity but expresses values *not* typically prioritized by the group, does this vitiate any identity-based gains? I next offer a theory that addresses these questions.

Social Identities, Values, and Perceived Representation

When making choices between policies, candidates, and more, voters are confronted with myriad pieces of information that might prove relevant to their judgments. Most people, even those with high levels of political knowledge, rely on mental shortcuts to simplify and interpret the complex political world. Among the most influential heuristics are the social groups with which a person identifies (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). With these in mind, individuals may seek descriptive representation, supporting politicians who belong to the same group(s) they do.

Experimental work in political communication has underlined the persuasive power of such identity cues. As one example, Kuklinski and Hurley (1994) famously find that the racial identity of the messenger can overwhelm their ideological reputation. They attributed a highly individualistic statement that "African-Americans must stop making excuses and rely much more

on themselves to get ahead in society" (735) to one of four well-known political figures: Ted

Kennedy (a white liberal), George H. W. Bush (a white conservative), Jesse Jackson (an African-

American liberal), or Clarence Thomas (an African-American conservative). After exposure to

the statement, African-American participants expressed considerably greater support for the

notion of black self-reliance when the source was either Jackson or Thomas, compared to

Kennedy or Bush. Broadly, then, political figures who share an identity with an individual tend

to receive stronger support and be seen as more credible, regardless of their political ideology

(also see Kam 2005; Nelson and Garst 2005).

Given the broad power of social identities to shape political attitudes, this result is quite

sensible. Citizens may be driven in their candidate preferences and vote choices by a sense of

linked fate with fellow group members (Dawson 1994; Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999;

Simien 2005), and/or by the psychological benefits that arise from the presence of role models

and group recognition within government (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Mansbridge

1999; Taylor 1992). A shared identity may further lead to the presumption of shared values

(Huddy 2013)—i.e., the potential for descriptive representation to lead to substantive

representation. This leads to my first hypothesis:

> **H1:** *Holding value message constant, an ingroup candidate will receive higher support.*
> *He/she will also be seen as more representative of the respondent's interests and the*
> *interests of the ingroup, and less representative of the outgroup.*

Political candidates, however, do not merely act as static members of social groups. They

communicate actively with voters, and in so doing, they may reinforce or undermine the

presumption of shared values based on identity cues. Indeed, political rhetoric is often laden with

value-based language (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman and Lupia 2016). Values, as defined by Schwartz (1992: 4), "(1) are concepts or beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance." Individuals' values underlie a plethora of more specific political attitudes (e.g., Feldman 1988; Goren 2004, 2013); thus, shared values between an officeholder and their constituents suggest, at a certain level of abstraction, substantive representation of people's preference and interests (Mansbridge 2003).

Numerous studies show strong, consistent relationships between values and vote choice, particularly when the choice is binary between center-left and center-right parties (Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Caprara et al. 2006; McCann 1997; Schwartz 1996; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010; Vecchione et al. 2013). Past work has also mapped correlations between different values and group identities, including gender, race, and partisanship (e.g., Eagly et al. 2004; Goren 2005, 2013; Kinder and Winter 2001). Identity-based candidate preferences, then, may operate in part through the recognition of shared values with a candidate.

Insights from the social identity approach in social psychology (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987) lend support to this expectation. Studies of leadership in this tradition tend to focus on a leader's "prototypicality"—that is, the extent to which they embody the characteristics associated with a group identity. These characteristics need not be restricted to, or even include, demographic attributes; rather, group prototypes "include what the group values, believes, and considers important" (van Knippenberg 2011: 1079). Thus, the expression of common group values by a prospective representative may signal devotion to the group's political demands, beyond the information provided by an identity match. The degree to which

simple descriptive representation matters, particularly among minority groups, seems to vary (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2002; Reingold and Harrell 2010), and without the expression of group values, an identity match alone may increase support to a lesser extent or not at all.

> **H2a:** *Holding identity constant, compared to a candidate who expresses no value, a candidate who expresses the ingroup value will receive higher support. He/she will also be seen as more representative of the respondent's interests and the interests of the ingroup, and less representative of the outgroup.*

The endorsement of a typical *outgroup* value, meanwhile, is likely to diminish ingroup support but also has the potential to generate support among outgroup members. As noted previously, individuals seek out a shared identity with a political figure because it communicates the potential for shared values. Violation of these expectations, on the other hand, may prove costly, driving ingroup members to dismiss the value message or become less supportive (Barker 2005; Nelson and Garst 2005). The extent to which these patterns hold among different identity groups, across a variety of outcomes related to candidate support and perceived democratic representation, remains to be seen.

> **H2b:** *Holding identity constant, compared to a candidate who expresses no value, a candidate who expresses the outgroup value will receive lower support and be seen as less representative of the respondent's interests and the interests of the ingroup, and more representative of the outgroup.*

Lastly, I do not expect the hypothesized differences to manifest uniformly. As noted above, members of *under*represented groups, such as racial minorities and women, often show more sensitivity to issues of both descriptive and substantive representation (e.g., Gay 2002;

Reingold and Harrell 2010). Thus, the effects of both identity and values, among members of these groups, should have a greater effect on perceptions of their prospective representatives.

    H3: The patterns described in H1 and H2 will be stronger among the members of underrepresented groups relative to majority groups.

Experiment

I test my expectations with a two-wave online survey experiment, conducted with a sample of undergraduates at a large, private Midwestern university in 2017 and 2018 (N = 373). Participants completed the study as part of a requirement for credit in a political science course. Undergraduate samples are not representative of the broader U.S. population, yet they can be employed to draw valid causal inferences (Druckman and Kam 2011).[22] Moreover, this sample provides a number of advantages, ensuring good retention across the two waves of the study while also providing sufficient variation in the identities of interest. Findings should therefore generalize to the broader population, with one notable caveat: individuals in this relatively young sample likely have less crystallized identities and values, making the present study a conservative test of the hypothesized effects.

In the first wave, respondents provided their partisanship, gender, and race—the identities on which this study focuses. All three of these identity groups exert a perennial influence on American politics, each in distinct ways (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Kaufman 2006; Kinder and Sanders 1996), making them ideal for tests of the theory described above.

Respondents later received an invitation to participate in the main wave of the survey, which presented each person with a series of three mock web pages belonging to different

---

[22] That said, below I discuss ways in which imbalances in my sample may bias some of my experimental results.

hypothetical congressional candidates. The pages simulated the front pages of the candidates'

websites, including the candidate's name, a brief message, and in two cases, a picture of the

candidate. Two key dimensions varied on each page: (1) the group identity of the candidate

(partisanship, gender, or race) and (2) the value (if any) expressed by the candidate.

Specifically, respondents first saw a male Democratic or male Republican candidate,

followed by a white female or white male candidate, and then finally an African-American male

or white male candidate. On the first page, party was noted using text (e.g., "Democrat for U.S.

Congress") so as not to cue race or other attributes, with name indicating gender as male. For the

second and third web pages, respectively, gender and race were indicated using pictures of the

candidates, with no text noting partisanship. Candidate names were selected to hold

socioeconomic status constant. Specifically, all names have a mean maternal education between

13.1 and 13.2 years, placing them at the bottom of the top quartile of SES. The partisan

candidate was named Julian Miller, the male/female candidates Josiah/Alexandria Phillips—all

of those names being between 64% and 74% white. The African-American and white candidates

were named Jalen McCray and Kyle Snyder—names that are 90% African-American and 90%

white, respectively (personal communication with David Figlio, 10/4/2016; for further discussion

of the effectiveness of names for signaling demographic attributes, see Butler and Homola 2017;

Fryer and Levitt 2004).

To capture the second factor of interest, each page randomly included (a) no value-based

rhetoric, (b) a value-based message in the web page text that is congruent with the cued identity,

or (c) a value-based message that is incongruent with the cued identity. This design was critical

to test my hypotheses as I can then see if, for example, congruent value rhetoric increases

support for ingroup candidates. As noted, I focus on partisanship, gender, and race as the identities of interest. Specific values congruent or incongruent with each of these identities were chosen based on existing work on groups' value priorities.

Specifically, along partisan lines, Democrats tend to highly value civil liberties and moral tolerance, whereas Republicans place greater emphasis on traditional morality (Goren 2005, 2013; Jacoby 2014). When it comes to gender differences, women more strongly support humanitarian and care-based values, particularly in the domain of social welfare, than do men, who give greater emphasis to individual responsibility (Eagly et al. 2004; Howell and Day 2000; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001). African Americans place higher priority on equality than do whites, who in turn place greater emphasis on limited government and individualism (Gaines et al. 1997; Kinder and Winter 2001). Based on these established identity-value associations, Table 5.1 notes the ingroup values for partisan, gender, and racial groups, along with the web page text for each value, used in the present study.[23]

Table 5.2 provides a general summary of the experimental conditions that result from combinations of identities and value messages. For each candidate web page, then, a participant was randomly assigned to one of six possible versions: (1) ingroup or outgroup and (2) ingroup value, outgroup value, or no value. (In addition, randomization was programmed so that a given respondent saw no more than one self-reliance treatment—i.e., if a respondent saw a gender + self-reliance treatment, they did not see a race + self-reliance treatment, and vice versa.)

---

[23] Treatments are adapted from text used on actual congressional campaign websites. My thanks to Chris Chapp for sharing his archive of web text.

Table 5.1. Web Page Text

Version	Text
Partisan Treatments	
No value	I'm running for Congress to bring common-sense solutions to Washington. I believe our country is the greatest on earth, and that together we can overcome the challenges we face. I hope I can count on your support!
Civil liberties (Democrat value)	I'm running for Congress to bring common-sense solutions to Washington. I believe our country is the greatest on earth, and that our most important strength lies in our commitment to the freedom of all people to think and act as they deem to be right. I hope I can count on your support!
Traditional morality (Republican value)	I'm running for Congress to bring common-sense solutions to Washington. I believe our country is the greatest on earth, and that our most important strength lies in our commitment to traditional moral and family values. I hope I can count on your support!
Gender Treatments	
No value	Thank you for visiting my website. Our country today faces many challenges, and I promise to fight for the people of our district. I would be honored to have your support!
Humanitarianism (Female value)	Thank you for visiting my website. Our country today faces many challenges, and I believe we must remain committed to caring for one another, especially the least fortunate among us. I would be honored to have your support!
Self-reliance (Male value)	Thank you for visiting my website. Our country today faces many challenges, and I believe we must remain committed to hard work and personal responsibility. I would be honored to have your support!
Race Treatments	
No value	Welcome to my campaign website. I'm running for Congress to move our state and our nation forward. If elected, I will work to improve the lives of ordinary Americans. Thank you.
Equality (African American value)	Welcome to my campaign website. I'm running for Congress to move our state and our nation forward. If elected, I will work to ensure equal treatment and opportunity for all Americans. Thank you.
Self-reliance (White value)	Welcome to my campaign website. I'm running for Congress to move our state and our nation forward. If elected, I will work to promote hard work and personal responsibility among all Americans. Thank you.

Table 5.2. Experimental Conditions

	No value	Ingroup value	Outgroup value
Ingroup candidate	Condition 1	Condition 2	Condition 3
Outgroup candidate	Condition 4	Condition 5	Condition 6

After viewing each page, respondents were asked the following outcome variables about the hypothetical candidate:

- "How strongly would you oppose or support this candidate?" *(7-point scale from "strongly oppose" to "strongly support")*

- "How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent your interests if elected?"

- "How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent [ingroup]?"

