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How NATO Decides:
A Theory for How NATO Takes Collective Action in the 21st Century

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ABSTRACT

On 14 January 2017, President Donald J. Trump described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as obsolete. During the first six months of his administration, President Trump discussed not honoring Article 5 commitments for NATO members who had not met the financial responsibilities outlined in the 2014 Wales Summit. His rhetoric created concern because it projects the sentiment: the costs of being in NATO are higher than the benefits.

My research looks to answer the question: How does NATO select, create, and decide to pursue out-of-area activities in the 21st Century, and what mechanisms facilitate that process? Answering this series of questions will establish a process that reveals how allies find common interests, overcome domestic constraints, and navigate the bureaucracy to send sovereign national military resources abroad.

Developing a theory that explains NATO's process for out-of-area activity selection, development, and execution illuminates how NATO achieves consensus despite evolving from a 12-nation defensive alliance into a 30-nation security provider offers three significant additions. First, I create an integrated explanation model (IEM) called Embeddedness Theory that defines NATO's decision-making process for selecting, developing, and deciding to pursue activities. By identifying the two groups of power players, the Quad and Principals, my theory highlights crunch points that anticipate success or conflict within the alliance. Second, I illustrate how two mechanisms, Diplomatic Embeddedness, and Issue Embeddedness, combine to categorize allies into one of four groups qualitatively and quantitatively. Each category has characteristics that predict how allies facilitate or hamper consensus. Third, I demonstrate how to apply the theoretical framework by examining NATO's out-of-area activities from 1995 to 2015.

Using a mixed-method research design, I develop and test Embeddedness Theory through small-n case analysis and interviews with NATO practitioners. The case analysis provides an opportunity to test theory via an analytical narrative and demonstrate the causal mechanisms that underpin NATO's collective action process. The research reveals how the four decision elements can morph based on the issue. The typology laid out by Embeddedness theory stipulates four elements be present for out-of-area activities. They are overlapping interests in the Triumvirate, Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) design by the Principals (Triumvirate plus Canada, Germany, and Italy), developing sufficient political will, and a dedication to building consensus.

With this framework, practitioners, military officials, and diplomats can anticipate how NATO will make future decisions regarding out-of-area activities and apply the topology to various security issues. Embeddedness theory lays a foundation for future leaders to continue evolving the world's greatest alliance throughout the 21st Century.

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PREFACE

"NATO is obsolete."

President Charles de Gaulle
France, 1966

"If current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders – those for whom the cold war was not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost."

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
United States, 2011

"NATO is obsolete because it does not take care of terror."

President Donald Trump
United States, 2017

Unknowingly, my inspiration to study the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started on 11 September 2001 (9/11). I was twelve playing the Alto-Saxophone in Wilson Middle School's concert band in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. At 10:03 am eastern standard time, the principal said over the loudspeaker, "Two planes have crashed into the twin towers in New York City, and another plane has crashed into the Pentagon. America is under attack, and school is canceled for the rest of the day." As a typical adolescent, I was happy to get out of school early and play video games with my friends. Clearly, I did not understand the gravity of the situation and needed my father to explain what was going on.

At the time, my father was a Colonel in the United States Army with 27 years of service and plans to retire in the next three years. On 1 August 2000, my father returned from his 365-day deployment in Yongsan, South Korea, and assured our family he was home for good because he was a seminar leader at the United States Army War College. Taking the tour near the demilitarized zone meant he should not have to take another deployment for the rest of his career.

At noon on 9/11, my dad came home and explained he would have to go back on his word because the day's events made a deployment for everyone imminent. My afternoon of video games ended with fear and grief because the geopolitical situation was scarier than I understood initially. My joy of being out of school early no longer felt appropriate because the day's events forced my dad to break his promise and put his life on the line again.

On 12 September, ABC News anchor, Peter Jennings, explained NATO invoked Article 5 and that a Paris newspaper had the headline "We are all Americans today." My father was shocked that the European Allies took that step because Article 5 was designed to respond to acts of war by another country. Invoking Article 5 meant that the other 18 countries in NATO viewed the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC as attacks on their citizens. He expressed

his belief that NATO's support would ensure the United States would recover from the tragedy of 9/11.

Inspired by my father's service, I pursued my commission through the United States Air Force Academy and graduated in 2010. My Air Force Training continued as I earned pilot wings through Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) program. While at Sheppard Air Force Base, I gained an appreciation for multilateralism and marveled at how nations from across North America and Europe supported each other inside and outside the squadron. After completing multiple deployments in the Middle East serving side by side NATO member states, my dad's words of affirmation for the alliance became a reality. Completing missions with Italians, British, Canadians, Norwegian, and Dutch service members showed me how the transatlantic alliance helped the United States confront terrorism and ensured the pain felt on 9/11 never happened again.

On 10 June 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that NATO would cease to exist if allies did not improve their military capabilities and commitments to the alliance. He came to that conclusion through conversations with younger leaders in the United States who were unfamiliar with NATO's impact on the Cold War. Additionally, the recently underway mission in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, highlighted inadequacies in the alliance because members ran out of munitions mid-campaign (Carnevale 2011).¹ The lack of connection and recency bias caused younger United States officials to question the organization's importance.

When Secretary Gates gave his speech, I was a Second Lieutenant and scoffed at the possibility that NATO would disband. Fast forward six years, I am a Captain deployed in an undisclosed location in the Middle East, and the former Secretary of Defense's prophecy had come

¹ Carnevale, Mary Lu. 2011. "Transcript of Defense Secretary Gates's Speech on NATO's Future." *The Wall Street Journal*, June 10, 2011. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-WB-30200>.

true. On 14 January 2017, a newly elected United States president said NATO was obsolete and threatened not to fulfill an Article 5 commitment unless an ally paid its fair share (Kaufman 2017).² After hearing the statement on various news outlets, I read President Trump's press conference transcript. What was particularly striking about the argument was that President Trump criticized the alliance for not contributing enough to the War on Terror. Later that night, I had a meal in the dining facility where militaries from seven other NATO nations got nourishment between missions fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The juxtaposition of my position in the world and the president's statement did not sit well with me and made me ask myself, "What am I missing?"

President Donald Trump's declaration that NATO was outdated led me to ponder Secretary Gates' warning to the transatlantic alliance in 2011. Given that the president did not serve in government during the Cold War, did he not see value in the alliance? If NATO disbands, what does that mean for future multinational military campaigns?

My desire to study NATO solidified while interviewing young men and women applying for congressional nominations to attend the service academies. In 2018, half of the high school students mentioned reading about the impact of 9/11 on the United States and the world. I was troubled because none of the applicants cited NATO invoking Article 5 in support of the United States. While they appreciated 9/11's significance, they did not have a visceral memory like my generation and older ones because they were 1-3 years old. At that point, I drew a parallel between my generation's view of the Cold-War and Generation Z's outlook on 9/11.

² Kaufman, Joyce. 2017. "The US Perspective on NATO Under Trump: Lessons of the Past and Prospects for the Future." *International Affairs* 93 (2): 251-66. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix009>. P. 251-2.

Comparing the two cohorts brought a revelation that combined Secretary Gates's prediction with President Trump's 2017 statement. Since the Cold War is the source of NATO's relevance and Article 5's usage attaches to the War on Terror, the organization is on a path towards extinction because its fundamental feature does not appear credible to political leaders in the most powerful nation in the organization. Consequently, I asked myself one big question: How does NATO decide to participate in out-of-area activities in the 21st Century?

This question was at the heart of the Secretary Gates warning and President Trump's frustration. If I could establish a theory about how NATO overcomes collective action problems, I would impact continuing the world's most significant alliance. By unlocking the elements and mechanism which lead to consensus amongst its members, I could highlight areas in the decision-making process that are successful and need improvement.

My time at ENJJPT and in the Middle East taught me NATO is the embodiment of soft and hard power. Hearing my Canadian and European classmates talk about NATO and the United States' impact on the institution helped me see the transatlantic alliance's value on the battlefield. NATO allows the United States and its allies to collaborate and address each other's anxieties. Simultaneously, the alliance enables the United States to operate its blue water navy, maintain installations around the world, and cultivate unrivaled Airpower to protect its national interests. While the military impact of NATO is easy to see, the international trust and commitment to defend democratic ideals that buttress the organization are not.

I came into this project as a United States Air Force officer with a basic understanding of NATO through the eyes of a millennial. I knew everyone had to agree for a decision to be made, membership expanded from 16 to 30 countries over the past 25 years, and the alliance used Article 5 once to respond to 9/11.

Born in 1988, I appreciate the Cold War's historical significance, but I do not have a proper understanding of America's anxiety during that era. Therefore, I am one of the officers that Secretary Gates warned NATO Allies about in 2011. However, as an officer who served in and alongside multinational units under the NATO flag, I saw when the alliance enhanced mission effectiveness and episodes where allied countries could not participate in specific missions due to increased risk. Therefore, I heard my colleagues in uniform intimate that not all NATO countries had skin in the game like the United States.

During interviews with current and former NATO practitioners, I grew an appreciation for how the organization empowers every member to improve its nation's security. Through my conversations, I learned about the complexity of policymaking on the international level. NATO has a 72-year history preserving principles like the rule of law and individual liberty. Additionally, the transatlantic alliance supplies protection for 46% of the global gross domestic product (GDP), 11% of the world's population, one-third of goods traded, and over half of international direct investment (Burns and Lute 2019).³

As the world moves deeper into the 21st Century, it is crucial for soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, diplomats, and policymakers to understand how NATO balances the tradeoffs between institutional values with an individual country's national security interests. In an increasingly complex world, figuring out how NATO decides to act is critical. The world's most significant alliance must uncover ways to wrestle with various new challenges like cyber warfare, hybrid warfare, China's rise, renewed Russian assertiveness, the arctic, and space. Given its vast responsibilities, scholars studying international security must understand how NATO elects to take

³ Burns, Nicolas, and Douglas Lute. February 2019. *NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis*. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Harvard Kennedy School). <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis>. P. 41.

action in a post-Cold War and post-9/11 environment. Hopefully, my dissertation helps scholars, practitioners, and military members across the alliance gain insight into how the world's oldest military alliance endures in 2021 and beyond.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	American Broadcasting Company
AMCC	SHAPE Allied Movements Coordination Centre
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control system planes
BATNA	Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
BCG	Balkan Contact Group
CPO	Causal Process Observations
CSDP	Common Security Defense Policy
DCA	Defense Cooperation Agreements
DE	Diplomatic Embeddedness
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DSO	Dataset Observations
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination
EC	European Community
EE	Expeditionary Embeddedness
ENJJPT	Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ET	Embeddedness Theory
EU	European Union
EUCOM	United States European Command

G20	Group of Twenty
G7	Group of Seven
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HPT	Hegemonic Power Theory
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IEM	Integrated Explanation Model
IEM	Integrated Explanation Model
IFOR	Implementation Force Stabilization Force
IGO	International Governmental Organizations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JME	Joint Military Exercises
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LCD	Least-Common- Denominator
MC	Military Committee
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MMR	Mixed Methods Research
MNF	Multinational Force
MNNA	Major Non-NATO Ally

MTA	Military-Technical Agreement
MWS	Major Weapon Systems
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NRF	NATO Response Force
NTM-I	NATO Training Mission Iraq
OAF	Operation Allied Force
OECCD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPER	Operation Pakistan Earthquake Relief
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
P5	Five Permanent Members of United Nations Security Council
PCT	Preference Convergence Theory
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PIC	Bonn Peace Implementation Council
Principals	Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, and USA
R&D	Research and Development
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SACEUR	The Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces
SE	Security Embeddedness

SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SRF	Spearhead Response Force
Triumvirate	the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
UK	The United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UN-OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	The United Nations Security Council Resolution
USA	The United States of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZOPA	Zone of Possible Agreement

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“NATO Version 2.0 was the post-Cold War NATO, from the fall of the Berlin Wall until today. It has also worked well. We helped consolidate peace and democracy across Europe. We managed crises from the Balkans to Afghanistan. And we engaged with new partners, with which we share common purpose. The time has now come for NATO 3.0. An Alliance which can defend the 900 million citizens of NATO countries against the threats we face today and will face in the coming decade.”

Anders Fogh Rasmussen
NATO Secretary-General, 2010

“In the nearly 70 years of NATO, perhaps never have we faced such a range of challenges all at once -- security, humanitarian, political.”

President Barrack Obama
United States, 2016

“NATO is on version 3.0? I Know the Cold War was 1.0. What was 2.0?”

Colonel (Ret.) Cortez Dial
United States Army, 2020

On 14 January 2017, President Donald J. Trump described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as obsolete (Gordon and Chokshi 2017).⁴ During the first six months of his administration, President Trump discussed not honoring Article 5 commitments for NATO members who had not met the financial responsibilities outlined in the 2014 Wales Summit (Dombrowski and Reich 2017).⁵ His rhetoric created concern because it projects the sentiment: the costs of being in NATO are higher than the benefits.

The Trump administration's threats of not honoring promises to NATO were upsetting for multiple reasons. First, from 2000 – 2017, the United States supplied 65% of NATO's total defense expenditures, making it by far the alliance's most significant contributor (NATO 2019c).⁶ Second, the ambiguity of American commitment creates doubt in the transatlantic partnership because if the United States no longer believes in NATO's benefits, then the alliance's viability comes into question. Third, the United States' potential exit from NATO challenges the Westphalian world order and the health of other multinational organizations like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Group of Seven (G7), and Group of Twenty (G20).

In the early 1950s, Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary-General, described the alliance's founding as a method to "Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down" (Walt 2018).⁷ Lord Ismay's three edicts remained the driving force and identity of NATO through the Soviet Union's fall.

⁴ Gordon, Michael, and Niraj Chokshi. 2017. "Trump Criticizes NATO and Hopes for 'Good Deals' With Russia." *New York Times*, January 17 2017, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/europe/donald-trump-nato.html?module=inline>.

⁵ Dombrowski, Peter, and Simon Reich. 2017. "Does Donald Trump Have a Grand Strategy?" *International Affairs* 93 (5): 1013-37. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix161>. P.1026.

⁶ NATO. 2019. "Information on Defence Expenditures." [Website]. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last Modified November 29 2019. Accessed February 2, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm.

⁷ Walt, Stephen. 2018. "NATO Isn't What You Think It Is." *FOREIGN POLICY*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/26/nato-isnt-what-you-think-it-is/>.

Throughout the 1990s, neorealist and neoliberal scholars debated the practicality of the alliance. Realists used alliance theory to predict NATO's demise because alliances are temporary and meant to defeat a common foe (Layne 2000a).⁸ For neorealists, NATO extinguished the Soviet Union's collective threat, and Germany's desire for European domination subsided. Neoliberals used intuitionism to forecast NATO's transformation because the apparatus supporting NATO was too expansive to expire. Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf encapsulate this debate in their 1993 *Security Studies* article, suggesting three potential outcomes for NATO: status quo, dissolution, or transformation (Hellmann and Reinhard 1993).⁹

During the 1990s, NATO pursued the third outcome. It transformed itself in two ways: adding areas of responsibility and expanding membership. NATO members decided to morph the institution from a defensive alliance designed to counter Soviet aggression into a security provider that encourages allies to coordinate efforts to address security concerns within and outside of their borders. NATO stretched its sphere of influence in 1993 when it conducted its first out-of-area activity with Operation Deny Flight that enforced a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 28 February 1994, NATO engaged in the alliance's first combat operations by shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft during Operation Deny Flight (Beale 1997).¹⁰ NATO continued its out-of-area operations with an airpower campaign called Operation Deliberate Force (30 August 1995 – 20 September 1995), which propelled Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to sign the Dayton Peace Accords. At the request of the UN, from 20 December 1995 to 2 December 2004, NATO

⁸ Layne, Christopher. 2000. "US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 23 (3): 59-91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390008437800>. P.60.

⁹ Hellmann, Gunther, and Wolf Reinhard. 1993. "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO." *Security Studies* 3 (1): 3-43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347537>. P.5.

¹⁰ Beale, Michael. 1997. *Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Air University (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13772.9>. P.21

continued its efforts in Bosnia with the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions, which enforced the peace agreement (Sperling and Webber 2009).¹¹

In 1994, the alliance established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to discuss opening membership to other European nations. PfP program created a coordination building near SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) to establish a dialogue with all countries able and willing to work with NATO. There were three aims of the PfP program: provide a training ground for future NATO membership, create a forum for non-NATO members to participate in missions with NATO, and assure Russia that NATO expansion was not a threat to its security (Borawski 1995).¹² PfP provided a way for non-NATO nations to contribute to the IFOR and SFOR missions and establish a dialogue with central and eastern European countries who hoped to join NATO (Shiffrinson 2016).¹³ The PfP has successfully led to NATO expansion. From 1999 – 2020, the alliance increased membership from 16 to 30 members. Additionally, the alliance created military relationships with 22 other nations through the PfP (NATO 2020b).¹⁴ In its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO added conflict prevention, crisis management, and cooperation with former rivals to its responsibility areas (NATO 1999b).¹⁵

From 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1999, NATO's institutions, responsibilities, missions, and scope swelled beyond Lord Ismay's three aims. The evolution from a reactionary alliance during its first forty years to a proactive European conflict prevention institution illustrated that NATO was willing to extend its influence beyond its member's borders to achieve

¹¹ Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. 2009. "NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul." *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 85 (3): 491-511. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27695027>. P.493-94.

¹² Borawski, John. 1995. "Partnership for Peace and Beyond." *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 71 (2): 233-46. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2623432>. P.234.

¹³ Shiffrinson, Joshua. 2016. "Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion." *International Security* 40 (4): 7-44. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00236. P.37.

¹⁴ NATO. 2020. "Partnership for Peace Programme." Accessed March 23, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm.

¹⁵ NATO. 1999. The Alliance's Strategic Concept. In *Press Release NAC-S(99) 65*, edited by NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Brussels, Belgium. P.4.

transatlantic security. As NATO forged its way into the 21st Century, researchers questioned if out-of-area operations would continue. Between 1999 and 2016, out-of-area activities became one of NATO's central practices conducting 18 different operations across four continents (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2017; NATO 2019d).

In the 1990s, researchers predicted NATO's 21st-century out-of-area activities would follow one of two theories: Hegemonic Power or Preference Convergence. In 1990, Charles Krauthammer explained, after the Cold War, the United States would be the only country with the requisite diplomatic, military, political, and economic resources to involve itself in any conflict in any part of the world (Krauthammer 1990).¹⁶ Therefore, Krauthammer predicted that NATO would pursue out-of-area activities to extend the United States' foreign policy objectives and become the United States' veil for multilateralism. However, NATO's refusal to support the United States' desire to topple the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the United States' participation in NATO's air campaign in Libya defeats this theory (Haesebrouck 2017; Stevens 2017; Christopher Chivvis 2015; E. Williams 2008; Cimbalo 2004; Overhaus 2004; C. Smith 2003).

In 1996, Robert McCalla explained that NATO's institutional structure and 40-year duration developed deep ties between its members. Specifically, the unanimous approval requirement and principle that an attack on one is an attack on all converge member preferences (McCalla 1996).¹⁷ Therefore, he predicted NATO would persist after the end of the Cold War, and its out-of-area activities would reflect a shared world view and threat perception. However, the decrease in NATO Europe's defense spending, reliance on the United States' hard power to execute

¹⁶ Krauthammer, Charles. 1990. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1): 23-33. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20044692>. P.24.

¹⁷ McCalla, Robert. 1996. "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50 (3): 445-75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033440>. P.457-63.

missions, and out-of-area force distributions not resembling NATO's proportion illustrate that NATO has consternation within its ranks when assessing external threats (Sandler and Shimzu 2014; Rynning 2017; Haesebrouck 2017; Biscop 2012; Hallams and Schreer 2012; Ringsmose 2010; Johnston 2017; Sloan 2016).

In his 1998 Article, Joseph Leggold doubted NATO would perform out-of-area operations after IFOR/SFOR because non-Article 5 external operations posed too many issues for the alliance to settle internally. Out-of-area activities are discretionary, too hard to coalesce preferences, and lack the requisite resources because NATO members would be unwilling to put their militaries in dangerous positions in non-NATO member territories (Leggold 1998).¹⁸ As a result, Leggold predicted that NATO would only unite member preferences to conduct humanitarian missions with low causality risk. NATO's actions during the 21st Century prove Leggold's prediction false. Between 1999 and 2016, NATO managed nearly 20 out-of-area activities and sustained over 3,000 casualties (Livingston and O'Hanlon 2017; Relations 2019; NATO 2019d). The Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories cannot consistently explain which out-of-area activities NATO pursues or how it creates coalitions to execute its strategic objectives.

My research looks to answer the question: *How does NATO select, create, and decide to pursue out-of-area activities in the 21st Century, and what mechanisms facilitate that process?* Answering this series of questions will demonstrate a process that reveals how allies find common interests, overcome domestic constraints, and navigate bureaucracy to send sovereign national military resources abroad. Developing a theory that explains NATO's process for out-of-area

¹⁸ Leggold, Joseph. 1998. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23 (1): 78-106. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P. 78-9.

activity selection, development, and execution illuminates how NATO achieves consensus despite evolving from a 12-nation defensive alliance into a 30-nation security provider.

Previous Studies of NATO Coalitions

Previous studies of NATO follow one of three patterns: Analyzing burden-sharing, explaining the construction of multilateral coalitions, or demonstrating how NATO's institutions evolve over time at critical junctures.

The first significant study of NATO came in the mid-1960s when scholars analyzed the intricacies of collective security and the United States providing a nuclear umbrella for NATO members. Olson and Zeckhauser's work led to the creation of exploitation theory, which expects wealthier alliance members to take on a disproportionate burden to provide security for the alliance (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966).¹⁹ As a result, the exploitation theory predicts nations with the highest military expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP) take on most of the responsibility for NATO's out-of-area activities.

Bennett, Leggold, and Unger's 1994 analysis of national contributions to the first Gulf War led to a challenge of exploitation theory's underlying assumptions. Although the exploitation theory expects nations to free ride on the United States' superior economic and military strengths, multiple countries in the coalition contributed more than their fair share (Bennett, Leggold, and

¹⁹ Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. "An Economic Theory of Alliances." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48 (3): 266-279. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1927082>. P. 268-8.

Unger 1994).²⁰ This realization revealed nations are not always rational profit-maximizing actors when operating in a multilateral coalition.

In 1998, Leggold used the exploitation theory and collective action models to examine if NATO would pursue out-of-area activities after IFOR/SFOR missions. He predicted, outside of an Article 5 response, NATO would not execute conflict resolution campaigns because countries would under-provide due to a fear of losing military resources for a non-vital national interest. With each nation giving less than its proportional amount, the alliance would be unable to create a viable coalition that could effectively execute the mission's objectives (Lepgold 1998).²¹ The theme of burden-sharing is a consistent element of NATO's inner workings that scholars explore from multiple angles.

Lake's analysis on international hierarchy in a unipolar post-Cold War system led by the United States illuminates how powerful nations affect the world. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis, he explains hierarchical order exerts direct and indirect effects on state behavior. Specifically, a country's position in the world system influences how it maximizes its options. He demonstrates states do not rely on self-help or balance against their dominant protectors in the national defense realm. Instead, nations trade subordination for protection or take advantage of their relegation and lower their security burdens (Lake 2007).²² His analysis applies to the dynamics in NATO because there is an inference that transatlantic alliance members take a subordinate role to the United States. Lake's theory of international hierarchy predicts NATO

²⁰ Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Leggold, and Danny Unger. 1994. "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War." *International Organization* 48 (1): 39-75. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P. 72.

²¹ Leggold, Joseph. 1998. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23 (1): 78-106. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P.104-5.

²² Lake, David. 2007. "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics." *International Security* 32 (1): 47-79. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.47>. <https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.47>. P. 76-7.

members join an out-of-area activity because the dominant state, the United States, coerces their participation.

Marina Henke argues the United States builds multilateral coalitions by leveraging its vast resources to capitalize on shared threat perceptions and common political ideology. Through various network effects, the United States identifies linkages between military and non-military priorities with multiple countries worldwide to maximize its political power. Through common political, social, and economic institutions, the United States goes beyond realist zero-sum security concerns by building coalitions through side-payments which may or may not directly affect the military campaign's execution (M. Henke 2017).²³ Henke's theory predicts the United States convinces NATO to pursue out-of-area activities through its various military and diplomatic ties.

Institutionalists highlight building consistent and iterative trust is the main difference between NATO and ad hoc coalitions. Consultations at the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's political decision-making body, at the Military Committee (MC), NATO's military advisory body, and subsequent subcommittees encourage cohesion between allies. Additionally, the consensus requirement forces each member to value every nation's concerns, needs, and desires. Overall, researchers using this logic explain that NATO persists because, without it, the United States, Canada, and European allies would need to create a similar institution that simultaneously consolidated security and political interests.

For Wallander, NATO developed general assets that facilitated political consultation and decision-making that accounted for military planning, coordination, and implementation during the Cold War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO did not have a specific threat but, the

²³ Henke, Marina. 2017. "The Politics of Diplomacy: How the United States Builds Multilateral Military Coalitions." *International Studies Quarterly* 61 (2): 410-24. <https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx017>. P.410-11.

institution continued because the rules, norms, and procedures were beneficial for facilitating coordination between states (Wallander 2000).²⁴ Johnston views NATO as a formal institution with weak independent power and agency. He examines NATO through the lens of a series of formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. In his analysis, the North Atlantic Treaty, commitment to collective defense, integrated joint multinational military structure, and consensus decision-making describe NATO, not the collection of sovereign nations (Johnston 2019).²⁵ As a result, Johnston explains NATO adapts because it is an instrument that drives member states towards a mutually beneficial solution.

Shortcomings of Previous NATO Studies

While all three frameworks of analyzing NATO are valuable, they fail to address how NATO's decision-making process has evolved post-Cold War in four ways. First, they do not articulate that NATO is a unique alliance without an equal in the world. There is a distinction between coalitions of willing, multilateral ad hoc agreements and NATO. The first two lack structured rules that establish constraints and norms between parties. Conversely, the transatlantic alliance has well-known standards and regulations which make interactions between members consistent and predictable. Fundamentally, NATO is different than coalitions of the willing and multilateral ad hoc agreements because it has a signed treaty that signals high political and military

²⁴ Wallander, Celeste. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War." *International Organization* 54 (4): 705-735. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343>. P. 731-2.

²⁵ Johnston, Seth. 2019. "NATO's Lessons From Afghanistan." *Parameters* 49 (3): 11-26. <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan>.

commitment between allies (Fearon 1997).²⁶ Allies, regardless of size and influence, pride themselves on adhering to two principles: votes counting the same numerically and collective agreement on alliance actions. On the other hand, in non-treaty partnerships, dominant states can compel weaker ones to capitulate (Lake 2013).²⁷ As a result, analysis that lumps NATO with different types of multilateral organizations does not capture the quirks and inherent standards embedded into the institution.

Second, the burden-sharing theories do not account for the size, capabilities, commitment, or agency each NATO member possesses. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have significantly more resources than Denmark, Belgium, and Norway. To expect the same number of contributions to any activity is not realistic. Additionally, the burden-sharing framework does not view contributions through the lens of relative size or commitment to an outcome. It is possible that a large nation supplies a significant number of troops to participate but restricts them from partaking in the most dangerous aspects of the operation. Conversely, it is possible that a smaller nation supplies fewer resources but does not limit their usage. The burden-sharing framework takes coinciding interest for granted because the framework overlooks a country that does not have the requisite military resources like a navy, airpower, or heavy machinery but applies their political assets behind the institution's objectives.

Burden-sharing fails to account for overlapping interests. At a minimum, NATO requires each member to vote in the affirmative or abstain. Therefore, each member has a veto over an out-of-area activity proceeding. When an operation goes against an ally's interests, that country most likely blocks it from happening under NATO's flag. While powerful nations can pursue their

²⁶ Fearon, James. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1): 68-90. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041001004>. P. 87.

²⁷ Lake, David. 2013. "Legitimizing Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy." *International Security* 38 (2): 74-111. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00139. P. 74.

national interest through a coalition of the willing, they give up regional legitimacy and risk negative repercussions without NATO's stamp of approval. Therefore, determining how powerful actors within the institution bring ideas to the group, work within the institution to develop a plan, examine alternative courses of action, and decide to pursue the activity with NATO is necessary to comprehend the alliance's durability. In an increasingly complex world where NATO has almost doubled, it should be more difficult for countries to find coinciding interests. However, NATO continues to pursue multiple movements across continents in the transatlantic region and outside of North American and Europe through consensus. Without accounting for idea generation, process, resource disparity, levels of commitment, and overlapping interests, the burden-sharing framework falls short of explaining how NATO's decision-making process has evolved post-Cold War.

Third, Lake and Henke's coalition-building frameworks do not account for how NATO's institutions protect each nation's sovereignty. While the United States unquestionably has considerable sway on the alliance, it cannot force or coerce the institution to bend to its will consistently. While ad hoc coalitions are susceptible to the dominant nation's desires, NATO's structure allows individual nations or factions to push back against the United States. The consensus requirement, differences in threat perception, and political will offer NATO members various avenues to advocate for their position and resist policies espoused by the United States. Although hierarchy and operationalizing diplomatic networks facilitate the United States creating coalitions of the willing, they are not powerful enough to overcome the domestic sovereignty baked into NATO's institutions. Therefore, another theory and different mechanisms must account for how NATO selects, develops, and decides to pursue out-of-area activities.

Fourth, analyzing institutions does not directly account for the autonomy each nation has. While institutionalists point-out powerful nations limit their power within NATO, they do not highlight how the institution provides avenues for strong and weak countries to exert their influence within the rules of the game. Policy entrepreneurs within the alliance can use the organization's rules as a means to link multiple issues to improve or destroy relations between members (R. Krebs 1999).²⁸ Understanding under what conditions nations are most likely to use their veto or withhold their military's participation in an out-of-area activity is a critical aspect of NATO policy missing in the literature.

While Johnston and Wallander explain NATO's durable and flexible institutions enabled the organization to continue after it defeated the Soviet Union, their analyses do not account for the subset of overlapping interests which facilitate the selection, development, and execution of NATO's out-of-area activities. NATO's institutions help allies triage priorities, triangulate collective benefits, and protect private national needs. Determining why operations do and do not reach consensus can illuminate what forces influence each step of the policymaking process.

Studies only focusing on rules and regulation within the organization take the process of navigating the institution's norms as given. However, understanding how NATO entrepreneurs bring proposals to the NAC and MC is as important as recognizing how both bodies operate. For example, what mechanism accounts for a country could withdraw its objection to a proposed activity but tie an abstention to limited military participation?

Grasping how resourced and less-resourced nations manipulate the rules of the game to maximize their position is a nuance institutionalism misses. Another scenario institutionalism

²⁸ Krebs, Ronald. 1999. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." *International Organization* 53 (2): 343-77. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550904>. P.

does not account for is ingenuity. For example, two powerful actors could disagree on policy and be in gridlock. However, through a superior understanding of the rules, one state could break the deadlock by outmaneuvering its rival using the institution's norms in its favor. In a different situation, a faction of countries could band together and limit a mission's objectives unless the institution addresses their concerns. Determining how NATO members use out-of-area activities to optimize other interests within the organization can illuminate what forces influence policy creation.

NATO's institutions help allies prioritize, differentiate, and agree on a course that give its actions regional legitimacy. At the same time, every country analyzes NATO activities on a case-by-case basis through a realist lens. The number of coalitions of the willing that have high numbers of NATO allies participating illustrates a cost-benefit analysis is in use. Does the price of gaining regional legitimacy offset the benefits of autonomy summarizes the dilemma national leaders in NATO asked themselves. A systematic approach that can predict gridlock in NATO and subsequent coalitions of the willing is missing in the current literature. Ideally, there would be a theory that combines process, realism, and institutionalism to describe how NATO decides to pursue out-of-area activities in the 21st Century.

Research Design

My research provides three significant additions. First, I create an integrated explanation model (IEM) called Embeddedness Theory that defines NATO's decision-making process for selecting, developing, and deciding to pursue activities. By identifying the two groups of power players, the

Quad, and Principals, my theory highlights crunch points that anticipate success or conflict within the alliance. Second, I illustrate how two mechanisms, Diplomatic Embeddedness and Issue Embeddedness, combine to categorize allies into one of four groups qualitatively and quantitatively. Each category has characteristics that predict how allies facilitate or hamper consensus. Third, I demonstrate how to apply the theoretical framework by examining NATO's out-of-area activities from 1995 to 2015.

Using a mixed-method research design, I test Embeddedness Theory through small-n case analysis and interviews with NATO practitioners. The case analysis provides an opportunity to test theory via an analytical narrative and demonstrate the causal mechanisms that underpin NATO's collective action process. Additionally, the case studies offer the chance to use process tracing to test Embeddedness Theory against neorealist Hegemonic Power and neoliberal Preference Convergence theories (Collier 2011).²⁹ Interviews with former and current NATO practitioners provide first-hand accounts to assess each category's assumptions. NATO experts offer the opportunity to test counterfactuals with individuals closest to the decision-makers who possess the most in-depth institutional knowledge.

Table 1 illustrates the five out-of-area activities NATO pursued post-Cold War analyzed: Kosovo Force (KFOR - Kosovo), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF - Afghanistan), NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I), Operation Pakistan earthquake relief (OPER), and Operation Unified Protector (OUP). The campaigns have a wide variety of objectives and take place on three different continents: Europe, Africa, and Asia. The five case studies offer the full array of NATO movement types and provide the opportunity to test Embeddedness Theory against

²⁹ Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 44 (4): 823-30. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429>. P.823.

Preference Convergence theory and Hegemonic Power theory. Examining the three theories across a range of operations reveals which philosophy better explains how NATO decides to pursue out-of-area activities.

Campaign	Start Date	End Date	Location	Mission Type
KFOR	24 March 1999	Continues	Kosovo	Peace Enforcement
ISAF	20 December 2001	28 December 2014	Afghanistan	Conflict Resolution
NTM-I	20 March 2003	31 December 2011	Iraq	Training & Mentoring
OPER	8 October 2005	1 February 2006	Pakistan	Humanitarian
OUP	27 March 2011	31 October 2011	Libya	Conflict Resolution

Table 1 - Five Case Studies: The five cases used to Embeddedness Theory against Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories. The five cases vary between duration, location, and mission type (NATO 2019b).³⁰

Expansion Date	Nations Accessed
12 March 1999	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
29 March 2004	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
1 April 2009	Albania, Croatia

Table 2 - Three NATO Expansions: The Table illustrates the three NATO expansions with the nations accessed between 1999 and 2015.

Table 2 highlights that all of the cases have a period that overlaps with at least one NATO expansion. While my research does not aim to critique NATO expansion by covering a period that encapsulates multiple enlargements, the study indirectly evaluates the impact of the alliance's expansion. KFOR demonstrates an air campaign that morphed into peace enforcement missions with a ground component that continues today. The alliance invoking Article 5 led to the creation of ISAF. While initially focused on rebuilding Kabul, ISAF became an extended ground mission

³⁰ NATO. 2019c. Operations and Missions: Past and Present. In *NATO Encyclopedia*, edited by Public Relations. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. P. 423 – 445.

with evolving objectives over the campaign to stabilize the Afghanistan region. NTM-I highlights how conflict materializes and subsides in the alliance. NTM-I is the result of disagreements within the organization on the validity of the United States' desire to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in the wake of 9/11. The case demonstrates how the institution resists its most vital member's wishes. OPER highlights a new mission NATO pursued during the 21st Century, out-of-area humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Lastly, OUP represents a situation that runs counter to Hegemonic Power theory, where the United Kingdom and France took the lead on the operation (Haesebrouck 2017).³¹

To bolster the case study analysis, I perform a large-N regression evaluation of Diplomatic and Issue Embeddedness. Using a multimethod approach leverages each process's strengths to provide a comprehensive assessment of Embeddedness Theory (Seawright 2016).³² The regression analysis has three parts. The first two parts test the impact of Diplomatic and issue Embeddedness individually. Afterward, I compare the qualitative and quantitative findings of the four NATO categories that impact consensus. The categories are the result of the interaction of the Diplomatic and Issue Embeddedness. The comprehensive research design solidifies Embeddedness Theory's durability and application by matching qualitative concept design with quantitative results.

³¹ Haesebrouck, Tim. 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (10): 2235-2261. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715626248>. P.2251.

³² Seawright, Jason. 2016. *Multi-Method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Tools*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. P. 55-70.

Goals of Research

Security concerns have never been more complex as NATO moves deeper into the 21st Century. The transatlantic alliance's longevity is astonishing when the accepted foreign policy wisdom assumes nations have constantly shifting interests, not friends. Despite multiple scholars and policymakers calling for its death, NATO continues to live. At 72 years old, if NATO was a person, she could withdraw full benefits from social security, access her retirement accounts without penalty, and be eligible for Medicare. Like people in their more advanced years, NATO has quirks that are hard to understand, habits that are hard to break, and must focus on diet and exercise to ensure she continues to live a long and prosperous life. A healthy meal for NATO starts with understanding the selection and development of an out-of-area activity. NATO's physique depends on working on its formal and informal decision-making processes.

Since the Cold War's conclusion, scholars have been predicting NATO's demise, yet she lives on because she is the embodiment of mutual support. While countries have individual interests, NATO anchors itself in providing the benefit of collective defense through Article 5, which is invaluable for maintaining national sovereignty. Being assured that 29 allies will come to your defense is valuable for every country in the alliance. However, to keep the institution vibrant, member states have to reflect on the ever-changing security environment.

Two seismic shifts have rocked the alliance directly and indirectly since 1 January 2016. The unquestioned anchor of the organization, the United States, called the institution out-of-date and threatened to flatline its heartbeat by pulling the cord that holds the organization together. Although he later walked his obsolete statement back, President Trump's frustration illustrates a boiling point within the United States' defense apparatus. Since its inception, scholars have opined

about the disproportionate burden the United States bears for the other allies. Therefore, the discussion is not new. However, the commander and chief expressing disparaging rhetoric about the alliance and doubling down when confronted is novel. President Trump's frustration with the partnership between the United States and its European allies illustrates why looking at how NATO decides to take action is essential now more than ever.

Indirectly, the United Kingdom deciding to leave the EU with "Brexit" in June of 2016 increases NATO's relevance to transatlantic security. The United Kingdom will join Norway and Turkey as nations with notable militaries outside of the EU but inside NATO. The decision does not immediately impact the alliance but indirectly changes the relationship between the EU and NATO. With the two most significant contributors to NATO's military expenditures outside of the EU, power dynamics will shift towards one of three outcomes: status quo, problematic, or promising. If the British reorient their national interests towards making NATO the preferred European security provider, it could stifle the German and French desire for an independent European security apparatus. A clash between NATO and the EU for institutional survival and supremacy would undoubtedly become detrimental to the region. Conversely, the two organizations could find an equitable division of labor where the EU would bolster its defense efforts across the continent and discover a partnership agreement that NATO would accept (Cladi and Locatelli 2020).³³ European security and stability are at a crossroads because the expectations for how institutions should operate are changing due to domestic pressures from some of the region's most powerful nations.

³³ Cladi, Lorenzo, and Andrea Locatelli. 2020. "Keep Calm and Carry On (Differently): NATO and CSDP after Brexit." *Global Policy* 11 (1): 5-14. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12747>. P. 5, P. 11.

Like recent empty-nesters, NATO allies are in a marriage with a new set of challenges. Despite a long history of success, member nations must re-examine their relationship with the institution and remember the benefits of maintaining mutual support. The density of security challenges and intricacies of future problems like space, the arctic, renewed Russian aggression, China's rise, cyber warfare, and hybrid warfare require a framework where allies can clearly understand NATO's decision-making process. By examining the first significant shift NATO made post-Cold War, sending NATO resources out-of-area, Embeddedness Theory provides expectations for future pitfalls in the allies' relationship.

CHAPTER 2: THEORY

“Whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is, then, a matter not of principle but of expediency.”

Hans J. Morgenthau
Politics Among Nations, 1960

“NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists argue that NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe. NATO cannot remain as it was during the Cold War.”

John Mearsheimer
The False Promise of International Institutions, 1995

“If NATO were simply a balancing alliance, the organization would be in an advanced stage of decay. It is NATO’s broader political function - binding the democracies together and reinforcing political community - that explains its remarkable durability.”

John Ikenberry
The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos, 1996

Typically, scholars analyze NATO through one of three lenses. As an umbrella organization that encapsulates the allied countries' desire to promote western democratic norms (Sloan 2016).³⁴ As a bureaucracy with formal institutions and rules with weak independent power and agency that adapts to fit its members' needs while converging preferences (Wallander 2000; Johnston 2019).³⁵ As a tool, each member state uses to accomplish its foreign policy objectives (M. Henke 2019; Lake 2009; Mearsheimer 1994).³⁶ According to a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all three characterizations are interchangeable and can apply simultaneously depending on the context.³⁷

A New Definition of NATO Explained

To analyze how the organization makes decisions, I define NATO as a collection of countries with shared values that manage a military alliance through consensus and allow each ally to contribute to an action plan within its maximal domestic political constraints.

Despite historical debates on the quality of representative government in certain allied countries, NATO is a collection of democracies. In the preamble of the North Atlantic treaty, NATO's founding document, each nation affirms its desire and determination to safeguard the principles of freedom, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

³⁴ Sloan, Stanley. 2016. *Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. P.9.

³⁵ Wallander, Celeste. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War." *International Organization* 54 (4): 705-735. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343>. P. 705-6.

Johnston, Seth. 2019. "NATO's Lessons From Afghanistan." *Parameters* 49 (3): 11-26. <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan>.

³⁶ Lake, David. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. P. 123.

Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078>. P. 47.

³⁷ Personal interview with a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2021.

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security (NATO 1949).³⁸

When joining NATO, each country agrees to adhere to the UN Charter's principles, safeguard democratic ideals, and promote the North Atlantic region's stability. The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty lays out the organization's operating guidance. NATO is first a foremost a group of democracies. Next, NATO is a military alliance founded on the concept of collective defense. Lastly, NATO is an organization that provides a mechanism for nations to discover common ground and advance the collective's political-military objectives in the transatlantic region. The democratic ideals which preface the military requirements provide an ethos of collective action through peaceful political debate internally, and mutual support to repeal would be external enemies.

The core of NATO as a military alliance is collective defense through Article 5. Under Article 5, each member agrees to view an armed attack against one as an attack against all. The collective pledges to support the attacked ally via whatever actions it deems necessary, including the use of force.

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack them all and consequently they agree

³⁸ NATO. 1949. "The North Atlantic Treaty." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security (NATO 1949).³⁹

The framers did not want to trigger an automatic military response if Allies invoked Article 5. George Kennan, father of the containment doctrine but a skeptic about the treaty's military dimension, shifted the original language to reflect the institution's defensive posture. Instead of the allies taking "forthwith such military or other action ... as may be necessary," Kennan finessed the final verbiage "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." The change reflects the goal of the alliance to provide individual members the ability to mold their response to an attack according to their respective national interests (Kaplan 2004).⁴⁰

Additionally, treaty designers limited the scope of Article 5. Throughout the Cold War, NATO developed a social norm where out-of-area military interventions were secondary to Article 5 concerns (Kitchen 2010).⁴¹ During the Cold War, the alliance maintained a normative hierarchy where the transatlantic region's protection was primary and all other areas secondary. NATO defines where members should and should not expect collective defense through Article 6 of the Washington Treaty.

³⁹ NATO. 1949. "The North Atlantic Treaty." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁴⁰ Kaplan, Lawrence. 2004. *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. P. 3.

⁴¹ Kitchen, Veronica. 2010. "NATO's out-of-area norm from Suez to Afghanistan." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 8 (2): 105-17. P.105-9.

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

On the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France², on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer (NATO 1949).⁴²

France could not persuade NATO to support its intervention in Egypt during the 1956 Suez crisis. Similarly, the United States could not convince NATO Allies to support its desire to curtail communism via the Vietnam war. Throughout the Cold War, NATO refused to insert itself in out-of-area operations that did not directly protect the European and North American continents from direct Soviet threats. In 1949, all NATO members understood the warning of “an armed attack,” and Article 5’s collective defense design described the Soviet land threat to Western European nations. The need for western allies on both sides of the Atlantic to unite was clear and easy to comprehend (Goldgeier 2010).⁴³

Article 5 deftly balances collective defense with national sovereignty. Although Article 5 considers an attack on one member to be an attack on all members, each member is required only to take “such action as it deems necessary.” The provision essentially ensures that the use of force is never mandatory, and each nation has autonomy over how it supports the alliance’s response (I. Daalder and Goldgeier 2006).⁴⁴

⁴² NATO. 1949. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁴³ Goldgeier, James. 2010. *The Future of NATO*. (Council on Foreign Relations). <https://www.cfr.org/report/future-nato>. P.6-7.

⁴⁴ Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier. 2006. “Global NATO.” *Foreign Affairs* 85 (5): 105-13. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20032073>. P.112-3.

Initially, the clear and present danger of a third World War and confrontation with the Soviet Union provided the impetus for Article 5. Even though the Cold War ended, Article 5 still provides the basis for maintaining the military command structure, day-to-day political consultation, and consistent strategic planning that make NATO a unique facilitator of defense cooperation amongst member states (Sloan 2016).⁴⁵ The concentration of policy and infrastructure around security follows Escott Reid, a Canadian diplomat and treaty framer, assertion that everything in the treaty is subordinate to Article 5 (Kaplan 2004).⁴⁶ As one former senior Italian officer explained, Article 5 provides the core purpose and enduring soul of NATO, which can be summed up in one phrase: “I’ve got your back.”⁴⁷

The commitment to consultation highlights the consensus requirement, one of the organization’s greatest strengths and weaknesses. The consensus rule exemplifies the Three Musketeers spirit that NATO echoes: “One for all, and all for one.” NATO decisions are consequential because they express the collective will of the transatlantic region’s governments. By offering each country the option to veto any significant policy, NATO allows each ally to protect its national sovereignty (Michel 2014).⁴⁸ Although each country has a veto, NATO does not require an affirmative vote because it uses silence procedures.

The silence procedure is an institutional norm used throughout NATO that allows an ally to voice concern about a proposal anonymously or consent to the community’s will within a specified time. The North Atlantic Treaty never established a voting procedure but, the “all for one and one for all” spirit of Article 5 led to the institution adopting a consensus model. The subtle

⁴⁵ Sloan, Stanley. 2016. *Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. P.11.

⁴⁶ Kaplan, Lawrence. 2004. *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. P. 3-4.

⁴⁷ Interview conducted on 1 March 2021.

⁴⁸ Michel, Leo. 2014. *NATO Decision-Making: The Consensus Rule Endures Despite Challenges*. Edited by Sebastian Mayer. *NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. P.109.

difference between a decision-making method that allows a nation to acquiesce (despite its public or private reservations) and a method that obligates a state to cast an official vote gives countries a save face feature, which enhances the possibility of consensus. Additionally, it minimizes direct conflict between countries by forcing nations to focus on policy concerns and voicing the way forward.

Furthermore, using the silence procedure has direct and indirect administrative consequences. Generally, NATO starts the silence procedure in one of two ways. One, the Secretary-General (leader of the NAC), Military Committee Chairman (Leader of MC), or chairperson of a committee passes a nation's formal written proposal to all delegations with a specified deadline to respond. Two, the staff reporting to the Secretary-General, Military Committee Chairman, or chairperson of a committee pass draft text to and ask for a formal response from each national representative. If no one objects, then the representative body ratifies the proposal.

Typically, nations have a minimum of 24 hours to respond because each ally has different constraints on their use of political and military resources. Depending on the proposal, NATO delegations have to receive approval from their head of state or legislature to see if their nation will approve or deny the policy. For example, Norway and Denmark do not allow peacetime stationing of foreign troops without approval from parliament. Germany requires a simple parliamentary majority to approve military deployments outside Germany. Hungary's constitution requires a two-thirds majority vote to station military troops outside of its borders. If any ally breaks silence and objects, the proposal is customarily referred back to the relevant body for further discussion. In most cases, the ally that breaks silence will offer additional information, alternative wording, or some rationale for its objection, but it is not obligated to do so. If, after

multiple rounds, no agreement can be made, the issue could be tabled indefinitely or canceled (Michel 2014).⁴⁹

The silence procedure has two main benefits. First, it gives space to the Secretary-General to influence the institution formally and informally. Second, it provides powerful nations an opportunity to create side deals. The Secretary-General aids consensus-building by having informal discussions at NATO headquarters with individual allies who express concerns about a particular policy. Additionally, he uses formal written communication to set the organization's political vision. The formal proposal and national objections set the table for informal negotiations between governments advocating and objecting to a policy. As with any international political body, countries make formal or informal side-payments to help move a course of action forward (Mayer 1992).⁵⁰ The silence procedure provides NATO members sufficient plausible deniability around the practice of trading resources for political gain.

A hidden detriment of the silence procedure and consensus are their ability to broaden a bilateral struggle between allies into a debilitating NATO problem. For example, during the rising tensions between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus from 1974 to 1980, the consensus rule made a deteriorating situation worse because representatives from both delegations used NATO rules to inflict pain on each other. Greece withdrew from the MC after NATO refused to take action in its defense of Cyprus from the Turks in 1974. From 1977 on, Turkey used its veto to block Greece's reentry into the alliance's military wing. As a result, the disagreement between Greece and Turkey defeated several plans on Cold War doctrine put forward by NATO's military and civilian

⁴⁹ Michel, Leo. 2014. *NATO Decision-Making: The Consensus Rule Endures Despite Challenges*. Edited by Sebastian Mayer. *NATO's Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. P.108-12.

⁵⁰ Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments." *International Organization* 46 (4): 793-818. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706875>. P. 793-4.

leadership. The alliance could not pass meaningful military policy until the deadlock broke in 1980 when the Turkish government changed hands due to a military coup (R. Krebs 1999).⁵¹

While consensus and the silence procedure are cumbersome, they have not fully paralyzed the institution. In a positive light, they facilitate agreement amongst allies that respect everyone's national sovereignty. On the other hand, consensus can hold the organization hostage by allowing one specialized anxiety to consume regional security. Overall, NATO giving everyone a veto maintains the institution's essence where all nations are necessary to provide regional security. The choice to enact that spirit via consensus and not unanimity underlines political leaders' appreciation that international policy is delicate. Unanimity requires a public affirmative vote tying government representatives to the policy's outcome. Conversely, NATO's style of consensus allows officials to take an assertive, complementary, passive, or obstinate role in the proposal's passing. The optionality provides each country the requisite political cover on contentious issues.

As a set of democracies, each national delegation at NATO is a reflection of its citizenry. NATO continues because it can facilitate multilateral agreements that allow each nation to contribute to regional security while simultaneously accounting for domestic sensitivities. As the definition of defense becomes more complex, having a format that enables each government to exercise self-determination for how it plans to contribute to regional security is increasingly important. Government type and control of the military are crucial to how a nation supports a NATO policy. For example, caveats on national militaries vary predictably according to political institutions in each NATO member's constitution. Countries with coalition governments are likely

⁵¹ Krebs, Ronald. 1999. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." *International Organization* 53 (2): 343-77. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550904>. P.365 – 9.

to limit their military participation in any activity. Conversely, allies with presidential or majoritarian parliamentary governments tend, on average, to have fewer caveats, but specific caveats depend on the background of key decision-makers in those countries (Auerswald and Saideman 2012).⁵²

In addition to government type, politicians have a healthy fear of elections. At times, governing parties fear or seek out opportunities to use force because of their party's domestic political standing. Studies building on democratic peace theory expect governments to be more constrained in their foreign policy behavior if elections are imminent. In contrast, diversionary views of war expect national leaders to be more likely to resort to the use of force at the end of an electoral cycle (Haesebrouck 2017).⁵³ Lastly, military posture impacts the ways a NATO Ally can participate. For example, Iceland has no standing military of its own. Luxembourg's history as a neutral state in Europe allows it to be the representative nation for the only NATO-owned military asset, a fleet of Airborne Warning and Control system planes (AWACS) (Haftendorn 2011).⁵⁴ Therefore, states with more muscular militaries should be more forward-leaning with the use of force and vice-a-versa.

Overall, NATO's integrated military and political structure allows for the collective to make regional policy and execute plans in a way that does not directly contradict another allied member's interest. The ability to ensure no nation directly or indirectly harms another in the alliance is paramount for NATO's durability.

⁵² Auerswald, David, and Stephen Saideman. 2012. "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions Upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan1." *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1): 67-84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41409823>. P. 67.

⁵³ Haesebrouck, Tim. 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (10): 2235-2261. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715626248>. P. 2242.

⁵⁴ Haftendorn, Helga. 2011. "NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a cold war relic in a peaceful region now faced with non-military challenges?" *European Security* 20 (3): 337-361. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2011.608352>. P. 343.

A Theory on How NATO Decides

NATO is an Intermediate Group

When evaluating NATO's decision-making process, scholars use the framework articulated by Mancur Olson in *The Logic of Collective Action*. Olson's seminal work explains there are three types of groups and various types of goods. The size and influence of members dictate the kind of groups. The ability to isolate access or limit usage defines a type of good. Pinpointing the kind of good NATO provides is problematic because it depends on the issue and which allies it affects. However, defining NATO's group type is simple. According to Olson's definitions, NATO is an intermediate group.

