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Irregular Worlds:
Senegalese Struggles for Moral Meaning in Barcelona

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Abstract

Migrant "illegality" gives way to "irregular" livelihoods in Spain and around the world. Studies on migrant "illegality" have generally focused on its political, legal and economic production and the social impact of a state's specific biopolitics. While invaluably important, there remains the need to better understand the modes of life people create "outside of the law" and the various ways everyday practice engenders social worlds of profound personal meaning that traverse state borders. In this dissertation, I approach migrant "illegality" as a historically constituted social field in which people create social worlds despite the overt and covert affront to personhood. I argue such social worlds are marked by a unique quality of waiting embedded in the category of the "illegal" migrant that precipitate an everyday suspension of normative systems of moral meaning.

Rather than focus on migrant "illegality" as a nullification of personhood, in this dissertation I approach "irregular" status as a state of exception that must be managed at the local level without violating strict state laws. Based on two years of fieldwork in and around what came to be known as "irregular settlements" in Barcelona, Spain, this dissertation interrogates local government strategies to regulate an "irregular" segment of the non-European Union (EU) citizen population in the city and the everyday struggles of "irregular" working class citizens to maximize tenuous spaces into transnational places of heightened autonomy. Deportation has been codified in Spanish immigration law as a natural conclusion to "illegal" status but its execution at the local level is often inviable. I draw from my ethnographic fieldwork in buildings transformed into sites for housing and informal labor by working class non-EU citizens Barcelona to explore local institutional mechanisms to incorporate "undocumented" residents within its immediate realm of action. While migrant "illegality" implies a kind of conscribed existence that today pivots on a

humanitarian imperative to maximize life, I argue these “irregular settlements” shed light on the value of spaces marked by a radical autonomy to people as they waited for “papers” or an opportunity to use them. In other words, these settlements were much more than a humanitarian crisis in need of an immediate intervention; they represent a complex social world of profound transnational value.

Turning to everyday experience, I argue the ill effects of migrant “illegality” are mitigated when a person has access to spaces in which they manage a sense of self informed by transnational economies of moral value. To wait “with one’s arms crossed” was untenable to the Senegalese men who participated in this study, despite the fact that they were often accused of “doing nothing” by interlocutors in public and private institutions. This dissertation examines this disjuncture between competing models of “being a correct person” by turning to an analysis of moral and ethical codes. Whereas from an institutional perspective such marginal spaces were morally and ethically untenable, I found everyday activities aimed at “getting by” consolidated into routines that progressively engendered a social world of special value to people bearing the brunt of migrant “illegality.” To explore the moral and ethical codes emergent in the interstices of laws and policies, I suggest the term *outpost* to designate a place that is politically and legally tenuous but of special value to working class non-EU citizens struggling to remain in Spain and sustain a sense of self within the context of structural violence. The outpost makes possible ways of being and belonging that transverse state borders.

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Anthropology is fraught with emotional landmines, both within and beyond the university. The academic pursuit of gaining a deeper understanding of distinct social worlds entails proximity but also distance, resulting in a unique dynamic of being "there" but also "here" in light of exigencies at times beyond a person's control (Geertz 1988). The "there" of my fieldwork spanned Southern Europe and West Africa, narrowed down to Barcelona and Dakar, and finally zoned in to a specific area of the Catalan capital experiencing profound structural change. The "here" of my training anthropological training matured in Evanston, IL. after periods of study in Spain, the Czech Republic and California. The department of anthropology at Northwestern University gave me the tools to be "there" as a critical scholar and the valiancy to sharpen my eye "here" as I searched for those details that only surface through fine-grained analysis and meditative reflection. I thank the Wenner-Gren Foundation for fieldwork funding (2013-2014). I am forever indebted to Northwestern University for making this study possible.

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Introduction

Two blocks from the warehouse I saw Ibrahima at a public water fountain filling the second of two large containers inside of a shopping cart. He attached a three-foot hose to one of the two spigots of the fountain and tightened a rope over the lever to engage a strong flow of water. He held the other end of the hose inside of the container while we chatted about the recent Barça football match. Securing water was tedious but manageable work due to the existence of public water fountains such as this one. Securing electricity was more difficult, requiring specialized knowledge that not everyone in the warehouse possessed. Ibrahima removed the rope to stop the flow of water and then removed the hose and placed it in his cart. Seeing as he was leaving the rope behind, I removed it and handed it to him. "No, leave that there," he replied. "Someone else can use it later." I made a mental note of this unwritten norm. I asked if he was heading to the warehouse. "Yes," he replied. "I'm going home."

We continued talking about football as we walked down empty streets to the entrance of the warehouse. Ibrahima pushed the cart through the entrance of the warehouse unimpeded. I followed suit but was quickly caught up in the movement of people. I had observed moments such as this in the past but had never been the source of interest until now. A man pointed to the microphone stand I was holding and asked for a price, while another man tried to take the computer monitor to examine it with greater care. I responded again and again that nothing I was carrying was for sale, a position that dissuaded some but was ignored by others. People bought and sold disparate objects found throughout the streets of Barcelona at the entrance of what had been until recently an abandoned industrial building in the outskirts of the Catalan capital. The objects I carried activated this market-like milieu around me, a state of being I had not expected and was

now struggling to move past. I heard the rattling of a cart behind me. I turned to see Mousa pushing his cart through the entrance as well, stepping back as the group of people around me moved to his cart to examine his finds. He stood next to the cart with a triumphant stance, knowing he had had luck that day.

"*Nan nga def, Mousa? Naka affair yi*[1]*?*" I said. I moved toward him, relieved that there was now a clear buffer between myself and would-be clients. "Ahh," Mousa responded. "Just getting by" (Cast. *buscando me la vida*). Mousa participated in the Baay Faal chant I was planning to record later that evening. Undocumented and unemployed, Mousa had moved to Barcelona from a neighboring city to "get by" collecting scrap metal and enjoy greater freedom living with friends, many of whom also actively participated in the weekly chant and searched within and around municipal rubbish and recycling containers for objects to sell. On this particular day, he had found a metal filing cabinet and two large motors from an industrial ventilation system he would later strip to separate the iron casing from the cooper wiring inside. He had also found a duffel bag with clothes, a small set of old encyclopedia books, a pair of old computer speakers, and a DVD player.

The chant I recorded later that evening was held inside a space within this former industrial building that was dedicated to the memory of the founder the Murid Brotherhood and his most celebrated disciple. While its perceived sanctity placed the question of morality in the forefront, in the course of my fieldwork I found a prevalent concern for "morals" and "ethics" among people using this industrial building to "get by" in the economic crisis of the early 2010's in Spain. Indeed, beyond a conventional image of the warehouse as iconic of an "humanitarian crisis," the places I visited showed an intricate world driven not so much by a desire to be "good" but rather

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[1] Wolof: "How are you Mousa? How are things?"

a need to be "evaluative" at multiple, intersecting levels (Laidlaw 2010). Economic transactions such as those at the entrance countered the ill effects of unemployment and undocumented status, but they also substantiated a temporary everyday rubric to mediate social relations and in turn generate a special kind of moral meaning.

This dissertation is based on in-depth fieldwork in buildings and other property temporarily appropriated and transformed by working class non-EU citizens from West and North Africa, South America and Eastern Europe in Barcelona. These were important because, as Mousa often reminded me, anyone could make money by trekking the streets with a cart in search of stuff to recycle or re-sell, which was especially important during a time of widespread social suffering due to the ongoing repercussions of the 2008-2009 economic crisis. The lack of permits to live or work in these buildings implied an "irregular" status that placed people in the cross-hairs of local politics but also in the unique predicament of reconciling disputes without recourse to the law or taken-for-granted conventions. Indeed, these were spaces at the margins of civil society, which for people such as Mousa without "papers," assuaged but also exacerbated the experience of structural marginality, exclusion and inequality by forcing people to confront the volatility of "getting by" in economic but also moral-ethical terms.

The study of "migrant illegality" is steeped in methodological, ethical and conceptual challenges for anthropologists who strive to gain a nuanced understanding of life on the ground without losing sight of the broader context in which life is embedded. While I concur with the view that studying the "illegal migrant" in isolation is "a rather egregious kind of epistemic violence" (de Genova 2002:422-423), I also support the idea that giving due diligence to lived experience is important in order to circumvent the risk of reducing a person into "a drudge, a victim, a number, assimilated to a category, a class, or a global phenomenon" (Jackson 2013:5).

To this end, this dissertation takes on an experience-near approach to "illegality" without neglecting the central role of the nation-state in constructing non-citizen subject positions that reflect the enduring legacy of colonialism on the one hand and the pressing demands of capital on the other.

The last 25 years of immigration to Spain has largely been a history of on-going "regularization" of unregulated international labor (Pajares 2004:8; Sabater and Domingo 2010:4). In the 1990's, Spain's economy became one of the fastest growing in all of Europe, and by 2007 constituted the 12th largest economy in the world. The first period of economic expansion (ca. 1994-2001) absorbed a mainly native labor force, while the second period of economic expansion (ca. 2001-2007) relied much more heavily on "migrant" labor, now codified in law and understood in the social imaginary as someone whose citizenship was not from the European Union (EU). During this second period, the Spanish state had the greatest migrant flows in relative numbers in the world and was second in absolute numbers only to the United States (Pajares 2009:24; Rodriguez-Garcia 2004:38). There have been five mass amnesty programs since the introduction of Spain's first comprehensive immigration law in 1985, with a permanent case-by-case channel to continue "regularizing" migrants put into effect in 2005 (Sabater and Domingo 2010:3). As the people I worked with waited for an opportunity to obtain "papers," their waiting engendered a distinct "social system" (Hage 2009:2-3) mainly centered around the recycling and re-selling of objects collected from the streets of Barcelona.

A critical study of immigration necessarily interrogates the politics undergirding a state's differentiation and ensuing management of resident populations along a citizen-migrant divide, revealing how life marked as "irregular" (i.e., "illegal") is stripped of the basic qualities for political participation and belonging (Andersson 2014; Calavita 2005; Coutin 2003; de Genova

2005; Dauvergne 2008; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2009; Khosravi 2010; Peutz 2006; Romero 2011; Rozakou 2012; Stolcke 1995; Suárez Navaz et. al. 2007). Delving deeper in this direction, research in critical medical anthropology has examined the imbrications of humanitarianism and biopower in the process of constituting manageable subjects and extending limited political recognition (Fassin 2012; Rozakou 2012; Ticktin 2012; Willen 2010). This dissertation builds on this important research but takes a different approach. If biopolitics is a politics aimed at the government of populations in which life emerges as the central source and object of power, it remains unclear how to conceptualize emergent modes of sociality within these populations aimed at the management and maximization of the life course in the absence of the state. More specifically, if "irregular" status implies an exclusion from civil society and thus a tacit authorization of the more punitive dimensions of the state, this dissertation is concerned with those spaces of everyday social relations that extend a sense of autonomy in the tenuous struggles of being and belonging in the context of migrant marginalization.

Irregular Settlements

I first heard allusions of "sub-Saharans" living in formerly abandoned industrial buildings during exploratory research in a mental health clinic in the summer of 2010. These were depicted as spaces where mental health was jeopardized and something resembling a normal life rendered impossible. I initially decided to exclude these spaces because they appeared to represent an exceptional case that was not representative of Senegalese experience in Catalonia more broadly. As my project developed to include the circulation of psychiatric discourse in non-institutional settings, I made the necessary arrangements to continue my collaboration with this same clinic and

subsequently began long-term fieldwork in late 2012. Serendipitously, among my first contacts outside of the clinic was with a young man who lived in one of these industrial buildings.

As I ascended from the underground metro station to meet Serigne in January 2013, I remember having the sudden realization that I was in a neighborhood I had read about in research on social exclusion in Catalonia and yet had never visited in person. We met at a café where I explained my project in greater detail and his role in my study, if he wished to participate. As per my Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol, I re-iterated and insisted that his participation in my study was absolutely voluntary and confidential, and would not impact his eligibility for institutional aid, services, or resources in any public or private institution in any way[2]. He agreed with noticeable reservations[3].

Serigne described the "industrial building" he lived in as "cold, very cold," without water, and "hard, very hard." His brief account painted a dismal picture, one that coincided with descriptions I had documented in the clinic and other institutional settings. Experiencing a combination of outrage and intrigue, I asked if he would like to meet the following week to speak further. He agreed and a week later we met again at the same café. During this second visit, Serigne was accompanied by his friend, Mousa, who spoke to me without reservations and quickly agreed to participate in my study. My knowledge of Wolof and experience visiting Senegal must have given Mousa a positive first impression, insisting I visit their home to drink *ataya*, the popular green tea in West Africa, and attend the *sikar*[4]. "You should come tonight, my brother, you will

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[2] Although my affiliatation with local institutions was solely based on my role as a researcher, many people initially assumed I worked for the city government or one of many collaborating non-governmental organizations, and thus had a say in the management and allocation of public and private resources. Despite my most ardent efforts, some people, especially those who I did not develop a close relationship with, continued to assume my affiliation was much more "institutional" than it actually was after nearly two years of knowing each other (e.g., acquaintances).

[3] As part of a plea agreement following a series of confrontations with the law during what had been classified as a psychotic break, Serigne was obliged to adhere to mental health treatment over the course of a year. He felt apprehensive to work with me at first because he assumed I worked for one of the many institutions he was regularly in contact with. Over time, however, we developed a constructive relationship based on trust and mutual respect.

[4] The chant is referred to as a *sikar* in Senegal and among my participants in Barcelona. Rather than use the Arabic spelling (e.g., *zhikar*), I use the Wolof spelling of the chant and other Sufi concepts and practices.

see, it's just like Africa!" I politely declined[5] but asked if we could meet the following week. "Yes, my brother, we're always here! Come whenever you want! You will see – it's just like Africa!" I made the appropriate personal arrangements and in a week's time I was in the same café waiting for Serigne and Mousa.

From the café we walked into the residential area of this neighborhood and entered a building without a front door, walked up a staircase without a handrail and pushed the door of an apartment without a lock. I was immediately greeted by the sounds of Youssou N'dour and the smells of fried food, tobacco and green tea. We entered Ali's room, a young Senegalese man who also participated in the weekly sikar, where we sat on the bed to drink tea, listen to music and chat. Serigne, Mousa, Ali and I spoke for close to an hour about Sufi Islam and what it meant to self-identify as "Baay Faal" in Spain. After three rounds of tea and multiple cigarettes they shared amongst themselves, we finally got up to walk to this "industrial building" I had heard so much about. It was evening time; the streets were calm in this peripheral Barcelona neighborhood. Reaching the entrance of this building at night added to my initial amazement of finding what was without a doubt a space that was "like Africa" in more ways than one.

Soon after my first visit I became aware this building and others like it faced an imminent eviction. The politics surrounding this usurpation of private property, however, pivoted on a certain moral discourse that validated certain interventions aimed at safeguarding the "dignity" of inhabitants while precluding any explicit reference of the broader legal, economic or political structures underpinning this emerging phenomenon. Referred to as "irregular settlements" by the city government, the language used to frame the places I visited helped extend political recognition

[5] I was married with a young child throughout fieldwork. While this relationhip ended during the writeup of this dissertation, throughout fieldwork I tried to strike a balance between the time I spent with my partner and son and the time I spent "in the field" with the people who participated in this study.

and institutional resources without bearing on the legal structures that gave rise to the "extreme vulnerability" people faced. Over the course of in-depth fieldwork, I concluded such language was central to a unique kind of government aimed at managing a non-citizen population at the local level within rather than against the strict confines of state immigration laws that directly undermined a person's claims to equal rights and liberties. In other words, the frequent evocation of "vulnerability," "suffering," and "dignity" that I documented during fieldwork reflected a distinct biopolitics undergirding the category of the "immigrant" in Spain rather than neutral qualities characteristic of the quotidian struggles people endured in these so-called "irregular settlements."

Referred to as "ghettos" by many people that I spoke to, these spaces were discursively framed as a moral dilemma that went beyond the legal imperative to execute an eviction. Despite the emphasis of a benign intervention, the extension of humanitarian aid was systematically rejected by those who were its target, leading many in local institutions to chastise what they viewed as a false consciousness that impeded well-intentioned efforts to find a solution to a pressing social problem. But whereas people were accused of failing to integrate because of the proliferation of such irregular settlements or their refusal to abandon them, long term fieldwork painted a more complex picture: these places assuaged the impact of deep-seated inequalities that local interventions were unable to rectify.

I build on critical scholarship in anthropology and other social sciences to argue the discourse surrounding the so-called irregular settlements re-aligned disaffiliated bodies within a subject formation process in a broader field of biopolitics aimed at governing working class non-EU citizens as contingent and disposable labor. However, I move beyond this important theoretical approach to better apprehend the use of and reliance on these spaces from the

perspective of people themselves. More specifically, I consider the limits of state power as a powerful margin that permits a kind of surrogate subject formation process that is linked to a person's struggle to fashion a culturally valued sense of self. In this vein, the central questions guiding my inquiry are as follows: what kind of policies, interventions, and programs does the naming of spaces, labor practices and people evoke on the ground, and what do these discursive practices reveal regarding the government of non-EU citizens? How do people conceptually reckon with these state-sanctioned categories, and through what means do they fashion personally valuable life trajectories in the context of structural exclusion and inequality? Beyond the economic benefits linked to contingent work, what is the socio-moral value of "getting by," and to what extent are these in conflict with or aligned to state structures that generate and reproduce their subjection qua "migrants"?

La Crisis

In preparation for fieldwork in the fall of 2012, I scheduled a meeting with a Senegalese friend in the center of Barcelona. We agreed to meet late in the afternoon, giving me enough time to bike to the Sant Antoni neighborhood and attend one of many demonstrations being organized around the city that day to protest austerity measures following the 2008-2009 economic crisis. I approached a large gathering and managed to secure a good spot just as a woman in her early 60's was handed a megaphone. "This country has always been a poor country," she began to say in Castilian. "Those of you who are younger may not remember, but those of us who have been around (Cast. *veteranos*) know perfectly well that this country has always been a poor country." With this provocative statement she argued that Spain has relied on a few sectors – automobile manufacturing, agriculture, tourism and construction – and the lack of diversification since the

transition to democratic rule in the 1970's has made the country vulnerable in the face of the global housing crash of 2008-2009. If, as she concluded, the crisis is a crisis of productivity, then any political measure aimed at palliating a faltering economy by reducing the wages of public employees, cut funding in education and healthcare, and render labor increasingly more precarious would only worsen an already difficult situation. "And this is important to keep in mind," she continued. "These measures deteriorate this situation; they don't fix it. And meanwhile they are destroying the lives of a large portion of the population." Although she did not use these terms, I interpreted the goal of her intervention to reframe austerity measures as a vestige of a kind of structural violence leveled against working class residents and generative of widespread social suffering that was imagined and discussed as "no body's fault" (Farmer 2004:307).

A year prior to this protest the city government of Barcelona published a study that revealed 29.5% of the population in Catalonia was living under the official poverty lines, much higher to the national average of 26.7% (Blanchar 2012). These figures are higher when calculating the cost of living in each of the 17 Autonomous Communities in Spain (Mars 2015; Rubiera Morollón et. al. 2013). Catalonia is among the most developed Autonomous Communities in Spain, with the second highest income per capita after Madrid. Factoring in cost of living, a study found 33% of families in Catalonia disposed of income that is below an average needed to meet associated costs in this affluent autonomous community (Rubiera Morollón et. al. 2013:121). If Spain "has always been a poor country" throughout the 20th century, its experience today is arguably more pernicious given the country's recent transformation into a major global economy and the concomitant rise in the cost of living for working class residents.

Among the most affected by the economic crisis have been "immigrants." Following an economic lull in the mid-1990's, private investment in the construction sector and government

deregulation on building restrictions in urban and coastal areas led to unprecedented economic growth at the turn of the 21st century. From the late-1990's to the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the Spanish economy grew at an annual rate of 3% in GDP (Cebrían et. al. 2010), creating more than 5.7 million housing development projects (Arellano and Bentolila 2010) and 7.5 million jobs (Felgueroso and Jimenez 2009). While this "miraculous" economic growth was driven by the construction sector, the construction sector as a whole was held afloat by the arrival of millions of workers from outside of the EU. The total number of non-Spanish citizens living in Spain in 1999 was less than 800 thousand, or approximately 1.8% of the total population. But by 2007 the number had increased to 4.5 million, or approximately 10% of the total population[6], representing the most intense migration flows in such a concentrated period of time in EU history (Rodriguez 2004:37-38). Indeed, this "prodigious decade in the history of immigration" (Oliver Alonso 2009:11) reflects back on the insatiable demand for labor, mainly in the construction sector but also in agriculture and domestic services (Pajares 2011:93).

A country with a long history of exporting labor abroad, Spain was rapidly transformed at the turn of the 21st century into a country importing labor at an unprecedented rate. The formal and informal incorporation of "immigrants" in the labor market, specifically in low-paying and hard to fill jobs, facilitated the socioeconomic mobility of Spanish and EU member state citizens to higher income jobs, such as in public administration, international business, technology and education (Pajares 2005, 2008). In this regard, the presence of working class non-EU citizens was pivotal in the repositioning of the Spanish nation-state as a new major global economic power after the transition to democracy in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Indeed, despite negative media

[6] Instituo Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), accessed May 5, 2015. Available online: https://www.ine.es/

coverage the arrival of "immigrants" was central in the Europeanization of Spain and the strengthening of an expanding Spanish and EU middle class.

Given the concentration of working class non-EU citizens in the construction sector, they were the first to bear the brunt of the housing crash, when more than a million jobs were destroyed in the third trimester of 2008 and the first trimester of 2009, alone (Pajares 2009:33). Unemployment has steadily gone up since the economic crisis, today comprising approximately 24% of the total working population[7]. Claims that Spain is recovering from the economic crisis does nothing to mitigate the day-to-day experiences of the millions of Spaniards who do not have a single family member formally employed or any formal source of income (Gomez 2016; Nuñez 2015) in what has become the longest period in Spanish history with an unemployment rate consistently above 20% (Gómez 2016).

If the situation is bleak for working class Spaniards, it is even worse for working class non-EU citizens. Formal unemployment among non-citizens is at a record high of 34%, and since 2010 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have denounced the dire living conditions of thousands of migrants. Caritas, an international NGO with a dominant presence throughout Spain, has argued that in "general…immigrants find themselves in a greater situation of vulnerability and social exclusion" than Spanish citizens (2011:8). Among the areas the NGO signals in its report, three are of particular interest here. First, the higher rate of unemployment among migrants is compounded by the fact that much of the employment opportunities still available are temporary and increasingly more precarious. Work in agriculture, for example, is seasonal and the increasing demand for work allows less socially conscious employers to neglect workers' or would-be-workers' need for housing, in turn leading to "shanty towns (Cast. *chabolas*) made with the plastics

[7] Instituo Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), accessed May 5, 2015. Available online: https://www.ine.es/

of the produce" (2011:9). Thus, the lack of formal labor opportunities has meant thousands have had to seek work in the informal market, which means people are not protected by labor laws or cannot claim certain public social benefits, if required, and rely on makeshift housing that exacerbates the structural vulnerability that characterizes much of their experience as "immigrants" in Spain. Second, working class non-EU citizens have horizontal social networks that are fiscally strained to mitigate the impacts of the economic recession in regards to the need for surplus resources, such as money or housing. Unlike Spaniards who have been able to rely on family and other middle class networks for support throughout the economic recession (Caritas 2011; Lafuente Portillo 2012; Mullor 2011), the lack of a secure source of income has left an increasing number of migrants unable to cover their living expenses and thus more prone to occupy "substandard housing" (Cast. *infravivienda*). And finally, but perhaps most importantly, the lack of formal employment has meant that more than 50% of those assisted in Caritas face "irregular" status (Caritas 2011:16), which is the legal category in Spain for migrant "illegality." As the report indicates, irregular status permeates all facets of an individual's life.

Formal unemployment statistics are not representative of local realities, where the informal economy has expanded and provided a much-needed safety net for a growing segment of the population bearing the brunt of the economic collapse (Minder 2012). In 2013, the informal economy represented close to 25% of the gross national product in Spain (Rosales 2014). The informal economy in Spain has historically been significant for working class non-EU citizens as a means to become incorporated in their respective localities and amass the required documentation to correct their administrative "irregular" status (Aja 2012; Calavita 2005; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012; Pajares 2011). Today, the informal economy offers many migrants regardless of legal status an opportunity structure to remain in the country and continue their long-

term projects. Undocumented migrants may gain access to public services such as the healthcare system but because this is legally codified as an exception to the general rule of exclusion, mainly on account of protracted unemployment (Calavita and Suárez 2003:108-109), there are significant restrictions. Access to other services and resources, such as social housing or employment assistance and training, are cordoned off along a migrant-citizen divide, with special provisions made for "legal" non-citizens but denied to anyone categorized as "irregular" within public administration. If *la crisis* is a force that has "destroyed lives," as the activist in the protest stated, then this threat was especially pronounced for "irregular" working class non-EU citizens.

Morality at the Margins

Toward the end of my first visit to the chant with Serigne and Mousa, I received a call from a young Senegalese man I had recently interviewed who insisted I wait for him upon learning I was in his neighborhood. He was offered a cup of *café Tuubaa* as soon as he arrived, taking the chair next to me and behind a group of five people watching and experiencing the event. On our way to the metro station later that night, I asked for his opinion about the building in general and the chant in particular. "This is just like Africa," he began, initially leading me to believe he would celebrate the space and its activities just as Mousa had done earlier that evening. "It's sad for me to see my fellow countrymen live like this." Intrigued, I asked him to elaborate. "I mean, no one comes to Europe to live like they do in Africa." His admonishment problematized my initial impressions and forced me to remain critical throughout my fieldwork.

Fieldwork was replete with references of people's chronic suffering. The city government's framing of these spaces was premised on the idea that people were suffering because they had failed as "immigrants" and were now forced to live in a "ghetto" they were unable to

escape. Unemployed, undocumented and relying on precarious housing, people were clearly suffering in these spaces, a fact that I consistently documented in narratives throughout my fieldwork. But the idea that suffering is an objective reality demands more critical reflection, something civil servants and NGO personnel I interviewed were unable or unwilling to entertain. According to Allan Young (1995), the term suffering refers to two distinct fields of meaning, namely a rudimentary consciousness of somatic pain and a "social or moral dimension" of experience that overlaps but is distinct from its corporeal manifestation (1995:245). While somatic pain represents a human universal, its interpretation is fundamentally cultural, relying on "social codes" that differentiate degrees of "suffering" across populations and individuals. The universality of pain, therefore, does not imply a universal understanding of pain, for determining what pain is or who is a sufferer of pain requires careful attention to its intersubjective context. The politics I analyze in this dissertation were premised on the conviction that the so-called "irregular settlements" were places that produced and exacerbated suffering as discerned from the precarious living and working conditions people endured. From this reasoning, the realm of possible interventions was narrowed to the removal of people from these places and in turn the eradication of these sites of "extreme vulnerability." How people themselves interpreted these spaces or the value they assigned to the practices they undertook within them was tertiary to the legal categories underpinning the figure of the "immigrant" on the one hand and the dominant institutional discourses directed at "irregular settlements" on the other hand.

I found people's experience was embedded in a complex cosmology in which suffering evoked a range of emotions that defied facile categorization, ranging from the experience of frustration, distress, and anger to a sense of empowerment, resilience and mysticism. In-depth fieldwork revealed competing economies of value that foreground distinct moral stakes for

different social actors. The competing references to "Africa" above call forth the need for fine-grained analysis of lived experience and the broader fields of meaning mobilized when making sense of it. Taking a critical approach, this dissertation begins its exploration of experience by embedding "individual biography in the larger matrix of culture, history, and political economy" (Farmer 2003:41) before turning to people as "deeply engaged stake-holders who have important things to lose, to gain, and to preserve" (Kleinman 1998:362). This dissertation seeks a deeper understanding of the places people called "home" throughout the period of my fieldwork by approaching these as undeniably intimate yet unceasingly inchoate social worlds.

Since the economic crisis of 2008-2009 a growing number of people in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia have relied on the collection of scrap metal as a means to generate income. Historically a niche labor practice occupied by *gitanos*[8], Senegalese began to turn to the collection of scrap metal as an alternative to other informal labor practices, namely street-vending, which has played an important role in the global Senegalese diaspora (Babou 2002, 2009; Buggenhagen 2003, 2012; Carter 1997; Goldberg 2003; Riccio 2001, 2005, 2008). But unlike domestic and foreign Roma groups[9], Senegalese and other West African residents have generally lacked access to motorized vehicles to collect or transport scrap metal, largely relying on repurposed supermarket shopping carts to search for scrap metal and other objects of value throughout the streets of Barcelona. The expansion of this labor practice transformed the urban landscape, one that became characterized by the juxtaposition of people pushing oil-stained carts alongside foreign tourists consuming the cosmopolitan city. In addition to chronic formal unemployment, citizens from the African continent, specifically from West Africa, bear the brunt

[8] In Spain the term "Roma" does not have as much traction as in other European countries. The term *gitano* is widely used and recognized.
[9] Since the mid-2000's there has been a significant increase in the number of people of Roma descent from Romania and Bulgaria, which became member states of the European Union in 2007.

of restrictive immigration laws and society-wide discrimination (Jabardo Velasco 2006; Martínez Veiga 2011; Mullor 2011). The everyday struggle to overcome multiple and intersecting forms of adversity is a central concern in this dissertation.

Following the 2008-2009 economic crisis West Africans in Barcelona began "occupying" industrial buildings in disuse to live but also to work. The history of these buildings in disuse can be traced back to the success of the 1992 Olympics when the city government aimed to revitalize Barcelona to become more competitive in the global neoliberal economy by earmarking industrial areas of the city to become new areas of tourism, technology and innovation. Initiated in the early 2000's, the 22@ urban project was such an initiative the city was fervently investing in but like other large-scale projects it came to an abrupt halt with the economic recession of 2008-2009. As a consequence, a vast landscape of industrial buildings remained empty as they had been shuttered by proprietors "who kept their properties throughout the housing fever waiting for a better offer that never came" (López 2012). From 2008 to 2013 the number of people experiencing homelessness in the city increased an estimated 54.8% while people living in abandoned industrial buildings, vacant lots, and other unconventional spaces, increased an estimated 125% (Sales i Campos 2013:24). Successive evictions of these industrial buildings coincided with the thousands of evictions of homeowners unable to pay their mortgage during this period[10], which spearheaded massive unrest and social movements throughout Spain, principally in areas most affected, such as Catalonia. Against a history of systematic neglect and unilateral evictions, the city government sought an alternative to the growing presence of "occupied" industrial-grade buildings with an aggregate of more than 1,000 people in 2013. But unlike those facing an eviction from their mortgaged homes, the vast majority of inhabitants of these buildings were non-EU citizens, many

[10] The Platform for People Affected by Mortgages (PAH) estimates more than 360,000 evictions were enforced between 2008 and 2012 (Colau and Alemany 2013).

undocumented or at risk of becoming undocumented, and ineligible for social housing or other forms of available aid, barring local authorities from extending certain resources through public institutions as they would for citizens or non-citizens with state authorization to reside in the country.

This dissertation approaches "illegality" as a cultural construct that bounds everyday life in profound ways. Since the 1970's, a growing number of scholars have turned to migrant "illegality" as a unit of analysis. In a paper presented at the annual Applied Anthropology conference, Glen Hendricks (1975) argues "illegality" needs to be studied in order to understand how immigration law influences individuals' day-to-day life, such as reinforcing kinship ties in the absence of public channels of incorporation or inadvertently instituting social spaces that are perceived as safe from punitive state action (1975:5, 13). Closer attention to "illegality" as an embodied social position has led research away from the perspective of the state, which has historically framed this phenomenon in terms of policy proposals and programs (Portes 1979), to the "perspectives and experiences of undocumented migrants themselves" (Coutin 2003:421). I build on this more recent scholarship to better apprehend the lived experience of Senegalese men relying on the so-called "irregular settlements" in Barcelona.

Experience is constrained by but never entirely subjected to state power. The analysis of "illegality," then, requires a theoretical approach that takes account of state processes of subject formation (e.g., "citizen," "immigrant," "refugee," etc.) while also paying close attention to the subjective stakes that inform people's day-to-day life (Galemba 2013). To this end, I propose nomenclature to frame and theorize the marginal status of migrant "illegality" and the broader historical conditions that produces it in relation to the varying social worlds people create and embody in their struggles to lead meaningful lives. I propose the spaces I visited are best conceived

as *outposts* within the context of transnational sociality which prompt and are prompted by a certain suspension of moral codes, or what I call a *moral moratorium*. Beyond a physical space, the outpost is a social field that is experienced as an abode, an extension of "home" across state borders and beyond subject formation processes, and characterized by a shared struggle to persevere and endure in what is increasingly a hostile and highly volatile socio-political milieu. The outpost is a place borne of a particular kind of waiting for a more stable and promising horizon, and as such is categorically exceptional, as are the modalities of life that inhere within and through it. To this effect, the notion of a moral moratorium refers to a temporary suspension of normative moral codes as people wait for "the world to reciprocate" (Lucht 2012), engendering in the places I visited a sense "like Africa" that was simultaneously praised and denounced. These terms will be important in my inquiry but also in advancing research on the phenomenology of migrant "illegality" in particular and biopolitical categories in general.

Fieldwork

From late 2012 to late 2014, I met with more than 100 Senegalese men and more than 60 government employees, NGO personnel, politicians, and activists in Barcelona[11]. After my first visit with Serigne and Mousa I continued visiting this site to attend the weekly chant and ultimately divided my time between the mental health center where I initially started fieldwork, an NGO providing humanitarian aid in a neighboring city, and various industrial buildings where many of my Senegalese interlocutors lived, worked and/or spent much of their free time in Barcelona. People at the mental health center and the humanitarian aid NGO were exceptionally helpful, granting me privileged access over the course of a year and a half to learn about their work and

[11] I also met with Senegalese men in cities within the Barcelona metropolitan area and throughout the Catalan Autonomous Community.

the challenges Senegalese and other non-Spanish citizens faced in the European Union. This dissertation, however, is not about these institutions.

Makeshift houses in an “irregular settlement” with repurposed shopping carts in the foreground.

Over the course of two years, I visited 8 “irregular settlements” and 10 *chatarrerias*, or informal recycling centers, in the city of Barcelona. I attended more than 16 chants and recorded 4 sessions with studio microphones I shared with participants. I commuted 4 to 5 days per week for an average of 10 hours per day[12]. In order to maximize the anonymity of people, I use pseudonyms throughout this dissertation[13]. Similarly, *Humanitarian Crisis Relief* (HCR) is a pseudonym for a humanitarian NGO in Barcelona that I refer to throughout this dissertation. HCR and other similar institutions represent a distinct compassionate-restrictive approach to migrant “illegality” that is central to my analysis.

I draw from my extensive fieldwork to present a composite of the various irregular settlements and chatarrerias I visited. The scenes I describe could have easily been at any of the irregular settlements I visited, for they were all anchored in the immediate drive to generate money

[12] Although I was not able to live in the same neighborhood, much less the same spaces, as my interlocutors for personal reasons, I did spend a cumulative total of a week and a half sleeping alongside participants, specifically after an eviction of a building, an experience that gave me invaluable insights into the ways a “humanitarian crisis” was produced, framed and managed by local institutions.

[13] I use the French spellings for pseudonyms because this was most common among the people I met and interviewed. I use Wolof spelling to the best of my ability elsewhere in my dissertation, particularly in reference to the Muridiyya.

and the need to mediate social relations with different people from distinct backgrounds. The place I discuss in detail in this dissertation, which I refer to as *the warehouse*, does not correspond to any one single place but to a composite of the various sites I visited. This is important to ensure full confidentiality as I foreground the lived experience of the Senegalese men who participated in my study.

Although my analysis is informed by innumerable conversations with people of different nationalities, I tried to focus on people of Senegalese citizenship throughout my fieldwork. The use of the term "Senegalese" takes much for granted and runs the risk of depicting the boundaries of nation-state as natural and dominant in people's sense of self, a kind of "methodological nationalism" that threatens fine-grained analysis of localities (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004:1003-1007). While I acknowledge this risk, I use the term "Senegalese" for two specific reasons. First, this is the default identification within institutional settings, either at the local, regional or state levels, or within private NGOs. Second, many of my interlocutors developed a sense of "Senegalese-ness" during their time abroad, imbuing this term with special meaning in their assessment of their experience within and outside of the law.

	2001	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**
Men	8,055	11,156	14,476	17,280	23,269	27,793	30,426	39,130
Women	1,875	2,466	3,118	4,185	4,611	5,315	6,529	7,490

	2009	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**
Men	47,270	51,230	52,014	51,626	51,307	49,715	48,699	49,090	49,642
Women	9,320	10,740	11,587	12,337	12,858	12,990	13,099	13,676	14,190

Senegalese citizens as registered residents in Spain – Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, accessed Oct. 2017.

Virtually all of my participants used Lyca Mobile as their phone carrier, which offered limited free minutes to call other Lyca Mobile subscribers. I began to use this phone provider early into my fieldwork so I would be easy to reach. I worked exclusively with men for demographic and methodological reasons. First and foremost, Senegalese in Spain have

predominantly been men, and the people that lived in or frequented the so-called irregular settlements were also overwhelmingly men. Second, my rapport with men was much stronger because of my own ethnic, national and gender identity[14]. I draw from extensive life history interviews with 20 research participants that are interspersed throughout this dissertation. My ability to speak and understand Wolof[15], the lingua franca of Senegal, enabled me to strengthen my relationships with people from Senegal and conduct interviews with people whose knowledge of Castilian, Catalan, French or English was limited.

I consistently informed my participants in particular and anyone I met during my fieldwork in general of my position as a researcher and my interest to write about the places where they lived, worked and/or spent much of their free time. I obtained informed consent as established by Northwestern IRB, and provided participants with as much information about their role in my research and my dissertation fieldwork more broadly when requested. I use pseudonyms throughout this dissertation as established in my IRB protocol. To ensure full confidentiality of all participants in this study, the life stories I re-tell in this dissertation are largely composites from innumerable conversations and hundreds of interviews from my fieldwork. This is essential to ensure the anonymity of everyone who participated in this study.

Throughout this dissertation, I employ the term, *working class non-EU citizen,* to destabilize the category of the "immigrant" and critically assess the underlying meaning this term mobilizes in political discourse and social imaginaries. To be identified as an "illegal immigrant" in general or "irregular immigrant" in Spain in particular is to embody a point of contrast that makes more tangible the identity of a national self within a new vision of Europe (Carter

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[14] Throughout fieldwork I identified as a California native of Mexican descent who was married to a Spanish woman and was father to a young child. This identification as a "foreigner" with an "immigrant" background managing an abundance of cultural differences with his spouse and struggling to raise a child between two countries facilitated communication on a more personal level.

[15] I began studying Wolof in 2008 as part of my MA in anthropology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. I reinitiated my studies during my exploratory fieldwork in Senegal in the summer of 2010 and again in 2011, and continued studying Wolof in Chicago in 2012.

1997:196). A poignant example of this point of contrast can be observed in the tacit difference assumed between the terms "immigrant" and "foreigner":

> In everyday life, the immigrant (Cast. *inmigrante*) is identified as a person that originates from an impoverished place; people whose movement, whose migration is interpreted almost exclusively as a response to economic needs and survival. In contrast, the identitary category of the foreigner (Cast. *extranjero*) refers to a person whose movement does not exclusively respond to economic necessities but rather to factors that are much more heterogeneous such as the desire to change lifestyles and advance in their respective careers (Ibañez Angulo 2008:112).

Whereas a "foreigner" is imagined as an equal in the social imaginary in Spain, an "immigrant" is conceived as a radical other vis-à-vis the middle-class ideal of contemporary EU society (Aldalur 2010). The image of the "immigrant" in the social imaginary in Spain is further compounded in relation to dominant ideas regarding "Africa" as a site antithetical to European notions of normalcy (Achebe 1978; López and Losa 2007; Martínez Veiga 2011). Throughout this dissertation I will only use the terms "immigrant" or "immigration" in reference to its more technical use in Spanish law and administration, and will use the category "working class non-EU citizen" to refer to the political position people inhabit. In so doing, I intend to problematize but also avoid inadvertently further naturalizing socio-cultural assumptions surrounding the category of the *inmigrante* in Spain.

In this same vein, I only use the term "Spanish" to refer to the Spanish state and its affiliated institutions. Recent calls for Catalan independence place the inherent political quality of such qualifiers in the foreground, shedding light on a historical process of nation-building and national reckoning that I will also essay to avoid further naturalizing. I will use the term *Castilian,* which is the most common term used in Barcelona and arguably throughout Spain to refer to the Spanish language, throughout my analysis, and the abbreviation *Cast*. for Castilian and *Cat.* for Catalan when providing in-text translations of key terms, idioms, or statements. The secessionist politics prominent in Catalonia today are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Outline

I begin chapter 1 by discussing the political, legal and economic circumstances of my fieldsite and the dominant perspective informing public and private institutional interventions. I argue these spaces constituted a distinct epistemology that pivoted on the need to wait in the short and long term rather than being a facile sign of "failure" that was easily recognizable to institutional personnel as well as people on the ground.

In chapter 2, I delve deeper into the city government's decision to include a humanitarian NGO in their intervention in the so-called "irregular settlements." I suggest this move helped to consolidate a distinct discourse surrounding these spaces and narrow the range of demands the city government was prepared to acknowledge or act upon, tacitly creating a buffer between individuals and the city government that was depoliticized in nature. Despite their stated neutrality, this humanitarian NGO actively reified political categories people were expected to inhabit, and in so doing systematically removed from the immediate political field the possibility of critical discourse. As I argue throughout this dissertation, the turn to humanitarian aid was pivotal in creating and substantiating a political subject for local forms of government.

In chapter 3, I explore the generative qualities and corollary systems of meaning within the social structures of everyday life in the warehouse. The warehouse was a consequence of migrant "illegality," a tenuous place people relied on in the absence of formal opportunities. But the situation people faced went beyond the institutional imperative of embodying the prototype of a deserving undocumented migrant in the individual quest for "papers." The situation for people who relied on the warehouse also implied finding ways of "getting by" that were congruent with personal notions of being a "correct person." In this chapter I pay special attention to the broader frameworks that imbued people's assessment of time and space in relation to everyday practice.

In chapter 4, I explore the relationship between space and personhood. Specifically, I focus on the varying processes through which spaces are turned into places of intersubjective meaning, and how such transformations take on an operative framework that informs but also project people's socio-moral stakes. I propose the concept of *the outpost* as a heuristic to apprehend the broader frameworks of meaning and the underlying rationale in everyday practice of such structurally tenuous places. I suggest the concept of the outpost elucidates the manner in which a space in transformed into a unique lifeworld of transnational significance.

In chapter 5, I explore the moral stakes pinned to the outpost and what I call a *moral moratorium*, that is, a temporary suspension of dominant moral frameworks that enables people to better inhabit an inchoate lifeworld. If the outpost is a place of emergent moral meaning, then this is made possible by re-creating an ethical framework of everyday practice independent of dominant normative frameworks. The moratorium I refer to is a consequence of structural forces beyond individual control but also an outcome of individual will to persevere.

In the following chapter I discuss the pivotal role of scrap metal in the warehouse, paying special attention to the blurred boundaries between formal and informal economies. Despite the fact that collecting and recycling scrap metal was viewed as a sign of abject poverty that annulled dignity for many local institutions, for Senegalese and the local scrap metal companies they directly and indirectly worked with this informal labor niche had immense potential. In the quest to "raise awareness," the city government and affiliated institutions reproduced discourse that was undergirded by dominant folk ideologies of the contemporary figure of the "immigrant" as one who is perpetually in need of aid but is in turn helplessly tied up in "tribal" affiliations that generate new forms of social exclusion.

In chapter 7, I examine the historical production of migrant "illegality" as a specific kind of biopolitics in Spain. I examine moral experience in relation to migrant "illegality," specifically in the historical production of the category of the "illegal migrant" and the constrained field of sociality this implies. I interrogate the broader historical conditions of migrant "illegality" in 21st century Spain to better understand how everyday experience is determined by the law but not entirely subsumed within it. Spaces such as the warehouse counter-act the threat to existence migrant "illegality" implies and extend fields of experience otherwise foreclosed to undocumented migrants that are more attuned with the broader aim of becoming mobile (e.g., within Spain/EU, between EU and Senegal) and establishing routines of self-fashioning within an inhabitable social world.

In chapter 8, I turn to a space called *Yoonu Baay Faal*, or "the way of the Baay Faal," within the warehouse to discuss the manner in which the outpost makes possible different social identities in the margin of state power. Yoonu Baay Faal was a sacred place that was inseparable from the moral stakes people who actively took part in its creation or weekly activities faced in Spain. More specifically, Yoonu Baay Faal sheds light on the role of *moral registers* in spaces that are "outside society" in the intersubjective struggle to imbue everyday routines with transnational value. I explore the role of Sufi Islam in a place such as the warehouse, and turn to a closer analysis of materiality to show how people's sense of self was uniquely elucidated in everyday interactions with objects (Miller 2005).

In chapter 9 I discuss the warehouse in relation to agency. I suggest the outpost is a place of agency despite state abjection, revealing central tensions inherent to the margins of political representation and participation that merit greater attention. The outpost evidences the manner in which people "use the domains of opportunity opened to them by neoliberal restructuring to build

pathways of local and transnational incorporation" (Glick Schiller 2011:212), fields of sociality determined by a myriad of structural forces but experienced as sites of fleeting opportunities for self-fashioning and transnational becoming. Agency is an important element in people's experience of an outpost, but as this chapter shows it needs to be theorized in relation to people's struggles to carve out areas of accountability and responsibility that are aligned with the quotidian will to become a certain kind of person.

Chapter 1 – To Live and Work without Problems

The Police

From the entrance of the warehouse, I walked down the main corridor to the place where the chant was held to find the doors were still locked. Expecting a potentially long wait, I decided to enter Assane's bar directly opposite of where I was now standing to leave the computer monitor, microphone stand and two of the three bags I was carrying[16]. Upon entering I was met with the smell of tobacco and marihuana smoke, and the sound of Lucky Dube, the South African reggae artist especially popular in the 1980's and 1990's, playing through a pair of speakers Assane had purchased from someone at the entrance two weeks before. At one of five tables was a group of people that gestured for me to sit down. I approached the group and started to exchange common greetings in Wolof when I felt an arm land over my shoulder.

"Hey, Arturo," Babou said, his right index finger pointing at Thierno, who was sitting between Cheikh and Fallou in front of a small space heater. "This guy, *moo ngi sai sai la*[17]! Don't trust him!" We all laughed. "And on top of that, he's a Real Madrid fan[18]!" Thierno interjected with confidence. "I've always been a fan of Real Madrid. But Madrid, no! I can never live in Madrid again!" It was a cold day in February. The space heater offered some comfort and protection against the humid cold of Barcelona. Thierno's interjection found a favorable welcome. "Madrid?" Thierno prefaced. "No! It's more difficult in Madrid! There, they always stop you

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[16] I kept my personal backpack with me at all times to safeguard my small netbook I used to take fieldnotes. While these I moved to an encrypted hard drive at the end of every day, I was much more careful with this bag to ensure full protection of any personal data collected during fieldwork (e.g., photos, recordings, videos, etc.) that may be potentially present.

[17] The Wolof term "sai sai" translates to "bandit" or "thief," but in this context it is a light-hearted exchange where the accusation of "being a thief" is a means to extol a friend's wit, creativity or cunning before difficult situations. Accusations such as this – "he is a thief" – were common among friends during my fieldwork.

[18] While most people rooted for Football Club Barcelona, there were many who expressed their support for rival football clubs, such as Real Madrid. Based on my fieldwork, a person's affiliation to a club reflected an underlying intersubjective dynamic linked the mediation of local social relationships.

and ask for your papers, and if you don't have them, they send you to Senegal the next day!" Babou agreed by nodding his head. He had entered the bar after selling the scrap metal he had found earlier in the day at Omar's chatarreria. This was a break of sorts from his work, a moment to talk to friends and have a meal before heading back to Omar's chatarreria to pick up his cart and continue searching for more items to recycle or re-sell throughout the streets of Barcelona. "Our politicians, you know, they work with them! To renew your passport, you need to go to the embassy in Madrid, and the embassy is next to *La Nacional*! They do it on purpose!" "Here, it's not like that," Thierno continued. "The *Mossos* don't bother you, they always let you go." "Here, the only problem is *La Nacional* but there aren't many of them," Babou added, trailing into Thierno's account. "And the *Mossos* don't care!" "But in Madrid? No! It is very difficult in Madrid!"

Political map of Spain and its Autonomous Communities. Catalonia (Cast. *Cataluña,* Cat. *Catalunya*) is located in the northeast of Spain bordering France and Andorra (www.gifex.com)

While "illegal" or "irregular" status, as it is known in Spain, befalls anyone lacking a residency permit within the territory of the Spanish state, its management and experience is

markedly different depending on the Autonomous Community, province or municipality in which an individual resides. As I was often reminded, Catalonia and, more specifically, the city of Barcelona, were "better" because "irregular" status, which was established by the central Spanish government in Madrid, was destabilized by latent Catalan secessionist sensibilities. During the transition to democratic rule, a Catalan police force was reinstated in the early 1980's and placed under the mandate of the newly restored Government of Catalonia (Cat. *Generalitat de Catalunya*). Law enforcement has since been a responsibility of the *Mossos d'Esquadra* and the *Guàrdia Urbana*, the latter specialized in traffic violations and minor security infractions. In the realm of immigration, the progressive institutionalization of bodies for self-representation and governance has further marked the political gap between "Spanish" policies, mainly dictated by EU pressures for increased controls, and "Catalan" moves for greater leverage to act as a quasi-state entity. "Once we are our own country," a politician in favor of independence for Catalonia told me during an interview, "they won't *need* papers - everyone will be a citizen[19]!"

Unlike other cities, the National Police[20] has a reduced presence in the Catalan capital, largely limited to a number of official buildings, the international airport of El Prat, the seaport, and the Center for the Internment of Foreigners (Cast. *Centro de Internamiento de Extranjeros*). For many Catalan politicians, administrators and activists I interviewed, immigration law was clearly part of a "Spanish" project to govern non-EU citizen entry and settlement that did not align with Catalan interests. An indicative example of this can be seen in the Spanish center-right government's reform of the national healthcare system in 2012 prohibiting "illegal migrants" from

[19] It is interesting to note that a basic criterion to participate in the referendum for independence organized by the Catalan government on October 1, 2017 was to be a Spanish citizen, a move that many activists for migrant rights argued reflected dominant assumptions and prejudices regarding who is and who is not eligible to be a member of an imagined Catalan nation.
[20] The National Police (Cast. *Policia Nacional*) is the law-enforcement agency tasked with managing immigration detention centers and coordinating the logistics of forced removals with other countries.

obtaining care[21]. Resistance to these reforms was particularly strong in Catalonia, where hospitals and general practitioners throughout the Autonomous Community refused to comply (Navarro Casado 2013) and the Catalan government began legislating new policies to guarantee access to healthcare regardless of legal status. Most of my Senegalese interlocutors were registered within the public healthcare system and kept their healthcare card on their person at all times as proof of their de facto residence. In a way, a valid healthcare card and *volante de empadronamiento*[22] represented an effective means to mediate interactions with the local police and other public bodies in lieu of a residency permit.

Autonomous Community of Catalonia with the four provinces of Lleida, Tarragona, Girona and Barcelona, and their respective "comarques" (www.gifex.com).

If the absence of "papers" is experienced differently depending on the city, municipality or Autonomous Community, it is nevertheless understood to be more "tolerated" in Spain in general in comparison to other EU member states. Inhabitants of the warehouse who had lived in France,

[21] Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Real Decreto 16/2012.
[22] Registration of all residents in their local municipality, a process known as *empadronamiento*, is required by law as a means to gather census and demographic data. This information is anonymous, and cannot be used to outside of these strict guidelines. Registration is important as it remains the primary means of accessing many basic services and resources.

Germany, Sweden and Denmark attested to this based on personal experience. Thierno had lived in the outskirts of Paris for a year before moving to the Autonomous Community of Andalusia at the behest of family. He lived for a year with an uncle and his family near Seville, where he moved throughout Andalusia for seasonal work, mainly collecting olives and tomatoes. Seeking greater economic opportunities, he relocated to Madrid to sell knock-off merchandise in the city center and subway. Frequent confrontations with the police and the perceived threat of deportation on account of his "irregular" status led Thierno to resettle in Terrassa in the province of Barcelona, where he had acquaintances from back home in Guediawaye, a neighborhood in the Greater Dakar metropolitan area. While he enjoyed Terrassa, he also found random police checks to be quite frequent. "I've lived everywhere in Spain," Thierno added during an interview. "And really, Barcelona is the best. Terrassa, there were many of my fellow countrymen (Cast. *paisanos*[23]), but now many moved to Barcelona, or Sabadell or Mataró. But in Terrassa, you can't walk down *la Rambla* without getting asked for papers[24], there are too many controls!"

Thierno traveled daily on the regional commuter train to the Catalan capital to sell football jerseys near Plaza Catalonia, quickly facing the same police pressures he experienced in Madrid. But unlike other cities, he found a large number of *paisanos* in Barcelona collecting scrap metal as a means to make a living. Through an acquaintance he made in the city, he visited the warehouse and learned more about this labor niche. A few days later, he decided to find a cart and begin collecting scrap metal himself. Thierno enjoyed greater freedom collecting scrap metal because of its alegal status. As Babou continued to tease Thierno, insisting he should move to Madrid because of his support of Real Madrid Football Club, Thierno iterated in a matter-of-fact tone, "I'm a Real Madrid fan but that's ok (Cast. *no pasa nada*), Barcelona is better. Here, I'm free."

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[23] The Spanish term *paisano* was readily used by Senegalese to refer to a fellow co-citizen.
[24] I attended a protest in 2014 organized by the local Senegalese association of Terrasa to denounce racial profiling and police harassment.

Migrant "illegality" has profound effects on people's sense of time and space by creating a cartography that requires nuanced knowledge to effectively navigate without immediate or long-term repercussions. The healthcare system in Catalonia and arguably throughout Spain is largely experienced as benign, largely because access to medical attention is overwhelmingly viewed as a universal right in Spain that is staunchly defended at the local level[25]. This is not the case in other EU member states, such as in Germany, where undocumented migrants seeking healthcare in clinics serving the uninsured run the risk of being reported to the police by physicians and personnel, often leading to deportation (Castañeda 2009:1559). Whereas other EU member states were described as rife with potential dangers for anyone lacking a residency permit, Catalonia in particular and Spain in general were readily described as more lenient. "Over there (in France), I can't walk like here," Thierno stated in an interview. "All the time, I see police and I hide. Here, I ask police for directions!" While "illegal" status was experienced as less punitive in Spain, it was nevertheless described as a source of suffering because of the volatility and, more specifically, the sense of immobilization such a status implies.

Overwhelmingly, the experience of "illegal" status was mitigated by the liminal status of the warehouse. After 24 hours of demonstrated continued habitation, Catalan housing laws extend limited but important rights to de facto inhabitants, prohibiting the police to carry out an eviction without just cause[26]. Without clear evidence of habitation and only one or two people present, the police have been known to arrest inhabitants and immediately shut down a space. For this reason, the first few days are imperative, as well as having a substantial number of people in the space to hinder any moves toward a unilateral eviction. Housing laws require local police to go through

[25] The aforementioned policy barring "illegal" migrants from accessing the healthcare system (Real Decree 16/2012) was also resisted in numerous cities throughout Spain.
[26] The right to privacy and freedom is recognized in relation to personhood and not property right, which means a person who can prove continuous habitation, can claim a place as their "home" (Vilaseca 2013:18). Throughout fieldwork I documented various people insist the minimum period of mandatory residence to claim such a right was 72 hours.

the courts before acting upon such de facto dwellings on private or public property. An exception to this was when a public institution decreed a state of emergency that required swift action to safeguard the safety of inhabitants, a mechanism that has been used in the past by public administrations[27].

The Mossos d'Esquadra and the Guardia Urbana made frequent visits to the warehouse but only to execute specific tasks, such as responding to the escalation of violence or carrying out an arrest warrant[28]. The National Police, on the other hand, intervened with the sole purpose of determining a non-EU citizen's legal status and detaining those unable to provide a valid residency permit. These actions led to fierce criticism from opposition parties, namely *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Cat. Republican Left of Catalonia) and *Iniciativa per Catalunya Vert* (Cat. Green Initiative for Catalonia), who denounced the city government of violating inhabitants' human rights. It is important to stress that this criticism was not leveled against "illegal" status as such but rather against its enforcement in this specific context. Within the discursive framing of the irregular settlements, political action against the "illegal" status of non-EU citizens was conceived as a violation of human rights because these spaces were conceived as sites of extreme exclusion and vulnerability, spaces that required a more compassionate approach in order to prevent further aggravating what was seen as a pressing humanitarian crisis. Political pressure led the city administration to find ways to work with the National Police and to distance their presence when executing an eviction.

The feeling of being "free" in Catalonia does not mean political sanctuary. Rather, "illegality" represents an exception that offers the state and regional administrations leverage to

[27] Activists referred to the eviction of the Cuartels de Sant Andreu in 2003-2004 as a key example.
[28] Although the police regularly entered the warehouse, this was generally for very specific reasons, such as searching for a particular individual with a warrant for their arrest or to intervene when personal safety was jeopardized (e.g., fights).

act according to changing political interests. As a case in point, throughout my fieldwork I was frequently reminded that local government had knowledge of spaces such as the warehouse but did not act because this would have further alienated voters who were already highly critical of Spanish and Catalan administrations at the height of the *Indignado* movement of 2011. According to various sources, West Africans learned of the value of "occupying" buildings and searching for scrap metal from their close contact with *gitanos*, a means of getting by that was initially sanctioned by local police. According to Faouzi, a de facto bar owner in the warehouse, it was this contact with *gitanos* and this implicit authorization that led to the consolidation of places such as the warehouse.

> It began with Joseph, from Ghana, who lived there, worked with the *gitanos* that lived there before; the *gitanos* lived there before we did. And then they evicted the *gitanos* and Joseph told us there was this place, if we want to occupy, we can do it. I told others, and they also wanted to occupy. We went there on a Thursday, I remember, on a Thursday, in 2011. And then the police came and said, "No, no, no, no, you cannot occupy this week, until next week." Because they had evicted the *gitanos* that same week, so we cannot occupy that week, until next week. We said, "Ok, we're leaving, we'll return next week." They themselves, the police, they told us, "Yes, you can, but not right now." We left and returned in a week. We went there and after a few days the police came. They identified us with our papers, and then they themselves promised us, "Here you can live and work without problems." We said, "Ok, agreed, that's what we are looking for.

Because Faouzi had "papers," he felt confident demanding his housing rights be respected. From this account and others like it, the police were interested in Faouzi's "papers" in so far as it allowed them to do their job of identifying the de facto inhabitants of the place and establish a means to take future action against this unlawful yet temporarily protected use of private property. The "promise" from the police suggests there was no political interest to act against these "occupations." Indeed, I documented various accounts of West Africans learning of the existence of the warehouse from their social worker or similar institutional figures, who would recommend

these spaces as an alternative when they were no longer eligible to continue receiving aid[29]. "If I were the city government, I'd ignore the law," a Spanish woman who was a regular of the warehouse once told me. "They are all gathered up here, they don't cause any trouble in the middle of Plaza Catalonia or anywhere else, you know?" This sense of being "gathered up" is important, for it suggests the "irregular settlements" formed part of a broader political process to govern a non-EU citizen population that was undocumented, unemployed and in need of housing. In this regard, the proliferation of these "settlements" was not a sign of unstructured neglect but rather a kind of tacit authorization that afforded local government leverage to act.

The Barcelona Ombudsman (Cat. *Sindica de Greuges de Barcelona*) was the first to formally bring the existence of these spaces to the attention of the city government in 2010, reminding public authorities of their legal obligations as signatories of the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City to defend "the right of nomads to be in the city in conditions compatible with human dignity" (Síndica de Greuges de Barcelona 2010:193). With the newly elected government of Xavier Trias in office (2011-2015) at a time of great political tension concerning the question of housing, these "settlements of an exclusionary character" (Síndica de Greuges de Barcelona 2010:146) became an immediate priority. "The first thing that the new authorities targeted, what worried them a lot, were the settlements," a city employee working in the department of immigration of the city government told me. "They had to do something. Something!"

The new government created the Office for the Plan of Irregular Settlements (Cat. *Oficina del Pla d'Assentaments Irregulars*) in 2011 with the immediate task of assessing the situation and

[29] Although squatting was made illegal in the mid 1990's, it is still largely decided upon by judges who often dictate in favor of de facto residents when property has been abandoned for a number of years before occupation and is in ruins, and/or where property owners have not been denied their right to residence in the property in question (Vilaseca 2013:28-29).

presenting proposals for an immediate intervention. For this task the OPAI, as it is known in Catalan, relied on established contacts with local NGOs and cultural associations to generate formal reports and evaluations for concerted interventions. Throughout these efforts, the need to safeguard people's "dignity" remained in the foreground, precipitating and substantiating a kind of politics in which the protection of life as universally discernable rather than socio-historically embedded took precedence.

"City of God"

I saw Fara enter and stand at the bar from my spot near the space heater, calling on Assane to sell him two cigarettes. He turned to examine the room. His face instantly transformed upon seeing me. "Arturo, *kaay, kaay*[30]." Curious, I responded and walked to the bar. Fara exited as soon as he had his cigarettes and change, signaling for me to come along. I followed him to the 4-foot metal barrel right outside Assane's door, where Seidou stood alone, warming his hands over a bed of red, hot embers. "Here," Fara said, handing me a small case. "Give me 20 euro and it's yours." Fara was wearing a sports jacket that looked new over a shirt that I had seen him wear for days. His shoes, like the bottom of his pants, were black from the oil and grit that covered the ground floor of the warehouse. Seidou threw a couple pieces of wood into the metal barrel. Fara rubbed his hands over the embers and the small fire that was now appearing as I examined the camera. I opened the case and found an older Casio digital camera, with a functioning battery and an SD card still in the slot. "It works, it's a good camera," he assured me. I declined and handed it back to him. "10 euro, give me 10 euro." I declined again. "8 euro, 8 euro and it's yours." I shook my head. "Ok, give me 5 euro. It's a good camera." I began formulating an explanation

[30] Wolof: *kaay* is the imperative of "come here".

when he abruptly cut me off. "Fine" (Cast. *Vale*), he said, taking the camera and leaving me bewildered by the brevity of our social encounter and the fluidity of the price of the item.

Before entering Assane's bar I heard a familiar voice. "*Sama xarit!*"[31] Mor was wearing his usual work clothes, stained with oil and torn from the occasional snag with some sharp metal object. He asked me to wait for him while he went into Assane's bar to buy a cigarette. Seidou had been standing next to me at the firepit in silence. I asked him about his day as I waited for Mor. "I swear to you," he began, with a stern look on his face. "This is like *City of God*!" I observed our surroundings from this perspective. Mounds of rubbish along the corridor, scrap metal inside carts that had once belonged to local supermarkets, firepits and make-shift walls, bare electrical cables nailed to the outside walls running from space to space cohered into an image that was unlike the Barcelona one would normally imagine. Intrigued, I asked him for details. "This is like a favela," Seidou responded. "Nobody's got a job here; we're all living however we can." Seidou's evocation of the "favela" called forth many interpretations, one of which was the saliency of poverty and the various ways that people "responded to exploitation, domination, and the patterns of inequality that have been imposed on them from above" (Goode and Maskovsky 2001:16).

Seidou's comparison also signals the absence of the state and the prevalence of violence in the warehouse that came as a result. Fara returned to the firepit, greeted Seidou before a football rolled near his feet, something that further contributed to this evocation of urban Brazil. He intercepted and kicked it back to Robert, a man from the French-speaking half of Cameroon, and moved to the middle of the corridor ready to receive the ball again, his eyes fixed on the ball now at Robert's feet. Robert kicked the ball back to Fara just as Mano stumbled out of Faouzi's bar a

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[31] Wolof: The expression "sama xarit", which translates to "my friend", was a common means to show appreciation for someone. In Castilian, Wolof speakers used the expression "mi hermano", which translates to "my brother", to show this similar kind of appreciation.

few doors down the corridor. One of Faouzi's regulars came out behind him, his fists clenched and in pursuit. Mano, whose real name was Babacar, earned his moniker because he was constantly hitting objects and people with his open hand in a manner that, while generally playful, consistently got him in trouble. I would later learn that on this occasion Mano had drank from this person's bottle after having been warned to leave him alone. Mano sped up his pace down the corridor, stopping next to Fara in a failed attempt to take possession of the ball through fancy footwork before sprinting again as the disgruntled man, now with a restrained smile on his face, came within arm's reach. Mano's shrieks and loud complaints, undecipherable and often identified as a sign of mental health problems for many in the warehouse, continued unabated as he turned right and vanished from sight. Fara and Seidou laughed, each stating at different intervals. "He's crazy!" Fara said. "See what I mean?" Seidou asked rhetorically, adding, "This is nobody's house, people live how they want here, they fight, they cause trouble, you know? I swear to you! This is like City of God."

A predominant idea in local institutions was that the warehouse and others like it were violent and inhospitable places. "The more normal people," Xabier, a city employee, stated during an interview, "They lock themselves in their rooms and don't go out at night." He insisted on the high degree of danger in these places, of fights that took place at night and over the weekend, and the profound emotional impact of living under such volatile conditions. The threat of violence, Xabier argued, created an unsafe environment that worsened people's general quality of life, but also led to a greater propensity toward at-risk behaviors, specifically the abuse of alcohol, which could then lead to serious mental health issues.

