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Welfare in (and from) Crisis: Democracy, State Elites and a New Paradigm for Understanding  
Welfare State Development in the Americas

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### **Abstract**

This dissertation starts with the question of what the global resurgence of authoritarianism means for the welfare states affected by it. The inadequacies of the dominant partisan and institutionalist paradigms within the welfare state literature suggest, however, that a new paradigm for understanding welfare state development is necessary to answer such a question. For this reason, this dissertation utilizes an integrative multi-method approach that incorporates multiple sets of Prais-Winston regression and moderation analyses of public social expenditure, social pension benefits and social pension coverage utilizing correlated panel corrected standard errors on Latin American cross-national data from 1980-2013, as well as case study analyses of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and, subsequently, the United States of America, to develop, evaluate and refine a new state-elite-driven model of welfare state development where state elites construct paradigms of social citizenship and implement welfare state reforms that accord with these paradigms in service of their independent interests.

The results of these analyses indicate that the social citizenship paradigm and state capacity elements that enable state elites to pursue their interests are stronger and more consistent predictors of welfare state outcomes than the traditional political regime type and partisan strength factors frequently focused on in welfare state studies. Beyond that, the results of these analyses indicate that welfare state outcomes are directly linked to state elite interests in, specifically, strengthening their power and mitigating the social and economic crises that threaten it, that civil conflict weakens state elites' ability to use the welfare state to pursue their interests, and that democracy plays a secondary role within welfare state development, but one that may have helped encourage state elites across South, Central and North America to

converge upon broad-based social citizenship paradigms and an accompanying social investment style of welfare state as a means of minimizing potential crises. The findings of this dissertation suggest, therefore, that the movement toward authoritarianism may bring about a return to more exclusionary social citizenship paradigms, particularistic welfare state reforms, and greater usage of the despotic powers of the state, which constrain the generosity of the welfare state.

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## **Chapter 1 – A Multi-Method Approach to Understanding State Elites, Social Citizenship and a New State-Elite-Driven Model of Welfare State Development in the Americas**

Over the last few years, the citizens of many different countries around the world have looked on as cracks in the foundations of democracy have appeared and grown around them. Well-documented slides toward authoritarianism in Russia under Vladimir Putin and China under Xi Jinping have been joined by, among others, those in Egypt, Poland, Hungary, India, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, and even the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump, who has seemingly served as a model for initiating this backslide to autocracy and authoritarianism in several of the nations just mentioned (Applebaum 2020). The actions of Putin, Bolsonaro, Trump and similar political figures like them around the world raise the question of what this potential movement away from democracy means for the lives of citizens around the world confronted with it, especially when this trend toward autocratic and authoritarian rule appears to have only be enhanced by the covid-19 pandemic. One domain that is at least expected to be affected by this shift is the domain of the “welfare state,” or state that modifies the play of market forces by guaranteeing individuals and families some form of a minimum income and reducing insecurity tied to contingencies such as sickness, old age and unemployment, and (ideally) promotes the equal treatment of all citizens by offering the best of a certain agreed range of social services without distinction (Briggs 1961), given the potential deleterious effects of authoritarianism on social citizenship and well-established theoretical linkages between social citizenship and the social protections and provisions granted by the various arms of the welfare state.

This connection between democracy, social citizenship and welfare state benefits, and current concerns over how a wave of authoritarianism will affect the social welfare-oriented actions of states, can be traced to the writings of T.H. Marshall. Marshall (1950) proposed that the (post-war, British) welfare state represented the realization of social citizenship that came with democracy. In his view, the welfare state was the culmination of a march from civil rights (such as property rights, free speech and equality before the law) to political rights (that include rights to participate in the exercise of political power as an elector or a representative chosen by the electorate) to subsequent social rights of citizenship (like cultural rights and rights to economic welfare and security) within the democratic setting that civil and political rights ushered in. According to Marshall (1950), this enhancement of social citizenship that came with the emergence of a welfare state was supposed to address remaining class differences that had survived what he described as the “war” between citizenship and the capitalist class system and solidify an expansive and inclusive democratic welfare state committed to alleviating inequalities.

In this formulation and others influenced by it, therefore, democracy is essential to welfare state development and the extension of social citizenship that comes with it. It is for this reason that the literature on the welfare state is flooded with studies of advanced, developed, or affluent *democracies*, since economic development has also joined democracy as essential element necessary for welfare state development. Also essential within this paradigm, then, is the idea that the achievement of democracy gives citizens (in a legal sense) the ability to petition for social rights (via the welfare state) that will allow them to fully participate within that society. Thus, social citizenship captures a step above legal citizenship wherein salient social axes no

longer limit access to the rights and responsibilities of citizens (and the domestic rights, protections, benefits, and obligations that come with it), one that helps to maintain and strengthen democracy, and its extension represents one of the most fundamental outcomes of welfare state policies and programs. In fact, for this reason, existing research evaluating welfare states have focused on social citizenship measures (as is discussed in more detail in the following chapter). The proposed democratic mechanisms that bring about welfare state and subsequent social citizenship developments, however, vary amongst a number of theoretical approaches to understanding welfare state development whose theoretical lineage can be traced back to Marshall (1950).

#### TRADITIONAL SCHOLARSHIP ON DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT

Among these various democracy-based perspectives, the most prominent in the literature have been versions that adopt some component of partisan theory, which see social welfare policy outcomes as the product of the partisan composition of governments, wherein parties, in exchange for political support, are expected to serve as vehicles for the beliefs and demands of their constituencies (Hibbs 1977; Castles 1982). One variant of this partisan approach has focused specifically on class mobilization, with this set of theories (both class analytical and neo-Marxian) identifying working-class mobilization and collective action through labor unions and left parties as the chief driver of reformist welfare policy (Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; Przeworski 1985; Hicks and Swank 1984, 1992; Flora and Alber 1983). For these scholars, the influence of labor and the left extends back to the formation of early welfare states, including the noteworthy examples of Germany and Britain (Marwick 1967; Rimlinger 1971; Kohler, Zacher

& Partington 1982; Mann 1993), and the spread of democracy since has only ensured that similar social welfare reform processes have continued (Pampel and Williamson 1985).

Another partisan approach, alternatively, broadens the focus and examines the effect on welfare state development of the diffusion of political rights to any and all sources of political demands within democracies (Dahl 1982; Lijphart 1984). This pluralist perspective, however, tends to similarly zoom in on the role of the working class and the left (Hicks 1999), as economic risks in developed, democratic societies are purported to lead to mobilization and support (particularly along class lines) for left parties and, in turn, left governments that advance welfare state reform (Castles & McKinlay 1978; Pampel & Williamson 1989; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hicks & Misra 1993; Huber et al. 1993). According to this perspective, welfare effort is largely driven by the (working-class and leftist) groups that are able to acquire swing votes and engage in lobbying activities (and navigate the opposition that will inevitably emerge from the many other political actors and groups that operate) (Pampel & Williamson 1988; Skocpol 1992; Hicks & Misra 1993; Mann 1993).

But, with a shared emphasis on the working class and left parties, namely social democratic parties who are seen as the biggest proponents of a strong welfare state in comparison to right-leaning parties and even the social welfare supporting centrist Christian democratic parties (Huber, Ragin & Stephens 1993), the most dominant, partisan-based theoretical approach for explaining a relationship between democracy and the welfare state has been power resources theory. Once again emphasizing the mobilization of these groups, power-resources proposes that social classes, specifically, are the main agents of societal change and that the balance of power among these classes determines distributional outcomes (Esping-

Andersen 1990). From the power resources perspective, working and middle-class groups, to the degree that they come together to mobilize and pool the political resources they possess against the upper class(es) in support of policies that are seen as beneficial to both within a democracy, produce more positive distributional and protectionary outcomes than would otherwise emerge through the market (Korpi & Palme 1998). Esping-Andersen (1990), in arguably the most influential work in this body of welfare state research, explained the development of three (liberal, conservative and social democratic) welfare regime clusters, based on their respective state-market relations, the effect of social policies on stratification and the degree to which they promote de-commodification (i.e. the extent to which citizens no longer subject to the economic risks and insecurity that come from having to sell their labor in the marketplace), by building upon this power resources framework and connecting social protection and provision outcomes to class competition and cooperation with regard to political resources.

Over time, this power resource, or social democratic model (as it has sometimes also been referred to), has been amended and expanded upon by other scholars who have looked at other actors who mobilize these political resources. For example, this scholarship has considered the role of unified right-wing parties (Castles 1985), Christian Democratic rule (van Kersbergen 1995), farmer-labor political coalitions (Esping-Andersen 1990), and expert-labor alliances (Orloff 1993). But, even in these cases, the focus has been on how social classes mobilize their political power through (predominantly left) parties that in-turn represent their class interests.

In a more recent example of this research, Korpi and Palme (2003), in their analysis of data on the welfare states of 18 western democracies, for instance, argued that left party governments are significantly less likely to pursue major cuts to social insurance than secular

conservative-centrist governments, while corporatist welfare states in particular have resisted change due to the lesser role played by left parties (Korpi & Palme 2003). Similarly, Huber and Stephens (2014) found that among the same set of 18 post-industrial countries, the strongest determinant of redistribution since 1985 in the so-called era of ‘new risks’ and rising inequality has been left government; it has had a stronger connection to redistribution than family structure, welfare state generosity, of unemployment and employment levels. For Huber and Stephens (2014), and others in the power resources tradition, left parties/governments in democracies are understood to be the forces best able to maintain benefit levels in the face of growing need and pursue investment in human capital. As highlighted by Emmenegger, Marx and Schaff (2015) in their study of the Dutch case, this is believed to be the case because democracy provides space for left parties to bring together working and middle-class interests and resources.

Other, stronger attempts to amend the partisan theoretical approach to understanding the role of democracy in shaping welfare state (and, in turn, social citizenship) developments have come in the form of institutionalist approaches that have focused less of left parties and more on the conditioning effects of political institutions. Like other institutions, democratic institutions establish rules of the game (backed by the state) that have important distributional consequences based on the form these rules take and how they are implemented (Mahoney & Thelen 2010), and those taking the former perspective have studied the ways in which the institutional arrangements of the democratic state shapes the likelihood of welfare state reform emerging by bringing a broad range of political actors into the policy creation and implementation process, who then serve as potential institutional veto-points. According to these scholars, veto-points signify the individual spaces where opposition groups can stall the momentum of policy activity,

and, in so doing, provide a built-in level of threat to reform (Bonoli 2000), as well as a source of political tension that can lead actors in the policy development and implementation process to promote gradual institutional transformation (of the welfare state) through either layering or drift (Mahoney & Thelen 2010).

Therefore, on one end of the spectrum, this institutionalist approach identifies a centralized democratic state as being a boon to welfare policy efforts, since a centralized state provides a direct channel for reform demands within a democracy that then allows these demands to be transformed smoothly into policy, promoting welfare state development. State centralization, in this case, promotes the state's responsiveness to democratic demands by minimizing the potential obstructions to welfare reform efforts (Pampel & Williamson 1989; Hicks & Swank 1992; Hicks & Misra 1993; Huber et al. 1993), most notably by limiting the vetoes that come with the dispersion of power across branches and levels of government in more federalist and decentralized forms of democracy (Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber et al. 1993). For this reason, scholars have found that early social policy reform measures were implemented primarily in unitary democracies like Great Britain, rather than federal democracies like Switzerland or Britain's former colonies (Castles 1985; Baldwin 1990).

Inversely, this scholarship identifies the presence of institutional veto-points as a formidable roadblock to further welfare state development in democracies, with two of the most important of these being the aforementioned federalism and direct democracy (Immergut 1992). Returning to the Swiss case mentioned above, Obinger (1998) has shown that Switzerland's embrace of federalism and direct democracy was not only a barrier to the emergence of its welfare state, but that it has proved to be a continuing obstacle to the growth of its welfare state

in the time since. In Switzerland, these two elements, along with arrangements that endorse corporatism and consociationalism, have limited the avenues to achieve reform such that both the expansion and retrenchment of social security has been difficult. Overall, the institutional arrangements have ensured, high policy stability and only incremental changes in the welfare state, despite their potential for policy innovation with the pluralism they build into the policy process. In this same vein, Lambert's (2008) analysis of variation in parental leave and childcare policies across OECD countries identifies the importance of institutional veto points, while also adding an additional focus on gender representation. Lambert (2008) constructed a new and expanded index of policies that affect women's ability to balance work and family across these countries from the mid-1980s to the early-2000s and found that the percent of women in the legislature, the number of veto points, and the representation and organization of employers were all key to the development of motherhood employment policy. According to Lambert (2008), a higher number of veto points and decentralized employer organizations greatly increased the chances that those opposed would be able to veto these policies, while having more women in power was, on the other hand, consistently associated with more generous childcare and parental leave policies.

Scholars taking a more statist approach have also addressed the ways in which the development and organization of state institutions shape (and limit) the capacities of these democratic states to change the trajectory of welfare state development. Morgan and Orloff (2017) note that this line of historical science research, critiquing the earlier society-centered/partisan-oriented first wave, brought a turn to state-centered approaches that famously sought to 'bring the state back in' and brought an extensive focus upon the autonomous nature of



state elites and state capacity, or the capabilities of states to shape the societies that exist within their territorial bounds, but, in doing so, also introduced a strand of scholarship that has highlighted the ways in which welfare state possibilities for change can be conditioned by prior policies and their feedback. Specifically, this strand of scholarship has addressed how state institutions create policy and administrative precedents that become difficult to change, leading welfare states along a trajectory largely defined by path dependency (Orloff & Skocpol 1984; Skocpol 1985; Weir & Skocpol 1985; Pierson 1994): sequences involving positive feedback, or self-reinforcement, in which “the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down the path” (Pierson 2004:21). These self-reinforcing paths emerge due to the “increasing returns” for states that come from the large set-up costs that incentivize identifying and staying with an option, learning effects that lead to higher returns from continuation, coordination effects, i.e. increasing benefits as others adopt the outcome, and adaptive expectations that lead people to support the option they think is most likely to succeed, which increase the likelihood that others will support it as well (Boas 2007; Mahoney 2000:508; Pierson 2004). In the welfare state literature, this “lock-in” has been seen as being driven (at least in part) by the institutional features within democracies that create entrenched proponents of and constituencies for those policies, who then become an obstacle to reform efforts and make the achievement of any new reforms difficult, and this is expected to remain the case unless the political institutions within a democratic state are subject to a sudden transformation (Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Streeck & Thelen 2005).

Despite their critiques, though, these various institutionalist perspectives still do not offer a significant departure from the prior political perspectives and instead offer only a shift in focus.

Both the earlier partisan perspectives and the more recently discussed perspectives concerned with political institutions point to the institutional settings under which governments are operating to explain this relationship of interest (Schmidt 1996). While the class-focused, pluralist and power resources versions of partisan theory do not devote most of their attention to the impact of political institutions upon the policy implementation process in the same way that the institutionalist approaches do, these theoretical approaches (at least implicitly) are understood to operate upon an institutional foundation of democratic electoral rules and laws that allow the partisan-based political processes to take place. On the flip side, the institutionalist analyses, much in the same way, imply or openly discuss the importance of partisan elements in their analyses as well. Slater (2008), for example, has gone so far as to argue that through competitive national elections, mass political parties in Southeast Asia themselves became adjunct institutions of the state that serve as the “institutional bridge” between state and society and become the vehicle for the administration of public goods (p. 261).

Thus, the dominant paradigm within the literature concerned with welfare state outcomes is one that sees (at least) some degree of integration of partisan theories (and their emphasis on left parties, in particular) with institutionalist perspectives focused on democratic states as essential to understanding welfare state developments (Scharpf 1997). It is a viewpoint that sees democracy having an effect on the welfare state through its creation of institutional spaces where parties (representing the beliefs and demands of the various social classes who support them) can vie with one another over welfare reform, eventually leading to welfare state outcomes that are backed by the state (to the degree that it is capable of doing so). The most complete and obvious realization of this perspective has been encapsulated within the body of research focused on

power constellations theory that deliberately brings together these two democracy-based approaches (Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens 1992; Huber & Stephens 2001; 2012). Yet, this paradigm is so dominant that it is often simply taken for granted and goes unmentioned. Mares' (2005) argument that the redistributive social policies (or lack thereof) that result from external economic risk are a product of the policy preferences of whichever worker sector (high-risk vs. low-risk) is stronger and the capabilities of the state, for instance, rests on the assumption that these workers operate within a democratic space in which their respective interests are represented in policymaking settings and, in accordance with their relative political power, are translated into the social policies outcomes that come about. Similarly, Mares and Young's (2019) more recent work on the connections between clientelism and welfare state outcomes, which states that 1) candidates or parties appeal to voters through both positive social policy inducements and coercion and 2) that the particular approach they settle upon depends on the distribution of supporters vs. opponents of anti-poverty programs in a given locality, relies on the premise that (effective) democratic institutions exist, that candidates/parties attempt to identify and match the interests of voters to gain their support, and that social policy outcomes are directly reflective of this.

Yet, despite their (at least implicit) widespread acceptance, the power of democracy-centered views to explain variations in welfare state development is not without obvious limitations. First, the current state of theory concerned with democracy, left parties and institutional factors has created an incomplete, and at times incoherent, picture that makes it hard to understand how welfare state developments do in fact occur. Democracies are seen as opening up spaces for groups, namely left parties, to pool political resources that then allow social

welfare policies to emerge and be put in place, yet at the same time democracy is positioned as a strong deterrent to such reforms being implemented. The pluralism that the partisan theory elements hold up, inversely, creates an institutional environment where counter-majoritarian forces could easily limit the agency of any leftist parties (Schmidt 1996; Huber et al. 1993). As Obinger (1998) found in the Swiss case mentioned earlier, these strong counter-majoritarian barriers had braking effects for social policy development that limited the expansion of state interventionist policies in that context of an established but more limited welfare state, and in so doing promoted the status quo. For this reason, then, it is also hard to understand how (in the opposite direction) democracies across the world, including the strongest Scandinavian welfare states, have at times adopted paths of retrenchment in the face of these institutional barriers and the constituencies they established that should pose similar braking effects in the era of so-called new risks (Elsässer, Rademacher & Schäfer 2015). This is even more difficult to understand in the Scandinavian cases when their legacies of cross-class coalitions and left party power, which should be able to supply the power resources necessary to at least prevent social policy slippage if not move social policy in the opposite direction and expand the role of the welfare state amid more uncertain economic conditions, are considered.

Then of course there is the question of what the shifts toward autocracy and authoritarianism described at the start of the chapter mean for welfare state development that these kinds of perspectives can offer little meaningful insight into, since this slide from democracy would be expected to completely undercut any possibilities for positive welfare state expansion (and the expansion of social citizenship that follows from it) but this has been shown to not be the case. Kulmala et al. (2014), for example, have recently shown that the process

Russia has undergone has been a “paradoxical” one when viewed from these democracy-focused perspectives (p. 551). Their study found that, under the autocratic Putin administration, welfare-related questions have been at the top of the Russian federal government’s agenda, leading to incremental social policy development at the federal level, declining poverty rates and inequality stabilizing despite the weak organization of civil society and social classes that prevents any systemic link that would connect social policy to citizens’ welfare concerns from forming. State elites, rather than political parties, trade unions or other bodies pooling political resources, have driven the push toward greater welfare-oriented funding, and have been responsible for identifying where this funding should be directed at. Under the Putin administration, welfare efforts have been targeted to narrowly selected state priorities that serve the state’s interests instead of citizens’ welfare concerns, and, in this case, it is a “lack of democratic agency” that explains developments like the growth in welfare funding, the monetization of Soviet-era non-monetary benefits, the implementation of the National Priority Programs, and the strong focus on family policy (p. 550) in this welfare state.

Taking a broader look at welfare state developments among post-communist states (instead of traditionally the strongest democratic settings), reveals that the above Russian findings are not a singular outlier, an ‘exception that proves the rule.’ Orenstein (2008), on the one hand, found democracy to be positively correlated with the level of social expenditure in post-communist Europe and Eurasia, with the strongest democracies being those that spent more on social protection as a share of GDP than other states in the region (as expected by democracy-based theories), but, on the other hand, found that both less-effective democracies and authoritarian regimes actually spent about the same on social protection, and that the more-

authoritarian post-communist states maintain a higher level of social protection than is found in much of the developing world. In addition, Orenstein (2008) noted that in the post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, democratization did not have the effect of strengthening the power of trade unions or leftist, socialist parties as would be expected by partisan theory and, instead, had the opposite effect, meaning democracy (at least) constrained the public's ability to protest and pool political resources to build the welfare state post-democracy, and left civil society scrambling to try and prevent dramatic cuts to pre-existing programs and spending levels. Mares and Young (2018) have also shown that within Hungary, recent elections serve as a point when the agents of politicians threaten those politician's core supporters with the withdrawal of access to the long-term benefits they had been made the beneficiaries of in a form of clientelistic activity that seems to fly in the face of partisan explanations of welfare state developments.

This, of course, does not even take into account Central and East European countries' history of social programs that long precedes even communism and extend back to the Bismarckian era and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Briggs (1961) long ago showed, for instance, that the German welfare state emerged under the autocratic rule of Otto von Bismarck and used the dissemination of social rights to quell popular dissent and create a "subservient" working class that would not seek out social democracy (p. 30). As such, this case provides evidence of a welfare state emerged under an autocratic regime setting where various parties, constituencies, and other elements of civil society lacked democratic channels to push their interests and, therein, would not be able to provide the same kind of institutionally supported political pressure that is thought to shape welfare state trajectories in democracies. Other examples can be cited as well. Amenta and Carruthers (1988) have discussed how in the United

States the New Deal policies associated with emergency relief, unemployment compensation, and old-age pensions that established what we think of as the modern American welfare state were implemented amid the Jim Crow era in which African Americans were disenfranchised. In the region of Latin America, where social welfare policy developments in several countries date back to the same period as those of the traditional European welfare states of scholarly interest, it has been shown that extensive social rights and social welfare commitments throughout the region (including notable cases like Argentina and Costa Rica) appeared before or in place of stable political and civil rights, that they were provided as a mechanism for cooptation and social control, and have remained in place despite a general history of democratic instability since (Lo Vuolo 2013; Oxhorn 2003). Overall, then, these findings indicate that democratic-based theories of welfare state development simply do not hold water in both modern periods and those as far back as the earliest periods of welfare state development; something else appears to be operating in this context.

This incompatibility of the modern partisan and institutionalist takes on a democratic model of welfare state development with the historical realities of welfare state development across the globe is not all that surprising actually, given the issues that scholarship has already identified in Marshall's (1950) work that they draw upon. As Gough (1978) more than four decades ago, Marshall presented a unilinear functionalist explanation of welfare state development that cannot explain a backwards slide toward authoritarianism following welfare state development, nor account for the general diversity in welfare outcomes we see. And, according to Gough (1978), Marshall (1950) did so based on a questionable consensual model of society where there is agreement within society on the securement of civil, political and social

rights through the welfare state as the solution to the agreed problems of the capitalist class system. Joining in on the second point, Offe (1987), only three decades ago, pointedly suggested that Marshall “took for granted the existence of large, self-conscious, and well-organized collectivities and class organizations of labor that would use the ballot for strategies of social reform and expansive social policies” (p. 527). In doing so, Offe (1987) suggested that Marshall’s work offers an ahistorical approach that extrapolates from the singular historical particularities of the post-World-War-II British welfare state to others across time and space.

In building upon work with such limitations, it is also unsurprising to see that these dominant democracy-centered perspectives have primarily concerned themselves with developed, affluent and (long-standing) democracy cases (where these perspectives have at least some uninterrogated plausibility), but have largely ignored welfare state developments in the numerous important settings that exist outside of the post-war European and United States context (where democracy is much less of a given). Therefore, one solution for moving beyond the inadequacies of the current democracy-centered perspectives and properly gauging what effect a slide toward authoritarianism will have on welfare states appears to be shifting attention toward the latter set of cases (that introduce variability between democratic and autocratic regime types), which provide the opportunity to both actually assess the effects of political regime type and potentially identify new insights that can lead to the construction of a better overall model of what drives welfare state developments (and one that can then give realistic expectations about what a shift toward authoritarianism means).

With this in mind, one option would be to examine welfare state developments in the former Soviet Union states of eastern Europe, as was done in studies discussed above. Focusing



on these cases, however, tends to suffer from the opposite problem of the traditional literature that restricts its focus to democratic settings: long, shared histories of autocratic rule provide too limited a recent window to fully evaluate the impact and relative importance of democratic political institutions and left parties. Alternatively, though, Latin America presents a setting to explore welfare state development among states with a longer history of welfare state commitments and, most importantly, a history of much greater variability in the adherence to democracy (Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Huber & Stephens 2012; Lo Vuolo 2013; Oxhorn 2003). Fortunately, a growing body of work has considered the potential connection between democracy and welfare state development in Latin America for this reason, which is reviewed in the following section.

## DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Brown & Hunter (1999) were among the first to study Latin American welfare state development and weigh the role of democratization in it. Brown & Hunter (1999) did so through an analysis of covariance model on a time-series cross-sectional panel data set for 17 Latin American countries from 1980 to 1992 that analyzed changes in social spending. They found that a consistent pattern emerges wherein authoritarian regimes display greater sensitivity than their democratic counterparts to economic constraints, while democracies show greater sensitivity to popular demands. More specifically, in poor countries, amid economic crisis especially, democracies increase the allocation of resources to social programs relative to authoritarian regimes, but when economic constraints subside and income rises, authoritarian regimes increase spending at a faster rate than democratic regimes. With respect to political constraints, however, they find that democracies respond to the pressures posed by an aging electorate by increasing

spending on social programs more rapidly than authoritarian regimes. Their results suggested that democracies are more consistent in their spending on social programs and are more responsive to demographic changes in demand than authoritarian regimes, but the use of this demographic characteristic as a proxy for political demand and responsiveness seems problematic, as it too employs a functionalist logic where popular demand automatically emanates from the presumed greater need of an aging society for social spending.

Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), through an analysis of changes in social security transfers and of health and education expenditures using a pooled time-series error-correction model on data from fourteen Latin American countries from 1973 to 1997, found that in the aggregate democratic regimes have no consistent, predictable impact on social expenditures, and that popular governments may actually spend less. Contrasting with Brown & Hunter (1999), they found that democracy appeared no more responsive than dictatorships to demographic and political pressures and no less resistant to downturns in the economy. Instead, they found that both democracy the prior year and change towards democracy were negatively associated with change in spending on social security and welfare, while democracy the year before was positively associated with change in the human capital-oriented health and education area of spending that reaches a larger segment of the population. Based on this contrast in the impact of democracy on human capital expenditures and social security they suggested that the preferences of a mass electorate may play a role in promoting more progressive forms of social spending, but they also found that a populist president (in democratic and non-democratic regimes alike) was positively associated with change in social security and welfare spending and negatively associated with change in health and education spending, which raises doubts about the above

assertion and muddies the picture regarding the connection between democracy and welfare states.

Afterward, Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005), in examining the impact of globalization and democracy on social spending with Times-series Cross-Sectional data for 19 Latin American countries over the period of 1980 to 1999 through OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors, found that the strongest and most consistent result was a positive and significant effect of democracy on overall social spending. Disaggregating this down further than the previous studies into health, education, and social security spending, respectively, these authors found that democracies do not significantly increase spending on health or social security, but do so for spending on education, which was consistent with a finding from the year before by Brown and Hunter (2004) as well. Avelino et al. (2005) proposed that democracies enhance the prospects for investing in human capital in the form of education while still at least preserving social security payments due to the political power possessed by those in support of social security spending and the constraint this provides on initiating cuts. However, as they themselves admitted, this was mostly conjecture since there was no evidence available that showed this. In addition, Avelino et al. (2005) found (though largely glossed over) that while democracies spend more than authoritarian regimes at low levels of financial liberalization this difference disappears under globalization as countries liberalize capital markets so that both regime types provide similar levels of social spending at the highest levels of liberalization.

Despite the limited nature of the estimated connection between democracy and the welfare state, the findings by both Brown and Hunter (2004) and Avelino et al. (2005) paint a decidedly much more positive picture of the potential of democracy to lead to beneficial welfare

state outcomes than Weyland (2004). Weyland (2004) argued that democracy's role in providing citizens with an opportunity to shape social policy in Latin America has decreased as democracy has stabilized following the spread of neoliberalism. This seemingly paradoxical correlation between more stable democracy and less participation, the study finds, is due to the limitations neoliberalism has imposed on policy makers, which in turn have weakened political participation. To begin with, neoliberalism was found to limit popular sovereignty by placing constraints on economic and social policymaking that, in turn, limit citizens' political options and encourage a decline in electoral participation. Secondly, "as neoliberalism has further tilted the internal balance of forces by strengthening elite sectors, it seems to have weakened important organizations of civil and political society, including political parties. Intermediary organizations, which are crucial for stimulating meaningful popular participation and for holding governments accountable, have grown feeble in most countries of the region and have atrophied or collapsed in some nations" (Weyland 2004:144). For Weyland (2004) then, neoliberal democracy has produced an increased cynicism and distrust of political institutions, as well as greater apathy for political participation by any means, that have pushed citizens out of the traditional political landscape and outside the conditions expected by both the partisan and institutional approaches.

Examining the case of Mexico, specifically, Holzner (2007) identified a similar result. Drawing on in-depth interviews, oral histories collected between 1998 and 2004, and public opinion data from the World Values Survey and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey covering the period between 1981 and 2003, Holzner (2007) found that voter turnout, petitioning activity, and feelings of political interest and efficacy have all declined overall since

the late 1990s, with this decline having been particularly steep for the poor. Their analysis revealed a growing feeling of distance between poor citizens and the state and increasing pessimism when it came to the capacity of these citizens to influence the decisions of government officials and policymakers. But, according to Holzner (2007), not only did pessimism increase among the poor, making political mobilization and demand-making more difficult and costly, the nature of the politics of the welfare state changed with them. As Holzner (2007) stated, “Popular politics in Mexico increasingly revolves less around big political questions of ideology and how best to influence the direction of reform-the issues that motivated social movements in the past-than around more basic, everyday issues of survival” (p. 117). In stark contrast to the expectations of partisan theorists of democracy and the welfare state, the period encompassing the end of one-party rule in Mexico saw an increasing limited view among citizens about the kinds of social policies that should be pursued.

Almeida (2007) and Roberts (2008) saw another new relationship between democracy and social policy development, one that was tied to the re-emergence of mass-demonstration-based politics. According to Almeida (2007), “a new wave of mass popular contention” emerged in the late 1990s/early 2000s that was spurred by the perception that economic benefits and social citizenship rights were under threat (p. 124). As Almeida (2007) explained, “If democratization had institutionalized earlier political struggles, it now provides a more open context for civic organizations to mobilize against a reduction in government commitments to social welfare. An emergent incentive structure of austerity measures threatening economic and social benefits and citizenship rights was generating a Latin America-wide wave of contestation against the deepening of neoliberal reforms” (p. 135). Similarly, Roberts (2008) contends that the

period since the late 1990s has seen the emergence of a period of mass political incorporation built around pluralistic, decentralized, and fluid social and political movements and protests against a technocratic consensus around neoliberalism, and the support for the expansion of social citizenship rights to combat the decline and decoupling of social and political citizenship rights that neoliberalism fostered. Roberts (2008) argues that this popular mobilization to extend citizenship rights from political rights to social rights was conditioned by previous political exclusion and demobilization and is part of a historical, cyclical pattern of political exclusion and incorporation, and the cyclical pattern of demobilization and mobilization to address unmet social needs, social inequalities and elevated economic insecurities that comes with it. For both Almeida (2007) and Roberts (2008), then, the frustrations and constraints imposed by neoliberalism were not believed to have only produced the apathy and change in policy desires discussed by Weyland (2004) and Holzner (2007), yet the finding that the public has pursued mass-demonstration politics (rather than representational politics) presents a different picture from that provided by the traditional democracy and the welfare state scholarship discussed earlier, and, as Tarrow (2011) has discussed, these kinds of contentious forms of collective action are closely associated with a lack of democratic representation rather than increasing democratization.

Despite these critiques of the traditional studies of democratization and the welfare state, Huber, Mustillo & Stephens (2008) examined the relationship between democracy and welfare state development by analyzing the determinants of social expenditure in an unbalanced pooled time-series analysis for 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970 to 2000, in what they proclaimed to be the first such analysis of spending in Latin American countries with a full

complement of regime, partisanship, state structure, economic, and demographic variables comparable to analyses of welfare states in advanced industrial countries. In focusing on levels of expenditure and the long-run effects of political variables, they found (by looking at moves from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile) that democracy mattered in the long run both for both social security and welfare and for health and education spending, while, in stark contrast to much of the literature discussed earlier, partisanship did not. Highly repressive authoritarian regimes were found to retrench spending on health and education, but not on social security. They also found that this kind of move in the percentage of aged population was a very powerful determinant of the level of spending on social security and welfare, similar to the above studies.

Based on these results, these authors argued that all forms of democratic government are more responsive to demands for state provision of social security and welfare, and for health and education services, than are authoritarian governments, and that the effects of partisanship, then, are not tied to how much they spend but how they allocate what they spend, with left-of-center parties (presumably) favoring programs with progressive profiles. Not only that, the authors expected that these effects of democracy, and left-leaning parties, on social policy would grow stronger as the democratic record gets longer. In addition, they also suggested that the reason why authoritarian regimes keep spending on health and education low, but not on social security was, in part, because these regimes are willing to target repression toward the lower classes who use public health and education services, but are reluctant to take on middle and upper middle classes and the social security schemes of which they are the primary beneficiaries, since this could invite strong(er) opposition coalitions. Yet, it's fair to wonder how fully we should take the authors understandings for granted on this, as their discussion overlooks a positive (though

non-significant) effect of authoritarianism that was twice as large as what was found for democracy in the area of social security and welfare, and, since health and education expenditure were combined, there was not an opportunity to evaluate how regime type potentially affected them individually.

That same year, Haggard and Kaufman (2008), in their book *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States*, analyzed this same topic using an error-correction model (ECM) with panel-corrected standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation that also utilized a similar complement of variables also comparable to those used in the analyses of welfare states in advanced industrial countries introduced earlier for the period between 1980 and 2005. These authors also expanded upon the earlier Latin American studies above by broadening their analysis to encompass the regions of Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe, and by providing in-depth case studies of the 21 welfare states that make up their sample over a 61-year period from 1945 to 2005. In their analysis, they focused on the impact of three key explanatory factors: the extent to which political elites incorporate or exclude organizations and parties tied to urban labor and the rural poor, economic factors including growth, fiscal constraints and the organization of the economy (and therein globalization), and, finally, political institutions, including namely whether a regime was democratic or not.

With this analytic approach, they found that while a positive effect of democracy (particularly long-standing democracies) on the expansion of social entitlements and expenditure exists, it is largely conditioned by economic conditions and the legacies of social policy prior to the third wave of democratization period. Before then, each region had developed distinct social-welfare models, with Eastern European welfare systems providing comprehensive protections



and services to almost all of their populations, East Asian welfare systems offering minimal social insurance but investing in education, and Latin American systems providing a relatively generous public protections to urban middle-class and some blue-collar workers that peasants and informal-sector workers, on the other hand, were excluded from. These models were found to be largely imposed from above, and their legacies had a strong influence on social policy after countries in the three regions democratized, as past policies, they argued, created constituencies and generated demands on incoming democratic governments, with wider coverage and more effective services making reform more difficult. Yet, at the same time, the fiscal consequences of prior welfare commitments in Eastern Europe and Latin America produced heavy burdens on governments and generated pressures for reform and retrenchment amid unfavorable economic conditions tied to their previous development models that weren't present in the unencumbered East Asian countries (facing more favorable economic circumstances). As a result, the East Asian countries expanded social insurance and services to voter-beneficiaries while facing little organized resistance from existing stakeholders.

Of note to those in the power resources and power constellations tradition, the authors also found a waning impact of labor and left parties on social welfare outcomes. In the formative period of welfare states development prior to 1980, when political elites sought to co-opt workers, peasants and the organizations and political parties that represented them, these groups were able to gain not only political representation but also social policy concessions, except in the situation when lower-class organizations were controlled or repressed and social policy directly reflected the objectives of ruling political elites, as happened in the minimalist East Asian case. But in recent decades, left and labor parties interests have diverged, with each being

shaped as much by historical legacies and economic circumstances as by enduring social cleavages and ideologies, such that rather than a clear left-right splits on social policy matters, parties across the political spectrum can be seen as having responded in narrow ways to common economic circumstances and policy legacies, which contrasts significantly with the expectations of power resource and constellations theorists. These findings, however, may need to be taken with a grain of salt as well, given that they were based on a “medium-n” case selection strategy in which all of the cases deemed “significant” to the authors (21 cases overall) were included, but in the context of Latin America this meant only the nine cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and Uruguay were analyzed.

Postero (2010) examined one of the Latin American cases left out by Haggard and Kaufman (2008), Bolivia, and (echoing their position on the top-down nature of policy implementation and weakening impact of traditional left parties) showed how political representation and the capability to shape social rights and welfare outcomes in this case has increasingly been shaped along ethno-racial lines. They found that it was after state-led multiculturalism reform efforts implemented under the neoliberal governments of the 1990s that subsequent indigenous movements under the MAS umbrella transformed the political system, and greater redistributive efforts were pursued. And, as Postero (2010) notes, this result was anything but an intentional attempt to empower the political rights of indigenous communities and further strengthen Bolivia’s democracy. According to Postero (2010), “Bolivia’s neoliberal multiculturalism...did not substantially alter the structural inequalities facing indigenous people. Rather, it was a top-down effort by the neoliberal state to incorporate indigenous peoples into the national project as responsible and docile neoliberal subjects” (p. 22). It was ultimately the

failure of these multicultural policies to address endemic racism in Bolivian society, reduce the power of elite-led political parties and curb historic economic inequalities that drove these communities to produce their own outsider political parties and candidates, who then adopted a greater focus on indigenous rights, popular democracy, and economic justice (Postero 2010).

Falleti (2010), similarly, provides a critique of power resources and power constellations explanations of welfare state development through their analysis of how the Brazilian health care system transformed from a centralized and narrow system to a decentralized and universalistic one. In this analysis, Falleti (2010) proposed that the universalization and decentralization of the health care system in Brazil can actually be traced to back to the efforts of prior authoritarian military governments to extend its control to the rural periphery of the nation through cooptation. These efforts of the state to penetrate society through the extension of health care to the periphery, according to Falleti (2010), provided an opportunity for reformist subversive civil society actors to infiltrate the state and incrementally reorient these health reforms through layering strategies that promoted universalization and decentralization, and began long before the state democratized. While universalization continued with the transition to democracy, the origins of this transformation were shown to be directly connected to the top-down efforts of authoritarian state elites and the civil society elements that infiltrated the state in response to push reforms in their own desired direction.

Huber and Stephens (2012) would later offer a power constellations rebuttal to these analyses in their book *Democracy and the Left*. Huber and Stephens (2012) through a mixed-method approach that incorporated quantitative analysis of 18 Latin America countries and the comparative historical analysis of five of them (plus two Iberian comparison cases) argued, in

line with previous studies by these authors discussed earlier in the chapter, that the development of democracy has been “one of the most important determinants of redistributive social policy” because it has been a precondition for the development of left parties with the ability to push for more redistributive policy across health, education, and social security domains (p. 3). In the Latin American context, they stated that economic inequality has been a central feature of the region and that most families and individuals would thus have an interest in redistributive reform, but such reform has been largely absent due to the political (representation) inequalities that accompanied those along income. According to Huber and Stephens (2012), the large distance between the median and mean voter in Latin America has produced a skewed distribution of political power that has restricted the actual and perceived policy options for redistribution historically, but democratization and the rise of left parties have more recently been able to address these conditions and expand the range of perceived and actualizable policy options, which has led to a decline in inequality across states in the region since the early 2000s. Consistent with the power constellations approach, partisanship is presented as the central factor shaping the extent and nature of social expenditure, and democracy, then, is seen as necessary for this effect to emerge.

Subsequently, Grassi (2014), in comparing the cases of Uruguay and Paraguay which possess a well-established democratic history and generally authoritarian past, respectively, largely echoed the findings of Huber & Stephens (2012). They asserted that a positive relationship exists between democracy and social welfare because democratic regimes are more likely to reach progressive welfare outcomes than authoritarian governments or regimes that restrain political and economic participation because “In the absence of competitive checks and

mechanisms, politicians have few motivations to support egalitarian social bargains, and are more inclined to redirect social resources to personal or private goals, thus upholding or increasing political and social inequality” (Grassi 2014:137). In their view, democratic institutions and the progressive political parties that subsequently emerge over time are viewed as necessary then to overcome this and spur a push for more equitable income redistribution. Grassi (2014), though, echoes Haggard and Kaufman (2008) in identifying an increasingly ambiguous role of parties (which Huber and Stephens (2012) positioned as essential) over time. According to their comparative historical analysis seemingly taken straight out of Haggard and Kaufman (2008), left parties were seen as initial the drivers of progressive social policy that emerge following democratization, but their impact over time was found to be mediated by, particularly, the welfare legacies and constituencies that emerge over time. For this reason, “in Uruguay, organized pensioners fought against both privatization of the public pension system and further redistribution to the poorest, while in Paraguay, business and rural interests vetoed a more generous redistributive welfare, and teachers’ unions were able to water down the partial reform promoted by President Duarte (Grassi 2014). As such, their findings privileged the institutionalist elements in power constellations theory over the partisan ones emphasized in Huber and Stephens (2012).

In the interim between Huber and Stephens (2012) and Grassi (2014), Pribble (2013a; 2013b) also picked up on this theme of democratization promoting an enhanced welfare state through the development of left parties too, but instead focused on the organizational structure and linkages to the general public of these parties and their connection to progressive and universalistic redistributionary policy. Like many of the analyses above, this work emphasized

the role of the policy legacies and argued that they influence social policy reform by structuring the kinds of policy adjustments that are needed and empowering or weakening certain organizations. On top of this, though, Pribble (2013a; 2013b) also found that the character of the parties themselves influenced the nature of reforms as well, with electoral-professional and constituency-coordinating left/center-left parties being more likely to pursue progressive, universalistic reform than charismatic movement and non-programmatic-electoral left parties (Pribble 2013a; 2013b). As a result, Pribble (2013b) identified two paths toward universalistic welfare states, the first involving left electoral-professional parties in power with favorable policy legacies and significant electoral competition, where technocratic elites operate in isolation from political demands due to their weak ties to their base, and the second involving left constituency-coordinating parties in power that pursue reform from the bottom up through coalition building and negotiation with various social groups due to the parties' strong ties with social movements. Herein, Pribble provides support for the power constellations approach, but introduces a distinction regarding the actual democratic responsiveness among left parties and their ability to pursue greater redistributionary measures that had been absent in previous studies within this analytic tradition.

Pribble was not alone in addressing how the organization of social groups shapes their capabilities to achieve desirable social policy outcomes. Tenorio (2014), similarly, found that political demonstration has an effect on social welfare outcomes that is largely conditioned by which groups are participating in it. Employing an error correction model on cross-national time-series data from 18 countries in the region between 1970 and 2007, Tenorio (2014) showed that under democracy, organized labor is in a better position relative to other groups in society, like

the poor discussed by Holzner (2007), to obtain social policy concessions as a consequence of their collective action efforts. Specifically, he showed that the effect of democracy on social security spending is conditioned by organized labor protest, since their greater organizational capacity grants them a better position to effectively mobilize from to defend their entitlements. This is the case, according to Tenorio (2014), because governments have incentives to respond to the interests of relatively more organized groups who impose the highest costs on them as a result of their protest, and to, alternatively, deploy strategies aimed at suppressing and demobilizing relatively unorganized and more heterogeneous protest movements when faced with competing sources of pressure. Therefore, this analysis argues that democracy has only enabled particularly strong labor groups to effectively push for and deflect attacks against social spending through popular demonstration, which seems to diverge from the power resources/constellations view that the left collectively, through left parties, mobilize in defense of entitlements or for their expansion.

Lo Vuolo (2013), in *Citizen's Income and Welfare Regimes in Latin America*, is less committed to this idea that democracy enables particular elements of the left to push for desired welfare state outcomes. He notes that as a region, social 'rights' based on participation in the formal labor market (which many are unable to participate in) have often appeared before or in place of political and civil rights under authoritarian regimes, and that despite the presence of these social rights elements of welfare states, inequality across the region has been high. In discussing the possibilities for the development of citizen's incomes in welfare states across Latin America, Lo Vuolo (2013) argued that the absence of citizen incomes from the political agenda until now, and their possibilities for the future, have been a product of a history of

multiple forms of inequality and discrimination, especially with regard to political representation. Haagh (2013) in a subsequent chapter, echoed this belief and argued that the weak extension of political democracy identified by Lo Vuolo (2013) is firmly the result of basic inequality of citizen status. According to Haagh (2013), the high inequality noted by Lo Vuolo (2013) has produced weak and unequal institutions of social insurance, which in turn reduce the inclusivity and increase the inequality of other institutional settings, including democratic ones, that require the real equality of opportunity that comes with social integration. In drawing upon Latin America's general history of welfare state development and highlighting the welfare state's role in promoting democratization, and examining the potential for citizen's incomes to promote social integration and democratization by promoting equal membership and multiple membership across institutions, these scholars flip the directionality built into the traditional explanations of the connection between democracy and the welfare state altogether.

Other scholarship has echoed much of this sentiment, arguing that these kinds of representational deficiencies mentioned above in countries across the region, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela, for example, have inspired the turn toward mass-based protest and other forms of collective action outside traditional (i.e., political party) channels of representation identified by Almeida (2007) and Roberts (2008) in response to neoliberalism, which has focused on addressing social and economic needs and inequalities, and the extension of social citizenship rights through welfare state transformation, along with presidential resignations, the partial or complete breakdown of traditional party systems, and the election of populist outsider and parties from outside the political establishment (Silva 2009, Roberts 2014; 2016). Roberts (2016) proposes, based on the experiences of Chile in the period since it returned



to democracy in 1990, that this politicization of inequality is not actually a given, as parties and the regime in power may pursue the depoliticization of inequalities, but that it does become increasingly likely in contexts of acute inequality since these motivate societal actors to turn to these forms of non-traditional mobilization outlets that involve mobilizing outside and against party-based channels of representation when faced with representational deficiencies. This, according to Roberts (2016), can be directly tied to the two necessary, difficult and sometimes at odds components of depoliticization: minimizing distributive conflicts along class lines (through clientelist linkages or placing a focus on valence issues like economic growth, for instance) and securing societal quiescence (most likely through political fragmentation). In the case of Chile, where depoliticization efforts involved the development of a technocratic frame toward support for neoliberal policies and addressing inequalities to de-emphasize distributive conflict, the successful de-emphasis of distributive conflict and the unwillingness of the party system to represent the interests of societal actors in tackling persistent inequalities would foster the breakdown in the latter condition of depoliticization of societal quiescence by encouraging civil society to engage in popular protest, which would bring an end to the neoliberal post-transition period in Chile and spawn a new period defined by the re-politicization of inequalities and efforts to redefine social provisions, especially in the area of education, “as universal social citizenship rights that are subject to collective decision-making processes” (Roberts 2016:132).

In their analysis of the development of universal social insurance in Costa Rica, Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2014) further challenge the idea that democracy leads to greater representation and political responsiveness via left parties and, as a result, the development of desirable, more-universalistic social welfare outcomes, and in so doing disputed

the oft-held view that the Costa Rican example of universalism was the result of strong democracy and relatively weak interest groups. Instead they identified an important role played by technopoliticians (or what they frequently refer to as “technopols”) in that democratic context and argued that democratic institutions and politicians provided technopolitical actors engaged in transnational policy networks with political space to shape social insurance, and that it has been these technopoliticians, not political parties, business elites nor trade unions that have made social insurance a top political priority and shaped its features. Additionally, according to Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2014), these ‘technopols’ played a role in managing any (weak) opposition that emerged until their social policy was implemented, at which point bureaucratic institutions became powerful legacies directing Costa Rica toward universalism. Importantly, the authors also identified that these technopoliticians, rather than being the true architects of the policies they implemented, were instead largely “intermediaries and translators of international ideas, drawing on them to shape policy debates and policy design” as components within transnational policy networks (Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea’s 2014: 111). By and large then, this analysis casts doubt on all of the lines of theory discussed earlier that privilege the power of domestic social groups to shape the direction of the welfare state, while establishing a new perspective on the role of democracy that also emphasizing the lock-in effects of institutions upon the trajectory of welfare state development.

Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) later highlighted the role played by technopoliticians in democratic settings as well, but this time in relation to differences in the degree of gender-equity promoted by early child education and care (ECEC) policy initiatives implemented in Costa Rica and Uruguay since 2010. They found that Uruguay moved further

toward reducing fragmentation and regulating the outside option than Costa Rica as a result of differences between the two countries in terms of the number and type of actors engaged in the policy process, and the framing of universalism as a goal in it as well. In Costa Rica, childcare moved into the policy agenda as a result of top-down decisions made by technopoliticians that were disconnected from civil society and therefore disconnected from collective actors potentially capable putting pressure in favor of program expansion. In Uruguay, the deliberation process was longer and was impacted by an issue network of, namely, feminist actors occupying spaces within the cabinet, political parties and civil society. Engagement with this network by the government within a broader context of policy proposals for paid leaves promoting greater gender equity, led the ECEC measures targeting the poor to be coupled with the gender-equity-focused work leave policies benefitting formal workers, creating a cross-class coalition that pushed for more inclusionary ECEC and ultimately brought a consensus around the need to steadily move toward universalism (Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea 2016).

Focusing on parental leave reform in Chile and Uruguay, Blofield (2016) found through process-tracing that the differences in reform between these two countries in terms of how they impact gender relations/equity were also driven by the presence of feminist networks in the policy formation process. In Uruguay, feminist technocrats brought the reform on to the agenda and were positioned to shape the direction of the policy to promote greater shared parental leave in order to attempt to lessen the care burden on women and reduce labor market discrimination against mothers, while in Chile their absence ensured that the policy would take on the maternalist bent that social policy in the region often does. Together, Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) and Blofield (2016) echo previous studies in identifying a limited

explanatory utility of left party strength, and instead highlight ways in which politicians in democratic institutional settings, rather than serving as channels of the pooled political desires of citizens, are either divorced from them altogether or respond to salient identity-based interest groups when deviating from what appears to be the maternalist default position of social policy implementers in Latin America, which contrasts significantly with more traditional accounts like that of Carnes and Mares (2015; 2016) that propose that the bottom-up demands of a new coalition of middle-and-low-income workers across Latin America have been responsible for a resurgence in social protection policies throughout the region, and that within Bolivia, it has been this new, broad coalition uniting social insurance insiders and outsiders that has pushed for these protectionary policies.

Using ethnographic and archival data, Paschel (2017) has expounded upon the power of identity-based interest groups to influence the direction of social policy as well in analyzing the effect of black activists upon the transformation of race-based policies in Brazil over the last two decades. According to Paschel (2017), the mobilization of black activists within a domestic and international political field alignment around addressing racial inequality (via multiculturalism, indigenous rights, and eventually antiracist struggle) transformed previously entrenched state discourses of colorblindness and race mixture in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and gave otherwise marginalized political actors an unprecedented opportunity to negotiate with high-level government officials and pursue greater racial equality through, among others, social welfare policy. These ethno-racial politics findings are not alone either; they seemingly build on a broader project from Loveman (2014), which a few years earlier examined census creation and

transformation across Latin America, and how micro- and macro- level politics of ethnoracial classification shaped who has been viewed as a citizen and entitled to political and social rights.

According to Loveman (2014), the national census has in past and present served as both a means of, in racist terms, defining the nation and highlighting a path toward national development and progress across Latin America, which has been shaped by shifting international ethno-racial norms of what it means to be a nation and international prescriptions for pursuing progress. These politics have had important consequences, as “the national census is a valued prize in battles for official recognition and political representation of particular ethnoracial groups...The categories used to count and classify the population determine the official statistical picture of the kinds of human beings who comprise a given nation” (Loveman 2014:301), and therein shape who has standing to engage in the politics of redistribution. As Loveman (2014) described, those officially counted can leverage official statistics in support of specific demands for representation, rights, and/or redress, and those of indigenous or Afro-descent have historically been left out of the picture. These struggles over recognition and which lines of ethnoracial distinction get official sanction while others remain statistically invisible, as well as who gets to speak for whom, shape the visions of progressive social policy that emerge in a way that moves beyond a traditional democracy-based explanatory framework.

## BRINGING THE STATE (AND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP) BACK IN

Thus, the work detailed above that has considered the relative importance of democracy on welfare state development offers anything but some kind of clear traditional explanation of how these two are connected. Though democratization is generally found to be correlated with social welfare commitments and outcomes of the state, left parties, believed to be central in most

political explanations of welfare state development from Marshall through power resource and power constellations theory, frequently receive conditional (at best) importance and one that has been declining over time. In fact, the literature on democracy and the Latin American welfare state finds many of the same issues that were discovered with the partisan and institutionalist approaches in welfare states outside of the region.

To start, these studies highlight the inconsistencies shown to be inherent in the traditional approaches when it comes to explaining how democracy shapes welfare state development in Latin America. Here too, democracies are in some cases positioned as institutional spaces for social groups and, specifically, left parties to pool their political resources and direct the trajectory of social welfare policy efforts, but in others this institutional setting is presented as a barrier that limits or constrains these kinds of social policy efforts. Even when left parties are viewed as potentially viable means of directing the social policy desires of the electorate, these institutional spaces are still often found to limit the types of left parties, activities and policies that can be effective. Yet, somehow at the same time, these constraining effects that should cut across partisan lines and promote stable trajectories of development seemingly disappear when we identify region-wide shifts toward neoliberal and later what appear to be social investment welfare state models (Jenson 2015; Morel, Palier & Palme 2012). These partisan and institutionalist traditional perspectives once again present the unsatisfying proposition that democracies promote welfare state growth, except for all of the times when they promote the status quo or retrenchment.

If this weren't enough to highlight the inadequacies of existing theory, many of the analyses of Latin America fail to find as strong a distinction between democracies and

authoritarian regimes as would be expected from the literature. And here too, in many cases the social rights pillars of the welfare states in the region were introduced during authoritarian regimes that preceded turns toward democracy. Therefore, we are presented with more evidence that the democratic lines of theory that have coalesced around the power constellations theory of welfare state development fail not only to adequately explain variation in modern welfare developments but also the early periods of welfare state emergence. While institutionalist explanations involving elements like institutional veto points may help us understand a little why dramatic transformations like the emergence of welfare states were possible under these authoritarian regimes, these explanations in the literature on Latin America still have not provided a viable explanation of *why* states adopted these systems of social protection and provision to begin with.

Overall, the analyses of welfare state developments in Latin America provide even more damning evidence that the traditional partisan and institutionalist takes on welfare state development fail to offer a meaningful explanation of this process as is. Their inability to adequately explain the historical development of welfare states in the Latin American region show that, at best, dominant democracy-based perspectives may be helpful explaining some welfare state outcomes in developed, affluent (and long-standing) democracies, though even this may be overstating their utility based on earlier discussions. Given the lack of consistent support, these Latin American studies of welfare state development demonstrate even more that there is a need to finally go beyond the democracy-based approaches that tend to focus on labor and the left, like that of Huber and Stephens (2012), and to look at other elements structuring welfare state outcomes across regime types in order to finally effectively answer the question: What

shapes welfare state development connected and why? Fortunately, though, this Latin American welfare state literature not only highlights many of the issues with existing theory but also provides several overlooked insights that provide for a new model of welfare state development.

First, many of the studies discussed in the above Latin American literature on democracy and welfare state development discuss the powerful and independent role played by state elite actors in shaping the direction of social welfare developments. Most explicitly, Postero (2010) asserted that Bolivia's adoption of multiculturalism policies (seemingly meant to improve the welfare of its indigenous population and potentially driven by indigenous demands for greater protection) "was a top-down effort by the neoliberal state to incorporate indigenous peoples into the national project as responsible and docile neoliberal subjects" (p. 22). Tenorio (2014) also noted that governments choose to respond to the interests of relatively more organized groups, like the mobilized black activists in the late 1990s and early 2000s that negotiated with high-level government officials to address entrenched state discourses of colorblindness and race mixture and pursue greater racial equality through social policy Paschel (2017) observed, while suppressing and demobilizing relatively unorganized and more heterogeneous protest movements, in explaining how organized labor conditions the social policy outcomes of democracies. Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) determined that the distinct social-welfare models of Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin America were largely imposed by state political elites who either controlled or repressed civil society or co-opted workers, peasants and the organizations and political parties that represented them. They also found that the policy legacies of these earlier state elite actions, in combination with economic circumstances, forced state



elites to pursue reform and retrenchment in the face of societal demands for social welfare provisions and protections.

This (at times constrained) singular policy development and implementation powers of state elites was picked up on by Weyland (2004) who noted that it contributed to weakened civil and political society organizations, including political parties, and political participation overall. For the poorer segments of society, Holzner (2007) found that these kinds of effects on voter turnout, petitioning activity, and feelings of political interest and efficacy have been particularly steep, as a growing sense of distance between them and the state and increasing pessimism about their policy influence has emerged. Almeida (2007), Roberts (2008; 2014; 2016) and Silva (2009) have similarly discussed how traditional systems of political representation and action through parties throughout Latin America have seemingly been replaced with mass-protest and collective mobilization, with representational deficiencies and the active efforts of state elites to demobilize civil society, depoliticize the issues the matter to them, and curtail their social citizenship rights having been cited as explanations for this move away from the party politics democracy-based explanations of welfare state development see as essential.

And, this theme of policy activity being divorced from representational politics came through in the discussions of technopoliticians as well. Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2014; 2016) and Blofield (2016) found that the ability of these actors to impose their top-down policy agenda without input from other elements of society, and even manage opposition to social policies after they were put in place, shaped social policy outcomes in areas as diverse as social insurance, early child education and care policy and parental leave reform.

Pribble (2013b), similarly, identified technocratic elites as a key component of one left-party led pathway to welfare state universalism.

Thus, this well-documented powerful and independent role played by state elite actors in shaping the direction of social welfare developments seems to re-direct us to the state-centered theory briefly introduced earlier in the chapter. This theoretical approach has paid particular attention to the importance of state capacity in explaining domestic developments and have informed path dependent explanations of welfare state development. But, as mentioned earlier, this is not the only key theoretical concept this line of scholarship introduced. These scholars have also shown how state actors have the ability to act and pursue goals autonomous from those of the citizens that live within the state's borders, or, in Skocpol's words (1985), can "implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances" (p. 9).

Next, this Latin American welfare state literature has also brought to light that any positive effects of democracies, in comparison with non-democracies, appears to largely operate conditionally or within particular domains of the welfare state rather than uniformly across the welfare state as a whole. Concerning overall welfare state differences between democracies and non-democracies, Brown & Hunter (1999) originally found that democracies increase the allocation of resources to social programs relative to authoritarian regimes under conditions of less economic development and economic crisis, but these differences dissipate when economic constraints subside and income rises because authoritarian regimes increase spending at a faster rate than democratic regimes. Avelino et al. (2005) presented similar findings, wherein democracies tend to spend more than authoritarian regimes at low levels of financial

liberalization, but as countries liberalize capital markets these differences disappear, with both regime types providing similar levels of social spending at the highest levels of liberalization, suggesting that economic development is the important factor here rather than democracy.

Within the specific education, health, and social security and welfare domains of the welfare state, and in chorus with other scholars who have addressed the multiple and potentially conflicting effects of the “many hands of the state” (Morgan & Orloff 2017), several studies of Latin American welfare states above have shown that the effects found for the social investment domains of health and education seem to differ considerably from that of social security and welfare, and that, in some cases, authoritarian regimes were found to be more strongly associated with social security and welfare commitments than democracies. This can be seen in Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), which found that established democratic regimes were associated with greater health and education spending while both established and newly democratic regimes had a negative correlation with social security and welfare spending. A similar trend was found in both Brown and Hunter (2004) and Avelino et. al (2005) where, in both cases, democracy was tied to increased education spending. Finally, Huber et. al (2008), who found democracy to be a significant predictor of social security and welfare plus health and education spending, identified that authoritarian regimes did not retrench spending on social security and welfare, like they did with health and education, and actually possessed a (non-statistically significant) positive association with social security and welfare twice the size of democracy.

These differences seem to suggest that, generally, different sets of priorities exist among the state elites just discussed in democracies and authoritarian political regimes, which traditional democracy-focused explanations have ignored. Democracies tend to prioritize

spending on areas associated with social investment, which is more likely to be universalistic in nature, while non-democracies seem to be primarily focused on spending on social security and welfare, which can be more particularistic in its aim. This aligns with the argument that Grassi (2014) made earlier that democratic regimes are more likely to reach progressive welfare outcomes than authoritarian governments or regimes because authoritarian political elites do not have the same impetus for supporting egalitarian measures, and will instead redirect social resources to personal or private goals and uphold or increase existing political and social inequality. Acknowledging the different scope that these different social welfare priorities address seems to help us understand why there appears to be such a limited connection between democracy and social security, and why authoritarian regimes may actually be spending more in this area: these autonomous leaders of the state are choosing to do so because they can direct them specifically to either themselves or those who align with and legitimate their interests.

From this insight in the Latin America welfare state literature a new question immediately comes to the fore: What motivates these differences in approaches (and, therein welfare state commitments) among state elites across democracies and non-democracies regarding who should receive social benefits and protections? Fortunately, the Latin American welfare state research introduced in this chapter helps us answer this question too and provides us with several final insights. To begin with, this literature raises two possible processes at play, one based on the accumulation of political power and one based on notions of citizenship. In the former case, Avelino et al (2005) and Huber et al (2008) suggest that democracies and authoritarian regimes, respectively, maintain high spending levels in the social security domain of the welfare state because the groups that receive these benefits possess the political power to

oppose the actions of state elites if state actors decided to reduce this spending. This particular explanation, though, is problematic for several reasons discussed previously. First, this explanation undercuts the documented autonomous power of state elites over policy decisions by positioning them as simply responding to the desire of powerful societal interests. In doing so, this explanation is also guilty of applying to authoritarian regimes a traditional political-institutional logic to the politics of the welfare state that should not operate in that context according to that line of theory. Last but not least, this explanation is of questionable utility because it is essentially the product of arm-chair theorizing, since none of the studies that proposed this explanation actually analyzed the political decision-making processes of policymakers.

A more promising explanation is the one rooted in notions of citizenship that, alternatively, is supported by empirical analysis and returns us to the concept that was fundamental to Marshall (1950): social citizenship. In the studies discussed earlier, Lo Voulo (2013) and Haagh (2013) most directly addressed the importance of citizenship in their scholarship on basic universal incomes, which they rename citizens' incomes. Lo Voulo (2013) argued that lack of existing citizen's incomes and their absence from the political agendas in Latin American welfare states are a product of the multiple inequalities and accompanying discrimination that permeate Latin America historically, which have limited the extension of political rights and, according to Marshall (1950), the extension of social citizenship. Haagh (2013) makes the same point and argues that these inequalities in the extension of citizenship have led to weak democracies and weak, unequal institutions of social insurance. Similarly, Almeida (2007) and Roberts (2008; 2014; 2016) position the rise of mass-demonstrations against

the neoliberal politics of welfare state transformation in the late 1990s through early 2000s as a product of the perception of civil society that rights of citizenship, and the benefits that accompany them, were being threatened by the actions of state elites. Postero (2010) also addressed this topic of neoliberal transformation and citizenship, but did so by looking at the impact of multiculturalism policies in Bolivia. In this analytical context, Postero (2010) found that this neoliberal multiculturalism effort was a state-elite driven project to incorporate indigenous peoples that had largely been excluded, which, eventually (and indirectly), opened the door to increased political influence and the prioritization of policies that addressed the inequalities indigenous communities faced.

Postero (2010), in particular, highlights two important points here. First, as can also be seen in Lo Voulo (2013), Haagh (2013) and Almeida (2007), Postero (2010) introduces a distinction between legal citizenship and social citizenship exists, as the state's attempt to incorporate indigenous communities was not an effort to translate non-citizens into citizens but rather to change their position within the social framework of Bolivian society. When Marshall (1950) described the trajectory of the acquisition of civil and political rights via democracy leading to the emergence of strong welfare states, for Marshall this brought with it the realization of *social* citizenship, which grants a societally recognized citizenship status that allows members of this status group to then petition for other social rights that will reduce existing societal inequities (and ensure that the welfare state that made this new social citizenship possible remains in place).

Built into Marshall's conception of social citizenship was the notion that boundaries between who will and will not receive the rights, protections and benefits that come with

citizenship are not wholly defined legally within states, but are defined via other salient social axes that exist within the state's boundaries as well. What the Latin American work discussed here demonstrates is that states vary based on how they understand who is deserving of the rights and responsibilities of true, social citizenship status and any benefits that come with it, which may then help better explain the cross-national variation in welfare states we have seen historically. Postero (2010), specifically, made the contribution of identifying potential axes of social citizenship status.

Postero (2010) shows that not only did inequalities according to citizenship shape the trajectory of welfare state development in Bolivia, but also that race/ethnicity shape these boundaries of citizenship. The ethnoracial nature of the boundaries of citizenship identified by Postero (2010) was an important element picked up by other scholars in the Latin American literature as well. Loveman (2014) showed that, across Latin America, the politics of ethnoracial classification that accompanied census creation defined the boundaries of who was understood to be a citizen and was entitled to political and social rights, plus any social rights that followed. Loveman (2014) highlighted that the obfuscation and exclusion of the indigenous and those with African ancestry from official statistics historically have hindered their opportunities their opportunities to attain the rights and benefits that come with being recognized as a member of the 'nation' (a citizen). Paschel (2017) subsequently showed in the Brazilian case that the increased recognition of the black community within this state in the late 1990s through early 2000s and the disappearance of discourses of colorblindness and of being a "racial paradise" that hid blackness from view, which followed from changing international political fields and the

work of black activists, would provide them with the standing to then pursue measures, like social welfare policy, to further reduce inequality.

But, of course, that is not the only important axis shaping citizenship extolled by the above Latin American welfare state literature either. Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) and Blofield (2016) both detailed how different conceptions of women's rights held by the state technopoliticians that develop policy have shaped the priorities and resulting social policy adopted by different states. According to Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016), the presence of feminist actors in the policy creation process in Uruguay led to more universal and inclusionary early child education and care policies than was found in Costa Rica where the presence of policy actors concerned specifically with women's rights were absent. Looking at Uruguay as well, but this time in comparison with Chile with regard to parental leave policy, Blofield (2016) also detailed how important the presence of feminist actors was in shaping the outcomes in this area as well. Their presence in Uruguay led to reform in Uruguay that promoted shared parental leave and better addressed inequalities related to providing care and labor market discrimination for women than was passed in Chile.

On top of this, both sets of work addressing the ethnoracial and gender-based bounds of citizenship also come together to identify another key aspect of what motivates the different approaches state elites take in deciding who will receive social welfare protections and provisions: historically contingent (international and domestic) political fields. Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) describe how feminist technopoliticians' engagement in a broader political context of concern about gender equity conditioned the more equitable social policies implemented in the areas of early child education found in Uruguay. This was



expounded upon by Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2014) as well, who stated that technopoliticians translate and adopt international ideas into domestic policy that they encounter through transnational policy networks. In a similar vein, both Loveman (2014) and Paschel (2017) referenced the impact of changing positions around the topic of race within international political fields upon state constructions of ethnoracial boundaries of citizenship and, in turn, welfare state access.

All together, these insights from the literature offer a clear alternative explanation of what is motivating different trajectories of welfare state development. Existing theories' focus on democratic institutions of the state and the possibilities of multiple societal forces to intervene and shape what the possibilities of welfare state development look like has misconstrued and overlooked the important role that state elites (i.e., the executive leadership made up of heads of state and their inner circle) play from start to finish in social policy processes. State elites, located within historically contingent domestic and international political fields and in pursuit of achieving their own particular priorities, shape the agenda (with the capabilities afforded by their control over state apparatuses) for and realities of welfare state developments through a process of defining who is (really) a citizen, and therefore who matters and is eligible for social provisions and protections. In defining the boundaries of citizenship and the priorities that the welfare state will pursue, state elites shape the terrain upon which future social policy actions are created and/or contested and, as a result orient welfare states toward particular trajectories of development. Cross-national differences in social welfare commitments, therefore, can be understood not as a direct result of the presence or absence of democracy, nor strong left and/or labor parties, but instead as a product of the varying models of social citizenship that exist within

democracies and non-democracies alike. The lack of a consistent effect of democracy can now be identified as a result of the fact that, though democracies may frequently adopt social citizenship values and priorities that extend beyond those of authoritarian regimes rooted in maintaining existing power hierarchies, democracies are still expected to differ amongst themselves in terms of how they define social citizenship, the priorities they pursue and, as a result, the trajectories they individually follow.

But, if partisan politics or institutions are not primarily responsible for social policy pathways and state elite paradigms of citizenship (conditioned by the historical international and domestic political fields in which they reside) are, how are these transmitted to society? What would we investigate in order to evaluate state elites' views of social citizenship on the ground? The Latin American welfare state literature is not as useful on this particular front, but a look back at previous studies of the postcommunist welfare states provides us with a promising solution. As discussed earlier, Orenstein (2008) found that the strongest democracies tend to be associated with greater social expenditure on social protection among postcommunist welfare states, but that authoritarian welfare states maintain spending levels on par with other, lesser democratic regimes, and more than welfare states in other parts of the developing world, due to their long histories of social programs that extend back to the communist period (and in some cases even before then). In explaining the impact of this developmental history upon more modern welfare state developments, Orenstein (2008) stated that "Communist governments provided far more social benefits to their citizens than did other authoritarian states, proving that democracies had not cornered the market on the provision of welfare" because "Communist ideals, which emphasized equality and valued the working class, had a major impact on state

behavior” (p. 83). Analyzing these *ideals* and *values* that serve as markers of the particular frameworks of social citizenship that permeate down from elites and structure the activities of society, then, appears to be a strong way of studying state elites’ broader understandings of social citizenship and how these translate to differences in social welfare development across democracies and non-democracies alike.

With the ongoing and growing concern surrounding the movement toward autocracy and authoritarianism noted at the beginning of the chapter, new analyses that reevaluate the importance of regime type to the welfare state and compare it against the alternative state elite model of welfare state development identified above, with its emphasis on the ideals, values and overarching paradigms of social citizenship, appears necessary. The chapters provide just this. Ultimately, these analyses provide support for a state elite power model of welfare state development that better explains welfare state heterogeneity in both democratic and autocratic regimes than the traditional democratic ones, but still, similarly, emphasizes a relationship between the welfare state and social citizenship. This new model, though, switches the causal pathway that exists between these two elements. In the Marshall-influenced perspectives, the welfare state is a mechanism shaping the outcome of social citizenship; the analyses in the chapters to come show that social citizenship is a mechanism shaping welfare state outcomes, and one tied to the interests and priorities of state elites. In this new model, the generosity of the welfare state is not an indicator of the degree of social citizenship attained, but are largely a reflection of the interests and priorities of state elites in the face of numerous crises, and the social citizenship paradigms they manufacture and distribute in light of these. In this new formulation, citizens are no longer those that see their push for welfare reforms directly lead to

the securement of social citizenship but rather those who can create the kinds of crises that shape the social citizenship paradigms state elites deploy and, therein, the welfare developments they push for.

## THE MULTI-METHOD FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

In carrying out these analyses, I employ what can be seen as a complete overhaul of the traditional “pathway analysis” approach to multi-method research, which encompasses a mixed-method nested approach that consists of regression analysis and case studies of welfare states identified from regression as suitable cases for investigation (Weller & Barnes 2016:426; Lieberman 2005). As outlined by Lieberman (2005) this nested approach would usually start with a statistical, Large-N Analysis (LNA) component that provides a preliminary analysis and direction for case selection and within-case analysis in the subsequent Small-N Analysis (SNA) component. In this kind of multi-method approach, the SNA can be either be oriented toward “Model-testing” or “Model-building”, and the approach adopted here starts, in a sense, with a “Model-testing” approach that evaluates the findings of previous work discussed above in light of newer and more diverse data (Lieberman 2005:436). In this design, the inclusion of these SNAs with LNAs provides an opportunity to integrate “thin” with “thick” analysis and expand inferential leverage by addressing potential issues such as causal direction and spuriousness, as well as causal processes & mechanisms (Brady & Collier 2010:180-181). But, the analytical approach taken here that carries through the chapters that follow draws heavily from the more recent insights of Seawright (2016) and adopts an innovative multi-method strategy that leverages, layers, and integrates the insights provided by multiple quantitative and qualitative designs in order to produce a stronger and more thorough overall analysis.

In the book *Multi-Method Social Science*, Seawright (2016) responds to the claim by Goertz and Mahoney (2012) that qualitative and quantitative research address distinct types of causation, inferences and research agendas and proposes that quantitative and qualitative methods can be combined using an integrative multi-method research framework, wherein one method provides the key causal inference, and the other is used to design, refine, bolster and, principally, test the key assumptions involved in that causal inference. Seawright (2016) argues that while different tools and different questions are offered by qualitative and quantitative research, these different tools and questions still coalesce around a shared understanding of causation under a potential-outcomes framework. In this potential-outcomes framework, “causal effects are characterized as the difference between what actually happens in a given case and what would have happened had that case been assigned to a different treatment category” (Seawright 2016:19). As such, this language of the potential-outcomes framework embodies key elements from both quantitative research (Morgan and Winship 2007; Angrist and Pischke 2009) and qualitative research that draws on the three common themes of regularity (Ragin 1987; 2000; Mahoney 2004), counterfactuals (Tetlock and Belkin 1996; Lebow 2010), and mechanisms and pathways (Collier et al. 2004; George and Bennett 2004; McKeown 2004) found in many qualitative approaches. Integrative multi-method research, therefore, presents an opportunity to tap the different tools and questions that quantitative and qualitative approaches each provide under a shared potential-outcomes conception of causation to develop causal theories and make causal inferences.

Beyond that, as discussed by Seawright (2016), an integrative multi-method approach allows each method to focus on what it is good at, substituting strengths for weaknesses, and in

the process eliminate potential inferential weaknesses. It avoids issues around reconciling the different kinds of inferences addressed by quantitative and qualitative analysis by using them to ask different kinds of questions about separate issues related to the causal inference of interest. In doing so, according to Seawright (2016), this type of integrative multi-method research provides inferential advantages over single-method research, triangulation-based analyses that simply ask the same question using two different methods, and the traditional pathway analyses discussed above through its clear focus on testing assumptions that frequently go untested in the other approaches just mentioned. For this reason, an integrative multi-method design, like the one that is employed here, offers a design in which quantitative and qualitative methods are carefully combined to produce a robust, high-quality and unified causal inference (Seawright 2016).

What enables these kinds of integrative multi-method design to be so effective? As discussed by Seawright (2016), these benefits are in large part derived through the sequential design that this multi-method approach adopts, wherein one analysis informs what comes next as part of a “cycle of discovery and refinement” (p. 10). This cycle presents another fundamental difference from even the traditional pathway analysis variant of multi-method research. Not only does a truly integrative use one type of method to derive causal inference and another to test and refine it, this approach encourages the incorporation of any potential insights gained from the first two analyses into further (potentially multi-method) analyses, instead of settling for (at most) a two-stage analytic design. When case studies are incorporated into this sequential design, an ideal version of this integrative multi-method approach also benefits from the adoption of extreme-case and deviant-case selection strategies that are best situated to evaluate the measurement of the independent and dependent variables, identify omitted variables and

interactions, and examine causal pathways (Seawright 2016). These case selection strategies are adopted in the integrative multi-method design undertaken here.

In incorporating these benefits provided by uniting quantitative and qualitative analysis, such a design generally takes one of two different forms. The first of these forms relies on quantitative analysis (typically standard regression) to obtain a primary causal effect estimate, before then moving on to, normally, case studies that serve an important, but secondary role in refining the results, testing its key assumptions, and potentially setting up subsequent analyses, as the case studies can provide crucial evidence concerning measurement quality, the plausibility of hypothesized causal paths, and the potential presence of omitted variables. Alternatively, an integrative multi-method design can take the opposite form. Seawright (2016) describes three different variants of this multi-method design that utilize case study analysis: 1) quantitative analysis tests the generalizability of qualitative findings, 2) quantitative analysis generates causal effect estimates to precisely quantify effects discovered in qualitative analysis, and 3) quantitative analysis is used as a key component of process tracing. In the latter case, qualitative methods (usually revolving around case studies) can be directed toward producing the primary causal inference, while quantitative analyses are drawn on to test one or more key steps in the causal chain that are purported to link an initial cause to an outcome of interest. Identifying the expected effects of these key steps in the quantitative analysis lends strong support to the causal model identified in the original qualitative analysis, while unexpected results can identify areas where the proposed model needs to be refined and potentially inform subsequent analyses.

As discussed in greater detail in the section and chapters that follow, the analytic approach taken here borrows from the second set, where qualitative case studies bear much of

the weight in establishing causal inference and quantitative (regression-based) analyses are utilized to test the proposed key causal mechanism of social citizenship paradigms linking state elite interests and priorities to welfare state outcomes. The qualifier of ‘borrows from’ is key here because the research design adopted here sets out to maximize the inferential power and flexibility provided by the integrative multi-method design and incorporates all three of the above qualitative-focused multi-method variants into the overall research design. The methodological approach taken here leverages the cycles of discovery and refinement enabled by an integrative multi-method design to 1) test, compare and clarify the effect of the key causal mechanism using quantitative analysis, 2) produce the primary causal inference using comparative qualitative analysis, 3) quantify and evaluate the generalizability of the effect of an important factor conditioning the causal mechanism identified by previous qualitative analysis in a new quantitative analysis, and 4) finally, refine the previous causal inference further through a new qualitative analysis that draws upon the information learned from the three previous analyses and extends it to a new setting to evaluate their overall generalizability.

## OUTLINE OF THE ANALYSES TO COME

Chapter 2 kicks off the multi-method analyses by evaluating the effects of the traditional explanatory factors of democracy and left party power against the (broader archetypes of) social citizenship paradigms, and the economic state capacity that supports them, that are central to the state elite model of welfare state development. It does so through a series of Prais-Winston regression analyses utilizing correlated panel corrected standard errors on Latin American cross-national data from 1980-2013 across the welfare state domains of education, health, social security and welfare, and aggregate public social expenditure, as well as public social pension



benefits and coverage. As noted above, this regression analysis does not focus on producing causal inference but instead sets its sights on testing and quantifying the effect of the expected causal mechanisms in the new model, and comparing them against the effects of political regime type and left party power in order to assess the strength of these effects against traditional explanations that see social citizenship as an outcome instead.

Overall, these analyses reveal that the social citizenship paradigm and state capacity elements that underlie the hypothesized relationship between state elites and welfare state outcomes are stronger and more consistent predictors of welfare state outcomes than the traditional political regime type and partisan strength factors frequently focused on in previous welfare state studies, which demonstrate much weaker connections to welfare state outcomes than would be expected in the traditional welfare state literature and support the critiques of partisan and institutionalist approaches that have emerged. By taking an analytic approach that looks at these potential relationships across each of the six welfare state outcome areas mentioned above and recognizes the ‘many hands of the state’ (Morgan & Orloff 2017), these analyses also identify the ways in which these effects vary based on social citizenship paradigm characteristics (namely those related to inclusion and executive power), the welfare state domain of interest, and economic capacity. The inclusion of additional moderation analyses in this chapter further highlights how, though political regime type can condition the effects of inclusionary social citizenship paradigms on welfare state outcomes, democracy is not nearly as important as social citizenship paradigms and economic capacity are to the trajectory of welfare state development. In sum, they supply the first crucial pieces of evidence supporting the new hypothesized state elite model of welfare state development, and they also offer some evidence

that changes in social citizenship paradigms may help explain global transitions toward enabling/social investment welfare states in the process.

Afterward, Chapter 3 introduces the comparative-historical case study analyses that do the heavy lifting in terms of producing causal inference in this overall research design. These case study analyses, as discussed earlier, set out to establish whether the connection between social citizenship paradigms and welfare state outcomes identified in the previous chapter is part of a causal chain that, in the new model of welfare state development being evaluated, links state elite interests and priorities to particular outcomes of welfare state development. Through process tracing within the four South and Central American case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala that were selected through an extreme-case selection strategy, these analyses investigate whether social citizenship paradigms are historically identifiable across Latin America, state elites possess identifiable autonomous interests and priorities that would lead to these social citizenship paradigms, and, welfare state outcomes correspond with both social citizenship paradigms and the state elite interests and priorities that precede them. Specifically, these case study analyses incorporate a series of ‘smoking gun’ tests to test if social citizenship paradigms provide a sufficient link between state elite interests and priorities and welfare state development across disparate national settings within Latin America.

Ultimately, these four Latin American case studies lend strong support to the hypothesized model of welfare state development being tested. These case studies identify common state elite interests and priorities in strengthening the state, managing social disorder, (re-)asserting control, and, principally, securing their political future, and show how these are tied to the social citizenship paradigms that are deployed and the welfare reform efforts that are

pursued and implemented. In addition, this comparative-historical analysis clearly demonstrates that state elites within both non-democracies and democracies alike possess this ability to develop and diffuse such social citizenship paradigms, that political party affiliation does not connect to welfare state outcomes in the ways expected by traditional welfare state theories, and that economic state capacity (instead) is one of the factors that conditions the kinds of welfare state efforts adopted, as states with greater state capacity are found to build stronger welfare states than those with less. This analysis also reveals how state elite interests and priorities are shaped by the prior actions of previous elites, which inspire path dependent trajectories of welfare state development, but ones that, collectively, have still come to a shared emphasis on social investment commitments as state elites in each country have sought to minimize social and economic crises. Importantly, these case studies also identify an important, but unclear role that civil conflict plays in welfare state development in the state-elite-driven model.

Based on this latter finding, Chapter 4 returns to quantitative analyses to evaluate the potential, under-explored connections between civil conflict, social citizenship paradigms, and the six welfare state outcomes focused on in Chapter 2. As in Chapter 2, these quantitative analyses consist of Prais-Winsten regression and moderation analyses using correlated panel corrected standard errors on Latin American cross-national data covering the period from 1980-2013. These analyses address how civil conflict affects the welfare state in the short-term, and how it factors into the model of welfare state development that were developed, tested and supported in the preceding chapters.

In general, the analyses in Chapter 4 indicate that civil conflict immediately imposes an obstacle to expanding welfare state commitments in the short-term. These analyses show, more

specifically, that civil conflict conditions the ability of state elites to achieve their interests through welfare state action by constraining the social pension benefits that the state offers in general and by constraining the potential for increasing social pension benefits through the deployment of social citizenship paradigms that fall within the deliberative archetype, in particular. Overall, then, these results show how the use of the despotic power of the state immediately shapes the infrastructural power that state elites draw upon to pursue their interests, and the welfare state developments that follow from them, leading to a trajectory of less generous social provision.

Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes the overall research agenda by re-capping the findings of the previous analyses and investigating how these discoveries translate to cases beyond those of Latin America. In keeping with the ‘in the Americas’ moniker of these analyses, this final set of analyses explores the generalizability of the new state-elite-driven model of welfare state development, where state elites attempt to shape welfare state development through the diffusion of social citizenship paradigms, by examining welfare state development within the United States of America. This United States case study provides a uniquely ideal setting to investigate such a question (as part of a deviant case-selection strategy) given its own influential position within the Americas and historical similarities related to colonialism, its position as one of the traditional affluent democracies typically addressed by welfare state research, and its ‘exceptional’ trajectory of welfare state development.

The brief analysis of the United States in this final chapter suggests that the model of welfare state development evaluated throughout is not restricted only to Latin American cases. Like the Latin American case studies before it, the United States case provides evidence that

state elites use their relative autonomy and capacity to shape welfare state development through identifiable social citizenship paradigms generally oriented around strengthening the state, establishing order, maintaining control, and securing their political survival (while other traditional explanations for welfare state development fall by the wayside), identifies important effects of civil conflict, and suggests that the interests of state elites in minimizing social and economic crises explains the United States' adoption of social-investment-oriented welfare state commitments.

## **Chapter 2 – Democracy, Social Citizenship Paradigms, Economic Capacity and the Welfare State in Latin America, 1980 – 2013**

The Latin American welfare state research on the link between democracy and the welfare state discussed in the prior chapter demonstrates that the connection between the two does not seamlessly line up with the dominant paradigm established by Marshall (1950). As Marshall (1950) envisioned it, the post-war welfare state represented the culmination of a march from civil rights to political rights to social rights of citizenship within a democracy, wherein this enhancement of social citizenship that came with the emergence of a welfare state would address the class differences that had survived what he described as the “war” between citizenship and the capitalist class system. In this formulation (and popular partisan-institutionalist ones since), democracy is positioned as the necessary steppingstone toward welfare state development, and, just as importantly, welfare state development is measured according to the degree to which social citizenship has been attained.

Yet, the Latin American welfare state literature presents an alternative perspective on how political regime type and welfare state development could be connected. Based on these collective findings, it appears that state elites, located within historically contingent domestic and international political fields around both democratic and non-democratic political regimes, implement social policy in line with their independent interests (conditional upon the resources available to the state), and do so (at least in part) by defining and constructing the boundaries of social citizenship and, therefore, who will be eligible for the social provisions and protections of the welfare state. Through the particular social citizenship paradigms state elites craft, and the beliefs, values and other elements that then inform the initial welfare state policies they pursue,

state elites set the direction that future social policy actions and responses build upon and push welfare states toward particular trajectories of development. Variations in welfare state outcomes, thus, comes to be seen as a product of the cross-national variation in the interests of state elites and how they understand and frame social citizenship to serve those interests.

For this reason, this alternative understanding of the connection between political regimes and welfare state outcomes significantly changes the roles of democracy and social citizenship. First, democracies are still likely to be associated with better outcomes than authoritarian regimes due to less particularistic goals of democratic state elites and a more encompassing vision of social citizenship, but this distinction is not expected to be as strong nor consistent as Marshall, power resource or power constellations theorists would anticipate since democratic regimes themselves are also expected to vary considerably based on differences in state elite's priorities and the social citizenship paradigms employed. Secondly, in relation to social citizenship, this new approach also transforms social citizenship from an outcome by which to evaluate welfare state development to a mechanism that is shaping welfare state outcomes. In doing so, this approach introduces social citizenship as important predictor of welfare state outcomes that has been overlooked in traditional studies of welfare state development and transformation. It identifies the beliefs and value sets, and other characteristics that signal particular paradigms of social citizenship as a potentially important source of variation in such development and transformation that should be analyzed. Finally, under this state elite-driven perspective, national economic resources are an additional element that resurfaces in importance and is expected to have an impact on the nature of welfare state outcomes, since state elites'

social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state policies and programs that follow are expected to be tied in some part to the resources these state elites can draw on.

But, does this alternative model better explain cross-national variation in welfare state outcomes? Are differences in paradigms of social citizenship related to differences in welfare state outcomes? If so, which characteristics of social citizenship paradigms have a demonstrable effect on social welfare outcomes? In general, then, do the social citizenship paradigm and accompanying economic resource factors highlighted in this new model offer up stronger predictors of welfare state outcomes than other traditional, democracy-related factors? Unfortunately, these are essential questions that previous studies have left unaddressed. They are also the questions that the following sections of this chapter set out to answer. Ultimately, Prais-Winston regression analyses utilizing panel corrected standard errors on cross-national data of Latin America from 1980-2013 provide strong additional evidence that support the new model of welfare state development discussed above. In doing so, the results in this chapter highlight the limitations inherent in common theoretical approaches that focus on the formal institutional characteristics of political regimes and the resulting social inclusivity of welfare states, as these strategies ignore an important source of welfare state variation and obfuscate the multiple logics that can be at play even in democracies. The following section highlights how extensive these limitations in the existing literature have been.

## SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE WELFARE STATE

Citizenship, and social citizenship specifically, have been much discussed topics in the broad body of work on the welfare state and, like the literature on democracy and the welfare state, has been heavily influenced by Marshall (1950). This, of course, should probably not be at



all surprising since in Marshall's (1950) estimation democratization, social citizenship and the welfare state were all directly linked together. For Marshall (1950), social citizenship represented the actualized extension of rights and responsibilities that came with citizens being able to fully participate within their society and had emerged in England through a three-stage process in which civil rights were first protected, political rights then came to be cemented alongside political rights with democratization, and finally social rights were granted through the social provisions and protections of the welfare state. From this perspective, the securement of civil and political rights within a democracy was a necessary step toward the achievement of social citizenship, and the social rights that lead to the extension of social citizenship help maintain and strengthen those democracies. But, surprising or not, the development of a dominant social-scientific paradigm shaped by Marshall's perspective on social citizenship emerged and has had a tremendous impact on the way subsequent scholars have addressed the relationship between social citizenship and the welfare state in their work since.

Based on the three-stage process just discussed, this Marshallian understanding of social citizenship that has filtered into subsequent welfare state analyses has been one that establishes social citizenship as an important outcome that captures the effectiveness of the social policies that have been implemented and constitute a given democratic welfare state (Stephens 2010). But, within the subsequent body of studies, social citizenship has not been just *an* outcome by which to evaluate welfare states, instead it has been seen as *the* outcome by which to do so, which can especially be seen in the predominant power resources and power constellations studies. Esping-Andersen (1990), for example, drew on Marshall's perspective emphasis on social citizenship (and the alleviation of social inequalities that allow individuals to fully

participate to the degree that they themselves want to) in identifying stratification and de-commodification, or the degree to which individuals livelihoods are no longer reliant on the market, as the outcome measures of welfare state efforts by which to identify common cross-national models of welfare systems (e.g. liberal, conservative/corporatist and social democratic). As Esping-Andersen (1990) put it, “Few can disagree with T. H. Marshall’s (1950) proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state” and the concept of social citizenship “must involve the granting of social rights” (p. 21). For Esping-Andersen (1990), it was this conception of social citizenship that “will entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals *vis-à-vis* the market,” as “one’s status as a citizen will compete with, or even replace, one’s class position” (p. 21). It is this same logic that also leads Mares and Young (2019) to recently characterize the extension of welfare state programs as “pro-poor.”

In the same vein, this perspective of social citizenship as the outcome by which to evaluate welfare state developments has been at the center of the particularly influential power resource analyses of left vs. right political party distributive conflicts (Korpi 1989; Korpi & Palme 2003; Ferrarini, Nelson, Korpi & Palme 2013), and led to the creation of the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (SCIP) that supports much of the existing research on welfare states by providing quantitative and qualitative information on the structures of social insurance programs in 18 prominent OECD countries for the period of 1930–2000 (Korpi 2010). This data, specifically, has provided information on citizens' legislated rights and duties in major social insurance programs designed to alleviate the economic needs related to old age, illness, unemployment, work accidents and family change, since other outcome measures are not seen as providing a complete picture “of the content of social citizenship rights and duties, of their

variations and driving forces” deemed to be essential from the power resources perspective (Korpi 2010: S16).

The influence of this understanding of social citizenship as being shaped by welfare state development (and the presence of democracy that enables it), and particularly the power resources variant, has been felt in scholarship addressing Latin American welfare state developments. In their recent set of work, Carnes and Mares (2015; 2016) have argued that the bottom-up demands of a new coalition of middle-and-low-income citizens across Latin America have driven an expansion in social protection policies throughout the region that recognize the needs of the historically marginalized low-income class, and that within Bolivia, specifically, past expansionary social protection reforms directed at the informal sector enabled such a coalition to form. Prior to these recent social protection development, Oxhorn (2003) argued that the weak protection of civil rights throughout Latin America had disrupted the progression from civil rights to political rights to then social rights outlined by Marshall (1950) and produced weak civil societies unable to effectively accumulate power resources, which has limited the extension of the social rights of citizenship (if not led to their reversal in some instances) that are born out of state efforts to reduce socio-economic inequality. In the interim, Almeida (2007) and Roberts (2008; 2016) proposed that the turn toward mass demonstration forms of politics (rather than relying on typical political mobilization through parties) throughout the region represented just the latest example of civil society mobilizing their collective political power to push for greater social protections and provisions, and the extension of social citizenship rights that come along with them, in the wake of previous neoliberal state efforts which had weakened the welfare state and threatened to break down these rights.

Institutionalist analyses of the welfare state in Latin America have not been immune to this view of social citizenship being tied to welfare state developments. Huber and Stephens (2012), in merging a power resources perspective with an institutionalist one as part of their power constellations approach, assert that democracy has been central to the extension of social citizenship within Latin America because it has enabled the development of left parties that push for more redistributive policy across health, education, and social security domains (p. 3). More recently, Davies and Falleti (2017) have suggested that the combination of democratization and the decentralization of social services by the state has enabled local civic participation among the poor (and indigenous) in Bolivia that helps shape the management and distribution of social services to better meet their needs. Such emphases on social citizenship as an outcome within these kinds of analyses is not surprising, though, according to Banting (2006), because social citizenship has been and continues to be the dominant logic of the welfare state that institutional factors and logics like federalism must confront and potentially impact, making social citizenship once again the best means of evaluating the operation of welfare states.

This dominance of the Marshallian paradigm has often even meant that even work by those attempting to amend these lines of political institutionalist approaches have often done so through a framework that still envisions social citizenship as the metric to evaluate the welfare state by, rather than as a factor shaping the outcomes of welfare states. Orloff (1993) provides a perfect example of this in critiquing Esping-Andersen (1990) and arguing that analyses of the welfare state should expand the stratification dimension to consider the effects of social provision on gender relations (particularly the treatment of paid and unpaid labor), critique the de-commodification dimension for its gendered assumptions and for ignoring the differential

effects on men and women of benefits that de-commodify labor, and, as a result, introduce two additional dimensions to be considered in future analyses: access to paid work and the “capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household” (p. 322-323), or the ability for a women to ensure her economic security without relying upon a male-breadwinner. Here, Orloff (1993), outlines the inadequacies of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) approach yet at the same time reaffirms the social citizenship paradigm by identifying new dimensions that would help better capture the social citizenship conditions of the welfare state instead of interrogating the underlying social citizenship perspective altogether.

The acceptance of this paradigm is so strong, in fact, that it has lead Evers & Guillemard (2013) to state matter-of-factly that “A strong citizenship status—such as would exist in a society where people see each other, despite differences in wealth, occupation, and family background, as equals—obviously depends on the existence of a political community that is democratic and able to guarantee basic civil rights to all its members. This depends on social rights that reduce inequality and help to include all” where “political democracies, civil society and its public sphere are central both to state policies on social rights and citizenship and to people’s opinions on what they can legitimately expect from each other and from their welfare state” and “different welfare strategies point to different rights,” as they are trying to argue for a “post-Marshallian” approach (Evers & Guillemard 2013: 25-28)! For these scholars and many others, the Marshallian view of social rights’ and social citizenships’ as following democratization and emerging out of the “welfare mix” or “mixed economy” of the welfare state is so engrained that even efforts to move beyond it inevitably start by accepting its premises (Evers 1993; Johnson 1999).

That is not to say, though, that all studies have completely ignored how states construct the boundaries of deservingness that then feed into particular welfare state outcomes. The previously discussed Oxhorn (2003), for instance, proposed that the citizenship rights, including social citizenship rights, are socially constructed and that the breadth of citizenship rights is tied to the strength of civil society and its ability to accumulate power resources as part of their analysis of the weak extension of the social rights of citizenship in Latin America. In addition, a growing body of research on welfare nationalism has addressed how the efforts of creating and differentiating the “imagined political community imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” of a nation within a nation-state (Anderson 1991), and the national identities that come with it, have served to promote particular trajectories of welfare state development across the globe. Several scholars have shown that the early systems of welfare provision in the oft-discussed welfare states of Great Britain, France and Sweden were founded upon on a logic of deservingness tied to their contributions to their national society and fulfillment of the duties that come with being a recognized member of it (Bellamy 1992; Cmiel 1996; Klausen 1995). Similarly, other scholars have noted that early social welfare benefits in a variety of contexts, including the conservative German and Austrian regimes and periods of crisis, were tied to the construction of national identities and the differential distribution and generosity of these benefits afforded to those deemed most important (Crepaz & Damron 2009; Katzenstein 1985; Leibfried & Pierson 2000).

According to Suszycki (2011), these findings are emblematic of two ideal types of welfare nationalism that operate, the first being an “archeological” welfare nationalism that merges the nation, state and welfare into the core of a national identity that is used to justify

political decision-making processes, and the second an “instrumental” welfare nationalism where political actors use appeals to welfare nationalism to promote and maintain support. Both highlight a process of state influence and decision-making based on the independent political interests of state elites that has been shown to operate in Latin America (Weyland 2004; Holzner 2007; Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Postero 2010; Pribble 2013b; Tenorio 2014; Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea 2014; 2016; Blofield 2016; Paschel 2017). Emmenegger and Careja (2011) have shown that this pattern of welfare state nationalism can in fact be found both across Western Europe and beyond just the period of early welfare state formation. They argue that in Western Europe welfare state nationalism has held a constant presence in social benefit schemes, as national identity has been used to both justify the creation of parts of the welfare state and, more recently, has inspired welfare states to impose barriers to immigration and weaken the entitlements and social protections available to asylum seekers, and immigrants in general, maintaining a model of deservingness where immigrants are not viewed as deserving members of the community but instead as foreign opportunists, a group that is considered to be one of if not the least deserving of the social benefits of the welfare states across Europe (Applebaum 2002; Van Oorschot 2000; 2006).