- "How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent [outgroup]?" *(all three of the preceding questions on 7-point scales from "very poorly" to "very well")*

The analyses that follow compare changes in support and perceived representation (of the respondent and of the relevant ingroup and outgroup) across treatment conditions. Experimental conditions are coded to indicate the candidate's belonging to the respondent's ingroup or outgroup and expressing the value associated with the ingroup or outgroup (or no value). To summarize the expectations laid out in my hypotheses, conditions ordered from greatest support and perceived representation (of the respondent and the ingroup) to least are (1) ingroup, ingroup value; (2) ingroup, no value; (3) ingroup, outgroup value / outgroup, ingroup value; (4) outgroup, no value; (5) outgroup, outgroup value. For representation of the outgroup, this order is reversed.

Results

As noted, I expect the hypothesized patterns of results to vary to an extent across different categories of groups. In particular, for cases in which one group is traditionally underrepresented relative to the other (i.e., gender and race), the effects of both descriptive

representation (an identity match with the candidate) and substantive representation (an ingroup value match with the candidate) should prove stronger for members of the underrepresented group. With this in mind, I present the results for partisanship, gender, and race separately. In all cases, I regress the four outcomes of interest on binary indicators for conditions 2-6, using condition 1 (i.e., an ingroup candidate expressing no value) as the baseline.

Partisanship

Given the absence of a substantially underrepresented group between Democrats and Republicans, I pool identifiers with both parties into a single sample (thus, this analysis tests H1 and H2, but not H3). Figure 5.1 summarizes the effects of each treatment—relative to an inparty candidate endorsing no value—with respect to support and perceived representation of the respondent's interests, as well as perceived representation of the inparty and outparty generally. (For detailed results from each regression model, see Table A21 in Appendix C.)

Recall that H1 predicts respondents will express greater support and perceived representation (of their own interests as well as that of the ingroup) for a candidate who shares their descriptive identity—in this case, their party affiliation. This proves to be the case: any outparty candidate receives significantly less support and is seen as less representative than an inparty candidate expressing no value (or, put another way, the inparty candidate receives more support). For example, as shown in Figure 5.1, an outparty candidate expressing no value suffers a loss greater than one scale point on all three outcomes. Unsurprisingly, such a candidate simultaneously experiences a roughly equal gain (1.2 points) when it comes to perceived representation of the outparty. In other words, respondents express an overall preference for a

candidate who belongs to their party, and they more broadly see a candidate's partisanship as an

indicator for how well he will represent party identifiers.

Figure 5.1. Partisan Treatment Effects

Value rhetoric introduces nuance to this story, moderating the impact of identity. Relative

to an inparty candidate expressing no value, a candidate who endorses a stereotypical partisan

value (civil liberties for a Democrat, traditional morality for a Republican) receives significantly

greater support and is seen as more representative of the inparty (but not the respondent) and less

representative of the outparty, all by about half a scale point. These results strongly confirm H2a.

At the same time, an inparty candidate who expresses the *outparty* value is seen as less

representative of the respondent and more representative of the outparty. Further, there are

decreased (albeit short of statistical significance) feelings of support and representation of the

inparty. Altogether, these results cohere with H2b. Interestingly, respondents consider an inparty

candidate who expresses the outparty value just as representative of the outparty as an actual outparty candidate. Clearly, the values partisans express affect how voters respond, over and above party identification alone.

H2 also suggests that respondents will differentiate between outparty candidates, less strongly penalizing those who express the inparty value and reacting even more negatively to those who explicitly endorse the outparty value. Contrary to these expectations, results do not show much significant distinction between outparty candidates based on their value expressions. For a candidate expressing no value or the outparty value, negative effect sizes for support and perceived representation are highly similar, as are positive effects on perceived representation of the outparty (i.e., all are between 1.15 and 1.64 scale points), providing little or no additional support for H2b. Point estimates for an outparty candidate endorsing the ingroup value are smaller in size but do not appear significantly different from those for a candidate using no value message—lending, at best, weak additional support for H2a. This lesser degree of differentiation between outparty candidates is consistent with psychological tendencies to more systematically process messages from ingroup members relative to those from outgroup members (Mackie, Worth, and Asuncion 1990; Nelson and Garst 2005).

Overall, while value expression does condition the impact of partisan identity, identity appears to be the stronger of the two factors. An outparty candidate expressing the inparty value, compared to an inparty candidate expressing no value, receives less support and is seen as less representative of both the respondent and the inparty, by at least half a scale point on each outcome. An inparty candidate expressing the outparty value, meanwhile, shows no significant loss in support or inparty representativeness but does, as mentioned, experience a loss in

representativeness with respect to the respondent. (The two candidates are, however, seen as about equally representative of the outparty, with respective differences of .70 and .88 from the baseline inparty candidate.)

Gender

I turn next to the joint effects of gender and values. As noted, I expect heterogeneous effects by respondent gender, as mindsets about descriptive and substantive representation may vary between dominant or majority groups and groups that are underrepresented or marginalized. In this case, considering women's typically subordinate status within the political system, they may be more sensitive to issues of representation and show stronger treatment effects compared to men, per H3. I thus break out the analyses of female and male respondents separately, as displayed in Figure 5.2; detailed regression results are presented in tables A22 and A23 in Appendix C.

Effects among female respondents, shown in the top panel of the figure, prove stronger and more consistent than those for men. However, the impact of the candidate's gender identity itself, as predicted in H1, proves comparatively minor when compared to the results for partisanship. Relative to a female candidate expressing no value, a male candidate doing the same is seen as less representative of women's interests by seven-tenths of a scale point. Women do not, however, express less support for this male candidate, nor do they see him as less representative of their interests personally.

Figure 5.2. Gender Treatment Effects by Respondent Gender

When value endorsements enter the equation, though, women markedly distinguish between candidates. A female candidate who expresses humanitarian values (typically attributed to women more than men) receives greater support by more than a scale point and is seen as more representative of the respondent and women in general by at least half a point, in line with H2a. Meanwhile, a female candidate emphasizing self-reliance (typically associated with men more than women) receives less support and is seen as less likely to represent the respondent's interests, by almost half a point for both outcomes (the effect for representation of women is in the expected direction but short of significance)—giving support to H2b.

Female respondents clearly differentiate between male candidates on the basis of values as well. Those expressing no value or the stereotypic male value are both perceived as less apt to represent women's interests than a female candidate. However, the value-typical male candidate suffers a negative effect on that outcome that is over twice as large (more than one and a half points), takes losses greater than half a point on support and representation of the respondent, and is seen as *more* representative of men. These results give strong support to H2b. At the same time, a male candidate expressing humanitarian values actually receives greater support than a female candidate who endorses no specific value. Overall, then, descriptive identity figures prominently into women's candidate evaluations, but its effects may be even more thoroughly conditioned by substantive values than in the case of party-based perceptions.

Results among male respondents, for the most part, do not mirror these patterns. Compared to a male candidate endorsing no value, men do not express less support for, or see themselves as less represented by, a female candidate of any type. The only additional support for H1 comes in their evaluation of a female candidate's representation of women as a group—a

female candidate endorsing no value or humanitarianism sees significant gains on this dimension. At the same time, men see a male candidate who expresses a message of self-reliance as more representative of men as a whole, but not of themselves, and they also perceive him as less representative of women's interests—partly confirming H2a. Such a candidate actually receives *less* support from male respondents (by over half a scale point), contradicting the same hypothesis.[24] Men do not penalize a candidate (male or female) who expresses the more "feminine" value, humanitarianism; however, they do see such a candidate as better able to represent women by more than a scale point, giving partial support to H2b. In sum, and in confirmation of H3, men do appear less sensitive to both descriptive and substantive representation, *except* when considering the representation of women rather than themselves.

Race

Finally, I present results for the race-based treatments—first for African-American respondents, then for whites, summarized in Figure 5.3 (see Tables A24 and A25 in Appendix C for detailed results). Again, as described in H3, I expect minority group members to respond more strongly to the treatments, owing to their greater sensitivity to issues of representation. African Americans exhibit mixed support for H1, concerning the impact of sharing an identity with the candidate. They do *not* express less support, or perceive differences in representation, for a white candidate relative to a black candidate expressing no value. However, they do give substantially less support to a white candidate endorsing self-reliance, and they see that candidate as less representative of both themselves and their racial group as a whole. An African-American

---

[24] This finding may stem in part from partisanship. Men in the sample are 60% Democrat, and invocation of self-reliance may resonate poorly with them given the value's association with the Republican Party (Goren 2005; Jacoby 2014; Nelson and Garst 2005).

candidate endorsing self-reliance, meanwhile, receives no penalty when it comes to support and perceived representation of the respondents' interests, though he is seen as less able to represent African Americans' interests in general. This accords with Kuklinski and Hurley's (1994) finding that minority politicians enjoy more leeway when expressing counter-stereotypic values.

Here, again, value rhetoric appears to condition the impact of identity. Relative to an African-American candidate stating no value, one who expressly endorses equality enjoys an increase of 1.5 scale points on both support and perceived representation of the respondent. (The effect for representation of African Americans runs in a positive direction but is only marginally significant using a one-tailed test.) A white candidate endorsing equality receives a bump in support as well, though the point estimate is smaller at .90 and he is not perceived as more representative of the respondent or the ingroup. These results provide partial support for H2a: to a degree, African Americans respond to messages invoking their group's stereotypic value, and though the effects are stronger for a black candidate, both candidates may benefit.

Results prove more mixed for the stereotypically white value, self-reliance, as alluded above. A white candidate using rhetoric focused on self-reliance loses nearly two points' worth of support and perceived representation of the respondent's interests. The loss is even greater—a full three points—with respect to representing African Americans' interests. Notably, all three of these effects outstrip even those suffered by an outparty candidate expressing the outparty value, described in a previous section, and they provide strong support for H2b. As mentioned, however, a black candidate delivering the same message does not experience a similar decrease in support. He is seen as a worse representative of African-American interests on the whole, but

the effect is less than half that for the white candidate. It appears that racial minority politicians, relative to whites, have more—but not total—latitude to employ counter-stereotypic values.

Results for white respondents, on the other hand, largely contradict expectations. White respondents, contrary to H1, seem to prefer any African-American candidate over a white candidate expressing no value, and they similarly express greater support and perceived self-representation for a white candidate who endorses equality. At the same time, they view all four of those candidates as more likely to represent the group interests of African Americans. Meanwhile, whites express no meaningful differences in their attitudes toward a white candidate endorsing self-reliance, but they prove more supportive of a white candidate expressing an egalitarian message. These last two results respectively disconfirm H2a and H2b among white respondents.

What might account for this unexpected pattern? I strongly suspect it has to do with the sample's partisan makeup. Whites in the sample are 68% Democratic and thus likely to be more receptive to equality-based appeals (Goren 2005; Jacoby 2014; Nelson and Garst 2005). It also seems plausible, given African Americans' strong association with the Democratic Party, that Democratic respondents would be more likely to express preferences for a black candidate (be it in a genuine manner or as a form of expressive responding). Indeed, if we further limit the analysis to whites who do *not* identify as Democrats, all of the above effects disappear.

Figure 5.3. Race Treatment Effects by Respondent Race

Discussion

This study demonstrates that, when it comes to the perception of political candidates and their representation of different groups, social identities and political values are closely intertwined. Oftentimes, a group identity in common with the candidate does not increase support on its own. The exception is partisanship: compared to an inparty candidate, outparty candidates across the board receive less support and are seen as less representative of the respondent and the inparty. When the salient identity is gender or race, however, the dynamics prove more complicated. All else equal, a candidate of the opposite gender or racial outgroup is perceived as less suited to represent the ingroup, but this does not necessarily come with a commensurate loss in support.