> Not everyone but there are people that are showing signs that they have been affected, that they are mentally affected (Cat. *pobres mentalment*), because, well, they have taken up alcohol or I don't know what, or marihuana, and so, there are some, and this is another profile, they are people that are, the longer time that they are in this situation the worse they are, because they deteriorate, they deteriorate. The people that are a bit better, when they arrive here, many of them arrive and they

> quickly leave to a calmer place, because at night it is very dangerous there. There are fights, there are … it is dangerous, people lock themselves away. The more normal people lock themselves away, they don't leave their rooms.

The evocation of a standard "normal" manner of behaving, thinking and feeling was a dominant theme throughout my fieldwork. The use of tobacco, alcohol and marihuana was widespread, but these were not consumed in same manner, often reveling different moral stakes that merit closer attention. While the correlation between "drugs" and "mental health" is important, it was systematically confounded in institutional discourse and presented as a primary reason why the so-called "irregular settlements" were untenable based on putative objective criteria rather than political motives. Xabier's statement that many people "quickly leave" seems to imply these were inhospitable places that only the most hardened or "mentally affected" individuals could endure for prolonged periods of time, those whose sense of "normal" had vanished and thus willingly or inadvertently participated in a social world that was categorically outside of acceptable models of sociality. But as my fieldwork suggests, facile descriptions of the warehouse as a violent and inhospitable place fail to take into account the qualities people valued in such spaces and the broader political, legal and economic forces that had precipitated such social realities in the first place. During our interview, I asked Xabier to elaborate on the kind of "calmer place" he had in mind, specifically given that "illegal" status inevitably creates around it "a field of illegal practices" that perennially places people in the cross-hairs of state intervention (Foucault 1979:280, cited by de Genova 2002:422). He stressed this was a "complex situation" that had no straightforward solution and as a result required a transversal intervention with the full cooperation of everyone involved, especially people relying on the irregular settlements.

While the threat of physical violence was undoubtedly part of the warehouse, it was generally seen as a final recourse for the vast majority of inhabitants, a potential symbolic and material resource to be employed only when dialogue or other tactics failed to curb an immediate

danger or a problem from becoming more chronic. Assane shunned the use of violence as quotidian recourse but nevertheless acknowledged that it was necessary at times given the marginal legal status of the warehouse. Assane recounted an occasion in which an obstinate customer who had been prohibited further entry into Assane's bar on account of not paying his tab and causing trouble entered with a large iron pipe and a "crazy look" on his face and begun swinging with the aim to destroy Assane's business. He was quickly restrained by people in the bar and thrown out, where Assane tackled him to the ground. Angered by the broken liquor and beer bottles that fell as he threw the iron pipe across the bar, Assane reached for a large glass bottle on the ground and unsuccessfully tried to break through the human wall that was now protecting the disoriented culprit, intoxicated by a combination of licit and illicit substances. A small group led him away while another group tried to restore a sense of normalcy with Assane, who was, as he described, "Ready to break his head." This person never set foot in Assane's bar again, which Assane attributed to his ability to show he was willing to protect his business against such unfounded actions by whatever means necessary.

Physical violence in the warehouse was often reactionary and targeted. "People who cause trouble," Seidou told me in an interview, "can't put up with this (Cast. *no pueden aguantar*). They *think and think* but they don't find a solution (Cast. *piensan y piensan pero no encuentran ninguna solución*)." This emphasis on "thinking" was rife throughout my fieldwork, often identified as the single most important cause of mental health people faced on account of their structural position in Spain. In this sense, the seemingly irrational recourse to violence by some is best interpreted as a means to cope with exogenous life conditions beyond personal control. Indeed, to externalize negative emotions onto an external object within one's immediate field of experience represents a means to create new terms of engagement and imbue a complex social reality with new and

potentially more favorable meaning. In this sense, the risk of physical violence in the warehouse was overwhelmingly moments in which people aimed to externalize their anxiety and distress brought upon by circumstances beyond their immediate control onto a field of social meaning where they experience greater autonomy over the world around them (Jackson 2005:42-45).

An "irregular settlement" visited during period of fieldwork.

Seidou's evocation of the favela points to an implicit kind of structural violence that impacted people in a myriad of ways difficult to identify and address. In her research with asylum seekers in the US, Bridgette Hass argues the liminality people experience as they wait for a decision on their application created a kind of "existential limbo" that was characterized by a "sense of immobility" (2017:76). Citing Pierre Bourdieu, Hass argues asylum seekers were caught in a liminal state of waiting as both potential "citizens-in-waiting" and "deportees-in-waiting" that was experienced as a painful breach "between one's subjective aspirations and the objective possibilities of realizing those aspirations" (2017:81). Beyond the potential risk of intermittent physical violence, Seidou's evocation of the Brazilian favelas points to this broader kind of insidious violence in people's everyday life that was experienced as a breach between subjective

aspirations and objective possibilities in the cosmopolitan city that had failed fulfill its promise as a place of equal rights and opportunities for all.

"Blade Runner"

Among the earliest descriptions of the warehouse were not by way of comparisons to the *favelas* of the major urban centers of Brazil but rather to the *barraques*[32] of major cities throughout Spain. "These are the barraques of the 21st century," an author in a major Spanish newspaper wrote. "Like the ones from the 20th century, with cartons, scraps and plastics" (López 2012). The increasing use of abandoned industrial buildings by working class non-EU citizens was initially depicted as a re-emergence of "shanty-townism" (Cat. *barraquisme*) in the city, this time propagated by "people who have lost their jobs, many without papers" (Barcelona Televisió 2012). Despite the overlap with the experience of working class migrants in the post-Civil War period, these early media depictions mobilized implicit assumptions regarding "immigrants" in Spain today as racialized others, a key variable that enabled a particular reading of people's experience independent of their own interpretation.

> There are differences between the barraques of the 20th century and these of the 21st century: in the chabolas of Somorrostro or La Perona[33], there were entire families; in the industrial buildings of (a particular neighborhood in Barcelona), the majority are men – young, alone and strong. Men who on the phone from call centers (Cast. *locutorios*) narrate an unreal image of Europe of opportunities to a family who depends on them. They don't say anything about the scrap metal (Cast. *chatarra*), the business with which they poorly survive (Cast. *mal sobreviven*); they don't explain the overcrowding of the warehouses where one can endure (Cast. *aguantar*) only if he belongs to a clan with a leader; they don't explain anything about the scrap metal that is sent to Africa with trucks of Moroccans and that fill their continent with scrap metal/rubbish (Cast. *chatarra*). That scrap metal/rubbish (Cast. *chatarra*) is what they take apart in those warehouses, using blowtorches and muscular arms, in images that link this Barcelona of 2011 to the city of *Blade Runner*, more than to the Barcelona of the 50's (El Periodico 2011).

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[32] *Barraca* (pl. *barraques*) is the Catalan term for make-shift abodes constructed by migrant workers in cities to meet their housing needs. In other parts of Spain, the term *chabola* (pl. *chabolas*) is preferred. These structures emerged following the industrialization of the Iberian Peninsula in the 19th century, but expanded exponentially in the post-Civil War period and continued to be a staple of the urban landscape until the early 1990's. Initially, the term *barraca* referred to a make-shift construction for storing farming/fishing materials, or temporary housing (RAE 2016).

[33] Somorrostro and La Perona were prominent neighborhoods in Barcelona comprised of barraques.

By describing inhabitants of the "21st century…chabolas" as "strong" with "muscular arms" and part of "a clan with a leader," this news article conjures up dominant folk ideas in Spain surrounding people from Africa, establishing a criterion of race-based differences to workers from the past century experiencing similar housing challenges. Their alterity is further amplified by the author's description of these spaces as akin to the dystopian reality of the science fiction film, *Blade Runner,* a film about fugitive drones that co-exist "illegally" with humans and are systematically hunted down to execute their removal. Based on this account, people live in an alter reality where they "narrate an unreal image of Europe of opportunities," conceptually removed from the desperate means they rely on to survive (Cast. *mal sobreviven*). In contrast to the Barcelona "of the 50's," people relying on the industrial buildings today are construed as inhabitants of a non-normative dimension that is incongruent with the self-image of the city in the 21st century. This account is a clear example of a kind of subtle and implicit racism that is experienced as a flagrant violation of personhood for those who suffer it firsthand (Hill 2008). Indeed, this kind of racism passes undetected and thus often remains uncontested as it nullifies people's de facto presence in favor of a reading that best suits the Spanish-Catalan social imaginary of "immigrants" today.

The term "immigrant," which historically referred to people from rural areas in Spain moving to industrialized cities in and beyond the nation-state in search of work, gained new meaning when Spain joined the European Union (EU) in the 1980's. Today this term conveys images of underdevelopment that contrasts sharply with images of "Europe" as a place of affluence, technology and innovation. Virtually all of the people I interviewed had numerous encounters with Spaniards and Catalans in which they felt pigeonholed to a vision of "Africa" as a continent where everyone is famished and malnourished. "A few years ago," Seidou recounted

during an interview, "I was waiting for a friend on a bench and a little girl came up to me and gave me a bottle of water! I thanked her but it felt strange because I could see her mom and the little girl looking at me like, 'poor *little black man* (Cast. *negrito*), he must be thirsty!'" This vision of "Africans" put many people in a position of having to debunk absurd assumptions not only of their respective countries but of the entire continent. In an interview with Fallou after he was released from a Center for the Internment of Foreigners, he recounted an encounter with the National Police that nullified his urban background and the 6 years he had spent in Spain.

> There was one day that we were eating and my spoon broke because, you know, they give you a plastic spoon in there. We were at a table, there were three of us – another Senegalese, a Gambian, and me. The police were right there, next to us, you know, and I say, "Officer, can you bring me a spoon?" And the police said, "Why do you need a spoon? What would you eat with in your country?" Like he was saying that we don't use spoons and things like this in our country! And he says to me, "How would you eat in your country?" And I answer, "What do you think, that in my country there are no spoons?! In my country there are spoons as well! I eat with a spoon in my country. What do you think?!" "No, no, I thought that what we see in the documentaries," I don't know what. And I said, "Everything that they show in the documentaries are lies because they don't show you the good parts, you know, they always go where there is hunger, where there is no water, where there is no electricity, you know, and they film there. But if they film inside of the cities, the capitals, all of that, what we do, well, you will see, we are not as poor that we live in deserts!"

Like Seidou, Fallou enjoyed spending time at Assane's bar because it reminded him of his native Dakar – the movement of people, the loud music, and the frequent conversations over coffee or tea. And like Seidou, Fallou described this encounter with the police inside the Center for the Internment of Foreigners as proof of people's ignorance rather than active discrimination. But while Fallou and others were willing to grant people the benefit of the doubt, they were nevertheless offended by the fact that many Spaniards and Catalans defined Africa and Africans vis-à-vis a perennial absence, which was interpreted as a vestige of European colonial domination. In post-World War II Europe, scholars argue overt racism has given way to subtle and defeasible varieties, most noticeably in the overemphasis of cultural differences among "Europeans" and "immigrants," imagined as categorically "non-European." Etienne Balibar (1991) argues a "new

racism"[34] has emerged from the era of decolonization and the subsequent reversal of movement between the colonies and the colonizing powers, moving away from a "theory of races" in history to a "theory of 'race relations' within society" in a manner that naturalizes race-based notions of nationalism (1991:22). Verena Stolcke (1995) argues this conflation of modern notions of citizenship, national identity and the nation-state has given impetus to what she calls a "contemporary cultural fundamentalism" that pivots on the assumption of an incommensurability of cultural differences rather than "what were once assertions of the differing endowment of human races" (1995:2-4). No longer anchored to a discourse of biological-genetic difference, these new modalities of alterity emphasize the "insurmountability of cultural differences" in their production of a new kind of racism that "does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions" (1995:21).

Inside an "irregular settlement" visited during fieldwork.

[34] Balibar's definition of this "new racism" merits citing in full: "It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions" (1991:21).

The reference to *Blade Runner* is an example of this kind of racism that is difficult to identify precisely because it operates by way of dominant national assumptions of a "citizen" self and an "immigrant" other. Whereas the term "immigrant" today encompasses the "Third world" poor, the term "sub-Saharan" signals a radical quintessential other qualified by their absence of all that which characterizes the hegemonic idea of "Europe" in the 21st century. In this regard, racism emerges as a "symbolically transmitted and reproduced relation of domination" (Staudigl 2012:32) that reflects a "global hierarchy of human superiority and inferiority, politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced for centuries" (Grosfoguel et. al. 2015:636). A critical apprehension of a space such as the warehouse needs to be approached in relation to colonialism and imperialism, wherein a global division of labor and the incessant need for domesticated labor-power precipitates structures of material and symbolic domination of people today identified as "immigrants" in the EU and elsewhere around the globe (de Genova 2005:123). Despite the common experience of working class citizens in the 20th century living in *barraques* and working class non-EU citizens in the 21st century relying on abandoned industrial buildings, the insistence that these were radically different evidences underlying processes of alterity that are often left unchecked. The designation of these more contemporary housing arrangements as "irregular settlements," I argue, show how these processes of alterity are inscribed into the law itself.

Voluntary Return

In 2011, the Department of Quality of Life, Equality and Sports[35] of the Barcelona government commissioned a report to gain more information on the resident population that "occupies industrial buildings in disuse[36]" in the city. This initial study identified 22 industrial

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[35] *Àrea d'Esports, Salut, I Qualitat de Vida*

[36] *Pla d'Assentaments Irregulars.* The office of Conflict Management Services (*Servei de Gestió de Conflictes*) conducted this initial report.

buildings or vacant lots that were being used by approximately 270 people for housing and work with scrap metal. A year later the city government estimated there were 62 settlements with more than 730 people. Formally recognized as a particular subset of the homeless population[37], the city government divided groups by nationality and cultural criteria, creating three distinct sub-groups: "Romanian Gypsy" (Cat. *Gitano Romanes*), "Autochthonous Gypsy" (Cat. *Gitano Autocton*), and "Sub-Saharans" (Cat. *Subsaharians*). This typology, I was informed, served to design specialized programs and interventions according to the particular needs of each group. Of these sub-groups, "Romania Gypsy" was the largest, followed by "Sub-Saharans," who, despite being smaller in number than the two "gypsy" categories combined, became the focus of city government interventions. Despite the fact that the living conditions and type of work was the same across these groups, the decision to prioritize "Sub-Saharans" reveals important political, legal and ideological imperatives that merit closer analysis.

Prolonged periods of "illegality" have been the norm for millions of working class non-EU citizens in Spain since immigration became a major demographic force in the late 1990's and early 2000's. For the vast majority of my Senegalese interlocutors, their "irregular" status felt like a "disciplinary apprenticeship" (de Genova 2002:429) in which attempts to "claim a place among the people" implied a prolonged period of punishment (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012:254). Based on her research on Central American struggles to gain legal status in the US, Susan Coutin (1998, 2003, 2005) argues undocumented migrants face a unique predicament of being physically present in a state's sovereign territory and yet being barred from exercising the rights such presence conventionally implies. With their rights limited and access to services restricted, Coutin argues "the undocumented therefore exist in a nondomain," one she calls,

[37] The terms *sense sostre* (Cat.) or *sin techo* (Cast.), which translate to "without roof," obviate the very fact that the warehouse offered, if anything, a roof to inhabitants.

"spaces of nonexistence" (2003:29). For Coutin, such nonexistence is "like a force field that sets them apart from the legally privileged" (2003:30), rendering many "commonplace actions such as working, traveling and driving illicit" (2003:33). While Senegalese I interviewed endured the everyday abjection of legal nonexistence, local institutions faced the formidable challenge of incorporating a "non-existing" segment of the population without violating state immigration law.

If the question of "illegality" of people, spaces and practices was a strong impetus to intervene, underlying this was a sense that the warehouse represented a violation of conventional norms and expectations, a kind of illicit way of life that called for immediate attention. With the possibility of gaining "papers" largely contingent on proof of employment and "social integration," a certain "moral economy of deservingness" informed these interventions, one based on the tacit conviction that "irregular migrants" were required "to accumulate official and semiofficial proofs of presence, certificates of reliable economic and legal conduct, and other formal emblems of good citizenship, especially – but not only – with a view to future legalization" (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012:243). The use of abandoned buildings was not deemed a criminal offense given housing laws that protect de facto residents. Moreover, the collection of scrap metal, which was by far the single most important form of work in the warehouse, was not in itself illegal in the city of Barcelona. While certain activities were clearly "illegal," such as the buying of scrap metal[38] or the selling of tobacco, alcohol or marihuana without a license[39], activities which could have justified unilateral police action, the qualifier "irregular" implied a breach of a normative order rather than a violation of the law as such. In this regard, the politics of deservingness were upended not because of a legal infringement but because of a mode of operating in the city that was outside

[38] Collecting items from the street that have been discarded is not illegal. As I detail in later chapters, buying scrap metal without a license or strict anti-theft and safety protocols is categorically illegal.
[39] Spain has seen the emergence of "cannabis clubs" since 2010, which permits the consumption of this otherwise illegal drug within "member only" premises (Kassam 2014; Tremlett 2010).

of the state sanctioned model of incorporating working class non-EU citizens. Phrased differently, whereas the reliance on alegal forms of livelihoods did not bear on the legal status of Spanish or Romanian "gypsies," for working class non-EU "Sub-Saharans" such livelihood threatened their legal status, as in the case of Faouzi and others with "papers," or more pressingly jeopardized any institutional strategy to incorporate people without "papers" and as a consequence fettered to a space of nonexistence within local government. The incorporation rather than expulsion of this segment of the de facto resident population of Barcelona bearing the brunt of the economic crisis was important during this specific period in the early 2010's following unpopular austerity measures and the sweeping social unrest that ensued. Despite the fact that Barcelona felt less punitive than other administrative areas in Spain, the threat of deportation loomed large and was from the very beginning seen as an important factor when designing a concerted intervention.

Among the early proposals was a pilot program for the "voluntary return" of Senegalese citizens in the so-called irregular settlements. There are at least four reasons why the city government targeted Senegalese citizens. First, unlike their "gypsy" counterparts, Senegalese citizens were not from the EU[40] and thus fell under the General Regime of Spanish immigration law, which meant they were susceptible to deportation in the absence of a valid residency permit. By facilitating the "voluntary return" of undocumented Senegalese citizens, the city administration offered a more humane alternative to "forced return" (i.e., deportation) as stipulated by immigration law. Second, among the inhabitants from West Africa, Senegalese citizens have the strongest cultural associations and networks in Catalonia (Sow and Mercader 2005), which was deemed an invaluable resource to "raise awareness" among potential participants. Third, unlike other West African countries, Senegal established bilateral agreements with Spain in 2007 for the

[40] Romania joined the European Union in 2007 and Romanian citizens were granted the right of travel and settlement to Spain two years later.

swift repatriation of "irregular migrants" in exchange for developmental aid (Aja 2012:143; Asín Cabrera 2008; Romero 2011), agreements that facilitated the logistics for establishing a voluntary return program, as well as providing the stipulated aid for a development project once in Senegal.

Of particular interest here, however, is the fourth reason. In contrast to people under the Romanian or Spanish "gypsy" categories, who were framed as "itinerant populations," the formal stance discursively framed Senegalese as having "failed" to achieve their objectives as "immigrants" in Spain. In other words, in contrast to "itinerant populations" for whom residence in informal and precarious settlements was assumed to be a way of life, it was assumed Senegalese "wanted to return" to their country of origin but lacked the means to do so. This position was clearly evident in the report by the Department of Quality of Life, Equality and Sports of the Barcelona government:

> …from the municipal administration of Barcelona and for the special interest to find an exit for very complex juridical-administrative situations, the aim has been to give an option that goes beyond social emergency aid. This pilot program comprises a proposal of voluntary return and of re-integration with guarantees in the country of origin through training for those people in vulnerable situations who have seen how their migratory project has failed[41].

As can be seen in this excerpt, the proposed voluntary return program was conceived "not as an expulsion but as a finalization of their migratory process" because it was concluded that Senegalese had "failed" as immigrants in Spain. The pilot program was launched in early 2012 and included job training and its corresponding documentation in Barcelona, as well as financial aid once in Senegal to kick start a small business, such as buying a taxi or paying rent for a small shop. Individuals' lack of "papers" was a major constraint in the type of training programs that could be made available or how such financial aid would be obtained and allocated[42]. Indeed, the program's emphasis on integration in Senegal rather than in Spain meant local public authorities

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[41] Tinència d'Alcaldia de Qualitat de Vida, Igualtat, i Esport. *Mesura de Govern: Projecte Pilot de Formació per al Retorn i Reintegrament Voluntari al Senegal.* September 5, 2011. Pp. 5.

[42] La Caixa Foundation, a private entity, provided funds to establish a business in Senegal.

could avoid the myriad of constraints that the “nonexistence” of illegal status implies in the EU. Although well-intentioned, the voluntary return program was overwhelmingly rejected by would-be participants because the continuation of “integration” at the local level was effectively denied and now restricted to the country of origin (on dominant ideologies surrounding integration see Rodriguez Garcia 2010), but also because the language of this program framed people as having lost control of their lives, which was antithetical to Senegalese transnational models of personhood.

Of the more than 500 interviews conducted with potential participants, less than 10 people agreed to return to Senegal (Síndica de Greuges de Barcelona 2012:157). Overwhelmingly, the people I interviewed at the Office for the Plan of Irregular Settlements were puzzled by this outcome. Reflecting on the failure of the voluntary return program, Marc, a city employee, stated: “Based on our analysis, they (Senegalese) were living in a very, very deteriorated and vulnerable situation, and so it was very possible that many wanted to return but the problem was that they didn’t have money to return.” The failure of the program was especially perplexing given the fact that would-be participants would have received financial aid to start a business in Senegal. Marc succinctly captured this sentiment. “It didn’t work and you say, ‘but they are telling you that they’ll help you to begin to live over there!’ It didn’t work and I don’t know why.”

Arguably, the failure of this voluntary return pilot program could have been predicted. The Spanish government of socialist Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, introduced a nation-wide voluntary return program in early 2009 that continued into the period of my fieldwork[43]. This program was directed to non-EU residents who were unemployed and, rather than exhaust their unemployment benefits in Spain while they search for a job, could claim these benefits in the form of a check before departure and a second check once in their country of origin.

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[43] Spanish Government, Ministry of Employment and Social Security, General Secretary of Immigration and Emigration, Program of Voluntary Return of Immigrants, Facts and Figures 2009-2014. Online: http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/Retorno_voluntario/programa/index.html

Although it was directed to all non-EU residents who had worked and contributed to social security, the majority of those who participated in this program were from South America[44]. While hundreds of thousands of people moved to Spain from South America in the 1990's and 2000's because of sluggish economies throughout the continent and an economic boom in Spain, this quickly changed following the 2008-2009 economic crisis. The steady recovery and expansion of South American markets in the early 2010's, coupled with eased travel restrictions to the EU, meant citizens from South American countries were much more inclined to participate in a voluntary return program than citizens from other economic regions, especially in light of the fact that participation in this program entailed losing one's residency permit and remaining out of the EU for a minimum period of 5 years.

Citizens from African countries faced an inverse scenario. Continued economic stagnation and increased restrictions on mobility to the EU meant the nation-wide voluntary return program was generally unpopular from the very beginning with them. While multiple factors may contribute to the unpopularity of "voluntary return" among citizens of African countries, the structural circumstances stand out as particularly important. At the same time that visa restrictions for tourists were eliminated for South American citizens, further restrictions have been imposed for citizens of African countries traveling to the EU. This has been part of a concerted effort to eradicate "illegal immigration," justified by the imperative to "save lives" and crack down on "human trafficking." Also included in this initiative is the increased militarization of land borders along the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla and investment in private and public security regimes surveying international waters in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea (Andersson 2014:109-130). At the time of fieldwork, for example, citizens from Morocco comprised more

[44] Figure from 2009-2014, citizens from Bolivia (3,250), Argentina (1,925), Brazil (1,913) and Ecuador (1,653) represented the largest groups participating in the national voluntary return program.

than 770,000 residents in Spain, or approximately 15% of the total "immigrant" population[45], and yet only 22 people participated in the national return program from 2009-2014. Similarly, with mounting visa restrictions and increased "dissuadable" measures capable of inflicting life-threatening injuries[46], the decision to leave the militarized space of the EU was not taken lightly by would-be Senegalese participants.

Outside Society

If the "irregular migrant today is the regular migrant tomorrow," as one city employee stated in an interview, the warehouse was conceived as a breach of the conventional model of integration and as such was deemed institutionally untenable. In an interview with Luis, an employee at Humanitarian Crisis Relief[47] (HCR), the warehouse was described as a "ghetto" that "protects the group," among other special "functions for people." This reference to the "ghetto" was common throughout my fieldwork. This term implied inhabitants were directly or indirectly responsible for aggravating a "complex situation," as Luis contended, doing more to exacerbate a condition of social exclusion than ameliorate it. But whereas supporters of the irregular settlements defended the possibility of political organization and mobilization, for Luis and other institutional employees the description of these spaces as "ghettos" implied a certain kind of false consciousness that delegitimized ways of life and marked calls for political change as beyond the realm of possibility. From this perspective the irregular settlements represented a clear case of

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[45] Instituo Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), accessed May 5, 2015. Available online: https://www.ine.es/

[46] A poignant symbol of the mounting barriers to the EU faced by working class citizens of African countries is the addition of razor wire to African land borders, first introduced by the government of socialist prime minister, José Luis Zapatero in 2005 (Rodier 2013:56), later removed following public and political outcry in 2007 (Sanchez 2013), but re-introduced by the center-right government of Mariano Rajoy in 2013 (Blasco de Avellaneda 2013).

[47] As noted in the introduction, this is a pseudonym to protect the confidentiality of the people I interviewed affiliated with this NGO.

social exclusion, a term frequently used yet seldom, if ever, defined. I pressed Luis for a definition during our interview.

> Arturo. And when you say, "social exclusion," what are you referring to exactly? How do you define "social exclusion" in this context?
>
> Luis. Ah, very, very, very close to the concept of social marginalization, I mean, the situation was, in my point of view, a space that, a space that generated and produced exclusion, and by exclusion, I mean people left outside of society. By outside we understand, well, outside of the standard that we have in our society. The longer you were in there, the further away you were from our society. In fact, something that worried us was what we called, entrapment, no?

Luis' definition of "social exclusion" is representative of how the warehouse and other similar spaces I visited were discursively framed in local politics and administration, characterized by an overarching conviction that these were spaces "outside of society" far removed from "the standard" across society. Moreover, I documented the concomitant conviction that people stayed in these spaces because they were "trapped" by their own misguided thought-processes or the misguidance of unscrupulous others. From this perspective, these spaces "generated and produced exclusion," as Luis states, as a result of individual volition rather than structural forces. Such a move was pivotal in the government of migrant "illegality," one that is qualified in practice not so much by the legal "nonexistence" of people but by a series of interventions aimed at conscribing people into normative state operations, either in the form of forced or voluntary removal or incorporation.

Inhabitants of the warehouse were accused of failing to produce an acceptable migrant subjectivity, one that is sanctioned by "papers" and is therefore economically productive within the formal labor market. More egregious, however, was the sense that their failure to produce this state-sanctioned subjectivity represented a sociocultural aberration of the very raison d'être of the "immigrant" category in the contemporary global political economy. According to Zygmunt Bauman (2004), the global expansion of capitalism has created large populations that are systematically rejected from the global market, marked as redundant and superfluous to its

continuity and sustainability, and a kind of "human waste" of modernity in their embodiment of "the inarticulate yet hurtful and painful presentiment of their own disposability" (2004:28) in which "there is no self-evident reason for (their) being around and no obvious justification for (their) claim to the right to stay around" (2004:12). The figure of the "immigrant," Bauman further argues, is often met with hostility in European destination countries because it embodies this quality of global waste or, more specifically, "imported waste" (2004:83). The warehouse was increasingly portrayed in local politics, administration and mass media as a container of an excluded and marginalized population that struggled to remain despite the fact that they lacked a strong reason to do so. Rather than forcefully remove people during a time of mass popular unrest, the political response to the so-called irregular settlements was to secure the well-being of people rather than acting on the radical alterity they unwittingly embodied when ultimately executing an eviction.

Returning to my interview with the HCR staff member, Luis contended the warehouse represented something akin to a segregated microcosm or, as Bauman states, a "mini-society" that reproduced aspects of the city that "served the daily needs and life pursuits of residents with a degree of security and at least a whiff of the feeling of *chez soi*, of being at home, unavailable to them outside" (Bauman 2004:81, italics in original). In this regard, the notion of the "ghetto" implies a kind of self-management among a specific group of people whose experience is determined by a history and continuing legacy of systematic segregation (Portes 1972). But Luis' use of this term is rhetorical, a means to delegitimize whatever "functions" or "protections" the warehouse may have offered. If we were to critically assess this term, then "ghettos" as Luis referred to them represent "socio-spatial constellations" with "underlying ties that firmly anchor them in the metropolitan ensemble - albeit in exclusionary fashion" (Wacquant 2008:46, 231). In

other words, the designation of these spaces as “ghettos” imply important underlying connections to society that Luis negates by claiming these were spaces categorically “outside of society” and in opposition to established standards. In contrast to this view, for the Recycling Labor and Trade Union of Catalonia (Cat. Gremi de Recuperació de Catalunya) the warehouse represented a site of great economic potential, one that had to be properly regulated rather than completely eradicated in order to further maximize the wealth it produced. And it is this wealth produced through “irregular” means that was of great value to people, mainly as economic capital but also as sociocultural capital with significant transnational meaning.

Conclusion

The warehouse existed because of the structural positioning of people as “irregular migrants” in Spain, whose unemployment directly undermined their claims for political recognition and equality. For people with “papers,” record-high unemployment made the warehouse an equally valuable resource to make a living. Efforts to remove people from irregular settlements without the use of force have been mired by rejection. Unemployed and precariously housed, the initial voluntary return program assumed individuals preferred returning to their country of origin than continue living in what were frequently referred to as “ghettos.” The failure of this initial program led city officials to devise another approach premised on a similar notion of “failure” on the one hand and the need to act with compassion on the other.

Chapter 2 – The Need to Intervene

By Coast

Mor returned to the firepit with a cigarette between his lips. He worked in the mornings and rested in the afternoon and evening, a routine that allowed him to see and talk to friends as most people unwound after a long day. This routine gave him a sense of order and stability, a key characteristic of such everyday activities (Ehn and Lofgren 2010:80), but also a sense of autonomy as it was one that he had crafted. At the firepit outside of Assane's bar, Mor asked me about the United States and the possible ways to enter. He had contacts that lived in New York City, a place he often imagined himself living in and trying out his luck. Seidou had left minutes earlier with a friend who had stopped at the firepit and said something in Mandinka while gesturing to the far end of the corridor. Although Seidou bid us farewell with a smile, I would later learn someone had stolen two mountain bikes from his open-door workshop that eventually led to an altercation with the presumptive culprit.

The main corridor, which was U shaped in 20-meter segments, was now buzzing with activity. It was early afternoon and people were coming back to sell their finds and have lunch, many returning to work after taking a break. My conversation with Mor was cut short by the arrival of Dauda, who placed his cart behind him before swinging his arm around Mor's shoulders and greeting us enthusiastically. "I know him a long time!" Dauda said, looking at me. "We're from the same neighborhood in St. Louis! Same street, same friends, everything! But I didn't know him until I came to Spain! We met here; I didn't know him before." Like Mor, Dauda's clothes were noticeably marked by his line of work. But unlike Mor, who wore neon yellow trousers with a grey sweater, Dauda wore cargo pants with a bright neon yellow vest. They each

had their work gloves, Mor in his trousers and Dauda in the hoody sweater underneath the vest, ready at hand, a sign I learned to interpret as a person's readiness to take advantage of any opportunity to make money collecting objects to recycle or resell. "Yeah, my brother is good friends with his friends," Mor added. "We met coming here, I swear to you, first time, coming here." They each recounted this story in separate interviews, specifically when we talked about the role of fate and destiny in a person's life.

Many of the Senegalese people I met and interviewed during my fieldwork had entered Spain via the Canary Islands from the coast of Senegal, The Gambia or Mauritania from 2006-2009. While Senegalese moving to Spain can be traced back to the 1980's (Kaplan 1998), it is not until the early 2000's that Spain became a major destination for people from West Africa (Jabardo Velasco 2006; Rodriguez Garcia 2004; Sow 2007). Following increased surveillance along the Mediterranean Sea, people began using local fishing boats to travel to the Canary Islands in the mid-2000's (Andersson 2014; González Ferrer and Graus 2012; Rodier 2013). Mor and Dauda traveled to Spain by boat in the summer of 2006 and first met while in detention in the Canary Islands. Originally from the coastal city of Saint Louis, Dauda and Mor were both raised in the neighborhood of Corniche on the Senegal River. Although they shared common friends in the neighborhood, they never met given their age difference as well as different family labor traditions. Born into a family of fishermen, Dauda worked with his father, uncles and brothers since he could remember. In contrast, Mor was born into a family of woodworkers and had similarly spent much of his free time in his family's business when not at school or with friends. Both were expected to continue their family labor traditions when they independently decided "to try their luck" in Europe by sailing to the Canary Islands from the coast of Senegal. Mor was the first to travel. He

had a friend who knew the captain of a fishing boat, which resulted in a reduced fare[48]. Mor spoke to his older brother about his plans to travel, who expressed his concerns for his safety but ultimately agreed to inform the rest of the family and the mother of his daughter only after he had departed. He was in his early 20's, a couple of years Dauda's junior, when he departed Saint Louis.

Dauda's experience at sea proved advantageous. Weeks after Mor's departure, Dauda was offered the opportunity to sail a fishing boat carrying more than 150 people to the Canary Islands. Unlike Mor, Dauda spoke to his parents about his desire to travel to Europe, who pressed him to stay. He agreed the idea was foolish but continued with his plans in secret. On the day of his travels, he bid his mother and father farewell as he often did when he went out to spend time with friends without giving them a reason to suspect anything out of the ordinary. That evening he went to the designated location where a large fishing boat had been dragged to the sandy beach with a large group of people surrounding it. He was let on the boat and sat near the motor. The person in charge collected 1000 euro from each passenger except Dauda, whose voyage he paid with his labor. They spent 6 days at sea before they were intercepted by the Spanish Coastal Guard off the coast of the Canary Islands. They were transported to the Foreigner Detention Center in Tenerife and placed in holding areas for further processing. Dauda remembers many Senegalese in the holding area and by chance speaking to Mor who had arrived a few days before. "He told me he was from Saint Louis. We talked, we knew the same people, we had the same friends!"

Dauda and Mor remained in detention for a month before they were released and subsequently relocated to the mainland. While Spanish immigration law stipulates anyone detained entering the country without a visa must be promptly "returned" (Cast. *devolución*),

[48] The fare for this form of travel depended on many factors, from social contacts such as Mor's friendship with someone who knew the captain of a boat to knowledge and skills to sail a boat such as Dauda's (Andersson 2014:36-37).

Dauda and Mor were released after having been held for the maximum period of detention permitted by law at the time[49] because of logistical obstacles they partially created, namely traveling without a passport and refusing to identify their country of origin[50]. Faced with an increasing number of undocumented arrivals to the Canary Islands who could not be repatriated or detained longer, the central Spanish government began relocating released detainees to the mainland. But in order to control these flows[51], the central Spanish government began placing them under the care of NGOs offering humanitarian aid, a process that was later codified by legal reforms the following year[52]. Dauda was flown to Madrid and Mor to Barcelona, where they were each placed under the care of a participating NGO before they each turned to their social networks to secure long-term housing and employment in the informal economy.

They crossed paths in Barcelona in 2011. Dauda had lived in Madrid and Andalusia for four years, selling imitation designer bags in the Spanish capital and collecting olives near the city of Jaen over the winter months. On two occasions he came close to securing the coveted job contract to apply for a residency permit, the last of which was mired by the onset of the economic crisis. With the prospect of a legalized future more elusive, he decided to move northeast in search of new opportunities. He stayed with friends in the city of Granollers north of the Catalan capital, where he began collecting carton and scrap metal as a way to avoid further encounters with the police and jeopardize his clean record. He soon included trips to Barcelona in his work routine given that scrap metal was more abundant. Through local contacts he discovered Senegalese and

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[49] The maximum period of detention in a Center for the Internment of Foreigners (CIEs) was raised from 30 days to 60 days in 2008.

[50] In 1991 Spain signed bi-lateral agreements with Morocco for the swift repatriation of undocumented migrants, rendering anyone of Moroccan citizenship increasingly vulnerable to face deportation when entering through such informal channels (Holert and Terkessidis 2009:39). Spain signed similar agreements with Senegal after this so-called "avalanche" in the Canary Islands in 2006 (Andersson 2014; Rodier 2013; Romero 2011).

[51] In 2000 and 2001, people were relocated to Barcelona, Madrid and other cities without institutional aid, leading to large concentration of North and West African people in central public plazas. This in turn strengthened migrant rights groups, which arguably the state government wanted to avoid.

[52] Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración – Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Real Decreto 441/2007.

others using what appeared to be abandoned industrial buildings for housing and work. The first time he visited one of these spaces he found Mor at the helm of a make-shift bar. They immediately recognized each other, and after a long afternoon catching up Mor offered to help Dauda find a spot in the building. The limited employment opportunities in Granollers coupled with unfavorable living conditions motivated Dauda to move in.

In the warehouse, more than half of the approximate 300 inhabitants had arrived "by coast," as is referred to in immigration law. Of this group, the majority had arrived in 2006, the year in which 32,000 people reached the Canary Islands in what was soon referred to in Spanish mass media as the "year of the patera" (Naranjo 2006). While such form of entry represented less than 5% of all immigration flows that year (Rodier 2013:98), over-reporting inevitably transformed the *patera*[53] into a dominant, value-laden sign in the Spanish social imaginary (López and Losa 2007). But of particular interest here is this object's impact on immigration laws, for "sub-Saharan Africa" soon became a priority in Spanish external affairs for the first time in recent history[54] (Alberdi Bidaguren and Bidaurratzaga Aure 2008; López Sala 2007:237; Romero 2011). It is important to underscore that despite the rhetoric of developmental aid, the ensuing bilateral agreements had as their principal aim the establishment of "procedures for an immediate repatriation of immigrants who access national territory in an irregular manner[55]". Eduardo Romero (2011) argues the question of "illegal immigration" was a strategic "smoke screen" in a new "scramble for Africa" that would extend Spanish hegemony in the area by cementing its "tentacles through its military, diplomatic, economic and cultural presence of the Spanish state in sub-Saharan African"

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[53] In Spain there are two principal terms to refer to these fishing boats, *patera* and *cayuco*. Although interchangeable, the latter originates from the Canary Islands whereas the former is etymologically similar to the French term, *pirogue*.
[54] The Spanish Minister of External Affairs traveled to Dakar and other West African capitals during this period to broker agreements that would foster the development of African countries, maximize the economic potential of natural resources for Spanish companies, and formalize cooperation strategies in the regulation of migration flows as part of Plan Africa 2006-2008.
[55] Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación. Plan de África 2006-2008. Pp. 9

(2011:93). Although a detailed analysis of Spain's presence in West Africa is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note these diplomatic moves had and continue to have an important impact in the everyday lives of Senegalese living in Spain or planning to move to the EU via Spanish sovereign territory.

The differentiation these agreements make between "illegal immigration" on the one hand and the "illegal immigrant" on the other is of special importance here. Whereas the fight against "mafias that generate profits (Cast. *lucrarse*) with the traffic of illegal people" legitimate the militarization of external borders and an array of punitive actions, the Spanish state's "scrupulous respect of human rights and International Law" is putatively upheld through the extension of limited forms of rights to "illegal migrants" as an exception to the norm[56]. Because Spain's "fight against illegal immigration" is never framed as against migrants themselves, this creates a distinct kind of politics around the imperative to protect the victims of unscrupulous others, a politics conceived as categorically different yet in practice inextricably part of a national and international industry in which "illegality" is not only produced but is also productive of certain kinds of governable subjects (Andersson 2012:274; Rodier 2013).

Beyond its impact in West Africa, these bi-lateral agreements helped consolidate the legal constitution of the "vulnerable migrant" in Spanish territory (Asín Cabrera 2008; Mullor 2011; Romero 2010, 2011). Legislation introduced in the mid-2000's established the form of entry known as "by coast" a basic criterion for identifying someone as "vulnerable" and thus eligible for certain kinds of humanitarian aid. More pressingly, this legally recognized criterion remained valid throughout a person's stay in Spain. As I was informed by an employee in a NGO affiliated to the Plan of Irregular Settlements, "If they came 'by coast' (Cast. *por costa*), then this gave them

[56] Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación. Plan de África 2006-2008. Pp. 9-10.

an advantage (Cast. *un plus*)." As this employee went on to explain, "It's an advantage because it comes from the very subsidy requirements in the Real Decree that says that there is a priority for people who entered by coasts." The law he is referring to – Real Decree 441/2007 – authorizes the allocation of state subsidies to NGOs and other institutions that provide humanitarian aid to "immigrants who are in a vulnerable situation due to physical deterioration and the lack of social and family support and economic means, and who arrive on Spanish coasts or form part of settlements that represent grave social and hygienic risks and require programs of immediate action for their treatment" (RD 441/2007, Art.1.2). The codification of "vulnerability" in immigration law is significant because it creates the very criteria that local institutions turn to when framing certain lived experiences as objective and pertinent, while others, specifically a person's hardship and distress as an "undocumented migrant," is determined to be beyond local institutions' purview.

Proof of having entered "by coast" in the form of detention papers from the Canary Islands or records of NGO assistance following relocation to the mainland granted some individuals "an advantage" against other inhabitants when interacting with NGOs or the city government. The fact that this was the case draws attention to two interrelated points. First, "vulnerability" has become a dominant criterion for determining the probationary inclusion of working class non-EU citizens who are otherwise categorically excluded from the body-politic. Second, from this perspective it is possible to see how the term "irregular settlement" forms part of a concerted effort to align this space and "homeless population," whose conventional incorporation was mired by "migrant illegality," within the legal dictates that permit local administrations to extend aid, services and limited protections. Within this legal framework, "vulnerability" was ascertained on a case-by-case basis, as was any claim for state support that may have derived from it. The

discursive framing of these spaces, then, reflected much more than an objective and neutral apolitical reality.

Non-Priorities

"You see, we don't bother anyone," Dauda said as he placed a large book of coins he had found earlier that day back inside the cart. "We are only working with *chatarra*[57], you know? But the police, they make trouble for us." We were outside Assane's bar talking while warming our hands over the firepit Mor had just fed with scraps of woods. Dauda's statement prompted Mor to tell us of a recent encounter with the *Mossos,* the Catalan police force, who had stopped him and asked for his "papers." He gave them his *volante de empadronamiento*, or registration with a local municipality, instead. "One of them asked me, 'why do you do chatarra?' I say, 'to fix our trouble with eating,' you know?" After handing him back his document, the police continued questioning his motivations. "Another told me, 'you know it's bad for your health,' don't you? He asks me like he's scolding me. I tell them, 'do you have a job for me? Give me a job and I'll leave this cart.' They shut up." The fire crackled. Unfazed, Mor continued. "Why did I leave my country, come here? Why did I come here? To work, you know, we all come here to work, make money, send to our families, you know? But there is no work, so now what? We are persons, we need to live – this is why we push our cart!"

When we first met, Mor lived in a two-bedroom apartment with 10 other people less than 5 minutes away. A friend of his who had since moved to Andalusia in search of work had negotiated with a local *gitano* to "open" the apartment after it had been repossessed by a major

[57] Unlike the Catalan term, *ferralla,* whose etymology is the term, *ferro,* or iron, the Castilian term to refer to scrap metal, *chatarra,* encompasses a broader parameter of semantic meaning. Unlike the Catalan term that signals the metal composition of an object, the etymology of the Castilian term is from Basque and means, "that which is old" (*Real Academia Española,* Accessed May 5, 2015. Online: https://www.rae.es/). Its current usage in Spain refers to metal objects in particular and to objects that have been discarded and are of little value in general.

Spanish bank. Unlike the warehouse, such apartments, which emerged by the thousands in the wake of the housing crash and the exorbitant number of evictions that followed[58], did not receive the same kind of attention from the city government[59]. In my interview with Joan, a city employee in the Office for the Plan of Irregular Settlements, I asked him to explain this discrepancy.

> Joan: Those are the (irregular) settlements. And then there is another situation that we know about but does not figure in our priorities, which are the over-occupied apartments. There are many over-occupied apartments, but well, the priority is the irregular settlement. Once someone says, "Now the over-occupied apartments," then we'll address the over-occupied apartments.
>
> Arturo: And why are the (irregular) settlements a priority?
>
> Joan: Well, because we understand that people are more vulnerable, no? They are in a more precarious situation. An apartment, whether you like it or not, has a roof, it has, there is (running) water, they can shower, they can, there's a kitchen, there are utilities, right? They are over-occupied they have all of this; a settlement doesn't have all of this. It doesn't, it's an irregular place, there is no (running) water, there's no electricity, trash accumulates there, there are dangers, there are fires, and so on.

The idea that the "over-occupied apartments" offered certain advantages over the irregular settlements was rooted in dominant assumptions rather than concrete field data. Considering that "there are many over-occupied apartments," which are by definition outside of the law and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to take full account of, it is illusory to speak of them as a homogenous whole. Because of their marginal legal position, over-occupied apartments may not have formal access to utilities, leading to haphazard tactics with potential deadly consequences. A fire in an over-occupied apartment in El Vendrell[60] in March, 2014, for example, killed four children and seriously injured the parents and two surviving children. The family had been evicted from this same apartment in 2011, but returned shortly thereafter to "occupy" after it had been repossessed by the bank. The father, who was unemployed, collected scrap metal he sometimes kept inside the apartment (Pérez Pons 2014). Like many "over-occupied apartments," the family

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[58] From 2008 to 2015 there have been more than 400,000 evictions throughout Spain, the majority of which are in Catalonia (Delgado 2015).

[59] Political neglect and inaction led to the creation of the Platform for those Affected by the Mortgage (*Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca*) in 2009.

[60] El Vendrell is in the province of Tarragona, Catalonia approximately 40 miles from Barcelona.

in Vendrell relied on make-shift electrical installations and a collection of butane gas tanks to meet their most basic needs. Thus, having access to conventional living spaces (e.g., kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, etc.) does not in itself translate to a safer environment.

The living conditions at Mor's apartment were comparable to those I documented in the warehouse, namely in regards to similar precarious electric installations, accumulated butane tanks for heating, and amassed bags of clothing and suitcases, among other potential fire hazards. There was no running water and the electricity was syphoned from an apartment on the first floor that in turn "pinched its power" from the municipal grid powering street lights and traffic signals[61]. I visited Mor's apartment on multiple occasions, and from what I gathered this apartment and others like it exhibited many of the same characteristics that people highlighted when they discussed the reasons why an eviction of all "irregular settlements" was absolutely necessary. Further along in our interview Joan changed his initial position.

> So, I believe it's more … those who establish the priorities are politicians. Is the person in a settlement more vulnerable? Not a priori. It's possible that there are also people who are very vulnerable in the over-occupied apartments, right? The over-occupied apartments are like another ball park (Cat. *estadi*). For example, we would see people who work in street vending (Cat. *venda ambulant*), they have an income, they have some income, they can share their resources, well, it's also a situation of exclusion but not as much as the others. It's another dynamic. Well, once we have more resources, maybe then someone will prioritize the over-occupied apartments.

The irregular settlements and the over-occupied apartments share many of the same qualities (e.g., lack of running water, electricity) and risks (e.g., eviction, potential fire) and yet the former were prioritized over the latter for reasons that were fundamentally political in nature. A central reason for this prioritization was the legal umbrella mentioned above, one that recognized certain spaces as more "vulnerable" than others. But another reason was the fact that the irregular settlements were much more visible, whereas the over-occupied apartments were conveniently out of view and, thus, out of mind. In this sense, the irregular settlements were similar to the *barraques*

[61] To "pinch the power" (Cast. *pinchar la luz*) means to syphon electricity outside of official protocols.

in that they problematized an image of Barcelona as a middle-class, cosmopolitan city, which has been especially central to the overall economy since the 1992 Olympics (Delgado 2007).

Containers and trolley chained to a bench near an "irregular settlement."

The creation of what is the "Barcelona brand" today required displacing any vestige of abject poverty. Although the history of make-shift housing among the working class moving to the city in search of jobs can be traced back to the advent of industrialization in the mid-19th century, it was not until after the Civil War that *barraques* or *chabolas* became a formidable presence in the urban landscape across the country. By the 1960's the number of people living in these make-shift abodes in Barcelona was over 100,000 or approximately 7% of the city's population[62] (Lopez 2010, 2013). The tacit neglect of these housing arrangements by public authorities changed following the death of Franco in 1975 and the subsequent state-wide transition to democracy.

Ahead of the 1992 Olympic Games, the city government relocated the last residents to new, high-rise public housing and officially declared the end of *barraquisme*[63] in Barcelona. Many

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[62] Approximately 40,000-50,000 people lived in similar make-shift houses in Madrid, Valencia, and Bilbao, respectively (Tatjer Mir 2011:56).
[63] This is a profound moment in the history of the city given the vast scope of shanty towns throughout Franco's regime. Whereas the number of these informal constructions had virtually remained the same since the 1930's, by the late 1940's and early 1950's census data indicated exponential

critiqued the city government, however, of eradicating "horizontal barraquisme" while fostering "vertical barraquisme" due to the low-quality materials, poor transit connections and lack of nearby public services of the newly constructed high-rise public housing now far removed from the city center or other areas of interest ahead of the Olympics (Tatjer Mir 2010). In a similar vein, a central point of contention about the irregular settlements was their visibility in the public sphere. But unlike residents of the barraques, the legal status of people today made certain interventions possible (e.g., voluntary return) while restricting others (e.g., public social housing), drawing attention to the manner in which discourse creates objects of government in accordance to a changing ideological optic and an emerging hegemonic point of reference.

A Complex Situation

Although the voluntary return program failed to meet its target objectives, officially it was touted as having improved the lives of participants, as well as having produced much needed information regarding a poorly understood segment of the resident population.

> Some of the direct results of which we are referring to include six people who returned to their countries, which implies six new life projects and the improvement in quality of life of these people and their families. But we have also obtained some secondary results, which we understand are very positive and have allowed us to establish rapport between people from the immigrant Senegalese community that find themselves in a situation of extreme vulnerability and the city government of Barcelona. Today we can affirm that we now have a better understanding of the characteristics and necessities of this population (Cat. *col·lectiu*) and that they know better the channels to seek aid (Cat. *d'apropament*) within the city government of Barcelona that will facilitate the taking of decisions in the global plan of irregular settlements the city government is elaborating[64].

The claim that those who participated in the program experienced an "improvement in quality of life" for themselves and their families is unsubstantiated given that there was no follow-

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growth, with small concentrations of under 50 barraques in key sites of the city growing to hundreds or more during this ten-year period (Oyón and Iglesias, 2010:32). In 1949 the state passed legislation that banned new constructions, implemented at the local level with a census of existing barraques and the placement of a plaque with an identification number on each one (Tatjer Mir 2011:45). Given the piecemeal approach to policy and enforcement under Franco's regime, the number of barraques continued to grow despite the ban. The number of barraques surged to over 439,000 from 1950–1960 and to 800,000 between 1961-1965, alone (Ferrer 2010:72).

[64] Ajuntament de Barcelona, Acta Consell Plenari. October 4, 2012. Pp. 25.

up of the program in Senegal. The program provided the logistical and financial support to return to Senegal and initiate a "new life project," but this was done with the allusion that returning to Senegal would immediately allay a person's suffering. A Senegalese activist summarized this dynamic in the following manner: "They left them there and expected things to go well, some with money, others only with training. Who knows how things went in a week, in a month, in a year!" In my interviews with city employees, I was told they did not have formal data on the evolution of the program in Senegal but based on their collaboration with members of Senegalese cultural associations in Barcelona had reason to believe people had experienced an improvement in their lives. The fact is, however, this program operated on the assumption that people would experience an immediate improvement once in their country of origin without additional aid following their initial "voluntary return."

To build on some of the "secondary results" of the pilot voluntary return program, the city government partnered with Humanitarian Crisis Relief[65] (HCR) to continue their outreach to Senegalese in the settlements. HCR is an international NGO delivering various forms of aid, resources, and services throughout the country. It is among the largest NGOs in Spain with a substantial system in place in Barcelona. Analogous to other NGOs whose work historically focused on the autochthonous unemployed, elderly and disabled, HCR initiated programs directed to non-Spanish citizens in the 1990's to cover their basic needs, such as housing and orientation with the legal system. HCR divided its intervention in the warehouse into three broad categories – humanitarian aid in the form of food, clothes and sheets, mediation in "situations of risk," namely regarding children, families and others with special needs, and information regarding more general administrative and medical care procedures. In their time inside and near the warehouse[66], I noted

[65] As mentioned in the Introduction, Humanitarian Crisis Relief (HCR) is a pseudonym.
[66] I documented an active presence for a period of 6 months.

general indifference, if not overt resistance, toward HCR personnel. Those who were critical of HCR argued the aid was incommensurate with their need to work and was thus perceived to be inadequate or worse, a ploy to force people to abandon the only source of income they had. Based on my own experience, I did not see HCR allocate any form of material aid in the warehouse, an observation that was corroborated in an interview with Emilia, an HCR employee. "While doing our work, well, we gave support, humanitarian aid, food, medical aid, covering basic necessities. But above all, the aim was to raise awareness of the situation itself and try to offer an alternative so people can exit the irregular settlements."

HCR was initially contacted by activists and inhabitants seeking assistance aimed at improving the living conditions *within* the settlements. After their first visit, however, HCR team members determined the situation was "much more complex" than what was initially assumed, one that required a different kind of intervention than what may have been expected. The decision to override inhabitants' demands was justified based on closer analysis of "the situation," one that was described as clearly "not appropriate" and "not good" for the physical and psychological well-being of inhabitants. The decision to ignore calls to improve the living conditions of the warehouse reflects an institutional will to align these spaces to the broader structure of public administration. Against accusations of biased assessments, conflict of interests or even "treason," HCR employees I interviewed remained steadfast in their resolve that their position was objective and neutral. Emilia conveyed this position succinctly during our interview.

> There were people who had a very, very limited understanding of the situation – their situation – and their future. And so, we knew from the very beginning that our discourse would not be welcomed because it went against the discourse of other, other entities that were much more possibilitistic (Cat. *posibilistic*), no? We always said our discourse was technical, not political. Clearly, everyone has their own political ideas, and personally I can agree that everyone have documentation (residency permits). But if a person is not within the purview of the law, we should say, 'you are not within the purview of the law.' And this was our task, very individualized so that people could at least gain an evaluation of their situation.

To be aware of a "situation" implies knowledge of a certain context and one's relationship to it and within it. Jarrett Zigon (2015) has argued a "situation" is best conceived as a "nontotalizable assemblage" that "falls upon us" and in which we "get caught up," providing "the conditions for possible ways of being, doing, speaking, and thinking" (2015:503). In this regard and from the "technical" perspective of local institutions, the "complex situation" people faced went beyond housing and the desire to work, and comprised the variables under state rather than local jurisdiction aimed at incorporating each individual as part of a determinate segment of the non-EU citizen resident population, either as a "legal migrant" or an "illegal migrant" working toward a legalized future. The HCR rebuffed demands to improve the living conditions of the warehouse because these actions would have tacitly authorized this mode of being and belonging outside of clearly marked state categories of government. Therefore, the HCR offered access to municipal homeless shelters and temporary housing in pensions following an eviction, but refused to acquiesce to people's demands to equip the warehouse to continue working with scrap metal, insisting this was "too possibilistic" and taking a firm stand that the only manner to access the labor market was to change one's personal attitude, behavior and general orientation in Spain. In this sense, the principal aim of the HCR was to foreground the "situation" of the non-EU citizen as one in which an individual's very presence is perennially contested unless they demonstrate a formal labor relationship in lieu of showing access to private funds.

In an interview with a HCR employee, Julia referred to people in the irregular settlements as in "a kind of limbo" outside of society without any clear plan to remedy their situation, which she suggested implied either to "return home because they haven't been able to do their migratory project" or work toward "anything that is useful for their migratory project." Like Emilia, Julia insisted people had a "very limited understanding of the situation" in Spain, something that was

clearly evidenced by their creation of a "world" that further distanced them from society. More pressingly, the irregular settlements in her opinion were "parallel worlds" that existed far removed from state recognized paths toward integration vis-à-vis "papers" and formal employment, and were therefore untenable for local administrations tasked with ensuring people comply with and ultimately inhabit state socio-legal categories.

> They've created these parallel worlds with people who are in the same situation as they are, and they continue getting by with the idea that 'I can be like this until things change.' But they aren't doing anything to change things! They don't have the skills or they don't know what skills to use to change things. For this reason, it is now a question of will, of betting on change.

The idea that people needed to change and yet did not possess the skills or knowledge to enact this change was dominant throughout my fieldwork. This idea had the immediate consequence of creating a wedge between everyday practice and corollary systems of meaning. In the excerpt above, the "parallel worlds" people created and relied on were paramount to an aberration that not only lacked a coherent logic but more importantly was not worth understanding outside the institutional imperative of dismantling them because they posed a material but also semiotic threat against a normative order. If "worlds" are made up by "densely intertwined knots" of nontotalizable assemblages that "constantly flow together and slip apart in a potentially infinite number of combinations" (Zigon 2015:505), then these "worlds" were far removed from the established institutional processes of conscribing people into "immigrant" subject positions as inscribed in law and in turn governing everyday practice according to normative models embedded in state structures but naturalized in dominant social imaginaries. Indeed, the argument that "they don't have the skills or they don't know what skills to use to change things" shows the manner in which discourse surrounding the "situation" of people, spaces and practices was tied to "cultural system of ideas" that implicitly function to constitute a specific social reality charged with "moral and political interests" (Irvine 1989:255). By framing other dimensions of their "situation" as

irrelevant or an impediment to any long-lasting solution, it became clear local institutions employed discourse that was understood to be legitimate and transversal, and ultimately forced through a process of "erasure" of those "elements that do not fit its interpretive structure" (Irvine and Gal 2000:25). While HCR personnel insisted their speech about people's "situation" was neutral, my fieldwork suggest such discourse in fact mirror a "world" that corresponds to state biopolitics on the one hand and an erasure of lived experience on the other.

Technical Discourse

The contrast Emilia draws between "technical" and "political" discourse merits closer scrutiny. The term "technical" qualifies discourse as somehow free of politics and thus free of bias, whereas the term "political" renders discourse open to objection and transformation into a different, potentially competing, social reality. Limiting discourse to the "purview of the law" is itself a political act because it reifies "the law" as an immutable social reality and precludes channels for greater participation in the political process. Indeed, if "politics" is characterized by dissensus between the act of governing subjects and the experience of being governed (Rancière 2010), then the "technical discourse" of the Humanitarian Crisis Relief served to displace such dissensus and secure compliance within a particular model for the government of working class non-EU citizens. Demands for greater equality in the form of "papers" or specialized resources such as access to subsidized spaces to continue working with scrap metal were deemed "political" and *possibilistic*, and therefore beyond serious deliberation.

The decision to partner with the HCR is important because this humanitarian NGO actively worked to "plug itself in" and provide the kind of intervention it is "set up to do" (Ferguson 1994:69). Analogous to the internationally funded NGOs working on development projects in

Lesotho studied by James Ferguson, HCR reports and assessments acknowledged the need for revolutionary structural transformations but only offered "technical solutions to 'problems' which were not technical in nature" (1994:87). In this regard, the HCR was present to help draw this phenomenon within the "purview of the law" rather than advocate for change that met people's immediate and long-term needs. Indeed, their position was simple: anyone "not within the purview of the law" was by definition at fault of being "outside" of the law. The aim of the HCR, then, was to help people correctly assess their situation and abandon "political ideas" that were ungrounded in what was deemed administratively feasible and pertinent. The turn to humanitarian aid allowed the city government to continue surveying, processing and managing "irregular migrants" within the framework of a publicly funded but privately co-managed program independent of and at times in opposition to the demands of the recipients of this aid.

The "technical discourse" of HCR personnel was part of a broader process of producing a *type* of subject that could then be incorporated into local government more effectively. An illustrative example of how discourse enacts this kind of work is the case of the "Galician Portuguese" families, a subset of "Autochthonous Gypsy" group identified by the city administration as part of the larger "homeless population" relying on the so-called irregular settlements. As the master narrative following the success of the 1992 Olympic Games distanced the city from its recent history of barraques, an increasing number of families from the border area between Galicia and Portugal began to arrive in the city in the mid-1990's and began using vacant and unused lots to station their caravans in living conditions reminiscent of the not-too distant past. Of Roma descent and Spanish citizenship, these families lived in the shadows of the law for years. In the early 2000's a local NGO brought the issue of precarious housing to the attention of the city government and began mediating between the administration and the families. After a long and

arduous process of negotiations, the city government finally agreed to allocate resources and services to address their concerns. However, the families soon discovered the resulting program, known as the Social Services for Itinerant Gypsy Populations (Cat. *Servei d'Atenció Social a Població Itinerant Gitana*), extended the same resources the city administration had previously offered despite claims of offering specialized aid. Tomás, a member of this NGO supporting Roma families, described the ensuing situation in the following manner:

> Of course, in theory it was good because you think they (the administration) can accompany these families better, right? But this program does not translate to resources – the resources are the same and they are not adequate for the needs of these families. This can happen to other people, people with handicaps or people with other types of problems. The issue is the same – there is one type of resource and people need to adapt to it rather than the resources adapting to the people, you know? This is what we believe has happened with these families in this program. And they emphasized schooling and healthcare, but the whole issue of housing and work was not addressed precisely because they (the administration) were dealing with an "itinerant" population, right? So, we're not on the right path.

Demands for streamlined assistance to secure alternative forms of work and housing were relegated as secondary concerns before the administrative imperative of ensuring youth's formal incorporation into the local school system and families' inclusion within the universal healthcare system as a public health measure. The use of the term "itinerant" categorically placated demands for greater flexibility in the allocation of resources and services, and reified a distinct relationship vis-à-vis the city government shielded by expert knowledge. Tomás' critique is leveled against the political promise to create "specialized programs" that seldom, if ever, lead to new resources or services. Rather, the Social Services for Itinerant Gypsy Populations, akin to the Plan of Irregular Settlements, engendered a system for the management of populations that were unincorporated within the general operations of local administration.

The use of the term "itinerant" to describe these Roma families placed this specific population within an institutional milieu that made available certain resources while restricting access to resources destined to "permanent" residents. Indeed, the discursive categorization of

Roma families as "itinerant" effectively established the parameters for and limits of political intervention, and helped institutionalize normative operations that subsequently created political subjects conducive to local and state government. By 2011, more than five years following the introduction of the Social Services for Itinerant Gypsy Populations there were still more than 113 Roma families living in 17 locations, or "settlements," comprising a total of 441 people[67]. Continued pressure eventually led to the resettlement of most families in early 2015, with some excluded for failing to meet administrative requirements. As the resources offered within this "specialized" program were in actuality the same as before the program's existence, people were obliged to adapt to local administration, designed for mainstream modes of being and belonging that obviate people's circumstantial needs.

Language surrounding the warehouse was overtly and covertly political. Of special interest is the manner in which language drew phenomena within given political parameters, destabilizing and delegitimizing people's own perspectives while also sanctioning them for resisting expert knowledge regarding their place in society, a powerful mechanism embedded in such knowledge production and circulation (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2003:266). If the warehouse was a site of "advanced marginalization," as Luis phrased it, and "the margin is a real place" characterized by a lack of public infrastructure, formal economic opportunities, and political guarantees (Poole 2004:38), then the aim of public interventions was to act upon segments of the population "insufficiently socialized into the law" (Das and Poole 2004:9) rather than essay to counteract or dismantle the margins themselves. In their analysis of the state, Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004) argue the margins are far from peripheral to state power whose existence can be easily and practically eradicated (2004:19). Indeed, by acting within and through the margins, "between

[67] Tinència d'Alcaldia de Qualitat de Vida, Igualtat, i Esport. *Mesura de Govern: Projecte Pilot de Formació per al Retorn i Reintegrament Voluntari al Senegal.* September 5, 2011. Pp. 5.

bodies, law, and discipline," populations are reconstituted according to a state's changing ideological point of reference (2004:10). The case of the Roma families from the Galician-Portuguese border and of the so-called irregular settlements draws attention to the manner in which "marginalization" remains a political reality that needs to be managed and controlled.

In order to critically ascertain the role of language surrounding the irregular settlements, I approach the "technical discourse" of local institutions as determinate linguistic registers that are "associated with particular social practices and categories of persons" (Agha 2007:79), which allowed local institutions to establish "footing or alignment with figures performed through speech" (Agha 2005:40). Linguistic registers are powerful vehicles of social meaning that constitute rather than simply refer to a given social reality. A prominent example of the power of a linguistic register is in the clinical encounter, for this is language that is imbued with the social practice and persona of the physician and embedded in the broader field of power of the medical profession. A medical diagnosis is not neutral and objective, but rather reflects a hierarchy of power embedded in expert knowledge that cues speakers (e.g., a physician and a patient) to certain types of social practices, identities and contexts (Agha 2004). Of special importance here is the manner a linguistic register undergirds certain power dynamics that are readily assumed to be natural and thus apolitical. In a study on the special education placement process in public schools, Hugh Mehan observed the way statements from an expert were generally regarded as a more legitimate evaluation of a student's needs than that of teachers or parents (1996). In a specific example, a psychologists' use of technical terms linked his perspective to the domain of scientific expertise and, thus, requesting clarification of the psychologist was "to challenge the authority of a clinically certified expert" (1996:270). This "psychological register" enjoyed a privileged position in contrast to the "social register" of the teacher or the "historical register" of the mother,

whose assertions about the student's development and future needs were much more easily questioned and contested (1996:266).