Classifying group type creates parameters for examining NATO's decision-making process. Olson defines three kinds of groups latent, intermediate, and privileged. A latent group is a large and unorganized group that requires a sophisticated organization to advance collective actions and provide a public good (Olson 1965).⁵⁵ In a latent group, no single member has the incentive nor ability to provide the public good on his/her own. Therefore, without an apparatus that compels members to act, the public good never materializes. An intermediate group is a collection of individuals where no one member has enough of an incentive to provide the public good on his/her own but, some members' contributions are sizable enough to make a noticeable

⁵⁵ Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 50-3.

impact (Olson 1965).⁵⁶ A privileged group is a collection of entities where at least one member has a personal benefit that exceeds the cost of providing the good for all members. As a result, in the absence of collective desire, the member who highly values the goodwill take on the burden by herself (Congleton 2015; Olson 1965).⁵⁷ Intermediate groups require an organization with low monitoring and enforcement costs to advance the collective's interests (Congleton 2015).⁵⁸ Additionally, two or more members must act simultaneously or in tacit coordination before a collective good can be obtained (Olson 1965; Congleton 2015).⁵⁹

NATO's decision-making process does not follow latent or privileged group expectations. NATO is not a latent group because the organization has reached consensus multiple times post-Cold War despite expanding membership and divergent preferences between members. As NATO became larger, Olson would expect policymaking to be increasingly tricky or impossible. Despite growing from 16 to 30 nations in the 21st Century, NATO has reached an agreement on a wide variety of activities. Passing initiatives to address out-of-area activities, maritime operations, internal capacity building, and cyber warfare proves NATO is not too big to reach consensus.

NATO does not follow Olson's expectations for a privileged group because it is impossible and illogical for a nation to commandeer the organization due to the institution's rules, norms, and values. For example, if NATO operated as a privileged group, the United States would act with autonomy under the NATO banner. In reality, if a nation takes on the burden of activity, it desires the benefits of sovereignty and being a dominant state that dictates terms to subordinates.

⁵⁶ Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 46-50.

⁵⁷ Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 57-60.

⁵⁸ Congleton, Roger D. 2015. "The Logic of Collective Action and beyond." *Public Choice* 164 (3-4): 217-234. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0266-7>. P. 217-9.

⁵⁹ Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 46.

Therefore, when the United States wants autonomy over a security activity, it creates a coalition of the willing or ad hoc multinational partnership.

NATO follows Olson's expectations for an intermediate group because it requires coordination between members with the essential resources to pass policy and make decisions. No nation has an incentive to act unilaterally on behalf of the alliance. Therefore, no single member has sufficient private interests to advance the other 29 nations' interests on its own. Traditionally, intermediate groups require a formal organization where two or more members must coordinate to advance shared interests. NATO's consistent interactions and consensus necessitate a subset of private interests to merge and convince the organization to take mutually beneficial action. For a multilateral operation to occur, the value of the collective good (reaching consensus) is not a sufficient inducement. Instead, purely private incentives must themselves induce an ad hoc coalition to take action (Lepgold 1998).⁶⁰ NATO's flexible regulations create minimal enforcement and monitoring mechanisms that make the space for international policymaking.

Embeddedness Theory

The Framework for How NATO Decides

⁶⁰ Lepgold, Joseph. 1998. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23 (1): 78-106. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P. 87.

Originally, a concept developed through the examination of social theory in institutions, embeddedness analyzes macro-level questions when markets and hierarchies are at play (Granovetter 1985).⁶¹ Embeddedness Theory explains NATO decides to act when an issue has overlapping interests with the most powerful members, influential allies design a plan of action, the collective gains sufficient political will, and all members work together to achieve consensus. Without all four, NATO falls short of making a decision.

Contrary to predictions made by Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories, the interaction of realism and institutionalism create a path towards successful collective action. For NATO to successfully select, develop, and decide to pass a policy, the most powerful actors must collaborate and coordinate efforts to navigate the organization's rules, regulations, and norms to overcome bureaucratic pitfalls.

The Four Powerful NATO Allies – The Quad

Informally known as “The Quad,” the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are the four most influential members of the alliance. In NATO circles, there is a sentiment that votes are weighted, not counted. Nations with the requisite resources needed to implement policy significantly influence shaping a consensus within the alliance (Johnston 2017).⁶² According to multiple current and former NATO officials, the alliance measures impact through three broad lenses: capabilities, cash, and contributions (Stoltenberg 2017).⁶³ Capabilities refer to the military

⁶¹ Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (3): 481-510. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/2780199>. P. 507.

⁶² Johnston, Seth. 2017. *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance*. JHU Press. Chapter 3.

⁶³ Interview with multiple NATO officials past and present between 1 Feb 2021 – 20 March 2021.

options a nation can provide to an operation. Cash is the military expenditure, military research and development (R&D), and the economic power a country yields. Lastly, contributions are how an ally supports NATO activities. The Quad maintains the top four positions for NATO's military expenditure and total gross domestic product (GDP), making them the power brokers within the alliance (World-Bank 2020).⁶⁴

The United States maintains the most powerful military and most prosperous economy with a substantial gap between its allies. Throughout the post-Cold War era, the United States has outspent NATO Allies on military R&D and provides a disproportionate number of essential military resources like tankers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and secure communications (Goulden 1996; Layne 2000a; Ringsmose 2010).⁶⁵ Additionally, the United States has a significant political influence with over 3,200 bilateral agreements and 192 embassies around the world (Kavanagh 2014).⁶⁶ The United States retains positional power on the security arm of NATO. The Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces (SACEUR), the military general responsible for all NATO military operations, has only been a United States military general. Lastly, the United States maintains defense commitments with nearly 50 nations worldwide (Cook 2013).⁶⁷ As many NATO officials explain, without the United States' support,

Stoltenberg, Jens, 2017, "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers," https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_145385.htm.

⁶⁴ World-Bank. 2020. "World Bank Datasets." The World Bank. Accessed February 1, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/>. 2016 Data.

⁶⁵ Goulden, John. 1996. "NATO approaching two summits: The UK perspective." *The RUSI Journal* 141 (6): 29-32. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849608446089>. P. 30-2.

Layne, Christopher. 2000. "US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 23 (3): 59-91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390008437800>. P. 77-8.

Ringsmose, Jens. 2010. "NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change After the Cold War." *Contemporary Security Policy* 31 (2): 319-338. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2010.491391>. P. 327-8.

⁶⁶ Kavanagh, Jennifer. 2014. *U.S. Security-Related Agreements in Force Since 1955*. RAND Corporation (Santa Monica). https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR736.html. P. 31.

⁶⁷ Cook, James. 2013. "Military Alliances in the 21st Century: Still Relevant after All These Years?" *Orbis* 57 (4): 559-73. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.08.004>. P. 560.

no policy will materialize.⁶⁸ Therefore, the United States occupies the *primus inter pares* (first amongst equals) position within NATO (Wolff 2000; Sperling and Webber 2019).⁶⁹

The United Kingdom is influential because they are the United States' closest military ally, high military expenditure (Biscop 2012).⁷⁰ As a nuclear power and one of the few members that consistently meet the 2% of GDP requirement, the United Kingdom has always advocated NATO's preeminence as the European security provider. Despite pressure from European nations to support the EU, United Kingdom sees NATO as an asset to European security and the best method to maintain the United States presence in the region (Martill and Sus 2018).⁷¹ Even though it is a relatively smaller country, the United Kingdom ranks fifth in total population, ninth in military size, second in military expenditure, and third in total gross GDP (World-Bank 2020).⁷²

France is the third nuclear power in the alliance and uses its influence to strengthen the European continent. As the Cold War ended, France advocated for an independent European security apparatus. While the dream of an autonomous European defense institution never materialized, post-Cold War France has gradually used NATO as a toolbox to advance its foreign policy objectives militarily and politically.

Although officially out of NATO's military structure from 1966 – 2009, France maintained its political position in the NAC. In 1992, as NATO considered its first out-of-area crisis response operation, the alliance broke from tradition. Typically, during the Cold War, the alliance started military planning in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). However, to start a new relationship

⁶⁸ Interview with multiple NATO officials past and present 1 Feb 2021 – 18 March 2021.

⁶⁹ Wolff, Stefan. 2000. "Coincidence or Commonality of Interests? German and American Views on NATO Enlargement." *International Studies Review* 2 (3): 103-11. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00218>. P. 111.

Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. 2019. "Trump's foreign policy and NATO: Exit and voice." *Review of International Studies* 45 (3): 511-526. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210519000123>. P. 521.

⁷⁰Biscop, Sven. 2012. "The UK and European Defense: Leading or Leaving?" *International Affairs* 88 (6): 1297-1313. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23324915>. P.1297.

⁷¹ Martill, Benjamin, and Monika Sus. 2018. "Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or 'French Connection'?" *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20 (4): 846-63. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118796979>. P. 856-7.

⁷² World-Bank. 2020. "World Bank Datasets." The World Bank. Accessed February 1, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/>. 2016 data..

with Paris, allies agreed to discuss the potential air surveillance mission in the NAC. The successful discussion led to a new precedent for NATO's significant military actions. France unofficially reintegrated into NATO's military apparatus in 1996 after Europe had to lean on NATO to solve the Bosnian crisis (Ghez and Larrabee 2009).⁷³

France has a pragmatic view of NATO, where its function is twofold. First, it is a defense and deterrence provider, which the French use when it suits their interests. Second, NATO is a political institution that facilitates negotiations on global affairs between allies (Rynning 2017).⁷⁴ Confirming its position as an influential ally, France quickly obtained multiple high-level positions in NATO while maintaining its roles in the EU when they officially rejoined NATO's military structure in 2009 (Irondelle and Mérand 2010).⁷⁵ Despite being outside of the military structure for over 40 years, France was a meaningful part of the planning and execution of NATO's operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Afghanistan (Michel 2014).⁷⁶ Overall within NATO, the French spend the third most on national defense, maintain the fourth largest military, and have the fourth-largest total GDP.

While not a nuclear power, Germany has significant sway on the institution because of its economic prowess and geography. As the second-largest economy in the alliance, Berlin enjoys an influential policy position because it embeds itself into the institution. German unification brought a fear of a German resurgence, and therefore, the transatlantic alliance offered Germany full accession into NATO. Germans view the combination of political-military dialogue with NATO and economic-trade policy in the EU as an opportunity to build European stability through

⁷³ Ghez, Jeremy, and Stephen Larrabee. 2009. "France and NATO." *Survival* 51 (2): 77-90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330902860819>. P. 77-9.

⁷⁴ Rynning, Sten. 2017. "The Divide: France, Germany and Political NATO." *International Affairs* 93 (2): 267-89. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iw060>. P. 267-8 and 284-6.

⁷⁵ Irondelle, Bastien, and Frédéric Mérand. 2010. "France's return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?" *European Security* 19 (1): 29-43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.499362>. P.

⁷⁶ Michel, Leo. 2014. *NATO Decision-Making: The Consensus Rule Endures Despite Challenges*. Edited by Sebastian Mayer. *NATO's Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 112.

integration. Throughout the 1990s, Germany used its political capital to push for an expansion of NATO membership eastward to begin the process of creating a lasting European peace throughout the continent. With the accessions of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, President George H.W. Bush's vision of a whole and free Europe became a reality. The expansion started the evolution of NATO from a defensive alliance into a security provider (Keller 2012).⁷⁷ By successfully lobbying the organization to move the eastern front of NATO from its border to central Europe, Germany found a new role as an influential legislator in the alliance.

German politicians use NATO to eliminate the 20th-century balance of power theories that led to the two world wars and influence European security in a non-threatening manner. NATO provides a forum for transatlantic political coordination. Germany sees NATO as a tool to help Europeans establish multilateral dialogue, collaboration, integration, and trust through political and military means (Voigt 2019; Keller 2012).⁷⁸ Additionally, Germany sees NATO as a way to maintain its leadership position in Europe while not threatening other European countries' interests. Germany uses its assets to support NATO's development endeavors while pushing for more integration of EU forces through its relationship with the French. By advocating for European legitimacy and the security concerns that coincide with Belgium, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, and Poland, Germany functions as a security leader for central and eastern Europe (Overhaus 2004).⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Keller, Patrick. 2012. "Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally." *Survival* 54 (3): 95-110. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2012.690985>. P. 95-9.

⁷⁸ Voigt, Karsten. 2019. *NATO Enlargment: Perspective of a Germany Politician*. Edited by Daniel Hamilton and Kristina Spohr. *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P. 235-50.

⁷⁹ Overhaus, Marco. 2004. "In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy." *German Politics* 13 (4): 551-68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0964400042000343137>. P. 562-3.

Overlapping Security Interests in the Quad

NATO's issue selection process starts when the Quad has a shared set of interests. The intersection of American, British, French, and German security concerns creates a vision for what four of the world's great military powers can accomplish together. Without the Quad having a like-minded approach, there is no coherent strategy that leads to NATO coming together because each nation has the resources to block the others from achieving consensus. The organization's formal and informal rules provide each member of the Quad an opportunity to be obstinate as an individual nation or gather support for its cause. However, when there is an agreement between the four, there is an opportunity for realist preferences to merge and find an avenue to use NATO as a mutually beneficial institution.

Security interests break down into three broad areas: geography, domestic salience, and military danger level. Using Stephan Walt's Balance-of-Threat theory, geographic proximity can create an alliance because conflicts and issues nearby pose a greater threat than those far away (Priess 1996).⁸⁰ While the term proximity is subjective given post-Cold War technology, an issue's location can significantly impact the Quad sharing the same threat perception.

During international negotiations, often, the most arduous bargaining is not between nations but within them. The reason is simple: international agreements, no matter how much in the "national interest," inevitably have differential effects on factional concerns (Mayer 1992).⁸¹ The domestic population has a meaningful impact on the salience of an issue for the Quad. Given their prominence on the world's stage and within NATO, political leaders in the United States,

⁸⁰ Priess, David. 1996. "Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study." *Security Studies* 5 (4): 143-71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429291>. P. 148-9.

⁸¹ Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments." *International Organization* 46 (4): 793-818. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706875>. P. 793.

United Kingdom, France, and Germany fear suffering at the polls for resorting to the use of force. As robust democracies with highly competitive elections, national leaders do not want to put their military or resources in harm's way unnecessarily. Domestic constituents tend to hold current politicians in power responsible for a foreign policy decision (L. Williams 2013).⁸² Therefore, as nations that promote stability, democratic peace theory expects politicians in leadership roles in Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris to constrain their foreign policy behavior when election dates are upcoming (Haesebrouck 2017).⁸³

Determining risk tolerance is fundamental to finding overlapping interests. After taking an internal cost-benefit analysis where foreign policy leaders weigh the threat level with military burden, some Quad members may be unwilling to use its resources. For example, German politicians push back on the idea of making NATO a global alliance because of limited resources and low threat perception (Keller 2012; Overhaus 2004). Therefore, the Germans would resist any dangerous mission outside of an Article 5 response.

Even though the Cold-War shifted how NATO exercises deterrence and pursues transatlantic security, the United States still bears a significant burden militarily. Between 2001-2010, the United States spent 13% of its defense budget on R&D while the NATO Allies spent a negligible amount (Sandler and Shimizu 2014).⁸⁴ If the mission calls for dynamic actions, where military members need to have decentralized decision-making authority, the United States may forgo NATO for a coalition of the willing. For example, in 1993, the United States grew frustrated with European allies' bureaucratic processes for using force. The United Nations and NATO had

⁸² Williams, Laron. 2013. "Flexible Election Timing and International Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (3): 449-61. <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12054>. P. 459.

⁸³ Haesebrouck, Tim. 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (10): 2235-2261. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715626248>. P. 2241-3.

⁸⁴ Sandler, Todd, and Hirofumi Shimizu. 2014. "NATO Burden Sharing 1999-2010." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (1): 43-60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00192.x>. P.44.

a "dual-key" arrangement for the use of force in Bosnia. The dual-key policy required that UN and NATO officials approve military targets and action before execution (Hendrickson 2005).⁸⁵ Having to navigate two complex bureaucracies made decisive action difficult and affected mission effectiveness from the United States' perspective.

Overall, location, national popularity, and military needs dictate if the Quad can find common ground and develop like-minds to select a project. The melding of the interests establishes a mechanism called Issue Embeddedness. Issue Embeddedness is the distance a NATO Ally is from the intersection of the Quad's preferences. Therefore, if the Quad cannot find common ground, there is no community matter that the NATO framework can address because consensus is impossible. Issue Embeddedness combines Waltz's neorealism and Lake's hierarchy in an international system with Wallander and Johnston's explanations of the firm but pliable institutions within NATO. Each member of the Quad has choices to reach its foreign policy goals and have a disproportionate amount of power within NATO. Therefore, using a concept like embeddedness, which accounts for persuasive actors choosing to find common ground, is necessary when looking at how issues arrive at Brussels and Mons.

Principals Create a Zone of Possible Agreement

To increase the chances of reaching consensus, the Quad uses its resources to get support from influential allies uniquely connected to their overlapping interests. The Quad targets at least two

⁸⁵ Hendrickson, Ryan. 2005. "Crossing the Rubicon" In "NATO Review Magazine." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/history.html>.

nations that possess a historical connection to the issue and resources that facilitate a path towards consensus and operational success.

Together, the Quad plus two, create a group I call the Principals. The Principals are the leading voices that turn the Quad's project into a potential NATO plan of action. Together they create NATO's zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). ZOPA is a negotiations term which describes the bargaining set of possible outcomes that parties could agree (Mayer 1992; Raiffa, Richardson, and Metcalfe 2002).⁸⁶ Although not the final agreement, the ZOPA creates the outline that moves the alliance towards achieving consensus.

The Quad includes at least two other nations in the ZOPA process for strategic reasons, politically and militarily. By expanding the number of stakeholders, the Quad increases its opportunity to overcome friction through a more comprehensive policy and a larger war chest for side payments. If an issue does not connect or harms the remaining allies, they could become impediments to consensus. Suppose an ally is lukewarm or damaged by a proposed policy. In either case, it is in their interest to maintain the status quo because their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is stronger than the proposed NATO action (Ahlert and Sträter 2016).⁸⁷ For some nations within NATO, being a roadblock to policy is advantageous because NATO does not have a removal mechanism. Therefore, a pessimist would express that a selfish country has the best of both worlds. The guaranteed support from the world's strongest military

⁸⁶ Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments." *International Organization* 46 (4): 793-818. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706875>. P. 799.

Raiffa, Howard, John Richardson, and David Metcalfe. 2002. *Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. P.105-11.

⁸⁷ Ahlert, Marlies, and Katharina Friederike Sträter. 2016. "Refining Raiffa – Aspiration Adaptation within the Zone of Possible Agreements." *German Economic Review* 17 (3): 298-315. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12096>. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12096>. P.302-4.

alliance and the ability to ensure every action benefits its domestic interest with no negative recourse (R. Krebs 1999).⁸⁸

To overcome perverse actions, having the Principals design the ZOPA makes the process more transparent and makes space for a cooperative game between a wide swath of stakeholders. When actions threaten to create winners and losers within NATO, potential winners need to compensate potential losers to incentivize participation. By sharing power, the Quad builds trust with the rest of the alliance and opens doors for direct and indirect side payments. The Principals have a higher likelihood of identifying and linking side-issues than the Quad because of increased network effects (Mayer 1992).⁸⁹ Increasing side-payment opportunities helps reopen portions of the bargaining set blocked by domestic factions and perverse players who hold consensus hostage for national gain.

Militarily, opening ownership of strategic objectives to a broader set of countries allows the Quad to maximize the alliance's resources. With Principals having buy-in, NATO has a greater chance of developing unified military objectives with overlapping interests for the entire alliance. Overall, the ZOPA process looks to lessen the diplomatic and operational burden on the Quad by enlisting the help of a cohort of inspired nations willing to risk their national assets. Additionally, domestic constituents give greater support to a foreign policy action when taking place under multilateral coalitions (Tago and Maki 2014).⁹⁰

Navigating the arctic, confronting terrorism in the Middle East, and dismantling piracy in the Mediterranean are examples of international issues that would lead the Quad to look to NATO

⁸⁸ Krebs, Ronald. 1999. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." *International Organization* 53 (2): 343-77. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550904>. P.369-70.

⁸⁹ Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side-Payments." *International Organization* 46 (4): 793-818. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706875>. P. 806-7.

⁹⁰ Tago, Atsushi, and Ikeda Maki. 2014. "Winning over Foreign Domestic Support for Use of Force: Power of Diplomatic and Operational Multilateralism." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 14 (2): 303-24. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcu003>. P. 308-309.

for a solution. Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and Canada would be candidates to join the Principal group for issues around the Arctic Ocean because of their location and domestic population's interest in a case that affects their backyards. Turkey would be a natural first stop to address terrorism in the Middle East because it is the NATO Ally closest to the region with one of the four strongest militaries. Additionally, Spain's connection to international terrorism is pertinent after the 2004 Madrid train bombing. Lastly, all of the allies that directly border the Mediterranean would be ideal Principals to draft strategic objectives for an action plan because the issue directly affects their national security.

The mechanism that facilitates identifying and linking side-issues is Diplomatic Embeddedness. In the book, *Constructing Allied Cooperation*, Henke defines Diplomatic Embeddedness as the number of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic ties that connect a pair of countries or dyads. Henke's work illustrates Diplomatic Embeddedness creates social and institutional networks that offer powerful countries five resources to build coalitions: credible commitments, access to private information, opportunities for issue linkages and side payments, cooperation brokers, and negotiation venues (M. Henke 2019).⁹¹

Applying Henke's concept to NATO, Diplomatic Embeddedness is the number of multilateral political, social, and economic ties that connect a NATO member with the Principals and enable consensus. As the nations that design the ZOPA, the Principals yield a disproportionate amount of political agenda-setting and deal-making within the negotiation. The Principals use Diplomatic Embeddedness to facilitate political coordination, make side payments, and gain consensus to execute the proposed NATO action.

⁹¹ Henke, Marina. 2019. *Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

Creating Sufficient Political Will in the Organization

Political Will is the enthusiasm to apply a specific policy given that the necessary knowledge and tools for the initiative already exist (Helwig 2013).⁹² As a collection of democracies, each NATO member delegation ultimately reflects the will of their domestic citizenry. Therefore, each ambassador to NATO must sell its head of state and electorate that the proposed NATO action is legitimate and worth risking their nation's time, treasure, and talent.

As a result, NATO reaching consensus and making a decision is dependent on creating sufficient political will in each nation's capital. The actions which create the requisite level of political will throughout the alliance rank in the following order. First, a NATO member suffers an armed attack that triggers Article 5. Second, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passes a resolution with an Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII Directive permitting the use of force. Third, a NATO Ally or non-NATO country makes a compelling ask for help from the alliance.

NATO's original purpose is to safeguard the territories of each member in North America and Europe. Whenever an ally suffers an attack, members of the alliance are quick to support their comrade. All members feel a sense of duty to help and make their military resources available because, if the roles reverse, they expect another ally to do the same. The political will to support is high because if NATO could not achieve consensus to help a member state that suffered an

⁹² Helwig, Niklas. 2013. "EU Foreign Policy and the High Representative's Capability-Expectations Gap: A Question of Political Will." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 18 (2): 235-54. <https://heinonline-org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/HOL/Contents?handle=hein.kluwer/eurofa0018&id=1&size=2&index=&collection=kluwer>. P. 237.

attack, the entire institution would crumble. Despite a great desire to help across NATO, the Principals would still have the most influence on how the institution would respond. Simply put, they have the most resources to develop a plan for NATO to structure each member's response to support an attacked member. Responding to an armed attack generates sufficient political will throughout NATO because collective defense is foundational to the entire institution and benefits each nation to maintain (NATO 2019a).⁹³

Additionally, political will increases when the international community makes a persuasive request of the alliance. The request can come from the UNSC, a fellow NATO member, or a nation outside of the alliance. The UNSC is the principal organ charged with establishing peacekeeping operations, enacting international sanctions, and authorizing military action (Morris and Wheeler 2007).⁹⁴ Of the six principal organs in the UN, the UNSC is the only organ that has the authority to issue binding resolutions on member states. With 193 member states in the United Nations, the UNSC has a significant influence on setting the international security agenda. The UNSC has five permanent and ten non-permanent seats. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States maintain the five permanent seats. The ten non-permanent members have two-year appointments and represent five regions: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Caribbean, and Western Europe. On top of their stable seats, the permanent members of the UNSC, known as the P5, have veto power over meaningful resolutions, which include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, international sanctions, or military

⁹³ NATO. 2019a. "Collective Defence - Article 5." North American Treaty Organization. Accessed December 15. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:~:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.

⁹⁴ Morris, Justin, and Nicholas Wheeler. 2007. "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force." *International Politics (Hague, Netherlands)* 44 (2-3): 214-31. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800185>. P. 214-5.

action authorizations. Therefore, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have the most clout on international security priorities.

For a policy to gain legitimacy through the UNSC, it must fall in line with the P5's interests and the international community. The P5's elevated position originates from each country's global power when World War II ended, and the international community established the United Nations. The P5 have a disproportionate amount of economic and military power in 1945 and gained legitimacy through their perceived place in the international hierarchy. The UNSC establishes a relationship where the powerful countries work together to provide a safe and secure world. As a result, countries lower in the order acknowledge their leadership as legitimate and comply with the United Nations Charter's rules (Hurd 2002).⁹⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, the concentration of P5 interests shape the approval of security council resolutions authoring the use of force (Allen and Yuen 2014).⁹⁶ The UNSC agenda is generally consistent with the UN Charter's ideals despite criticism that the P5 use their veto for individual national interests. Since the Cold-War international disputes with high numbers of refugees and deaths trigger UNSC resolutions. Although in the 21st Century, Russia, China, and the United States have used the vetoes to block resolutions addressing security issues in Syria, Myanmar, and Israel, the UNSC maintains legitimacy by addressing intense conflicts that alter broad international interest (Frederking and Patane 2017).⁹⁷ The precedent set in the early and mid-1990s where the UNSC would define an area as less than peaceful and offer parameters for

⁹⁵ Hurd, Ian. 2002. "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council." *Global Governance* 8 (1): 35-51. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-00801006>, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800326>. P. 36-38.

⁹⁶ Allen, Susan, and Amy Yuen. 2014. "The Politics of Peacekeeping: UN Security Council Oversight Across Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (3): 621-32. <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12086>. <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/58/3/621/1797809?login=true>. P. 630.

⁹⁷ Frederking, Brian, and Christopher Patane. 2017. "Legitimacy and the UN Security Council Agenda." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 50 (2): 347-53. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909651600278X>. P. 352.

using force created a blueprint that domestic governments began to expect for NATO to obtain legitimacy for an operation.

As the institution charged with maintaining peace and stability worldwide, when the UNSC concludes an area is less than peaceful, NATO pays attention. The UNSC has appointed NATO to operate autonomously to implement its policy objectives when it needed an organization to enforce its security resolutions (Leurdijk 1997).⁹⁸ When the UNSC explains a region is in distress, NATO has a request that it can choose to accept. The Allies answer the call to action when the Quad has a vision for stability, the Principals set clear parameters, and the plan of action does not conflict with the remaining NATO members' domestic interests.

The UNSC constructs a clear call to action when two features are present: an Article 39 Designation and a Chapter VII Directive. An "Article 39 Designation" is the UNSC's determination that there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression in a specific United Nations member territory. A "Chapter VII Directive" is when the resolution articulates that a UN member can use all necessary means, including force, to administer the UNSC's mandate. (Johansson 2009).⁹⁹ The UNSC Resolution provides international legality and settles each country's internal debate on legitimacy, moving NATO participation towards domestic appetite for action. With the UNSC defining an area and authorizing force, each NATO member has the political cover and parameters for what a plan of action could entail. A UNSC Resolution with an Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII Directive, generates sufficient political will to reach consensus throughout NATO.

⁹⁸ Leurdijk, Dick. 1997. "Before and After Dayton: The UN and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia." *Third World Quarterly* 18 (3): 457-470. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993263>. P. 468.

⁹⁹ Johansson, Patrik. 2009. "The Humdrum Use of Ultimate Authority: Defining and Analysing Chapter VII Resolutions." *Nordic Journal of International Law* 78 (3): 309-42. <https://doi.org/10.1163/090273509X12448190941129>. P. 309-11.

Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the shortest of the 14 Articles but serves a fundamental purpose. It guarantees an avenue for an ally to request help from the alliance. Article 4 states:

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened (NATO 1949).¹⁰⁰

The ability to call a meeting of the NAC for security matters provides an opportunity for members to voice concerns about issues that affect their national security. Although primarily seen as a political coordination mechanism, individuals in NATO circles see Article 4 as a step to prevent invoking collective defense commitments under Article 5 (Priebe and Binnendijk 2019).¹⁰¹ The broad language of Article 4 leads to three possible responses: one, a simple airing of grievances with no action. Two, a method for the threatened country to increase its security capacity via assistance from allies. Three, the alliance takes significant actions to prepare for potential external conflict (Yost 1998).¹⁰²

As Table 3 shows, invoking Article 4 is a 21st Century phenomenon most often used by Turkey. Each Article 4 declaration is a NATO member asking for support to protect its domestic interests when military unrest is on its border with a non-NATO country. Article 4 has worked as a method for allies to elevate concerns to the NAC and encourage the alliance to take limited military actions to deter tenuous situations from escalating. However, invoking Article 4 may or may not create sufficient political will across the alliance to reach consensus.

¹⁰⁰ NATO. 1949. "The North Atlantic Treaty." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed 1 Feb 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

¹⁰¹ Priebe, Miranda, and Anika Binnendijk. 2019. *An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense*. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation). P.4

¹⁰² Yost, David. 1998. "The New NATO and Collective Security." *Survival* 40 (2): 135-60. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.1998.10107846>. P.144-6.

Depending on Issue and Diplomatic Embeddedness, NATO fails to reach an agreement for a variety of reasons. A country does not want its constituents associated with the proposed action. A group of countries views the proposal as a provocation creating adverse consequences for their national security. Lastly, members of the alliance could see providing additional resources as a slippery slope for the organization because the party outside of NATO could view a military buildup as an act of war.

Occurrence	Nation	Date Invoked	Purpose	Result
1	Turkey	10 February 2003	Threat from increasingly violent armed conflict in Iraq and potential relation for Turkey's ties to US coalition.	25 February – 16 April, NATO deployed AWACS surveillance aircraft and crews, theatre missile defenses, and chemical and biological defense equipment
2	Turkey	22 June 2012	Turkish Aircraft shot down by Syrian Air Defense forces	No Action from NATO
3	Turkey	3 October 2012	Five Turkish civilians were killed by Syrian shells.	NATO agreed to deploy theatre missile defenses and resources to de-escalate hostilities on the Syria-Turkey border
4	Poland	3 March 2014	To raise concerns about increasing tensions between Ukraine and Poland. The Russian aggression with Crimea alarmed the Poland and Lithuania delegation	NATO expanded its Baltic Air Policing mission and deployed NATO's Standing Maritime Group 1 to the Baltic Sea. NATO established rotating battlegroups in Poland and each Baltic State through the enhanced foreign presence (Brooke-Holland 2016). ¹⁰³
5	Turkey	26 July 2015	Turkey wanted to inform the alliance of the deteriorating situation in Syria and how a recent string of terrorist attacks in Turkey resulted in several Turkish soldiers' deaths.	NATO maintained its stationing of Spanish Patriot anti-aircraft missiles in Turkey.
6	Turkey	28 February 2020	Turkey wanted to inform the alliance of the deteriorating situation in Syria and how the chaos resulted in several Turkish soldiers' deaths.	NATO did not take additional action as of 1 March 2020.

Table 3 - Article 4 Declarations: The table illustrates the six times NATO has invoked Article 4. The table reflects the nation who made the declaration, the declaration's date, the purpose of the invocation, and NATO's resulting actions (NATO 2020c).¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Brooke-Holland, Louisa. 2016. *NATO's Military Response to Russia: November 2016 Update*. (House of Commons Library). <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7276/>. P. 8, P. 11, P.22

¹⁰⁴ NATO. 2020b. "The Consultation Process and Article 4." NATO. Accessed 1 April 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm.

Overall, Allies requesting support from the organization has mixed results creating sufficient political will. One nation's anxiety does not have the power to overcome NATO's desire to maintain the status quo consistently. Therefore, one country's concern must be regional, or else, it fails to have a broad appeal for alliance support.

The final way to create sufficient political will is through a direct request from a non-NATO member. NATO's agreement with nations in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has a mechanism that resembles Article 4:

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security (NATO 1994).¹⁰⁵

The PfP pledge has similar issues for non-NATO countries as the Article 4 commitment has for Allies. Implicitly, the guarantee for consultation signals NATO's willingness to respond to a threat. Non-NATO members and PfP nations could view the language as a back door to Article 5-type commitments (Yost 1998).¹⁰⁶ The ambiguity and discord within the alliance about using force for NATO Allies magnify whenever nations outside of the organization request military assistance. Therefore, NATO will not make a military commitment to any country outside of the organization. However, NATO Allies view humanitarian services in a different light.

Domestic constituencies desire to help another nation in need after a natural disaster or political conflict threatens to destabilize the transatlantic region. Post-Cold War, NATO leaders, insisted that stability throughout Europe is in their countries' best interests. However, how each

¹⁰⁵ NATO, 1994, "Partnership for Peace: Invitation," <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1994/p94-002.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ Yost, David. 1998. "The New NATO and Collective Security." *Survival* 40 (2): 135-60. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.1998.10107846>. P.144-6.

nation defines stability varies. Peace operations fall into one of two categories: humanitarian operations and conflict resolution. Humanitarian operations provide food, shelter, and medicine directly to victims of a crisis or protect relief workers who furnish these goods and services. Conflict resolution signifies an engagement that influences actors' political incentives in a military battle (Leppgold 1998).¹⁰⁷ Besides humanitarian assistance and training, NATO has had difficulty reaching consensus to support nations' direct requests outside of the alliance. NATO provided humanitarian assistance to Pakistan after a devastating Earthquake in October 2005, a training and equip mission in Iraq to support their national security, and logistical support to the African Union force in Darfur (Berdal and Ucko 2009).¹⁰⁸ Overall, all three operations were narrow in scope and did not place NATO resources in harm's way. As a result, NATO has insufficient political will to support nations outside of the alliance unless the proposal is a tailored, nonthreatening humanitarian operation.

Building Consensus

Issue Embeddedness and Diplomatic Embeddedness combine to create a two-by-two matrix with four category types. Each category has characteristics that highlight a nation's ability to enhance or hinder reaching consensus on a particular policy initiative. By creating categories, practitioners can learn the alliance's pressure points and understand why allies go away from NATO and towards coalitions of the willing.

¹⁰⁷ Leppgold, Joseph. 1998. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23 (1): 78-106. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P. 82-3.

¹⁰⁸ Berdal, Mats, and David Ucko. 2009. "NATO at 60." *Survival* 51 (2): 55-76. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330902860793>. P. 57-62.

Issue Embeddedness is the distance a NATO Ally is from the intersection of the Quad's preferences. As the most resourced countries which traditionally lead NATO movements, being connected to the Quad, specifically the United States, makes a nation more likely to participate in a NATO action. Additionally, Issue Embeddedness provides insight into which countries can make meaningful contributions to the proposal. Highlighting which nations under-provide or over-provide signals governments potentially made side payments within the alliance.

Diplomatic Embeddedness is the number of multilateral political, social, and economic ties that connect a NATO member with the Principals. As nations that design the ZOPA, the Principals use their social and institutional networks to understand what an agreement would entail. Through formal and informal meetings inside and outside of NATO, Principals use their relationships throughout the international system to create credible commitments, access private information, and link issues with side payments to facilitate consensus. By arming Diplomatic Embeddedness, Principals glean insight into which nations commit to using NATO to execute the plan or prefer pursuing a multinational coalition outside of NATO.

Operationalizing the two mechanisms demonstrates how institutional relationships inside and outside of NATO combine with realist concerns allies have. Networked Allies are nations with high-Issue Embeddedness and high-Diplomatic Embeddedness. Networked members can make a meaningful contribution to the Principals' objectives and highly value NATO's regional legitimacy to execute the ZOPA. However, when the goals conflict with their national interests, nations in this category are the biggest impediment to reaching consensus. Networked nations are willing to act through NATO through political means more often than military means. If the proposal entails a significant danger to resources, they require an Article 5 attack on a NATO member or UNSC Resolution to have sufficient political will to act.

Allies with high-Issue Embeddedness and low-Diplomatic Embeddedness are in the Motivated category. These nations can make a meaningful contribution but hold consensus hostage if the proposal falls out of line with their national interest. Motivated countries look to create a coalition of the willing whenever the ZOPA does not address their concerns. Countries in this category derive their political will internally. If their domestic constituency approves of an action, Motivated countries look to act despite resistance from other NATO Allies and the international community.

Helpful members are nations with low-Issue Embeddedness and high-Diplomatic Embeddedness. They believe in NATO's regional legitimacy but place caveats on their military's participation. These countries tend to under-provide because it is not in their national interest to do more than what's minimally required. Nations in the Helpful category need a UNSC resolution or an Article 5 attack to have sufficient political will to place their resources in harm's way. Without one of the two, Helpful members do not block consensus but do not provide meaningful contributions.

Lastly, nations with low-Issue Embeddedness and low-Diplomatic Embeddedness categorize as Fair-Share. Fair-Share Allies see NATO as a defensive alliance and do not block consensus because they have limited influence militarily and politically. They align their opinion in the NAC with the United States because they want to associate themselves with the alliance's most powerful nation. Therefore, if the United States is interested in taking action, they help the organization reach an agreement. If the United States opposes a proposal, they block consensus. As a result, Fair-Share nations lean towards being consensus builders and find ways to positively impact any plan to engender themselves to the more influential alliance members.

By identifying four profiles for NATO members, policymakers understand where the obstacles to consensus reside and who has leverage during negotiations. With the two-by-two illustrated by Figure 1, NATO practitioners and leaders can anticipate the likelihood a policy passes and who to lean on to ensure no nation breaks silence during the final vote.




Figure 1 - NATO Consensus-Categories: The Figure illustrates the four categories that NATO members occupy when the alliance tries to reach consensus. Each category corresponds with the relative level of Diplomatic Embeddedness and Issue Embeddedness.

Applying Embeddedness Theory to Out-of-Area Activities

Defining the Issue – Expeditionary Movements

As NATO moved into a post-Cold War world, NATO's most significant contributor, the United States, called for the alliance to shift its priorities from quelling Soviet aggression towards establishing a secure Europe. Senator Richard Lugar's speech, "NATO Out of Area or Out of Business," summarized the early 1990s position of security hawks in the United States. Lugar explains that in light of NATO achieving its original purpose, containing Soviet power, the time had come for the organization to shift its focus outside its members' borders. Notably, the transatlantic alliance needed to establish strategic stability across Europe by extending membership to the Balkans and former Soviet bloc countries (Rosenfeld 1993).¹⁰⁹ The United States' call to expand NATO's reach created its first post-Cold War issue, expeditionary movements.

Overlapping Expeditionary Interests in the Quad

Traditionally, the Quad has vital national interests beyond their borders in multiple locations simultaneously. Vital national interests are developments that could concretely affect a nation's

¹⁰⁹ Rosenfeld, Stephen. 1993. "NATO's Last Chance." *The Washington Post*, July 2, 1993.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1993/07/02/natos-last-chance/22054ea7-5958-44b0-9e6a-212ee1da51de/>.

security or economic future, causing that nation to take military action.¹¹⁰ While Germany is a powerful force economically, its government does not have vital interests outside of the transatlantic region like France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United States maintains American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. France has multiple constellations of islands in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The United Kingdom perseveres the legacy of its empire with the commonwealth of nations that includes 54 independent countries. According to Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the aforementioned territories and commonwealth are outside of NATO's purview because they are not in North America or Europe and above the Tropic of Cancer. However, all three nations are sensitive to any issues that threaten their territories and would take unilateral action to protect them.

Additionally, Germany chooses to operate in multilateral frameworks to avoid the government's perception of dominating the European region. German political decision-makers aim to increase Germany's influence in the world via institutional legitimacy in multiple organizations. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany has been diversifying its security options, with NATO being one of many tools in its toolbox. In the absence of an existential threat to German territory, decision-makers in Berlin view security through non-military means as its primary tool (Overhaus 2004).¹¹¹ When it comes to out-of-area activities, Germany is a step below the other three members in the Quad because its government has an inability to generate forces

¹¹⁰ Nicolas Burns defines vital national interests as conflicts that could involve a nation in a larger war or situations if destabilized, could result in generational conflict (Burns 2019). Edwin Feulner defines vital national interests as developments that could concretely affect the security or economic future of a country (Feulner 1996).

¹¹¹ Overhaus, Marco. 2004. "In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy." *German Politics* 13 (4): 551-68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0964400042000343137>. P.551-4.

and military resources commensurate with its economic power (Keller 2012).¹¹² As a result, Germany self-selects out of the issue selection process for NATO's expeditionary activities.

The distinction between Germany and the other three Quad members with out-of-area activities dates back to the late 1950s. French President Charles de Gaulle advocated for the United Kingdom, United States, and France to collaborate on the future of European security and form an alliance called the Triumvirate (Furniss 1964).¹¹³ While the sub-alliance never came to pass, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France are the three NATO members with the most influence on the organization's international security agenda because they have permanent seats on the UNSC and possess nuclear weapons. Between their institutional power in the UNSC and their willingness to advocate for their national interests unilaterally, the intersection of security interests in the Triumvirate serves as the selection mechanism for NATO out-of-area activities. Germany's lack of vital national interests and reluctance to operate outside of institutions leaves them outside the Quad looking in when exploring out-of-area activities. Therefore, expeditionary movements start when the Triumvirate share an interest in an area outside of NATO. As a result, Expeditionary Embeddedness is the distance a NATO Ally is from the intersection of the Triumvirate's preferences.

Italy and Canada Complete the Principals

¹¹² Keller, Patrick. 2012. "Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally." *Survival* 54 (3): 95-110. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2012.690985>. P.98-100.

¹¹³ Furniss, Edgar S. 1964. "The Grand Design of Charles de Gaulle." *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 40 (2): 161-181. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26444859>. P. 166-9.

Traditionally, the Quad look to Italy and Canada to build consensus and design a ZOPA for expeditionary movements. The Italians share interests with southern European countries that directly access the Mediterranean Sea, like Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Canada and the United States share the world's longest border (5,525 miles) with 120 land ports-of-entry and one of the world's most extensive bilateral relationships (US-State-Department 2020).¹¹⁴

During the Cold War, Italy did not assert influence on European security issues. With its membership in NATO, holding US nuclear weapons, and hosting American navy ships, the Italians enjoyed an umbrella of safety and the opportunity to dedicate their attention to domestic issues. Throughout the Cold War, Italy placed a premium on aligning its foreign policy with the United States through its support of NATO initiatives (Foradori 2014; Ratti 2001; Rosa and Foradori 2007; Rosa 2013). Today, between two bases, Italy carries the most significant number of nuclear gravity bombs in Europe under NATO's aegis (Foradori 2014).¹¹⁵

As NATO transitioned into a post-Cold War environment, Italy looked to advocate for its security positions through multilateral institutions like the UN, EU, and NATO. Throughout the 1990s, Italy was the third-largest contributor of troops and personnel (after the United States and the United Kingdom) to peacekeeping and enforcement campaigns directly managed by the UN and UNSC entrusted coalitions (Croci 2003).¹¹⁶ The political and economic instability that the Bosnian conflict brought to southeastern Europe illustrated to Italian government officials that their security concerns needed to expand beyond their borders. As a result, Italy was an early

¹¹⁴ US-State-Department. 2020. "U.S. Relations With Canada." Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet. Last Modified July 16, 2020. Accessed 1 Feb 2021. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-canada/>.

¹¹⁵ Foradori, Paolo. 2014. "Reluctant Disarmer: Italy's Ambiguous Attitude Toward NATO's Nuclear Weapons Policy." *European Security* 23 (1): 31-44. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.851674>. P. 31.

¹¹⁶ Croci, Osvaldo. 2003. "Italian Security Policy after the Cold War." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 8 (2): 266-83. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571032000078239>. P.269.

proponent of NATO expansion into the Balkans and was keen to offer its military to support multilateral organizations like the UN and NATO (Rosa 2013; Foradori 2014).

While the evolution of a post-Cold War Europe revealed it needed to expand its security, Italy understood it could not address its security concerns across the continent alone due to domestic constraints. Therefore, Italy sees NATO as a mechanism to advance its security concerns by paring the Quad and advocating for southern European interests. To elevate its standing in NATO, Italy became increasingly involved in nearly all out-of-area peacekeeping, crisis management, policing, and stabilization operations (Foradori 2014).¹¹⁷

Italy and the Quad have had an informal relationship as members of the Quint. The Quint is the nickname given to these five countries because historically, they made the most significant military and financial contributions to NATO and formed the Contact Group in the 1990s (Gegout 2002).¹¹⁸ The Quad learned Italy was a reliable partner for out-of-area activities through its pivotal role in the Contact Group when NATO used coercive diplomacy to bring peace to Bosnia. The Quad plus Russia and Italy formed the Contact Group in the spring of 1994 to address the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Initially, the Contact Group was only the four permanent members of the UNSC with distinct interests in the region. However, it expanded to Germany and Italy as the situation became more complex. Despite problems maintaining unity, the Contact Group's Bosnia efforts confirmed its member states as the international stage's key actors. They demonstrated their ability to work together despite notable differences in approach (Leigh-Phippard 1998).¹¹⁹ Through the Dayton Accords, IFOR, and SFOR missions, the Quad

¹¹⁷ Foradori, Paolo. 2014. "Reluctant Disarmer: Italy's Ambiguous Attitude Toward NATO's Nuclear Weapons Policy." *European Security* 23 (1):

31-44. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.851674>. P. 34-5.

¹¹⁸ Gegout, Catherine. 2002. "The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directorate at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process European Agenda." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2): 331-344. P. 335.

¹¹⁹ Leigh-Phippard, Helen. 1998. "The Contact Group on (And in) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation?" *International Journal* 53 (2): 306-324. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203296>. P.323-4.

learned Italy was a dependable partner for expeditionary movements and getting NATO Allies to develop the political will to act out-of-area.

During the Cold War, NATO was a way for Canada to ensure one nation did not dominate the European Continent. Outside of the United States, Europe is Canada's largest trading partner. After the Soviet Union's fall, Canada viewed NATO as an essential organization with increasing political importance because it was as a mechanism to maintain positive relations and a more vibrant economy with European allies (Leuprecht and Sokolsky 2017).¹²⁰ Consultations in the NAC and MC allowed Quebec to pick and choose where to contribute to the alliance.

The United States and Canadian governments have close ties and overlapping interests across various defense, political, and economic domains. Their military forces cooperate on continental defense within the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the world's only binational military command. Additionally, they share membership in the UN, World Trade Organization (WTO), G7, G20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. In 2009, Canada and the United States created the High-Level Policy Review Group to coordinate efforts across global issues. Both countries produce policies to advance approaches that benefit both nations (US-State-Department 2020).¹²¹ Current and Former diplomats in both countries explain the two nations offer each other a combination of hard and soft power on the world stage during negotiations. For example, governments look at Canada as a conduit of information. The United States can rely on Quebec to convey its desires to other nations in a more palatable way. Conversely, in

¹²⁰ Leuprecht, Christian, and Joel Sokolsky. 2017. "An Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics: Canada's Enduring Commitment to Transatlantic Security." *Atlantisch Perspectief* 41 (5): 21-26. <https://doi.org/10.2307/48581377>. P.21.

¹²¹ US-State-Department. 2020. "U.S. Relations With Canada." Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet. Last Modified July 16, 2020. Accessed 1 Feb 2021.

<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-canada/>.

NATO, the Allies look to pass concerns and possible policy solutions to the United States through Canada.¹²²

In the 1990s, Canada took various actions on multiple levels in NATO and on the International stage. Ottawa answered participated in the Gulf War in 1990. Although not a NATO operation, Canada became a dependable ally to the United States' international endeavors through its support of UNSC Resolution 678 and contributions to the United States-led coalition. With 6,600 troops in constant rotation, Canada sent two-thirds of its navy and special forces to build field hospitals to help the security efforts in the Gulf.

In 1994 as the Balkans grew more contentious, Canada was a willing participant in the Quad's peace efforts. Canada provided the fifth most troops supporting United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. Despite heavy cuts to the federal budget, Canada punched well above its weight. Ottawa showed its commitment to international peace and security in the Balkans by providing the third most resources of NATO countries despite its great distance from the conflict (Zyla 2010).¹²³ Canadians offered as many troops to Bosnia's SFOR mission as they did to secure the Berlin Wall during the Cold War (Joseph Jockel and Sokolsky 2009).¹²⁴ Canada's consistent pledge to assist the United States' efforts throughout the 1990s made them a dependable ally for expeditionary movements.

Canada sees NATO as a mechanism to ensure a vital national interest, political and military stability in Europe (Joseph Jockel and Sokolsky 2009).¹²⁵ Canada enhances its national security by participating in international institutions and providing a non-traditional approach to security

¹²² Interviews conducted with diplomats from the United States in Canada 1 Feb – 15 March 2021.

¹²³ Zyla, Benjamin. 2010. "Years of Free-Riding? Canada, the New NATO, and Collective Crisis Management in Europe, 1989-2001." *American Review of Canadian Studies* 40 (1): 22-39. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02722010903536938>. P. 30-34.

¹²⁴ Jockel, Joseph, and Joel Sokolsky. 2009. "Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses down, Criticism out... and the Country Secure." *International Journal* 64 (2): 315-36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200906400202>. P.332.

¹²⁵ Jockel, Joseph, and Joel Sokolsky. 2009. "Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, Expenses down, Criticism out... and the Country Secure." *International Journal* 64 (2): 315-36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200906400202>. P.332.

through its advocacy for international human rights and economic development. The Canadian government made a significant portion of its diplomatic and development resources available for NATO to support an evolving global security environment. Starting in the mid-1990s, Canada launched its “3D approach” (defense, democracy, and development) to foreign policy (Zyla 2010; Murray and McCoy 2010). The new approach led Canadian officials to adopt a whole-of-government approach with international security. As a result, Canada works within the NATO framework to advance policy and initiatives that use nonmilitary means to enhance regional stability (Manwaring 2006).¹²⁶

Lastly, Canada established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) at the encouragement of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The ICISS aims to develop legally sound, politically feasible, and acceptable guidelines on humanitarian intervention. In 2001, the ICISS published the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) report that outlined three core elements of legal interventions: the duty of states to prevent humanitarian crisis and gross violations of human rights, react in a timely and effective fashion, and rebuild states and societies in the aftermath of interventions (Ayub and Kouvo 2008).¹²⁷ In light of the new world order developed in the 1990s where states could intervene based on R2P, Canada's connection to human rights provides familiarity with the legality and legitimacy of out-of-area operations. Canada's direct and indirect approach to global security aids the Quad's development of broad objectives that would attract all NATO members to support an out-of-area activity.

¹²⁶ Manwaring, Max. 2006. *Defense, Development, and Diplomacy (3D): Canadian and U.S. Military Perspectives*. U.S. Army War College, Queens University, and the Canadian Land Forces Doctrine and Training System (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute). <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a456853.pdf>. P.3-4.

¹²⁷ Ayub, Fatima, and Sari Kouvo. 2008. "Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 84 (4): 641-657. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/25144869>. P.645.

In the post-Cold War security environment, Italian and Canadian officials provide a comprehensive diplomatic, social, economic, and moral approach to ZOPA creation as the Quad explores pursuing an out-of-area operation. Italy and Canada have robust networks and international security philosophies that complement the Quad's approach to selecting, developing, and deciding to execute an out-of-area activity. As a result, in the context of out-of-area activities, Diplomatic Embeddedness is the number of multilateral political, social, and economic ties that connect a NATO member with the Triumvirate, Germany, Italy, and Canada.

Creating Sufficient Political Will

NATO's approval of out-of-area activities is dependent on creating sufficient political will throughout the alliance. Two external actions achieve adequate political will for NATO to act out-of-area: an armed attack against a NATO Ally and the passing of a UNSC resolution with an Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII Directive. Direct requests from NATO and non-NATO Allies do not generate enough support throughout the alliance for an out-of-area operation. At least one Ally will disregard the request due to differences in geography, domestic salience, or willingness to accept military danger.

The source of political will originates from each NATO Ally seeing a proposal as legitimate. Legitimacy comes from a social acceptance of the rules, not by coercion or self-interest (Frederking and Patane 2017).¹²⁸ As a group of democracies, NATO values the rule of law and an

¹²⁸ Frederking, Brian, and Christopher Patane. 2017. "Legitimacy and the UN Security Council Agenda." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 50 (2): 347-53. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909651600278X>. P. 347.

international body with legal jurisdiction formally ordaining an issue worthy of intervention. NATO outlines three places where it draws its international legitimacy: Article 5, UNSC Resolutions, or a direct ask from NATO and non-NATO Allies.

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, each member has the right to self-defense and therefore the right to use military force to protect its national sovereignty. Additionally, Article 51 states the Security Council should take measures to maintain international peace and security after the attack (Morris and Wheeler 2007).¹²⁹ The UNSC can stabilize a region by tasking a Chapter VIII regional organization like the African Union, European Union or the Islamic Conference Organization to execute a resolution (Drieskens 2010).¹³⁰ To avoid influence from the Soviet Union, NATO purposefully did not classify itself as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations charter. NATO founders saw the alliance as a way to counter potential Soviet Union obstructionism in the UNSC. Therefore it was essential to situate NATO in a way that looked to the UN Charter for inspiration and the rule of law while maintaining its autonomy to operate in its members' best interests (Kaplan 2004).¹³¹

Article 51 of the UN Charter provides the framework for Article 5 and institutional legitimacy to act out-of-area. Although in the 21st Century, an armed attack can take many forms, whenever a non-NATO nation harms a transatlantic ally, the organization has sufficient political will to take action out-of-area because if not, NATO would no longer provide value to its members. Therefore, institutional survival stimulates every NATO country to authorize force outside of NATO's borders with little to no resistance. Simultaneously, nations have a realist incentive to

¹²⁹ Morris, Justin, and Nicholas Wheeler. 2007. "The Security Council's Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force." *International Politics (Hague, Netherlands)* 44 (2-3): 214-31. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800185>. P. 214-5.