Across all three identity categories, respondents attend to the value rhetoric employed by both ingroup and outgroup candidates, and this rhetoric *conditions* the impact of identity on their judgments. Compared to an ingroup candidate expressing no value, one who highlights a typical group value (e.g., an African-American candidate endorsing equality) receives greater support and is seen as more representative of the group's interests. At the same time, such a candidate who expresses a typical outgroup value (e.g., a Republican emphasizing civil liberties) is likely to lose support. In other words, respondents seem to recognize that being *descriptively* represented does not necessarily imply being *substantively* represented, and they look to the candidate's rhetoric to judge the strength of that connection.

Findings around outgroup candidates largely mirror the above. When these candidates express a value typical to their group, ingroup respondents give them even less support and see them as less representative. On the other hand, an outgroup candidate expressing the *ingroup*

value reduces this loss or, in some cases, may even prove more appealing than an ingroup candidate who endorses no value or the outgroup value.

Interestingly, though, among gender and racial groups, these effects occur almost entirely among the traditionally underrepresented groups (i.e., women and African Americans). Both subgroups express preferences for, relative to an ingroup candidate expressing no value, such a candidate endorsing the ingroup value (humanitarianism for women, equality for African Americans). However, they do not generally show decreased support for an outgroup candidate unless that candidate also expresses the stereotypical outgroup value (self-reliance in both cases). These results suggest a highly nuanced view of descriptive and substantive representation among marginalized groups (see Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2002; Mansbridge 1999; Reingold and Harrell 2010), where both descriptive identity and substantive values have a role.

These findings shed new light on the nature of group-based representation. When a candidate shares an identity with a group of citizens, they tend to infer a commitment to their group's interests, but this does not always engender greater support among those individuals. Even the effects of party affiliation, an inherently politicized identity, vary depending on partisanship's fit with the political values being expressed by the candidate. The politicization of race and gender, meanwhile, proves even more contingent on values, with an identity match alone showing little to no effect. What may put a candidate "over the top," then, is the expression of group-congruent values, causing voters not only to see that person as a better representative of their group, but to give him or her their personal political support. Conversely, outside the realm of partisanship, voters seem similarly willing to support candidates from both their ingroup and

their outgroup; however, if they see an outgroup candidate as explicitly threatening their values, they may mobilize in opposition.

The study of identity politics and group-based representation often focuses on group identity *per se*. However, the link between a shared identity and representation of group interests is not guaranteed (Grofman 1982; Grose 2011; Mansbridge 1999; Swain 1995). My findings highlight that researchers must also attend to the values underlying those identities, and how politicians may invoke those values in their rhetoric. In sum, to be successful, practitioners of identity politics must remain mindful not only of group membership but of the value commitments those memberships entail among the citizenry.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Taken together, the preceding studies demonstrate that social identities and values are deeply linked. Racial, gender, class, religious, and partisan identity groups in the U.S. express divergent value priorities, predictable by groups' social status—or, in the case of parties, their associations with traditionally dominant or subordinate groups. Members of the public correctly identify the directions of these differences, but in most instances, they vastly overestimate their magnitude. Moreover, they perceive a large number of value conflicts between groups where none exist in actuality. These exaggerated (or outright incorrect) beliefs have the potential to exacerbate intergroup conflict and polarization, turning widespread perceptions of a divided polity into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

However, I also find evidence of an untapped basis for cooperation between groups. Believing that members of outgroups subscribe to broad, prosocial values relates to a host of more positive attitudes toward those groups, including a willingness to participate in political action on their behalf. This proves true even when accounting for other personally held and perceived group values (both basic and political); these other values matter, but in a less consistent manner. Thus, fundamental and ostensibly nonpolitical beliefs may serve as the primary drivers of intergroup cooperation—and interventions to make individuals recognize these common value priorities may reduce polarization and aid in the formation of intergroup coalitions.

Finally, my study of candidate perceptions illustrates that the impact of identity *per se* on political evaluations may depend upon the expression of identity-congruent or -incongruent

values. Citizens do not necessarily feel better represented by a candidate who simply shares one of their group memberships; rather, they also attend to the value-based rhetoric of candidates—from both ingroups and outgroups—to assess their dedication to the group's interests. These findings further highlight that identity politics need not be inherently divisive.

A great deal remains to be explored, however, concerning the relationships between social identities and values. First, how do these two phenomena jointly affect opinions on policy? Competing policy alternatives are often presented to the public as aligning with different values, and this competition makes possible the influence of frames that make certain values more accessible than others in the mind of an individual (Chong and Druckman 2007). Along similar lines, raising the salience of a particular identity over others is likely to increase its influence on policy preferences (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Klar 2013). When social identities as well as values become activated in the course of political debate, how do these influences interact? Given that certain identity groups tend to prioritize certain values, does simply raising the salience of a given identity alter a person's receptiveness to a set of value-based appeals?

Additionally, the use of values is often contextual (Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996). People and societies may bring different values to bear on their political attitudes, depending on whether they have their ingroup or different outgroups in mind (Eicher, Pratto, and Wilhelm 2007; Schwartz 2007). Considering my own findings that personally held self-transcendence values inconsistently relate to attitudes toward outgroups, what sorts of interventions or rhetoric might prompt individuals to expand their application of these values to a wider range of groups?

Perhaps the answer lies in the aforementioned value misperceptions that I find between groups, along with the importance that all groups appear to attach to self-transcendence values.

Existing work indicates that intergroup misperceptions can be corrected to some degree, and that doing so can ameliorate attitude extremity and polarization (Ahler 2014; Ahler and Sood 2018). How, then, might individuals belonging to different groups be made to believe that they hold these and other values in common?

I intend to investigate all of these questions in future survey experiments. All should provide considerable new insights into how social identities influence politics. Groups' core belief systems—along with *perceptions* of those beliefs—have the potential to elucidate a vast range of mass political attitudes and behaviors, with important ramifications for the functioning of pluralist democracy.

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. "Is Polarization a Myth?" *Journal of Politics* 70(2): 542-555.

Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ahler, Douglas J. 2014. "Self-Fulfilling Misperceptions of Public Polarization." *Journal of Politics* 76(3): 607-620.

Ahler, Douglas J., and Gaurav Sood. 2018. "The Parties in Our Heads: Misperceptions about Party Composition and Their Consequences." *Journal of Politics* 80(3): 964-981.

Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Bardi, Anat, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2003. "Values and Behavior: Strength and Structure of Relations." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29(10): 1207-1220.

Barker, David C. 2005. "Values, Frames, and Persuasion in Presidential Nominating Campaigns." *Political Behavior* 27(4): 375-394.

Barnea, Marina F., and Shalom H. Schwartz. 1998. "Values and Voting." *Political Psychology* 19(1): 17-40.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Biernat, Monica, Theresa K. Vescio, and Shelley A. Theno. 1996. "Violating American Values: A 'Value Congruence' Approach to Understanding Outgroup Attitudes." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 32(4): 387-410.

Blumer, Herbert. 1958. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *Pacific Sociological Review* 1: 3-7.

Bobo, Lawrence D. 1999. "Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a Sociological Approach to Racism and Race Relations." *Journal of Social Issues* 55(3): 445-472.

Bobo, Lawrence, and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment." *American Political Science Review* 84(2): 377-393.

Bordalo, Pedro, Katherine Coffman, Nicola Gennaioli, and Andrei Shleifer. 2016. "Stereotypes." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 141(4): 1753-1794.

Brandt, Mark J., and Christine Reyna. 2012. "The Functions of Symbolic Racism." *Social Justice Research* 25(1): 41-60.

Brandt, Mark J., and Daryl R. Van Tongeren. 2017. "People Both High and Low on Religious Fundamentalism Are Prejudiced Toward Dissimilar Groups." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 112(1): 76-97.

Bullock, John G. 2011. "Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 496-515.

Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Butler, Daniel M., and Jonathan Homola. 2017. "An Empirical Justification for the Use of Racially Distinctive Names to Signal Race in Experiments." *Political Analysis* 25: 122-130.

Campbell, Angus, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley.

Caprara, Gian Vittorio, Shalom H. Schwartz, Cristina Capanna, Michele Vecchione, and Claudio Barbaranelli. 2006. "Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and Political Choice." *Political Psychology* 27(1): 1-28.

Chapp, Christopher B. 2012. *Religious Rhetoric in American Politics: The Endurance of Civil Religion in Electoral Campaigns.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. "Framing Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 103-126.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent,* edited by David E. Apter. New York: Wiley, 206-261.

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davidov, Eldad, Bart Meuleman, Jaak Billiet, and Peter Schmidt. 2008. "Values and Support for Immigration: A Cross-Country Comparison." *European Sociological Review* 24(5): 583-599.

Davidov, Eldad, Bart Muelemann, Shalom H. Schwartz, and Peter Schmidt. 2014. "Individual Values, Cultural Embeddedness, and Anti-Immigration Sentiments: Explaining Differences in the Effect of Values on Attitudes toward Immigration across Europe." *Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologi*e 66: 263-285.

Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dawson, Michael C. 2001. *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Devos, Thierry, Dario Spini, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2002. "Conflicts Among Human Values and Trust in Institutions." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 41(4): 481-494.

Douglas, Mary. 1986. *How Institutions Think.* New York: Syracuse University Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.

Druckman, James N., and Cindy D. Kam. 2011. "Students as Experimental Participants: A Defense of the 'Narrow Data Base.'" In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 41-57.

Druckman, James N., and Arthur Lupia. 2016. "Preference Change in Competitive Political Environments." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 13-31.

Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. 2013. "How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation." *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 57-79.

Eagly, Alice H., Amanda B. Diekman, Mary C. Johannesen-Schmidt, and Anne M. Koenig. 2004. "Gender Gaps in Sociopolitical Attitudes: A Social Psychological Analysis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 87(6): 796-816.

Eicher, Véronique, Felicia Pratto, and Peter Wilhelm. 2013. "Value Differentiation Between Allies and Enemies: Value Projection in National Images." *Political Psychology* 34(1): 127-144.

Federico, Christopher M., Damla Ergun, and Corrie Hunt. 2014. "Opposition to Equality and Support for Tradition as Mediators of the Relationship between Epistemic Motivation and System-Justifying Identifications." *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 17(4): 524-541.

Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(2): 416-440.

Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology,* edited by David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press, 477-508.

Feldman, Stanley, and John Zaller. 1992. "The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State." *American Journal of Political Science* 36(1): 268-307.

Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. "Political Polarization in the American Public." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 563-588.

Fischer, Ronald, and Shalom Schwartz. 2011. "Whence Differences in Value Priorities? Individual, Cultural, or Artifactual Sources." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 42(7): 1127-1144.

Fryer, Roland G., and Steven D. Levitt. 2004. "The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119(3): 767-805.

Gaines, Stanley O., Jr., William D. Marelich, Katrina L. Bledsoe, W. Neil Steers, Michael C. Henderson, Cherlyn S. Granrose, Lisa Barájas, Diana Hicks, Michael Lyde, Yumi Takahashi, Nancy Yum, Diana I. Ríos, Ben F. García, Karlyn R. Farris, and Mary S. Page. 1997. "Links Between Race/Ethnicity and Cultural Values as Mediated by Racial/Ethnic Identity and Moderated by Gender." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72(6): 1460-1476.

Gastil, John, Don Braman, Dan Kahan, and Paul Slovic. 2011. "The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44(4): 711-714.

Gay, Claudine. 2002. "Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship between Citizens and Their Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 717-732.