The emergence of this welfare nationalism body of research can be seen as a byproduct of a broader cultural turn witnessed in social science research that has turned its attention to the causal role played by cultural processes and systems of signification tied to the classification and stratification powers of the state (Steinmetz 1999). In asserting the constitutive role of culture, this cultural turn has (re-)highlighted the power of discursive elements (which include the observable elements of state language, symbols, ideals, and values) and their established role as

important sources of welfare state path dependency (MacIntyre 1978; Taylor 1979). As a result, this cultural turn in research has encouraged the growing recognition that a given societal context imbues particular interpretive frameworks of ideas, classificatory action and values, which collectively form “paradigms,” that structure social relations and policy choices, including those associated with welfare systems, and, thus, that they are a necessary component to understanding the different observed patterns of welfare state development (Hall 1993:279, 290; Jenson 1989:238-239; 2004:172; Schmidt 2000; 2002).

Yet, this cultural approach that emphasizes state constructions of shared membership in the rights and responsibilities of the nation-state and the discursive elements like values that diffuse into society as part of broader paradigms to reinforce these constructions, however, has largely been divorced from traditional studies of social citizenship, as seen in the above distinction between ‘social citizenship’ and ‘nationalism’. To the degree that those addressing welfare nationalism speak of ‘citizenship’, they tend to do so from a more strictly legal sense, as seen in the focus on immigrants’ access to the welfare state. As a result, the theoretical insights provided by this cultural turn have to this point largely overlooked the impact that *paradigms of social citizenship* might have upon the welfare state.

The analyses that follow set out to address this issue in the literature. They ask the question: How would integrating the culturalist focus on the state’s classificatory and discursive influence with the social citizenship concept that Marshall brought to the forefront reshape out understanding of welfare state development? Does social citizenship itself have an effect on welfare state outcomes rather than just being one? If so, how does this vary among different kinds of paradigms (and associated characteristics) of social citizenship? Which paradigms and



characteristics of social citizenship have the strongest effects, and on what dimensions of the welfare state? Do these potential effects hold up against the regime type and partisan factors that Marshall (and the political-institutionalist scholars that have followed in his footsteps) believed to be the most important when examining cross-national welfare state development, the presupposed importance of economic resources, and other known or expected-to-be important factors?

These questions seem to be even more important as broad transformations of welfare states across the globe have raised questions about the modern utility of a traditional focus on the social citizenship outcomes of the welfare state. In particular, a new model of an active, “enabling” welfare state that turns its attention toward social investment (or human capital generation) has emerged, and risen to prominence particularly within Latin America, which eschews the focus on changes in entitlements and services associated with the social citizenship outcome approach in favor of social policies that invest in a society’s future, has made analyses using the traditional change in social citizenship lens of analysis difficult to interpret (Gilbert & Gilbert 1989; Giddens 1998; Esping-Andersen 2002; Evers & Guillemard 2013; Gilbert 2013). And, the diffusion of a social investment model of the welfare state is not unique in this respect; analyses of new social risks and the turn toward neoliberalism witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s earlier, had already highlighted the need for an alternate analytic approach that addresses the logics of welfare, how the systems of social provision and protection are justified, how the processes of redesign occur, and the impact this has (Evers & Guillemard 2013). Strongest of all, scholarship like Orloff and Skocpol (1984) and Taylor-Gooby (2009) documenting tendencies

toward clientelistic implementation of social policies cast doubt on the traditional understanding of social citizenship as a meaningful outcome altogether.

## DATA AND METHODS

Addressing these questions and the limitations of the existing literature, then, necessitates cross-national analyses of how democracy, social citizenship paradigms, national resources and other factors are connected to welfare state outcomes. To meet this need, I employ a series of Prais-Winsten regressions using correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) that conclude with moderation analyses on a dataset that draws upon secondary, cross-national data from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2016), V-Dem Institute (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein, Marquardt, Tzelgov, Wang, Krusell and Miri 2018), United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Cominetti & Ruiz 1998; ECLAC 2018) and the World Bank (2018), as well as Huber & Stephens' (2016) Latin America and Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2012 for the period of 1980-2013 and 18 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The models incorporated in these Prais-Winsten regression analyses using correlated PCSEs can be written as

$$y_{it} = 1 + x_{it-l}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where  $y$  is the outcome of interest;  $x$  is a vector of covariates;  $i = 1, \dots, m$  is the number of panels;  $t = 1, \dots, T_i$ ;  $T_i$  is the number of periods in panel  $i$ ; and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is a disturbance that is autocorrelated along  $t$  and contemporaneously correlated across  $i$  (Beck and Katz 1995).

This dataset covers the 34-year period of 1980-2013 for both substantive and methodological reasons. Substantively, this period covers Latin America's "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991), and thus captures variation on this independent variable of interest as other prior studies looking at this timeframe can attest to. Methodologically, using data from this period ensures that the widest amount of outcome data that comes from a consistent and reliable source is used for analysis.

These regression analyses focus primarily on the association between measures of democratization, social citizenship paradigm characteristics and social public expenditure-related outcomes the following year, which include both aggregate and education, health, and social security and welfare specific expenditure as well as public social pension benefits and coverage the following year. The independent democracy and social citizenship paradigm variables are derived from data from Huber and Stephens (2016), Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. (2018) and Pemstein et al. (2018), and Marshall et al. (2016), while the dependent social welfare variables originate from the exclusively ECLAC-affiliated sources (Cominetti & Ruiz 1998, ECLAC 2018). Control variables identified as potential key predictors of social expenditure from the literature are also been included. These consist of measures of left political strength, GDP per capita (which serves as a measure of national economic resources), age dependency, labor force participation among women,

unemployment rate, and globalization, drawn from Huber and Stephens (2016) and the World Bank's (2018) World Development Indicators (2018) database.

The dependent variables in this analysis are combined social public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, education public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, health public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, social security and welfare public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, weighted average social pension benefits in U.S. dollars and the number of people who receive social pension benefits. The first five of these outcome measures are logged transformed in the analyses that follow, while the measure of social pension coverage is not. This transformation helps increase the symmetry of the distribution and reduce non-linearity, while also changing the interpretation of results in the analyses that use the first five outcome measures, such that a one-unit change in an independent variable is no longer associated with percentage point changes in GDP among the public expenditure outcome measures, and dollar changes in the weighted average social pension benefit outcome measure, but instead percentage changes in public expenditures and benefit amounts, respectively.

To evaluate the effects of democratization and social citizenship paradigms on these measures of welfare state commitments and effort, multiple independent variables are utilized. First among these is the traditional measures of regime type: a dichotomous measure of democracy (1) vs autocracy (0) based on a "6" or greater 'polity2' score (Marshall et al. 2016). Second, four continuous measures that capture several common social citizenship paradigm archetypes (i.e., broader types of social citizenship paradigms rather than the specific variants of social citizenship paradigms seen on the ground) are included. These four measures are an egalitarian component index (focused on equal political participatory capacity through the

protection of political rights and the removal of inequality-based barriers to their exercise), deliberative component index (focused on public decision-making based on the common good), participatory component index (focused on active participation in political processes through civil society organizations and direct democracy), and a liberal component index (focused on individual rights and protections from the state) developed by the V-Dem Institute (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). From this point forward, they will be referred to as the egalitarian social citizenship index, deliberative social citizenship index, participatory social citizenship index, and liberal social citizenship index, respectively.

Each of these four social citizenship indexes are formed from component measures that capture important social-citizenship-related beliefs, values and other characteristics. The egalitarian social citizenship index is, specifically, formed by averaging equal protection, equal access, and equal distribution of resources indices that capture the degree to which rights and freedoms across social groups are equally protected, equal de facto capabilities to participate and serve in positions of political power and influence policymaking exist, and resources that structure political opportunities are distributed equally, respectively. The deliberative social citizenship index is formed by point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, range of consultation, and engaged society indicators, which capture the extent to which reasoned justifications of policy positions are provided to the public, policy positions are tied to the common good, counter-arguments are acknowledged and respected, a range of voices are consulted on policy matters, and society is engaged in public deliberations on policy matters are

drawn upon, respectively. The participatory social citizenship index is produced by averaging civil society participation, direct popular vote, elected local government power, and elected regional government power indices that address the level of civil society engagement, direct popular decision-making through initiatives, referendums and plebiscites, local government representation, and regional government representation, respectively. Finally, the liberal social citizenship index is the result of averaging equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on the executive indices that address commitments to equality before the law and civil liberties, constraints on the executive by independent judiciaries, and constraints on the executive by legislative bodies, respectively (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). These individual component measures will, themselves, be evaluated when the larger composite social citizenship paradigm indexes are shown to be important predictors of a particular welfare outcome. Additional information on the V-Dem Institute measures can be found in the Appendix.

Lastly, additional control variables are also included in order to accurately identify the impact of democracy and social citizenship paradigms on social public expenditure outcomes. The first, and the most emphasized in previous literature, is a measure of left political power operationalized as the percentage of left party seats in the Lower Houses of national legislatures that is a focal point in analyses addressing democratization (Huber & Stephens 2016). The next, and even more important for the analyses here, is a (mean-centered) control for GDP per capita that speaks to wealth disparities between countries in the region and, in doing so, captures the differential economic resources that each individual state (and the respective state elites in

power) can tap into (World Bank 2018). Measures of potential societal demand for social welfare programs and expenditures in the form of the age dependency ratio and the unemployment rate are also included. Age dependency ratio captures the ratio of the elderly and youth population that is most likely to benefit from any social expenditure to the working age population, while the percentage of the total labor force that is unemployed addresses precarity and demands on the social safety net. The labor force participation rate among women is also included to account for the increasing role of women in the labor market. Finally, I incorporate trade as a percentage of GDP and foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) as a percentage of GDP as indicators for trade openness and capital movement to capture the dimensions of globalization that previous research suggests may pose limits on expenditure (World Bank 2018). Summary statistics for all of the variables used in the analyses can be found in Table 2.1.

As the multiple democracy and social citizenship measures of interest would indicate, the analysis of the relationship between democracy, social citizenship paradigms and social welfare outcomes itself proceeds in a series of stages. To start, analyses of the relationship between democracy and each of the welfare state outcomes are introduced. This is then followed by analyses of the four liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian social citizenship paradigms and the six welfare state outcomes discussed above. Afterward, analyses of these four social citizenship paradigms while controlling for democracy are considered for the six welfare state outcomes. This is followed by subsequent moderation analyses that examine the interactive effect of democracy and economic capacity upon significant social citizenship paradigms to establish whether they each alter the strength of a potential causal relationship between, in this case, these social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state outcomes of interest (Aiken &

West 1991; Marsh, Hau, Wen, Nagengast & Morin 2011). These moderation analyses then inform the identification of full models incorporating social citizenship paradigms, democracy, economic capacity and interactions found to be significant. But, these full models do not represent the final step in the analysis. Instead, they serve as a jumping off point for the next stage of the analysis, where the underlying characteristics motivating significant social citizenship paradigm predictors of welfare state outcomes are investigated. These analyses of social citizenship paradigm characteristics are then followed by their own set of moderation analyses that examine the interactive effects of democracy and economic capacity upon them.

Thus, the methodological approach taken in this chapter incorporates the same sequential design principle at the heart of the multi-method social science research approach uniting each chapter in this overall project to strengthen this chapter's findings (Seawright 2016). In doing so, this study offers the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of the relationship between democracy, social citizenship and the welfare state to date. The results of this comprehensive analysis are found directly below.

## RESULTS

### *Democracy and Welfare State Outcomes*

To start, Table 2.2 presents the results of six individual regressions of (in order) combined, education, health, and social security and welfare public expenditure, and then social pension benefit levels and coverage, upon the traditional measure of (institutional) democracy discussed in the previous section, a dichotomous measure of democratic (as opposed to autocratic) political regime type. Among these results several important ones stand out. First and



foremost among these, democracy is shown to have widely varying effects upon welfare state outcomes depending on which area of the welfare state is examined, and in only one instance does its effect reach statistical significance. For example, democracies are associated with a modest increase in spending over autocratic regimes when looking at combined public social expenditure, and the individual domain of public health expenditure, but within the specific social security and welfare and social pension benefits domains democracies are associated with modest to relatively strong decreases in expenditure as compared to autocratic regimes.

Democracy also possesses what appears to be a relatively strong positive relationship with social pension coverage. None of these relationships reach statistical significance, however. The one domain where democracy does appear to share a significant connection to the welfare state is within the domain of public health. Here, after taking into account that the dependent measure is the *natural log* of public health expenditure by exponentiating the coefficient, democracies are associated with an increase in education spending of more than 8.7% over autocratic regimes, controlling for the left party power, economic capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions, and global economic integration of a country.

Though they are not necessarily the central focus of this initial analysis, Table 2.2 also sheds light on several interesting findings related to these control measures as well. One of the most noteworthy appears to be the marginal importance of left party power on welfare state outcomes despite its central importance in the literature. For five of the six welfare state outcomes examined, this measure neither reaches statistical significance nor demonstrates a substantively significant connection to the welfare state, and the direction of these connections varies across domains, casting doubt on the assertion that welfare state outcomes are tied to the

strength of the left. In the domain of social pension benefits where this measure of left party power does achieve statistical significance, each one percentage point increase in left party representation is only associated with roughly a .8% increase in the level of benefits provided. Instead, a far more important factor for welfare state development appears to be economic capacity. As shown in Table 2.2, the GDP per capita measure shares a statistically significant relationship with education, health and combined public expenditure, plus social pension benefit levels as well. In fact, this connection to social pension benefits appears to be the single strongest relationship in this table. Each increase in the average economic production value of its citizens, and therein the economic capacity of a country, of \$1000 (2010 US) is associated with an increase in social pension benefit amounts provided of 42.5%. Additionally, age dependency ratio, unemployment, trade and foreign direct investment also demonstrate statistically significant relationships with welfare state outcomes that appear to meet or exceed the substantive significance of left party power. For instance, a one percentage point increase in the proportion of the population outside of working age and in the unemployed relative to the total labor force are tied to statistically significant decreases in social pension coverage by approximately 42,298 and 46,322 people, respectively (since this outcome measure was not transformed). Finally, despite women's labor force participation having been cited as one of the 'new risks' that shape welfare state development, this measure, though, shared weak, non-statistically significant results across each outcome.

### *Social Citizenship Paradigms and Welfare State Outcomes*

Next, Table 2.3 presents the results of the six individual regressions of combined, education, health, and social security and welfare public expenditure, plus social pension benefit

levels and coverage, upon a new set of social citizenship paradigm measures instead of democracy. As seen in Table 2.3 (and mentioned previously), this set of social citizenship paradigm measures is made up of egalitarian, deliberative, participatory and liberal social citizenship measures. Several important findings are easy to identify within this new set of results, with the most obvious among these being the finding of a statistically significant connection between the three egalitarian, deliberative and participatory social citizenship paradigm measures and various welfare state outcomes. Whereas democracy only shared a modest, statistically significant association with public health expenditure, egalitarian social citizenship shares dramatic, statistically significant associations with social pension benefits and combined public social expenditure, while deliberative and participatory social citizenship share even stronger associations with the former social pension benefits outcome. Specifically, the results in Table 2.3 indicate that a move from the absence to maximum adoption of egalitarian social citizenship is associated with a 220% increase in combined public social expenditure and a 73.4% decrease in social pension benefits provided, controlling for the other social citizenship paradigms, left party power, economic capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions, and global economic integration. Alternatively, a move from the absence to maximum adoption of deliberative and participatory social citizenship are, in turn, associated with increases in social pension benefits provided of roughly 350% and 555%. Only the liberal social citizenship paradigm measure does not reach statistical significance among the four.

Other notable effects tied to the control measures are identifiable as well. In this set of results, left party strength no longer shares a statistically significant relationship with social pension benefits but, rather, shares a small, negative statistically significant one with combined

public social expenditure and a larger, negative relationship with social security and welfare expenditure. Despite left party strength being positioned as central to meaningful welfare state expansion in the literature, here it is shown to have somewhat of the opposite effect. Instead, as was the case in Table 2.2, economic capacity appears to be the strongest predictor of welfare state outcomes among the controls. An increase in GDP per capita of \$1000 (2010 US) is associated with an increase in combined public social expenditure of 2.5%, and increases in public health expenditure and social pension benefits of 15.8% and 37.3%. Similarly, unemployment, trade and foreign direct investment are found to share small to modest statistically significant relationships with welfare state outcomes that appear to meet or exceed the substantive significance of left party power, while female labor force participation and now age dependency ratio do not share statistically significant relationships with any of the welfare state outcomes. Overall, though, the most important finding so far appears to be the stronger nature of the relationships between social citizenship paradigms and economic capacity to welfare state outcomes than those seen for democracy or left party power.

### *Social Citizenship Paradigms, Democracy and Welfare State Outcomes*

What do these social citizenship (and economic capacity) effects look like, though, once democracy is accounted for as well? Does democracy mediate much of these effects or even emerge as a more significant predictor of welfare state outcomes on its own? Table 2.4 provides the answer to these questions. As the results in Table 2.4 indicate, though, social citizenship paradigms remain the most powerful drivers of welfare state outcomes. In fact, the effects of egalitarian, deliberative and participatory social citizenship presented in Table 2.4 are largely similar to those seen in Table 2.3. For instance, a move from the absence to maximum adoption

of egalitarian social citizenship went from being associated with a 220% increase in combined public social expenditure and a 73.4% decrease in social pension benefits provided in Table 2.3 to a 241% increase in combined expenditure and a 75.2% decrease in social pension benefits, controlling for the other social citizenship paradigms, left party power, economic capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions, global economic integration, and now democracy. The most notable difference between the two tables for social citizenship paradigms has to do with the emergence of a statistically (and substantively) significant negative relationship between liberal social citizenship and both public education expenditure and social pension coverage after accounting for democracy. Now, a move from the absence to maximum adoption of liberal social citizenship is tied to a decrease in public education expenditure of approximately 24.2% and a decrease in social pension coverage of approximately 2,431,078 people.

The significance of these social citizenship paradigms does not mean, though, that democracy should be ignored when it comes to welfare state outcomes. The results in Table 2.4 show that controlling for the four social citizenship paradigms strengthens the statistically significant positive connection with public education expenditure found in Table 2.2 and reveals a strong positive and statistically significant connection with social pension coverage. Democracies are now associated with increases in public education and social pension coverage of about 12.1% and 805,110 people, respectively, over autocratic regimes once controlling for the left party power, economic capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions, global economic integration and now the four social citizenship paradigms.

These findings related to democracy are not the only important one with regards to the control variables in the model results presented in Table 2.4. Left party strength continues to

share only small and negative statistically significant correlations with public social security and welfare expenditure and combined public social expenditure. On the flip side, GDP per capita continues to share positive (and stronger) statistically significant associations with combined public social expenditure and the individual domains of public health expenditure and social pension benefits. Additionally, the proportion of the population outside of working age re-emerges as a small positive, statistically significant predictor of social pension benefits and a moderate negative, statistically significant predictor of social pension coverage. The strength of the statistically significant negative relationships between unemployment and combined public social spending, public education spending and social pension coverage grew too. With regards to the globalization indicators, a one percentage point increases in trade are associated with similar statistically significant increases in public education expenditure and social pension benefits of .3% and .4%, and a similar statistically significant decrease in social pension coverage of a little more than 5,900 people, while a one percentage point increase in foreign direct investment inflows maintains a similar positive statistically significant correlation with public social security and welfare expenditure and negative statistically significant correlations with social pension benefits and coverage, but loses its statistically significant correlation with combined public social expenditure. Finally, female labor force participation continues to go without a statistically or substantively significant connection to any welfare state outcome.

#### *Moderation Analyses of Social Citizenship Paradigms and Welfare State Outcomes*

The above findings that social citizenship paradigms, democracy and economic capacity, are each at times important predictors of welfare state outcomes in Table 2.4 encourages further analysis. While neither democracy nor economic state capacity best explain welfare state

outcomes on their own (the social citizenship paradigms do instead), their statistical and relative substantive significance alongside social citizenship paradigm measures raises the questions of: Do these factors condition the strength of the relationships between social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state outcomes of interest? Are there interactive effects of democracy and economic capacity upon significant social citizenship paradigm relationships with the welfare state? Table 2.5 presents results of analyses that answer these questions.

Due to the focus on the interactive effects of democracy and economic capacity on significant social citizenship paradigm relationships with the welfare state, the analyses presented in Table 2.5 address only on the welfare state domains where at least one social citizenship paradigm plus democracy or GDP per capita were found to be statistically significant predictors. For this reason, only the welfare state outcomes of combined public social expenditure, public education expenditure, social pension benefits and social pension coverage are considered. The analysis of combined public social expenditure includes a new interaction term between egalitarian social citizenship and GDP per capita, while the analysis of public education expenditure includes a new interaction term between liberal social citizenship and GDP per capita, the analysis of social pension benefits includes interaction terms between egalitarian, deliberative and participatory social citizenship paradigms and GDP per capita, and the analysis of social pension coverage includes an interaction terms between liberal social citizenships and democracy.

Out of these four analyses, though, only the analysis of social pension benefits provides evidence of moderation effects. As shown in Table 2.5, the lack of statistical significance for the egalitarian social citizenship and GDP per capita interaction term in the case of combined public

social expenditure and the liberal social citizenship and democracy interaction term in the case of both public education expenditure and social pension coverage indicate that moderation effects are absent in those respective instances. The statistically significant egalitarian social citizenship and GDP per capita and deliberative social citizenship and GDP per capita interaction terms indicate that economic capacity does shape the strength of the relationship between egalitarian and deliberative social citizenship and social pension benefit levels. In particular, both of these interaction terms suggest that a \$1000 increase in GDP per capita from the mean weakens the strength of the connection between social citizenship paradigms on social pension benefit levels. On the one hand, the strong negative effect of a move to full adoption of egalitarian social citizenship on social pension benefit levels is lessened with each \$1000 increase in GDP per capita. On the other, the strong positive effect of a similar move to the maximum adoption of deliberative social citizenship on social pension benefits is lessened with each \$1000 increase.

Yet, it also needs to be pointed out that these are not the only interactions included in this analysis of social pension benefit levels. An interaction term between participatory social citizenship and GDP per capita is also introduced, but this interaction term failed to reach statistical significance. As such, this result indicates that further model refinement is needed for the social pension benefit level outcome. Table 2.6 offers the results of this refinement in reporting full models for each of the welfare state outcomes informed by the last two stages of analysis that incorporated democracy and GDP per capita as controls and then moderator variables.

Given that none of the interaction terms included in the moderation analyses of combined public social expenditure, public education expenditure and social pension coverage attained



statistical significance, the models seen for these outcomes (as well as public health expenditure and social security and welfare expenditure) revert back to those seen in Table 2.4. The only new model presented in Table 2.6 is the one for social pension benefits. This new model includes interaction terms between egalitarian social citizenship and GDP per capita and deliberative social citizenship and GDP per capita, but forgoes the interaction between participatory social citizenship and GDP per capita seen in the previous table since it failed to reach statistical significance. In this new analysis of social pension benefit levels, egalitarian, deliberative, participatory and liberal social citizenship, plus GDP per capita and the interactions between egalitarian social citizenship and GDP per capita and deliberative social citizenship and GDP per capita reach statistical significance. Democratization, left party strength, age dependency ratio, female labor force participation, unemployment, trade and foreign direct investment do not reach statistical significance in this case. The interaction terms in this new model indicate that the full adoption of egalitarian and deliberative social citizenship would be associated with 78.3% decreases and 300.7% increases in social pension benefits, respectively, when GDP per capita is at the mean but ‘only’ 62.1% decreases and 107.9% increases when GDP per capita increases to \$1000 above the mean, controlling for the other social citizenship paradigms, democracy, left party power, economic capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions, global economic integration, and now democracy. Inversely, the interaction terms also indicate that decreasing GDP per capita by \$1000 from the mean would lead the full adoption of egalitarian social citizenship to be associated with an 87.6% decrease in social pension benefits and the full adoption of deliberative social citizenship to be associated with a 672.1% increase in benefits.

*Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics and Welfare State Outcomes*

While Table 2.6 marks the end of one set of analyses, it also offers a natural jumping off point for another. The statistical significance and magnitude of these relationships between the four social citizenship paradigms and welfare state outcomes identified in Table 2.6 invite further analysis to understand which particular elements of these paradigms, then, most strongly influence their connection to the welfare state. For this reason, Table 2.7 presents the results of analyses aimed at answering these very questions for each of the welfare outcomes that social citizenship paradigms were found to share a strong connection with.

As is clear in Table 2.7, these new set of analyses focus on the welfare state outcomes of public education expenditure, combined public social expenditure, social pension benefit levels and social pension coverage since these were the welfare state outcomes found to possess significant connections to the four social citizenship paradigms. The first of these analyses looks at the characteristics of egalitarian social citizenship, the social citizenship paradigm that was found to be a significant predictor of combined public social expenditure. In this case, the egalitarian characteristic of equal protection was found to be statistically significant, with a move from the absence to maximum adoption of equal protection being associated with a 134.7% increase in combined public social expenditure, while the characteristics of both equal access and equal distribution failed to reach this threshold of significance. The second analysis of public education expenditure, however, fails to identify a liberal social citizenship characteristic that reaches statistical significance; equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive and legislative constraints on the executive each failed to demonstrate a statistically significant effect. The other two analyses that included liberal social

citizenship characteristics, however, did not share this inability to find a statistically significant connection between liberal social citizenship characteristics and the welfare state.

In relation to social pension coverage, legislative constraints on the executive demonstrated a massive, statistically significant effect wherein a move from the absence to maximum adoption of legislative constraints is tied to a 1,100,929 reduction in the number of people covered. For the social pension benefit levels, a number of liberal, plus egalitarian, deliberative and participatory, social citizenship paradigm characteristics demonstrate statistically and substantively significant relationships with this outcome. The egalitarian characteristics of equal access and equal distribution, the deliberative characteristics of reasoned justification and range of consultation, the participatory characteristics of civil society participation and regional government representation, and all three liberal characteristics of equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive and legislative constraints on the executive all show meaningful relationships with benefit levels. The strongest among these appears to be the liberal characteristic of equality before the law and individual liberties, where a move from the absence to maximum adoption of it is associated with an increase in benefit levels by 5,767%!

Of course, these were not the only factors found to be statistically significant predictors of the four welfare outcomes. First, democracy was found to be a moderate, positive and statistically significant predictor of both public education expenditure and social pension coverage, while left party power only shared a weak and negative statistically significant connection to combined public social expenditure. GDP per capita, alternatively, shares positive statistically significant relationships with both of the expenditure outcomes and an especially

strong, positive and statistically significant relationship with social pension benefits, where a \$1000 increase in GDP per capita from the mean is associated with a nearly 37% increase in benefit levels. Additionally, age dependency ratio only displays a negative statistically significant relationship with social pension coverage; foreign direct investment inflows only shared a negative statistically significant relationship with social pension benefits; unemployment shared negative statistically significant relationships with combined public social expenditure, public education expenditure and social pension coverage; trade is found to possess a positive statistically significant relationship with education expenditure, but negative statistically significant relationships with both social pension outcomes; and female labor force participation continues to go without any statistical significant connections to welfare outcomes.

*Moderation Analyses of Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics and Welfare State Outcomes*

Having just addressed the relationships between these individual elements of social citizenship paradigms and the four welfare state outcomes of combined public social expenditure, public education expenditure, social pension benefits and social pension coverage, the significance of the democracy and GDP per capita measures suggest that it may be important to also consider how these factors may shape the direction and magnitude of any relationship between individual social citizenship characteristics and the welfare state. The final set of moderation analyses examines this in the three domains of combined public social expenditure, social pension coverage and social pension benefits where social citizenship characteristics and either democracy or GDP per capita were found to be statistically significant predictors of these

outcomes. Table 2.8 presents results for the first group of analyses that look at the two welfare state outcomes of combined public social expenditure and social pension coverage.

Within these two analyses in Table 2.8, the analysis of combined public social expenditure includes a new interaction term between the egalitarian social citizenship characteristic of equal protection and GDP per capita, while the analysis of social pension coverage includes a new interaction term between the liberal social citizenship characteristic of legislative constraints on the executive and democracy. Neither of these two analyses, though, provides evidence of moderation effects. While the equal protection main term retains its statistical significance in the first model, GDP per capita and the key interaction term do not, and none of the focal independent variables (including namely the interaction between legislative constraints and democracy) do in the second model focused on social pension coverage.

Yet, it is a much different matter for the analyses of social pension benefit levels presented in Table 2.9. Both of the analyses presented in Table 2.9 focus on this single outcome of social pension benefits, with the first introducing interactions between the equal access, equal distribution, reasoned justification, range of consultation, civil society participation, regional government representation equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive and legislative constraints on the executive social citizenship characteristics and the economic capacity measure of GDP per capita. In this first model, several moderation effects are found, as the equal access and GDP per capita, judicial constraints and GDP per capita, and legislative constraints and GDP per capita interactions terms each attain statistical significance.

This finding inspired a second, refined model of social pension benefits that includes the significant interactions found in the first model but leaves out the other interactions that were not

statistically significant. In this final model, each of the three included interaction terms retains statistical significance (along with the measures of equal protection, equal access, equal distribution, range of consultation, direct popular vote, regional government representation and judicial constraints on the executive among the independent variables of interest) and are joined by the three measures of equal access, engaged society and legislative constraints on the executive that now reach statistical significance as well. The interaction terms in this final model indicate that the maximum adoption of equal access and judicial constraints on the executive would be associated with approximately 519% and 393% increases in social pension benefits when GDP per capita is at the mean, which becomes 1486% and 70.7% increases, respectively, when GDP per capita increases by \$1000 over the mean, while an increase in GDP per capita by \$1000 changes the expected decrease in social pension benefits associated with the maximum adoption of legislative constraints on the executive from 77% to 61%. Thus, these results show that increasing GDP per capita will quickly lead the relationship between judicial constraints on the executive and social pension benefits to flip from positive to negative and the relationship between legislative constraints on the executive and social pension benefits to flip from negative to positive.

## DISCUSSION

Therefore, many important findings are evident among the results discussed above. The most obvious and most important among these appears to be that the social citizenship paradigm archetypes, and the individual characteristics that comprise them, analyzed here are important sources of variation in welfare states. Despite democracy emerging as a significant correlate of public education expenditure and social pension coverage, and left party strength as a significant

correlate of social security and welfare and combined public social expenditure, the results of these analyses identify social citizenship paradigms and their characteristics as much stronger predictors of welfare state outcomes than either of these most commonly focused on measures. In fact, not only did social citizenship paradigms possess stronger relationships with welfare state outcomes than the other prominent factors in the welfare state literature included as controls, so did the GDP per capita measure of economic capacity, together providing powerful support for the new model of social welfare development tested here and the idea that state elites, and the social citizenship paradigms they produce, shape welfare state outcomes. (Interestingly, female labor force participation proved to be consistently the least important factor despite the attention it has received in the welfare state literature.) But, beyond providing support for this new model (and casting doubt on traditional partisan and institutionalist explanations) of welfare state development, these results also shed light on how this connection between social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state varies according to the type of social citizenship paradigm, the area of the welfare state of interest, the political regime type, and the amount of economic capacity.

For starters, the analyses in this chapter reveal that each of the social citizenship paradigms appear to be better predictors of some welfare state outcomes over others. The egalitarian paradigm of social citizenship demonstrates a strong significant connection with combined public social expenditure. Liberal social citizenship paradigms are found to share strong significant connections with public education expenditure and social pension coverage. Both of these paradigms, plus deliberative and participatory social citizenship, each also share powerful significant associations with social pension benefit levels, which suggests that this may

be the domain of the welfare state where the impacts of social citizenship paradigms are most felt overall. Therefore, these results also suggest that these social citizenship paradigm archetypes, overall, may help explain the global transitions toward enabling/social investment welfare states discussed earlier, which tend to focus less on social security commitments and place more emphasis on education and social pension commitments. On the flip side, the domains of public health and social security and welfare expenditure are identified as ones where none of the social citizenship paradigms addressed in these analyses are found to be significant explanatory factors. Instead, for these two outcomes economic capacity and left party power may play a more important role (though the coefficients for the four social citizenship paradigms remain much larger and these are two of the outcomes for which the least amount of variation has been accounted for according to the  $r^2$  values in Table 2.6).

The subsequent moderation analyses of democracy and economic capacity then provide clarity about the domains in which these factors do and do not shape the strength of relationships between social citizenship paradigms and welfare state outcomes. These moderation analyses reveal that, despite being important factors that need to be controlled for, neither political regime type nor economic capacity are moderators of social citizenship paradigm effects for five of the six welfare state outcomes evaluated in this chapter. In relation to social pension benefit levels, however, economic capacity is found to be a moderator of egalitarian and deliberative social citizenship paradigms, one that strengthens their relationships as GDP per capita decreases but weakens and eventually changes the direction of them as GDP per capita increases (whereas democracy has no such moderating effect in any of the welfare state outcomes of interest).



These insights would inform the last set of analyses looking at the impact of individual beliefs, values and other characteristics of social citizenship paradigms within each of the welfare state domains, which shed light on which salient social citizenship elements within social citizenship paradigms are driving the relationships highlighted above. Among the egalitarian social citizenship paradigm characteristics, equal protection is shown in these analyses to share a significant relationship with both combined public social expenditure and social pension benefit levels, while equal access and equal distribution share significant ones with social pension benefits as well. With regards to the deliberative social citizenship paradigm characteristics, range of consultation and societal engagement are ultimately found to be the biggest drivers of this paradigm's connection to social pension benefit levels. Within participatory social citizenship, direct popular voting and regional government representation emerges as the primary characteristics behind this paradigm's relationship with social pension benefits. Lastly, legislative constraints on the executive is identified as a significant liberal social citizenship paradigm characteristic shaping social pension coverage and benefits, and is joined by judicial constraints on the executive in shaping the latter.

The final set of moderation analyses that was then applied to these social citizenship paradigm characteristics with the results in many ways echoing the main findings of the previous moderation analyses. Here, economic capacity, rather than political regime type, is the potential moderator that needs to be paid attention to, and specifically for the outcome of social pension benefit levels. Moderating effects of economic capacity on the egalitarian characteristic of equal access and the liberal characteristics of both judicial and legislative constraints on the executive were found for only this particular welfare state outcome. Like the original moderation results

discussed above, the moderating effects of economic capacity on both judicial and legislative constraints on the executive are ones that strengthen their connection to social pension benefits as GDP per capita decreases but weakens and eventually changes the direction of them as GDP per capita increases. Yet, these moderation results focused on social citizenship paradigm characteristics differ in that these moderating effects are tied to liberal social citizenship paradigm characteristics as opposed to the egalitarian and deliberative social citizenship paradigms found to be moderated by economic capacity. Even the egalitarian characteristic of equal protection that is found to be moderated by economic capacity differs from the broader paradigm pattern in that increasing GDP per capita actually strengthens the positive connection equal protection shares with social pension benefit levels.

Altogether, then, these social citizenship paradigm characteristic results help identify some underlying characteristics driving broader social citizenship patterns while also identifying elements that might have otherwise been overlooked and the multiple (and sometimes conflicting) patterns at this level that underlie the relationships between social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state. Collectively, though, they show that the characteristics of social citizenship archetypes that address inclusion and the power of the executive are the ones that have the strongest effects on welfare state development. In doing so, they provide more evidence that social citizenship paradigm measures corresponding to the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development tested in this analysis better explain welfare state outcomes than the democracy and left party measures associated with traditional partisan and institutionalist explanations influenced by Marshall (1950) and his understanding of social citizenship.

NEXT STEPS

Thus, the results found in this chapter provide support for the new model of welfare state development born out of the Latin American welfare state literature. The results show that social citizenship paradigms and economic capacity are stronger individual predictors of welfare state outcomes than traditional political predictors discussed most frequently in welfare state studies. As such, they provide critical evidence of the weakness of existing Marshallian-influenced theories and provide the first, crucial set of evidence that social citizenship paradigms have a significant connection to welfare state outcomes, which is necessary for the new model of welfare state development to operate. Additionally, the results also support this theory's expectation that differences between political regimes on welfare state outcomes (though at times still evident) are often less dramatic than anticipated by much of the existing literature, and that many of the differences between democratic regimes in welfare state outcomes can be connected to differences in the social citizenship paradigms and accompanying values, beliefs and other elements operating within them. In keeping with the two above findings, the results also suggest that changes in social citizenship paradigms may help explain the globally observable transitions toward enabling/social investment welfare states. Finally, they provide additional insight into what motivates welfare state development by revealing a strong positive connection between social citizenship paradigms and characteristics related to inclusion and the power of the executive and welfare state outcomes across several domains.

As such, these results provide strong support for the perspective that social citizenship paradigms reflecting the interests of state elites shape the trajectory of welfare state development. Yet, the evidence presented here is not nearly enough to establish that this is in fact the case. Crucially, the analyses conducted here in no meaningful way examine the interests and power of

state elites nor the process by which social citizenship paradigms become salient. For this reason, a different analytic approach, one built around process tracing, is necessary to identify if this new model of welfare state development matches the historical realities of welfare state development. This type of analysis is found in the following chapter.

**Chapter 3 – The Autonomous Power of (Welfare) State Elites: Social Citizenship  
Paradigms and the State-Elite-Driven Model of Welfare State Development in Argentina,  
Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala**

The prior chapter provided crucial, initial support for the alternative model of welfare state development developed in Chapter 1 that establishes state elites, located within historically contingent domestic and international political fields, as directing the path that welfare state development. According to the prior Latin American literature that informs this state elite model, this occurs through the construction of dominant paradigms of social citizenship that define who will and will not have access to the social provision and protections of the state in ways that serve current state elites' goals and interests, which then inform subsequent cycles of state elite driven social policy action when new interests emerge. The results in Chapter 2 established that several different, common social citizenship paradigm themes, and the values, beliefs and institutional elements that come along with and support them, meaningfully shape welfare state outcomes, and, further, that these social citizenship paradigm themes provide a better explanation of welfare state developments than standard welfare studies (rooted in the belief that social citizenship is an important welfare state outcome) focused on democratization or other political-institutionalist explanations (such as left party strength). Democratization, rather than being the explanation for cross-national differences in welfare state development, appears to be just one factor that conditions the effects that social citizenship paradigms have on welfare-related outcomes.

These findings, however, represent only a necessary starting point for determining the validity of this alternative understanding of welfare state development. While the prior chapter

identified that a relationship exists between particular social citizenship paradigm themes and various welfare state outcomes, the scope of the analysis was incapable of fully addressing whether that connection between social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state was a part of the expected broader relationship between state elite interests and goals and the direction that welfare states take. To do so, a new set of analyses is required, one that can evaluate whether expected causal processes take place and answer several important remaining questions: To start, can social citizenship paradigms be identified on the ground? Are state elites capable of pursuing their own interests, and do these paradigms of social citizenship correspond with their interests? Are state elites responsible for developing and diffusing pertinent social citizenship paradigms or do they precede or develop outside of them? Are these social citizenship paradigms a sufficient feature of any link between state elites and welfare state outcomes, or can other factors better explain any potential linkage between state elites and these outcomes? Finally, can any potential variation in welfare state outcomes be attributed, then, to the state elite model of welfare state development developed in Chapter 2 and outlined above, or can an alternative provide a better explanation for what actually occurs on the ground?

To answer these questions, the analyses in this chapter take a comparative-historical approach that explores whether the state elite model of welfare state development can explain the actual historical trajectories of welfare state development in several cases across the region of Latin America. To do so, the analyses in this chapter apply process tracing to the disparate cases of welfare state development found in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala. Despite their unique histories, the comparative-historical analyses that follow show that each of these cases support the new model and demonstrate that state elites defined the boundaries of social

citizenship in accordance with their interests and priorities, and as a result the path that welfare state policy took, through social citizenship paradigms that enabled and enhanced their use of both the infrastructural and despotic powers of the state. Additionally, the within-case analyses in this chapter indicate that civil conflict is an important, common feature that conditions this causal process and the trajectory of welfare state development defined by state (elite) autonomy and capacity. The state-centered literature that has developed these concepts, and that this chapter builds upon, is examined in the section that follows.

## STATE-CENTERED THEORY AND THE NEED FOR FRAMEWORKS OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

As originally discussed in Chapter 1, the existing literature on Latin American welfare states presents a far different picture of social policy creation and implementation than the approaches influenced by Marshall (1950) that emphasize democracy and social citizenship generation, which have provided the dominant explanation for (European and U.S.) welfare state development. Postero (2010), for example, argued that in Bolivia the adoption of multiculturalism policies by the state “was a top-down effort by the neoliberal state to incorporate indigenous peoples into the national project as responsible and docile neoliberal subjects” (p. 22), rather than the result of bottom-up pressure for social citizenship rights and the social provisions and protections expected by these traditional perspectives. A number of studies have, in a similar vein, found that social insurance, early child education and care, parental leave, and even the overall degree of welfare state universalism can be explained by the degree to which state technopolitical actors direct social policy reform in a top-down manner and manage civil society’s responses to it in other cases throughout Latin America (Martínez Franzoni &

Sánchez-Ancochea 2014; 2016; Blofield 2016; Pribble 2013b). Across Latin America, Weyland (2004) found that this condition of state elite control has also been associated with weakening civil society and political organizations, and as a result overall political engagement, which Holzner (2007) subsequently found was felt particularly in the poorest members of society who saw little connection between their political interests and state policies.

The above studies posit that social policy is not directly a reflection of societal needs or demands and instead is a state elite driven enterprise that is the result of state elites' interests and their active pursuit of those interests, even in the face, and at the potential expense, of societal forces located within the confines of the state. But if state elites are operating in this way (which flies in the face of traditional Marshallian explanations of welfare state development) what explains it? What explains the different motivations of state elites and the means by which they are able to pursue particular social policy outcomes in the face of other actors, including those located in democratic political regimes and in light of the waning political engagement among some (but not all) members of society described by Weyland (2004) and Holzner (2007)? And, how do the elements of social citizenship established as important predictors of welfare state outcomes in the previous chapter fit into the state elite driven process depicted above? While the traditional social citizenship approach in the welfare state literature provides no solutions, the literature on state-centered theory offers several insights.

As was briefly introduced in Chapter 1, states and state elites have been a considerable focal point of social science research following the transition from the “first-wave” of historical social science research associated with society-centered understandings of state action to the neo-Weberian “second-wave” of historically-oriented state-centered lines of theory (Morgan &



Orloff 2017). According to Weber originally, states (and the particular state form of the welfare state) are compulsory associations that claim control over defined territories and the people that live within them, and do so, at least in part, through their possession of the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within that bounded territory (Gerth & Mills 1946). First-wave theories of the state predominantly offered two society-centered explanations of state action, the first being a neo-Marxist perspective that saw states activity as simply a function of dominant capitalist class interests and will, and the second offering a pluralist approach wherein state action reflects the state's embodiment of the current structure of class relations that have been established through battles and alliances among political factions (Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1985). In response, the second wave, state-centered approach (and subsequent waves of research since) returned to Weber's focus on the administrative, extractive, coercive and legal systems that states, and specifically state elites, leverage in structuring relationships with and within civil society (Stepan 1978; Skocpol 1985). Through their efforts to "bring the state back in" (Skocpol 1985:4), these studies have identified two critical components that make states and state elites important actors in their own right and allow them to shape society (rather than be shaped by it): state autonomy and state capacity.

According to Skocpol (1985), the sheer amount of scholarly attention devoted to analyses of the state and state elites presupposes that they are not simply vehicles that transmit the interests of social groups, classes or other civil society members (since they would add nothing of analytic value in that case) but are instead actors that exercise a degree of autonomy that allows them to formulate and pursue their own interests and goals. But, Cardoso (1979) provides a more theoretically grounded explanation for this state autonomy in arguing that the state cannot

be seen “just as the expression of class interests, without recognizing that such an expression requires an organization which, since it cannot be other than a social network of people, exists in its own right and possesses interests of its own” (p. 51). With this in mind, Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) propose that state actors may develop a “perspective distinct from that of private members of the dominant class” due to their unique organizational positioning, since this reduces their exposure to short-run profit considerations, and instead exposes them to shared technocratic training and often a shared ideological frame (p. 53). Additionally, Skocpol (1985) adds that the independence of their interests, goals and action can also be attributed to their particular location within multiple political fields.

But if state elites are autonomous and not singularly governed by short-run profit considerations as Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) suggest, what do these interests and goals that these actors pursue look like? According to Skocpol (1985), these interests and goals generally revolve around something Piven and Cloward (1971/1993) previously identified as operating within the specific domain of state poor relief: maintaining control and order. As Skocpol put it, “autonomous state actions will regularly take forms that attempt to reinforce the authority, political longevity, and social control of the state organizations whose incumbents generated the relevant policies or policy ideas...one (hidden or overt) feature of all autonomous state actions will be the reinforcement of the prerogatives of collectivities of state officials” (Skocpol 1985:15). To achieve this, though, Rueschemeyer & Evans (1985) introduce another interest state elites must pursue: coherency in state action. State elites need to ensure that a minimum of coherence and coordination is achieved such that the different organizational parts of the state respond to “internal guidance and coordination of state action rather than to outside interests and

demands” (Rueschemeyer & Evans 1985:55), and will mobilize support and potentially oppose dominant interests in civil society to achieve it. Yet, coherent state action is not enough to grant state elites the ability to “implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances” (Skocpol 1985:9).

As discussed by Mann (1984), autonomous state action directed by state elites is derived not only from the independent interests of these state elites but also from the unique resources state elites can draw on and deploy due to the state being the only entity capable of servicing (some) needs civil society actors cannot provide, the multiplicity of domains in which it can service these needs, and the usefulness of its centralization “over a delimited territory over which it has [been granted] authoritative power” (p. 198). According to Mann (1984), autonomous state elite action is made possible when civil society confers “power resources” upon state elites for the reasons mentioned above and their use generates additional resources that are also channeled into the hands of state elites (pp. 210-211). Thus, independent state action, in this formulation, is tied to a process of state capacity generation, a process that can also be seen in Tilly’s (1985) analysis of war-making and European state formation, wherein “war making led to increased extraction of the means of war...from the population within that territory. The building up of war making capacity likewise increased the capacity to extract...thus, it led to state making” (p. 183).

But, Mann (1984) expands upon Tilly (1985) by highlighting how civil society’s initial willingness to confer resources to state elites produces two identifiable types of state powers, or capacities, through this process that state elites can leverage to pursue action in the domain of civil society: infrastructural power and despotic power. Of the two, the latter form of state power,

despotic power, most resembles the state capacity tied to control over the means of violence addressed by Tilly (1985), where state elites possess the ability to undertake action without negotiation with civil society, and, therefore, possess power “over civil society” (Mann 1984:190). Tilly’s discussion of extraction, though, lends itself to the first, more fundamental, form of state elite-held power identified by Mann (1984), infrastructural power, which captures the “the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure” and, therefore, work through society to implement their desired ends (p. 190). According to Mann (1984), infrastructural power is placed in the hands of state elites as a direct function of the social utility that the state’s territorial-centralization provides to civil society, while despotic power may develop subsequently when the infrastructural power resources civil society granted state elites is outside of the control of civil society and exploited by state elites. Whether significant despotic power comes to accompany infrastructural power or not, though, this necessary development of infrastructural power provides state elites (in accordance with the extent of infrastructural power that exists) with the means to regulate, maintain and bound social relations, and thus shape what society means within its borders, through a process of “territorializing social life” (Mann 1984:208).

This process takes different forms. One of these is “legibility” projects, like the standardization of naming practices and the implementation of census counts, which make elements of society identifiable and easier to comprehend for state actors who can then pursue “large scale social engineering” (particularly in authoritarian regimes) with the enhanced administrative capacity they gain from seeing and simplifying society (Scott 1998:5). According to Slater (2008), one especially important type of legibility project is competitive democratic

elections. Slater (2008) shows that in Southeast Asia “competitive elections amid robust mass mobilization” enhance the infrastructural, and territorializing, power of state actors by “(1) stimulating the emergence of mass political parties, which can increase the state’s willingness and capacity to deliver broad public goods; (2) pressing the state to improve the ‘legibility’ of the general population through mass voter registration, with potential spillover effects in other areas of governance; and (3) compelling central state authorities to expand their coercive monopoly into areas previously lorded over by parochial strongmen or armed militias” (Slater 2008:254-255), therein turning mass political parties into adjunct institutions of the state that connect state and society and further enable the state’s administration of public goods.

Another avenue of territorialization takes the form of policy networks that link state elites and key societal groups together in policy implementation processes (Katzenstein 1978; Chibber 2003). Chibber (2003), in particular, shows that the ability of state elites to engage with dominant (i.e. capitalist in the minds of both Katzenstein and Chibber) social forces through these kind of policy networks enables state elites to coordinate and harness them toward satisfying the state elites goals, in explaining the more successful implementation of developmental policies in South Korea as opposed to India. As Chibber (2003) explains, in South Korea, where state elites could connect with and build “an alliance of sorts with its domestic business class” through such channels, these state elites adopted an export-led industrialization (ELI) developmental strategy they knew the business class would support that also then strengthened the state and brought the private firms that this class represented under further state discipline (p. 9), whereas state elites in India (without this linkage) pursued an import-substituting industrialization (ISI) strategy that embroiled them in conflicts with the business

class and ultimately led to a failed implementation of developmental policies. Instead of these linkages bringing state elites in alignment with the interests of powerful societal actors as pluralist theories suggest, the infrastructural power of the state promotes the cooptation of these actors by state elites.