¹³⁰ Drieskens, Edith. 2010. "Beyond Chapter VIII: Limits and Opportunities for Regional Representation at the UN Security Council." *International Organizations Law Review* 7 (1): 149-69. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157237310X523795>. P.155.

¹³¹ Kaplan, Lawrence. 2004. *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. P. 1-4.

participate in an out-of-area activity because of its moral and practical implications. Morally, countries want every ally to come to their rescue if they were harmed. Practically, governments do not want to harm their reputation because international relations have legacies. Even though it has broad language that allows members to fulfill its obligation without providing boots on the ground, NATO Allies view an Article 5 declaration as a moral commitment to defend another nation (I. Daalder and Goldgeier 2006).¹³²

It is challenging to recreate broad regional unity outside of direct attack on a member's territory (Lute and Burns 2019).¹³³ However, NATO obtains sufficient political will when the UNSC deems a situation less than peaceful and outlines how the international community can bring stability to that part of the world. As members balance their national concerns with the organization's goals, there is a worthy debate within NATO with what is legitimately a concern to the collective. With the Triumvirate's expeditionary tendencies, remaining NATO Allies have a skepticism of any out-of-area activity. A UNSC Resolution with Article 39 Designation and a Chapter VII Directive creates a ZOPA template for the Principals. It quells the remaining nations' concerns about its country's legality approving and participating in an out-of-area activity under the NATO flag. Therefore, whenever a UNSC Resolution passes, NATO will create an out-of-area activity that resembles the policy goals expressed by the UNSC.

Direct request for services alone does not create sufficient political will to approve an out-of-area activity because the Triumvirate and Principals' transactional cost is too high. Although NATO is a group of democracies, there must be a gain for the organization. The institution should reject any request that does not have a clear benefit for the Principals. Therefore, whenever NATO

¹³² Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier. 2006. "Global NATO." *Foreign Affairs* 85 (5): 105-13. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20032073>. P.112-3.

¹³³ Lute, Douglas, and Nicolas Burns. 2019. *NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis*. P.39-40.

creates an out-of-area activity to answer a direct request from another NATO member or non-NATO country, the Triumvirate and Principals will directly benefit. As an intermediary group, even if the allies agreed that helping a fellow NATO member or country outside of the alliance would be feasible, designing the operation's objectives would be too difficult because of typical collective action problems like divergent interests and devolving coordination. Therefore, like all other out-of-area campaigns, the Triumvirate must have overlapping interests in the region. Subsequently, the Principals must agree on a course of action to design a ZOPA. Without Triumvirate support and a coherent vision from the Principals, an out-of-area activity will not materialize.

Building Consensus

The baseline assumption for a state's willingness to take action out-of-area is an inherent fear of national sovereignty driving state action. A nation's distress level indicates its desire to coordinate security activity with the Triumvirate, who set the out-of-area agenda. When the Triumvirate has an internal disagreement on an activity's salience, the nation(s) that push for the expeditionary mission will design a coalition of the willing to help address its security interests. Therefore, Expeditionary Embeddedness highlights a nation's realist concerns on an issue, ability to make a meaningful impact on the proposed operation, and capacity to lower the burden on the Triumvirate.

The fundamental assumption for reaching consensus is that the Principals design an out-of-area activity that meets the needs of the lowest common denominator in the alliance. Without incentivizing states to participate through policy, side-payment, or institutional pressure, the

organization will not proceed with a collective action under the NATO flag. When the Principals disagree on a ZOPA, the out-of-area activity fails to materialize because the institution does not have the requisite leadership needed to merge multiple interests. As a result, Diplomatic Embeddedness is an institutional mechanism that the Principals use to exert organizational pressure and create avenues for deal-making that facilitate NATO reaching consensus.

A NATO Ally works to build consensus when the combination of Issue and Diplomatic Embeddedness overcomes the domestic will to maintain the status quo. Countries approve an out-of-area activity when the international circumstance raises a nation's realist concerns to an uncomfortable level, or the institution's norms place sufficient pressure to acquiesce to the collective's will. Without adequate danger to the homeland or organizational pressure, NATO's default posture is to incrementally use its resources and build momentum towards a military action as a last resort. The incremental or lowest common denominator approach stems from the reality that NATO is an institution with weak independent power and agency because 30 sovereign states converge to set the organization's resolve. As a result, any member can derail NATO's direction. If one or a region of states do not feel that their security is at risk, then NATO does not feel threatened. Therefore, outside of an armed attack against an ally or UNSC Resolution, NATO is hesitant to take military action outside of NATO's borders because multiple nations question the legitimacy and need (Lorenz 2016).¹³⁴

In the absence of sufficient political will, NATO members will configure along Expeditionary and Diplomatic embeddedness lines. Nations with high diplomatic embeddedness push the institution to design a low-risk out-of-area endeavor that is more political than military in

¹³⁴ Lorenz, Wojciech. 2016. "NATO at a Critical Crossroads NATO at a Critical Crossroads." *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 25 (1): 9-12. P.10-2.

nature. Governments with high expeditionary embeddedness prefer a coalition of the willing. They attract other countries within the alliance to participate using a combination of proximity, capacity building, and side-payment. Therefore, coalitions of the willing led by a NATO member result from a lack of political will within the transatlantic alliance. Conversely, NATO train, educate, and equip operations signify the alliance's desire to develop relationships via non-threatening means.

Expeditionary Embeddedness, Diplomatic Embeddedness, and political will impact the interactions between the four groups of NATO Allies. Networked Allies (high-Expeditionary Embeddedness and high-Diplomatic Embeddedness) are highly capable NATO members that look to create a lowest common denominator plan within the alliance. Collectively, they have the most formal and informal connections in the organization. As a result, Networked Allies can be a barrier to consensus when the campaign conflicts with their domestic interest but is willing to use their military with limited caveats if the proposal is in its national interests. Their network is most influential with nations in the Helpful category. Outside of an Article 5 attack, Networked allies require a UNSC Resolution to have sufficient political will to support an out-of-area activity. When a NATO Ally requests support, it will be willing to do so, as long as the proposed action does not threaten to invite an Article 5 attack from a non-NATO member. When a non-NATO member asks for assistance from the alliance, Networked Allies look to create a political solution with limited military risk.

Helpful Allies (low-Expeditionary Embeddedness and high-Diplomatic Embeddedness) are highly connected allies with middle-tier militaries. Allies in the Helpful category can make notable military contributions with limited caveats if the out-of-area activity is in its national interests. Collectively, they have low political will unless it is an Article 5 response because they

typically have coalition governments that restrict their military's participation in out-of-area activities. Therefore, outside of Article 5 responses, Helpful Allies hinder the organization from reaching consensus for an out-of-area activity unless the alliance is operating in response to a UNSC resolution. Even with a UNSC Resolution, countries in the Helpful category place significant caveats on their military participation because getting consent from national representatives requires compromises between elected officials. When a NATO Ally requests support, Helpful Allies are willing to do so, as long as the proposed action does not require substantial effort on their part. When a non-NATO member asks for support from the alliance, Helpful members advocate for a political solution with limited military risk.

Motivated Allies (high-Expeditionary Embeddedness and low-Diplomatic Embeddedness) are highly capable NATO Allies that create a willing coalition when the lowest common denominator approach does not address their national interest. Additionally, countries in the Motivated category could hold consensus hostage until the alliance addresses a unique domestic issue. Motivated Allies use their influence to persuade Fair-Share nations to follow their lead. Unlike Networked and Helpful Allies, countries in the Motivated category do not need approval from the UNSC to take action outside NATO's borders. They have the political will whenever their domestic governments deem it necessary to advance their national security. Lastly, Motivated Allies work with the alliance to design low-threat operations whenever a NATO-ally or non-NATO country asks directly for NATO's help.

Fair-Share Allies (low-Expeditionary Embeddedness and low-Diplomatic Embeddedness) fear abandonment from the alliance's strongest militaries and economies. Therefore, they contribute their proportional amount of resources to all NATO out-of-area activities because they want to be team players and engender themselves to the powerful allies. Countries in the Fair-

Share category joined NATO to access the Article 5 guarantee, modernize their country, build their government's capacity, and gain greater reach through their accession into the world's most renowned alliance. Fair-Share Allies see NATO's Article 5 guarantees as crucial to their national sovereignty. Consequently, the domestic pressure to maintain the alliance's collective defense outweighs its fear of entrapment in an out-of-area activity. Although the institution provides economic and military benefits, Fair-Share allies see NATO as a defensive alliance first and foremost. Therefore, when in doubt, they align their interests with the alliance's most powerful military, the United States, to ensure its support never wavers in the future. Fair Share allies' political will is tied to the organization continuing. Hence, they always approve an out-of-area activity and contribute at a level commensurate with its proportion of NATO forces. Often because of their lack of size, the Principals do not ask much beyond political support of Fair-Share Allies.

The level of Expeditionary and Diplomatic Embeddedness on a specific issue dictates which category a NATO Ally lands and can be seen in Figure 2. The Triumvirate, Germany, Canada, and Italy will always be in the Motivated or Networked categories because their vast resources make them institutional leaders in all scenarios. However, nations outside of the Principals can shift between the four categories. The shifting is predictable because each situation has a unique set of circumstances that depend on timing, geostrategic implications, balance-of-threat, and internal politics.




Figure 2 - NATO Consensus Categories Applied to Out-of-Area Activities - The Figure illustrates the four categories that NATO members occupy when the alliance tries to reach consensus for out-of-area activities. The issue at hand is Expeditionary Activity, and therefore, the Expeditionary Embeddedness captures the overlapping interests of the Triumvirate (France, UK, USA). Diplomatic Embeddedness is the number of multilateral political, social, and economic ties that connect a NATO member with the Triumvirate, Germany, Italy, and Canada.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

“Researchers conducting mixed methods studies are actually using both quantitative and qualitative approaches to conduct their “traditional” research designs, whether these are narrative studies, experimental studies, meta-analyses, ethnography, evaluations, action research, and so forth.”

John Creswell and Abbas Tashakkori,
Differing Perspectives on Mixed Methods Research, 2007

“Case selection and case analysis are intertwined to a much greater extent in case study research than in large-N cross-case analysis. The method of choosing cases and analyzing those cases can scarcely be separated when the focus of a work is on one or a few instances of some broader phenomenon.”

Jason Seawright and John Gerring,
Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research, 2008

“Mixed methods is increasingly being recognized across disciplines as a sound and pragmatic research approach. The utility of mixed methods research has been enhanced by its methodological flexibility to intersect or to be meaningfully integrated with other research approaches such as action research, by adding a solid methodological foundation and creating an integrated approach for addressing complex problems of practical importance.”

Nataliya Ivankova and Nancy Wingo,
Applying Mixed Methods in Action Research, 2018

To examine *how NATO selects, creates, and decides to pursue out-of-area movements in the 21st Century and what mechanisms facilitate that process* requires the use of mixed methods research (MMR) because there are multiple elements within the research question. The research question has two distinctive parts: analyzing a process and finding a mechanism(s) that assist the process. The former lends itself towards qualitative analysis and the latter quantitative.

Triangulation and integration are two types of MMR designs. Triangulation involves using two different methods (qualitative and quantitative) to ask the same question of causal inference and checking that both approaches produce the same conclusion. However, Triangulation has a fatal flaw. The possibility that the two methods produce different results. Conversely, integration carefully combines qualitative and quantitative approaches to support a single, unified causal inference. Therefore, an integrative design produces one method that tests, refines, and bolsters an analysis to generate a final causal inference. MMR designs that use integration use each methodology for what it is especially good at and minimize inferential weaknesses by using other methods to test, revise, or justify assumptions (Seawright 2016).¹³⁵

Researchers use MMR to collect, analyze, and integrate quantitative and qualitative data within a study or program of inquiry and generate conclusions addressing complex research questions to answer exploratory questions in a single investigation. As a result, MMR reveals a fuller picture of a problem in practice. When working in tandem, quantitative and qualitative approaches address questions looking to verify and generate knowledge in a single study (Ivankova and Wingo 2018).¹³⁶ I use a comprehensive MMR design to tests the existence and analytical

¹³⁵ Seawright, Jason. 2016. *Multi-Method Social Science: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Tools*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. P.4-10.

¹³⁶ Ivankova, Nataliya, and Nancy Wingo. 2018. "Applying Mixed Methods in Action Research: Methodological Potentials and Advantages." *American Behavioral Scientist* 62 (7): 978-997. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218772673>. P. 980-5.

power of Embeddedness Theory. Therefore, generating knowledge on how NATO selects, develops, and decides to pursue out-of-area operations in the 21st Century.

An integrative MMR approach best examines Embeddedness Theory's ability to explain NATO's process for pursuing out-of-area activities because it provides the framework to answer multiple questions in one study. As outlined in the previous chapter, three sub-questions underline the validity of Embeddedness Theory. First, do Expeditionary Embeddedness and Diplomatic Embeddedness exist? Second, do the two mechanisms interact and produce four categories with distinctive characteristics? Third, does NATO require each of the following four elements to pursue an out-of-area activity: 1) overlapping interests within the Triumvirate, 2) the Principals creating a ZOPA 3) sufficient political will, and 4) consensus building throughout the organization. Quantitative analysis can answer the first two questions, and qualitative research is best situated to answer the third.

Research Design Explained

Quantitative Versus Qualitative Analyses

Quantitative (statistical or large-N approaches) and Qualitative (case study or small-N approaches) have two cultures with different underlying assumptions and practices. The foundational differences can contradict or enhance knowledge across three broad areas: approaches to

explanation, conceptions of causation, and conceptual measurement (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).¹³⁷

The difference between statistical and case study analyses begins with how the two groups observe the world around them and select which problems to solve. Quantitative researchers have a general curiosity and do not want to focus on a specific outcome but patterns in a population. Therefore, scholars using statistical disciplines aggregate large swaths of data and perform analysis to explain how particular variables impact the world around them. Qualitative researchers are more intentional about their inquisitiveness because they identify the phenomenon they are interested in and examine what produced the result. They look to explain a specific outcome by illustrating what set of circumstances facilitated the rare event (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Mahoney 2010; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Seawright 2016; Brady and Collier 2010).

In addition to observational starting points, the two cultures have different concepts of causation and conceptual measurement. Quantitative and qualitative researchers use different kinds of observations to analyze the world and reach a conclusion. Whereas mainstream quantitative research uses Dataset Observations (DSOs), qualitative researchers rely primarily on Causal Process Observations (CPOs).

Quantitative researchers inherently see the world as random with multiple paths to a destination. Their fundamental goal is to determine what elements have the most significant effect on the journey to an end state. Put differently, they look to find what variables have the greatest impact and potentially cause an outcome. Statistical researchers generally select cases without regard for their value on the outcome variable. Choosing cases based on their value on the outcome

¹³⁷ Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2006. "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research." *Political Analysis* 14 (3): 227-249. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791851>. P. 229-31.

variable can bias findings in statistical research. Therefore, negative and positive outcome cases are weighted the same because the independent variables are the element of interest in this discipline (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).¹³⁸

A DSO is a row of data with a specified outcome variable and subsequent independent variables. Each row aggregates and is the basis of statistical analysis and standard regression techniques. The selection criteria are random and broad because statistical researchers do not have a central concept they are looking to test. As a result, quantitative research is not shaded towards a specific area or interested in a particular set of circumstances. Instead, the methodology is rooted in the complete set of cases available. Therefore, the conclusions are more general and less specific (Brady and Collier 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Mahoney 2010).

In contrast, qualitative researchers examine a particular set of circumstances using necessary and sufficient conditions and set logic via CPOs. Using a narrow scope and an orientation towards events that have already occurred, case study methods provide an in-depth analysis of a sporadic phenomenon. Qualitative researchers focus on rare circumstances because the negative outcome is infinite. In other words, the phenomenon is far more likely not to happen than to happen. Therefore, the challenge is finding the combination of events that lead to the rare occurrence taking place (Brady and Collier 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Mahoney 2010).

CPOs serve two fundamental research tasks. First, they develop, elaborate, or specify more precisely a given theory or hypothesis. Second, CPOs take one of three forms (independent, mechanism, or auxiliary) to test a theory's validity. Independent CPOs provide information about a variable's presence (or about the existence of a particular range of values on an independent

¹³⁸ Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2006. "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research." *Political Analysis* 14 (3): 227-249. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791851>. P. 239-41.

variable). CPOs that function as mechanisms provide information about whether an intervening event posited by a theory is present. Lastly, auxiliary CPOs are information about particular occurrences that should transpire alongside the primary outcome of interest if the theory made a correct prediction (Mahoney 2010).¹³⁹

A necessary condition means the occurrence of a specified event is a circumstance where the absence of the condition the event cannot occur. For example, the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for combustion to occur. A sufficient condition means an event's occurrence is a circumstance in whose presence the event must occur. For example, being in a specific temperature range in the presence of oxygen is a sufficient condition for the combustion of that substance to take place (Copi 1982).¹⁴⁰ To illuminate necessary and sufficient conditions, case study researchers use hoop and smoking gun tests. A hoop test is a hypothesis where the circumstance must comply, or else the hypothesis is false. Hoop tests illustrate a necessary but not sufficient condition for a phenomenon because failing the test makes the theory invalid. A smoking gun test presumes if specific pieces of evidence are present, then the hypothesis must be valid. A smoking gun test provides a sufficient but not necessary criterion for a theory (Bennett 2010).¹⁴¹

Broadly, the difference between the two schools of thought originates from their ultimate analytical goal. Quantitative analysis determines if a phenomenon exists and its consistent impact on an outcome through a “effects of causes” approach. Conversely, qualitative methods use a

¹³⁹ Mahoney, James. 2010. "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 62 (1): 120-147. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990220>. P. 125-7.

¹⁴⁰ Copi, Irving. 1982. *Introduction to Logic.Causal Connections: Mill's Methods of Experimental Inquiry*. New York: MacMillan. P.409-10.

¹⁴¹ Bennett, Andrew. 2010. *Process Tracing and Causal Inference.Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standard*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. P.209-10.

“causes of effects” approach to determine how an outcome changes based on the presence of certain variables (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).¹⁴²

A core goal of qualitative research is to explain the outcome of individual cases by identifying the variables that cause the specific outcomes for each case that falls within the scope of the theory under investigation. By starting with cases and their results and then moving backward to identify the causes and underlying elements, qualitative analysts use past events to analyze a unique phenomenon. On the other hand, quantitative analysts look to explain the average effects of a component on outcomes across a wide range of cases. Consequently, statistical approaches tend to offer a macroanalysis on a particular variable's impact, whereas case studies produce microanalysis on how variables interact to produce specific outcomes consistently. Therefore, to test the existence or average effects of a phenomenon, quantitative methods are superior. On the other hand, when a researcher wants to understand how a particular set of outcomes unfold, qualitative methods provide better tools.

Despite having different practices, norms, and underlying assumptions, qualitative and quantitative methods do not entirely seal themselves off from one another. For example, quantitative and qualitative scholars use CPOs for theory development (Mahoney 2010).¹⁴³ At times, using CPOs plays a pivotal role in a quantitative study. By defining and understanding the conceptual mechanism, the researcher can explain why a specific indicator is better than another when approximating a variable. CPOs are diagnostic nuggets of information that make a substantial contribution to a causal inference through the detective work of a researcher to analyze the sequence of events, gain knowledge from practitioners, or learn about the experiences of

¹⁴² Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2006. "A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research." *Political Analysis* 14 (3): 227-249. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791851>. P. 229-31.

¹⁴³ Mahoney, James. 2010. "After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 62 (1): 120-147. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990220>. P. 125-7.

individuals involved in the phenomenon through process tracing. If CPOs and DSOs work together and land on the same conclusion, they can make a powerful argument (Brady and Collier 2010).¹⁴⁴

Underlying Typology of Embeddedness Theory

Typologies are a well-established analytical tool used to organize systems of categorization. They make crucial contributions to diverse analytic tasks like forming and refining concepts, drawing out underlying dimensions, creating categories for measurement, and sorting cases (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012).¹⁴⁵ Embeddedness Theory has a typology that is unique because it combines qualitative and quantitative elements. The research theorizes and tests a proposal for NATO's decision-making process when evaluating out-of-area activities.

Embeddedness Theory explains NATO needs to obtain four elements to make a decision: 1) overlapping interests in the Triumvirate, 2) ZOPA creation by the Principals, 3) sufficient political will in the organization, and 4) consensus building throughout the organization. Each variable has a unique explanatory typology that impacts how the organization makes a decision. Explanatory typology requires an outcome to be separate from the variables which combine to create the result (Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012).¹⁴⁶ The four variables that impact NATO's decision-making process are separate from the organization pursuing an out-of-area activity.

¹⁴⁴ Brady, Henry, and David Collier. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. P. 201-3.

¹⁴⁵ Collier, David, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright. 2012. "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (1): 217-232. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/23209571>. P. 217.

¹⁴⁶ Collier, David, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright. 2012. "Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (1): 217-232. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/23209571>. P. 218.

Therefore, understanding the outcome variable's and four independent variables' conceptual underpinnings is essential to the research design.

Concepts have three levels: basic, secondary, and indicator. The basic level is the cognitive thoughts associated with an idea and constitute the theoretical proposition. Specifically, it is the noun to which adjectives attach. The secondary level involves giving a basic concept constitutive dimensions. The secondary level articulates the characteristics and magnitudes which form the ontological analysis of a concept. Additionally, the secondary level provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for a situation to fulfill a concept. Lastly, the indicator level is the specific operationalization of a concept. The tertiary level illustrates if the concept is dichotomous or continuous and what types of data can approximate the idea (Goertz 2005).¹⁴⁷

Embeddedness Theory has five variables, and each has a unique set of CPOs which develop the reasoning behind its measurement. Table 4 outlines each variable, its three conceptual levels, evaluation methodology, and CPO classification. An out-of-area activity materializing is the event being studied and, therefore, the outcome variable. An out-of-area activity is any operation that takes place outside of NATO's borders. The measurement is dichotomous because either the activity happens inside or outside of NATO's member territories.

Overlapping interests in the Triumvirate is an independent variable that is necessary for an out-of-area activity to materialize. The variable is present when the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have at least one shared interest in a region outside of NATO's borders. Using statements from political leaders from each country provides the methodological framework to determine if common interests exist between the three.

¹⁴⁷ Goertz, Gary. 2005. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P. 5-6.

The definition for “Principals Creating a ZOPA” is when the Triumvirate, Canada, Germany, and Italy express support and outline the parameters for participation in an out-of-area activity. Like with overlapping Triumvirate interests, by observing each nation’s public declarations on a particular issue, the parameters for an out-of-area operation are understood. Additionally, a government stating its disagreement with a proposed activity would be readily available and would negate the existence of a ZOPA. The indicator is dichotomous because either the six countries are on board with an out-of-area operation, or they are not.

Embeddedness Theory explains obtaining sufficient political will is the variable that unlocks a significant portion of allies' support for NATO pursuing an out-of-area campaign. While there are four ways to impact political will, only a NATO member suffering an armed attack triggering Article 5 or the UNSC passing a resolution with an Article 39 Designation and a Chapter VII Directive achieve sufficient political will throughout the organization. Therefore, the indicator for sufficient political will is a qualitative dichotomous variable present when official text from the UNSC or NAC exists with the conditions met.

Building Consensus is inherently a necessary condition because NATO does not ratify a solution if any nation objects to a proposal. However, a country’s willingness to work with other allies and find a workable solution for the alliance is a function of a nation’s level of Diplomatic Embeddedness (DE) and Expeditionary Embeddedness (EE). NATO Allies fall into one of four consensus categories: Networked (High DE | High EE), Motivated (Low DE | High EE), Helpful (High DE | Low EE), and Fair-Share (Low DE | Low EE). Each category has a set of characteristics that impact its capacity for consensus-building (Table 8). While conceptually, the four categories have value, they lack validity because they only exist theoretically. Proving the existence of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness statistically bolsters their analytical power. Once

confirmed, statistical methods then develop the two terms' interaction to demonstrate the four conceptual categories' legitimacy. Using quantitative methods to establish the two mechanisms and four categories provides a firmer foundation for Embeddedness Theory. By solidifying the Consensus Building variable's foundation, the qualitative analysis in the case studies becomes more compelling.

Variable Type	Basic Level	Secondary Level	Indicator Level	Methodological Approach	CPO Type
Outcome Variable	Out-of-Area Activity	Operation that takes place outside of NATO's borders	Dichotomous: 0 = inside NATO 1 = outside NATO	Qualitative	n/a
Independent Variable	Overlapping interests in Triumvirate	France, UK, and USA have at least one interest in common	Dichotomous 0 = not present 1 = present	Qualitative	Independent
Independent Variable	ZOPA Creation from Principals	Triumvirate, Canada, Germany, and Italy express their limits for an operation	Dichotomous 0 = not present 1 = present	Qualitative	Independent
Independent Variable	Sufficient Political Will	NATO Invokes Article 5 or has a UNSCR with Article 39 designation & Chapter VII directive	Dichotomous: 0 = Neither present 1 = at least one present	Qualitative	Mechanism
Independent Variable	Consensus Building	Intersection of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness	Categorical: Networked = HDE / HEE Motivated = LDE / HDE Helpful = HDE / LEE Fair-Share = LDE / LEE	Quantitative & Qualitative	Mechanism

Table 4 - Variable Explanation and Typology: The table illustrates whether a variable type, the three conceptual levels of each variable, the evaluation methodology, and condition type. Variables have two types: outcome and independent. The three conceptual levels illustrate how a variable is defined and quantified in the analysis. The condition type is either necessary or sufficient.

Competing Theories

Embeddedness Theory explains a NATO out-of-activity results when the Triumvirate selects an issue, the Principals create a ZOPA, sufficient political will exist, and NATO reaches consensus. The subsequent large-N regression analysis, qualitative case study analysis, and interviews with NATO practitioners refute the Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories. The Hegemonic Power theory explains that NATO out-of-area campaigns follow the United States' strategic aims because the institution is a veil for US foreign policy. Therefore, NATO achieves consensus due to its subordinate position to the United States. The Preference Convergence theory explains NATO's out-of-area activities emerge whenever all member interests align. Inferring each member of NATO has equal opportunity to coalesce allies around an idea and influence policy. Therefore, when NATO achieves consensus, it results from shared threat and support for a particular activity and subsequently proportional resources from all allies.

Neorealist Hegemonic Power Theory

Neorealists explain NATO persisted after the Cold War because the United States repurposed the institution as an offensive alliance that would allow Washington to project power throughout Europe and the world via a legitimate international organization (Layne 2000b; Sireci and Coletta

2009).¹⁴⁸ Hegemonic Power theory is within the Neorealist framework. It explains NATO pursues out-of-area campaigns as an extension of the United States' foreign policy because America operates in a unipolar world. Being the only country with the requisite diplomatic, military, political, and economic resources to involve itself in any conflict in any part of the world creates the United States' preeminence (Krauthammer 1990).¹⁴⁹

As a result, Hegemonic Power theory expects the United States to use its asymmetric power and influence to coerce Brussels into acquiescing to its foreign policy objectives. Coercion could come in one of two forms, first, through efforts to convince NATO to take a particular course of action – by imposing or threatening to impose costs (M. Henke 2019; Thompson 2009).¹⁵⁰ Second, using economic, security, or institutional influences to establish a hierarchy that compels less-resourced nations to make costly acts or contributions that acknowledges their lower position in the order (Lake 2009).¹⁵¹

Hegemonic Power theory anticipates NATO selects issues and creates coalitions to execute out-of-area campaigns when the United States highlights an international issue as a foreign policy concern. For the Hegemonic Power prediction to hold, when the United States advocates for an out-of-area campaign, NATO should pursue that operation. Additionally, whenever an Ally's preferences clash with the United States' wishes, NATO should side with Washington. Lastly, if the United States does not want to pursue an out-of-area campaign, NATO should not engage. The Hegemonic Power theory views NATO as a privileged group where the United States obtains a

¹⁴⁸ Layne, Christopher. 2000. "US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 23 (3): 59-91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390008437800>. P. 59.

¹⁴⁹ Krauthammer, Charles. 1990. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1): 23-33. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20044692>. P. 24.

¹⁵⁰ Thompson, Alexander. 2009. *Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. P. 16.

¹⁵¹ Lake, David. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. P. 165.

private benefit that exceeds the cost of providing the majority of resources for an out-of-area activity (Olson 1965).¹⁵²

Neoliberal Preference Convergence Theory

Neoliberals suggest that NATO continued after the Cold War's conclusion because the institution's forty years of norms, rules, procedures, and successfully defeating the Soviet Union solidified a political and security relationship between its members. The comradery, political dialogue, and Article 5 guarantee made NATO an indispensable resource for transatlantic security (McCalla 1996; Adler 2008).¹⁵³ Despite member participation in other international organizations, NATO became the preferred vehicle to achieve North American and European security because it had mechanisms that facilitated political consultation and military planning (Johnston 2017; Sloan and Stavridis 2016; I. Daalder 2000).¹⁵⁴ Throughout the 1990s, NATO transformed from a defensive alliance designed to counter Soviet aggression into a security provider, allowing its members to coordinate efforts to address security concerns efficiently (Wallander 2000).¹⁵⁵ Neoliberals predict NATO's institutions made it a dependable organization for all members to work together and address emerging out-of-area security threats in the 21st century.

¹⁵² Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 46-50.

¹⁵³ McCalla, Robert. 1996. "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50 (3): 445-75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033440>. P. 452.

¹⁵⁴ Johnston, Seth. 2017. *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance*. JHU Press. Chapter 6.

¹⁵⁵ Wallander, Celeste. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War." *International Organization* 54 (4): 705-735. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343>. P.705-9.

The neoliberalism Preference Convergence theory predicts out-of-area activities will materialize when all members have a shared threat perception and the entire institution works in concert (Bearce and Bondanella 2007a, 2007b).¹⁵⁶ As a result, NATO out-of-area coalitions will have a proportional contribution from each member. The Preference Convergence theory implicitly views NATO as a latent group that requires the institution to coordinate efforts between members to create an out-of-area coalition (Olson 1965).¹⁵⁷ The shared threat perception is a tenet of Alliance theory. Alliance scholars propose multilateral coalitions form as a way for countries to address the most imminent threat or defeat a common foe (A. Smith 1995; Weitsman 2003).¹⁵⁸ Preference Convergence theory explains no NATO member will free ride during an out-of-area activity because the institution requires a proportional contribution from each member. Otherwise, the campaign will not obtain its full benefits for the alliance.

Applying Mixed Methods Approach

Qualitative Theoretical Drive with Quantitative Support

The theoretical drive of Embeddedness Theory is explaining a process for a specific entity, NATO. Therefore, the core component of the analysis is qualitative, and the supplemental is quantitative.

¹⁵⁶Bearce, David H., and Stacy Bondanella. 2007. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence." *International Organization* 61 (4): 703-33. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070245>. P.708.

¹⁵⁷ Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 50-3.

¹⁵⁸ Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (4): 405-25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600800>. P.409-11.

When qualitative research drives an MMR design, it is developing a theory and, therefore, inductive. Qualitative dominant MMR relies on a constructivist poststructuralist-critical view of the research process while concurrently recognizing that the addition of quantitative data and approaches provide benefits. The theoretical drive creates dependences because the supplemental component relies on the core component's context (Schoonenboom and Johnson 2017).¹⁵⁹ The goal of testing a qualitative theory against two other theories drives the research design.

Embeddedness Theory has four conceptual variables which combined to create a process. The first three variables, overlapping interests in the Triumvirate, the Principals creating a ZOPA, and achieving sufficient political will, are independent and do not lend themselves to quantitative methodology. All three elements conceptually do not benefit from particular indicators beyond a binary theoretical proposition. To test each variable's presence and effects on the outcome do not need a sample population beyond the five case studies: KFOR, ISAF, NTM-I, OPER, and OUP. However, measuring how the alliance builds consensus for an out-of-area activity benefits from more specific indicators and expanding the sample population.

The four consensus building categories for out-of-area operations depend on the intersection of Expeditionary and Diplomatic Embeddedness. Conceptually, Diplomatic Embeddedness is the number of multilateral political, social, and economic ties that connect a NATO member with the Triumvirate, Germany, Italy, and Canada. Expeditionary Embeddedness is the distance a NATO Ally is from the intersection of the Triumvirate's preferences. To solidify the existence of Embeddedness theory, ensuring Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness exist is fundamental.

¹⁵⁹ Schoonenboom, Judith, and R. Burke Johnson. 2017. "How to Construct a Mixed Methods Research Design." *KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 69 (2): 107-131. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-017-0454-1>. P. 112-3, P. 123. .

To verify Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness takes three steps. First, the number of observations expands from the five cases (KFOR, ISAF, NTM-I, OPER, and OUP) to the entire population of NATO's out-of-area activities by aggregating DSOs. By looking at the whole set of NATO out-of-area operations post-Cold War, the quantitative results provide confident findings because they are comprehensive and not the result of cherry-picking. Second, each type of embeddedness must have independent statistical significance to prove it is a unique consensus-building component. Third, there must be a statistically significant difference between each of the four NATO categories: Networked, Motivated, Helpful, and Fair-Share. The categories result from creating a high and low threshold for each type of embeddedness and then evaluating the result of when the two variables with corresponding levels interact. To have credibility, the four kinds of NATO Allies must have quantitative results that are statistically significant and match the conceptual assumptions of their respective categories mentioned in Table 8 at the end of the chapter.

Although testing Embeddedness Theory does not require quantitative analysis, performing statistical analysis enhances the qualitative findings. By demonstrating the conceptual underpinnings of consensus building, the reader and future researchers become more confident in the subsequent case-study results. The reader becomes more secure in the conceptualization of consensus building because the ideas of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness have verified value. Additionally, the reader accompanies a quantifiable appreciation for the differences between the four NATO categories with the conceptual distinctions. Finally, future researchers have a new set of metrics and methodologies to build on.

Case Selection

While large-N regression analysis provides a macro view of Diplomatic Embeddedness, Expeditionary Embeddedness, and the four NATO Consensus Categories: Networked, Motivated, Helpful, and Fair-Share, it does not demonstrate the collective action process for NATO selecting, developing, and deciding to pursue an out-of-area activity. To make a more compelling argument, I use process tracing techniques to compare Embeddedness Theory with Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories across five cases (Table 5).

Out-of-Area Activity Name	Start of Analysis	End of Analysis	Location	Mission Type
KFOR	1 January 1998	11 June 1999	Kosovo	Peace Enforcement
ISAF	1 February 2002	11 August 2003	Afghanistan	Conflict Resolution
NTM-I	1 February 2003	14 August 2004	Iraq	Training & Mentoring
OPER	1 February 2005	1 February 2006	Pakistan	Humanitarian
OUP	1 September 2009	27 March 2011	Libya	Conflict Resolution

Table 5 - Five Case Studies: The five cases used to test Embeddedness Theory against Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories. The five cases vary between duration, location, and mission type (NATO 2019d).¹⁶⁰

I used a combination of diverse and deviant case strategies to select these five cases. Diverse case selection looks to achieve maximum variance along relevant dimensions. The results from a diverse set of cases demonstrate the durability of a theory by having a wide range of elements. Deviant strategies entail selecting cases that have a surprising value or offer theoretical anomalies.

¹⁶⁰ NATO. 2019c. Operations and Missions: Past and Present. In *NATO Encyclopedia*, edited by Public Relations. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. P. 423 – 445.

Deviant cases are useful for probing for new findings or testing existing theories (Seawright and Gerring 2008).¹⁶¹

KFOR, ISAF, NTM-I, OPER, and OUP offer a wide area of dates, locations, and mission types. Representing a continuation of NATO's efforts in the Balkans, Kosovo (KFOR) demonstrates an air campaign that morphed into ground force peacekeeping missions. Libya (OUP) presents an air campaign that took place in Northern Africa without a follow-on ground mission. Taking place in the Middle East, ISAF was an extended ground mission with multiple objectives over the campaign. The Pakistan earthquake relief effort (OPER) shows NATO's humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Lastly, the mission in Iraq (NTM-I) highlights NATO's ability to train and assist nations outside of the alliance with non-traditional ties. Therefore, the array of factors provides a comprehensive proving ground to compare Embeddedness, Hegemonic Power, and Preference Convergence theories.

Additionally, each case offers a unique outlier when compared to the other four. For instance, Kosovo is the only case on the European continent. Therefore, there is an implicit test of regional interests amongst the NATO members. Pakistan is the only campaign that is in response to a natural disaster. Inherently, OPER tests Lepgold's assumption that NATO responds differently to conflict resolution missions versus humanitarian assistance (Lepgold 1998).¹⁶² The Iraq training mission highlights a contentious time in NATO's history. Before NTM-I, NATO resisted its most vital member's desires to topple Saddam Hussein. Combining breath and abnormality provides a comprehensive set of circumstances across the five cases to determine how NATO decides to pursue out-of-area activities.

¹⁶¹ Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 294-308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077>. P. 297-302.

¹⁶² Lepgold, Joseph. 1998. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23 (1): 78-106. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P.95-9.

Scope Conditions and Limitations

Each case concentrates specifically on the 18-month window prior to NATO commencing the execution of an out-of-area activity. Therefore, the “End of Analysis” date in Table 5 signifies the day NAC approved or the MC started an out-of-area movement.¹⁶³ The examination period ends there to focus the analysis on the initial decision-making process that led to the creation of an out-of-area activity. The research question centers on policy design, not the continuation or conclusion of an out-of-area activity. Sewn into each foreign policy decision are the current circumstances of the world domestically and internationally. How policies continue and conclude have different sets of events, variables, and contributing factors than how an operation starts. While the Embeddedness Theory’s framework could apply in additional settings, the purpose of the current analysis is to understand how NATO selects, develops, and decides to pursue an out-of-area activity. Therefore, focusing on the initial 18-months that lead to the NAC deciding to proceed with the operation is the appropriate examination period.

NATO is a highly guarded institution. NATO classifies votes in the NAC, MC, and subsequent committees for up to 30 years and only allows access to source documents by visiting its archives. Additionally, NATO guards force generation numbers, national contributions to particular campaigns, activities, and operations for alliance security reasons. Whereas the United Nations makes their votes and contributions publicly available, NATO requires a security

¹⁶³ Exception is OPER. This is the date the operation ended. OPER only lasted for 5 months, therefore I took the day it ended and worked backwards. This design deviation was due to the opportunity to encapsulate an entire operation in one 18-month study. No other activity offers that opportunity.

clearance and a need to know to gain access to its inner workings past and present. As a result, the analysis would benefit from increased access to the NATO archives, official datasets, and voting results by nation.

All of the cases have a period that overlaps with at least one NATO expansion Table 6. While the research does not aim to critique NATO's expansion by covering a 13-year span that encapsulates multiple enlargements, the analysis will indirectly critique the impact of the alliance's expansion on out-of-area activities.

Expansion Year	Nations Accessed
1999	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
2004	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
2009	Albania, Croatia

Table 6 - Three NATO Expansions: The Table illustrates the three NATO expansions with the nations accessed between 1999 and 2014.

The key actors and methodological design are not affected by expansion. First, the Triumvirate and Principals were consistent members of NATO throughout. Second, Expeditionary and Diplomatic Embeddedness are dependent on the relationship of the Triumvirate and Principals, respectively. Therefore, NATO's enlargement is a complementary factor in analyzing the research question because with an increase in membership comes an elevated difficulty in reaching consensus.

Case Study Analysis Techniques – Process Tracing

Process tracing takes three forms: causal process observations (CPOs), descriptions, and sequences of events (Collier 2011).¹⁶⁴ Process tracing is rooted in case analysis and uses logic and set theory to make inferences about a case using necessary and sufficient conditions to test a phenomenon's existence in a given case (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).¹⁶⁵ To make a causal claim about Embeddedness Theory, I employ a series of hoop and smoking gun tests on five NATO out-of-area activities. Specifically, I examine four observable implications for each case to test the Embeddedness Theory against Preference Convergence and Hegemonic Power theories (Table 7).

Embeddedness Theory posits four elements are necessary and sufficient for NATO to pursue an out-of-area activity. Issue Selection, ZOPA Creation, Sufficient Political Will, and Building. The five cases provide opportunities to test all three theories on the same set of circumstances.

Issue selection is how a situation outside of NATO's borders becomes highlighted by NATO and discussed. Embeddedness Theory stipulates if the Triumvirate does not have an overlapping interest, the operation never materializes. If France, the United Kingdom, or the United States disagrees with a location's salience, the alliance never pursues an activity in that area. Hegemonic Power advances that the United States preference is the main point of view required to move an issue through NATO's bureaucracy. Therefore, if the United States advocates for a campaign or activity in a location and it does not happen, Hegemonic Power fails the requisite hoop test. Lastly, Preference Convergence explains the institutional framework of NATO brings

¹⁶⁴ Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 44 (4): 823-30. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429>. P.823-4.

¹⁶⁵ Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. 2012. *A tale of two cultures: qualitative and quantitative research in the social sciences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. P. 2.

issues to the organization. Allowing nations outside of the Triumvirate can highlight and urge the institution to look at a situation outside of NATO's borders. If countries outside of the Triumvirate do not move the institution towards pursuing an out-of-area activity, then Preference Convergence fails the Issue Selection hoop test.

ZOPA creation is the process where a policy and strategic objectives materialize. While the votes and consultations are classified, press releases, press conference sessions, and interviews with NATO practitioners reveal the behind-the-scenes activities between nations in Brussels and Mons. Embeddedness Theory explains the Principals (Triumvirate plus Canada, Germany, and Italy) set the ZOPA. If any of the six disagree with NATO pursuing an out-of-area activity, the operation never materializes because each has networks that will block consensus. Developing strategic objectives is a smoking gun test where Principals define joint preferences to maximize benefits for all NATO members choosing to participate in the out-of-area activity.

Hegemonic Power postulates the plan of action comes from the United States. The remainder of the alliance takes on a subordinate role and ops into the United States plan when it suits its national interest. Therefore, if a country outside of the United States limits or advances an out-of-area activity, Hegemonic Power fails the Hoop test.

Preference Convergence theory requires nations outside of the Principals to take the lead on discussions for the execution or have a pivotal role in creating an out-of-area activity. If any country outside of the Principals leads the alliance towards the out-of-area campaign, then the Embeddedness Theory fails the hoop test.

Sufficient political will is the willingness to apply a specific policy given that the necessary knowledge and tools for the initiative already exist. Embeddedness Theory explains four instances impact a NATO Ally's political will: a NATO member suffering an armed attack, a UNSC

resolution permitting force, a NATO Ally requesting assistance, and a non-NATO country asking for help. Although all four have an impact, only the first two generate sufficient political will consistently. Therefore, if a NATO ally suffers an attack or UNSC passes a resolution with the requisite parts (Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII Directive), NATO should pursue an out-of-area activity or Embeddedness Theory fails the hoop test.

Hegemonic Power explains that NATO having sufficient political will is a byproduct of the United States' interest in an out-of-area activity. Like with ZOPA creation, the remaining NATO members take a secondary role to the United States and politically consent to America's willingness to execute an out-of-area activity. Therefore, if nations resist the United States, then Hegemonic Power fails the hoop test. Conversely, the Preference Convergence theory postulates each NATO ally's source of sufficient political will originates from their shared threat perception. Therefore, invoking Article 5 or the UNSC passing a resolution are not requirements for nations to pursue an out-of-area activity. If NATO approves an out-of-area movement without invoking Article 5 or a UNSC, Embeddedness Theory fails the hoop test set up by Preference Convergence theory.

Building Consensus is the act of getting all NATO Allies to approve or abstain through policy incentives, side-payments, or institutional pressure. The quantitative analysis illustrates how the intersection of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness creates four types of Consensus Builders in NATO: Networked, Motivated, Fair-Share, and Helpful. Each Ally has a set of characteristics that impact how the institution reaches consensus. Embeddedness Theory explains that for an out-of-area operation to materialize, there is inherently politicking between countries to ensure each member contributes in a way that maximizes its position. The profiles

highlight where countries have leverage and weak points and where side deals are most likely to happen (Table 7).

The existence of side deals is a smoking gun test for each of the four categories' validity. For example, suppose a Fair-Share Ally makes a public statement in support of the United States position. In that case, the declaration bolsters Embeddedness Theory's claim on the relationship between the United States and Fair-Share countries. Additionally, the consensus categories signal where countries make concessions on their strategic objectives and responsibilities. Again, suppose a group of Motivated Allies convinces Networked Allies to pursue one of their policy objectives. In that case, that is a smoking gun in support of Embeddedness Theory.

Hegemonic Power views consensus-building as the United States using its economic and military power to coerce fellow allies through threats or bribes to support or abstain from the proposal for an out-of-area activity. If a nation successfully resists the United States or makes side-payments that help the alliance reach consensus, Hegemonic Power fails the hoop test. Conversely, there is little deal-making in Preference Convergence theory because each nation sees value in the out-of-area activity and contributes to the operation at a rate proportional to its size of NATO forces. Therefore, if many countries under-provide or over-provide to an out-of-area activity, Preference Convergence fails a hoop test. Similarly, if the out-of-area operation's approval highlights a significant use of institutional pressure, side deals, or policy concessions, Preference Convergence fails a smoking gun test.

Overall, the five cases provide the necessary range and depth to evaluate how NATO selects and executes out-of-area activities in the 21st Century. The research will highlight trends in the out-of-area activity selection, development, and execution process. Additionally, the findings will reveal areas where the alliance could have tension in the future with China's rise and

increased Russian aggression. Lastly, by combining large-N regression analysis, small-n case analysis, and interviews with NATO practitioners, the research provides a comprehensive look at Embeddedness Theory and a road map for future scholars to investigate.

Collective Action Step	Embeddedness Theory	Hegemonic Power	Preference Convergence
Issue Selection	<p>Triumvirate (France, UK, & USA) have at least one common interests and see a benefit in intervening outside of NATO's borders.</p> <p>If there is no common interest the activity never materializes under the NATO banner.</p>	<p>USA advances their desire to pursue a particular issue outside of NATO's borders.</p>	<p>Multiple nations bring forward an out-of-area activity to the NAC.</p> <p>Nations outside of the Triumvirate have as much weight in the organization as the USA, UK, & France.</p>
ZOPA Creation	<p>Principals (Triumvirate, Canada, Germany, and Italy) articulate support and parameters for out-of-area activity.</p> <p>Without support of all six countries, the activity never materializes.</p>	<p>The alliance adopts the United States' plan of action.</p> <p>NATO does not work collaboratively and takes a subordinate role the United States foreign policy objectives.</p>	<p>Nations outside of the Principals lead the discussions or set the objectives for an out-of-area campaign.</p>
Sufficient Political Will	<p>There is an Article 5 attack on a NATO ally.</p> <p>The Principals use their network to create a UNSCR.</p> <p>Without at least one of the two, the activity never materializes.</p>	<p>NATO has sufficient political will because the United States is advocating for the organization to pursue the out-of-area activity.</p>	<p>Nations share threat perception, goals, and desired end state.</p> <p>NATO approves out-of-area activities without an Article 5 attack on an ally or a UNSCR because they are not necessary for the institution.</p>
Building Consensus	<p>The four types of NATO members work together to achieve an agreement via policy concessions and side deals.</p>	<p>The United States uses coercion via treat or bribe to compel resistant NATO allies to support the out-of-area activity.</p>	<p>NATO members have limited to no consternation about supporting the activity and give proportional resources to support.</p>

Table 7 - Summary of Observable Implications: The table illustrates the four elements that are necessary for the manifestation of a NATO out-of-area activity according to Embeddedness Theory. The table serves as a guide to highlight the expectations for the three theories: Embeddedness, Hegemonic Power, and Preference Convergence. The five cases will reveal which theory better predicts NATO's decision-making process for NATO's out-of-area activities.

Category Type	Political Will Threshold	Military Participation	Impact on Consensus
<p>Networked <i>high-Diplomatic Embeddedness</i> <i>high-Expeditionary Embeddedness</i></p>	Require an Article 5 Attack or Passing of UNSCR to support an out-of-area activity	<p>Willing to use military with limited caveats if out-of-area activity is in national interests</p> <p>Look to create lowest common denominator activity amongst NATO allies</p>	<p>Barrier to consensus when out-of-area activity conflicts with domestic interest.</p> <p>Facilitator of consensus when activity is in national interests.</p> <p>Have influence on Helpful Allies</p>
<p>Motivated <i>low-Diplomatic Embeddedness</i> <i>high-Expeditionary Embeddedness</i></p>	Only require domestic approval to support an out-of-area activity	<p>Provide the required number of forces to execute its national interests through NATO</p> <p>Tend to have limited caveats on military</p>	<p>Could hold consensus hostage until alliance addresses a unique domestic issue</p> <p>Facilitator of consensus when activity is in national interests</p> <p>Have influence on Fair-Share Allies</p>
<p>Helpful <i>high Diplomatic Embeddedness</i> <i>low-Expeditionary Embeddedness)</i></p>	Require an Article 5 Attack or Passing of UNSCR to support an out-of-area activity	Place significant caveats on military because domestic politics limits use of military for interests outside of a response to an Article 5 attack	Work with Networked members to limit burden on their military
<p>Fair-Share <i>low-Diplomatic Embeddedness</i> <i>low-Expeditionary Embeddedness</i></p>	<p>See NATO as a defensive alliance</p> <p>Fear abandonment from stronger members</p> <p>Lean towards supporting out-of-area activity to keep in high esteem with the United States</p>	Make a contribution at a level commensurate with its proportion of NATO forces.	<p>Rarely a hindrance to consensus.</p> <p>If the organization has political will to pursue an activity, they acquiesce</p>

Table 8 - Summary of Observable Actions from NATO Consensus Categories: The table shows the four NATO categories. Each category has expectations tested across five cases via three aspects: Political Will Threshold, Military Participation, and Impact on Consensus. “Political Will” is how the category approaches an out-of-area activity. “Military Participation” is how the category intends to use its resources for the out-of-area activity. “Impact on Consensus” signals where potential conflicts take place within the alliance during the deal-making process.

CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

“Experience shows how very difficult it is for allies to reach firm agreement on the distribution of the burdens of defense. Each ally tends to weigh its burden more heavily than that of its partners. Understanding the ability and willingness of America's allies to take up burdens abandoned by United States is the key to balancing risks and costs, because appropriate force thresholds depend not only upon the risks that policy makers are willing to accept and the capabilities of the potential enemy, but upon available allied forces as well.”

L.R. Jones and Fred Thompson
Burden Sharing Among America and Its Allies, 1990

“The present period is partly analogous insofar as NATO won a cold war and thus far at least has facilitated continued cooperation by outlasting the effects of Soviet disintegration and German unification.”

Andrew Bennett and Joseph Lepgold
Reinventing Collective Security After the Cold War and Gulf Conflict, 1993

“The organization of effective ‘coalitions of the willing’ may become more difficult, if and when Allies judge that the crises at hand are not central enough to national-security interests to justify the risks and costs involved.”

David Yost
The New NATO and Collective Security, 1998

“By using a relative force share index that calculates deployed troops to a NATO operation as a share of states’ active-duty personnel, we found that middle powers carried a disproportionately high share of NATO’s burden. They contributed more to NATO’s collective peace operations than their conventional major power counterparts (for example, France, Germany).”

Benjamin Zyla
Who is Keeping the Peace and Who is Free-Riding?, 2010

Over the years, the division of burden-sharing in the NATO alliance has incited an extensive body of academic literature. While this research almost exclusively focused on defense budgets during the Cold War period, the division of the responsibilities to conduct out-of-area operations has come under an increasing level of academic scrutiny since the 1990s, with various quantitative studies (Haesebrouck 2017).¹⁶⁶

Post-Cold War, there was a shift in the global order that changed political concerns across the transatlantic alliance. The shifts placed the middle powers in a new position. On the one hand, the end of bipolar power dynamics gave them new prominence in international organizations. On the other hand, it presented them with new roles and responsibilities, especially in regional order governance in Europe. They experienced tremendous internal institutional pressures, mainly by the major powers (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States), to shoulder a more significant share of the Atlantic burden, especially in NATO (Zyla 2016).¹⁶⁷

In addition to new institutional burdens on countries like Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain, from 1999 to 2009, NATO expanded membership from 16 to 28. Besides membership enlargement, five elements impacted the alliance's functionality. First, there was a widening gap in weaponry and technology among the allies. Second, there was a much greater reliance on out-of-area missions that involve combat and nation-building operations in areas away from member territories. Third, economic challenges stressed many NATO budgets and made them reassess their defense and non-defense public expenditures. Fourth the post-9/11 era and the war on terror impacted NATO members differently because each nation had varying proximity to international terrorism. Fifth, throughout the early 21st century, there was a decreased concern about Russia as

¹⁶⁶ Haesebrouck, Tim. 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (10): 2235-2261. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715626248>. P. 2236.