Goel, Sharad, Mason Winter, and Duncan J. Watts. 2010. "Real and Perceived Attitude Agreement in Social Networks." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 99(4): 611-621.

Goren, Paul. 2004. "Political Sophistication and Policy Reasoning: A Reconsideration." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 462-478.

Goren, Paul. 2005. "Party Identification and Core Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 881-896.

Goren, Paul. 2013. *On Voter Competence.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Goren, Paul, Harald Schoen, Jason Reifler, Thomas Scotto, and William Chittick. 2016. "A Unified Theory of Value-Based Reasoning and U.S. Public Opinion." *Political Behavior* 38(4): 977-997.

Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek. 2009. "Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96(5): 1029-1046.

Graham, Jesse, Brian A., Nosek, and Jonathan Haidt, J. 2012. "The Moral Stereotypes of Liberals and Conservatives: Exaggeration of Differences across the Political Spectrum." *PLoS ONE* 7: e50092.

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Greene, Steven. 1999. "Understanding Party Identification: A Social Identity Approach." *Political Psychology* 20(2): 393-403.

Greene, Steven. 2004. "Social Identity Theory and Party Identification." *Social Science Quarterly* 85(1): 136-153.

Grofman, Bernard. 1982. "Should Representatives Be Typical of Their Constituents?" In *Representation and Redistricting Issues*, edited by Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay, and Howard Scarrow. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Grose, Christian R. 2011. *Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Henry, P. J., and Christine Reyna. 2007. "Value Judgments: The Impact of Perceived Value Violations on American Political Attitudes." *Political Psychology* 28(3): 273-298.

Herring, Mary, Thomas B. Jankowski, and Ronald E. Brown. 1999. "Pro-Black Doesn't Mean Anti-White: The Structure of African-American Group Identity." *Journal of Politics* 61(2): 363-386.

Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 619-631.

Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hitlin, Steven. 2003. "Values as the Core of Personal Identity: Drawing Links between Two Theories of Self." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 66:118-137.

Hitlin, Steven. 2011. "Values, Personal Identity, and the Moral Self." In *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research,* edited by Seth J. Schwartz, Koen Luyckx, and Vivian L. Vignoles, 515-529. New York: Springer.

Hogg, Michael A., and Dominic Abrams. 1988. *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relationships and Group Processes.* New York: Routledge.

Howell, Susan E., and Christine L. Day. 2000. "Complexities of the Gender Gap." *Journal of Politics* 62: 858-874.

Huddy, Leonie. 2001. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory." *Political Psychology* 22(1): 127-156.

Huddy, Leonie, 2013. "From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, Second Edition*, edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, 737-773. New York: Oxford University Press.

Huddy, Leonie, Lilliana Mason, and Lene Aarøe. 2015. "Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity." *American Political Science Review* 109(1): 1-17.

Iyengar, Shanto, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra, and Sean J. Westwood. 2019. "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. "Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76(3): 405-431.

Jacoby, William G. 2014. "Is There a Culture War? Conflicting Value Structures in American Public Opinion." *American Political Science Review* 108(4): 754-771.

Jennings, M. Kent. 1992. "Ideological Thinking Among Mass Publics and Political Elites." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56(4): 419-441.

Jost, John T., and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 1994. "The Role of Stereotyping in System Justification." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 33(1): 1-27.

Jost, John T., Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek. 2004. "A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo." *Political Psychology* 25(6): 881-919.

Jost, John T., and Orsolya Hunyady. 2005. "Antecedents and Consequences of System-Justifying Ideologies." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 14(5): 260-265.

Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway. 2003. "Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition." *Psychological Bulletin* 129(3): 339-375.

Jost, John T., and Jojanekke van der Toorn. 2012. "System Justification Theory." In *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology (Vol. 2)*, edited by Paul A. M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanski, and E. Tory Higgins. London: Sage Publications, 313-343.

Kam, Cindy D. 2005. "Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences." *Political Behavior* 27(2): 163-182.

Kaufman, Karen M. 2002. "Culture Wars, Secular Realignment, and the Gender Gap in Party Identification." *Political Behavior* 24(3): 283-307.

Kaufman, Karen M. 2006. "The Gender Gap." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39(3): 447-453.

Kilburn, H. Whitt. 2009. "Personal Values and Public Opinion." *Social Science Quarterly* 90(4): 868-885.

Kinder, Donald R., and Nathan P. Kalmoe. 2017. *Neither Liberal Nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald R. and Cindy D. Kam. 2009. *Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Lynne M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and Nicholas Winter. 2001. "Exploring the Racial Divide: Blacks, Whites, and Opinion on National Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 439-456.

Kingdon, John W. 1981. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*. New York: Harper and Row.

Klandermans, Bert. 1997. *The Social Psychology of Protest.* Oxford: Basic Blackwell.

Klandermans, Bert, and Dirk Oegema. 1987. "Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps toward Participation in Social Movements." *American Sociological Review* 52: 519-531.

Klar, Samara. 2013. "The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences." *Journal of Politics* 75(4): 1108-1124.

Kreiner, Glen E., Blake E. Ashforth, and David M. Sluss. 2006. "Identity Dynamics in Occupational Dirty Work: Integrating Social Identity and System Justification Perspectives." *Organization Science* 17(5): 619-636.

Kuklinski, James H., and Norman L. Hurley. 1994. "On Hearing and Interpreting Political Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking." *Journal of Politics* 56:729-751.

Kunda, Ziva. 1990. "The Case for Motivated Reasoning." *Psychological Bulletin* 108(3): 480-498.

Lakoff, George. 2002. *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. *Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians' Policies and Performance.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levendusky, Matthew S. 2010. "Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters." *Political Behavior* 32(1): 111-131.

Levendusky, Matthew, and Neil Malhotra. 2016a. "Does Media Coverage of Partisan Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?" *Political Communication* 33(2): 283-301.

Levendusky, Matthew, and Neil Malhotra. 2016b. "(Mis)perceptions of Partisan Polarization in the American Public." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80(S1): 378-391.

Levitin, Teresa E., and Warren E. Miller. 1979. "Ideological Interpretations of Presidential Elections." *American Political Science Review* 73(3): 751-777.

Longest, Kyle C., Steven Hitlin, and Stephen Vaisey. 2013. "Position and Disposition: The Contextual Development of Human Values." *Social Forces* 91(4): 1499-1528.

Mackie, Diane M., Leila T. Worth, and Arlene G. Asuncion. 1990. "Processing of Persuasive In-Group Messages." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58(5), 812-822.

Maio, Gregory R., Ali Pakizeh, Wing-Yee Cheung, and Kerry J. Rees. 2009. "Changing, Priming, and Acting on Values: Effects via Motivational Relations in a Circular Model." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 97(4): 699-715.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 628-657.

Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 515-528.

Mansbridge, Jane. 2011. "Clarifying the Concept of Representation." *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 621-630.

Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McCann, James A. 1997. "Electoral Choices and Value Change: The 1992 Presidential Campaign." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(2): 564-583.

McClosky, Herbert, and John Zaller. 1984. *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Miles, Andrew, and Stephen Vaisey. 2015. "Morality and Politics: Comparing Alternate Theories." *Social Science Research* 53: 252-269.

Nelson, Thomas E., and Jennifer Garst. 2005. "Values-Based Political Messages and Persuasion: Relationships among Speaker, Recipient, and Evoked Values." *Political Psychology* 26(4): 489-515.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Thomas J. Wood. 2018. *Enchanted America: How Intuition and Reason Divide Our Politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Postmes, Tom, S. Alexander Haslam, and Lise Jans. 2013. "A Single-Item Measure of Social Identification: Reliability, Validity, and Utility." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 52(4): 597-617.

Price, Vincent, and John Zaller. 1993. "Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News Reception and Their Implications for Research." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57(2): 133-164.

Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. 2010. *American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Rehfeld, Andrew. 2009. "Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Representation and Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 214-230.

Reingold, Beth, and Jessica Harrell. 2010. "The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women's Political Engagement." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(2): 280-294.

Reysen, Stephen, Iva Katzarska-Miller, Sundé M. Nesbit, and Lindsey Pierce. 2013. "Further Validation of a Single-Item Measure of Social Identification." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 43(6): 463-470.

Robison, Joshua, and Kevin J. Mullinix. 2016. "Elite Polarization and Public Opinion: How Polarization Is Communicated and Its Effects." *Political Communication* 33(2): 261-282.

Robison, Joshua, and Rachel Moskowitz. Forthcoming, "The Group Basis of Partisan Affective Polarization." *Journal of Politics.*

Roccas, Sonia. "Religion and Value Systems." *Journal of Social Issues* 61(4): 747-759.

Rokeach, Milton. 1973. *The Nature of Human Values.* New York: Free Press.

Rothschild, Jacob E., Adam J. Howat, Richard M. Shafranek, and Ethan C. Busby. 2019. "Pigeonholing Partisans: Stereotypes of Party Supporters and Partisan Polarization." *Political Behavior* 41(2): 423-443.

Sagiv, Lilach, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 1995. "Value Priorities and Readiness for Out-Group Social Contact." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69(3): 437-448.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Scherer, Aaron M., Paul D. Windschitl, and Jesse Graham. 2015. "An Ideological House of Mirrors: Political Stereotypes as Exaggerations of Motivated Social Cognition Differences." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 6(2): 201-209.

Schlesinger, Mark, and Caroline Heldman. 2001. "Gender Gap or Gender Gaps? New Perspectives on Support for Government Action and Policies." *Journal of Politics* 63(1): 59-92.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1992. "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theory and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,* Vol. 25, edited by Mark P. Zanna. New York: Academic Press, 1-65.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 1996. "Value Priorities and Behavior: Applying a Theory of Integrated Value Systems." In *The Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium (Vol. 8),* edited by Clive Seligman, James M. Olson, and Mark P. Zanna. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1-24.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 2003. "A Proposal for Measuring Value Orientations Across Nations." *Questionnaire Package of the European Social Survey*: 259-290.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 2007. "Universalism Values and the Inclusiveness of Our Moral Universe." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 38(6): 711-728.

Schwartz, Shalom H. 2012. "An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values." *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture* 2(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1116

Schwartz, Shalom H., and Anat Bardi. 2001. "Value Hierarchies across Cultures: Taking a Similarities Perspective." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 32(3): 268-290.

Schwartz, Shalom H., Gian Vittorio Caprara, and Michele Vecchione. 2010. "Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis." *Political Psychology* 31(3): 421-452.

Schwartz, Shalom H., Gian Vittorio Caprara, Michele Vecchione, Paul Bain, Gabriel Bianchi, Maria Giovanna Caprara, Jan Cieciuch, Hasan Kirmanoglu, Cem Baslevent, Jan-Erik Lonnqvist, Catalin Mamali, Jorge Manzi, Vassilis Pavlopoulos, Tetyana Posnova, Harald Schoen, Jo Silvester, Carmen Tabernero, Claudio Torres, Markku Verkasalo, Eva Vondrakova, Christian Welzel, and Zbigniew Zaleski. 2014. "Basic Personal Values Underlie and Give Coherence to Political Values: A Cross National Study in 15 Countries." *Political Behavior* 36(4): 899-930.

Schwartz, Shalom H., and Sipke Huismans. 1995. "Value Priorities and Religiosity in Four Western Religions." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 58(2): 88-107.

Schwartz, Shalom H., and Tammy Rubel. 2005. "Sex Differences in Value Priorities: Cross-Cultural and Multimethod Studies." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 89(6): 1010-1028.

Schwartz, Shalom H., and Galit Sagie. 2000. "Value Consensus and Importance: A Cross-National Study." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 31(4): 465-497.