A linguistic register is important in constituting social realities by delimiting the jurisdiction of expert knowledge and setting protocols for embodying and enacting social identities. The "technical discourse" of Humanitarian Crisis Relief can be conceived as an institutional register that narrowed the purview of debate, reflection and deliberation to a field of expert knowledge beyond the control of Senegalese and others. More specifically, the employment of this register, which could be described as a "humanitarian register," repositioned the "situation" people faced within the jurisdiction of what Didier Fassin calls "humanitarian government," that is, a field of power in which the question of "suffering" takes precedence over "rights" (2012). A humanitarian register mobilized but also validated a politics of "precarious lives" that put forth a discursive framework that authorized the city government to recognize undocumented migrants within a specific political-judicial category.

While the use of a humanitarian register made possible a form of incorporation of undocumented migrants that abated some of the ill effects of migrant "illegality," it nevertheless fell short of people's demands for equal treatment as residents and workers. As a consequence, this line of reasoning and the expectation that people act in a certain manner was systematically rejected as a ruse to "cheat" people to act against their immediate interests. The first step in this process of incorporation was to schedule an interview with the HCR in their main offices in Barcelona. Although he lived with friends in an "over-occupied apartment," Mor decided to look into and ultimately join the Plan of Irregular Settlements toward the end of my fieldwork. He described his first interview after speaking to HCR employees near the warehouse as the most rigorous. He was asked details of where he lived, the people he lived with, and the day-to-day

activities in his particular irregular settlements. Because Mor spent much of his free time in the warehouse and in his "occupied" apartment, he knew these spaces exceptionally well. Mor left the interview with a sense that the HCR had heightened knowledge of these spaces, a feeling he explored in numerous conversations with others in the warehouse, reaching the conclusion that such knowledge had been acquired through months of panoptical observations[68]. The woman interviewing Mor decided he fit the type of person eligible for the program and added him to an internal list of potential participants.

At the end of this interview Mor was given a document he was required to take to Social Incorporation Services (Cat. *Servei d'Inserció Social*). In order to formally join the program Mor needed to be a resident of Barcelona, which could only be verified by registering in a local municipal register. While this is generally a straightforward process for anyone moving residence in Spain, individuals without the required proof of formal residence (e.g., apartment lease) face significant challenges gaining their *volante de empadronamiento*. As a public institution that aims at "improving the life conditions of people who are on the street" (Cat. *Servei adreçat a millorar les condicions de vida de les persones que estan al carrer*), Mor's second interview at the Social Incorporation Services was pivotal to be officially identified as a "vulnerable" resident and gain access to the municipal public register as a de facto resident "without resources" (Cat. *sense recursos*). This interview was less rigorous than the first, and Mor was finally given a document to show at the corresponding municipal office so he could be entered into the municipal register. He was also assigned a social worker he now had to meet on a regular basis, a fact that turned many away from the prospect of seeking aid through the program.

[68] This was a common feeling I documented throughout my fieldwork. Whenever I asked city employees how they obtained their knowledge of a particular "settlement," a common response was, "we have our sources."

The final step involved visiting the district office closest to the Social Incorporation Services office to register as a de facto resident without a fixed address[69]. Of the three steps, this was described as the least difficult, largely because individuals had already been vetted by distinct institutions before reaching the district office. He offered the public servant his passport and the various documents he had been assigned, and was finally registered as a resident of Barcelona. With his "proof of registration" (Cat. *certificat de empadronament*), he was now eligible to apply for his healthcare card in the public healthcare system, a document that further attested to his de facto residency in Spain, as well as receive aid such as access to municipal homeless shelters and services under a social worker in Barcelona. This tedious process of visiting different offices and undergoing various interviews was fundamental to gain a degree of incorporation within the local formal social fabric despite lacking the pertinent state authorization as a non-EU "immigrant" to do so on par with EU citizens.

After his first meeting with his social worker, Mor was assigned to a room with three other beds in a pension in the city center. His request for a space to leave his shopping cart was quickly denied. As a participant of the program, Mor was prohibited from visiting any other irregular settlement and was tacitly instructed to cease any further involvement collecting scrap metal. Despite this prohibition, he continued visiting the warehouse. He was assigned to various soup kitchens where he could have breakfast, lunch and dinner, and was placed on a list for training courses, specifically in waste collection. On the second day at the pension, he found his cart was no longer chained to the light post where he had left it the night before. He managed to buy another one at Omar's chatarreria that same day, but struggled to find a place to leave it at night in the city

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[69] With an increasing number of unemployed workers moving to Barcelona in search of work after the 2008-2009 crisis, the city government no longer permitted an *empadronamiento* without a formal address. Inhabitants of the irregular settlements enjoyed an exception to the rule given the political priority to address their situation.

center. His new routine of visiting soup kitchens, training facilities, mandatory language courses, and his social worker's office made it much harder for him to work during the day and make money to spend in Barcelona but also send to his family in Senegal. His social worker lamented this predicament but assured him this was a smart investment of his time. After three weeks Mor decided to leave the pension and moved back into the over-occupied apartment. A week later he quit the program all together.

By the end 2014, approximately 540 people had gone through the interview process to receive some form of aid and of these 350 had abandoned the program all together[70]. City employees and Humanitarian Crisis Relief personnel I interviewed rebuked this behavior, often framing this as proof of the need to continue "raising awareness" among a segment of the population living in a "parallel world" in the city. By repudiating the "technical discourse" of institutions and the change in behavior this implied, people qua "immigrants" were marked as deviant and their activities "the canonical hallmark of an assimilation process that has become pathological" (de Genova 2005:84). Indeed, through the use of a humanitarian register people's behaviors, motivations and interpretations were systematically devalued with the authority of expert knowledge, framed as a deviation from a normative standard of migrant integration that had to be immediately addressed and reconciled. What this "parallel world" meant to people is the focus of the next chapter.

Conclusion

The political identification of the spaces people relied on for work, housing and leisure signals the manner in which the city government was prepared to engage with them. The

[70] These figures were provided by a city employee involved in the Plan of Irregular Settlement.

designation of these spaces as "irregular settlements" corresponds to legal categories that make available limited forms of political recognition and material assistance. In contrast to Roma families from the Galician-Portuguese border who also relied on abandoned spaces and the collection of scrap metal, Senegalese were categorized in local policy not as an "itinerant" population but as a non-EU citizen *foreign* population whose needs were initially conceived as best met in their country of origin. In the wake of general opposition, the city government turned to humanitarian aid to mediate the political and legal identity of this segment of the resident population. The humanitarian register employed in subsequent policy and practice created a means to move beyond a punitive approach, which would have been politically damaging following mass public unrest in the early 2010's. The legal-political category of the "vulnerable" migrant provided a specialized form of government that aimed not at meeting the needs of participants but of easing their incorporation into the formal operations of local institutions. Because people experienced this as a blatant incongruence between discourse and action, the Plan of Irregular Settlements was systematically rejected, many preferring to continue maximizing the use-value of spaces such as the warehouse until an inevitable eviction.

Chapter 3 – A Good Place for Waiting

Being a Correct Person

Mor was in his late 20's when we met. He abandoned the program because he felt he was unable to "get by," a feeling he characterized as "doing nothing" other than eating. "I am a man," he stated once during an interview. "I don't like people always helping me. I also like to do my own things, my life, to work and if I have a problem, I can look inside my pocket to fix it." To invest time in activities that did not generate money was perceived as a state of immobility and as a sign that one was failing or had failed. As long as one continued to "move" to make money (*ñafe* in Wolof; Cast. *moverse*/*espabilarse*) it was possible to ascribe worth to one's activities in Spain in the absence of the ideal economic situation of having a stable job in the formal labor market. "I didn't come here just to eat," Mor emphasized. "If I thought this, then I'm better off in my country to eat! I didn't come here to just eat – I came here to work, you know?"

The Plan of Irregular Settlements essayed to procure a person's housing and nourishment needs independent of their input and evaluation. As such, they privileged what Abraham Maslow called "basic needs," such as food, drink and sleep, while neglecting more "complex needs," including the need to belong to a social group and experience affection (i.e., "love needs") and the need to have a positive evaluation of oneself, respect from others, and prestige/status within social contexts (i.e., "esteem needs") (1943:376-382). While the warehouse was far from anyone's ideal in Europe, given the circumstances it was generally described as an important resource to work toward meeting basic and complex needs, fulfilling these at different degrees and intervals. If human needs are "culturally malleable in their content, their strength, and in the ways they are satisfied" (Kesebir et. al. 2010:316), determined by the historical context in which they are

experienced, then the warehouse represented more than a place "just to eat" – it was also a place to have a sense of oneself as a complex being in the world.

The feeling of being autonomous was generally described as a means to work toward one's need for self-realization, a complex need central to a person's sense of self (Maslow 1943). Babou, who often teased Thierno for being a Real Madrid fan, remembers exiting Sants Station, the main transport hub in Barcelona, keen on finding a "fellow country" (Cast. *paisano*) to help him gain a stronger foothold in his new city. He described this early experience as evidence of his desire and ability to meet his own needs as he struggled to "get by" in the city. In his early 30's when he first moved to Barcelona, his drive to be autonomous was an easily identifiable sign of his personal resolve and his will "to be a man."

> In the street, I speak to him, he responds in my language, the language of my country, in Wolof, and I tell him, 'I need a place to sleep until tomorrow,' and so on. And he says, 'Come, let's go to (my neighborhood).' When I went there, the people live in the warehouse, I slept there for two, three days, then I searched for my own cart (Cast. *carrito*), to also go earn my own living (Cast. *buscarme la vida*). I want to earn my own living (Cast. *ganarme la vida*) like everyone else, you know? And no one helps me. Every morning I go search for my own chatarra, I go search in the street, I go search for my own chatarra.

Babou's trajectory into this specific labor niche was a common experience for many people I worked with. Babou's interest in finding a "fellow countryman" was to secure access to a social network to ease his incorporation into the urban fabric of Barcelona. Babou's statement, "I go search for my own chatarra," goes beyond the simple act of finding residues to recycle for a marginal profit. Babou foregrounds an important link between object and subject by emphasizing the pronoun (e.g., I went, I searched, I want, I go, etc.) and possessive pronoun (e.g., my cart, my living, my chatarra, etc.) that helps him project a particular sense of self in his everyday efforts to fashion a determinate material reality.

Thierno, who was three years older than Babou, searched for *a paisano* in the hopes he spoke Wolof as he stepped outside of Sants Station in a similar predicament of being new in the

city without any contacts. He found someone along Josep Tarradellas Avenue pushing a cart with two large bed frames. Sensing an opportunity, Thierno approached the man and offered to help. Accepting his offer, Thierno loaded his bag under the bed frames and helped support the bed frames for the 10 kilometers back to the warehouse. I asked Thierno for his first impressions, as this was a new labor niche for him in Spain as well, one he had not considered as an option before moving here from Senegal. Like the vast majority of people I interviewed, he remained ambivalent about this sort of work because of its low economic output. My ethnographic data corroborates a study conducted by the Recycling Labor and Trade Union of Catalonia (Cat. *Gremi de Recuperació de Catalunya*) that found approximately 60% of "informal scrap metal" collectors earned approximately 8 euro per day. Moreover, Thierno remained ambivalent toward scrap metal because there was little hope in establishing greater stability in regards to "papers." He counteracted this ambivalence by remaining confident things would soon change, drawing examples from history to make his point.

> Well, what I thought – nothing. Because in life everything can go, everything can change as well. One day a person told me, I was talking to him, he said something and I told him, 'sure.' And he told me, 'No, Thierno, *nothing* is for sure. In life everything can change.' He was right. Look at (Muammar) Gaddafi. Gaddafi had a good situation, look at his end – that's life. Look at Saddam (Hussein). In life everything can change. If you have a good situation, one day it can change. If you have a bad situation, one day it can change, you know? In life nothing is sure/certain.

While people expected to earn 5 – 10 euro whenever they trekked the streets with their cart, it is important to stress that "searching" was inexorably a matter of luck; a person could just as well find a highly valuable object to resell as he could meet someone with a promising job opportunity. Like Muammar Gaddafi or Saddam Hussein, whose opulence throughout much of their respective regimes seemed at times inviolable, one's fortune would naturally change as long as one waited and continued to try.

The drive to acquire a cart to "go search" for scrap metal draws attention to a person's struggles to meet their "basic needs" with the hopes of fulfilling more "complex needs" as well.

Babou and Thierno consistently framed scrap metal as a privileged means to do just this, to "fight" against unfavorable odds as they waited for their "luck" to change. In this regard, to search in the broad sense of the term meant more than simply locating objects of potential value to resell – it was a term that drew attention to the inseparable link between objects, behavior and intersubjective understandings of what it is be a "correct person" independent of the law. To be "a correct person," I was often reminded, meant to endure trying circumstances and to continue moving forward in a way that did not directly inflict harm on others. Stealing, cheating and violence were readily seen as the polar opposite of what it meant to be a "correct person," even if one could generate more income through these activities. Rather, a "correct person" was one who persevered through the enactment of work that was socially acceptable across transnational Senegalese networks. This was succinctly formulated by Thierno during an interview:

> A correct person is someone who works. We are here to work; we have to fight (Cast. *luchar*). For me this is a correct person. That's what there is (Cast. *es lo que hay*) – scrap metal – this is what we have, we don't have anything else. If we don't search for scrap metal, how are we going to live? I don't have a job, we don't have anything. That's what there is (Cast. *es lo que hay*), you have to do it. There is nothing else.

The etymology of the term "effort" implies[71] a certain kind of value that reflects positively on the subject of the act. Scrap metal generated income that fulfilled the immediate exigencies of caring for one's own basic needs, a fact that was widely recognized by external observers. Seldom recognized, however, was the significance of work in Senegalese cultural understandings surrounding personhood. To work despite unfavorable circumstances meant one remained committed to core personal and social values within and beyond Spain, which was evidenced by one's efforts rather than economic output alone. Indeed, the value of being "a correct person" is not diminished by assertions that "we don't have anything," for the core value is one's commitment to personal and social prosperity that may not necessarily materialize into the objective economic

[71] From Old French, *est forte,* which can be literally translated to "is strong" (Klein 1966).

output that is desired. A "correct person," therefore, must nurture an unwavering will to continue trying, "moving," "fighting" beyond life's exigencies.

Waiting for Change

Mamadou spotted me as soon as he turned the corner. I was still at the firepit in front of Assane's bar, now chatting with Adil, a Moroccan man in his early 40's who had stopped to greet Mor and ask him about a flat-screen TV set he had recently found. Mamadou approached us but kept his distance, an action that was common in mediating social relations on one's own terms[72]. He was wearing bright rimmed sunglasses and large winter coat that reached his thighs. With haste, Mamadou informed me he had recently moved to a space where he had constructed a very comfortable room. He asked me if I was busy. The place where the chant was held remained closed, and Mor and Adil were about to leave to view the TV stored inside Mactar's chatarreria. I signaled I was available. "Good," Mamadou responded. "Follow me." I told him I had to speak to Assane before we left. He agreed, warming his hand over the hot coals as I went into Assane's bar to ask if I could keep my things with him until later that evening. Assane looked at my computer monitor, microphone stand, and two backpacks before nodding with approval and gesturing for me to leave everything behind the bar.

Mamadou and I turned right at the end of the corridor and then entered a section of the building I had not been inside before. Mamadou mentioned this is where he had first lived as we went up a staircase and into a hallway. "I don't like it here," he stated as he entered a small room that was dimly lit. "It's no good; people are not clean, look, people here are dirty." He motioned to a small coffee table with cups, ashtrays, beer cans, cigarette butts and cigarette packs, among

[72] While a robust network of contacts was exceptionally valuable, more intimate friendships were at times sustained or dissolved according to changing circumstances.

other small objects scattered over its surface. This space without windows had been used for storage behind the main office when the industrial building had been in formal operation. A large bed sheet hanging from the ceiling divided a space to sleep from the space where we stood. Mamadou moved the bed sheet to one side to reveal 4 mattresses placed next to each other in the form of a large padded sleeping area. He then turned to the other space, where a large TV broadcast a local football match. Mamadou grabbed a plastic chair and then reached for an empty plastic cup with a tea bag still inside. “Ok, let’s go. Let’s go to my new place.” He asked me to check the packs of cigarettes on the table before we left. I shook them. “Nothing.” “Ok, let’s go,” he replied.

We walked toward Assane’s bar but went into a door immediately next to it. Mamadou repositioned the chair over his shoulder as we entered the building and went up the stairs. “I live here now,” he said. “This is better, I have my own room, you know, it’s good.” We turned at the second floor and walked down a long corridor. What had once been offices were now informal living quarters, many doors along the corridor still bearing the small plastic plaques of a company’s or supervisor’s name. Mamadou pushed a door open with his back and invited me in. “This is where I live now. It’s good, better than the other place.” This former office with a high ceiling and plenty of light had been transformed into four separate rooms with a communal kitchen and a toilet that had to be manually flushed with stored water in containers. Multiple sheets of wood formed a large outer wall, against which the four make-shift rooms gained structural support. “This is my room,” he said as he turned his key to open the lock securing his door. A large hole had been drilled through his door and the principal outer wall to fit a thick chain. This was the go-to approach throughout the warehouse in the absence of more conventional security set-ups.

The space was approximately 3 by 3 meters in dimension. Three of the walls were made of recycled sheets of wood or similar material, with one of the walls comprised of the brick structure of the building. The wooden walls did not reach the ceiling, which was approximately 10 meters tall, but were tall enough to prevent an easy break-in. There was a single mattress against one of the wooden walls, and a large suitcase directly in front of it. A power-strip in the center of the room distributed electricity to a kettle, a microwave and a radio alarm clock that had not been set to the current time. Mamadou placed the chair next to the mattress and asked me to sit. He had acquired access to this space through a contact he made after a month of living in the warehouse, paying 50 euro to finalize the transaction. He built the room himself with materials he had collected throughout the warehouse and during his treks in the city searching for scrap metal. The three wooden walls looked sturdy; I complemented his work. He stood by the door frame, adding he was quite thankful to have this space and not have to worry about paying rent or utilities. He sat to turn on the kettle. “This is a good place for waiting, you know, no problem here.”

Mamadou’s room inside the warehouse.

According to Spanish immigration law, it is necessary to wait for two or three years before a person can apply for a temporary residence permit. Mamadou reached Spain in 2008 but had not managed to secure a job contract and was thus forced to wait in a legal limbo before initiating this process for "papers." In the meantime, the warehouse was "a good place for waiting" because it offered a sense of stability and reprieve from "the streets," the principal point of contrast where a person was highly vulnerable to unpredictable forces. Mamadou made this point in an interview.

> It's complicated but here it's better for us than before, on the streets without knowing where we are going, without knowing what we are going to do, without work, without anything, roaming the streets (Cast. *ambulando*), where the police, they follow you, they ask you if you have papers, if they are up to date (Cast. *en regla*) or what you are doing, what your job is, what you are doing here, and all that stuff – it's hard. Now this doesn't happen here because we, we have a roof, we have work, we don't have much but each day you can earn 20 euro, 10 euro to survive. They take this away from us, then what? Then we can't even work, we can't even do anything, because our first worry is shelter. You can't be on the street and, on the street all day, all day, and thinking when you are going to find something to eat, it's very difficult.

Because dominant institutional discourse did not recognize the benefits of a place like the warehouse, Mamadou and others I interviewed felt the Plan of Irregular Settlements and similar such interventions missed the mark. "It's all politics," Mamadou once told me during an interview. "Because if you have a problem, they won't help you, you know? This is why I say that it is very difficult for us, very difficult right now." Mamadou's evocation of "waiting" reflects a distinct epistemology from which people evaluated various dimensions of their everyday experience. To wait with "one's arms crossed," as I was often reminded, was personally untenable and socially reproachable. It was a person's obligation to oneself and to others to "work" in the broad sense of the term[73], and to transform "waiting" into an opportunity structure capable of generating economic but also socio-moral value. Indeed, waiting renders evident a person's relation to power[74] but it also reveals a certain degree of autonomy and agency in *how* a person chooses to wait before changing circumstances.

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[73] To work - Cast. *trabajar;* Cat. *treballar;* Wolof *ligeey* (Fall, 2013).
[74] As Pierre Bourdieu states, "the all-powerful is he who does not wait but who makes others wait" (2000:228).

Mamadou's statement points to an underlying rationale informing people's experience of the warehouse as a place to "wait" not for concrete things such as "papers" or a formal job but for a general change of fortunate that will precipitate a new lived experience in Europe. As such, "waiting" was generally discussed as a state of mind that "people learn to handle, a skill that must be trained and developed" (Ehn and Lofgren 2010:10), and ultimately as a means to act upon one's existential horizon. Ghassan Hage (2009) argues waiting can be understood not only as a phenomenon as such but as a "perspective on a particular sociocultural practice or process" (2009:3), that is, as a means to gain a sense of orientation and feeling of groundedness in the worlds we inhabit. When people evoked the notion of waiting in the context of the warehouse, they meant to foreground a critical perspective through which they systematically evaluate their situation as both *immigrant* in Spain and *emigrant* in Senegal rather than simply a passive activity devoid of critical reflection. If the warehouse was a "god place for waiting," then this is because it was an ideal place to persist in one's efforts to create opportunities that met basic and complex needs, counterweight the recurring feelings of "doing nothing," and re-frame the non-domain of migrant "illegality" within a field of personal agency in everyday life.

Waiting was central in people's everyday struggle to endure the structural inequalities of "illegal" status and bear the weight of abjection that such status often provoked. Peter Dwyer (2009) proposes two distinct perspectives to approach waiting that are particularly helpful here. Building on Lars Svendsen's (2005) work on boredom, Dwyer suggests "situational waiting" as a kind of waiting within a social world with clearly established roles people can embody and are expected to move in and out of. Waiting for a phone call, the birth of a child, or a job interview are examples of situational waiting because they involve social relations that are clearly marked and predictable, offering a perspective within a particular social world in which a person embodies

one or another given role. If such roles are absent, fractured, or inchoate, Dwyer suggests this can be conceived as a kind of "existential waiting" to be a part of a given social world, giving a person "a sense of abandonment" and the feeling of being "devoid of engagement with all that exists beyond self" (Dwyer 2009:20). Speaking in his room, Mamadou directed his complaints to the city government for failing to provide "help" that went beyond the temporary quality of humanitarian aid. "And so, people make what they can to endure this (Cat. *aguantarlo*), to have something to help the family and everything. You want to live here (in Spain), but it is very difficult. People are here for many years and do not find work, you know, it's very difficult. And I also want to go to find work but I can't." Mamadou's complaints, as well as Seidou's admonishment that people were "doing nothing," are aimed at a kind of waiting that is existential, one in which life is "seemingly removed from time" and any coherent system of meaning (2009:21). And this is the principal value most of the people I spoke to saw in the so-called irregular settlements – people relied on the warehouse in order to combat the existential threat of being removed from the world. Even for people with "papers," such as Faouzi and Omar, the warehouse transformed an existential waiting into a situational waiting that counteracted the adverse impacts of chronic unemployment in the formal labor market. The warehouse as a place for waiting created a distinct epistemology in which everyday actions reimbued the present with the quality of self-realization and the future with the promise of favorable change. If "waiting without hope" threatens a person's core and "reduces a person to nothingness" (Jackson 2005:147), then the warehouse helped people re-frame and re-position everyday activities within a broader hierarchy of value in which the act of waiting evidenced a person's will to persevere against unfavorable odds. In this sense, people's efforts to "get by" in the so-called irregular settlements

formed part of a historical trajectory of Senegalese struggles to expand their horizons beyond national boundaries and test their "luck" abroad.

A Culture of Labor Movement

As the capital of French West Africa (1890-1960), Senegal has historically enjoyed special rights and privileges denied to other colonies, such as full citizenship for residents of the municipalities of Dakar, Saint-Louis, Gorée and Rufisque in 1916 and later extended to the entire Senegalese population in 1946 (Diouf 1993:229). Reconstruction efforts in the post-war period throughout Western Europe led to a large demand for workers, many of whom were recruited from former colonies in the case of France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, or from neighboring countries in the case of Germany. Following independence in 1960, Senegalese citizens continued to be recruited to work in France, mainly in the booming automobile sector. These early movements created transnational networks that facilitated the incorporation of new arrivals in regards to housing but also finding jobs. More broadly, the increasing importance of international migration generated new family pressures on those who moved to Europe for continued economic support but also new forms of achieving social prestige and recognition with profound value in Senegal (Babou 2002, 2009; Jabardo Velasco 2006; Riccio 2001, 2008). West African migration to Europe holds a certain mystique among people due to the ability to create wealth for one's family and secure status in the process (Babou 2009; Kane 2011; Whitehouse 2009), especially in the wake of a changing topography of bride wealth in Senegal since the introduction of neoliberal reforms (Buggenhagen 2012:120).

Restrictions on entry and settlement in France in the early 1970's[75] coincided with a global drop in the peanut market, Senegal's main cash crop during the colonial and post-colonial era, which significantly weakened the national economy[76]. With oil prices rising and peanut oil prices dropping, Senegal became one of the first African countries to seek financial aid from the IMF-World Bank (Bond 2006; Delgado and Jammeh 1991:9), entering into its second Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) the year after France imposed a visa on travel from Senegal and other former African colonies in 1985 (Diop 2002, 2008). With mounting restrictions to enter and settle in France and as the Senegalese government defaulted and entered into new SALs throughout the 1980's and 1990's (Hesse 2004; Youm 1991:27-30), the preferred countries of destination as well as the general profile of the average "emigrant" began to change. Migration flows continued to be overwhelmingly male, but were no longer solely the Senegalese elite from the historic municipalities of influence or Soninke and Pulaar speakers from the Senegal River Valley who had comprised the majority of labor migrants to France (Diop 2008; Sow 2007). From the early 1980's onward, a growing number of people from rural backgrounds, often with greater training in Sufi Islam than extensive formal (i.e., French) education, began to move abroad. Unlike earlier Senegalese citizens whose educational background helped them enjoy greater privilege and affluence in France (González Ferrer and Graus 2012:6), newer arrivals had to rely on their cunning and creativity to maximize fleeting opportunities in their attempts to gain a foothold in Europe. Over time, the Wolof term *moodu moodu* came to represent this new figure of global emigration.

[75] Until this time, Senegalese enjoyed greater freedom of movement to France, granted they show proof of a "national identity card or a passport, a certificate of vaccinations, and a guarantee of 1,500 French Francs ($250) for their repatriation" (Tall 2003:42; for a broader perspective, see Sassen 1988).
[76] Following independence, the central aims of the nascent Senegalese state centered on creating a united nation following 19th century liberal ideology while also promoting the successive modernization of its rural economy to generate greater national wealth (Diouf 1993:235-239).

With fewer economic opportunities in Senegal, a growing "desire of the outside world" (Fren. *désir d'ailleurs*) characterized everyday life for many in Senegalese urban and rural areas in the 1990's and early 2000's (Diop 2008:22). Between 1988 and 1997 an estimated 6.5% of the population of Dakar and 8.8% of Tuubaa, the second largest city in Senegal, emigrated abroad (Willems 2008:281). While the push toward "privatization as the gateway to limitless opportunity" produced an enduring state of economic crisis (Diouf 1993:249), market liberalization had the inadvertent effect of bolstering the economic interests of local Sufi Brotherhoods, principally the Muridiyya (Babou 2002; Bugenhagen 2012; Kane 2011). Among the four major Sufi orders in Senegal, the Muridiyya had created a monopoly in the peanut market by the turn of the 20th century (Cruise O'Brien 1971). The drop in price of this cash crop in conjunction with state moves to liberalize the economy led to a rural to urban exodus and a progressive "control of the bazaar in most Senegalese cities" by Murid disciples (Kane 2011:44). The expanding Murid economic network blurred secular and sacred spheres of influence, enabling adherents to pursue a "doctrine of salvation" through work and, more specifically, the creation of economic wealth (Buggenhagen 2012:71). Murid traders seeking new products to sell in Senegalese markets created some of the earliest transnational communities in the United States (Kane 2011:61:63), Italy (Carter 1997:5-7) and Spain (Goldberg 2003:74; Jabardo Velasco 2006; Kaplan 1998; Sow 2007:204).

The term moodu moodu historically referred to seasonal workers in the local peanut economy in Senegal, but since the 1990's the term moodu moodu has gained greater purchase. According to Papa Sow (2007), the figure of the moodu moodu in Spain refers to a person from a rural area in Senegal with a strong Wolof historical identity (i.e., Diourbel, Thies, Kaolack and Louga) who does not have "papers" and thus relies on the vibrant informal economy to generate

wealth, specifically by street-vending in large cities or popular tourist destinations (Sow 2007:205). In his study of Senegalese street vendors in Catalonia, Alejandro Goldberg (2003) distinguished between "traditional moodu moodu" and "modern moodu moodu," the latter more open to adopt and exhibit "Western lifestyles" on account of having been "raised under the influence of hegemonic global US culture" (Goldberg 2003:95). While people who arrived after 2006 may be considered the new "modern moodu moodu," virtually none of my Senegalese interlocutors used this Wolof term to describe themselves or their socioeconomic and cultural projects. Most of my interlocutors had limited formal education, greater exposure to Koranic studies, and persistent trouble with legal status. But rather than employ this term, which evoked images of backwardness[77] as well as images of economic success in Europe[78], the vast majority of my Senegalese participants preferred language that emphasized their continued efforts to persevere and their refusal to relinquish their hopes of creating wealth in the benefit of a transnational social network. Indeed, faced with economic and legal obstacles that threatened their livelihood but also their very presence in Spain, language that helped foreground personal effort was highly valued because it shed light on emergent understandings of personhood responsive to structural forces beyond personal control.

In Search of Life

"Moodu Moodu is a Senegalese expression that refers to two kinds of people who come to Europe to *buscar su vida*," Assane once explained to me.

> *Moodu Moodu* and *Fatou Fatou*, Moodu Moodu for men, Fatou Fatou for women. Moodu Moodu are people who sell in the street, for example, in Catalonia Plaza. Moodu Moodu can be a person collecting scrap metal, they are all Moodu Moodu. They don't have papers. Moodu Moodu are

[77] Ousmane Kane (2011) argues the term *moodu moodu* "entered the Senegalese lexicon to refer to a not too well-educated Senegalese, a disciple of a Sufi *shaykh* of rural origin with some experience in migration, and particularly international migration" (2011:44). This notion of having a "not too well educated" background implies a certain stigma of being poorly adapted for cosmopolitan city life.

[78] Ruben Andersson (2014) notes how the term *moodu moodu* often evokes images of success abroad on account of the remittances people send from the EU and the US that are used to buy land and build houses (2014:39).

> here in Spain, in Italy, in France, wherever, the ones who sell, who don't have papers. Moodu Moodu is very specific, first those who don't have papers, and second those who work in the street. If I say, 'you are Moodu Moodu,' it means (laughing), 'Arturo doesn't have papers and doesn't have (formal) work.' It's an expression from Senegal that means someone makes his living from the sweat of their brow.

Assane "searched for his life" by selling drinks (e.g., soft drinks, beer, tea, coffee, etc.), plates of food, single cigarettes and rolling paper, and marihuana from a bar he had put together with the help of Ibou. Instead of aligning everyday life to this Senegalese figure, my Senegalese participants readily used the Spanish idiom *buscarse la vida* and the Wolof idiom *goorgor lu* to describe their time in the warehouse in particular and in the EU in general. The Spanish idiom *buscarse la vida*, which literally means *to search for one's life*, had special meaning in the warehouse because it helped people foreground their routines as generative of social as well as economic value. The use of the verb *buscar* and, more specifically, the reflexive verb, *buscar se* foregrounds an object but also a subject, creating a loop through which seemingly mundane routines reflect back on a person and informs their sense of self. "Each one comes here (Spain/EU) to get by (Cast. *buscarse la vida*)," Mamadou told me in an interview. "And here, you need to search (Cast. *buscar*), because no one is going to give you something to help you, you are forced to get by (Cast. *buscarte la vida*), to have your bread, on your own." For Mamadou, securing his room in the warehouse was part of such a search, as was his attempts to strengthen his social network within and beyond the warehouse to make money. In this assessment, the use of the idiom *buscarse la vida* allows Assane and Mamadou to foreground the act of "searching" as always ready at hand, shedding light on a mode of day-to-day operations in the face of adversity and, more importantly, a sense of agency constricted by yet independent from structural forces.

The drive to make money, either by collecting scrap metal or creating a business were readily described as examples of "searching" for opportunities in an otherwise inhospitable field of everyday experience. In an interview with Assane outside his bar, he lamented the fact that

people had "to occupy a house or search through the trash," but ultimately justified and even extolled these activities because they did not "cheat the population" in the process.

> We are here as last, last idea for a human being. It is the last thing you can do, find a place where you can live without cheating (Cast. *engañar*) anyone and with your own means (Cast. *propia cuenta*). No one will help you to live, you need to find your own solutions (Cast. *buscar la vida*), always, always in a way that does not cheat the population, work and have your bread without cheating anyone. Here you cannot have more than one (piece of) bread. This is the point we have reached, this is what drives us to occupy a house or search through the trash.

While Assane suggests that living in a previously abandoned building is the "last, last idea" for someone, that is, a last resort given extraneous circumstances, it is important to emphasize that this is not within the humanitarian register but within a transnational domain of meaning in which personal resilience is highly valued. In other words, from the perspective of the city government and the institutions extending humanitarian aid, the irregular settlements were indicative of an absence of agency wherein people were forced to desperate measures and to live in inhumane conditions. But from Assane's assessment, the drive to construct a social world such as the warehouse and make do with limited resources showcased a person's will to be a "correct person" that repositioned their everyday activities into an ethical-moral realm of profound transnational significance. The imperative to earn one's "bread" without "cheating the population" points to this ethical-moral dimension that merits greater attention.

The idea that people had a "limited understanding of their situation," as Humanitarian Crisis Relief employees maintained during our interviews, implies their everyday life trajectories were based on a series of misguided assumptions that needed to be addressed. Indeed, a tacit psychologization of people's experience undergirded dominant discourse surrounding the irregular settlements precisely because it formed part of a broader repertoire of expert knowledge through which demands for political equality could be more effectively displaced in favor of interventions aimed at producing certain kinds of political subjects amenable to local forms of government. I

will return to these subject formation processes in subsequent chapters. Of particular interest here is the relationship between everyday practice on the one hand and the on-going fashioning of personhood on the other. In this regard, if psychological interiority is constituted through the "linkage of humans into other objects and practices, multiplicities and forces" (Rose 1998:172), then the routines people established were central in the fashioning of selves at a broader transnational level. The creation of routines was an effective means to keep one's mind clear of things beyond personal control and in so doing mitigate the suffering many experienced on account of "irregular" legal status in particular and chronic unemployment or underemployment in general. More specifically, routines anchored experience in an immediate field of sociality that was imbued with a sense of power over one's own life (Ehn and Lofgren 2010:120), counteracting the sense of immobility and liminality produced under the yoke of immigrant subject formation processes.

People who collected scrap metal generally set out early in the morning to maximize their chance of finding large or valuable objects[79]. Dauda and Mor would wake up at 5am and search throughout the Eixample neighborhoods of Barcelona until 5pm. Babou and Thierno often met after midnight and searched until late morning. Unlike Dauda, Mor, Babou and Thierno who either lived in or near the warehouse, many regulars came from much further afield, such as Cheikh, who lived in Sabadell, a city approximately 30 minutes from Barcelona by train. Cheikh caught the first train to Barcelona around 5:30am in order to spend the morning searching for scrap metal and be back in Sabadell in time for a Catalan course. Cheikh also lived in an over-occupied apartment with friends and acquaintances, and received aid in the form of food items from a NGO in Sabadell. Although he spent much of his time during the week in the warehouse, he preferred Sabadell

[79] The idea behind this reasoning was that most people set things out in municipal trash or recycling containers in the evening, therefore trekking the streets of Barcelona in the early morning increased one's chances of scoring an economically important find.

because he felt he had more peace and quiet than in Barcelona and more straightforward access to basic resources when necessary.

An unremitting will to "search" demonstrated a strong work ethic and moral commitment to others, evidencing a type of social persona that virtually all of my Senegalese participants highly valued. It is important to note the term *will* implies choice and volition (Murphy and Throop 2010:6). The English term *will* translates to *voluntad* in Castilian and *voluntat* in Catalan, respectively, which implies personal conduct and disposition, and to *begg begg*[80] in Wolof, which implies directionality of action and desire. Willing has a complicated history in anthropology, often regulated to a realm of improbability in the pursuit of a thorough analysis of social structures, most clearly evidenced in the concept of *habitus* as theorized by Pierre Bourdieu (1977) where everyday practice is a product not of free intention but of historical circumstances[81]. Recent research has moved against this trend to examine willing in relation to subjective experience and intersubjective understandings of morality and ethics. Jason Throop (2010) suggests a person experiences "a sense of own-ness" in the act of willing, which grants a certain "directionality" and a feeling of "effortful-ness" in their life (2010:34). The use of the Castilian idiom *buscarse la vida* conveyed a sense of ownership over certain circumstances (e.g., ***yo me*** *busco* *la vida*) and concrete routines embedded in everyday systems of "getting by" (e.g., *yo me* ***busco*** *la vida*), ultimately engendering an existential orientation and direction that is shared across interconnected subjects (e.g., *yo me busco* ***la vida***). This perspective sheds light on a person's on-going assessment of their lived experience from a broader subject-structure binary (2010:49). The warehouse was

[80] The term *begg* is the common verb for "to want." *Begg begg* is a noun that expresses a more profound desire rooted in a person's sense of self (Fall 2013)

[81] Pierre Bourdieu's work has been invaluable in discerning the relationship between class, taste and everyday practice. Bourdieu's theorization of the concept of the *habitus* has been critiqued because it is premised on a kind of automatism that precludes agentive "ways of doing" (de Certeau 1984) away from a set "master process" (Delanda 2006).

important to people because it provided the space to accentuate a person's will and, in turn, their on-going orientation as a particular type of person in the world.

A Man Trying to be a Man

In addition to *buscar se la vida,* people used the Wolof idiom *goorgor lu* to describe their experience in the warehouse. Figuratively translated to "getting by" or "making ends meet," this popular idiom in Senegal is a culturally recognized and accepted means to talk about behavior aimed at caring for oneself and one's family. Historically, it became popular in the period following the privatization of the groundnut economy in Senegal and the retrenchment of state subsidies in agriculture[82] following a series of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) heavily promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the early 1980's and 1990's. SAPs throughout the African continent were meant to revamp state economies and make these more dynamic in the global market. But over time the introduction of SAPs made general employment more precarious (Hesse 2004:4). As Patrick Bond (2006) argues, SAPs throughout the African continent have translated to the scaling back of the welfare state and, as a consequence, "the need for civil societies to pick up the pieces" (2006:127).

The sharp rise in formal unemployment forced a growing segment of the population to "learn how to *get by*" in the transformed political economy of the country (Cissé 2007:8). The new national ethos of "getting by," known in French as *se débrouiller*, was iconized by Senegalese cartoonist T.T. Fons in the form of the comic titled, *Goorgoorlou.* Created in the late 1980's "in the midst of structural adjustment," the protagonist of the comic[83] is someone who "has tried

[82] From independence from France in 1960 to the implementation of the New Agricultural Policy from 1982–1984, the Senegalese state had maintained a monopoly on agricultural production, exports and financing (Mbodj 1993:87).
[83] The comic was then developed into a series in the early 2000's broadcast on Senegalese public television, quickly becoming a major success.

everything when he lost his job before resorting to a quotidian getting by, an experience that strengthened his character" (Fons 1994; Robert 2002). Goorgorlu moves to the city from the Senegalese countryside after he lost his job in the economic downturn and relies solely on his cunning to make enough money to provide for his family. Although many of his ideas lead to misadventures, his unwavering resolve gets him through many difficult situations and allows him to always meet his objectives.



Front cover depicting a moment of interaction between the title character and a European finance representative (Fons 1994)

Goorgoorlu has become a popular Wolof idiom that refers to activities to make money in a manner that is socially acceptable. In evaluating what was and was not acceptable, my Senegalese interlocutors used two specific behaviors as points of reference: begging and stealing. Despite a long history in Africa (Tana 1985), collecting scrap metal was generally viewed as a new labor niche that offered an honorable and dignified form of generating money. People defended this line of work against the persistent stigmatization in mass media and political debates. In an interview with Fatou, an active member of local Senegalese cultural associations, she strongly defended individual collectors against what she perceived was a concerted effort in different cities in Catalonia to malign this form of work.

> You know, the city government of Mataró called us for a plan of social aid (Cast. *plan de acogida*), and the idea was that we had to blame these people (scrap metal collectors) and tell them that the workforce at the recycling plant of Mataró had gone down and they had fired people because of them. And that people were complaining. 'And what are the complaints?' I asked them. 'Well, the complaints are the neighbors who say that they fill their carts in the staircases.' I say, 'There is no apartment building where there is a cart tied to the staircase because the majority of these people leave their carts in the woods. Now, to blame these people who collect and recycle and not to blame the government's poor management of the crisis is not right. Because when you blame people you don't blame the poor economic management of this country. I refuse to inform anyone (about this). Now, if you as an institution of the administration want to do it, then go ahead.'

Neighboring cities began prohibiting the collection of objects left inside or around municipal bins, mainly carton and other paper products, and targeting individual collectors by framing their activities as an economic and civic threat[84]. My interview with Fatou illustrates a general frustration with what had become a default portrayal of West Africans engaged in this kind of work, one that was individualized and decoupled from its structural context. Moreover, Fatou was frustrated by the fact that individuals' own assignment of value was systematically ignored. Later in our interview she informed me of her desire to "raise awareness" of the issue but from a radically distinct perspective than local public institutions by making T-Shirts for scrap metal collectors to wear that read "I work" on the front (Cat. *Treballo*) and "I am working" on the back (Cat. *Estic Treballant*).

> I had the idea when I was in front of a store, they were taking out cardboard boxes, but they were throwing them like this (in a disrespectful manner). The (collector) was folding them and putting them in his cart. So, the black man is doing a job that is important to the other man, cleaning the shit out of public space (Cast. *limpiando toda la mierda del espacio publico*). But they don't think that, they see it as, 'what are you doing here?' 'Well, I'm collecting the shit trash that you put out; I am fixing it for you so I can take it.' So, the idea came to me. If I had funds to make these shirts, I would hand them out so they can wear them so people know that they are working, because it is dignified work, because they have a cart, because here I have met people who have a van and they work in this. But with the van, you don't see it; you don't see what is inside.

The juxtaposition of the cart and the van at the end of this excerpt is significant because the repurposed shopping cart places people in the crosshairs of public scrutiny while the motorized van gives people a degree of autonomy on account of the invisibility of the material they are

[84] The collection of card board was more frequent in other cities where scrap metal was scarcer. Cities such as Matarò, Granollers, and Terrassa all had some form of prohibition on the collection of material inside recycle bins during the period of fieldwork.

transporting. The warehouse gave people a similar degree of tactical invisibility, namely in regard to how people managed their work and social affairs. Fatou's perspective is illustrative of the view within the warehouse in which removing "the shit trash" from public spaces was unequivocally framed as a dignified means to work and earn one's living despite a dominant stigma that portrayed this labor niche as an unbecoming activity in the cosmopolitan urban landscape of Barcelona. The emphasis on "work" in Fatou's narrative upends the tendency to "blame these people" but also re-frames people's efforts within a broader cosmology in which one's effort to "get by" holds profound transnational meaning.

A closer look at the Senegalese idiom *goorgoorlu* provides important insights to understand the relationship between everyday practice and a person's sense of self in the warehouse. *Goor* in Wolof refers to qualities of either a boy or a man, while *goor goor,* which is the grammatical structure of compound nouns, is understood as "a man." The use of this idiom in certain contexts mobilized underlying cultural connotations linked to its literal translation – "a man being a man" – and evoked subtle and socially acceptable ways of aligning a person's actions with dominant views surrounding gender norms (Biaya 2001:78). Closer analysis of Wolof grammar, however, paints a more complex picture. The adverb *lu* indicates one is acting in ways characteristic of this particular compound noun[85]. The idiom, then, literally translates to "a man *trying* to be a man" or, more specifically, "a man in the act of trying to be a man." As such, the potential to be "a man" (i.e., trying, effort) takes precedence over the actual intersubjective fact of being "a man," which for those who emigrate is conceived in relation to their ability "to acquire rising social mobility, marry well, enjoy greater respect and consideration, and support aging parents" (Kane 2011:224). In other words, in the absence of this kind of transnational success

[85] An illustrative example is the term *dofdof lu*, which is used to describe a person's actions as that of a "crazy person" (i.e., *dof* is to be "crazy," *dofdof* is someone who is "crazy"). To refer to someone as *dofdof lu*, then, means, "you are acting like a (so-called) crazy person."

due to restricted access to a broad range of opportunities in Spain in particular and the EU in general, the emphasis on *trying* the idiom *goorgoor lu* foregrounds suggests individuals were nevertheless able to gain a sense of purpose and status in an everyday field of practice driven by their resolve and will. In this sense, the routines people created in the warehouse reflected the type of social person they labored to become, which in turn generated a sense of self-realization in the act of trying itself.

Conclusion

To wait with "one's arms crossed," as I was often reminded, was to be avoided at all costs. Indeed, to wait without movement was the single most important sign that one was failing or had failed. As long as a person actively "searched for one's life" (Cast. *buscarse la vida*), the absence of economic capital or a residency permit was mitigated within the broader value system in the warehouse. A person's will, made tangible in the form of "searching" for opportunities, gave people a sense of autonomy, direction and purpose that was of great personal significance and yet inadvertently subversive of state power because it muted and rendered inconsequential the dominant subject position of the "non-EU migrant." From this perspective, the warehouse was a space for the articulation and projection of a distinct subject position, one indistinguishable from the act of trying. The frequent use of the popular Castilian idiom *buscarse la vida* and Wolof idiom *goorgorlu* point to a different understanding of waiting and willing anchored in the everyday need to meet one's own needs and potentiated through the drive to make money and relate to others. In this way, people counteracted the structural inequalities they faced and created value that was important in economic but also social terms.

Chapter 4 –The Outpost

"Life, like in Africa"

I received a phone call from Mousa while drinking tea and speaking to Mamadou in his new room. Mousa informed me an old Catalan man whom he often greeted when they crossed paths on the street when he searched with his cart and the man walked his dog had given him a laptop the day before. He wanted me to take a look at it, and format it if necessary. Mousa and I agreed to meet in Omar's chatarreria. Once off the phone, I asked Mamadou if he wanted to join me. He agreed, but was quick to state he wanted to see Granada at the entrance first. He finished the last of the tea we were sharing before he signaled for us to leave. I stepped out of the room and waited for him to secure the door against the doorframe with the chain and lock.

Omar's chatarreria was near the entrance and directly opposite Granada's business, which would have been easily missed if it had not been for the large refrigerator and two lawn chairs staking a claim of a small portion of the corridor. I greeted Granada as Mamadou sat down in the free chair with a 50-cent coin between his fingers. Mamadou asked for a couple of cigarettes. "These are Chinese, not very good, but they're cheap," Mamadou stated, as though explaining his decision. Soon thereafter Suleiman stopped next to us with the same intention to buy cigarettes, his shopping cart full of different size pieces of iron and aluminum he had been given by workers remodeling a storefront and clearing it out of objects that would have otherwise been thrown away. Granada showed Suleiman the pack of Winston cigarettes in his waist pack and waited for approval. Suleiman nodded. "I only smoke Winstons," he said, handing Granada a single euro coin without expecting change. "These are better for making joints" (Cast. *porros*[86]).

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[86] The use of marijuana has become more widespread in Catalonia in recent years, as evidenced by the legalization of "cannabis associations" in Barcelona. Marijuana was ubiquitous in spaces such as the warehouse. Those who smoked marihuana mixed with tobacco informed me they

I accompanied Suleiman inside Omar's chatarreria where he finally lit one of his two cigarettes while two men loaded the scrap metal he had found onto an industrial size scale. The air inside the chatarreria was thick from the smell of oil, metal debris and cigarette smoke, a material quality of these spaces I had grown accustomed to. Suleiman had found 80 kilos of residues that were bought at the price of iron, which at the time oscillated between .18 and .22 cents a kilo. A third man recorded the final weight into an oil-stained notebook and then took out a 10 euro bill followed by a 5 euro bill and two small coins. "Come, let's drink coffee," Suleiman said after he collected his money.

We walked toward a long table inside Omar's chatarreria where Pap and Oumou served their respective clients. I sat next to Adama, with whom I initiated the Baay Faal *beggee*[87], and across from Abdou, who shook my hand in a less ceremonious manner. Suleiman sat to my right, closer to Pap and the metal display shelf where he kept two large coffee dispensers in addition to cans of Fanta and Cola and some edible goods, such as pastries he bought wholesale and bags of four to five *beñe*[88] that were frequently replenished. I began reaching inside my coat pockets for coins to pay for the coffee Pap placed before us when Suleiman stopped me. I insisted but finally conceded after Adama intervened. "He's treating you, he's a Baay Faal, he's a Baay Faal." Suleiman nodded, qualifying this initial statement. After our meeting, I detailed the encounter in my fieldnotes as best as possible.

> Suleiman: Arturo, here, we are in life of Africa. This is life, like in Africa. You yourself have been to Senegal, you've seen something. People don't have anything but what we have they share, they share.
>
> Adama: Of course, sharing is important.

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started smoking in Senegal or The Gambia, but only experienced the freedom of smoking in public and without fear of police persecution once in the EU.

[87] The *beggee* involves a calculated three-step hand-face movement that conveys information about the people engaged in this greeting, a person's self-image and moving the back of one's hand to my forehead, moving my hand to his forehead, and finally back to my forehead. I return to the beggee in chapter 8.

[88] *Beñe* are deep-fried dough balls rolled in sugar

Suleiman: Here in the warehouse, what you see here, we are all like a family.

Adama: The same, the same. Those who live here also live on the other side.

Suleiman: The reason we do this, the idea that we have, is that in this world one cannot go alone.

Adama: No, he can't, he can't.

Suleiman: He can't, you know, he can't walk on life's path, you understand? On life's path you need company.

Adama: Alxamduliha, *seriñ Tuubaa*[89].

Suleiman's description of the warehouse as "life, like in Africa" represents a simultaneity of being and belonging that blurs nation-state borders. This quality of simultaneity has been a central point of reference in transnational migration studies since the 1990's, an approach to inter-state mobility and settlement that has problematized and moved beyond a pervasive assumption in early migration studies that held assimilation to be the default form of incorporation[90] (Glick Schiller and Çaglar 2009:181). In contrast to this early view of immigration not only as "a change of residence" but also as "the breaking of home times" (Park 1928:886-887), more recent scholarship has placed greater emphasis on the fact that "immigration" is part of a broader global system that is characterized by strong historical ties between sending and receiving countries (Grosfoguel et. al. 2016). Transnationalism as a theoretical prism moves away from these earlier assumptions to privilege a view that holds "migrants' social relationships, political actions, loyalties, beliefs, and identities" as linked in important ways across state-borders through intersecting global processes (Glick Schiller et. al. 1992:8). From the shipping of second-hand materials to Senegal and other West African countries to selling foods, drinks and other goods that were described as genuinely "African," the warehouse was a place characterized by simultaneity

[89] Seriñ Tuubaa is an affectionate and very popular designation of the founder of the Muridiyya, Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba.

[90] Robert Park's famous concept of "marginal man," for example, contended that people were inherently divided between an old "primitive" culture and a new "modern" society following migration to the US (Park 1928:892). This concept of the marginal man is based on a conception of "culture" as something that is discreet and fixed, as evidenced in the very first sentence of Everett V. Stonequist's essay building on Park's argument, "probably the great majority of individuals in the world live and have their being within a single cultural system" (1935:1).

of multiple interconnections established and strengthened by “transmigrants” (Glick Shiller et. al. 1995), a place that was “like Africa” because it made possible “transnational ways of being” and “transnational ways of belonging” (Glick Schiller 2009; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). In certain circumstances, routines were markers of a shared sense of we-ness surrounding people’s understandings of terms such as African, Senegalese, Wolof, or Baay Faal, a combination of actions and degrees of awareness that enabled people to construe and project an individual and group identity (Glick Schiller 2009:31). Indeed, routines formed part of an emergent way of belonging that cut across national lines. The claim that this was a place “like Africa” indexed such ways of being and belonging that were readily devalued in dominant discourse.

References to Africa were not all constructive. With the economic crisis, Senegalese felt they were forced to wait indefinitely to ascend to European standards of life. Such blocked “existential reciprocity” was painful (Lucht 2012:103), representing the primary reason why people denounced the existence of the warehouse by reference to Africa. If people moved to Spain to gain European acquisitive power and experience European middle-class comforts (Beauchemin 2015), then living in a place “like Africa,” as the young man stated on my first visit to the warehouse, was a sign that the world had failed to reciprocate despite one’s best attempts. But taking into account the possibility of radical change at any moment, as Thierno made clear with reference to Gaddafi and Hussein, to be blocked from experiencing Europe in the present did not translate to being barred from gaining access to it in the future. Waiting under the conditions of “irregular” status reveals “what is actually a dynamic and morally charged activity” (Ehn and Lofgren 2010: 78), a state of being in which the stakes people face in the short and long term are manifested in the routines established to pursue life projects and objectives. Positive references to “Africa,” then, point to a social world of everyday routines with a working order ethic that was

inextricably part of the social, legal and political fabric of Barcelona and yet noticeably distinct and independent from it.

An Inchoate Lifeworld

Beyond its practical use value, businesses such as Oumou's restaurant and Pap's shop offered moments of reprieve from the most immediate physical pains of collecting scrap metal, a line of work that takes a major toll on the body in the form of cuts, bruises, calluses, sore muscles and sprained ligaments. Moreover, these spaces afforded an opportunity for patrons to discuss a myriad of troubles they encountered with Spanish authorities, from unpaid fines for taking public transit without a valid ticket to dealing with an active order of deportation (Cast. *orden de expulsión*). As many participants informed me, the existence of spaces to meet and talk were essential to avoid "going crazy," which was largely understood as inevitable for anyone dealing with their troubles in solitude. People like Mano, the Senegalese man who was often chased out of the bars in the warehouse, were viewed as "less crazy" when they participated in group life, a basic need often described as especially important in the face of continuous barriers, obstacles and precarious opportunities as "illegal immigrants" in Europe.

The establishment of businesses, however, also presented unexpected challenges, many of which did not have a straightforward path to resolve. The warehouse was uncoupled from state law but also from any law-like structures, a space characterized by an everyday freedom that was both relieving as it was frustrating. For virtually all of my Senegalese participants, Islam provided guidance of how to be a man and, more specifically, how one should interact in economic transactions or cohabitation more generally. Islam has a rich history in West Africa that informed the way people engaged with the world abroad (Loimeier 2013). They drew on stories of Sufi

leaders acquired in *daaras*, or Koranic schools within the Sufi tradition, to evaluate social behavior as appropriate or inappropriate. But due to the great diversity of backgrounds in the warehouse, coupled with a broad array of individual interests and idiosyncrasies, there could be little consensus on a standard guide for everyday actions without explicit and persistent mediation, something that was identified as necessary but never materialized during my fieldwork. For many, to be in "Europe" meant to be in pursuit of economic gains, and in order to achieve such gains it was at times necessary to narrow one's frame of reference to personal and family objectives, something that resulted in what people referred to as "selfish" behavior. In this sense, routines in the warehouse generated a contingent framework driven by a person's individual interests that at times aligned with others.

Daily interactions between individuals of diverse backgrounds created a certain sense of camaraderie based on their common experience of the situation in which they were embedded. Whereas Jarrett Zigon emphasizes broader intersecting forces, Jürgen Habermas defines "a situation" as a changing horizon within a lifeworld that makes mutual understanding possible (Habermas 1987). More specifically, for Habermas a situation is a temporal margin of the lifeworld determined by a person's present plans aimed at achieving certain aims and realizing certain ends, always *within* the world[91] they experience and embody (1987:126-127). In this sense, the warehouse was experienced as a common situation that was at its core transnational. But rather than reflect a lifeworld understood as the "reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken convictions that participants in communication draw upon in cooperative processes of interpretation" (1987:124), such a transnational situation was indicative of an inchoate lifeworld determined by

[91] Habermas distinguishes between an "objective world" consisting of "the totality of entities about which true statements are possible," a "social world" grounded by "the totality of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations," and a "subjective world" understood as "the totality of experience to which a speaker has privileged access and which he can express before a public" (1987:120).

people's experience of distinct social, political and intersubjective categories. This inchoate lifeworld was undergirded by a social dynamic Thierno summarized in an interview following the eviction of the warehouse.

> So, look, a Central African, whose village I don't know, right? We cross paths there (in the warehouse), we become like brothers. Today, if I put myself in his village, I only have to call him. 'I am in your town. Hey, I don't know anyone here.' 'Ok,' he's going to say, 'Go there, you will sleep there.' Why? Because this is the closeness, this is the solidarity we have tried to have to get along marvelously. But they don't let us, they don't show us where to go. They are not giving us what is possible so we can go at least a little better than how we were. Today we are worse, worse. We are worse now than when we used to live there (in the warehouse).

A census[92] conducted by activists in one of the largest irregular settlements found inhabitants were from 34 different nationalities from Africa (19 countries), Europe (8 countries) and the Americas (7 countries), the vast majority from Senegal, Ghana, The Gambia, Cameroon and Nigeria. Individuals generally formed groups along national lines for practical (e.g., use of language) and symbolic reasons (e.g., ideologies surrounding language). In this particular space, for example, individuals lived in spaces that corresponded to nationality, creating the impression that the "ethnic group" prevailed above all other identity markers[93]. But beyond a purported "natural" inclination toward the "ethnic" group, which was often stressed by outside observers, people gravitated to others with whom communication and communion was streamlined. Although important, the "experience of cohabitation" Thierno refers to points to a laminating of divergent worldviews that began to coalesce over time into its own framework.

For outside observers unaffiliated to the city government, the warehouse appeared as a "community" firmly linked to a common "African culture," a point I return to in subsequent

[92] This census was initially conducted for the purposes of securing temporary housing before the eviction of this specific irregular settlement. When the possibility of obtaining a residency permit on humanitarian grounds was made public, the number of people willingly participating in the census, which had initially been a challenge, dramatically increased. There were indications many people had travelled to Barcelona after learning of this possibility and signing up to "the list" to the chagrin of many long-term inhabitants. The census reflects a total of 409 inhabitants from Africa (336), Europe (60) and the Americans (13). Romania (42) was by far the most representative group from Europe.

[93] People identified under different political, legal, and social categories depending on preference, circumstance and context. In this particular example, modes of organization were largely due to the practical dimension of sharing a common language and the more symbolic dimension of sharing affinities and experiences specific to a country or region of origin.

chapters. Moreover, for many activists the warehouse was a space ripe for political mobilization because it was conceived as a blatant violation of human rights. In the introduction to their edited volume, Pierpaolo Mudu and Sutapa Chattopadhyay (2017) argue migrants that "squat" in Europe and North America "problematize who and where they can be and how they can be political subjects" (2017:8). While the "irregular settlements" subverted state power in important ways, it is important to emphasize that there was no overt political ideology in the warehouse. Unlike the so-called *okupas* in Spain, people did not "occupy" buildings in order to advance a particular political platform in the public sphere. This was a major point of contention for many activists who sporadically managed to mobilize people to participate in demonstrations and protests but failed to secure their long-term involvement in the "struggle" for migrant rights. This was expressed by Jordi, a local activist with a long history working for migrant rights in Barcelona, when he noted many people "forget about the fight" (Cast. *se olvidan de la lucha*) after they acquire the coveted "papers" (i.e., residence permit, citizenship, etc.).

However, the fact that the warehouse did not have an explicit political agenda should not be understood as evidence that it lacked political leverage. As many activists were quick to point out, the creation of a city-like space posed a threat not only to local government but to state legislation surrounding working class non-EU citizens. In a conversation with Jordi and other activists, the warehouse was described as a "city" with its own housing stock, work stations, restaurants and bars, and common areas for leisure activities that produced a feeling of "we-ness" that was inadvertently politically subversive.

> Jordi: This is their city!
>
> Lucia: Yes, yes, I can see that. Of course, the critique that they (the city government, local institutions, mass media) make is that they have self-organized well, too well.
>
> Jordi: Yes and that probably does not interest them.

> Lucia: Exactly, exactly. That's the critique, the critique is this. They are too well organized, you understand? Yes, yes, it's sad but it's like this.
>
> Jordi: It's because, well, if you really want to live and endure (Cat. *aguantar*), then there must be a minimum of organization.
>
> Lucia: Yes, that's what I say.
>
> Jordi: Cohabitation has improved a lot.
>
> Lucia: The difference from our last visit, the difference is abysmal
>
> Jordi: Yes, there's no comparison.

Beyond a "city," the warehouse was a lifeworld that enabled transnational ways of being and belonging that were invaluable to the people that enjoyed its infrastructural benefits. The concept of the lifeworld based on Edmund Husserl's work refers to a field of meaning in which human culture is possible, an "all the meaning-strata which transform natural things into cultural objects, human bodies into fellow-men, and the movements of fellow-men into acts, gestures, and communications" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:5). As an analytic, the concept of the lifeworld offers an "experience primary" approach to meaning that problematizes objective truth and privileges subjective perception (Detmer 2013:162-165). In this regard, rather than a city, which foregrounds exogenous structures, I suggest the warehouse was a lifeworld that was fundamentally intersubjective (Knibbe and Versteeg 2008:49). It is necessary, however, to qualify the use of this concept, for the warehouse was a space experienced at once within a normative transnational framework and as an exception to people's expectations before and after moving to Spain.

Based on his research in Mozambique, Stephen Lubkemann argues migration has long been "one of the most important and common ways people coped with violence and its effects" (2008:2), representing a continuation of prewar dynamics informed by their "specific social logic and cultural terms of expression" (2008:30) rather than a rupture wherein individuals re-create social worlds "ex nihilo." From this perspective, cross-border movement does not represent a rupture with a person's lifeworld but rather its territorial expansion. The on-going struggle to earn money,

get married, have and raise children, and care for one's elders remain core priorities in what Lubkeman calls a person's "lifescape[94]," which he defines as the "material (including ecological), social, and symbolic resources available to social actors for the realization of the life courses that they have been socialized to pursue" (2008:192). The concept of the lifescape foregrounds lived experience against a backdrop of liminality, and emphasizes the continued importance of life projects across multiple localities.

The warehouse was akin to a lifescape because it was overwhelmingly imagined by the Senegalese men and women I interviewed as a material, social and symbolic resource that facilitated the realization of certain aspects of the life course they were socialized to pursue, such as "trying to be a man" through the incessant search of opportunities despite the seemingly insurmountable difficulties they faced in Spain. In Donald Carter's (1997) study in Italy, Carter found Senegalese conceived of travel to and work in Turin as an expansion of a certain mystique in Murid cosmology (1997:62-65). Faced with major economic restructuring and increasing discrimination against working class non-EU migrants in the late 80's and early 90's, Carter suggests Senegalese remain in Italy despite these hostile circumstances because it is an extension of a "home" culture and is thus perceived as a kind of autonomous Senegalese lifeworld or lifescape that imbues everyday experience with symbolic value. Analogous to Carter's study, Senegalese overwhelmingly viewed the warehouse as an extension of their life in Dakar, Tuubaa, or Ndar (Saint-Louis), among other cities, with the same mysterious qualities and secrets that are only revealed over time.

With consistent state efforts to restrict the free movement of people from West Africa to the EU, the goal of making money as a "legal" resident was generally viewed as inextricably a

[94] Building on Arjun Appadurai's work on globalization as constitutive of certain "-scapes," namely ethnoscapes, mediascape, technoscape, financescape and ideoscape (1990).

matter of luck. Thierno's statement "in life everything can change" evokes a certain element of fate, which is intimately tied to dominant Sufi dispositions. Like Gaddafi and Hussein, Thierno's situation would inevitably change, prompting him to hope for a "miracle" to enjoy more promising opportunities in Spain and imbuing his everyday routines with a power to "transform patterns of exchange into mystical and religious capital" (Carter 1997:67). Fate and luck feature prominently in a transnational system of mystical flexible accumulation in which people's active participation in local networks in the form of remittances, telephone calls, and circulation of ideas extends home social networks beyond the nation-state and creates a framework for being and belonging that is adaptive to the transnational context. For this reason, trying circumstances "outside of the country" (Wolof *bitim reew*) are conceived as varying -scapes that are best endured because of the vast potential that lies ahead. If Senegalese "often set up their settlements in the most run-down and peripheral areas of the cities to which they migrate" (1997:83), this is because hardship is a cultural grammar people draw from to reframe their situation abroad as part of a process of waiting for favorable change.