This kind of obedience and cooptation is even more pronounced under the strongest form of territorializing of social life that may potentially develop: hegemony. Building upon the Marxist work of Gramsci, Laitin (1985) shows that state elites can establish hegemonic idea systems that structure a society's own "common sense" understandings of patterns of political group formation and social relations through the analysis of British colonial administration in Yorubaland (pp. 287, 307-308). According to Laitin (1985), "political forging – whether through coercion or elite bargaining – and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a society and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense" is a process that powerful forces both within and external to society engage in to bend other forces towards their interests (p. 287), and one that state elites with both their autonomy from societal actors and their centralization within society via infrastructural power appear uniquely capable of initiating. In Yorubaland, Laitin (1985) shows that British colonial elites solidified which social cleavages would and would not become politicized by preempting religious cleavages whenever possible while, at the same time, magnifying tribal cleavages tied to ancestral cities through the infusion of resources to kings of ancestral cities and administrative operations that framed ancestral cities as the only meaningful form of political attachment. This activity, plus the deployment of military repression, reified and enhanced existing beliefs about the legitimate leadership of kings, who colonial elites could easily coopt in service of (again)

maintaining social control. With this type of hegemonic process states, like the colonial British state in Yorubaland, can “decisively influence the nature of the societal inputs that it must subsequently process” (Laitin 1985: 312).

Within this hegemonic process, the creation and manipulation of social cleavages, such as the minimization of religious cleavages and establishment of tribal cleavages as the most important in Yorubaland society, should not be overlooked. In the above example, the importance of manufacturing such cleavages extended beyond just establishing a few figureheads state elites could manipulate; these kinds of social cleavages are themselves an important element that enables autonomous state action. In stating that “patterns of politicized cleavages may be better understood to be largely a function of the strategies of political control by hegemonic states” Laitin (1985:308) builds upon Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) who state that state autonomy is enhanced by social cleavages, since these may lead “dominant classes to grant greater autonomy to the state” due to (perceived) threats from below (p. 64). Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), specifically, note that state autonomy is likely to be enhanced by social cleavages when those cleavages are hierarchically ordered ethnic cleavages that leaves one ethnic group with access to state power that can be levied against others, but Laitin (1985) adds to this that, for ethnic-based cleavages and others, this process of state autonomy generation derives from the general creation of patterns of social stratification that incentivize groups on one side to repress those on the other side of the (manufactured) divide.

Overall, then, state-centered theory details a process wherein the generation of independent state elite interests, state infrastructural and despotic power, and social division grants state elites the ability to pursue autonomous action that serves their interests of increasing

the power of the state and maintaining order, control and political security in domains that include the social policy domains of the welfare state. Such a process necessarily pushes domains where state elites can freely express their autonomy down a pathway that mirrors the interests of those state elites, and one that differs from what we would expect if this were not the case. As such, this process meshes with those seen within the path dependency literature referenced in Chapter 2, which highlighted the ways in which welfare state possibilities (especially) have been conditioned by prior policies, precedents and their feedback, making deviations from an established trajectory difficult (Orloff & Skocpol 1984; Skocpol 1985; Weir & Skocpol 1985; Pierson 1994). Orloff and Skocpol (1984), for instance, show that the differing trajectories of welfare state development between the United States and Britain can be traced to the degree of autonomy afforded to state elites. In Britain, where state elites possessed extensive infrastructural capacity aided by the state's bureaucratic organization, these state elites were able to pursue social policies that encouraged support among working class voters, and therein further solidified their grasp on political power, whereas in the United States state elites lacked similar state capacity and faced a more empowered and skeptical civil society that similar social policy designs (and their potential for solidifying political support in a similar manner to Britain, as well as what had been seen with prior civil war pensions) untenable. According to Orloff and Skocpol (1984), it was these differing experiences with regard to the power of state elites to pursue their own interests led Britain down the path toward being a welfare leader and the United States to lagging well behind it.

But as the above discussion also makes much clearer, establishing and maintaining the conditions that allow for self-serving autonomous state action by state elites is not guaranteed



nor even easy. As Skocpol (1985) concisely states, “State autonomy is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system. It can come and go...because the very *structural potentials* for autonomous state actions change over time, as the organizations of coercion and administration undergo transformations, both internally and in their relations to societal groups and to representative parts of government” (p. 14). Within the process identified above, we can identify several areas where the “structural potentials” for autonomous state elite-directed action can collapse, starting with the maintenance of coherent independent state interests and action.

As Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) noted above, one crucial requirement for autonomous action by state elites is a minimum degree of coherency and coordination that allows such action to be implemented by the various organizational parts of the state as intended. According to Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), though, that degree of coherency and coordination is made problematic by, potentially, differences in the substantive goals of state managers, the state’s position as an arena of social conflict among societal forces, and the state’s claim to being the guardian of universal societal interests, which may impose limits on the degree of deviation from societal interests that is possible. Because of this, the coherency and coordination of state elite action can be compromised by the same state infrastructural power that makes state elite autonomous activity possible in the first place. For this reason, Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985) describe the growth of infrastructural power as being a “double-edged relationship” since as the state enhances its ability to penetrate and coordinate social and economic life it also encourages the state to decentralize by granting its lower-level leaders their own increasing autonomy to navigate a growing and increasingly complex set of social and political relations (p. 49), which in turn may encourage a break down in corporate cohesion and

coordination in and of itself. This breakdown, though, may be even more dramatic if civil society forces are able to gain control over those lower-levels of the state apparatus or, at least, mobilize and pose a roadblock to any desired state action at the local level (Stepan 1978; Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol; Rueschemeyer & Evans 1985). And, this is not all that unlikely an event; according to Mann (1984), this outcome is especially likely when the state deploys despotic power. As Mann (1984) explains, the deployment of despotic power temporarily boosts both the infrastructural and despotic powers of the state, but this comes at the cost of also increasing private infrastructural resources that will diffuse into civil society, which decenter and de-territorialize the state, granting more power to those civil society forces and, in so doing, restraining the autonomous actions of the state.

Thus, the existing literature on state-centered theory offers a powerful but still incomplete picture of the process by which state elites may shape the trajectories of welfare state development, as has been suggested in the Latin American welfare state literature. The unique positioning of state elites allows them to develop autonomous interests related to control, order, and political security, as well as a high degree of coherency in the state action meant to address those purposes, and the unique positioning of the state generates the means for state elites to carry out these kinds of actions. The powers of the state that make autonomous action possible, though, also often encourage a breakdown in coherency and coordination, conscribing the actual ability for state elites to pursue and achieve their own interests, including those related to the welfare state. What would be most conducive, then, to a process of autonomous state elite interests translating into state elite-desired social policy (and pushes welfare states onto paths that align with those interests) is a mechanism equivalent to the hegemony described above that

aligns the perspectives of state elites and those at the lower-levels of the state apparatus and enables state elites to channel their autonomous interests over and through society by encouraging the territorialization of social life, establishing common-sense social cleavages, and (in the process) bringing civil society elements onto a shared ideological terrain with the state, reducing the threat of civil society confrontation with the state. State elite-driven, dominant paradigms that incorporate the archetypes and elements of social citizenship introduced in Chapter 1 and analyzed in Chapter 2, which capture the definitions and boundaries around who is deemed a member of the political community and therefore deserving of the (civil, political and social) rights and entitlements (as well as responsibilities) that enable people to participate within society, appear to be exactly such a mechanism.

For this reason, the analyses that follow return our attention toward the kinds of paradigms of social citizenship addressed in the preceding chapter. The analyses in that chapter established that the social welfare commitments of welfare states vary by the themes of social citizenship that are dominant, but was not able to test whether this was in fact part of a causal process driven by state elites in accordance with the state-centered theories of state power discussed above. The analyses to come do just that. These analyses move beyond just evaluating the relationship between social citizenship and welfare state outcomes and address the fundamental question of: Do established social citizenship paradigms provide a mechanism by which state elites are able to pursue welfare state outcomes that accord with their interests? To answer this broader question, the analyses that follow answer two other crucial, underlying questions as well: Do state elites possess identifiable autonomous interests and do welfare outcomes correlate with those interests? Ultimately, the analyses in this chapter set out to firmly

answer whether the new state-elite-driven model of welfare state development, wherein state elites (in line with their own various interests) develop and diffuse particular social citizenship paradigms that then shape the subsequent trajectory of welfare state outcomes in accordance with those interests, can be witnessed in the historical development of welfare states in Latin America. As explained in greater detail in the following section, these questions are answered through the comparative-historical analysis of the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala.

## DATA AND METHODS

Given the shift in focus of analysis from establishing first whether a connection exists between social citizenship paradigm themes and state social welfare commitments in the prior chapter to now testing whether this connection is part of the hypothesized state-elite-driven welfare state development causal process, the analyses in this chapter depart from the Prais-Winsten regressions using panels corrected standard errors and subsequent moderation analyses found in the previous chapter. Instead, the analyses in this chapter transition to the next necessary step in the broader analytic process, analyses of whether such a causal process exists through the examination of individual cases, which is in keeping with the multi-method approach detailed by Seawright (2016). According to Seawright (2016), regressions (like those in the previous chapter) can never in practice be a basis for causal inference on their own since causal inference based on regression analysis requires that there are no confounding variables, that the set of control variables includes no colliders or post-treatment variables, and that measurement of the treatment variable is accurate (all of which constitutes information beyond what is available from regression analysis alone). Adding a case-study component, however, can bridge that gap toward arriving at causal inference, as case studies can validate or improve the measurement of

the treatment, build or test causal pathways, identify evidence of potential omitted variables in previous analyses, and even identify causal counterfactuals (Seawright 2016). The within-case evidence revealed from this form of analysis can in this case, then, corroborate that the assumptions of regression analyses are consistent with the realities of cases on the ground, identify or rule out any other potentially important factors influencing the relationship between state elite perspectives and welfare state development, and evaluate the proposed relationship by exploring if the anticipated causal mechanism of social citizenship frameworks operates as theorized.

According to Seawright (2016), the best strategy for selecting which cases to study in this circumstance is an approach that selects extreme cases on the independent variable(s) because this type of selection rule helps identify omitted variables and sources of measurement error on the independent variable(s), discover pathway variables and/or test claims about such variables, and finally re-estimate the overall slope found in the preceding regression analyses. With this in mind, the cases selected for in-depth within and across case analysis in this chapter were the following four cases: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala. Each of these cases possessed extreme values on the explanatory social citizenship paradigm elements found to be important in the preceding chapter.

But, their values on the independent variables of interest were not the only reasons that these four cases present ideal cases to study and were ultimately selected. First, at the most basic level, the incorporation of these four specific cases offers the opportunity to both compare within and across the sub-regions of Central and South America that fall within the broader region of Latin America and, therefore, account for any potential sub-regional differences, since Argentina

and Bolivia both fall within South America and Costa Rica and Guatemala fall within Central America. On top of this, these cases provide an opportunity to compare and contrast the trajectories of some of the oldest welfare states in each of these sub-regions within Latin America (Argentina and Costa Rica) with some of the ‘laggards’ that have only much more recently consolidated their systems of social protection and provision, or have even still yet to do so (Bolivia and Guatemala, respectively). The selection of this set of case studies provides significant variation with regards to their histories of democratization: Costa Rica has enjoyed nearly continuous democracy, while Argentina and Bolivia alternated between democracy and authoritarianism until the 1980s and then moved toward stable democracy in the 2000s, and Guatemala endured nearly continuous authoritarian rule until the 1980s when a weak, fragile democracy emerged and has remained in place ever since.

Additionally, each of these cases also provide different experiences of colonialism and subsequent trajectories of economic development and ethnoracial stratification post-independence to consider. Specifically, Argentina and Costa Rica were both peripheral colonies during the mercantilist period of Spanish colonialism (1492-1700), while Guatemala was a semi-peripheral colony, and Bolivia was a colonial center, and was thus most strongly exposed to colonial administration, systems of labor exploitation, and Spanish sociocultural mores (Mahoney 2010). With the transition to the liberal period of Spanish colonialism (1700-1808), Argentina rose to a colonial center that most strongly embraced liberal institutions, Bolivia fell from a colonial center to a colonial periphery, Costa Rica remained a periphery and Guatemala fell from being a semi-periphery to a peripheral colony. In the post-colonial period of interest, these differing paths would enable Argentina and Costa Rica to attain higher levels of economic

development within the region and (at least the myth of) cohesive ethnically homogenous societies, while Bolivia and Guatemala would ‘attain’ among the lowest economic development and a bifurcated ethnoracial order that positioned indigenous and other non-European groups within society below their white counterparts (Mahoney 2010). Studying these cases, then provides the opportunity to consider any potential omitted variables connected to colonial experience and potentially clarify how colonial history ties into the political interests/problems, social citizenship paradigm responses and economic state capacity of state elites, and the resulting welfare state developments that come about if the hypothesized state-elite-driven welfare state development model holds. Thus, a focus on these four cases best accounts for other potentially important axes of variation and offers the opportunity for valid and insightful results.

To test whether the hypothesized state-elite-driven welfare state development model holds or not, the within-case analysis of these cases draw upon primarily secondary source materials (and a limited number of primary sources when needed for additional clarification or detail) that offer up the “causal process observations” needed to provide evidence for or against a historical relationship between state elites and welfare state development in each of these countries and the theorized causal mechanism that connects the two. This evidence is evaluated within each case through process tracing. Here, process tracing will evaluate the hypothesis that state elites shape the particular trajectories of welfare state development that states follow through their development and diffusion of particular social citizenship paradigms that establish who is and is not deserving of the social provisions and protections of the state in accordance with these state elite’s independent perspectives and interests through a series of “smoking gun” evaluations that test for the presence of a sufficient causal mechanism sufficient for each

outcome (Mahoney 2012). Thus, reframing it in this language of necessary and sufficient conditions, the hypothesis being tested is that autonomous state elite interests are sufficient for the intervening causal mechanism of the development and diffusion of state-elite-driven paradigms of social citizenship (the smoking gun), which itself is sufficient for welfare state developments. Passing this kind of smoking gun test would lend decisive support to the hypothesized model of welfare state development proposed here (Mahoney 2012), and engaging in these smoking gun tests across each of the disparate cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala will help ensure that the gains associated with case study analysis discussed by Seawright (2016) are realized by providing difficult to dispute evidence in support of or against the theory being tested.

The causal process observations to be evaluated through process tracing cover the entire period from independence through the final administration for which reliable social expenditure data was available and included in the analyses of the previous chapter for each of the four case studies. To support the model of welfare state developments I have proposed, and pass the smoking gun tests described above, the case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala should provide causal process observations that show that state elites act in pursuit of their autonomous interests (including, principally, political survival), these actions involve the development of social citizenship paradigms that (at least offer the possibility) of aligning others around this pursuit of their interests, and welfare state developments correspond with these paradigms and (fundamentally) these pursuits. As seen below, the evidence revealed through process tracing provides evidence of this and lends decisive support to the state elite power



model of welfare state development, while also highlighting the crippling inaccuracies of the partisan and institutionalist theories of welfare state development influenced by Marshall (1950).

## CASE STUDIES

### *Argentina*

In the post-colonial period, Argentina has possessed a history of functional democracy that dates back to the 1940s (and even earlier in name), and, in line with Marshall's (1950) theory, has primarily seen its welfare state solidify and expand following this transition. Following Peron's populist welfare reforms and Argentina's import substitution industrialization (ISI) period, during which union-administered health plans financed through payroll taxes and universal education were established, Argentina's status as one of the welfare leaders in the region had been cemented (Riesco 2007; Huber & Stephens 2012). At a quick glance, then, Argentina appears to be a poster child for a Marshallian paradigm of welfare state development. Yet, a longer gaze reveals that the origins of the welfare state precede this democratic period and that welfare state developments since have occurred under periods shaped by shifts between democracy and authoritarian rule under which, even during periods of sustained democracy, state elites seem to have exercised significant power in shaping the policies of the country. Because of this, Argentina provides an essential test case to evaluate to what extent its trajectory of welfare state development has been shaped by hypothesized state elite interests through the development and diffusion of particular social citizenship paradigms. Given that the origins of the welfare state precede the onset of democratization, the discussion of this case starts with this (oft-overlooked) pre-Peron period.

After years of internal conflict following its independence in 1816, the modern Argentinian state emerged in 1861 and kicked off a liberal state period that would last until 1930 wherein Argentina became one of the wealthier nations of the world in terms of GDP per capita (Mahoney 2010). During this time, Argentina developed a largely nominal democracy that was dominated by “caudillos” (authoritarians) that sought to strengthen and elevate the state through a combination of economic development spurred by liberal economic policies and establishing the perception of a unified ethnically homogenous and European nation through the acceptance of hundreds of thousands of European immigrants and the military conquest of autonomous indigenous peoples of Patagonia that had remained autonomous throughout Argentina’s experience with colonialism (Mahoney 2010). From 1874 to 1916, these elites came to power under the conservative one-party rule of Argentina’s landowner-oriented National Autonomist Party (PAN), and democracy, even in the incomplete form of only universal, secret and obligatory male suffrage, would not come into existence until the “Sáenz Peña Law” was passed under President Roque Sáenz Peña in 1912 (Pérez 2008; U.S. Department of State 1942). By this time, the first building blocks of its future welfare state had already been laid in place with the passing of public, compulsory, free, and secular education in 1884 for this allegedly unified white populous, and the establishment of the National Retirement & Pension Fund in 1904, which at this time covered only the state’s own civil servants and military members (Brooks 2009).

This movement toward democracy following the “Sáenz Peña Law” (and well after the foundations of the Argentinian welfare state were already laid) enabled an expansion of voter turnout from about a third of eligible voters to approximately 70-80 percent of eligible voters in

the country and the rise to power of the liberal opposition movement represented by the populist and nationalistic Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical), who saw its leader Hipólito Irigoyen (or Yrigoyen) elected president in 1916 and become the first president from outside the traditional ruling class of landed elites (Goodwin & Palermo 2008; Pérez 2008; U.S. Department of State 1942). The administrations of President Irigoyen (1916–1922, 1928–1930) that followed, and sandwiched fellow Radical President Marcelo T. de Alvear (1922–1928), were marked by conflict with the entrenched conservative opposition, leading to the promotion of a (personalist) vision of change built around moral regeneration, economic nationalism and loyalty to him, the use of executive power to intervene in local elections and issue executive decrees to override conservative opposition in the legislature, and the pragmatic extension of education and social security as part of a patronage-oriented program of welfare state expansion that served to maintain an urban-based political machine of lower-and-middle-class support (Goodwin & Palermo 2008). The combination of economic instability posed by the Great Depression, conservative opposition, and military alienation brought about by his personalistic use of and meddling in the military, though, brought an end to Irigoyen's second administration when a right-wing military coup led by General José Félix Uriburu in 1930 re-established the control of the land-owning and aristocratic conservative minority over the state, who would then remain in power through the systematic violation of electoral law (e.g., electoral fraud and violence) until 1943 during the period of autocratic military rule known as the 'Infamous Decade' (Goodwin & Palermo 2008; Pérez 2008; U.S. Department of State 1942).

During the first two years of this 'Infamous Decade,' the now-President Uriburu (1930–1932), following the Argentinian supreme court's recognition of him as president, dissolution of

the congress and declaration of a state of siege, attacked those he deemed to be a part of the opposition and censored the press in alignment with the fascist paradigm he installed (Palermo 2008d). When support for President Uriburu began to fade in 1931 and his cancer worsened, however, the provisional government sponsored elections in 1932, which with the support of the National Democratic Party and the Anti-Personalist Radicals and electoral fraud by the Interior Ministry, replaced Uriburu with General José Agustín Pedro Justo (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008b; Palermo 2008d). President Justo (1932-1938) established a paradigm more directly aligned with the conservatives that helped elect him, and consolidated this conservative control (with him at the fore of it) by establishing a ruling-coalition of conservative political forces known as the “Concordancia” and keeping it in power through electoral fraud, censorship, and repression (Lewis 2008a; 2008b). This Concordancia encompassed the National Democratic Party, the Independent Socialist Party and the Anti-Personalist Radical Civic Union, with the Anti-Personalist President Justo followed by the Anti-Personalist President Roberto Ortiz (1938–1940) and then the National Democrat President Ramón S. Castillo (1940-1943) when Ortiz resigned due to illness, and, collectively, constrained spending while still initiating a wave of social investment in infrastructure, including hospitals and low-cost housing, and establishing the five-and-a-half-day work week, paid vacations, maternity leave, pensions for government employees and protection from loss of employment as part of a program of reforms that aimed at promoting economic stabilization and growth (while minimizing social unrest) in the face of the tumult posed by protest, the Great Depression and World War II (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Goodwin 2008; Lewis 2008a; Tcach 2008).

These efforts, though, would not be enough to manage the political divisions and economic challenges that would lead to the coalition's removal from power by a military coup in 1943, the establishment of a new military regime, and leave a lasting impact on the political landscape and welfare state development of the country by opening the way for the political ascendancy of Colonel Juan Domingo Perón (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008a; Tcach 2008). Between 1943 and 1946 three different presidents led the military regime and would each struggle to develop a vision for the regime and deal with the variability of wartime politics, while Perón, who had formed the United Officers Group (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos, GOU) that had pulled off the successful coup, would take control of the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare during this period and would immediately elevate it into a political machine promoting his political advancement through the implementation of a range of social reforms that established higher pay and better benefits for workers and coopted support from the burgeoning labor movement behind him specifically (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008). After quickly being elevated to Vice President in 1944, arrested by rivals in the military regime in October of 1945, and then freed days later after mass demonstrations from his now loyal labor base, Perón ran for and was easily elected President in 1946, receiving support from those with ties to the labor movement or those disaffected by the prior regime(s) that cut across the political spectrum (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008).

Upon capturing the highest position in the state, President Perón (1946-1955, 1973-1974) quickly solidified his power by centering this loyal labor base in the regime's new social citizenship paradigm that was built around an authoritarian personalism (that emphasized loyalty to Perón) similar to that of Irigoyen previously (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008). During the

early Perón administrations, courts (including the supreme court) were purged, media was censored and became government controlled, political opposition was repressed, and joining the Peronist Party and Perón's state sanctioned labor unions became prerequisites to having a job: workers had to join the General Confederation of Labor (CGT); businessmen and farmers had to join the General Economic Confederation (CGE); professionals, schoolteachers and intellectuals had to join the General Confederation of Professionals (CGP); and university students and professors had to belong to the General University Confederation (CGU) (Huber & Stephens 2012; Lewis 2008). Under such conditions, the labor movement quickly developed into the most powerful in Latin America and (with the benefit of positive economic conditions of wartime foreign exchange surpluses and high prices for agricultural products) became (along with the middle class) the beneficiaries of the Perón administration's boom-and-spend populist policy activity that expanded upon the policy efforts of the prior autocratic regimes of the 1930s and early 1940s and redistributed wealth toward labor as part of a "Argentine New Deal," one that would reward the (industrial) laborers that entered into his political coalition with access to old-age pensions, health insurance and new public hospitals (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Huber & Stephens 2012; Lewis 2008).

At the same time that President Juan Domingo Perón was institutionalizing labor as central in Argentinian society, his wife Eva Perón, who was extremely popular with and helped mobilize the working-class (giving her an influential position within the Perón administration), also helped re-envision the position of women in Argentina and create another base of popular support (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008; Navarro 2008). Eva Perón helped build the countries women's movement and realize women's suffrage in 1947 during her husband's

administration, while also establishing a new feminist wing of the Peronist Party that could channel these new voters toward supporting President Perón (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Navarro 2008). Like their (male) worker counterparts, this new support bloc would also become the beneficiaries of social reform efforts that included the construction of schools, health care facilities, and low-income housing, as well as the distribution of social assistance, which was carried out primarily through the new *de facto* social investment and assistance arm of the state: the Eva Perón Foundation (Castiñeiras 2018; Huber & Stephens 2012; Navarro 2008).

During his first term, Perón had rewritten the Constitution to allow him to seek a second consecutive term, and the combined efforts of Juan and Eva Perón to redefine the rights and entitlements within Argentina in favor of (male) workers and women (and meld it with state repression of opposition) entrenched their “Peronism” at the center of Argentinian politics and (though it didn’t prevent the military from opposing Eva Perón’s selection as Vice President) ensured Juan Perón’s re-election in 1951 (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008; Navarro 2008). This second term, however, encountered much more difficult conditions than the first, which would ultimately bring about an early end to it. First, this administration endured the death of Eva Perón from cancer early on in 1952, and with it an inevitable weakening in support given her popularity. Additionally, declining economic conditions throughout the term encouraged a reduction in public spending and a turn toward more orthodox economic policies (despite their commitment to nationalization in the prior term), which left the labor constituency he had cultivated alienated alongside members of the business community, agriculture, and the urban middle class. Growing opposition by those on the left and the right that up until then had been largely silenced, imprisoned, or exiled was now emboldened by his weakening hold over the

country and joined by the Catholic Church and the military (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008). Amid these circumstances, Perón expanded access to welfare entitlements (and attempted to secure a new base for political support) through the extension of the old-age pension and health insurance schemes from important public and private sector employees to rural workers and the self-employed in 1954 (Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Huber & Stephens 2012; Brooks 2009). Yet, this would not be enough to maintain his hold over the state as President Perón would be ousted during the “Revolución Libertadora” (“Liberating Revolution”), a military coup in September 1955 that drove him into exile in Spain (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008; Palermo 2008a).

Pedro Eugenio Aramburu would take control of Argentina that same year, and initiate a cycle dominated by authoritarian military regimes and conflicts over Peronism. The Aramburu administration (1955-1958) began this by instituting a new social citizenship paradigm that outlawed Peronism (and even mentioning Perón), repositioning labor unions under the military’s control and exercising violence against oppositional elements (Palermo 2008a). With a large share of the (potential) electorate now supporting Peronism at even the low points like this, this proved to be politically unwise, as Arturo Frondizi of the Radical Civic Union won the election President Aramburu called for in 1958 by reaching out to Perón and his supporters (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Palermo 2008a). Following his victory, President Frondizi (1958-1962) lifted the ban on Peronism as part of a new vision of social citizenship that would welcome the return of Peronists but replace the personalism of Peronism with nationalism in an effort to secure support from both the Peronists and the military who had opposed them, and followed this up with efforts to promote economic development and investments in education that would similarly address a wide swath of the population, but the diffusion of this new social citizenship paradigm



backfired and drew the ire of factions within his own party and (most importantly) the military who proceeded to depose him (Falcoff & Crites 2008). Following the proscription of Peronism once again, new elections held in 1963 by the military led to the election of Arturo Umberto Illia from the left-wing faction of the Radical Civic Union that opposed President Frondizi after collecting around only 25% of the vote (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Palermo 2008c). President Illia (1963-1966), pressured by the military and without electoral legitimacy, pursued a nationalist-populist paradigm to claim political support that would lead to him supporting the re-legalization of Peronism and a program of reforms oriented toward promoting economic growth through industrialization and social investment in education and health, but his support for Peronism would lead to his removal by the army and replacement with General Juan Carlos Onganía (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Palermo 2008c). This marked the start of another military government that would withhold general elections until 1973, but would initiate PAMI, Argentina's state-subsidized health insurance offered exclusively to pensioners and funded through payroll tax, in 1971 after confronting economic deterioration and popular disorder (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Pribble 2013b).

When elections returned in May 1973, a stand-in for the still banned Juan Perón, Héctor Cámpora of the Justicialist Party won the election and then quickly resigned and setup new elections in September that Perón could enter and would easily win (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008). The third term of the Juan Perón administration (1973-1974), however, would last only 10 months before Perón died in office and would be defined by mounting social and economic problems that would promote continued division within Argentina (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008). When he entered office, Perón possessed the backing of groups that ranged

from the far-left to the far-right and attempted to re-institute the same social and economic interventionist approach taken in his previous regime, but continuing economic deterioration wrought by high inflation and falling production, and the breakdown of his alliance with the militant left-wing faction of Peronism, led President Perón to quickly construct a new paradigm that embraced the conservative version of Peronism and opposed leftist elements like the Montoneros (who would then be expelled from the Justicialist Party) (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008). When Juan Perón died in the midst of these circumstances of economic and social upheaval, his Vice President and wife María Estela Martínez (Isabel) de Perón became president and, tasked with addressing these same economic and political problems, maintained a social citizenship paradigm that embraced social division between the political right and left and supported conservatives. Spiraling violence (which included death squads organized by those within her administration) and economic tumult during the presidency of Isabel Perón (1974-1976) would only come to an end when the military would (once again) take control of the state, and do so through 1983 (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Lewis 2008; Méndez 2005).

The new military junta, led by General Jorge Videla, took control of the country, and instituted the “National Reorganization Process,” which would combine liberalization efforts at the best of international financial institutions with a "dirty war" that magnified the state repression of the previous Perón administration and instilled a regime of widespread persecution of political dissidents and state terrorism (Méndez 2005; Lewis 2008). During this period Supreme Court judges were removed, oppositional political parties and unions were (once again) banned, and groups like the Montoneros would be wiped out, with the Videla and subsequent military governments responsible for thousands of instances of forced disappearances, torture

and/or deaths of alleged left-wing activists or associates that affected at least approximately 9,000 people (Falcoff & Crites 2008), and are estimated to have affected as many as 30,000 according to the National Commission on the Disappeared (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, CONADEP) (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Finchelstein 2008; Méndez 2005). The authoritarian regime would come to an end when inflation and the failed Falklands War in 1982 humiliated the regime to such a degree that then-head-of-state General Leopoldo Galtieri resigned and elections were subsequently called for (Falcoff & Crites 2008).

Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civic Union, a strong critic of the military, would be the winner of this election in 1983 (Falcoff & Crites 2008). Tasked with managing the post-dictatorship transition and an economic downturn brought on by a region-wide (but also localized) debt crisis, President Alfonsín ushered in initially a social citizenship paradigm stressing military accountability for human rights abuses (Brooks 2009; Falcoff & Crites 2008; Huber & Stephens 2012). Alfonsín initially established the CONADEP truth commission to investigate human rights violations committed by the military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983, and pushed for trials and the sentencing of military leaders for human rights abuses (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Finchelstein 2008; Méndez 2005). After the military staged multiple uprisings against his regime and threatened its viability, though, the Alfonsín administration about-faced and instituted a new social citizenship paradigm of military reconciliation and compromised his earlier actions against the previous military leadership by enacting the Full Stop (Punto Final) and Due Obedience (Obediencia Debida) laws, which halted prosecutions and effectively provided blanket amnesty to those implicated in the abuses of the previous military regime (Méndez 2005). The Alfonsín administration's protection of the military, plus the

worsening economic crisis and hyperinflation in the wake of the region-wide debt crisis and collapse of ISI initiated during the previous military regime, though, inspired unrest that led to the election of the Peronist Carlos Menem (1989-1999) of the Justicialist Party in the 1989 election and an early resignation (Falcoff & Crites 2008).

The new Menem administration built upon the conciliatory approach to the military of the previous Alfonsín administration under these circumstances by outright pardoning the few officers who had been sentenced during Alfonsín's government and bringing them under his control, melded it with the liberalism of the previous military regimes under a neoliberal framework that would also appeal to conservatives and weaken the labor movement, and passed constitutional reform that allowed him to remain in office for a second consecutive term (Brooks 2009; Falcoff & Crites 2008; Huber & Stephens 2012; Méndez 2005). In keeping with this new paradigm, and in an effort to reduce fiscal pressures on the federal government, the Menem administration would also implement a privatization push, which would lead to a series of notable welfare reforms (Falcoff & Crites 2008). For starters, President Menem implemented reform that decentralized all primary and secondary education to the provincial level and, in the public health domain, implemented reform that transferred public hospitals to provincial control or self-management (Pribble 2013b). Finally, in response to years of suspended payments, debts to pensioners, and a fiscal deficit in the pension system of 45%, Menem also implemented pension reform that established a mixed, “multi-pillar” old-age pension system with a basic public pension equal to 28% of the average wage in 1994, plus the choice of either an additional public defined-benefit pension from the reformed public system or a private defined-contribution based pension from the newly created private pillar meant to be the main source of old-age

pensions (Brooks 2009:125-126; Huber & Stephens 2012:158). With this reform, workers (from 1994-2007) who failed to designate a pension choice were then automatically assigned to the private system and Argentines overall would receive pensions in which 54% was derived from private retirement accounts (Brooks 2009).

Increasing unemployment and recession under Menem helped bring about the election of President Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) of the UCR in 1999 (Novaro 2008b). Yet, President de la Rúa maintained a similar framework of neoliberalism in the face of the deteriorating economic condition, and similarly succumbed to economic crisis. The de la Rúa administration initiated a number of adjustment measures, including the devaluation of the peso (which wiped out the savings of the middle class) and a partial freeze of bank accounts and savings, before the government eventually defaulted on its debt (Brooks 2009; Falcoff & Crites 2008; Novaro 2008b). The government default led to a decline in the value of the worker's pension savings by 40% and a significant weakening of private system, which was only aggravated further by the government also halving employee contributions, and the benefit levels tied to them, from 11% to 5% of wages, which contributed to a dramatic drop off in contributions and, therefore, coverage (Brooks 2009). These experiences spurred further street demonstrations by the Movement of the Unemployed, public sector employees, and members of the middle class, as well as growing public support for public pensions that (following an initial effort to put down the protests with violent suppression) led to De la Rúa's resignation on December 21, 2001 and several short-lived interim presidents before landing upon Peronist Eduardo Duhalde of the Justicialist Party (PJ) (Brooks 2009; Falcoff & Crites 2008; Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; Novaro 2008b; Riggirozzi 2008; 2010).

Confronted with complete social, economic and political breakdown, the new Duhalde administration abandoned the neoliberal vision of the series of earlier administrations and instead embraced a more traditional paradigm of Peronism open to direct economic interventions (Palermo 2008b). President Duhalde initiated a conversion of foreign currency deposits into the Argentine peso and the devaluation of it to move toward economic stabilization, while also implementing the largest social assistance program in the country's history (Palermo 2008b). This "Elderly Plan," starting in 2003, would provide supplemental income to 70+ year-olds not covered by the pension system and removed restrictions on the number of pensions that could be distributed each year, before popular protests and pressure from within the Justicialist Party forced him to call for elections that the Justicialist Party Peronist he supported, Néstor Kirchner, would win as part of the Front for Victory (Frente para la Victoria, FPV) (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Palermo 2008b; Pribble 2013b).

The Kirchner administration (2003-2007), unlike the Duhalde administration before it, downplayed the PJ's importance (and Peronism along with it) and instead emphasized a populist and nationalist anti-neoliberal paradigm that would allow the president to build and maintain a coalition of anti-Menem factions (Falcoff & Crites 2008; Novaro 2008a). President Kirchner aimed to strengthen and increase this base of political support, and foster a decline in economic and social turmoil, by continuing and expanding upon the economic reactivation approach of the Duhalde administration and rescheduling and restructuring Argentina's considerable debts owed, while also prosecuting the human rights violators of the Dirty War, undermining opposition with both state repression and clientelism, and using taxes on exports to increase social expenditure and push Argentina toward a more universalist social welfare system (Méndez 2005; Novaro

2008; Pribble 2013b; Riggirozzi 2008). Namely, in 2005 this (first) Kirchner administration introduced a moratorium that expanded pension benefits and health insurance coverage to elderly individuals who otherwise would not receive them due to limited contributory records and followed it up with reform in 2007 that increased the generosity of the universal basic pension, raised the benefit rate of the public defined-benefit pension, auto-enrolled undecided workers into the public instead of the private system, and allowed those in the private system to return to the public one (Lo Vuolo 2013; Brooks 2009). By the time, only 24% of the labor force had been actively contributing to the private system (Brooks 2009). In addition to this, Kirchner implemented the National Education Act in 2006 that extended preschool coverage to 4-year-olds, set a minimum wage for public teachers, established a common education structure throughout the country, and ensured a minimum level of funding of 6% of GDP (Pribble 2013b).

The success of President Néstor Kirchner's administration helped ensure that his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner would succeed him in the 2007 elections. This new Kirchner administration (2007-2015) offered a continuation of the previous, but replaced the anti-neoliberal paradigm with a more personalist brand of populism that would build support among the poor and working classes directly behind her (mirroring the Peronism of the past) (Pineda 2015). President Fernández de Kirchner's efforts to cultivate and elevate a popular base of poor and working-class individuals would lead to a new series of social welfare reforms (financed by increased taxes on exports) that included, for starters, the renationalization of pensions in 2008, which transferred private funds to the National Social Security Administration, redirected contributions to public system with defined benefits set at the average salary of the last 10 years of work and increased retirement age coverage from 62% in 2005 to 85% in 2010 (Pineda 2015;

Pribble 2013b; Lo Vuolo 2013). These expanded welfare efforts also included in 2009 the implementation of the Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection, a conditional cash transfers (CCT) which directed the poor toward health services by providing a noncontributory benefit for every child under 18 whose parents are unemployed or employed in informal sector for less than minimum wage that is conditioned upon health check-up (and educational attainment) requirements (Lo Vuolo 2013). In a similar (social investment) vein, President Fernández de Kirchner would also implement programs that distributed food to the poor, the Unemployed Head of Households program (which provided a monthly cash transfer to those who satisfied a labor contribution requirement) and the Birth Plan program that covers expenses related to prenatal, childbirth and pediatric care for children under age 6 (Pineda 2015).

### *Bolivia*

Unlike Argentina, Bolivia was not a welfare leader in the region, nor did it develop an extensive welfare state prior to the 1980s when the state transitioned toward democracy (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Prior to this point, its welfare state was comprised of universal education and a patchy corporatist scheme of social insurance and protection, which under subsequent military regimes had been expanded into a Beveridgian-style social security system covering only a small privileged population (Artaraz 2012; Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Huber & Stephens 2012; Lo Vuolo 2013). It wouldn't be until the country moved toward democracy and, especially, the election of the leftist populist Evo Morales in the mid-2000s that Bolivia saw its welfare efforts expand beyond those associated with an exclusionary welfare regime (Huber & Stephens 2012; Lo Vuolo 2013). In this way, then, Bolivia provides a case that appears to line-up with traditional explanations of welfare state development and expanded social citizenship following from



democratization. Yet, the developmental trajectory noted above in which autocratic military regimes played a central role in producing the exclusionary model of the Bolivian welfare state suggests that autonomous state elite interests, and the subsequent deployment of particular paradigms of social citizenship, may offer a better understanding of Bolivia's welfare state development. This is evaluated below and, as in the case of Argentina, requires taking a close look at its development since independence.

Surprisingly perhaps, given their different histories of development, the modern Bolivian state precedes the previous Argentinian state and emerged in 1825 alongside the brief self-anointed rule of Simon Bolívar. During this period, Bolívar issued a flood of decrees, including those that targeted the existing ethnoracial order and exploitation of the indigenous by abolishing indigenous tribute payments and introduced land reform that would redistribute lands among the (indigenous) peasants of Bolivia, before introducing the country's first constitution in 1826 that extended civil liberties and equality before the law to everyone, but restricted voting rights by age, literacy and occupation and established a strong and autonomous president that would name local government officials, would not be held accountable for the actions of his administration, and would rule for life with the power to then name their successor (Bushnell 2008; Conroy 2008; Langer & Block 2008). By this time, though, Bolívar had already left Bolivia and named Antonio José de Sucre as his successor (Langer & Block 2008; Lofstrom 2008).

The Sucre presidency (1825-1828) would also be relatively brief and similarly promote a social citizenship paradigm that embraced the inclusion of the indigenous, but its new social citizenship paradigm would also aim to weaken the societal power held by the Catholic Church as part of a more radical inclusionary approach (Langer & Block 2008; Lofstrom 2008). In

accordance with this paradigm, President Sucre would pursue the elimination of both indigenous tribute and the tithe, institute a universal head tax and taxes on wealth and income, and bring about anticlerical reforms that liquidated the assets of the Catholic Church within Bolivia, which would be used toward investment projects that included the creation and funding of a new network of public primary and secondary schools. Negative reaction to his program of racial inclusion and economic troubles, however, led President Sucre to backtrack and quickly pursue a new, less radical ethnoracial paradigm, abandon the uniform head tax and reinstitute the indigenous tribute under the new banner of “indigenous contribution” (*contribucion indigenal*). These efforts, however, did not prevent the opposition to his earlier efforts from leading to a revolt in the Bolivian capital that, in combination with an invasion of Bolivia by Peruvian forces, would force him to resign (Langer 2008a; Langer & Block 2008; Lofstrom 2008).

After Sucre’s resignation, Andrés de Santa Cruz would be elected president and pragmatically institute a similar paradigm of ethnoracial division to facilitate his imperialist aims (Langer 2008a; Langer & Block 2008). The Santa Cruz administration (1829–1839) both amended the constitution to remove the widely unpopular presidential lifetime term provision and institute a four-year presidential term and formalized the new ‘indigenous contribution’ tribute system (in return for a state guarantee that the indigenous could retain possession of community lands for ten years) to provide a consistent source of revenue (to a state that lacked it) and fund its efforts to extend Bolivia’s sovereign borders and successfully unite Bolivia and Peru under the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, where Santa Cruz would not only be the President of Bolivia but also the leader of this confederation made up of Bolivia and a Peru that was now divided into northern and southern halves (Bushnell 2008; Conroy 2008; Langer 2008a; Langer

& Block 2008). This period of imperialist-oriented rule also saw President Santa Cruz commit to investments in infrastructure and the liberal distribution of land grants to facilitate economic development and promote further economic resources that the state could tap to fund its various expansion efforts (Langer 2008a; Langer & Block 2008). Internal opposition (both Peruvian and Bolivian) and an invasion by Chile that were fostered by these imperial pursuits would ultimately lead to Santa Cruz's exile, however. (Langer 2008a; Langer & Block 2008)

Despite the aforementioned amendment of the constitution to restrict presidents to four-year terms under Santa Cruz's administration, and the subsequent ratification of a new constitution in 1939 that established both a one-term waiting period before a president could seek reelection and the direct election of presidents by secret ballot, the next approximately 100 years (like the previous fifteen) in Bolivia would be only nominally democratic and see the country remain among the least economically and socially developed in the region, a rural and indigenous peasant nation prone to economic crisis (Conroy 2008; Langer & Block 2008; Mahoney 2010). During this period, political strife, coups, a multitude of short-lived constitutions increasing the power of presidents and the presence of autocratic caudillos as presidents, who maintained and expanded upon the above bifurcated ethnoracial social citizenship paradigm tied to Bolivia's colonial history of forced labor and tribute collection programs and merged it with liberal ideology, were the norm and led to the continued exclusion and oppression of the (majority) indigenous population (Conroy 2008; Langer & Block 2008; Mahoney 2010). State efforts would be largely directed at seizing indigenous communal lands and either auctioning them off to (increasingly larger) haciendas that had been established during the colonial period(s) or distributing them to military veterans through land grants in order to

promote economic development and increase the power of the state, ending labor unrest among indigenous workers in the mining industry and transitioning former indigenous landholders into peons of the haciendas, and suppressing indigenous uprisings that these previous state actions inspired (Langer & Block 2008). The elections that would be held during this time were still subject to voting restrictions that dated back to the constitution Simon Bolívar originally wrote, and would come to be dominated by periods of effectively one-party-rule by first the Conservative (or Constitutionalist) Party from 1880-1899, then their Liberal Party opposition following the (indigenous-supported) Federalist War, who remained in power until 1920, and finally, following another revolt, a Republican Party that would rule until they were ousted by the military in 1934 in the midst of the Chaco War with Paraguay (Langer & Block 2008).

After the Bolivian army's humiliating defeat in the Chaco War, the relatively brief "military socialist" presidencies of General David Toro (1936–1938) and Germán Busch (1938–1939) would follow, providing a radical break with the traditional liberal political elites and strongly influence the foundations of the Bolivian welfare state through their populist vision (Arnade 2008c; Langer & Block 2008). President Toro, to start, introduced a populist-nationalist social citizenship paradigm meant to capture widespread support behind him, particularly from labor. In accordance with this paradigm, President Toro granted women total equality by decree, created a new Ministry of Labor, established state-sponsored unions as part of a "state syndicalism" system that he would control, and pursued economic nationalization projects (Arnade 2008c; Langer & Block 2008). These efforts, though, would not be enough to prevent Busch from taking over in a bloodless coup and being elected constitutional president in 1938 (Arnade 2008a; Arnade 2008c). Despite the usurpation of power from Toro, Busch doubled-

down on his nationalist “military socialism” vision by passing a new constitution in 1938 that incorporated the principle of social justice and granted workers the right to organize, conduct collective bargaining and strike, gave the state a more active role in the country's economy, and gave the state more responsibility for health and education, and pursuing nationalization efforts as well (Arnade 2008a; Conroy 2008; Langer & Block 2008). The constitution would be suspended in 1939, though, when Busch declared himself dictator, before committing suicide later that year (Arnade 2008a; Langer & Block 2008).

The brief presidency of General Carlos Quintanilla (1939–1940) would follow before General Enrique Peñaranda would be elected president and return to a more traditional social citizenship paradigm embracing the merger of ethnoracial exclusion and liberal ideology. The administration of President Peñaranda (1940–1943), however, would be overthrown by Major Gualberto Villarroel and the fascist National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; MNR), which was composed of the moderate and middle-class left, in 1943 (Langer 2008b; Langer & Block 2008). Afterward, Villarroel became president and the new Villarroel administration (1943–1946), sought to further strengthen the state and this administration’s control over it by attempting to build a popular base of support that included and extended beyond the MNR with which he had formed an alliance, in addition to repressing opposition elements, in order to secure its future against the traditional political bases had been overthrown in the coup (Langer 2008b; Langer & Block 2008). This pursuit saw President Villarroel also align with the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario; POR), a revolutionary leftist party, and reconstitute the social position of the marginalized indigenous peasants and miners that had been continuous sources of social disruption through

labor disputes and uprisings by developing a social citizenship paradigm (similar to those of the military socialist regimes) that celebrated labor and (like the much earlier Sucre regime) embraced the ethnoracial inclusion of the majority indigenous population. In accordance with this paradigm, Villarroel's administration saw the passage of mine labor legislation and the first national miners' union being formed, along with the organization of the First National Indian Congress which brought together a thousand indigenous leaders, which led to the abolition of "pongueaje," or unpaid labor services provided on haciendas, and promises to provide indigenous communities with schools (Langer 2008b; Langer & Block 2008). President Villarroel's additional commitment to repression, including the execution of opposition leaders, however, would bring his regime to an abrupt end when a civilian mob stormed the presidential palace and hanged the president from a lamppost in a nearby plaza (Langer 2008b; Langer & Block 2008).

In the wake of this sudden political upheaval, Enrique Hertzog Garaizabal of the Republican Socialist Unity Party (Partido de la Unión Republicana Socialista, PURS) won the subsequent 1947 presidential election (Arnade 2008b; Grieshaber 2008). Faced with severe labor unrest and political opposition from the start, President Hertzog (1947-1949) attempted to reassert conservatives hold over the state and undercut the growing leftist movement by aligning both traditional conservative and leftist forces in opposition to the more radical of the recently unionized and empowered (indigenous) miners. Under this paradigm, the Hertzog administration worked with the Party of the Revolutionary Left (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, PIR) to violently put an end to strikes in the mines, while also pursuing improvements in education and social services, which would help curry support among those not in the mines (Arnade 2008b;

Langer & Block 2008). Hertzog voluntarily resigned in 1949 following the strong performance of the MNR opposition in mid-term elections and ceded the presidency to Vice President Mamerto Urriolagoitía (Arnade 2008b; Gamarra 2008; Grieshaber 2008). The now-President Urriolagoitía (1949–1951), ramped up labor oppression (rather than continue social welfare efforts) and used the military to put down continued worker uprisings and an attempted civilian coup (Grieshaber 2008; Langer & Block 2008).