Schwartz, Shalom H., Naomi Struch, and Wolfgang Bilsky. 1990. "Values and Intergroup Social Motives: A Study of Israeli and German Students." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 53(3): 185-198.

Sears, David O., and P. J. Henry. 2003. "The Origins of Symbolic Racism." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85(2): 259-275.

Sears, David O., and P. J. Henry. 2005. "Over 30 Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 37: 95-150.

Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simien, Evelyn M. 2005. "Race, Gender, and Linked Fate." *Journal of Black Studies* 35(5): 529-550.

Subašić, Emina, Katherine J. Reynolds, and John C. Turner. 2008. "The Political Solidarity Model of Social Change: Dynamics of Self-Categorization in Intergroup Power Relations." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 12(4): 330-352.

Subašić, Emina, Michael T. Schmitt, and Katherine J. Reynolds. 2011. "Are We All in This Together? Co-Victimization, Inclusive Social Identity and Political action in Solidarity with the Disadvantaged." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 50(4): 707-725.

Sullivan, John L., James Pierson, and George E. Marcus. 1993. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Swain, Carol M. 1995. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tajfel, Henri. 1970. "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination." *Scientific American* 223: 96-102.

Tajfel, Henri. 1975. "The Exit of Social Mobility and the Voice of Social Change: Notes on the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations." *Social Science Information* 14(2): 101-118.

Tajfel, Henri. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,* edited by William G. Austin. Monterey, CA: BrookeCole, 33-47.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." In *The Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, 2nd ed., edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 7-24.

Taylor, Charles. 1992. *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tetlock, Philip E., Randall S. Peterson, and Jennifer S. Lerner. 1996. "Revising the Value Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulates." In *The Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium (Vol. 8),* edited by Clive Seligman, James M. Olson, and Mark P. Zanna. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 25-51.

Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1990. *Cultural Theory.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Turner, John C., Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, and Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell. 1987. *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Uhlmann, Eric Luis, T. Andrew Poehlman, and John A. Bargh. 2009. "American Moral Exceptionalism." In *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, edited by John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir. New York: Oxford University Press, 27-52.

van Knippenberg, Daan. 2011. "Embodying Who We Are: Leader Group Prototypicality and Leadership Effectiveness." *Leadership Quarterly* 22: 1078-1091.

van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien. 2013. "The Political Psychology of Protest: Sacrificing for a Cause." *European Psychologist* 18(4): 224-234.

van Zomeren, Martijn, and Aarti Iyer. 2009. "Introduction to the Social and Psychological Dynamics of Collective Action." *Journal of Social Issues* 65(4): 645-660.

Vecchione, Michele, Gian Vittorio Caprara, Francesco Dentale, and Shalom H. Schwartz. 2013. "Voting and Values: Reciprocal Effects Over Time." *Political Psychology* 34(4): 465-485.

Waters, Mary C. 1990. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Westfall, Jacob, Leaf Van Boven, John R. Chambers, and Charles M. Judd. 2015. "Perceiving Political Polarization in America: Party Identity Strength and Attitude Extremity Exacerbate the Perceived Partisan Divide." *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 10(2): 145-158.

Wetherell, Geoffrey A., Mark J. Brandt, and Christine Reyna. 2013. "Discrimination Across the Ideological Divide: The Role of Value Violations and Abstract Values in Discrimination by Liberals and Conservatives." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 4(6): 658-667.

Whitby, Kenny J. 1997. The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior and Black Interests. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Observational Survey Question Wordings

The following survey items were not provided in the main text.

Personal Value Measures

Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and indicate how much these people are like or not like **you**.
(Not like me at all, Not like me, A little like me, Somewhat like me, Like me, Very much like me)

Perceived Group Value Measures

Please read each description and indicate how much you think these people are like or not like a typical **[group member]**.
(Not like a typical [group member] at all, Not like a typical [group member], A little like a typical [group member], Somewhat like a typical [group member], Like a typical [group member], Very much like a typical [group member])

(See below for individual items and associated values.)

Basic Value Items

Benevolence	It's very important to them to help the people around them. They want to care for others' well-being.
Universalism	They think it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. They want justice for everybody, even for people they don't know.
Self-Direction	It is important to them to make their own decisions about what they do. They like to be free and not depend on others.
Stimulation	They look for adventures and like to take risks. They want to have an exciting life.
Hedonism	They seek every chance they can to have fun. It is important to them to do things that give them pleasure.
Achievement	Being very successful is important to them. They hope people will recognize their achievements.
Power	It is important to them to be in charge and tell others what to do. They want people to do what they say.
Security	It is important to them to live in secure surroundings. They avoid anything that might endanger their safety.
Conformity	They believe that people should do what they're told. They think people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching.
Tradition	Tradition is important to them. They try to follow the customs handed down by their religion or their family.

Political Value Items

Equality	They think that if people were treated more equally in this country, we would have fewer problems. They believe our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has equal opportunities to succeed.
Civil Liberties	They believe individuals should have the freedom to be and believe whatever they want. It's important to them that our country defend civil liberties.
Self-Reliance	They think most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system. They believe that any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.
Free Enterprise	It's important to them that the market remains free from government interference. They think government regulation creates more problems than it solves.
Military Strength	They think it's important for the U.S. to have a strong military in order to effectively deal with its enemies. They believe going to war is sometimes the only solution to international problems.
Blind Patriotism	They think it is unpatriotic to criticize this country. They would support their country, right or wrong.
Law and Order	They think the most important thing for our country is to maintain law and order. It's important to them that the government takes action to increase security even if it could mean sacrificing the freedom of citizens.
Traditional Morality	It's important to them to protect our traditional religious and moral values. They believe modern, permissive lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.

Other Items

What is your age? (*Under 18, 18-24, 25-34, 35-50, 51-65, Over 65*)

What is your estimate of your family's annual household income (before taxes)?
(*Under $30,000, $30,000 - $69,999, $70,000-$99,999, $100,000-$200,000, Over $200,000*)

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
(*Less than high school, High school, Some college or 2-year degree, 4-year college degree, Advanced degree*)

In general, how interested are you in politics?
(*Not at all interested, Not too interested, Somewhat interested, Very interested, Extremely interested*)

How much attention do you pay to news about national politics (from any source)?
(*None at all, A little, A moderate amount, A lot, A great deal*)

Next, we are interested in what you know about American politics. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, so if there are any you don't know, just check "don't know" or leave the answer blank.

Do you happen to know which job or political office is now held by John Roberts?
(Attorney General of the United States, Vice President of the United States, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Don't know)

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington, D.C.? (*Democrats, Republicans, Tie, Don't know*)

How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto? (*Senate and House cannot override, 1/3, 2/3, 3/4, Don't know*)

Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional?
(President, Congress, Supreme Court, Don't know)

Appendix B: Survey Experiment Question Wordings

Wave 1

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else? *(Democrat, Independent, Republican, Other)*

What is your gender? *(Male, Female, Other)*

Which of the following racial/ethnic categories *best* describes you?
(White, African American, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, Other)

Wave 2

Outcomes for All Candidates

How strongly would you oppose or support this candidate?
(strongly oppose, oppose, somewhat oppose, neither oppose nor support, somewhat support, support, strongly support)

How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent your interests if elected?
(very poorly, poorly, somewhat poorly, neither poorly nor well, somewhat well, well, very well)

Partisan, Gender, and Racial Outcomes

How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent Democrats?
(very poorly, poorly, somewhat poorly, neither poorly nor well, somewhat well, well, very well)

How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent Republicans?
(very poorly, poorly, somewhat poorly, neither poorly nor well, somewhat well, well, very well)

How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent women?
(very poorly, poorly, somewhat poorly, neither poorly nor well, somewhat well, well, very well)

How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent men?
(very poorly, poorly, somewhat poorly, neither poorly nor well, somewhat well, well, very well)

How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent African Americans?
(very poorly, poorly, somewhat poorly, neither poorly nor well, somewhat well, well, very well)

How poorly or well do you believe this candidate would represent white Americans?
very poorly, poorly, somewhat poorly, neither poorly nor well, somewhat well, well, very well

Appendix C: Supplemental Results

Chapter 2

Table A1. Mean Value Ratings by Religiosity

Value	Actual			Perceived		
	Religious	*Non-Religious*	*Difference*	*Religious*	*Non-Religious*	*Difference*
Basic Values						
Self-Transcendence	4.89	4.87	-.02	3.97	4.12	.15
	(.03)	(.05)		(.06)	(.08)	
Openness to Change	4.23	4.31	.08	3.58	4.47	.88***
	(.03)	(.05)		(.06)	(.07)	
Self-Enhancement	3.37	3.35	-.02	3.91	3.94	.03
	(.04)	(.05)		(.06)	(.08)	
Conservation	4.29	3.63	-.66***	4.47	3.44	-1.03***
	(.03)	(.06)		(.06)	(.08)	
Political Values						
Equality	4.52	4.81	.29***	3.85	4.32	.47***
	(.05)	(.07)		(.07)	(.09)	
Civil Liberties	4.77	4.93	.16**	3.77	4.58	.81***
	(.04)	(.07)		(.07)	(.09)	
Self-Reliance	4.48	3.93	-.54***	3.95	3.74	-.21*
	(.05)	(.08)		(.06)	(.10)	
Free Enterprise	4.09	3.62	-.48***	3.85	4.07	.22*
	(.05)	(.08)		(.06)	(.10)	
Military Strength	4.17	3.48	-.69***	3.59	3.82	.23**
	(.05)	(.09)		(.07)	(.10)	
Blind Patriotism	3.50	2.60	-.90***	3.64	3.40	-.24*
	(.05)	(.08)		(.07)	(.11)	
Law & Order	3.51	2.85	-.66***	3.58	3.46	-.12
	(.05)	(.08)		(.07)	(.10)	
Traditional Morality	4.01	2.72	-1.29***	4.55	2.94	-1.61***
	(.05)	(.09)		(.07)	(.11)	

Table A2. OLS Models for Basic Value Dimensions

	Self-Transcendence	Openness to Change	Self-Enhancement	Conservation
Nonwhite	.10	.21***	.25***	.26***
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.07)
Female	.32***	-.10	-.21***	.21***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.07)
Lower/working	.07	-.11*	-.27***	-.13**
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.07)
Non-Christian	-.04	.05	-.03	-.37***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)
Democrat	.33***	-.03	-.13*	-.29***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.07)
Age	-.05	-.18***	-.27***	.01
	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Education	-.06	.06	.15***	-.03
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Income	.00	.01	.03	.02
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)
Political interest	.19***	.14***	.17***	.10***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.03)
Political knowledge	.03	-.06**	-.17***	-.12***
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
N	1,010	1,007	1,012	1,006
Adj. R^2	.09	.10	.17	.09

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A3. OLS Models for Equality, Civil Liberties, Self-Reliance, and Free Enterprise

	Equality	Civil Liberties	Self-Reliance	Free Enterprise
Nonwhite	.20**	.02	.22**	.03
	(.10)	(.08)	(.10)	(.10)
Female	.11	.10	.11	-.18*
	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)
Lower/ working	.05	-.01	-.11	-.09
	(.09)	(.08)	(.10)	(.10)
Non-Christian	.07	.21***	-.31***	-.36***
	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)	(.10)
Democrat	.84***	.37***	-.79***	-.74***
	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)	(.10)
Age	.00	.01	.06	-.03
	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	-.03	-.03	-.15***	-.11**
	(.05)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Income	-.02	-.01	.09**	.07
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)
Political Interest	.17***	.19***	.09*	.09**
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
Political Knowledge	.01	.05	-.13***	-.13***
	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)
N	1,020	1,020	1,021	1,020
Adj. R^2	.12	.06	.11	.10