Despite its inchoate qualities, the central frame of reference of the social world that cohered in the warehouse pivoted around the suspension of the persona of the "irregular immigrant" and the positive valuation of people's own understandings of personhood on the one hand and the everyday routines linked to these on the other. Upending the persona of the "illegal immigrant" in Spain was important given that its construction is precisely aimed at restricting a person's complexity and invalidating their own understanding of life outside of dominant tropes of the "immigrant." Similar to other countries joining the European Union in the 1990's and the euro in the early 2000's, the persona of the "immigrant" in Spain is marked by an inexpugnable quality of radical other, a social persona in the social imaginary conceived as one who is "not European, not

a native, not a citizen, not legal, not one of us" (Dal Lago 2004:213). Based on her work with women from Mozambique working as *peisqueres* in Lisbon, Kesha Fikes (2009) shows how this specific labor niche, historically occupied by local urban working class women, increasingly became devalued as work reserved for "immigrants" in Portugal in the late 1990's and early 2000's. With ascension into the EU, the category of the "citizen" took on new qualities of status and prestige in which the political economic exclusion of the "immigrant" was understood as natural. Within an emergent "signifying value of racism" (2009:161), to be an "immigrant" is to embody a position in the social imaginary categorically devalued vis-à-vis the category of the "citizen," a position now imagined as an indissoluble part of an economically prosperous EU[95]. The warehouse rendered superfluous the more egregious dimensions of the category the "illegal immigrant," namely the threat of detention and deportation that disrupts a person's overall sense of existential groundedness (de Genova 2010:23-45).

The suspension of the persona of the "illegal immigrant" meant the warehouse was a place free from the most pernicious effects of everyday racism and structural violence. If racism creates a space of negation, one in which personhood is nullified and recast according to dominant tropes of alterity, then the warehouse was a means to recast one's presence and practice with new meaning. It merits emphasizing that in the new "division of humanity" following de-colonialism in the 20th century (Balibar 1991:21), racism operates as an implicit force that is experienced by Senegalese and others as an undeniable fact of life that is "built into the social, economic, and geographic landscape during centuries of systematic racism" (Bornstein 2015:53). The historical division of populations according to the demands of a "modern/colonial/capitalist world-system" has given rise to what Ramón Grosfoguel and colleagues (2015) characterize as "zones of being"

[95] I am referring to Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Ireland specifically, countries that joined the EU in the 1980's. Therefore, I am not referring to countries that joined in the 2000's – Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

and "zones of non-being" that correspond to "positions within racial power relations" at a global scale (Grosfoguel et. al. 2016:638). If "for the clandestine migrants, Europe's external border is a threshold between worlds," this is because "Africa" has long felt like a zone of non-being vis-à-vis the zone of being of "Europe" as a "space of 'human rights' and the promise of freedom" (Andersson 2014:137). But rather than discreet geographical areas, these zones of being and non-being reflect global structures of exclusion and inequality that bear on experience. If migrant "illegality," that is, the overarching structure of "irregular" status in Spain, is to be conceived as a "space of nonexistence" (Coutin 2005), then this is because it forms part of a broader assemblage of systemic exclusions and segregations that people struggle to mitigate by creating places that infuse de facto presence with new, constructive meaning.

"I am here"

Mousa reached Omar's chatarreria with his laptop an hour after he had petitioned me to take a look at it. I was at the table drinking my second cup of café Tuubaa while chatting to Adama about the founder of the Murid Brotherhood, Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba, and the importance of his work for people currently living abroad. I examined the laptop, a 15" Dell Inspiron from the mid 2000's, while I continued to listen to Adama speak. In his early 30's, Adama was one of principal forces behind Yoonu Baay Faal, the space that hosted the weekly chant, or *sikar*. He was always very welcoming to my requests for details about the Muridiyya in general and the Baay Faal in particular, for which I had the greatest respect and gratitude. I tried to demonstrate my appreciation of his time and consideration by initiating the *beggee* whenever I was quick enough to beat him to it, something I rarely achieved. Focused on the laptop and on Adama's narrative, I felt someone's hand on my shoulder.

"*Sama xarit, nan nga def?*[96]"

"*El Hadji, nan nga def? Waaw, waaw, maa ngi fii*[97]*,*" I responded to jubilant cheer. "He speaks my language; I swear to you!" El Hadji patted me on the back, now looking ahead at a Moroccan man who was drinking coffee after his meal. "I swear to you, he speaks my language!" The man stared at me in silence, finally inquiring, "Do you speak Arabic?" "No, but I wish that I did." "You look Arabic." "Yeah, I get that a lot, especially when I say *Salam malekum*." "*Malekum salam,*" the man responded automatically with a grin on his face. "*Sai sai la*", El Hadji said, patting me again on the shoulder. Although I had learned that friends often accused each other of being *sai sai*, I readily drew a blank and remained silent when this jovial accusation was directed at me. Adama interjected, saying, "*Waaw, moo ngi bax na*[98]," juxtaposing the image of "the thief" and the "good person" in my head. "*Jerejef,*" I said thanking him, followed by "*dank a dank moo jaap golo ci ñaay*[99]." The Wolof idiom did not fail to evoke the heartfelt laughter I had grown to anticipate. The Moroccan man laughed as well, nodding his head in approval.

The use of the term *sai sai*[100] was readily used to commend a person's moral character by jokingly implying they lacked one. Sai sai is a colloquial Wolof term that translates to "thief," "bandit," or "trickster," and is used in this way among people whose relationship is close and based on trust. When El Hadji called me a *sai sai*, as when Babou used the term to refer to Thierno inside Assane's bar, the purpose of such language is to show a certain degree of familiarity based on friendship but also to strengthen social bonds between speakers. Humor was also a means to create a certain mood to influence and inform people's broader assessment of their trajectories as

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[96] The common Wolof greeting *nan nga def?* (How are you?) was often used in conjunction with the term *sama xarit* (my friend) in the warehouse in particular and throughout my fieldwork in Catalonia in general.
[97] The Wolof expression *maa ngi fii*, which translates to, "I am here," was often used to signal the present as an intersubjective state of affairs.
[98] Wolof, "Yes, he is good."
[99] This Wolof idiom, which literally translates as "slowly, slowly, you catch a monkey in the forest," is used to express the need to be patient in situations that cause feelings of restlessness.
[100] *Sai sai* in Wolof translates to "thief" but is figuratively used to describe one as too clever for their own good, always with the intent to create a jovial mood among the people in a particular social space.

"immigrants" in Spain. Humor imbued experience with special value, recasting it in a positive light outside of the abject qualities of the "immigrant" in the dominant social imaginary.

The expression *maa ngi fi*, literally, "I am here," was used as is conventionally expected, but the emphasis on *fi,* or "here," evoked an image of a common struggle that was clearly manifest in the material space of the warehouse. Light-hearted interactions in bars and restaurants, along the corridor, or in the privacy of personal living spaces helped to assuage the weight of their "illegal" or "irregular" status. Based on her work among undocumented migrants in Israel, Sarah Willen (2007) suggests migrant "illegality" impacts important aspects of individuals' everyday experience and largely determines "particular modes of being-in-the-world" (2007:11). Carried out at the height of Israel's deportation campaign in the early 2000's, Willen argues state techniques such as house raids, obligatory institutional reporting, and random ID "paper" inspections in busy public spaces impact individuals' sense of space, time and self[101] (2007:16) and reveals "the penetrating influence of sociopolitical abjection" (Willen 2014:86). The emphasis of *here* in the context of the warehouse conveyed the sense that life constricted by migrant "illegality" was reduced to a perpetual present that was characterized by uncertainty and a myriad of ambivalent emotions.

How to discern the experience of a tumultuous "here," especially when it is identified as an affront to a person's sense of self? Willen proposes a "critical phenomenology of illegality" to approach migrant "illegality" as a political status but also a social condition that is embodied in everyday life. This approach offers a critical lens to examine the political, social and ideological production of an abject subject position that "contributes in powerful – and dynamic – ways to the emergence of particular modes of being-in-the-world" (Willen 2006:430). Willen coins the term

[101] In one example from her fieldwork Willen recounts how a West African family completely covered the widows to prevent police looking in and avoid detection, and placed Israeli flags throughout the apartment in case they were the target of a random house visit (Willen 2007:25).

abjectivity in her effort to "yield rich ethnographic insight into the grinding tensions and intermittent terrors" inherent in migrant "illegality" (2007:25). Although scholars have argued the concept of abjectivity does not necessarily "result in complete surrender or silencing" of agency (Gonzales and Chavez 2012:261), it is unclear how or to what degree individuals experience freedom within the "conditions of structural inequality and structural violence that shape migrants' position and status" (Willen 2007:13). Indeed, moments of humor such as those evoked by the use of terms such as *sai sai* raises the question of how to conceive of spaces of autonomy that enjoy greater freedom from state subject formation processes and, more specifically, how people lead socially dynamic lives within "a space of forced invisibility, exclusion, subjugation, and repression" (de Genova 2002:427).

In more recent scholarship, Sarah Willen has argued individuals create small zones in which they find moments of "familiarity, comfort, meaning and safety" in the shadows of the law and the state (2014:86). She calls these zones "inhabitable spaces of welcome" and suggests these are important "to achieve existential and moral groundedness" (2014:97). Willen draws from the work of Michael Jackson (2005) to theorize this concept, namely what he terms an "existential imperative" people possess to "convert givenness into choice, and live *the* world as if it were *our own*" (Jackson 2005:xxii, italics in original). As spaces where a person's "own existential imperatives and moral commitments are sustained despite the abjection they daily confront" (Willen 2014:87), the concept of an inhabitable space of welcome is an important contribution in Willen's "critical phenomenology of illegality" (2007) as it points to modes of being-in-the-world that are otherwise foreclosed to undocumented migrants. Unclear, however, is the relationship between a person's experience of being-in-the-world on the one hand and the broader social world in which such experience is embedded.

If people used the Wolof expression *maa ngi **fi*** to stress the sense of immobility of migrant "illegality," it also served the purpose of differentiating the warehouse from a broader social world. Indeed, the boundary making function of stressing "here" sheds light on the "parallel world" that coalesced around everyday routines and the emergence of a make-shift moral system to mediate social relations as they unfolded. Based on my fieldwork, I suggest the warehouse is best conceived as *an outpost* in international social networks, which I define as a transnational social field whose use of space is politically, legally and ideologically tenuous and whose construction of place is established according to the in situ and in real time needs of present engagements. In this regard, it is unlike a "lifeworld" or a "lifescape" in the absence of predefined and normative trajectories to follow, and it is more than an "inhabitable space of welcome" in its inextricable links to structural barriers to global human movements people learn to navigate over time and space. While the outpost implies an extension of a "home culture" in a foreign land and the construction of a "home base" in a land that increasingly becomes more familiar, it is fundamentally an experiment that offers a sense of groundedness that can never be taken for granted. The outpost unfolds in everyday practice, and represents a specific scale in transnational movement, a constellation of social relations aimed at establishing a stronger or more favorable foothold in a foreign country. The outpost implies incorporation within rather than exclusion from a so-called "host society," albeit at a structural disadvantage, evidencing broader global and national dimensions regulating the movement and settlement of working class non-EU citizens around the globe. In this way, it is a node in international social networks but one in which the moral stakes of people are intractably placed in the experiential front lines of state politics.

Building on Benedict Anderson's (2006) approach to nationalism, Leo Chavez suggests undocumented migrants are politically categorized but also socially construed as though they were

"outside the imagined community" of the nation-state (1991). The outpost is a means to circumvent this "outside" quality by staking a place "inside" the nation-state in a manner that benefits people and yet does not allay the full punitive force of the law. Indeed, the outpost exists in an "outside-inside" or "exclusion-inclusion" binary that does not in itself call for an abrogation of state law but rather a field of politics to act upon its exception.

The outpost reflects and serves the immediate needs of working class non-EU citizens who lack "papers," formal employment and/or conventional housing, and as such is linked to migrant "illegality" but is not entirely confined to it. It is important to emphasize that "illegality" is built into the law, rendering both "legal" and "illegal" migrants to a marginal position in Spain.

> The production and reproduction of illegality through law enhances the precariousness and marginalization of those who are thereby illegalized. And this marginalization is not limited to the illegal population; it affects those who are (temporarily) legal as well. Indeed, in this system, there are few real distinctions between the two, because legal status is always a fragile state and almost inevitably gives way to periods of illegality (Calavita and Suárez-Navaz 2003:116).

An outpost exists in direct correlation to the structural abjection of people, and therefore serves certain needs derived from "legal" and "illegal" status alike. Despite this important qualification, the outpost is especially important to people who lack "papers" because it provides a space of reprieve from the affront to personhood inherent in migrant "illegality." If the lack of "papers" entails a kind of "legal non-existence," then an outpost provides a means to "move in and out of existence" (Coutin 2003:40) with greater freedom. Make-shift housing constructed by "migrants" in Calais, France as they wait to cross to the UK are readily described as "jungles" in the media (Townsend 2014). Similarly, make-shift settlements constructed and relied upon by hundreds of mostly West African men as they wait for an opportunity to enter Spain in the Moroccan foothills around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are readily described as "ghettos" (Cerebrio Belaza 2012). Extending my theoretical framework beyond the city limits of Barcelona, I suggest the inchoate maximization of material (e.g., space), social (e.g., networks)

and symbolic (e.g., cultural capital) resources under the tendrils of state biopolitics seeking to act upon a person's being-in-the-world can more productively be conceived as outposts that grounds a sense of self vis-à-vis a symbiosis of local and global forces.

The outpost is dependent on social networks rather than on space itself, which is understood to be a claim that cannot be secured. As an extension of the home country, the outpost forms part of a transnational network through which people remain active members of their "local" community. With few exceptions, virtually all of my Senegalese interlocutors sent remittances whenever possible. Mamadou, for example, managed to create a routine where he sent 50 euro to his family on a regular basis, usually at the end of the month, and Dauda and Mor each sent an average of 150 euro a month to their families in St. Louis. Thierno and Babou also sent money on a regular basis, at times as much as 500 euro if they were diligent with their finances in Barcelona. Others such as Adama actively strengthened ties with the holy city of Tuubaa and a vast network of Murid disciples in Senegal and abroad, often in the form of *adiyya,* or economic contributions, or logistical support during events in Barcelona. The role of religion in Senegalese international movement and settlement has been pivotal, in particular the Muridiyya which has linked cities such as New York, Paris, Milan, Rome, Madrid and Barcelona to Dakar and Tuubaa through economic entrepreneurship and community centers known as *dahiras* (Babou 2002; Buggenhagen 2012; Massó Guijarro 2014, 2016; Riccio 2005). The outpost is distinct from an "ethnic community" because it is understood by those who comprise it as fundamentally temporary. The outpost is non-conventional and is contingent on social networks materialized through practice rather than on space itself, rendering evident historical and emergent inequalities between 'fellow countrymen' (Cast. *paisanos*) in a transnational context.

As I am defining the concept, an outpost is best conceived as an assemblage that is experienced *within* people's control despite its position in a broader context of structural violence and abjection. An assemblage refers to a "whole characterized by *relations of exteriority*" (DeLanda 2006:10, italics in original), "the product of multiple determinations that are not reducible to a single logic" (Collier and Ong 2005:12). Compliance to a medical regimen, for example, can be understood as an assemblage that brings together the institutional register of the physician and the clinic, the political economy of the pharmaceutical industry and the use of inconspicuous tools such as medication cassettes (Brodwin 2010:130-131). Similarly, the outpost is an assemblage of distinct yet intersecting and co-constitutive dimensions, such as post-colonial global inequalities throughout the "Third World," restrictive policies against "immigration" to the "First World," and an expansion of a global horizon in which "migration" and the economic promise it evokes are increasingly "processes of imagination and expectation that shape people's lives and lifeworlds from the outset" (Knut and Schielke 2012:11). Among its varied aspects, I am particularly interested in this secondary dimension, namely the outpost as an intersubjective field of experience that coalesces around repeated interactions (DeLanda 2006:56). In what follows, I explore the outpost as *a place of transnational ways of being and belonging* and *a place to produce symbolic-economic value*, and suggest it is here that a "world" can be discerned that is structurally restrained by "illegality" but never entirely subsumed by it.

The Outpost as a Place of Being and Belonging

The warehouse was a place that put money into circulation through a myriad of activities revolving around the buying, selling and storing of objects collected on the street. This potential to make money demanded a repertoire of skills and knowledge that was often described as akin to

"big business." Analogies to "big business" reflect an underlying capitalist logic in the warehouse, where money was systematically "thrown into circulation to obtain more money" (Harvey 1982:69), with more profits created the faster capital circulated (Harvey 2010:41). Scrap metal identified as iron (Cast. *hierro*, Cat. *ferro*) was by far the most common metal collected and recycled. While a social structure coalesced over a period of time, largely based on seniority, age and social capital, the warehouse remained a space open to creative initiatives, allowing individuals to create new or build on existing business ventures. Of central importance was the absolute freedom individuals had of walking the streets of Barcelona, searching in or around municipal containers, and collect objects they could then bring back to the warehouse to sell for a profit. "The question, 'How do you do?' has special meaning here," Lucas, a native from Poland, told me during an interview. "Greeting someone is important because it is a potential business partner you're talking to." Lucas spent most of his afternoons in Abdou's bar on the second floor above Assane's bar, occasionally watching his business when he went to nearby supermarkets to restock his inventory. I interviewed him because of his unique perspective and his experience as someone of non-African descent in a social world that was "like Africa." "This is like big business," he added. "You can make money quite easily." Money circulated rapidly but in limited quantities, a dynamic Lucas summed up in the following manner:

> Imagine that many people here go out every day and try to find iron. If they do, they have 5, 10, 20 cents, or 5 or 10 euro if they make a full working day, or maybe 20 euro or more if they have luck. To get 50 cents like this can happen quite randomly and easily. Often, they find some more or less used things, which they can only sell at a low price - few euro for clothes, 20 or 30 euro for laptop, and so on. As those things are consistently used and low-quality, you can be kind of rich here. Each piece of your equipment is old and even broken but usable. Your room looks poor, but it has everything. All those things are also money.

The fact that people could "randomly" find objects meant they could participate in the circulation of money and in so doing be "kind of rich" in the warehouse, that is, experience an improvement in their quality of life. "Business and sharing" and a "smart combination of the mind

and the heart," as Lucas phrased it, constituted an important foundation in everyday sociality reminiscent of what E.P. Thompson called a "moral economy" (1964, 1971). The concept of moral economy[102] was initially conceived to illustrate how working class populations voiced their opposition to rising food prices in the advent of industrialization in England based on a shared notion that this was morally wrong and unacceptable. While there was a shared sense of right and wrong in the warehouse, such consensus was tenuous, often a source of contention and consistent mediation. Social categories such as "Wolof," "Senegalese," or "African" were often put aside in favor of a common project aimed at making money, such as buying and selling used goods or managing its transportation within and beyond Spain. The absence of a normative moral economy in the warehouse meant the drive to make money co-existed with a personal sense of accountability to and of others, but was radically independent of it, offering people greater flexibility and dangers in their social encounters. This dynamic was succinctly captured in an interview with Thierno. "*Gitanos* are not racists, not like Spanish people. *Gitanos*, they just see money, nothing else! They don't care if you are black, white, whatever! If they can make money, they'll talk to you!" In the warehouse, categories such as "black" or "white" were deemed irrelevant not because of an overt anti-racism politics like in many *okupas* but because they were understood to be superfluous or obstructive to the process of making money. Lucas also expressed a similar sentiment when he emphasized mutual benefit rather than sociocultural categories of identity: "If you want to survive, you need to mind the reality and share only with others who fairly share back, like a contract." A

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[102] The Corn Laws of the early 18th century that precipitated such popular unrest evidence the new political economy to undergo a systematic "demoralization" of economic activities, thereby ensuring the efficacy and efficiency of transactions "disinfested of intrusive moral imperatives" (Thompson 1991:202). With over two thirds of the working class population relying on bread in their diets, the rise in price of cereal and other grains following free market laws to stimulate economic growth meant that households progressively struggled to meet basic subsistence needs, often relegating more than half of their budget to bread alone (1991:193). In the context of migration, the concept of moral economy is used much as Didier Fassin (2009a) defined it as the production and circulation of "moral sentiments, emotions and values, norms and obligations within a social space" (2009a:1257).

business ethos flattened some "cultural" barriers while also creating new difficulties as people struggled to lead "good" lives without recourse to a conventional moral-ethical framework.

The outpost exists in a state of exception that is marked by structural forces but fundamentally depends on individual volition. It is experienced as a place of waiting for a future that has been desired in the past but can only be imagined in the present. According to Hans Lucht (2012), people endure harrowing circumstances because of the promise of a more welcoming future, naturally inclined to seek ways to connect their personal aspirations, goals and desires with the external world in which they are thrust into. This search for connectedness, Lucht suggests, is premised on the promise of an "ontological security" that is fulfilled when one gives to the world, a process he terms "existential reciprocity." Lucht suggests the undocumented status of the people from Ghana he worked with in Italy see the possibility of such a connection reduced, if not foreclosed, which produces a unique kind of suffering as desires remain unrealized despite being "so close to what they imagined would be the turning point of their lives" (2012:105). Feelings of disappointment, anger, resentment, sadness and even regret were also present in the narratives I documented, but having access to an outpost such as the warehouse mitigated the existential suffering described in Lucht's analysis.

Because the outpost is non-conventional, there is no fixed name to the place it represents or the practices it encompasses. Rather, the fluidity in the use of names evidences the way people envision its relationship to broader history and its functions in individual and group life projects. By far the most common name for the places I visited was "home" or "industrial warehouse"[103], both of which were presumed to be objective and neutral designations. For others these places were known as *Mama Africa, Africa Now* and *Jamaica Street,* which drew clear links to notions

[103] The most frequently used terms – *nave industrial* (Cast.) and *nau industrial* (Cat.) – roughly translate to "industrial warehouse" or "industrial building," respectively.

of the African diaspora. These latter names tended to be much more politicized as they reduced the social plurality of places to a monolithic "African" culture, particularly popular among activists rallying support in political debates. Beyond an overt political agenda, overwhelmingly the names chosen and used by Senegalese and others expressed a sense of humor and wit, such as the name *La Modelo* and *La Franja*[104], which evoked images of subjugation but also resilience and unwavering struggle to persevere through a comparison to a panoptical prison or a stateless territory. The name of a place sets "conceptual markers" through which narratives gain vital metaphoric value[105] and makes available a discursive template to evaluate and adapt behavior in culturally acceptable ways. Without the postulate of a set name, the outpost depends on conceptual markers such as "Africa" or "prison" to ground personal stories in broader semiotic networks of associations within a transnational province of meaning[106].

The outpost is a place of being and belonging that pivots on the exercise of knowledge of and ways of doing within a specific scale of incorporation. In her research based in the Gare du Nord railway station in the French capital, Julie Kleinman (2014) argues people "create social worlds" not by claiming and defending spaces as their own but through the continuous engagement in and management of social relationships (2014:303). By gaining detailed knowledge of the train station and train schedules, West African men in the Gare du Nord station were able to transform this public space into an important resource that offered social, symbolic and economic capital in a person's efforts to gain a stronger footing in the country (2014:293). The knowledge they codified and differentially employed engendered a place with its own perceptible boundaries and

[104] *La Modelo* was a prison in Barcelona that was operational from 1904 to 2017. *La Franja* was shorthand for *La Franja de Gaza*, or the Gaza Strip.
[105] In his study on place-names among the Western Apache, Keith Basso (1996) shows how vast geographic areas that appear barren and vacuous of meaning to the untrained eye are in actually steeped in social signification (Basso 1996: 69). Narratives are told to parallel behaviors of people in the present to "shoot with an arrow" and make them aware they are consciously or unconsciously violating moral codes.
[106] A "finite province of meaning" is central to the notion of the lifeworld as constituted through shared experience: "As long as our experiences participate in the same lived experience – viz cognitive style – as long therefore as they remain in a finite province of meaning, the reality of these experiences continues for us" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973:24).

internal logic, distinct and yet indissoluble from the metropolitan whole, with a social template "through which these men orient their actions in France" (2014:288). Speaking to travelers and establishing relationships with non-kin in the hopes of expanding job and housing prospects were part of learning the "Gare du Nord" method and the varying possibilities to amalgamate "African" models of personhood (e.g., adventurer) with "Western" lifestyles and fashion tastes (e.g., hip-hop apparel, dreadlocks). Similarly, people learned to navigate and make the most of the warehouse and in so doing actively contributed to a social world that felt one's own despite its broader marginal position.

While people waited for the external world to reciprocate, they acted upon the more immediate world of everyday social engagements. As such, the outpost as a place of being and belonging refers to action that engenders an autonomous field of sociality that is embedded in transnational networks of meaning and prototypes of personhood. The possibility of finding objects of value on the street meant that many interactions were potential business transactions, especially involving coveted items such as cell phones, flat screen TVs and laptops, to name a few. "Here," Lucas concluded during an interview. "People talk, 'I help you, you help me,' you know? This is how business is defined here." Oumou's restaurant, Pap's shop or Assane's bar were businesses adapted to the acquisitive power of its patrons, making possible the rapid circulation of capital and the gelling of social relations among people of different backgrounds, religious affiliations and worldviews. After a long day of work, Mor, Daura, Babou, and Thierno generally met at one of many businesses in the warehouse to drink coffee, have a meal or simply chat over the warmth of a space heater or in the cool of a light summer breeze. Cracking jokes in Wolof or Mandinka, discussing Senegambian politics over café Tuubaa and beñe, or attending the weekly

Baay Faal chant created a certain mood that substantiated the feeling that this was a place of strong phatic communion where "speaking my language" went beyond its referential qualities.

Creating a business was a way to create a field of experience that was aligned to personal aspirations. In her research in South African townships, Anne-Maria Makhulu (2010) argues that people experience a heighted sense of autonomy as they devise "creative if challenging ways to work" within the post-apartheid structural conditions of high rates of crime, violence and AIDS-related deaths (2010:47). While the life circumstances and material conditions people face in many South African townships are pernicious and at times deadly, Makhulu argues people found ways to "work *within* abjection....steadily redefining its conditions at every turn, painstakingly remaking the world around them, and at the same time debating the limits and limitations of their own conditions of possibility" (2010:37). In the absence of wage work, people calculated risks and profits similar to investors in the formal financial sector, giving rise to what Makhulu calls an "economic sovereignty" that mitigated people's global positioning as a "superfluous" population (2010:44). At its core the warehouse was a place characterized by a similar economic sovereignty where the unwavering potential to conduct "business" at any moment informed quotidian social relations. Granada, whose real name was Babacar, laid claim to a 2 x 2 square meter area near the entrance to capitalize on the flow of potential business partners to sell to and buy from. Most of his customers bought single cigarettes, but he also sold rolling paper at 0.05 cents per unit and cans of Fanta and Cola at 0.50 cents per unit. Granada bought cigarettes brought in from Andorra from a local contact, which were half the price of tobacco bought at the Tobacconist[107]. While many preferred these because of their greater affordability – .25 cents compared to .35 - .50 cents – Granada kept brand name cigarettes to keep his clientele base satisfied and returning, as was

[107] In Spain, tobacco is exclusively sold at tobacconist. In the early 2010's, a pack of brand name cigarettes cost between 3.5 and 4.5 euro.

Suleiman's case. On average, Granada sold 180-200 cigarettes, or 9-10 packs, generating an average take-home margin that oscillated between 14 and 20 euro per day on cigarette sales alone. On busy weekends, Granada sometimes doubled his sales on cigarettes. His proximity to the entrance meant Granada could also keep a close watch on objects coming in, moving quickly to secure those items he felt he could later re-sell at a higher price. His business ventures generated an intermittent income of approximately 300-400 euro, offering him a kind of sovereignty that he highly valued because of the money he was able to earn for himself in Spain as well as for his family back in Senegal.

Routines to "get by" had the corollary effect of propagating a certain mood in the warehouse that altered and colored "the totality of all objects" within people's immediate field of experience (Svendsen 2005:109). Based on his on-going research on the island of Yap, Jason Throop (2014) defines moods as "diffusely dispersed, context defining, and totalistic in their encompassment" (2014:69) and a kind of "existential medium through which our reflections take shape" (2014:70). Business transactions created a mood of own-ness that informed social relations along transnational ideologies of redistribution and solidarity[108]. Indeed, the vast majority of social engagements created a particular mood that people evoked in their use of idioms such as *buscarse la vida* and *goorgor lu*, or markers of identity such as *Baay Faal*, or humorous descriptions of others as *sai sai*. As a place to be and belong, an outpost has the capacity to align everyday activities with broader models of personhood, that is, intersubjective understandings of one's presence in the world that are pragmatically constructed and re-constructed and informed and influenced in the multiple interactions people experience throughout their lives (Desjarlais 2000:467). Scrap metal made possible the circulation of money but it also made possible multiple

[108] The Wolof term *teranga* refers to a mood of hospitality that is readily associated with everyday culture in Senegal. People occasionally used this term to refer to the mood in the warehouse, especially when describing it to outside observers (e.g., activitists, politicians, etc.).

economic and non-economic engagements pivotal in people's struggles to abate structural abjection.

Appliances found while "searching" in Barcelona, which are stored in the warehouse before they are shipped to North and West African countries.

While Senegalese abroad are expected and even pressured to send remittances to their family back home (Jabardo Velasco 2006; Buggenhagen 2012; Kane 2011; Riccio 2005, 2008; Sow 2007; Tall 2008), the outpost gives people important leverage to strategize the right distance within a mood of collective struggle to remain vital members of transnational networks. Maria Hernández Carretero found many Senegalese in various cities in Catalonia[109] "strive to negotiate the *right* spatial and social distance" with their loved ones back home through various tactics, such as not answering phone calls from Senegal or emphasizing the different work culture in Europe to justify the rhythm or absence of remittances (2015:2028-2030, italics in original). I documented a similar dynamic among my interlocutors, who struggled to send money but managed to placate

[109] Substantial part of Maria Hernández Carretero's fieldwork was conducted in the coastal city of Salou, which represents a major point in Senegalese transnational movement and settlement, specifically in relation to the informal economy of street vending and the expansion of the Murid Sufi Brotherhood in Spain (2007).

family pressure by using their distance from home networks to their advantage. As an outpost the warehouse did not imply a "failure" of a "migratory project" but a temporary alteration whose meaning was within a person's sphere of direct influence. "Business" and the feeling of being autonomous created a certain mood in the warehouse of a place that assuaged the ill effects of "illegality," such as forced economic immobility, and informed the manner people engaged with each other outside of conventional rubrics by establishing common footing based on a series of values that were fundamentally transnational.

The Outpost as a Place to Produce Value

With an official unemployment rate of 32% among working class non-EU citizens and approximately 55% among West African citizens (Martínez Veiga 2013; also see Cross 2013), the 62 "irregular settlements" identified by the city of Barcelona during my fieldwork were an important resource to create socio-symbolic and economic value through personal effort. Labor-power is pivotal to capitalism as the only commodity in the market capable of creating value, but it is also among the most cumbersome on account of its "historical and moral element" (Harvey 2010:105). This element is linked to the very process of reproducing labor-power and the "social norms and obligations" informing local understandings of "the proper economic functions of several parties within the community" (Thompson 1991:188). To fully understand how routines aimed at "getting by" created value through the maximization of the key attribute in the history of capitalism between an employer of labor and a tender of labor (Marx 1976:274) in a manner that remained attuned within individuals' moral dispositions it is necessary to better theorize the productive activities of the outpost.

In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt (1958) details a triadic model that differentiates the *labor* inherent in sustaining the human body, the *work* necessary to produce durable goods and objects, and the *action* implied when mediating contact with others. The outpost is first and foremost a site of labor, that is, a place to enact those activities aimed at procuring the life course (e.g., basic needs). This is also a place of work that produces economic value, albeit in a marginal relationship to the body-politic it is embedded in (i.e., "outside-inside", "excluded-included"). Labor and work imply a series of social relations with others dictated according to unfolding points of consensus and contention. This triadic framework is useful is delving deeper into the production of value that is meant for economic circulation as well as leading a moral and ethical life.

According to Arendt, the fruits of labor, such as preparing meals and caring for the body, are "the blessing of life as a whole" precisely because it guarantees its continuation (1958:107-108). Work, on the other hand, is the mark of *homo faber*, that is, our human capacity to change the "natural" world into a social one. Arendt argues the latter has gained more prominence than the former since industrialization, forging an indelible link between the procurement of life as such and the productive capacity to create objects of political economic value (1958:155). The disenfranchised wage-seeking worker displaced from local moral economies is central to the history of industrialization and the subsequent expansion of a capitalist mode of production around the world. As other theorists have posited, with the introduction of modern capitalism an employer can wait and "contract freely" whereas the wage-earning worker is "biologically driven to sell his labor power because he is in urgent need; he needs his wage immediately in order to survive" (Castel 2003:180). It is from this historic paradigm that Arendt argues the modern period is deeply committed to a "glorification of labor" in which *labor* as a biological necessity and *work* as a stratified means of modifying the natural world are conflated (1958:85). From this perspective,

Arendt critiques Marx and other theorists for conceiving of a "society of laborers" as independent of the individual labor of the life process itself[110] (1958:118), a point that is important in understanding the complex system of meaning attributed to everyday activities in an outpost such as the warehouse.

The outpost is a place to produce value through labor and work. The oft used idioms *buscarse la vida* and *goorgor lu* implied a personal struggle to procure the necessary resources to sustain "life" as such. Saskia Sassen's (1999) study of the history of migration movements in Europe shows how the advancement of new technologies in the 18th and 19th centuries generated unprecedented surplus and yet progressively disintegrated rural economies and ultimately forced thousands on a trajectory in which "struggle for survival consumed their energies" (1999:45). Until this period, migrations were seasonal and highly predictable, with workers returning to and from specific sites over long periods of time. Industrialization changed this, solidifying the political economic figure of the *migrant* as a worker with "no permanent home" and "forever searching for jobs" (1999:49). The figure of the "immigrant" in historical context is inextricable from the imbrications of labor and work described by Arendt.

Since the progressive disenfranchisement of rural populations in the advent of capital and the development of cash crops (Thompson 1991:200; Sassen 1999:39), the use of space among workers has been a perennial point of contention[111]. The outpost is part of this history of disenfranchisement, both as a consequence of an agonistic relationship between the categories of

[110] According to Arendt, the "emancipation from labor" heralded by Marx is an impossibility as it implies an emancipation "from the metabolism with nature which is the very condition of human life" (1958:130).

[111] For states that defined membership based on political affiliation, such as France, non-citizen labor migrants posed less of a threat given that long-term settlement was reconciled with potential incorporation into the body-politic (*ius solis*). For states with less centralized states, such as Germany and Italy, membership to the state was largely conceived in terms of ethno-linguistic rather than simply political affiliation (*ius sanguinis*). Thus, whereas Spanish and Portuguese workers in agriculture in southern France faced little state intervention, Russian and Polish workers in eastern Germany were consistently persecuted by the state anxious of the threat of "Polonization" of its eastern provinces (Torpey 2000:109). The will of states to protect the imagined community of the nation by acting on the use of its territory has since its inception remained in tension with the desire to generate economic and military power through the expanding labor-power of citizen and non-citizen populations.

the “citizen” and the “immigrant” and as a response to a systemic differentiation of life opportunities. Spain’s political economic re-positioning following the death of Franco transformed the country into a major destination for non-EU migrant workers. The figure of the “immigrant” was enfettered to their potential economic value as workers, persecuting and divesting activities aimed at procuring the lifecourse outside of this strict economic rationale. Despite this historical trajectory to actively or tacitly enlist working class non-EU citizens as workers rather than potential citizens (i.e., members of an “imagined community”), the state has an important interest in maximizing labor as conceived by Arendt in order to ensure a strong reserve of migrant workers whose presence in the formal economy in particular and in the body-politic in general can be advantageously governed. The outpost is akin to a motile lodestar that is responsive to a volatile inter-state system and allows individuals to wield greater influence before a nation-state’s expanding system of strategies for governing non-citizen workers.

While the warehouse felt like an independent place with clearly marked boundaries between a contested “inside” from a mainstream “outside,” the concept of the outpost as I am defining it includes any use of space by working class non-EU citizens that coalesces into an “own” place through routine social relations. El Hadji often commented on my ability to speak Wolof, largely because this was an important means to more closely participate in the outpost he was part of. El Hadji had lived in Spain since 2001, and had lived through numerous evictions. He was among the hundreds of people who camped in Plaza Catalonia in 2000-2001 after being detained at the border of Melilla and later relocated to the mainland due to the impossibility of being returned[112]. As people waited in Plaza Catalonia, they gained invaluable information on changing

[112] Spanish immigration law limits the length of time of detention of non-citizens waiting to be repatriated. At this time, people were relocated to the mainland from the Canary Islands or the Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla after the maximum period of detention and left without counsel or assistance at an airport in a major city, mainly Madrid and Barcelona (Barbero Gonzalez 2010:300).

legislation and assistance from local NGOs and activists to apply for a residency permit in Spain's fourth mass amnesty program in 2000[113]. While many new arrivals succeeded in gaining a residency permit, El Hadji was among the thousands of people who failed to meet the stringent application requirements[114]. Plaza Catalonia continued to be a space to meet one's need for housing and basic information, but also to organize with local groups to make political demands, transforming Plaza Catalonia into a site of activism that culminated in a series of church lock-ins in Barcelona[115] and other cities throughout Spain. El Hadji met many people during this period that would later be pivotal in his continued efforts to meet his basic and more complex needs independent of public or private institutions.

When the central Catalonia Plaza was finally cleared of encampments in 2001, El Hadji and many others that continued to bear the brunt of undocumented and "irregular" status moved to the Sant Andreu barracks (Barbero Gonzales 2010:501). The Sant Andreu barracks (Cast. *cuarteles de San Andres,* Cat. *casernes de Sant Andreu*) was a 106,000 sq. meters military complex that closed in 1995 and was progressively "occupied" to meet the housing needs of the city's most disenfranchised populations. By the time the Sant Andreu barracks were evicted in 2004, the total number of inhabitants from South America, North and West Africa, and Asia had reached over 1,000 people (Blanchar 2004). Catalonia Plaza was transformed into an outpost in its capacity to produce socio-symbolic value for people in the form of information to gain "papers," knowledge of public and private services, and contacts to continue one's personal struggle to remain in Spain. The Sant Andreu barracks, on the other hand, was an outpost in its capacity to produce socio-

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[113] Since the introduction of Span's first comprehensive immigration law in 1985 and legislation that ultimately replaced it in 2000, the government initiated multiple amnesty programs, or "mass regularizations" (Cast. *regularizaciones masivas*) that "legalized" 43,000 workers in 1986, 110,000 workers in 1991 and 21,000 workers in 1996 (Karaboytcheva 2006:6; Laubenthal 2007:114).

[114] This mass amnesty was held between March 21 and July 31, 2000, and approved 137,000 of the more than 246,000 applications submitted, hardly enough to satiate the demand for labor in the booming sectors in agriculture, construction, domestic service and customer service or the demand for "papers" by the rapidly growing number of "illegal migrants" (Suarez et. al. 2007:188).

[115] The central Santa Maria del Mar del Pi church was the focal point of these struggles in Barcelona, an "occupation" that was partly sanctioned but also partly undermined by the clergy.

symbolic but also economic value in the form of opportunity structures such as recycling, make-shift businesses, and more direct access to the informal economy. Indeed, the case study of the Sant Andreu barracks are significant in the recent history of citizen-migrant relations in Barcelona because it shows how working class non-EU citizens "succeeded in converting a spontaneous occupation into a physical space from which to coordinate their demands for dignified housing (Cast. *vivienda digna*) in addition to the right of juridical existence" (Cast. *el derecho a la existencia juridical*) (Suarez et. al. 2007:229).

An outpost is a social field whose aim is to meet a person's needs and advance a person's material and socio-symbolic interests. In her study of Senegalese transnationalism, Giula Sinatti (2009, 2013) has argued for an approach to "translocalities" that emphasizes the "places in which mobile subjects are locally grounded" (2009:62), which in turn need to be conceived as a "setting for interaction, where people are brought together in bodily co-presence" (2009:62-63). The outpost is a unique type of translocality that exists in the interstitial space that is produced in the exercise of state power. El Hadji felt "at home" in the warehouse in so far as this was a place free of the structural violence of migrant "illegality," but also the overt and systemic racism that generally accompanies it[116]. Stories of racist encounters abounded throughout my fieldwork, often recounted from the general mood of solidarity in a common struggle experienced in the warehouse. Whereas the warehouse was experienced as a place to mitigate racism, any expedition beyond it was rife with potential encounters that could quickly challenge a person's sense of self. El Hadji told me a story that took place in a transited metro station in Barcelona that illustrates this danger. When he pulled out his wallet to retrieve his transit card his wallet got caught on the jacket of a

[116] In the dominant social imaginary in Spain, the black body is targeted as a locus of radical alterity against which an EU self can be clearly discerned. A poignant example is the proliferation of images of the *patera* (i.e., fishing boat) reaching the Canary Islands as a symbol of "illegal" migration (Nash 2005:53), which was readily depicted as a "black invasion" (Naranjo 2008:63) threatening EU social order despite representing a statistical insignificant proportion of migration flows (de Haas 2009:1307-1309).

man leaving the station with his wife and 10-year-old son. The woman saw the wallet, and quickly accused El Hadji of theft. His attempts to explain the misunderstanding were of no avail. El Hadji finally showed her the wallet, and she immediately apologized. "They wanted to leave," El Hadji recounted. "But I didn't let them. 'Now I will show you,' I said to the man to his face. He didn't say anything because he knew I was right." El Hadji had meant to create a scene in the metro station, but relinquished the idea upon seeing the young boy frightened and confused. He let them go with the bitter affirmation that he would always be held suspect of wrong doing because of the color of his skin. The outpost is a place where a person's value was discerned in relation to everyday activities and social relations rather than conventional social beliefs and biases.

Where labor sustains life and work materializes and/or remunerates it, the human activity Arendt identifies as *action* represents the inescapable imperative of human plurality. Building on Arendt's work, Paulo Virno (2013) argues, *action,* that privileged activity "that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter" (Arendt 1958:7), is today equally imbricated in the contemporary valuation of human activities. Virno argues labor without an end product, which was identified as problematic by Marx, has now become "the prototype of all wage labor" in global neoliberalism (Virno 2013:258). Virno focuses on virtuosity as a sub-section within action to illustrate the manner in which the absence of an end product is today reconciled by the commoditization of the act itself. From the growing hegemony of the service sector to the incessant need to demonstrate expert competence in a myriad of fields of knowledge, Virno suggests *action* is now conflated with *labor* and *work*, as Arendt initially suggested, posing new challenges in contemporary life.

From this prism, the outpost as a place to produce economic value was devalued because the activities it fostered did not align with the over-valuation of virtuosity in a new neoliberal

economy. The claim that people needed to "form themselves" (Cat. *formar-se*) and accusations that people were "doing nothing" to improve their situation evidences this shift to a model of economic productivity where the prototypical commodity is action itself. While the *labor* and *work* within the warehouse was readily described as constitutive of dignity by my Senegalese participants, these activities were generally viewed as incommensurable with mainstream Barcelona. Indeed, statements that described people as "outside of society" or scrap metal as a "trap" that impeded their integration point to a broader devaluation of activities deemed at odds in a city increasingly transformed into a major destination of global services (e.g., tourism, new technologies) and its de facto residents into its service providers (Delgado 2007). This devaluation of the productive power of the outpost, however, was not shared by those sectors that were directly impacted by such activities. On the contrary, the exclusion of people from the formal labor market forced them to invest in a kind of economic sovereignty that inadvertently aligned with a neoliberal disposition to create economic opportunities independent of the state[117].

Conclusion

The warehouse constituted a social field that was firmly grounded in the maximization of a person's economic and legal status and position. A temporary arrangement, the warehouse was a contingent social world that people recognized could and would cease to exist at any moment given that an eviction was inevitable and a more favorable legal and employment status a sought-after future prospect. A "life, like in Africa" refers to a constellation of routines that coalesced over into a unique place of being and belonging on the one hand and a place to produce value on the other. Calling someone *sai sai* (thief, bandit) or *Baay Faal* produced moods that transformed

[117] In recent years people living in the EU have increasingly begun to send raw materials to Senegal, dominating this sector and representing a formidable economic force driven from the diaspora (Sinatti 2009:68).

the industrial space of the warehouse into a particular place that was markedly different from the rest of Barcelona.

Managing a "business" or managing oneself with a "business" mindset meant creating a mood that conveyed a common struggle to make money but also remain relevant within those social networks of personal significance in one's economic pursuits. The outpost is a transnational social field whose claim to space is politically, legally and culturally tenuous. The outpost as I theorize it here exists in correlation to the construction of "illegality" but is experienced as a unique place that is constituted according to the unfolding of everyday practice. Cognizant of its inherent contingent and exceptional status, people turn to an outpost as a means to mitigate the state of limbo of "illegal" status, one that is experienced as a forced state of waiting. As people wait for change, the outpost extends opportunities to work toward culturally intelligible models of personhood.

Chapter 5 – A Moral Moratorium

"Goorgorlu rekk"

Babacar pushed his cart down the corridor from the entrance. I extended my right hand, but because he was still wearing his work gloves, he reciprocated with his right wrist, a gesture I had become accustomed to in the warehouse.

"*Nan nga def,* Babacar?!"

"*Waaw, maa ngi fii*," he responded. He turned to survey his cart, adding, "*Goorgoor lu rekk.*[118]"

Granada walked up to his cart to examine his finds, followed by a small group of people, a sure sign he had found valuable objects. Granada grabbed a large faux leather jacket in the front end of the cart and tried it on. I complemented the new look. After a few moments, Babacar and Granada agreed on a final price of 4 euro. Granada returned to his business a few feet away with a new beat to his step. A Moroccan man asked Babacar for the price of three women's hand bags in good condition with no tears or visible imperfections. "Give me 10 euro," Babacar said in Spanish. The man examined the bags further before offering 5 euro. Babacar nodded, accepting the 5 euro banknote. A Pakistani man asked about a CD/DVD player that appeared to be in working condition. "Does it work?" "Test it in there," he replied, pointing to Omar's chatarerria. "How much?" "Give me 10 for it, my friend." The man went into Omar's chatarreria where he plugged it in and saw the lights turn on and the CD/DVD shelf extend out. The man returned examining the appliance with greater care before offering 4 euro. "Give me 6 for it." The man

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[118] Exchange in Wolof, which translates to the following:
Arturo: How are you, Babacar?!
Babacar: Yes, I am here/fine. Only/just getting by.

nodded. Seeing as he was busy, I bid him farewell. "Waaw, *leegi leegi*[119]," he replied, turning to a Romanian man who was haggling over the price quoted for an alarm-clock radio. As I walked away, I overheard them settling on 3 euro for the appliance.

The use of the Wolof word *rekk,* which translates to "only" or "just, qualifies the idiom *goorgor lu* and sheds light on a cultural logic that informs people's understanding of their "situation." To emphasize "getting by" as the sole path to follow, Babacar points to an intersubjective process of person-making in which struggle is a central component. Like the act of waiting, "to struggle" is a mode of operation that is anchored in a particular cultural milieu and is learned as part of a process of becoming a certain kind of person. In her research in Sierra Leone, Caroline Bledsoe (1990) examines the popular maxim "No Success without Struggle" as part of a local "hardship ideology" that foregrounds three interrelated adult objectives in childhood education – development, knowledge, and struggle[120]. Although readily conceived as a private affair, Bledsoe shows how a certain "cultural logic" undergirds the way people face and endure hardship and ultimately "shapes what we regard as very private sentiments" (1990:85). The Wolof term *rekk* accentuates the quality of *goorgorlu* as a kind of "hardship ideology" that frames contingent work as an existential feat with the potential to expand one's horizon. If the outpost is a place for different modes of being, belonging, and producing value, then this is contingent on the possibility to construe struggle as an indelible part of success, its own feat that is part of a continuous process of learning.

[119] The Wolof term *leegi* translates to "now" in English. As a compound noun, *leegi leegi* translates to "see you soon".

[120] Bledsoe suggests children are treated harshly in their upbringing as a means to aid the development of their character and help them gain more than their parents (1990:76). To these ends, children need the knowledge that goes beyond the family unit, thereby necessitating a radical separation and distance from the family for foster children. Knowledge to develop into successful adults needs to be earned through struggle rather than passively allocated. Struggle forms part of a broader cosmology in which ancestors and God are called to weigh in to determine a child's training as meritorious and through which adult relationships are negotiated.

Babacar often walked from the warehouse west on one of the main throughways, such as Aragon Street, to the more densely populated Eixample districts. At the centric Passeig de Gracià, Babacar would continue depending on how or what he had collected by this point. If he deemed it necessary to continue working, he would go north into the Gracià neighborhood and return via Passeig Sant Joan to the Ciutadella Parc and then east to the post-industrial area of the 22@ district. He would return to the warehouse via a parallel street to continue checking containers on his way back.

On average people who collected scrap metal walked 10-25 kilometers per day. In addition to the cart, the single most important instrument for many I interviewed was a stick, often made from the remains of a broom or mop handle used to rummage through the content of rubbish or recycling containers with greater speed, precision and comfort. These sticks often had a nail taped to one end in order to puncture plastic bags and open their content. Because of this common practice, it was possible to see if someone had recently checked that particular container by the presence of punctured plastic bags. When something was spotted that was difficult to extract with the stick alone, many relied on gloves to reach into the container without soiling or injuring their hands. While generally viewed as necessary, gloves were not as ubiquitous as the cart or the stick. A backpack placed around the handlebar of the cart was used to store smaller objects, many of which were of greater value (e.g., electronics, antiques, jewelry).

Like many others, Babacar had lived in Andalucía for the first five months in the country in 2006, working mainly in agriculture near Jaen. He moved to Catalonia to expand his labor opportunities and began selling imitation designer goods in Plaza Catalonia, La Rambla and along the beachfront in Barceloneta. He remembers making substantial sums of money, sometimes as much as 300 euro per week, but also having frequent encounters with the police. With the crisis

in full swing in 2009 and the persistent preoccupation of being detained and possibly deported, he decided to seek opportunities in agriculture in Lleida, a city in Catalonia. He stayed in and around the small city of Mollerusa for two years where he lived in a two-bedroom apartment with an average of 10 other people[121] and in a vacant lot[122] whenever he found work collecting tomatoes in a hothouse (Cast. *invernadero*). In Mollerussa he met a young man from the city of Kaolack where he was born and raised that told him of people collecting scrap metal in Barcelona and living in abandoned industrial buildings. As many prepared to move to the city of Salou on the Catalan coast to sell imitation goods in tourist areas in the summer season, Babacar decided to move to Barcelona and explore his options there. Drawing from his social network, he was quickly able to find one such building in the 22@ area of the city where he first met Babou, Assane and Ibou.

Babacar was from the same neighborhood of Parcell in Dakar as Babou, with whom he initiated a strong friendship. Babacar lived with Babou and helped with his bar, but was disillusioned with this kind of business because of the constant need to mediate conflicts within the establishment and the inevitable precarity before the law inherent in such economic ventures. After the space was evicted and Babou lost his bar, Babacar decided to focus solely on scrap metal and its derivatives, such as "cleaning" motors for their copper wiring. Babacar and Babou moved into the specific space where I met them in what used to be a large office that they shared with two other people. Although he was no longer interested in starting a new business, Babou decided to help his friends Assane and Ibou secure their space for a bar. Assane and Ibou began constructing their business with materials he found on the street without anyone but Babou and Babacar knowing of their plans. "No, don't tell anyone until you get there," Assane once told me. "No

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[121] The term *cama caliente* (Cast. literally, "hot bed") was readily used in media reports and political debates to refer to apartments used primarily for sleeping by a high number of people.

[122] Encampments of workers searching for work in and near agricultural cities such as Lleida have increased in number since the economic crisis (Biela 2015; Visa 2012).

one knows about this until the bar was finished[123]. One day I opened the door and people saw I had a bar!" The bar was fully stocked and ready to receive its first patrons the day they opened the main and only door leading into the corridor. The bar was an instant success. "It's better to tell people where you are going only when you get there!" Assane insisted when retelling the beginnings of his business. "If you tell them where you want to go, then you will never reach your destination!"

Although Babacar and Babou did not reap the immediate economic benefits of having a bar, they did benefit from having such a space available in the warehouse. For many I consulted, this was more than a business for the simple fact that it made available a space to find moments of reprieve from daily struggles with others facing similar existential challenges, an underlying quality Babou captured in the comparison of his bar to an "NGO" that provided an important social service to people. "I had my restaurant," Babou recollected during an interview. "I cooked to sell, you know, to make life easier for us, to help, like an NGO, because we can't afford prices today, you know?" The warehouse was a place of being and belonging that provided people the opportunity to produce value that was economic but also socio-symbolic, from helping others to finding ways to maximize one's gains, however marginal and tenuous. "Because in the warehouse," Babou continued. "If you had 5 euro, you will eat daily, you will drink Fanta and you will smoke if you want. If you don't want (to spend money), you put a euro in your pocket, you understand? And that's a euro for tomorrow."

Rather than a "squat" or a "shanty town" (i.e., *barraca/chabola*), the warehouse was an outpost in people's transnational networks that offered certain material means to reinforce their foothold in Spain while experiencing a sense of autonomy within its limited parameters to "become

[123] This is a common idea in Senegalese society. Where coveted resources or projects are concerned, it is common knowledge to keep this secret in order to protect them from the potential sabotage of jealous onlookers.

everything that one is capable of becoming" (Maslow 1968:82). If migrant "illegality" implies a kind of breach in people's experience of the world (Coutin 2003; Jackson 2013; Lucht 2012; Willen 2007, 2014), then the outpost represents a means to become re-grounded by transforming an "existential waiting" into a more predictable and manageable "situational waiting" within an accessible lifeworld (Dwyer 2009). Waiting, then, foregrounds the question of agency and the role of action in the constitution of ethical-moral structures of everyday experience (Ghassan 2009), an intersubjective dynamic that merits closer analysis.

Jaapal Baayal

Walking down the corridor I occasionally thought of my first few visits to the warehouse and my initial ambivalent feeling of curiosity and apprehension. I entered the warehouse unaccompanied on my second visit and found a place that felt uninviting. The sound of Mbalax and reggae coming from chatarrerias and bars mixed with the din of scrap metal rattling inside carts or crashing against containers as it was thrown inside, with numerous firepits lining the corridor and creating a center of gravity for small groups of men that warmed their calloused hands while chatting in languages only they understood. The few West African women I saw, particularly from Senegal, prepared meals inside chatarrerias or sold roasted peanuts and cups of café Tuubaa for 50 cent along the corridor. I bought coffee and peanuts, chatted with people next to firepits, and had a meal in what felt like an outdoor street restaurant in a busy city.

Having a business meant having more to lose, a fact that discouraged people such as Babacar or Babou to pursue this option despite its economic promise. Having a business also meant dealing with others without a fixed ethical-moral rubric to rely on, which was a major source of emotional frustration and physical-material risk. In the warehouse the activity of labor was

governed at the personal and interpersonal level, the activity of work systematized at the interpersonal and structural level, and the activity of action, the *sine qua non* and the *condicio per quam* of communal life (Arendt 1958:7), apprehended through in situ and real time evaluation. And it was within this last aspect of everyday activities – action – that self-fashioning was especially prominent, engaging with others from a particular model of personhood.

The idioms people used to describe everyday activities reveal more about their experience than implicit or explicit depictions in dominant discourse of the warehouse as an inhospitable "ghetto." Faouzi, a de facto bar owner in the warehouse, often used the Wolof idiom *jaapal baayal* to describe the uncertainty of social relations in the warehouse in addition to the broader uncertainty of the fate of the space itself. Literally translated to *holding-slipping*, the idiom jaapal baayal points to the challenge of "holding" economic gains in a broader context of structural marginality when redistributive expectations vis-à-vis loved ones with less acquisitive power in Senegal or abroad entail a "slipping" of personal resources and thus a relinquishing of prior marginal advantages. Faouzi was able to send money back to his family on a more or less regular basis with his bar, but as he noted in an interview, the fact that he often allowed people to eat for free meant he regularly earned only enough to cover costs and support himself.

> Sometimes nothing, there are days that nothing, yes, yes. Maybe people come, but they say, 'hand me beer, give me a plate (of food),' but me, really, I give food for nothing, thank God that, man, if someone comes to me, tells me that they don't have anything to eat, that they are hungry, yes. Alcohol no, but food it's true that I give it. Because, you now, it's not that I have to show extra effort, or that I'm more important than they, no. But well, me with food, me myself, if I see someone who doesn't have food, if I have extra food, I will give it to them. Or many brothers come to me, 'I don't have anything, give me a plate and put it on my tab.' I say, 'no, no, I won't open a tab for you. If in this moment I am also hungry, I will serve you food, I will make myself a plate we both eat, we sit and we eat together. Or if I have eaten, I will prepare a small plate and you eat, it's ok (Cast. *no pasa nada*). I've done that many times.

Whereas beer was strictly economized, Faouzi valued the sharing of food because of his moral dispositions privileging such redistribution. The consumption of alcohol is strictly prohibited in Islam, and as such was heavily reprimanded by those who observed a more

conservative lifestyle in the warehouse. People who sold alcohol viewed this as a market exception, and went to great lengths to keep it under a strict economic framework. But meals and non-alcoholic drinks, especially tea, were made available to others in the mood of friendship, as "brothers" who are facing similar political and personal predicaments. The autonomy of how these relationships proceeded and how they were modified reflects not only the value of activities aimed at procuring the life course (i.e., labor, but also the imbrication and maximization of activities aimed at being-with-others within a certain social realm of the "good" (i.e., labor, work and action). Like Assane, Faouzi built his bar in order to generate income. And like Assane, Faouzi was unable (or unwilling) to only privilege monetized relations. On the contrary, he operated his business with the aim of creating a place for people to spend time and re-group after a long day of "searching" within and beyond the warehouse. The cultural expectations around "holding" wealth and subsequently "releasing" it in the form of redistribution sheds light on an underlying moral economy that is dominant in Senegal as well as in the diaspora.

Faouzi opened his bar around the same time as Assane. Originally from the Parcelles Assainies neighborhood in the outskirts of the Senegalese capital, Faouzi was expected to continue the wood cutting trade with his father and other family members before he met a Spanish woman on holiday in the summer of 2001 and set his sights on Europe. Married to an EU citizen facilitated his entry into Spain and provided him with the state authorization "to work and live without problems," as he phrased it in an interview. He managed to find work re-stocking produce in a warehouse in Les Corts in Barcelona, but quit his job after the couple separated two years later. He decided to move to Mataró to live with family where he worked collecting tomatoes and lettuce. He moved back to Barcelona in 2009 at the behest of friends who had found a large abandoned building to live and store material that could then be re-sold. During this time, he enrolled in a

course in electrical work and began gaining firsthand experience setting up the electrical system of countless "occupied" spaces. He decided to open a bar in the warehouse to have another source of income and to be of help to others.

In the context of the warehouse, the idiom *jaapal baayal* signaled the precarious grasp over whatever advantage a place such as the warehouse extended to people. The use of this metaphor to describe gains as something that can be held but at a perennial risk of slipping away draws attention to important phenomenological qualities of the warehouse as an outpost – gains are potentially ephemeral and opportunities are categorically reoccurring. An idiom such as *jaapal baayal* communicates the struggle to remain firm in one's resolve to wait for a change of fortune despite constantly feeling gains slip just as appear. In contrast to "the streets," the warehouse offered a degree of material and symbolic cohesion, such as Faouzi's insistence that food in his bar will always be shared with others in need, that mobilized dominant moral codes from Senegal. To share food is to enact phatic communion with others, creating from unpredictable and spontaneous activities a social field that feels aligned with dominant models of personhood. But if personhood reflects a "particular relationship to morality" (Zigon 2011:64) and the outpost is an assemblage that amalgamates different moral codes, then *jaapal baayal* also communicates the struggle to endure a state of liminality in the absence of a conventional moral framework. Faouzi's efforts to keep the area within and around his bar clean and his regular and would-be patrons in good spirits are experimental iterations within a social world that buttressed but also threatened the meaning attributed to day-to-day activities.

Drawing from the work of Charles Peirce, Robert Desjarlais (1997) suggests among the most difficult experiences of living "on the streets" is to be vulnerable to the whims of others – people and objects – in the world. Based on his work at a homeless shelter in Boston, Desjarlais

suggests the "world of Secondness," characterized not by the innate qualities of objects and their potential but rather by contact between them and their subsequent movement[124], was mitigated by recourse to the Firstness of an empty lobby or a quiet park where people could "block out all the rest" and no longer be continually and unpredictably acted upon and influenced by others (1997:133). Unlike Firstness or Secondness, Thirdness refers to social conventions guiding objects and their interactions, a kind of "finite province of meaning" that is taken for granted as a natural articulation of the everyday lifeworld (Schutz and Luckman 1973:35, also see Wilson 2005). In contrast to the people in Desjarlais' study, who reckoned with the authority of an institutional register, people in the warehouse had greater leverage to attempt to "mold the Secondness into a kind of Thirdness" (Desjarlais 1997:133). Certain spaces, such as Mamadou's room, Omar's chatarreria or Faouzi's bar, constitute a kind of Thirdness in that it cohered ways of being and belonging that were experienced as more predictable and on one's own terms. But the quality of Thirdness was exceptionally thin, as is characteristic of an outpost as a place whose claim to space is politically, legally and socio-symbolically tenuous.

The idiom jaapal baayal in the context of the warehouse referred to an anterior process of meaning production, namely the effort to mitigate a "world of Secondness" through the establishment of routines and a working-order framework for their interpretation. Without established norms or rules, the warehouse comprised multiple individual interests, desires and motivations that aligned in the form of a business ethos but diverged in the communication or resolution of a grievance. Whatever Faouzi managed to "hold" through his work in his bar could "slip" at any moment because of the unpredictability of the warehouse. Mano was among those

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[124] Charles Peirce differentiates between a First, Second and Third level of apprehension of the world. The innate qualities and potentialities of objects absent of determined or a priori meaning is known as Firstness, objects and things bearing on each other is referred to as Secondness, and the norms and laws consolidating processes of signification represent Thirdness (Peirce 1955:75-78).

identified as a person with a drinking problem that was constantly causing trouble. Faouzi, Assane and others insisted he was a “good guy” who had “lost it” when he began drinking a few years before. Whenever he was inside a bar there was a high possibility of trouble as a result of Mano striking tables to make a point or reaching for other people’s beer bottles when they were not looking. Turning Mano away only temporarily solved the problem, for there was no conventional means to enforce this dictate other than through violence, which was overwhelmingly shunned as a last resort.

Jaapal baayal communicated a sense of having and not having control in everyday operations in the outpost, a kind of fragility that is entirely due to circumstances. Faouzi was among the few in the warehouse with the knowledge to tinker with electrical power lines. In one encounter, he told me someone came into his room and demanded that he immediately connect their electricity. Electric power was brought in and subsequently distributed haphazardly with cables connected and disconnected in an increasingly complex web that was progressively nailed high above the ground to avoid contact with water or other liquids on the floor. The person who came into his room had been a regular patron of his bar, someone with whom Faouzi had spoken to on innumerable occasions and had come to consider a friend. Perhaps because of this sense of friendship, this person felt as though Faouzi had betrayed him for leaving him in the dark just when others on his floor had full access to the electric grid. The discussion escalated to a fist fight that spilled over into the corridor and was finally brought to an end through the intervention of others. As a sign of good faith, Faouzi agreed to connect this person’s room to the electric grid, but refused to serve him again in his bar. They frequently crossed paths in the warehouse, but kept their interactions cordial, if not indifferent, until the eviction a year later.

The Question of Morality

Assane was welcoming from the very beginning. Assane's bar was among the most popular in the warehouse because of its prime location along a principal section of the corridor, but also because his supplies were constantly re-stocked, mainly from a nearby Lidl supermarket, and he remained open when other bars closed, always with food and drinks available and ready to be served. The majority of his patrons during the day were Senegalese and Gambian, who mainly bought single cigarettes and rolling paper. In the late-afternoon and evenings, however, his clientele was much more diverse, often with representation from West Africa, North Africa, Eastern Europe and South America. Assane's bar was an invaluable resource but also an abiding affront to his peace and quiet, forcing him to "put up with" (Cast. *aguantar*) the worst in people's behavior day and night. "The bar is good," he assured me during an interview. "Because at least you earn something, you know? But you will have to put up with all kinds of things. Yes, you can count on it! Because people come to drink, to get drunk, until the last drop, everything! All kinds of fights, all kinds of people, and of course, you have to put up with it (Cast. *aguantar*) because if not, in the end you will be the one fighting with the people every day."

Debates regarding the "good" were pervasive throughout my fieldwork. As an assemblage, an outpost is comprised of multiple intersecting dimensions for construing behavior, which may overlap as much as they may be in perpetual contention. The quest for the "good" was a dimension of the outpost that was a persistent source of concern and deliberation. Just as the outpost exists in the interstices of state power, it also occupies a marginal position vis-à-vis normative moral and ethical structures guiding everyday life. Because people drew from different moral codes, their assessments of the "good" and their activities informed by them often created points of tension that undermined authoritative evaluative frameworks. Assane seldom drank because of his

Muslim faith, and reluctantly sold alcohol because of the critiques he knew were leveled against him but also because of the kind of behavior its sale would aggravate. To deal with people whose inebriation rendered impossible calm and orderly dispute resolutions meant facing the need to resort to violence on a regular basis, a fact that turned off people like Babacar and Babou to the idea of having a bar.