¹⁶⁷ Zyla, Benjamin. 2016. "Who is Keeping the Peace and Who is Free-Riding? NATO Middle Powers and Burden Sharing, 1995-2001." *International Politics (Hague, Netherlands)* 53 (3): 303-23. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2016.2>. P. 304.

a threat that permeated the alliance (Sandler and Shimizu 2014).¹⁶⁸ In 2012, then president Barack Obama replied, “The 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back because the Cold War’s been over for 20 years,” when presidential challenger Mitt Romney suggested that Russia was the United States’ top geopolitical threat during a presidential debate (Kessler 2014). From the fall of the Berlin Wall through the annexation of Crimea, NATO pursued new aims from its original design.

Despite consternation on which nations fulfilled their new obligations regarding the “Three C’s” cost, contributions, and capabilities, NATO continued. Often scholars debate the burden-sharing post-Cold War through the lens of participation in out-of-area activities. Traditionally, there are approaches to the discussion: absolute numbers and relative contributions. The absolute camp focuses on the total number of contributions via the amount of service member deaths, the number of troops supplied, or level of military caveats (Haesebrouck 2017; Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger 1994; Sandler and Shimizu 2014; L. Jones and Thompson 1990; Murdoch and Sandler 2000; Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Hallams and Schreer 2012). The relative crowd focuses on proportional contributions where the authors account for the percentage of a nation’s military used for NATO operations (Zyla 2016, 2010; Ringsmose 2010).

Although both perspectives have value, they tend to slant the conclusions in one direction or another. Using absolute numbers tends to tilt positive results towards the Quad because they are the nations with the most resources. Using relative contributions tends to shade the results towards middle and smaller NATO members. Analyzing participation is critical because contributions to specific operations signal a nation’s support for the activity and their desire to build consensus within the alliance. Therefore, to have a comprehensive picture of how NATO members contribute, looking at both the relative numbers and absolute numbers simultaneously in the model is critical. Through understanding the absolute and relative contributions of NATO members, the model deduces the impact of Expeditionary Embeddedness, Diplomatic embeddedness, and the four NATO Consensus Categories.

¹⁶⁸ Sandler, Todd, and Hirofumi Shimizu. 2014. "NATO Burden Sharing 1999-2010." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (1): 43-60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00192.x>. P. 44.

Inspiration for Quantitative Model

Influences from Lake, Henke, and Zyla

My statistical analysis draws inspiration from quantitative work testing coalition formation done by David Lake and Marina Henke. Lake created a dataset that included fifteen US-led interventions conducted between 1950 and 2000 to test the effects of economic and security hierarchy on coalition contributions (Lake 2009).¹⁶⁹ Lake test coalition participation through an outcome variable called coalition participation. Coalition participation is a dichotomous variable where 0 = no participation and 1 = participation.

Lake's independent variables overlap Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories. To test the impact of coercion theory (which resembles Hegemonic Power theory), Lake uses two hierarchy indices to measure how dependent a state is on the United States. The security hierarchy index measures a state's dependence on the United States security umbrella through two indicators. The first is an indicator that measures the United States forces' presence on the potential coalition participant's territory. The second, the number of non-U.S. alliances possessed by the potential coalition contributor. The second index, the "economic hierarchy index," captures a state's economic dependence on the United States uses two indicators as well. First, an indicator that measures economic reliance on the United States, and second, an indicator measuring the

¹⁶⁹ Lake, David. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. P.165-7.

relative trade dependence of the potential coalition participant on the United States (Lake 2009).¹⁷⁰

Lake's variables intend to account for how much the United States influence coerces nations to join into a multilateral military operation. The United States influence that Lake captures in his model is similar to the Hegemonic Power theory I look to test. If NATO is a veil for US foreign policy, nations that participate in an out-of-area campaign will be heavily dependent on the United States for political, economic, or security protections.

To test Preference Convergency theory, Lake uses three variables: same region, joint primary language, and joint democracy. According to the Correlates of War definitions, the same region is a dichotomous variable that codes as present when a country is in the same region as the coalition's target. Joint primary language is a dichotomous variable that codes as present when a country shares a principal language with the United States. Joint democracy is a dichotomous variable that codes as present when a polity IV score of greater than seven. Together, the three variables illustrate when a country shares preferences with the United States via geography, culture, or political regime type. For control variables, Lake calculates various variables to account for a nation's relative power, military capabilities, government stability, and international legitimation (Lake 2009).¹⁷¹ Through his modeling and case study analysis, Lake determines international hierarchy not only exists it matters and influences policy behaviors of nations around the world. Order influences the choices of powerful and weak countries in both directions. More vulnerable subordinate nations follow the lead of dominant states for their national security and often find themselves in wars that are not in their direct national interests. At the same time, dominant nations are quick to support their subordinate countries to ensure free trade routes. As a

¹⁷⁰ Lake, David. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. P.68-72.

¹⁷¹ Lake, David. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. P.198-9.

result, Lake determines dominant states have hard power over their subordinate states and exercise soft power to influence subordinate states' domestic politics. Overall, Lake explains the United States position at the top of the international hierarchy is powerful and does not have a rival as of 2009 (Lake 2009).¹⁷²

Henke expands on Lake's study by examining multiple outcome variables. In addition to measuring if a nation participates in a coalition, Henke uses a second dichotomous variable, which measures if a country provides a company size (100 or more troops) contribution to a campaign and a continuous measurement of the total amount of military members provided. Additionally, Henke tests her diplomatic embeddedness variable on top of Lake's model to see how the number of diplomatic ties a country has with powerful nations impacts its participation in a multilateral military coalition led by the United States. She finds that diplomatic embeddedness impacts all three outcome variables. Therefore, Henke determines an increase in diplomatic embeddedness positively affects how a nation participates in a US-led multilateral coalition (M. Henke 2019).¹⁷³

While Lake and Henke measure total contributions on three levels: 1) contribution versus no contribution, 2) company size contribution versus no company size contribution, and 3) total contributions, they do not account for each military's size and relative contributions. In Benjamin Zyla's 2016 Article, he tests the free-riding hypothesis. Brought forward by collective action theorists, the theory predicts middle powers like the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, contribute less than their fair share because larger nations, like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, take on most of the burden to execute for the alliance. Through his examination of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), and Kosovo Force (KFOR), Zyla

¹⁷² Lake, David. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. P.175-8.

¹⁷³ Henke, Marina. 2019. *Constructing Allied Cooperation : Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapter 3.

illustrates that the free-riding hypothesis does not predict NATO contributions. His study reveals when accounting for military size, the middle powers' relative contributions to each campaign required their militaries to shoulder a disproportionately high share of each operation (Zyla 2016).¹⁷⁴

Specifically, Zyla creates a measurement for relative contributions by taking the total force contributions to an operation and dividing it by the total number of active-duty military members within a nation's military. In contrast, the United States, France, and Germany ranked one, two, three in total contributions to IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR. They ranked thirteenth, ninth, and eighth, respectively, in relative contributions. The discrepancy between absolute contributions and relative contributions highlights a disconnect in quantitative investigations of NATO. Intuitively, no one expects Estonia to provide the same number of total troops to an out-of-area activity as France. However, there is a minimum threshold of resources necessary to execute an out-of-area campaign. Therefore, the question remains: should relative size or absolute number be the standard measurement of NATO contributions? To be comprehensive, a model should account for both.

Model Creation

Dataset Creation

¹⁷⁴ Zyla, Benjamin. 2016. "Who is Keeping the Peace and Who is Free-Riding? NATO Middle Powers and Burden Sharing, 1995-2001." *International Politics (Hague, Netherlands)* 53 (3): 303-23. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2016.2>. P. 309-15.

Using an original dataset, I created a model to test the validity of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness within NATO. Additionally, I use the model to test if there is a statistical difference in the four consensus categories' (Networked, Motivated, Helpful, and Fair-Share) contributions to out-of-area activities. Using the Military Balance Journal, I compiled and calculated the number of troops each NATO member contributed to every out-of-area campaign listed in the Military Balance Journal between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2015.¹⁷⁵ I used Military Balance for consistency because it was the only source of information that had regular data for each NATO member annually during the period of interest (Table 9).

The dataset tracks each country's contribution to the campaign annually. For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began in 2001 and ended in 2014. Each row in the dataset is a given nation's contribution to a specific campaign in a defined year with their characteristics in that year. Tracking every year accounts for each nation's agency and offers insight into how contributions to an out-of-area operation change over time. Additionally, tracking annual contributions accounts for how NATO activities change as theatre conditions evolve and NATO's objectives shift. There are 1541 rows in the dataset. The number is significant because it treats every year, country, and operation as an independent row. For example, with the ISAF mission, the United States alone has 14 rows of information for that one mission. Additionally, the number is not easily divisible because NATO had multiple expansions. While some countries contributed to a campaign as a NATO ally and a PfP country, I only included their contributions as a NATO member.

¹⁷⁵ I excluded maritime missions because the information was unreliable. The database did not have a mechanism to account for the United States' contributions to each maritime mission. I cross-referenced the Military Balance Journal information with NATO placemats, RAND studies, and Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) reports whenever possible. But, I defaulted to the Military Balance Journal whenever there was a discrepancy.

I chose to combine the Afghanistan campaign contributions because of the context and reality of the operations. For example, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) worked in concert with the United States leading OEF and NATO taking the leadership role for ISAF. However, both operations took place in Afghanistan, and often used each other's command-and-control structures to accomplish their military objectives. Additionally, Operation Althea is included in the dataset because it was a continuation of NATO's SFOR mission that was dual hatted between the EU and NATO. Like with the Afghanistan mission, the historical context of the mission makes it's a hybrid of the EU and NATO, but the EU used the command-and-control structure of NATO to execute the mission throughout the time period.

#	Campaign Name	Location	Start Date	End Date
1	Operation Deny Flight	Bosnia-Herzegovina	12-Apr-93	20-Dec-95
2	Implementation Force (IFOR)	Bosnia-Herzegovina	20-Dec-95	20-Dec-96
3	Stability Force (SFOR)	Bosnia-Herzegovina	20-Dec-96	2-Dec-04
4	Operation Alba	Albania	28-Mar-97	31-Aug-97
5	Operation Allied Force	Kosovo	23-Mar-99	10-Jun-99
6	Albanian Force (AFOR)	Albania	10-Apr-99	1-Sep-99
7	Operation Joint Guardian	Kosovo	11-Jun-99	31-Dec-99
8	Kosovo Force (KFOR)*	Kosovo	11-Jun-99	31-Dec-15
9	Amber Fox	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	27-Sep-01	15-Dec-02
10	Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)^	Afghanistan	7-Oct-01	31-Dec-14
11	International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)^	Afghanistan	20-Dec-01	28-Dec-14
12	NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I)	Iraq	8-Jun-04	17-Dec-11
13	Operation Althea*	Bosnia-Herzegovina	2-Dec-04	31-Dec-11
14	Operation Pakistan Earthquake Relief (OPER)	Pakistan	11-Oct-05	1-Feb-06
15	Operation Unified Protector (OUP)	Libya	23-Mar-11	31-Oct-11
16	Operation Resolute Support (ORS) ~ *	Afghanistan	28-Dec-14	31-Dec-15
17	Operation Freedom Sentinel (OFS) ~ *	Afghanistan	1-Jan-15	31-Dec-15

Table 9 - List of Out-of-Area Campaigns in Original Dataset: The table illustrates the name of every campaign in the original dataset. There are 17 missions ranging from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2015. “*” signifies the campaign continued after 31 December 2015. The dataset calculates troop contributions every year. “^” represents the combination of OEF and ISAF. “~” signifies the combination of ORS and OFS. I combined contributions to the Afghanistan missions because both campaigns worked in parallel and used the same command and control structures. Operation Althea is in the dataset because it was a NATO mission that did not become fully an EU mission until 2012. The dataset treats each row as country and contribution in a given year. The dataset tracks each country’s contribution to the campaign annually. Tracking every year accounts for each nation’s agency and offers insight into how contributions to an out-of-area operation change over time. There are 1541 rows in the dataset. The number is large because it treats every year, country, and operation as an independent row. For example, with the ISAF mission, the United States alone has 14 rows of information for that one mission. Additionally, the number is not easily divisible because NATO had multiple expansions. While some countries contributed to a campaign as a NATO ally and a PfP country, I only included their contributions as NATO members (Chipman, Giegerich, and Hackett 2019; NATO 2019d). Source: Military Balance Journal and NATO Encyclopedia 2019.

Outcome Variables Explanation

I drew inspiration from Lake, Henke, and Zyla to develop a model and outcome variables to provide a comprehensive perspective of NATO members' relative and absolute contributions to out-of-area activities (Table 10). For outcome variables, I use three variables to measure the number of contributions and three variables to measure relative contributions. Over-100, Over-1000, and Forces Contributed are the three absolute outcome variables.

“Over-100” is a dichotomous variable that measures if a nation contributed 100 or more troops to an activity in a given year. Using Henke’s logic, I wanted the minimum test of absolute numbers to be if a nation contributed a meaningful number of resources. “Over-1000” is a dichotomous variable that measures if a country contributed over 1000 troops to an activity. Taking Henke’s logic one step further, whenever a nation contributes 1000 or more troops (10+ companies) to a campaign, they make a sizeable contribution, which would be hard to replace. Additionally, supplying 1000 or more troops shows a dedication to executing the activity’s military objectives. “Forces Contributed” is a continuous variable, which is the log of the total amount of troops supplied to a specific activity in a given year. Seeing the impact on total forces accounts for the reality that some countries have to fill the slots needed to complete an activity’s objectives. It also provides a profile for nations that contribute more than other allies.

Although Zyla points out how previous scholarship on member contributions to NATO did not account for relative military size, his calculations are questionable. He calculates relative contribution by the number of troops contributed to a campaign as a percentage of the nation’s

military size (Zyla 2016).¹⁷⁶ While that approach is adequate, it does not offer a comprehensive look at relative contribution. It illustrates resources provided as a percentage of what the nation is capable of offering. However, it does not account for a nation's proportion of NATO's forces. A more accurate measure of relative contribution is the proportion of NATO's total forces a country has. In theory, NATO is an "all-in" or "all-out" institution. Therefore, whenever the Alliance votes to pursue an out-of-area activity, every country should give its proportion of resources to the campaign, assuming the nation has assets that can execute the operation's objectives. For example, suppose the United States has 35% of the active-duty troops within NATO. In that case, the United States' expected relative contribution to an activity is 35% of the resources needed to complete the operation. Similarly, if Estonia is 2% of NATO's total forces, then Estonia's expected relative contribution is 2% of the resources needed to complete the operation.

The three relative contribution variables are Over-Provide, Provide, and Under-Provide. Over-Provide is a dichotomous variable that codes as present when a nation provides more resources to a campaign than its expected proportion. For example, suppose the United States accounts for 35% of NATO's total forces in a given year. In that case, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute a campaign, and the United States supplies 4,000 troops, then the United States over provided that year.

Provide is a dichotomous variable that is present when a nation gives between its expected proportion and half of its expected proportion of forces to a campaign. For example, if Estonia accounts for 2% of NATO's total forces in a given year, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute an activity, and Estonia's expected range of troops is between 100 and 200. Therefore, if Estonia

¹⁷⁶ Zyla, Benjamin. 2016. "Who is Keeping the Peace and Who is Free-Riding? NATO Middle Powers and Burden Sharing, 1995-2001." *International Politics (Hague, Netherlands)* 53 (3): 303-23. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2016.2>. P.309-14.

supplies 150 troops (1.5% of forces required), they provide an adequate number of troops to a campaign. The Provide variable offers an acceptable range of contributions to a NATO activity that accounts for various circumstances. Middle power and smaller NATO countries may not have the requisite skills or resources to make their expected contribution levels to particular campaigns that require a significant amount of airpower, naval vessels, or heavy machinery. Similarly, small nations may have domestic issues that demand more of their attention and diminish that country's ability to contribute to an out-of-area NATO activity.

Under-Provide is a dichotomous variable that codes as present when a nation provides less than half its expected value. For example, the United States and Estonia account for 35% and 2% of NATO's total forces available. An out-of-area campaign requires 10,000 to execute. If the United States and Estonia supply 1,000 and 10 troops, respectively, then both nations underprovided.

Using outcome variables that examine various levels of absolute and relative contributions offers a more comprehensive analysis. The different metrics analyze NATO member participation rates from multiple angles. The results do not skew towards the smaller countries' perspective of relative contributions or the Principals' perspective of total number of contributions. Lastly, the six variables provide a method to compare how Networked, Motivated, Fair-Share, and Helpful NATO Allies contribute to an out-of-area activity.

Outcome Variable Type	Basic Level	Secondary Level	Indicator Level
Absolute	Over-100	A company size Contribution. Approximates a meaningful contribution	Dichotomous: 0 = less than 100 troops 1 = 100 or more troops
Absolute	Over-1000	10+ companies supplied. A sizeable contribution that is hard to replace	Dichotomous 0 = less than 1000 troops 1 = 1000 or more troops
Absolute	Forces Contributed	Total contributions. Provides the absolute range of contributions	Continuous Total forces contributed in a given year
Relative	Over-Provide	When a nation provides more resources to a campaign than its expected proportion. Signals a country was interested in an activity and more likely to build consensus.	Dichotomous: 0 = Did not Over-Provide 1 = Over-Provided
Relative	Provide	When a nation provides between its expected proportion and half of its expected proportion of forces to a campaign Signals a country was amenable to an activity or has limited resources.	Dichotomous: 0 = Did not Provide 1 = Provided
Relative	Under-Provide	When a nation provides less than half of its expected contribution. Signals a country was resistant to an out-of-area activity.	Dichotomous: 0 = Did not Under-Provide 1 = Under-Provided

Table 10 - Outcome Variables Explained: Using the conceptual framework laid out by Goertz, the table explains the three levels and reasoning behind each outcome variable. The Basic Level is the name, the secondary level gives the reason behind measuring the concept, and the indicator level describes the outcome's tabulation (Goertz 2005).¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Goertz, Gary. 2005. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P. 5-6.

Independent Variables Explanation

Henke and Lake created comprehensive models to account for various impacts on contributions to a multilateral campaign. They account for Coercion theory and Preference Convergence while controlling for general country characteristics. However, their analysis has three fundamental differences with my research interests.

First, they test how hierarchy impacts coalition formation explicitly for Lake and implicitly for Henke. In contrast, my research looks at how a specific institution creates coalitions when all potential campaign members have equal veto power.

Second, they look at coalition formation during and after the Cold War from the United States' and Western powers' perspective. Conversely, my analysis specifically looks at coalition formation during the post-Cold War era and from the perspective of NATO as an independent institution that depends on individual member nations' contributions. The members of NATO have the opportunity to use the transatlantic alliance or other means to execute out-of-area activities to meet their foreign policy objectives.

Third, Lake and Henke examine coalitions in a realist world where each nation assumes the world is anarchy, must operate in a way to protect its interests, and may not have legitimacy from an international or regional body to act. On the other hand, my model assumes regional legitimacy because NATO requires consensus for an activity to take place. By limiting the analysis scope to NATO members and making out-of-area campaigns a collective action process that assumes international legitimacy is present before coalition formation, my analysis requires a new model.

In my quantitative analysis, I draw inspiration from Henke's and Lake's work to create an original model. Lake's linear regression, which tests various theories with control variables to determine hierarchies' effects on coalition formation, provides a template for creating a model. Henke's logit model illustrates how to test an explanatory variable (Diplomatic Embeddedness) while accounting for rival theories with independent variables. Using Henke and Lake's framework, I created a model that tests Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness validity while accounting for Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories. After testing each explanatory variable individually, I make a high and low threshold for Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness to examine the four NATO consensus categories: Networked, Motivated, Fair-Share, and Helpful.

To approximate Hegemonic Power theory and Preference Convergence theory, I use six variables (three each) to capture their underlying assumptions. Hegemonic Power theory assumes that the United States uses NATO as a veil to implement its foreign policy objectives. If the theory holds, then NATO members most influenced by the United States security position, economic interests, and governmental support should be the most likely to provide resources for out-of-area activities.

To take a comprehensive measurement of Hegemonic Power theory, I use distance from the United States security position, aid the United States sends to each NATO member, and trade levels each NATO country has with the United States.

Although using UN voting records is the standard practice for measuring a nation's proximity to the United States foreign policy position, recent scholarship demonstrates that political ideology and security interests can have divergent positions. By comparing his security score metric and UN ideal point scores, Waldie illustrates how political ideology and security

preferences can meaningfully differ. Figure 3 highlights Waldie's finding that the security position and ideology can diverge regardless of government type.




Figure 3 - Difference in Ideology and Security Score from 1960 – 2010: This figure replicates the chart Bradford Waldie used in his working paper to show the difference between security scores and ideology scores based on UN voting data. The solid lines reflect security scores based on a US security hegemony, and the dash lines reflect the US-led liberal ideology as measured by UN ideal points (Waldie 2020).¹⁷⁸

In his working paper, Waldie develops a metric that uses security activities such as defense cooperation agreements (DCA), arms trade, alliances, joint military exercises (JME), and major weapon systems (MWS) to create a security score for each country. The score assumes the United

¹⁷⁸ Waldie, Bradford. 2020. "Measuring State Security Relationships: The Security Position Score." Working Paper, Political Science, Stanford University. P.4-8.

States is at the top of the order. Therefore, the United States has the highest score in the metric, and traditional United States enemies like Russia and China have the lowest scores.

The metric's underlying assumption is that each activity is a vote where a country prefers operating with the United States or its allies on a security measure versus other options. While a state's security preferences are not directly observable, their preferences generate visible outcomes. The choice to pursue a DCA, purchase an MWS, or participate in JMEs is an observable choice a nation makes that signals its security preferences. Therefore, the more DCAs, MWSs, and JMEs a nation shares with the United States, the more likely that country is to integrate with America in an out-of-area activity because they have familiarity. The more closely aligned two states are in security matters, the more likely they are to carry out similar displays of hard power (Waldie 2020).¹⁷⁹

While NATO members have similar political ideologies that include adherence to the rule of law, liberal economies, and democratic governance, there is significant variation in each member's security preferences and proximity to the United States' security position. Figure 4 illustrates how NATO members were clustered together with positions that favor a United States led political ideology and security world. However, within the NATO members, there is variation in 1985, which was the Cold War era's height. Additionally, it is interesting to see the Warsaw Pact members' position in 1985 who later became NATO members in 1999, 2004, and 2009.

The notable difference between ideology and security positions influenced the decision to depart from using the standard UN Voting metrics like affinity scores. Instead, I use Waldie's security position score to account for Hegemonic Power theory because it is a better representation

¹⁷⁹ Waldie, Bradford. 2020. "Measuring State Security Relationships: The Security Position Score." Working Paper, Political Science, Stanford University. P.4-8.

of realist concerns and most NATO Allies being less capable than the United States of executing sustained hard power operations.




Figure 4 - Comparison of Ideology positions and Security Positions in 1985. This figure replicates the chart Bradford Waldie used in his working paper to chart the various nations' combined ideology and security positions in 1985. Security position reflects a US led unipolar world. The ideology position reflects the US-led liberal ideology as measured by UN ideal points. Blue letters reflect NATO members' position, green letters reflect non-aligned countries' position, and red countries reflect Warsaw pact members (Waldie 2020).¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Waldie, Bradford. 2020. "Measuring State Security Relationships: The Security Position Score." Working Paper, Political Science, Stanford University. P.4-8.

Hegemonic Power theory stipulates that the United States practices false multilateralism through NATO to enact its foreign policy objectives under the guise of regional legitimacy. Therefore, NATO members with the highest security, economic, and governmental ties should most likely provide resources for out-of-area campaigns. Distance from US security position is the absolute value of the difference between the United States' security score and the given NATO member. Therefore, the higher the distance, the fewer DCAs, MWSs, JMEs, and alliances a nation shares with the United States, the further away from the United States Security position a country will be (Waldie 2020).¹⁸¹ If the Hegemonic Power theory holds, then as the distance from the US security score increase, the less a NATO member should provide to an out-of-area activity.

The log of aid the United States sends to each NATO member reflects how much influence America has on a nation's economic and political stability (USAID 2020).¹⁸² If the Hegemonic Power theory holds, the more aid a government receives, the more likely it will provide resources to an out-of-area NATO activity due to fear of abandonment.

Lastly, the log of trade with the United States is a variable I created by combining the dollar amount of imports and exports (\$US 2016 constant) a country had with the United States (United-Nations 2020).¹⁸³ If Hegemonic Power theory holds, the more a country trades with the United States, the more likely a nation is to contribute to a NATO out-of-area activity because they should share economic interests. In their totality, the three variables capture the level to which each NATO members' security, government, and economic interests align with the United States.

¹⁸¹ Waldie, Bradford. 2020. "Measuring State Security Relationships: The Security Position Score." Working Paper, Political Science, Stanford University. *Note: I obtained the security scores from Bradford Waldie directly. We are classmates from the US Air Force Academy and good friends. He sent me his dataset with scores for every United Nations member from 1990 – 2015.*

¹⁸² USAID. 2020. "Foreign Aid Explorer." Foreign Assistance Funding. USAID Last Modified October 29, 2020. <https://explorer.usaid.gov/data>. There is a dataset which illustrates in 2017 constant dollars how much aid the United States provided each country in the world.

¹⁸³ United-Nations. 2020. "UN Comtrade Database." United Nations. Accessed 1 December 2020. <https://comtrade.un.org/>. I obtained the amount of aid from USAID website. I obtained the data from the United Nations Commercial trade website. There is a multifaceted interface which allows users to select years and trade partners. <https://comtrade.un.org/>.

Preference Convergence theory assumes out-of-area activities are random events resulting from each NATO member taking an interest in a target area outside of NATO member borders. When members have aligned preferences, the theory infers that NATO allies see the transatlantic alliance as the best method to achieve its foreign policy objectives. To approximate Preference Convergence theory, I use sharing a common language with the target nation, trade with the target nation, and aid sent to the target nation.

Sharing a common language with the target nation is a dichotomous variable that codes as present when a country has an official language or a language that 5% of its population speaks in the target nation. I used the CIA factbook for information on what each country listed as official languages and the percentage of a population that speaks a given language (CIA 2020).¹⁸⁴ Sharing a common language is a great predictor in coalition creation throughout modern history (Tago 2007).¹⁸⁵ I used a 5% threshold because nations with enclaves that can speak a language become inviting to a foreigner. After all, assimilation is more comfortable when a person can speak the language (Weeden 2002).¹⁸⁶ Additionally, with common language linked to culture, whenever a nation has 5% of its population that speaks a language, there is a possibility that the country has a diaspora with political influence that can urge its political leaders to intervene in a situation abroad (Cochrane, Baser, and Swain 2009).¹⁸⁷ If Preference Convergence holds, then whenever a NATO member has a common language with a target, the country will be more likely to participate in an out-of-area activity.

¹⁸⁴ CIA. 2020. "World Factbook - Languages." Accessed 1 December 2020. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/languages/>.

¹⁸⁵ Tago, Atsushi. 2007. "Why Do States Join US-Led Military Coalitions?: The Compulsion of the Coalition's Missions and Legitimacy." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7: 179-202. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcl001>. P.182-4.

¹⁸⁶ Weeden, Lisa. 2002. "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science." *The American Political Science Review* 96 (4): 713-728. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117506>. P.713-20.

¹⁸⁷ Cochrane, Feargal, Bahar Baser, and Ashok Swain. 2009. "Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32 (8): 681-704. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903040716>. P. 682-4.

The log of trade with the target nation measures the total value of imports and exports, in constant 2017 US dollars, that a NATO member shares with the target nation of an out-of-area campaign (United-Nations 2020).¹⁸⁸ If Preference Convergence holds, the more a country trades with the target nation, the more likely it is to participate in the out-of-area activity.

The log of aid provided to the target nation is the total amount, in constant 2016 US dollars, that a NATO member provided the target nation (OECD 2020).¹⁸⁹ If Preference Convergence holds, then the more aid a nation gives to a target, the more likely the country will provide resources to an out-of-area campaign because they invested in the target's success. Overall, the three variables capture how invested each NATO member is during a given year with the target of an out-of-area campaign through the lens of shared culture, government support, and economic interests Table 11.

¹⁸⁸ United-Nations. 2020. "UN Comtrade Database." United Nations. Accessed 1 December 2020. <https://comtrade.un.org/>.

¹⁸⁹ OECD. 2020. "OECD.Stat." Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development. <https://stats.oecd.org/>.

Variable Function	Variable Name	Definition	Indicator Reasoning	Indicator Level
Approximate Preference Convergence	Common Language	A country has an official language or a language that 5% of its population speaks in the target nation.	Common language linked to culture, there is a possibility that the country has a diaspora with political influence that can urge its political leaders to intervene in a situation abroad.	Dichotomous: 0 = no common language 1 = common language
Approximate Preference Convergence	Aid to Target	The log of aid provided to the target nation is the total amount.	The more aid a nation gives to a target, the more likely the country will provide resources to an out-of-area campaign because they invested in the target's success.	Continuous Min value = 0.26 Max value = 22.88
Approximate Preference Convergence	Trade with Target	The log of trade with the target nation measures the total value of imports and exports.	The more a country trades with the target nation, the more likely it is to participate in the out-of-area campaign.	Continuous Min value = 0 Max value = 23.95
Approximate Hegemonic Power	Distance from US Security Position	The absolute value of the difference between the United States' security score and the given NATO member	As the distance from the US security score increase, the less a NATO member should provide to an out-of-area campaign.	Continuous Min value = 0 Max value = 3.49
Approximate Hegemonic Power	Aid from US	The log of aid the United States sends to each NATO member	The more aid a nation receives, the more likely it will provide resources to an out-of-area NATO campaign	Continuous Min value = 0 Max value = 22.68
Approximate Hegemonic Power	Trade With US	The log of trade with the United States	When a nation provides between its expected proportion and half of its expected proportion of forces to a campaign Signals a country was amenable to an activity or has limited resources.	Continuous Min value = 0 Max value = 13.40

Table 11 - The Independent Variables Approximating Preference Convergence and Hegemonic Power Theories: Using the conceptual framework laid out by Goertz, the table explains the three levels and reasoning behind each outcome variable. The Basic Level is the name, the secondary level gives the definition and reason behind measuring the concept and the theory's expectations, and the indicator level describes the variable's tabulation (Goertz 2005).¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰ Goertz, Gary. 2005. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P. 5-6.

Along with the six variables to approximate the effects of Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories, I incorporated four control variables to account for military size, military spending, population, and economic power (World-Bank 2020).¹⁹¹ The log of military personnel is a measure of the size of each nation's total active-duty military. The larger the military, the more apt a government is to participate in an out-of-area movement. Log of military expenditure is the total amount a nation spends in a given year on its military in constant 2016 US dollars. The more a government spends on its military, the more resources a nation has to contribute to an out-of-area operation. Log of total population is a measurement of the size of a country. The larger the citizenry, the more people a nation has that can participate in the military. The more people live in a country, the more interests a government has to weigh, impacting participation negatively or positively depending on the national culture of sending resources out-of-area. Lastly, the log of total GDP approximates the economic power a nation has. The greater the national GDP, the more resources a country has, the more dependent on a stable world its government is. Therefore, as GDP increases, the likelihood a nation participates in an out-of-area activity increases. Overall, the four control variables offer approximations for NATO member characteristics that would impact a nation's participation in an out-of-area activity (Table 12).

The four control variables, three Hegemonic Power variables, and three Preference Convergence variables combine to generate a comprehensive model that creates a base for measuring how various elements impact NATO Allies' contributions to an out-of-area activity.

¹⁹¹ World-Bank. 2020. "World Bank Datasets." The World Bank. Accessed February 1, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

Variable Function	Variable Name	Definition	Indicator Reasoning	Indicator Level
Control	Military Personnel	The log of military personnel is a measure of the size of each nation's total active-duty military.	The larger the military, the more apt a government is to participate in an out-of-area activity.	Continuous Min value = 4.61 Max value = 14.31
Control	Military Expenditure	The log of military expenditure is the total amount a nation spends in a given year on its military.	The more a government spends on its military, the more resources a nation has to contribute to an out-of-area activity.	Continuous Min value = 0 Max value = 27.35
Control	Population	The log of total population is a measurement of the size of a country.	The more people live in a country, the more interests a government has to weigh.	Continuous Min value = 12.50 Max value = 19.59
Control	Total GDP	The log of total GDP approximates the economic power and security a nation has.	The greater the national GDP, the more resources a country has, the more dependent on a stable world the government is. As GDP increases, the likelihood a nation participates in an out-of-area activity increases.	Continuous Max value = 22.58 Min value = 30.49

Table 12 - The Independent Variables Serving as Controls: The control variables account for essential characteristics that would impact how a nation participates in an out-of-area activity. Using the conceptual framework laid out by Goertz, the table explains the three levels and reasoning behind each independent variable. The basic level is the name. The secondary level gives the definition and reason behind measuring the concept and the theory's expectations. The indicator level describes the variable's tabulation (Goertz 2005).¹⁹²

Dataset and Model Limitations

¹⁹² Goertz, Gary. 2005. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P. 5-6.

Although comprehensive, there are limitations to the model and places to improve the dataset's information. Lack of access to NATO's official information, like the exact number of troops and military caveats, leaves some ambiguity in the dataset's validity because the military journal is a secondary source. Not having NATO's official numbers limits the accuracy of the findings. Although the Military Balance Journal has a robust reputation, having numbers from NATO would provide additional confidence in the results.

Additionally, NATO allows countries to restrict the use of their military in an operation. The caveats a nation places on its resources significantly impact the size of its contribution to any activity. The model treats every troop as fully participating without caveats. Therefore, the results have an inherent flaw. It is possible that a large nation supplies a significant number of soldiers to participate but restricts them from partaking in the most dangerous aspects of the operation. Conversely, it is possible that a smaller nation supplies fewer resources but does not limit their usage. While having a metric that captures military risk tolerance would be beneficial, it is unnecessary to test the existence of Expeditionary and Diplomatic Embeddedness. There is a reasonable assumption that nations supporting an operation would supply more resources and vice-a-versa.

The dataset does not include out-of-area naval operations. While the Military Balance Journal mentions NATO's maritime missions like Operation Active Endeavour, Operation Ocean Shield, and Operation Sea Guardian, they did not offer exact troop contributions. Instead, the Military Balance Journal explained the types of vessels each nation supplied or omitted information all together. Given my model is based on absolute and relative troop contributions, I did not include maritime missions in the dataset because the numbers were not available.

Overall, the model's purpose is to test the existence and statistical significance of Diplomatic Embeddedness, Expeditionary Embeddedness, and the four consensus categories. The lack of primary sources and accounting for maritime operations impact the results but do not fundamentally call into question the model's findings.

Results of Base Model – Absolute Forces

The base model results reveal mixed consequences for the absolute outcomes: Over-100, Over-1000, and Total Forces Contributed (Figure 5). The variables approximating Preference Convergence do not follow the theory's predictions. A nation sharing a common language with a target is associated with a decrease in making a noticeable contribution (Over-100 troops) and total troops supplied. An increase in aid to the target is related to creating a meaningful contribution (over 100 troops), a sizeable contribution (over 1000 troops), and total forces. Lastly, trade with the target does not have an impact on any of the outcome variables. Therefore, the model's results reveal that the Preference Convergence Theory does not hold for predicting the absolute number of out-of-area activity contributions.

The variables approximating Hegemonic Power theory yields mixed results as well. An increase in aid from the United States is associated with a decrease in the total amount of troops supplied to an out-of-area campaign. An increase in trade with the United States correlates with an increase in the total amount of soldiers given to an activity and the likelihood a country makes a meaningful contribution (Over-1000 troops). Lastly, the further a nation is from the United States' security position, the more likely the country is to make a meaningful contribution (Over-

100 troops) and increase the number of total forces provided. Therefore, the closer to the United States security position, the less likely a nation is to contribute to an out-of-area campaign. The contradictory results signify Hegemonic Power theory does not predict a nation's contributions to an out-of-area activity.

Lastly, the control variables provide value to the model. A higher number of active-duty military forces and a larger population are associated with increases in contributions to out-of-area activities. On the other hand, an increase in total GDP correlates with a decrease in participation in an out-of-area activity, which contradicts the assumption that nations with higher GDPs are more likely to intervene. The lack of consistency across the models illustrates another variable could impact and predict how NATO members contribute to out-of-area activities.

Results of Base Model – Relative Forces

The base model results reveal inconsistent findings for the relative outcomes: Over-Provide, Provide, and Under-Provide (Figure 6). The variables approximating Preference Convergence do not follow the theory's predictions. Common language does not produce any significant results. An increase in aid to the targets is associated with a lower likelihood of under-providing to a campaign. Additionally, an increase in trade with a target links with an increase in the probability a nation over-provides resources. The result bolsters the finding that increased trade with target has an association with a decrease in the likelihood a country Under-Provides. The Preference Convergence theory holds when examining the relative contributions a nation makes.

The variables approximating Hegemonic Power theory yield mixed results as well. Increased aid from the United States links to an increased likelihood a nation Under-Provides to an out-of-area activity and a lower possibility of Over-Providing to a campaign. An increase in trade with the United States correlates with an increased probability a country Over-Provides to an out-of-area operation and a decreased likelihood a nation Under-Provides. Increasing distance from the United States' security position connects with an increased likelihood a nation Over-Provides resources and provides its proportional number of resources to a campaign. Like with the absolute model, the Hegemonic Power theory does not hold for relative contributions. The more connected a nation is with the United States, the less likely it is to contribute to an out-of-area activity. The finding supports Lake's Hierarchy theory that nations subordinate themselves to the dominant power and trade a secondary status with less security burden.

Lastly, only one control variable yields statistically significant results. Nations that spend more money on their military are more likely to over-provide and less likely to Under-Provide to an out-of-area activity. The results for the relative force model signal another variable could account for how nations decide to participate in out-of-area activities.




Figure 5 - Dot and Whisker Plot for Base Model of Absolute Contributions The dot and whisker Plot reflects the three models with absolute outcome variables. Over-100 is a dichotomous variable that is present when a nation contributes over 100 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Over-1000 is a dichotomous variable that is present when a country contributes over 1,000 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Log of Total Forces is a continuous variable, which is the log of total forces contributed to an out-of-area campaign. When a variable has whiskers that fail to touch the center dotted line, the variable's impact is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level with a p-value < 0.01.

Appendix A has the regression table for the model.




Figure 6 - Dot and Whisker Plot for Base Model of Relative Contributions: The dot and whisker plot reflects the three models with relative outcome variables. Over-Provide is a dichotomous variable that is present when a nation provides more resources to a campaign than its expected proportion. Provide is a dichotomous variable that is present when a country supplies between its expected proportion and half of its expected proportion of forces to a campaign. Under-Provide is a dichotomous variable that is present when a nation provides less than half of its expected value. When a variable has whiskers that fail to touch the center dotted line, the variable's impact is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level with a p-value < 0.01.

Appendix A has the regression table for the model.

Testing Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness

Embeddedness Theory stipulates two mechanisms impact NATO's ability to achieve consensus: Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness (Table 13). Conceptually, Diplomatic Embeddedness is the number of multilateral political, social, and economic ties that connect a NATO member with the Principals (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

As the six nations with the most significant economic, social, and political influence within the transatlantic region, the Principals yield a disproportionate level of political agenda-setting and deal-making within NATO. The Principals use Diplomatic Embeddedness to foster political coordination and gain consensus to approve an out-of-area activity. As nations with a lower threshold for out-of-area military operations but significant interests in transatlantic regional stability, Canada, Germany, and Italy use their diplomatic influence to make deals within the alliance and facilitate creating a ZOPA for an out-of-area activity. Although they possess powerful militaries, the domestic politics within Canada, Germany, and Italy do not have an appetite for unilateral military operations or coalitions without regional legitimacy. As a result, the three Principals outside of the Triumvirate view NATO as the most efficient and politically expedient way to advance their security interests in the region.

To approximate Diplomatic Embeddedness, I use the proportion of total international governmental organizations (IGOs) a nation participates in when four or more Principals are

present. IGOs are institutions that have three or more states working to fulfill a common purpose or objective (Pevehouse et al. 2019).¹⁹³

There are three types of IGOs: political, economic, and social. Diplomatic Embeddedness values each kind of IGO equally because the number of IGOs serves as a proxy for integrating a nation with the Principals and their national interests. I use the threshold of four or more because that cut point means most Principals see the organization enhancing its foreign policy objectives. With a majority of Principals in a given organization, there is a higher probability for the Principals to find shared interests with that NATO ally. Having a significant number of IGOs in common provides more arenas outside of NATO for Principals to identify issues, learn additional information, and make side-payments with a given NATO member.

To explain the metric, if 50 IGOs have four or more Principals present and Norway is in 41 of them, then Norway's Diplomatic Embeddedness in that year is 0.82 or 82%. I gathered the list of IGOs from the correlates of war project dataset (Pevehouse et al. 2019).¹⁹⁴ Overall, having multiple IGOs in commons allows the Principals to develop a ZOPA via their diplomatic networks and ability to link issues. As a result, having multiple ties across social, economic, and political organizations helps the Principals build consensus to pursue an out-of-area activity.

Expeditionary Embeddedness is the distance a NATO Ally is from the intersection of the Triumvirate's (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) security preferences. To operationalize and test the Expeditionary Embeddedness concept, I use a two-step process. First, I use a weighted average for France, the United Kingdom, and the United States using Waldie's

¹⁹³ Pevehouse, Jon, Roseanne McManus, Timothy Nordstrom, and Anne Jamison. 2019. "Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets." *Journal of Peace Research*. <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/IGOs/international-organization-v2.3>.

¹⁹⁴ Pevehouse, Jon, Roseanne McManus, Timothy Nordstrom, and Anne Jamison. 2019. "Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets." *Journal of Peace Research*. <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/IGOs/international-organization-v2.3>.

security score to establish the Triumvirate's security score. The proportions are based on the total active-duty forces between the three countries. Therefore, on average, the weights in descending order are the United States (70%), France (20%), the United Kingdom (10%). Second, I take the absolute distance of a NATO member's security score from the Triumvirate's security score. Consequently, the lower the score, the closer a NATO Ally is to the Triumvirate's security position and more likely to participate in an out-of-area activity.

The Triumvirate security score reflects a compromise between the Triumvirate on security issues, which is the premise of Embeddedness Theory's selection process for out-of-area activities. A NATO member's distance from that compromise illustrates potential shared security interests and ability to integrate with the alliance's three strongest militaries. Using Waldie's security score metric separates the defense practices of the Triumvirate from its diplomatic networks. Furthermore, the Triumvirate's security score separates military integration from the ideological preferences France, the United Kingdom, and the United States share with the other Principals: Canada, Germany, and Italy.

Creating Thresholds for Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness

I created high and low thresholds for the Expeditionary Embeddedness and Diplomatic Embeddedness concepts to create four NATO consensus categories. A nation scores as high on the Diplomatic Embeddedness when it is present in more than 83% of the total (IGOs) a country belongs to when four or more Principals are members. Although 83% appears to be a high threshold, it is not in the context of only NATO members (Appendix I). Figure 7 illustrates the

number and percentage of IGOs each NATO member belongs to when four or more Principals are members. From 1994 to 2014, no NATO member was a member of less than 40% of the IGOs where four or more Principals were present, and the average of NATO members as a whole was 79%. The 83% threshold separates the top third from the bottom two thirds. Therefore, being highly embedded means a nation is in the top-third of NATO members for the number of IGOs as the typical number of IGOs between 1995 and 2015.

Expeditionary Embeddedness is a function of how far a NATO member is from the intersection of the Triumvirate's security interests. According to Embeddedness Theory, the Triumvirate leads the selection process for NATO's out-of-area activities as the three countries with disproportionate influence on NATO's international agenda. Increases in military connections with the Triumvirate provide trust and integration with the most powerful militaries in the Alliance and a greater opportunity of executing out-of-area activities.

Like with Diplomatic Embeddedness, I created a high and low threshold for Expeditionary Embeddedness. A nation scores high on Expeditionary Embeddedness when its distance from the Triumvirate's security score is within 0.92 units. The Triumvirate's security scores weights are by the size of each member's military force. Therefore, the United States has the most pull, followed by France, then the United Kingdom. The security score distances range from 0.00 to 3.08, and I selected the 0.92 threshold because it divides the top one-third from the bottom two-thirds of scores between 1995 and 2015 (Appendix J). Figure 8 displays each NATO Ally's distance from the Triumvirate's security score.

Variable Function	Variable Name	Definition	Indicator Reasoning	Indicator Level
Explanatory Variable	Diplomatic Embeddedness	The proportion of total international governmental organizations (IGOs) a nation participates in when four or more Principals are present.	Illustrates common interests and arenas where Principals can identify issues, gain more information, and make side-payments with a given NATO member.	Continuous Min value = 0.40 Max value = 0.99
Cut Point for X-Axis 2 x 2	High-Diplomatic Embeddedness	When a nation is present in more than 83% of the total IGOs a country belongs to when four or more Principals are present. Top-third IGOs in common with the Principals.	Shows greater connection with the Principal's diplomatic networks.	Dichotomous 0 = less than 0.83 1 = greater than 0.83
Cut Point for X-Axis 2 x 2	Low-Diplomatic Embeddedness	When a nation is present in less than 83% of the total IGOs a country belongs to when four or more Principals are present. Bottom two-thirds IGOs in common with the Principals	Shows less connection with the Principal's diplomatic networks	Dichotomous 0 = greater than 0.83 1 = less than 0.83
Explanatory Variable	Expeditionary Embeddedness	The absolute distance a NATO Ally is from the Triumvirate's Security Score.	The lower the score, the closer a NATO Ally is to the Triumvirate's expeditionary position and more likely to participate in an out-of-area activity.	Continuous Min value = 0.00 Max value = 3.26
Cut Point for Y-Axis 2 x 2	High-Expeditionary Embeddedness	When a nation's distance from the weighted security score average of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States has a value below 0.92.	Signifies a nation is in the top third of nations with the closest proximity to the Triumvirate's security position between 1995 and 2015.	Dichotomous 0 = greater than 0.92 1 = less than 0.92
Cut Point for Y-Axis 2 x 2	Low-Expeditionary Embeddedness	When a nation's distance from the weighted security score average of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States has a value above 0.92.	Means a nation is in the bottom two-thirds of nations with the closest proximity to the Triumvirate's security position between 1995 and 2015.	Dichotomous 0 = less than 0.92 1 = greater 0.92

Table 13 - Operationalizing Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness Concepts: The Table explains how the quantitative model operationalized the Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness concepts. Additionally, the table illustrates how each type of embeddedness obtains its respective high and low thresholds. Using the conceptual framework laid out by Goertz, the table explains the three levels and reasoning behind each variable. The basic level is the name. The definition provides the impetus for the variable. The secondary level gives the reason behind measuring the concept and how the theory's expectations. The indicator level describes the variable's tabulation along with its min/max range. (Goertz 2005).¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ Goertz, Gary. 2005. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. P. 5-6.

Country	1995 - 1998	1999 - 2003	2004 - 2008	2009 - 2015	More Embedded
Albania	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.54	1
Belgium	0.95	0.93	0.92	0.94	0.97
Bulgaria	n/a	n/a	0.62	0.72	0.93
Canada	0.70	0.69	0.68	0.72	0.90
Croatia	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.66	0.86
Czech Republic	n/a	0.60	0.63	0.73	0.83
Denmark	0.89	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.79
Estonia	n/a	n/a	0.50	0.63	0.76
France	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.99	0.72
Germany	0.94	0.93	0.91	0.94	0.69
Greece	0.82	0.83	0.81	0.84	0.65
Hungary	n/a	0.64	0.68	0.73	0.62
Iceland	0.46	0.46	0.51	0.54	0.58
Italy	0.98	0.99	0.97	0.98	0.55
Latvia	n/a	n/a	0.50	0.61	0.51
Lithuania	n/a	n/a	0.52	0.66	0.48
Luxembourg	0.71	0.70	0.69	0.73	0.44
Netherlands	0.99	0.97	0.95	0.95	0.40
Norway	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.37
Poland	n/a	0.70	0.74	0.80	0.33
Portugal	0.87	0.89	0.88	0.91	0.30
Romania	n/a	n/a	0.60	0.71	0.26
Slovakia	n/a	n/a	0.60	0.67	0.23
Slovenia	n/a	n/a	0.65	0.73	0.19
Spain	0.95	0.95	0.92	0.94	0.16
Turkey	0.66	0.66	0.65	0.68	0.08
United Kingdom	0.91	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.00
United States	0.71	0.67	0.64	0.67	Less Embedded

Figure 7 - Diplomatic Embeddedness Heat Map: 1995 – 2015: The figure illustrates the level of Diplomatic Embeddedness for each NATO member between 1995 – 2015. The higher the decimal, the more embedded a nation is with the Principals, and the greener the individual cell. “n/a” reflects that country is not a member of NATO during the period. The number of members during each period is as follows: 1995 – 1998 (16), 1999 – 2003 (19), 2004 – 2008 (26), and 2009 – 2015 (28) (Pevehouse et al. 2019).¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Pevehouse, Jon, Roseanne McManus, Timothy Nordstrom, and Anne Jamison. 2019. "Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 datasets." *Journal of Peace Research*. <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/IGOs/international-organization-v2.3>. The Correlates of War dataset provided the basis for the analysis. All of the tabulations were done by me.

Country	1994 - 1998	1999 - 2003	2004 - 2008	2009 - 2015	More Embedded
Albania	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.48	0
Belgium	1.47	1.33	1.49	1.21	0.12
Bulgaria	n/a	n/a	1.41	1.60	0.24
Canada	0.65	0.70	0.82	0.66	0.36
Croatia	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.46	0.48
Czech_Republic	n/a	1.05	1.42	1.81	0.6
Denmark	1.31	1.23	1.47	1.19	0.72
Estonia	n/a	n/a	2.08	1.63	0.84
France	0.59	0.62	0.58	0.41	0.96
Germany	0.54	0.52	0.79	0.59	1.08
Greece	0.81	0.68	0.81	0.91	1.2
Hungary	n/a	1.53	2.25	2.61	1.32
Iceland	2.98	2.67	3.08	3.06	1.44
Italy	0.69	0.83	0.91	0.66	1.56
Latvia	n/a	n/a	1.76	1.58	1.68
Lithuania	n/a	n/a	1.72	1.54	1.8
Luxembourg	2.49	2.20	2.69	2.78	1.92
Netherlands	1.12	0.95	1.24	0.86	2.04
Norway	1.15	1.22	1.45	1.12	2.16
Poland	n/a	0.83	1.11	1.04	2.28
Portugal	1.41	1.16	1.38	1.30	2.4
Romania	n/a	n/a	1.38	1.66	2.52
Slovakia	n/a	n/a	2.01	2.70	2.64
Slovenia	n/a	n/a	2.03	2.29	2.76
Spain	0.60	0.57	0.52	0.53	2.88
Turkey	0.11	0.15	0.06	0.30	3
United Kingdom	0.51	0.27	0.54	0.35	3.12
United States	0.21	0.26	0.21	0.15	Less Embedded

Figure 8 - Expeditionary Embeddedness Heat Map 1995 – 2015: The figure illustrates the level of Expeditionary Embeddedness for each NATO member. The lower the decimal, the more embedded a nation is with the Triumvirate's security position. Each year range reflects the average position across the years prescribed. "n/a" reflects that country is not a member of NATO during the period. The number of members during each period is as follows: 1995 – 1998 (16), 1999 – 2003 (19), 2004 – 2008 (26), and 2009 – 2015 (28) (Waldie 2020).¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ Waldie, Bradford. 2020. "Measuring State Security Relationships: The Security Position Score." Working Paper, Political Science, Stanford University. P.4-8. Waldie's metric provided the basis for this analysis. All of the tabulations were done by myself with the approval of Bradford Waldie.

Results

Diplomatic Embeddedness, Expeditionary Embeddedness, and each of the four Consensus Categories have a statistically significant impact on NATO member's participation in out-of-area activities. The quantitative analysis reveals Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness exists (Table 14). Additionally, Networked, Motivated, Helpful, and Fair-Share Allies have distinctive characteristics that quantitatively follow each category's conceptual expectations when all six models are evaluated comprehensively (Table 15).

Diplomatic Embeddedness

When added to the base model, Diplomatic Embeddedness is an impactful variable on both relative (Over-Provide, Provide, Under-Provide) and absolute (Over-100, Over-1000, Forces Contributed) models (Appendix C & D). Increasing Diplomatic Embeddedness connects with an increased likelihood of a country providing more than its expected resources to an out-of-area activity. Additionally, increasing Diplomatic Embeddedness correlates with a lower chance that a country Under-Provides to an out-of-area operation. For example, a ten percent increase in the number of IGOs in common with the Principals increases a nation's likelihood of Over-Providing by seven percent. Therefore, increasing shared IGOs with Principals from 50% to 60% is associated with a country becoming seven percent more likely to give more than its proportional resources to the out-of-area activity.

Regarding the absolute outcomes, increasing Diplomatic Embeddedness connects with an increased likelihood a nation provides more resources and the probability the country supplies at least 100 troops. For example, for every percent increase in Diplomatic Embeddedness, a NATO ally is associated with increasing its total troop contributions by three percent. Therefore, Norway supplying 100 troops with a Diplomatic Embeddedness rate of 70% means at 80%, the Norwegians would provide 130 military members. Diplomatic Embeddedness's statistical impact on most models illustrates it is a powerful concept that affects NATO. The quantitative results bolster the idea that diplomatic networks across multiple areas provide an opportunity for issue linkage, side-payments, access to private information, or more options for deal-making. Therefore, the statistical analysis supports Diplomatic Embeddedness being a factor in NATO consensus building for out-of-area activities.