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A4. OLS Models for Military Strength, Blind Patriotism, Law & Order, and Traditional Morality

	Military Strength	Blind Patriotism	Law & Order	Traditional Morality
Nonwhite	.05	.14	.11	.51***
	(.10)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)
Female	-.23***	.08	-.01	.14
	(.09)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Lower/ working	-.07	-.12	-.29***	-.19*
	(.10)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Non-Christian	-.41***	-.64***	-.48***	-.89***
	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)	(.11)
Democrat	-1.11***	-1.03***	-.67***	-1.31***
	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)	(.11)
Age	.07*	.04	-.03	.11***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education	-.05	-.13**	-.02	-.09
	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Income	.05	.01	.07	-.01
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Political Interest	.14***	.08	.10**	.06
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Political Knowledge	-.16***	-.30***	-.18***	-.20***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
N	1,015	1,015	1,017	1,017
Adj. R^2	.18	.19	.10	.24

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Chapter 3

Table A5. Predicting Perceived Democrat versus Republican Political Value Differences

	Equality	*Civil Liberties*	*Self-Reliance*	*Free Enterprise*	*Military Strength*	*Blind Patriotism*	*Law & Order*	*Traditional Morality*
Political knowledge	2.02***	1.49***	1.16***	1.17***	1.36***	1.70***	1.39***	1.76***
	(.36)	(.38)	(.39)	(.38)	(.36)	(.38)	(.37)	(.37)
Attention to news	.32	.56	.75*	.78*	.56	1.01***	.91**	1.22***
	(.39)	(.41)	(.42)	(.41)	(.39)	(.40)	(.39)	(.40)
Partisan strength	.30	.37	.65**	.55*	.63**	.42	.37	.41
	(.27)	(.28)	(.29)	(.29)	(.27)	(.28)	(.28)	(.28)
Nonwhite	-.02	-.10	-.43*	-.01	-.12	-.29	-.38*	-.14
	(.22)	(.23)	(.23)	(.23)	(.22)	(.23)	(.22)	(.22)
Female	-.04	-.15	-.41*	-.29	-.26	-.35*	.19	-.03
	(.20)	(.21)	(.21)	(.21)	(.20)	(.21)	(.20)	(.21)
Lower/ working	.31	-.01	.49**	.07	.31	.28	.18	.34
	(.22)	(.24)	(.23)	(.23)	(.22)	(.23)	(.22)	(.22)
Non-Christian	.03	-.19	.27	.15	-.07	.35*	.20	.10
	(.20)	(.21)	(.21)	(.21)	(.20)	(.21)	(.20)	(.21)
Age	-.92***	-.48	-.18	.11	-.38	-.35	-.48	.11
	(.35)	(.37)	(.38)	(.37)	(.35)	(.37)	(.36)	(.36)
Education	-.31	-.16	-.04	.33	-.03	.32	-.22	-.30
	(.50)	(.51)	(.53)	(.52)	(.49)	(.52)	(.50)	(.51)
Income	.26	-.15	.20	.01	-.03	-.08	.17	-.05
	(.44)	(.45)	(.46)	(.45)	(.43)	(.45)	(.44)	(.44)
7-point PID	-.55*	-.60*	1.11***	.53*	.58*	.26	-.01	.25
	(.32)	(.33)	(.33)	(.33)	(.31)	(.32)	(.31)	(.32)
N	261	257	259	259	259	253	256	255
R^2	.19	.15	.19	.17	.16	.23	.15	.22

Table A6. Predicting Perceived White versus Nonwhite Political Value Differences

	Equality	Civil Liberties	Self-Reliance	Free Enterprise	Military Strength	Blind Patriotism	Law & Order	Traditional Morality
Political knowledge	.65**	.16	.64***	.41*	.55**	.79***	.31	.27
	(.27)	(.24)	(.25)	(.23)	(.28)	(.30)	(.27)	(.23)
Attention to news	.61**	.39	.10	.06	-.16	.10	.20	.53**
	(.28)	(.25)	(.27)	(.24)	(.29)	(.31)	(.28)	(.24)
Partisan strength	.02	-.06	.49**	.30*	.27	.17	.15	.00
	(.22)	(.19)	(.20)	(.18)	(.22)	(.24)	(.21)	(.19)
Nonwhite	.53***	.26*	.12	.35**	.16	.17	.09	-.12
	(.17)	(.15)	(.16)	(.14)	(.17)	(.19)	(.17)	(.15)
Racial ID strength	-.38	-.47**	-.13	-.18	-.31	-.38	-.29	-.21
	(.27)	(.23)	(.25)	(.23)	(.27)	(.30)	(.27)	(.23)
Female	.32**	.21	.11	-.06	.15	.08	.38**	.19
	(.16)	(.14)	(.15)	(.13)	(.16)	(.18)	(.16)	(.14)
Age	-.12	-.11	-.36	.00	-.51*	-.56**	-.16	-.30
	(.26)	(.23)	(.25)	(.22)	(.27)	(.29)	(.26)	(.22)
Education	-.08	-.02	-.14	.21	-.30	-.51	-.18	-.54*
	(.37)	(.33)	(.35)	(.31)	(.38)	(.41)	(.37)	(.32)
Income	-.23	-.46*	-.30	-.65***	-.02	.18	.08	-.26
	(.30)	(.26)	(.28)	(.25)	(.30)	(.33)	(.30)	(.26)
7-point PID	-.56***	-.50***	.51**	.35*	-.15	-.07	-.08	.20
	(.22)	(.20)	(.21)	(.19)	(.23)	(.25)	(.22)	(.19)
N	224	224	224	222	224	223	224	223
R^2	.17	.11	.10	.10	.06	.07	.05	.08

Table A7. Predicting Perceived Male versus Female Political Value Differences

	Equality	*Civil Liberties*	*Self-Reliance*	*Free Enterprise*	*Military Strength*	*Blind Patriotism*	*Law & Order*	*Traditional Morality*
Political knowledge	.69***	.40*	.53**	.12	.84***	.41	.70***	.23
	(.27)	(.24)	(.25)	(.23)	(.31)	(.27)	(.26)	(.25)
Attention to news	-.28	-.26	-.31	-.05	.13	.33	-.04	.04
	(.31)	(.28)	(.30)	(.27)	(.36)	(.31)	(.30)	(.30)
Partisan strength	-.37*	.10	-.38*	-.24	-.52**	.04	.18	-.21
	(.21)	(.19)	(.20)	(.18)	(.25)	(.21)	(.20)	(.20)
Female	.39**	.26	-.08	.03	.28	.32**	.33**	.28*
	(.16)	(.14)	(.15)	(.14)	(.18)	(.16)	(.15)	(.15)
Gender ID strength	-.09	.01	.20	.00	-.15	-.77**	-.18	-.26
	(.31)	(.28)	(.29)	(.27)	(.36)	(.32)	(.30)	(.30)
Nonwhite	.16	-.06	-.12	.19	.01	.07	.31*	.12
	(.17)	(.15)	(.16)	(.15)	(.20)	(.17)	(.16)	(.16)
Age	-.26	-.37*	-.30	.33	-.58**	-.54**	-.54**	-.21
	(.25)	(.22)	(.24)	(.21)	(.29)	(.25)	(.24)	(.23)
Education	.34	-.22	.77**	.71**	.13	-.06	-.15	-.17
	(.33)	(.29)	(.32)	(.29)	(.39)	(.33)	(.32)	(.31)
Income	.07	-.04	.28	-.11	.12	.24	-.03	.45
	(.30)	(.27)	(.29)	(.26)	(.35)	(.30)	(.29)	(.28)
7-point PID	-.61***	-.38*	-.25	-.32	-.07	-.06	-.32	-.02
	(.23)	(.20)	(.22)	(.20)	(.27)	(.23)	(.22)	(.21)
N	251	248	250	249	252	251	252	249
R^2	.11	.05	.10	.07	.07	.06	.09	.04

Table A8. Predicting Perceived Christian versus Non-Christian Political Value Differences

	Equality	*Civil Liberties*	*Self-Reliance*	*Free Enterprise*	*Military Strength*	*Blind Patriotism*	*Law & Order*	*Traditional Morality*
Political knowledge	.05	.55**	.28	.35	.44	1.01***	.80***	.83***
	(.26)	(.25)	(.26)	(.23)	(.28)	(.29)	(.26)	(.25)
Attention to news	.33	.41	.60**	.38	.57**	.27	-.02	.23
	(.27)	(.27)	(.27)	(.24)	(.29)	(.31)	(.27)	(.26)
Partisan strength	.09	.08	.18	.37**	.16	.16	.34*	.42**
	(.21)	(.20)	(.21)	(.18)	(.22)	(.23)	(.21)	(.20)
Non-Christian	-.01	.34**	.11	.46***	.14	.30*	.22	.37**
	(.16)	(.15)	(.16)	(.14)	(.17)	(.18)	(.16)	(.15)
Relig. ID strength	-.35	-.21	-.10	-.17	.16	-.24	-.06	-.03
	(.27)	(.27)	(.27)	(.24)	(.30)	(.31)	(.28)	(.26)
Nonwhite	-.20	-.17	-.17	.07	.01	-.08	.16	-.13
	(.18)	(.17)	(.18)	(.15)	(.19)	(.20)	(.18)	(.17)
Female	.31**	.30**	.37***	.02	.11	.31*	.23	.22
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.13)	(.16)	(.17)	(.15)	(.14)
Age	-.22	-.37	-.66***	-.18	-.01	.32	-.36	-.12
	(.25)	(.24)	(.25)	(.22)	(.27)	(.28)	(.25)	(.24)
Education	-.39	-.16	.38	.03	-.34	-.20	-.19	-.97***
	(.38)	(.37)	(.37)	(.33)	(.40)	(.42)	(.37)	(.36)
Income	.24	.05	-.37	-.37	.17	.24	-.24	.53*
	(.29)	(.29)	(.29)	(.26)	(.32)	(.33)	(.29)	(.28)
7-point PID	-.28	-.29	.16	.05	.22	-.15	.10	.34
	(.23)	(.22)	(.23)	(.20)	(.24)	(.26)	(.23)	(.22)
N	246	247	245	246	247	246	247	245
R^2	.05	.10	.09	.10	.06	.13	.07	.14

Chapter 4

Table A9. Attitudes toward African Americans (Whites only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	.40***	.26*	.12	.01
	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(.13)
Openness to change	.21	.08	.11	.18
	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(.13)
Self-enhancement	-.08	.04	.09	-.32***
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.10)
Conservation	-.39**	-.31**	-.25*	-.18
	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)	(.15)
System-undermining	-.15	-.31***	.01	.12
	(.13)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)
System-justifying	.15	.06	.04	-.08
	(.16)	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)
Perceived African American Values				
Self-transcendence	.05	.04	.05	.22
	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)	(.15)
Openness to change	.17	-.05	.22**	-.07
	(.12)	(.16)	(.11)	(.11)
Self-enhancement	-.08	.06	-.01	-.08
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.11)
Conservation	.33**	.33**	.12	.12
	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)	(.15)
System-undermining	-.02	.16	.12	.24**
	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(.11)
System-justifying	-.02	.25*	.13	-.26**
	(.06)	(.14)	(.13)	(.13)
Racial ID strength	.03	-.06	-.08	.10*
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Party ID	.07	-.07	-.11	.14*
	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)
Ideology	-.28***	-.15	-.13	-.08
	(.11)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Female	.21	-.26	-.06	.24
	(.25)	(.24)	(.23)	(.23)
Education	.05	-.10	-.08	.17
	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)	(.12)
Income	.16	-.04	-.09	.00
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Age	-.03	-.03	-.12	.02
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Political interest	.09	.20*	.13	-.25**
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Political knowledge	.06	.04	.21**	.16*