Michel Foucault (1990) argues morality should not be understood as a homogenous social reality due to the fact that people increasingly encounter different "moralities" in their interaction with distinct institutions (1990:25). Rather than attempt to ascertain a unifying definition of morality, Foucault emphasizes the importance of interrogating the "morality of behaviors" and the set of "moral codes" in any social space against which people assess their being-in-the-world, a dynamic process he calls "modes of subjectivation" (1990:27). Joel Robbins (2012) conceptualizes morality as that which "encompasses the demand that people adhere to shared models of action and the fact that people sometimes confront situations in which no single model of action is clearly best and must make moral choices between a number of models of how to proceed" (2012:118). The idioms people used throughout my fieldwork point to a tension between what he calls a "morality of reproduction" on the one hand and a "morality of freedom" on the other (Robins 2007:296) in so far the outpost is a place of on-going experimentation in which the desire to live in the comfort of Thirdness (e.g., convention) is perennially enmeshed in the struggle to mediate the exigencies of unpredictable Secondness (e.g., absence of established norms) and the "doing nothing" of Firstness (e.g., pre-social identity).

A recent "moral turn" in anthropology (Fassin 2012) has spurred numerous theoretical frameworks that are especially productive in further understanding the intersubjective qualities of the outpost. Joel Robbins (2007, 2012) suggests the tension between moral obligation and free

will is best approached through the theorization of value. In his fieldwork in Papua New Guinea, Robbins notes how the Urapmin with whom he worked are "constantly and keenly aware of the stakes involved in their moral choices" because for them the second coming of Jesus is understood as immanent (Robbins 2007:303). With everyday life pierced with moral concern, Robbins argues the saliency of freedom (i.e., conscious moral choices) among the Urapmin does not take full account of culture change or the co-existence of different cultural logics. Robbins argues people evoke a hierarchy of values to reconcile the potential moral conflicts between a Urapmin traditional cultural logic that values creating and maximizing relationships with others and a Urapmin Christian cultural logic that values "the creation of an individual self that is worthy of salvation" (2007:308-309). Robbin understands values as qualities within social structures rather than imposed upon them, discerned by looking at "relations of encompassment and limitation between elements" in the hierarchical organization of social life (2007:297). Building on Weber's notion of "value spheres," Robbins suggests values "organize their own spheres aimed at their realization and in doing so create hierarchies of elements within each sphere," as well as hierarchies among different value spheres (Robbins 2012:122). This approach to morality explains how routine behavior can be enacted in the service of a morality of reproduction when it takes place within a clearly marked and bounded value sphere or a morality of freedom in "situations in which it is not evident which value should govern interaction" (2012:124). The outpost is a place comprised of intersecting and often contradictory value spheres, but it is also a place to produce new value spheres that best fit the structural and intersubjective context at hand.

To "occupy" directly challenged the value of upholding the law, which was readily voiced in the form of self-critique. Rather than defend an overt political position, such as the *okupas* and the drive to create an alternative model for "a better life *despite* capitalism" (Vilaseca 2013:4,

italics in original), people I worked with were sympathetic with others who complained about the existence of the irregular settlements and understood the act of using private property without authorization to be an infringement of a valued norm. Often people emphasized the difficult living conditions they "put up with" in the warehouse as a means to contextualize their situation and, more specifically, align the existence of and activities within the outpost within a higher value of "searching for one's life." This was clearly stressed in an interview with Assane and Ibou who emphasized the inhospitable living conditions of the warehouse to reconcile their sense of a blatant infringement of social norms.

> Ibou: People who say, 'look at these immigrants, occupying all these places, look at how they live! Living there, (with) water, electricity, everything free – look!' People say this, they hear this, but they have never been here! They walk past on the street, looking but they never come inside!"
>
> Assane: Here, look, here there are more rats than people! More rats than people! In Africa, you've been to Africa, you know. In Africa, we are poor and it's dirty, but like this?! No! Living with rats?! No! Right now, when you look under your feet, you will find one! So why are we living like this?
>
> Ibou: We don't have anything better than this, that's why, of course.
>
> Assane: When we are living here, here we can get ahead (Cast. *buscar nos la vida*) with many things; without begging, without begging. We can get ahead doing many things without begging.

Assane and Ibou evoke but also redraw moral codes grounded in "European" or "African" sensibilities and dispositions. They do this precisely because the morality of reproduction of either dominant value sphere was experienced as fractured and unwieldy in the immediate lifeworld of the warehouse. Indeed, because of the interstitial position of the outpost everyday life can be pierced with the feeling of a "breakdown" that demands conscious ethical rumination. Jarrett Zigon (2008) suggests morality is best approached from three distinct but interrelated spheres – the discursive, the institutional and the embodied – that "come together to *inform* the ways in which a person works on herself" (Zigon 2008:165, italics in original). Based on his research at a church-run drug-rehabilitation center in Russia, Zigon argues people are generally unaware of morality in everyday life until something fails to "fit the context," precipitating what he calls "a

moral breakdown" (Zigon 2009:263). The perceived animosity against "immigrants … living there … everything free" and the ubiquity of "rats ... under your feet" implied for Assane and Ibou a kind of moral breakdown of "European" but also "African" moralities in discursive, institutional and embodied dimensions.

According to Zigon, when a person experiences a moral breakdown they seek ways to "move back *in*to the world" where they can "once again dwell in the unreflective comfort of the familiar" (2007:138). Such a move is made possible by what he calls "an ethical moment" that impels a person in a given situation to "consciously reflect upon the appropriate ethical response" (2009:262). At the church-run drug rehabilitation center where Zigon conducted fieldwork, HIV was at times referred to as a "blessing" by staff because this meant people were forced to shed reproachable lifestyles and enter the fold of the Orthodox church by becoming conscious of their actions in ethical terms and re-fashioning a new moral person attuned to dominant discursive and institutional moralities (2011:60-63). The center's emphasis on responsibility and self-discipline, which are viewed as pillars in the struggle to live a pious life free from sin, overlap with an increasingly hegemonic neoliberal rationale informing contemporary society today. Because moralities are composites of different spheres and an ethical moment invites people to "consciously and creatively find a way to be moral" (2009:263), Zigon suggests an assemblic approach to morality that does "not assume the existence of moral totalities in the world and thus provides a more nuanced perspective for understanding the fuzzy, fragmentary, and oftentimes contradictory moral milieu most often characteristic of any singular social location, situation, or experience" (2014:17-18). For Zigon, moral and ethical assemblages are "unique conglomerations" that "offer a greater range of possibilities for morally being in the world and ethically working on oneself" (2014:19). However, in the context of transnational mobility in

general and the structural abjection of migration "illegality" in particular, an approach to morality as "a kind of habitus or an unreflective and unreflexive disposition of everyday social life" (2008:17) needs to be further qualified to better understand being-in-the-world as an inherently contingent experience.

A Moral Tragedy

In their pursuit of the values of making money, being autonomous, and remaining connected to family in Senegal, people inadvertently infracted legal and socio-normative norms and saw themselves facing conflicting value spheres without straightforward settlement. James Laidlaw (2002, 2014) has argued anthropology has favored an approach to morality that foregrounds the reproduction of social structures in a discrete culture as a result of Emile Durkheim's influence in the discipline who "understood society to be based on moral obligation, and indeed defined it as being a system of moral facts" (2002:312). Laidlaw critiques this approach for conflating social collectivities with notions of the good and removing the grounds to critically assess not only the relationship between morality and power, but also to discern the "different ways in which people have purposefully made themselves into certain kinds of persons" (2002:324). In this vein, Laidlaw turns to Kant and his emphasis of the importance of personal will over the presumed sanctity of moral obligation to call for greater attention on "freedom" and the different "ethical practices" people enact and embody as "our response to invitations or injunctions to make oneself into a certain kind of person" (2002:321-322). The activities in the warehouse were embedded in such a freedom of self-fashioning.

Cheryl Mattingly (2012, 2014a, 2014b) proposes a neo-Aristotelian approach to morality that privileges the role of circumstance rather than universal notions of the good to explore how

activities are construed as more or less meaningful under strenuous conditions. Based on her fieldwork with African American families with special needs children, she argues her interlocutors face "a moral tragedy" when they find themselves "imprisoned" within conflicting yet desired values and "the performative requirements attached to them" (2014b:135). Her use of this term from ancient Greek thought is to problematize any pretension of evaluating social life from a single universal standpoint and stressing the need to be "judged in terms of the particularities of each situation" (2014a:109). To say the warehouse is an example of a moral tragedy is to foreground the feeling that the pursuit of a cherished good, such as earning money and working toward a middle-class standard of living, inadvertently undermined other goods, such as living and working "within the purview of the law." Thierno's suggestion to "look at Gaddafi and Hussein" illustrates this point, a call to privilege lived experience independent of the broader structural circumstances because such a person's immediate social world is categorically defined by its propensity to change. To "occupy" an industrial warehouse was admonished by Thierno and others because it went against their definition of a person who "does not cheat the population" despite the fact that these very same spaces were conceived as crucial to embody the contours of a "correct person" who is consistently searching for opportunities to work. Thierno and others went to great lengths in our interviews to situate their activities and the contradictions they sparked within the broader "circumstances they did not initiate" (Mattingly 2012:168). In this regard, the outpost is inevitably pierced with the sense of a moral tragedy in which 'good people' act in ways contrary to their moral and ethical convictions as a consequence of a temporary unfolding of fate that is "out of human control[125]" (2012:167). To borrow this term is to emphasize the important role of fate for

[125] Needless to say, circumstances derived from things in the world such as legal status or unemployment are not natural but veritable cultural constructs. To stress the importance of "fate" is not to deny this fact but to suggest people *experience* these as "out of human control" because they are beyond *their* immediate control, something I was often reminded of throughout my fieldwork.

my Senegalese participants, many of whom used this as a conceptual lens to focus on the value of activities in the warehouse and relegate to the background anything deemed to be superfluous in its immediate lifeworld.

The following encounter illustrates this moral predicament of undermining a cherished good in the pursuit of another. On a visit to Assane's bar a young Catalan photographer walked in accompanied by a Gambian regular. I had seen the photographer before but had not had a chance to interact with him. The warehouse and other similar spaces had received substantial coverage from the media, and this young man was among the many that worked independently and desired to help by making the phenomenon "visible" to a more general public. They ordered two Fantas and a couple of single cigarettes for a total of 2.50 euro. The photographer had visited Assane's bar before, evident by the very friendly manner in which he greeted him, asking him about his business and his overall well-being. Assane responded to his pleasantries, "You know, it's difficult, but we are putting up with it" (Cast. *estamos aguantando*). Thierno was at the bar, leaning over a Fanta soda can while he smoked cigarettes. "It's very difficult, but this is what we have to do, we have to put up with it." The photographer's gaze was fixed on Assane's face and then on Thierno's, the can of Fanta he ordered unopened and his single cigarette between his fingers still unlit. "We are suffering here. It's hard, it's very hard," Thierno added. "Yes, I know," the photographer interjected, his voice conveying concern. "It pains me to see you waste your life like this." The comment sank like a stone. Assane released a single and elongated, "No," while his head lowered and his hands moved to a pouch of tobacco to roll a cigarette. Thierno remained silent, clearly no longer interested in continuing their exchange of words. The photographer appeared confused by the sudden change in rapport. His Gambian acquaintance suggested they

go outside. Perplexed, the photographer agreed to the proposition. He waved and said farewell but only I responded in kind.

"These people, they don't understand," Assane stated once they had left. "It's difficult, man, we are suffering," Thierno added, putting out one cigarette before lighting another. "It's hard, you know, it's very hard." I was intrigued by the exchange and what appeared to have been a moment of miscommunication. "We are trying, it isn't easy. We are putting up with/enduring it (Cast. *estamos aguantando*)." Their tone was that of a person bringing forth a complaint to an impartial arbiter. I nodded, repeating, "It's tough, it's tough," for lack of a better thing to say. This encounter shows how the photographer evaluated activities in the warehouse according to a dominant moral code or sphere of value that denounces these spaces as sites of "social exclusion" while inadvertently undermining a different moral code or sphere of value that extolled personal struggle. Because Assane, Thierno and others remained committed to the pursuit of cherished goods made accessible in an outpost (e.g., making money, sending remittances, being autonomous, etc.), they found themselves in the unique situation of pursuing one good while inadvertently subverting others (Mattingly 2014b:129).

This sense of making do within arduous circumstances was palpable throughout my fieldwork. In his early 50's with a long-term residency permit in Spain, Mactar was particularly concerned about his "younger brothers" who lacked their "papers" and a strong network of support, fearing their circumstances may lead them to criminal activity or living on the streets.

> Hunger can overpower everything (Cast. *el hambre puede con todo*), because if you're hungry you are capable of doing things that you, that you did not want to do previously. That is what we are fighting against, together so that we don't reach that situation. That they help us so that we have a space where our brothers who don't have any papers can be, spaces where they can be, protected because if not they will end up in the street worse off.

The idea that "hunger can overpower everything" signals the very real human vulnerability of falling victim to a moral tragedy in which the pursuit of fulfilling basic or complex needs may

inadvertently lead to "doing things that…you did not want to do previously." His insistence that "they help us" is an acknowledgment of the structural basis of the problem and, thus, the material possibility of change. Rather than solely focus on the structural, however, Mactar's statement shows a re-framing of the social issue and an extrication of the social, moral and interpersonal stakes people faced. By pursuing the virtues of honest work in the warehouse, people inadvertently put themselves at odds with the virtues of the law-abiding "immigrant" that is actively committed to integrate in society (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012). We need another approach to moral and ethical assemblages that are valid in their localizable instantiation (Hernández-Carretero 2015; Sinatti 2009, 2014; Willen 2014) but are not presumed to be substitutes for conventional moral norms.

Moral Moratorium

Overwhelmingly, my Senegalese interlocutors rejected "squatting" for political reasons, a dominant trend in Spain since the 1980's (Vilaseca 2013). They viewed this as an action that was clearly wrong and thus did not essay to justify it as an alternative to mainstream society. On the contrary, to "occupy" buildings was largely viewed as unethical and morally reproachable, an act that could not be justified outside of the circumstances people faced. This was clearly expressed in an interview with Omar inside his chatarreria.

> If we work (in the formal labor market) we can stop what we are doing. We don't want to do what we are doing - to occupy. No one wants to rob; no one wants to occupy a shirt that belongs to someone else. But if you don't have a shirt, some have 4, 5, you are forced to take one and protect yourself against the cold. And what is happening, that we go into a warehouse when we see that outside, we die of cold or we die of heat. That is what makes us go into a house. But we don't want. We know that it is not, it is not fair, it is not legal.

Omar denounced the "occupation" of private property because he acknowledged "it is not fair, it is not legal," but he also denounced the broader context that precipitates this social reality.

While Omar laments the present situation people face, he defends such occupations as a final resort before exceptional circumstances, such as when a person is acting to procure the lifecourse against natural and political elements (e.g., "protect yourself against the cold;" "when we see that outside we die of cold or we die of heat"; unable to work in the formal labor market). In this sense, Omar makes a plea for people's efforts to be assessed independently of the fact that people are violating a social norm, which Omar and others acknowledge as a painful truth that cannot be easily reconciled. It is revealing that the act of temporarily usurping private property forces Omar to categorically state "no one wants to rob" and metaphorically re-frame the situation as the need "to occupy a shirt that belongs to someone else." Boundaries are blurred here, and this is a pressing moral-ethical challenge that had no facile solution. In any case, whatever sense that this was justified as a temporary arrangement ended once a person stepped out of the warehouse, at which point a person faced the need to evoke a higher sphere of value (e.g., making money, sending remittances, being autonomous, etc.) to counteract the hegemony of conventional moral norms that re-framed their most ardent struggles as evidence of a morally questionable or "bad life" (Cast. *malvivir*).

I propose the term *moral moratorium* to signal a kind of suspension of dominant moralities and their concomitant spheres of value for a period of time contingent on extraneous circumstances understood to be exceptional, such as the experience of migrant "illegality" and the "non-existence" this implies. This suspension permits individuals to re-imbue everyday activities with moral value without subverting conventional moral codes that would otherwise delegitimate these activities as unacceptable forms of labor, work or action. People who rely on the outpost in the absence of more favorable opportunities tacitly declare a moratorium on local and transnational taken-for-granted systems of evaluation in order to "get by" without subverting socio-symbolic

expectations of an ideal good life. In a moral moratorium, activities are evaluated not by how they ought to be but by how they truly are. In this sense, the social world of the outpost operates through and within assessments that are inseparable from the context of their iteration, independent of, albeit informed by, conventional moralities and ethics.

The moral moratorium of the outpost grants people greater flexibility in how they place value on ways of being and belonging, as well as how they create value through everyday activities. Because a moral moratorium is indubitably linked to a spatialized field of sociality, it ceases to be a generalized default in social relationships beyond it, a point of concern for many people I worked with. Thierno dated a woman he never brought to the warehouse because he was embarrassed of the beer bottles laying around. "What is she going to think? This is not a place I can bring her!" Thierno was concerned Elisa would get the "wrong" message, evaluating some behaviors (e.g., consuming alcohol) while overlooking others (e.g., merits of hard work). Thierno preferred to meet Elisa at her place or a friend's apartment in the Clot neighborhood, an apartment that was also "occupied" but was far removed from the possible negative associations the warehouse inadvertently produced. "This is not a presentable place," Thierno added. "It's not good to show people, you know?" As a law-abiding Muslim, it was hard enough living and working in an "occupied" warehouse under such precarious conditions; the presence of alcohol and marijuana made him uncomfortable because there was no way to manage its morally charged meaning, something he emphasized during our interview. "See, people come here, they see that (beer bottles), they take pictures, and what, they think we drank them all! I'm Muslim, I don't drink! But someone sees that, they say, 'oh, he must be a drunk! If not, why does he live there, why does he go there?'" Empty beer bottles were a source of consternation for many people because it undermined the kind of person they wished to project beyond the warehouse.

In my interview with Assane and Ibou discussed above, they acknowledge and assume responsibility as “immigrants...living there (with) everything free” but within a moratorium of normative local and transnational moral orders. Because of their circumstances, they “occupy” spaces to avoid the detrimental impacts of “living on the streets” or the shameful implications of “begging” with one’s “arms crossed.” The warehouse was not a space Assane, Ibou or anyone else I interviewed desired to prolong indefinitely. The presence of rats was real, often congregating in large packs that scurried inside living spaces and in the corridor. But this reference is rhetorical – to live in a space where there are “more rats than people” signals an exceptional and strictly temporary arrangement, one that is a source of a special kind of moral suffering. Mention of rats conveys the idea that life is in a state of limbo, marked by an inability to decidedly distinguished realms of the “good” (e.g., hard work, solidarity, self-discipline) from the “bad” (e.g., vermin, vices, violence). A life that involves “living with rats” is unfathomable in Europe *or* in Africa, and is construed as a breakdown of conventional social structures. Rather than state there was an absence of morality in the warehouse, I suggest these narratives point to a suspension of normative moral codes in people’s attempts to erect provisional and experimental frameworks to lead ethical lives under forbidding circumstances.

A moral moratorium allows people to create and follow routines that undergird ethical projects “to make oneself a certain kind of person” (Laidlaw 2002:322). Whereas Assane, Ibou, Thierno and others I interviewed emphasized “practice,” that is, “trying” and “doing,” the overwhelming number of outside observers I spoke to and interviewed privileged the abstract interpretation of what were *clearly* “miserable” places. In an interview with Francesc, an activist organizing protests in support of inhabitants of the so-called irregular settlements, I asked for his assessment of the warehouse. “This is basically a place of misery,” he responded. “The life

conditions are miserable here. Without water, without electricity, without a minimum of infrastructure, your nourishment however you can, I mean, all together it's very precarious." When pressed for details, Francesc added, "The thing is, one can be in miserable conditions but have dignity (Cat. *un pot estar en la miseria però ser digne*) and fight for one's dignity. But here it is so deteriorated; even this dignity (is deteriorated)."

Water fountain in the background with a container and cart locked to a bench in the foreground.

This sense that "dignity" can be fought for was immediately retracted by a broader assessment of the so-called irregular settlements as unequivocally places of misery. The material conditions were important in so far as they reduced a person's overall quality of life and implied lifestyles that people put up with as if by an extra-ordinary obligation. In an interview with Adama, who was in his early 30's at the time we met, he insisted the warehouse was not "a place to live" despite the fact that it made possible the cherished good of the Baay Faal chant and a quotidian Baay Faal way of being and belonging.

> Adama: This is not a life, my friend; I'm telling you the truth. When you go out from here, you see people; it's not a life, man. We are in Europe, yes or no? In Africa we don't live like this. Africa? You are not going to leave your house to search for water.
>
> Arturo: Yeah

> Adama: In your own house, there is water.
>
> Arturo: But that's why I said, if the warehouse, for example, if it had water, if it had electricity, if it didn't have problems with the police
>
> Adama: (interjecting) I don't want you to talk about the warehouse for the people, it's not a place to live, man! This is not to live. It was a warehouse; it was a factory. It's not to live, we should have luxurious apartments. Big! Very big, of course! Why not?

The warehouse was a place to produce value as much as it was a source of frustration, disappointment and suffering. Like Thierno, who relied on the warehouse and yet found it to be a liability in his relationship with Elisa, Adama had ambivalent feelings toward this space: on the one hand, it offered the physical space for a weekly chant, or *sikar*, in an autonomously run place known by participants as *Yoonu Baay Faal*, but on the other it represented the inexplicable exclusion of a segment of the working class non-EU citizen population in Barcelona from a "normal" life. Despite the fact that Adama relied on the space of the warehouse for housing, work and worship, he was adamant that this was "not a life" in general and "not a place to live" in particular. Following the eviction, Adama regretted the loss of this important resource in the city but he remained ambivalent throughout the time of my fieldwork, most notably surrounding his feeling of being confined to a "factory" and being denied "luxurious apartments." The frequent references to "Africa" in positive terms co-existed with the more negative references to "Africa" to foreground the experience of an existential breach and the sense that "dignity" was under threat.

While the physical conditions of the warehouse were clearly important to people, they formed part of a complex framework for assigning value that problematized a more facile interpretation such as Francesc offered above. On more than one occasion I was told by inhabitants of the warehouse that "blacks" were stronger than "whites" because they were able to put up with these difficult life conditions. "We only eat once a day," Mamadou told me once. "They (Spanish citizens) need to eat three or four times a day! We can put up with/endure this better" (Cast. *aguantamos mas*). Similarly, I was also told on more than one occasion that people felt respect

for inhabitants because they saw how they continued to "get by" (Cast. *buscarse la vida*) despite living without basic utilities. Suffering and the special value attributed to everyday struggle were an indubitable part of everyday life in the warehouse.

If the outpost is a place to produce value, then an antecedent process of suspending rather than subverting conventional moralities is necessary to potentiate routinized activities. In this regard, a common complaint was the enduring vigilance of conventional moralities which inadvertently re-framed the social world of the warehouse from a prism that was less than favorable. Like Thierno, Babou often complained of having his picture taken inside the warehouse because of the presence of beer bottles in the background. "If my family sees these pictures, they're going to think I drank all of these beers! They will not be happy!" The unconventional social behaviors sanctioned in the outpost, such as drinking alcohol or smoking marihuana, were the principal reasons why Dauda sought housing through the Plan of Irregular Settlements. "I didn't want to live there," Dauda emphatically stated during an interview, "there are too many bad people living in the warehouse, you know? They smoke marihuana, fight, hmm, they come drunk, they drink, you know? No one can put up with this (Cast. *nadie puede aguantar eso*). No, I can't put up with that situation."

A moral moratorium creates new spaces for moral and ethical assessments that are pegged to personal will and routine activities rather than to material surroundings as such. In contrast to Francesc, Granada responded to a similar question during an interview emphasizing work rather than space. "Dignity? Dignity is working without robbing, working with your own sweat, working as though it were your last hour to live." For Granada as for the vast majority of my Senegalese participants, "dignity" was influenced by a person's will and routinized activities rather than conventional norms or ideal expectations.

An outpost operates within a moral moratorium that does not portend to supplant conventional local and transnational value spheres, but rather is aimed to maximize limited gains given arduous circumstances beyond individual control. Although many people I interviewed denounced the warehouse, they were also critical of facile descriptions that construed their most sincere efforts as a "waste" of their life. "These people," Assane said after the photographer had left. "They think we are here doing nothing. We don't want to be here, you understand me? But we don't have a choice. We are getting by (Cast. *nos estamos buscando la vida*)." As the conversation ensued, Assane and Thierno were joined by Ibou in their emphasis that the warehouse was an alternative to "begging" for money in public or "sitting with one's arms crossed" waiting for someone to provide assistance to meet one's needs. These were the single most cited worse case scenarios by Senegalese and other West Africans I spoke to, providing a point of reference to assess a person's efforts and output. In this regard, "to work without robbing," as Granada noted in his definition of "dignity," invoked the personal responsibility to assure the safe continuity of life (i.e., labor), the interpersonal expectation to create economic opportunities in the city (i.e., work), and the intersubjective obligation to respect others who labor and work with pride (i.e., action).

Conclusion

The outpost mitigates the ill effects of structural abjection but it also poses new challenges in people's sense of self. Morality is ambiguous given that an individual may encounter different moralities according to institution and context, creating the possibility of two moralities contradicting each other or overlapping in such a way so as to create "loopholes" (Foucault 1990:25). The outpost is a social field characterized by such loopholes, where a given "morality of behaviors" can only be ascertained by identifying a circumstantial set of "moral codes" and

examining *how* an individual subjects him/herself to these in practice (1990: 27). Whereas this flexibility is an inherent capacity of the outpost as a place to be and belong and a place to produce value, it is also a challenge that requires persistent mediation.

The warehouse made people exceptionally aware of the moral and ethical potential in their daily routines because of the absence of a conventional moral framework. The idiom jaapal baayal points to the unpredictability of social encounters and the persistent need to resolve disputes, a persistent source of frustration. But more pressingly, the warehouse placed people in the dilemma of subverting certain goods in their pursuit of other, equally cherished goods. To best understand the tensions and affordances of the warehouse, I propose the term "moral moratorium" in order to foreground a temporary suspension of moral codes throughout which people can gain more tractable grasp of social encounters in the absence of conventional norms.

Chapter 6 – Irregular Lives

"Erroneous Cognitions"

Whenever I walked down the corridor, I thought of the curious juxtaposition of a space with a high degree of organization resembling "a city" on the one hand and a "squat" characterized by its radical spontaneity on the other. It was clear from the constant sound of scrap metal rattling inside carts and hauled onto weights and containers why people gravitated to such spaces – there was work. But it was also possible to discern why these spaces were the target of criticism within and beyond the warehouse. No one cleaned the corridor except for a diligent few who swept around the entrance of their de facto business, such as in front and inside of Omar's chatarreria, especially after an industrial size container had been filled with scrap metal and moved out of the warehouse, or around and under the large table where Oumou's clients sat to have lunch, coffee or tea on their self-claimed break from work. Unlike Granada, who sporadically kept his area clean, Pap was diligent with cleaning, making his business one of the most sought after at the entrance for a light snack, a single cigarette and/or an item to drink. Assane and Faouzi were frequently cleaning up broken beer bottles around the entrance to their bars, often needing to mop around the front door when the floor felt viscous from spilled beer, cola or other such liquids. Faouzi often swept more of the corridor than he felt obliged to in an attempt to inspire others to follow suit, a plan that seldom seemed to work. The corridor was a peculiar amalgamation of the business ethos of the warehouse and a pragmatic nihilism among those who viewed this as "a squat" without rules or norms.

The warehouse assuaged the abjection of "illegal" status because it extended a province of meaning independent of the structural forces surrounding "illegality." This was a problem in so

far as the warehouse created a distinct logic to govern everyday life, inadvertently engendering a sense of autonomy that was antagonistic and antithetical to the very category of the "migrant" subject in Spain. This was succinctly expressed in an interview with Tomàs from the Humanitarian Crisis Relief (HCR) main offices in Barcelona.

> (To rely on irregular settlements) is an erroneous cognition and that makes things harder. So you understand me, we're in a situation of (economic) crisis that makes it hard to find work opportunities. The number of possibilities that they have are limited, and on top of that they have these types of cognitions, they're making it more difficult. And *that* you see often. I mean, it's not mental illness but they are cognitions that are hindering their improvement. Or the fact of making this parallel world in industrial buildings where they have their opportunities with businesses, like a bar, or before the businesses, they could sleep there, or work with scrap metal. This kind of parallel world that makes it possible for them to send money home, which is the priority for them, has made them lose contact with the society where they live. And there are even people who believe they can continue like this for many years. 'And until when?' 'Until I have papers.' 'What are you doing to obtain your papers?' They aren't doing anything!

Like Julia, Tomas refers to the irregular settlements as "parallel worlds" because he understands these as a clear deviation from a model of "immigrant" integration local institutions such as the HCR were tasked to enforce. Moreover, his emphasis on parallelism implicitly suggests these spaces border the pathological because they represent a manifestation of a series of "erroneous cognitions" that are categorically disjointed from mainstream society. Tomàs' rhetorical questions can be seen as a common device to re-frame people's own understanding of their situation according to the rationale of an institutional register in which deflection can be swiftly and authoritatively reprimanded. The claim that "they aren't doing anything" is from the register of humanitarian aid that overtly and tacitly devalues "parallel" modes of determining what is important in life with the authority of formal institutions.

It is significant to note that the office of the Ombudsman initially made the suggestion to equip empty spaces or buildings in order to relocate inhabitants facing an eminent eviction (Síndica de Greuges de Barcelona 2013). Given that the majority of the irregular settlements were on private property, the Ombudsman recommended relocating inhabitants to temporary camps fitted

with running water and other basic amenities ahead of an eviction to return the property to its owner(s). These temporary camps were also conceived as having the necessary space for individuals to continue working with scrap metal, as it was understood this was their primary source of income. Ultimately, these temporary camps would have been spaces to "wait" for alternatives that were understood to be structural in nature (e.g., legal status, access to formal labor market, available housing stock, etc.). For many I consulted, this would have been a good alternative since they would have been able to continue "getting by" through their own means. Mousa stated this succinctly in an interview before a chant at Yoonu Baay Faal: "Look, I wouldn't care if they, if they give us even a, a little land, a little bit of land where people can put a tent and have running water, always, you know? Because many here, they get by (Cast. *se buscan la vida*) with scrap metal. We can live there until there is a better solution, something for now, you know? That would be a good solution; we wouldn't be on the street."

The Ombudsman's suggestion, however, was dismissed as politically unfeasible. First and foremost, because these were by definition an exception to the law, any call to create authorized "settlements," however temporary, was inconceivable. Public authorities, I was frequently reminded by Humanitarian Crisis Relief and city government employees, cannot facilitate or authorize spaces that are contrary to the law, such as granting a work space for people who are not authorized to work or for jobs that require permits to undertake. Without a clear pathway to work, many Senegalese and other West Africans viewed the city government's insistence to find "an exit" to the so-called irregular settlements an insecure investment of their effort, time and limited economic resources. If HCR personnel "did not see any other option," then inhabitants' rejection of these interventions was also a rejection of an institutional register of what was and was not

possible, a rejection that was identified as a clear example of the kind of "erroneous cognitions" impeding an otherwise sound intervention.

Like others I interviewed, Tomàs narrows the parameters of sensible discourse to individual actions, motivations, and evaluations, drawing a clear distinction between a normative mode of being and belonging (e.g., "society") and an abnormal manifestation of "cognitions" (e.g., "ghetto") that was deemed untenable to an established mode of "immigrant" integration. The institutional register of the HCR served the immediate function of re-framing individuals' struggles in the non-political realm of exceptional aid unhinged from the broader historical political economic context in which their lives were embedded, and devaluing everyday struggles from the authority of an institution whose principal aim is to raise awareness of a situation that they play a central role in shaping. To emphasize "cognition" as a problem is to further substantiate an anterior process of individualization and a prevailing notion that people's aggregation into "ghettos" is symptomatic of their radical cultural difference. Critical analysis and debate of the structural forces that led to such socio-spatial constellations is deemed inconsequential to the need to intervene in a series of "cognitions" understood to be unaligned with society.

To counteract the hegemonic devaluation of the warehouse, Senegalese suspended pre-migration and post-migration ideas regarding their lives in "Europe" in order to re-evaluate their positions according to the situation as they reckoned was most pertinent. The notion of a moral moratorium points to a suspension that enabled individuals to better navigate positions of structural liminality without the intention of completely annulling normative standards of the "world" they dreamed of inhabiting as fully participating citizens. The aim of imbuing an emergent social reality with value that aligns with culturally salient ideas of moral personhood allows us to see

individuals' assessments and motivations not as "erroneous cognitions" but as a temporary otherwise that palliates the structural violence of the present.

"Day to day life?" Mousa repeated soon after I posed the question. "Normal, like any other place. One tries to have a normal life. One has to work, do things like in a normal house, clean your clothes, go out to make money, do a good job at your work, and sometimes talk to your neighbors, have a bit of a social life, you know?" A "normal life" was conceived in relation to everyday activities, which were in turn assessed and valued according to criteria that emerged in-situ and in real time. The political, economic and legal liminality of the warehouse did not in itself imply a revocation of personhood – it posed an existential challenge that led to personal transformation. The kind of transformation the warehouse made possible, however, was beyond the purview of normative models of being and belonging in the cosmopolitan city.

The Barcelona Brand

An implicit problem with the "irregular settlements" was that they were deemed incommensurable with the new image of Barcelona as a site of global tourism and innovation, a major drive pushing the city government to action, according to local activists. In a study on *okupas*, or "squats," in Barcelona, Stephen Vilaseca (2013) argued the city government has consistently cracked down on these forms of housing after the 1992 Olympics because they threaten the hegemony of the status quo in the simple act of constituting and materializing an otherwise. The "irregular settlements" tarnished the "Barcelona brand[126]", but they also opened up the possibility for "parallel" modes of being and belonging that inadvertently undermined state

[126] In his study, Stephen Vilaseca shows how the principal savings bank in Catalonia – *La Caixa* – was pivotal in funding the transformation of Barcelona into a "brand" for global consumption in the increasing dominance of the tourism sector (2013:16). For Vilaseca, "the streets are no longer for the people but for tourists and investors" (2013:36).

power surrounding the government of "illegal migrants." These are some of the underlying reasons dominant discourse surrounding the irregular settlements accused individuals of "making it more difficult" and of "doing nothing" to improve their situation.

The warehouse was inseparable from the history of the city's transformation into a major destination for "immigrants" searching for work but also "foreigners" driven by the desire to consume or invest. The corridor used to connect to different workshops from the late 1950's to the mid 1990's in what used to be a central industrial area of the city. With more than 8 billion euro in international and domestic funding, the 1992 Olympic Games hosted in Barcelona[127] spearheaded the transition to a new neoliberal economy through the transformation of the city's urban landscape[128] (Roche 2000:144). Part of this process was the transformation of the image of the city itself as an inviting destination for global middle to upper class visitors[129]. By the late 1990's, the city government ceased granting and extending permits for heavy industrial activity within what would become the Innovation District of Barcelona, known in shorthand as 22@. The industrial landscape of the city was now the epicenter of the region's transition to a post-industrial economy. In this regard, this period overlapped with the city's transition to an industrial economy in the mid-19th century, when in the early 1840's the city government passed a resolution to bring down the Medieval walls surrounding what is today known as the *Old City* (Cat. *Ciutat Viella*) in

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[127] Five years following an attempted coup d'état to restore a fascist government in 1981, Barcelona won the bid to host the 1992 Olympics. This was an important opportunity to show the city's commitment to liberal, democratic values (Roche 2000:91), which had proposed and gained support to host a parallel "Workers' Olympic Games" in 1936 in protest against the fascist Nazi regime and an effort to "protect Olympic ideals" (Pujadas and Santacana 1992:142). Part of a wider fascist surge in Europe, General Francisco Franco and others launched their attack against the Second Spanish Republic as the 1936 Olympic games were set to begin, setting in motion a brutal year civil war that ousted a democratically elected government and led to the establishment of a nearly four-decade dictatorship (Roche 2000:107, 143).

[128] The Olympic Village near the port was aimed at incentivizing tourism but also attracting middle-class residents to the area, thereby further consolidating middle-class consumption practices in what had historically been a working class area of the city (Tatjer Mir 1988). The redevelopment of the beachfront meant demolishing long-held businesses, such as the hundreds of informal and make-shift *chiringuitos* selling freshly caught seafood, to clear spaces for hotels, new business buildings, and a wide promenade.

[129] Now known as *Vila Olimpica,* the waterfront was progressively transformed to align with global tastes, namely by the eradication of make-shift housing and business structures. Certain central neighborhoods remained stigmatized in the social imaginary as spaces of poverty, vice and crime. The Raval neighborhood in the Old Town is an illustrative example (McDonogh 1987). Despite recent gentrification, it remains highly stigmatized in the social imaginary.

order to expand the city in the benefit of industrial productivity[130]. The 1992 Olympics paved the way for the neoliberalization of the economy in particular and society in general.

An important example of this development was the eradication of *barraques*, or make-shift housing constructions. The history of "shanty towns" has a long history in the Iberian Peninsula, in particular in the rural countryside among farmers and along the Mediterranean Sea among Fishermen (Tatjer Mir 2011). As of the mid-1800's, however, they emerged as an inevitable consequence of a growing need for labor in the fast industrialization of key cities and the lack of housing to cover workers' needs[131]. The comparison of the warehouse to a *chabola* or *barraca* puts into relief the politics of housing for "migrants" moving to a major city in search of work. During the Franco regime, the barraques were often construed as representative of "misery" and "squalor" that required the intervention of religious institutions independent of the state (Camino et. al. 2011:104). The piecemeal approach to the barraques under Franco meant this housing arrangement continued to be an option for many people in or moving to Barcelona until the 1980's, when the city was determined to eradicate the barraques ahead of the 1992 Olympics. In a plenary meeting in late 2012, members of a neighborhood association evoked this history when they stated they did not "give support to the settlements because they like the settlements but because they want measures adopted so that people can have a dignified life," pressing the city government to "take on this task in the same manner that it did in its day to eradicate barraquisme"[132]. The

[130] The famous Passeig de Gracia that connects Plaza Catalonia at the top of Les Rambles and what is today the neighborhood of Gràcia was part of this expansion, connecting what was then the city proper of Barcelona with the adjacent autonomous city of Gràcia. The "expansion" of the city in the 19th century was made possible by the progressive incorporation of migrant labor from the Catalan rural countryside, increasing the resident population from 189,948 in 1860 to 595,632 in 1910 (Marin 2004:21). Housing for migrants, however, remained in consistent shortage, giving rise to thousands of "barraques," or make-shift housing structures, throughout the city.

[131] The city of Barcelona was the epicenter of industrialization in Catalonia, growing in population from 189,948 in 1860 to 595,632 in 1910, mostly newly relocated individuals from the Catalan rural side (Marin 2004:21). Large urban development projects, such as the construction of major through ways (e.g., Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, Passeig de Gracià) and the extension of neighborhoods (e.g., L'Exeimple, Poblenou) in the second half of the 1800's. By 1914, the Barcelona city government had identified 1,218 barraques with approximately 4,950 inhabitants (Oyón and Iglesias 2010:25), which steadily increased to 3,859 barraques with approximately 15,552 inhabitants by 1922 (Vallhonrat et. al. 2011:36). The lack of available housing for the increasing number of "migrant" workers coupled with systemic political neglect led to a rise in barraques throughout the growing metropolitan area.

[132] Ajuntament de Barcelona, Acta Consell Plenari. October 4, 2012. Pp. 20.

irresolution of the city government reveals a new citizen-migrant divide that was not lost on people I worked with. "They don't want immigrants," Babou concluded during an interview. "They don't help because they don't want us to stay." Whereas the memory of the barraques[133] is now a part of the normative history of the city, the "irregular settlements" were construed as an aberrant amalgamation spurred from the economic crisis on the one hand and the cultural idiosyncrasies of a population tenaciously holding on to a horizon that has ceased to be valid in the real world on the other. Babou rejected the Plan of Irregular Settlements because whatever aid it offered was conceived as temporary for a "migrant" population that would one day return home.

With his "own *chabola*," Babou had the experience of being autonomous despite his "irregular" status. Babou secured a space in an "occupied" warehouse in mid-2011 and used the income he generated from collecting scrap metal to buy cans of beer and cola, tobacco and rolling paper, and the necessary food items to prepare rice with chicken or lamb. His bar was an immediate success, generating enough money to cover Babou's needs in Spain as well as send between 50 and 100 euro to his mother in Dakar on a weekly basis. He operated his bar for 8 months before he was awakened one day by riot police who ordered him to immediately evacuate the premises. He tried to negotiate with them in order to have more time to move his refrigerator, mattress, stove and butane tanks, a motley assortment of furniture and many other smaller objects (e.g., space heater, pots and pans, stereo speakers, etc.), but the police were inflexible, allowing him only to take his most mobile possessions. Fearing the presence of the National Police, Babou vacated the building without raising any further objections. The experience of losing his bar in

[133] In 2011 the city government formally renamed part of the beach in the Barceloneta neighborhood *Somorrostro* as a way to "recover the memory of the years of barraqusime" that had been effaced from the formal narrative of the city since the 1992 Olympic Games (Ajunament de Barcelona, *Barcelona recupera la memòria dels barris de* barraques. Dossier de Premsa. Nov. 25, 2014. Pp. 2). In 2014 the city government unveiled a commemorative plaque to mark this event in a strand of beach that is today more popularly known as *la Via Olimpica.* However, "deficient" or "miserable" the living conditions may have been for the "other Catalans" (Candel 2013:211), supporters argued the barraques had been a formative experience for thousands of citizens and therefore deserved a more normative place in the dominant narrative of the city.

such an abrupt manner discouraged him to start a new one. Although collecting scrap metal did not generate as much money, it did extend a certain sense of freedom that he continued to appreciate. "With scrap metal I get by (Cast. *me busco la vida*) and that's that. There's no nonsense with scrap metal, you know what I mean? You work, you have little money, and that's it. That's what there is."

Waiting to Root

As a place of being and belonging independent of institutions and conventional norms, the warehouse conceived as an outpost was imbued with a heightened sense of autonomy that maximized social relations and identities according to emergent personal interests. Serigne was more than just an outpatient in a mental health center in the warehouse, and Mano was a big personality whose absence was relished but also often missed. Granada and Fara were talented entrepreneurs whose presence was regularly sought for a few smokes or a steal on used goods. In the warehouse Mor and Dauda were friends brought together by fate rather than unscrupulous traffickers contributing to "illegal immigration" at sea, and Adama and other Baay Faals viewed themselves as spiritual warriors committed to a pious lifestyle determined to help others experience God in daily routines. The outpost is an assemblage whose underlying impetus may be extraneous to individual control but its day-to-day articulation is contingent on individual will and imagination. Like others I interviewed, Mousa was critical of the warehouse but rejected the Plan of Irregular Settlements because of the loss of freedom it implied. He summarized his views in one of our many interviews:

> I wanted to live here, I don't like to depend on anyone. I don't like living in a place that has a time to wake up, time to go to bed, time to come in, time to go out, you know? I don't like that because I need my liberty. I have my things and I have my way of living. I don't have a time to go to bed, I don't have a time to wake up, so I can go, best to stay here. Because here I can sleep when I feel like it, I can wake up when I feel like it, well, it doesn't bother me not having electricity, nor water

> nor any of that. If there's water, we have water. Electricity? Pss, that's ok because I'm hardly here anyway, I only come to sleep.

During my two years of fieldwork, Mousa lived in three different "irregular settlements" and two "over-occupied apartments." His flexibility with his living arrangements was widely shared among participants in my study under the age of 30, many of whom preferred the freedom such flexibility offered to the sense of ownership of a private room such as Mamadou's. In either case, the warehouse was a place to expand one's horizon of opportunities. Mousa collected scrap metal throughout my fieldwork, worked in Faouzi's bar for 3 months before he decided to quit and join Abdou's bar on the second floor above Assane's bar, and actively participated in the events held at Yoonu Baay Faal. While Mousa was critical of the structural exclusion that had precipitated the need for an outpost such as the warehouse in the first place, he was adamant such spaces improved people's quality of life when other more normalized means of "searching for one's life" were irrevocably denied.

Mousa refused to participate in the Plan of Irregular Settlements because he had received institutional aid before and felt his life had not improved much as result. On the contrary, because these institutions had been unable to offer a direct path to a residency permit and/or a job, Mousa described these as a "waste of time" and a prime source of frustration and disappointment. Mousa had a friend who knew a man who owned a camping site that he hoped would soon lead to a yearlong job contract. With a job contract and paying the social security himself, Mousa planned to apply for a residence permit through an *arraigo social,* a legalizing channel introduced in 2000 that extends the opportunity to apply for a residency permit following a period of "irregular" residence "on account of being rooted/settled" (Cast. *arraigo*). An *arraigo* directly evokes the metaphor of "being rooted" in Spain, and legally recognizes a non-EU citizen's integration according to stipulated criteria set out by the Spanish state.

This legalizing channel has three distinct types distinguished by social, labor and family ties[134]. Of the three types, the vast majority of people I interviewed hoped to apply for a residency permit through an *arraigo social*, which requires three years of "illegal" residence, a job contract, and proof of "social insertion" provided by the municipal government where a person is a registered resident (Cast. *empadronamiento*). In contrast, an *arraigo laboral* requires a person to already be working with the employer who will offer a formal job contract (i.e., prior "labor relations") and an *arraigo familiar* is reserved for people who can prove they are descendant of a Spanish citizen, the latter of which represents one of many "ethnic-affinity policies" in Spanish immigration law that grant "a privileged migration or citizenship status (to certain migrants) based on perceived common origins" (Cook-Martin and Viladrich 2009:153).

In addition to the *arraigo social*, the second most common way to obtain "papers" is to apply for a residence permit as a formally recognized partner or parent-guardian of a Spanish citizen. Getting married with a Spanish citizen provides a streamlined path to a residence permit on account of state ideologies surrounding the "imagined community" of the nation as united by blood. While the vast majority of people I interviewed objected to "starting a family" outside of a cultural-religious context, this option remained within people's radar. Indeed, people waited not only to meet someone in the hopes of obtaining a job contract but also of initiating a relationship

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[134] This "legalizing" channel was further codified following the 2000-2001 amnesty. The three types of "settlement" outlined in immigration law are the following:
1) By means of labor (Cast. *arraigo laboral*), foreigners will be able to obtain an authorization when they can prove continued residence during a minimum period of two years, as long as there is no criminal record in Spain or their country of origin, and they can demonstrate the existence of labor relations, the duration of which is not inferior to one year.
2) By means of social ties (Cast. *arraigo social*), foreigners who prove continued residence in Spain during a minimum period of three years, as long as there is no criminal record in Spain or their country of origin, they have a work contract signed by the worker and the employer at the time of submitting the application, the duration of which is not inferior to one year, and are able to prove family ties with other foreign residents, or present a report emitted by the municipality of habitual residence that proves his/her social insertion.
To this effect, family ties are exclusively understood in reference to spouses, ascendants and descendants in direct line.
3) By means of family ties (Cast. *arraigo familiar*) when it concerns children of a father or mother who were originally Spanish
(Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración – Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Real Decreto 2393/2004).

that would lead to legally recognized conjugal ties, evidencing how "illegality" also had an impact in a person's intimate life.

On one of my encounters with Mor, he handed his cell phone with a QWERTY keyboard and asked me for advice. "Maria sent me this but I don't understand. My Spanish is not very good." I had a hard time reading the text on the small screen with two large cracks on either side. The text message read, "Is something special going on? Remember to save money, no calls, yes texts. Good night, Enjoy and be Happy." I suddenly understood his long face. "I don't understand," he said after I read the text message. "Why does she say this?" My first gut response was to say she probably needed space. "*Degg la, degg la*," (Wolof: that's/you're right) he said. I handed him the phone but he refused. "Please, write her something, I don't know, write her something." I hesitated. He called her often, but she did not take his calls or cut him off before they could set a date to meet. "Please," he insisted, adding, "she's with friends, having dinner. Write, I don't know, something." Feeling obliged, I typed the following message and showed it to him: "Hello! Enjoy your dinner but don't eat too much because you may explode! Good night." He laughed and hit the send button himself. "You know, she says she doesn't want a relationship, but we are together, so I don't understand. She says she doesn't want to be married; she says she wants to be free like a bird." We both laughed.

Mor met Maria in a dance club near Urquinaona Plaza a few months before. He normally did not visit such places, but agreed to accompany a group of friends after much insistence. He remembers an instant connection with Maria, who was in her early 50's, some 15 years his senior. Their relationship began that very night, seeing each other once or twice a week since then. I met her in the warehouse once, visiting Mor's place of work and leisure with her friends. Maria seemed distant. "Yes, he's a good person," she replied after I praised Mor's work ethic. "But I keep telling

him to save his money! Calling can be expensive!" Although they had just met, Mor referred to her as his wife, which when asked he justified by referring to their intimate relationship. Pressed further, he insisted this was a symbolic gesture on his part, a way to communicate his feeling and future aspirations.

Mor's relationship with Maria was short lived. Speaking to him some six months after he asked me to send Maria a text message, he informed me he had met a woman from Sweden while taking a stroll in his neighborhood. "So, if I marry her, can I get my papers?" Although the question may appear extraordinary, it shows how the question of "papers" impacts the way people create intimate bonds with others as they work toward securing a legalized future for themselves in Spain in particular and the EU in general. But for Maria, their relationship meant something very different. "She only wanted sex, you know?" Mor concluded. "That's not worth anything" (Cast. *eso no vale nada*). A relationship that is solely based on sex is "not worth anything" because it is perceived to be ephemeral and thus incommensurable with the aim of becoming more established in Spain. But much to people's dismay, "papers" also have a transient quality that make it exceedingly simple to fall back into "irregular" status.

The Trouble with Incorporation

The core dilemma of the so-called irregular settlements was a question of individuals' "structural" rather than "cultural" integration, to use Spanish sociologist, Miguel Pajares' terms (2005). The voluntary return program was the only proposal put forth that represented a middle path, a "permanent" solution in so far as it removed the need to dominate or govern a particular segment of the population. Following its failure, humanitarian government offered a means to craft a subject position to incorporate people whose political identification was defined by their

exclusion from the body-politic (Ruiz Lopez and Ruiz Vieytez 2001). The people I interviewed wanted "papers" and access to the formal labor market, which was not possible through the humanitarian aid offered by the Plan of Irregular Settlements. With the so-called irregular settlements increasingly in the center of political and mass media debates, the city administration searched for new alternatives within the strict confines of state immigration laws.

In 2014 the city government began to "buy" job contracts for a select number of participants from companies associated with the Federation of Entities of Integration of Catalonia (Cat. *Federació d'Empreses d'Inserció de Catalunya*). These companies agreed to reserve job contracts for participants of the Plan of Irregular Settlements who could then use these contracts to apply for a residency permit. While the scheme had secured more than 50 contracts and made possible the legalization of more than 20 participants by late 2014, it remained riddled with complications due to the limited number of contracts available as well as various restrictions in immigration laws. As the director of the program informed me, one major constraint his team had to work through was the question of time.

> The company will do the (job) offer, they wait one, two or three months until the papers are made, right? Because you know that you need to make the (job) offer, do the papers and then begin to work. And of course, there are companies that say, 'I need workers NEXT WEEK!' 'No, but you need to wait three months.' 'Ahh, no, no, I need them next week!' Of course (chuckling), you can't convince them given that he's already giving you a job contract, right? So, here we have to negotiate a lot. In this case, we have already agreed that the contracts can wait one, two or three weeks, or one or two months, so the companies understand this and this allows us to legalize one by one.

The time-lag of up to 3 months to apply for a residency permit through the *arraigo social* is impractical for businesses that need workers in the immediate future. Moreover, the involved process of applying for the permit, including completing numerous forms and submitting various documents in person at different national-state offices, implies a heightened degree of commitment that many businesses would rather avoid, especially if they have a more straightforward option at hand. This has led to a limited number of companies willing to participate in this program, but

also the number of participants willing to accept a protracted period without a source of income. Observing figures from early 2013 to mid 2014, the total number of individuals seen by the Plan of Irregular Settlements was 563, of which 250 received temporary housing, 142 received job training and work placement assistance, 34 had been incorporated into the labor market and 11 had been "legalized" through the agreement with the Federation noted above[135]. Of this total number, 345 people abandoned the program or were removed for failing to meet stipulated requirements, 32 gained employment by their own means, and 9 participated in the voluntary return program, with 177 people remaining in the program, 44 in "regular" status and 133 "irregular" status[136]. The high dropout rate raises important questions regarding the efficacy of the plan to meet the needs of the people it is designed to serve.

Despite its complications, this process of "buying" contracts was seen as more feasible than a second scheme, known as the scrap metal co-op (Cat. *la cooperativa de ferralla*), which took years of planning and was finalized in late 2014 and early 2015. Alencop Co-op (Cat. *Cooperativa Alencop*) formally opened in mid 2015 with 15 members offering door-to-door collection service of scrap metal and other objects to recycle to residents in the St. Marti District of Barcelona (Fernández Guerrero 2015). Although a small group of inhabitants and activists supported the establishment of a scrap metal co-op, from the city government's perspective this was the least viable option given that it implied greater costs to create and maintain, and did not guarantee a pathway to legalization. Nevertheless, its political significance was important for the city government, namely in showcasing its commitment to protecting vulnerable populations while strengthening sustainable practices in the collection of recyclable material. This was clearly stated by a coordinator of the program.

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[135] These figures were provided to me by representatives of the Office of the Plan of Irregular Settlements.

[136] Of participants whose status is "irregular," 74 had never had a residency permit and 59 had failed to renew it, thereby falling back into "illegality."

> The co-op was a political claim that, well, it has certain media impact, right? But I believe, from a technical perspective, it is very (emphasis) complicated because to do a co-op has a series of legal requirements that are very complicated (Cat. *complicadisims*), it is very, very, very complicated. It is implying an investment of technical resources, of money, of legal assistance of all kinds, with experts in co-ops and we are investing a lot of money, a lot, a lot of money, and the result, well, it is an innovation, ok? If we take it as an experiment, you say, 'well, we are investing in research.' (laughs) If the thing turns out ok, we will at least have the procedure to be able to construct a co-op in the social sector that can serve others, others, not only for the sub-Saharans and scrap metal, it can also be for women, it can serve excluded people, it can serve, it can serve for other things, right?

Participants to either work scheme had to be part of the Plan of Irregular Settlements, and as such agree to the conditions of the program, which entailed active participation in language and job training courses, meeting with a social worker to assess an individual's progress, following strict housing protocols in private or public temporary accommodations, and abstaining from having any further contact with irregular settlements. Without an immediate flow of income and institutional restrictions to engage in informal economic practices, many ultimately abandoned the program. Whereas most of the clients with "papers" were working in some capacity through the program, those without them were primarily involved in language and job training courses. For my Senegalese interlocutors who participated at any point in the Plan of Irregular Settlements, dedicating their time to courses and training, however beneficial for the future, represented an important challenge to their ability to subsist in the present and send remittances to their families. These personal considerations were minimized by institutional employees, leading many of my Senegalese interlocutors to denounce the program as a waste of time.

The evolution of these occupational schemes is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it to emphasize that the concept of "integration" is fundamentally a structural rather than a cultural process, one that is overwhelmingly mediated by relations of labor. The city government's initiative to "buy" job contracts and create a co-op evidences the administrative barriers of "illegality" and the need to find strategic channels to facilitate the incorporation of an otherwise marginalized population without changing the law that produces and normalizes such

marginalization. The insistence that whatever aid the city government provided was directed to "vulnerable populations" regardless of citizenship shows how a humanitarian register operates within an explicitly depoliticized field of action that does not purport to modify structures of inequality that are responsible for the very suffering it aims to ameliorate. Because humanitarian aid would not change the structural inequality people faced, people rejected this as insufficient or worse, as a concerted attempt to "throw them out." Although such assessments were readily critiqued, they nevertheless draw attention to a relationship of structural inequality that was systematically ignored.

Repurposed shopping cart chained to a street light near to the warehouse.

The (de)centrality of Scrap Metal

In contrast to the city government and affiliated institutions, the Recycling Labor and Trade Union of Catalonia (Cat. *Gremi de Recuperació de Catalunya* – GRC) viewed informal scrap metal collection as work that needed to be regulated rather than eradicated. A study found that there were approximately 53,000 individual scrap metal collectors in Catalonia alone, whose work

comprised 22% of the total metals recovered (ca. 124,491 tons), or 141 million euro in sales[137]. "When we saw that almost a quarter of what is being moved in our sector comes from this channel," Manuel, a representative of the GRC, stated during our interview, "that's when we really began to worry." As calls to "do something as a trade union" echoed among its members, the desire to "guarantee the existence of this flow in the future" ultimately meant addressing the "legal" status of informal collectors.

The formal recycling sector is divided into small-scale plants (Cat. *minoristes*), large-scale plants (Cat. *majoristes*), and smelting plants. Small-scale plants buy material from the public, in a process called, "open doors" (Cat. *fer porta*), and mostly focus their attention on organizing all of the material they receive. Unlike the small-scale plants, large-scale plants exclusively buy in bulk and process the material to a greater extent. There are far fewer large-scale plants in Catalonia, less than 20, compared to more than 300 small-scale plants, of which 128 receive *chatarra* from the public. Moreover, in contrast to small-scale plants, which sell to *majoristes* in Catalonia or other regions in Spain, large-scale plants have a greater propensity to sell abroad, such as to companies in Turkey, Pakistan or China, where the demand and compensation for processed or unprocessed metals is more compelling. There is a single smelting plant for scrap metal in Catalonia, which competes with other smelting plants in Spain and throughout the world for metals "recovered" from the streets of Barcelona.

Small-scale plants that "open door" require identification from anyone who sells to them, which they then provide to the local police (i.e., *els Mossos d'Esqudra*). On a weekly basis, small-scale plants provide the police data on materials that are often the targets of theft such as copper, and keep a detailed log as the police are known to conduct random inspections. The law does not

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[137] Representatives of the Recycling Labor and Trade Union of Catalonia gave me access to this study's most significant findings.

explicitly prohibit small-scale plants from accepting materials from collectors who lack a residency or work permit, as evidenced by the wide-spread practice of informal collectors presenting their passport as a form of government issued identification. Approximately 90% of all the material small-scale plants receive comes from their "open door" to the public, of which informal collectors represent the vast majority. The alarm within the GRC, then, was most pronounced among the *minoristes,* who would be directly impacted by the sudden "disappearance" of this labor practice.

Prices of metals in a *chatarreria* inside an "irregular settlement" visited during fieldwork.

Among my interlocutors, the vast majority preferred selling to an informal *chatarreria*, such as those in the warehouse, with whom they interacted as equal parties conducting a mutually beneficial economic transaction. During the course of my fieldwork, iron, the most common metal recycled, was bought at 0.18-0.20 cents per kilo from informal collectors, with the price in the formal market fluctuating between 0.20 and 0.22 cents per kilo. On average, *chatarrerias* loaded a 10-ton container per week, generating 200-400 euro of profits per container divided among 3 to 4 workers. Busier *chatarrerias* I consulted reported loading a 10-ton container every other day,

generating 1800 – 2000 euro of net value (.18-.20 per kilo scrap metal), and 100-200 euro of take-home profit divided among workers. Income was supplemented by dissembling objects and removing more valuable metals, specifically copper, which sold at 4-5 euro per kilo. *Chatarrerias* generally had a fixed work crew, but many welcomed day laborers, usually when in need to fill and move out a container.

From the perspective of the GRC, the informal collection of scrap metal itself was not a problem. Manuel frequently returned to the fact that the collection of scrap metal was "alegal" and therefore not in violation of the law.

> The act of someone finding something on the street and taking it to sell – this is not illegal, nor is it legal, it is simply not defined. Anyone can do it, if someone finds something in the street, we take it because it is abandoned and take it to sell. The manager pays you and you haven't done anything illegal, it is not illegal. But this doesn't mean one is collecting legally. So, this is the situation – that it is alegal as of now.

For the GRC, the most important aspect of "the situation" at hand was the alegality of everyday work activities and in turn the need to institutionalize them. The GRC proposed a modification to the tax code that would allow informal collectors to pay a small percentage of whatever they recycled to a social security account. On their end, the GRC would incorporate informal collectors as *special* members with an identification card, work uniform, and full corresponding authorization from the GRC to collect scrap metal throughout Barcelona and elsewhere in Catalonia.

> We will give him an authorization so he can do the work, and we will allow for his client (small-scale plants) who is buying the material pays the taxes. The (informal) collector won't do anything (different), but his situation will change because you will have social security (Cast. *tener una cuotización*) that someone will pay for you, therefore, definitely, you will receive more money, your situation will guarantee you better access to, well, to healthcare, to education, whatever it may be, it will dignify the profession, and also what we intend is that there is a fund for training (Cast. *para formarse*), we intend to give them a vest, an identification, the identification is an ID card that is renewed every year, that needs to be a rule, you must not commit any illegalities, I mean, not to enter (a place) to rob, to not take what you shouldn't take, because if not you will lose that status and you will lose what we are giving in return.

This "authorization" to work meant the GRC would not seek legal action against informal collectors but would rather institutionalize the material they collected and sold. As an entity that wields political, legal and economic influence, the GRC has its "own place" (de Certeau 1984:36) from which to intervene in the alegal status of informal collectors, funding a concerted effort of lawyers, researchers, and technicians to lobby on their behalf. Indeed, the need to "do something" derives from the knowledge that the Union's "own place" was under threat not by an external equal, that is, another entity with its own *formal* base of operations, such as a government or a business, but from the aggregate of ephemeral, "informal" labor practices. Justified by the conviction that this was clearly within *their* jurisdiction, the proposed intervention aimed to incorporate collectors within the "own place" of the Union and curtail this incipient threat through the power therein invested. Giving collectors "vests" and "identification cards" would link people to the GRC, and impose a labor regime dictated by concessions reached between the Union and other entities of equal influence, which may benefit but also inadvertently harm informal collectors. "If we're not careful," Carlos, an affiliated member of the GRC stated during an interview, "we will further marginalize illegals because they will continue doing what they are doing but now, on top of everything, they won't have a valid identification card and, therefore, they (the police) will confiscate their scrap metal."

The proposed plan to "authorize" informal collectors did not impact a person's immigration status. On the contrary, this was understood as beyond the jurisdiction of the GRC and therefore not of immediate concern. Overwhelmingly, my interviews with GRC representatives or affiliated entities stressed the importance of being pragmatic, which implied acknowledging a natural divide between "legal" and "illegal" workers. "The first step to fix the situation that we have today and to arrive to some order," Manuel stated during our interview, "is to begin with what is the easiest

to order and legalize, which is the people that already have papers. Once these are controlled and so forth, we need to consider what happens with the second group." The "second group" represented an uphill battle. "Without documentation you can't do a contract, you can't do anything," Carlos assured me. "The *minoriste* (small-scale plant) won't do a job contract! And besides, even if they did, then we would be in the General Regime of the social security, and, so, the cost to pay (social security per worker) would be so high that this guy (the informal collector) would no longer be able to eat!"

In practice, small-scale plants only require a valid, government issued form of identification, which does not necessarily have to be a work or residency permit. Although I did hear of small-scale plants that refused to buy from collectors without such documents, this was more of the exception than the rule. Overwhelmingly, my West African interlocutors in Barcelona and other cities in Catalonia discussed a network of small-scale plants they frequented according to how much they paid for certain materials or how far they were located in relation to their neighborhood. The "open door" policy without an explicit demand for a residency or work permit is a key reason why *chatarra* has expanded in the past five years as a labor practice. However, there are various reasons why someone who is undocumented may be deterred from selling to a *legal* small-scale plant, such as lacking a valid passport or any acceptable form of government issued identification. For the vast majority of people I interviewed, they preferred selling their valuable finds in *chatarrerias* such as Omar's inside a space such as the warehouse because here their undocumented status was never an issue and, moreover, they generally felt welcomed beyond the immediate economic transaction of recycling scrap metal. Businesses such as Omar's *chatarreria*, qualified as a "clandestine business" by the city government and union, were the principal target of contention. "The Union doesn't want to go against these men with the carts,"

Carlos assured me. "But it does go against the clandestine businesses because they are unfair competition. There will always be someone with a cart who sells to the clandestine business and one who doesn't." But because this represented a gray area that made the situation much more complex, the default position was to focus attention and energy on whatever and whoever was "alegal" or "legal" and set "the second group" aside. "This other situation (informal, "clandestine" *chatarrerias*) is what is clearly defined as illegal," Manuel concluded. "And that is to be in the country without papers – this is an issue that is illegal."

The GRC came up against a wall concerning the question of people's "legal" status. "We keep coming up with solutions," Carlos stated during our interview. "But I've never, at least up to now, found a solution that includes the undocumented because technically a decision by the administration can't include a person that is illegal." Carlos worked as a technician in the GRC, and like others I spoke to he emphasized the need to prioritize informal collectors "with papers" for practical reasons. But his concern for social justice led him to phrase the problem in a significant manner. "There's no solution, and what I don't know is if we should help them or if we shouldn't help them." Intrigued, I elicited more details.

> For people without their documentation, it's impossible, at the moment, in the current political moment, it's impossible. With *Convergència* in government in Catalonia and in the city government in Barcelona, and with the *PP* in absolute majority in Madrid, it's impossible[138]. What these people want is to throw them out! This is what I mean, if we should help them or not. If we should help them, to normalize and dignify those who have papers and also do this, or not do anything and see where it breaks.