In light of this state violence, the MNR leader Víctor Paz Estenssoro (unsurprisingly) would win the next presidential election in 1951, inspiring President Urriolagoitía to resign immediately and hand over control to General Hugo Ballivián, who in turn annulled the election and prevented the president-elect from taking office (Grieshaber 2008; Langer & Block 2008). This inspired the MNR-led revolution of 1952, which deposed the military regime, installed Paz Estenssoro as president and led to the MNR possessing sole control over the state until 1964 (Gamarra & Mitchell 2008; Langer & Block 2008). During this period, President Paz Estenssoro (1952–1956, 1960–1964) installed a new paradigm that cast out the military establishment and empowered the indigenous peasants and (armed) miners that had helped bring his regime through a series of reforms that granted universal suffrage to adult Bolivians, weakened the military, nationalized the tin mines, and instituted free, obligatory and universal education, along with a patchy, corporatist scheme of social insurance and protection as part of the new Bolivian Social Security System (Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Gamarra & Mitchell 2008; Langer & Block 2008; Mahoney 2010). In response to the social disruption posed by indigenous peasant attacks on haciendas, the Paz Estenssoro administration also implemented land reform that made the MNR-led state responsible for expropriating estates, established unions of peasants, and made

them completely beholden to the state to receive land (Gamarra & Mitchell 2008; Langer & Block 2008). These revolutionary changes brought hyperinflation with them, though, compelling Paz Estenssoro, and the intermediary presidential administration of his Vice President Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960), to change course on their extensive spending commitments and instead pursue a stabilization program (Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Gamarra 2008; Gamarra & Mitchell 2008). This brought the MNR regimes in confrontation with the organized labor base they had cultivated which, combined with the revitalization of the military, weakened the position of Paz Estenssoro to the point that he barely won a third term and his new Vice President General René Barrientos Ortuño was able to quickly overthrow him in a military coup (Gamarra 2008; Gamarra & Mitchell 2008; Langer & Block 2008).

This ousting of President Paz Estenssoro transitioned the country toward a nearly 20-year period of authoritarian military rule in Bolivia during which time a highly bureaucratized, Beveridgian social security system catering only to a small privileged population would fully crystalize (Artaraz 2012; Banting & Kymlicka 2006). President Barrientos (1964–1969) began this period by instituting a new divisive social citizenship paradigm that incorporated indigenous peasants while targeting members of organized labor, particularly miners, for state oppression (Alexander 2008a). Under the Barrientos administration, heavy-handed violence leveled against miners and their families would be complemented with a military-peasant pact wherein the state would continue to support land redistribution and provide technical assistance to the peasants in exchange for their quiescence, which enabled the state to smother resistance efforts like the guerrilla campaign led by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who was captured and executed (Alexander 2008a; Langer & Block 2008). After Barrientos died unexpectedly in a helicopter crash in 1969,



several short presidencies followed before Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez wrestled control of the presidency in a bloody coup (Alexander 2008b; Barr 2008a; Langer & Block 2008). The right-wing Banzer dictatorship (1971-1978) that followed combined an emphasis on public investment to realize economic growth with violent repression and the banning of all political parties to prevent his own regime from being toppled (Barr 2008a; Langer & Block 2008). Mounting internal pressure (which had already produced numerous coup attempts against Banzer) and external pressure from U.S. President Jimmy Carter ultimately forced President Banzer to resign, leading to annulled elections in 1979 and 1980, the military dictatorship of General Luis García Meza (1980-1982) closely connected to cocaine trafficking, and eventually the election by congress of former-President Hernán Siles Zuazo, who now belonged to the leftist Democratic and Popular Union (Union Democrática y Popular; UDP) and had won the previous annulled elections (Barr 2008a; Gamarra 2008; Langer & Block 2008).

President Siles' second term (1982-1985) presented the daunting task of not only handling the pent-up unrest and demands of civil society but also managing the country's worst economic crisis brought on by military mismanagement, falling tin prices and a (region-wide) debt crisis, as well as external pressure from IFIs to implement austerity measures and the U.S. to combat the cocaine industry (Brooks 2009; Gamarra 2008; Huber & Stephens 2012; Langer & Block 2008). Under the weight of this pressure, the Siles administration collapsed. The state proved unable to meet the demands of labor and other elements of civil society or to manage inflation that would reach an astounding 40,000%, leading Siles to call for elections in 1985 and resign a year before his term was set to expire (Gamarra 2008; Langer & Block 2008).

Paz Estenssoro returned to the presidency once again after gaining the support of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and being elected president by congress in the 1985 elections, and the fourth term of President Paz Estenssoro (1985-1989) saw him become the first of several consecutive administrations to promote a neoliberal paradigm to meet the country's hyperinflation-fueled economic deterioration (Gamarra & Mitchell 2008; Langer & Block 2008). Despite his earlier efforts building up labor and the alliance he formed with the MIR to gain the presidency once more, President Paz Estenssoro introduced a "New Economic Plan" that sought support from the right-wing Nationalist Democratic Action (Acción Democrática Nacionalista; ADN) party led by former-dictator Hugo Banzer, crippled the power of unionized mine workers and led to some of the most extensive structural readjustment and retrenchment reforms in the region in service of receiving IMF assistance and alleviating economic crisis (Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Gamarra & Mitchell 2008; Langer & Block 2008). The subsequent Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993) and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997) presidencies maintained similar neoliberal frameworks but, due to continued social unrest, President Sánchez de Lozada attempted to create a new paradigm that supported the incorporation of indigenous communities as well. During his (first) presidency, Sánchez de Lozada implemented constitutional reforms that redefined Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nation and enshrined indigenous rights, and combined this with both widespread privatization efforts, including those that replaced the public pension system with a private one (so that 92% of the average worker's retirement income would come from privately managed individual pension accounts following the reform measure), and a universal, old-age benefit, or "Solidarity Bonus" (Bono Solidario, Bonosol), paid annually for life to all Bolivian citizens above 21 years old in 1995 upon reaching

65 from the proceeds of privatization efforts (Artaraz 2012:24; Barr 2008b; Brooks 2009; Huber & Stephens 2012).

These efforts, however, did little to mitigate social unrest. The neoliberal regime of the following (and now democratically elected) presidency of Hugo Banzer (1997-2001) was defined by protests that escalated into the Cochabamba Water War against water privatization and were met by a violent state response following the declaration of a state of siege, as well as a resumption of the Bonosol non-contributory old-age benefit, which had been discontinued by his administration in 1998, at a reduced benefit level under the new Bolivida moniker (Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Lo Vuolo 2013). Afterward, Sánchez de Lozada's second presidency (2002–2003) continued to embrace a neoliberal paradigm as well, but his accompanying plans enabling foreign exploitation of Bolivia's natural gas resources quickly brought about widespread protests, violent repression against protesters, and his resignation (Barr 2008b). Similarly, Sánchez de Lozada's vice-president and neoliberal replacement, Carlos Diego Mesa Gisbert (2003-2005), would be forced to step down due to continued protest activity by these groups (Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Kohl 2002; Riesco 2007; Riggirozzi 2010; Robinson 2008).

This social unrest-driven breakdown, though, would ultimately inspire the most recent and dramatic transformations of the Bolivian welfare state. Following the interim presidency of Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (2005-2006), Evo Morales, former cocalero and leader of the indigenous social movements affiliated with the Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) umbrella, became the first indigenous president in Latin America, and one elected upon a platform of opposition to the neoliberalism of the previous administrations (Banting & Kymlicka 2006). The Morales administration (2006-2019), faced with the question

of how to consolidate its control, avoid the protest-induced collapse of previous regimes and secure itself against conservative opposition forces (that would ultimately launch a failed coup in 2008, and force him into exile in 2019), emphasized the fuller inclusion of the indigenous majority of Bolivia and expanded the welfare state to better reach these indigenous community members. Principally, Morales enacted a new constitution in 2009 that further recognized indigenous economic and political rights. This new constitution also established a constitutional right to the kind of national, universal, noncontributory pension first seen in Bonosol, which the Morales administration had recently re-introduced as the “Dignity Income” (Renta Dignidad) in 2008, and expanded benefits to citizens over the age of 60 independent of other factors, initiating a dramatic shift in coverage for a country that at the start of Morales’ term had possessed the lowest percentage of the labor force covered by the pension system in Latin America (Lo Vuolo 2013; Pribble 2013b; Brooks 2009). On top of these efforts, Morales put in place conditional cash transfers (CCTs) like Juanito Pinto and the Bono Juana Azurduy (Riggirozzi 2010), which provided an annual payment to primary school children in public schools (Riggirozzi 2010) and transfers to mothers if they attend check-ups and have a hospital birth (Riggirozzi 2010; Artaraz 2012), and in doing so transitioned Bolivia away from being an exclusionary welfare regime (Artaraz 2012; Banting & Kymlicka 2006; Huber & Stephens 2012; Lo Vuolo 2013).

### *Costa Rica*

Unlike many other countries in the region, Costa Rica has experienced sustained democracy dating back to 1949, and, as would be expected by traditional theories of welfare state development, has seen its welfare state expand during this period (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). However, this has occurred amid a two-party system uniquely dominated by a Social Democratic

Party (PLN) committed to social welfare and Christian democratic parties largely responsible for the creating the welfare state, which date back to the authoritarian governments that precede the transition to full democracy (Huber & Stephens 2012; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). For this reason, Costa Rica's trajectory of welfare state development provides an important opportunity to evaluate whether this case was, in fact, shaped by a Marshallian march toward democracy and enhanced social citizenship or, instead, by state elite interests through the development and diffusion of particular paradigms of social inclusion and participation. Given that the Christian democratic parties responsible for the origins of the welfare state precede the transition to full democracy, the discussion of Costa Rica starts with this oft overlooked, pre-democracy period following independence as well.

Despite the Costa Rica's current status as one of the strongest welfare states in Latin America, the foundations of this welfare state would emerge in a nation that at the time of its independence was among the poorest in the region due to its sustained peripheral colonial experience and small population of about only 60,000 (Bell 2008c; Mahoney 2010). Following a post-independence period of integration into the Central American Federation, a consolidated Costa Rican nation-state first emerged under the dictatorship of Braulio Carrillo Colina (1838–1842), who immediately separated Costa Rica from the federation and, as part of his efforts to establish a strong new Costa Rican nation led by him, amended Costa Rica's constitution to codify civil laws, curtail the power of municipal authorities and the legislative branch and name himself ruler for life, and ordered municipalities to distribute coffee seedlings to all peasant farmers who would plant them and public lands accessible for planting in order to foster the cultivation and export of coffee, the development of his newly-consolidated nation's economy,

and the public's support of him, before being overthrown by external forces seeking (but ultimately failing) to reestablish the Federation in 1842 (Bell 2008c; Gudmundson 2008a; Gudmundson 2008b). The weak integration of colonial institutions and actors into the new independent state, the successful efforts of the Carrillo regime to strengthen the power of the executive over the state and promote economic development, plus the relative avoidance of regional warfare during and after the Carrillo regime in this early state formation period in Costa Rica would together inspire a subsequent wave of liberal regimes that pursued state centralization and the concentration of power with the presidency through a series of constitutional reforms alongside the codification of civil laws, land privatization and coffee exportation, and quickly elevated Costa Rica to the richest country in Central America on a per capita basis by the early twentieth century (Bell 2008c; Gudmundson 2008a; Gudmundson 2008b; Mahoney 2010).

While 'democratic' elections were introduced in this period that followed the Carrillo dictatorship, Costa Rica through the early twentieth century was democratic in name only, as Costa Rica alternated between periods of dictatorship, like the autocratic rule of President Juan Rafael Mora Porras (1849–1859), President Tomás Guardia Gutiérrez (1870–1882) and Federico Tinoco Granados (1917–1919), and nominal democracy (wherein political participation was limited by property, literacy, and gender restrictions), both of which were characterized by the autocratic rule of state elites, episodes of repression against opposition, and coups (Bell 2008c; Gudmundson 2008b; Gudmundson 2008c). Unsurprisingly then, the first meaningful sign of democracy would not be witnessed until 1889 when President Bernardo Soto Alfaro (1885–1889) peacefully transferred power to his electoral successor President José Joaquín Rodríguez

Zeledón (1890–1894) for the first time in Costa Rica’s history, and essential democratic reforms that established direct elections and the secret ballot would not come until 1913 and 1928, respectively (Bell 2008c; Gudmundson 2008b; Leonard 2008). Under such non-democratic conditions, the first three decades of the twentieth century would be largely dominated by just two presidents: Cleto González Víquez (1906–1910, 1928–1932) and Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno (1910–1914, 1924–1928, 1932–1936) (Bell 2008c). Yet, despite the absence of meaningful democracy, this set of state elites who promoted social citizenship paradigms that blended inclusionary ideas of a unified, and ethnically European citizenry with those of liberalism and personalism would be the ones to see to a series of public investment initiatives and education reforms that would create and support a free, compulsory and secular system of public education (which undermined the power of the Catholic Church and supported the economic development goals of the state elites) by the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, plus additional land distribution efforts, the establishment of the first minimum wage and the creation of insurance schemes (in order to undercut a growing communist movement that had emerged with the Great Depression), which laid the foundations of the Costa Rican welfare state and set the stage for the development of the social security system that quickly followed (Bell 2008c; Gudmundson 2008c; Leonard 2008; Mahoney 2010; Riesco 2007).

This political ascension of Manuel Mora Valverde’s communist party, the Farmers and Workers Bloc (*Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos*), and the growing social unrest it sponsored (like its successful banana strike under President Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno), though, would bring an end to the decades-long hegemony of the previous liberalism and personalism infused social citizenship paradigms. While the nominal nature of Costa Rica’s democracy at the time

ensured a fellow National Republican, León Cortés Castro, would be elected as President Jiménez's successor in 1936, the challenge the communists posed to the vision of unity offered in the previous paradigms encouraged a new, oppositional approach (Bell 2008b; Bell 2008c; Gudmundson 2008b). The Cortés administration (1936–1940) responded to the disruption posed by the communists by establishing a new, anticommunist social citizenship paradigm, one that led to civil rights violations and multiple election interference efforts that prevented communist opposition candidates from being elected to Congress 1938 and prevented opposition figures from mounting a meaningful challenge in the 1940 presidential election, while also continuing public work efforts (Bell 2008b; Bell 2008c). The protests that President Cortés new anticommunist social citizenship paradigm courted, however, encouraged another, more important, break with the previous dominant social citizenship paradigms following the election of President Cortés' successor, National Republican Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, in the aforementioned 1940 election (Bell 2008b; Bell 2008c; Salazar 2008).

Like the state elites that immediately came before him, President Calderón (1940–1944) came to power with the support of the liberal agricultural export sector elite and inherited the upheaval brought on by communist mobilization in the 1930s, but Calderón also inherited upheaval brought on by the repression tactics of his predecessor and an economic crisis that came with World War II. Disavowing the classical liberal paradigms that helped justify the elevation of the wealthy and the poor economic and working conditions of the Costa Rican peasants and working class, President Calderón met this turbulent period with a completely new Christian-socialist social citizenship paradigm centered around elevating the peasantry and working-class of Costa Rica, rather than the oligarchy that had supported his candidacy (Bell



2008c; Salazar 2008). Under this new social citizenship paradigm, the Calderón administration continued the practice of repressing opposition elements (like José Figueres Ferrer) while also cultivating support from a disparate but sympathetic coalition that included members of his National Republican Party, the Catholic Church (led in Costa Rica by his friend Archbishop Víctor Manuel Sanabria Martínez), and the renamed communist party (Popular Vanguard Party, PVP) still led by (Calderón's opponent in the prior election) Manuel Mora Valverde that would enable it to push through an extensive social reform agenda appealing directly to the peasant and working class bloc that had been a source of disruption and offered a potential broad base of support (Ameringer 2008a; Bell 2008c; Bell 2008f; Salazar 2008). This program of social reforms enacted by the Calderón administration would involve founding the University of Costa Rica, instituting "social guarantees" to a social security system that provided pensions for retirement and disability and national health insurance, a minimum wage, eight-hour workday and to organize and strike, distributing uncultivated land, establishing new social assistance programs, and, thus, the crystallization of the Costa Rican welfare state (Bell 2008c; Bell 2008f; Huber and Stephens 2012; Salazar 2008).

The radical nature of the social citizenship transformation in favor of the peasant and working classes engendered by President Calderón (plus his authoritarian tendencies), though, fostered opposition and protests among the economic elite and members of the middle class, including some from within the National Republican Party, which coalesced around the Democratic Party and previous National Republican President León Cortés to challenge Calderón's proposed successor Teodoro Picado Michalski from the Victory Bloc (Bloque de la Victoria), the new political alliance between Calderón and communists, in the 1944 election

(Bell 2008b; Bell 2008c; Bell 2008e; Huber & Stephens 2012). Though Teodoro Picado would go on to win the election, he was accused of committing a violent campaign of fraud and intimidation aided by Calderón in the lead-up, and opposition would remain a constant and escalating feature of the heavily Calderón-influenced presidential administration of Teodoro Picado (1944–1948) that followed, despite his efforts to secure support through the enactment of progressive income tax and electoral reform (Bell 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; Huber & Stephens 2012; Salazar 2008). When President Calderón ran for office once again in 1948, the opposition to him and his bridge successor united behind the National Union Party (PUN) and its liberal leader Otilio Ulate Blanco provisionally won the election before congress annulled the results in response to Calderón's protestation, each side charged the other with fraud and the façade of Costa Rican democracy was broken, leading to open civil war (Ameringer 2008a; Bell 2008c; 2008c; Salazar 2008).

While President Picado's government responded to the breakdown by repressing opposition figures, exiled dissident José Figueres Ferrer, with the support of Guatemalan president Juan José Arévalo Bermejo, mobilized opposition into an armed rebellion that in only six weeks would topple the Picado regime (Ameringer 2008a; Bell 2008c; Bell 2008e; Salazar 2008). This civil war ended when Figueres reached agreements that would trade the resignation of Picado and transition to a Figueres-led junta for a peaceful transition without violence or persecution and the maintenance of the previous social reform efforts (Bell 2008c). Despite the annulment of Ulate's electoral victory being the supposed motivation for the rebellion, and Figueres agreeing to recognize him as the president-elect, Figueres would rule the country for 18 months as the head of the Founding Junta of the Second Republic before transferring power over

to him. In the interim, and under his own unique social democratic social citizenship paradigm (which contrasted with the liberal orientation of Ulate and his supporters), Figueres would integrate the socio-politically excluded Afro-Costa Rican enclave born out of Costa Rica's banana production, approve a new constitution that would eliminate voting restrictions (except for those who had aligned with Calderón and Picado), including those against women, and strengthen and expand upon the social welfare commitments of the Calderón administration, while also persecuting communists and Calderón/Picado's other supporters despite the promises he made not to (Ameringer 2008a; Bell 2008c; Gudmundson 2008b; Huber & Stephens 2012). This melding of social democratic elements with some of the Christian socialist elements of the Calderón administration (plus positive economic conditions) would push the now (finally) democratic Costa Rica toward the development of a stratified, universalistic welfare state by the late 1970s (Lo Vuolo 2013).

After power was transferred over, the presidency of Otilio Ulate (1949-1953), despite its liberal leanings (and the oppositional stance of the PUN to some of Figueres' social democratic reforms), adopted a unification paradigm that would minimize hostilities between his base of anti-Calderónists that originally elected him and Figueres' social democrats that had transferred power to him (Bell 2008c; 2008e). His government prioritized fiscal constraint but still continued the popular welfare state building efforts of the preceding Christian socialist and social democracy governments and established the General Directorate of Medical & Social Services and the Higher Council of Education (Bell 2008g; Riesco 2007). Ulate would transfer state control back to Jose Figueres Ferrer and his new left-leaning National Liberation Party (PLN) (Ameringer 2008a; Bell 2008c). This Figueres presidency (1953-1958) offered a return to the

social democratic vision of the first and further expanded the state's commitments to health care, education (with the Fundamental Law of Education that set out the guidelines, goals and objective for the future of the Costa Rican educational system) and housing (with the National Institute of Housing and Urban Planning) (Ameringer 2008a; Bell 2008c; Riesco 2007). Afterward, the conservative PUN opposition returned to the presidency under Mario Echandi Jiménez (1958-1962) (Bell 2008c; 2008d). Under a conservative paradigm meant to align and draw support from both Ulate and Calderón supporters, President Echandi focused on fostering industrial development and pushed the country toward an import substitution industrialization model of development with the Industrial Protection Law of 1959, created the Institute of Lands and Human Settlements to manage land reform efforts that had begun under Calderón, and universalized the social security system originally built by Calderon via a constitutional amendment in 1961 (Bell 2008d; Huber & Stephens 2012; Riesco 2007).

This cycling of PLN and PUN/National Republican presidencies adopting social democratic and conservative paradigms influenced by President Figueres and Calderón, respectively, which each embraced expansions of the welfare state, would continue with the presidencies of Francisco José Orlich Bolmarcich (1962-1966), José Joaquín Antonio Trejos Fernández (1966-1970), Jose Figueres Ferrer (1970-1974), again, and Porfirio Ricardo José Luis Daniel Oduber Quirós (1974-1978) (Bell 2008c). Collectively, these administrations extended pension coverage to self-employed workers, passed control of the Ministry of Health and charitable health facilities (with the exception of first-line health service facilities at the time) to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, launched the Rural Health Program that expanded the coverage of primary care services in rural areas and the Community Health Program that applied

the same principles of improving access to primary care services found in the Rural Health Program to suburban neighborhoods, and created both the Mixed Institute for Social Services and the Social Development & Family Allowance Fund (FODESAF), which financed food programs, rural health initiatives, and one of the first of its kind in the region non-contributory pensions for poor indigents (Haggard & Kaufman 2008; Riesco 2007; Durán-Valverde 2002).

This cycle of social democratic and conservative administrations each strengthening the welfare state was interrupted, though, with the election of President Rodrigo José Ramón Francisco de Jesús Carazo Odio (1978-1982), who represented the anti-PLN Unity coalition (Bell 2008c). When confronted with a deteriorating economic condition inspired by the collapse of the ISI development model, the local onset of a regionwide debt crisis, and high inflation (and the growing poverty that came with it), President Carazo promoted a new paradigm embracing elements of neoliberalism and (in keeping with this) cut social spending, while also promoting the activation of health committees in rural health posts as part of the Ministry of Health's new Unit for People's Participation (Bell 2008c; Riesco 2007; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Unger, de Paepe, Buitrón & Soors 2008). Subsequently, under the Luis Alberto Monge Álvarez administration (1982-1986) of the PLN that came into office at the height of the debt crisis, neoliberalism would be more strongly embraced and fused with elements of the social democratic paradigm to form a soft neoliberal paradigm that would pursue economic stabilization and support those harmed by policies to prevent economic 'losers,' and therein minimize economic and social disruption (Ameringer 2008b). Moves toward austerity would be made in the form of cuts to public spending and the elimination of many government subsidies to various activities, and would be joined by trade liberalization and monetary law reform to

address inflation, but these efforts would be accompanied by state efforts to manage unemployment through a series of social compensation policies directed at those who lost out in manufacturing sector, dubbed the “Social Compensation Plan,” which boosted social spending as manufacturing decreased and was financed by aid received from the U.S. in the 1980s due to its position vis-à-vis the civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador during this period (Ameringer 2008b; Huber & Stephens 2012; Riesco 2007:337; Segura-Ubiergo 2007).

Following the administration of Oscar Arias Sánchez (1986–1990) oriented around the construction of Central American peace (and the broader social disruption in the region), this soft neoliberalism paradigm would return and influence the paradigms of the regimes that would follow, irrespective of the political affiliation of these regimes (Bell 2008c; Gall & Gleason 2012). President Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier (1990-1994), the son of President Calderon Guardia son and leader of the new and united conservative party known as the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), embraced a paradigm that merged neoliberalism with the Christian-socialist tenets of his father when faced with economic troubles, leading to an emphasis on economic liberalization in service of promoting economic equality and the maintenance of the welfare state to support laborers negatively impacted by neoliberal efforts (Bell 2008a; Bell 2008c; Gall & Gleason 2012). The subsequent PLN presidency of José María Figueres Olsen (1994-1998), the son of President Figueres, similarly introduced a soft neoliberalism paradigm that merged neoliberalism with the social democratic tenets of his father when faced with an economic decline, eventual recession and protests, which led to combination of a focus on economic reforms related to privatization and spending cuts and social investment-oriented welfare state reforms, including an amendment in 1997 mandating that public expenditure on education be at

least 6% of GDP and the creation of Basic Teams for Integrated Attention (EBAIS) to provide preventive medical care and transfer patients to the Costa Rican Social Security system (CCSS) (Gall & Gleason 2012; Huber & Stephens 2012; Riesco 2007:340; Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Dissatisfaction with the new Figueres administration (despite its welfare efforts to rally support) brought a shift back to PUSC presidency of Miguel Ángel Rodríguez Echeverría (1998-2002), who also offered a soft neoliberal paradigm that embraced economic liberalization in combination with social investment, and implemented both a (relatively mild) form of pension privatization that established a mixed system with a supplemental private tier, where only 20% of the average wage earner's pension would be derived from private accounts, and additional education reforms meant to secure support in front of the next election (Brooks 2009; Gall & Gleason 2012; Huber & Stephens 2012; Segura-Ubiergo 2007).

These efforts would lead to the successful election of PUSC President Abel Pacheco de la Espriella (2002-2006), but corruption scandals involving him and former PUSC Presidents Rafael Ángel Calderón Fournier and Miguel Ángel Rodríguez Echeverría, brought the return to power of the PLN and Oscar Arias in the 2006 presidential election. This second Arias administration continued the trend and adopted a soft neoliberal vision, one that pushed forward the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), but (when pressured by extensive opposition and protest, particularly from the Citizen's Action Party, and a first-of-its-kind national referendum seeking to nullify it) complemented this policy effort directed at economic growth with a dramatic increase in the benefit level of Costa Rica's noncontributory pension and a new CCT, Avancemos, which established a means-tested benefit targeting poor families aimed at reducing secondary education desertion by providing benefits

being contingent upon school attendance and health requirements, to help mollify this resistance (Cupples & Larios 2010; Huber & Stephens 2012; Koehler-Geib & Sanchez 2015; Lo Vuolo 2013; Urbatsch 2013; Willis & Seiz 2012). In the same vein, the next PLN and final administration under consideration of Laura Chinchilla (2010-2014) would similarly offer a widely palatable soft neoliberal paradigm that integrated a neoliberal focus on free-market policies and job creation with fiscal reform aimed toward strengthening education commitments (Ellicott 2014; Gall & Gleason 2012).

### *Guatemala*

Finally, on the opposite end of the spectrum from Costa Rica, Guatemala has been a country with one of the weakest histories of democracy and welfare state development in all of Latin America, and is, therein, emblematic of many other countries in Latin America and a necessary contrast to the cases discussed previously. Whereas decades of uninterrupted democracy and welfare state development followed a relatively brief civil war in Costa Rica, and histories of regime change, civil conflict and (at times) inclusionary social citizenship paradigm approaches have produced more complicated trajectories of welfare state expansion in Argentina and Bolivia, in Guatemala only fragments of a welfare state have emerged in the wake of decades of authoritarian rule and genocide committed against its indigenous communities during a civil war that lasted from 1960-1996 (Davison 2008; Woodward 2008c; Lunsford 2015). As such, Guatemala presents an underexplored case of limited welfare state development that offers the unique chance to evaluate how well the traditional and state-elite-based theories of welfare state development explain a lack of development. With this in mind, the following case study examines both the period prior to and following the civil war to investigate just this, whether the



lack of a sturdy welfare state can be attributed to democratic and left party failures in accordance with traditional understandings of welfare state development, or is instead tied to the development and diffusion of social citizenship paradigms that promoted exclusion, violence and the confrontation between state and society constrained welfare state development. Like the case studies before it, this case study considers historical developments since the pre-democracy period following independence to offer a thorough evaluation of these theories.

Following its declaration of independence from Spain in 1821, Guatemala entered into the same Central American Federation as Costa Rica and became embroiled in years of interstate conflict before exiting the federation in 1839 and (eventually) declaring itself an independent republic in 1847 under President José Rafael Carrera (Davison 2008; Woodward 2008b; Woodward 2008c). President Carrera (1844-1848), who had been the president of the State of Guatemala before declaring it an independent republic and led a nation affected by the collapse of the indigo industry and a system of ethnic-stratification tied to its colonial history of the exploitation of the indigenous majority, promoted a conservative social citizenship regime during his time as president that strengthened the position of the economic elite of the capital, the Catholic Church and the indigenous peasant communities who had all previously helped him oust him oust regimes with liberal social citizenship paradigms that targeted the church (by reducing the power of the clergy and auctioning off church land to further economic development aims) and favored white Northern Europeans (who became the targeted beneficiaries of a state land grant scheme) over the indigenous natives (Mahoney 2010; Woodward 2008b; Woodward 2008c). His time as president came to an initial abrupt end when the liberal opposition he angered forced him to resign and enter into (brief) exile in 1848, but

after re-entering Guatemala in 1949 with an army composed of the indigenous, Carrera quickly captured control of the military and, with conservative support, the country, which he further secured with successful military campaigns against liberal forces before becoming “president” once again in 1951 (Woodward 2008b; Woodward 2008c). During this second presidency (1851-1865), Carrera would be declared president for life through constitutional reform in 1854 and, with his opposition crushed, would usher in a sustained period where his conservative paradigm dominated, with the church exercising a powerful role in the state and indigenous land and labor being protected from exploitation while his administration also promoted investment in coffee cultivation and export to maintain its support from the conservative economic elite and further economic growth (Davison 2008; Woodward 2008b; Woodward 2008c).

However, following Carrera’s death in 1865, this paradigm came under attack. While General Vicente Cerna inherited his dictatorship and promoted a similar conservative paradigm, the liberals that had been repressed by the conservative paradigm mounted growing opposition against the Cerna administration (1865–1871), and eventually launched a successful “Liberal Revolution” that overthrew Cerna in 1871 and ushered in the liberal presidency of Miguel García Granados (1871-1873) and then Justo Rufino Barrios (1873-1885), who worked to strengthen the state and promote economic development under his new dictatorship (Davison 2008; Woodward 2008a; Woodward 2008c). With these goals came the adoption of a new liberal paradigm under which President Barrios targeted the conservative opposition by weakening the power of the Catholic Church and secularizing the state, weakening the position of the indigenous rural peasantry, and elevating a new class of economic elites tied to coffee production outside of the capital to displace the merchant elite of the capital (Woodward 2008a; Woodward 2008c). In

accordance with this paradigm, President Barrios ratified a new constitution that introduced term limits but restricted voting to literates under the supervision of an official delegate to control elections and facilitate his dictatorship, implemented anticlerical reforms that reduced the number of clergy in the country and expropriated church property, enabled the confiscation of indigenous communal lands and the exploitation of indigenous labor by coffee producers, supported the formation of financial institutions to provide credit and facilitate economic development, created new ministries of agriculture, development and education, established a new public education system, took control of the University of San Carlos from the Catholic Church and transformed it into a state university, and restructured the university to emphasize the kinds of professional and technical education that would support his export-centered economic development aims (Davison 2008; Woodward 2008a; Woodward 2008c).

When the dictator died in 1885, a series of new repressive presidents carrying out similar liberal social citizenship paradigms followed in the late 19<sup>th</sup> through early 20<sup>th</sup> century: General Manuel Lisandro Barillas (1885–1892), José María Reyna Barrios (1892–1898), and (following Reyna Barrios’ assassination) Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898–1920) (Davison 2008; Kit 2008b; Woodward 2008c). The violent dictatorial 22-year rule of the latter figure (facilitated by President Barrios’ new constitution), President Cabrera, would be the longest period of uninterrupted rule in Guatemalan and (Central American) history, but would also see the dominance of the liberal paradigm begin to weaken despite the economic development it continued to foster because of the combination of repression, corruption, and unequal distribution of economic growth that came with it. Cabrera’s extension of the liberal paradigm encouraged the further centralization of power in the state, the continued elevation of the

supportive coffee elite into a landed oligarchy and forced indigenous labor on their estates to support coffee export efforts, but mobilization by opposition forces composed of the Catholic Church, laborers, students, and the middle class of the capital marginalized that were marginalized and repressed under the existing framework would eventually bring about the end of President Cabrera's rule through impeachment and install Carlos Herrera (of the Unionist Party that these opposition forces coalesced around) as his replacement (Kit 2008b; Woodward 2008c).

The unstable political footing of the Herrera regime (1920-1921), plus the emergence of economic crisis, provided an opportunity for liberal proponents in the military to quickly step in and force his resignation, leading to the presidencies of General José María Orellana (1921–1926) and General Lázaro Chacón (1926–1930) that embraced (somewhat less repressive but still very much inequitable) liberal social citizenship paradigms, before the economic crisis wrought by the Great Depression and a stroke that incapacitated President Chacón ushered in a new period of political turmoil (Kit 2008a; Woodward 2008c). After a number of very short-term presidencies, the Liberal Party candidate General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda was easily elected president in 1931 and, after taking office, introduced a more personalist and nationalist variant of the liberal social citizenship paradigm to support his regime's economic stabilization goals (Grieb 2008; Woodward 2008c). Under this paradigm, President Ubico (1931–1944) severely cracked down on leftist groups and political parties to help maintain support from the coffee elite and ensure he would run unopposed in subsequent 'elections,' reduced indigenous political autonomy by instituting a new municipal government system that replaced their mayors with political appointees, and abolished debt peonage among the rural indigenous in order to replace it

with a vagrancy system that compelled peasants to work on farms, ensured their farm labor would be cheap and, simultaneously, supplied workers that were obligated to help the state carry out an extensive set of public works projects that would make further economic development possible, including public-health-oriented projects that established sewage and fresh water systems. World War II, however, brought an end to his regime, as the confiscation of property from the German community (that played an important role in coffee exportation) weakened his support from the coffee elite and coffee production, wartime inflation hit, and resurgent protests led by the members of the middle-class (most affected by inflation) brought about his resignation in 1944 (Grieb 2008; Woodward 2008c).

President Ubico appointed a loyal military junta, led by General Federico Ponce Vaides, to take his place, but the new provisional president would face mounting opposition and be overthrown within only a few months by a pro-democratic military coup led by Major Francisco Javier Arana and Captain Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who together formed an interim junta with Jorge Toriello and led the country until Juan José Arévalo Bermejo took office in 1945 (after winning a landslide presidential election at the end of 1944) and ushered in a decade-long Guatemalan Revolution that provided sweeping social and economic reforms (Ebel 2008b; Ebel 2008c; Woodward 2008c). When the Arévalo administration (1945-1951) came into office, it did so at a moment fraught with obvious tension due to the overthrow of the previous regime, the poor economic situation, the lack of civil and political rights, legacies of indigenous inequality and accompanying land and wealth inequality, and, thus, a situation in which the wealthy, the middle class, and the indigenous peasant class all had grievances against the state. President Arévalo met this challenge with a social citizenship paradigm of “spiritual socialism”

that embraced broad political participation, a strengthened position of (principally urban) labor, and more equal distribution of wealth alongside a continued emphasis on economic development (Ebel 2008c; Woodward 2008c). In line with this paradigm, the Arévalo administration ratified a new constitution that granted popular suffrage and the right to organize political parties, employers' groups and unions, prevented the reelection of the president, and included social guarantees that (among other things) created a social security program; abolished the prior vagrancy law; implemented a social security law that provided access to workmen's compensation, maternity benefits, and health care, plus a labor code that established a minimum wage, collective bargaining (except for peasants) and the right to strike; created the Social Security Institute (IGSS) and the National Production Institute (INFOP), which built hospitals and clinics and provided credit to small producers, respectively; enacted the Law of Forced Rental that made unused land on estates available for rent to peasants; and distributed lands confiscated from Germans during World War II; while also passing the Law on the Expression of Thought to expand the definition of sedition and curtail opposition (Davison 2008; Ebel 2008c; Woodward 2008c).

And, there was plenty of opposition to be concerned about; Arévalo's actions and connections to the Marxist leaders of the unions he created rallied conservatives against a government they saw as communist, leading to over 20 coup attempts while in office that revolutionary leader Major Francisco Javier Arana was largely responsible for putting down as the head of the military (Ebel 2008c; Woodward 2008c). This opposition would reach its zenith point, though, when President Arévalo and now-minister-of-defense Jacobo Arbenz conspired to assassinate the more conservative Arana (whom they suspected of plotting his own coup), setting

off a powerful coup attempt by the military that was only staved off by a general strike in support of the government from Arévalo's loyal worker base, and the arming of students and workers by Arbenz (Ebel 2008b; Ebel 2008c; Woodward 2008c). This death of Arana and successful aversion of a military coup, though, enabled Arévalo's hand-picked successor Jacobo Arbenz to cruise to easy victory in the next presidential election in 1950 and continue the revolution (Ebel 2008b; Ebel 2008c; Woodward 2008c).

This new Arbenz administration (1951–1954), though, offered not only a continuation of the Guatemalan Revolution but also a new and potent nationalist and populist social citizenship paradigm that enhanced the position of both urban labor and the indigenous peasant laborers that made up such a significant portion of the country's population, openly accepted communist activity, but attacked the power of the United Fruit Company (the nation's largest landowner) and conservative opposition as part of its efforts to promote Guatemalan-led economic development and maintain political support (Ebel 2008b; Karnes 2008; Woodward 2008c). In keeping with this paradigm, Arbenz supported the formation of the National Confederation of Guatemalan Campesinos (CNCG) to push for increased agricultural wages for the peasantry, allowed communists to openly organize, and established relationships with Marxist unions (like the CNCG that came under communist influence), while also engaging in widespread repression against opponents. Most famously, President Arbenz also initiated agrarian reform that expropriated uncultivated lands from large landholdings (those above 223 acres), provided compensation to the owners equal to the self-declared tax valuation of the land, and redistributed it to peasants for lifetime usage (Ebel 2008b; Woodward 2008c). This policy hit the United Fruit Company hard, as 400,000 of its roughly 550,000 acres of land were taken for just the

\$1,185,115 it was valued at for tax purposes (rather than the \$16 million the company claimed it was really worth), and this ultimately brought about the downfall of the regime and the revolution (Ebel 2008b; Karnes 2008; Woodward 2008c). Lobbying by the United Fruit Company encouraged the United States' Eisenhower administration to offer Central Intelligence Agency support to the opposition forces led by exiled-Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas against a perceived communist threat, and brought about President Arbenz's resignation in the middle of 1954 (Ebel 2008b; Ebel 2008d; Karnes 2008; Woodward 2008c).

The end of the revolutionary period would mark the start of decades of dictatorships in Guatemala, the first of which was led by Castillo Armas, who initially served as the U.S.-backed leader of a junta and later won an unopposed presidential election following the overthrow of the Arbenz regime (Ebel 2008b; Ebel 2008d; Woodward 2008c). Under President Castillo Armas (1954-1957) a conservative and highly exclusionary social citizenship paradigm built around undermining those who were empowered under the previous revolutionary regimes was imposed, and would set the tone for the paradigms that would follow (Ebel 2008d; Woodward 2008c). The Castillo Armas administration would replace the previous constitution, disenfranchise roughly three-quarters of the electorate through literacy requirements and ban all peasant organizations, labor federations and political parties, while also bringing an end to previous reforms through annulment or un-enforcement, like Arbenz's land redistribution program (Ebel 2008d; Davison 2008; Woodward 2008c). Instead, the reforms of the Castillo Armas regime would involve encouraging foreign investment, public investment projects that aimed to support economic development, and the restoration of religious instruction in public schools by the Catholic Church (Ebel 2008d; Woodward 2008c).



While this paradigm was successful in suppressing opposition, it didn't prevent political infighting from emerging within his National Democratic Movement (MDN), which would lead to the assassination of President Castillo Armas in 1957 and, following a disputed election and street demonstrations, the contested eventual ascension of Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes to the presidency in 1958 (Ebel 2008d; Ebel 2008h; Woodward 2008c). While in power, the Ydígoras administration (1958–1963) offered a less-hardline conservative social citizenship paradigm than his predecessor, one that brought less repression overall, allowed President Arévalo to return to Guatemala and participate in the 1963 elections, and led to support for a limited version of agrarian reform, but still also saw Ydígoras quash opposition within the army, the survivors of which would organize the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and launch a guerrilla movement that would spend the next three decades at war with the state (Ebel 2008h; Woodward 2008c). This guerrilla movement, plus a student-led protest movement and President Ydígoras' willingness to allow Arévalo to return and participate in the election, lost the president the support of the military, and led to his overthrow by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia in 1963 (Ebel 2008g; Ebel 2008h; Woodward 2008c).

The subsequent Peralta administration (1963-1966) established a strict anticommunist social citizenship paradigm that would strengthen military power and reduce the influence of the left (Ebel 2008g; Woodward 2008c). Under it, Peralta went after the leftist guerrilla movement, killing labor and leftist leaders (encouraging reciprocal violence from the guerrillas), abolished the constitution and replaced it with his own that allowed the state to control which political parties would be authorized (and therefore limited the emergence and power of leftist ones), and forged an alliance between his Democratic Institutional Party (PID), the National Liberation

Movement (MLN) and the left-leaning Revolutionary Party (PR) (Ebel 2008g; Davison 2008; Woodward 2008c). While the PID would split and Julio César Méndez Montenegro of the PR would win the subsequent presidential election, becoming the first and only civilian president to take office between 1950 and 1985, the strength of this paradigm and the power that it supplied to the military ensured that the following Méndez administration (1966-1970) would adopt a similar antiguerrilla paradigm to appease the military despite its political affiliation and support from reformists it received in the election (Ebel 2008f; Ebel 2008g; Woodward 2008c). In accordance with this paradigm, right-wing death squads emerged and the military intensified its repression against guerrillas through a “scorched earth” campaign of terror led by Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio (and supported by the U.S.) in the countryside that murdered thousands suspected of affiliating with the guerrillas, on the one hand, while Méndez invested in the construction of schools and public hospitals on the other (Ebel 2008a; Ebel 2008f).

Much of the same can be said about the three PID dictatorships that followed. After winning a controlled election marked by violence and the participation of less than half of the registered voters, the subsequent Arana administration (1970-1974) similarly implemented an economic nationalist version of the anticommunist/antiguerrilla paradigm that continued the repression he had directly carried out in the countryside previously and married it with public investment efforts that would lead to economic growth and maintain support among the military and the middle-to-upper-classes unaffected by the state violence (Ebel 2008a; Woodward 2008c). President Arana’s successor, President Eugenio Kjell Laugerud (1974-1978), initially introduced a moderated anticommunist paradigm following his own fraudulent election that would allow for increased labor union organization and new programs that offered land for

landless peasants to settle, but the increased social unrest that came after a destructive earthquake hit the country inspired a return toward a strong antiguerrilla paradigm and violent repression against those deemed to be subversive elements (Garrard-Burnett 2008a; Woodward 2008c). After General Romeo Lucas García won the next sham election (with even lower voter turnout), the new Lucas administration (1978-1982) transitioned the previous anticommunist/antiguerrilla paradigms into a more broadly anti-leftist and anti-indigenous one, leading to a genocidal campaign in the countryside against indigenous peoples who were suspected of supporting the guerrilla movement, and the seizure of indigenous lands, while death squads continued to carry out murders and disappearances of left-leaning union members, professionals and students in urban settings (Garrard-Burnett 2008a; Garrard-Burnett 2008b; Woodward 2008c). The increased guerrilla mobilization, end of U.S. military support by the Carter administration and loss of tourism engendered by the human rights violations of the Lucas regime, plus a recession that brought falling prices for exports and inflation, however, brought a military coup that overturned the fraudulent election of the PID candidate, General, Ángel Aníbal Guevara, ousted President Lucas and brought an end to the rule of the PID in 1982 (Garrard-Burnett 2008b; Woodward 2008c).

That is not to say, though, that the social citizenship paradigms that immediately followed would, from the start, be dramatically different. After President Lucas was overthrown, a three-man junta consisting of General José Efraín Ríos Montt, General Horatio Maldonado Schad and Colonel Francisco Gordillo momentarily took control of the state before Ríos Montt dismissed the other members, claimed the presidency for himself, and implemented his own conservative and anti-guerrilla social citizenship paradigm to meet the economic circumstances

and the resistance movement that had united to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) (Burnett 2008b; Garrard-Burnett 2008b; Woodward 2008c). In accordance with this paradigm, the Ríos Montt regime (1982-1983) suspended the constitution, censored the press, banned union and political activity, granted the military the power to arrest suspected guerillas, set up special tribunals to prosecute alleged guerillas without a fair trial, and implemented a "rifles and beans" counterinsurgency campaign under which members of the rural indigenous population were conscripted into civil patrols against the guerrillas and made the beneficiaries of social provisions (converting potential insurgents into agents of state violence), while those who refused would be among the victims of continued mass murder campaigns in the countryside or forced into exile in order to reign in social disorder (Burnett 2008b; U.S. Department of State 1982; Woodward 2008c). In the cities, though, Ríos Montt curbed the activity of death squads in order to encourage a return to prior levels of tourism (Burnett 2008b; Woodward 2008c). Thus, the Ríos Montt dictatorship embraced “two sets of rules, one to protect and respect the rights of average citizens who lived in secure areas (mostly in the cities) and had nothing to do with subversion. The second set of rules would be applied to the areas where subversion was prevalent. In these areas ('war zones') the rules of unconventional warfare would apply. Guerrillas would be destroyed by fire and their infrastructure eradicated by social welfare programs" (U.S. Department of Defense 1982).

Ríos Montt's reign did not last long at all, though, as a coup replaced him with his defense minister General Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores in response to the conservative elements of his paradigm that embraced a larger role in the state for Protestants, his unwillingness to set up subsequent election and his inability to effectively manage the economic

downturn (Burnett 2008a; Burnett 2008b; Woodward 2008c). The Mejía administration (1983–1986) initially maintained a similar anticommunist/anti-indigenous paradigm that continued the genocidal actions of previous regimes as well, but the inability to stop the economic situation from worsening led to the promulgation of a more equitable social citizenship paradigm under which a new constitution that allowed (non-leftist) political parties to openly participate in democratic elections and prevented reelection. After the civilian Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo (from the center-right Christian Democratic Party) won the following democratic election in 1986, Mejía stepped down and transferred power over to him, marking arguably the true (yet still flawed) beginning of democracy in Guatemala (Burnett 2008a; Davison 2008; Ebel 2008e; Woodward 2008c).

The legacy of civil war (i.e., a still powerful military, a mobilized peasantry and continuing guerilla activity) and the spiraling economic crisis in the country heavily shaped the incoming Cerezo administration, which offered a new social citizenship paradigm to maintain his control over the state that married the maintenance of the elevated position of the military with a neoliberal vision that would appeal to the upper-classes and the United States (Ebel 2008e; Woodward 2008c). In keeping with this paradigm, political participation among urban workers and the rural peasantry remained low, military campaigns against the leftist insurgency continued in the countryside and killings by death squads increased in cities despite the creation of new laws of habeas corpus, a human rights committee and an Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, while Cerezo implemented a program of economic reforms that involved privatization, austerity measures, currency devaluation, and the removal of price controls (which exacerbated economic inequality and reduced living standards for the majority of Guatemalans),

but increased taxes to support an expanded military bureaucracy (Ebel 2008e; Ellicott 2014; Woodward 2008c). The continuation of the civil war and the economic strife his paradigm brought led to multiple strikes, coup attempts and the overwhelming victory of Jorge Serrano Elías from the opposing Solidarity Action Movement (MAS) in the 1990 election over his chosen successor, but neoliberalism would emerge as a dominant feature of the social citizenship paradigms promoted in the administrations that followed (Ebel 2008e; Woodward 2008c; Woodward 2008d).

The Serrano administration (1991-1993), to start, proposed a neoliberal social pact to unite business, labor and the (military) state, but the implementation of neoliberal policies did little to quell violence, or the social unrest posed by an earthquake that left 30,000 homeless in the country, bringing about a self-initiated coup, Serrano's removal from office and the interim presidency of Ramiro de León Carpio (Ellicott 2014; Woodward 2008c; Woodward 2008d). Following the administration of de León (1993-1995), which saw the politically-unaffiliated Human Rights Ombudsman launch a social citizenship paradigm built around the purification of the country and unilaterally complete constitutional reforms, demand resignations from all congress members and the supreme court and hold elections to install a new congress, and sign agreements with the UNRG on human rights, resettlement for displaced persons and indigenous rights, the election of President Álvaro Arzú (1996-2000) from the National Advancement Party (PAN) brought a social citizenship paradigm that merged a similar emphasis on the re-incorporation of the indigenous people of the insurgency with neoliberalism (Ellicott 2014; Woodward 2008c). The Arzú administration signed peace agreements that brought a formal end to the civil war, dismissed military members accused of human rights violations and weakened

the role of the military and supported increased spending in education, health and housing, while implementing strong neoliberal reforms that drove economic growth (Ellicott 2014; Gall & Gleason 2012; Woodward 2008c).

The persistence of poverty and violence under this neoliberal approach, however, gave Alfonso Portillo from the right-wing Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) opposition an opening to win the next election and implement his own neoliberal, tough on crime vision, but the Portillo administration would suffer from similar issues, plus charges of corruption (Ellicott 2014; Gall & Gleason 2012; Woodward 2008c). Afterward, Óscar Berger of the right-leaning Grand National Alliance (GAN) coalition defeated Ríos Montt and his disgraced FRG in the next presidential election, and initiated his own neoliberal paradigm that reoriented it specifically around the elevation of Guatemala's indigenous majority, leading to an espoused recognition of the state's responsibility for prior violence, a reduced military, efforts to reduce violence, compensation to peasants for the land and lives they lost, and neoliberal economic policies, like the ratification of the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), that (for a timer) supported rising coffee prices, productivity and creation of new jobs and aimed to address economic inequality concerns with increased employment and economic development during his administration (2004-2008) (Ellicott 2014; Woodward 2008c).