	(.10)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
N	137	138	138	138
R^2	.36	.32	.35	.38

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A10. Attitudes toward Latinos (Whites only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	.17	.10	.17	.01
	(.16)	(.17)	(.14)	(.14)
Openness to change	.11	.11	.01	.04
	(.15)	(.16)	(.14)	(.14)
Self-enhancement	.02	.13	.18*	-.25**
	(.12)	(.13)	(.11)	(.11)
Conservation	-.06	.00	-.07	-.07
	(.17)	(.18)	(.15)	(.15)
System-undermining	-.05	-.13	-.07	.05
	(.14)	(.15)	(.13)	(.13)
System-justifying	-.18	-.06	-.37***	-.14
	(.16)	(.16)	(.14)	(.14)
Perceived Latino Values				
Self-transcendence	.51***	.28*	.11	.37**
	(.17)	(.17)	(.15)	(.15)
Openness to change	.14	.11	.27**	-.11
	(.15)	(.16)	(.14)	(.14)
Self-enhancement	.11	.15	.14	-.13
	(.14)	(.15)	(.13)	(.13)
Conservation	.01	.04	-.11	.06
	(.16)	(.17)	(.15)	(.15)
System-undermining	-.36***	-.13	.01	.02
	(.13)	(.14)	(.12)	(.12)
System-justifying	.16	.22	.29*	-.20
	(.07)	(.18)	(.16)	(.16)
Racial ID strength	-.04	-.03	.00	.08
	(.07)	(.07)	(.06)	(.06)
Party ID	.13	.01	-.08	.13*
	(.09)	(.09)	(.08)	(.08)
Ideology	-.19*	-.14	-.06	-.04
	(.11)	(.12)	(.10)	(.10)
Female	-.09	-.25	-.22	.02
	(.26)	(.28)	(.24)	(.24)
Education	-.07	-.15	-.06	.19
	(.14)	(.15)	(.13)	(.13)
Income	.04	-.10	-.18*	.04
	(.11)	(.12)	(.10)	(.10)

Age	.22**	.17	.13	-.04
	(.11)	(.12)	(.10)	(.10)
Political interest	-.03	-.05	.10	.01
	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(.11)
Political knowledge	.12	.11	.10	.03
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.10)
N	136	137	137	137
R^2	.17	.11	.27	.21

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A11. Attitudes toward Asian Americans (Whites only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	.39***	.30**	.31**	.22
	(.14)	(.13)	(.13)	(.15)
Openness to change	.21	-.02	.00	.13
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.15)
Self-enhancement	.15	.30***	.19*	-.24*
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)
Conservation	-.29*	-.01	-.06	-.12
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.17)
System-undermining	-.11	-.24**	-.05	-.02
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.13)
System-justifying	.01	.01	-.20	-.23
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.16)
Perceived Asian American Values				
Self-transcendence	.49***	.51***	.23	.11
	(.15)	(.12)	(.14)	(.17)
Openness to change	-.12	-.13	-.11	.01
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.15)
Self-enhancement	-.25**	-.25**	-.16	-.15
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
Conservation	-.05	.00	-.07	.29*
	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(.16)
System-undermining	.06	.05	.00	-.04
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.15)
System-justifying	.18	.27*	.41***	-.22
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.16)
Racial ID strength	-.05	-.12**	-.11*	.08
	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)
Party ID	.12	.02	-.03	.14*
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)
Ideology	-.16	-.15	-.17*	-.04
	(.10)	(.10)	(.09)	(.11)
Female	.02	-.19	-.14	.13

	(.22)	(.22)	(.22)	(.25)
Education	.17	-.09	-.04	.13
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.14)
Income	.06	.09	-.06	.15
	(.10)	(.10)	(.09)	(.11)
Age	.04	-.03	-.14	.18
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)
Political interest	-.04	-.01	.10	-.03
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.12)
Political knowledge	.22**	.24***	.22**	.09
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
N	141	142	142	142
R^2	.32	.32	.26	.23

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A12. Attitudes toward White Americans (Nonwhites only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	-.24	-.09	-.08	.03
	(.21)	(.22)	(.24)	(.29)
Openness to change	-.06	-.31	.16	-.13
	(.19)	(.20)	(.21)	(.25)
Self-enhancement	.17	.05	-.36*	-.05
	(.19)	(.20)	(.22)	(.26)
Conservation	.24	-.20	.14	.05
	(.23)	(.24)	(.26)	(.31)
System-undermining	.12	.23	.12	.29
	(.19)	(.20)	(.22)	(.26)
System-justifying	-.28	-.03	.01	-.01
	(.20)	(.20)	(.22)	(.26)
Perceived White Values				
Self-transcendence	.43**	.78***	.64***	-.46
	(.21)	(.22)	(.24)	(.29)
Openness to change	.43**	.03	-.11	-.05
	(.22)	(.22)	(.25)	(.29)
Self-enhancement	.33	.05	.15	.22
	(.25)	(.26)	(.29)	(.34)
Conservation	.39	.31	.04	-.66**
	(.25)	(.26)	(.28)	(.33)
System-undermining	-.05	.19	.18	.26
	(.18)	(.19)	(.21)	(.25)
System-justifying	-.53*	-.09	-.23	.42
	(.27)	(.28)	(.30)	(.36)
Racial ID strength	-.13	-.13	-.18	-.09
	(.11)	(.12)	(.13)	(.15)

Party ID	.09	.22**	-.08	.05
	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)	(.13)
Ideology	.06	-.13	.15	.03
	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)	(.16)
Female	-.15	.17	-.15	-.11
	(.35)	(.37)	(.40)	(.47)
Education	.00	-.24	.15	.03
	(.20)	(.21)	(.23)	(.27)
Income	-.11	-.22*	-.12	.23
	(.12)	(.13)	(.14)	(.16)
Age	.22	.22	.03	.08
	(.15)	(.15)	(.17)	(.20)
Political interest	.28*	.17	.30*	-.13
	(.14)	(.15)	(.16)	(.19)
Political knowledge	-.27**	-.08	-.23	.52***
	(.12)	(.13)	(.14)	(.16)
N	57	57	57	57
R^2	.49	.58	.44	.24

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A13. Attitudes toward Jewish People (non–Jewish only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	-.13	-.17	-.20*	.14
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
Openness to change	.10	.18	.17*	.16
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.12)
Self-enhancement	-.03	.12	.03	-.07
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Conservation	.18*	.02	-.03	.02
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.12)
System-undermining	.00	-.13	.02	-.13
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)
System-justifying	-.12	.01	.05	-.22*
	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(.13)
Perceived Jewish Values				
Self-transcendence	.34***	.42***	.31***	.23**
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Openness to change	-.21**	.07	.06	-.17
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.12)
Self-enhancement	-.19**	-.24***	-.14*	-.05
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Conservation	.08	.18	.18	.11
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
System-undermining	.12	.05	-.03	.04

	(.10)	(.10)	(.09)	(.10)
System-justifying	.07	-.16	-.15	-.08
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.14)
Religious ID strength	.09	.02	-.06	.08
	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)
Party ID	.03	.03	-.06	.00
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)
Ideology	.02	-.07	.00	.03
	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.08)
Female	.06	-.33*	-.04	.25
	(.20)	(.19)	(.19)	(.21)
Education	.13	.11	.01	-.08
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
Income	.00	.02	-.09	-.04
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Age	.10	.07	-.05	.22**
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)
Political interest	.26***	.26***	.27***	-.12
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Political knowledge	.03	.02	.10	.27***
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)
N	222	224	223	224
R^2	.22	.27	.18	.16

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A14. Attitudes toward Muslims (non-Muslims only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	-.09	-.10	-.15	.28**
	(.11)	(.12)	(.11)	(.13)
Openness to change	-.05	.08	.02	.13
	(.10)	(.11)	(.10)	(.12)
Self-enhancement	.02	.19**	.16*	.05
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Conservation	-.08	-.10	-.11	-.10
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)
System-undermining	.05	.05	.19**	-.05
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)
System-justifying	-.01	.08	.04	-.43***
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
Perceived Muslim Values				
Self-transcendence	.27***	.38***	.36***	.17
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)
Openness to change	-.03	.11	-.04	-.24**
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)

Self-enhancement	-.33***	-.33***	-.26***	-.22**
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Conservation	.21*	-.04	.09	.08
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)
System-undermining	.06	.15	.13	.11
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)
System-justifying	.14	-.03	-.06	.15
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
Religious ID strength	.13**	.02	.03	.07
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Party ID	-.14**	-.07	-.14**	-.07
	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)
Ideology	-.05	-.13*	-.03	.09
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)
Female	-.02	-.18	-.03	.31
	(.19)	(.20)	(.19)	(.22)
Education	.03	-.06	-.02	.06
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)
Income	.17**	.16*	.10	.01
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Age	-.01	.00	-.09	-.06
	(.08)	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)
Political interest	.05	.08	.03	-.29***
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)
Political knowledge	-.10	-.17**	.02	.19**
	(.08)	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)
N	214	214	214	214
R^2	.33	.38	.37	.30

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

163

Table A15. Attitudes toward Non-Religious People (religious only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	.00	-.07	-.11	.06
	(.14)	(.15)	(.15)	(.14)
Openness to change	.03	.17	.11	.03
	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)
Self-enhancement	-.06	.05	.02	.10
	(.10)	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)
Conservation	-.09	.00	-.15	-.13
	(.13)	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)
System-undermining	.04	-.02	.13	.14
	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)
System-justifying	.01	-.09	-.08	-.18
	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)
Perceived Non-religious Values				
Self-transcendence	.48***	.37**	.16	.05
	(.15)	(.15)	(.16)	(.15)
Openness to change	-.03	-.15	.01	.13
	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)
Self-enhancement	-.16	-.13	-.06	-.19*
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Conservation	-.05	.12	.13	.03
	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)
System-undermining	.01	.14	.05	.14
	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)
System-justifying	.08	.06	.04	-.14
	(.10)	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)
Religious ID strength	.01	-.05	.00	-.07
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)
Party ID	-.07	-.01	-.05	-.06
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Ideology	-.13	-.27***	-.16*	.06
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Female	-.25	-.17	-.24	.50**
	(.23)	(.24)	(.25)	(.23)
Education	.14	.01	-.03	.02
	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)	(.14)
Income	.15	.06	.09	-.16
	(.10)	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)
Age	.13	-.01	-.05	.08
	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)	(.10)
Political interest	.23**	.02	.12	-.22**
	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)
Political knowledge	-.13	-.04	.01	.15
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)
N	170	170	170	170