Expeditionary Embeddedness

Expeditionary Embeddedness proved significant but did not have the same level of impact as Diplomatic Embeddedness on the various models (Appendix E & F). Expeditionary Embeddedness only produced statistically significant results when added to the Over-Provide base model. However, the finding shows the strength of the metric's conceptual development and its explanatory power for the difference between the United States and NATO interests. A one-unit increase in proximity to the Triumvirate's Security Score reflects a NATO Ally is 50% more likely to Over-Provide to an out-of-Area activity. Conversely, the model shows that a one-unit increase

in proximity to the United States' Security Score reflects a NATO Ally is 63% less likely to Over-Provide to an out-of-area activity.

The finding shows how the intersection of the Triumvirate's security preferences better predicts participation than the United States alone. Additionally, the result supports alliance dependence for NATO Allies that have limited integration with the Triumvirate. The Security Score reflects MWS, JMEs, DCAs, and other military connections with the United States and its major allies. The majority of countries that joined NATO after the Cold War still have a significant number of Soviet MWS and do not participate in many JMEs with the United States. Therefore, these countries use NATO to modernize their military and participate in activities with more powerful militaries in the Alliance.

Furthermore, the finding illustrates that the United States' national interests do not drive NATO members. The finding delivers a quantitative blow to Hegemonic Power and support for Embeddedness Theories' issue selection variable. Overall, the quantitative model reveals Expeditionary Embeddedness is a mechanism that exists in NATO out-of-area activities and is sufficient to serve as one of the two elements that impact NATO building consensus for an out-of-area operation.

Explanatory Variable	Model 1: Over-100	Model 2: Over 1000	Model 3: Total Forces	Model 4: Over-Provide	Model 5: Provide	Model 6: Under-Provide
Diplomatic Embeddedness	Increase in DE means more likely to make noticeable contribution	n/a	Increase in DE means more likely to provide more troops	Increase in DE means more likely to provide more than a country's proportional resources	n/a	Increase in DE means less likely to give less than a country's proportional resources
Expeditionary Embeddedness	n/a	n/a	n/a	Increase in EE means more likely to provide more than a country's proportional resources	n/a	n/a

Table 14 - Results of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness on Base Model: The table summarizes the results for Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness. Each type of Embeddedness was added individually to the base model in Figures 5 and 6. Diplomatic Embeddedness had a significant impact across four of the six models. Appendix C&D contains the regression tables and dot and whisker plots which reflects the results. Expeditionary Embeddedness only impacted one of the six models. Appendix E & F contains the regression tables and dot and whisker plots. Overall, both variables' statistically significant impact gives confidence that the concepts exist and influence NATO's out-of-area activities. They provide legitimate metrics to create the 2-by-2 for NATO's consensus categories. "n/a" means there was not a statistically significant result.

Consensus Building Categories

Networked, Motivated, Helpful, and Fair-Share Allies have unique profiles that are statistically significant (Appendix G & H). The quantitative analysis follows Embeddedness Theory's assumptions outlined in the theory and conceptualization sections (Table 15).

When looking at total troop contributions, Networked NATO members are associated with an increased likelihood of contributing substantially (Over-1000). Motivated countries correlate with an increased chance of committing a significant number of resources (Over-1000). As outlined in the theory section, nations in the Networked and Motivated categories have the most

resources and should make the most significant contributions to NATO out-of-area activities. Therefore, the probability of countries with high-Expeditionary Embeddedness being statistically more likely to give substantial contributions solidifies Embeddedness Theory's expectations.

Nations in the Helpful category correlate with an increased likelihood of contributing in a meaningful way (Over-100 troops). The consistent contributions that are noticeable but not large follow Embeddedness Theory's anticipations. The theory explains that nations in this category are highly resistant to out-of-area activities because they tend to have coalition governments and cultures that are risk averse to deaths within their militaries. Therefore, they contribute in a limited way. Helpful countries are more likely to give 100 troops than any other category, meaning they are more consistent in their participation than any other group at the meaningful level. This inference lends itself towards alliance dependence theories and deal-making inherent in Diplomatic Embeddedness. The countries in this category negotiate objectives and responsibilities that are favorable for their participation.

Fair-Share members of NATO are associated with contributing less than the other three categories. The result follows Embeddedness Theory's prediction that nations in the low-Diplomatic and low-Expeditionary Embeddedness category are smaller and less resourced.

When looking at relative contributions, the Embeddedness Theory predictions hold for the four consensus categories. Being a Networked Ally is associated with a higher likelihood of delivering more than a nation's expected proportions of resources to a campaign. The result holds with Embeddedness Theory's expectations because countries in this category are likely to use the lowest common denominator approach to an out-of-area activity. Therefore, given their advocacy for an operation and superior resources, nations in the networked category are willing to use more than sufficient resources for an out-of-area activity.

Motivated NATO Members are associated with a higher likelihood of providing relatively fewer resources to a campaign than capable. Nations in this category look to provide resources as long as the operation is in its national interest. Therefore, when the activity coincides with its domestic politicians' foreign policy objectives, they provide sufficient resources to meet those ends. Additionally, Motivated Countries are nations that are highly capable militarily and driven by national benefits. Therefore, governments in this category could numerically provide a significant amount of resources, but as a percentage of what they could give, be falling short of other countries with less capable militaries.

Helpful Allies have a higher likelihood of using a disproportionate number of resources to support an out-of-area activity. The finding supports Zyla's inference that Middle Powers like Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands offer a significant amount of its resources for NATO operations (Zyla 2016).¹⁹⁸ Combining the relative and absolute models for Helpful Allies, they are countries that consistently provide a significant amount of their national military to participate in NATO out-of-area operations.

Fair-Share NATO members have the highest association with providing its expected proportion of forces to an out-of-area campaign. In other words, nations with low-Diplomatic Embeddedness and low-Expeditionary Embeddedness are the most likely to provide their fair share. Although they are smaller and less-resourced countries, Fair-Share Allies are dependable. The consistent willingness to supply its proportional amount of resources bolsters the conceptual idea that Fair-Share Allies fear abandonment from the Alliance's stronger members.

¹⁹⁸ Zyla, Benjamin. 2016. "Who is Keeping the Peace and Who is Free-Riding? NATO Middle Powers and Burden Sharing, 1995-2001." *International Politics (Hague, Netherlands)* 53 (3): 303-23. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2016.2>. P. 304.

Consensus Category	Model 1: Over-100	Model 2: Over-1000	Model 3: Total Forces	Model 4: Over-Provide	Model 5: Provide	Model 6: Under-Provide
Networked (HDE / HEE)	n/a	Allies more likely to provide 1000 or more troops to an out-of-area operation	n/a	Allies more likely to provide more than their country's proportional resources	n/a	n/a
Motivated (LDE / HEE)	n/a	Allies more likely to provide 1000 or more troops to an out-of-area operation	n/a	n/a	n/a	Allies most likely to provide less than its proportional resources
Helpful (HDE / LEE)	Allies more likely to contribute over 100 troops	n/a	n/a	Allies in this category more likely to provide more than their country's proportional resources	n/a	n/a
Fair-Share (LDE / LEE)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	Allies more likely to provide their proportional share to an out-of-area activity	n/a

Table 15 - Results of Consensus Categories on Base Model: The table summarizes the results of when the four categories were added simultaneously to the base model in Figures 5 and 6. For the absolute outcome models, Networked and Motivated Allies are more likely to make substantial troop contributions to an out-of-area activity.

Helpful Allies were most likely to provide a noticeable contribution. Both findings follow the expectations of Embeddedness Theory. Appendix G & H contains the regression tables and dot and whisker plots. For the relative outcome models, Helpful and Networked Allies are likely to provide more than their proportional resources to an out-of-area activity. Fair-Share Allies are the most likely to provide their expected proportion to NATO out-of-area activities. Lastly, Motivated Allies are associated with providing less than their proportional resources to an out-of-area activity. Overall, the statistically significant results on relative and absolute models illustrates there is quantitative validity to the concepts of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness as well as the four NATO consensus categories. "n/a" means there was not a statistically significant result.

After analyzing the effects of the four categories, I placed each NATO Ally in their respective category. Figure 9 illustrates the percentage of times a NATO ally landed in a category between 1995 - 2015. The model captures how each NATO member's diplomatic and security networks

change from year to year by calculating categories annually. Therefore, NATO members potentially change from year to year. Figure 10 illustrates the consensus category each country occupies most often between 1995-2015.

Countries tend to stay in one category the majority of the time. However, the movement between categories shows national preferences for expeditionary activities are not stagnant—foreign policy interest change based on a country's domestic politics and the international situation. The results also support selecting the Triumvirate as leaders for expeditionary activities and Canada, Germany, and Italy as strong influencers of building consensus within the Alliance.

The Networked Allies are France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The percentages reveal an interesting story and one surprising finding. France, Spain, and the United Kingdom are in the Networked category 100% of the time. Spain is slightly surprising, but their high participation in training with the United States and MWS overlap with the Triumvirate, explain its high security score. Having a high rate of integration signals, Spain can make a sizeable impact on an out-of-area activity. Germany and Italy are Networked, but lean Helpful at times, illustrating that their out-of-area interests differ from the Triumvirate. Conceptually, their movement between the two categories supports the claim that Germany is on the outside looking in regarding the pursuit of activities outside of NATO member borders. Additionally, Italy's position as the least stable Networked Ally illustrates that they tend to have more restrictive domestic government constraints. As a result, their participation leans towards the expectation that they are a facilitator of consensus and look to create a lowest common denominator activity to reach consensus because its domestic interest requires compromise for its participation.

Canada, Turkey, and the United States constitute the Motivated Allies. The United States and Canada are not surprising, but Turkey is. The close diplomatic relationship explains why

Washington and Ottawa have similar security interests internationally. However, their geography across the Atlantic makes them not as integrated with the Principals and greater Europe. Additionally, Canada's leaning towards Fair-Share illustrates Canadians' alliance dependence and subordinate role to the United States on regional security concerns. While close partners, there is a big brother versus little brother relationship between the two countries.¹⁹⁹ The United States placement in the Motivated category over Networked follows Embeddedness Theory. The United States acts out of self-interest and does not constrain its foreign policy on out-of-area activities to other national capitals in the alliance. Therefore, when NATO offers an insufficient out-of-area action, the United States creates a coalition of the willing to address its security concerns.

With the fourth largest military, on average, over the 21 years examined, Turkey has a solid and capable military which explains its firm placement in the Motivated category. Therefore, Ankara is not beholden to NATO for its national security. If there is a threat to its sovereignty, the Turks are capable and willing to take unilateral action. Additionally, Ankara is not an EU member, making their political leadership and diplomatic networks less integrated with Western Europe. The combination of outsider status and capable military makes the Turks' relationship with Russia more understandable because Embeddedness Theory predicts Motivated Allies use NATO as a tool to enhance domestic interests. Therefore, for the Turks, if NATO does not address its concerns, it will use other avenues to achieve its interests. The method could be holding consensus hostage, using Article 4 to force the Alliance to address a unique domestic concern, or cultivate bilateral relationships outside of the Alliance.

There are five Helpful Allies which follow the assumption that the category's members have government structures that require compromise for military usage. Belgium and Denmark

¹⁹⁹ Relayed during multiple interviews with former US State Department officials with post in Canada or working with Canadians in NATO.

have traditional coalition governments, the Netherlands and Norway have parliamentary constitutional monarchies, and the Portuguese have a semi-presidential republic. However, the Helpful Allies have four countries with a standard profile and one outlier. The countries following Embeddedness Theory's expectations are Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal, and Norway is an outlier.

The four standard profile countries follow Embeddedness Theory's expectation that Networked and Helpful Allies have a close bond and similar political will thresholds. The main difference between the two categories, level of military caveats, is somewhat captured by proximity to the Triumvirate's security score. Like Spain, the Netherlands has a high level of participation in training with the United States, and MWSs overlap with the Triumvirate, explaining its frequent placement in the Networked category. By having a high rate of military integration signals, the Dutch can make a sizeable impact on an out-of-area activity and that they are more expeditionary leaning than the other Helpful Allies.

Norway belonging to all four consensus categories highlights its unique position in the Alliance. As one of the founding NATO members that share a border with Russia, Norway has a particular concern about its national sovereignty. Simultaneously, as a relatively small country economically and militarily, the Norwegians have to lean on institutions to integrate their country into Europe politically while simultaneously protecting its borders through a close relationship with the United States and NATO's Article 5 guarantee. Given its size and location, it makes sense for Norway to be Helpful, more times than not. However, the model capturing Oslo's movement in all four categories illustrates Norway's unique set of political, economic, and security issues.

Like Norway, Greece is a country that lands in all four categories. However, unlike Norway, Greece does not have a majority category. As a country with proximity to both cut points

for DE and EE, some of Greece's movement is due to the model's measurement technique. Athens's and Ankara's historical tensions support Greece's main category being Motivated because Motivated Allies hold consensus hostage if the Alliance does not meet their domestic interests. Militarily, hosting multiple US military bases and sharing MWSs with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France explain why the Greeks score in the top third of security scores 70% of the time.

Additionally, Greece's parliamentary republic government structure supports its second category placement being Helpful and Networked. The coalition government requires domestic concessions between Greek politicians. Adding Greece's percentage of time in Helpful and Networked categories equals its time as a Motivated Ally. Therefore, its ties with the Principals diplomatic network equal its security interests with the Triumvirate. Overall, the model capturing Athens' movement between the four categories highlights how the intersection of security concerns and diplomatic ties create a distinct set of circumstances for each NATO member.

Lastly, Fair-Share Allies have two profiles traditionally neutral countries and new members. As original North Atlantic Treaty signatories, Luxembourg and Iceland are heavily reliant on the Article 5 guarantee for their national sovereignty and have limited military resources. Iceland does not have a standing military, and Luxembourg has less than 1000 active-duty military members. The remaining Fair-Share Allies are countries that joined NATO post-Cold War. These countries fit Embeddedness Theory's expectations. They see NATO as a defensive alliance, fear abandonment from stronger NATO allies, and lean towards supporting out-of-area activities to modernize their military by integrating with the Triumvirate.

Additionally, the profile of the Fair-Share countries contributing its proportional share more regularly than any other category reflects its alliance dependence. The central and eastern

European countries which joined NATO in 1999, 2004, and 2009 were looking to get out of Russia's orbit by orienting its security preferences with the West and gaining Article 5 guarantees to protect against potential Russian aggression (Noetzel and Schreer 2009; Græger 2005; Haesebrouck 2017). Fair-Share countries' movement along security lines and not diplomatic integration bolsters this inference. In the quantitative model, nations in the Fair-Share category do not move horizontally along the Diplomatic Embeddedness axis. Instead, these countries place resources behind gaining military capacity through integration with the Triumvirate (mainly the United States). Therefore, Fair-Share countries look to add value to the alliance while simultaneously modernizing their military through participation in NATO out-of-area activities. Lastly, the Fair-Share Allies' propensity to provide their expected proportion of resources makes it reasonable to assume they do not hinder NATO from reaching consensus.

Broadly, the statistical results reflect nations' movement between categories is more often affected by the issue, expeditionary activities and not on diplomatic networks. Outside of Norway and Greece, all the countries stayed at the same high or low Diplomatic Embeddedness level. Instead, NATO Allies moved on the issue, expeditionary activities, and proximity to the intersection of the Triumvirate's security interests.

Country	Networked	Motivated	Helpful	Fair-Share
Albania	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Belgium	4.8%	0.0%	95.2%	0.0%
Bulgaria	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Canada	0.0%	95.2%	0.0%	4.8%
Croatia	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Czech Republic	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	94.1%
Denmark	9.5%	0.0%	90.5%	0.0%
Estonia	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	91.7%
France	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Germany	95.2%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%
Greece	23.8%	47.6%	23.8%	4.8%
Hungary	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Iceland	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Italy	81.0%	0.0%	19.0%	0.0%
Latvia	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	91.7%
Lithuania	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	91.7%
Luxembourg	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Netherlands	42.9%	0.0%	57.1%	0.0%
Norway	14.3%	4.8%	52.4%	28.6%
Poland	0.0%	47.1%	0.0%	52.9%
Portugal	4.8%	0.0%	95.2%	0.0%
Romania	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Slovakia	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Slovenia	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Spain	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Turkey	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United Kingdom	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
United States	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Figure 9 - NATO Consensus Category Membership by Percentages: The figure illustrates the percentage of the time a country is a member of a given category between 1995 and 2015. The highlighted percentages reflect whenever a nation is above 50% in a given category. The country's name is highlighted in color when it is a member of a consensus category more than 50% of the time. Only one country, Greece, does not have a category that it lands in over 50% of the time.




Figure 10 - NATO Consensus Category by Country Flag: The figure illustrates which category each NATO ally is in the majority of the time between 1995 and 2015 with each nation's respective flags. The color coordination mirrors that of Figure 9. Greece is highlighted in light yellow because it is not in the Motivated most of the time and leans towards Helpful.

Modeling Choices, Robustness Checks, and Model Weaknesses

All models use linear regression with robust standard errors and clustering via countries. I chose to use linear regression over logit or probit models to make interpretability easier. When outcome and explanatory variables are both dichotomous, the interpretation is much easier for the reader to understand in a linear regression model (Hellevik 2007; King and Zeng 2001).²⁰⁰ Effectively, a one-unit change in the explanatory variable accounts for a percentage change in the outcome. For example, a one percent increase in Diplomatic Embeddedness is associated with a half of a percent increase in the likelihood a nation provides at least 100 troops to an out-of-area operation.²⁰¹ Therefore a 10% increase in Diplomatic Embeddedness is associated with a 5% increase in the likelihood a nation contributes at least 100 troops to an out-of-area activity. I chose to use a linear regression model because almost all of the outcome and explanatory variables were dichotomous.

Given that social sciences tend to have a broad audience with varying statistical training levels, ensuring most readers can understand the results is essential for the research. Using log-linear and logarithmic methods requires a higher level of statistical training because interpreting the results is difficult. On top of being easier to interpret, future researchers could use my base model and create a linear regression propensity score matching analysis and make causal claims. Conversely, log-based methods are not commonly used for causal analyses because their explanation of dichotomous associations is less reliable. As a result, log-based results are challenging to interpret and offer little substantive meaning to an audience (Hellevik 2007).²⁰²

²⁰⁰ Hellevik, Ottar. 2007. "Linear Versus Logistic Regression When the Dependent Variable Is a Dichotomy." *Quality & Quantity* 43 (1): 59-74. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-007-9077-3>. P. 59-60.

King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data." *Political Analysis* 9 (2): 137-63. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a004868>. P. 138-9.

²⁰¹ See Appendix C for Linear Regression Table for the impact of Diplomatic Embeddedness on various outcomes.

²⁰² Hellevik, Ottar. 2007. "Linear Versus Logistic Regression When the Dependent Variable Is a Dichotomy." *Quality & Quantity* 43 (1): 59-74. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-007-9077-3>. P. 73-4.

All models estimate robust standard errors clustered by country to control for national autonomy, agency, and intra-class correlation among NATO members. As a result, each model has 28 clusters. I assume that participation in an out-of-area activity is not independent within a country. Each country has its internal politics, international concerns, approach to NATO, and risk tolerance for out-of-area campaigns. I assume that nations approach out-of-area campaigns similarly regardless of region, mission type, or mission objectives. A government prone to participate in an out-of-area campaign might be more likely to participate in future out-of-area activity and vice-a-versa. A country's participation levels may lean in a particular direction or stay consistent over the 1995 – 2015 period. By clustering standard errors by country, I control for unique qualities to each NATO member that cannot be measured or omitted from the model.

There is a small likelihood that all models are victims of omitted variable bias. There is a logical argument that an unaccounted or unobserved variable like “prone to enter into a conflict” or “fear seeing military members injured” could bias each explanatory variable's estimation values. Diplomatic Embeddedness, trade to target, aid to target, and trade with the United States could all suffer from an association with “prone to enter into a conflict.” Expeditionary Embeddedness, security score distance from the United States, and military expenditure could be affected by “fear seeing military members injured.” However, I could not find a variable that measures a nation's desire to enter into a military conflict or risk tolerance for out-of-area activities.

Additionally, there are some heteroskedastic and skewed data concerns because Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness are variables that use characteristics from specific members to define all members. While statistically, this is a valid worry, in reality, when looking at nations'

raw data, it is not a concern. For example, the government that ranks the highest on Expeditionary Embeddedness is not a Triumvirate member, even though the metric uses the weighted average of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Instead, Turkey consistently ranks the highest from 1995 to 2008 (see Figure 8). Likewise, although I calculate Diplomatic embeddedness using IGOs where four or more Principals are present, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain rank in the top 4 for this metric from 1995 to 2015 (see Figure 9). Therefore, the two explanatory variables do not skew data to create extremely biased results.

By omitting maritime operations, the results do not capture nations with strong naval forces. Therefore, the model and results only reflect the impact of ground and airpower missions. Lastly, the model's most significant limitation is that it uses some inductive reasoning because it uses members' NATO participation levels to describe a NATO phenomenon. Therefore, the inputs and outputs are not entirely independent of each other. While technically this is a concern, there is no practical way to investigate how NATO selects, develops, and decides to execute an out-of-area activity without using its members' data. NATO is a collection of 30 sovereign nations which offer its national resources to accomplish a task collectively. Therefore, the organization is an institution with weak independent power and agency that bends to its members' collective will.

Conclusion

Overall, the quantitative model bolsters Embeddedness Theory's conceptualization of building consensus. The model provided statistical support for the existence of Expeditionary

Embeddedness, Diplomatic Embeddedness, and the four consensus-building categories. Diplomatic Embeddedness proved to be the more substantial variable of the two when predicting relative and absolute contributions. Having multiple social, economic, and political ties supports Henke's work that powerful countries like the Principals' can operationalize their networks to access private information, link issues, make side-payments, and shift policy to build consensus within NATO.

Additionally, the consensus categories' distinctive descriptions illustrate that countries' characteristics have an impact on contributions to out-of-area activities. Moreover, how nations shifted between categories reveals how the model accounts for national autonomy. Intuitively, nations alter foreign policy preferences based on their domestic politics and the international security environment. However, locating how nations shift and the impact of those modifications is nebulous. The model provides a framework to account for changing out-of-area interests and articulates what to expect given the nation's altered position.

As a side benefit, the model signals how NATO enlargement has impacted some countries differently than others. For example, despite assessing the same year, Poland is more integrated with the Triumvirate's security interests than the Czech Republic by a wide margin. The former being a Motivated Ally 47.1% of its time and the latter only 5.9% reflects the different level of connection with the Alliance's most powerful militaries. While the model does not explain why the difference exists, it accounts for the contrast. It can predict how the two countries impact the Alliance reaching consensus for an out-of-area activity and how each nation would participate, despite being very similar on paper.

Touching all four categories at least once, Greece and Norway illustrate how a particular combination of issues and diplomatic networks impact certain countries differently. The shifting of countries signals how consensus is challenging to obtain yearly and explains why nations contribute more or less to specific out-of-area activities. Having statistical findings which match the conceptualization of the four consensus categories is advantageous for the case analysis because the results provide a road map for detecting deal-making during an out-of-area activity.

The statistical findings solidify that NATO has four distinct types of members which impact NATO's ability to reach consensus. Networked Allies have capable militaries which provide a substantial number of resources to an out-of-area activity at a rate that is slightly above its proportion of NATO resources. Motivated Allies have the most significant militaries which make ample contributions to an out-of-area activity as well. However, their offerings are at a rate that is below their relative capabilities, signaling their military superiority within the Alliance. Helpful Allies are countries that consistently make a noticeable contribution to an out-of-area activity. But their contributions to the Alliance are at a higher relative cost than any other member. Lastly, Fair-Share Allies are countries that provide the least number of resources. Yet, they are the most dependable Allies, with their contributions being most representative of their relative share of NATO's forces.

Identifying the four types of NATO Allies and validating the presence of Diplomatic and Expeditionary Embeddedness creates confidence in the subsequent qualitative case-study analysis.

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

“After Dayton, the Security Council authorized, at the request of the signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the deployment of IFOR and SFOR under the conditions set out in the document to ensure the implementation of the military aspects under Chapter VII.”

Dick A Leurdijk,
Before and After Dayton: The UN and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia, 1997

“In today’s dynamic environment of increasingly challenging threats— violent extremist networks, global terrorism, and failing states—it is more critical than ever to work with our allies and friends. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to be a most valued partner in these struggles. However, the Alliance faces its own unique problem set as it endeavors to transform to become an even more relevant player in this new reality.”

General James Jones,
A Blueprint for Change Transforming NATO Special Operations, 2007

“The alliance will now have to summon the political will to implement these standards in a period of fiscal austerity. NATO countries can continue to invest in their military capabilities on their own— which means investing inefficiently and often insufficiently, while leaning on an increasingly impatient United States to make up the difference. Or member states can invest through NATO and other multinational programs, saving money, promoting cooperation, sharing capabilities, and demonstrating solidarity.”

Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis
NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention, 2012

The Bosnian conflict was an indirect forum that set the template for the future rules of international security policy post-Cold War between Western Powers and Russia. Four groups in the region attempted to bring President Slobodan Milosevic, President Franjo Tudman, and President Alija Izetbegovic to the negotiation table. 1) the European Community (EC) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 2) the United Nations (UN) and EC, 3) the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 4) the Balkan Contact Group (BCG) and the UN (Atiyas 1995).²⁰³ The group that ultimately brought a peace agreement was a combination of the BCG and NATO with the signing of the Dayton Accords and the creation of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Sustainment Force (SFOR).

The Dayton Accords established the BCG and NATO as important players in shaping the international order post-Cold War. The Bosnian settlement allowed each nation in the BCG to promote its national interests in the region and on the global stage. France enhanced its declining resources and prestige in Europe by taking a leading role within NATO and the EU. The United Kingdom bolstered its status as a significant power. Germany secured its eastern and southern flanks with friendly and stable states. Russia played the role of great power, gained acceptance into major economic forums and financial assistance for its reforms. The United States solidified NATO's centrality to European security and America's position in Europe. Despite a lack of unity and public disagreements, the BCG countries established themselves as the key actors in Balkan diplomacy and on the wider international stage by working together in the face of significant differences in interest (Leigh-Phippard 1998).²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Atiyas, Nimet Beriker. 1995. "Mediating Regional Conflicts and Negotiating Flexibility: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 542 (1): 185-201. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716295542001012>. P. 186, P.202.

²⁰⁴ Leigh-Phippard, Helen. 1998. "The Contact Group on (And in) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation?" *International Journal* 53 (2): 306-324. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203296>. P. 322-3.

While Article 5 was the bedrock of the institution, NATO had an infrastructure that integrated strategic policymaking with military execution and the United States' hard power. As an institution, NATO made a difference in the capacity of states to coordinate their policies and mount credible deterrence and defense of collective interests.

Institutions persist because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain. Therefore, they may remain useful despite changed circumstances. NATO provided a reliable format for American, British, French, and German policymakers to coordinate efforts and handle various security problems like political instability and relations among other Allies.

During the mid and late 1990s, the United States put its weight behind NATO, not other European Security organizations. The transatlantic alliance had easily adaptable daily interactions, procedures, and trusted processes that facilitated corporation amongst members. European Allies invested in NATO to eliminate the need to renationalize their militaries, keep the cost of national defense down, and preserve the United States' involvement with European Security which proved vital in solving the Balkans volatility (Wallander 2000).²⁰⁵

The UN and European networks' inability to quell the instability in the Balkans created a new role for NATO, security provider. Before the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO was a defensive alliance with an orientation towards responding towards Soviet aggression. Before Dayton, NATO responded to invitations of the UN Security Council (UN), and after Dayton, the UNSC legitimized NATO's ability to implement strategic peacekeeping objectives outside its member's borders. UNSC Resolutions 1031 and 1088, which

²⁰⁵ Wallander, Celeste. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War." *International Organization* 54 (4): 705-735. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343>. P. 705-6, P.723-4.

authorized IFOR and SFOR, effectively used NATO as a subcontractor to fulfill the UNSC's peace enforcement and keeping objectives in Bosnia (Leurdijk 1997).²⁰⁶

With a vote of 15 to 0, the UNSC appointed NATO to be the political and military institution charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Accords and sustaining peace in the region. The specific naming of NATO is contextually important because it set a new precedent for international security. Bosnia was the first major conflict that caught the attention of multiple world powers post-Cold War. Therefore, the settlement created a new avenue for military intervention. The five permanent members (P5) and ten rotating members could cede international responsibility for peace in the Balkans to NATO. Additionally, it anchored parts of domestic populations in NATO to look to the UN for international legitimacy for out-of-area activities.

While institutionalists view the Bosnian settlement illustrates that rules, norms, and structure can shape state behavior, a deeper dive into the players involved illustrate that the Contact Group, UNSC, and NATO were mechanisms that coalesced realist interests. Therefore, it was the intersection of institutionalism and realism that lead to the settlement. Every nation in the original Contact Group had a seat on the UNSC when resolutions 1031 (IFOR) and 1088 (SFOR) passed.²⁰⁷ The BCG held positions in relevant international organizations like the EU, NATO, and UNSC, which enabled the five nations to act as lead nations of the international community with the Balkans. Therefore, the BCG was instrumental in negotiating the peace agreements for Bosnia and assuming responsibility for the peace implementation processes (Schwegmann 2000a).²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Leurdijk, Dick. 1997. "Before and After Dayton: The UN and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia." *Third World Quarterly* 18 (3): 457-470. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993263>. P. 467-70.

²⁰⁷ Italy joined the Contact Group in 1996 (making six members) and was a member of the UNSC when UNSCR 1031 and 1088 were signed. Italy joined the BCG as the holder of the EU presidency in 1996. Italy kept its seat in the BCG by exerting pressure on the United States.

²⁰⁸ Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P. iii.

Although each international situation is different, the Bosnian negotiated settlement set the stage for NATO out-of-area activities because it was the first. The development of IFOR and SFOR set a precedent for NATO to act. Four elements had to be present. First, the Quad (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has overlapping interests. Second, influential NATO allies outside of the Quad see value in the out-of-area activity and have the opportunity to shape the organization's strategic interests. Third, NATO Allies obtain sufficient political will to sacrifice resources. Fourth, all Allies have a willingness to build consensus.

Case Selection

The following five cases, Kosovo (KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF), Iraq (NTM-I), Pakistan (OPER), and Libya (OUP), provide diverse factors to test the validity of Embeddedness Theory's typology while testing independent variables.

First, KFOR serves as a case to test political will. Operation Allied Force (OAF) is controversial within the international security community because it lacked a UNSC Resolution authorizing the use of force. Embeddedness Theory's Integrated Explanation Model (IEM) demonstrates how OAF illustrates how a UNSC Resolution impacts a country's political will to participate in an out-of-area activity. Conversely, KFOR had UNSC Resolution that had an explicit Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII response which unlocked the political will for NATO to have sufficient political will to sustain an out-of-area activity. The case illustrates the nuance of sufficient political will for short-term and long-term interests.

Second, ISAF tests Embeddedness Theory's assumptions that an Article 5 attack creates a willingness for NATO to act out-of-area. The IEM explains despite sufficient political will and consensus-building, executing the activity still requires two more factors. First, the Principals must design a ZOPA because they have the most resources. Second, the Triumvirate needs overlapping interests because they possess the most influence on the agenda. Additionally, ISAF provides a hoop test for how out-of-area activities are selected and developed. Preference Convergence theory predicts they come together randomly. Instead, Embeddedness Theory explains the powerful actors in the Alliance put them together.

Third, NTM-I highlights the need for the Triumvirate to have overlapping interests for any out-of-area activity to have a legitimate place on NATO's agenda. Additionally, the Principals need to have an agreement with how an operation could work. NATO did not participate in the 2003 Iraq War because the Triumvirate and Principals disagreed on the approach to the situation in Iraq. Therefore, despite the United States' influence in the organization, the institution is robust enough to push back against the most powerful Ally in the Alliance. Despite great consternation in the Alliance, NTM-I demonstrates the Principals' willingness to take a Least-Common-Denominator (LCD) approach to out-of-area operations. The LCD approach is when members constrain themselves and their negotiation efforts by the need for public unity and a commitment to shared principles. As a result, the group promotes a decision that contains conflict rather than promoting a resolution to the conflict (Leigh-Phippard 1998).²⁰⁹ The buildup to NTM-I provides a hoop test for Hegemonic Power theory which expects the United States to coerce the Alliance to adhere to its foreign policy objectives.

²⁰⁹ Leigh-Phippard, Helen. 1998. "The Contact Group on (And in) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation?" *International Journal* 53 (2): 306-324. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203296>. P. 324

Fourth, OPER offers an examination of Lepgold's assumption that humanitarian missions are different because they are immune from major force-thinning constraints when military concerns are not involved (Lepgold 1998).²¹⁰ Despite drawing a valuable distinction between humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, Lepgold negates NATO's process for selecting, developing, and deciding to pursue an out-of-area activity by focusing on the type of public good the operation provides its members. Embeddedness Theory's IEM illustrates the process for all out-of-area activities is the same. Therefore, the kind of good supplied (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian) does not impact NATO's decision-making process nor the elements that need to be present for the out-of-area operation to materialize. Despite immediate political will to support the people of Pakistan, NATO's relief efforts were the product of overlapping interests in the Triumvirate and policy agreement amongst the Principals.

Fifth, OUP provides an example of how overlapping interests in the Triumvirate drives the Alliance's pursuit of out-of-area activities, not United States foreign policy. The development of OUP combats Hegemonic Power theory's assumption that the United States priorities drive NATO's actions and Preference Convergence theory's logic that out-of-area activities come together through shared threat perception or interests. Additionally, the operation highlights how influential Allies can shape policy through their participation and withholding of resources. Embeddedness Theory's typology provides an avenue for a NATO Ally to trade its silence for assurance around domestic concerns. The Alliance's approach to handling Libya demonstrates how NATO builds consensus through specific actions and not institutional norms.

²¹⁰ Lepgold, Joseph. 1998. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23 (1): 78-106. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P. 95.

Case 1: Kosovo, 1 January 1998 – 11 June 1999

Background

As a former autonomous province of Serbia, diplomatic circles had an interest in Kosovo since the signing of the Dayton Accords. Diplomats and political analysts expressed concern about Kosovo because the aim of radical Albanians in Kosovo to unite with Albanians in Albania and Macedonia to create a “Greater Albania” was a potential threat to the region (Schwegmann 2000a).²¹¹.

At the time of the Dayton Accords, the threats concerning Kosovo were not as pressing as Bosnia because the distribution of territory was simpler. Bosnia had three warring factions in disputed territories between former Yugoslav republics. Therefore, Bosnia and Croatia were disputed lands due to the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Kosovo was a part of Serbia and directly under President Milosevic’s rule because Kosovo was a region within Serbia (I. Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000; Schwegmann 2000a; Auerswald 2004). Although the dynamic between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians was a concern to NATO Allies in the mid-1990s, the United States and its European Allies did not focus on Kosovo until early 1998.

On 8 January 1998, the BCG officially put the deteriorating situation in Kosovo on its agenda. In a joint statement, the six nations expressed their deep concern developed after the Bonn

²¹¹ Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P. 11-12.

Peace Implementation Council (PIC) on 9 December 1997.²¹² The BCG explained they would focus on Kosovo as a matter of high priority and asked the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to begin dialogues and stop using violence against one another (US-State-Department 1998a).²¹³ The BCG explained they would focus on Kosovo as a matter of high priority and asked the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to begin dialogues and stop using violence against one another (US-State-Department 1998a).²¹⁴

On 7 March, the conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) reached a crescendo when Serbian military forces killed over 50 people in an attempt to capture a KLA leader named Adem Jeshari. Called a terrorist by the Serbian security forces, the military operation in Prekaz to apprehend Jeshari attempted to send an intermediating message to the KLA (Little 2000).²¹⁵ The Serbian military's actions transformed the situation in Kosovo by turning a domestic dispute into an international ordeal based on grave violations of human rights. Once the photos of murdered innocent Kosovar Albanian civilians surfaced, the event became a rallying cry for young Albanian men to fight against Milosevic (Koinova 2018).²¹⁶ Additionally, the escalation of violence did not allow the international community to ignore the situation in Kosovo any longer.

²¹² The PIC, charged with implementing the Bosnian peace process, included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, President of the EU, President of the European Commission, and President of Islamic Conference.

²¹³ US-State-Department, January 8, 1998, "Contact Group Statement on Kosovo," <https://1997-2001.state.gov/briefings/statements/1998/ps980108.html>.

²¹⁴ US-State-Department, January 8, 1998, "Contact Group Statement on Kosovo," <https://1997-2001.state.gov/briefings/statements/1998/ps980108.html>.

²¹⁵ Little, Allan. 2000. "Behind the Kosovo Crisis." *BBC News*, March 12, 2000. Accessed February 1, 2021. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/674056.stm>.

²¹⁶ Koinova, Maria. 2018. "Critical junctures and transformative events in diaspora mobilisation for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood." *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies* 44 (8): 1289-1308. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354158>. P.

Overlapping Interests in the Triumvirate

Shaped by the events earlier in the decade with Bosnia, the Triumvirate was determined to act quickly and use similar diplomatic tactics, which produced the Bosnian peace agreement in Bosnia. Geographically all three countries agreed they could no longer ignore the violence and human rights abuses in Kosovo. If the situation deteriorated, it could negatively impact the peace plan in Bosnia. After the events in Prekaz, leaders in Paris, London, and Washington had to address the fact that they would not accept the Serbian military doing in Bosnia what it had done in Kosovo. Additionally, all three capitals saw stability in the Balkans as central to their political futures and legacies.

Since the beginning of the Bosnian crisis, the Triumvirate feared addressing the Kosovo situation would become a bloody ordeal. The historical and cultural differences between Serbs and Albanians could destabilize eastern and southern Europe because of large Albanian populations in the region. For these reasons, the United States and its European allies were determined to avoid an escalation in the conflict.

On the heels of the Bosnian conflict, the United States had heavy interest Geographically and Strategically in Kosovo early in March 1998. During her official address to the BCG on 9 March 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained the United States' position on Kosovo.

It took us seven years to bring Bosnia to this moment of hope. It must not take us that long to resolve the crisis that is growing in Kosovo; and it does not have to if we apply the lessons of 1991. This time, we must act with unity and resolve. This time, we must respond before it is too late.

We must first acknowledge that this crisis is not an internal affair of the FRY. The violence is an affront to universal standards of human rights we are pledged to uphold. It represents precisely the sort of conduct that sparked the war in the former Yugoslavia. It is divide and rule all over again, with thugs in uniform targeting not just individuals, but whole families, clans and communities in order to sow widespread fear.

It is President Milosevic who is responsible for internationalizing this crisis -- not we. The time to stop it is now, before it spreads (Albright 1998).²¹⁷

Albright's condemnation of Milosevic and the explanation that the events in Kosovo were no longer an internal Serbian issue illustrated the United States' interest in the region.

Earlier in his second term, President Clinton and his administration made clear their goal of making Europe a continent undivided, peaceful, and democratic. In his 1996 speech to NATO, President Clinton explained nowhere are America's interests more engaged than Europe, and NATO was the bedrock of the common security for North America and Europe. Through this lens, Clinton advanced his support for NATO expansion and the United States' involvement in the Balkans. In his speech, he explained Russia and the West were becoming partners for peace through positive interactions with NATO and the BCG (Clinton 1996).²¹⁸

From the beginning of the Kosovo situation, the United States took the lead on negotiations. Washington pushed for the use of the BCG because the mechanism worked to minimize friction between Russia and the West and intra-alliance disputes amongst NATO leaders.

²¹⁷ Albright, Madeleine, March 9, 1998, "Statement at the Contact Group Ministerial on Kosovo," <https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/980309.html>.

²¹⁸ Clinton, William, October 10, 1996, "President W. J. Clinton To People Of Detroit," <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm>.

The decision to use the BCG signaled the United States' reluctance to use force because Russia had expressed it would not approve military strikes in Kosovo (I. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²¹⁹ The Russian political leadership had expressed its disappointment in the prospect of NATO expansion and did not want any NATO military action in Serbia (Schwegmann 2000a).²²⁰

As Washington began to form its position, one item was apparent the United States did not intend to use ground troops in Kosovo. First, the lead negotiator Richard Holbrooke knew President Milosovic would not agree to NATO troops in his country. Second, the Clinton Administration saw the Bosnian playbook of coercive diplomacy via airstrikes to pressure Milosovic as a sufficient level of military force.

Within Washington policy circles, the thought was if force were necessary, Milosevic would only be capable of withstanding a couple of weeks of bombing. The foreign policy prognosticators based their opinions on his tolerance level during the Bosnia bombings in 1995 (I.H. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²²¹ Overall, the United States was committed to action and the use of force but reluctant to commit to resources beyond airpower.

As a relatively new Prime Minister, Tony Blair was determined not to repeat his predecessor's mistakes in Bosnia with his handling of Kosovo. In a speech he gave in Chicago in 1999, Blair explained his five principles which shaped his perspective on why the humanitarian intervention was justified with Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo.

²¹⁹ ²¹⁹ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P.24-5.

²²⁰ Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P. 11-12.

²²¹ Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. 2000. "The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay." *Washington Quarterly* 23 (4): 157-170. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016366000561277>. P.160 and P.164.

1. Are we sure of our case?
2. Have we exhausted all diplomatic options?
3. Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake?
4. Are we prepared for the long term?
5. Do we have national interests involved? (Atkins 2006).²²²

Keen to change his party's historically weak foreign policy image, Blair saw Kosovo as an opportunity to make a mark on British defense doctrine (Daddow 2009).²²³

The British were particularly far in front on the issue of ground troops and the use of force to address the Kosovo situation. In June of 1998, British Defense Secretary George Robertson announced the United Kingdom's unwavering support for bringing an end to the violence in Serbia.

The world has learned its lesson from Bosnia. The international community now knows it must be united, firm and determined from the earliest possible moment in dealing with the Balkans (Caplan 1998).²²⁴

While not afraid to use force if necessary, London committed to using diplomatic channels first. In late spring of 1998, as the crisis began to escalate and Washington lacked a specific strategy, officials from London started to circulate a draft UNSC Resolution authorizing "all necessary measures" to stabilize the region. The resolution resembled the language and structure used to enable the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and NATO's intervention in Bosnia in 1996 (Jeffrey Smith

²²² Atkins, Judi. 2006. "A New Approach to Humanitarian Intervention? Tony Blair's 'Doctrine of the International Community'." *British Politics* 1 (2): 274-283. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.bp.4200023>. P.

²²³ Daddow, Oliver. 2009. "'Tony's war'? Blair, Kosovo and the interventionist impulse in British foreign policy." *International Affairs* 85 (3): 547-560. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00813.x>. P. 548-9.

²²⁴ Caplan, Richard. 1998. "International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo." *International Affairs* 74 (4): 745. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00043>. P.745.

1998).²²⁵ Like the United States, the United Kingdom had concluded via the Bosnia conflict that dealing with Belgrade that only diplomacy with teeth would produce a desirable outcome. However, unlike the United States, Prime Minister Blair was prepared to put forces on the ground in Kosovo in early June of 1998 if negotiations failed (Robbins and Ricks 1998).²²⁶

After United States airpower brought an end to the Bosnian conflict, President Jacques Chirac began a gradual rapprochement with NATO's military institutions. On 17 January 1996, the French ambassador to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) announced two changes in its approach to the organization. First, the French Defense Minister would attend NATO meetings where the Alliance discussed nuclear policy and Bosnian peace-keeping activities. Second, France rejoined the permanent Military Committee (MC) and participated in international military staff training programs like the NATO defense college and the NATO situation center. France's gradual acceptance that NATO and United States military power was necessary for European security (Tiersky 1996).²²⁷

France's departure from traditional Gaullism was a product of pragmatism. President Chirac understood that the United States' leadership in the region was inevitable after its leadership and implementation of coercive diplomacy brought an end to the Bosnian crisis. The failures of the UN and EU efforts proved to be the most effective political-military institution for European security was NATO. Therefore, to maintain Paris' prominence in the region, it had to adapt its orientation towards the transatlantic alliance. During a speech to Congress in February 1996,

²²⁵ Smith, Jeffrey. 1998. "Officials Seek Kosovo Intervention." *The Washington Post*, June 8, 1998.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/06/officials-seek-kosovo-intervention/967fed3f-ebd1-483f-938d-13132dbc0820/>.

²²⁶ Robbins, Carla, and Thomas Ricks. 1998. "U.S. and NATO Allies Plan to Conduct Air-Raid Exercise to Halt Serb Attacks." *The Wall Street Journal*, June 11, 1998. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB897528446629810000>.

²²⁷ Tiersky, Ronald. 1996. "A Likely Story: Chirac, France-NATO, European Security, and American Hegemony." *French Politics and Society* 14 (2): 1-8. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/42844543>. P. 5-6.

Chirac explained NATO must adapt itself to a universe that is no longer that in which it was born and that there needed to be a more substantial European pillar within NATO to balance its strategic objectives (Erlanger 1996).²²⁸ NATO's transition from IFOR to SFOR created a scenario where the Alliance started a rebirth and France wanted to contribute to its reconstitution. Specifically, France looked to strengthen its political control in the NAC and consolidate the European identity by participating in more MC decisions (Millon 1996).

As Kosovo became direr, Chirac announced that France supported NATO threatening military intervention if Serbian authorities did not agree to negotiations with the Kosovar Albanians. France backed NATO military planners investigating various solutions, including a show of force exercise, large-scale air strikes against Serbian targets, or moving peacekeeping troops onto the Albanian and Kosovo border (Whitney 1998a).²²⁹ With France back in the fold for military activities, and NATO's success with the Bosnian conflict, President Chirac looked to the Contact group and NATO as institutions to insert French influence on the Kosovo peace process.

Principals Design a ZOPA

With Albanians living in at least four countries (Albania, Greece, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia), anything that stoked Albanian nationalism could be highly disruptive for Kosovo's neighbors (I.

²²⁸ Erlanger, Steven. 1996. "Chirac Offers a Vision of NATO; Few in Congress Come to Listen." *The New York Times*, February 2, 1996. <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/02/world/chirac-offers-a-vision-of-nato-few-in-congress-come-to-listen.html>.

²²⁹ Whitney, Craig. 1998. "France Urges Allies to Define Plan for Autonomy for Kosovo." *The New York Times*, June 25, 1998. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/25/world/france-urges-allies-to-define-plan-for-autonomy-for-kosovo.html>.

Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²³⁰ Shaped by the events earlier in the decade with Bosnia, the Principals wanted to act quickly and use the same diplomatic tactics which produced the settled peace agreement in Bosnia. Leverage talks with the BCG to coordinate international peace enforcement actions in the UNSC and NATO.

As an original member of the BCG, Germany invested in Kosovo from the beginning for two reasons. First, it jeopardized maintaining peace in Bosnia. Second, increases in violence in the Balkans threatened to produce more refugees and a burden on the German population. Politically, the Kosovo conflict came at a precarious time when examining Germany's commitment to a military solution. Their parliament had shifted from a conservative orientation with Helmut Kohl to a more liberal order under Gerhard Schroder in October of 1998.

Initially, Kohl's cabinet was willing to pursue a military option if diplomatic efforts failed, which was a monumental position given Germany's history of non-interventionist since WWII. Kohl's minister of defense Volker R  he, explained:

We cannot afford any longer to focus on hollow solutions of rather symbolic character like border-securing missions in Albania or Macedonia, thus sealing off Kosovo from the outside. What we now have to focus on in order to support the ongoing political process is to elaborate credible military options aiming at the core of the problem: the extensive use of violence by Serb security or military forces against the Albanian population in Kosovo (Whitney 1998b).

Under Kohl and R  he's leadership, the German military set the course for Germany to be a more integrated part of NATO and a major player in the post-Cold War European security environment while assuring domestic constituents and fellow Europeans the Bundeswehr was not the

²³⁰ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P.9.

Wehrmacht (Wood 2002).²³¹ Specifically, the conservative leadership explained Germany was ready to do more to bolster the economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe, expand NATO's missions to include crisis management, and create joint and combined force packages adaptable to various European defense situations (Rühe 1993).²³² Therefore, the IFOR/SFOR missions and Kosovo's humanitarian crisis aligned with their strategic vision for German participation in NATO out-of-area activities.

Although a new government, Chancellor Schroder assured allies that his cabinet was committed to finding a solution in Kosovo because he thought the crisis could have repercussions that would extend far beyond the conflict zone (Brummer 2012).²³³ First, without being a reliable partner to NATO and its major Western allies, Germany would harm its status and reputation in international politics. Indeed, he went out of his way to signal to Germany's allies that under his leadership, the country would be as reliable a partner as it was under his conservative predecessor Helmut Kohl.

Second, he feared for the domestic political implications around refugees entering the country. In a speech to the Bundestag, Chancellor Schröder explained that the conflict in Bosnia had led to a massive refugee stream, with Germany admitting more than 300,000 refugees costing DM 20 billion (\$12 billion). Therefore, Germany could not afford another humanitarian catastrophe in the region because the result could be a drag on the German government (Brummer 2012).²³⁴ Despite the change in government, Germany was committed to addressing the

²³¹ Wood, Steve. 2002. "German Foreign and Security Policy after Kohl and Kosovo." *Government and Opposition* 37 (2): 250-270. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/44482986>. P. 255.

²³² Ruhe, Volker. 1993. "Shaping euro-Atlantic policies: A grand strategy for a new era." *Survival* 35 (2): 129-137. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442689>. P.

²³³ Brummer, Klaus. 2012. "Germany's participation in the Kosovo war: Bringing agency back in." *Acta Politica* 47 (3): 272-291. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2011.1>. P. 284.

²³⁴ Brummer, Klaus. 2012. "Germany's participation in the Kosovo war: Bringing agency back in." *Acta Politica* 47 (3): 272-291. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2011.1>. P. 280.

humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. It was willing to use military resources if necessary, but they were cautious about putting boots on the ground like the Americans.

As a country with a regional interest in the Balkans, Italy was disturbed when it was not an original member of the BCG. In 1996 Rome received a seat via its presidency in the EU and never left.²³⁵ As the Kosovo crisis continued, Italian public support for military action in Kosovo was the lowest among NATO Allies in the BCG (Auerswald 2004).²³⁶ Like the Germans, the Italians were changing governments with the Prodi leaving and D'Alema entering. While both governments leaned center-left, the change made a firm commitment from the Italians on their policy objectives difficult for the Triumvirate to pinpoint.

Joining the BCG and NATO's response to the Kosovo crisis was critical to Italy's foreign policy. Its political leaders feared being sidelined and excluded from exclusive foreign policy clubs that had taken shape in the early and mid-1990s euro-zone, Contact Group, and Schengen (Missiroli 2007). Italy's political leadership pushed for NATO to take the lead on Kosovo to maintain its position as an influential nation in European affairs and advocate for its domestic concern about refugees crossing the Adriatic Sea causing an immigration issue. Therefore, Italy widely accepted NATO taking diplomatic action to address Kosovo. However, the country's left-leaning government was resistant to using any more than the minimum amount of force necessary to stop the conflict. The Italian legal community expressed uneasiness on the legality of taking military action in a sovereign country without international legitimacy (D'Alema 2019).²³⁷

²³⁵ Italy managed to stay in the Contact Group by exerting enormous pressure on the United States. It threatened, inter alia, to forbid the deployment of the new US stealth bombers on NATO air bases in Italy. (Schwegmann 2000a) Footnote 42 p. 12.

²³⁶ Auerswald, David. 2004. "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (3): 631-662. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693526>. P. 640.

²³⁷ D'Alema, Massimo. 2019. Oral History Kosovo: Interview with Massimo D'Alema. In *Oral History Kosovo*, edited by Anna Di Lellio. <https://oralhistorykosovo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Massimo-DAlema-ENG.pdf>. P. 1-6.

Throughout the 1990s, Canada was active, supporting the United Nations' and NATO's efforts in Yugoslavia. Therefore, Canadian officials felt slighted and surprised when Ottawa was not a welcomed part of the BCG initially in 1994.²³⁸ As the international system changed post-Cold War, Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy advanced the "Human Security" agenda as Canadians new foreign policy principal for putting resources out-of-area from 1996 to 2000. Human Security referred to Axworthy's view of seeing the world, taking people as the point of reference, rather than focusing on the security of territory or governments (Joe Jockel and Sokolsky 2000).²³⁹ Additionally, the Foreign Affairs minister saw the future of foreign policy for Canada being the constellations of roles a nation has in international organizations (Geddes 1999).²⁴⁰ Therefore, organizations would become tools that Canada could advance or protect its interests by holding positions in influential organizations like the UN and NATO.

Since the end of the cold war, Canada's military and foreign policy aims have been to advance human security through diplomatic and military means. As a strong proponent of Human rights, Canada was one of the first NATO members to engage Milosevic on Kosovo's humanitarian issue in 1996. As violence escalated in 1998, Canada used its positional influence in various international organizations like the G8 and UNSC to advocate for sanctions against Yugoslavia (Manulak 2009). Supporting an effort to stabilize Kosovo was simple for Canadians. Canada could aid in the international community stopping a brutal tyrant with his military and police. Ottawa should participate in an out-of-area operation, even at the cost of the lives of Canadian

²³⁸ Paul Heinbecker, then ambassador to Germany, insisted on and received an invitation to the first contact group meeting on the Bosnian issue. The Canadian minister of foreign affairs, however, balked at the commitment it implied. Although this may be so, it was widely perceived that Canada had been excluded or that it should not have had to insist on an invitation (Manulak 2009), p. 567 footnote 2.

²³⁹ Jockel, Joe, and Joel Sokolsky. 2000. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56 (1): 1-18. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203528>. P. 2.