The two final administrations discussed here that followed the onset of the global economic crisis of the Great Recession, however, would diverge from this neoliberal paradigm. To start, Berger's administration would give way to the first left-wing president in decades, Álvaro Colom from the National Unity for Hope (UNE), who (faced with a global economic crisis, the entrenched strength of liberal forces and a need to solidify an indigenous majority base

of support) would introduce a new paradigm that saw business as needing to serve a social function, one that would combine the push for economic development with the embrace of a more active role of the state in service of the social development of the rural indigenous poor (Burris 2015; Gall & Gleason 2012; Sandberg & Tally 2015). Emblematic of this paradigm, President Colom (2008-2012) introduced the country's first conditional cash transfer (CCT) program *Mi Familia Progres*a (MIFAPRO), a social investment program originally coordinated directly through the First Lady's Social Cohesion Council within the President's Office and later setup as a social trust fund within the ministry of Education (in both cases to avoid the involvement of an unsupportive congress) that provided financial support to poor families that ensure their children attend school, agree to having the growth of their children monitored and meet certain health requirements (and was deliberately targeted, marketed, and leveraged through coercive tactics to maximize political support within the communities it was rolled out to), which would be implemented throughout the country, increase social expenditure commitments dramatically and support (future) economic development aims through the human capital investments it provided (Sandberg & Tally 2015). This emphasis on social investment continued then when General Otto Pérez Molina from the conservative Patriotic Party won the following election after the First Lady Sandra Torres was deemed constitutionally ineligible to run in the election (Gall & Gleason 2012; Nichols 2015; Sandberg & Tally 2015). Confronted with an exploding violent crime problem and still entrenched poverty, President Pérez Molina (2012-2016) promoted an anti-crime paradigm that would support the reinstatement of the death penalty and televised executions for the gang and cartel affiliated individuals engaged in violent crime and reward the law-abiding (poor) members of the country who sided with him against the social turmoil it produced (Gall & Gleason 2012; Nichols 2015). In keeping with this paradigm,



and its expressed desire to expand social programs (to reward and encourage the good citizenry that does not lead to social crises), the Pérez Molina administration created a new Ministry of Social Development and created a new CCT program, *Mi Bono Seguro*, to replace the previous CCT program that came to an end with the Colom administration, marking a clear recent turn toward social investment welfare state commitments (Sandberg & Tally 2015).

## DISCUSSION AND NEXT STEPS

Clearly, then, the comparative-historical analyses conducted above provide strong support for the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development first developed in Chapter 1, both within and across each of the cases evaluated. To start, within Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rican and Guatemala from the start of the postcolonial period to the present, state elites were found to possess and act upon autonomous interests and welfare state developments were found to correlate with those interests. Crucially, in each of these cases, paradigms of social citizenship were identified and shown to correspond both to the interests of state elites and the social welfare efforts that followed. As such, the social citizenship paradigms discovered in the case studies here supplied a numerous set of “smoking guns” to support the hypothesis that state elites, located within their historically contingent domestic and international political fields, directly shape the path that welfare state development takes.

In fact, the amount of smoking gun evidence found across these case studies provides substantial support for the hypothesis that the policies and trajectory of welfare states in the region are tied to the (sometimes but not always successful) entrepreneurial efforts of state elites to try to manage social disorder, assert control, strengthen their state power and secure their political future through social welfare policies that reflect social citizenship paradigms conducive

to such objectives. Rather than identifying a few key instances where the key mechanism of paradigms of social citizenship can be found, the case studies included in this analysis revealed that (at least) among the welfare reform efforts discussed here (which cover nearly 200 years of history in each of the four case studies), these reform efforts could be directly linked to the social citizenship paradigms deployed by the state elites in power in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala. On top of this, the case studies also showed that these numerous welfare state transformations were implemented by state elites with significant autonomy from civil society, both within democracies and full-fledged dictatorships, and that neither welfare expansion nor retrenchment was meaningfully tied to the left vs. right political affiliation of state elites since welfare state expansions were carried out by state elites from both political orientations sides (and the state elites responsible for these were even shown to flip between these orientations in a number of instances), casting significant doubt on the importance of these factors often touted as important predictors of welfare state outcomes and the validity of the theories of welfare state development influenced by Marshall (1950). In fact, one of the most shocking results from the analysis is just the amount of welfare state expansion carried out by authoritarians, and, specifically, right-wing ones. Therefore, the causal process observations found in the above case studies provide enough evidence to not only make the argument that state elite efforts to address their interests in maintaining order, asserting control, strengthening the state and ensuring their political (and physical) survival are a sufficient explanation of welfare state developments in Latin America, but also to effectively rule out other prominent explanations.

Importantly, the case studies in this analysis also highlight a number of factors that condition the relationship between social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state

developments that take place. First, the four case studies considered here demonstrate that these social citizenship paradigms that shape welfare state development are inextricably linked to the particular histories of that country and, in turn, produce path dependent, but constantly evolving, processes of welfare state development. In Costa Rica, for example, the move toward social citizenship paradigms embracing (only) soft forms of neoliberalism in the last 40 years (and the resulting trajectory of maintaining strong commitments to the welfare state that has been seen) cannot be understood without accounting for the important legacies of Calderón's social citizenship paradigm embracing elements of Christian democracy and Figueres' social citizenship paradigm embracing elements of social democracy earlier that make social citizenship paradigms built around the stronger forms of neoliberalism seen within the region and around the globe untenable. Similarly, the social citizenship paradigms of Morales, Árbenz and Perón in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Argentina, respectively, offer (just) a few other notable examples that demonstrate the impact that the unique, country-specific legacies of prior social citizenship paradigms have on those that follow, and the individual trajectories of welfare state development they produce.

In addition to prior social citizenship paradigms, economic capacity was also found to condition the kinds of welfare outcomes achieved as a result of state elite interests as well. While state elites who successfully deployed social citizenship paradigms were found to be the primary driver of welfare state developments, the case studies discussed here highlight how the resources available to draw on through the infrastructural power of the state appear to shape the kinds of welfare policies these state elites implemented. Administrations in the wealthier countries of Argentina and Costa Rica have adopted more generous and/or sophisticated efforts than those

found in Bolivia and Guatemala, echoing the strong effects of wealth upon social expenditure found in the previous chapter's regression analyses. As expected by state-centered theory, state capacity emerges an important element conditioning the autonomy state elites have to shape policy outcomes.

But, just as importantly, economic development not only emerged as a factor that conditioned welfare state outcomes, it also appeared to be one of the main aims of the welfare state developments seen in each of the four case studies. At times throughout their respective histories, each of these welfare states have embraced social-investment-and-activation-oriented welfare state activity concerned with promoting further economic development (such as land distribution and cultivation support, which has seemingly been overlooked by the welfare state literature) despite their unique individual trajectories of welfare state development. This suggests that economic development is understood by state elites to be critical to achieving their interests in strengthening the state, managing social disorder, asserting control, and securing their political future, and may be tied to the historical legacies of colonialism and the need to 'catch up' to established states (and potentially overcome the obstacles) it created, and/or the shared influence of the United States and IFIs in the international political fields, that each of these cases share in common. It is important to also note, though, that this emphasis has not receded over time; if anything, it has increased as seen in the shared movement toward the kinds of welfare state policy efforts associated with the enabling or social investment model of welfare states identified in the literature (Gilbert & Gilbert 1989; Giddens 1998; Esping-Andersen 2002; Evers & Guillemard 2013; Gilbert 2013).

While this movement toward shared welfare state policies may seem at odds with the impact of prior social citizenship paradigms discussed above initially, it actually highlights another important takeaway revealed in the case studies. The case studies examined here have shown that this shared movement toward increasingly economic-development-supporting and social-investment-focused welfare state policies over time has corresponded not only with shared state elite interest in avoiding economic crisis, but also with a similar shared movement over time away from the divisive social citizenship paradigms that would inevitably spark alienation, conflict, social disruption, and regime change (that were associated with the regimes that principally carried out social security reforms) and toward more broadly encompassing social citizenship paradigms, which can be seen in the recent inclusionary social citizenship paradigms of Bolivia, as well as the populist social citizenship paradigms of Argentina, and even the (at least) widely-palatable soft neoliberal social citizenship paradigms of Costa Rica and (to some extent) Guatemala following democratization. Democracy, it seems, has incentivized state elites to move away from the often-exclusionary social citizenship paradigms seen under authoritarian rule and sponsored a push toward less-likely-to-offend social citizenship paradigms and, in turn, widely acceptable social-investment-oriented welfare state developments that are supposed to promote the economic growth and stability that (at least in theory) benefits everyone. Thus, the results of these case studies suggest that democracy may still have an important (but lesser) role in explaining welfare state developments tied directly to the state-elite-driven model, and that the push toward social investment welfare states seen across the world is tied to the evolving recognition of state elites over time that the combination of broad-based social citizenship paradigms and economic development-serving welfare state developments provides a means of

minimizing the social and (potentially) economic crises that have historically derailed their regimes.

Finally, the case studies in this chapter have clearly shown that the state elites who engage in welfare reform efforts may be familiar with not only the infrastructural powers of the state but also the despotic powers as well, and this shapes the resources available to the state and the welfare state transformations that are seen. Throughout these case studies, state repression by state elites adopting divisive and exclusionary social citizenship paradigms often played a huge role in shaping the trajectories of social policy efforts as the use of the despotic powers of the state (in accordance with the expectations of state-centered theory) appears to magnify societal rifts that constrict the ability of state elites to utilize state infrastructural powers over the long-term. As a result, the overall trajectories of welfare state development witnessed for each of the cases seems to correlate strongly with the amount of state repression experienced, wherein a more extensive history of repression is associated with a less expansive welfare state, and vice versa.

The case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala also make very clear, at the same time though, that state violence itself may serve as one form of the social disruption that state elites can attempt to manage through changes in social welfare commitments. In particular, civil conflicts like the civil wars in Costa Rica and (at times) Guatemala seemed to motivate short-term state-elite-driven efforts that expanded welfare state commitments, which is a somewhat surprising finding based on state theory, and one missing in the existing welfare state literature. Thus, the findings here suggest that state violence presents both a long-term constraint and potential short-term opportunity for new welfare state interventions in the same

way that economic disturbances and other instances of social disruption do. Yet, it is not clear based on this analysis, how these opposite inclinations typically resolve themselves and what welfare state effects can typically be ascribed to incidences of state violence in the short-term. Therefore, further analysis is needed to understand the role that civil conflict plays in the state elite model of welfare state development. This analysis is found in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 4 – Civil Conflict, Economic Capacity, Social Citizenship Paradigms and the Welfare State in Latin America, 1980 – 2013**

The past two chapters have provided extensive support for the hypothesized model of welfare state development that sees state elites, located within historically contingent domestic (and international) political fields, as setting the path that welfare state development takes through the construction of social citizenship paradigms in accordance with their own interests that define who will and will not have access to the social provision and protections of the state and guide subsequent social policy action. Chapter 2 demonstrated that, first, broader archetypes of social citizenship paradigms and their characteristics are far more powerful and important predictors of welfare state outcomes than the democracy-based ones used in the Marshallian-influenced welfare state literature. Chapter 3, afterward, demonstrated that these social citizenship paradigms helped shape the welfare state development paths undertaken by Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala through the expected process in which state elites defined the boundaries of social citizenship in accordance with their interests and priorities, using the infrastructural powers of the state. It also showed that the shifts toward social-investment-oriented welfare states seen in these four cases (and also across the globe) can be understood as a result of state elites pursuing their interests in minimizing economic and social crises in accordance with this new model (and, to a much lesser extent, the supplementary role that democracy plays within it).

But, in the process of revealing these important findings, Chapter 3 revealed another important discovery. Despite their unique histories and varying pathways of welfare state development, in each case civil conflict has seemingly played an important part in welfare state



development by offering both a potential impetus for welfare state action in the short-term (social crisis) and a clear constraint on welfare state interventions over the long-term (through the atrophy of infrastructural power it propels). Though unaddressed in the welfare state literatures discussed previously, this dual-and-conflicting potential suggests that civil conflict is an important additional element conditioning the trajectory of welfare state development within the state-elite-driven model of welfare state that needs to be investigated, particularly with regards to its less understood effects in the near-term.

For this reason, the analyses in this chapter that follow consider how civil conflict affects the welfare state in the short-term, and how this may factor into the model of welfare state development that has been developed and supported in previous chapters. These analyses start by addressing questions such as: Does civil conflict share a relationship with welfare state outcomes that extends beyond just the case studies analyzed earlier and can be observed across the region of Latin America as a whole? If so, in what specific domains of the welfare state does civil conflict have any such impact? Afterward, the analyses transition toward answering how, and to what degree, civil conflict changes the relationships between economic capacity, social citizenship paradigm themes and characteristics, and welfare state development seen in previous chapters. In sum, the analyses that follow investigate the role that civil conflict plays in the state elite driven model of welfare state development observed across Latin America.

Through Prais-Winston regression analyses utilizing correlated panel corrected standard errors on cross-national data of Latin America from 1980-2013, these analyses show that civil conflict has a strong, consistent and underexplored negative relationship with social pensions and, as a result, the welfare state as a whole. This relationship suggests that civil conflict, rather

than serving as a motivation for welfare state expansion, immediately poses an obstacle to expanding welfare state commitments in the manner that state theory proposes (and that the Guatemalan case study showed to operate) in the long-term. In the process, these analyses show that civil conflict conditions the ability of state elites to achieve their interests through welfare state action by constraining the social pension benefits that the state offers in general and by constraining the potential for increasing social pension benefits under the deliberative archetype of social citizenship paradigms, in particular. Thus, the results of these analyses clarify how the despotic power of the state shapes the infrastructural power that state elites draw upon to pursue their interests, and the welfare state developments that follow from them. How these findings relate to the existing literature on conflict (and the virtually non-existent literature on civil conflict specifically) and welfare state development is addressed in the following section.

## CONFLICT AND THE WELFARE STATE

Political conflict has, actually, long been seen as a key explanatory factor shaping the emergence and transformation of welfare states. As discussed in previous chapters, conflict, in this sense, is present in the dominant ‘political class struggle’ approaches of power resource and power constellations theory (Skocpol 1987: 357), as well as other partisan and institutionalist perspectives that see social policies as the outcome of competing political forces. But, while political conflict has been the subject of thorough evaluation, scholars’ understanding of the relationship between armed conflict and the welfare state has been less developed despite this link having been discussed in works as far back as Titmuss (1958).

Originally, the ‘welfare state’ concept was popularized as the (British) antithesis of the fascist ‘warfare state’ of Germany in World War II (Gal 2007; Temple 1941; Petersen &

Petersen 2013). The death and destruction of war was viewed as incongruent with the reformist goals of providing social protections to ensure a certain degree of human well-being and achieving more equitability than would otherwise be possible in relying on the market (Esping-Andersen 1999). At most, then, a negative correlation between war and welfare state action was *assumed* to exist, with war being an *assumed* obstacle to the achievement of the social welfare aims of the welfare state.

This reluctance to study the connection between the two has been changing, though, and with it so has the perception that conflict is only in opposition to welfare state development. In fact, a more complicated picture has emerged, and war itself has been recognized as an important element that structures the possibilities for welfare state development, both negatively and positively. For this reason, the features that constitute the welfare state are now described as “pensions, death benefits, and disability insurance; health insurance; education; family policies; job injury insurance; unemployment and related labor-market practices; *war victims’ benefits* [emphasis added]; and miscellaneous aid to the poor” (Wilensky 2002:61). With this growing recognition of the importance of a connection between conflict and welfare outcomes, two theoretical logics have been applied to explain the conditioning role played by conflict, a dominant paradigm that sees this linkage as a product of state capacity development and alternative perspective that sees it as one example of the broader connection between social unrest and the welfare state.

Within the existing body of research on conflict and the welfare state, the majority of studies have addressed this relationship by focusing on the connection between inter-state armed conflict, i.e., international war, and the welfare state. These studies appear, in particular, to have

built on Tilly's (1975) state-centered approach that sees (largely European) nation-state formation and development as a product of war-making efforts, and the state capacity that is developed through it. In this conflict and welfare literature, these state formation and state capacity development effects have been extended to the welfare state as well.

Given its original attribution as the 'welfare state' opposing the 'warfare state', the British welfare state that is the basis of Marshall's (1950) theories on democracy, social citizenship and the welfare state has been the focus of a number of these studies addressing conflict, starting with Titmuss (1958). Titmuss (1958) argued that the solidarity that came with shared national experience of World War II helped bring about the transition from traditional poor relief to the rights associated with the modern British welfare state Marshall (1950) described, an argument that Marwick (1988) made as well. Other scholars have similarly noted that the experience of World War II made social welfare reforms more popular, as the uncertainty that came with World War II increased demand for efforts geared toward redistribution and pooling risk (Briggs 1961; Dryzek & Goodin 1986). And World War II has not been the only conflict that has been connected to the origins of the British welfare state; both Fraser (1973) and Dwork (1987) cite the earlier Boer War as the cause of earlier social welfare interventions that were directed at children to ensure they would receive the nutrition necessary to grow up healthy enough to participate in future military efforts, suggesting a possible reciprocal relationship between conflict and welfare state development.

The British welfare state, though, is not the only one that has been identified as having been shaped by episodes of conflict. This link between conflict and welfare state development has been explored in several other welfare states that are prominent within the existing welfare

state literature. Among the Nordic states, for example, the world wars were found to have been central to welfare state formation in Finland and to have shaped the trajectory of welfare state development in Norway, Sweden and Denmark through their impact on state capacity, family policy and labor market regulation (Kettunen 2001; 2006; Klausen 2001; Ahlund 2012).

According to Feldman (1992), labor shortages during World War I established labor union power in the Weimar Republic and, in turn, shaped the early proto-welfare state of the Weimar Republic, and subsequent German welfare state. With regards to the United States, both world wars have been identified as the impetus for an increasing federal role in spending and taxation (Schaeffer 1991; Eisner 2000; Sparrow 2011; Scheve & Stasavage 2016). Kasza (2002) found that World War II also drove the expansion of the Japanese welfare state, particularly its extension of health insurance. Obinger, Petersen and Starke (2018), in the most comprehensive analysis of this topic, which addresses this relationship across 14 advanced welfare states during the period of mass warfare between approximately 1860 and 1960, found that war impacted social policy development on both the demand and supply sides of the state political system by, first, bringing about the destruction that created major demand for social provisions and protection among the survivors in the former case, and by, namely, strengthening state capacity and reconfiguring the distribution of power resources in the latter case. In each of these studies, a similar pattern of mass warfare shaping the capabilities and trajectories of disparate welfare states emerges.

Yet, this mass, inter-state conflict is obviously not the same as the civil conflict discussed in the Latin American case studies of the previous chapter. Shifting the focus from inter-state conflict and the welfare state to internal, civil conflict and the welfare may change this picture

for a number of reasons highlighted in the broader civil conflict literature. While international wars have drawn more attention, civil wars are the most likely form of war to be experienced today (Collier et al. 2003), and, as a byproduct of this, the victims of conflict are increasingly civilian populations rather than the military personnel associated with international wars (Cairns 1997). Additionally, civil conflict seems unlikely to sponsor welfare state activity in the ways associated with international conflicts, as GDP is found to decline by 2.2% on average (Collier 1999), with economic losses on average totaling more than \$64 billion due to intra-state injury, death, loss of labor, destruction of resources, denigration of property rights, economic disruption, the potential creation of rogue lands, and displacement effects that have led millions to seek refuge in new communities (Collier & Hoeffler 1998; 2005; Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000; Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Together, the existing state of literature on civil conflicts indicates that not only may civil conflicts be even more important to evaluate in relation to welfare state outcomes than the inter-state conflicts that have received the most attention in the literature, but also that the internal concentration of the destruction wrought by this type of conflict may inhibit welfare state development rather than potentially encouraging it as seen in the studies of inter-state warfare.

Even so, the broader literature on civil conflict still tends to privilege the importance of state capacity, since civil conflicts are seen to be essentially about the control of the state and monopoly over the use of force (Arbetman & Kugler 1997; Benson & Kugler 1998; Krasner 1999; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Buhaug 2006), and the small subset of studies addressing the relationship between civil conflict and the welfare state echo this as well. In many of these studies, though, welfare state development is presented not as the product of the state capacity

that emerges out of war but instead as itself a component of state capacity that shapes whether civil conflict is likely to occur. Azam (1995; 2001) asserts that internal conflicts in Africa have been a product of weak governments that lack the state capacity to implement redistributive social policies in areas like health and education necessary to maintain peace and avoid political violence. This type of under-provision by the state has been found to weaken the self-interest-based ties between citizens and the state and promote the sense of insecurity that leads people to take up arms against the state (Azam 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gill & Lundsgaarde 2004; Burgoon 2006). More recently, Taydas and Peksen's (2012) have extended this line of analysis by evaluating the relationship between the state's ability to provide social welfare policies to its citizens and civil conflict onset in a cross-national study of 153 countries covering the period of 1975-2005. In a similar fashion, they found that as public social spending on education, health and social security increases the likelihood of civil conflict decreases, which they argue is a function of its ability to improve the living standards of citizens by reducing poverty and inequality and, therein, minimize opposition and limit the reasons for rebellion described above.

Yet, these studies only highlight the state capacity-based effects of the welfare state on limiting civil conflict and, therefore, do not provide an answer to the question of how civil conflict affects subsequent, short-term welfare state development. Unfortunately, little has been written on this to date (Obinger, Petersen & Starke 2018). Among the limited studies on civil conflict and the welfare state development that do exist, work on the path dependent effects of the American Civil War on U.S. welfare state development has been far and away the most prominent. According to Skocpol (1987; 1992; 1993) it was the creation of relatively generous

Civil War pensions in the aftermath of the conflict between the North and South that, amid an existing system of patronage democracy, led to the United States' first de facto national disability and old-age benefits system in the late nineteenth-century. By the early twentieth century, this federal system reached 28% of American men over 65 years old and more than a third of elderly men in the North (Skocpol 1987), and, as a result, imparted a lasting legacy on the country's welfare state development going forward. As the American government began to more fully bureaucratize and professionalize, the connection to patronage practices, which fostered elite perceptions of corruption around the Civil War pension system, ultimately discouraged US progressives from imitating the more comprehensive pension and social insurance innovations of their English contemporaries in the welfare reforms that followed (Orloff & Skocpol 1984).

In these analyses, then, a complex picture of the path dependent effects of civil conflict on state capacity and welfare state development re-emerges. In the decades after the victory of the Union side (more supportive of centralized state power and capacity), the state expanded its existing infrastructural state powers through patronage practices via a more expansive system of social provision, which would indicate that the positive effects of inter-state conflict on welfare state development apply to intra-state conflict as well in the medium to long-term. But, this offers little insight into the immediate impact of civil conflict on welfare state development, which is the topic of interest here.

Similarly, the more recent studies of civil conflict and welfare state development that have emerged fail to address this unresolved question within the new state-elite-driven model of welfare state development. Yörük (2012), for instance, has shown that social assistance programs



in Turkey have been directed disproportionately at the Kurdish minority, particularly internally displaced Kurds in urban and metropolitan areas, that have become increasingly politicized and confrontational with the Turkish state over time. In this analysis, Yörük (2012) argues that their displacement, movement into the growing proportion of the informal proletariat, and increasing political radicalization made them such a growing source of political threat to the state in Turkey that the state expanded and redirected the social assistance arm of the welfare state toward this political threat while also engaging in increasingly militaristic activity to dissuade further opposition and unrest, a pattern that was also seen for a brief time during, but well into, the Guatemalan civil war in the previous chapter. The Indonesia government was similarly shown to have implemented a new social assistance program to foster trust that had been lost in the state following thirty-years of armed ethnic conflict (Barron, Humphreys, Paler & Weinstein 2009). Chen and Barrientos (2006) demonstrated that the Chinese social assistance system is another example of this pattern of containment via social assistance after years and years of conflict by showing that while social assistance through the MLSA program reaches only 17.9% of the poor nationwide, in Tibet (the site of long running unrest) this program reached 92.1% of the poor.

In connecting civil conflict to social unrest, these studies introduce an alternative line of welfare state theory to explain the relationship between civil conflict and the welfare state, one that emphasizes the welfare state expansion that actually comes with it (and the constraint that is likely to follow). While the state-centered approaches previously connected conflict to state capacity in explaining welfare outcomes, the studies most recently discussed draw on the welfare tradition associated with Piven and Cloward (1971/1993) that (in alignment with the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development) sees social assistance commitments as

being tied to the presence or absence of social unrest (rather than social need), and establishes civil conflict as one, especially consequential, variant of it. Piven and Cloward (1971/1993) originally argued that the poor relief system of the American welfare state have consistently served as a political mechanism to manage social disorder among the poor, one where this relief system expands during periods of civil disorder to allow the state to establish control over the disorderly but later contracts when disorder has subsided, with relief (once again) taking on the kind of highly stigmatizing nature that would compel the poor to participate in the labor market during these periods of stability. Extending this line of argument further, then, these studies suggest that the relationship between civil conflict and the welfare state broadly could be one where the unrest accompanying civil conflict invites the state (specifically state elites) to expand the welfare state to manage it, and then curtail it once the disorder has been resolved.

Yet, as we have seen, the studies that provide evidence for this potential connection between civil conflict and the welfare state concerns do not focus on the short-term effects of civil conflict on the welfare state and, instead, focus on the later impacts of this kind of conflict. Secondly, each of these previous studies pertaining to the effects of conflict on welfare state outcomes, have only addressed the effects on social pensions, and, as a result, offer no insight into civil conflicts potential impact on the welfare state in any other domain. Thus, the literature leaves the question of what short-term impacts civil conflict have on welfare state developments very much unanswered. Does civil conflict have an immediate effect on social pensions as both the state-elite-driven model and the limited existing literature suggest is possible? If so, is this the case for both pension coverage and the benefits provided, or just coverage, which has been the focus of previous analyses? What about for the other domains of the welfare state like

education, health, and social security; can an immediate effect of civil conflict be identified within these areas? Finally, and most importantly, how do identifiable short-term impacts of civil conflict (if there are any) fit into, and potentially modify, the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development observed across Latin America? These are questions that the minimal existing literature on civil conflict and the welfare state has failed to address, but ones that will be investigated in the analyses that follow.

## DATA AND METHODS

To do so, further cross-national analyses are employed that examine the immediate effects of civil conflict on welfare state outcomes. These analyses, once again, consist of a series of Prais-Winsten regressions using correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) that conclude with moderation analyses on a dataset that draws upon secondary, cross-national data from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2016; Marshall 2019), V-Dem Institute (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018), United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Cominetti & Ruiz 1998; ECLAC 2018) and the World Bank (2018), as well as Huber & Stephens' (2016) Latin America and Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2012 for the period of 1980-2013 and 18 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The models incorporated in these Prais-Winsten regression analyses using correlated PCSEs can be written as

$$y_{it} = 1 + x_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where  $y$  is the outcome of interest;  $x$  is a vector of covariates;  $i = 1, \dots, m$  is the number of panels;  $t = 1, \dots, T_i$ ;  $T_i$  is the number of periods in panel  $i$ ; and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is a disturbance that is autocorrelated along  $t$  and contemporaneously correlated across  $i$  (Beck and Katz 1995).

This dataset covers the 34-year period of 1980-2013 for the same substantive and methodological reasons discussed in Chapter 2. Substantively, this period includes Latin America's "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991), and therefore ensures variation in the political regime factor that the analyses in the previous chapter showed plays a supplementary role in the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development. Methodologically (and more importantly given the limited support for the importance of political regime type in previous chapters), data from this period provides the widest amount of outcome data that comes from a consistent and reliable source.

These regression analyses introduce a new measure of civil conflict and examine the connection between it and social public expenditure-related outcomes the following year, which include both aggregate and education, health, and social security and welfare specific expenditure as well as public social pension benefits and coverage the following year, as well as how accounting for this new civil conflict measure changes (if at all) the relationships between social citizenship paradigm characteristics and the above welfare state outcomes identified previously. The independent conflict and social citizenship paradigm variables are derived from data from Marshall (2019), Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. (2018) and Pemstein et al. (2018), while the dependent social welfare variables originate from the exclusively ECLAC-affiliated sources (Cominetti & Ruiz 1998, ECLAC 2018). Control variables identified as potential key predictors of social expenditure from

the literature are also been included. These consist of measures of democracy, left political strength, GDP per capita (which serves as a measure of national economic resources), age dependency, labor force participation among women, unemployment rate, and globalization, drawn from Marshall et al. (2016), Huber and Stephens (2016) and the World Bank's (2018) World Development Indicators database.

The dependent variables in this analysis are (just like in Chapter 2) combined social public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, education public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, health public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, social security and welfare public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, weighted average social pension benefits in U.S. dollars and the number of people who receive social pension benefits. The first five of these outcome measures are (once again) logged transformed in the analyses that follow, while the measure of social pension coverage is not. As noted in Chapter 2, this transformation helps increase the symmetry of the distribution and reduce non-linearity, while also changing the interpretation of results in the analyses that use the first five outcome measures, such that a one-unit change in an independent variable is no longer associated with percentage point changes in GDP among the public expenditure outcome measures, and dollar changes in the weighted average social pension benefit outcome measure, but instead percentage changes in public expenditures and benefit amounts, respectively.

To evaluate the effects of civil conflict and social citizenship paradigms on the above measures of welfare state commitments and effort, multiple independent variables of interest are utilized. The first of these is a new dichotomous measure of civil conflict that captures the incidence of civil violence, civil warfare, ethnic violence, or ethnic warfare involving the state

(Marshall 2019). Second, four continuous measures that capture several common social citizenship paradigm archetypes (i.e., broader types of social citizenship paradigms rather than the specific variants of social citizenship paradigms seen on the ground) are included here too. These four measures are the egalitarian social citizenship index (focused on equal political participatory capacity through the protection of political rights and the removal of inequality-based barriers to their exercise), deliberative social citizenship index (focused on public decision-making based on the common good), participatory social citizenship index (focused on active participation in political processes through civil society organizations and direct democracy), and liberal social citizenship index (focused on individual rights and protections from the state) developed by the V-Dem Institute and discussed previously in Chapter 2 (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).

As was discussed in Chapter 2, each of these four social citizenship indexes are formed from component measures that capture important social-citizenship-related beliefs, values and other characteristics. The egalitarian social citizenship index is formed by averaging equal protection, equal access, and equal distribution of resources indices that capture the degree to which rights and freedoms across social groups are equally protected, equal de facto capabilities to participate and serve in positions of political power and influence policymaking exist, and resources that structure political opportunities are distributed equally, respectively. The deliberative social citizenship index is, alternatively, formed by point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, range of consultation, and engaged society indicators, which capture the

extent to which reasoned justifications of policy positions are provided to the public, policy positions are tied to the common good, counter-arguments are acknowledged and respected, a range of voices are consulted on policy matters, and society is engaged in public deliberations on policy matters are drawn upon, respectively. The participatory social citizenship index is, then, produced by averaging civil society participation, direct popular vote, elected local government power, and elected regional government power indices that address the level of civil society engagement, direct popular decision-making through initiatives, referendums and plebiscites, local government representation, and regional government representation, respectively. Lastly, the liberal social citizenship index is the result of averaging equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on the executive indices that address commitments to equality before the law and civil liberties, constraints on the executive by independent judiciaries, and constraints on the executive by legislative bodies, respectively (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). These individual component measures are evaluated too when the larger composite social citizenship paradigm indexes are shown to be important predictors of a particular welfare outcome. Additional information on the V-Dem Institute measures can, once again, be found in the Appendix.

Lastly, additional control variables are also included in order to accurately identify the impact of civil conflict and social citizenship paradigm themes on social public expenditure outcomes. Principal among these, at least as far as the existing welfare state literature is concerned, is a traditional measure of regime type: a dichotomous measure of democracy (1) vs autocracy (0) based on a “6” or greater ‘polity2’ score, which was also shown to play a

supplementary role within the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development in Chapter 3 (Marshall et al. 2016). Another focal point in the literature among those concerned with democracy included here (but shown to be of limited importance in the previous chapters) is a measure of left political power operationalized as the percentage of left party seats in the Lower Houses of national legislatures (Huber & Stephens 2016). Next, and more important given the analyses completed in the previous chapters, is a (mean-centered) control for GDP per capita that accounts for wealth disparities between countries in the region and the differential economic resources that states (and the respective state elites in power) can tap into (World Bank 2018). In addition, two measures of potential societal demand for welfare state programs and provisions are included as well: (1) Age dependency ratio, which captures the ratio of the elderly and youth population most likely to benefit from social welfare efforts to the working age population, and (2) the percentage of the total labor force that is unemployed, which addresses demands on the social safety net tied to this state of precarity. The increasing role of women in the labor market is also accounted for through a measure of the labor force participation rate among women. Lastly, trade as a percentage of GDP and foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) as a percentage of GDP are also incorporated as controls for trade openness and capital movement, two dimensions of globalization that previous research suggests may constrain welfare state expenditure (World Bank 2018). Summary statistics for each of these variables used in the analyses below can be found in Table 4.1.

As was the case in Chapter 2, the analysis of the relationships between conflict, social citizenship paradigms and social welfare outcomes itself proceeds in a series of stages. To start, analyses of the relationship between conflict and each of the six welfare state outcomes are



introduced. These analyses are then followed by analyses that involve the four liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian social citizenship paradigm archetype measures and the six welfare state outcomes discussed above with civil conflict factored into the mix as well. This is followed by subsequent moderation analyses that examine the interactive effect of conflict and economic capacity (given its established importance and previous moderating effects) upon significant social citizenship paradigms to establish whether they each alter the strength of a potential causal relationship between, in this case, these archetypes of social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state outcomes of interest now that civil conflict has been factored in (Aiken & West 1991; Marsh, Hau, Wen, Nagengast & Morin 2011). These moderation analyses then inform the identification of full models incorporating the social citizenship paradigm archetype measures, civil conflict, economic capacity and interactions found to be significant. Afterward, these full models serve as a jumping off point for the next stage of the analysis, where the underlying characteristics motivating significant social citizenship paradigm predictors of welfare state outcomes are investigated. These analyses of social citizenship paradigm archetype characteristics are then followed by their own set of moderation analyses that examine the interactive effects of civil conflict and economic capacity upon them. Thus, the methodological approach taken in this chapter builds upon the insights of previous chapters, and continues to incorporate the sequential design principle at the heart of the multi-method social science research approach (Seawright 2016), to offer the novel insights regarding the role of civil conflict within the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development found below.

## RESULTS

### *Civil Conflict and Welfare State Outcomes*

Table 4.2 presents the results of six individual regressions of (in order) combined, education, health, and social security and welfare public expenditure, and then social pension benefit levels and coverage, upon the new dichotomous measure of civil conflict discussed above. Among these results several important ones stand out. These results indicate that civil conflict has primarily negative associations with the welfare state outcomes examined here (the strongest of which is with social security and welfare public expenditure), with two of these reaching statistical significance. To start, the incidence of civil conflict is shown to be associated with a modest, statistically significant decrease in combined public social expenditure of 11.6%, after taking into account that the dependent measure is the *natural log* of combined public social expenditure by exponentiating the coefficient. This modest effect on combined public social expenditure appears to be directly attributable to the much stronger, statistically significant negative relationship between civil conflict and social pension benefits. In this case, civil conflict is associated with a 54.3% decrease in the level of social pension benefits provided, controlling for political regime type, left party power, economic capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions, and the global economic integration of a country.

While not the focus of this first analysis, Table 4.2 also provides several interesting findings tied to the control measures as well. Of these, among the most noteworthy are the (continued) limited significance of democracy and left party power despite their central importance in welfare state literature. Democracy demonstrates a modest, positive and statistically significant relationship with public education expenditure, wherein the presence of democracy is only associated with an 8.8% increase in this kind of expenditure, while left party power only shares two small statistically significant relationships with social security and

welfare public and combined social public expenditure, both of which are negative despite the positive expectations of the current literature. Instead, and most interestingly, economic capacity is once again shown to be a far bigger determinant of welfare state development. Here, GDP per capita measure shares positive statistically significant relationships with education, health and combined public social expenditure, as well as social pension benefit levels, which it shares the single strongest relationship with. In relation to the outcome of social pension benefits, each increase in the average economic production value of its citizens (and thus the country's economic capacity) of \$1000 (2010 US) is associated with an increase in social pension benefit amounts provided of 32.6%. On top of this, age dependency ratio, unemployment, trade and foreign direct investment also demonstrate statistically significant relationships with welfare state outcomes that approximate or exceed the substantive significance of political regime type and, especially, left party power. For example, a one percentage point increase in the proportion of the population that falls outside of working age and in the unemployed, relative to the total labor force, are tied to statistically significant decreases in social security and welfare expenditure of 9.4% and in social pension coverage by approximately 46,357 people, respectively (since the latter outcome measure was not transformed). Women's labor force participation, however, continues to share weak, non-statistically significant connections with each outcome.

### *Social Citizenship Paradigms, Civil Conflict and Welfare State Outcomes*

With the above findings in mind, what do the short-term effects of civil conflict look like, though, when social citizenship paradigms (and economic capacity) are accounted for, and vice versa? Does civil conflict alter the effects identified in previous chapters, and does it remain a

significant predictor of welfare state outcomes on its own? Table 4.3 addresses these questions. As seen in Table 4.3, civil conflict does little to change the effects of social citizenship paradigms, which remain the most powerful drivers of welfare state outcomes and are statistically significant predictors of each of the welfare state domains except for public health expenditure. Here, a move from the absence to the maximum adoption of egalitarian social citizenship is associated with a 213.9% increase in combined public social expenditure controlling for the other social citizenship paradigms, civil conflict, democracy, left party power, economic capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions and global economic integration. A move from the absence to the maximum adoption of participatory social citizenship has a similar positive effect on the domain of social pension benefits, one that is tied to a 344.6% in social pension benefit levels. On the other hand, though, this kind of move in liberal social citizenship is associated with decreases of 23.9% and nearly 2.57 million recipients in public education expenditure and social pension coverage, respectively. Lastly, the move from the absence to full adoption of deliberative social citizenship is both associated with a decrease in social security and welfare expenditure of 84.1% and, alternatively, an increase in social pension benefits of 146.7%.

Yet, civil conflict remains an important factor in its own right, at least as it concerns the domain of social pension benefits. While civil conflict no longer shares a statistically significant connection to combined public social expenditure within these results, it does retain a similarly strong negative relationship with the aforementioned social pension benefits. Specifically, the incidence of civil conflict is now associated with a decrease in these benefits by 50.4%, controlling for the four social citizenship paradigms, democratization, left party power, economic

capacity, societal age structure, employment conditions and global economic integration. Thus, controlling for social citizenship paradigms mediates its effect on combined expenditure, but its negative effect on social pension benefits remains largely intact.

Finally, Table 4.3 also presents important findings related to economic capacity and the other controls. In this latest set of analyses, GDP per capita no longer shares a statistically significant association with public education expenditure, but it retains its statistically (and substantively) significant relationships with health and combined public social expenditure, plus social pension benefits. The strongest connection remains the one with social pension benefits, where each increase in GDP per capita by \$1000 from the mean is connected to an increase in social pension benefits of more than 28%. Interestingly, political regime type no longer quite demonstrates a statistically significant positive connection with education expenditure, but it is found to possess a fairly strong one with social pension coverage. And, it is far from the only control variable that sees its effects change once civil conflict and the social citizenship paradigms are all factored in. Age dependency ratio retains a small, negative and statistically significant correlation with combined public social expenditure, but loses its statistically significant association with public social security and welfare expenditure. Unemployment now not only shares statistically significant negative associations with education expenditure and social pension coverage but does so with combined expenditure as well. In these latest results trade goes from sharing positive statistically significant relationships with education and combined expenditure to sharing these with education and health expenditure, and sharing a negative statistically significant one with social pension coverage. Finally, foreign direct investment retains its positive statistically significant correlation with social security and welfare

expenditure, but replaces its negative one with social pension benefits for a negative one with social pension coverage. The connections between left party strength and female labor force participation and the welfare state remain largely the same though, as left party strength continues to share a small, negative and statistically significant correlation with public social security and welfare expenditure and combined public social expenditure, and female labor force participation to go without meaningful connections to welfare state outcomes.

*New Moderation Analyses of Social Citizenship Paradigms and Welfare State Outcomes*

The findings that social citizenship paradigms, civil conflict and economic capacity, are each important predictors of welfare state outcomes in Table 4.3 motivates further analysis. While neither civil conflict nor economic state capacity individually best explain welfare state outcomes (social citizenship paradigms, in accordance with the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development, do), their statistical and substantive significance begs consideration of whether these factors shape the strength of the relationships between social citizenship paradigms and the welfare state (especially since economic capacity was already found to do so previously) in models that include civil conflict. Do civil conflict and economic capacity possess interactive effects upon significant social citizenship paradigm relationships with the welfare state? Table 4.4 presents the results of analyses that investigated these questions.

Given the interest in the interactive effects of civil conflict and economic capacity on significant social citizenship paradigm relationships with welfare state outcomes, the analyses presented in Table 4.4 focus only on the welfare state domains where at least one social citizenship paradigm, as well as civil conflict and/or GDP per capita, were found to be statistically significant predictors. Therefore, only the welfare state domains of combined public

social expenditure and social pension benefits are addressed. The analysis of combined public social expenditure includes a single interaction term between egalitarian social citizenship and GDP per capita, while the multiple models analyzing social pension benefits include interactions between the deliberative and participatory social citizenship paradigms and the civil conflict and GDP per capita measures.

As is immediately evident from these results, all three of the analyses provide evidence of moderation effects. In the first analysis of combined public social expenditure, the statistically significant interaction between egalitarian social citizenship and GDP per capita indicates that economic capacity shapes the strength of the relationship between this kind of social citizenship paradigm and combined public social expenditure. This interaction term indicates that a \$1000 increase in GDP per capita from the mean increases the strength of the positive effect of a move to full adoption of egalitarian social citizenship on combined public social expenditure, such that egalitarian social citizenship goes from being associated with a 257.5% increase in expenditure with GDP per capita at the mean to a 279% increase in expenditure when GDP per capita is increased to \$1000 above the mean. In the other analyses of social pension benefits, though, the focus shifts to the deliberative and participatory social citizenship paradigms and their interactions with civil conflict and GDP per capita, with the first of these models looking specifically at these social citizenship paradigms' interactions with civil conflict and the second looking at their interactions with GDP per capita. The first of these moderation analyses addressing social pension benefits shows that civil conflict does moderate the relationship between deliberative social citizenship and social pension benefits, but has no such moderating effect on participatory social citizenship. With regards to deliberative social citizenship, the

interaction term suggests that the move toward maximum adoption of deliberative social citizenship is associated with large increases in social pension benefits when civil conflict has been absent, but is instead associated with a small decrease in these benefits when civil conflict has been present. Next, the second of these analyses shows that GDP per capita moderates the relationship between both deliberative and participatory social citizenship and social pension benefits, but that these moderating effects operate differently. In this case, an increase in GDP per capita by \$1000 from the mean dramatically weakens deliberative social citizenship's positive relationship with social pension benefits, while the same increase in GDP per capita actually strengthens the positive relationship between participatory social citizenship and social pension benefits considerably.

The presence of moderating effects of both civil conflict and GDP per capita in relation to social pension benefits suggests that further model refinement is needed for this outcome. This refined model is presented in Table 4.5, which provides final, full models for each welfare state outcome informed by the two previous stages of analysis that inserted civil conflict as a control and then tested for moderating effects. Table 4.5 presents a new model for social pension benefits that includes interaction terms between deliberative and participatory social citizenship and GDP per capita, plus deliberative social citizenship and civil conflict, but foregoes an interaction between participatory social citizenship and civil conflict since it failed to reach statistical significance above. In this new model of social pension benefits, egalitarian, deliberative and participatory social citizenship, plus GDP per capita, each of the interactions and as trade, reach statistical significance. The statistically significant interaction terms in this model indicate that the presence of civil conflict dramatically reduces (but no longer flips the



direction of) the positive relationship between deliberative social citizenship and social pension benefits seen when civil conflict is absent, an increase in GDP per capita by \$1000 from the mean also continues to weaken the positive relationship between the adoption of deliberative social citizenship and social pension benefits, and this kind of increase in GDP per capita continues to greatly strengthen the positive connection between the adoption of participatory social citizenship and this outcome. The other models found in Table 4.5, however, are those that have been reported already. They include the model identifying the moderation effects of GDP per capita on egalitarian social citizenship in relation to combined public social expenditure found previously in Table 4.4, and the models for public education, health, and social security and welfare expenditure, as well as social pension coverage, reported in Table 4.3 (since none of these models were evaluated for moderating effects).

#### *Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics, Civil Conflict and Welfare State Outcomes*

Though the term “final” was used to describe the results presented in Table 4.5, they do not represent the last set of analyses conducted here. Though these full models represented the end of one set of analyses, they also represent a natural starting point for further analyses that investigate which particular elements of these paradigms, in turn, have the greatest connection to the welfare state when civil conflict is included in the model. Table 4.6 presents the results of such analyses that identify the social citizenship paradigm characteristics that shape the welfare state in each of the welfare outcomes where archetypes of social citizenship paradigms were found to share a strong connection with them.

These new set of analyses include all but the domain of public health expenditure, since the combined, education and social security and welfare public expenditure, and social pension

benefits and coverage, outcomes were each shown to be significantly tied to the four social citizenship paradigms. The first of these analyses turns its attention to characteristics of egalitarian social citizenship, since this social citizenship paradigm was shown to be a significant predictor of combined public social expenditure in Table 4.5. Among these egalitarian social citizenship paradigm characteristics, equal protection and equal distribution (but not equal access) were found to be statistically significant predictors of combined public social expenditure, with a move from the absence to maximum adoption of equal distribution tied to a 53.7% increase in expenditure and a similar move in equal protection tied to an even greater increase in expenditure of 103.4%. Similarly, the egalitarian characteristics of equal access and equal distribution were found to be statistically significant predictors of social pension benefits, along with the deliberative characteristics of range of consultation and engaged society, and the participatory characteristic of regional government representation. Of these, the strongest predictor is clearly the egalitarian characteristic of equal access, where the move from the absence to maximum adoption of equal access is tied to an increase in social pension benefit levels by over 1,440%. For the welfare state domain of social pension coverage, the liberal social citizenship paradigm characteristic of legislative constraints on the executive was found to be statistically significant, with the move toward the maximum adoption of these being associated with more than a 1.2-million-person reduction in those covered. For public education and social security and welfare expenditure, though, none of the liberal nor deliberative social citizenship characteristics, respectively, were found to be individual statistically significant predictors of these outcomes.

These, of course, were not the only measures that possessed statistically significant connections to the four welfare outcomes. Of central importance to the analyses conducted here, the incidence of civil conflict was found, once again, to be a strong, negative and statistically significant predictor of social pension benefits, one associated with a 24.4% decrease in benefits. Additionally, the GDP per capita measure of economic capacity was found to share positive associations with public education and combined social expenditure and social pension benefits, the latter of which being similar in magnitude to the effect seen for civil conflict (but the opposite direction). Interestingly, democracy was found to be a moderate, positive and statistically significant predictor of public education expenditure and social pension coverage, but also a strong negative one of social pension benefits. Like what was seen in Table 4.5, left party power remains a small, but negative, statistically significant predictor of social security and welfare and combined expenditure. Additionally, age dependency ratio and unemployment share statistically significant negative relationships with health and combined expenditure, plus social pension coverage in the latter case, while trade has a small positive connection to education expenditure and a small negative connection to social pension benefits, and foreign direct investment inflows has a modest positive relationship with health expenditure. Female labor force participation continues to go without demonstrating any statistically significant connection to welfare state outcomes.

*New Moderation Analyses of Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics and Welfare State Outcomes*

As was the case with the archetypes of social citizenship paradigms before them, the significance of the relationships between these individual elements of social citizenship

paradigms, plus civil conflict and GDP per capita, and the five welfare state outcomes above suggest that it may be important to also consider if these relationships between social citizenship paradigm characteristics and the domains of the welfare state are moderated by civil conflict and/or economic capacity. For this reason, a final set of moderation analyses test for moderating effects of civil conflict and GDP per capita upon social citizenship characteristics in the two domains of combined public social expenditure and social pension benefits where social citizenship characteristics and either civil conflict or GDP per capita were found to be statistically significant predictors. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.7, with the first set of analyses looking at the moderating effects of GDP per capita upon the egalitarian characteristics of equal protection and equal distribution with regards to combined expenditure, and the latter two looking at the moderating effects of civil conflict and GDP per capita, respectively, upon the egalitarian characteristics of equal access and equal distribution, the deliberative characteristics of range of consultation and societal engagement, and the participatory characteristic of regional government representation within the domain of social pension benefits. None of these models provided any indication of moderation, however.