R^2	.25	.30	.14	.18

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A16. Attitudes toward Christians (non-Christians only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	.07	.09	-.01	.00
	(.17)	(.21)	(.18)	(.21)
Openness to change	-.19	.06	-.24	.37*
	(.17)	(.20)	(.17)	(.20)
Self-enhancement	.14	.18	.12	-.11
	(.15)	(.18)	(.15)	(.18)
Conservation	.19	-.05	.00	.03
	(.17)	(.20)	(.17)	(.20)
System-undermining	-.04	.01	-.10	-.06
	(.18)	(.22)	(.19)	(.22)
System-justifying	-.06	-.10	.12	-.18
	(.17)	(.20)	(.17)	(.20)
Perceived Christian Values				
Self-transcendence	.66***	.29*	.34**	.18
	(.15)	(.17)	(.15)	(.18)
Openness to change	-.13	.14	.25*	-.03
	(.13)	(.15)	(.13)	(.16)
Self-enhancement	-.25*	-.26	-.04	.02
	(.14)	(.16)	(.14)	(.16)
Conservation	-.15	-.03	-.10	.08
	(.19)	(.22)	(.19)	(.23)
System-undermining	-.03	.35**	.18	-.01
	(.13)	(.15)	(.13)	(.15)
System-justifying	.43**	.20	.26	-.16
	(.20)	(.22)	(.18)	(.22)
Religious ID strength	.10	.07	.20**	.16
	(.08)	(.10)	(.09)	(.10)
Party ID	-.06	-.06	-.16	-.21*
	(.10)	(.12)	(.10)	(.12)
Ideology	.32***	.17	.10	.45***
	(.12)	(.14)	(.12)	(.14)
Female	-.06	.10	.06	.30
	(.29)	(.35)	(.30)	(.36)
Education	-.06	-.01	.19	.02
	(.21)	(.25)	(.21)	(.25)
Income	.09	-.07	-.07	-.19
	(.17)	(.20)	(.17)	(.21)
Age	.06	-.04	-.13	.27*
	(.13)	(.16)	(.13)	(.16)

Political interest	.45***	.21	.23	-.10
	(.14)	(.17)	(.14)	(.17)
Political knowledge	-.22	-.07	-.09	.31*
	(.15)	(.18)	(.15)	(.18)
N	75	77	77	77
R^2	.46	.30	.42	.14

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A17. Attitudes toward Democrats (Republicans only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	-.35*	-.06	-.17	.09
	(.20)	(.21)	(.19)	(.22)
Openness to change	-.09	.09	-.16	.13
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.18)
Self-enhancement	-.08	-.10	.27*	.03
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.18)
Conservation	-.05	-.04	.06	.23
	(.19)	(.20)	(.18)	(.21)
System-undermining	.45**	.13	.17	.03
	(.21)	(.22)	(.21)	(.24)
System-justifying	-.48**	-.34	-.54**	.09
	(.22)	(.23)	(.21)	(.24)
Perceived Democrat Values				
Self-transcendence	.54***	.35**	.31**	.27
	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)	(.17)
Openness to change	-.03	.17	.31*	.17
	(.17)	(.18)	(.16)	(.19)
Self-enhancement	-.10	-.33*	-.14	-.16
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.18)
Conservation	-.03	.18	.24	.40**
	(.19)	(.18)	(.17)	(.19)
System-undermining	-.18	-.15	-.14	.14
	(.13)	(.14)	(.13)	(.15)
System-justifying	.27	.21	-.13	-.19
	(.19)	(.19)	(.18)	(.21)
PID strength	-.04	-.11	-.07	-.14
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.12)
Ideology	.02	-.05	-.09	.03
	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(.14)
Female	-.50	-.48	-.30	-.47
	(.36)	(.38)	(.35)	(.40)
Education	-.02	.07	.09	.21
	(.20)	(.21)	(.19)	(.22)
Income	.16	-.02	-.19	.17

166

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.18)
Age	-.05	.03	-.15	.12
	(.19)	(.19)	(.18)	(.21)
Political interest	-.36**	-.12	-.18	-.48***
	(.17)	(.18)	(.17)	(.19)
Political knowledge	-.13	-.01	-.27	.25
	(.18)	(.18)	(.17)	(.19)
N	64	65	64	65
R^2	.45	.31	.45	.25

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A18. Attitudes toward Republicans (Democrats only)

	Favorability	Solidarity Scale	Political Action Scale	Tolerance Scale
Own Values				
Self-transcendence	-.02	-.22	-.12	.12
	(.19)	(.19)	(.18)	(.24)
Openness to change	.11	.05	.11	.21
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.21)
Self-enhancement	-.09	.05	-.01	-.28*
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.16)
Conservation	-.29*	-.41**	-.42***	-.19
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.21)
System-undermining	.07	-.04	-.05	.09
	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)	(.20)
System-justifying	.31*	.29*	.04	-.26
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.21)
Perceived Republican Values				
Self-transcendence	.43***	.54***	.46***	.05
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.16)
Openness to change	.15	.01	-.02	.53***
	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)	(.16)
Self-enhancement	-.23	-.19	-.04	-.24
	(.15)	(.15)	(.14)	(.19)
Conservation	-.18	-.12	-.16	.22
	(.17)	(.16)	(.15)	(.20)
System-undermining	-.01	.03	.13	-.25
	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(.17)
System-justifying	.39*	.42**	.10	-.06
	(.22)	(.22)	(.20)	(.27)
PID strength	-.14	-.11	.05	-.19
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.14)
Ideology	.40***	.28***	.12	.34***
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.14)
Female	.57**	.47*	.56**	.59*
	(.26)	(.26)	(.25)	(.33)

Education	-.07	.02	-.05	-.25
	(.17)	(.17)	(.16)	(.21)
Income	.13	.01	-.03	.29**
	(.12)	(.12)	(.11)	(.15)
Age	-.09	-.10	-.21**	.14
	(.11)	(.11)	(.10)	(.13)
Political interest	.00	.05	.07	.15
	(.13)	(.13)	(.12)	(.16)
Political knowledge	.09	-.03	-.04	.06
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.15)
N	110	110	110	110
R^2	.43	.43	.32	.21

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A19. Whites' Immigration Policy Preferences and Perceived Latino and Asian American Values

Own Values	
Self-transcendence	-.08
	(.12)
Openness to change	.05
	(.11)
Self-enhancement	.08
	(.10)
Conservation	-.08
	(.13)
System-undermining	.15
	(.10)
System-justifying	-.28**
	(.12)
Perceived Latino Values	
Self-transcendence	.40***
	(.13)
Openness to change	-.06
	(.11)
Self-enhancement	.09
	(.11)
Conservation	-.25**
	(.12)
System-undermining	-.18*
	(.10)
System-justifying	.03
	(.14)
Perceived Asian American Values	
Self-transcendence	.00
	(.13)
Openness to change	.15

168

	(.12)
Self-enhancement	.02
	(.10)
Conservation	.11
	(.13)
System-undermining	-.06
	(.12)
System-justifying	-.03
	(.14)
Racial ID strength	-.02
	(.05)
Party ID	.05
	(.06)
Ideology	-.36***
	(.08)
Female	.46**
	(.19)
Education	.02
	(.10)
Income	-.04
	(.08)
Age	.07
	(.09)
Political interest	.06
	(.09)
Political knowledge	.00
	(.08)
N	131
R^2	.44

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is on a 5-point scale with higher values indicating more pro-immigration preferences. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A20. Non-Muslims' Immigration Policy Preferences and Perceived Muslim Values

Own Values	
Self-transcendence	.05
	(.09)
Openness to change	-.06
	(.08)
Self-enhancement	.03
	(.07)
Conservation	-.02
	(.09)
System-undermining	-.01
	(.08)
System-justifying	-.20**
	(.09)

Perceived Muslim Values	
Self-transcendence	.34***
	(.08)
Openness to change	-.06
	(.08)
Self-enhancement	-.01
	(.07)
Conservation	-.10
	(.09)
System-undermining	-.13
	(.08)
System-justifying	.00
	(.09)
Religious ID strength	-.02
	(.04)
Party ID	.03
	(.05)
Ideology	-.13
	(.06)
Female	-.01
	(.16)
Education	.07
	(.10)
Income	.00
	(.07)
Age	-.18***
	(.07)
Political interest	.11
	(.07)
Political knowledge	-.08
	(.07)
N	213
R^2	.26

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is on a 5-point scale with higher values indicating more pro-immigration preferences. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Chapter 5

Table A21. Effect of Candidate Party + Values

	Support	Represent Self	Represent In-party	Represent Out-party
In-party, in-party value	.47**	.27	.49*	-.48*
	(.24)	(.26)	(.29)	(.26)
In-party, out-party value	-.25	-.42*	-.42	.88***
	(.24)	(.25)	(.28)	(.26)
Out-party, no value	-1.15***	-1.29***	-1.38***	1.20***
	(.23)	(.24)	(.28)	(.25)
Out-party, in-party value	-.57**	-.52**	-.66**	.70***
	(.24)	(.26)	(.29)	(.26)
Out-party, out-party value	-1.41***	-1.53***	-1.64***	1.50***
	(.23)	(.25)	(.28)	(.25)
N	295	294	295	294

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *$p<.10$, **$p<.05$, ***$p<.01$ (two-tailed tests)

Table A22. Effect of Candidate Gender + Values (women only)

	Support	Represent Self	Represent Women	Represent Men
Female, humanitarianism	1.06***	.67**	.52*	.28
	(.26)	(.29)	(.29)	(.24)
Female, self-reliance	-.41*	-.49*	-.38	.24
	(.24)	(.27)	(.27)	(.23)
Male, no value	.22	-.02	-.71**	.35
	(.28)	(.31)	(.31)	(.26)
Male, humanitarianism	.54**	.57**	-.20	.85***
	(.24)	(.27)	(.27)	(.23)
Male, self-reliance	-.66***	-.69***	-1.53***	.56***
	(.24)	(.27)	(.27)	(.22)
N	202	202	202	202

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A23. Effect of Candidate Gender + Values (men only)

	Support	Represent Self	Represent Men	Represent Women
Male, self-reliance	-.58*	-.28	.59***	-.47*
	(.31)	(.32)	(.24)	(.29)
Male, humanitarianism	.29	.32	.00	1.06***
	(.32)	(.32)	(.24)	(.29)
Female, no value	-.24	.11	.02	.80***
	(.33)	(.34)	(.25)	(.30)
Female, self-reliance	-.39	-.43	-.11	.49
	(.34)	(.35)	(.26)	(.31)
Female, humanitarianism	.27	.14	.18	1.25***
	(.32)	(.33)	(.25)	(.29)
N	165	166	166	166

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A24. Effect of Candidate Race + Values (African Americans only)

	Support	Represent Self	Represent Blacks	Represent Whites
Black, equality	1.50***	1.50**	1.33	.33
	(.51)	(.63)	(.80)	(.56)
Black, self-reliance	-.70	-.70	-1.40**	.20
	(.44)	(.54)	(.68)	(.48)
White, no value	.50	.50	-1.00	.00
	(.78)	(.97)	(.1.22)	(.86)
White, equality	.90**	.70	-.20	1.00**
	(.44)	(.54)	(.68)	(.48)
White, self-reliance	-1.79***	-1.93***	-3.00***	.43
	(.40)	(.50)	(.63)	(.44)
N	27	27	27	27

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table A25. Effect of Candidate Race + Values (whites only)

	Support	Represent Self	Represent Whites	Represent Blacks
White, self-reliance	.11	.28	.22	-.01
	(.29)	(.29)	(.22)	(.29)
White, equality	1.37***	1.57***	-.13	1.63***
	(.32)	(.32)	(.25)	(.33)
Black, no value	1.41***	1.33***	-.30	2.11***
	(.30)	(.30)	(.23)	(.30)
Black, self-reliance	.59**	.69**	-.47**	1.04***
	(.30)	(.29)	(.23)	(.30)
Black, equality	1.31***	1.40***	-.27	2.31***
	(.30)	(.30)	(.23)	(.31)
N	227	227	227	226

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All dependent variables are on 7-point scales. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed tests)