The GRC approached this problem in a pragmatic fashion, narrowing their scope to people who were "legal" residents in Spain and avoiding the insurmountable task of incorporating within the fold of the Union a segment of the population that regional and state government purportedly

[138] During the period of fieldwork, center-right parties governed at the city, autonomous community and state levels.

wanted to "throw out." Carlos' provocative question whether the GRC should "help them" reveals the manner in which "illegality" is naturalized and deemed beyond the realm of everyday politics.

Moral Stakes

The aim to "raise awareness" implied a kind of moral obligation to lead people to "correct cognitions," that is, to think and conceive of their situation in a manner that was institutionally recognized and acceptable. From this perspective, the city government was "worried by the issue of … scrap metal itself, what it did" to people, as Tomàs stated during our interview, because it "led to a cycle from which it was very, very complicated to exit." The discrepancy with a private institution such as the Recycling Labor and Trade Union of Catalonia (GRC) is revealing of distinct underlying rationales: Whereas the GRC was concerned with maximizing the economic potential of "alegal" scrap metal collectors, the city government was tasked with the government of non-EU citizens within the maxim of economic profitability but also beyond it, namely within the maxim of *convivencia*, or community building, a deep-seated ideology throughout the Iberian Peninsula (Erickson 2011). Indeed, the very law that makes available state subsidies to fund public programs for "vulnerable" immigrant programs is justified as necessary to minimize and eradicate the "grave social and hygienic risks" that these spaces represent.[139]

The task of raising awareness rested in contradistinction to punitive action, namely a unilateral eviction and/or the detention of "illegal migrants," a threat that despite agreements between city officials, activists and residents perennially loomed large. The task of raising awareness corresponded to a more subtle "art of government," one in which power is determined through "governing techniques" that move away from the overt use of violence and their

[139] Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración – Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Real Decreto 441/2007, Articulo1.2.

corresponding relations of domination (Foucault 2016:115). The emphasis on the individual nature of the problem (e.g., lack of knowledge of the "situation," prevalent "erroneous cognitions," etc.) is evidence of an exercise of power that is more effective in the long term because it is grounded in the formation of governable working class non-EU citizen subjects. In this sense, an institutional register is a governing technique that aims to act on "the self of people, and the self-conduct of people," beyond the use of punitive power (2016:114), which is effective in the short term but unstable in the long term.

Local institutions approached spaces and the activities they made possible independent of people and the moral stakes they faced. Mor spoke to humanitarian aid workers during their intervention around the warehouse, whose offer of temporary shelter was favorably esteemed. In order to receive aid, namely in the form of housing and job training, Mor had to join the Plan for Irregular Settlements funded by the city government and agree to refrain from visiting or staying in any "occupied" space but also cease collecting scrap metal in general, as this was seen as a generator of social exclusion. He resided in a room provided by an NGO working with the city government for the maximum available period of three months, and subsequently in a shelter for homeless populations run by a second NGO for another three months. Despite the resources available, Mor decided to quit the program, refusing not only a possible extension of housing but all involvement with affiliated institutions. "I left the program because I like very much to live alone, to pay for everything myself. If I don't have anything, I can get by (Cast. *buscar mi vida*) to pay for my room, and that is that. I like this." With a steady source of income through his work with *chatarra*, he was able to pay for a room in a shared apartment not too far from the warehouse. "I have little work here. But here, I can pay for my room, buy my food." When the *chatarreria*

where he was working was shut down a few months later, he was unable to pay for his room and moved in with a friend in an over-occupied apartment.

Site of an informal recycling center (i.e., *chatarreria*) after it was shut down by police due to a lack of permits.

The outpost was subversive not because of an overt political agenda but because it made possible and substantiated a "parallel world" outside of the immediate sphere of state power. Waiting gave rise to routines that were morally charged because they evidenced the strength of a person's will before trying circumstances and extended value to everyday effort in an autonomous province of meaning. Cheryl Mattingly (2010) has suggested the act of willing is inextricably a narrative act whereby a person links everyday action to "an orientation that is part of a story" (2010:59). Narrative is important in the construction of a person's life story (Ochs and Capps 1996; Peacock and Holland 1993), often shaping the very life it recounts (Capps and Ochs 1995). As "small paths" that are "anchored in the everyday" (Ehn and Lofgren 2010:80-81), routines represent a realization of the will that is liberated "from energy-demanding choices" (2010:113) and is set on a process of self-fashioning over time. From this prism, recurring idioms in the warehouse offer a glimpse into the mechanics of framing experience following a recognized

narrative structure that foregrounds willing and in turn the person as his own agentive subject with direction and purpose. Indeed, if people "feel small and insignificant" when they experience a loss of agency in day-to-day operations as "undocumented migrants" (Lucht 2012:74), then the outpost is a place that helps produce an otherwise and re-establish a sense of normalcy, however temporary, in people's lives.

Waiting implies a historically defined directionality that was experienced in the outpost as a circumscribed radical freedom that presented new and unexpected challenges. In the moral moratorium of the outpost, people felt more at home to engage in casual sex outside of conventional norms[140] but were quick to contextualize their actions. Mor referred to Maria as his "wife" as a manner to reconcile the prohibition of sex outside of marriage in Islam with the new freedom he experienced in Barcelona to date casually, a freedom that felt amplified by the openness of the outpost. Rather than decry the breach of norms, people emphasized the need to take a more holistic approach. "There is no one who is perfect," Adama often reminded me. "Everyone is *doing something* that they hide (Cast. *un poquito rollo que lo esconden*). What matters is that you have a clean heart." An important dimension of the outpost can be gleaned from the fact that people emphasized one's relationship to actions vis-à-vis one's will rather than to actions or spaces as such, many of which were understood to be a consequence of circumstances beyond individual control.

The warehouse was a site in which the question of ethics was continuously talked about. When I first met Mor he was sitting standing next to Thierno and Granada debating an incident involving his room. Granada had acquired his room in a section of the building above Assane's

[140] In my interviews with people who worked at Humanitarian Crisis Relief (HCR), I was repeatedly told people had limited knowledge of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) and so were at a higher risk of contraction. Despite this position, the central message in HCR outreach interventions was of the urgent need to abandon the irregular settlements with limited attention to addressing potential current risks (e.g., sexual health). While not common, I documented accusations of sex trafficking from people who emphasized the dangerous nature of the irregular settlements, accusations leveled especially against people of Romanian and Nigerian citizenship.

bar from a friend who had moved to Andalucía to work collecting olives[141]. A few days before we met someone had entered his room unannounced and demanded he vacate the premises, claiming he had loaned the room to Granada's friend for a couple of months and now that he had returned from working in the fields in northern Catalonia, he demanded his room back. Granada stood his ground and the young man left, vowing to return with friends. Later that night the man who was from The Gambia returned with Lamine, one of the senior residents of the warehouse who had taken on a greater political role against a unilateral eviction of the "irregular settlements" and was often confused to be the "leader" of the hundreds of people who lived and/or worked in this particular building. Lamine insisted this room belonged to the Gambian, bearing witness to his initial claim of the space when the warehouse was first opened. Granada did not budge. A fight nearly broke out in the hallway of the second floor where the room was located, averted by Lamine and the three others accompanying them who would rather resolve the problem without recourse to physical violence. The following evening Granada returned to his room to find all of his things had been thrown out onto the corridor. He kicked in the door that had been outfitted with a new lock and returned his things to the space he claimed as 'his room.' He stayed in his room for an entire day until the young disgruntled man returned. Unable to reach an agreement, the Gambian left without resolving the issue. When I met Granada, I was told they had agreed he would "buy" the room for 60 euro, something Thierno found objectionable but Mor and Granada insisted was not a bad deal.

Routines in the outpost made possible an intersubjective framework to assess one's behaviors and others' actions through the use of idioms and other morally charged discursive parameters prime for critical analysis. For Veena Das (2012), forms of life grow from moral

[141] Seasonal work was an important labor niche for many people from Senegal, specifically collecting olives in Andalucía.

dispositions, re-inscribing habits as moral actions in what she calls an "ordinary ethics" (2012:136). She approaches the question of ethics in relation to the ordinary in "the labor of bringing about the eventual everyday from within the actual everyday" (2012:134). Granada was from the Guediye neighborhood in the Dakar metropolitan area, and had a brother who currently lived in a town near Granada whom he had minimal contact since he moved to Barcelona. As he often stressed, he valued his autonomy and independence too much to live with his older brother, who often critiqued him for his lifestyle choices, such as smoking tobacco and failing to live up to the mandates of their Muslim faith. Unlike his brother, who regularly went to the mosque and always observed daily prayer and Ramadan, Granada found this was too taxing in light of his present circumstances. In order to live up to these expectations, Granada argued, he would have to adopt a more pious lifestyle, which he was not ready to commit to. Analogous to many younger interlocutors from the Senegalese capital of Dakar, Granada aimed to strike a balance between the moral codes of his faith and "culture" on the one hand and the moral codes dominant in cosmopolitan life in Europe on the other. He had moved to Spain to work, as most non-EU working class citizens, but as a young man from a West African urban background he also desired to experience the novelty of Europe as a place of emotional, intellectual and romantic stimulation. His brother, who was the eldest and the representative head of household following the death of their father years before, considered anything outside of remunerated work *non-sense* (Cast. *tonterias*) that ultimately detracted from their first and only objective in Europe – to make money. Granada distanced himself from this moral imperative without the desire to undermine it, citing his present circumstances as a means to legitimate an alternative mode of being and belonging in the world.

> No, no, well, I *used to be* a good Muslim, but with everything that is happening now, the difficult time we are in, I'm dealing with too much to practice my religion as before. Now I can't, really. For example, here the conditions we are in, it's difficult to pray. We can still do it because nothing

is the matter with me, I'm not ill, I don't have anything that is bothering me, but it's difficult to do at this moment.

To focus on people's everyday assessments is a kind of "descend into the ordinary" (Das 2012:138) that sheds light on the moral stakes individuals experienced within the social world of the outpost. Granada acknowledges the moral codes he should subject himself to, and continues appraising his day-to-day activities in relation to these traversal values. But he also acknowledges these are in the present not entirely pertinent given his structural circumstances and, more specifically, his personal choices within them. His emphasis of the "difficult times" he is enduring as a principal reason why he cannot enact the kind of activities to be a "good Muslim" is indicative of a moral moratorium through which other ethical horizons are made more accessible. In this sense, the moral moratorium in the outpost re-imbues a person with agency on account of their socio-historical contingency rather than a presumed universal quality that precedes its social production.

Conclusion

The contention that individuals' assessments and actions were "making it more difficult" to find solutions obviates the fact that immigration law constricts and limits individuals' horizon of opportunities for a legalized future. The vast majority of people relying on spaces such as the warehouse had lived in Spain for more than 3 years, and had accepted their marginal status as a painful part of being an "immigrant" in the Europe Union. With this in mind, "people who believe they can continue like this for many years" was not indicative of a character flaw, as Tomàs purported, but rather an assessment based on prior experience as "illegal immigrants" in Spain. Moreover, as Mousa's experience illustrates, securing a job contract does not depend on individual will alone but rather on the unpredictable wavering of local employers to sign full-time job

contracts. His allusion to "waiting," then, is best approached as a means to mitigate and ultimately transcend the marginal space of "illegal" status.

Because everyday activities were imbued with cultural understandings of what is "correct" and what is moral, the manner in which people spoke about their struggles to "get by" embedded their efforts in a broader field of meaning surrounding acceptable and untenable transnational ways of being and belonging. Activities in the warehouse were outlined in a pre-migration schema of "ordinary ethics" in Senegal that have extended past national boundaries with the increased viability of transnational movement and settlement. The everyday exercise of labor, work and action among others reflected a person's on-going orientation of the self in the multiple social worlds they helped shape and transform. The "parallel world" of the warehouse was one in which a person's will and the decisions that stemmed from it gained precedence over the outcome and output of their corresponding activities. Whereas the material circumstances of everyday life were restricted by structural forces beyond individual control, a person's struggle to "get by" was independent of state power and was thus understood as a ready sign of agency and dignity. The fact that the outpost is an assemblage of competing moral codes, however, meant that paths to personhood were inherently ambivalent and tenuous, a key factor that was difficult to reconcile.

Chapter 7 – **Migrant "Illegality"**

Superiors and Inferiors

Scrap metal was the driving economic force making other "business" ventures possible. According to the law, anyone who sells scrap metal needs to be identified and entered into a database in order to track stolen material from construction sites, public infrastructure, or similar locations. In the warehouse there was no such system of formal accountability, and thus the material collected was in theory ineligible to be incorporated into the mainstream flow of recycled residues. This is where contacts with local Spanish residents proved pivotal. Omar's chatarreria, for example, consisted of a large, industrial sized scale to weigh the scrap metal coming in, the funds to pay individual collectors, an oil-stained notebook to tally amounts collected and paid out, and a 10-ton container that was brought in, loaded, and taken out to the formal, small-scale recycling plant. Omar moved to Spain in 2000 and had consistently found work in construction until the housing crash in 2008. As the economic recession began to wreak havoc, he turned to collecting scrap metal with a friend. On one occasion the owner of a small-scale recycling plant approached him with a proposition. The owner, who had moved to Barcelona with his family from Andalusia in the 1960's, offered to loan him money to buy scrap metal from his "fellow countrymen" (Cast. *paisanos*) in order to maximize his profits in this expanding informal labor niche. Knowing that Omar and his friends used abandoned warehouses to live but also to store scrap metal, he asked if he knew of any such site that would suffice for this operation. Omar quickly agreed and confirmed that he had just discovered a new, larger building not too far from his plant. Weeks later Omar established his first of many *chatarrerias*. Although all of these were inevitably shut down by police either as part of an eviction of an irregular settlement or a more

concerted intervention against labor violations, Omar continued working with scrap metal throughout the length of my fieldwork. My last encounter with Omar was next to a large cargo van he had purchased to weigh and store scrap metal to circumvent run-ins with the police.

Of the people that worked in the *chatarreria*, Omar earned the most, up to 700-800 euro a month. People who worked on a consistent basis in Omar's business weighing scrap metal, "cleaning" motors and other objects, or loading containers destined to the local recycling plant earned up to 500 euro per month. Individual collectors, on the other hand, earned substantially less. The difference in take-home pay in addition to the lack of transparency was readily construed as evidence of a flagrant exploitation of an unscrupulous few of a vulnerable many. "It was a space that for me operated in a manner that was not democratic," a city employee stated during an interview. "And it was a space in which I think the interests of a few were not the interests of the group." Recourse to these opaque interests helped explain why people rejected the Plan of Irregular Settlements. In a different interview, Meritxell described these "intermediaries" as part of an elite cultural group that exerted their privilege and power in a manner reminiscent of African tribal life.

> Meritxell: There are certain intermediaries that are mainly from Senegal, from an ethnic group from the South of the country. Now I can't remember what it's called.
>
> Arturo: In the Casamance?
>
> Meritxell: From the Casamance, yes, but I can't remember the name of the group.
>
> Arturo: Jola? Mandinka?
>
> Meritxell: Mandinka! They are Mandinka, they are Mandinka! Of course, they are the ones who control, they are the intermediaries
>
> Arturo: Intermediaries?
>
> Meritxell: Yes, the Mandinka, they are the superior caste in Senegal. They are the ones who buy, they have, they have taken over the warehouse, they are the intermediaries, they buy, they have important economic interests, they are not vulnerable people. They do business, and lots of business, eh! Therefore, and of course, here, pam (makes a loud sound), you have an interference – you have very vulnerable people, and then you have intermediaries with very particular economic interests.

It is significant to note people I interviewed in the city government, HCR and other institutions seldom, if ever, visited a so-called "irregular settlement," most relying on second-hand accounts. Omar emphasized the importance of personal initiative, patience and good fortune when explaining his success in the warehouse. Moreover, Omar insisted he was helping his "fellow countrymen," many of whom would be hard-pressed to make money without "papers" outside of selling counterfeit commodities in busy tourist areas, which would ultimately make them more vulnerable to police harassment, detention and possibly deportation. Accusations of exploitation and unscrupulous interests appeared in many of my interviews with public and private employees, often imbricated in folk ideas of cultural difference. Those who did visit a so-called "irregular settlement" emphasized its radical cultural difference (e.g., tribal mentality), which highlighted an underlining assumption of a kind of "cultural fundamentalism" that marked "immigrants" as radical others by "reifying cultural boundaries and difference" (Stolcke 1995:4, 12; also see Nash 2005). This was succinctly encapsulated in an interview with Jordi, a local politician.

> Arturo: Can you expand on these hierarchies, eh, what were they like? How did they manifest?
>
> Jordi: The hierarchy, you know, for example, Lamine, no one has to tell you who he is. You already know he is one of the ones on top (Cat. *un dels de dal*), because they, hm, you see that in the atmosphere. You could see a respect, you know? Their hierarchy status can be seen in the respect they profess to certain people. It's not necessary that they tell you that Lamine is the chief, hmm, I'm not sure of what, of the warehouse, of the Senegalese, but that he is one of the ones at top is clear because they respect him, they treat him with respect. In other words, they have a mental structure that is very hierarchical because they are tribal, and since they are tribal and in tribes you know what happens, how they are structured, so whether you want or not they replicate it. You see, that is the only hurdle that there is of finding a solution for everybody, that they don't see themselves as being equals.

Based on my fieldwork, there were no leaders as such, and much less leaders based on some purported "superior caste" reaching back to the distant past. This argument foments dominant images of Africa and its people, "affixed to the image of desperate Africans – 'twenty-first century savages,' perhaps, banging at the doors of European civilization and thereby replaying enduring stereotypes of dependency and helplessness" (Makhulu et. al. 2010:2). Omar identified

as Mandinka from his mother and Wolof from his father. He spoke both languages, and regularly used them with clients and partners. De facto "owners" such as Omar gained these positions on account of personal circumstances, individual prowess, strong social capital, seniority of relationships and/or linguistic ability, among other factors. Ethnic affiliation served as a common point of reference between people but was largely overshadowed by a business ethos that aimed to establish and strengthen favorable working relationships beyond such "cultural" factors. The warehouse as an outpost was a transitory social field borne of structural forces but contingent upon a person's initiative to "get by" with whatever resources were available. As an outpost, the warehouse and the *chatarrerias* it housed were fluid fields of social relations characterized by the ins and outs of people seeking a stronger foothold in a foreign country, influenced by but fundamentally independent of conventional hierarchies or social structures.

Lamine was a charismatic person who spoke fluent Spanish, Catalan, English, and French, in addition to various languages native to West Africa, including Wolof, Mandinka, Fula and Sarahule. People respected him because he was "very intelligent" and as a result was exceptionally good at "getting ahead" (Cast. *buscar se la vida*), as I was often reminded. Whether Lamine exploited his talents to the detriment of others is a different issue than to state with absolute certainty that Lamine was the "leader" of a group of people (e.g., the warehouse, the Senegalese, the Mandinka, etc.) that followed him blindly. If his position leveraged any kind of influence, this was fundamentally contingent on the social life of the outpost and the willingness of people to participate in what was an emergent and perennially inchoate social world. On one occasion, a man from the Ivory Coast came into Omar's *chatarreria* where I was drinking coffee with Faouzi and asked, "Is the boss here?" This was the first and only time I heard someone use this language to describe Lamine *within* the warehouse. Faouzi chuckled, replying in French, "No, no, he is not

the boss! He searches for opportunities like everyone else. Yes, he searches like you, like me, like everyone else" (French, *Il n'est pas patron, il se débrouille comme tout le monde, oui, il se debrouille comme toi, com moi, comme tout le monde*). The man shrugged off his comment. "We are all getting by/struggling, you know?" (Cast. *Todos nos estamos buscando la vida, sabes?*), Faouzi said to me after the man had left without the information he desired. "Here we are all the same" (Cast. *Aqui estamos todos igual*).

In contrast to the institutions driving the Plan of Irregular Settlements, Manuel, the representative of the Recycling Labor and Trade Union of Catalonia (GRC) I interviewed, romanticized this purported innate group mentality to justify privileging scrap metal collectors with "papers" and inadvertently discriminating against those without them.

> In other words, if we are five from the same country and I have papers and you don't, and the others don't have papers either, then what I expect is that if I don't have papers, I expect my friend to treat me well. If my friend experiences an improvement, then I should also have that improvement. So, us, this hypothesis is always in good faith. We don't think that if some have an increase that others should have a decrease. This shouldn't be the case.

Manuel argued that those with "papers" who experience an economic improvement will naturally be inclined to share their new economic prosperity with others because of natural cultural proclivities. While Senegalese readily emphasized the importance of *teranga*, or hospitality, and of creating relationships based on solidarity with others, they also accused Senegalese and non-Senegalese of "doing what they like" without thinking of others but themselves. Lamine was not a "tribal leader" but someone who was exceptionally apt at "getting by" with his talents, often privileging economic opportunities that generated the most profits for himself and his intimate networks in Spain and Senegal. Given the dire structural context in which any economic gain was tenuous, solidarity was highly selective and contextual, as Lucas succinctly stated during an interview. "If people cannot share back, then you must be rich to share with people for long!" Lamine was very selective of who he involved in his projects, and how he managed their proximity

in his efforts to earn money. Accusations of "tribal mentalities" and assumptions of innate solidarity stripped people of their individuality and reduced them to a faceless multitude that was conceived through an Orientalist lens, that is, as an imagined social system incapable of change, "for once, for all time" (Said 2003:70).

The evocation of "culture" mobilized folk ideologies that served political and socio-cultural functions independent of the people whose purported cultural way of life was under scrutiny. When I asked Manuel about the possibility of creating and incorporating a co-op of scrap metal collectors within the general operations of the Union, he emphasized the need to protect people's "equilibrium" within these precarious circumstances and defend their "idiosyncrasy" against calls to "change the rules of the game."

> If you do that (introduce a self-managed co-op), certain inefficiencies begin to emerge because they have adapted, they have obtained an equilibrium that is at its optimum of what it could be. But if you change the rules of the game, and you impose a structure that they have not searched for, they will try to adapt but, in the end, they will become aware of it – if they collect ten or collect twenty (tons), there are others who collect more or less, then I'll go slower, it's a cooperative, here we all count, this and that, so and so. It's important that each one maintain their, their idiosyncrasy, their independence within the system, and that we don't drastically change the situation that they have, which is precarious enough, right?

For Manuel, recourse to "culture" was important in order to justify measures that would benefit the GRC and minimize the potential loss of an important source of "alegal" economic wealth. Indeed, the warehouse was a space of contained labor-power, that is, "the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality, of a human being, capabilities which he sets in motion whenever he produces a use-value of any kind" (Marx 1976:270). But although the warehouse created value in the form of economic wealth, Manuel espouses a neoliberal argument that wealth is best created with minimal intervention, obfuscating a basic truism in critical political economy that the creation of value has always "operated imperfectly" and the direct benefits of economic productivity are often only "partially felt" by everyone involved (Harvey 1982:144). Rather than victims of an unscrupulous few,

informal scrap metal collectors were a source of wealth for the GRC that had to be regulated. Such regulation, however, threatened to exacerbate the adverse effects of migrant "illegality" drawing scrap metal collection within the fold of an institutional register that was strictly economic. And here it is possible to see how the dominant discourse surrounding the "irregular settlements" in local politics and media was one among different rationales: whereas the absence of institutional protections was construed as a positive quality from the neoliberal perspective of the GRC, such an absence was readily identified as grounds to critique the city government for turning a blind eye to social exclusion and failing to defend human rights regardless of migrant legal status (For more on human rights and migrant legal status, see CHR 2007; Cornelisse 2010; Mendoza 2005; Mouzo 2015; Nett 1971; Terradas i Saborit 2004; Tesón 1988). Such a divergence in rationales draws attention to an underlying biopolitics underpinning non-EU citizens that merits closer attention.

The Possibility of being Expelled

Historically a country of *emigration*, Spain first turned its attention to the government of non-Spanish citizens within its territory following the death of Francisco Franco in 1975[142]. Spain's re-positioning in the political formation of Western European nation-states in the late

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[142] The transition to democracy represents an important historical period that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. While many feared the appointment of Juan Carlos I as King of Spain following Franco's death in 1975 would mark the beginning of a more stringent regime, he soon created new hopes for change by legalizing opposition parties, appointing Adolfo Suarez prime minister, and holding elections in 1977 which democratically upheld Suarez' position. The newly elected government introduced a new constitution, which was approved by referendum and ratified into law in 1978. After a failed coup d'état by military generals loyal to Franco on February 23, 1981, the general elections in 1982 and the peaceful transition of power to the center-left government of Felipe González of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) were largely celebrated as a key turning point in Spain's transition to democratic rule. In order to strengthen the new democratic state, integration into the EEC in particular and into Western international community was paramount. When treaties were finally signed in summer of 1985 and went into effect at the start of the following year, "notable efforts in terms of modernization and strengthening of diplomacy" were demanded of the new Spanish and Portuguese members (Villar 2016:129-132), also seeking to join the EEC after an equally brutal period under dictatorial rule. The desire to foment Spain's integration on the global stage faced its most formidable challenge with the referendum on remaining a member of NATO in 1986, in which 43% against 56% of voters preferred revoking its membership held since 1982. For Felipe González, Spanish prime minister and leader of the PSOE during the referendum, a NO vote would have not only ruptured ties with NATO, it would have had "unpredictable and far from positive consequences for the links that Spain had secured with the Western world" (Villar 2016:139). The desire to join the ranks of affluent Western European countries meant introducing legislation such as remaining within NATO and creating harsh immigration laws that were overwhelmingly unpopular at home.

1970's and early 1980's implied adhesion to liberal democratic values but also the incorporation of restrictive governmental policies in view of its concomitant new place in the global economic market. The first articulation of the "illegal foreigner" appeared in Organic Law 7/1985, On the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain (Cast. *Ley Orgánica 7/1985, de 1 de Julio, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España*), the first comprehensive immigration law in the history of the modern Spanish state. The fact that this law was ratified the same year Spain signed treaties joining the European Economic Community (EEC), which had been the central objective of Spanish external affairs since 1977 (Villar 2016:98), suggests a larger political economic shift and the pivotal role the "illegal foreigner" was to play throughout this process. Indeed, this law was introduced not to address a pressing political issue at the time[143], but rather to establish the legal mechanisms to control and expel *certain* foreigners in the future (Aja 2012:68-69). The non-Spanish citizen became a crucial figure in a new biopolitical era in Spain.

The LO 7/1985 is the first legal document of its kind to differentiate "with absolute clarity" between non-Spanish citizens in "situations of legality from those of illegality" (LO 7/1985, preamble), and create "non-penitentiary" internment centers to detain and "expel" anyone who "finds themselves illegally in Spanish territory" (LO 7/1985, Art. 25.3). While the former is protected by national laws and assured "full rights and guarantees," the latter is only guaranteed rights by way of Spain's ratification of international laws, treaties and mandates (LO 7/1985, preamble). It is possible to see here the manner in which the figure of the "illegal migrant" represents a special legal category that is simultaneously qualified by its exclusion from national law but also inclusion under the state's social protections as dictated by international laws Spain

[143] There were less than 250,000 foreigners registered in local municipalities in the mid-1980's, the majority of whom were from Western European countries, such as the UK (Aja 2012).

began to ratify shortly after Franco's death[144]. Within this exclusion-inclusion dynamic, people whose residence is identified as "clandestine" can only make claims and demands by appealing to their humanity[145], a fact that foregrounds their exclusion from the "imagined community" of the nation[146] and places them at a structural disadvantage that rests solely on the state.

For the first time non-citizens now needed to obtain a visa from the Spanish embassy in their country of origin to be "legal" residents in Spain (LO 7/1985, Art. 12). Over time, this requirement became increasingly more restrictive. In 1991, for example, Moroccan citizens, who had consistently represented one of the largest non-citizen populations in Spain, required a visa to enter and settle in the country, which in the majority of cases included proof of a valid job contract. In theory, visas were granted when a Spanish employer made available a job offer that had first been made available locally, thus justifying the need to hire a non-citizen and facilitate their relocation to Spain. In practice, however, the visa process to work and live was doomed from the start. As Eliseo Aja (2012) notes, not only was this process too slow for any employer in need of workers to rely on, but there was also no mechanism in place to make these job offers abroad available to potential "migrants" (2012:156). The difficulties in securing "legal" non-citizen workers as dictated by law led to a large "illegal" pool of would-be formal workers just as the Spanish economy expanded in the late 1980's and early 1990's (Rius Sant 2007). Preparations for the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona created an insatiable demand for workers in the booming

[144] More on Franco's influence, particularly concerning housing and rights, see López 2013; Miguez Macho 2016; Sánchez 2016; Sevillano, 2016; Tatjer Mir 1988; Viñas 2015.

[145] Upon Franco's death, the newly instituted government of Adolfo Suarez began signing into law many international bills, such as the Declaration of Human Rights of 1946 or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes "the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" and "the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" (Art. 13), it remains mute on the right to enter and settle in a country different than one's own, that is, a right of freedom of movement in broad terms (Nett 1971). Because a state cannot be obliged to admit or accept a "foreigner" within its boundaries, any claims made on the basis of international law are ultimately contingent on a state's national interests.

145 This is the most common expression used in Spain to refer to work that is unregulated by official state administrations (e.g., "under the table").

[146] Hannah Arendt (1978) makes this point when she argues the increasing consolidation of a unified world political stage in the 20th century has precipitated the possibility of conceiving of a single humanity from which people can be included or excluded. More specifically, the emergence of a "human rights" framework stems from the hegemony of a global inter-state system and the concomitant modern condition of bearing the plight of those that state's neglects, that is, "not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them" (1978:296).

construction sector, many of whom managed to find employment "in black"[147] (Cast. *en negro;* Cat. *en negre*).

The absence of "papers" in Spain has continued to be a common experience among working class non-EU citizens. A new comprehensive immigration bill[148] introduced in 2000 sought to extend more rights to non-citizens on the basis of their de facto residence. This new bill granted non-citizens access to public healthcare, education, housing and other services, guaranteed their freedom of assembly and their right to unionize, protest and strike for the first time regardless of legal status (Calavita 2005:30-33), and restricted deportation to "very grave/serious violations" (LO 4/2000, Art. 53.2) in its mission to combat discrimination and promote equality among "immigrants" and "citizens" (Aja 2012:76-77). This bill implied a radical rupture with its predecessor, but also a radical departure from similar legislation throughout the EU and around the world. In effect, the figure of the "immigrant" had been transformed as complementary rather than antithetical to the figure of the citizen in a flexible and dynamic vision of the modern democratic state.

With a new absolute majority in the Parliament after elections that same year, the center-right government of Jose Maria Aznar immediately introduced important reforms[149], including limiting family reunification and eliminating freedom of assembly for "ideological reasons" (Aja 2012:79). Of the most significant changes[150] is the re-introduction of deportation as a legitimate mechanism to reconcile "illegal" status. Deportation was first introduced in 1985 but significantly restricted with the new immigration bill in 2000. The center-right government of Aznar re-

[147] This is the most common expression used in Spain to refer to work that is unregulated by official state administrations (e.g., "under the table").
[148] Organic Law 4/2000 (LO 4/2000) superseded LO 7/1985.
[149] The Popular Party (PP) had been opposed to LO 4/2000 from the beginning. They passed far-reaching reforms with LO 8/2000 later that same year with the support of the center-right Convergencia i Unió party from Catalonia.
[150] This reform did not imply a complete overhaul of LO 4/2000. LO 8/2000 maintained many rights and provisions initially introduced by LO 4/2000, such as access to public healthcare and education regardless of legal status.

introduced internment and expulsion as a mechanism to control "illegal migration" (Calavita 2005:139) and further solidified the legal basis that renders the figure of the "immigrant" at odds with the figure of the national citizen.

> Based on the idea that in a State of law it is necessary to establish the instruments that permit making effective the enforcement of regulations, in this case, those that regard the entry and permanence in Spanish territory, illegal permanence in Spanish territory has been introduced as a violation sanctioned with expulsion, aiming with this to increase the capacity of action of the State in regard to the control of illegal immigration, at the level of other member States of the European Union, that count with their own juridical legal system with the possibility of expelling foreigners that find themselves in this situation, a criterion that is reflected in the conclusions of the European Council of Tampere (preamble, LO 8/2000)

Since these reforms, migrant "illegality" has remained categorically dichotomous to "citizenship." While the Spanish constitution clearly distinguishes Spanish citizens as the source from which "the powers of the state emanate" (Art. 1.2), moves to create a common area of borderless travel among European Union member states, as well as policy for entry and stays longer than 3 months[151] (Karaboytcheva 2006:4), have expanded the category of the national citizen to that of an EU citizen[152]. The center-right government of Aznar justified its reforms as commensurable with an EU-wide position on "illegal immigration," which was driven not by policies to grant greater equality to de facto residents regardless of "legal" status but rather by the exercise of sovereign power to isolate and remove working class non-EU citizens whose presence was not justified on the basis[153] of family ties, economic productivity or international laws (e.g., refugees). The framing of "illegal" residence as a "violation sanctioned with expulsion" forms the backdrop of the outpost as an invaluable social field where people can experience moments of reprieve from a kind of covert violence embedded in the law.

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[151] Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 and Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 establish the European Union (EU) and the groundwork of EU citizenship.

[152] The consolidation of a more united "Europe" has paved the way for greater equality among citizens of member states throughout the EU, as evidenced in the differentiation in Spanish immigration law between "communitarians" (i.e., "Communitarian Regime") and "non-communitarians" (i.e., "General Regime"), the former of which is except from the threat of detention and removal.

[153] Non-EU citizens may be identified under different categories, such as tourists, students and diplomats, but for the Senegalese men I worked with the struggle to gain or maintain "papers" largely depended on demonstrating their family ties to a Spanish citizen, year-long job contract, or their deservingness of state protection under international law.

Waiting in this context implies a de facto ethics that is informed by conventional moral codes but cannot entirely depend on them because of changing circumstances. To be undocumented and therefore "irregular" entails a unique kind of waiting that people experience for the first time in Spain. Because immigration law renders individuals vulnerable to the fluctuations of the market and makes the threat of "illegality" and, hence, deportability a constant reality, gaining "papers" through a process such as an *arraigo* only marginally eased a person's feeling of being vulnerable before the law. In a study of 84,027 applications from the last mass amnesty in 2005 and 36,210 applications within the purview of this new legalizing mechanism from 2006-2009 in the province of Barcelona, Albert Sabater and Andreu Domingo (2012) found that the majority of applicants of the former were successful (93% accepted, 6% denied) whereas close to half of the latter were denied (59.3% accepted, 40.7% denied). Moreover, Sabater and Domingo found a greater number of applicants of what they call the "Settlement Program" (i.e., *arraigo*) failed to renew their residency permit after their first year[154]. Among people from South of the Sahara, 18.2% of applicants of the mass amnesty failed to renew their residency permit whereas 35.7% of applicants of labor settlement and 27.7% of applicants of social settlement failed to renew their residency permit, thereby going "back into illegal status" (2012:206-209). With the possibility of falling back into "illegality" a constant threat, the politics surrounding the extension or denial of "papers" needs greater analysis.

Migrant "illegality" produces contradictions that are a constant source of frustration. According to Eduard Sagarra Trias (2004), the inherent contradiction of "illegal" status leads to a peculiar yet untenable figure of government – "*the irregular immigrant, registered and a de facto*

[154] Whereas 84.8% who gained a residency permit through the mass amnesty were able to renew their residency permit, only 76% who obtained a residency permit through labor were able to renew and 70.8% who obtained a residency permit through social settlement were able to renew (Sabater and Domingo 2012:203-207)

resident of Spain, working to subsist with a pending active order of deportation, and as a consequence living legally in Spain"[155] (2004:10). Sagarra Trias argues this reality is due to the lack of funds to execute deportation orders on the one hand and the lack of agreements with countries of origin to accept repatriated citizens on the other. But more importantly, he argues such a situation is indefensible because it represents a clear violation of the law despite the fact that it is tacitly accepted by state and local authorities. There is no mention of this unique figure anywhere in the law, suggesting it is a radical transgression of the law or, as Sagarra Trias states, a "grotesque" situation that is nevertheless an undeniable reality (2004:15).

The "dizzying frequency" (Calavita 2005:5) with which Spanish immigration law has been modified should not be interpreted as merely "an image of disorientation and lack of legal rigor" (Aja 2012:80). The law, no matter how seemingly fragmented, effectively establishes "categories of governance" that in turn certain non-citizens are expected or forced to inhabit (Karakayali and Rigo 2010:129). As the exercise of Spanish governmentality, that is, a kind of power that "has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument" (Foucault 2007:108), immigration law divides and delineates resident populations, ascribes them value according to national and international economic interests, and governs them through a series of technologies to perpetuate their state identification. Humanitarian discourse or, more specifically, the humanitarian register of the concerted intervention in the irregular settlements was pivotal to further incorporate an otherwise ineligible and therefore inadmissible segment of the population but also to prevent from activating that which structurally excludes and marginalizes them in Spain.

[155] Sagarra Trias is referring to the possibility of being integrated in local institutions, such as the healthcare or education systems, as a right bearing member (and therefore "legal" within these institutions) while continuing to be identified as "illegal" by the central Spanish state and a myriad of public administrations.

Road to the CIE in Barcelona (left) and front entrance during a protest for its closure (right). This CIE is located in an industrial area of the city, a few kilometers from the international airport El Prat.

The Biopolitics of Immigration Law

The rise of democracy as the hegemonic model of governance engendered new forms of inequality based on a distinct politics of human life. Of particular importance here is the progressive pegging of human life to sovereign power, transforming what had been conceived as a natural resource akin to any other material resource within a sovereign's jurisdiction into the *sine qua non* of sovereign power itself, that is, the determining source of political legitimacy in the modern era. At the core of the modern nation-state is the central idea of "the people," based on the re-inscription of human life as politically valuable in so far as it legitimates and authorizes sovereign power over and in representation of the figure of the citizen. It is here that we see a significant characteristic of the modern era, the point at which birth and life are "invested with the principle of sovereignty" (Agamben 1999:76).

The shift to democracy in Spain meant the institutionalization of a distinct kind of sovereign power. Foucault described Franco's death as a "clash between two systems of power" where human life was the central point of reference (Foucault 2003:249). Franco's week-long

confrontation with death, drawn out under the auspices of a new power whose aim is not the termination but "the regularization of life" (2003:249), stood in stark contrast with the dictator's withering sovereign power, which he exercised "with great savagery" (2003:248). The transition to democracy implied the transformation of sovereign power and the abandoning of a system in which the Catholic Church rather than public institutions care for the moral welfare of "the people" (Cast. *el pueblo*). Whereas former modalities of sovereignty were premised on a right to "take life or let live" (1978:139), most iconic in the figure of the *pater familias* in Roman law that granted the sovereign right to the father to "dispose of the life of his children and his slaves" based on the idea that "he had given them life, so he could take it away" (1978:135), a new kind of sovereign power, which Foucault calls "biopower," begins to take hold in the 17th and 18th centuries. The government of Francisco Franco (1936-1975) was a manifestation of a modality of sovereign power that had ceased to be hegemonic in the world[156], one in which discipline and punishment of citizens often led to death without further political recourse in contrast to the modality of sovereign power today in Spain that seeks to maximize and in turn incorporate the life of citizens and non-citizens alike, albeit in an exclusionary arrangement, with subjects categorically outside a state's *people*[157].

[156] Achille Mbembe (2003) has convincingly argued the concept of biopolitics does not sufficiently account for global structures whose aim has been not "to let die" but rather to patrol a "living dead" on the margins of state operations. By "necropolitics" and "death worlds," Mbembe aims to re-frame contemporary sovereign power in the historical context of racialization in modern Western history that makes possible the subjugation of large segments of the human population to "the register of undifferentiated generality" (2003:35).

[157] Article 1.2 of the Spanish constitution of 1977 states, "National sovereignty resides in the Spanish people from whom the powers of the state emanate" (Cast. La soberanía nacional reside en el pueblo español, del que emanan los poderes del Estado)

The rise of biopower[158] pivots on a re-evaluation of human life, from phenomena formerly conceived akin to natural historical processes[159] to the very raison d'être of modern states "to invest life through and through" (1978:138-139). Didier Fassin (2009b) has argued Foucault's main point of interest was not on life as such but rather the intersecting processes by which "impersonal 'living beings' were turned into populations and individuals" (2009b:47). According to Fassin, life remained elusive in Foucault's writing, whose emphasis on the regulation and governance of populations is more concerned with a normalization of life and inherent inequalities between populations and regimes of legitimacy "deciding the sort of life people may or may not live" (2009b:49). To this end, Fassin argues the modern era is less characterized by a biopower *over* life but rather what he calls a "biolegitimacy" embedded in the "construction of the meaning and value of life" (2009b:52) and "the concrete way in which individuals and groups are treated," substantiating what he calls, "bio-inequalities" (2009b:57). Spanish immigration imbues citizen and non-citizen life with radically different value, which explicitly and implicitly legitimates regimes of structural inequality at the legal and institutional levels. The fact that the law clearly distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens by justifying the deportation of "illegal migrants" within its sovereign territory suggest a kind of biolegitimacy whose calculated history is readily elided from political debates. Senegalese I consulted rejected the Plan of Irregular Settlements because it fomented a "biolegitimacy" that favored a migrant subject template based on underlying "bio-inequalities" that would ultimately reproduce rather than efface everyday vulnerability.

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[158] This modality of power manifested in two distinct but overlapping "poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations," which Foucault identifies as "anatomo-politics of the human body" on the one hand and a "biopolitics of the population" on the other (Foucault 1978:139). This framework explains the growing centrality of institutions such as the army and the school in modern statecraft, whose principal mission is to discipline bodies according to a given ideology, but also the emergence and dominance of institutions tasked with generating knowledge regarding size and health of the general population as indicative of a new form of sovereign power. Moreover, this framework also explained the emergence of corollary institutions aimed at "normalizing society" as the "historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life" (1978:144). This is a significant departure from conventional understandings of the state and, laid the foundation for a burgeoning literature on "bodies, law and discipline."

[159] Foucault describes these "pressures through which the moments of life and process of history interfere with one another" in a manner inconsequential to power as "bio-history" (1978:143).

The discursive framing of people relying on the warehouse as "vulnerable" was generally coupled with the moral imperative to alleviate an egregious case of extreme and chronic misery, discursively targeting the mode of life people inhabited rather than the broader structures that had precipitated a social world in the interstices of state power. In her research on the imbrications of compassion and politics in France, Miriam Ticktin (2011) found struggles for "papers" driving individuals and activists to foreground stories of vulnerability and suffering to gain state recognition. Since French immigration law concedes the possibility to obtain residency permits on the basis of serious illness, violence against women and other "humanitarian reasons," the *sans-papier* (e.g., "undocumented") movement Ticktin followed framed their claims in a manner that acknowledged and reified legal categories the state was prepared to recognize, what she calls "the figure of the morally legitimate suffering body" (2011:132). Her analysis resonates in an important way with Fassin's formulation of biopower as biolegitimacy, where at stake is not life as such but a more profound evaluation of life as more or less deserving to be lived. Indeed, Ticktin draws from feminist theory to further explore "how the suffering body comes to be known as such," drawing attention to the multiple processes and actors implicated in the constitution and naturalization of a social position as a "recognizable sufferer" (2011:15). If biopower targets "man-as-living-being" rather than solely "man-as-body" (Foucault 2003:42), then qualifying *being* (e.g., vulnerable, suffering, "illegal," etc.) is a necessary component in the exercise of a new art of government that goes beyond strict regimes of discipline and punishment alone (e.g., forced detention, forced removal, etc.).

The move to name spaces such as the warehouse "irregular settlements" was conditioned by immigration law, such as Real Decree 441/2007 that authorizes the allocation of state subsidies to combat the "vulnerable situation" of immigrants through the creation of "programs of immediate

action for its treatment" regardless of legal status[160]. To emphasize the physical ailments of people rather than their legal status as such is to foreground "bare life" in the political sphere. Despite important overlaps, Ticktin argues against building on the concept of bare life as formulated by Giorgio Agamben because it "assumes that we can know what life stripped of all political and social features looks like" and "we can all imagine it, and universally recognize it" (Ticktin 2011:14). She argues the *sans-papiers* struggles offer "a key ethnographic site by which to think about what 'politics' means in our world – where its borders lie and what constitutes political action" (2011:6), and an ethnographic means to analyze the manner in which the "imagined universal suffering body" has become "the primary subject of care for those on the margins of nation-states" (2011:11) within political processes that are "grounded in benevolence and compassion" (2011:63). While this is a valid point, in my analysis the concept of *bare life* is helpful in better understanding the category of "illegality" from the broader optics of world-making.

If the margins run through the very core of nation-states, then the incorporation of life into national politics beyond specific formulations of suffering is central in the very constitution of figures such as the citizen and the non-citizen, but also the state as a legitimate sovereign power. In anthropology Giorgio Agamben's (1999) work[161] has been significant in conceptualizing the ways in which "individuals are reconstituted through special laws as populations on whom new forms of regulation can be exercised" (Das and Poole 2004:13). For Agamben, the political deliberation over life can be traced back to the very beginning of civilization, thereby problematizing Foucault's initial formulations. If "the production of a biopolitical body is the

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[160] Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración – Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Real Decreto RD 441/2007, Articulo 1.2.

[161] In a recent reader on biopolitics, Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze argue Foucault's ideas on this new modality of power remained largely neglected by Anglophone scholars until the English publication of Giorgio Agamben's book, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (2013:4). Also see Knudsen and Stage 2015.

original activity of sovereign power," then what is new about the modern political era is not a shift to a politics over life but rather the visibilization of "the secret tie uniting power and bare life" (Tickin 2011:11). Agamben argues the Nazi concentration camp represents the ultimate articulation of a biopolitics in which bare life and political distinctions merge into one. Indeed, for Agamben politics is categorically defined by an initial distinction between "life" as natural phenomena and the "good life" as a social and cultural development, where the right to decide on such a distinction represents the "original activity of sovereign power" (Agamben 1999:11). Phrased differently, politics has always been a kind of biopolitics in so far as it has been premised on the promise of cultivating the "good life" out of natural life. The Roman legal-juridical figure of *homo sacer* represents an exclusion from this project but an inclusion in the form of a unique constellation of social relations that allow for it to be killed but not sacrificed (1999:12). Removed from the socio-political field of value, the value ascribed to this figure is contingent on its natural affiliation to the gods, hence its designation as the "sacred man." Under the aegis of the gods, "sacred life" or "bare life" is no longer within the jurisdiction of sovereign power and, thus, can be killed without the threat of punishment. But equally important, because of its removal "bare life" cannot be re-incorporated into the socio-political field of value in which sacrifice would take place.

The notion of bare life is helpful in the context of immigration because it sheds light on the intersecting processes aimed at incorporating working class non-EU citizens within a determinate exclusionary margin. Nicholas de Genova (2010) argues the figure of the "illegal migrant" is stripped of social and cultural context and is solely valued for its "bare" or "naked" labor-power outside of the standard modes of government and regulation (2010:47). The quality of being deportable engenders a "zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and

inclusion," wherein the "bare life" of the "illegal migrant" makes evident, indeed, emboldens sovereign power in its capacity to decide on an individual's very presence in the form of a ban (2010:37). The question of *nativism*, whereby the extension of rights is premised on the basis of *natal* rather than civil entitlement (2010:54), produces a margin in the state's perennial project of "producing a 'people' in its own image" (2010:51). This margin is not an anomaly or even an "internal contradiction of the system" (Suárez Navaz 2007:17), but rather an effective mechanism to stake borders in the physical presence of the non-EU citizen as "truly everywhere *within* the space of the nation-state" (De Genova 2010:52).

The political quality attached to human life today responds to a distinct form and exercise of sovereign power. Despite the rhetoric of integration, Spanish immigration law "systematically illegalize most third-world immigrants by making it virtually impossible for them to retain legal status" (Calavita and Suárez Navaz 2003:121). This contradiction is especially present in the figure of the "illegal migrant," whose legal position signals distinct yet intersecting rationales between a universal logic of human rights on the one hand and a labor-centric logic based on existing work relations on the other (Suárez Navaz 2007:201). But while local victories in the struggle for "the right to have rights" (Arendt 1974 cited by Suárez Navaz 2007:25) can be interpreted as "an extension of citizenship," it is also indicative of how state power delimits the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion at the national level by acting (or not) upon the state of exception that is "irregular" or "illegal" status. Indeed, if the nation-state has historically asserted its sovereign right by closing borders, the globalized state today has greater leverage in differentiating and separating "citizens" from "non-citizens" given that these boundaries are "now diffuse and no longer lines up neatly with the clear bright lines of a map" (Dauvergne 2008:17-18).

Scholars have suggested the occupation of Catalonia Plaza in 2000 and the subsequent church lock-ins in Barcelona and in many other cities throughout Spain in 2001 are clear examples of the inviability of an orthodox model of citizenship in the modern era (Barbero 2013; Suárez Navaz et al. 2007). Mass "legalization" schemes in the early 2000's was touted as a victory in the struggle for "papers" by activists looking to politicize the warehouse and get people to be more participative in various protests and campaigns. While I agree the politics surrounding "papers" point to a "postnational logic" and a kind of "extension of citizenship" that amalgamates "a complex web of interests" (Suárez Navaz et. al. 2007:206), I hold it is important to historicize the ideologies undergirding state practices and situate unfolding legal reforms within a broader drive to instantiate and uphold a world of governable sociopolitical categories. In this respect, the irregular settlements were systematically apoliticized by local administrations because the historical period of economic expansion that demanded migrant workers had given way to an era in which "politics is replaced by moralism" in the government of working class non-EU citizens (Feldman and Ticktin 2010:12). By framing the irregular settlements into a moral issue, the aim of dominant discourse and the exercise of institutional practice was to narrow the purview of local politics to the figure of bare life (Agamben 1999:78) in an attempt to manage rather than dispel the inherent vulnerability associated to the state's margins. Where such vulnerability is especially prominent is in the employment of deportation.

The (non) Detention Camps

"I've never known suffering until I came here," Ibou told me during one of our interviews. "Here, we suffer. We don't know suffering like this in Africa." Like the Wolof expression *maa ngi fi,* Ibou's use of the deictic *here* accentuated the condition of migrant "illegality" rather than

the space of the warehouse as such. Ibou first told me of his encounter with the police while preparing a meal with Assane in the bar, providing details in a later interview. While watching TV with a group of friends in Premià de Mar, approximately 25 kilometers northeast of the city of Barcelona, Ibou buzzed open the front door of the building to find two police officers standing at the door of the apartment. They were searching for someone who had recently traveled to Senegal to visit family, which put him at ease. But when they asked for his name, he suddenly became nervous. "The first word I said, I lied. I gave them another name." The police asked to see an identification card. He stalled until the police officers threatened to take him back to the police station with them if he did not comply. Although he insisted he was only visiting his friends in Premià de Mar, the police officers remained steadfast to see his ID card. Because he refused to give his real name or produce any form of documentation, the police informed him he needed to join them to Matarò for further questioning. He became anxious as he retold this part of the story. "I say, 'for what?!' I told them, I told them because you come to look for someone, he's not here, he's not here." He gave them his real name in the hopes this would appease them. The police asked to see his "papers," which Ibou said he did not have. Ibou tried to divert attention away from his situation to no avail. "You ask me about my document, I told you I have no document. I gave you my name, so what do you want now?!' 'Let's go,' they say. 'All those things, let's go, too much talk, we don't need it.' I tell them, 'Ok, no worries.' And we go."

Ibou was escorted to the police car outside the apartment complex and they drove to the city of Matarò. "Yes, the time came; I was there, they took my fingerprints, they make too much shit, a lot of shit, man. Many pictures man, a lot of pictures." He was moved to a cell and appointed a public attorney. Because he had a clean police record, he was released with a "report of irregularity" (Cast. *Informe de Irregularidad*). In contrast to a deportation order (Cast. *orden*

de expulsion), a report of irregularity makes Ibou's undocumented status explicit. This is especially important *if* or *when* Ibou breaks the law; in such a circumstance, a judge deciding on his case may be more willing to authorize his detention and forced removal on account of this encounter with law enforcement. His experience with the police motivated him to act in a manner that appeared less "illegal," such as refraining from selling in public spaces, taking public transit without a valid ticket, or even crossing busy streets on a red light. The fact that he worked with Assane selling different commodities without a license was a liability that he justified by emphasizing this was not *his* bar but Assane's. Despite this sense of security, a year and a half after I concluded my fieldwork I learned Ibou had been detained and held in a Center of Internment for Foreigners (CIE) before he was deported to Senegal.

Ibou had come close on two occasions to obtain the coveted job contract necessary to apply for a residence permit. Like Granada, Ibou was from the neighborhood of Guediwaye in the outskirts of Dakar and reached Spain in 2008 by boarding a small fishing boat en route to the Canary Islands. He was relocated to Barcelona as he had contacts there, and stayed in the care of an NGO for 3 months before moving in with a friend south of the Catalan capital. Barred from gaining formal employment Ibou managed to earn enough money to pay for a single room by selling imitation goods in tourist areas. He joined a friend moving for seasonal work to Andalucía, and quickly established himself with a local farmer in Jaen. For 3 years he continued moving to Andalucía during the harvest season of olives and tomatoes, and moving to the seaside city of Salou in Catalonia during the summer months to sell imitation sunglasses. He developed a close relationship with his employer in Jaen, and was promised a full-time job contract in order to apply for a residency permit. But the economic recession and the continued loss of jobs that followed ultimately buried this proposition. Ibou remembers pleading with his employer to help him with

a job contract, offering to pay for the social security himself[162]. "His wife liked me," Ibou stated during one of our interviews. "She would say, 'He's a good guy, take him! He works well, take him!!' But nothing, I don't understand." Ibou was welcome to continue working in Jaen but without a job contract and thus without the possibility to legalize. In early 2011 he moved to Barcelona and had not returned to Andalusia since.

As Ibou recounted his story I thought of an interview with an employee of an NGO participating in the Plan of Irregular Settlements. "We see this a lot," Maria stated. "People come to the office, or they are picked up from the CIE (Cast. *Centro de Internamiento de Extranjeros*), showing their order of deportation (Cast. *orden de expulsion*) as though these were their "papers" to work and live in Spain!" Finding such interactions amusing, she added with a generous smile, "And we have to tell them, 'No, these are *not* your papers *to stay* but your papers that say that Spain wants you *to leave*!'" Despite calls to "raise awareness" among Senegalese youth about the structural realities in Europe, migrant "illegality" is a condition that is only understood through direct or indirect experience. And one formidable experience with "illegality" is detention.

There are 9 Centers for the Internment of Foreigners (CIEs) in Spain with a capacity to intern 4,120 persons[163]. Internment can only be authorized by a judge, who is presented by a "report of irregularity" (Cast. *Informe de irregularidad*) by local police. The law clearly stipulates that these "places of internment for foreigners will not have a penitentiary character," authorizing internment as a last measure to exercise the "expulsion" of non-EU foreigners living and/or

[162] Paying for social security (Cast. *seguridad social*) is arguably the single most important deterrent for employers when considering hiring workers on a full-time contract, as associated costs range anywhere from 120 to 400 euro per month per employee. For many searching for a means to legalize, a common strategy is to cover the costs of social security for a minimum of 6 months and thus freeing a would-be employer from the fiscal obligation associated with taking on new employees. Immigration law requires a minimum of 6 months paid into social security in order to be legible to renew a residency permit. I documented accounts of people securing a job contract without an actual job (e.g., wage, work, etc.) and paying their own social security tributes for the legal minimum of 6 months.

[163] These are located in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Málaga, Fuerteventura, Gran Canaria, Murica, Algeciras and Tenerife.

working in Spain without a residency permit[164]. But internment has been a point of contention since the first immigration law of 1985 introduced these centers, as evidenced by the court ruling that the detention of foreigners was unconstitutional (LO 7/1985 Art. 26.2). The Spanish constitution allows for the "preventative" detention of individuals while they are processed in the system, but no more than 72 hours, after which point individuals need to be released (Art. 17.2). Until 2006 the CIE in Barcelona was in the Police station in La Verneda (Jarrín Morán et. al. 2012:10). Since 2008 there have been three deaths in the CIE of Barcelona (Ecuador 2008, Morocco 2010, Guinea-Conakry 2012), the last of which was due to lack of medical attention (Jarrín Morán et. al. 2012:12). The majority of people interned in these centers are not deported to their country because of logistical factors, evidencing the manner in which "illegality" is indubitably a part of a disciplinary regime of subject formation.

A year after beginning my fieldwork I was informed that Mamadou had been interned in one of these centers. I visited him on two occasions, the last of which was the day before he was supposed to be repatriated. In a future interview, he informed he had been escorted to the airport but after moments of confusion he was eventually told he was free to leave. The flight had been cancelled and rescheduled for the following week. Because he had met the maximum 60-day period of internment, it was no longer possible to readmit him into the center. He remembers weeping at the airport and again at the center when he walked out with his belongings.

His description of the CIE resonates with other accounts I documented as a space that is "worse than a prison" because of its radical liminal status. One of his most vivid memories was an early morning in which a detainee's number was read over the intercom and the detainee was

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[164] "… and will have social, juridical, cultural and health services. Interned foreigners will only be denied the *derecho ambulatorio"* (Art. 60, LO 8/2000 and LO 11/2003.

escorted out by police. The unceasing drill of escorting people from their cells to the airport placed special stress on the fact that this was no ordinary space.

> Every day, airport, airport, airport. Every day, every day, every day you see how they come or they call your number and all of that. They call someone, two secret police come, they enter the room, they take you, because your clothes you don't take in there with you. They keep it for you with a ticket (identification), when you want something you make a line in the afternoon to take something from your bag. But there are things that they don't permit inside either, they won't let enter. You take whatever you can. They look at everything you take, shoes and pants and things like that and, well, they leave you inside. There they treat people really bad, Arturo.

Like an airport[165], Mamadou experienced the CIE as a "non-place" that constricted his individuality and his claims of complex social relations in its pursuit of maximizing mobility between localities (Augé 1995:106). But whereas the experience of indeterminateness of the non-place described by Marc Augé ends at checkpoints, checkout counters, or toll booths[166], Mamadou's experience of liminality in the CIE was different because here the exceptional quality of the non-place is in actuality a new norm: once here, a person's individuality and social relations are systematically nullified in anticipation of their removal from Spanish territory. As Shahram Khosravi (2010) states based on his personal experience, the non-place of an airport transit hall is experienced differently among those without "papers," a difference that pivots on the ability to leave such spaces with one's socio-historical identity intact. For the "illegal" traveler, an airport as well as a detention centers are spaces that bear on their identity precisely because they raise the ontological question of whether or not they should be allowed to *be* at all, that is, to remain within the borders of the nation-state as a de facto "citizen" (2010:65). In these non-places for non-EU citizens, a person is stripped of the identity they have grown to engage with either in their country of origin or throughout their stay in a "host" country as they are processed and measured against a

[165] Other "non-places" include highways, shopping malls, public transit, other sites in which social interaction is minimal or non-existent (1995:98).
[166] As Marc Augé argues, "the space of the non-place does not create singular identity nor relation, but rather solitude and similarity" (1995:107).

politically amenable category of governance. Like others I consulted, what struck Mamadou the most was just how easy it was to fall victim of indiscriminate abuse as a legal non-person.

> Mamadou: And on top of that they hit you!
>
> Arturo. They hit you?
>
> Mamadou: Buah! They are quick to hit you!! Pam, pam, pam (sound of fists hitting a body). You don't know, you know, because they want to treat you like a piece of shit, you know? One day, one of them almost hit me.
>
> Arturo. Yes?
>
> Mamadou: But they, they, they wanted to hit me, but I was lucky. Because in the room that we were in, me, a man from Pakistan, and two new guys, they don't speak Castilian, not a word, ok? And when the police come to change us to another room, we say, 'Hello,' 'Hello, take the blanket and the sheet, we are going to another room over there because we have to fix up here, I don't know what,' ok? We begin to collect the things, all of that, and one guy is talking, the guy doesn't understand what he is saying because he doesn't speak Cast … Spanish, you know?
>
> Arturo: The man from Pakistan?
>
> Mamadou. No, the other one, he was African. But the police begin to insult him, you know, and they say to him, I don't know what, "Animal, take it however you want, animal!" You know?
>
> Arturo. Damn
>
> Mamadou. And I turn around and I say to him, 'Hey, you can say whatever you want to him except *animal*. You need to respect all people (Cast. *la gente tambien hay que respetar*).' That, if he says 'animal' to him it's like he is saying it to me as well, you know, and that's not right. 'What is with you? Are you acting up?' (Cast. *vas de chulo*?) I say, 'No, I'm not acting up, it is you who is talking of 'acting up,' but it is not like that.' The truth, one needs to speak it. And he says to me, 'Ok, ok, that's enough, another room.' Man, like, you know, like he's trying to be nice. But no, sometimes, one guy same thing but seven or eight come and take him, they put him in a room without cameras or anything, and they hit him good! And where they hit you there are never any cameras. They know this, because if they do it and the boss sees it, that's a problem for them. But them, when they hit, they take you and put you in a room there and puff, puff, puff (batons hitting a body). They hit you good! Uff, everywhere. When they leave you, you can't even walk. There are many who they've hit in there.

The violence people experience in the CIE is quite literally outside of the law. As detainees waiting to be repatriated, people are forced to inhabit a liminal state where rights are curtailed and demands are easily ignored. Like the camp analyzed by Agamben, the Center for the Internment of Foreigners (CIE) represents a state of exception that has become the norm, where "detainees" are no longer protected by the same civil laws of mainstream society because they have been removed from mainstream politics. Mamadou's objection to the use of the word "animal" can be

understood as a struggle against the dehumanization such spaces are designed to achieve. An animal is not deserving of rights, and is therefore treated like an object rather than an equal. Mamadou objected to having his sense of self reduced to categories he was unable to change, and demanded "respect" as a person and not an object whose meaning was defined by state power. Without the right to make a claim beyond the question of their "legal status," the CIE was experienced as a true space of non-existence in which no other social identity but that of the "non-EU citizen" marks the horizon.

Based on accounts such as Mamadou's during the period of fieldwork, CIE's are "worse than a prison" because of the absolute lack of rights beyond the right to life, which was often itself violated. There are no toilets in the cell but buckets detainees must empty every morning. Once detainees are returned to their cells in the evening it is very difficult to get a police officer's attention, even in an emergency. Mamadou described one occasion in which one of his cellmates fell from the top bunk bed and cut his head. "We screamed for 15 minutes, but nothing, nothing. They finally heard something and they came. The poor guy was there with lots of blood, you know, they took him to the hospital." Although routinely denounced, the subpar healthcare provisions in the CIE's are defended at the political level by recourse to their distinct legal position within Spain. As the then Secretary of State of Security, Ignacio Ulloa, answered in an interview, "It wouldn't be logical, and less with the (budget) restrictions that we are experiencing, that the healthcare service that is available in the Internment Centers is superior to the one enjoyed by nationals" (Carranco 2012).

If modern sovereign power is premised on the inclusion of life in politics in the form of natural rights, then these detention centers activate the denial of such rights inherent in the figure of the "illegal migrant," a denial that legitimates and justifies, indeed, compels the systemic

discrimination against and expulsion of people identified as "illegal," and a denial that undergirds the very makeup of the nation-state (e.g., citizen vs. non-citizen). As LO 8/2000 re-introduced, forced removal of "illegal migrants" is justified on the normative assumption that they cannot from the start be conceived as equals to Spanish or, more recently, EU member state citizens. The CIEs strip a person of any social meaning other than the quality of their non-EU citizenship and thus foreground their exclusion from the *nomos* (Virno 2004), rendering mute whatever experiences they may have acquired in their years in the country. *Here* people embody the figure of *homo sacer* conceived as a figure outside the body-politic whose demands to "respect all people" fall on deaf ears.

Conscribed Existence

Unincorporated populations have represented a pervading dilemma for European sovereign powers that has called forth distinct political strategies according to the socio-historical period[167]. The emergence of wage labor initially built upon an *ancien régime* based on a "society of orders, status, estates, all regulated by tutelage" (Castel 2003:155) that ultimately laid the foundation of the social state premised on the "salaried society from which the majority of social subjects will draw their guarantees and their rights" (2003:89). If the consolidation of the social state was meant to mitigate what Robert Castel refers to as the "risk of disaffiliation" in the salaried society, then to form part of a "vulnerable" population today implies embodying such a threat, a certain social condition that is today politically and economically untenable because of its "unprofitability" in neoliberal capitalism (Valverde Gefaell 2015). In line with hegemonic neoliberal logic, policies

[167] Robert Castel argues different historical political economic periods are embodied in distinct cultural figures, such as the "vagabond" in pre-industrial Europe, *les miserable* at the height of industrialization, and the "socially excluded" in post-industrial society following WWII (2003:xxii).

meant to mitigate "exclusion" today emphasize the need to invest in an individual's *formation*[168] (Cast. *formación*, Cat. *formació*) in order to successfully increase their profitability in Barcelona's global economy.