## DISCUSSION

Thus, from this exhaustive set of analyses several important findings emerge. To start, these results make it clear that civil conflict is an important factor shaping observed variation in welfare state development in the short-term. While the initial set of analyses suggests that the incidence of civil conflict has a modest, significant negative impact on combined social public expenditure, the analyses as a whole show that civil conflict has pronounced impact on the domain of social pension benefits in the short-term, specifically. Within this domain, civil

conflict was shown to have a significant, negative effect on social pension benefits that trumps the effects of other traditional explanations for welfare state development and variation.

Therefore, these findings indicate that the short-term effects of civil conflict fall in-line with the long-term effects of civil conflict identified by state theory and shown to operate in the previous chapter. They indicate that the use of the despotic powers of the state by state elites imposes immediate limits on those state elites' ability to deploy resources toward welfare state efforts.

Beyond this, these results also show that this important effect of civil conflict does not itself challenge the state-elite-driven model addressed in the previous chapters but instead clarifies it further. After now controlling for civil conflict, the results of these analyses indicate that the social citizenship paradigm archetypes and their characteristics are still the strongest predictors of welfare state outcomes. But, not only do these results show that social citizenship paradigms are stronger predictors of welfare state outcomes than other traditional focal points of welfare state research when civil conflict is accounted for, they also indicate that economic capacity (in the form of GDP per capita) is still too, providing continued support for the proposed model of welfare state development based around the idea that state elites (in accordance with the economic resources they have available to them) introduce social citizenship paradigms that align with their interests and, in turn, shape the direction of welfare outcomes. In these analyses, common subjects of analysis within the institutionalist and partisan traditions, in the form of democracy and left party strength, were found to be at times statistically significant predictors of welfare state outcomes, but still not to the degree, or even in the direction, expected by this literature, as were age dependency ratio, unemployment, trade and foreign direct investment inflows (while female labor force participation was not), but the key takeaways

concern how the connection between social citizenship paradigms and their characteristics vary based on the domain of the welfare state, the incidence of civil conflict, and the amount of economic capacity.

First, the analyses in this chapter continue to show that each of the social citizenship paradigms are most closely tied to particular welfare state domains. The egalitarian social citizenship paradigm possesses strong, significant correlations with combined public social expenditure and social pension benefits (though the direction of the correlations differs between the two domains). Deliberative social citizenship is also tied to social pension benefits, plus now social security and welfare public expenditure (with the direction of these relationships differing between the two domains as well) while accounting for civil conflict. Participatory social citizenship shares an important (if not the most important) connection with social pension benefits too. Lastly, liberal social citizenship shares strong (negative) relationships with public education expenditure and social pension coverage. None of the four share significant connections with public health expenditure, instead economic capacity shares the largest, statistically significant one (though the coefficients themselves for the four social citizenship paradigms are larger).

Second, the moderation analyses of civil conflict and economic capacity that followed provided additional insights regarding which domains these factors help shape the strength of relationships between social citizenship paradigms and welfare state outcomes when civil conflict is accounted for. These moderation analyses showed that economic capacity remains an important moderator of deliberative social citizenship within the domain of social pension benefits as was seen in Chapter 2, one that lessens the positive effects of deliberative social

citizenship as GDP per capita increases, while also revealing that increasing economic capacity enhances the positive effects of participatory social citizenship within this domain, as well as the positive effects of egalitarian social citizenship within the domain of combined public social expenditure. Importantly, they also revealed that the incidence of civil conflict dramatically weakens the positive relationship between deliberative social citizenship paradigms and social pension benefits witnessed during periods without civil conflict.

Third, the insights gained from these analyses help identify individual beliefs, values and other characteristics of social citizenship paradigms that are (at least in part) driving the relationships between the broader social citizenship paradigm themes and particular domains of the welfare state when civil conflict is accounted for. With regards to the egalitarian social citizenship characteristics, equal protection was identified as sharing a significant positive relationship with combined public social expenditure, whereas equal access was identified as sharing one with social pension benefits, and equal distribution was identified as sharing a positive one with combined public social expenditure and negative one with social pension benefits (suggesting that it is primarily responsible for the overall negative relationship between egalitarian social citizenship and this welfare state outcome, and that high levels of adoption of equal access are rare). Among the deliberative social citizenship characteristics, range of consultation and societal engagement were found to be the only significant predictors and only of social pension benefits (with range of consultation being a positive one and societal engagement being a negative one). In relation to participatory social citizenship, only regional government representation would be identified as a significant (negative) predictor of social pension benefits (leaving it unclear what is driving the broader positive relationship between participatory social

citizenship and this outcome, but suggesting that this positive relationship is strongest when regional government power is minimal). Lastly, none of the liberal social citizenship characteristics would demonstrate a significant connection to education expenditure.

Finally, the moderation analyses conducted afterward revealed that no interaction between these social citizenship characteristics and either civil conflict or GDP per capita existed within these welfare state domains. Thus, the results of these analyses of social citizenship paradigm characteristics and civil conflict identify the multiple-and-sometimes-conflicting relationships between elements of social citizenship and welfare state outcomes, while showing that the moderating effects identified with civil conflict and GDP per capita upon the paradigms themselves do not appear to operate on the individual characteristics that comprise them.

## CONCLUSION

Overall, then, the findings in this chapter provide additional support for and new insights into the proposed state elite power model of welfare state development. The results here show that the social citizenship paradigms and economic capacity utilized by state elites, as well as the constraint posed on the infrastructural power that state elites rely upon by civil conflict, are stronger individual predictors of welfare state outcomes than the other predictors frequently discussed in the welfare state literature, supporting and expanding upon the previous findings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. They provide additional, reaffirming evidence that existing theories linked to the work of Marshall (1950) do not best explain variation in welfare state development, and that, instead, these differences can be better explained by the different social citizenship paradigms deployed by state elites (in accordance with their interests via the infrastructural powers of the state).



The analyses in this chapter also provide additional insight into the role that civil conflict plays in this model of welfare state development. The findings in this chapter confirm that the seemingly important role of civil conflict in shaping welfare state development identified in the previous chapter can be generalized to the broader context of Latin America and can be linked, specifically, to its relationship with the generosity of social pension benefits provided. The results in this chapter indicate that civil conflicts are not moments of social crises that inspire state elites to promote expanded short-term welfare state commitments. Instead, these moments of disruption that pit the state (and state elites) against civil society weaken infrastructural power leading to declining social pension benefits. In this way, the findings in this chapter clarify how the deployment of the despotic power of the state (civil conflict) interacts with the infrastructural power of the state that state elites utilize to diffuse social citizenship paradigms and shape welfare state development in Latin America in a way that corresponds with the effects of civil conflict that operate over the long-term.

What do these collective findings supporting the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development mean for welfare state development beyond Latin America, though? This is the subject explored in the following, final chapter.

**Chapter 5 – Conclusion: How Does the State-Elite-Driven Model Explain Welfare State Developments in Latin America and Beyond, and What Does This Tell US About the Effects of Authoritarianism?**

Chapter 1 opened with the question: What do recent shifts toward authoritarianism seen around the world mean for the welfare states (and those who benefit from them) in those countries? That chapter, and the three chapters since, have each examined and evaluated the traditional partisan and institutionalist literature on welfare state development influenced by Marshall (1950) that most scholars would draw upon to answer the question and identified large oversights, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in these theoretical approaches. Collectively, these four previous chapters have made the case that these traditional democracy-centered explanations for welfare state development fail to explain the patterns of welfare state development seen around the world, and unquestionably those witnessed within the region of Latin America, and that a new model of welfare state development must, therefore, be introduced in order to properly understand how recent shifts toward authoritarianism might affect the systems of social provision and protection (and the welfare state that it represents) in those countries. In service of this, the previous four chapters have also, together, developed, tested and supported a new model that explains welfare state development within the region of Latin America: a new state-elite-driven model that builds and expands upon state-centered theory in identifying the role that state elites have played in shaping the trajectories that their respective welfare states have followed.

Specifically, Chapter 1, at the outset, drilled into the many inadequacies and flaws with the existing partisan, institutionalist and, the more recent power constellations variants of

democracy-centered theories of welfare state development that have been previously identified within this area of scholarship. After introducing this set of literature that sees democracy as essential to welfare state outcomes through its creation of institutional spaces where parties (representing the beliefs and demands of the various social classes who support them) vie with one another and eventually generate welfare state reforms backed by the state (and in turn expand or constrict, and introducing some of the limitations within these democracy-centered approaches that have been identified by previous analyses focused on Europe and the United States (where these approaches are best-suited to offering explanations for welfare state developments), this chapter turned its attention to the insights provided by recent scholarship on Latin American welfare state development in order to further understand the limitations of existing theory and develop a new one that can better explain welfare state development (from its origins through current developments) and clarify how shifts from democracy to authoritarianism are likely to shape welfare state commitments going forward.

This Latin American literature highlighted a different role of state elites and of social citizenship in welfare state developments than was present in the traditional democracy-centered literature, and formed the basis for a new model, one where state elites (given the capacities and autonomy afforded by their position in the state) are understood to possess a powerful and independent role in shaping the direction of social welfare developments in accordance with their interests. Under this new model, cross-national differences in welfare state outcomes are, principally, tied to how state elites construct paradigms about who is deserving of the rights and responsibilities of social citizenship within their national boundaries, and therein the benefits that come along with it, in service of their interests while situated in historically contingent (domestic

and international) political fields. On top of this, these social welfare actions linked to the crafting of social citizenship paradigms by interest-driven state elites are seen as setting the terrain in which subsequent state elites operate and re-craft social citizenship paradigms, and orienting them and later state elites down particular trajectories of welfare state development that produce observable cross-national variation (and, as would be discussed in subsequent chapters, certain similarities) among welfare states. In keeping with this theory, then, the current shift away from democracy would not be expected to have a powerful effect in-and-of-itself; instead, any effects would be tied to changing interests (and accompanying social citizenship paradigms) of state elites that correspond with such a shift, but what they are was unclear in the existing literature and required further investigation alongside the general applicability of this new model. Chapter 1, with this in mind, concluded by detailing the integrative multi-method analytic approach that would be taken to evaluate and further develop this new model in the chapters that followed.

Chapter 2 introduced the first of these analyses of the new state-elite-driven model of welfare state development, ones that evaluated the strength of the connection between welfare state outcomes and the social citizenship paradigm and (economic) state capacity elements that are central in this new model against the relationship between welfare state outcomes and the democratization and left party political strength factors that are commonly addressed within the traditional democracy-centered perspectives. These analyses consisted of a series of Prais-Winston regression analyses utilizing correlated panel corrected standard errors on the best available cross-national data of 18 Latin American countries from 1980-2013 in the areas of education, health, social security and welfare, and aggregate social public expenditure, as well as

public social pension benefits and coverage. The results of these regression analyses in Chapter 2 provided a first wave of support for the new state elite model of welfare state development in showing that social citizenship paradigm archetypes, their characteristics and economic state capacity (i.e., the components necessary for state elites to affect welfare state development under the state-elite-drive theory) are stronger, more consistent predictors of subsequent welfare state outcomes than the political regime type and partisan strength factors that are at the core of the dominant traditional institutionalist and partisan explanations of welfare state development. In fact, the results in Chapter 2 indicated that partisan composition has little, if any, meaningful effect on welfare state outcomes, that the differences between democratic and non-democratic political regimes in welfare state outcomes are less dramatic than anticipated by this Marshallian-influenced literature, and that conceptions of social citizenship (and differences in the particular vision of inclusion and executive power between different social citizenship paradigms) shape the welfare state outcomes that follow, instead of simply being the result of welfare state developments, as the democracy-centered literature influenced by Marshall (1950) suggests.

The moderation analyses in this chapter further highlighted, specifically, how democracy is not nearly as important as social citizenship paradigms and economic capacity are to the trajectory of welfare state development, and that, rather, democracy only conditions the effects that social citizenship paradigm characteristics have on welfare-related outcomes. As such, these results provided solid, initial support for the perspective that social citizenship paradigms reflecting the interests of state elites principally shape the trajectory of welfare state development, and, in doing so, suggest that analyses of welfare state transformations, such as

those around global shifts toward enabling/social investment types of welfare states, should look toward the kinds of social citizenship paradigm being employed to explain the particular welfare priorities of states.

Afterward, Chapter 3 introduced the comparative-historical case study analyses that set out to establish whether the connection between social citizenship paradigms and welfare state outcomes identified in Chapter 2 are part of a causal chain that, in this new model of welfare state development, links state elite interests and priorities (namely around strengthening the state, managing social disorder, asserting control, and securing their political future) to particular outcomes of welfare state development. Specifically, the analyses in Chapter 3 turned their attention to answering the following series of underlying questions: Are social citizenship paradigms identifiable on the ground in Latin America? Do state elites possess the capability to pursue their own interests, and do social citizenship paradigms, if present, align with their interests? Do state elites themselves develop and deploy these social citizenship paradigms (if they are present at all)? And (if social citizenship paradigms are present), are they a sufficient link between state elites and welfare state outcomes, or can other factors better explain any potential linkage between state elites and these outcomes? These questions were addressed via process tracing within the four South and Central American case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala, using primarily secondary source materials, and a series of “smoking gun” tests that evaluated whether state elites possess identifiable autonomous interests and priorities, welfare state outcomes correlate with those interests and priorities, and social citizenship paradigms provide a mechanism by which state elites are able to pursue welfare state

outcomes in accordance with their interests and priorities across these different national settings within Latin America.

Overall, the evidence revealed within these case studies provided strong support for the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development. Chapter 3 identified numerous examples wherein welfare reform efforts went hand-in-hand with the deployment of social citizenship paradigms by state elites tied to their interests and priorities strengthening the state, managing social disorder, (re-)asserting control, and (most importantly) securing their political future across each of the four cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala. This analysis showcased that state elites within both democracies and full-fledged dictatorships alike possess the relative autonomy to develop and diffuse such social citizenship paradigms, and that left vs. right political party affiliation does not connect to welfare state outcomes in any way consistent with traditional welfare state theories (as evidenced by the large role that right-wing authoritarians have played in welfare state expansion).

Instead, the evidence in the case studies doubled down on the new model of welfare state development by also revealing how the infrastructural state capacity afforded by domestic economic resources shape the kinds of welfare policies these state elites implemented, with wealthier states in Argentina and Costa Rica adopting more comprehensive social welfare policy efforts than those found in the poorer Bolivia and Guatemala. This analysis also revealed how state elite interests and priorities were themselves shaped by the prior actions of previous elites (plus international developments often spearheaded by the United States), which created path dependent trajectories of welfare state development, but ones that, collectively, have still converged on a shared emphasis on social investment commitments aimed at generating

economic development, as state elites in each country have sought to minimize social and economic crises. As part of this convergence process, democracy was shown to play the small, supplementary role within the state-elite-driven model of providing a greater incentive for state elites to move away from the exclusionary social citizenship paradigms adopted frequently seen under authoritarian rule and toward the broad-based (and inoffensive) paradigms and welfare reforms that would be associated with the social investment push as part of their efforts to minimize the kinds of economic and social crises that would otherwise put their regime in jeopardy.

Lastly, these case studies also identified an important, but unsettled role of civil conflict in welfare state development in the state-elite-driven model. Across these case studies, state repression by state elites adopting divisive and exclusionary social citizenship paradigms helped shape the trajectory welfare state developments would take, as the repeated use of the despotic powers of the state appeared to magnify societal rifts that weakened the ability of state elites to utilize state infrastructural powers over the long-term (and, therein, to introduce welfare state reforms that would serve their interests), as expected by state-centered theory. As a result, the trajectories of welfare state development witnessed over the long-term for each of the cases seems to correlate strongly with the amount of state repression experienced, as a more extensive history of repression was found to be associated with a less expansive welfare state, and vice versa. But, the case studies also showed that these instances of civil conflict clearly serve as moments of social disruption and crisis that state elites may attempt to manage through welfare state reforms. Thus, these case studies identified an unresolved question within the state-elite-



driven model regarding the role that civil conflict plays in welfare state development in the short-term.

For this reason, Chapter 4 zeroed in on the under-explored connection between civil conflict, social citizenship paradigms and welfare state outcomes and evaluated the short-term role that civil conflict plays in the state elite model of welfare state development. The analyses in this chapter would take aim at the questions of: Is there an observable short-term relationship between civil conflict and the welfare state across Latin America? In which domains of the welfare state (if any) does civil conflict show a short-term impact? And, finally, how does civil conflict play into the relationships (or lack thereof) between social citizenship paradigms, state capacity and welfare state development established under the state-elite driven model and identified in previous chapters? To evaluate such questions about how civil conflict affects the welfare state in the short-term, and how it factors into the model of welfare state development that were developed, tested and supported in preceding chapters, Chapter 4 employed a new series of Prais-Winsten regression and moderation analyses using correlated panel corrected standard errors on cross-national data for 18 Latin American countries from 1980-2013.

Overall, these analyses revealed that civil conflict has a strong, immediate connection to welfare state outcomes that, together with social citizenship paradigms and economic capacity, conditions the trajectories of welfare state development across Latin America. Civil conflict was found to be an obstacle to expanding welfare state commitments in the short-term in general, with civil conflict having a modest negative effect on aggregate public social expenditure and a powerful, consistent negative effect on social pension benefits, specifically. These analyses also showed, in particular, that civil conflict conditions the ability of state elites to achieve their

interests through welfare state action by constraining the potential for increasing social pension benefits under social citizenship paradigms that fall within the deliberative archetype. In sum, these analyses indicated that, even though civil conflict presents an obvious opportunity for state elites to try to manage social crisis through expansions in welfare state commitments, the use of the despotic power of the state reduces the capabilities of state elites to pursue their interests with welfare state developments and leads to less generous social provision, which is in alignment with the expectations of state-centered theory and the findings of the case studies in Chapter 3 regarding the effects of civil conflict over the long-term. And, in the process of doing so, they also provided further affirmation of (and additional insights into) the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development.

The analyses in this project have, thus, collectively found strong evidence supporting a new model of welfare state development in which state elites pursue their interests and priorities (that are historically contingent and path dependent) through the deployment of social citizenship paradigms that shape welfare state reforms in alignment with these interests and establish the baseline conditions that go on to inform the next wave of future state-elite-driven welfare reform efforts across Latin America. As such, this new model offers a very different understanding of what drives welfare state transformation than the democracy-based theoretical traditions that predominate in the existing literature by changing the role of democracy, social citizenship and even economic development, and identifying a role of civil conflict as well, in this process. The previous partisan and institutionalist theories of welfare state shared in common a presumption that the achievement of democracy and left party strength (plus high economic development) leads to welfare state development, which in turn leads to the diffusion of social citizenship. The

theory tested and supported here proposes, instead, that state elites, their interests and the social citizenship paradigms they implement to pursue them (and primarily strengthen their position) structure the direction that welfare state developments will take, while economic state capacity, civil conflict, and democracy condition how and to what degree state elites will be able to pursue their interests.

Since the promotion of economic growth and development serves these ends by strengthening economic state capacity and reduce the likelihood of crises that undermine their interest of maintaining a strong hold on the state, welfare state developments under this new model are consistently and increasingly oriented toward economic growth and development to further economic capacity and mitigate crises (rather than social citizenship building aims as traditional explanations suggest), which then pushes welfare states toward social-investment-oriented approaches, which frequently includes the overlooked distribution of land in the literature. In this formulation, democracy, then, plays a secondary and supplementary role of providing further incentive for state elites to pair this economic development orientation meant to reduce (mainly economic) crises with open, broad-based social citizenship paradigms that are unlikely to offend and alienate large sectors of civil society (therein creating buy-in with the economic aims, while also reducing the likelihood of social disruption and crises by alienated outsiders). In Latin America, therefore, this state elite model of welfare state development appears to offer an explanation for the movement toward inclusionary social investment types of welfare states, and identify areas of the welfare state that scholars need to pay more attention to along with it.

It also suggests that the ongoing global shifts from democracy toward authoritarianism are likely to have a much more nuanced effect on the welfare state than the partisan or institutionalist theories suggest. Rather than crippling the welfare state, as those theories would suggest, this state-elite-driven theory of welfare state development suggests that the welfare state itself is not directly threatened by the move toward authoritarianism, but this movement is likely to affect welfare state development by changing the incentives for state elites to adopt the combination of open social citizenship paradigms and social investment-oriented approaches meant to appeal to everyone and anger none. Instead, this movement toward authoritarianism could bring about the return of divisive social citizenship paradigms, welfare state particularism that rewards loyalists, and potentially increased civil conflict, which in turn weakens the general capabilities of the state's systems of social provision and protection.

Of course, these findings can only speak authoritatively to welfare state developments in Latin America given the exclusive focus on the region in these chapters. The biggest questions that remain, then, are: Do these findings apply outside of the Latin American context? Are these results the product of a unique Latin American experience or representative of a process that applies to other welfare states across the world? Does this model provide insight about what the effects of shifts toward authoritarianism seen around the world might be? The analyses of Western and Eastern European welfare state development discussed in previous chapters seem to lend credence to the notion that this state elite driven process may extend beyond the confines of Latin America, but, given the many historical differences between these regions (which include differences in location, histories of colonialism, state formation, political institutions, history of democracy and wealth among many others), such an inference is anything but a given. As a final

step in the integrative multi-method analysis undertaken here, the questions above are evaluated through a brief, preliminary analysis of a different ‘American’ case: the United States of America.

## THE ‘EXCEPTIONAL’ CASE OF AMERICAN WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT

The United States of America shares several elements in common with the Latin American cases focused on thus far. First (and most obviously), the United States shares a similar geographical location within the western hemisphere with the region of Latin America given its location within North America and shared border with Mexico. This location and proximity to Latin America (plus the United States’ deployment of a Monroe Doctrine of non-European interference in this western portion of the world) has positioned the United States and Latin America within shared regional political fields that have seen the United States and Latin America frequently engaged with one another, as the presence of U.S. companies within Latin America, U.S. military involvement in the region, agreements between Latin American countries and U.S.-led IFIs, and direct agreements between Latin American countries and the U.S. (like CAFTA) discussed in Chapter 3 can attest to. In addition to this, the United States also shares with the nation-states of Latin America a history of becoming an independent state following centuries of subjection to colonial rule. On top of this, the United States shares with many Latin American states a typical depiction as historically being a “welfare laggard” whose welfare state developments emerged well after similar developments were seen in Europe (Wilensky & Lebeaux 1958; Orloff & Skocpol 1984; Howard 1993; Prasad 2016).

Yet, the United States still presents a host of differences from Latin American cases like Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala that have been the subject of the state-elite-driven

model of welfare state development analyses to this point. Despite its location and participation in the shared political fields discussed above, the United States' history that includes earlier independence, sustained democracy, and greater economic development has elevated the United States to being a hegemonic force within the Americas (and the rest of the world), granting it the position of exerting substantial influence on Latin America within these political fields, as opposed to being similarly shaped by them. This history of sustained democracy, high economic development and global influence, at least, also seems to bear much greater resemblance to the European welfare states that scholars have predominantly focused on, and has led to the United States frequently serving as a comparison to European cases in welfare state analyses and being identified as a "liberal welfare state" alongside the United Kingdom (Esping-Andersen 1990), while the majority of Latin American nations have traditionally been left out of such studies.

Yet, as many comparative studies highlight, the United States appears to be considerably different from European welfare states as well. As referenced above, the development of the American welfare state has been identified as occurring much later than European welfare state development, with the United States being the last affluent democracy to see the state take a role in guaranteeing access to health insurance nationally (Prasad 2016). The interventions of the U.S. welfare state has also been described as less inclusive, less generous, more hesitant, more fragmented, more resistant to change, and generally smaller (in terms of direct spending) than the European welfare states it has been compared against (while instead relying heavily on indirect spending through tax expenditures), with particular liberal values oriented around individualism and limited government and absence of a statist tradition, the institutional veto points created by the United States' federal structure of government and the dual economy of and division between

the North and South, the weakness of labor and absence of programmatic political parties, the unique sequence of democratization before bureaucratization, the extensive power of business cited as possible sources of this ‘American exceptionalism’ in welfare state development (Collier & Messick 1975; Howard 1993; 1997; Immergut 1990; Iversen & Soskice 2009; Katznelson 2014; Orloff & Skocpol 1984; Prasad 2016; Quadagno 1987; Skocpol 1992; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). This ‘exceptional’ character, therefore, makes the United States case not only a natural starting point for evaluating the generalizability of the state elite model of welfare state development outside of Latin America because of the similarities it does share with the Latin American cases discussed thus far, but also because it is theoretically one of the most difficult cases to explain and theoretically one of toughest possible cases for the state-elite-driven model to operate within.

With this in mind, then, the following section briefly examines welfare state development in the United States as a first step toward understanding if, and potentially to what degree, the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development can be generalized to other welfare states. The selection of this exceptional (or “deviant”) case for analysis, whose welfare state differs considerably from what would otherwise be expected, presents an alternative to the extreme case selection strategy used previously, but represents an ideal case selection strategy for an analysis evaluating the generalizability of the state elite model of welfare state development, since this strategy helps reveal sources of measurement error in the outcome, confounders, information about the causal pathway of interest and sources of causal heterogeneity that can shed further light on the model (Seawright 2016).

To make such an analysis possible, the following within-case analysis of the United States case, like the analyses of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala previously, draws on “causal process observations” from primary and secondary source materials through process tracing and turns to a series of “smoking gun” tests of sufficiency (which provide decisive support for the model if successful) to evaluate whether state elites shaped the trajectory of welfare state development through the deployment of social citizenship paradigms that established who was deserving of the social provisions and protections of the state in alignment with state elite’s independent perspectives and interests (Mahoney 2012). As seen in the section below, the within-case analysis of important moments of United States welfare state development suggests that the theorized model of welfare state is not a uniquely Latin American phenomenon, as developments from its founding through the present stand out for their consistency with the findings of Chapter 2 through Chapter 4 identified in Latin America.

#### A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF POSTCOLONIAL WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Nearly 100 years after the declaration of its independence, the foundations of the United States welfare state would be laid during the Civil War presidency of Abraham Lincoln, as noted principally in (what Morris (2015) characterizes as the seminal but historically overlooked) scholarship of W.E.B. Du Bois (1903/1989; 1935). President Lincoln (1861-1865), confronted with secession and the existence of the Confederate States of America from the moment he took office, initially espoused a vision of union between the North and South wherein slavery could continue to exist (though contained) in a shared nation. The attack of Confederate forces on Fort Sumter only about a month into his presidency, however, initiated a bloody civil war, fought



from 1861-1865, that inspired a new social citizenship paradigm (Batten 2011; Weber 2008). With the need to manage the civil war crisis and re-establish order and control in the divided nation, Lincoln revised his vision of social citizenship to one embracing *loyal* northern whites, leading to the Homestead Act of 1862 that offered 160-acre plots of public land in the west to (primarily white and male) northern citizens that had never taken up arms against the United States government, and a newly expanded military pension system for Union Army soldiers that entitled them to disability pensions, or their dependents if they died as a result of their military service, which would be transformed over the following decades into an extensive de facto old age pension system that provided benefits to elderly and disabled veterans of the Union army, their widows and dependents (accounting for a substantial portion of federal spending) through patronage-based systems (Orloff & Skocpol 1984; Shapiro 2004; Skocpol 1992; 1993).

Loyal northern whites were not the only members of this new union paradigm, however; the black populations that the Confederacy was fighting to maintain control over were incorporated into this new social citizenship paradigm as well. Accordingly, President Lincoln signed off on the seizure of property from convicted Confederate supporters and the emancipation of their slaves through the Confiscation Act of 1862, before signing the Emancipation Proclamation freeing millions of black slaves in the rebelling states of the Confederacy (but not the Union-allied slave states) and authorizing the enlistment of the black population in the Union army, making them eligible then for the new military pensions as well (Batten 2011; Leep 2013; Weber 2008). Under this new paradigm, Lincoln re-defined the objectives of the military arm of the state from simply winning the civil war to also securing the

freedom of black slaves, incorporating them into the American state and destabilizing the economy and social relations of the Confederate south.

This paradigm shift set the table for the ratification of his 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment outlawing slavery nationally at the conclusion of the civil war and the other key welfare state development under Lincoln: the creation of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (aka the Freedmen's Bureau) that would "For some fifteen million dollars...set going a system of free labor, established a beginning of proprietorship, secured the recognition of black freedom before courts of law, and founded the free common school," in addition to providing social assistance and health care, and carrying out typical functions of a state that included the creation and execution of laws, collection of taxes, and maintenance of military force as part of a comprehensive southern proto-welfare state (Batten 2011; Du Bois 1903/1989). As Du Bois (1935) put it:

Twelve labors of Hercules faced the Freedmen's Bureau: to make as rapidly possible a general survey of conditions and needs in every state and locality; to relieve immediate hunger and distress; to appoint state commissioners and upwards of 900 bureau officials; to put the laborers to work at a regular wage; to transport laborers, teachers and officials; to furnish land for the peasant; to open schools; to pay bounties to black soldiers and their families; to establish hospitals and guard health; to administer justice between man and former master; to answer continuous and persistent criticism, North and South, black and white; to find funds to pay for all of this (p. 225).

Under the subsequent Andrew Johnson Administration that followed the assassination of Lincoln in 1865, however, "the Freedmen's Bureau died" (Du Bois 1903/1989:34). President

Johnson, presented with the problem of maintaining order and the state's control over the south, committed to a "reconstruction" paradigm of southern accommodation that would strengthen southern whites' place (while conscribing the position of blacks) in the newly stitched together United States and seemingly build a strong coalition of support behind him (Weber 2008). In accordance with this paradigm, Johnson enabled the promulgation of the Black Codes and (twice) vetoed bills that would extend the Freedmen's Bureau and its activities before seeing the veto overridden by Congress, but these efforts and the unwillingness to provide financial support to the Bureau left it to wither away such that "its main work was practically done" when Johnson left office in 1869 (Du Bois 1935:224; Weber 2008). In its stead, Johnson built upon Lincoln's Homestead Act and signed the Southern Homestead Act of 1866 into law, legislation that would open up the state provision of land to white settlers into the south rather than the black settlers served by the Freedmen's Bureau. This and subsequent expansions of the original Homestead Act would go on to extend 1.5 million (white) families with title to 246 million acres of land while blacks would be excluded from this land distribution program in practice (Shapiro 2004).

Following the decline of the Freedmen's Bureau and the (initial) expansions of the homestead act and the civil war pensions described above, the "three worlds" of labor, politics, and race during the presidencies of Warren G. Harding (1921-1923), Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929) and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) would come together to produce differential access to welfare (social assistance) across the North, South, and West regions of the U.S. for the European immigrants, African Americans, and Mexican immigrants (and even Mexican-American citizens) who resided in them (Fox 2012). European immigrants, primarily residing in the North, were treated as white, incorporated into the local machine politics of the era, and

incorporated into the emerging welfare state; while African Americans in the Jim Crow South experienced violence, were politically disenfranchised and excluded from (or at least segregated within) the U.S. welfare state; and Mexicans immigrants and citizens in the West straddled the boundaries of social citizenship until a wave of nativism (that began under Harding and picked up under Coolidge and, particularly, the Hoover administration) ultimately minimized their political participation and led to their expulsion from the country by a welfare state that came to function as an arm of immigration services and discouraged seeking aid (Fox 2012).

The onset of the Great Depression, explosion of unemployment, and mass demonstrations by the destitute, including the Bonus Expeditionary Force composed of tens of thousands of World War I veterans and their family members that marched to and amassed in Washington, D.C. to demand immediate payment of the bonuses that were to be awarded to them in 1945, though, ensured that Hoover would receive little support in the 1932 election and give way to a period of dramatic welfare state expansion under the “New Deal” paradigm of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration (1933-1945) that aimed at (at least initially) uniting a coalition of support among white constituencies of farmers, industrial labor, business and the mass unemployed, and undercutting the fomentation of social unrest by these groups and their leaders during this period of unprecedented economic upheaval that it took office under (Piven & Cloward 1971/1993). These groups would come to be the beneficiaries of the Agricultural Adjustment Act that offered price supports and cheap credit to (non-tenant-and-sharecropping) farmers, the National Industrial Recovery Act that allowed business to limit production and fix prices in exchange for accepting labor codes regarding wages, hours and right to collective bargaining, the massive expansion of direct and work relief programs, and, of course, the new

social security reforms that established state-administered unemployment insurance, means-tested old age and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) programs (the latter of which provided benefits to families that were headed by single mothers or fathers who were unable to work, largely excluding black mothers because of their labor force participation), as well as a national social security system funded through payroll taxes that would provide pensions to the elderly (wherein farmers, domestic workers, and other disproportionately ethnoracial minority groups were excluded from the social security system altogether) (Piven & Cloward 1971/1993; Quadagno 1988).

As Piven and Cloward (1971/1993) note, direct relief gave way to work relief, which was then reduced in favor of the kind of categorical aid to the disabled, elderly, and children offered by the Social Security Act as the economic and social crises posed by the Great Depression dissipated over the course of FDR's administration, and this trend would continue in the administrations that followed in the interim between FDR and President John F. Kennedy, with relief receding further as these state elites adopted social citizenship paradigms that further enforced work and supported a reduction in the 'welfare' rolls. By the 1960s, though, according to Piven and Cloward (1971/1993), the Great Migration of black workers out of the rural south to the Northeast, Midwest, and Western parts of the United States and their displacement in those new locales led to growing unrest, disorder, the civil rights movement and a need then to re-expand the distribution of welfare relief. During this new period, state elites from the Democratic Party of the era sought to draw in the black constituents that were at the fore of the unrest and essential to maintaining control over the state and, in doing so, committed state action to establishing services that provided information about welfare rights, initiating litigation to

challenge discriminatory local welfare laws, and supporting new organizations, like Mobilization for Youth, that would pressure for welfare rights and help assist welfare applicants and eventually merge to form the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO). In turn, welfare rolls jumped precipitously during a period of massive expansion of the welfare state under JFK and, especially, his successor Lyndon B. Johnson (Piven & Cloward 1971/1993).

As Piven and Cloward (1971/1993) discuss, the two decades between the end of the Johnson administration and the early 1990, though, would see a reinforcement of work responsibilities for welfare recipients, declining benefit levels and a dramatic reduction in welfare rolls as unrest dissipated. During the Cold War administrations of Richard Nixon (1969-1974), Gerald Ford (1974-1977), Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and George H.W. Bush (1989-1993), and a period of “new social risks” that included deindustrialization, changing employment opportunities and career pathways, mass unemployment, the increased labor force participation of women, and changing family structures (Bonoli 2007:498), alienated Southern whites would be incorporated while blacks, Latinos, and welfare mothers in particular would come to be scapegoated and exorcised from social citizenship over their ‘welfare dependency’ to facilitate this reduction in a process similar to the one identified seen in the Progressive through New Deal eras (Piven & Cloward 1971/1993; Fox 2012). At the same time, the forms of social assistance seen in the 1960s would give way increasingly to a welfare-to-work or “workfare” variant that would impose limits on benefits and serve to punish and degrade the social status of those that receive it in order to maintain reduced social assistance commitments (Piven & Cloward 1971/1993: 395-398).

The presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001) that followed would be shaped by intense pressures for austerity, including changes in the global economy, slowing economic growth, maturing government commitments and population aging (Pierson 2001). Met with such pressures (and the legacies of prior welfare state actions), Clinton, instead, adopted a “third way” paradigm that embraced elements of conservatism and liberalism in order to draw support from people on each side, build a majority coalition, and (at the same time) insulate himself from partisan attack when confronted with the above constraints, which was then paired with moderate, modernizing reforms oriented around re-commodification, cost containment and recalibration (Pierson 2001). One emblematic example of these moderate, modernizing reforms would come in the form of the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and replacement of AFDC with the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) program, which shifted responsibility to states by instituting a block grant program, restricted immigrant welfare assistance, made food stamps eligibility more difficult, and imposed lifetime limits on and work requirements for receiving aid in an effort to “end welfare as we know it” and promote an increase in labor force participation in an environment of slowing economic growth (Fox 2012; Pierson 2001).

This adoption of broad social citizenship paradigms that would facilitate welfare state efforts directed at promoting economic growth, and managing economic (and social) crisis, can be seen in the presidencies of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century that followed as well. In keeping with his paradigm of “compassionate conservatism,” President George W. Bush (2001-2009) issued an immediate stimulus tax rebate, implemented the “No Child Left Behind” education reform that expanded the federal government’s role in public education and aimed at improving the

education received and performance of children around the country, and implemented stronger work requirements for TANF after inheriting the economic upheaval that came with the burst of the dot-com bubble and the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 terrorist attacks, before later responding to the economic crisis of the Great Recession with a stimulus package that sent tax rebate checks to Americans to encourage spending and economic stabilization (Goertz 2005; Sahm, Shapiro & Slemrod 2010; Schulze 2015). Afterward, President Barack Obama (2009-2017) took office still facing the disruptive effects of the ‘Great Recession’ and offered an inclusionary vision of social citizenship in keeping with the unprecedented nature of his election as the country’s first black president, and responded to the economic upheaval immediately with his own stimulus tax credits and payments and to the uninsured problem magnified by the economic crisis by passing the human-capital-oriented Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act that would together expand insurance coverage to tens of millions (Blumenthal, Abrams & Nuzum 2015; Sahm et al. 2010). Similarly, the most recent administrations of Donald Trump (2017-2021) and Joe Biden (2021-) have each, clearly, responded to the global pandemic with approaches that encouraged a slew of welfare state expansions, the benefits of which would be made available to wide-swaths of the American public in order to minimize economic (and social) crisis.

#### AN AMERICAN MODEL OF WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT?

Thus, this brief case study of the United States suggests that its own postcolonial welfare state development accords with the state-elite-driven model developed, tested and supported in the Latin American context. Like Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala, the previous subjects of within-case analysis, welfare state developments in the U.S. from the mid-19<sup>th</sup>



Century through modern, recent developments have been shown to be linked to the (historically contingent and path dependent) interests and priorities of state elites (which as shown here date back its very emergence as an independent nation-state). In this case study, as was the case in the Latin American ones before it, state elites were shown to possess considerable autonomy and capacity to craft and deploy identifiable social citizenship paradigms that would structure the direction and content of welfare state reforms in ways that accorded with state elite interests in strengthening the state, establishing or maintaining order and control, and securing their political survival, and were often directed at managing economic and social crises as a result. In addition, in keeping with the expectations of the state-elite-driven model, and the findings within Chapter 3, there also appears to be a strong and increasing emphasis placed on economic growth/development and social investment activities within the welfare state over time (where land distribution once again plays an important but overlooked role), which has been increasingly matched with open social citizenship paradigms in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> Century. They also highlight how the civil conflict that sparked extensive welfare efforts also weakened the state's ability to carry out the activities of the Freedmen's Bureau, leaving it in a precarious financial place that would enable a subsequent administration to kill it when new interests and a new social citizenship paradigm emerged.

This historical analysis of welfare state developments in the United States also mirrors those of the previous three chapters focused on Latin America by, simultaneously, casting doubt on predominant, democracy-based explanations of welfare state development. First, like each of the Latin American cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Guatemala, the U.S. case study shows that welfare state expansions occurred under regimes that would be difficult to call

completely democratic. Second, this case study shows that through changing conditions of democracy, political party arrangements and composition, and institutional veto points across time, state elites in the executive branch throughout US history (and particularly under President Lincoln and Roosevelt) have continually exercised the autonomy to introduce particular understandings of social citizenship that serve their interests. The constituency that political parties propose to represent has frequently changed over time (in accordance with the social citizenship paradigm of the President at the time), and general ‘left’ vs. ‘right’ party distinctions do not appear to be all that informative either, as presidents on both sides have authored dramatic welfare state expansions.

Obviously, the brief case study provided here only offers a preliminary and exploratory analysis of whether the United States ascribes to the state-elite-driven model developed, evaluated, and supported in the Latin American context within previous chapters. A full analysis of whether welfare state development follows the state-elite-driven model is beyond the scope of this project and is, frankly, a project in its own right, as evidenced by just the small sample of studies of the United States welfare state I have referenced in this and preceding chapters. Yet, based on the evidence provided, the unique welfare state development of the United States, that other analyses have struggled to grapple with, appears to be directly explained by the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development shown to operate in Latin America, which in turn suggests that the model’s expectations about the role of democracy extend beyond Latin America.

Could this process of welfare state development supported and developed through each chapter be restricted to South, Central and North America, and the particular social investment-

oriented welfare state development that they have each converged upon, though? To return to the fundamental question raised earlier: Does this (initial evidence about the applicability of the state-elite-driven model to the U.S. case) suggest it is generalizable to other parts of the world? There are several reasons to think that this model of welfare state development may be useful for understanding welfare state developments beyond those in the Americas.

For starters, the uniqueness of the U.S. case and the difficulty previous research has had in explaining its trajectory of welfare state development, suggests that the U.S. case would be one of the most unlikely cases to see the state-elite-driven model operate (as discussed above), and as a result offers powerful evidence of its broader utility. In addition, Piven and Cloward (1971/1993) have similarly shown that even state elites in early European history have responded to social disruption by extending relief, in line with the expectations of this broader model of welfare state development born out of state elite responses to crisis. This model's presence in early European history and across the Americas could suggest that state elites' location within shared international political fields produces conditions of state isomorphism, wherein conformity around how "modern" nation-states operate sets in (Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez 1997:148), creating similar, shared models of how welfare state development occurs.

Finally, a couple macro-level, historical developments suggest that this model may be increasingly applicable to understanding modern welfare state developments, even in traditional European welfare settings. First, the ongoing process of globalization has weakened traditional boundaries between states (especially in Europe) and, in doing so, has been reducing ethnoracial homogenization, creating greater potential for (and already some clear instances of) state elites deploying new paradigms of social citizenship that clarify which sets of residents are eligible for

the benefits provided by the state (and which are ineligible) as part of a fear-based “welfare chauvinism” that is similar to the early divisive social citizenship regimes found within the Latin American and U.S. case studies (Crepaz 2008:65). Last but not least, the global shift away from democracy toward authoritarianism discussed throughout this project should conceivably only expand the opportunities for state elites to pursue their interests, develop their own social citizenship paradigms that match them, and implement welfare state reforms that follow from these (conditional upon their economic capacity and engagement in civil conflict).

As discussed earlier in the chapter, this shift toward authoritarianism can be expected by the state-elite-driven model of welfare state development to bring a continued commitment to welfare state efforts, but a greater likelihood that state elites will adopt divisive social citizenship paradigms that will restrict the distribution of benefits to those on ‘their side,’ and a greater potential for civil conflict that, in turn, weakens the welfare capabilities of the state.