²⁴⁰ Geddes, John. 1999. "Mission: 'Human security'." *Maclean's*, 1999 Apr 26, 36.

military personnel (Joe Jockel and Sokolsky 2000).²⁴¹ As a strong proponent of Human rights, Canada was one of the first NATO members to engage Milosevic on Kosovo's humanitarian issue in 1996. As violence escalated in 1998, Canada used its positional influence in various international organizations like the G8 and UNSC to advocate for sanctions against Yugoslavia (Manulak 2009).²⁴² While not a powerful player in any organization, Canada's presence and ability to act as a lubricant could facilitate discussions between power players like United States, France, and Russia.

The BCG had five of the six Principals and was the main negotiating forum for developing NATO's potential avenues.²⁴³ On 9 March 1998, the BCG made a joint statement condemning the Serbian Government's use of force against Kosovar civilians and gave President Milosevic 10 days to withdraw his units from the Kosovo region and start a dialogue with Kosovar Albanian leadership. In the statement, the BCG articulated its position that it was a neutral party trying to stabilize the area and decrease conflict spillover into other parts of the Balkans and surrounding regions.

We are dismayed that in the period since September, rather than taking steps to reduce tensions or to enter without preconditions into dialogue toward a political solution, the Belgrade authorities have applied repressive measures in Kosovo. We note with particular concern the recent violence in Kosovo resulting in at least 80 fatalities and condemn the use of excessive force by Serbian police against civilians, and against peaceful demonstrators in Pristina on 2 March.

Our condemnation of the actions of the Serbian police should not in any way be mistaken for an endorsement of terrorism. Our position on this is clear. We wholly condemn terrorist actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or

²⁴¹ Jockel, Joe, and Joel Sokolsky. 2000. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56 (1): 1-18. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203528>. P. P.5. P. 18.

²⁴² Manulak, Michael W. 2009. "Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A "Golden Moment" in Canadian Foreign Policy?" *International Journal* 64 (2): 565-581. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/40204525>. P.577-80.

²⁴³ Canada was the only Principal not in the BCG. However, Canada had a seat on the UNSC and G8 which proved crucial in negotiations.

individual. Those in the Kosovar Albanian community who speak for the different political constituencies should make it clear that they, too, abhor terrorism. We insist likewise that those outside the FRY who are supplying finance, arms or training for terrorist activity in Kosovo should immediately cease doing so.

We condemn the large-scale police actions of the last 10 days that further inflamed an already volatile situation. The violent repression at non-violent expression of political views is completely indefensible. We call upon the authorities in Belgrade to invite independent forensic experts to investigate the very serious allegations of extrajudicial killings. If these accusations are borne out, we expect the FRY authorities to prosecute and punish those responsible (US-State-Department 1998b).²⁴⁴

The BCG's consistent goal was to promote a diplomatic dialogue between the KLA and the Serbian government. Scared by the experience with Bosnia, the escalating violence in Kosovo in late 1997 and early 1998 created a call to action because peace in Bosnia and Eastern Europe was in jeopardy. There were four main lessons learned and assumptions built into the Principals' psyche. First, all agreed that they had to act rapidly to avoid a repeat of the Bosnian horrors. Second, successful intervention required unity of effort and American leadership because neither were present early in Bosnia. Third, only concerted pressure on Milosevic would effectively convince Belgrade to end the violence and commence a dialogue with the Albanian community in Kosovo. Fourth, Albanian independence in Kosovo independent was not an option for ending the violence (I. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁴⁵

The complicated dynamics of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the delegation of unofficially elected representatives in Kosovo raised significant legitimacy questions throughout the BCG. As effectively non-state actors on the international stage, creating a peace agreement

²⁴⁴ US-State-Department, March 9, 1998b, "London Contact Group Meeting, 9 March 1998, Statement on Kosovo," https://1997-2001.state.gov/travels/980309_kosovo.html.

²⁴⁵ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P.24.

that Serbia would recognize was hard to fathom. Additionally, the threat of the KLA inspiring other Albanians to create their own separatist regions in Greece, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was not acceptable to anyone in the BCG (Weller 1999).²⁴⁶ Therefore, the BCG agreed that an autonomous but not entirely independent Kosovo was the only sustainable solution that all members would agree.

As the Principals came to the reality that military intervention was likely, four options materialized. The plans centered on two elements. First, had NATO negotiated a cease-fire that allowed NATO to intervene. Second, the number of ground forces needed to institute peace. The two options which consented to NATO intervention were labeled options A and A-. Whereas the two options where NATO forced their way into Kosovo were labeled B and B-.

“Option A” stipulated NATO was enforcing a cease-fire agreement reached by the parties and had to maintain an environment conducive to negotiating a peace settlement. Option A required 50,000 NATO troops. “Option A-” was NATO enforcement of a peace settlement reached by the parties, but the security demands were not as high and, therefore, only 28,000 NATO troops.

“Option B” was NATO’s forced entry into all of Yugoslavia, with the mission of suppressing the Yugoslav government to facilitate negotiation of a cease-fire and a peace settlement in Kosovo. Option B called for 200,000 NATO troops. “Option B-” was NATO’s forced entry into Kosovo, with a mission of defeating the Yugoslav army and the Serb Interior Ministry police. Simultaneously, NATO forces would need to neutralize the KLA to negotiate a

²⁴⁶ Weller, Marc. 1999. "The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo." *International Affairs* 75 (2): 211. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00069>. P. 211-213.

cease-fire and a peace settlement. Option B- stipulated 75,000 NATO troops would be necessary (I. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁴⁷

Sufficient Political Will

Before 1998, the Principals lacked the political will and a clear vision for engaging with the Balkans outside of Bosnia. The Albanian President Sali Berisha's request for assistance in February 1997 during the uprisings highlighted the differences. Greece and Italy saw the potential refugee crisis as turning into an immigration problem. In contrast, the United States and Germany saw the spillover effects of Albania's civil war as remote. Additionally, given the precedent to use the BCG as the forum to discuss the Balkans, none of the Principals wanted to involve Russian interest in any handling of Albania (Schwegmann 2000a).²⁴⁸ Therefore, the Principals did not see a way to move forward through NATO before early 1998.

The Contact Group's 25 March 1998 official statement asking the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease actions against the Kosovar Albanian civilians inspired other nations to notice the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. UNSC Resolution 1160 came after the BCG released an official statement calling for the Yugoslav and Kosovar Albanian leadership to begin a political dialogue to prevent the escalation of violence. The six nations were a decisive factor in uniting

²⁴⁷ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P. 34.

²⁴⁸ Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P. 11-12.

the international community to combine resources and find a peaceful solution in the Balkans (Schwegmann 2000b).²⁴⁹

On 31 March 1998, the UNSC passed Resolution 1160, which condemned the Serbian Police Force's actions against civilians and nonviolent demonstrators in Kosovo as well as acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army and other terrorist activity in Kosovo. Along with acknowledging the less than peaceful situation in Kosovo, the UNSC called for a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. The UNSC resolution highlighted to the world, the peace agreement achieved in Bosnia was not enough to spur peace throughout the region. The UNSC intended to stimulate political dialogue between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovar Albanians' conflict in the Kosovo region.

In May of 1998, the NAC commissioned studies for preventive NATO deployments near Kosovo. NATO's success with the Dayton Accords in 1995 was fresh on the minds of many key leaders in the UNSC and Contact group. Many figures in the United States, France, and United Kingdom leadership during the Bosnian conflict occupied the same or similar seats in 1998. The lesson leaders in the Triumvirate learned from Bosnia was the need to act quickly and cohesively through NATO and UNSC. However, achieving decisive actions via group dynamics proved difficult because there were two factions. The Russians and Italians viewed Kosovo as a protracted process that needed to incentivize Milosevic and the Albanian community to find peaceful solutions. Conversely, the United States and the United Kingdom preferred a confrontational approach through coercive diplomacy used in 1995 that brought Milosevic to the table and sign

²⁴⁹ Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P. iii.

the Dayton Accords (I. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁵⁰ The two sides found a less than desirable middle ground, which allowed the Republic of Yugoslavia to worsen.

Over the rest of the Spring and Summer of 1998, violence continued to escalate. Forcing the UNSC to take further action. On 23 September 1998, the UNSC passed Resolution 1199, which escalated the call for peace in the region by making six demands:

- (a) That all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a meaningful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian Leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe
- (b) Cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression.
- (c) Enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors to, from and within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring.
- (d) Facilitate, in agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo.
- (e) Make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the problems of Kosovo.
- (f) The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe.

²⁵⁰ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P.24-7.

The UNSC Resolution 1199 provided firmer rhetoric and placed the ultimate responsibility of security and peace in the region with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Although UNSC Resolution 1199 outlined what needed to happen in Kosovo to move towards a more peaceful situation, the document did not provide clear direction or legitimacy to take action in the region.

While the US, UK, and France were determined to stop Milosevic from inflicting further harm on the Kosovar Albanians, the other two permanent members of the Security Council, Russia, and China expressed strong reservations about military intervention in what they viewed as the 'internal affairs' of the FRY. China abstained from voting on all resolutions dealing with the situation in Kosovo (1160, 1199, 1203, 1239, 1244), while Russia abstained only from supporting resolutions 1203 and 1239 (Bjola 2005).²⁵¹ By design, Russia threatened to veto any resolution that legitimized the use of force if Belgrade and Milosevic did not comply with the UNSC desires. As a result, UNSC Resolution 1199 was a more sternly worded 1160. Both resolutions are examples of Article 39 Designations. They define that Kosovo was less than peaceful and outline a process that would lead towards less conflict and potential reconciliation. However, neither document legitimizes the use of force nor sets the parameters for UNSC to ask UN members to enforce the resolution.

The lack of a Chapter VII Directive creates ambiguity on the international legality of NATO using UNSC Resolutions 1160 and 1199 as reasons to take military action against a sovereign member of the United Nations. NATO members internally wrestled with the reality of

²⁵¹ Bjola, Corneliu. 2005. "Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2): 266-303. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052968>. P. 288-90.

a deteriorating situation in Kosovo and the lack of a legal mandate from the UNSC. French President Jacques Chirac's words on 8 October 1998 allude to this problem within NATO.

Any military action must be requested and decided by the Security Council. In this particular case, we have a resolution (UNSCR 1199) which does open the way to the possibility of military action. I would add, and repeat, that the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to a rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required it, then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in order to assist those that are in danger (Guicherd 1999).²⁵²

President Chirac's statement to the French Press highlights how NATO had the right to interpret the spirit of UNSC Resolution 1199 in the context of the dynamics on the ground. At the same time, he acknowledged that there is no clear-cut mandate to intervene in Kosovo like in Bosnia.

Throughout much of 1998, however, the United States, European, and NATO policy toward Kosovo was haphazard and marked by a tendency to avoid making difficult decisions. The focus of the initial effort was on economic sanctions and encouraging a dialogue between the parties to arrive at a settlement of Kosovo's political future. The tide started to turn during the Holbrooke-Milosevic negotiations of late 1998. In September of 1998, Holbrooke worked with NATO officials to obtain an activation warning for limited airstrikes in Serbia, which opened the door for NATO to take military action in Kosovo. The Alliance approved limited airstrikes with the understanding that the authorization orders would strengthen Richard Holbrooke's negotiating position with Milosovic.

²⁵² Guicherd, Catherine. 1999. "International Law and the War in Kosovo." *Survival (London)* 41 (2): 19-34.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/41.2.19>. P.28.

During the Holbrooke-Milosovic negotiations in Belgrade in October of 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted a report on 3 October 1998 to the UNSC. In his report summary, Secretary Annan explained that the United Nations could not verify the Yugoslavian government had complied with Resolutions 1160 and 1199. The increases in refugees and lack of compliance forced NATO to realize diplomacy was hitting a dead end. The Alliance activated a second activation order (ACTORD) with a 96-hour suspense to encourage Milosovic to comply with the UNSC Resolutions parameters. Brussels wanted to signal its willingness to use coercive diplomacy again with Milosevic to bring him to take the negotiation process with Holbrooke seriously (Perlez 1998).²⁵³

The credible threat and consensus amongst the NATO allies led to UNSC Resolution 1203 on 24 October 1998. The resolution endorsed an agreement signed in Belgrade by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the OSCE, and NATO. The agreement explained that the Yugoslavian government would comply with the requirements outlined in UNSC Resolutions 1160 and 1199. Additionally, the resolution calls on all members of the Kosovo Albanian leadership to comply with 1160 and 1190 and enter into peace talks with Yugoslavia. Unlike 1160 and 1190, UNSC Resolution 1203 endorsed NATO as a legitimate institution to comply with UNSC Resolutions. Implicitly, UNSC Resolution 1203 set the groundwork for an Article VII Declaration for NATO. If the Yugoslavian government or Kosovar Albanians did not take meaningful actions to facilitate a peaceful solution, then NATO had the right to intervene on behalf of the UNSC's enforcement of 1160 and 1199.

²⁵³ Perlez, Jane. 1998. "NATO Raises Its Pressure On the Serbs." *The New York Times*, October 12, 1998, 8, A. <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/12/world/nato-raises-its-pressure-on-the-serbs.html>.

Initially, Yugoslavian and Albanian officials made efforts to move towards peace talks. The removal of military and special police units in Kosovo led NATO to announce it would no longer execute an airstrike campaign on 27 October 1998. Secretary-General Solana explained the alliance would continue to keep a constant review of the Kosovo situation and ensure the effectiveness of OSCE monitors, UNHCR regime charged with ensuring both sides fulfill their obligations. Lastly, the NATO Secretary-General signaled that NATO would take military action if the conflict's status quo continued (Solana 1998).

NATO's patience was tested from 24 December 1998 through 30 January 1999. Eventually, NATO issued a statement giving full support to the Contact Group's Strategy of negotiations starting on 6 February 1999 in Rambouillet, France. Additionally, NATO announced it would consider airstrikes if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not adhere to the 25 October 1998 agreement to remove their forces from Kosovo (NATO 1999a).²⁵⁴ Milosovic complied, and both sides entered into peace talks in Rambouillet on 6 February 1999. Despite incremental progress, on 23 March 1999, talks ended with only the Kosovar Albanians agreeing to the peace terms. While Milosovic sent additional Serbian military forces to occupy Kosovo and prepare for a large-scale offensive against the KLA.

After Richard Holbrooke, lead peace negotiator left Belgrade with no deal from the Yugoslavian government, he traveled to Brussels and explained to the NAC that Milosevic would not end the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. As a result, NATO had to come to grips with the fact that military action would be necessary to subside the conflict in Kosovo. Since the UNSC could not agree on a military response, the chances for inducing change from outside NATO were

²⁵⁴ NATO, January 30, 1999, "Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo," <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm>.

effectively zero. Thus, NATO faced the prospect of either witnessing a deliberately engineered mass expulsion of people in a region bordering NATO and the EU or address the Kosovo crisis without the approval of Russia and China (Solana 1999).²⁵⁵

Secretary-General Javier Solana directed Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) Richard Clark to begin Operation Allied Force (OAF) on 24 March 1999, a multi-phased air bombing campaign that looked to cripple the Serbian military and its supporting infrastructure. OAF was NATO's first out-of-area campaign post IFOR/SFOR (I. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁵⁶

OAF caused a substantial rift in the BCG between the western powers and Russia. Moscow froze communication with BCG members in other international forums and was unwilling to come back to the negotiating table to discuss Kosovo outside of the G8 setting (Schwegmann 2000a).²⁵⁷ The G8 elevated talks to heads of state and changed the dynamics of negotiations because Japan and Canada (a non-permanent member of the UNSC at the time) were members on top of the other BCG members. The G8 convened an emergency meeting in Dresden to discuss a potential peace plan for Kosovo in early April. During the talks, the eight heads of state did not outline a deal, but all parties agreed that an agreement would need a UNSC Resolution and an international ground force to implement peace in Kosovo (Manulak 2009).²⁵⁸

With an international security force pending, NATO had to readdress the divisive issue of putting troops on the ground in Kosovo. With the conflict lingering, the United States and other

²⁵⁵ Solana, Javier. 1999. "NATO's Success in Kosovo." *Foreign Affairs* 78 (6): 114-120. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20049537>. P. 116.

²⁵⁶ Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. 2000. "The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay." *Washington Quarterly* 23 (4): 157-170. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016366000561277>. P. 164-8.

²⁵⁷ Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P. 17-8.

²⁵⁸ Manulak, Michael W. 2009. "Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A "Golden Moment" in Canadian Foreign Policy?" *International Journal* 64 (2): 565-581. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/40204525>. P.577-80.

Allies realized that NATO's credibility was on the line again as it was with Bosnia. Therefore, the Clinton administration committed to providing a little less than 4,000 ground troops to a ground force in Kosovo. Washington's willingness to reverse course and place troops on the ground capitalized on the French and British militaries' commitment and unlocked other NATO Allies like Italy and Canada to make credible commitments as well. Additionally, Germany insisted that Moscow have involvement in the peace negotiations to protect the reputation of NATO. For Berlin, Moscow's presence and input were signs to their constituents and the international community that Germany and NATO were attempting to resolve the crisis without having to bomb Belgrade into submission. Russian inputs and blessing would increase the likelihood Milosevic accepted NATO's peace conditions. NATO agreed with Berlin's assessment and pushed for re-engaging Russia and Serbia via the G8 (I.H. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁵⁹

As the bombing continued through April and May, the definitive end of the war was murky because Belgrade was not relenting on its persecution of Albanians. NATO committed to five conditions that would end OAF.

1. A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. The withdrawal of the Serbian military, police, and paramilitary from Kosovo.
3. Milosovic agreeing to an international military presence in Kosovo.
4. The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons.
5. Credible assurance of implementing the Rambouillet Accords in establishing a political framework for Kosovo.

Between the April emergency meeting and the June G8 summit in Cologne, the heads of states created the framework for peace that included six primary elements.

²⁵⁹ Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. 2000. "The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay." *Washington Quarterly* 23 (4): 157-170. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016366000561277>. P. 162-8.

1. An immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all Serb military, police, and paramilitary forces within seven days.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and commanded by NATO's SACEUR.
4. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
5. A political process toward the establishment self-government for Kosovo,
6. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

The task of defining the actual terms of a final agreement fell to three individuals: Strobe Talbott, who represented NATO's interests, Viktor Chernomyrdin, who negotiated on Moscow's behalf, and Martti Ahtisaari, who represented the European Union. The three negotiators created a peace agreement that resembled the G8's framework, and Milosovic signed on 3 June, beginning the peace process in Kosovo (I. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁶⁰

OAF continued through 10 June 1999 when the UNSC passed Resolution 1244. UNSC Resolution 1244 established an explicit "Article 39 Designation" and a "Chapter VII Directive" for the international community to end hostilities between all parties in Kosovo through military action if necessary. Additionally, 1244 established a political and military hierarchy for the international military force, The United Nations would lead, and the relevant international organizations would follow. The framework would allow NATO to have a significant role and simultaneously allowed Russian forces to participate.

With clear international legitimacy, NATO established Kosovo Force (KFOR) out-of-area campaign. KFOR initially had 50,000 military troops from NATO countries, Partnership for Peace

²⁶⁰ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P.165-74.

members, and other non-NATO countries under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). NATO's KFOR troop strength was 17,500 by the end of 2003. Despite NATO's ongoing presence in Kosovo and the persistence of the KFOR mission, NATO operates under the mandate of the UNSC and the UNMIK leadership. As of 19 November 2019, NATO has 4,000 troops from 28 nations contributing to the UNMIK contingent (NATO 2019d).²⁶¹

Consensus Building

The gradual build to OAF and the signing of UNSC Resolution 1244 was the product of the Triumvirate, remaining Principals, and the remaining members of the Alliance dealing with a new multipolar world and trying to fight the demons of the immediate past. Despite identifying a region and cause, NATO lacked the political will to take action until no other options were on the table. The process of obtaining consensus was elusive because the Principals could not settle on a coherent policy objective nor the appropriate level of coercive diplomacy.

The British were strong proponents of military intervention, steadfastly supporting the air campaign while arguing strongly for ground intervention. The French were more cautious than the British, providing moderate support for the air campaign but questioned the need for ground intervention. German support for the air campaign was fragile initially and had only increased slightly by the war's end. The Germans also vocally opposed a ground intervention. The Italians mainly contributed defensive assets to the air campaign and repeatedly objected to continuing or

²⁶¹ NATO. 2019. Operations and Missions: Past and Present. In *NATO Encyclopedia*, edited by Public Relations. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. P.621-5.

escalating the operation due to the lack of a UNSC Resolution. They also ruled out ground intervention except as a very last resort. Finally, the Americans were the architects and leading contributors to the air campaign but opposed a ground intervention (Auerswald 2004).²⁶²

Despite numerous diplomatic efforts, the BCG was unable to deescalate the violence between the KLA and Serbs throughout the summer of 1998. The main reason was the inability to make the use of force credible given the Russian Federation's staunch stance of rejecting any activity that would harm Yugoslav integrity using military action. Part of Moscow's stance was a negotiating position on three fronts. First, Russian leadership wanted to establish a stronger negotiating position within the BCG by protecting Serbian interests. Second, Russia wanted to ensure it had maximum influence over the outcome of Kosovo by providing the BCG only used institutions like the OSCE and UNSC, where the Federation enjoys a veto. Third, as the only country outside the transatlantic alliance, using force meant the other BCG members were using NATO. Altogether, Russia did not want a precedence set where NATO could intervene in a sovereign country for humanitarian reasons. Russia's relationship with Chechnya resembled Serbia and Kosovo (Weller 1999; Schwegmann 2000a).²⁶³

The combination of a desire to keep Russians involved in negotiations and Moscow's demands around the use of force created discomfort within NATO throughout the summer of 1998. A rift materialized around contingencies if diplomatic efforts did not produce a negotiated agreement. The Principals ended up in three camps which followed a religious debate. First,

²⁶² Auerswald, David. 2004. "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (3): 631-662. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693526>. P.656.

²⁶³ Weller, Marc. 1999. "The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo." *International Affairs* 75 (2): 211. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00069>. P. 211-12.

Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P. 12-13.

France and Italy were in the “Catholic” group, which insisted on the need for a UNSC Resolution authorizing the use of force while recognizing that, like sinning, the circumstances in Kosovo were exceptional and therefore taking military action would be forgivable. Second, a “Lutheran” camp (including Britain, Germany, Canada*) sought to devise an alternative dogma to justify actions necessitated by the humanitarian crisis, notably the fact that the problem was both overwhelming and required an emergency response. Third, the “Agnostic” (the United States) took the position that a UNSC resolution authorizing force was neither a rule nor absolute (I. Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000)²⁶⁴.

Additionally, the lack of consensus materialized during OAF as the alliance went through progressive phases of targets. NATO had three phases of targets outlined for its air campaign against Milosovic. Phase 1 focused on Yugoslavia's anti-aircraft installations, integrated air defense system, command, and control military centers. During the initial stage, any targets that NATO forces wanted to attack needed NAC approval. Ultimately, 14 of the 19 countries participated in the beginning stages of the air campaign. Iceland, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Poland, and Greece did not participate for various reasons. Greece refused to participate because the intervention was unpopular domestically. Iceland and Luxembourg did not have the requisite assets to contribute to the campaign. As brand new NATO Allies, the Czech Republic and Poland did not have aircraft compatible with NATO's command and control systems when the campaign launched (Auerswald 2004).²⁶⁵ The planning and conduct of air operations were dominated by the US military.

²⁶⁴ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O’Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P. 44-5.

* Canada was added into the Lutheran Group via an Interview with a NATO practitioner familiar with the situation.

²⁶⁵ Auerswald, David. 2004. "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (3): 631-662. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693526>. P.656.

NATO ran out of Phase 1 targets in less than five days, launching Phase 2 on 27 March. Phase 2 escalated the bombing campaign by including attacks against a broader set of military targets to include military infrastructure like military depots, airfields, and Serbian forces in the field below the forty-fourth parallel. The forty-fourth parallel divided Yugoslavia with Belgrade to the north and Montenegro and Kosovo to the south. As the campaign intensified, NATO members began to voice concerns about the nature of the bombing. Germany, Greece, Italy, and France expressed concern within the NAC about the escalation and legality of dual-purpose targets. Dual-purpose targets were civilian infrastructure with a military application that were the focus of Phase 3 of OAF.

The apprehension of Germany, Italy, and France to escalate the attacks against Milosovic follows Embeddedness Theory's expectation that Networked Allies look for the least-common-denominator solutions to issues whenever possible. Additionally, as a Motivated Ally, Greece's objections adhere to Embeddedness Theory. The operation was not in its domestic interest but did not veto because they traded disengagement from the military operation for political support. However, once OAF became more intense and threatened the political leadership's position, Greece articulated a red line, restricting NATO from pursuing Phase 3 targets.

As a compromise, NATO officials approved Phase 2+, which created an informal channel for NATO Allies with concerns on specific targets a forum with SACEUR, General Clark, to offer input. Additionally, the NAC gave Secretary-General Solana the role of approving or disapproving particular categories of targets that were technically within phase 3. Additionally, the United States granted the United Kingdom and France the right to review targeting from that point on

(I.H. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁶⁶ The compromise between members of the Triumvirate and NATO's political leader illustrates the power of "Three C's" as well as the robust institutions of NATO. As the three countries with the highest levels of contributions, capabilities, and financial contributions to OAF, the Alliance acquiesced to the Triumvirate and created a two-tier system. The Triumvirate with targeting authority and the remaining Allies with a line to the Secretary-General who could interpret the organization's will. However, the inherent desire for consensus provided nations with concern about the operation's execution, forced to settle on a method of execution that fulfilled both sides.

NATO made an additional caveat, allowing the United States the option of not integrating with all NATO's command and control orders. Given its overwhelmingly important political and military power and American generals effectively ran the NATO war. The United States chose the time and nature of many attacks without consultation or coordination with NAC once a target received approval (I. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000).²⁶⁷ As a Motivated Ally with a considerable interest in the success of NATO's out-of-area operation, the United States provided a disproportionate amount of resources for the air campaign in exchange for lesser resources for the KFOR ground mission. The United States' domestic apprehension for sustained ground forces in Kosovo provided the impetus for their overwhelming contributions to OAF.

²⁶⁶ Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. 2000. "The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay." *Washington Quarterly* 23 (4): 157-170. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016366000561277>. P. 162-3.

²⁶⁷ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P. 117-27.

Closing

KFOR serves as an example of insufficient political will stifling the Alliance's ability to act. Operation Allied Force consistently comes under the scrutiny of international legitimacy because of the lack of a UNSC Resolution authorizing the use of force. The consternation between allies is present throughout the buildup to the Rambouillet negotiations. Despite the Triumvirate and remaining Principals agreeing that the humanitarian violations and ethnic cleanings in Kosovo needed to stop, a lack of political will between the Principals and the institution at large paralyzed NATO. Specifically, the United States' unwillingness to use ground troops and the French, German, and Italian hesitancy to use force without a UNSC authorization hindered consensus within the organization (Auerswald 2004).²⁶⁸

Despite serious negotiations from the summer of 1998 through March 1999 and previous UNSC resolutions 1160 and 1199, NATO capitals could not obtain the requisite political will to commit its resources to address an issue that all parties agreed was problematic. Not until the Clinton administration agreed to send ground troops and the G8 delivered the outline for UNSC Resolution 1244 did NATO decide to act-of-area area sending the requisite political and military resources to quell the violence stabilizing relations between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians (Schwegmann 2000a).²⁶⁹

Eventually, the organization obtained sufficient political will to use force with Operation Allied Force because all diplomatic options were ineffective. The “Lutheran” (the United

²⁶⁸ Auerswald, David. 2004. "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo." *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (3): 631-662. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693526>. P.648-56.

²⁶⁹ Schwegmann, Christoph. June 2000. *The Contact Group and its impact on the European Institutional Structure*. The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union (The Institute For Security Studies Western European Union). <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/contact-group-and-its-impact-european-institutional-structure>. P.12-23.

Kingdom, Germany, Canada) and “Catholic” (Italy and France) groups decide to act without a UNSCR authorizing force because Russia was obstinate to the using military action in Kosovo despite Milosevic’s increased violence and unwillingness to negotiate at Rambouillet (I. Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000).²⁷⁰ Once the United States succumbed to the political pressure and committed to send boots on the ground, NATO created the framework to achieve UNSCR 1244, which produced a sustained NATO out-of-area activity (I.H. Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000).²⁷¹

Table 16 illustrates each NATO Ally’s consensus category according to the quantitative model, how the country obtained sufficient political will, the total number of troops contributed to KFOR in 1999, and the level of relative contribution. The main finding is that nations that succumbed to the Organization’s will politically tend to under-provide the out-of-area activity. The exception being Greece, whose domestic population had a 97% disapproval with NATO’s OAF (I. Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000).²⁷² However, once UNSC Resolution 1244 was signed, the Hellenic Armed Forces were willing to contribute to NATO’s out-of-area operation to protect its domestic interest and support one of its closest allies, the United States. Additionally, the majority of NATO Allies supplied more than their expected amount to KFOR. 11 of the 19 Allies contributions classify as “Over-Provide” and an additional three countries classify as “Provide.” Therefore, the salience of the KFOR campaign was high throughout the Alliance. As a conflict in Europe geographically and politically, all of the NATO countries have an easily identifiable interest in the stability of Serbia and Kosovo. The connection to Kosovo did not affect the relative

²⁷⁰ Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O’Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P. 44-5.

* Canada was added into the Lutheran Group via an Interview with a NATO practitioner familiar with the situation.

²⁷¹ Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. 2000. “The United States in the Balkans: There to Stay.” *Washington Quarterly* 23 (4): 157-170. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016366000561277>. P. 164-5.

²⁷² Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O’Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. P. 161.

contributions along consensus category lines. Overall, the Alliance's journey to establish a lasting out-of-area activity in Kosovo took many twists and turns. Ultimately, once the Triumvirate had overlapping interests, the Principals created a ZOPA, a UNSC Resolution provided sufficient political will, and the Allies worked to build consensus, NATO created a sustainable out-of-area activity with significant contributions from a broad array of countries.

Embeddedness Theory's Integrated Explanation Model (IEM) explains a UNSCR with an explicit Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII response is needed for NATO to have sufficient political will to decide to make a lasting decision. Despite approving OAF, a sustained NATO action did not materialize until UNSC 1244 passed. Today NATO continues the KFOR mission under UNSCR 1244, which remains its north star when developing NATO political and military policy in the region.²⁷³ The Kosovo case illustrates how The Principals must create an acceptable solution for all six countries for NATO to develop tangible policy objectives. Without the influential out-of-area Allies agreeing, NATO cannot achieve sufficient political will and build a consensus for sustained out-of-area activity.

²⁷³ Zoom interview with NATO official that has knowledge on current KFOR policy and operations

Name	1998 Consensus Category	1999 Consensus Category	Sufficient Political Will	Troop Contribution 1998 - 1999	Relative Contribution
Belgium	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	1100	Over-Provide
Canada	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Domestic	70	Under-Provide
Czech Republic	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	175	Under-Provide
Denmark	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	980	Over-Provide
France	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	5300	Over-Provide
Germany	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	5300	Over-Provide
Greece	Fair-Share	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	1700	Over-Provide
Hungary	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	325	Provide
Iceland	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Italy	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	5376	Over-Provide
Luxembourg	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	10	Over-Provide
Netherlands	Helpful	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	1610	Over-Provide
Norway	Fair-Share	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	980	Over-Provide
Poland	n/a	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	532	Under-Provide
Portugal	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	313	Provide
Spain	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	2180	Over-Provide
Turkey	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	1100	Under-Provide
United Kingdom	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	4330	Over-Provide
United States	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Domestic	6865	Provide

Table 16 - KFOR Consensus Categories and Contributions: The Table illustrates each NATO Ally's Consensus Category according to the quantitative model. According to the Military Balance Journal, the numbers reflect the Allies' contributions to KFOR from 10 June 1999 – 31 December 1999. Additionally, the model delineates if each nation obtained sufficient political will according to Embeddedness Theory's expectation for that Consensus category. For countries that switch categories between 1998 and 1999, the 1999 category was used to evaluate if a nation had sufficient Political Will. The Troop Contribution column reflects the total amount of troops that a country provided to OEF and ISAF. The Relative Contribution column explains if that country's contributions fell into the realm of Over-Provide, Provide, or Under-Provide. Over-Provide means a nation gave more to the operation than its share of total NATO forces. Provide means the country supplied between half and its expected proportion of resources to the activity. Under-Provide means the Ally the resources provided to the operation are less than half of its proportion of NATO's total resources.

Case 2: Afghanistan, 1 February 2002 – 13 October 2003

Background

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) on the United States in New York City, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania were a direct attack. NATO rose to support the organization's most significant contributor despite the lack of a well-defined offender. On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council released a short but direct press release officially invoking Article 5.

When the Heads of State and Government of NATO met in Washington in 1999, they paid tribute to the success of the Alliance in ensuring the freedom of its members during the Cold War and in making possible a Europe that was whole and free. But they also recognized the existence of a wide variety of risks to security, some of them quite unlike those that had called NATO into existence. More specifically, they condemned terrorism as a serious threat to peace and stability and reaffirmed their determination to combat it in accordance with their commitments to one another, their international commitments and national legislation.

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty stipulates that in the event of attacks falling within its purview, each Ally will assist the Party that has been attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary. Accordingly, the United States' NATO Allies stand ready to provide the assistance that may be required as a consequence of these acts of barbarism (NATO 2001).²⁷⁴

NATO's press release reveals three important sentiments around international legitimacy. First, there was little apprehension amongst Allied countries to support the United States security concerns created by the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Second, NATO provided a mechanism

²⁷⁴ NATO, September 12, 2001, "Statement by the North Atlantic Council. Press Release 124 (2001)," <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>.

for Allied nations to exercise their security interests at four levels: domestically, bilaterally, regionally, and internationally. Third, although the framers created Article 5 to deter an attack by a nation-state, namely the Soviet Union, the Alliance had non-state actors to confront in the 21st Century.

Overlapping Interest in Triumvirate

France, the United States, and the United Kingdom agreed addressing international terrorism was in their national interests. All three nations viewed the 9/11 attacks as dangerous to each of their capitals and were willing to put substantial resources on the table to confront the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, the United States preferred to lead a coalition of the willing rather than share responsibility with its NATO Allies.

Throughout NATO's efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, United States security officials had two consistent complaints. First, its targeting plans were inefficient because enemy targets needed multiple layers of approval, sometimes as high as heads of state, in real-time. Given NATO is a political-military institution, some members did not want to delegate targeting authority to the NATO military commanders for fear of blowback from their domestic constituents. Second, there was a significant gap in military capabilities between the United States and the other Allies. Therefore, the United States did not want the burden of heavy lifting and allow other nations to have a veto. The combination of the two limited operational success in the view of senior military leaders in the United States (Sperling and Webber 2009).²⁷⁵

²⁷⁵ Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. 2009. "NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul." *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 85 (3): 491-511. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27695027>.

The United States decided to operate through a coalition of the willing because, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained, "the mission determines the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission" (Rumsfeld 2001).²⁷⁶ The Bush Administration's apprehension to use the NATO alliance resulted from United States' frustration with the inherent need for consensus in NATO (Collins 2002).²⁷⁷ Additionally, through its NATO Allies invoking Article 5, the United States exercised its right to operate on a bilateral basis with each NATO member and use NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) to monitor its eastern border (Gerleman, Hildreth, and Stevens 2001).²⁷⁸

After invoking Article 5, the United Kingdom felt a duty to respond to the 9/11 attacks.

On 11 September, Prime Minister Tony Blair explained:

This is not a battle between the United States of America and Terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. We, therefore, here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world (Blair 2001).²⁷⁹

Blair recalled the British Parliament from its recesses and outlined three main objectives for the United Kingdom's response to the terrorist attacks in the United States. First, bring those responsible to justice, including those harboring terrorists. Second, form a common alliance against terrorism and in support of any action. Third, rethink the scale and effort of activity taken by the world to combat terrorism. After the speech to parliament, the United Kingdom published

²⁷⁶ Rumsfeld, Donald, October 18, 2001, "Rumsfeld's Pentagon News Conference."

²⁷⁷ Collins, Brian. 2002. "Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 3 (2): 51-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43134050>. P.52-3.

²⁷⁸ Gerleman, David, Steven Hildreth, and Jennifer Stevens. 2001. *Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military & Intelligence Support*. Congressional Research Service (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service). https://congressional-proquest-com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/congressional/docview/t21_d22_crs-2001-fdt-0069?accountid=12861. P. 1. P.4.

²⁷⁹ Blair, Tony. 2001. "Full transcript of Tony Blair's statement." *The Guardian*. Last Modified September 11, 2001. Accessed February 25. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/11/september11.usa23>.

a document clarifying its plan to combat international terrorism by bringing down Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and more broadly renewing efforts to bear down on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. London justified the use of force in Afghanistan whenever an activity thwarted future attacks planned by Al Qaeda against the United States or the United Kingdom (Katselli and Shah 2003).²⁸⁰

On 12 September 2001, the leading French newspaper *Le Monde* had the opening headline, 'We are all Americans.' On the same day, President Chirac offered support to the United States via NATO and bilaterally saying, "We shall play our part in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility" (Gerleman, Hildreth, and Stevens 2001).²⁸¹ Additionally, France made its intelligence services available, which had a history of combatting Islamic terrorism, given France's history with rogue cells in northern Africa and the Middle East. Within a month of 9/11, The French deployed its special forces and intelligence services to Afghanistan and entrenched them with the anti-Taliban opposition. Together they began to identify targets for the American response (Gregory 2003).²⁸²

France and the United Kingdom supported the United States' efforts in Afghanistan and did not see a need to conduct the offensive under NATO. Instead, both countries pledged the use of their airspace, sent naval vessels, offered intelligence services, and committed forces to support the United States' pending offensive. In addition to the 18 NATO Allies offering support, 51 other

²⁸⁰ Katselli, Elena, and Sangeeta Shah. 2003. "September 11 and the UK Response." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 52 (1): 245-255. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3663216>. P. 248-9.

²⁸¹ Gerleman, David, Steven Hildreth, and Jennifer Stevens. 2001. *Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military & Intelligence Support*. Congressional Research Service (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service). https://congressional-proquest-com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/congressional/docview/t21_d22_crs-2001-fdt-0069?accountid=12861. P. 4,

²⁸² Gregory, Shaun. 2003. "France and the war on terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15 (1): 124-147. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550312331292987>. P. 139-41.

nations and four regional organizations made means available to aid the United States response.

The international community provided five broad types of support:

1. Room for the United States to stage its air, land, and sea forces.
2. Access to countries' ports, airspace, airfields, and internal infrastructure like roads and bridges.
3. National troops to provide border security around US assets in Afghanistan.
4. National military assets like aircraft, ships, and military equipment to be added to the United States military efforts.
5. Sharing of intelligence and information.

On 4 October 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained each country provided support to the United States' campaign in a manner he called "fair, proper and certainly to the United States' advantage (Gerleman, Hildreth, and Stevens 2001).²⁸³ With the international community supporting the United States' right to self-defense, Washington did not look to collaborate with NATO. Instead, the Bush Administration went shopping for resources as it developed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).²⁸⁴

On 7 October 2001, the United States informed the UNSC that it was launching military strikes against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan because they had failed to hand over Osama Bin Laden. The Security Council accepted the United States' offensive as a legitimate exercise of self-defense. The UNSC authorized Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under UN Charter Article 51 and UNSC Resolution 1368, which authorized responses to the threats of international terrorism (Ayub and Kouvo 2008; Kocabas and Nesip 2015).²⁸⁵ The United States

²⁸³ Gerleman, David, Steven Hildreth, and Jennifer Stevens. 2001. *Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military & Intelligence Support*. Congressional Research Service (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service). https://congressional-proquest-com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/congressional/docview/t21_d22_crs-2001-fdt-0069?accountid=12861. P. 4, P.9 – 10.

²⁸⁴ Phrase used during an interview with State Department official in NATO during OEF.

²⁸⁵ Ayub, Fatima, and Sari Kouvo. 2008. "Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 84 (4): 641-657. <http://www.jstor.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/25144869>. P. 646-7.

launched the intervention to ensure that Afghanistan could no longer be a source of insecurity to the sovereignty of its homeland and its Allies.

Principal's ZOPA Design

Originally called the agreement on the provisional arrangement in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, the Bonn Accord was signed on 5 December 2001. To stabilize the country after the United States defeated the Taliban during OEF, the United Nations brokered the Bonn Accord with the international community and various internal Afghan stakeholders. The negotiations established the path forward for Afghanistan to establish an interim government that would develop a democracy with a constitution and national elections over five years (United-Nations 2001a).²⁸⁶

The Bonn Agreement was not a peace agreement to the decade-long Afghan civil war and conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Instead, it was a plan to deal with the aftermath of OEF and ensure Afghanistan no longer was a haven for terrorists. The five-year plan did not try to reconcile differences between the warring parties or attempt to draw 'moderate' members of the Taliban into the process of government creation. Afghanistan's transition from a war-torn country ruled by the Taliban to neophyte democracy would not have happened without

Kocabas, Ugur, and Mehmet Nesip. 2015. *NATO's Counterterrorism & Counterinsurgency Experience in Afghanistan*. NATO Lessons Learned Center (Brussels: NATO). <https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20private/nato%20ct%20coin%20in%20afghanistan.pdf>. P. 8.

²⁸⁶ United-Nations. 2001a. "Agreement On Provisional Arrangements in AFghanisan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions." United Nations Peacemaker. The United Nations. Accessed August 1 2020. <https://peacemaker.un.org/afghanistan-bonnagreement2001>.

9/11 (Johnson 2006).²⁸⁷ Additionally, the UNSC aided the plan's execution by providing security assistance through support from the international community.

One hundred days after 9/11, the UNSC passed UNSC Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001, establishing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Using the template described in the Bonn Agreement, the UNSC created ISAF to assist the Afghan Interim Authority to maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas to allow the United Nations to operate for six months. ISAF would continue to operate with a different lead nation every six months.

The United Kingdom led ISAF initially. However, the United States had authority over ISAF to prevent conflicts between the two operations. ISAF and the Interim Afghan government signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) that outlined the number of troops, rules of engagement, and rights of USAF personnel. One of the non-negotiables for ISAF personnel was immunity from personal arrest or detention in Afghanistan and any international tribunal without the consent of ISAF. The United States and the United Kingdom's insisted that the interim government shield their forces from potential trials in the international criminal court (Katselli and Shah 2003).²⁸⁸ The United States and the United Kingdom wanted to have clear expectations with local Afghan authorities on how the ISAF and OEF would aid them in completing the timelines laid out in the Bonn agreement. Eventually, Afghanistan's interim leader, Hamid Karzai, acquiesced and approved immunity for OEF and ISAF troops immunity and a force strength of up to 6,000 (CNN 2001).²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Johnson, ThomasH. 2006. "Afghanistan's post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war." *Central Asian Survey* 25 (1/2): 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930600902991>. P. 1-3.

²⁸⁸ Katselli, Elena, and Sangeeta Shah. 2003. "September 11 and the UK Response." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 52 (1): 245-255. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3663216>. P. 247-8.

²⁸⁹ CNN. 2001. "Afghan Peace Mission Delayed." CNN. CNN. Last Modified December 19, 2001. Accessed January 15. <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/19/gen.peacekeeping.force/>.

The first four ISAF lead nations were NATO members: The United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands. The first two led nations were not by accident. As the United States' closest military ally, the United Kingdom was ideal for the initial chaotic stages of the operation. Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country, exemplified a secular democratic model for Afghanistan's interim government to follow. Having the British start and hand-off command to the Turks allowed Washington to establish a relationship with the multinational force that complemented its interests and show the international community it had Muslim partners in the war on terror (BBC 2002).²⁹⁰

As the third iteration of ISAF began, the need to change ISAF's model became apparent. Germany and Netherlands decided to serve as lead nations jointly. Yet, they needed assistance from NATO for force generation, intelligence, logistics, and communication (NATO 2002a).²⁹¹ After Turkey, no NATO Ally could shoulder the burden of leading a sizeable force on its own in Afghanistan, outside of France. Germany volunteered but expressed that it would only lead if another nation provided additional resources because they had 10,000 troops already in peacekeeping operations worldwide. German Defense Minister Peter Struck told a press conference following the handover ceremony that the mission of the German-Dutch command would be limited to six months and suggested NATO lead ISAF in the future (DW 2003).

The United Nations initially designed the six-month leadership tour to lower the burden on anyone nation volunteering to lead ISAF. However, it made coherent security policy difficult because each country had to rely solely on its resources. Once a lead nation completed its term,

²⁹⁰ BBC. 2002. "Turkey takes charge of Kabul Security." BBC. Last Modified June 20, 2002. Accessed January 15. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2055141.stm.

²⁹¹ NATO, 2002. "NATO to Support ISAF 3." NATO. Last Modified December 16, 2002. Accessed January 15, 2020. <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/11-november/e1127a.htm>.

the next leader of ISAF would have to re-establish a new base of operations. Additionally, the United Nations did not have a succession process. The lead nation's job was to find an adequate replacement to ensure its military was not stuck. As a result, the leaders of ISAF lacked a centralized command structure and strategic vision for how to operate (Lang and Stein 2007).²⁹²

Without a clear successor to the German-Dutch leadership of ISAF, Canadian and German officials began to collaborate on how to make NATO more involved in Afghanistan. During a bilateral meeting in Berlin in November of 2002, Canada's minister of national defense, John McCallum, and German defense minister Peter Struck agreed ISAF's current structure had a strategic leadership problem that NATO could solve. They made a pact began to solicit feedback from other Principals. Struck meet with his British counterpart, Geoff Hoon, and floated the idea of NATO officially taking ownership of ISAF. The United Kingdom saw merit because officials in London appreciated the logistical difficulties in the current ISAF structure from its time as the initial lead nation.

During the November 2002 summit in Prague, Canadian and German officials met separately with Michele Alliot-Marie, France's defense minister. Although reluctant to offer support, French officials acknowledged that the Afghan mission would garner support from other European partners and NATO's Secretary-General. Additionally, Alliot-Marie signaled that NATO's support of ISAF could offset Paris' opposition to the invasion of Iraq. After Canadian persistence, France agreed to advocate for NATO to have a leadership role in Afghanistan. Lastly, Canadian and German officials met with the United States about the prospect of NATO officially taking command of ISAF. The United States supported NATO involvement in Afghanistan and

²⁹² Lang, Eugene, and Janice Stein. 2007. *The Unexpected War Canada in Kandahar*. New York City: Viking Press. P.47-9.

offered a blessing for Canadian leadership. Washington knew the potential war with Iraq would reduce its military capacity (Fitzsimmons 2013).²⁹³

After the NATO summit in Prague, German and Canadian officials had solidified general support from the Alliance's major players to take leadership of ISAF. Berlin's and Ottawa's collaboration led to the framework of NATO becoming the institution charged with securing Afghanistan's transitioning government by taking ISAF ownership. Ministers in Ottawa pushed for Canada to lead NATO's efforts in Afghanistan to raise its national profile and shield itself from the United States' criticism of not supporting the pending Iraq War.

Sufficient Political Will

As the idea of an official out-of-area activity began to materialize, NATO Allies were willing to participate based on the international legitimacy already given to ISAF. UNSC Resolution 1386 meets the “Article 39 Designation” and “Chapter VII Directive.” The resolution authorized anyone participating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate. The phrase “Kabul and the surrounding area” leaves some room for ambiguity regarding the limits of the ISAF’s jurisdiction of the greater Kabul area. However, the ability to use force to establish a secure Kabul was well-defined (United-Nations 2001b).²⁹⁴

²⁹³ Fitzsimmons, Dan. 2013. "Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." *International Journal* 68 (2): 305-313. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013494547>. P. 310-3.

²⁹⁴ United-Nations. December 20 2001. *United Nations Security Resolution 1386*. United Nations Security Council (New York, NY). https://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unsr/resolution_1386.pdf. P.1

The charge of securing Kabul and the surrounding areas and supporting the transiting government were fundamentally different tasks. Although NATO had supported OEF, NATO capitals framed their support as a right to self-defense against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and fulfilling their Article 5 commitments. When questioned, original leaders of ISAF explained to their domestic constituents that they were acting under an authorized UNSC resolution. The proposal of taking over ISAF raised some angst within the Alliance because national leaders wanted a new source of international legitimacy to offer anything beyond tacit political support. Specifically, the European Allies insisted that a UN resolution govern NATO's mission to give legitimacy to the insertion of NATO troops in Afghanistan (Gallis 2007).²⁹⁵

The expectation of international legitimacy from the UNSC existed even for some of the most active countries in Afghanistan. For example, before leading the original ISAF mission, British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon had to brief parliament on the operation parameters prior to UNSC Resolution 1386 passing. He made it a point to explain to elected leaders that a UNSC resolution authorizing the Use of Force under a Chapter 7 Directive would be on the books before forces departing for Kabul (CNN 2001).²⁹⁶

Multiple Principals were heavily involved with implementing the Bonn Agreements governmental goals for Afghanistan's transitional government. The Bonn Agreement established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and gave influential nations lead nation roles. The United States was designated lead nation for supporting military reform, Germany for police reform, Italy for justice, and the UK for counter-narcotics. While good on

²⁹⁵ Gallis, Paul. 2007. "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance." *Connections* 6 (3): 10-32. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26323297>. P. 10-11.

²⁹⁶ CNN. 2001. "Afghan Peace Mission Delayed." CNN. CNN. Last Modified December 19, 2001. Accessed January 15. <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/12/19/gen.peacekeeping.force/>.

paper, the lead nation approach lacked coordination and a coherent strategy to integrate inputs from the Afghan government. The lack of centralized leadership connecting the actions of the lead nations and poor design led to ineffective results in Afghanistan. Additionally, the inherent focus on Kabul neglected the Taliban's strongholds throughout the country. The Alliance quickly realized that for Afghanistan to have a successful government, ISAF had to address the entire country, not simply (Ayub and Kouvo 2008; Sopko 2017).²⁹⁷

The essential condition for a state, having an effective monopoly over the means of violence, was deteriorating because ISAF's jurisdiction only encompassed Kabul and war lords could resist the new government with profits from opium production (Johnson 2006).²⁹⁸ Therefore, the Alliance internalized to stabilize Afghanistan successfully, NATO had to obtain a UNSC Resolution that would expand its role beyond Afghanistan's capital city.

Expanding ISAF to all of Afghanistan was a riskier endeavor and received some pushback from smaller and middle-tier Allies. While each country was committed to its Article 5 commitment and addressing international terrorism, for some, the Alliance needed international credibility for expanding ISAF's mission. The concern had two camps nations that needed political cover and another that wanted to understand the goals of the new task. Without a new UNSC that expanded ISAF's area to the entire country, multiple European Allies explained it would restrict its military to Kabul or not make a meaningful contribution. Additionally, the UNSC Resolution

²⁹⁷ Ayub, Fatima, and Sari Kouvo. 2008. "Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 84 (4): 641-657. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/25144869>. P. 652.

Sopko, John. 2017. *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the US experience in Afghanistan*. NATO Lessons Learned Center (Brussels: NATO). https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20public/sigar_afghanistan%20security%20sector%20assistance_lessons%20learned%20report.pdf. P. 14-5.

²⁹⁸ Johnson, ThomasH. 2006. "Afghanistan's post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war." *Central Asian Survey* 25 (1/2): 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930600902991>. P. 22-3.

provided necessary and sufficient conditions for many European Allies because participating in ISAF meant risking the lives of its military members for a nonvital interest.²⁹⁹

Multiple nations highlighted how ISAF's perception of international legitimacy provided national capitals with the blessing to put its blood and treasure in harm's way. For example, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper explained that his nation linked its commitment to Afghanistan with UNSC Resolutions. Similarly, the Italian Prime Minister explained to his parliament that the presence of Italian Troops is part of Italy's duty as a NATO member and legitimate because they are fulfilling a request made by the UNSC. Insinuating that the cause of creating security, development, and stable governance to Afghanistan had international legitimacy through the blessing of the UNSC. The call to action provided Canadians and Italians to share peace and prosperity with Afghanistan (Zyla 2012; Croci 2007).³⁰⁰

On 11 August 2003, NATO formally took command of ISAF and petitioned the UNSC to expand ISAF authority from around Kabul to the entire country of Afghanistan. On 13 October 2003, UNSC passed Resolution 1510, which accepted NATO's request and made four declarations.

²⁹⁹ Interview with NATO expert that was part of the ISAF negotiations.

³⁰⁰ Zyla, Benjamin. 2012. "Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through Its Norm of External Responsibility Invited Essay." *International Journal* 68 (2): 289-304. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013493756>. P. 301.

Croci, Osvaldo. 2007. "Italian foreign policy after the end of the cold war: the issue of continuity and change in Italian-US relations." *Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans* 9 (2): 117-131. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190701414376>. P. 128.

1. Authorizes expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force
2. Support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.
3. Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to work with the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1386 mandate.
4. Authorizes the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate (United-Nations 2003).³⁰¹

With UNSC Resolution 1510, NATO had the international community's permission to use force throughout Afghanistan. Additionally, UNSC Resolution 1510 legitimized the efforts of the United States coalition to defend its interests in Afghanistan by naming OEF as a legitimate operation. NATO's primary objective became enabling the Afghan authorities to provide security across the country and ensure that that country cannot become a haven for terrorists again (Kocabas and Nesip 2015).³⁰²

From October 2003 through October 2013, the UNSC continued to empower NATO to establish security within Afghanistan by an annual extension of the "take all necessary measures" clause of UNSC Resolutions 1510. UNSC Resolutions 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1890, 1943, 2011, and 2069 have the following clause:

³⁰¹ United-Nations. 2003. "UNSC Resolution 1510 (2003)." United Nations. Last Modified October 13, 2003. Accessed January 15. https://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf.