The aim of the Plan of Irregular Settlements was to conscribe an otherwise disaffiliated non-EU citizen population within a field of local governmentality. By establishing the boundaries of "technical discourse" surrounding the irregular settlements, inhabitants were expected to draw from this language to describe their experiences and make demands of local institutions. In her research on NGOs working with Roma in Hungary, Andria Timmer (2010) found that the over-emphasis of stories of hardship and suffering reflected a structural relationship between the state, NGOs and clients in which these stories constituted a kind of currency that could be traded in for financial support from the Hungarian state and, more importantly, the EU (2010:267). For Timmer, the forceful re-iteration of stories of discrimination, inequality and poverty in grant proposals produced rather than simply referred to a unique subject of government she calls, the "needy subject." These NGOs relied on an institutional register that framed Roma experience according to funding stipulations, which inadvertently silenced aspects of Roma experience that did not align with an emerging master narrative. The emphasis on stories of suffering created and ultimately naturalized an image of the Roma as iconic of extreme poverty and in perpetual need, effectively occluding sites of agency or resilience and failing to fully capture the more nuanced difficulties the NGO's clients encountered (2010:269). Similarly, the institutional register of the HCR instantiated a "humanitarian subject" that was recognized by law, legible in local administration, and ultimately naturalized in a myriad of well-intentioned local initiatives.

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[168] The use of the terms *formación* and *formació* in this context translate to "training" in English. Its other translation – "formation" – is revealing of the process of subject making such initiatives imply.

Due to the fact that most people overtly or tacitly opposed the Plan of Irregular Settlements, local activists played a pivotal role in mediating relations between residents and the city government. The Coalition in Defense of Human Rights in the Settlements (CDHRS) was an activist group that organized protests in prominent public places, such as Catalonia Plaza and Saint James' Plaza[169], and scheduled meetings with various politicians and administrators with the aim of securing alternatives to a unilateral eviction. They were at the helm of the negotiations with three different government bodies (city, autonomous community, state) to procure access to a residency permit on humanitarian grounds. Although activists' role in the outpost is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I briefly turn to this dimension of my fieldwork to illustrate how the use of formal registers sets into motion discursive apparatuses whose sole function is to further reify the subject position people are conscribed to inhabit.

Activists worked tirelessly ahead of an eviction to ensure people had a place to sleep and access to places to continue to work. The CDHRS was created in 2011 as a network of concerned neighbors who felt compelled to do something as abandoned buildings were occupied, transformed into sites of work and housing, and later evicted by local authorities. The CDHRS envisioned itself as a horizontal entity comprised of Spanish and Catalan activists working alongside inhabitants of these spaces. Partnered with the local neighbors' association[170], the CDHRS developed constructive relationships with inhabitants and ultimately became the de facto mediator of all communication with the city government prior and after political demonstrations. Because the central aim was to defend the human rights of inhabitants, the CDHRS relied on a dominant

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[169] *Plaça Sant Jaume* is located between the principal administration buildings for the city of Barcelona and the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, and as such is regarded as a highly symbolic space to hold protests given that demands or objections can be addressed to both city and regional officials.

[170] An *association of neighbors* (Cast. *asociación de vecinos*, Cat. *associació de veïns*) is an important entity that not only coordinates many neighborhood level activities and events, but also represents residents in the city government.

lexicon to make claims that inadvertently created fissures in their relationship with the people whose rights they were working to defend.

The Coalition in the Defense of Human Rights in the Settlements (CDHRS) demanded a sign of good faith that "no one would be left on the streets," as Raul, one of the founding members of the Coalition, told me. "People don't disappear (after an eviction) and they are left without a home or without their means of making a living!" Because evictions were often a consequence of city government pressure on the owners of the properties to file charges or health and safety inspectors to produce expert reports that would then authorize a unilateral eviction, activists insisted the city government was responsible for "these poor people" (Cat. *aquests pobres*) when they are left on the street. The CDHRS also demanded the city and Catalan Government[171] refrain from alerting the National Police when executing an eviction. In previous occasions, the National Police would stand outside an irregular settlement and stop people as they crossed lines of riot police to ask for their "papers." Those who did not produce these requested documents would then be detained and moved to a CIE. "The eviction is traumatic enough," Raul argued. "We don't want the National Police to come, and the only one who can intervene is the Catalan Government. It is they who send the National (Police)." Both of these demands were successful: people had access to temporary housing through the Plan of Irregular Settlements, and the city government worked with the Generalitat to adjudge a state of exception against deportation and in favor of humanitarian aid.

In mid-2013 the city government began meeting with CDHRS representatives to discuss their demand for "papers," specifically the possibility of applying for residency permits on the basis of inhabitants' documented vulnerability. Although the *arraigo* (i.e. "Settlement Program")

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[171] Generalitat de Catalunya

represents the primary means to gain a residency permit for anyone identified as "illegal" in the country, it is nevertheless framed as an "exceptional circumstance," which means the state holds the ultimate decision on these applications and the review process is conducted on a case-by case basis. Within this section of immigration law[172] is another, less known mechanism to confer a residency permit for "humanitarian reasons." Talk about "papers" was quickly hailed as a momentous development by activists and inhabitants alike, largely because it was initially assumed a job contract would not be necessary in lieu of people's documented "extreme vulnerability." The quest for residency permits quickly overshadowed the political agenda of the CDHRS.

According to Spanish immigration law, the state may extend a residency permit to foreigners who can "prove to suffer from an illness of grave character (developed in Spain, *sobrevenida*) that requires specialized healthcare assistance not available in their country of origin, and that the interruption or lack of treatment would imply a grave risk to health or life"[173]

. These humanitarian reasons (Cast. *razones humanitarias*) form part of the "temporary residency due to exceptional circumstances" section of Spanish immigration law[174], which includes the provision of a residency permit for "international protection" (Cast. *protection internacional*), "collaboration with the authorities" (Cast. *colaboración con autoridades*), and "national security or public interest" (Cast. *seguridad nacional o interés publico*). While inhabitants did not "suffer from an illness of grave character," the CDHRS argued inhabitants should be eligible for state recognition because of the humanitarian crisis the irregular settlements represented.

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[172] Title V: Temporary Residency for Exceptional Circumstances, Chapter 1: Temporary Residency for Exceptional Circumstances for Arraigo, International Protection, Humanitarian Reasons, Collaboration with the Authorities, National Security or Public Interest.
[173] Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Real Decreto 557/2011, Articulo 126.2.
[174] Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Real Decreto 557/2011, Titulo V.

The CDHRS requested a meeting with the city government, the Catalan government, and the Spanish immigration office in Barcelona[175] to discuss the possibility of obtaining "papers" for those who were undocumented. Earlier meetings with each level of government had proven fruitful, especially for people who struggled to renew their residency permit or had recently lost it and were eligible to gain it back. Proposals for creating "transitory residency and work permits" on the grounds that inhabitants faced a situation of extreme vulnerability and exclusion led to concerted efforts to facilitate individuals' *empadronamiento* and *certificate of social integration*[176], the latter issued by Catalan government. A meeting between the three levels of government never materialized, and the path toward legalization for people who had never had a residency permit was ultimately buried under a flurry of "denied" letters from the Spanish ministry in Madrid.

Whereas local administrations considered extending greater recognition on humanitarian grounds, activists ultimately rejected any proposal that did not extend the right to work in the formal economy, a hard-line position that created a rift with many inhabitants who expressed greater flexibility. With a long history in local struggles for immigrant rights, many activists argued a residency permit without an authorization to work incapacitated people from "getting by." Victor and Victoria were the most vocal in their rejection of a residency permit without the authorization to work. "What are people going to live off of?" Victor often asked rhetorically in CDHRS meetings. "We want a residency permit with the authorization to work because no one wants to live off the charity (Cast. *caridad*) of the city government, no one wants to work under the table (Cast. *trabajar en negro*). The residency permit without an authorization to work is bullshit (Cast. *es una mierda*)." For Victor and other activists, a permit without the authorization

[175] Subdelegación de Gobierno.
[176] Cast. *Certificado de arraigo;* Cat. Certificat d'Arrelament.

to work undermined a person's dignity (Cast. *esta opción no es digna*), and hence was unacceptable. While Senegalese and other West Africans I consulted would have chosen a residency permit with the authorization to work if they were given the choice, they also stressed their willingness to gain any kind of state recognition that permitted them to live in Spain without the perennial threat of forced removal. For my participants, the choice was not between the right to work or not to work, but rather between having greater state recognition and being denied it, a reality that many activists were unwilling to concede.

With growing tension within the CDHRS regarding the best route to secure the coveted residency permit, I asked Victoria during a protest before the Catalan Department of Quality of Life, Equality and Sports (Cat. *Área de Qualitat de Vida, Igualtat, i Esports*) if it was not in inhabitants' best interest to focus their attention on acquiring such a residency permit *without* the right to work instead of pursuing a residency *with* the right to work, which would have implied going through a more rigorous state evaluation process. She listened to me quietly but would unexpectedly interrupt me to say, "The ones that have to decide are them" and "It's them who have to decide." Freedom of choice was readily held as an ideal, despite the fact that the manner in which the CDHRS talked about "papers" implicitly put forth a decision for people. Victoria disagreed with my assessment and moved on to speak to someone else.

The CDHRS tacitly decided for others by pointing to the *right* decision and shielding their stance from critical analysis by evoking a human rights discourse. The emphasis to set the group's sights on demanding state recognition en par with "documented" working class non-EU citizens[177] was defended by Victor, Victoria and other self-identified "veterans" within the CDHRS by pointing to the mass mobilization for "papers" in 2001 and again in 2005 as clear victories in the

[177] The default point of reference was that of a working class non-EU citizen in possession of a residency permit with the authorization to work on equal terms with a Spanish citizen.

struggle for immigrant rights in Spain. Such an interpretation of the past, however, completely ignores the fact that the Spanish economy was experiencing unprecedented growth and as a result had an insatiable demand for "immigrant" workers during the early 2000's, a context that was painfully different during my fieldwork. In other words, the position adopted within the CDHRS ignored the fact that any move into legal existence implies conscription into a particular subject position within a state's biopolitics, which in the period of widespread austerity was dominated not by the figure of the "immigrant worker" but of the "humanitarian subject" in need of institutional aid. If the fight for human rights reflects a "constellation of philosophical, practical, and phenomenological dimensions through which universal rights, rights believed to be entailed by a common human nature, are enacted, debated, practiced, violated, envisioned, and experienced" (Goodale 2006:490), then the re-framing of the irregular settlements as a human rights issue inadvertently mobilized its own institutionalized register that further strengthened rather than contested the underlying subject formation processes the humanitarian register of the Plan of Irregular Settlements aimed to secure.

A Center for the Interment of Foreigners (CIE) known as "Aluche" in Madrid.

Conclusion

The local political dimensions of undocumented status coupled with housing laws that protect disenfranchised residents from unilateral evictions created a unique state of limbo in the warehouse. The politics of immigration and legal implications surrounding de facto residence permitted individuals to live outside of the law pending further formal administrative action. Overwhelmingly, inhabitants recognized the warehouse as a temporary phenomenon that would ultimately be shut down by the police on orders from the city government. Although there was no pretension among my interlocutors that any of these spaces could continue indefinitely, there was an implicit assumption that this particular mode of life had value for the time being.

The fact that inhabitants understood the limitations of the law and acted within and against those legal parameters led to new settlements as old ones were evicted and either boarded up or demolished. Migrant "illegality" renders people more susceptible to state violence and less empowered to pursue legal redress (Willen 2006:289), forcing them to inhabit a marginal field of politics not of the citizen but of the "non-person" (Dal Lago 2004). The "fight" (Cast. *lucha*, Cat. *lluita*) for immigrant rights formed part of this process of conscribing non-EU citizens into a category of legal existence, namely that of the worker. Human rights discourse within the Coalition in the Defense of Human Rights in the Settlements (CDHRS) represented an institutionalized register capable of mobilizing a field of formal politics that transcended the informality of the social world of the warehouse. The presence and use of a human rights register presented subtle challenges to people's system of value and was largely responsible for the progressive fracturing of whatever momentum activists had succeeded in amassing for a "movement" in support of the irregular settlements.

Chapter 8 – Yoonu Baay Faal

Structures of Meaning

It was getting late. With Mousa's laptop now in my possession to format at home, I walked down the corridor greeting people along the way until reaching Yoonu Baay Faal, which was now open. I stepped into Assane's bar to pick up my gear. I entered an establishment that *felt* like any other bar in the city before the nation-wide smoking ban came into effect in 2011. Two of the four tables were occupied by a party of three Romanian Roma and a party of four Nigerians. On top of each table were liter sized beer bottles and pouches of rolling tobacco. One of the Nigerian men was cleaning marijuana on a piece of paper and mixing the content with half of a pre-rolled cigarette. As I spoke to Assane I could see one of the Romanian men try to communicate in limited Castilian with one of the Nigerian men about the activity he was undertaking. By the time I left Assane's bar the two tables had merged together and the "joint" (Cast. *porro*) now circulated from person to person in a jovial mood.

The warehouse was a complex social world of multiple intersecting interests that was grounded in a working order ethical structure that people continuously drew from but also added to in real-time. Assane and Ibou were maternal second cousins who ran their restaurant like a family business. Because of their family ties, they endured threats to their business as a close unit. Partnerships based on family ties were more resistant to the exigencies of running a business in a space where disputes were resolved without recourse to conventional norms and rules. But whereas family ties proved useful in galvanizing a drive to work closely together in pursuit of economic gains, the nature of the outpost meant people could not rely on common expectations of others within and beyond a family context, or even conventional social pressures to impel others

to act in a certain manner. After the eviction Assane and Ibou had an abrupt falling out when they struggled to assign right of ownership to the bar items they had accumulated over a 9 month period. Because their business had been created in a marginal irregular space, their claims of right and wrong behavior were largely contingent on a kind of situational rubric that was difficult, if not impossible, to extrapolate beyond the warehouse. They had since reconciled their differences the last time I met them in late 2015, but by their respective private accounts their relationship was never the same.

Initially, Assane and Ibou worked the whole day together, but when they began extending their business hours to the early hours of the following day they decided to work in shifts. Assane and Ibou slept in a bed located behind the bar they alternated according to their work schedule. They sold plates of food for 3 euro in the afternoon, progressively adding items to their menu to satisfy customer demands, especially in the evenings. Their location at the back-end of the warehouse where most people lived coupled with the fact that they often remained open for 24 hours transformed their bar into an important site for everyday sociality for inhabitants and regulars alike. Their bar had a constant stream of customers, many popping in to buy single cigarettes throughout the work day. Their family ties allowed them to run a tight business with fluid communication. Like Faouzi, they regularly invited people to eat with them when they could not afford to pay for their own plate of food, and opened tabs for alcohol or tobacco only with customers who had proved to be trustworthy. Their business was by many accounts a success during the existence of the warehouse.

Businesses partnerships based solely on an economic relationship were much more volatile. Throughout fieldwork, Faouzi hired 5 different people to help in his bar, one of which was Mousa who worked in Faouzi's bar in the afternoons to complement the income he generated

searching for scrap metal in the morning. In exchange for his work, Mousa had ample access to food and tobacco, as well as a place to sleep in Faouzi's dormitory on the top floor above his bar. While he was able to eat and smoke as he pleased, Mousa never received any monetary benefits as he had initially expected. After a dispute about what meal to prepare, Mousa decided to abandon his work relationship with Faouzi and join two close friends who had just opened their own bar after the previous owner had decided to relocate to another occupied industrial building. In similar cases I documented, people simply abandoned the work relationship when it did not suit their interests, a finding that upends the notion that people were naturally inclined to follow leaders based on "tribal" affiliations. Any recognition as a de facto owner of a business or a leader of a particular project was contingent on the legitimacy as such from others that was negotiated in real time.

The absence of conventional norms compelled people to create their own structures of meaning in their efforts to fashion a social world aligned with the kind of social person they sought to embody. And it is here, at the level of constituting a social world on one's own terms, that the concept of the outpost is most salient. Although the warehouse was primarily a place to meet people's basic needs to ensure the procurement of the lifecourse, it was also a place to strive toward more complex needs tied to subjectivity. As such, the warehouse was a place to produce economic value to "survive" in the city (Cast. *sobrevivir*, Cat. *sobreviure*), but also a place to produce a kind of symbolic value that was central in people's changing position within transnational networks. In the temporary suspension of moral structures of the outpost (i.e., moral moratorium), people crafted their own system of meaning according to the circumstances they encountered, drawing from but also open to modifying broader moralities according to needs and demands. An illustrative example can be appreciated by turning to the space within the warehouse known as

Yoonu Baay Faal. The role of religion was most palpable in this space, but it was conceived and practiced with a heightened sense of liberty, a fact that was at times a source of contention with others who followed regimented path of a religious institution. Yoonu Baay Faal – path of the Baay Faal – illustrates how the suspension of norms in a space enables people to re-establish a system of meaning that adheres to their complex need of being-in-the-world with greater existential comfort (Willen 2014; Zigon 2009).

A University

Mousa was tending a fire in a small cylindrical container in the corridor he would then drag inside Yoonu Baay Faal once there were enough hot coals. I greeted him with the customary *beggee* for the second time on this particular day. A man in his early 40's sitting against the wall at the entrance with a Tetra Pack of wine behind his back and a cigarette in his hand called me over after seeing me interact with Mousa in this manner. I knelt down and initiated and ended the *beggee* by bringing the back of his hand to my forehead. He smiled, pleased to see me take such initiative. He was visiting from Granada where he lived in the Sacromonte caves. "We do our sikar in the caves," he stated with pride. "Many Europeans, not just Senegalese, many people come." As I reflected on the connotations of his statement Adama joined us, knelt before the man, took his hand and initiated the *beggee* with marked exuberance. The man looked elated to be receiving such treatment. Adama spoke to him as though he were the man were his teacher, a position he created by having knelt down before the man, initiating the *beggee* the same way I had, keeping his head lowered and avoiding direct eye contact at all times. The man was older than Adama, which partially explained Adama's behavior. But Adama's actions went beyond customary protocol: Adama was projecting and embodying the iconic traits of a humble, respectful

and devoted disciple to the Murid path to Islam. The drums began. Adama thanked the man for coming, and insisted he stay longer. The man thanked him for his hospitality. Adama stood up. "I'll be there soon, Baay Faal" (Wolof, *maa ngi ñew*, *Baay Faal*), the man stated, waving from under the mural of Ibrahima Faal where he was sitting.

Inside *Yoonu Baay Faal*.

Upon entering Yoonu Baay Faal, there was an area to the right that had been transformed to wash clothes or repair appliances, such as refrigerators and washing machines. A make-shift wall separated this area from the main space of the *sikar*, or chant. The main area consisted of approximately eight meters by eight meters of ground floor fully covered in more than twenty different shaped and colored rugs. On the central wall there were large posters of Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba and Sheikh Ibrahima Faal, and various smaller images of their respective descendants[178]. The largest poster was of Sheikh Ibrahima Faal on the adjacent wall with a disco ball hanging from

[178] Among which was a poster of Sheikh Seriñ Fàllu, the second son of Bamba, who assumed the role of Xalifa General in 1945 and presided over the inauguration of the Grand Mosque of Tuubaa in 1963. Seriñ Fàllu is credited as the first Xalifa General to formally recognize the work of Ibrahima Faal as foundational to the Muridiyya.

the ceiling in front of it. Different size sofas along the two walls were used to seat special guests and treat them with visible signs of respect during their visit. Across the two walls was a large spray-painted caption that read, *Dieureudiufe Borom Touba*, or "thank you Lord of Tuubaa." This is a very common caption seen throughout Senegal, one that my interlocutors in Spain relished explaining to me.

In an interview with Adama, I asked what he had learned during his time at Yoonu Baay Faal. In his response, he compared Yoonu Baay Faal to a "university" that had taught him how to enrich his life through everyday activities. "(During) my time here, I've changed, the house has changed me." I asked for clarification.

> In many things. For example, since I have been here, I have worked with Seriñ Tuubaa and Sheikh Ibrahima Faal. I think of them, I am always willing to work with them. They clean you, they teach you, they show you things, and things that are true, that, for example, a university, how to speak to people, how to respect people, how to behave. This is very important, and we have left everything so this moves forward, you understand me? We don't want anything, only this goes forward; that people come and take advantage, that we clean our bodies, our culture as well, this is something that I myself feel in my life.

Yoonu Baay Faal was conceived as an autonomous project that was aimed not at generating money but establishing a material and semiotic infrastructure to work toward the type of person one desired to become. The disproportionate emphasis on the political economic dimensions of the Muridiyya has largely neglected its potential for self-formation[179]. If the aim of Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba was to establish a pedagogical system for "a lifelong education geared towards the transformation of the character and behavior of the disciples" (Babou 2003:316), then a place like Yoonu Baay Faal was an important site in people's pursuit to fashion a sense of self of

[179] The emergence of the Muridiyya in late 19th century Senegal has tended to warrant a political economic approach because of its emphasis on labor, its creation of wealth, and its consolidation of power and prestige for rising families of spiritual leaders. In his classic study on Islam and modernity, John Voll (1982) referred to the emergence of the Muridiyya in Senegal as a "major economic force" in agriculture and an "influential political force" in colonial and post-colonial administrative contexts (1982:249). From this perspective, the founder Sheikh Amadou Bamba had "no interest in the *jihad* of the sword, but only in the greater *jihad* of the soul" (Robinson 1991:167) because he placed value on ways of being and belonging that best consolidated his religious program with the need to generate economic wealth, that is, to transform a nascent Sufi Brotherhood "into a vigorous economic enterprise" (Voll 1982:249). As important as the political economic dimension may be, such an approach is inadequate to analyze the intricacies of everyday piety in an outpost. Indeed, if Senegalese expect and are accustomed to bearing hardship in all facets of emigration (Carter 1997), then my interest lies in the underlying social structures people put in place to help them not only generate wealth but more specifically endure and persevere difficult extraneous forces.

profound value despite the abject everyday life conditions they faced as "immigrants." Adama and others who self-identified as Baay Faal consistently emphasized their faith in God and their commitment to "follow him always" as highly important and valuable. In this sense, the sikar was an independently organized activity to "apprehend God" and experience "intense moments of communion, based on the adjustment of all of the participants" (Perezil 2008a:198). The outpost extended the opportunity to produce symbolic value that was transnational in scope.

Although it was initially conceived as a *dahira*, or religious community center, Yoonu Baay Faal was never recognized as such by Murids or even most participants of the sikar. For the vast majority of the people I spoke to, this was a space to work on the self within intersecting social worlds. Based on her study of "Bayefaalism" in irregular social spaces in Madrid and the Sacromonte caves in Granada, Ester Massó Guijarro (2014) argues many Murids self identify as Baay Faal for the first time in the "migrant diaspora" due to the stigma tacitly associated with this social identity in Senegal, where many are labeled "Baay Faux" (i.e., False Baay Faal) or "Baay mbedd" (i.e., Baay Faal of the streets) (2014:26-27). The transnational context mitigates the associated stigma, making available identities, practices and desires previously foreclosed, but it does not entirely dissolve it. Massó Guijarro argues the unorthodox practices of the Baay Faal in the "squats" in Madrid and the caves in Granada create a dichotomy between an ostensibly pure and original "good Baay Faal" and a corrupted and inauthentic "bad Baay Faal" (2016). This tension was palpable throughout my fieldwork, impacting everyday social engagements and informing the manner people construed others as particular kinds of people.

The Baay Faal are caught in a unique paradox, for they embody the Murid ideal of the fervently devoted disciple and yet they also represent the uncompromising iconoclast who is stigmatized in Senegalese society (Pezeril 2008a). The Tetra Pack of wine the man from Granada

hid behind his back is representative of a disjuncture that characterizes the social identity of the Baay Faal on the one hand and an unorthodox freedom in the outpost that extends greater flexibility in crafting and embodying a sense of self within the broader paradigm of everyday piety on the other. The term *baay* translates to "father," and *Faal* is a prominent Wolof surname. The notion of "father Faal" further emphasizes the value placed on the relationship between spiritual leaders and participating members of the Murid Brotherhood, where the disciple seeks the guidance and blessing from their spiritual guide as a "father" figure. But because this is a term used by disciples and not spiritual leaders, the term suggests people embody key characteristics of "father (Ibrahima) Faal," whose influence in the Muridiyya cannot be emphasized enough. The tallest minaret of the Grand Mosque in Tuubaa, for example, is known as "Lamp Faal" in order to communicate to disciples throughout the Muridiyya that "Faal is your guiding path" (Ross 2006).

Disciples within the different Sufi brotherhoods in Senegal relate to their *marabout* or *seriñ* as a "teacher-guide" to whom they owe "allegiance and submission" (Villalon 2007:173, also see Glover 2007). The Baay Faal represent a unique model of being and belonging within the Murid brotherhood that extols a person's unwavering will to nurture their relationship to a spiritual guide but also their continued efforts to work in the service of the Murid spiritual mission, historically in the form of labor in the fields surrounding the holy city of Tuubaa and progressively in the form of cash remittances sent from abroad. Indeed, cash remittances have become a crucial resource not only to economically support family back home but also for people to meet their moral and spiritual obligations with their spiritual guides (Buggenhagen 2003:25). If Ibrahima Faal represents the "social and economic core" of the Murid brotherhood (Mbacke 2005:65), then the Baay Faal embody core Murid values that are materialized in people's everyday activities.

In the context of international movement, the absence of the spiritual leader but also the added difficulties of balancing life as an "immigrant" (e.g., "papers," jobs, housing, racism, nourishment, etc.) with religious life (i.e., active participation in formal Murid establishments) meant the warehouse represented an opportunity to create a space aimed at the production of pious routines and in turn labor/work/act on a sense of self. In his study of child rearing practices among the FulBe and the RiimaayBe in Burkina Faso, Paul Riesman (1992) argues a person's sense of self is distinct and should not be conflated with a person's identity or personality[180]. For Riesman a sense of self refers to one's relationship with the world, and as such is contingent on the changing contours of lived circumstances. To inhabit the socio-political category of the "illegal migrant" is to reckon with a particular social identity, which Riesman defines as a "person's location in a social structure" (1992:188) and within a hierarchy of "categories of understanding" (1992:186). While Riesman's definition of personality as "the quality that we infer from a person's actions" (1992:189) and "a phenomenon that occurs in direct relations with other people because it mainly concerns those relations" (1992:191) is useful, I prefer using the term "personhood" or "persona" in order to foreground an imagined model of being and belonging with others that is more fluid within and among different groups. Indeed, Riesman's brief elaboration of "persona" as "the symbolic medium through which one person establishes contact with another" (1992:188) helps to shed light on the way "every action expresses something of a person's current sense of self" (1992:191). In this regard, the routines established in the outpost projected a social persona and reflected an identity that people acted upon and drew from to ground their sense of self despite abject structural conditions.

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[180] Because I do not delve into the vast literature on personality, I do not use the term in this dissertation. Instead, I prefer terms such as *personhood* or *persona* that foreground the intersecting processes of creating and engaging with everyday life social models that inform the manner in which we understand and act upon the behavior of others.

A person's sense of self is indubitably informed by the broader categories that they are expected or forced to inhabit, threatened as much as it is constituted and strengthened by these exogenous elements. Based on her work with Candomblé mediums in Brazil, Rebecca Seligman (2010) defines identity as "enduring self-concepts and self-understandings, which are strongly influenced through social feedback and vulnerable to the disjunctive effects of suffering" (2010:298). Seligman's participants described their experience in Candomblé as a process of recovery, which draws attention to a kind of suffering that impacts identity in its capacity to undermine the coherence of the self at a reflexive but also embodied level. To address such suffering Candomblé practice extends the necessary semiotic resources to foreground the body and its relationship to the self in order to gain a sense of attunement of one's emotions as people "rewrite self-narratives" (2010:315). Indeed, Seligman's research shows how people's sense of recovery pivots on the efficacy of the multiple practices that act on the "embodied self" to mitigate suffering rather than to heal the body of illness as such (2010:307). Similarly, based on his work on the tarantella in Sicily, Italy, Ernesto de Martino defined suffering as a "crisis of presence" in which "presence is felt as lost, dreamy, estranged from itself" (de Martino 2012:436). Drawing from Benedetto Croce's work on history (1912), de Martino argues a crisis of presence occurs when the person is removed from history by being fixed and entangled to a particular mode of being, deprived of "that energy of categorization according to values, which constitutes the reality itself of being-in-human-history" (2012:435-436). "Madness," for de Martino, occurs when a person is unable to engage with the world dialectically, and is instead an inert object within the realm of nature rather than the dynamic interplay of human culture. From this perspective, ritual practice in social systems such as Candomblé or Tarantism represents a means to "restore the balance" between a person's being-in-the-world as an embodied self with the world around it

through the rediscovery and reenacting of values "in the experience of the sacred" (2012:448). It is this production of and realignment to values that mitigates suffering in the existential context that the social categories one inhabits do not correspond with the world one seeks to embody.

The creation of routines in the warehouse was a means to ground a person's everyday practice to a system of value that imbued their sense of self with profound transnational meaning. Informed by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, Saba Mahmood (2005) draws from the work of Foucault to argue a subject is historically created and "contingently made possible by the discursive logic of the ethical traditions she enacts" (2005:32). Mahmood suggests women's participation in the mosque movement was a means to learn how to create and maximize situations that reinforced a certain virtuous habitus through their own practice and discipline[181] (2005:136). The warehouse was a place to create the necessary routines that would permit people to work toward a particular kind of self in everyday activities, a place of routines that were geared toward earning money but also becoming a certain kind of person to oneself and in the eyes of others. While people strived to be "good" through their labor, work and action, the Baay Faal were unique in extending a rubric for being and belonging that was nevertheless flexible enough to adapt to people's present circumstances.

With long dreadlocks (Wolof, *njeñ*), patchwork clothing (Wolof, *najaax*), and a leather necklace with the iconic image of Ibrahima Faal from the early 1900's (Marty 1917), Adama and others embodied a Baay Faal aesthetic that was extolled by some and heavily criticized by others. The man sitting against the wall had traveled to Barcelona to accompany his spiritual leader from Senegal in his tour through Spain, with Catalonia his last stop before continuing on to France and

[181] As Mahmood notes, Aristotle's conception of habitus is quite distinct from Bourdieu's whose formulation explains the pathways through which class positions insidiously shape and give rise to dispositions that are sociopolitical in nature. Rather than an unconscious process, Aristotle's conception of habitus refers to an individual's active will and labor in creating routines that will ultimately leave "its imprint on a person's character" (Mattingly 2012:176).

Italy. Adama and others who self-identified as Baay Faal placed greater value on a person's efforts to be close to spiritual leaders and willingness to offer logistical and financial assistance when possible over compliance to conventional norms, such as the requirement to pray five times a day and the prohibition against drinking alcohol. In an interview with Adama, I asked what it meant to be Baay Faal. "You yourself can be a Baay Faal," he responded. "Black, white, everyone can be Baay Faal." Perplexed by his omission of the need to be Muslim as a basic criterion, I asked for clarification. "Look, to be a Baay Faal you have to believe in God. If you believe in God, you follow him always. You can't do foolish things (Cast. *tonterias*), you know what I mean? People who don't believe in God, they do whatever they want." This notion of "doing whatever" represents an important point of contrast to the sense of structure experienced in the outpost, a place characterized by its innate flexibility but also by people's projects of self-formation. The model of piety at Yoonu Baay Faal was "like a University" in so far as it helped people establish daily routines that would maximize their learning how to live in the world according to certain cherished values. Yoonu Baay Faal reflects this dynamic of the outpost, specifically in the weekly organization of the chant.

The Sikar

The unauthorized status of the warehouse made possible the use drums and sound systems to amplify the chant, or *sikar*, without concern for permits or noise ordinances. The sikar began around 8:40pm with a single participant removing his shoes, positioning himself before the large poster of Sheikh Ibrahima Faal on the adjacent wall and projecting his voice as loud as possible, chanting, *Laa ilaaha illaalaa*. He would place his fingers to his ears with his eyes shut tight, completely impervious to other participants progressively joining him. By 9:00pm there was a

small group standing and chanting before the poster of Faal and another group setting a row of chairs on the cement along the edge of the rugs. Those who were particularly talented or simply desired to practice a specific *bakk*, or drum pattern, occupied a chair and readied their instrument. But it was not until the lead drummer playing the xiin stood before the drum line and opposite the now larger group of participants on the rugs that the sikar felt like an event. With the xiin leading the other 5-6 drums, the majority of participants formed a large circle on the rugs and began moving counterclockwise as they chanted in response to the "talking drum," changing verses as the lead drummer modified the rhythm. With the intensity growing, there was then a single participant who would take the lead in the chant, his voice amplified with the PA system that was often breaking down. More than 30 participants danced and moved in a circle around the main singer, replying to the chants in unison. The sikar ended before midnight, with a period from 15 up to 45 minutes reserved at the end for general announcements and closing remarks.

Yoonu Baay Faal was located in what had been a mechanic's workshop in the 1960's and 1970's. Like the rest of the warehouse, it had been abandoned in the 1990's and remained empty for many years, earmarked for redevelopment as part of the city's transition to a neoliberal economy. When the warehouse was initially occupied in late 2011, this space was claimed by an older Senegalese man who used it mostly for storage and shelter. He was a close friend of Mustafa, allowing him to keep his belongings in his space and even spend the night whenever he visited the city. Shortly after it was opened the man moved to Andalusia to work in the olive fields, and entrusted the space to Mustafa before his departure. "He knew me," Mustafa recalled during our interview. "He saw me work, he knew I was a good person. He said, 'use it, so you can work.' I told him, 'Yes, I will use it; it will be a house for the Baay Faal.'" In his mid-30's, Mustafa moved to Barcelona from the neighboring city of Sabadell where he had lived for the last 2 years. He

contacted friends who immediately showed interest. Around this period, he remembers visiting the neighborhood of Barceloneta where he spotted a group of men with dreadlocks playing drums on the beach. Adama was among those on the beach that day. He informed them of his plans and they agreed to join him. Adama recalled his initial excitement:

> For 6 months we worked here, cleaning, fixing up the house. We are young, it's been a long time that we wanted to do this; this is something in our blood, from Senegal, you know what I mean? So, we arrived here, we have been lucky, and we say, 'let's take advantage (of this opportunity), let's make a (pause) dahira here for the Baay Faal, when they come here, we make a group, we play (drums), we pray together, we talk together, you know what I mean? This is very important. We don't want anything, only for this to go forward, that people come, take advantage, that we clean our bodies, our culture as well, this is something very important that I myself feel in my life.

This small but growing group of young men devoted much of their time and energy cleaning and removing years of accumulated rubbish, collecting rugs and varying pieces of furniture (e.g., sofas, bookcases, drawers, etc.), and partitioning the main area from the entrance. One of these early founders painted two large murals of Sheikh Ibrahima Faal and Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba on opposite side of the entrance, with the words, "*Lamp Fall*," written above the image of Faal. After 6 months of preparation the space was truly transformed.

There are two types of sikar, Sam Faal and *xiin* (Perezil 2008a:197), with the key distinction being the absence and presence of percussion. The local dahira, or Murid community center with religious and secular functions (Babou 2002:154), hosted Sam Fall every Sunday, but never with xiin. According to my interlocutors from the dahira, the use of percussion was banned in Tuubaa along with smoking and gambling in the 1980's. The sikar in the local dahira was comprised of a small group (approximately 6 men) chanting litanies written by Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba as the rest in attendance (approximately 60 men and 10 women) listened attentively while drinking tea and/or coffee. After prayers and toward the end of the evening's processions a man would stand before the group and begin chanting *Laa ilaaha illaalaa* - the most iconic Baay Faal chant - with a microphone in hand. This acted as a call to attention for anyone interested in

participating in the *kurel,* that is, the group encircling the main singer, moving and responding to his chants in unison. The Sam Faal sikar in the dahira followed a more orthodox approach. The person leading the Sam Faal sikar was often in a more formal position of *juriñ*, or leader of the Baay Faals, with many forming the kurel respecting and following his directions.

The presence of the xiin in Yoonu Baay Faal offered an alternative. "Sikar is rhythm," Mustafa once told me. "We do rhythm with drums. There is rhythm everywhere, it can never be missing. Even the Murids, in the dahira, there is rhythm there but without drums. They do rhythm differently. Everyone does rhythm their own way." Indeed, the sikar in Yoonu Baay Faal felt like a distinct event given the different approach to "rhythm," as Mustafa phrased it. In this regard, Mustafa's insistence that "everyone does rhythm their own way" provides an apt metaphor to appreciate the different understandings of what constituted a legitimate religious experience. In more traditional settings, the juriñ is the leader of a daara and is chosen by the *seriñ,* or spiritual leader, according to age, experience, and leadership skills (Cruise O'Brien 1971:168). Among the juriñ's main tasks is to maintain discipline as encompassed within the dictates of the spiritual leader. Because there was no seriñ overseeing the project of Yoonu Baay Faal, any claim to be juriñ was categorically at odds with the sense of freedom people experienced and cherished in Yoonu Baay Faal in particular or in the warehouse in general. To emphasize diversity in "rhythm" is to foreground distinct modes of assigning value to everyday activities and objects, and to shed light on the varied personal and intersubjective modalities through which identities are embodied, defended and contested.

The xiin, or the "talking drum," is a small drum that is thought to have been used by Ibrahima Faal to call disciples in from the fields, announcing events in the daara, or getting villagers' attention as he toured the countryside praising his sheikh (Cruise O'Brien 1971).

Whoever played the xiin in the sikar at Yoonu Baay Faal assumed the symbolic position of Ibrahima Faal of responding to the chanting of devoted disciples. Those with exceptional talent played the xiin as their contribution to the sikar, a form of praising Ibrahima Faal by mimesis. But for at least three individuals playing the xiin was not only a symbolic gesture; it was a way to claim their role as juriñ and, thus, as leader of the Baay Faals. These individuals claimed the title of juriñ to varying degrees, each vying for recognition through subtle and non-confrontational actions. Abdou was among the oldest participants and had lived in a daara in Mbakke for many years before moving to Spain. His claim to the title of juriñ was possibly the strongest. He demanded the xiin whenever he attended the sikar, directing participants to specific drums, and readily taking the microphone at the end of the event to address participants with his closing thoughts and remarks. Despite his strong profile, his inconsistent attendance and lack of material support for the event, namely in securing café Tuubaa, undermined his claim. "He only talks and talks," Mustafa critiqued once. "He never brings the coffee, we always have to buy it, and we're only getting by (Cast. *nosotros nos buscamos la vida*). He says he is juriñ; while you talk, you need to give example."

In a traditional setting, the juriñ is the leader of the Baay Faal to the extent that he mediates the relationship between the sheikh and the disciples, or *taalibe*. In the fields around the city of Tuubaa the juriñ is the person who administers the work and sees that objectives are met. Similarly, when the spiritual leader gives a *ndigel*, or spiritual dictate, that requires large scale coordination, it is the juriñ who is responsible to see the project to completion. In the transnational context, however, the absence of a strong sheikh-talibé relationship offsets the legitimacy and jurisdiction of the position of juriñ. In Abdou's case, his claims received greater recognition in the dahira than in Yoonu Baay Faal. Without a strict hierarchical structure, participants of the xiin

sikar went along with Abdou's dictates in so far as they were convenient for them, and would abandon these without hesitation when they were not. On one occasion Abdou gave the xiin he had been playing to an exceptionally talented drummer who had just joined the sikar, but before joining the kurel began giving the other drummers instructions on what and how to play. Turning to Seriñ, a participant in his early 20's, he took his drum away and replaced it with a smaller one. Once in the kurel and away from the drums, Seriñ overturned Abdou's dictate by simply taking his old drum back without hesitation or consequence.

Mustafa would have accepted the title of juriñ had it been given to him, but he did not interact with others as though he deserved this title because his relationship with the formal Muridiyya was marginal. Perhaps the most important task of the juriñ is to mediate the relationship between the Baay Faal and the social structure of Muridiyya, namely vis-à-vis local dahiras throughout Catalonia. Mustafa's claim was undermined because he did not actively participate in any dahira, and so was unable or unwilling to do such mediation work. Abdou's claim was confounded by the fact that many from Yoonu Baay Faal relished their autonomy and thus kept a strategic distance to formal organizational structures.

If a particular lifeworld coalesced around business practices in the warehouse, then Yoonu Baay Faal represents a distinct social world that revolved around the "mission" of following the lived example of Ibrahima Faal without intermediaries, including the figure of the spiritual leader or juriñ. This is not to imply participants rejected conventional social hierarchies or formal integration within them; on the contrary, some referred to Yoonu Baay Faal as a "dahira" precisely because they remained hopeful to gain recognition for their spiritual labor. Among the most valuable elements of a place like Yoonu Baay Faal was the fact that routines were infused with piety and yet adapted to the exigencies of being an "immigrant" in Barcelona.

The Way of the Heart

In the weeks before the eviction every single object of spiritual and mystical value was removed from Yoonu Baay Faal. According to Christian Coulon (1999), "simply to set foot in the holy places is itself to partake of the sanctity of Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba, the founder of the Murid Brotherhood, to receive blessings, to acquire a spiritual force which is of benefit for the present life as well as that which is to come" (1999:201). Paintings were covered and all of the posters removed. Adama kept the smaller photographs of the Xalifa General, specifically Seriñ Fàllu, whom he identified as *his* seriñ. The space was gutted of any pieces of iron that could be removed, such as handrails and window bars, and sold as scrap metal. All of the other valuable objects were also sold in one of the many chatarrerias. Proceeds were split between workers, with a large chunk given to Mustafa, who stood to lose the most from the eviction. The drums were his, as were many of the rugs, which he managed to save in another building that had just been "occupied" in the same neighborhood.

Mustafa smoked marijuana but did not drink alcohol; he did not pray or fast during Ramadan. His position was indicative of many participants of the sikar, who identified such a model of piety as "BaayFaal." Among the most prominent arguments in defense of this unorthodox model was that the Baay Faal represent the "way of the heart," or *haqiqa*, aimed at creating reiterative acts of communion to learn "how to speak to people, how to respect people, how to behave," as Adama stated. In this context, the Wolof term *liggey*, or work, refers to a myriad of activities linked to the agentive task of "cleaning the heart," as another participant of the sikar phrased it. "Those who criticize the Baay Faal," Basiru explained to me, "do not

understand that the Baay Faal is made for the *haqiqa;* they show others good actions and good examples to be clean; they worship in every little thing that you do."

The haqiqa is one of four paths in Sufi Islam[182], and is arguably the most mystical as it interconnects experience in the social world with the ontology of God's creation through an ethos of self-exploration and formation. Basiru's evocation of the haqiqa positions the will of the Baay Faal on the path of "hidden, esoteric truth" (Frager 1999:44), and by extension their unique modality of action (Mahmood 2005:105) within the epistemology of Islamic thought. To maximize mystical gains, the quest for self-knowledge needs to be translated into action (*jëf*), which Basiru communicated by emphasizing the need to share with others.

> When we say that the Baay Faal is someone who is always for the truth, he is someone who does not negotiate with what is the truth. The truth you have to say to a person, even if what you do is not correct, you want to tell them the truth, tell it to him in a way that you will not offend him. On the contrary, he will listen to you, he knows that you have told him the truth, there he will respect you more. Because if you have another problem, he may come to explain it to you, because he knows that with you, he will speak at peace.

By definition, the search for truth in the world can be guided but never determined by formal subjects (e.g., sheikh) or objects (e.g., Koran). Thus, the path toward the truth, a kind of work that is uniquely Baay Faal, is a path made available yet unconstrained by the dominant Murid and Muslim structures of personhood. The outpost was highly valued by participants of Yoonu Baay Faal because it offered a unique freedom to pursue a model of being and belonging that was pivotal in people's sense of self. The poster of Seriñ Fàllu Mbakke in Yoonu Baay Faal was a way to confirm the inviolability of being "for the truth" despite the odds. Ibrahima Faal's search led him to Bamba, and his steadfast conviction of what was "true" fueled his work under his sheikh and modeled his action for others to experience and follow in turn. "Seriñ Fàllu Mbakke, we call him a Baay Faal," Basiru added. "Seriñ Fàllu knew that the secret, everything that the people

[182] There are four paths in Sufi Islam – sharia (law), tariqa (path), haqiqa (truth), and marifa (gnosis).

searched for, Mame Sheikh Ibrahima Faal had it. That's why we say, 'Seriñ Sheikh Ibra Faal, Seriñ Mbakke knows you, he knows who you are.' That is why we say Seriñ Fàllu is a Baay Faal."

If gaining *truth* requires personal effort, communicating this to others represents a kind of intrapersonal and intersubjective labor that is learned through practice. Basiru's emphasis of the significance of self-knowledge and practice in the long-term process of subjectivation points to the idea that a person's sense of self is grounded in the intimate interplay between "moral codes" and a person's willing subjection to them (Foucault 1990). To be for the truth was described with the same emphasis on movement as when people described money generating activities as a means to "search for one's life" (Cast. *buscarse la vida*) or "try to be a man" (*goorgorlu*), an assemblage of everyday activities that had important value because they were understood as a great responsibility to oneself and to others. To think of God and "follow him always," as Adama signaled, is to search for divine truth, and to be willing to enact deeds indexical of kindness, generosity, honesty, and love, among other virtuous traits is to materialize one's mystical work. The Baay Faal embody a model of being and belonging a place such as the outpost made available to people who would have otherwise not had the opportunity to experiment in this manner in the Diaspora. This synergy between thinking/searching and action/doing is the reason Adama argues "anyone can be Baay Faal."

Warriors, Rastas and Ascetics

Ibrahima Faal is said to have been the 40th disciple of Ahmadu Bamba (Babou 2007; Pezeril 2008a). Steeped in mystery and myth, there is broad consensus that his most important contribution to the Muridiyya was his unique approach to the faith and his propagation of Bamba's status as a messenger of the prophet. Ibrahima Faal reached Mbakke Kajoor where Bamba had

established a daara following his first exile (1880's) to declare his allegiance after having had a divine revelation that he seek a spiritual guide in life (Cruise O'Brien 1971:141-142). Faal soon stood out among other disciples for his overzealous behavior: he extolled Bamba as though he were "more than human" and cared for his needs to the detriment of his own obligations as a Muslim to pray daily or fast during the month of Ramadan. His behavior soon became a source of contention among local sheikhs and other leaders in the area, many of whom urged Bamba to expel the "madman" (Cruise O'Brien 1971:144; Pezeril 2008b:793). Despite his unorthodox style, Bamba acknowledged Faal's power of organizing and leading disciples, and recognized the potential of his personal ethics centered on hard-work and fervent submission to his sheik. Rather than expel Faal, Bamba further incorporated him into his project, first as a manager of the disciples in his daara and as a recruiter of new disciples throughout the region, and finally as sheikh of his own daara and disciples. In his examination of Islam in Senegal, Paul Marty (1917) juxtaposes Faal's "unflattering" physical appearance and unusual behavior with his undeniable importance in advancing the idea that Bamba was in special favor with God. Faal is credited for strengthening the Murid economic base following the Brotherhood's consolidation, and helping expand its interests within and beyond the region of Tuubaa. Marty's description merits citing in full.

> Ibra Fal has a physical build that is unflattering and does not serve in his favor. With his tics, nervous laugh (Fren. *ricanements nerveux*), a kind of *delirium tremens* that makes him agitated, one is tempted to take him as a "fool" (Fren. *simple*). It is important to consider, however, that he was one of the first disciples of Amadou Bamba, at a time when no one had yet suspected the nascent fortune of the Serigne, to notice a certain flair. Since then he has always pursued, with as much intelligence as tenacity, increasing of his interests. One can call him "the Minister of Economic Affairs" of the Mouride confession. He has mansions in Saint-Louis and in Dakar, his concessions in Thiès, in Diourbel, in Ndande, in Kébemer. He has set up commercial establishments in many sectors and manages these through his disciples and his women (1917:246).

This early description of Faal underscores his unconventional appearance and behavior, his devotion and dedication, and his centrality to the foundation and expansion of the Muridiyya. Marty's last statement draws attention to the idea that Ibra Faal abandoned the lifestyle of an

aesthetic later in life, a claim contested by more recent scholars (Perezil 2008a; 2008b). Marty's unflattering portrayal of Faal, however, has not waned with time. Overwhelmingly, scholars have continued to frame the role of Ibrahima Faal and, more specifically, the unique following he gave rise to, the Baay Faal, as evidence that Islam is "less pure" South of the Sahara (Diouf and Leichtman 2009). Donal Cruise O'Brien (1971), for example, argued Ibrahima Faal was from the *tyéddo* (Wolof, *ceddo*) warrior caste in pre-Islamic Senegal whose historical resistance to Islam demanded special accommodation. These pre-Islamic warriors were known as unruly and violent who expressed an overzealous commitment and devotion to their *damal*, or chief, and readily carried leather amulets, necklaces and a thick belt to fasten a wooden club (1971:142-148). Cruise O'Brien argues Bamba excused Faal's neglect of Muslim norms, such as drinking alcohol, fasting or daily prayer, as a means of incorporating such groups into Islam and, more specifically, within his sphere of influence (1971:151). A strong sense of belonging emerged among the followers of Faal, with their "reverence for their founder" and their labor in service of the spiritual leader central markers of identity.

> Despite this lack of unity among the leaders of the branch, the Bay Fall are held together by a certain overall unity of belief. There is a common reverence for their founder, whose teaching all Bay Fall must respect, and there is also a strong sense of collective obligation to the brotherhood. These obligations are seen as a logical extension of the service rendered by Shaikh Ibra to Ahmadu Bamba, as a special duty which applies to them more than any other brand of the Mourides. If the Bay Fall have a reason to exist it is as a working elite within the brotherhood, ready for the most difficult and demanding tasks in the service of its leaders (Cruise O'Brien 1971:156).

By all accounts Ibrahima Faal was an exceptional historical figure who garnered special favor with Ahmadu Bamba, most notably in his status as an exception to otherwise steadfast rules and norms. Sheikh Anta Babou (2007) argues Bamba refused to expel Faal because he understood his behavior was that of an ascetic in the Sufi tradition, or *majzabal*, who blurs the boundaries between the normative and the exceptional because of his intense love of God (2007:65). In this regard, any follower of the Muridiyya can say "Baay Faal," that is, "father Faal," in their respect

and admiration for his work in the service of Bamba but also as a means to embody a virtuous style of conduct. Submission to a seriñ goes beyond economic productivity; in line with Bamba's pedagogy, a disciple can only learn how to nurture his spirit and body with the guidance of a spiritual leader, whose central aim is to "touch the soul" (Babou 2003:320). The early Baay Faal were followers of Faal who tended the fields and catered to the needs of their spiritual leader. Over time, the term Baay Faal has come to refer to a social identity that has largely been neglected in the literature despite its centrality to Murid morality.

Ibrahima Faal is said to have been so consumed by his labor that he neglected the state of his hair or clothing, with the *njeñ* (dreadlocks) and *ñajaax* (patchwork clothing) understood as external signs of his unparalleled devotion and selfless abandon in hard labor. The progressive move away from the countryside and into cities since the 1950's and 1960's unhinged the social persona of the Baay Faal from its historical context. In a more recent study, Neil J. Savishinsky (1994) argues the rise of reggae music and Rastafarianism in the 1980's in West Africa is responsible for the increasing number of Senegalese youth in Dakar and St. Louis who wear their hair in dreadlocks and consume cannabis as part of a Baay Faal identity (1994:214). Savishinsky concurs with the view that the figure of the Baay Faal is based on a pre-Islamic social category in Wolof society (i.e., ceddo), but argues this figure has recently been transformed and appropriated by youth who wish to participate in a global Rastafarian culture in a manner that is locally intelligible and acceptable (1994:215). Thus, whereas the style of hair and dress may have been signs of piety during Ibrahima Faal's lifetime, today they can be markers of stigma (Audrain 2004; Pezeril 2008a, 2008b).

By privileging exogenous elements and functionalist accounts, Cruise O'Brien and Savishinsky ultimately silence individuals' own sense of religiosity and meaning. As Charlotte

Pezeril (2008a, 2008b) notes, the designation of the Baay Faal as *ceddo,* which she argues is "an ambiguous Wolof term that designates the slave warriors of the pre-colonial royal courts that comprised, in large part, violent men, who strive for power" (2008b:792), falls in line with social apprehension of this group as akin to "beggars" or "delinquent" in Senegalese society. There are few notable exceptions in the literature. Xavier Audrain (2004) has argued young adults in Dakar gain a sense of independence and freedom when they claim a Baay Faal identity. Most of Audrain's interlocutors were from Murid families who participated in Muslim life but did not share the same level of commitment as their Baay Faal brethren. Indeed, for his interlocutors self-identifying as Baay Faal creates a field of autonomy that was distinct from others in the family unit but still within the parameters of the family religion. The meaning assigned to religion and religious practice by different individuals allowed these young adults to manage *how* they build rapport and a model of conduct, inadvertently confirming a sense of "being master of one's self" (2004:154).

Based on her study of "Baayfaalism" in Dakar, Ngor and Mbakee, Charlotte Pezeril (2008a) identifies four distinct trajectories among her urban and rural interlocutors. Analogous to Audrain, Charlotte Pezeril found a similar dynamic among her participants who took on this social identity as a means to ascertain their sense of independence and freedom in relation to their families. Whereas people who followed a "traditional" trajectory in Pezeril's typology adamantly situated their sense of self within the hierarchical organization structure of the Muridiyya, people who relied on a Baay Faal social identity in their conversion to the Murid Brotherhood tended be the most visible (i.e., dreadlocks, patchwork clothing, overzealous initiation of the beggee, etc.) and the least dependent on the broader structure of the Muridiyya[183]. Pezeril suggests such a trend,

[183] Pezeril offers four types of Baay Faal trajectories in Senegal: 1) traditional (Rural/Urban, All generations, Continuation of Traditions, Occasional/Constant ties to Murid hierarchy, minimally visible), 2) Virtuous-mystic (Urban/Rural, Adults, Conversion/personal path,

which she refers to as a "partial-distant" or "strategic-symbolic" trajectory, respectively, is particularly prominent among the "marginalized periphery of urban youth" who struggle to meet their daily subsistence needs, turning to Baayfaalism as a "means to regain health" (2008a:236). Although virtually every single participant at Yoonu Baay Fall traced their back their affinity to the Muridiyya to their time in Senegal[184], more than half of the weekly participants of the sikar had adopted a Baay Faal identity once in Spain, especially in the context of abject structural lived conditions. "If you are not a Baay Faal, you are going to suffer," Adama readily reminded me. "Us Baay Faal, we share everything, we are a family. If you are outside (of the Baay Faal-Murid network), you are going to suffer." In the dire economic conditions faced by undocumented, unemployed and precariously housed working class non-EU citizens, forming part of such a network was viewed as a resource that extended a boost in quality of life.

Ester Massó Guijarro (2014) has suggested self-identifying as Baay Faal in Spain "offers a very strong support group in a new society" and affords people greater autonomy in the manner in which they practice their Murid faith without "losing an ideal connection to the founding fathers of the Murid community" (2014:28). Analogous to the occupied houses in Madrid and the Sacromonte caves of Granada in which she conducted research, the warehouse was comprised of a highly diverse group of people from Africa (e.g., Senegal, the Gambia, Ghana, Cameroon, Morocco, etc.), Europe (e.g., Spanish, French, Italian, Romanian, etc.), Asia (e.g., China, Pakistan) and South America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, etc.). The ability to accommodate and attract diversity was interpreted as a marker of the universal truth of the Baay Faal message, but it was also an important means to enhance and maximize social relations with non-Murids in

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Regular/Constant ties to Murid hierarchy, variably visible), 3) Partial-distant (Urban, Youth, Conversion, Occasional ties to Murid hierarchy, Maximum visibility), and 4) Strategic-symbolic (Urban, Youth, Conversion/Claiming sense of belonging, No/Exceptional ties to Murid hierarchy, Maximum visibility) (2008a:239)

[184] A handful of people not from Senegal claimed a Baay Faal identity in Barcelona, often in a manner that was directly linked to the sikar in particular or Murid events in general.

Spain. Rather than an "urban tribe[185]" (Massó Guijarro 2014:28), Yoonu Baay Faal was a product of people's efforts within an outpost, in which the experiential structures they created were aimed at acting on their sense of self. Future research needs to pay closer attention to this important dimension.

A Baay Faal Sense of Self

On a visit to Yoonu for the weekly sikar, I found Adama in the middle of the room chanting *Laa ilaaha illaalaa* before the largest poster in the room, and iconic image of Ibrahima Faal with 15 or more disciples behind him. As usual, I placed my things under the desk in the area where the drums set up. I meant to return later in the afternoon, but upon seeing me Adama came to where I was standing and initiated the customary *beggee*. Adama collected scrap metal to cover his most basic needs. He lived in Yoonu Baay Faal with four other young men, all of which participated to varying degrees in the sikar, and together they pooled their limited resources to secure daily sustenance. He had dreadlocks, often dressed in the customary patchwork clothing, and smoked tobacco and cannabis. Since reaching Spain in 2006 he had not managed to obtain a job contract to apply for a residency permit. These objects were important to Adama because they were an aid to help him "always be willing to work" in the service of Sheikh Ahmadu Bamba (i.e., Seriñ Tuubaa) and Ibrahima Faal.

For participants of Yoonu Baay Faal, disparate materiality mediated the absence of a spiritual leader and a clear hierarchical structure enforcing norm of conduct. Indeed, there was a strong sense that the Baay Faal mission of "cleaning the heart" and "seeking the truth" was maximized rather than diminished through a more direct communion with the evocation of Bamba

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[185] "Urban tribe" is a term that is common among Spanish academics, and refers to a group "way of dress, life, leisure, entertainment, affiliations and even shared ideology" (Scandoglio 2010:45) that is not only secular but does not aim to transform the person in the process.

and Faal. In a study of a Church in Zimbabwe whose congregants do not read the Bible, Matthew Engelke's (2007) argues the physical absence of the canonical Christian texts enhances rather than diminishes his interlocutors' sense of following the true message of God. The "Friday apostolics," as they refer to themselves, argue they are revitalizing the Christian mission by moving away from the human limitations of the Bible and practicing what they call "live and direct" faith. Their approach is modeled on the earliest converts to Christianity, whose faith was based on oral rather than textual mediums (2007:17). In this regard, the Friday apostolics draw attention to a prevalent dilemma in Judeo-Christian thought and tradition concerning the relationships between oral and textual mediums for conveying and interpreting the Divine word. Engelke rephrases this dilemma as a paradox between the simultaneous absence and presence of God in what he terms, a "problem of presence." Whereas for many Christians the presence of God is evidenced in the written word, for Engelke's interlocutors His presence can only be ascertained through lived experience.

Engelke's analysis is of particular interest here for his elaboration of the role of materiality in the domain of religion. The Friday apostolics shun the Bible as a material barrier to God's true presence, but also due to its political history in Africa[186]. Introduced on a large scale beginning in the mid-19th century, the Bible has long been a strategic instrument of colonization (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). Missionaries essayed to "foster a love of the book (Bible) through the promotion of literacy" (Engelke 2007:54), and through conversion and literacy local populations were transformed into more conducive colonial subjects (2007:77). Working against this history, Friday apostolics employ different techniques through which God's absence is reconciled not through the

[186] The imbrications of religion, writing and politics was a central point of contention for the founder of the Friday apostolics, Johane Masowe, who emphasized the need for a mode of practice unhinged from colonial history. The concept of *mutemo* refers to a kind of inner knowledge one gains from experiencing God's presence (Engelke 2007:139). Engelke struggles to define this concept precisely because it is so diffuse in its use and meaning among his interlocutors.

presence of canonical material objects (i.e., the Bible) but by engaging with special materiality, such as certain kinds of knowledge, experiences, or language use.

Similarly, participants at Yoonu Baay Faal acted on their sense of self by establishing a relationship to norms and rules in relation to the materiality they themselves facilitated in their everyday lives. In this sense, they actively essayed to create a habitus of willful and pious conduct in their efforts to embody the Baay Faal ideal. As stated, the participants at Yoonu Baay Faal, particularly those without any previous formal training in the Muridiyya, did not deliberately resist Murid structures nor seek to subvert orthodox practices. But given the strong consensus that lived experience and introspection were necessary elements to "clean the heart" and remain on the "path of the truth," then direct engagement with Bamba and Faal rather than deliberation within a strict hierarchical power structure was important in developing virtuous everyday practices. Indeed, just as the warehouse helped people strike the "right distance" with their family networks back home (e.g., remittances), Yoonu Baay Faal was a place of special value because it extended the possibility to exercise greater autonomy in how to lead a pious and virtuous life in Barcelona.

Everyday displays of piety made people's faith explicit and, in so doing, allowed people to gauge their progress and fine-tune their conduct or desires in their on-going work aimed at cultivating a Baay Faal sense of self[187]. An illustrative example is Adama's reaction to the man from Granada. By kneeling, taking the man's hand and bringing it to his forehead, keeping his head lowered and insisting for the man to stay longer, Adama projected key attributes such as humility, care and servitude central to people's definition of a Baay Faal persona and identity. Such behavior is not only an expression of interiorized religiosity but also a means to make

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[187] In Saba Mahmood's study, people construed external displays of shyness as markers of female virtue but also tangible objects to work on one's personality (2005: 141). Similarly, the concept *mutemo* Matthew Engelke struggles to define refers to the effectiveness of external materiality in shaping and transforming Friday apostolics' internal communion with God (2007: 140).

available for oneself and others a model of piety and virtue to follow in everyday life (Mahmood 2005:147). Engagement with Café Tuubaa is another illustrative example, for the coffee as well as its distribution is charged with moral meaning. There was always café Tuubaa in the sikar, often prepared by Adama, Mousa or Basiru at around 8pm, coinciding with the first chants of the evening. The coffee was then distributed in small plastic cups to participants of the sikar, who at this time are either in the circle of the chant over the rugs or playing one of many different drums. The person distributing the coffee worked the hardest at this time, but also received the greatest unspoken accolades for embodying the cherished goods of hard work, care for others, and selflessness.

Obtaining this special blend of coffee was often a challenge due to a lack of economic resources. Using two bags of coffee at 4 euro each per sikar represented an important economic burden to those who took on the responsibility to procure the coffee before the event. This was a source of frustration for Mustafa, Adama and others who participated in the project since the very beginning. When I discovered this, I volunteered to buy the coffee but was quickly turned down. Many who participated in the sikar did not contribute before or after the event, leading those who regularly contributed to question their commitment to Yoonu Baay Faal. Based on my fieldwork, this tension was an inadvertent consequence of the moral moratorium that is characteristic of the outpost: because Yoonu Baay Faal was not a *real* (i.e., formal, official, recognized) Murid establishment, participants of the sikar felt less obliged to give the same economic support (e.g., *adiyya*) as the local dahira or larger Murid events hosted in the honor of a visiting spiritual guide. And here we find a pressing challenge of the outpost that is not easily reconcilable: the same freedom that allowed people to create a project to express and materialize a Baay Faal sense of self ultimately undermined it.

The objects present at Yoonu Baay Faal provided a means to fashion a sense of self and align practices and experiences within a Murid understanding of moral personhood. Drawing from the work of Webb Keane (2003), Yoonu Baay Faal demarcated a "representational economy" that made a Baay Faal subject position accessible. In this specific space in the warehouse, a Baay Faal "semiotic ideology," that is, a series of dominant understandings and assumptions regarding what may or may not constitute as a sign, how signs function in social space, and the manner in which signs are most or least effective, substantiated an economy of signification within a broader field of moral-ethical exploration and communication. Materiality made possible the consolidation of moral codes at Yoonu Baay Faal, and once established facilitated the processes of subjectivation to these codes in individuals' attempts to embody a transnational model of the Baay Faal. In addition to the materiality of the chanting, the posters, or the percussion, of particular importance was the Baay Faal greeting, the role of café Tuubaa, and the ban on smoking or drinking within Yoonu Baay Faal.

The *beggee* or *sujóot*, although common among all Murids, is a form of greeting most closely associated with the Baay Faal (Perezil 2008a:135). It consists of a three-motion gesture in which the person who initiates the beggee brings the back part of the other person's hand to their forehead, allows the other person to mimic his gesture before he repeats one last time. Over time I deduced a subtle power dynamic with how this greeting was initiated, marked by age, status or self-representation, which changed according to context. Generally, those who were younger or wished to mark their position as particularly humble made it a point to initiate the beggee. Because humility is a core value in the Muridiyya, to accentuate one's youth is to foreground the role of the student, which is iconic of the figure of the disciple willing to learn and grow with the aid of others.

The beggee was described as a "Baay Faal thing" that represented a means to communicate one's sense of self throughout daily interactions. Those who invested more in a Baay Faal social identity *always* used this unique greeting, often to the surprise of individuals not associated to the Muridiyya and unfamiliar with this practice. The indiscriminate initiation of this greeting with Murids and non-Murids alike signals the perception among Baay Faals that theirs was a universal philosophy. Moreover, by engaging with this greeting with non-Murids in secular settings, such as in an NGO or public administration office, individuals perceived as though they were advancing the message of the Murid founder to new audiences. Curious observers would naturally ask details about the greeting, allowing the Baay Faal to explain and evoke the social memory of the founder and his most dedicated disciple.

The *beggee* was a quotidian practice that reaffirmed a person's identity as a Baay Faal and imbued otherwise inconsequential activities with spiritual value. In this sense, to maintain a strict consistency with the beggee projected a person's own conceptualization of how they related to the external world as a particular kind of person.

Moral Registers

The realization that Yoonu Baay Faal was a sacred place came as a surprise to many. Politicians, NGO employees, activists and curious neighbors construed Yoonu Baay Faal as part of the "cultural" idiosyncrasies of a homogeneous space devoid of any other meaning beyond the practical functions of seeking shelter and finding work. Many outside observers described the Baay Faal and their space as a kind of "Rastafarianism" from West Africa that smoked cannabis, wore dreadlocks and played drums as part of some kind of animist tradition. The sound of percussion, the colorful style of dress and the presence of dreadlocks were assumed to be "African"

in the same way that people's rejection of institutional aid was assumed to be indicative of their "tribal mentalities" and their deep-seated desire to "live in groups" at all costs.