## Tables

Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	mean	sd	min	max	n
Combined Public Social Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	10.16206	4.801859	2.000002	25.6	336
Education Public Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	3.624702	1.405681	0.6	7.3	336
Health Public Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	2.599108	1.645214	0.000001	7.300001	336
Social Security & Welfare Public Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	3.938245	3.207106	0.000001	16.9	336
Social Pension Benefits (weighted avg. in US\$, untransformed)	89.53822	78.52497	5.333333	325.7955	122
Social Pension Recipients (# of people)	1420498	2553540	6487	10400000	114
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	0.5663729	0.1790765	0.1501676	0.9042642	336
Equal Protection	0.5686575	0.2157346	0.0257545	0.9363813	336
Equal Access	0.6410553	0.1709832	0.0972214	0.9111559	336
Equal Distribution	0.4993318	0.2124434	0.0934935	0.933854	336
Deliberative Social Citizenship	0.7451528	0.1921028	0.0977791	0.9695073	336
Reasoned Justification	0.2710221	0.8359072	-2.144391	1.893232	336
Common Good	0.2597436	0.901069	-2.012028	1.690677	336
Respect Counterarguments	0.2829643	0.8464728	-2.65463	1.67416	336
Range of Consultation	0.2426297	0.9152104	-2.436226	2.279365	336
Engaged Society	0.2986129	0.7667738	-2.248349	1.611415	336
Participatory Social Citizenship	0.5770233	0.0921388	0.2612379	0.8646595	336
Civil Society Participation	0.7570898	0.1490267	0.2070115	0.9604351	336
Direct Popular Vote	0.0930445	0.1354366	0	0.6687	336
Local Government Representation	0.8636178	0.1658359	0	0.9920037	336
Regional Government Representation	0.5820996	0.3553117	0	0.99152	336
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.6694342	0.193662	0.1761251	0.9564402	336
Equality Before the Law and Liberty	0.7558032	0.1773984	0.0153771	0.9792863	336
Judicial Constraints on the Executive	0.6316515	0.227967	0.0539823	0.9660776	336
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	0.6381599	0.2637187	0.0322023	0.9431312	336
Democracy	0.9077381	0.2898269	0	1	336
Proportion of Left Seats in Lower House	31.90812	23.07123	0	95.03	336
GDP Per Capita (in 1000s of 2010 US\$)	5.820797	3.257246	1.213172	14.65218	336
Age Dependency Ratio (% of working-age population)	65.04153	11.02779	45.11883	102.2029	336
Female Labor Force Participation (% of female population ages 15+)	43.24583	9.751818	13.8	64.1	336
Unemployment (% of labor force)	7.845833	3.973477	1.4	20.5	336
Trade (% of GDP)	61.14516	29.4322	13.75305	157.0687	336
FDI (% of GDP)	2.955213	2.789826	-10.0817	16.22949	336

Table 2.2. Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Democracy with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Health	Soc. Sec. & Welfare	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Democracy	0.0716 (0.0424)	0.0838* (0.0420)	0.139 (0.0970)	-0.0930 (0.235)	-0.198 (0.319)	137815.6 (117430.8)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00147 (0.000930)	0.000378 (0.000919)	0.00460 (0.00570)	-0.00940 (0.00711)	0.00764* (0.00305)	3484.9 (3456.1)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0369*** (0.00926)	0.0201* (0.00894)	0.0855* (0.0415)	0.148 (0.0865)	0.354*** (0.0310)	-39894.5 (24482.3)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.0144*** (0.00233)	-0.00493 (0.00263)	0.0131 (0.0177)	-0.0565* (0.0285)	0.0326** (0.0104)	-42298.2** (13995.5)
Female Labor Force Participation	-0.000465 (0.00139)	0.000760 (0.00152)	-0.00155 (0.00782)	-0.00903 (0.00941)	-0.00936 (0.00619)	-223.5 (4521.8)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.00797* (0.00402)	-0.0143** (0.00461)	-0.0421 (0.0289)	0.0172 (0.0303)	-0.0117 (0.0221)	-46321.7*** (11939.5)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.00200* (0.000816)	0.00432*** (0.000930)	0.00678 (0.00495)	-0.00411 (0.00653)	0.00302** (0.00107)	-3920.0** (1430.8)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00357 (0.00313)	0.000770 (0.00320)	-0.00570 (0.0205)	0.0808* (0.0336)	-0.0360* (0.0160)	-8524.1 (10622.3)
Constant	2.775*** (0.255)	1.096*** (0.274)	-1.308 (1.921)	3.545 (2.457)	0.218 (0.963)	3544597.5*** (967529.6)
R-sq	0.940	0.848	0.018	0.071	0.967	.
Groups	18	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 2.3. Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigms with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Health	Soc. Sec. & Welfare	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	1.163*** (0.236)	0.283 (0.255)	1.458 (1.543)	3.068 (1.886)	-1.324** (0.481)	425087.2 (518468.4)
Deliberative Social Citizenship	-0.0972 (0.108)	0.108 (0.0998)	0.545 (1.266)	-1.459 (0.793)	1.501*** (0.416)	72167.9 (284168.7)
Participatory Social Citizenship	-0.0947 (0.270)	0.255 (0.255)	-1.343 (2.091)	2.092 (1.603)	1.880* (0.746)	-487244.9 (732922.7)
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.179 (0.155)	-0.198 (0.123)	-0.630 (1.018)	0.624 (1.219)	-0.959 (0.712)	-655528.1 (467595.9)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00320** (0.00112)	0.000194 (0.000961)	0.00387 (0.00513)	-0.0223*** (0.00590)	0.00324 (0.00296)	215.7 (4831.2)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0250* (0.0108)	0.00818 (0.0100)	0.147* (0.0718)	0.0560 (0.0787)	0.317*** (0.0316)	9223.7 (32003.0)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00667 (0.00386)	-0.00164 (0.00341)	0.0274 (0.0270)	-0.0348 (0.0296)	0.0163 (0.00871)	-19960.6 (11449.0)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.00109 (0.00150)	0.00197 (0.00153)	-0.00168 (0.00746)	-0.00547 (0.00935)	-0.0104 (0.00565)	3756.8 (5638.6)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0156*** (0.00458)	-0.0160*** (0.00458)	-0.0398 (0.0325)	0.00775 (0.0272)	-0.000337 (0.0217)	-51673.0*** (10483.7)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000638 (0.000898)	0.00328*** (0.000902)	0.00770 (0.00448)	0.000257 (0.00396)	0.00422* (0.00196)	-4875.2** (1790.0)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00687* (0.00333)	0.00146 (0.00322)	-0.0118 (0.0222)	0.0769* (0.0379)	-0.0356* (0.0159)	-24346.2* (11616.2)
Constant	1.912*** (0.409)	0.779* (0.347)	-2.397 (3.387)	0.725 (3.495)	0.460 (1.088)	2603799.7** (816435.3)
R-sq	0.907	0.720	0.039	0.101	0.966	0.018
Groups	18	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 2.4. Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigms and Democracy with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Health	Soc. Sec. & Welfare	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	1.228*** (0.232)	0.444 (0.243)	1.602 (1.543)	3.394 (2.000)	-1.393** (0.498)	775916.8 (521138.4)
Deliberative Social Citizenship	-0.0972 (0.109)	0.0936 (0.0985)	0.498 (1.260)	-1.359 (0.747)	1.374*** (0.395)	547709.8 (331602.1)
Participatory Social Citizenship	-0.116 (0.275)	0.166 (0.245)	-1.431 (2.131)	1.743 (1.521)	1.848* (0.737)	-434770.7 (749139.5)
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.126 (0.159)	-0.277* (0.127)	-0.760 (0.973)	0.656 (1.284)	-0.661 (0.978)	-2431078.3** (818660.4)
Democracy	0.0543 (0.0559)	0.114* (0.0518)	0.179 (0.137)	-0.185 (0.282)	-0.182 (0.348)	805110.1*** (232612.5)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00329** (0.00112)	0.0000707 (0.000955)	0.00380 (0.00516)	-0.0213*** (0.00569)	0.00376 (0.00283)	771.6 (4490.0)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0263* (0.0110)	0.00797 (0.00976)	0.152* (0.0713)	0.0547 (0.0777)	0.317*** (0.0328)	-6938.8 (31314.3)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00643 (0.00381)	-0.000739 (0.00330)	0.0292 (0.0268)	-0.0290 (0.0298)	0.0185* (0.00854)	-41433.1** (15119.8)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.000969 (0.00151)	0.00183 (0.00155)	-0.00242 (0.00776)	-0.00559 (0.00904)	-0.00935 (0.00611)	-1589.8 (5421.6)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0161*** (0.00457)	-0.0170*** (0.00453)	-0.0412 (0.0324)	0.0119 (0.0267)	0.00251 (0.0217)	-64417.8*** (12327.8)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000674 (0.000904)	0.00325*** (0.000891)	0.00786 (0.00460)	-0.00109 (0.00379)	0.00423* (0.00198)	-5908.4** (1838.0)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00626 (0.00343)	0.000626 (0.00348)	-0.0150 (0.0227)	0.0789* (0.0387)	-0.0319* (0.0157)	-25427.6* (10481.7)
Constant	1.865*** (0.407)	0.668* (0.339)	-2.565 (3.352)	0.465 (3.504)	0.337 (1.084)	4309482.6*** (1116542.7)
R-sq	0.904	0.722	0.040	0.101	0.963	0.078
Groups	18	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*

p<0.001



Table 2.5. Regression of Public Social Expenditures Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigms, Democracy, Economic Capacity and Interactions with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	0.825* (0.360)	0.432 (0.232)	-1.755*** (.534)	751626.1 (515502.1)
Deliberative Social Citizenship	-0.108 (0.106)	0.106 (0.100)	1.246** (.435)	583678.6 (343746.8)
Participatory Social Citizenship	-0.190 (0.273)	0.199 (0.243)	1.908** (.705)	-577723.8 (885017.8)
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.141 (0.135)	-0.507 (0.374)	-0.785 (0.859)	-1034014.5 (1785254.6)
Democracy	0.0665 (0.0561)	0.0174 (0.135)	-0.171 (0.330)	1700766.1 (1000790.1)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00427*** (0.001000)	-0.000114 (0.000949)	0.00520 (0.00313)	1955.9 (5209.9)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	-0.0334 (0.0320)	0.00643 (0.00970)	0.472** (0.147)	671.2 (27114.6)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00595 (0.00327)	-0.000562 (0.00327)	0.000153 (0.0137)	-41657.6** (14990.7)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.000353 (0.00157)	0.00169 (0.00155)	-0.00671 (0.00547)	-584.0 (5621.1)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0163*** (0.00446)	-0.0172*** (0.00455)	0.00849 (0.0158)	-61592.3*** (12242.5)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000208 (0.000844)	0.00343*** (0.000852)	-0.000619 (0.00219)	-6108.8** (2067.8)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00561 (0.00341)	0.00110 (0.00358)	-0.0134 (0.0143)	-23979.3* (10393.8)
Egalitarian*GDP per capita	0.0980 (0.0501)		0.761*** (0.172)	
Deliberative*GDP per capita			-0.553*** (0.162)	
Participatory*GDP per capita			-0.344 (0.219)	
Liberal*Democracy		0.235 (0.353)		-1742824.9 (1839413.8)
Constant	2.209*** (0.420)	0.735* (0.344)	3.537** (1.284)	3591703.3** (1209283.2)
R-sq	0.933	0.729	0.977	0.040
Groups	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 2.6. Final Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigms, Democracy, Economic Capacity and Interactions with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Health	Soc. Sec. & Welfare	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	1.228*** (0.232)	0.444 (0.243)	1.602 (1.543)	3.394 (2.000)	-1.528** (0.493)	775916.8 (521138.4)
Deliberative Social Citizenship	-0.0972 (0.109)	0.0936 (0.0985)	0.498 (1.260)	-1.359 (0.747)	1.388** (0.449)	547709.8 (331602.1)
Participatory Social Citizenship	-0.116 (0.275)	0.166 (0.245)	-1.431 (2.131)	1.743 (1.521)	1.961** (0.699)	-434770.7 (749139.5)
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.126 (0.159)	-0.277* (0.127)	-0.760 (0.973)	0.656 (1.284)	-1.689* (0.760)	-2431078.3** (818660.4)
Democracy	0.0543 (0.0559)	0.114* (0.0518)	0.179 (0.137)	-0.185 (0.282)	0.138 (0.326)	805110.1*** (232612.5)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00329** (0.00112)	0.0000707 (0.000955)	0.00380 (0.00516)	-0.0213*** (0.00569)	0.00479 (0.00325)	771.6 (4490.0)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0263* (0.0110)	0.00797 (0.00976)	0.152* (0.0713)	0.0547 (0.0777)	0.476** (0.152)	-6938.8 (31314.3)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00643 (0.00381)	-0.000739 (0.00330)	0.0292 (0.0268)	-0.0290 (0.0298)	-0.00874 (0.0118)	-41433.1** (15119.8)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.000969 (0.00151)	0.00183 (0.00155)	-0.00242 (0.00776)	-0.00559 (0.00904)	-0.00854 (0.00549)	-1589.8 (5421.6)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0161*** (0.00457)	-0.0170*** (0.00453)	-0.0412 (0.0324)	0.0119 (0.0267)	0.00642 (0.0165)	-64417.8*** (12327.8)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000674 (0.000904)	0.00325*** (0.000891)	0.00786 (0.00460)	-0.00109 (0.00379)	0.000981 (0.00226)	-5908.4** (1838.0)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00626 (0.00343)	0.000626 (0.00348)	-0.0150 (0.0227)	0.0789* (0.0387)	-0.0205 (0.0142)	-25427.6* (10481.7)
Egalitarian*GDP per capita					0.559*** (0.137)	
Deliberative*GDP per capita					-0.656*** (0.152)	
Constant	1.865*** (0.407)	0.668* (0.339)	-2.565 (3.352)	0.465 (3.504)	4.250*** (1.093)	4309482.6*** (1116542.7)
R-sq	0.904	0.722	0.040	0.101	0.970	0.078
Groups	18	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 2.7. Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics, Democracy and Economic Capacity with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Equal Protection	0.853** (0.277)		0.744 (0.878)	
Equal Access	-0.155 (0.171)		3.290** (1.131)	
Equal Distribution	0.417 (0.219)		-2.771*** (0.579)	
Reasoned Justification			-0.272** (0.0946)	
Common Good			-0.110 (0.106)	
Respect Counterarguments			-0.0351 (0.0863)	
Range of Consultation			0.349*** (0.102)	
Engaged Society			-0.143 (0.120)	
Civil Society Participation			-1.843* (0.760)	
Direct Popular Vote			0.299 (0.301)	
Local Government Representation			0.340 (0.302)	
Regional Government Representation			-0.781** (0.264)	
Equality Before the Law and Liberty		0.174 (0.136)	4.072*** (1.068)	143974.2 (966414.6)
Judicial Constraints on the Executive		-0.152 (0.0904)	2.378*** (0.559)	-45531.0 (364051.7)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive		-0.149 (0.104)	-3.533*** (0.756)	-1100928.8* (561553.2)
Democracy	0.0542 (0.0530)	0.116* (0.0479)	-0.0965 (0.337)	577751.5* (244947.8)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00310** (0.00110)	0.00000139 (0.000919)	-0.000192 (0.00255)	1388.5 (4292.3)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0296** (0.0105)	0.0262** (0.00950)	0.314*** (0.0321)	-20957.5 (39593.8)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00582 (0.00386)	-0.00453 (0.00262)	0.0149 (0.00824)	-46878.2** (14421.3)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.00201 (0.00150)	0.000738 (0.00143)	-0.00873 (0.00610)	-2040.0 (4505.6)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0149*** (0.00432)	-0.0152*** (0.00463)	0.00195 (0.0171)	-44558.9*** (12023.2)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000341 (0.000863)	0.00338*** (0.000880)	-0.00518** (0.00198)	-3728.3* (1818.5)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00625 (0.00322)	0.0000580 (0.00305)	-0.0328* (0.0134)	-14822.0 (11498.9)
Constant	1.984*** (0.363)	1.283*** (0.245)	1.925 (1.048)	4063421.7*** (1148132.3)
R-sq	0.930	0.843	0.991	.
Groups	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p&lt;0.05 \*\* p&lt;0.01 \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 2.8. Regression of Public Social Expenditures and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics, Democracy, Economic Capacity and Interactions with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Soc. Pension Coverage
Equal Protection	0.827*** (0.250)	
Equal Access	-0.0435 (0.156)	
Equal Distribution	0.410* (0.206)	
Equality Before the Law and Liberty		10014.6 (1066211.0)
Judicial Constraints on the Executive		-217627.8 (416582.3)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive		-245938.9 (1320540.3)
Democracy	0.0707 (0.0540)	957103.4 (724023.7)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00436*** (0.000985)	2318.8 (4980.9)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	-0.00800 (0.0313)	-13769.9 (41792.7)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00714* (0.00307)	-52727.2** (16225.6)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.00157 (0.00157)	-2097.8 (4672.3)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0174*** (0.00439)	-43382.0*** (12321.0)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000154 (0.000814)	-3493.9 (1853.0)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00596 (0.00346)	-16429.7 (11969.4)
Equal Protection*GDP per capita	0.0442 (0.0470)	
Legislative Constraints*Democracy		-857110.2 (1374009.9)
Constant	2.095*** (0.298)	4189460.8*** (1114008.7)
R-sq	0.930	.
Groups	18	13
N	336	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p&lt;0.05 \*\* p&lt;0.01 \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 2.9. Regression of Social Pension Benefit Levels on Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics, Democracy, Economic Capacity and Interactions with Correlated PCSE

	New Model	Refined Model
Equal Protection	2.371** (0.756)	2.400*** (0.699)
Equal Access	1.672 (0.997)	1.823* (0.899)
Equal Distribution	-4.942*** (0.657)	-4.261*** (0.556)
Reasoned Justification	-0.149 (0.103)	-0.119 (0.0757)
Common Good	-0.0755 (0.131)	-0.0660 (0.105)
Respect Counterarguments	0.108 (0.0898)	0.120 (0.0846)
Range of Consultation	0.273** (0.0922)	0.301*** (0.0912)
Engaged Society	-0.164 (0.0864)	-0.276** (0.0960)
Civil Society Participation	0.00242 (0.741)	0.240 (0.683)
Direct Popular Vote	1.078** (0.397)	0.789* (0.356)
Local Government Representation	0.398 (0.358)	0.323 (0.318)
Regional Government Representation	-0.738* (0.289)	-0.698*** (0.205)
Equality Before the Law and Liberty	2.069* (0.871)	1.425 (0.873)
Judicial Constraints on the Executive	1.712*** (0.520)	1.595*** (0.481)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	-1.143 (0.692)	-1.468** (0.514)
Democracy	-1.073*** (0.293)	-0.929*** (0.236)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	0.00793*** (0.00205)	0.00633** (0.00201)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	-0.275 (0.274)	-0.0433 (0.185)
Age Dependency Ratio	0.0273** (0.00978)	0.0223** (0.00799)
Female Labor Force Participation	-0.00472 (0.00487)	-0.00429 (0.00473)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	0.00555 (0.0152)	-0.0174 (0.0129)
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.00394 (0.00284)	-0.00709*** (0.00199)

FDI (% of GDP)	-0.00325 (0.0135)	-0.0124 (0.0116)
Equal Access*GDP per capita	0.940*** (0.247)	0.941*** (0.164)
Equal Distribution*GDP per capita	-0.0911 (0.141)	
Reasoned Justification*GDP per capita	-0.0276 (0.0287)	
Range of Consultation*GDP per capita	-0.0172 (0.0272)	
Civil Society*GDP per capita	0.285 (0.262)	
Regional Government*GDP per capita	0.0445 (0.0526)	
Equality*GDP per capita	-0.127 (0.302)	
Judicial Constraints*GDP per capita	-1.155*** (0.230)	-1.060*** (0.152)
Legislative Constraints*GDP per capita	0.833* (0.351)	0.527** (0.198)
Constant	1.443 (1.095)	2.307* (1.003)
R-sq	0.989	0.991
Groups	14	14
N	122	122

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	mean	sd	min	max	n
Combined Public Social Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	10.16206	4.801859	2.000002	25.6	336
Education Public Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	3.624702	1.405681	0.6	7.3	336
Health Public Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	2.599108	1.645214	0.000001	7.300001	336
Social Security & Welfare Public Expenditure (% of GDP, untransformed)	3.938245	3.207106	0.000001	16.9	336
Social Pension Benefits (weighted avg. in US\$, untransformed)	89.53822	78.52497	5.333333	325.7955	122
Social Pension Recipients (# of people)	1420498	2553540	6487	10400000	114
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	0.5663729	0.1790765	0.1501676	0.9042642	336
Equal Protection	0.5686575	0.2157346	0.0257545	0.9363813	336
Equal Access	0.6410553	0.1709832	0.0972214	0.9111559	336
Equal Distribution	0.4993318	0.2124434	0.0934935	0.933854	336
Deliberative Social Citizenship	0.7451528	0.1921028	0.0977791	0.9695073	336
Reasoned Justification	0.2710221	0.8359072	-2.144391	1.893232	336
Common Good	0.2597436	0.901069	-2.012028	1.690677	336
Respect Counterarguments	0.2829643	0.8464728	-2.65463	1.67416	336
Range of Consultation	0.2426297	0.9152104	-2.436226	2.279365	336
Engaged Society	0.2986129	0.7667738	-2.248349	1.611415	336
Participatory Social Citizenship	0.5770233	0.0921388	0.2612379	0.8646595	336
Civil Society Participation	0.7570898	0.1490267	0.2070115	0.9604351	336
Direct Popular Vote	0.0930445	0.1354366	0	0.6687	336
Local Government Representation	0.8636178	0.1658359	0	0.9920037	336
Regional Government Representation	0.5820996	0.3553117	0	0.99152	336
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.6694342	0.193662	0.1761251	0.9564402	336
Equality Before the Law and Liberty	0.7558032	0.1773984	0.0153771	0.9792863	336
Judicial Constraints on the Executive	0.6316515	0.227967	0.0539823	0.9660776	336
Legislative Constraints on the Executive	0.6381599	0.2637187	0.0322023	0.9431312	336
Civil Conflict	0.1220238	0.3278015	0	1	336
Democracy	0.9077381	0.2898269	0	1	336
Proportion of Left Seats in Lower House	31.90812	23.07123	0	95.03	336
GDP Per Capita (in 1000s of 2010 US\$)	5.820797	3.257246	1.213172	14.65218	336
Age Dependency Ratio (% of working-age population)	65.04153	11.02779	45.11883	102.2029	336
Female Labor Force Participation (% of female population ages 15+)	43.24583	9.751818	13.8	64.1	336
Unemployment (% of labor force)	7.845833	3.973477	1.4	20.5	336
Trade (% of GDP)	61.14516	29.4322	13.75305	157.0687	336
FDI (% of GDP)	2.955213	2.789826	-10.0817	16.22949	336

Table 4.2. Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Civil Conflict with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Health	Soc. Sec. & Welfare	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Civil Conflict	-0.123*	0.00140	-0.584	-1.062	-0.782***	717321.3
	(0.0491)	(0.0368)	(0.440)	(0.803)	(0.151)	(444577.7)
Democracy	0.0343	0.0841*	0.127	-0.0997	-0.229	29234.5
	(0.0459)	(0.0421)	(0.122)	(0.319)	(0.369)	(119148.7)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00291**	0.000394	0.00342	-0.0223**	0.00583	5141.6
	(0.000960)	(0.000920)	(0.00514)	(0.00774)	(0.00317)	(3384.2)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0280**	0.0200*	0.103*	0.183	0.282***	-8649.4
	(0.0102)	(0.00897)	(0.0516)	(0.0968)	(0.0254)	(33726.7)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.0162***	-0.00495	0.0178	-0.0983**	0.00155	-17931.0
	(0.00243)	(0.00261)	(0.0186)	(0.0300)	(0.00990)	(19414.1)
Female Labor Force Participation	-0.000865	0.000773	-0.00480	-0.0173	-0.00388	-967.6
	(0.00147)	(0.00151)	(0.00800)	(0.0111)	(0.00614)	(4460.5)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.00695	-0.0143**	-0.0482	0.0389	-0.000541	-46356.8***
	(0.00410)	(0.00462)	(0.0261)	(0.0275)	(0.0182)	(11712.0)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.00228**	0.00432***	0.00566	0.000313	0.00121	-2459.4
	(0.000873)	(0.000934)	(0.00328)	(0.00689)	(0.00131)	(1717.8)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00564	0.000760	-0.00607	0.0876*	-0.0313*	-13811.7
	(0.00324)	(0.00320)	(0.0208)	(0.0353)	(0.0148)	(11830.0)
Constant	3.149***	1.205***	-0.712	7.652***	3.978***	1785666.1
	(0.234)	(0.236)	(1.574)	(2.263)	(0.850)	(1276601.5)
R-sq	0.925	0.848	0.041	0.168	0.947	0.014
Groups	18	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001



Table 4.3. Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigms and Civil Conflict with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Health	Soc. Sec. & Welfare	Soc. Pension Benefits	Soc. Pension Coverage
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	1.144*** (0.219)	0.417 (0.259)	1.218 (1.307)	2.844 (2.201)	-0.618 (0.615)	1088462.8 (557991.2)
Deliberative Social Citizenship	-0.120 (0.110)	0.0956 (0.0974)	0.512 (1.274)	-1.842* (0.841)	0.903* (0.375)	480828.9 (329683.6)
Participatory Social Citizenship	-0.0692 (0.273)	0.173 (0.249)	-1.707 (1.979)	3.254 (1.729)	1.492* (0.703)	-582194.4 (685902.3)
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.143 (0.156)	-0.273* (0.130)	-0.725 (0.900)	0.660 (1.466)	-0.00383 (0.886)	-2569893.2*** (748825.4)
Civil Conflict	-0.0919 (0.0504)	0.0365 (0.0341)	-0.786 (0.453)	-0.775 (0.830)	-0.702*** (0.173)	820111.2 (444572.4)
Democracy	0.0483 (0.0558)	0.0927 (0.0531)	0.202 (0.144)	-0.299 (0.317)	-0.271 (0.359)	782412.1*** (214640.4)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00362** (0.00110)	-0.000357 (0.00101)	0.00311 (0.00516)	0.0269*** (0.00619)	0.00334 (0.00292)	2081.1 (4062.7)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0231* (0.0104)	0.0118 (0.0102)	0.136* (0.0626)	0.0352 (0.0743)	0.248*** (0.0258)	15359.3 (32372.3)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00813* (0.00369)	0.00121 (0.00346)	0.0273 (0.0229)	-0.0413 (0.0309)	-0.00298 (0.0104)	-27033.5 (16455.7)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.000677 (0.00153)	0.00174 (0.00154)	-0.00543 (0.00795)	-0.00729 (0.00985)	-0.00920 (0.00622)	-3355.0 (5192.9)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0153*** (0.00456)	-0.0194*** (0.00461)	-0.0500 (0.0305)	0.0173 (0.0268)	0.00261 (0.0209)	-63542.4*** (11841.9)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000838 (0.000875)	0.00270** (0.000969)	0.00676* (0.00334)	0.00104 (0.00393)	0.00158 (0.00204)	-5165.4** (1771.7)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00607 (0.00343)	0.000747 (0.00325)	-0.0179 (0.0229)	0.0832* (0.0404)	-0.0253 (0.0136)	-29585.0** (11389.6)
Constant	2.174*** (0.361)	0.701* (0.327)	-0.829 (2.486)	1.455 (3.329)	3.283** (1.018)	3412955.4** (1178874.9)
R-sq	0.902	0.705	0.079	0.134	0.970	0.182
Groups	18	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 4.4. Regression of Public Social Expenditures and Social Pension Benefit Levels on Social Citizenship Paradigms, Civil Conflict, Economic Capacity and Interactions with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Social Pension Benefits Model 1	Social Pension Benefits Model 2
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	1.274*** (0.183)	-0.711 (0.611)	-1.609** (0.574)
Deliberative Social Citizenship	-0.130 (0.109)	1.398* (0.586)	1.094** (0.405)
Participatory Social Citizenship	-0.124 (0.281)	1.601* (0.703)	1.969** (0.723)
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.155 (0.138)	-0.409 (0.960)	-0.624 (0.922)
Civil Conflict	-0.0837 (0.0492)	4.344 (2.764)	-0.882*** (0.204)
Democracy	0.0668 (0.0572)	-0.153 (0.354)	0.00919 (0.377)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00438*** (0.000968)	0.00231 (0.00307)	0.00559 (0.00368)
GDP Per Capita (2010 US \$1000s)	-0.0154 (0.0145)	0.242*** (0.0288)	0.385* (0.180)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00620 (0.00318)	-0.00972 (0.0121)	-0.0126 (0.0120)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.000227 (0.00160)	-0.00954 (0.00615)	-0.00919 (0.00671)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0157*** (0.00444)	-0.00428 (0.0219)	0.0120 (0.0218)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000542 (0.000827)	0.00129 (0.00207)	0.00597*** (0.00157)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00533 (0.00344)	-0.0244 (0.0141)	-0.0271 (0.0157)
Egalitarian*GDP Per Capita	0.0584*** (0.0160)		
Deliberative*Civil Conflict		-1.425* (0.664)	
Deliberative*GDP per capita			-0.454* (0.204)
Participatory*Civil Conflict		-6.808 (4.498)	
Participatory*GDP per capita			0.385** (0.120)
Constant	2.070*** (0.325)	3.592*** (1.065)	3.920** (1.204)
R-sq	0.935	0.972	0.971
Groups	18	14	14
N	336	122	122

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p&lt;0.05 \*\* p&lt;0.01 \*\*\* p&lt;0.001

Table 4.5. Final Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigms, Civil Conflict, Economic Capacity and Interactions with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Health	Social Security & Welfare	Social Pension Benefits	Social Pension Coverage
Egalitarian Social Citizenship	1.274*** (0.183)	0.417 (0.259)	1.218 (1.307)	2.844 (2.201)	-1.607** (0.579)	1088462.8 (557991.2)
Deliberative Social Citizenship	-0.130 (0.109)	0.0956 (0.0974)	0.512 (1.274)	-1.842* (0.841)	1.677** (0.612)	480828.9 (329683.6)
Participatory Social Citizenship	-0.124 (0.281)	0.173 (0.249)	-1.707 (1.979)	3.254 (1.729)	1.868* (0.727)	-582194.4 (685902.3)
Liberal Social Citizenship	0.155 (0.138)	-0.273* (0.130)	-0.725 (0.900)	0.660 (1.466)	-1.211 (1.009)	-2569893.2*** (748825.4)
Civil Conflict	-0.0837 (0.0492)	0.0365 (0.0341)	-0.786 (0.453)	-0.775 (0.830)	0.225 (0.552)	820111.2 (444572.4)
Democracy	0.0668 (0.0572)	0.0927 (0.0531)	0.202 (0.144)	-0.299 (0.317)	0.135 (0.368)	782412.1*** (214640.4)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00438*** (0.000968)	-0.000357 (0.00101)	0.00311 (0.00516)	-0.0269*** (0.00619)	0.00586 (0.00350)	2081.1 (4062.7)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	-0.0154 (0.0145)	0.0118 (0.0102)	0.136* (0.0626)	0.0352 (0.0743)	0.385* (0.180)	15359.3 (32372.3)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00620 (0.00318)	0.00121 (0.00346)	0.0273 (0.0229)	-0.0413 (0.0309)	-0.0130 (0.0119)	-27033.5 (16455.7)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.000227 (0.00160)	0.00174 (0.00154)	-0.00543 (0.00795)	-0.00729 (0.00985)	-0.0104 (0.00663)	-3355.0 (5192.9)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0157*** (0.00444)	-0.0194*** (0.00461)	-0.0500 (0.0305)	0.0173 (0.0268)	0.00396 (0.0223)	-63542.4*** (11841.9)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000542 (0.000827)	0.00270** (0.000969)	0.00676* (0.00334)	0.00104 (0.00393)	0.00550*** (0.00161)	-5165.4** (1771.7)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00533 (0.00344)	0.000747 (0.00325)	-0.0179 (0.0229)	0.0832* (0.0404)	-0.0303 (0.0158)	-29585.0** (11389.6)
Egalitarian*GDP per capita	0.0584*** (0.0160)					
Deliberative*Civil Conflict					-1.535* (0.719)	
Deliberative*GDP per capita					-0.448* (0.201)	
Participatory*GDP per capita					0.392** (0.120)	
Constant	2.070*** (0.325)	0.701* (0.327)	-0.829 (2.486)	1.455 (3.329)	3.964*** (1.191)	3412955.4** (1178874.9)
R-sq	0.935	0.705	0.079	0.134	0.972	0.182
Groups	18	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\*

p<0.001

Table 4.6. Regression of Public Social Expenditures, Social Pension Benefit Levels and Social Pension Coverage on Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics and Civil Conflict with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Education	Social Security & Welfare	Social Pension Benefits	Social Pension Coverage
Equal Protection	0.710** (0.272)			0.652 (0.829)	
Equal Access	-0.177 (0.165)			4.978*** (1.045)	
Equal Distribution	0.430* (0.214)			-2.124*** (0.614)	
Reasoned Justification			-0.313 (0.238)	-0.109 (0.0957)	
Common Good			-0.135 (0.359)	-0.0751 (0.109)	
Respect Counterarguments			-0.387 (0.260)	-0.0211 (0.0817)	
Range of Consultation			0.00759 (0.278)	0.293** (0.111)	
Engaged Society			0.675 (0.360)	-0.271* (0.126)	
Civil Society Participation				-1.064 (0.711)	
Direct Popular Vote				0.442 (0.287)	
Local Government Representation				0.235 (0.328)	
Regional Government Representation				-0.585* (0.259)	
Equality Before the Law and Liberty		0.173 (0.140)			1829117.2 (1388354.7)
Judicial Constraints on the Executive		-0.144 (0.0886)			-232784.2 (397296.6)
Legislative Constraints on the Executive		-0.153 (0.102)			-1213138.8* (572782.1)
Civil Conflict	-0.0930 (0.0496)	0.0297 (0.0342)	-0.868 (0.799)	-0.280* (0.122)	840890.2 (513351.1)
Democracy	0.0525 (0.0528)	0.112* (0.0483)	-0.236 (0.267)	-0.556* (0.276)	673555.7* (263248.0)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00336** (0.00107)	0.0000925 (0.000951)	-0.0255*** (0.00768)	-0.00232 (0.00261)	2216.0 (3930.6)
GDP per capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.0276** (0.01000)	0.0241* (0.00952)	0.142 (0.111)	0.276*** (0.0336)	-14398.0 (40986.2)
Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00772* (0.00371)	-0.00405 (0.00269)	-0.102** (0.0331)	-0.00341 (0.00692)	-27093.0 (17745.7)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.00161 (0.00152)	0.000768 (0.00143)	-0.00592 (0.0107)	-0.00492 (0.00595)	-3280.6 (4472.2)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0142*** (0.00431)	-0.0155*** (0.00459)	0.0283 (0.0364)	-0.00897 (0.0188)	-44881.2*** (11935.1)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000415 (0.000843)	0.00323*** (0.000883)	-0.00335 (0.00460)	-0.00464* (0.00202)	-2937.5 (2020.5)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00592 (0.00322)	0.000346 (0.00306)	0.0837* (0.0387)	-0.0101 (0.0144)	-17095.6 (11418.9)

Constant	2.222*** (0.354)	1.261*** (0.248)	7.910** (2.558)	3.464*** (0.926)	1457595.1 (1835202.0)
R-sq	0.933	0.849	0.166	0.988	0.056
Groups	18	18	18	14	13
N	336	336	336	122	114

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

Table 4.7. Regression of Public Social Expenditures and Social Pension Benefit Levels on Social Citizenship Paradigm Characteristics, Civil Conflict, Economic Capacity and Interactions with Correlated PCSE

	Combined	Social Pension Benefits Model 1	Social Pension Benefits Model 2
Equal Protection	0.765** (0.255)	0.517 (0.820)	0.770 (0.899)
Equal Access	-0.0887 (0.163)	5.616*** (1.102)	4.801*** (1.031)
Equal Distribution	0.432* (0.204)	-2.299*** (0.650)	-3.336*** (0.701)
Reasoned Justification		-0.0860 (0.0986)	-0.0566 (0.0910)
Common Good		-0.0979 (0.109)	-0.0331 (0.0965)
Respect Counterarguments		-0.0167 (0.0999)	-0.0448 (0.0935)
Range of Consultation		0.310* (0.128)	0.360** (0.121)
Engaged Society		-0.260* (0.130)	-0.318* (0.128)
Civil Society Participation		-1.334 (0.774)	-0.618 (0.756)
Direct Popular Vote		0.303 (0.317)	0.304 (0.449)
Local Government Representation		0.224 (0.342)	0.0768 (0.395)
Regional Government Representation		-0.524 (0.295)	-0.518* (0.261)
Civil Conflict	-0.0821 (0.0489)	17.34 (14.16)	-0.164 (0.126)
Democracy	0.0655 (0.0563)	-0.626* (0.265)	-0.655** (0.243)
Prop. of Left Seats in Lower House	-0.00426*** (0.00100)	-0.00149 (0.00262)	-0.000324 (0.00257)
GDP Per Capita (2010 US \$1000s)	0.00358 (0.0340)	0.286*** (0.0353)	-0.180 (0.187)

Age Dependency Ratio	-0.00619 (0.00341)	0.00257 (0.00867)	-0.00451 (0.0116)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.00140 (0.00158)	-0.00341 (0.00626)	-0.00993 (0.00579)
Unemployment (% of Labor Force)	-0.0159*** (0.00438)	-0.0128 (0.0198)	-0.00724 (0.0162)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.000386 (0.000873)	-0.00468* (0.00221)	-0.00400 (0.00265)
FDI (% of GDP)	0.00538 (0.00346)	-0.0120 (0.0154)	0.00379 (0.0126)
Equal Protection*GDP Per Capita	-0.00225 (0.0698)		
Equal Access*Civil Conflict		-0.754 (2.747)	
Equal Access*GDP Per Capita			0.495 (0.317)
Equal Distribution*Civil Conflict		-2.091 (3.851)	
Equal Distribution*GDP Per Capita	0.0452 (0.0626)		0.144 (0.137)
Range of Consultation*Civil Conflict		-0.244 (0.231)	
Range of Consultation*GDP Per Capita			-0.0290 (0.0211)
Engaged Society*Civil Conflict		0.407 (0.573)	
Engaged Society*GDP Per Capita			-0.0253 (0.0469)
Regional Government*Civil Conflict		-16.72 (13.18)	
Regional Government*GDP Per Capita			0.0318 (0.0715)
Constant	2.096*** (0.330)	2.974** (0.984)	4.123*** (1.222)
R-sq	0.938	0.989	0.986
Groups	18	14	14
N	336	122	122

Standard errors are in parentheses.

\* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\* p<0.001

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### **Appendix: Social Citizenship Paradigm Measures**

As discussed previously, four continuous measures that capture several common social citizenship paradigm archetypes (i.e., broader types of social citizenship paradigms rather than the specific variants of social citizenship paradigms seen on the ground) are included. These four measures are the egalitarian social citizenship index (focused on equal political participatory capacity through the protection of political rights and the removal of inequality-based barriers to their exercise), deliberative social citizenship index (focused on public decision-making based on the common good), participatory social citizenship index (focused on active participation in political processes through civil society organizations and direct democracy), and liberal social citizenship index (focused on individual rights and protections from the state). These are referred to as the egalitarian component index, deliberative component index, participatory component index and liberal component index, respectively, by the V-Dem Institute and operate on a 0-1 (low to high) scale (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).

As was also discussed previously, each of these four social citizenship indexes are composed from component measures that capture important social-citizenship-related beliefs, values and other characteristics. The egalitarian social citizenship index is produced by averaging equal protection, equal access, and equal distribution of resources indices. The deliberative social citizenship index is developed from point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, range of consultation, and engaged society indicators. The participatory social

citizenship index comes from averaging civil society participation, direct popular vote, elected local government power, and elected regional government power indices. Lastly, the liberal social citizenship index is produced by averaging equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on the executive indices. Each of these, except for the deliberative component measures (discussed further below), operate on a 0-1 (low to high) scale as well (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).

#### EGALITARIAN SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP COMPONENT MEASURES

Each of these component measures are themselves produced from several underlying variables. Starting with the egalitarian composite measures, the equal protection index is produced by taking point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes measures of social class equality in respect for civil liberties, social group equality in respect for civil liberties, and percent of population with weaker civil liberties (reversed scaled). The equal access index is produced by taking point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes measures of power distributed by socioeconomic position, power distributed by social group, and power distributed by gender. The equal distribution of resources index is produced by taking point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes measures of particularistic or public goods, means-tested vs. universalistic welfare policies, educational equality, and health equality (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).

### *Equal Protection Component Measures*

Among the equal protection index component measures, the social class equality in respect for civil liberties measure evaluates the extent to which civil liberties (i.e., access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labor) are the same across socioeconomic groups (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that poor people have much fewer civil liberties than rich people and “4” means that poor people share the same level of civil liberties as rich people (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:164). The social group equality in respect for civil liberties measure evaluates whether all social groups (distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste) enjoy the same level of civil liberties (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that some social groups have much fewer civil liberties than the general population and “4” means that all salient social groups share the same level of civil liberties (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:164). Finally, the percent of population with weaker civil liberties measure is self-explanatory; it measures the percentage of the population that have weaker civil liberties (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:166).

### *Equal Access Component Measures*

Among the equal access index component measures, the power distributed by socioeconomic position measure evaluates the extent to which wealth and income are translated into political power (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that wealthy people have a virtual monopoly on political power while those with less wealth and income have almost no influence and “4” means that wealthy people do not have more political power than others (as political power is distributed roughly equally across economic groups) (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:184). The power distributed by social group measure evaluates the extent to which political power is divided amongst social groups (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that political power is institutionally monopolized by one social group that represents a minority of the population and “4” means that all social groups have approximately equal political power or strong ethnic, racial, caste, linguistic, religious, or regional cleavages do not operate (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:184-185). Finally, the power distributed by gender measure evaluates the extent to which political power is divided along gender lines (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that men possess nearly a monopoly on political power and “4” means that men and women share approximately equal political power

(Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:185).

*Equal Distribution of Resources Component Measures*

Among the equal distribution of resources index component measures, the particularistic or public goods measure evaluates whether social and infrastructural spending are targeted toward specific corporations, sectors, social groups, regions, parties, or sets of constituents or are, instead, intended to serve all communities within a society (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that nearly all of the social and infrastructural spending are particularistic in nature and “4” means that nearly all of the social and infrastructural spending is public in nature (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:144). The means-tested vs. universalistic welfare policies measure evaluates how many welfare programs are means-tested as opposed to benefitting all (or nearly all) members of the society (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that welfare state policies are absent or extremely limited and “5” means that nearly all of the welfare state policies are universalistic (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:145).

The educational equality measure evaluates the extent to which a high-quality basic education (typically between 6 and 16 years of age) is available to all (Coppedge, Gerring



Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75% of children receive a low-quality education that compromises their ability to exercise their rights as adult citizens and “4” means that basic education is virtually equal in quality and less than 5% of children receive a low-quality education that compromises their ability to exercise their rights as adult citizens (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:186). The educational equality measure evaluates the extent to which high quality basic healthcare is guaranteed to all (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the provision of high-quality basic healthcare is extremely unequal and at least 75% of people receive low-quality healthcare that compromises their ability to exercise their rights as adult citizens and “4” means that basic healthcare is virtually equal in quality and less than 5% of people receive low-quality healthcare that compromises their ability to exercise their rights as adult citizens (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:186-187).

#### DELIBERATIVE SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP COMPONENT MEASURES

Unlike the three egalitarian component measures above that were themselves composite measures of several other underlying measures, the reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, range of consultation, and engaged society

deliberative component measures are the only five measures that underlie the deliberative social citizenship index. The reasoned justification measure evaluates the extent to which political elites provide reasoned and public justifications for their positions (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-3 scale, where “0” means that elites provide no justification and “3” means that political elites provide complex, more than one or complete justifications (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:142). The common good measure evaluates the extent to which political elites justify their positions by drawing upon the common good (understood as either the greatest good for the greatest number or as serving the least advantaged of society) (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that elites provide little or no justification that relies upon the common good and “4” means that elites provide justification that are mostly tied to the common good (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:142-143).

The respect for counterarguments measure evaluates the extent to which political elites respect counterarguments (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that elites do not allow or punish counterarguments and “5” means that elites acknowledge

counterarguments, value them and frequently change their position in light of them (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:143). The range of consultation measure evaluates the range of consultation that occurs at elite levels when policy changes are being considered (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that the leader or a very small group make their own authoritative decisions and “5” means that consultation involves virtually all parts of the political spectrum and society (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:143). The engaged society measure evaluates how independent and wide public deliberations are when policy changes are being considered (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that public deliberation is (almost) never allowed and “5” means that grass-roots deliberation is unconstrained and common (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:144).

## PARTICIPATORY SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP COMPONENT MEASURES

As was the case with the egalitarian social citizenship component measures earlier, the component measures of participatory social citizenship are composites of underlying variables too. The civil society participation index is produced by taking point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes measures of candidate selection, civil society organization consultation, civil society organization participatory environment, and civil society organization

women's participation. The direct popular vote index is produced through the addition of weighted scores of popular initiatives, referendums, plebiscites and obligatory referendums measures, where each type of popular vote receives a maximum score of two (based on the addition of the two terms of easiness of initiation and easiness of approval, which each obtain a maximum value of one) and has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 8, and are subsequently normalized to range between 0 and 1. The elected local government power index is produced by multiplying a local government election measure (which has been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1) by a measure of local offices relative power (which has also been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1), and it takes on a value of 0 when there is no local government. The elected regional government power index is produced by multiplying a regional government election measure (which has been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1) by a measure of regional offices relative power (which has also been rescaled to vary from 0 to 1), and it takes on a 0 value when there is no regional government (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).

#### *Civil Society Participation Component Measures*

Among the civil society participation index component measures, the candidate selection measure evaluates who selects national legislative candidates within parties (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where "0" means that national party leaders exclusively select national legislative candidates and "5" means that constituency groups or direct primaries select

national legislative candidates (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:90). The civil society organization consultation measure evaluates whether policymakers consult major civil society organizations on relevant policies (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-2 scale, where “0” means that the government is insulated from civil society organization input while formulating policies and “2” means that civil society organizations are given a voice in the policymaking process (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:174). The civil society participatory environment measure evaluates the civil society organizations people are involved in (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-3 scale, where “0” means that people involuntarily participate in state-sponsored associations and “3” means that people are at least occasionally active in a diverse set of civil society organizations (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:175). The civil society organization women’s participation measure evaluates the degree to which women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means nearly always and “4” means nearly never (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:175-176).

### *Direct Popular Vote Component Measures*

For each of the popular initiatives, referendums, plebiscites and obligatory referendums popular vote types, ease of initiation is measured by indicators for the existence of a direct democracy process, number of signatures needed, time-limits to circulate signatures, and level of government. Ease of approval is measured by “the surface of the polygon determined by” indicators for participation quorum, approval quorum, and supermajority, and is then multiplied with an indicator for district majority. The consequences of citizen initiated popular vote are measured by indicators of the legal status (binding or consultative) of the decision made by citizens and the frequency and degree of success of direct popular votes held in the past. (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:46; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).

### *Elected Local Government Power Component Measures*

Among the elected local government power index component measures, the local government election measure evaluates the extent to which local government offices are elected in practice (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that offices at the local level are generally not elected and “5” means that local executive and assembly offices are generally elected (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:64). The local offices relative power measure evaluates the power of elected and non-elected offices at the local level, relative to each other

(Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that (nearly) all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected ones at the local level and “4” means that (nearly) all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected ones at the local level (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:65).

#### *Elected Regional Government Power Component Measures*

Among the elected regional government power index component measures, the regional government election measure evaluates the extent to which regional government offices are elected in practice (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that offices at the regional level are generally not elected and “5” means that regional executive and assembly offices are generally elected (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:62-63). The regional offices relative power measure evaluates the power of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level, relative to each other (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that (nearly) all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected ones at the regional level and “4” means that (nearly) all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected ones at the regional level (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:63).

## LIBERAL SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP COMPONENT MEASURES

Finally, as was the case with the egalitarian and participatory social citizenship component measures above, the component measures of liberal social citizenship are composites of underlying variables as well. The equality before the law and individual liberties index is produced by taking point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes measures of rigorous and impartial public administration, transparent laws with predictable enforcement, access to justice for men, access to justice for women, property rights for men, property rights for women, freedom from torture, freedom from political killings, freedom from forced labor for men, freedom from forced labor for women, freedom of religion, freedom of foreign movement, and freedom of domestic movement for men, and freedom of domestic movement for women. The judicial constraints on the executive index is produced by taking point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes measures of executive respect of constitution, compliance with judiciary, compliance with high court, high court independence, and lower court independence. The legislative constraints on the executive index is produced by taking point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model that includes measures of the legislature questioning officials in practice, executive oversight, legislature investigates in practice, and legislature opposition parties (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).

### *Equality Before the Law and Individual Liberties Component Measures*

Among the equality before the law and individual liberties index component measures, the rigorous and impartial public administration measure evaluates the extent to which public



officials are rigorous and impartial in the performance of public administration (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that biased or arbitrary administration of the law is widespread (the law is not respected by public officials) and “4” means that biased or arbitrary administration of the law is very limited (the law is generally respected by public officials) (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:157-158). The transparent laws with predictable enforcement measure evaluates the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the transparency and predictability of laws are nearly non-existent and “4” means that the transparency and predictability of laws is very strong (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:157).

The access to justice for men measure evaluates whether men possess secure and effective access to justice (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that effective and secure access to justice for men is non-existent and “4” means that effective and secure access to justice is nearly always observed (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:163). The access to justice for women measure evaluates whether women possess secure and effective access to justice (Coppedge,

Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that effective and secure access to justice for women is non-existent and “4” means that effective and secure access to justice is nearly always observed (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:163-164). The property rights for men measure evaluates whether men possess the right to private property (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that virtually no men possess private property rights and “5” means that virtually all men possess (nearly) all property rights (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:162). The property rights for women measure evaluates whether women possess the right to private property (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-5 scale, where “0” means that virtually no women possess private property rights and “5” means that virtually all women possess (nearly) all property rights (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:162).

The freedom from torture measure evaluates just that, whether there is freedom from torture (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that torture is

systematically practiced and approved by leaders of the government and “4” means that torture is absent (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:156). The freedom from political killings measure, similarly, self-explanatorily evaluates whether there is freedom from political killings. It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that political killings are systematically practiced and approved by leaders of the government and “4” means that political killings are absent (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:156-157).

The freedom from forced labor for men measure evaluates whether adult men are free from various kinds of forced labor (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the forced labor of men is widespread, accepted and potentially organized by the state and “4” means that the forced labor of men is virtually absent (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:160-161). The freedom from forced labor for women measure evaluates whether adult women are free from various kinds of forced labor (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the forced labor of women is widespread, accepted and potentially organized by the state and “4” means that the forced labor of women is virtually absent (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:160-161). The freedom of religion measure evaluates the extent to which people have the ability to choose a religion, change it, and

practice and proselytize their religion in private and public without restrictions by public authorities (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that freedom of religion is hardly respected by public authorities and “4” means that freedom of religion is respected fully by public authorities (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:155-156).

The freedom of foreign movement measure evaluates whether citizens are able to freely engage in foreign travel and emigration without restriction by public authorities (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the freedom to engage in foreign travel and emigration is not respected and “4” means that this freedom is respected fully by the government (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:158). The freedom of domestic movement for men measure evaluates the extent to which men are able to establish a permanent residency where they wish and move freely throughout the day and night (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that men possess virtually no freedom of movement and “4” means that all men possess full freedom of movement (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:158-159). Finally, the freedom of domestic movement for

women measure evaluates the extent to which women are able to establish a permanent residency where they wish and move freely throughout the day and night (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that women possess virtually no freedom of movement and “4” means that all women possess full freedom of movement (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:159).

#### *Judicial Constraints on the Executive Component Measures*

Among the judicial constraints on the executive index component measures, the executive respect of constitution measure evaluates the extent to which members of the executive respect the constitution (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that executive members violate the constitution without legal consequences whenever they want and “4” means that executive members never violate the constitution (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:117). The compliance with judiciary measure evaluates the compliance of the government with decisions by courts with which it disagrees (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the government never complies and “4” means that they always do (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:152). The

compliance with high court measure evaluates the compliance of the government with decisions by the high court with which it disagrees (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the government never complies and “4” means that they always do (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:152).

The high court independence measure evaluates the extent to which high court decisions simply reflect the governments wishes rather than being autonomous (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that the high court makes decisions that always reflect the wishes of the government and “4” means that they never do (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:151). The lower court independence measure evaluates the extent to which lower court decisions simply reflect the governments wishes rather than being autonomous (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that lower courts make decisions that always reflect the wishes of the government and “4” means that they never do (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:151).

#### *Legislative Constraints on the Executive Component Measures*

Among the legislative constraints on the executive index component measures, the legislature questioning officials in practice measure evaluates the extent to which the legislature routinely questions officials from the executive branch (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-1 scale, where “0” means that the legislature never or rarely questions executive branch officials and “1” means that they routinely do so (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:129). The executive oversight measure evaluates the extent to which a body other than the legislature would question or investigate executive branch officials and issue decisions or reports unfavorable to those executive officials (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-4 scale, where “0” means that bodies other than the legislature would be extremely unlikely to question, investigate and issue unfavorable decisions unfavorable to executive officials and “4” means that these bodies would be (nearly) certain to do so (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:130).

The legislature investigates in practice measure evaluates the extent to which a body of the legislature would question or investigate executive branch officials and issue decisions or reports unfavorable to those executive officials (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a

0-4 scale, where “0” means that a body of the legislature would be extremely unlikely to question, investigate and issue unfavorable decisions unfavorable to executive officials and “4” means that they would be (nearly) certain to do so (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:129). Lastly, the legislature opposition parties measure evaluates the extent to which opposition parties are able to exercise oversight over the governing party or coalition (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018). It is measured on a 0-2 scale, where “0” means that opposition parties are not able at all to exercise oversight over the governing party or coalition and “2” means they are, for the most part, able to exercise this oversight (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018:130).

#### ORIGIN OF SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP PARADIGM MEASURE DATA

The V-Dem data that forms the basis for the composite social citizenship paradigm measures and their underlying component measures rely on data derived from three types of sources. First, some data has been gathered from other existing datasets or secondary sources and are factual in nature. A second set of data is drawn from country-specific sources and are, again, factual in nature. Together, these two sets of pre-coded data are used to produce factual indicators. A third set of data relies on the coding of the state of affairs within a particular country and point in time by country experts (who are largely scholars or professionals that reside in the country being coded), which are used to produce evaluative indicators. Multiple country experts code each of these types of variables. In these instances where multiple,



overlapping country expert codes exist, a Bayesian item response theory measurement model is used for cross-coder aggregation (Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish et al. 2018; Coppedge, Gerring Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Krusell et al. 2018; Pemstein et al. 2018).