³⁰² Kocabas, Ugur, and Mehmet Nesip. 2015. *NATO's Counterterrorism & Counterinsurgency Experience in Afghanistan*. NATO Lessons Learned Center (Brussels: NATO). <https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20private/nato%20ct%20coin%20in%20afghanistan.pdf>. P.9.

Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

- i. *Decides* to extend the authorization of the International Security Assistance Force, as defined in resolution 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of twelve months beyond 13 October 20xx.

UNSC Resolution 1510 provided the foundation for NATO's strategic objectives for the subsequent decade. The annual renewal provided unquestioned international legitimacy and a necessary and sufficient condition for many European Allies. The UN mandate acted as a call to action for nations and provided more opportunities for smaller countries to contribute to ISAF. The UNSC Resolution solidified consensus amongst the allies and cover for political leaders to support the operation regardless of domestic politics. The combination of UNSC Resolution and NATO approval insulated national leaders from participation in ISAF internally and externally (Kreps 2010).³⁰³

Consensus Building

The consensus building process did not revolve around policy but, responsibilities in Afghanistan and level of national caveats. In Afghanistan, as in previous NATO operations, each national contingent designates an officer to hold that nation's "red card," allowing that officer to inform the multilateral chain of command that his/her country cannot or will not participate in an operation (Auerswald and Saideman 2012).³⁰⁴

³⁰³ Kreps, Sarah. 2010. "Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (3): 191-215. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00108.x>.

³⁰⁴ Auerswald, David, and Stephen Saideman. 2012. "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions Upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan1." *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1): 67-84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41409823>. P.69.

Most NATO governments understood participation in the ISAF mission would involve deploying some soldiers to conduct counterinsurgency operations, not just peacekeeping. However, members of the Alliance had two different approaches to counterinsurgency and capacity building in Afghanistan. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey were adamant that development and reconstruction efforts were successful recipes. They were convinced that combat operations were likely to alienate the Afghan population, especially if they led to civilian casualties. Their view of the operation consistently produced friction because they were unwilling to take the same risk as other Allies. Many of their political leaders feared backlash from their constituents because of low domestic support for combat operations. The second group, the remaining NATO Allies, viewed the ISAF operation as reconstruction and combat going hand and hand (S. Jones 2009).³⁰⁵

Over time, the Alliance laid out four stages to bring most of Afghanistan under NATO control by moving in a counterclockwise fashion around the country. In Stage one, NATO would move into the northern part of the country, predominantly relying on French and German forces. The north was a less intense area and was at a manageable threat level for Berlin and Paris. Stage two involved taking the western provinces with Italian and Spanish forces. These sections of the country are relatively stable, therefore balancing their national caveats with mission effectiveness. Stage three would be executed by American, British, Canadian, and Dutch forces because it called for the most intense fighting with insurgents in southern Afghanistan. Stage Four would begin once ISAF took control of the entire country. The United States would continue to operate in conjunction with the ISAF's mission (Gallis 2007).³⁰⁶

³⁰⁵ Jones, Seth. 2009. *In the Graveyard of Empires*. New York City: "W. W. Norton & Company, Inc" P. 374 -8.

³⁰⁶ Gallis, Paul. 2007. "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance." *Connections* 6 (3): 10-32.

Although NATO agreed on the salience of conducting an out-of-area activity in Afghanistan, the Allies had different perspectives on acceptable risk levels for its militaries. Given the limited NATO footprint in Afghanistan, restrictions on any ISAF contingents significantly constrained SACEUR and strategic commanders on the ground, limiting what ultimately could be done by the Alliance.

Conclusion

The process of NATO taking command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan illustrates how Article 5 produces high political will for the Alliance to decide and act out-of-area. However, NATO does not choose to take action without Triumvirate interest overlapping and Principals agreeing to a set of parameters. Within a day of the 9/11 attacks, the Alliance invoked Article 5 and pledged support to the United States' response. Since the United States wanted to promote its interests and did not consult with France or the United Kingdom to execute its strategic objectives, there were no overlapping interests in the Triumvirate. As a result, Embeddedness Theory correctly predicted the United States would create a coalition versus operating through NATO.

The disparity between the transatlantic Allies' and the United States' capabilities during Bosnia and Kosovo made operating through NATO less attractive for the United States' military leaders. The cumbersome selection and approval process for a legitimate target during Operation Allied Force led to OEF operating outside NATO. Executing OEF as a coalition of the willing

maximized the United States' operational flexibility in its attempt to eliminate the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (I.H. Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000; Johnston 2017; Archick and Gallis 2005). While Allies contributed to the coalition and participated in ISAF, NATO did not have an official activity until it took command of the ISAF mission in August 2003.

Over time the Principals realized the initial UN strategy with six-month rotations in Afghanistan was not sustainable and operationally was ineffective. The United Nations faced the problem that the mission did not have any centralized command structure, lacked an actual headquarters, and lacked sufficient capacity to achieve the UN's objectives (Lang and Stein 2007).³⁰⁷ After British, Canadian, French, and German leaders agreed to stabilize Kabul meant expanding ISAF's mandate to the entire country, the respective capitals worked together to obtain a new UNSCR.

After working with President Hamid Karzai and the UNSC, the Principals crafted a UNSC Resolution that provided a mandate to expand the use of force in all parts of Afghanistan and promoted ISAF working with OEF. The European Allies insisted that a UNSC resolution govern NATO's mission to give legitimacy to NATO troops' insertion in Afghanistan (Gallis 2007).³⁰⁸

The United States' and the United Kingdom's desire for operational flexibility and the other four Principals' concerns of international legitimacy initially made a ZOPA impossible. Once Canada and Germany worked their networks and established a vision for NATO's takeover of ISAF, the Principals developed a common goal in Afghanistan to operationalize NATO's infrastructure (Kaim 2008; Fitzsimmons 2013)³⁰⁹ Once the Principals had overlapping interests,

³⁰⁷ Lang, Eugene, and Janice Stein. 2007. *The Unexpected War Canada in Kandahar*. New York City: Viking Press. P. 47-49.

³⁰⁸ Gallis, Paul. 2007. "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance." *Connections* 6 (3): 10-32. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26323297>. P. 10-11.

³⁰⁹ Fitzsimmons, Dan. 2013. "Canada, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan." *International Journal* 68 (2): 305-313. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013494547>. P.310-13.

which included deploying major forces, instituting provincial reconstruction teams throughout the country, and taking on the burden of military casualties, NATO had strategic objectives to execute. With UNSCR 1510, which extended the all-necessary means clause of UNSCR 1386 to all of Afghanistan, the Alliance obtained the consensus to approve an out-of-area activity.

Lastly, ISAF shows how Consensus Building entails operational side-payments between countries with national caveats and limiting responsibilities.³¹⁰ Caveats pose complex problems to commanders at the strategic and operational levels because they limit their ability to use the troops under their charge. NATO must shape the mission based on the number of forces available, the troops' capabilities, and national caveats. At the summit in Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, NATO leaders sought to reduce the caveats placed on forces deployed in Afghanistan (Auerswald and Saideman 2012; Gallis 2007).³¹¹ After public and private shamming, many nations loosened their caveats to allow their forces to go outside of their assigned areas if the Alliance was in an emergency.

Table 17 illustrates each NATO Ally's consensus category according to the quantitative model, how the country obtained sufficient political will, the total number of troops contributed to ISAF and OEF from 2002-2003, and the level of relative contribution. The main finding is other than Germany, no country with national caveats provided more than its expected level of assistance to NATO. Nations with caveats providing and under providing meet the expectation that governments with limits on their military resources would not be eager to supply troops.

Kaim, Markus. 2008. "Germany, Afghanistan, and the Future of NATO." *International Journal* 63 (3): 607-623.
<http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/40204400>. P. 609-10.

³¹⁰ Multiple interviews with NATO practitioners familiar with the national bargaining of troop contributions during NATO's force generation process.

³¹¹ Gallis, Paul. 2007. "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance." *Connections* 6 (3): 10-32.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/26323297>. P. 12-13.

Auerswald, David, and Stephen Saideman. 2012. "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions Upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan1." *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (1): 67-84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41409823>. P.67-8.

Additionally, the distribution of relative contributions shows how nations with the highest level of interest in a scenario take the lead in policy creation and execution. Canada, Germany, and the United States all had significant interests in Afghanistan. While the Germans were not willing to put their military in harm's way, Berlin highly invested in provincial reconstruction and training the Afghan police because they thought it was the best way to combat the spread of international terrorism (Sopko 2017; Overhaus 2004).³¹²

Overall, ISAF demonstrates that the process for decision-making matters greatly for NATO. Despite invoking Article 5 on 12 September 2001, displaying more than sufficient political will, NATO did not create and approve an out-of-area action until the other three decision-making elements unfolded 698 days later. First, the Triumvirate had to compose overlapping interests in Afghanistan. The Principals made a ZOPA around taking over the UN's ISAF mission, and the UNSC Resolutions and national caveats created a mechanism to facilitate consensus. Embeddedness Theory's IEM explains how NATO's out-of-area activities are selected and developed. They do not come together randomly, as Preference Convergence theory predicts. Instead, powerful actors within NATO put operations together. Also, ISAF did not materialize because the United States directed it, as Hegemonic Power theory expects. Instead, other influential countries spurred the Alliance to develop an out-of-area activity. Without synergy between the influential nations, NATO fails to act out-of-area, even when there is more than enough political will throughout the Alliance.

³¹² Overhaus, Marco. 2004. "In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy." *German Politics* 13 (4): 551-68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0964400042000343137>. P. 557.

Sopko, John. 2017. *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the US experience in Afghanistan*. NATO Lessons Learned Center (Brussels: NATO). https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20public/sigar_afghanistan%20security%20sector%20assistance_lessons%20learned%20report.pdf. P.26-28.

Name	2002 Consensus Category	2003 Consensus Category	Sufficient Political Will	Troop Contribution 2002 - 2003	Relative Contribution
Belgium	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	665	Provide
Canada	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Domestic Interests	3152	Over-Provide
Czech Republic	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	208	Under-Provide
Denmark	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	809	Over-Provide
France*	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	2394	Under-Provide
Germany*	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	7157	Over-Provide
Greece*	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	314	Under-Provide
Hungary	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	260	Under-Provide
Iceland	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Italy*	Networked	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	2553	Provide
Luxembourg	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	28	Over-Provide
Netherlands	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	916	Provide
Norway	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	324	Provide
Poland	Fair-Share	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	283	Under-Provide
Portugal	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	36	Under-Provide
Spain*	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	1530	Provide
Turkey*	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	1722	Under-Provide
United Kingdom	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	930	Under-Provide
United States	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Domestic Interests	49748	Over-Provide

Table 17 - ISAF and OEF Consensus Categories and Contributions: The Table illustrates each NATO Ally's Consensus Category according to the quantitative model. According to the Military Balance Journal, the numbers reflect the combination of Operation Enduring Freedom and International Assistance Force (ISAF) from 1 January 2002 – 31 December 2003. Additionally, the model delineates if each nation obtained sufficient political will according to Embeddedness Theory's expectation for that Consensus category. For countries that switch categories between 2002 and 2003, the 2002 category was used to evaluate if a nation had sufficient Political Will. The Troop Contribution column reflects the total amount of troops that a country provided to OEF and ISAF. The Relative Contribution column explains if that country's contributions fell into the realm of Over-Provide, Provide, or Under-Provide. Over-Provide means a nation gave more to the operation than its share of total NATO forces. Provide means the country supplied between half and its expected proportion of resources to the activity. Under-Provide means the Ally the resources provided to the operation are less than half of its proportion of NATO's total resources. "*" signifies a nation has national caveats limiting the participation of its forces in combat operations. While the specific caveats are classified, there have been multiple articles, books, and public statements outlining a nation's level of support for ISAF.

Case 3: Iraq, 1 October 2002 – 14 August 2004

Background

After Gulf War I, the UNSC passed resolution 687, making a ceasefire between the coalition and Saddam Hussein subject to a range of conditions. They included eliminating WMD and missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and other matters such as resolving border issues with Kuwait, reparations, and the end of state-sponsored terrorism. In 1991 Iraq had an extensive chemical weapons program which the Western world feared could destabilize the region. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), charged with implementing the disarmament requirements set out in UNSCR 687, met consistent obstruction throughout the 1990s. Despite additional UNSC Resolutions, from UNSCR 707 (1991) to UNSCR 1441 (2002), inspectors consistently found Iraq in breach of the preconditions set forward in the 1991 ceasefire (Bluth 2004).³¹³

After the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks, the United States and the world became acutely aware of how interconnected the world is in the 21st Century and the destructiveness of international terrorism. The attacks revealed a world where the threat of mass-casualty terrorism suddenly became very real. As a result, the ethical distinction between actions of preemption and prevention became murky. Within days of 11 September, President George W. Bush and his advisers consistently portrayed the 9/11 attacks as the latest stage in a terrorist "war" on "America"

³¹³ Bluth, Christoph. 2004. "The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq." *International Affairs* 80 (5): 871-892. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00423.x>. P. 872.

and its "values" (R.R. Krebs and Lobasz 2007).³¹⁴ On 14 September 2001, President George W. Bush announced a national day of prayer, remembering and honoring the victims of 9/11. During his speech, Bush explained:

Civilized people around the world denounce the evildoers who devised and executed these terrible attacks. Justice demands that those who helped or harbored the terrorists be punished -- and punished severely. The enormity of their evil demands it. We will use all the resources of the United States and our cooperating friends and allies to pursue those responsible for this evil, until justice is done (Bush 2001).³¹⁵

The speech and early rhetoric from his administration, launched the foundation for President Bush's war on terror. Initially, the western world focused on dismantling the entities responsible for 9/11, namely Osama Bin Laden's cells, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban.

Following the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, Europe experienced a wave of solidarity with the United States offering emotional and military support to protect western values. The United States did not fall back to any significant degree on Europe's offer despite NATO invoking Article 5. Politically, it valued the Europeans' support and the activation of Article 5 as a source of legitimacy for its 'international war on terrorism' (Overhaus 2004).³¹⁶ However, the Transatlantic solidarity quickly waned as the United States began to focus the world's attention on Saddam Hussein and his regime's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and non-compliance with UNSC resolutions.

³¹⁴ Krebs, Ronald R., and Jennifer K. Lobasz. 2007. "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq." *Security Studies* 16 (3): 409-451. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410701547881>. P. 421-2.

³¹⁵ Bush, George W., September 13, 2001, 2001, "National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims Of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001," <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-7.html>.

³¹⁶ Overhaus, Marco. 2004. "In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy." *German Politics* 13 (4): 551-68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0964400042000343137>. P. 556-7.

Overlapping Interests in Triumvirate

During the November 2002 summit in Prague, NATO Allies discussed a range of topics from new member accessions, strategic partnership with the EU, and new threats like the proliferation of WMDs. On 21 November 2002, NATO put out a press release that hinted at the tension between factions of the Alliance around terrorism and the spread of WMDs.

Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO's Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come. Today's decisions will provide for balanced and effective capabilities within the Alliance so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (NATO 2002b).³¹⁷

Within the Triumvirate, there were two distinct camps: the United States and the United Kingdom on one side and France on the other. The former articulated that Iraq had connections to international terrorism and posed WMDs that could do great harm to NATO and its partners. On 22 January 2003, the 40th anniversary of the Franco-Germany Treaty, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder jointly declared that Paris and Berlin would

³¹⁷ NATO, November 21, 2002b, "Prague Summit Declaration," https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19552.htm.

work together to oppose the Bush Administration's evident intent to use force to disarm the Saddam regime. Instead, they wanted to give diplomacy and peace a chance (Layne 2003).³¹⁸

The George W. Bush administration began with Iraq on its agenda before 9/11. Cheney, Powell, and Wolfowitz, individuals who had made the decisions in the first Iraq War, were back in Washington. Some of them had made clear in writings and speeches while out of office that they believed the United States should unseat Saddam, finish what they failed to do the first time. After 9/11, the administration made a concerted effort to connect terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs to Iraq. As a result, Washington portrayed Iraq as the most dangerous entity to its national security.

In addition to the connection to WMDs and Terrorism, deposing of Saddam Hussein had three additional benefits. First, create an Arab democracy that could serve as a model for other Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which were friendly with the United States.

Second, permit the withdrawal of the United States' forces from Saudi Arabia (after 12 years). American troops were stationed in the kingdom to counter the Iraqi military, but their presence became a source of anti-Americanism over time. Third, to create another source of oil for the United States' market and reduce dependency upon oil from Saudi Arabia where there was always a possibility the citizens topple the royal family (Clarke 2004).³¹⁹

From the Prague summit forward, the United States continued to beat the drum that Iraq was an imminent threat to the United States' national security, and action needed to be taken sooner rather than later. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

³¹⁸ Layne, Christopher. 2003. "America as European Hegemon." *National Interest* (72): 17-29.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=10252001&site=ehost-live>. P. 17.

³¹⁹ Clarke, Richard. 2004. *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press: Simon & Schuster. P. 264 -

debated America's approach to the Iraq threat. Powell advocated for the United States to pursue a UNSC Resolution authorizing force to ensure the international community was behind the United States' efforts as it was in Gulf War 1. He wanted to follow the four conditions needed to fulfill the Powell Doctrine: 1) that the use of force ought to be overwhelming; 2) that the use of force ought to command public and Congressional support and used to achieve clear objectives; 3) that force should only be used in the vital national interest; 4) that US Forces should have a clear exit strategy. Conversely, Rumsfeld believed the United States had a duty to remove the threat of Saddam Hussein regardless of UN support and allow the Iraqi people to establish their own democratic system of government. For Rumsfeld, he forecasted that the United States' time in Iraq would be brief as it was in Gulf War I (Middup 2015).³²⁰

From mid-2002 through early 2003, the Bush administration framed Iraq as a "gathering storm" that had either acquired or would soon acquire WMDs, notably nuclear weapons. The pending procurement of that kind of weaponry would spark an intolerable level of instability in the Middle East. Lastly, Iraq might share the bomb with terrorists determined to harm western values (R.R. Krebs and Lobasz 2007).³²¹

Beginning in the Spring of 2002, Tony Blair and the United Kingdom supported the United States' position on the looming threat of Saddam Hussein. He started to broker a deal between the United States and influential EU members (names Germany and France) during his 2002 speech at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. During the speech, he explained the need for the Transatlantic Alliance to stick together. At the same time, Blair made the distinction that the

³²⁰ Middup, Luke. 2015. *The Powell Doctrine and US Foreign Policy*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. P. 1, P. 152.

³²¹ Krebs, Ronald R., and Jennifer K. Lobasz. 2007. "Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq." *Security Studies* 16 (3): 409-451. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410701547881>. P. 439-40.

United Kingdom would support the United States and implement regime change if necessary and justified.

The world works better when the US and the EU stand together. There will be issues that divide - issues of trade, most recently over steel, for example. But on the big security issues, the common interests dwarf the divide.

We must be prepared to act where terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threaten us. The fight against international terrorism is right. We should pursue it vigorously. Not just in Afghanistan but elsewhere.

Not just by military means but by disrupting the finances of terrorism, getting at the middlemen, the bankrollers of the trade in terror and WMD. Since September 11 the action has been considerable, in many countries. But there should be no let up. If necessary the action should be military and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change (Blair 2002).³²²

Since World War II, The British sought to maintain a significant role in the world through supporting rather than opposing the United States and allowing London to maintain its special relationship with the most powerful country in the world. The concept of the 'special relationship' is based on unwavering loyalty and closeness. Blair explained to the British parliament on 24 September 2002 that "it is an article of faith with me that the American relationship and our ability to partner with America in these difficult issues is of fundamental importance, not just to this country but to the wider world" (Jervis 2016).³²³

Although Blair was supportive of the Bush Administration and agreed that Saddam's position of WMDs posed a threat to international stability, he attempted to sway the United States

³²² Blair, Tony. 2002. "Full text of Tony Blair's speech in Texas, George Bush Senior Presidential Library." The Guardian. Last Modified April 8, 2002. Accessed January 18, . <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/apr/08/foreignpolicy.iraq>.

³²³ Jervis, Robert. 2016. "Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Preventive Wars and Regime Change." *Political Science Quarterly* (Wiley-Blackwell) 131 (2): 285-311. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12476>. P.307-8.

by tying the United Kingdom's support to two conditions. First, to legitimize any military action, they needed to pursue a UNSC Resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq. Second, they needed to reengage and make strides on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) before taking military action in Iraq. While the Bush Administration took these conditions relatively seriously initially in mid-2002, over time, Washington disregarded them because the United Kingdom's conditions were not credible threats of withdrawing their military support (M.E. Henke 2018).³²⁴ Ultimately, the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared to take unilateral action against Iraq and enforce UNSC Resolutions on Saddam's WMDs to dismantle Iraq's WMD program (Blair 2010).³²⁵

Conversely, France was not prepared for military action against Iraq because they did not see the Saddam regime as an imminent threat that required removal. Additionally, France had unique bonds to Iraq, which created a different approach to the United States allegations about their WMD program. Since the 1970s, France has had the closest ties of any Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to Iraq. In this context, Paris and Baghdad have a range of diplomatic and commercial actors with ties to the oil industry. Additionally, France's broader Arab and Middle Eastern policy differs from the United States and the United Kingdom. Since Gulf War I, Paris has articulated an unease or direct opposition to sanctions on Iraq.

French policy towards Iraq nevertheless began to diverge from that of the US and Britain. From 1994 onward, Paris and Baghdad progressively reopened diplomatic and commercial

³²⁴ Henke, Marina E. 2018. "Tony Blair's gamble: The Middle East Peace Process and British participation in the Iraq 2003 campaign." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20 (4): 773-789. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118784708>. P. 774.

³²⁵ ---, 2010. *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: Random House.

Blitz, James. 2011. "Cameron Ardent in Support of Rebels in Libya." *Financial Times*, March 9, 2011. <https://www.ft.com/content/f279b98a-4a9b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a>. P. 899 (e-reader).

channels of communication. The 1995 UN Resolution 986, nicknamed 'oil for food,' opened the way for limited commercial transactions between the two countries. After the international community established the mechanisms for the oil-for-food accords, bilateral Franco-Iraqi trade rose steadily, from €685 million in 1997 to €1.6 billion in 2001. From 1998–2002, French domestic hostility to sanctions grew significantly, placing distance between Paris and the two other members of the Triumvirate (Styan 2004).³²⁶

On 8 September 2002, President Chirac did an interview with the New York Times. He laid out his opposition to the United States and the United Kingdom's position on the legitimacy of preemptive actions because it would create chaos in the world. For Chirac, the only way for the argument of preemptive action to be legitimate would be through the approval of the UNSC.

As soon as one nation claims the right to take preventive action, other countries will naturally do the same. And what would you say in the entirely hypothetical event that China wanted to take preemptive action against Taiwan, saying that Taiwan was a threat to it? How would the Americans, the Europeans and others react? Or what if India decided to take preventive action against Pakistan, or vice versa? Or Russia against Chechnya or somewhere else? What would we say?

I think this is an extraordinarily dangerous doctrine that could have tragic consequences. Preventive action can be undertaken if it appears necessary, but it must be taken by the international community, which today is represented by the United Nations Security Council (Chirac 2002).³²⁷

The French President's stress on the need to go through the Security Council had three motives: First, reaffirm France's long-standing history of pushing back against United States hegemony. Second, curtail the United States and United Kingdom's unilateral military action. Third, protect

³²⁶ Styan, David. 2004. "Jacques Chirac's 'non': France, Iraq and the United Nations, 1991-2003." *Modern & Contemporary France* 12 (3): 371-385. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0963948042000263167>. P. 372, P. 378,

³²⁷ Chirac, Jacques. 2002. "Interview With Jacques Chirac." The New York Times. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/international/europe/interview-with-jacques-chirac.html>.

its domestic interest of maintaining a stable oil market with Iraq. By establishing the importance of UNSC, the French solidified its position as an influencer of international policy and expressed that the consequences of war in the Middle East did not offset the potential threat of Iraq possessing WMDs.

Ultimately, France was not prepared to take military action against Saddam Hussein without a UNSC Resolution authorizing force in Iraq. As a P5 member with a veto, France had a direct say on a UNSC blessing. The lack of agreement amongst the Triumvirate set the stage for no meaningful policy or activity to happen in Iraq because the conflicting views of the situation incentivized each side of the debate to contradict the other using the institution's rules and their individual networks.

ZOPA Design by Principals

In the fall of 2002, when the United States and the United Kingdom attempted to gain the support of UNSC for military action against Iraq. However, the other P5 members pushed back. After several weeks of deliberations and failed efforts to achieve an agreement, on November 7, 2002, the UNSC unanimously approved Resolution 1441, which found Iraq in "material breach" of earlier resolutions. The resolution established a new regime for inspections and warned of "serious consequences" in the event of Baghdad did not comply. Despite the United States' greatest efforts,

the resolution did not explicitly authorize or threaten the use of force for non-compliance (Paul 2005).³²⁸

As the debate over an approach to Iraq reached Brussels and the NAC, two camps quickly emerged. One that supported intervention and the other that would not take action without a UNSC Resolution authorizing force. The intervention camp was led by the United States and the United Kingdom. While France and Germany wanted the Alliance to adhere to the UNSC's disarmament process. Germany and France's objection to the United States desire to intervene militarily led Rumsfeld to criticize the prosperous European nations and drive a wedge between the EU.

Secretary Rumsfeld explained Europe had two groups: Old and New. France and Germany constituted "Old Europe," which he viewed as the leader of the European Union that periodically tried to undermine the United States' hegemonic aspirations. Conversely, "New Europe" was the other countries in Europe that were beginning to reach higher social and economic development levels and more prone to agree with United States' policy initiatives (Grote 2007).³²⁹

Despite heavy criticism, Germany and France consistently explained that they wanted to give the weapons inspectors more time and avoid war because diplomacy hadn't run its entire course. In early 2003, German Chancellor Schroeder explained the French and German position saying, "good old Europe has an awareness of what war really means and that France and Germany hope to disarm Iraq by peaceful means and expect the world to avoid war" (CNN 2003).³³⁰

³²⁸ Paul, Thazha. 2005. "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy." *International Security* 30 (1): 46-71. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137458>. P.65.

³²⁹ Grote, Inga. 2007. "Donald Rumsfeld's Old and New Europe and the United States' Strategy to Destabilize the European Union." *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali* 74 (3 (295)): 347-356. <http://www.jstor.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/42740613>. P.347-8.

³³⁰ CNN. 2003. "Europeans Make Counter-Proposal." CNN. Last Modified February 25, 2003. Accessed 15 Feb 2021. <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/24/sprj.irq.iraq.germany.france/>.

Tensions only grew in early 2003 as the UNSC debates permeated through the Principals during discussions in the NAC. The United Kingdom, with American support, favored a new UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, while France and Germany opposed such a step. As time continued in early 2003, it became apparent that the United States was going to intervene in Iraq. On 15 January 2003, the United States requested formal assistance from the Alliance to protect Turkey's southern border against a potential missile attack from Saddam Hussein. In 1991, before Gulf War I, NATO deployed AWACS and missile defense systems to Turkey's southern border, and the United States expected the same in 2003 (Michel 2003; Yesiltas 2009).³³¹ However, the US could not find the support it had expected from the other NATO members. Germany, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg believed such a step was premature and that planning for war would undermine UNSC attempts to broker a peaceful resolution. From their perspective, fortifying Turkey's southern border would dissuade Saddam from complying with weapon inspectors (PBS 2003; Yesiltas 2009).³³²

Fearful of potential conflict as the United States continued to rattle the saber, Turkey invoked Article 4 for the first time in the Alliance's history on 10 February 2003. Officially, the Turks asked for consultations in the NAC to discuss defensive assistance from NATO in the event of a threat to its population or territory resulting from armed conflict with its southern neighbor Iraq (NATO 2020c).³³³ Belgium, France, and Germany objected again to any plans to put military weaponry in Turkey, explaining that such planning was premature. Moving anti-missile weapons

³³¹ Michel, Leo. 2003. "NATO Decisionmaking : Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?" *Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University* 202 (August 2003): 1-8. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA421879.pdf>. P. 8.

³³² PBS. 2003. "NATO Rift Continues Ahead of Security Council Meeting." PBS. Last Modified February 13, 2003. Accessed 15 February 2021. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/international-jan-june03-nato_02-13.

Yesiltas, Murat. 2009. "Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of the 2003 Iraq War." *PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs* 14 (1): 25-51. <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/perception/issue/48991/625069>. P. 43.

³³³ NATO. 2020. "The Consultation Process and Article 4." NATO. Accessed 1 April 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm.

into southern Turkey would send a harmful political signal that NATO accepted the "logic of war" with Iraq. Secretary-General George Robertson quickly circulated a formal decision sheet, at which point those three Allies formally broke silence.

Through diplomatic back channels, the United States began a campaign to ease the Belgians, Germans, and French concerns one by one. After persuading the Belgians and the Germans, the United States moved to France. However, France would not budge, explaining they have fully committed to UNSC Resolution 1441's process. They expressed they would veto any action that jeopardized it. Since France had not formally joined the entire military structure of NATO, Turkey's moved its Article 4 request to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) to avoid France's veto. The maneuver was a departure from the 1990s norm, where the Alliance discussed significant military planning in the NAC. However, the stalemate pushed NATO officials to take a different course of action. As a result, the Alliance reached consensus, and NATO approved a plan to fly NATO AWACS and provide countermeasures for chemical and biological weapons to Southern Turkey (Michel 2003; Kaplan 2004).³³⁴ After the Alliance decided to support Turkey's request, US Ambassador to NATO, Nicolas Burns, called the episode a near death experience for the Alliance:

NATO had a near-death experience in February, when differences over Iraq caused an unpardonable delay in responding to Turkey's request for assistance to deter a potential attack by Saddam Hussein's forces. Nevertheless, NATO did finally act, living up to its fundamental commitment to defend its members against external threats (Burns 2003)³³⁵

³³⁴ Michel, Leo. 2003. "NATO Decisionmaking : Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?" *Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University* 202 (August 2003): 1-8. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA421879.pdf>. P. 4.

Kaplan, Lawrence. 2004. *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. P.145-6.

³³⁵ Burns, Nicolas. 2003. "NATO Has Adapted : An Alliance with a New Mission." *The New York Times*, May 24, 2003, Opinion. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/24/opinion/IHT-nato-has-adapted-an-alliance-with-a-new-mission.html>. P.

Despite supporting the Turks' request, the Principals still had deep divides, with only the United States and the United Kingdom supporting intervention in Iraq. The German government repeatedly and categorically ruled out sending German troops into Iraq, explaining they were skeptical of any NATO involvement. However, Berlin repeatedly assured Washington that it would not block it should a consensus evolve within the Alliance. While Germany rejected any direct military involvement in Iraq, it offered the Bush Administration an expansion of its engagement within the ISAF operation in Afghanistan (Overhaus 2004).³³⁶

Although Italy viewed Iraq as a threat and offered political support to the Bush Administration, they would not provide military resources for the Iraq mission without a UNSC resolution authorizing force. The Berlusconi government sided with the United States' stance that the world could no longer ignore Iraq's repeated failures to comply with UNSC Resolutions. However, within Italian foreign policy circles, there was a tradition that if the use of force were necessary, it would come with authorization from the UNSC, NATO, or another multilateral organization. For Berlusconi, Iraq was different from Kosovo because diplomacy had not yet run its course with Saddam. There were still options on the table to disarm the Iraqi regime. Additionally, the Franco-German opposition to intervention did not allow the Alliance to unite behind a common goal as it did with Kosovo. In the end, Italy expressed solidarity with the United States' planned intervention but would not go further until the use of force gained international legitimacy from a multilateral organization (Croci 2007).³³⁷

³³⁶ Overhaus, Marco. 2004. "In Search of a Post-Hegemonic Order: Germany, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy." *German Politics* 13 (4): 551-68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0964400042000343137>. P. 560.

³³⁷ Croci, Osvaldo. 2007. "Italian foreign policy after the end of the cold war: the issue of continuity and change in Italian-US relations." *Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans* 9 (2): 117-131. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14613190701414376>. P. 126-8.

Canada did not want to upset its traditional position as a supporter of security interests expressed by London and Washington. However, the Canadian Prime Minister explained to the United States and the United Kingdom that the WMD evidence was shaky at best. However, if there were a UNSCR, Ottawa would support with military resources(Chretien 2008).³³⁸ Prime Minister Chretien explained that he had faith in the United Nations inspectors to find WMDs and that the UNSC could disarm Saddam through diplomacy. He expressed deep concern about intervention and disapproved of regime change (Sayle 2010).³³⁹ With the Principals firmly in two different camps, NATO did not have ZOPA to support intervening in Iraq until the UNSC approved of an intervention or WMDs were found.

Sufficient Political Will

On 8 November 2002, the UNSC passed Resolution 1441, which announced Iraq violated UNSC Resolution 687. As a result, Resolution 1441 explained the Iraqi government had a 30-day period to allow international inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to evaluate its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, the resolution stipulated Iraq had to provide UNMOVIC and IAEA “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to all of its facilities.

³³⁸ Chretien, Jean. 2008. *My Years as Prime Minister*. New York, NY: Vintage Canada. P. 359-62 (e-reader).

³³⁹ Sayle, Timothy. 2010. "But he has nothing on at all! Canada and the Iraq War, 2003." *Canadian Military History* 19 (4): 5-19. <https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=cmh>. P. 2.

The resolution was a compromise between various factions within the UNSC. The United States, United Kingdom, and Spain articulated that Saddam Hussein harbored terrorists, had violated previous UNSC resolutions and intended to use WMDs against the United States and its allies. Russia and China stated that there was no justification for intervening in Iraq beyond sending inspectors to investigate their weapons programs. Lastly, Germany and France held a position that the UNSC should pursue a two-step strategy. First, allow UNSC Resolution 1441 to run its entire course. Authorize inspectors to investigate, evaluate, and report back to the UNSC the status of Iraq and its weapons program. Hopefully, through their investigation, the UNSC would influence Saddam Hussein to disarm. Second, in the event Saddam Hussein did not disband his weapons program or became hostile towards IAEA or UNMOVIC inspectors, the UNSC would pursue military action to ensure disarmament (De Villepin 2003).³⁴⁰

The disagreement in the UNSC spilled over to NATO and the NAC. During the November 2002 summit held in Prague, NATO heads of state disagreed on the validity of the transatlantic alliance taking unilateral military action. As a result, the Allies explained the following in a press release:

Concerning Iraq, we pledge our full support for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and call on Iraq to comply fully and immediately with this and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

We deplore Iraq's failure to comply fully with its obligations which were imposed as a necessary step to restore international peace and security and we recall that the Security Council has decided in its resolution to afford Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.

³⁴⁰ De Villepin, Dominique, 2003, "Statement by France to Security Council," <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/14/international/middleeast/statement-by-france-to-security-council.html>.

NATO Allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UNSCR 1441 (NATO 2002c).³⁴¹

The press release illustrates that NATO did not have consensus, and NATO ceded its legitimacy to operate out-of-area to the United Nations. Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg stressed that intervention without UNSC Resolution or weapons inspectors finding WMDs lacked legality. While the alliance had an uneasiness around the international legitimacy in Kosovo, many allies saw the Yugoslavian differently than Iraq because NATO had regional legitimacy, agreed that the humanitarian situation was worsening, and through backchannels achieved consensus (Michel 2003).³⁴² Effectively, without a UNSC resolution that offered an Article 39 Designation with a Chapter VII Directive, NATO did not have an appetite nor the legality to disarm Saddam Hussein.³⁴³

Under the logic of preemptive war, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the coalition of the willing toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq via Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As the Iraqi people began to rebuild and create new democratic institutions, the UNSC passed a series of Resolutions. On 22 May 2003, the UNSC passed Resolution 1483, which called for UN member states to assist the people of Iraq in reforming their institutions, rebuilding their country, and contributing to stability and security in Iraq. On 14 August 2003, the UNSC established a United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) through Resolution 1500. With Resolution 1511, the UNSC authorized a multinational force to take all necessary measures

³⁴¹ NATO. 2002, "Prague Summit Statement on Iraq," <https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-133e.htm>.

³⁴² Michel, Leo. 2003. "NATO Decisionmaking : Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?" *Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University* 202 (August 2003): 1-8. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA421879.pdf>. P.1-3.

³⁴³ Two interviews with NATO practitioners familiar with the discussion explained that the four countries placed a great deal of legitimacy into the hands of the UNSC and its legal authority for the use of force internationally.

to operate under UNAMI and contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. The combination of Resolutions 1483, 1500, and 1511 created the Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII Directive needed for NATO to operate out-of-area.

Despite lingering resentment within the Alliance, then NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson laid out three conditions for an out-of-area campaign in Iraq. 1) a UNSC Resolution pledging international support to the new Iraqi government, 2) a request from the government for military support, and 3) unanimous consent within the Alliance.

On 8 June 2004, the UNSC passed Resolution 1546. It recognized the Interim Government of Iraq and explained it needed a Multinational Force (MNF) to help build the new democracy's security and capacity. Resolution 1546 gave the MNF the authority to take all necessary measures to maintain security and stability in Iraq as long as the Iraqi government requests their presence.

On June 20, Iraqi's interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi sent an official request to the NATO Secretary-General. Minister Allawi asked for NATO's support to train and equip the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in four priority areas: the Department of Border Enforcement, police service, national guard, and army (Lynch and Janzen 2006).³⁴⁴

During the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul, Allies released a press release that explained the alliance would support a training mission in Iraq.

In response to the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, and in accordance with Resolution 1546 which requests international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the Multinational Force, we have decided today to offer NATO's assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces. We therefore also encourage nations to contribute to the training of the Iraqi armed forces.

³⁴⁴ Lynch, Rick, and Phillip Janzen. 2006. "NATO Training Mission-Iraq: Looking to the Future." *Joint Force Quarterly* 40 (1): 29-34. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA521751.pdf>. P. 30-1.

We have asked the North Atlantic Council to develop on an urgent basis the modalities to implement this decision with the Iraqi Interim Government.

We have also asked the North Atlantic Council to consider, as a matter of urgency and on the basis of a report by the Secretary General, further proposals to support the nascent Iraqi security institutions in response to the request of the Iraqi Interim Government and in accordance with UNSCR 1546 (NATO 2004).

With all three of Lord Robertson's conditions met, NATO Allies approved NATO training mission Iraq (NTM-I). On 28 June 2004, 26 NATO allies came together to support an out-of-area campaign. Even though collective action theorists predicted difficulties, increasing from 19 to 26 member states did not prevent the transatlantic alliance from supporting the activity. The approval of NTM-I illustrates how national capitals' perception of international legitimacy impacts NATO's collective action process. Once the UNSC passed resolutions with an Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII Directive, NATO's divergent interest coalesced and turned the wheels of the institution's bureaucracy in a way that helped the alliance create an out-of-area activity.

Consensus Building

During the lead-up to OIF, tensions grew along the Consensus Category lines. Nations in the Fair-Share and Motivated categories sided with the United States and countries in the Helpful and Networked split based on the presence of a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

The French and German determination to oppose the United States falls in line with Embeddedness Theory's expectations for Networked Allies when the proposed out-of-area activity does not fall in line with their national interests. As a result, Germany and France used entangled

diplomacy and signals of resolve to balance against the United States and its advocacy for intervention in Iraq. Entangling diplomacy involves countries using international institutions and ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers to delay a superior state's plan for war. The rules and norms of institutions reduce the element of surprise and give the weaker side more time to prepare and potentially delay the intervention long enough that the issue becomes irrelevant. France and Germany tried to use the debates in the UNSC to strengthen their positions in the NAC.

Using signals of resolve is a tactic used to galvanize weaker states behind a cause and confront the superior nation, hoping that the stronger state's goals do not materialize. By banding together, smaller states gradually increase their trust in each other's willingness to cooperate against the unipolar leader's ambitions. Therefore, Berlin's and Paris' core purpose of using signals of resolve to unite a faction of NATO Allies around the primacy of the UNSC was to create a line in the sand for future interactions with the United States. Ultimately, the tactic cannot coerce or even impede the United States from taking unilateral action, but it does signal a commitment to resist the superpower's future ambitions (Pape 2005b).³⁴⁵

France and Germany were able to sway Helpful and Networked Allies like Belgium, Norway, and Italy to follow their lead and tie backing for military intervention to a UNSC Resolution authorizing force. Additionally, by vigorously tying up support to Turkey's Article 4 request in NATO's institutions, France and Germany established a future debate on the offensive or defensive nature of NATO actions within its members' borders. The support of Luxemburg and Belgium demonstrates other nations of varying size and influence in the Alliance share objections

³⁴⁵ Pape, Robert. 2005. "Soft Balancing Against the United States." *International Security* 30 (1): 7-45. <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894607>. P.

to out-of-area activities without UNSC approval. The combination of using signals of resolve and entangled diplomacy worked to help Germany and France limit consensus for intervention in Iraq.

Embeddedness Theory highlights the tiers of influence in the resistance to intervention in Iraq. While France held firm on their opposition to any intervention, Germany and Belgium relented. As a Triumvirate member, France's position on the UNSC provided a venue to continue to fight for its position beyond the NAC. However, as a Principal, Germany had a heavy influence on the process but did not have additional interests beyond solidifying its position as anti-intervention. As a Helpful nation, Belgium did not support an out-of-area activity due to the lack of a USCR but did not work to prevent consensus. Instead, Belgium ensured NATO did not use its military resources for any future action. Lastly, Luxembourg's position as a Fair-Share Ally did not allow it to push its position beyond its initial objection. Once the United States engaged, Luxembourg acquiesced.

Conversely, the influence of the United States and the United Kingdom illustrates a growing divide on the legitimacy of the UNSC and its control over how NATO protects its interests. Multiple European nations put out letters supporting the United States' calls for intervention. First came the Letter of Eight, which included the support of the Prime Ministers from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which further divided NATO because it was a combination of original and new members. Signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, the Vilnius Letter created a new sentiment in Europe. Former Soviet satellites that chose to align themselves with the United States on security matters over the French

and Germans despite their aspirations to join the EU club (Grote 2007).³⁴⁶ President Chirac did not take kindly to aspiring EU nations siding with Washington. In an outburst to reporters in February of 2003, Chirac explained that Germany and France would remember the European nations that chose North American interests over European when discussing their EU membership (C. Smith 2003; Leveux and Leveux 2003).³⁴⁷

The group which signed the Vilnius letter follows the expectations of Embeddedness Theory. All ten countries and Hungary and the Czech Republic fall into the consensus category of Fair-Share, meaning that their default position is to align themselves with the United States to solidify the Article 5 guarantee via NATO or at a minimum on a bilateral basis with Washington. Fair-Share Allies fear abandonment from stronger NATO Allies and therefore lean towards supporting out-of-area activities to keep in high esteem and engender themselves with the United States.

The actions taken by Denmark, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom illustrate that nations do not have to connect political support with military contributions. Denmark extended political and military support for OIF as well as NTM-I. Portugal and Italy provided political support for OIF without initially offering substantial military resources given the lack of a UNSCR. However, once a UNSCR was signed, both nations provided a disproportionate number of resources for NTM-I. Conversely, Spain, Poland, and the United

³⁴⁶ Grote, Inga. 2007. "Donald Rumsfeld's Old and New Europe and the United States' Strategy to Destabilize the European Union." *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali* 74 (3 (295)): 347-356. <http://www.jstor.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/42740613>. P.348-50.

³⁴⁷ Smith, Craig. 2003. "Chirac Upsets East Europe by Telling It to 'Shut Up' on Iraq." *The New York Times*, February 18, 2003, 2003. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/18/international/europe/chirac-upsets-east-europe-by-telling-it-to-shut-up-on.html>.

Leveux, Michel, and Eleanor Leveux. 2003. "The World; No, Chirac Didn't Say 'Shut Up'." *The New York Times*, 2003. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/weekinreview/the-world-no-chirac-didn-t-say-shut-up.html>.

Kingdom fully supported the United States' calls for intervention with or without a UNSCR. However, none of the three offered substantial resources for NTM-I.

Table 18 illustrates each NATO Ally's consensus category according to the quantitative model, how the country obtained sufficient political will, the total number of troops contributed to NTM-I from 2004-2008, and the level of relative contribution. The main findings are that countries that did not support OIF did not supply any resources to NTM-I, and the countries that offered political support but no military resources extended a disproportionate amount of troops to NTM-I. Secondly, given less than 600 NATO members participated in NTM-I, the scope of the activity was very small, highlighting the level of tension within the alliance and that NTM-I was NATO's least-common-denominator (LCD) approach to Iraq. The LCD approach is when members constrain themselves and their negotiation efforts by creating public unity and a commitment to shared principles. As a result, the group promotes a decision that contains internal strife rather than promoting a resolution to the conflict (Leigh-Phippard 1998).³⁴⁸

³⁴⁸ Leigh-Phippard, Helen. 1998. "The Contact Group on (And in) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation?" *International Journal* 53 (2): 306-324. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40203296>. P. 324

Name	2003 Consensus Category	2004 Consensus Category	Sufficient Political Will	Troop Contribution 2004 - 2008	Relative Contribution
Albania	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	n/a
Belgium	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	0	Under-Provide
Bulgaria	n/a	Fair-Share	n/a	2	Under-Provide
Canada	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Croatia	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	n/a
Czech Republic	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	10	Over-Provide
Denmark	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	66	Over-Provide
Estonia	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	13	Over-Provide
France	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	0	Under-Provide
Germany	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	0	Under-Provide
Greece	Networked	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Hungary	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	14	Under-Provide
Iceland	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Italy	Helpful	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	242	Over-Provide
Latvia	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Lithuania	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	12	Over-Provide
Luxembourg	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Netherlands	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	61	Over-Provide
Norway	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	7	Over-Provide
Poland	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Domestic	13	Provide
Portugal	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	39	Over-Provide
Romania	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	6	Provide
Slovakia	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	3	Over-Provide
Slovenia	n/a	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	10	Over-Provide
Spain	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	0	Under-Provide
Turkey	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	12	Under-Provide
United Kingdom	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	16	Provide
United States	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Domestic	32	Under-Provide

Table 18 - NTM-I Consensus Categories and Contributions: The Table illustrates each NATO Ally's Consensus Category according to the quantitative model. The numbers reflect NATO Allies troop contributions to NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) from 1 January 2004 – 31 December 2008 according to the Military Balance Journal. Additionally, the model delineates if each nation obtained sufficient political will according to Embeddedness Theory's expectation for that Consensus category. For nations which switch categories between 2003 and 2004, the 2003 category expectations were used to evaluate if a nation had sufficient Political Will. The Troop Contribution column reflects the total amount of troops that a nation provided to NTM-I. The Relative Contribution column explains if that country's contributions fell into the realm of Over-Provide, Provide, or Under-Provide. Over-Provide means a nation gave more to the operation than its share of total NATO forces. Provide means the country supplied between half and its expected proportion of resources to the operation. Under-Provide means the Ally the resources provided to the operation are less than half of its proportion of NATO's total resources.

Conclusion

NTM-I highlights the need for the Triumvirate to have overlapping interests for any out-of-area activity to take place. NATO did not participate in the Iraq War of 2003 because the Triumvirate lacked overlapping interests, and the Principals did not agree on an approach or the legitimacy of intervention. Specifically, the United States and the United Kingdom, and Italy had one view of the situation while Canada, France, and Germany, had another.

Initially, the United States and the United Kingdom made a three-part case for military intervention in Iraq. First, since the end of the first gulf war, it had become ineffective to use UNSC resolutions to contain Iraq's chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction programs. Second, Saddam's attacks on his citizenry were reprehensible and unacceptable by the international community. Third, the Saddam regime had ties to international terrorists who could acquire access to Iraq's various weapons systems, creating a threat to the western world and the Middle East's stability (Bluth 2004).³⁴⁹

Canada broke ranks from the traditional Commonwealth country (the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia) foreign policy by not participating in the 2003 Iraq War (Fawn 2008).³⁵⁰ Canada felt the case for war in Iraq was faulty and aligned its support conditional on the passing of a UNSC Resolution authorizing force (Sayle 2010).³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ Bluth, Christoph. 2004. "The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq." *International Affairs* 80 (5): 871-892. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00423.x>. P. 871.

³⁵⁰ Fawn, Rick. 2008. "No Consensus with the Commonwealth, No Consensus with Itself? Canada and the Iraq War." *Round Table* 97 (397): 519-533. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530802207229>. P.520.

³⁵¹ Sayle, Timothy. 2010. "But he has nothing on at all! Canada and the Iraq War, 2003." *Canadian Military History* 19 (4): 5-19. <https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1634&context=cmh>. P. 6.

France objected to the war because they were concerned about the adverse effects on the Middle East's stability that would follow a unilateral US intervention. Germany was committed to allowing the UN weapons inspectors more time to complete their investigation (Bjola 2005).³⁵² Germany's reluctance to support the United States and its advocacy of the Franco-German plan for additional weapons inspectors drew numerous threats from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld tried to intimidate Germany with rash proposals and name-calling. He expressed a desire to move US military bases out of Germany to other NATO nations with leaders that were not "treacherous and inept" like Chancellor Schröder (Beaumont, Roseand, and Beaver 2003).³⁵³ Italy provided political support for the Bush Administration. However, the war's unpopularity within the Italian citizenry and took military support off the table (Davidson 2009).³⁵⁴

Despite the United States' influence in the organization, NATO's institutions, rules, and norms were robust enough to push back against the most powerful nation in the Alliance. Even though the debate around the Iraq war put NATO in peril, NTM-I demonstrates the Principals' willingness to take a Least-Common-Denominator (LCD) approach to out-of-area activities.

The creation of the NTM-I mission highlights how important a UNSC Resolution is to coalescing interests within the Alliance to build consensus. Even a year after OIF, the Alliance could not develop the political will to do anything in Iraq until NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Schaffer laid out three conditions in June 2004. First, a UNSC Resolution authorizing NATO actions. Second, a request from the new Iraqi government for help from NATO. Third, a

³⁵² Bjola, Corneliu. 2005. "Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2): 266-303. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052968>. P.292.

³⁵³ Beaumont, Peter, David Roseand, and Paul Beaver. 2003. "US to punish German 'Treachery'." *The Guardian*, February 15, 2003. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/16/iraq.germany>.

³⁵⁴ Davidson, Jason. 2009. "Italy-US Relations since the End of the Cold War: Prestige, Peace, and the Transatlantic Balance." *Bulletin of Italian Politics* 1 (2): 289-308. http://glasgowsciencefestival.org.uk/media/media_140583_en.pdf. P.302-3.

consensus within the Alliance (Lynch and Janzen 2006).³⁵⁵ Once the Alliance obtained the first two, NATO achieved consensus. Although the mission was small compared to KFOR and ISAF, NATO created an activity that lasted for over seven years, trained over 15,000 security personnel in Iraq. Despite the size, the eventual creation and execution of NTM-I followed the expectations of Embeddedness Theory.

³⁵⁵ Lynch, Rick, and Phillip Janzen. 2006. "NATO Training Mission-Iraq: Looking to the Future." *Joint Force Quarterly* 40 (1): 29-34. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA521751.pdf>. P. 30.

Case 4: Pakistan, 1 February 2005 – 1 February 2006

Background

On 8 October 2005, a magnitude 7.6 earthquake struck in northern Pakistan and Kashmir. The effects of the quake left three million people without power, and an estimated 80,000 people died. Initially, the Pakistani military responded to the crisis by coordinating the relief efforts and deploying around 60.000 troops in the affected area. Moreover, the terrain, extreme winter weather, and limited infrastructure hampered their relief efforts. With worse weather conditions on the horizon, the government developed additional concerns for its population. Within the first 48 hours, the Pakistani authorities realized they were incapable of dealing with the level of devastation alone. Pakistani government decided to request help from international organizations, including NATO (Popa 2019).³⁵⁶

On 10 October, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shaukat-Aziz, made a formal request to NATO for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) (NATO 2019d).³⁵⁷ The Alliance's only experience with HA/DR missions was a limited operation in 2004 to support the United States' Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. At the request of the United States, NATO sent 12 cargo planes

³⁵⁶Popa, Ioan-Dan. 2019. "Some Considerations Related to NATO Intervention for Disaster Mitigation (Case Study: Pakistan Earthquake)." *International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION* 25: 123-128. <https://doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2019-0020>. P. 125-6.

³⁵⁷ NATO. 2019. Operations and Missions: Past and Present. In *NATO Encyclopedia*, edited by Public Relations. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. P. 440-43.

carrying 189 tons of relief goods donated by European Allies to Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas (Crawley 2005).³⁵⁸

Typically, the HA/DR missions fall under the jurisdiction of the UN. However, the UN did not have the necessary logistical resources to provide the aid required by Pakistan in a timely fashion. Generating the requisite strategic lift and transportation to operate in the rugged terrain of the Pakistani mountains would take time to mobilize them for a catastrophe of that magnitude, so the UN requested NATO assistance (Jochems 2006). Despite the lack of experience, NATO agreed to participate in the HA/DR efforts in Pakistan. On 11 October, the NAC released an official statement approving an air operation to bring supplies from NATO and Partner countries to Pakistan for earthquake relief efforts.