Yoonu Baay Faal was a "micro-community" independent of formal Murid structures[188] (Pezeril 2008a), and as such was the source of local polemics among Senegalese Murids who disparaged the heterodox practices this space made possible. Despite the fact that I was encouraged to ignore such "epiphenomena," as the director of a daara stated during an interview, it is important to foreground the quality of this space as a "university" in which individuals gained invaluable insights on their day to day struggles in Spain and advanced Murid spiritual interests by juxtaposing their lived experiences as "illegal migrants" to those lessons learned creating social spaces for their evocation of Bamba and Faal. Focusing on the rules and norms disparate materiality obliged and individuals' subsequent relationship to these suggest this was a social world whose aim was the formation of ethico-moral subjects (Miller 2005).

Yoonu Baay Faal sheds light on a key characteristic of the outpost as an assemblage that is grounded to a moral-ethical structure based on on-going interpretation of activities rather than on the recognition of institutionalized norms and values. In this regard, the outpost goes beyond a person's drive to make money or reproduction of conventional norms drawn from Senegal. The outpost is an assemblage that engenders distinct moral registers that create a certain kind of mood (see Throop 2014, 2017), specifically aimed at cultivating a particular kind of subject position. Rather than a morality or a code of ethics, a moral register imbues everyday activities and interactions with meaning by positioning them within broader spheres of value important in people's lives. Yoonu Baay Faal operated within a specific moral register that aided people in

[188] The absence of Koranic schools known as *daaras* in Europe religious community centers known as *dahiras* are imbued with special value. Despite the centralized authority of the Xalifa General of the Baay Faal, Pezeril argues there is a great propensity toward "fragmentation" into "micro-communities" that live autonomously in relation to *daaras within* the hierarchy of the Muridiyya in Senegal (2008a:276). Yoonu Baay Fall was such a "micro-community" aimed at extending material means for transforming their subjectivity independent of the local *dahira*.

their efforts to "walk on the correct path." Among the principal reasons to create Yoonu Baay Faal was to offer Senegalese, especially young men, a place to have greater contact with Murid values on their own terms. "It was a long time that I had thought about it," Mustafa told me during one of our interviews. "To give the people a place to meet, you know, so the kids[189] do not escape, do non-sense (Cast. *tonterias*) and such, you know." This emphasis on helping younger generations "find their way" (Cast. *encontrar su camino*) does not refer to a closer affiliation to the hierarchical order of the Murid Brotherhood, but rather to a more profound intersubjective dynamic of grounding one's sense of self in relation to the world. And such grounding was achieved not by establishing a conventional hierarchical structure but rather a place in which a determinate Baay Faal moral register was palpable and thus easily discerned in everyday life.

When people consciously aligned their social persona with that of the famous Murid disciple, they took on the great responsibility to "walk a little …. like Sheikh Ibra Faal." Matching Faal's greatness is impossible, Mousa told me during an interview, and yet anyone who self identifies as Baay Faal needs to try to emulate his lived example on a daily basis. Such an attempt was laudable within the social world of Yoonu Baay Faal but a source of contention outside of it, where different moral registers commanded greater leverage within the suspension of normative modes of being and belong of the outpost.

> That's it, I am *trying* (emphasis original) to walk a little; everyday, trying. It is not walking like Sheikh Ibra Faal, because that is unique (only one). He is the only one who does what he does. He is the first and he is the last, you understand? He does it, nobody does it before and nobody is going to do it again, you know? So, I am trying to walk a little what he left here as an example, Mame Sheikh Ibra Faal. But I will not be nor will I ever be like Faal.

[189] Of the 30 or more participants of the sikar at Yoonu Baay Faal at any given night, more than 10 had not declared allegiance. Many of the "children" Mustafa is referring to are young adults in their 20's who reached Europe as minors and taken on the Baay Faal lifestyle in Spain. Yoonu Baay Faal offered a social world in which the primary focus was the experience of the sikar, the collegial talks regarding the deeds of Bamba and Faal, and the creation of a support network aimed at cleaning the heart and getting by. The absence of the spiritual leader in Spain created a "problem of presence" (Engelke 2007) that was lived as an opportunity to come closer to Bamba and Faal, but also as a challenge to reconcile one's sense of self with the potential stigma of their social identity.

People drew from a transnational model of being and belonging but adapted it to their immediate circumstances, ultimately foregrounding everyday modes of labor, work and action as indicative of a person's efforts to produce economic but also socio-symbolic value. Cheryl Mattingly (2014a, 2014b) has recently proposed the concept of a moral laboratory to describe the way that people experiment in their constitution of moral frameworks appropriate to new circumstances. In her work with African American families with special needs children (2014a), Mattingly argues the activities surrounding the aim of "raising good children" implies a heightened degree of moral experimentation given the heterodox circumstances family members, particularly mothers and grandmothers, face when undertaking what would otherwise be routine and mundane everyday tasks (2014a:6-9). In this context, the everyday becomes a laboratory for experimentation but also transformation, one that creates "experiences that are also experiments in how life might or should be lived" (2014a:15). The outpost was such a laboratory in which Yoonu Baay Faal experimentation was more accepted because this was understood to be within the boundaries of a state of exception determined by extraneous forces. In this regard, those who actively participated in the social world of Yoonu Baay Faal acted upon their sense of self with greater autonomy from conventional structures aimed at molding personhood and more closely aligned to the Murid founder's philosophy of acting on "the spirit as well as the body through his ability to touch the soul" (Babou 2003:320).

The value produced in the outpost is undergirded by a particular kind of moral register that imbues everyday activities with transcendental meaning. To read activities such as collecting scrap metal or initiating the *beggee* as "good" implies an anterior process of signification that is informed by transnational ways of being and belonging but is ultimately contingent on the in-situ and real time evaluation of people directly participating in the social encounters within the outpost.

A moral register is a "representational field" with its concomitant "semiotic ideology" (Keane 2003) capable of transforming an "abandoned" space into a vibrant lifeworld and re-framing activities according to a rubric of moral meaning that designates people as certain types of persons. Waiting in the outpost is never a neutral experience because people are invariably part of the production and/or substantiation of registers that imbues the world around them with meaning.

In the "laboratory" of the outpost, it is the manner people hold themselves and others accountable for everyday activities that takes on special importance in crafting a working order moral system. If a "good illegal immigrant" is one who accepts ways of being and belonging on-track to securing a legalized future (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012:249), then a space such as the warehouse is an overt affront to state power in so far as it challenges non-EU citizen subject formation processes and grants people an unprecedented degree of autonomy in the shadow of state biopolitics. Against the backdrop of legal non-existence, a social world such as a Yoonu Baay Faal offered the material and semiotic tools to fashion a sense of self that was aligned to the moral stakes in people's lives.

Conclusion

Yoonu Baay Faal was an important site for the cultivation of a sense of self that was overlooked from dominant discourse. The structural constraints individuals faced did not reduce their struggles to a "bad life" (Cast. *malvivir;* Cat. *malviure*; literally "bad living/life") devoid of meaning or significance beyond basic corporeal needs. Individuals' labor was aimed at meeting "basic needs," but also at cultivating a virtuous self that was too often obviated from critical discussions on the so-called irregular settlements and possible solutions before an inevitable eviction. Although the space faced an inevitable eviction, the labor-intensive and time-consuming

process of transforming it was part of "the path" of the Baay Faal in so far as it externalized individuals' devotion and allowed them to further hone in their faith through reiterative engagement with materiality. Doing and acting enabled Adama and others to align their sense of self to the central pillars of the Muridiyya and in so doing progressively mold their subjectivity according to their sense of piety.

Yoonu Baay Faal was a free space where anyone who self-identified as Baay Faal was welcome to participate. The destructive effects of migrant "illegality" coupled with exclusion from the labor market generated wide-spread social suffering that wreaked havoc in people's lives but did not strip them of their personhood. Yoonu Baay Faal demonstrates how life-worlds can defy sovereign power by offering individuals an alternative *modus vivendi* that problematizes, if not undermines, state subject formation processes. Yoonu Baay Faal was a place to produce a particular kind of value, most notably aimed at procuring a sense of self through the projection of a tangible Baay Faal social identity that was informed yet independent of the broader political economic context in which people were embedded. This kind of work on the self was made possible by creating a moral register that provided people a rubric to imbue everyday activities with meaning and construe other people's actions within a given spectrum of personhood.

Chapter 9 – Abjection, Autonomy, Agency

The Immigrant Subject

The warehouse was a space in which a moral register coalesced around people's drive to make money and live as autonomously as possible in Spain. If the social category of the "immigrant" in Spain is imagined as categorically distinct from the social category of the "citizen," whose alterity justifies and even naturalizes a "breach with the world" (Lucht 2012) or the embodiment of abjection (Willen 2007), then the outpost is a space in which a person's sense of self is temporarily resettled within a value sphere that is codified in everyday practice and through in-situ and in real-time assessments.

The dominant discourse espoused by the Humanitarian Crisis Relief (HCR) and other institutions ultimately psychologized everyday life operations in the warehouse in an attempt to act on the will of individuals. Indeed, the dominant institutional discourse surrounding the irregular settlements revealed a certain kind of power that questions a person's will with the ultimate aim of supplanting it with a new and authorized position, that is, "to tell you what you want" (Foucault 2016:134). The institutional drive to "raise awareness" among inhabitants and regulars of the so-called irregular settlements of the "situation itself" can be conceived as an exercise of such a power to act on the conduct of others. As my ethnographic data shows, the use of space allowed people to establish daily routines that willingly or inadvertently propped up an ethical-moral structure at the margins of the state. While people drew from other institutions, such as the Murid Brotherhood, the ethical-moral structures people put in place in the warehouse were ultimately independent in their everyday iteration.

The systematic crack-down on unauthorized immigration from West African coasts to EU territories clearly differentiates between networks of traffickers that need to be brought to justice and individual "immigrants" who are deserving of basic protection because their life is under threat *within* the EU. Whereas the former is the "criminal" and "culprit" driven by economic interests to perpetuate morally reproachable acts, the latter is the "victim" who is unscrupulously manipulated and led to life threatening situations. In this light, the term "victim" holds important ideological weight, namely because it "constructs persons as lacking agency and voice, erases dimensions of their lives that do not accord with an image of powerlessness, and suggests that they are in need of pity, supervision, assistance, and representation" (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2003:108). The manner in which social phenomena is discursively framed is significant[190], for it sets limits to political recognition and determines overt and covert expectations in public interventions.

If expert knowledge encapsulated in the form of an institutional register is something "people do rather than something people have or hold" (Carr 2010:17), then the "technical" discourse of HCR was pivotal in constituting and substantiating the putatively objective reality it incorporated into the political field. A consequence of this register was to create a unique subject for local government, a subject position that was at odds with the sense of self people cultivated in the warehouse. In Robert Desjarlais' (1997) study of a homeless shelter in the US northeast, clients were interpellated as "persons-in-the-making" (1997:209) and encouraged "to act and think in terms of self-industry, responsibility, sociability, and independence" (Desjarlais 1996:883). Whereas staff in Desjarlais' study drew from an institutional register to demand compliance,

[190] In their study of the cholera outbreak in Venezuela in the late 1990's Charles Briggs and Clara Mantini-Briggs argue the use and circulation of the term "cholera" undermined local public health interventions as this imbued the phenomenon with greater political significance and ultimately transformed it into an object of national interest (2003:44). As the epidemic came under increasing military control, Briggs and Mantini-Briggs argue language use during the containment efforts led to the consolidation of a master narrative throughout the country that linked the "image of dirty, defective, defecating bodies" with poverty, immigration and *indigenas* (2003:47). The meaning the term accrues may be grounded in expert knowledge and forms of communication, but in circulating beyond their spaces of initial instantiation they create discreet, discursive objects for politics, mass media and lay conversations (2003:77).

clients were forced to find creative ways to make demands, voice complaints, or raise objections within the disciplinary regime of the shelter. Maximizing the potential of waiting was particularly significant for Desjarlais' interlocutors, as it was for people relying on the warehouse, making available "timely opportunities, various tricks and ruses, and other nomadic actions" to get things done (1997:184). The aim of raising awareness in the so-called irregular settlements was to help people take account of their "situation" from the perspective of the institutional register of humanitarian government, which extended limited forms of recognition in exchange of people's compliance with strict socio-normative protocol. The outpost imbued waiting with new meaning, transforming it into "an art of the weak" (de Certeau 1984:37) that mobilized an autonomous epistemology distinct from "the office of institutional reason" (Desjarlais 1996) of humanitarian intervention. Activities set within the act of waiting were part and parcel to people's efforts to enrich their sense of self, activities that were not imagined as permanent substitutes but as temporary paths to gain vital life experiences.

Activists inadvertently strengthened the underlying influence and power of institutional registers by naturalizing key terms and concepts in the complex process of making claims for greater access to resources and political recognition. This can be appreciated in an interview with Raul from the Coalition in the Defense of Human Rights in the Settlements (CDHRS) when I asked him to define the term "vulnerability" and reflect on its meaning in the broader context of political activism in Barcelona.

> Those are words that keep coming out, but they point to a reality. So, who is a vulnerable person? Well, this is a person who is feeble (Cat. *feble*), a person without resources, a person who is exposed to the threat of being detained, that is, a whole ensemble of circumstances that make that person, anything that happens can make him stagger and he may disappear, that is, his existence is always under complete threat, no? A vulnerable person is a person who can break at any moment, like a small child that if you do not look after him, he may fall, he may hurt himself, no? And in this case, the problem of vulnerability is very real. Even if they appear to be strong people, people who have had the courage to come here, to risk their life, they do not cease being vulnerable because these conditions in society cannot be tolerated.

Raul's definition of the term "vulnerability" moves beyond a strict structural relationship between working class non-EU citizens and the state on the one hand and global political economy on the other to infuse the category of the "vulnerable migrant" with folk ideologies pinned to the figure of the victim as conceived in immigration law in particular and dominant social imaginaries in general. Raul's contention that vulnerability implies being "feeble," susceptible to "break at any moment," and akin to a "child" who may "hurt himself" illustrates the manner in which institutional registers aimed at governing working class non-EU citizen populations circulate in non-institutional settings with a kind of authority that foregrounds the material conditions of daily life in the warehouse while precluding people's own understanding of their everyday efforts and struggles to "get by" (Cast. *buscarse la vida*) and "try to be a man" (Wolof *goorgor lu*) in the process. This excerpt shows how terms within the framework of the institutional register of the city government's concerted intervention against the irregular settlements ultimately mobilized normative structures that undermined the tacit suspension of dominant moralities characteristic of the warehouse qua outpost and led many outside observers to a facile interpretation of lived experience in a way that invalidated people's own critical understanding of their "situation."

My participants' references to hardship pointed to a kind of "social suffering" that they identified as a consequence of "political, economic, and institutional power" (Kleinman et. al. 1997: ix). The uncritical use of dominant language rendered this mute, leading many activists and concerned observers such as the photographer in Assane's bar to mobilize and naturalize a broader moral system of subjectification aimed at substantiating a governable non-EU citizen subject. In other words, well-intentioned social actors inadvertently undermined and devalued people's sense of self (e.g., *goorgor lu*, *buscar se la vida*, *Baay Faal*) by drawing from the dominant institutional registers underpinning the government of the irregular settlements and ignoring people's own

moral registers and concomitant emergent moral system. To identify people as “feeble” in describing their situation as “vulnerable” shows the manner in which a dominant economy of moral values trumps local interpretations of moral experience.

Graffiti outside an “irregular settlement” that reads: “This is our house, respect.”

The “irregular” quality of any movement within an outpost places people in the cross-hairs of state politics. If, as Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran (2015) argue, the mobility of people through and within borders “shapes state behavior at multiple levels” (2015:7), then free movement in the outpost stands as an affront not only to the law on account of its legal transgression but also to the state in is capacity to materialize a “parallel world” that is unhinged from processes of subject formation. If the first step in raising awareness was to inform inhabitants of the support and aid available through the Plan of Irregular Settlements, a second step was to systematically delegitimize whatever value had accrued in the warehouse and other spaces like it. The value of producing money was demonized as a scheme driven by unscrupulous “tribal” leaders, and the value of being autonomous in the city as a false sense of security experienced in the “ghetto” (Portes 1972). The distinct social world of the warehouse and its concomitant moral

registers, such as the one engendered in Yoonu Baay Faal, were systematically ignored or derided as inconsequential.

For working class citizens, their capacity to work is their only visa for normative state recognition, whose absence impels the state's exercise of sovereign power in disciplining and punishing non-compliant, working class non-citizens. Suffering was mitigated by creating economic and social value, which in turn was contingent on one's willingness "to move" (Cast. *moverse*), that is, to create and maximize fleeting opportunities. Such metaphor of movement, which undergirded idioms such as *buscarse la vida, goorgor lu*, and *jaapal baayal* was important to individuals because through it they established and legitimated multiple activities that they then imbued with moral significance. In the moral moratorium of the outpost, the willingness to move is valued over the ability to move as such, the latter of which is understood in relation to circumstances beyond individual control rather than to the individual's sense of self. To wedge and suspend everyday activities from broader normative moralities was a necessary precursor to re-establishing a working order moral framework to move within a social world that remained aligned to dominant spheres of value despite its "parallel" status.

The Pain of Immobility

On a visit to Omar's chatarreria inside of the warehouse, I found Babacar with a bag full of electrical cables by his feet. With a kitchen knife in one hand and a thin cable in the other, Babacar extended his wrist as I approached in lieu of a right hand to shake. He continued with his work as I sat on an empty chair next to him. There was a plastic milk crate under his seat that was half full with copper. He used the kitchen knife to cut the plastic deep enough to be able to pull on both ends and remove it from the small strand of copper inside. The work involved in

"cleaning" cables was tedious but easier on the body than "searching for chatarra," especially in the summer months. As we exchanged greetings in Wolof, I asked, "*naka affair yi?*" (How are things?) to which he replied, "*Ah, moo ngi doxul!*" (Ah, it doesn't go/walk). I nodded, unsure how to respond. "We are suffering here, Arturo, it's really bad, really bad," he added. "*Amul xaalis! Crisis bi, xoolal, fi, dafa meeti lool*" (There is no money! The crisis here, you see, it is very difficult/painful).

The word *doxul* translates to "does not go/walk" in the third person pronoun, and offers a poignant metaphor to frame Babacar's lived experience of chronic unemployment. The metaphor of immobility is significant because it sheds light on a central characteristic of migrant "illegality," specifically the everyday experience within the liminal dimension of political-legal margins. It is telling that Babacar juxtaposes the metaphor of movement with that of *meeti*, a term that translates to "pain" and "difficulty." Without access to wage jobs, people were forced to "search for their life" (Cast. *buscar se la vida*) on their own, enduring precarious living conditions without assistance from anyone but others who worked "off the books," that is, within the margins they were forced to inhabit as "irregular" foreigners. The margin was a painful/difficult place because it forced people to live in the present, chronically unsure if their presence in Spain would be welcomed in the future.

Through fieldwork it became evident that references to "suffering" signaled a "social and moral dimension" of experience beyond the somatic discomforts and torments of pain (Young 1999). Framed in the language of universal human physiology, terms such as *meeti* and *sonu* (exhausted), represented recognizable "idioms of distress" to voice complex feelings, such as a person's frustration, anger and disappointment in Spain. An idiom of distress, that is, a socially acceptable way of inviting "discussions of issues related to general well-being, not simply

symptoms" (Nichter 1981:387), are important discursive tools at people's disposal. In a recent follow-up to his original article, Mark Nichter (2010) reiterates the importance of variability and change in idioms of distress research, and the need to be attentive to the historical sociopolitical context and local semantics and pragmatics of established, contested and emerging idioms of distress (2010:409). Idioms such as k*iyang-yang* in southern Guinea Bissau (de Jon and Reis 2010), *nyongo* in Cameroon and in the Cameroonian Diaspora (Nyamjoh 2005), and *nervios* in many Latin American countries and populations throughout the Americas (Guarnaccia et. al. 1989; Jenkins 1991; Mendenhall et. al. 2010) attest to an important facet of the experience of suffering outside of clinical settings, particularly among people who do not receive formal aid (Groleau and Kirmayer 2004:118).

Rather than interpret statements such as Babacar's as a cultural model communicating an affront to a person's sense of self (Seligman 2010), the city government and affiliated institutions assumed a universality to suffering that had the immediate consequence of rendering people's nuanced accounts tertiary to expert knowledge. The disjuncture between a person's sense of self and the social identity/persona they are expected to embody is a source of suffering or, as Paul Riesman (1992) argued, "if there is no overlap between a person's sense of self and other's image of the person, that would be madness" (1992:192). Babacar's emphasis on immobility (*doxul*) as a source of "pain" and "difficulty" (*meeti*) suggest such a disjuncture, one that was mediated in the everyday activities of the outpost and aggravated in the subject formation process implied in concerted interventions to raise awareness and compel people to act, think and feel a certain way. "I have learned how to suffer (in Spain)," Babar assured me, iterating a common sentiment among my participants that "illegal" status but also the channel to gain and sustain state recognition represented a form of covert violence despite its depiction as a neutral repertoire of structures.

The warehouse was a place of waiting, a place to produce value that allowed people to exercise ways of being and belonging to counteract the symbolic violence of immobility and mitigate the risk of overt violence in the form of detention and forced removal from Spain. The activities the warehouse made possible were important in so far as they substantiated a social world anchored in spheres of value but also of hope, "for if there is one thing that reduces a person to nothingness it is waiting without hope" (Jackson 2005:147). Babacar's use of the term *meeti* helps him voice his experience of anger, frustration and disappointment as an "illegal" migrant in Spain, an idiomatic function that was misconstrued by outside observers. For Babacar, the source of his "suffering" was the conviction that people from Senegal and other African countries were not welcome in Spain, a feeling he expressed by pointing to the conjunction of restrictions imposed on working class non-EU citizens and the myriad of travails working class citizens endured in the economic crisis. "Always fines, always fines," Babacar told me during an interview. "We cannot pay, we don't have money! What do they want? They don't want us here, they don't want us here." For Babacar, as for many other participants, the ready threat of a fine (Cast. *multa*) when failing to pay for public transport or attempting to sell non-original brand merchandise in busy tourist areas was construed in its totality, that is, not solely in relation to a sanctionable act but rather as a consequence of a series of structures that disproportionately fell on the "immigrant" other.

The linguistic translation of Wolof terms such as *meeti* with Castilian expressions such as "*es muy duro*" and "*estamos sufriendo*" were readily assumed to be referring to a universal phenomenon rather than a cultural manifestation of lived experience. "I've never gone to the warehouses," Emilia from Humanitarian Crisis Relief stated during our interview. "But they (colleagues) have explained to me the living conditions - they live with rats, there were fights,

people sold drugs, there were many problems in there. It was clear we had to do something." Throughout fieldwork, institutional personnel emphasized the need to act based on such accounts of the dire living conditions in the so-called irregular settlements, often unable to answer questions regarding other "irregular" spaces, such as over-occupied apartments, since these were not part of the city government's concerted interventions. Circulating accounts of the living conditions "in there" were held as sufficient evidence to boast a sense of understanding of the social world that people relied on to make-do in the city, and solid grounds to mobilize a political response[191] in order to address people's suffering.

Babacar and others pointed to structural discrimination on the one hand and multiple forms of racism on the other to explain why "it doesn't walk" despite a person's most fervent attempts. "They want us to return," Thierno stated during an interview. "They want us to return but no, I will always be here, you will have to screw yourself to see me here! I will be here, working, you see me, I earn money, I send to my country, without paying any right, without paying anything. Look here, each black sends money to Africa, lots of money, eh, without paying any rights, man! Who's to blame? 'I am a racist!' That's who's to blame." "There are people that you only need to look at them, only the look on their face tells you everything," Mamadou stated during an interview. "Looking at the face you are going to think, 'Ohh, this person…' Yes, because their first look is a look of a racist, you know? They look at you like, 'get over there, don't come close to me,' you know? There are lots of racists, you can expect it!"

The sentiment that "immigrants" are not welcome was rife throughout fieldwork, with many participants pointing to mass media as evidence. In a newspaper article on the "tenacity of

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[191] According to Michael Jackson, the suffering of others became the target of deliberation just as cities continued to grow at an unprecedented speed and higher strata citizens were progressively thrown into greater contact with "the poor," an emerging dynamic that was central for seminal thinkers such as Rousseau and Adams in "radically rethinking the grounds of civilitas and community in an urban setting" (2005:149). Unable to change the world around them, those critical of the distant suffering of others turned their efforts of intervention inward, giving rise to the modern notion of interiority as a site of legitimate political action (2005:150).

West Africans" to continue creating "settlements" following a succession of evictions since 2011, the author described these initiates as a chaotic transformation of parts of Barcelona into urban spaces reminiscent of "a north American suburb" or "the outskirts of an African metropolitan area" (Blanchar 2015). The article refers to the irregular settlements as *chabolas* and describes these spaces as deprived of any vestige of community.

> The space is sordid, sad, and threatening. Here no one wants to speak to the press. Nor the 50 people who live in *chabolas* constructed against the wall of what used to be an interior parking lot. Nor the ones who deliver, collect or classify *chatarra* in the patio. Nor the women who cook over a wood fire in the living spaces at the very end of the disturbing entrance hallway, covered in cloths, frames and objects. Nor the youth of the neighborhood who enter and exit within three minutes.

By qualifying the space as "sordid, sad and threatening," this newspaper article projects a conceptual framework through which readers can construe the space at a distance, relying only on their assumptions and prior interpretations of places such as the US (i.e., "North American") and an "African metropolitan area," as well as distance the social history of the irregular settlements from the city's own past of working class migrants struggling to secure housing. These media depictions conveyed information about race and class without running the risk of appearing racist or elitist. Jane Hill (2008) has argued U.S. monolingual English speakers who use select Spanish terms or morph English ones to make them sound Spanish engage in a form of racism that is largely invisible to its speakers yet often very real and undeniable to Latinos/as. Readily used for comic relief, Hill argues such use of Spanish words, which she calls "mock-Spanish[192]," is a form of covert racism because it "requires that those who 'get' the joke have access to a stereotype of speakers of Spanish as lazy procrastinators" (2008:120). Dominant descriptions of the irregular settlements implied an aberration of city norms and values, and fomented the idea that these were

[192] "Mock Spanish" refers to English speakers who draw from Spanish in order to convey a particular message to other English speakers rather than to learn the language. Hence, Jane Hill is clear to distinguish mono-English speakers engaging in "mock Spanish" from those English speakers who struggle to communicate in Spanish. When an English speaker engages in mock Spanish s/he is portraying an image of themselves as carefree, laid-back and at ease in plural societies on account of the existence of dominant images in mainstream society of Latino/as in general and Spanish speakers in particular as particular *types* of persons, images that if made explicit would be immediately denounced as prejudiced and inflammatory.

more akin to an alternate, dystopian reality (e.g., "Blade Runner") than part of the organic history of the city of Barcelona.

If transnationalism needs to be conceived "in some *working* relation to imperialism" in order to better ascertain the concerted state efforts to maximize "homogenized, abstract, highly mobile labor" (de Genova 2005:123), then narratives of social abjection need to understood as the lived repercussions of a broader system that constitutes distinct populations and exacts varying degrees of violence to ensure optimal forms of government. Indeed, racism forms part of a social field where being is entrenched in dominant ideologies of difference, and in which the subject is elided in favor of manageable dispositives best suited to reproduce dominant hierarchies of power. A clear example of this dynamic can be seen in a 2008 political campaign slogan from prominent Catalan politician, Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, that stated, "People do not leave their country because they want but because they are hungry" (Cat. *La gent no se'n va del seu país per ganes sinó per gana. Però a Catalunya no hi cap tothom*), with the closing caption, "They will respect Catalonia" (Cat. *Respectaran Catalunya*). The juxtaposition of volition or choice (*ganes*) to hunger (*gana*) evokes a common distinction in the Spanish-Catalan social imaginary that contrasts an image of "Europe" as a place of prosperity against the image of the "immigrant" who moves from one place to another as a victim of a chaotic and undecipherable "Third world" that is incessantly at risk of imploding. Such use of conventional terms reproduces stereotypes that are entirely implicit because they are contingent on speakers having access to anterior "culturally shared ideas that underpin racism" (Hill 2008:41). Historically, emigration has never been a ready option for the poorest segments of a population (Sassen 1999:55). To equate "immigration" to extreme poverty is to propagate a dominant trope central to the racialization of a large segment of working class non-EU citizens, one in which "the 'problem' is not 'us' but 'them' (Manzanos

Bilbao 1999). ‘We’ are the measure of the good life which ‘they’ are threatening to undermine, and this is so because ‘they’ are foreigners’ and culturally ‘different’” (Stolcke 1995:3). Indeed, as Kitty Calavita has suggested, “it is their poverty that distinguishes them, their economic need that racializes them as *inmigrantes*, not simply *extranjeros*” (2003:154).



Photo of campaign poster of CiU candidate Josep Antoni i Duran. Photo online: https://siempreenmedio.wordpress.com/2018/05/21/el-viejo-y-la-turra/

While fines (Cast. *multas*) are not in and of themselves a means to exact systematic racism, they were experienced as such because of the underlying system of governmentality aimed at managing working class non-EU citizens. More specifically, the vulnerability people faced as “deportable” de facto residents on the one hand and chronically underemployed workers on the other shed light on a kind of “a system in which policies that do not necessarily refer to race nevertheless reproduce and sometimes intensify racial disparities and hierarchies” (Bornstein 2015:53), that is, a kind of institutional racism that was obvious to my Senegalese participants and yet easy to disparage for outside observers. “Look at this,” Babacar once stated in a matter-of-fact tone. “We are young, we should be working (in the formal economy), not here, doing what? Doing nothing! We come to Europe, we suffer. In Africa, we suffer. Black people (Cast. *los negros*)

always suffering! Why do we suffer? Why?" While such rhetorical question was readily sidelined by institutional personnel and even activists frustrated by what they identified as a lack of political initiative on the part of immigrants, such statements call forth the need to take experience more seriously and pay closer attention to the idioms people use to either exalt personal effort (e.g., *goorgorlu, buscar se la vida*) or denounce structures of naturalized inequality (e.g., *meeti, soonu*). The production of dominant stereotypes surrounding the "immigrant" other is beyond the scope of this dissertation (González Alcantud 2002; Nash 2005). Suffice it to say that the social imaginary that construes working class non-EU citizens as radical others forms part of a broader historical paradigm in which undocumented migrants are conceived as naturally outside the nation-state and the European Union, and as a result in perpetual need of validation.

Inciting Discourse

The "technical discourse" of the HCR was pivotal in creating rather than simply referring to a distinct field of politics. The "technical discourse" of the HCR and the city government was important in "inciting" a particular kind of language that would subsequently frame the phenomenon within strict and limited discursive boundaries. Michel Foucault's (1978) analysis of sex in the Victorian era posits a trend not toward repressing sexuality but rather constraining it within new conceptual markers for its effective government. Foucault argues the "incitement" to speak about sex and sexuality was imperative, as this enabled emerging authorities to police discourse around it and, in so doing, guarantee it was discursively formed in one way and not another. Underlying Foucault's analysis is a central idea in speech act theory that states language can *constitute* rather than merely *refer* to a social reality, that is, language can *do* things in the world. But whereas this research explored the relationship between language and the context in

which it is used (Austin 1962:99-100), Foucault's approach stressed language's ability not only to make and unmake social relations but, more profoundly, constitute persons and the social worlds they inhabit. He argues an explosion of speech aimed at "driving sex out of hiding" and into its new "discursive existence" (Foucualt 1978:33) made it possible to better govern populations according to the rise of a new secular science[193] (Foucault 2004:67). With changing norms and values following the industrialization of Europe and the systematic colonialization of the globe, the re-iteration of speech consolidated a new normative order people were then compelled to embody (Butler 1999:241). Studies on the role of language in institutions focus on this generative property and the tacit power relationships that ensue as people navigate dominant "scripts" pegged to particular kinds of social identities (Carr 2011)

The production and circulation of the "technical discourse" of the HCR and the city government aimed to discursively constitute a social phenomenon within the immediate jurisdiction of the local administration. In Foucault's work, he notes how the ancient Greeks and Romans lacked universal laws regulating sexuality (Foucalt 1990:250-253), thereby necessitating in the "Age of Reason" the "continuous incitement to discourse" (Foucault 1978:56) in order to transform sex and sexuality into manageable objects of knowledge, power and subjectification (Foucalt 1990:4). Intercourse between partners of the same sex, for example, was transformed into an object of scientific, medical and legal concern in the 18th and 19th century, obliging people to qualify not only the act itself but also the individuals involved as *types* of people. In contrast to ancient Greek and Roman thought that stressed the need to evaluate acts in relation to their context, the modern period targets the individual independent of context, a shift that is only possible if universal rules and codes are presumed (1990:30). Over time, such discourse was vital not only

[193] As Foucault argues in the 1977-1978 lecture series, statistics are the "science of the state" and, as such, generates "the state's knowledge of the state, understood as the state's knowledge both of itself and also of other states" (2007:101, 305).

as a source of control of segments of the population but also in fashioning subjectivities within the field of power. Foucault's analysis and critique of the interconnections between psychiatry, jurisprudence and state power derive from this attention to processes of subjectification achieved through discourse, especially by subjects themselves. "Homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf," Foucault writes, "Often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified" (Foucault 1978:101).

From this perspective, the task of "raising awareness" was concerned less with alerting individuals of dangers or threats in the physical space of the warehouse or even informing them of relevant details in immigration, labor and/or housing laws. Rather, discourse in and around the warehouse served the broader function of providing a strategic lexicon to discursively frame this phenomenon into a particular kind of social issue that would then be more conducive to local government. In other words, by qualifying discourse surrounding the so-called irregular settlements as "technical" local institutions were able to draw from recognized state templates to identify tenuously incorporated non-citizens as special kind of recipients.

Of particular importance here is the fact that institutions establish the legitimate and authorized manner to interpret, discuss and debate social phenomena. Aihwa Ong (1995) was among the first anthropologists to draw from Foucault's work to interrogate the role of biomedicine in non-citizens' claims for greater political recognition, such as citizenship or refugee status (1995:1251). Ong focuses on Khmer experiences of clinical encounters in Northern California, and argues the institutional control over medical terms and practices enabled "an overall scheme of power" that aimed to make the administration of healthcare more efficient and streamlined by targeting the subjectivities of "refugees" (1995:1247). In other words, the linguistic register in these institutional encounters served the function of establishing terms of engagement

and, more importantly, foregrounding a prototype for Khmer patients to adopt as the only appropriate subjective role for effective care. The register of institutional aid categorically strips individuals a degree of agency in order for its expertise and its intervention to be its most effective. If, as stated above, the register of humanitarian aid narrows the purview of legitimate discourse to interventions focused on the individual, then it is in the immediate realm of thoughts and action that such interventions are conceived as most effective and, indeed, appropriate.

In her research in Rome, Italy Cristiana Giordano (2008) found two competing forms of citizenship in institutions working for the rehabilitation of "victims of human trafficking." For undocumented migrant women seeking legal status and social services, it was necessary to visit and become incorporated into different institutional settings. Each setting had its own discursive template to frame migrants' lived experience, which produced what Giordano argues were different kinds of citizenship. First, through publicly funded but privately operated NGOs (Catholic denomination), women were encouraged to speak about their experience coming to Italy and forming part of the world of prostitution. In these institutions, gaining the recognition of the state as a "trafficked victim" and thus becoming legal was "often figured by legal and religious institutions as emancipation" (2008:589). According to the logic of a "confessional citizenship," "inclusion is granted on the basis of an autobiographical account, of the displaying of a life which needs to be reformed in order to be fully recognized" (Giordano 2006:109), and where prior lived experience is deemed irrelevant. Second, women were required to undergo diverse psychiatric evaluations throughout the process of soliciting the state to recognize them as victims and, thus, entitled to state protection (i.e., residency papers). In a participating ethnopsychiatric clinic, women were encouraged to talk about their experience *before* traveling to Italy in the interest of empowering women with a more positive self-imagine. Here, the clinic mobilized a "cultural

citizenship" that over-emphasized the importance of their socio-cultural background and inadvertently denied their claim of a transnational identity. Giordano demonstrates how women vying for state recognition under the "victims of human trafficking" clause in Italian immigration law were required to produce narratives that reduced the complexity of the immigration experience to competing forms of citizenship, and ultimately found themselves in the difficult position of negotiating these institutional identities. "As victims," Giordano argues, "migrant women are recognized and taken in charge by social services. Outside of the narrative of the victim, recognizing the other in his/her difference becomes a terrain fraught with danger and risk of losing one's own center" (2006:228). With this in mind, it is important to disentangle discourse produced for the benefit of institutions from individuals' narratives in order to isolate the multiple ideologies undergirding these relations and better understand how individuals themselves construe "their situation" as determined by yet independent of structural inequalities.

The incitement to humanitarian discourse was a strategy to conscribe into existence a segment of the de facto resident population that was as a consequence of its liminal legal status a steady source of political turmoil and controversy. In order to gain access to public resources and build a case for a possible legalized future, local institutions had to over-emphasize individuals' vulnerability, exclusion and need for exceptional state protection, akin to asylum seekers, victims of human trafficking, and other exceptional figure of government. The fact that suffering and compassion mobilized such a response suggests "a new hierarchy of morals and moral legitimacy" in Spain since its transition to democratic rule, one in which "certain ethical configurations gain credence" (Ticktin 2011:98) while others lose traction. Humanitarian government assuages the ills of "illegality" in its ability to acknowledge political claims limited to the purview of the human body, thereby offering a degree of incorporation into the protection of the social state while

upholding the state's right to ultimately decide on the exception of a person's "irregular" status. "A politics of life and a politics of suffering" (Fassin 2012:248) undergird the local management of "precarious lives" forced to inhabit the state's margins.

Without mediation, a person's "illegal" or "irregular" status could be acted upon at any moment, leading to detentions and deportations following an increasing web of clandestine activities in the shadow of the law. The move to prioritize alternatives to unilateral evictions, detentions and deportations of its "illegal" population is a response to the political climate following the introduction of unpopular austerity measures in the early 2010's, but also a dominant administrative rationale that posits "the irregular migrant today" as "the regular migrant tomorrow," which advocates for resources to facilitate the social incorporation of working class non-citizens and changes to policies that strengthen and naturalize inequality based on citizenship. The incitement to humanitarian discourse was a means to conscribe people into inhabiting determinate subject positions, and as such was aimed at "shaping and governing" the self, a task that is largely contingent on the manner in which individuals are "incited to live as if making a *project* of themselves" and "to develop a 'style' of living that will maximize the worth of their existence to themselves" (Rose 1998:157). But people had their own projection of self and other, developing a "style of living" that was constricted by the state and its biopolitics but autonomous in the assignment of value and staking moral claims.

The Outpost as a place of Agency

Personal effort was highly valued in the warehouse because it was evaluated in relation to the abject structural and everyday conditions people faced in Spain in particular and the EU in general. In other words, in contrast to the question of "papers" personal effort was within an

individual's sphere of control and thus was readily identified as an important benchmark to assign value in the warehouse and similar spaces of heightened autonomy. According to James Laidlaw (2010), agency should not be conceived as "an inherent quality" people have more or less of but rather "an aspect of situations" people find themselves in and confront in everyday life (2010:147). For Laidlaw, agency is best conceived in the series of relations individuals establish willingly or unwillingly with what he terms "mediating entities," that is, materiality that spans "body parts, property, artworks, tools or weaponry, witchcraft substance, or statistical effects" that "reach both into and beyond the individual" in the assignment of responsibility and accountability in social encounters (2010:163).

This definition of agency grants greater freedom people's efforts to create a system of meaning anchored in everyday routines through which they actively essay to fashion a sense of self. Adama and others who self-identified as Baay Faal were thankful of a place such as Yoonu Baay Faal because it provided the freedom to assign value to objects, behaviors and people according to a system of meaning that was important in their lives. Similarly, Thierno, Babou, Mor, Mamadou, Assane, Ibou and others were appreciative of a place such as the warehouse because it extended the material means to substantiate a model of everyday labor, work and action that aligned with dominant transnational models of personhood in the interstices of state power. More specifically, the warehouse as an outpost offered the social freedom to inhabit such models of personhood on one's own terms, namely in relation to others. Among the most illustrative examples I documented was the case of Cheikh, who socialized with others but was also reticent to spend too much time with people at the warehouse because he felt ambivalent about behaviors that were clearly outside a strict imperative to work and generate money.

Cheikh traveled to Barcelona from the neighboring city of Sabadell, a 30-40-minute commute, on a regular basis, at times 7 days a week. After 10 to 12 hours of searching for scrap metal, Cheikh returned to the Omar's chatarreria to sell what he had found, earning as much as 30 euro on a good, average day. After he collected his money, he very meticulously transitioned back into his non-work attire. "Once I return, I take off these clothes, there's a bathroom there. I wash my hands, I have soap, you know, I keep it in the backpack. I wash my arms, my face, you know, I comb my hair, I put on my clothes, like this. I have cologne, I even have cologne." For Cheikh as well as for others I interviewed, drawing a clear distinction between "work" and "non-work" was important in circumventing the stigma readily associated with collecting scrap metal. In this sense, drawing this boundary was a sign of self-respect for Cheikh because it showed that he valued his effort to generate money and he took pride in his honest work. Moreover, this boundary was important because it represented to Cheikh his effort to further "integrate" into mainstream society. Whether or not Cheikh *felt* integrated is distinct from his efforts to show that he was trying to integrate, according to the resources at his disposal and the semiotic ideologies most pertinent to him. "I put on cologne, I put it on good," he emphasized during our interview. "You can't tell, you can't tell. Returning on the train, no one can imagine, Arturo."

To try is Cheikh's responsibility. Cheikh described this routine with equal importance as the principal money-generating facet of trekking the streets in search of objects to place in his cart. This commitment to going unnoticed on the train, however, was not shared by everyone. Cheikh recounted an experience with other Senegalese who had also been out searching for scrap metal during the day but had not changed their clothes, wash their hands or face, or apply on cologne to mask the smell of sweat and oil. When no one sat next to them on the train, the Senegalese men accused people of being racists.

> One day I was with lots of people, we were sitting but there were people who stand up to change seats, normal. Normal. And they (Senegalese men) begin to complain, to complain of racism, I mean, to say, '*ley racist, ley baxul! Loy ni, xolal ni! Baxul ñu*! (they are racist, they are bad! Them there, look at them! They are bad!). I say, '*mais no, sama guy, waxul ni*' (But no, my friend, don't say this). It could be you, you get up, you go to work in Barcelona from morning to the afternoon. You return and I don't know, I don't know how to tell you, you don't change anything, nothing, don't wash your hands, you know, and you come on the train? Man, no, no! There are things that bother others, you know? 'No, it's not like that, *digey ligey* (we were working).' 'Look (signaling his clothing), I was working just like you, I was working just like you.' 'But no, *langay cambiar ne*' (But no, it's not necessary to change). They can't understand. Ehh, they weren't happy.

In this story, Cheikh shows how agency is determined in relation to those objects within a delimited sphere of control, such as changing clothes and putting on cologne. Cheikh tried to convince the Senegalese men on the train that their actions were responsible for this scene, which they steadfastly denied. "I spoke to them," Cheikh insisted. "But they were not happy." For Cheikh, it was "normal" for people to refrain from sitting next to someone who had not changed from their work clothes. "We are the same," Cheikh continued to repeat. "The person is the person, you know, it's normal."

Cheikh had studied to be a school teacher in Dakar and moved to Europe on a study visa to Germany. He was among 15 people I met and interviewed who had pursued higher education before moving to Spain, and among a select few who planned to continue their education in a local university in Barcelona. Although important class distinctions informed people's experience[194] in the warehouse, Cheikh's assessment draws attention to a general sentiment among virtually everyone I consulted when defining the degree to which someone can be held accountable for their actions within a context of political, economic and legal abjection.

For Cheikh, people's negative reaction on the train was not indicative of racism or any other form of discrimination as the other Senegalese men claimed, but was on account of factors they had the power to change but had refused to. And because people exercised greater power in

[194] Throughout my research class background emerged as an important factor for further study, specifically through more extensive fieldwork in Senegal to ascertain its underlying logic and expression. In the political economic context of crisis in Spain, these class distinctions were leveled and rendered superfluous. In a broader European context, however, class background has been shown to manifest in differentiated access social networks and the varying degrees of capital this implies (González-Ferrer and Graus 2012).

how they managed the strong smell of metal clippings, fumes, and sweat, Cheikh argued any complaints should be directed to oneself rather than to the outside world, in this case those who refused to sit close to them. While Cheikh felt the circumstances he encountered as an undocumented migrant left him with little choice but to collect scrap metal, he was adamant about exercising his choice to look clean when he was not at work. He held himself and others responsible for such activities, an area in which personal will and agency is most visible.

Cheikh's story is significant because it illustrates how a person's relationship to objects helps them mediate their social relations in a given situation by enabling individuals to assign responsibility and, in turn, create a more intimate field of agency in which things *are* within their control. The bottle of cologne Cheikh keeps in Omar's chatarreria is a "mediating entity" that gave him leverage to manage his actual or potential relationships with others on his own terms. Cheikh justified his desire to distance himself from people by recourse to his routine and the problems not adhering to a similar work ethic implied. "That's why I don't like to go on the train with lots of people, with Africans," Cheikh concluded. "It is our fault sometimes, we are like this." From this perspective, agency refers to a realm in which one is or can be held accountable for change in the world.

The outpost is spatialized, and as such offers the material means to creatively weave links between labor, work and action that give people a sense of groundedness in a particular social world. If agency is conceived as something that is exogenous, then people bearing the weight of "illegality" are conscribed to an existence in which there is little agency. But if agency is conceived as a relational force field, then people experience heightened degrees of agency in different contexts according to how they assign responsibility. The outpost is a place in which agency is constituted through the networks of accountability people establish to assign value to

objects but also to everyday activities. While people may have been vulnerable vis-à-vis the state and mainstream Spanish society, they felt degrees of power in the warehouse and the myriad of networks such a space made possible.

The Outpost as a place of Moral Registers

People who abstained from alcohol and marijuana because of their religion frequently signaled the sale of these in the warehouse as the principal reasons why the city government tenaciously pursued an eviction. The consumption of alcohol is strictly prohibited in Islam, and as such was heavily reprimanded by those who observed a more conservative lifestyle. But alcohol also detracted from people's work ethic and gave rise to activities that were "foolish" (Cast. *tonterias*). For these reasons, among the most criticized activities in the warehouse was that of consumption of alcohol and, to a large extent, the management of make-shift bars that supplied this alcohol.

A bar inside the warehouse.

Many Spanish and Catalan observers opined similarly, focusing not on the consumption of substances as much as the creation of bars that made accessible excessive drinking and smoking.

From many fronts, people who opened a bar were chastised for only thinking of making money and paying little heed to a growing problem of "co-habitation" (Cat. *convivència;* Cast. *convivencia*) marked by unpredictable bouts of violence, loud music late into the night, and erratic behavior throughout the day. De facto bar owners took on a different view, for they re-assigned responsibility to the individual and away from themselves or their business ventures.

> Arturo: When did things become a problem (Cast. *cuando empezo a desbordarse*)?
>
> Assane: About a year ago. A lot of people started coming, a lot of problems (Cast. *mucho rollo*), each one does his own thing, each one does as he likes. If you speak to him (concerning his behavior), he tells you, 'it's a squat' (Cast. *es casa okupa*)! This is what went wrong.
>
> Arturo: A lot of people have told me that the problem was the bars, that when the bars opened that's when the problems started.
>
> Assane: No, the bars no, the bar can't create problems. If you drink alcohol, if you can't control yourself, the problem is yours, it's not the problem of, you can't blame the bar of being guilty. No. Or screaming at everyone there, yelling at everyone there, or of insulting everyone there, no. That is your fault, it's not the fault of the bar, because there's a lot of chatarra here, here we have come, here there's work, most of us does what he can to earn to survive. Some do chatarra, some do bars, some do mechanic workshops, ehh, each one does what he can to survive. If someone says that the bar, no, the bar since the beginning!

Opening a bar implied a myriad of benefits as it did risks. Assane and Ibou had a steady source of income, as did Faouzi, who had a loyal customer base at the warehouse and at another building following the eviction. Assane and Ibou managed their bar with the same care as someone looking to make their business grow, investing in new products (e.g., more lunch items) and offering a broader range of services (e.g., staying open all night). Faouzi invested time and resources in the decor of his bar, driven by the desire to create a space that felt his own to spend quality leisure time talking to friends about politics in Senegal and The Gambia, a favorite pastime of his. All of the de facto bar owners I met took pride in their business and having a solid customer base they had earned through their conscious efforts. Disgruntled patrons or sporadic run-ins with the police were among the most common risks one would face in this line of business. In the excerpt above, Assane refuses to be held accountable for people's behavior after visiting his bar.

From his perspective, the sale of alcohol as a potential problem paled in comparison to the more pressing problem of inhabiting a space unincorporated in conventional systems of social order. Assane's complaint that it was impossible to open constructive dialogues with people about their behavior because they simply retorted this was "a squat" points to this underlying tension of leading an ethical life without ready recourse to convention.

Counter top of a bar inside an "irregular settlement" visited during fieldwork.

Although Assane, Ibou, Faouzi and many other de facto bar owners I interviewed complained of their clients' behavior, they emphasized the need to hold the general circumstances accountable for whatever problems arose from the creation of a bar. To inhabit a space on the margins of mainstream Spanish society meant people experienced a radical freedom that they then struggled to keep under control. On one occasion, I found Faouzi outside of his bar, pointing to two young men fighting in the corridor. "They're no good (Cast. *ellos no valen nada*), always fighting," Faouzi said, noticeably vexed by the men's conduct. "They do whatever they want, like this non-sense (Cast. *como estas tonterias*); they drink and fight, that's no good (Cast. *eso no vale nada*)." In a space disconnected from dominant norms and conventions, conflicts arose precisely in those moments where resolution took longer than usual and someone took it on themselves to

settle a problem on their own terms. While the vast majority of people took advantage of spaces such as the corridor, Omar's chatarreria or one of many bars to discuss emerging dilemmas with their peers, recourse to violence remained in the horizon to externalize the anxiety and distress a person may be experiencing, and through this process act on those inner emotions (Jackson 2005:45). Faouzi explained the fight between these two young was a consequence of being "very nervous" (Cast. *muy nerviosos*) in the chronic state of immobility engendered by unemployment, undocumented status and precarious housing. "We're in a terrible state" (Cast. *estamos fatal*), he added. "And some of us can't endure it (Cast. *y unos no lo pueden aguantar*)." From this perspective, it is not the bar or the alcohol they made more readily available, but the state of being "nervous" that represented a mediating entity that acted on people's agency and forced otherwise good people to act in reproachable ways.

The in-situ and real time evaluation of activities aimed at procuring the lifecourse (*labor*), creating wealth (*work*) or engaging with others (*action*) can be conceived of as inchoate moral registers through which people understand themselves as moral subjects with local and transnational moral stakes. In his study of experience in the context of transnational mobility and settlement, Michael Jackson (2008, 2013) is critical of studies that "give the impression that human beings find little satisfaction in their mutability and prefer the illusion of a unitary and stable sense of self" (2013:201). Jackson calls for greater attention to what he calls "the ethical space" between external constraints and personal imperatives in order to better understand the manner in which people cope with but also grow from "improvisation, experimentation, opportunism, and existential mobility" (2013:202). A moral register allows such flexibility because its aim is to substantiate a mood that informs but never entirely determines people's understanding of the social world in which they participate. Moreover, people draw from intersecting moral registers

according to their own personal interests, at times coinciding with conventional moral structures while at others radically deviating from them.

A moral register is one that draws from different moral codes without being entirely subsumed by them. Moral registers help people gain a sense of grounding by framing phenomenon in a socio-culturally legible manner that is nevertheless flexible enough to adapt to the demands of immediate social relations. Whereas de facto bar owners justified and defended their actions, others were adamant in their criticism against these places because they substantiated a moral registered too distant from family obligations of working only to send remittances on a regular basis. "We come here because we have large families," Fàllu once told me. "And these guys who are always drinking and doing drugs, you know, they live for themselves and they never send any money to their families." Fàllu was from the city of Louga south of Saint Louis. He was among the most diligent workers I met in the warehouse, who sent an average of 500 euro to his wife and extended family every two months. He was able to save money because of he kept an austere lifestyle in Barcelona, focusing on work and removing himself from places and social networks that only "wasted time." For Fàllu, the only moral registers that were acceptable were those that revolved around everyday routines

The social world of the warehouse extended models of personhood through praxis, helping people gain "a sense that life is worth living" (Jackson 2006:xxii) despite the abjection they experience as immigrants in Spain. The outpost exists in a state of exception, both at the structural level vis-à-vis the state and at the socio-imaginary level in relation to local and transnational networks. People employed different moral registers according to the models of personhood they aligned with, and in so doing instantiating rubrics for evaluating behavior within and beyond the warehouse. Abdou was a close friend of Fallou's, and shared many of his opinions about the

creation of bars and the problems these generated. Originally from Dakar, Abdou described himself as someone solely committed to work and to his responsibility to his family to earn money and send back as much and as frequently of it as possible. “The little that we have is sufficient for us,” Abdou once told me during an interview. “We won’t go ask someone else if we have the little that we have. We won’t go cry before someone because we have the little that we have. The little that we have comes from our struggle, our thoughts, our ideas, our way of life.” While his use of the plural pronoun “we” included anyone who relied on the warehouse, he also qualified his stance to only extol those who actively participated in engendering a moral register aligned with dominant transnational moralities. Later in our interview Abdou critiqued people who “hurt us,” an “us” here imagined by people engaged more acceptable forms of work, by engaging in “foolish behavior” or “non-sense” (Cast. *tonterias*) in Barcelona.

> The warehouse was for this, to make their restaurants to sell food, like this, there were people who did this; it was to live peacefully and so on. With so many people, you will also have people who only think of themselves, they do non-sense (Cast. *tonterias*), they don’t think of others, you know? That will also happen. People there, they come there, they do their bars, that in the end hurt us, because bars makes noise and then the neighbors complain, the police comes, there’s more and more of them, and then they say that it cannot be controlled.

The outpost is a place to “live and work without problems,” as Faouzi phrased it, while people waited for the world to reciprocate. But because the outpost is a place born of a breach with the world, it is also a place of persistent challenges and constant mediation. The frequent comparison to “Africa” was principally employed in a positive manner to embolden people’s efforts, and recast everyday activities to secure *le dispense quotidienne* through contingent work with a kind of transcendental quality of “trying to be a man” in the face of arduous life obstacles. But as a place defined by “irregular” plurality, people faced unique challenges that were reconciled in situ and in real time. Abdou expressed empathy with people’s desire to meet their own needs through informal businesses, but was nevertheless adamant in his objection to bars, as these only

led to *tonterias* and, thus, were contradictory to the maintenance of constructive relationships with others within and beyond the warehouse. More specifically, Abdou critiqued bars because, in his opinion, they gave way to moral registers that were much more independent than was allowed in the model of the *emigrant* in Senegal (e.g., *moodu moodu, goorgor lu*) and the enduring obligations to one's family back home. Engaging in routines involving alcohol, marihuana, extra-marital relationships, or any other activity identified as *tonterias* was "selfish" behavior. In this sense, people were held responsible for the activities they had control over, evidencing a rubric in which agency was an indubitable part of everyday life.

Conclusion

Without recourse to norms or conventions, people relied on "mediating entities" to assign value to everyday activities and hold people accountable for actions that were imbued with special meaning, creating an experience-near network of agents that was determined by exogenous forces but ultimately independent of them (Laidlaw 2010:149). The outpost was a place of freedom that allowed people to fashion ways of being and belonging through the various everyday activities aimed at producing value. Idioms used to describe everyday practice evidences the difficulties people face meeting their daily needs and securing the material resources necessary for a culturally meaningful lifeworld. Because everyone was "searching for their life" or "trying to be a man," everyday routines established a de facto modus operandi with transnational value. The outpost was a means to secure the "right distance" with social networks in Spain and in Senegal (Hernández Carretero 2015), while upholding family expectations across nation-state borders (Findley 1989).

Chapter 10 – Final Thoughts

Riot police cordoned off one of my fieldsites in early March 2015 and impeded any attempt to re-enter the building once a person had stepped out. Behind the swat vehicles and more than 40 riot police there were five "social emergency workers" (Cat. *treballadors d'emergencies socials*) who offered temporary housing and meal vouchers to people, many of whom pushed a shopping cart loaded with suitcases, boxes and plastic bags full of clothes and valuable belongings. Employees from Humanitarian Crisis Relief (HCR) were also present, coordinating with the police and social emergency workers to make sure the eviction went as smoothly as possible. There was no resistance to the eviction; people left the building as soon as the riot police entered and ordered everyone to abandon the place. Once outside, the riot police stood by as social emergency and humanitarian aid workers took down names and directed willing participants to "Social Incorporation Services" (Cat. *Servei d'Inserció Social*) for further processing. Unlike other evictions people were not detained and relocated to a Center for the Internment of Foreigners (CIE) where they would then be processed to be forcefully removed from the country. Rather, the identification of people exiting the building as part of a "vulnerable" population opened the possibility to make claims as humanitarian subjects while simultaneously precluding more encompassing claims for equality and justice.

Activists and opposition party members joined the group in solidarity, many holding large signs with slogans such as, "No Person is Illegal" (Cat. *Cap Persona es Illegal*) and "Papers, Shelter, Work and Dignity" (Cat. *Papers, Sostre, Treball i Dignitat*), while others faced off with riot police, shouting, "Shame, shame!" (Cat. *vergonya*, Cast. *vergüenza*). For them, the systematic eviction of "irregular settlements" represented a violation of human rights, and as such provided

the grounds to hold the city government accountable. But as court rulings attest, the recognition of a "humanitarian crisis" did not reconcile the legal violation against private property, thereby justifying an eviction. The symbols activists employed formed part of a broader cosmology that shaped the dominant narrative surrounding the "irregular settlements" but fell off mark from the symbols Senegalese and others from abroad sought to draw attention to, a dynamic that generally went unidentified and therefore a source of tension that was not easily reconciled.

Inside an "irregular settlement" visited during fieldwork.

The increasing number of people migrating to Barcelona from other cities in Catalonia or Spain in search of work represented a significant challenge for local public administrations. For the city government, the challenge was not so much to remove people from a particular space by brute force but through the exercise of a more exacting kind of power in which people are "acted upon" indirectly (Foucault 2016:129). The Plan of Irregular Settlements acted upon people vis-à-vis expert knowledge aimed at "raising awareness" that these were unsuitable housing, work and social alternatives to become "integrated" in society. This exercise of power had the ultimate objective of securing people's voluntary participation in institutional interventions aimed at

"eradicating" existing irregular settlements and preventing a growing "disaffiliated" population from creating new settlements in the cosmopolitan city of Barcelona. To this end, these interventions did not achieve the compliance of this target population.

The initial "voluntary return" to Senegal was overwhelmingly rejected because it was premised on dominant assumptions of what constitutes a "bad life" (Cast. *malvivir,* Cat. *malviure*) that inadvertently undermined the everyday struggle to lead a transnationally grounded "good life" in the context of economic crisis in Barcelona. In contrast to the dominant view of the person as a "bounded ... whole" (Geertz 1983:53), this dissertation has suggested people drew and re-drew boundaries of self-fashioning according to changing circumstances. The fact that the "voluntary return" program failed to meet its target goals problematizes the general assumption that relying on the so-called "irregular settlements" was an objective marker of the failure of a "migratory project" and a clear sign that a person desired to return to Senegal. Of the most pertinent explanations for this failure are those centered on the question of money. "They won't return unless it's with a wallet full of money," an employee in the city government working in the Plan of Irregular Settlements told me during an interview. "If they return practically the same as they left or sometimes worse, they think they have failed." While this preoccupation with money is very real, it is wrong to assume such an idea is an "erroneous cognition" that needs to be corrected through concerted interventions aimed at raising awareness. A critical approach to the political economy of global immigration suggests a more profound divide between populations that carves up the world of human perception into "zones of being" and "zones of non-being" (Grosfoguel et. al. 2015), that is, fields of everyday experience in which global horizons are more or less within a person's grasp (Jackson 2013; Knut and Schielke 2012; Lucht 2012). Indeed, a "critical anthropology" is one that "self-consciously creates space between itself and ideas and practices

that have become coextensive with or, in fact, constitute the experience of everyday life" (Goodale 2006:491).

Graffiti inside an "irregular settlement" visited during fieldwork.

It is significant to note that only those who were referred and often accompanied by someone of Senegalese descent joined the pilot program and went through all of the steps to return to Senegal. Speaking to Senegalese who collaborated with the city government in this capacity, they focused on the person's efforts to provide for himself and his family and emphasized that such efforts would be best served in Senegal rather than in Spain. While this emphasize on "effort" was important to convince less than a dozen people go through this difficult decision, most people focused on "effort" as the single most important ground to continue the struggle to remain in Spain. Rather than "a wallet full of money," the vast majority of the people I interviewed wanted an assured means to generate income in order to fully participate in redistributive relations back home, rendering a "voluntary return" to Senegal inconceivable if their return to the EU was not assured. Rather than "a wallet full of money" to buy a home or a business, of greater significance was

having "papers" that would enable people to move freely between Senegal and Spain with a stable job to effectively work toward life projects over the long term.

The rejection of this pilot program led to an important shift in which the focus was no longer on convincing people to agree to a "voluntary return" to Senegal but to comply with a humanitarian program within the institutional fabric of Barcelona in particular and Catalonia in general. Resistance to this program was often explained in cultural terms, such as placing blame on unscrupulous "tribal leaders" who misinformed their "people" or an innate "tribal mentality" that impeded otherwise sensible people from making the right decision, rather than in relation to political-legal structures that naturalized folk ideologies of the "immigrant" as a quintessential other in Spain.

A "culture of immigration" (Willems 2008:282) characterizes the contemporary moment in Senegal as well as in other African countries (Carling 2007; Kane 2011; Mutema 2010; Whitehouse 2007). Spain's ascension into "Europe" in the mid 1980's is part of this culture in so far as it forms part of a broader global political economy that people in Senegal are forced to respond to and learn to navigate. The popularity of T.T. Fon's creation *Goorgoorlou* evidences a national ethos in Senegal that was difficult to communicate in Spain. While the title character of the comic was described as a "victim of hard times," he was also depicted as the country's "champion" whose daily struggles ultimately "strengthened his character" and reflects a national and transnational "doctrine of goorgorlisme" (Fons 1994). As I have shown throughout this dissertation, people focused on aspects of their situation in which personal effort itself produced forms of value that held important moral meaning too easily ignored in the dominant discourse of local politics. Rather than construe a person in relation to a series of deficits (e.g., "papers," formal employment, dignity, etc.), my fieldwork suggests it is more fruitful to focus our analysis in those

realms a person feels a greater sense of control and in turn a greater sense of responsibility to him/her self. In this regard, *est-forte* (Old French, "is strong") despite unfavorable odds was more important than the material and structural limitations people faced, which were understood from the optics of a universal truth – everything must change.

Humanitarian discourse facilitated a kind of government that aimed to incorporate an otherwise disaffiliated segment of the population. In pursuit of this aim, it employed discourse that constituted rather than neutrally referred to a particular social reality, one that local authorities were legally authorized to recognize. By inciting a distinct way of talking about social phenomena, institutional discourse constituted a political object by encompassing everyday life in the settlements in a manner that was conducive to state and local politics. The Coalition in Defense of Human Rights in the Settlements (CDHRS) made important gains toward their four main demands – shelter, work, papers, and dignity – through their political actions. While the re-framing of the irregular settlements as a human rights issue mobilized a powerful political mechanism (Rancière 2004), the uncritical use of political language inadvertently created points of tension within the CDHRS that ultimately stifled whatever political momentum they had achieved. As I have shown in this dissertation, concepts such as "vulnerability" and "social exclusion" are not neutral concepts but indubitably embedded categories in state biopolitics aimed at governing a segment of the resident population. If inhabitants refused to abandon the warehouse for whatever reason, then this was taken as a sign that they were actively exacerbating their exclusion, hindering their integration and preventing local institutions from effectively addressing a pressing concern (Rodriguez Garcia 2010).

Over many years of living in Spain, many of my Senegalese participants viewed themselves as "inter-cultural" and expressed hesitation with the idea of permanently moving back

to Senegal. While this was of greater concern among men in their 20's and 30's, the sentiment of being "in between" social worlds were a common sentiment among most of the people I spoke to. The warehouse made possible contact with many non-Africans, who visited to buy and sell disparate objects, listen to music while consuming alcohol or marijuana, or meet with inhabitants to organize political actions. Whereas "illegal status" reduces a person to a historically specific subject position, the warehouse qua outpost enabled people to establish a "parallel world" in which a person's sense of self was construed in more constructive spheres of value. Idioms such as *goorgorlu* and *buscar se la vida* evidence the importance of narrative in Senegalese worldviews (Seck 2013) and the will to substantiate an otherwise independent of state power (Povinelli 2012). The outpost as I have theorized it here represents a place to create a different self-image, one in which a person can cultivate a sense of self through everyday activities (e.g., labor, work, action) that coincides with social categories others invested in this specific place can recognize. Outposts amalgamate local and global dimensions that are forever in a state of becoming, transnational social fields to re-calibrate understandings of the world and one's place in it.

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