Overlapping Interests in Triumvirate

After launching OEF, the United States was looking for ways to bolster its efforts in Afghanistan through NATO. In January 2002, the United States National Security Council (NSC) advisors created an idea for a new rapid reaction force to present during the NATO Summit in Prague scheduled for November of that year. The policy advisors created the idea for a “spearhead response force” (SRF) of between 20,000–25,000 troops that could deploy quickly to crisis zones and operate closely with American forces. Effectively, the SRF could deploy to Afghanistan and work closely with the United States forces there, lowering its military burden. The Bush

³⁵⁸ Crawley, Vince, 2005, "NATO Faces Challenge in Pakistan Earthquake Response," <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/nato-faces-challenge-pakistan-earthquake-response>.

Administration thought the SRF would be large enough to be militarily meaningful yet small enough to be affordable and politically attractive to NATO's members (Kugler 2006).³⁵⁹

The relationship between the Alliance and the United States was waning because Washington did not formally include NATO in its response to the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, throughout the summer and fall of 2002, the push for intervention in Iraq drove a wedge between the United States and its influential European Allies, Germany and France. The Bush administration saw the SRF as a signal to Paris, Berlin, and other European Allies that the United States had a renewed interest in transatlantic security and a political willingness to collaborate.

Multiple European Allies welcomed the idea of acquiring a high-tech military force that would enhance NATO's relevance and allow it to participate in expeditionary operations outside Europe. Among the Europeans, Britain, Germany, and even France, a traditional naysayer to U.S. leadership, approved of the new military force. For Paris, the new specialized joint force aligned with France's notions of power projection, expeditionary missions, and NATO transformation (Kugler 2006).³⁶⁰

During a Defense Ministers meeting in Warsaw in September of 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld explained the SRF would be separate from the European Union's 60,000-member rapid reaction force, which planned to be operational in 2003. The European unit would be focused "on the low end of peacekeeping," while the NATO expeditionary force would execute "high intensity"

³⁵⁹ Kugler, Richard. December 2006. *The NATO Response Force 2002–2006 Innovation by the Atlantic Alliance*. Center for Technology and National Security Policy (Washington DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense). <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/occasional/CTNSP/CaseStudiesArchive/Case-1-NATO-Response-Force.pdf?ver=2017-06-16-150518-373>. P. 3-4.

³⁶⁰ Kugler, Richard. December 2006. *The NATO Response Force 2002–2006 Innovation by the Atlantic Alliance*. Center for Technology and National Security Policy (Washington DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense). <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/occasional/CTNSP/CaseStudiesArchive/Case-1-NATO-Response-Force.pdf?ver=2017-06-16-150518-373>. P. 3-4.

missions (Sciolino 2002).³⁶¹ As a result, the new NATO force would not hinder the EU's goal of creating a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and creating a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) for peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

American-led out-of-area operations would 'provide both sides of the Atlantic an opportunity to revitalize the alliance. From Washington's point of view, the force would allow for a more equal burden-sharing for missions. Moreover, and perhaps more important at the time, increased European force contributions would enhance the political legitimacy of American military responses to new threats in the more complex multipolar security environment. Conversely, Europeans saw the new force as an opportunity to gain additional influence on how to protect their security interests as well as gain more operational credibility with the Americans. Potentially the joint force could reduce the overhanging risk of the United States acting unilaterally (Ringsmose 2009).³⁶²

During the Prague Summit, the Alliance broadly agreed that creating a new, highly specialized mobile force was beneficial for NATO. The idea of forming a mobile expeditionary brigade-size force with air, land, and sea capabilities was consistent with emerging trends in U.S. military doctrine that promoted integrated joint capabilities. However, the proposal was a revolutionary departure for NATO and the Europeans. Most European countries had not been thinking in terms of either joint operations or expeditionary missions outside Europe. However, the proposal provided a vehicle for signaling European political willingness to participate in crisis missions in distant areas without necessarily supporting the United States in Iraq. Additionally,

³⁶¹ Sciolino, Elaine. 2002. "U.S. Pressing NATO for Rapid Reaction Force." *The New York Times*, September 18, 2002, 2002, 8, Section A. <https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/18/world/us-pressing-nato-for-rapid-reaction-force.html>.

³⁶² Ringsmose, Jens. 2009. "NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?" *European Security* 18 (3): 287-304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662831003694674>. P. 288-89.

for the smaller and middle-tier Allies, the new rapid reaction force was affordable and would not upset other high-priority European defense programs. Less than five months later, on 10 April 2003, NATO's Military Committee (MC) laid out the details of the new multinational specialized military unit in the document MC 477. The document turned the concept of the SRF officially into NATO Response Force's (NRF) (Ringsmose 2009; Reis 2018; Kugler 2006)³⁶³.

NATO determined the North Atlantic Council would control the deployment of the NRF and did not place a geographical limit on its use. The new force had a range of functions to include evacuation operations, support for disaster relief management (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events), humanitarian assistance, and counterterrorism operations (Reis 2018).³⁶⁴ NATO designed the NRF to be deployed within five days and sustainable for up to 30 days. The NRF moved from concept to reality in October 2004 when it reached an initial operational capacity of 17,000 troops.

NATO deployed the NRF for the first time to support the United States Hurricane Katrina's relief efforts. The expeditionary unit delivered 189 tons of food, first-aid kits, medical supplies, generators, and water pumps donated by European governments (Julianne Smith 2006).³⁶⁵ The NRF's successful initial deployment illustrated to NATO officials that it could be an effective HA/DR tool for the Alliance.

In October of 2005, NATO had begun plans to launch Stage 3 of the ISAF campaign, which called for the most formidable fighting in the southern region of Afghanistan. The humanitarian

³⁶³ Ringsmose, Jens. 2009. "NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?" *European Security* 18 (3): 287-304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662831003694674>. P. 290.

³⁶⁴ Reis, Flavio Américo dos. 2018. "Military Logistics in Natural Disasters: The Use of the NATO Response Force in Assistance to the Pakistan Earthquake Relief Efforts." *Contexto Internacional* 40: 73-96. <https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.2017400100004>. P.84.

³⁶⁵ Smith, Julianne. 2006. *Transforming NATO (: again) A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006*. Center For Strategic & International Studies (Washington DC). <https://www.csis.org/analysis/transforming-nato-again>. P. 29.

crisis in Pakistan offered an opportunity for the Triumvirate to use NATO's NRF to execute a HA/DR effort and simultaneously open communication channels between NATO officials and Islamabad. As the eastern neighbor to Afghanistan, positive relations with Pakistan were critical to the Alliance achieving its goals of stabilizing the Afghanistan government and defeating international terrorism in the region. At the time of the earthquake, there were substantial NATO military assets nearby in Afghanistan. Pakistan also granted US forces operating in Afghanistan access to Pakistani airbases, and Pakistani security forces were committed to fighting the Taliban and international jihadists along the Afghan border.³⁶⁶

ZOPA Design by Principals

The Principals understood the Pakistan relief effort would be far more complex and challenging than its Hurricane Katrina mission for multiple reasons. First, operating with a NATO Ally and a country outside of the Alliance with limited diplomatic ties would make coordinating efforts more difficult. Second, the level of destruction was more severe in a country with far less infrastructure. Third, NATO officials needed to determine the goal of the operation.

The NAC clarified that NATO's involvement in the disaster response was purely to save lives and livelihoods and speed up Pakistan's recovery. Accordingly, it established that: The duration of NATO's mission would be limited to three months, would only encompass emergency relief and recovery, not reconstruction. Additionally, NATO made it a point to separate the

³⁶⁶ Interview with NATO official conducted on 3 March 2021.

HA/DR mission from the global war on terrorism by coordinating all efforts with and for the Government of Pakistan.

Lastly, the NAC agreed that the deployment of the NRF would not set a precedent for future out-of-area humanitarian deployments. Internally, NATO officials decided the devastation, timing, and potential strategic partnership with Pakistan was a unique set of circumstances that engendered the collective to place its resources at risk. Two weeks after the earthquake, the UN officially reported that the logistical challenges were more complex than the aftermath of the unprecedented 2004 9.0 tsunami in Indonesia (Wiharta et al. 2008).³⁶⁷ Therefore, NATO saw an out-of-area intervention as in line with previous extraordinary circumstances like Bosnia and Kosovo, where the international community needed its unique set of capabilities.

Members of the Principals saw intervention as worthwhile and another test of the NRF structure. However, the Principals agreed that NATO should only be in Pakistan for 90 days unless the Pakistani government requested additional resources. Limiting NATO's participation would demonstrate to the people of Pakistan that NATO had no intention of staying in the region.

OPLAN 10305 spelled out a two-stage approach to NATO's HA/DR mission. Stage one focused on establishing an air bridge through the NRF's tactical airlift resources flying missions from Germany and Turkey to Pakistan. The Airbridge would be used to consolidate the collection and distribution of resources collected by Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination (EADRCC), United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), and the SHAPE Allied Movements Coordination Centre (AMCC). Initially, the Principals wanted to stop at logistical support, limiting the operation to the air bridge. However, as the situation on the

³⁶⁷ Wiharta, Sharon, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randall. 2008. *Annex D: Case Study: South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, 2005*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm). P. 88., P.108.

ground became direr, the Pakistani government and United Nations requested additional support, which launched stage two.

The second stage began on 17 October 2005 with the NAC sending military, medical, and engineering elements of the NRF to Pakistan. The Secretary-General decided to dispatch a Senior Civil Representative to liaise with the Pakistani authorities in Islamabad (NATO 2006c).³⁶⁸ During this phase, specialized units from the NRF deployed to facilitate the relief efforts. The NRF reconfigured its warfighting engineer unit into a HA/DR operation to coordinate with the various NGOs in Pakistan. NATO troops moved survivors away from the earthquake zone, maintained the air bridge, treated thousands of sick and injured people, built shelters, and restored critical infrastructure like roads and bridges (Julianne Smith 2006)³⁶⁹

The Principals saw the HA/DR mission in Pakistan through two lenses. First, as a way to signal to the international community NATO still had relevance and demonstrate unity amid the Iraq War. Second, to engender the Alliance to Pakistan's citizens and government officials. Many Pakistanis NATO encountered were not familiar with the organization. Therefore, hundreds of military members performing medical services and rebuilding infrastructure raised interest amongst the local population and some media members in Pakistan. The operation created goodwill and countered anti-west messages in Pakistan (NATO 2006a).³⁷⁰ Principals provided a vision and set parameters to generate a ZOPA for consensus amongst the Allies because they saw the campaign as an opportunity to achieve their security goals. NATO officials were able to

³⁶⁸ NATO, February 15, 2006, 2006c, "The EADRCC Final Situation Report N° 23 Earthquake Pakistan," <https://www.nato.int/eadrcc/2005/pakistan/060215-final.pdf>. P.1-2.

³⁶⁹ Smith, Julianne. 2006. *Transforming NATO (: again) A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006*. Center For Strategic & International Studies (Washington DC). <https://www.csis.org/analysis/transforming-nato-again>. P. 30.

³⁷⁰ NATO, 2006a, "Lessons Learned in Pakistan: NATO Providing Humanitarian Aid, and the Role of the NATO Response Force," <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060306a.htm>.

increase the communication with the Pakistani government and develop trust with the Pakistani people. Additionally, the HA/DR mission in Pakistan offered the opportunity to stress test the NRF framework.

The relief efforts deepened communication channels between diplomats and military members in the Principals and Pakistan. The improved relationship led to Pakistan becoming a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) with access to training, capacity building, and education for the Pakistani military (US-State-Department 2021).³⁷¹ Although Pakistan obtained MNNA Status in June of 2004, they had not received access to NATO resources until after the operation ended. Additionally, the positive relationship started through the 2005 HA/DR campaign led to the development of a joint Afghan, ISAF, and Pakistani intelligence center in Kabul to combat terrorism and bring stability to the region (NATO 2007a).³⁷²

Sufficient Political Will

Pakistan's initial request for assistance from NATO suggested a link between participation in the relief effort and the global war on terrorism. The connection between the ISAF mission and the proposed HA/DR operation displeased many in NATO. During deliberations in the NAC, a strong contingent wanted to turn the request down and encourage bilateral agreements between willing nations and Pakistan. Reportedly, it was an appeal by the UN-OCHA's response coordinator Jan

³⁷¹ US-State-Department, 2021, "Major Non-NATO Ally Status," <https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/>.

³⁷² NATO, January 30, 2007a, "NATO and Pakistan agree on Afghanistan approach," <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/01-january/e0130a.html>.

Egeland encouraging the NAC to be 'big and bold' that finally convinced the NAC to agree to accept the mission officially under the NATO banner (Wiharta et al. 2008).³⁷³

On 11 October, one day after the Pakistani government requested assistance, the NAC released an official statement approving an air operation to bring supplies from NATO and Partner countries to Pakistan for earthquake relief efforts. Understanding the devastation and international attention, the NAC explained the air campaign was only the initial response, and the Alliance may do more.

This action represents the initial response by the Alliance. The North Atlantic Council also agreed today to examine the potential requirement for follow-on stages of support to Pakistan, which could include use of sealift and possible deployment of specific NATO Response Force (NRF) military assets and capabilities, for example to transport rescue and transport helicopters, shelter items, medical equipment and medications (NATO 2005).

The press release reflects the Alliance's willingness to assist the UN and other NGOs by providing an Airbridge to ease the logistical burden on the international community. However, the allusion to future unknown stages illustrates the consternation within NATO on what precisely the operation would entail.

The swift reaction of the NAC to approve an out-of-area campaign illustrates the power of international legitimacy and how NATO responds to direct requests by the United Nations.

NATO members' eagerness to intervene in Pakistan demonstrates its interests could adapt from a strict focus on territorial integrity and security towards overall international stability. Effectively, NATO expanded its geographic range and operational scope by adopting an out-of-

³⁷³ Wiharta, Sharon, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randall. 2008. *Annex D: Case Study: South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, 2005*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm). P. 108.

area HA/DR mission in Pakistan (I. Daalder and Goldgeier 2006).³⁷⁴ Minister Shaukat-Aziz's direct plea for help provided the political will for the alliance to come together and approve a new type of out-of-area activity. In a January 2007 address to NATO, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz explained:

We also want to take this opportunity, Ladies and Gentlemen, to thank NATO for responding to our request to assist us after the earthquake which took place on the 8th of October about a year and a half ago. This was a major catastrophe. We lost lot of lives. And what was built in decades and centuries, was destroyed in seconds.

However, today, Ladies and Gentlemen, you will be pleased to know that as a result of the efforts of the global community and our own efforts reconstruction and restoration of normalcy is proceeding.

We are also pleased to share with you that as a result of the earthquake, after the earthquake occurred, not one person lost their lives due to hunger; not one person lost their lives because of lack of shelter; and not one person lost their lives because of any epidemic which occurred after the earthquake.

These I mention, because they were all concerns at the time. And we feel very privileged that a collective global effort for the cause of the earthquake evictees was successful (NATO 2007b).

Unlike previous campaigns, the Triumvirate and Principals did not exert their influence to provide the impetus for the HA/DR mission outside of highlighting the NRF's usefulness. The Alliance had the Political Will to supply logistical support and strategic airlift to the international community. However, the institution did not have the will to put troops outside of NATO's borders without the UN making an official direct request. While the UN provided the political cover for NATO to take on a new role, the execution of the mission still came down to the Principals because multiple nations did not want their military executing a HA/DR mission for a non-transatlantic and

³⁷⁴ Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier. 2006. "Global NATO." *Foreign Affairs* 85 (5): 105-13. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20032073>. P.109

non-NATO partner nation. The Principals' interests in the NRF and developing its capabilities provided the avenue for NATO to operationalize its political will beyond logistical support.

NATO's earthquake relief efforts illustrated two shortcomings with the NRF framework. First, the NRF has an inherent funding challenge. In the Pakistan mission, Spain won what many call the "reverse lottery," meaning that the country that happens to be in rotation when the NRF deploys ends up paying the deployment's total costs. General James Jones, SACEUR at the time, explained the current funding structure had long-term implications on the readiness and usefulness of NRF. Due to the unpredictability of cost, nations would be unwilling to contribute financially or militarily to the NRF's reverse lottery system stayed in place (Julianne Smith 2006; Ringsmose 2009)³⁷⁵

Second, the NRF mission in Pakistan exhibited the consequences of not having a status of force agreements in place in advance. The lack of clear legality on entry, force protection, and legal status between NATO and Pakistan wasted time and potentially lost lives. The lack of formal agreement between Brussels and Islamabad increased costs and limited taskings (Julianne Smith 2006; Popa 2019; Wiharta et al. 2008)³⁷⁶

Overall, the Alliance had sufficient political will to aid in Pakistan's recovery for three reasons. First, the level of devastation created a high humanitarian need, the Principal's strategic interests in the NRF's functionality provided a proving ground for the new unit, and supplying aid

³⁷⁵ Smith, Julianne. 2006. *Transforming NATO (: again) A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006*. Center For Strategic & International Studies (Washington DC). <https://www.csis.org/analysis/transforming-nato-again>. P. 30.

Ringsmose, Jens. 2009. "NATO's Response Force: finally getting it right?" *European Security* 18 (3): 287-304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662831003694674>. P. 296. P. 300.

³⁷⁶ Smith, Julianne. 2006. *Transforming NATO (: again) A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006*. Center For Strategic & International Studies (Washington DC). <https://www.csis.org/analysis/transforming-nato-again>. P. 30.

Popa, Ioan-Dan. 2019. "Some Considerations Related to NATO Intervention for Disaster Mitigation (Case Study: Pakistan Earthquake)." *International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION* 25: 123-128. <https://doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2019-0020>. P. 127.

Wiharta, Sharon, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randall. 2008. *Annex D: Case Study: South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, 2005*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm). P. 116.

eased created another avenue to improve ISAF's mission in Afghanistan through better diplomatic relations with Islamabad.

Consensus Building

The deployment of NATO resources to conduct out-of-area HA/DR missions began with the creation of the NRF. Fall 2002 was a period in which the United States and Britain were beginning to quarrel publicly with Germany and France over whether to invade Iraq in the near future. The divide over the salience of intervening in Iraq created a rift between the Principals. The invention of the NRF highlights how NATO's consensus-building operates on a case-by-case basis and that one of NATO's indelible features is its ability to discover and coordinate overlapping interests. Despite the squabble between Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin, the NRF moved through the NATO consensus-building process and emerged with the support of the entire Alliance (Kugler 2006).³⁷⁷

The establishment of the NRF set the foundation for NATO to have an apparatus to select, develop, and approve a non-Article five out-of-area activity in less than a week. Even though NATO approved an out-of-area operation to aid Pakistan within 24 hours of Islamabad's request, the Alliance had reservations about the operational demands and the precedent set by going out-of-area for a HA/DR operation. Some allies worried, especially the French, that the NRF,

³⁷⁷ Kugler, Richard. December 2006 2006. *The NATO Response Force 2002–2006 Innovation by the Atlantic Alliance*. Center for Technology and National Security Policy (Washington DC: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense). <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/occasional/CTNSP/CaseStudiesArchive/Case-1-NATO-Response-Force.pdf?ver=2017-06-16-150518-373>. P. 5-6.

primarily designed for high-intensity combat, would be at risk of changing into an arm of the International Red Cross (Berdal and Ucko 2009).³⁷⁸ The Secretary-General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer echoed Paris' sentiment that the NRF and NATO is not a humanitarian organization, but added that NATO has a duty to help when asked (Julianne Smith 2006)³⁷⁹

Although the NAC approved the HA/DR mission in Pakistan, not all NATO members accepted that the organization should be involved in disaster response or other humanitarian activities in countries outside of the Alliance. The fight for consensus came in two forms. First, limiting the operation to 90 days, and second, establishing the ground force. Smaller and Middle Tier nations provided fierce opposition to the prospect of future obligations to out-of-area HA/DR missions. Therefore, the NAC found consensus in limiting the operation to 90 days, making it clear in all communications that the mission was a unique circumstance, and allowing nations to opt-out of their NRF obligations. Multiple countries within the NRF objected to Stage Two of the operation because they did not want to expose their military members to potential violence in Pakistan. Consequently, Italy and the United Kingdom filled the gaps in the NRF.³⁸⁰

Conclusion

OPER offers an examination of Leggold's assumption that humanitarian missions are different because they are immune from significant force-thinning constraints when military concerns are

³⁷⁸ Berdal, Mats, and David Ucko. 2009. "NATO at 60." *Survival* 51 (2): 55-76. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330902860793>. P. 67.

³⁷⁹ Smith, Julianne. 2006. *Transforming NATO (: again) A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006*. Center For Strategic & International Studies (Washington DC). <https://www.csis.org/analysis/transforming-nato-again>. P. 30.

³⁸⁰ Interview with two NATO officials familiar with NATO's Pakistan Earthquake Relief efforts. Conducted on 15 February 2021.

not involved (Lepgold 1998).³⁸¹ Despite drawing a valuable distinction between humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, Lepgold takes NATO's process for selecting, developing, and deciding to pursue an out-of-area activity as given and focuses on the type of public good the operation provides its members. Embeddedness Theory's IEM illustrates the process for all out-of-area activities is the same. Therefore, no matter the mission type (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian), the four elements for NATO's decision-making process must be present for the out-of-area operation to materialize.

OPER reflects that nations can acquire sufficient political will to approve a to-be-determined out-of-area action when a country is in crisis. Therefore, Embeddedness Theory's assumption that NATO lacks the desire to act without invoking Article 5 or obtaining a UNSCR is incorrect in this case. Within 24 hours of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz making a formal request, the NAC committed to assisting Pakistan with relief efforts by making its transportation capabilities available for the EADRCC and UN-OCHA (NATO 2010c).³⁸²

However, four distinctions account for why OPER produced an unexpected result. First, NATO officials limited its support to three months, making it tailored in scope. Second, NATO's main effort was building an Air Bridge to Pakistan for other Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) to use. Third, most of the relief coordination took place through the EADRCC and the NRF. Four, NATO agreed to do more than strategic lift as long as NATO's involvement only

³⁸¹ Lepgold, Joseph. 1998. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." *International Security* 23 (1): 78-106. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300000813>. P. 95.

³⁸² NATO. 2010. "Pakistan Earthquake Relief Operation." NATO. Last Modified March 15, 2010. Accessed February 1 2021. <https://www.nato.int/eadrcc/2005/pakistan/index.htm>.

encompassed emergency relief and was not linked to the War on Terror (Popa 2019; Wiharta et al. 2008).³⁸³

The Alliance's hesitancy to support relief efforts beyond airlift illustrates how despite having the political will, the plan of execution comes back to the Principals having goals that guide NATO's policies and actions. As a result, the relief effort fell mainly on the Principals. The influential members of the Alliance capitalized on the relief efforts to have direct interactions with the Pakistani government (Wiharta et al. 2008).³⁸⁴ Specifically, the Alliance's reliance on the United States for large aircraft to build the air bridge was critical. The United States is one of very few Allies capable of transporting significant people and resources over great distances to austere areas needed to sustain the relief effort. The Canadians placed its Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) under the NATO operation, left a clinic behind, and made resources available to the UN-OCHA (NATO 2006b).³⁸⁵ Germany provided significant rotatory lift, France supplied a Fuel farm which enhanced transportation efficiency in the operation, and the United Kingdom contributed engineers, troops, and multiple helicopters.

NATO's humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts in Pakistan demonstrate its interests could evolve from strict territorial integrity issues and security towards overall international stability. Effectively, with OPER, NATO expanded its geographic range and operational scope by adopting an out-of-area HA/DR mission (I. Daalder and Goldgeier 2006).³⁸⁶

³⁸³ Popa, Ioan-Dan. 2019. "Some Considerations Related to NATO Intervention for Disaster Mitigation (Case Study: Pakistan Earthquake)." *International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION* 25: 123-128. <https://doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2019-0020>. P. 126.

Wiharta, Sharon, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randall. 2008. *Annex D: Case Study: South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, 2005*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm). P. 113.

³⁸⁴ Wiharta, Sharon, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randall. 2008. *Annex D: Case Study: South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, 2005*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm). P. 112-114.

³⁸⁵ NATO. 2006. "NATO's Growing Humanitarian Role." *NATO Review*. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/art4.html>. P. 3-4.

³⁸⁶ Daalder, Ivo, and James Goldgeier. 2006. "Global NATO." *Foreign Affairs* 85 (5): 105-13. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20032073>. P.109

Additionally, OPER highlights the possibility of strategic relationship interest. Requiring direct communication with the Pakistani government served NATO's long-term interest of developing trust with an important stakeholder in the ISAF mission. The relief efforts deepened communication channels between diplomats and military members in the Principals and Pakistan. The improved relationship led to Pakistan becoming a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) with access to training, capacity building, and education for the Pakistani military (US-State-Department 2021).³⁸⁷ Additionally, the positive relationship started through the 2005 HA/DR campaign led to the development of a joint Afghan, ISAF, and Pakistani intelligence center in Kabul to combat terrorism and bring stability to the region (NATO 2007a).³⁸⁸

Table 19 illustrates each NATO Ally's consensus category according to the quantitative model, how the country obtained sufficient political will, the total number of troops in Pakistan during Stage 2 of OPER, and the level of relative contribution. The main findings are that the majority (15/26) of NATO Allies made their expected level of contribution or more to the HA/DR operation. The assistance distribution highlights the tension within the Principals with France Under-Providing and the other five in either the Provide or Over-Provide category. Canada being the second highest contributor, behind the United States, follows its pattern of investing in development projects sponsored by the UN. Additionally, all of the countries that did not contribute troops were nations in the Fair-Share category. Their lack of participation follows Embeddedness Theory's expectations because Fair-Share Allies do not have extra resources to

³⁸⁷ US-State-Department, 2021, "Major Non-NATO Ally Status," <https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/>.

³⁸⁸ NATO, January 30, 2007a, "NATO and Pakistan agree on Afghanistan approach," <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/01-january/e0130a.html>.

contribute to a new mission type. The Alliance expects nations in the Fair-Share category to use their resources on more substantial military campaigns like OIF, OEF, and ISAF.

Overall, OPER illustrates that given a once-in-a-generation natural disaster with little military danger, NATO can obtain sufficient political will to act out-of-area, which contradicts Embeddedness Theory's expectation. However, the UN-OCHA's request for troops on the ground to perform HA/DR activities functions like a UNSC Resolution. The international body that many NATO capitals look to for political cover directly appealed to Brussels and authorized its use of resources out-of-area. Although the Allies did not universally agree with using its expeditionary force for HA/DR, the UN provided the lubricant for NATO to achieve consensus. Additionally, the Triumvirate's operational burden providing the majority of the strategic lift, Principals' resources providing the parameters for the activity, and consensus-building depending on national caveats, follow Embeddedness Theory's typology. The Alliance developing the political will to operate outside its members' borders in a new capacity is surprising. It shows how the organization is adaptable provided common interests amongst Allies exist. However, at the same time, NATO's selection, development, and decision to pursue OPER reflects the Alliance's pattern of executing out-of-area activities when encouraged to do so by the United Nations.

Name	2005 Consensus Category	2006 Consensus Category	Sufficient Political Will	Troop Contribution 2005 - 2006	Relative Contribution
Belgium	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	24	Over-Provide
Bulgaria	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Canada	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	200	Over-Provide
Czech Republic	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	23	Over-Provide
Denmark	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	35	Over-Provide
Estonia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	18	Over-Provide
France	Networked	Networked	Yes – Org Will	38	Under-Provide
Germany	Networked	Networked	Yes – Org Will	81	Over-Provide
Greece	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	21	Under-Provide
Hungary	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	24	Over-Provide
Iceland	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Italy	Networked	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	46	Provide
Latvia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Lithuania	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Luxembourg	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Netherlands	Networked	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	46	Over-Provide
Norway	Fair-Share	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Poland	Motivated	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	27	Provide
Portugal	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	14	Over-Provide
Romania	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Slovakia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Slovenia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Spain	Networked	Networked	Yes – Org Will	47	Over-Provide
Turkey	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	111	Provide
United Kingdom	Networked	Networked	Yes – Org Will	112	Over-Provide
United States	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	296	Provide

Table 19 - OPER Consensus Categories and Contributions: The Table illustrates each NATO Ally's Consensus Category according to the quantitative model. The numbers reflect NATO Allies troop contributions to NATO Operation Pakistan Earthquake Relief (OPER) from 11 October 2005 – 1 February 2006, according to the EADRCC and NATO final report. Additionally, the model delineates if each nation obtained sufficient political will according to Embeddedness Theory's expectation for that Consensus category. For countries that switch categories between 2005 and 2006, the 2006 expectations were used. The Troop Contribution column reflects the total amount of troops that a nation provided to OPER. The Relative Contribution column explains if that country's contributions fall into the realm of Over-Provide, Provide, or Under-Provide. Over-Provide means a nation gave more to the operation than its share of total NATO forces. Provide means the country supplied between half and its expected proportion of resources to the operation. Under-Provide means the Ally the resources provided to the operation are less than half of its proportion of NATO's total resources.

Case 5: Libya, 1 September 2009 - 31 March 2011

Background

On 13 January 2011, peaceful demonstrations began in Benghazi, Libya, to protest the 42-year rule of Colonel Moammar Gadhafi. These protests were a part of the larger "Arab Spring" movement that rocked the Arabic-speaking countries of North Africa and the Middle East throughout 2011 (Domansky, Jensen, and Bryson 2012).³⁸⁹ When the people of Libya rose up against Qaddafi in February 2011, many hoped that the nonviolent protests would follow the path of similar uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (I. Daalder and Stavridis 2012).³⁹⁰

Early in 2011, overwhelming anti-government protests swept North Africa. After 23 years in power, Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled the country immediately. After 18 days of protest, Egyptian President Muhammed Hosni Mubarak, who had maintained authority over the country for more than 30 years, stepped down from office. These tremendous political changes in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt encouraged similar protests in Algeria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya (Song 2016).³⁹¹

In February, after two days of protesting the imprisonment of a popular lawyer advocating for a new constitution and increased civil rights in Benghazi, the Arab Spring Revolution in Libya

³⁸⁹ Domansky, Katie, Rebecca Jensen, and Rahael Bryson. 2012. "Canada and the Libya Coalition." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14 (3&4): 1 - 29. P.2.

³⁹⁰ Daalder, Ivo, and James Stavridis. 2012. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 91 (2): 2-7. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23217215>. P. 2.

³⁹¹ Song, Yanan. 2016. "The US Commitment to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period - A Case Study on Libya." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 14 (1): 83-113. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2015.1125165>. P.84.

turned from an internal matter to a civil war which drew international attention. On February 17, 2011, Qaddafi loyalists in the police and military opened fire with machine guns on unarmed crowds of protesters. The events of the “Day of Rage” led a broad swath of Benghazi’s roughly 800,000 citizens to push back on the Qaddafi regime (Worth 2011).³⁹² The Rebels in Benghazi called on the international community to help them fight Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s oppressive and brutal tactics of silencing dissenters through force.

Overlapping Interests

After nearly a decade fighting two major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and the Obama administration were not keen on another intervention in the region. During his graduation speech to cadets at the United States Military Academy (West Point), Secretary of Defense Robert Gates alluded to how war-weary the current administration was.

“In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it” (Shanker 2011).³⁹³

As fighting intensified in Libya in February of 2011, the United States shied away from calls by the United Kingdom and France to intervene.

³⁹² Worth, Robert. 2011. "On Libya’s Revolutionary Road." *The New York Times Magazine*, March 30.

³⁹³ Shanker, Thom. 2011. "Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and Afghanistan." *The New York Times*, February 25, 2011. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/26gates.html>.

Despite gruesome photographs and the recent trend of the United States leading multilateral efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States could not take its typical role as leader of out-of-area campaigns due to limited capacity and political will. The Obama administration shifted its efforts towards China and the Pacific region and could not lead a third major military effort in the Middle East (Hallams and Schreer 2012).³⁹⁴

Historical ties, migration concerns, oil trade, and prestige were three reasons why the Sarkozy government advocated for intervention and removing Qaddafi from power. Post-Cold War, France took an active role in influencing its former colonies in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. Considered its backyard and an area of national significance, France has not hesitated to intervene militarily in the domestic politics of its former colonies like Chad and Mali. With multiple military bases throughout Africa, numerous former African heads of state living in Paris, and the Elysée Palace having a dedicated African cell, France felt it was in its national interests to take a leadership role with the Libya situation (Bucher et al. 2013).³⁹⁵

Throughout late February and Early March of 2011, French officials expressed concerns about the destabilizing effects of thousands of people fleeing the violence in Libya for Tunisia and Egypt. Before the uprising, France imported over 15 percent of its oil from Libya. Therefore, minimize violence in the region was essential to maintaining stable markets. On 23 February, Sarkozy said the Qaddafi government's repression of civilians was revolting. Three days later, France's Ambassador to the UN, Gerard Araud, labeled the Qaddafi government's repression 'brutal and bloody.' France did not want to be bystanders in Libya's political uprising as it was

³⁹⁴ Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313–27. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x>. P.318-20.

³⁹⁵ Bucher, Jessica, Lena Engel, Stephanie Harfensteller, and Hylke Dijkstra. 2013. "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya." *European Security* 22 (4): 524-539. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.766597>. P. 527.

during Egypt's and Tunisia's. France's historical influence in Northern African weakened after not intervening in the democratic protest in Egypt and Tunisia (Davidson 2013).³⁹⁶

Newly reintegrated into the military structure of NATO, France had a variety of interests in Libya's deteriorating situation to include increasing its military prestige. Prestige is the social recognition of a state's power and impacts the reputation for strength in war. A country will fight when it believes that its prestige in diplomacy is not equivalent to its real strength. The rising state increasingly demands changes in the system that will reflect their newly gained power and unmet interests (Gilpin 1981).³⁹⁷ With its military generals occupying new positions throughout NATO, a variety of NATO officials explained France saw the Libya situation as a way to elevate its prestige by announcing itself as a fully capable military power on the world's stage. With the United States unwilling to take the lead as it traditionally did for the Alliance, French officials saw the military intervention in Libya as a way to reestablish France as a strategic security power.³⁹⁸

Initially, the United Kingdom shared a reluctant position with the United States. Under Prime Minister David Cameron, the Conservative government indicated opposition to the type of "liberal interventionism" attributed to Tony Blair's tenure as prime minister (Goulter 2015).³⁹⁹ However, Cameron's position changed in late February as pictures and reports of Qaddafi using his military against unarmed civilians proliferated. In July 1995, Cameron was a junior adviser in the Conservative government when Bosnian Serb forces slaughtered 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys (Blitz 2011).⁴⁰⁰ His administration did not want to allow history to repeat itself. Britain's

³⁹⁶ Davidson, Jason. 2013. "France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26 (2): 310-29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.784573>. P. 314-7.

³⁹⁷ Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. P. 32-3.

³⁹⁸ Four Interviews with NATO officials past and present. 5 March 2021.

³⁹⁹ Goulter, Christina. 2015. *The British Experience Operation Ellamy*. RAND Corporation. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/10.7249/j.ctt16f8d7x.12>. P. 157.

⁴⁰⁰ Blitz, James. 2011. "Cameron Ardent in Support of Rebels in Libya." *Financial Times*, March 9, 2011. <https://www.ft.com/content/f279b98a-4a9b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a>.

representative to the United Nations Human Rights Council explained the UK had increasing concerns about the "gross and systematic violations of human rights by Colonel Qaddafi and his supporters" (Davidson 2013).⁴⁰¹

For Cameron, the United Kingdom and the international community should align themselves against tyrants and with people in the region who want a job, a vote, and a new system of government. Additionally, the members of the United Kingdom's defense minister staff worried Col Qaddafi would partition Libya and become a haven for terrorists like he was in the 1980s (Blitz 2011).⁴⁰² Although London understood its primary foreign military effort was in Afghanistan, Cameron instructed his defense minister to develop plans for military intervention in Libya, starting with the imposition of a naval blockade and a no-fly zone, with the potential to expand the operation if required but short of a commitment of land forces (Goulter 2015).⁴⁰³

With France's ardent stance and the United Kingdom's willingness to intervene, the United States found itself in a new position, the Triumvirate member asking for time and consensus before using force for an out-of-area intervention. The United States explained to France and UK it would support an intervention but would only do so if France and UK took the lead. Specifically, the United States saw the operation as a first step to finding a more sustainable burden-sharing arrangement with its European Allies (Hallams and Schreer 2012; Domansky, Jensen, and Bryson 2012; Davidson 2013).⁴⁰⁴ Despite the call for patience from Washington, all three Triumvirate members agreed that they needed to prepare to use force if the situation in Libya continued to

⁴⁰¹ Davidson, Jason. 2013. "France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26 (2): 310-29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.784573>. P. 320-2.

⁴⁰² Blitz, James. 2011. "Cameron Ardent in Support of Rebels in Libya." *Financial Times*, March 9, 2011. <https://www.ft.com/content/f279b98a-4a9b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a>.

⁴⁰³ Goulter, Christina. 2015. *The British Experience Operation Ellamy*. RAND Corporation. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/10.7249/j.ctt16f8d7x.12>. P. 157.

⁴⁰⁴ Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313-27. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x>. P.313-20.

deteriorate. The three agreed taking action in Libya was an essential step in providing support for the Arab Spring by sending a message to strongmen like Qaddafi in the region that they would not tolerate crackdowns on democratic protests.

ZOPA Design by Principals

In a joint article, U.S. President Obama, France's President Nicholas Sarkozy, and Great Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron explained that:

Our duty and our mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Qaddafi by force. But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power. The International Criminal Court is rightly investigating the crimes committed against civilians and the grievous violations of international law. It is unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their future government. The brave citizens of those towns that have held out against forces that have been mercilessly targeting them would face a fearful vengeance if the world accepted such an arrangement. It would be an unconscionable betrayal (BBC 2011).⁴⁰⁵

On Thursday 24 February, President Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy, British prime minister David Cameron, and Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi had telephone calls to discuss the deteriorating situation in Libya. Collectively, they agreed the violence committed by the Qaddafi

⁴⁰⁵ BBC. 2011. "Libya letter by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy." British Broadcasting Corporation. Last Modified April 15, 2011. Accessed February 15. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13090646>.

regime violated international norms and that they needed to find a way to support the Libyan people's desire to determine their own future (Obama 2011).⁴⁰⁶

Obama began pushing for a broader UN Security Council resolution that would authorize military force against Qaddafi's forces. On the other hand, Britain and France called for the imposition of a no-fly zone. From the United States' perspective, the crisis in Libya represented an opportunity for a rebalancing of burden-sharing within the alliance. The Southern Mediterranean was minimally concerning to the United States interests but of critical importance to Europe. Initially, the United States' prevarication over what role to play in the crisis caught some European Allies by surprise (Hallams and Schreer 2012).⁴⁰⁷

France was keen on involving the EU, and the United States advocated for NATO. France saw Libya as an opportunity to push for European Security independence. However, as military planning cells explored options for an intervention in Libya, it became obvious to Washington and London the EU was not a viable alternative to NATO. It lacked sufficient intelligence platforms and the ability to conduct large scale airpower coordination. Conversely, NATO, institutionally provided an invaluable 'plug and play' umbrella to coordinate the military campaign. According to most officials, only the United States and NATO have military command chains capable of controlling an operation of such complexity as the one in Libya (O'Donnell and Vaisse 2011).⁴⁰⁸ The Libyan intervention was of moderate-intensity compared to the war in Afghanistan. Even so,

⁴⁰⁶ Obama, Barack, February 24, 2011, "Readout of President Obama's Calls with President Sarkozy of France, Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Berlusconi of Italy," <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/24/readout-president-obama-s-calls-president-sarkozy-france-prime-minister->

⁴⁰⁷ Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313–27. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x>. P.320.

⁴⁰⁸ O'Donnell, Clara, and Justin Vaisse. 2011. "Is Libya NATO's Final Bow?". Brookings Institute. Last Modified December 2, 2011. Accessed February 15. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-libya-natos-final-bow/>.

military planners on both sides of Brussels (EU and NATO) understood only NATO could handle the coordination of multiple coalition partners and their assets (Cizel and von Hlatky 2014).⁴⁰⁹

Whereas France, as a former colonial power, felt a special bond with the Maghreb, Germany's relations were mostly economic and rather limited. The differences in Paris' and Berlin's approach to northern Africa dates back to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. Germany has instead tried to keep financial contributions to the Southern Mediterranean as limited as possible. In the Arab Spring, Germany did not see a need to intervene and concentrated most of its diplomatic efforts on its economic interests (Bucher et al. 2013).⁴¹⁰

In 2011, Germany was a nonpermanent member of the UNSC and repeatedly noted the responsibility of the Security Council to legitimize any military action outside of NATO's borders. Berlin suspected that Sarkozy was primarily motivated by the upcoming French presidential election and a desire to impress voters with his activist attitude, thereby making up for his inaction with previous Arab Spring uprising and relationships with Arab dictators.

German policymakers also doubted whether a no-fly zone or similar military engagement from the air would stabilize the situation on the ground. Berlin feared that any level of intervention would lead to Western entanglement in a Libyan civil war. As a result, Germany made clear that it would not participate in any capacity in any Libyan military intervention. The clear redline came from a belief that military involvement would lead to an intervention with ground troops, which no government wanted, including those of Paris and London (Brockmeier 2013).⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁹ Cizel, Annick, and Stéphanie von Hlatky. 2014. "From exceptional to special? A reassessment of France–NATO relations since reintegration." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 12 (4): 353-366. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2014.962760>. P. 357.

⁴¹⁰ Bucher, Jessica, Lena Engel, Stephanie Harfensteller, and Hylke Dijkstra. 2013. "Domestic politics, news media and humanitarian intervention: why France and Germany diverged over Libya." *European Security* 22 (4): 524-539. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.766597>. P. 528.

⁴¹¹ Brockmeier, Sarah. 2013. "Germany and the Intervention in Libya." *Survival* 55 (6): 63-90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.862937>. P. 67-8.

However, Berlin explained it would not stop Consensus and would increase its participation with NATO's AWACS missions in Afghanistan to free up crews from other nations if the Alliance decided to pursue military action in Libya (O'Donnell and Vaisse 2011).⁴¹²

Italy had a complex history with the Qaddafi regime dating back to when he first took power in 1970. After one year in power, Qaddafi expelled and confiscated the assets of approximately 20,000 Italians who had settled in Libya over colonial territorial disputes from the early 20th Century. In August 2008, Italy and Libya signed the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation (TFPC) in Benghazi. The agreement resolved all Libyan claims related to Italian colonialism and began an economic relationship between the two nations. In 2009, Italy was Libya's largest trading partner accounting for 17.5 of all Libyan imports. Conversely, Libya became Rome's most important oil supplier accounting for 30 percent of Italian crude oil imports and 13% of natural gas imports

Italy was hesitant to intervene in Libya for three reasons. First, Italians feared a large refugee influx on its borders. Second, they were concerned that if NATO removed Qaddafi, his replacement would be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood or Al Qaeda, creating a safe haven for terrorists. Third, they worried that a conflict in Libya would harm their domestic economy. Therefore, the Italians tied their support for any intervention by the EU or NATO to a UNSC Resolution authorizing sanctions and the use of force (Croci and Valigi 2011).⁴¹³

As the NATO Ally with the highest amount of interoperability with the Americans, Canada saw an opportunity to raise its profile and support its southern neighbor. The calls for intervention

⁴¹² O'Donnell, Clara, and Justin Vaisse. 2011. "Is Libya NATO's Final Bow?". Brookings Institute. Last Modified December 2, 2011. Accessed February 15. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-libya-natos-final-bow/>.

⁴¹³ Croci, Osvaldo, and Marco Valigi. 2011. "Italy and the International Intervention In Libya." *Italian Politics* 27: 191-206. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/43486407>. P. 192-3.

in Libya harmonized multiple aspects of Ottawa's foreign policy. Ensuring human security, strengthening international collective security, solidifying Canada's role as an American ally and NATO member, and demonstrating Ottawa's impact on global security were mutually reinforcing considerations in the intervention. One of Canada's primary strategic goals for participating in the Libya campaign was to demonstrate a rapprochement in its defense partnership with the US. Canada's willingness and ability to lead the NATO mission was also a benefit to a reluctant US. From Washington's perspective, Canadian leadership would allow a greater degree of American influence without appearing to lead the mission (Domansky, Jensen, and Bryson 2012).⁴¹⁴

On March 10, NATO held its Defense Ministers meeting and one of the leading topics was the Libyan crisis. France was out in front, with the most aggressive public position, followed closely by Britain. Germany, Poland, Turkey, and others, however, were opposed to any intervention. The United States sided with non-intervention at the time publicly.

Multiple issues divided the Alliance at the time, First, there was the potential impact of any military operations on other NATO operations like Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the various maritime missions in the Mediterranean and the horn of Africa. Allies knew their resources were stretched thin and therefore were reluctant to put another demand on themselves. Although NATO had slack in some areas, in critical areas such as surveillance, any new operation was bound to come at a cost. Second, there was the question of what the political goals of any military action would be. United States Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates had reservations on military intervention because post-Qaddafi Libya could become a breeding ground for Al-Qaeda and its offshoots. Third, there were the second-order effects on the Arab Spring to consider. Not intervening meant a tacit

⁴¹⁴ Domansky, Katie, Rebecca Jensen, and Rahael Bryson. 2012. "Canada and the Libya Coalition." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14 (3&4): 1 - 29. P. 13.

encouragement of leaders using repressive tactics to maintain power and squelch dissent or calls for democracy. Taking military action could actually delegitimize the work of the Libyan people calling for a revolution. Moving forward, the Libyan rebels who toppled Qaddafi could be seen as pawns of the west.(Chivviss 2015).⁴¹⁵

Overall, the Alliance identified Libya was an issue that required attention and some type of action but, was unable to determine the appropriate level of intervention. NATO did not have a collective interest to take military action because questions of legitimacy and secondary impact lingered. However, the Principals identified that an out-of-area activity was possible if the UNSC passed a resolution.

Sufficient Political Will

On 26 February 2011, the French and British introduced UNSC Resolution 1970 to the UNSC which imposed an arms embargo, travel ban on important Qaddafi regime officials, froze the regime's international financial assets. UNSC Resolution 1970 met the Article 39 Designation but not the Chapter VII Directive because it determined Libya was less than peaceful and highlighted the African union's, Arab League's, and Islamic Conference's condemnation of the violence in addition to the Security Council. Due to his brutal crackdown against the citizens of Libya, Resolution 1970 referred Qaddafi's crimes to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

⁴¹⁵ Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 40-1.

The sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1970 would eventually limit the resources the regime could draw on to prosecute the war, but their immediate impact was largely symbolic. There was no effect on the ground or any indication that Qaddafi would negotiate or consider a ceasefire (Chivviss 2015).⁴¹⁶ The United States facilitated this rapid international reaction. In late February, Washington was the first country to cut off Qaddafi's funding, freezing \$32 billion in Libyan assets and prompting other countries to follow suit (I. Daalder and Stavridis 2012).⁴¹⁷

Initially, France, like its allies, had preferred the sanctions strategy and supported Resolution 1970. However, President Sarkozy changed course and took up the mantle of military intervention more forcefully than any other Western leader when on March 19, at the end of a summit between the three, President Sarkozy revealed in front of the world's press that French Rafale fighters had just undertaken attacks on Qaddafi's forces that were advancing on Benghazi (Goulter 2015).⁴¹⁸

The unilateral action from France raised tensions and led to further discussion between NATO Allies. The British, Canadians, and French leaned forward in favor of military action. Spain and Italy, and others insisted that it was unwise to act without a UN mandate authorizing the use of force. The U.S. position, while recognizing the possibility for NATO military action in some areas, remained one of the more cautious (Chivviss 2015).⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁶ Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 30.

⁴¹⁷ Daalder, Ivo, and James Stavridis. 2012. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 91 (2): 2-7. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23217215>. P. 5.

⁴¹⁸ Goulter, Christina. 2015. *The British Experience Operation Ellamy*. RAND Corporation. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/10.7249/j.ctt16f8d7x.12>. P.158.

⁴¹⁹ Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 34, P.40-1..

The military reality was that neither country (even with US support) could execute the military campaign without the other. In early March France noted that a no-fly zone ‘could only be in the framework of a joint operation with great powers. The Gaddafi regime’s violence and threat of violence against civilians and concern with refugee flows led the Sarkozy and Cameron governments to call for a no-fly zone. French and British officials believed that a low-cost air war could be effective and that they could not free-ride on others’ efforts (Davidson 2013).⁴²⁰

Washington began to weigh military intervention because it became clear that France and the United Kingdom may act on their own, and as a result create greater uncertainty in Libya. Some officials in the Obama Administration voiced concern that a more robust unilateral French strike in Libya could make the situation on the ground worse if French strategy and capabilities were inadequate. Therefore, the United States had to weigh not only the humanitarian situation but additionally the reputation of a major NATO Ally (Chivviss 2015).⁴²¹

Despite international pressure of sanctions and numerous calls from regional organizations for Qaddafi to step down, the Libyan situation deteriorated. The Arab League called for a no-fly zone on 12 March 2011 (Cooper and Momani 2014).⁴²²

With mounting calls for military intervention by regional organizations Washington led the charge for a UNSCR that authorized all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya effectively, authorizing the use of force. However, to quell the concerns of NATO Allies, as well as the Russians and Chinese, the resolution stipulated

⁴²⁰ Davidson, Jason. 2013. "France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26 (2): 310-29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.784573>. P. 325..

⁴²¹ Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 52-3.

⁴²² Cooper, Andrew F., and Bessma Momani. 2014. "The Harper government's messaging in the build-up to the Libyan Intervention: was Canada different than its NATO allies?" *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20 (2): 176-188. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.934855>. P.179.

that no "occupying force" could be used. To satisfy German and Italian concerns about regime change, the resolution did not call for the removal of Qaddafi. Additionally, the United States proposal called for Arab League support, a no-fly zone, an extended arms embargo, and further sanctions on Qaddafi's assets overseas. On 17 March, the Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1973 which followed the United States' proposal. (I. Daalder and Stavridis 2012; Christopher Chivvis 2014; Cooper and Momani 2014).⁴²³

The support from multiple Muslim, northern Africa, and Arab organizations solidified UNSCR 1973's political legitimacy amongst the vast majority of NATO capitals. But in spite of its broad regional appeal, some European nations remained unmoved, namely Germany. When Germany joined the UNSC in January 2011, Germany's Foreign Minister presented a motto that would guide his country through its two-year tenure: 'responsibility, reliability and commitment' (Brockmeier 2013).⁴²⁴ Germany solidified its desire to separate itself from NATO's pending military intervention with their abstention. Despite not blocking NATO from pursuing an out-of-area activity, Germany joined China, Russia, India and Brazil in a vote of abstention. Unlike the P5 votes of Russia and China, Germany's abstention was not a veiled 'yes' but a veiled 'no' and was widely interpreted as such by other countries.

UNSC Resolution 1973 provided the political cover and institutional pressure on many resistant countries with economic ties in Libya. The Italian government reversed its position on

⁴²³ Daalder, Ivo, and James Stavridis. 2012. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 91 (2): 2-7. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23217215>. P. 5.

Cooper, Andrew F., and Bessma Momani. 2014. "The Harper government's messaging in the build-up to the Libyan Intervention: was Canada different than its NATO allies?" *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20 (2): 176-188. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.934855>. P.185.

Chivvis, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 59-61.

⁴²⁴ Brockmeier, Sarah. 2013. "Germany and the Intervention in Libya." *Survival* 55 (6): 63-90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.862937>. P. 63.

economic sanctions and military intervention but made clear to its domestic population that it would not be using heavy weapons in its participation in NATO's military activities in Libya (Croci and Valigi 2011).⁴²⁵

The relatively low risk for Danish personnel, combined with the legitimacy of a UNSCR helped secure Danish participation. The Danish legislature passed its proposal to participate in NATO's military activities unanimously on March 19, a first for Danish military action in the post-World War II era.

Norway placed a high significance on the legitimacy of UNSC authorizing force early on during NATO's deliberations on military intervention in Libya. With UNSC Resolution 1973, Norway's political left supported the operation on humanitarian grounds, while in conservative circles it was seen as a way to demonstrate continued military relevance after Afghanistan.

Despite a political crisis that was dividing the country politically, Belgium passed a parliamentary vote in favor of military support to Resolution 1973 on March 18 (Christopher Chivvis 2014).⁴²⁶

Before the adoption of the UN Security Resolution 1973, America hesitated to make any public stance on military intervention in Libya. Eventually, President Obama decided to pursue military action for humanitarian calculations. From his perspective, the United States had a responsibility to prevent Qaddafi from slaughtering innocent civilians, explaining that the UN, the Arab League, and other countries had already requested the international community intervene.

⁴²⁵ Croci, Osvaldo, and Marco Valigi. 2011. "Italy and the International Intervention In Libya." *Italian Politics* 27: 191-206. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/43486407>. P. 196, P. 200.

⁴²⁶ Chivvis, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 84-5.

The level of regional request signals that the United States needed to ensure that a disaster did not happen on its watch (Song 2016).⁴²⁷

To create a clear hand-off, the United States led Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn as the initial coalition of the willing with an expectation that NATO forces, led by Canada, would continue the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1973. The arrangement allowed the US military to participate in an international conflict without taking the leadership role because the intervention was seen as low risk and after suppressing Libya's air defense force (Lizza 2011).⁴²⁸

In less than 10 days, Operation Odyssey Dawn accomplished a great deal destroying Qaddafi's air-defense systems, grounding Libya's Air Force, and degrading its command-and-control systems. The United States provided the vast majority of the military effort in Operation Odyssey Dawn. The United States had fired 192 Tomahawk missiles, with the United Kingdom firing only 7. The United States dropped 455 precision-guided munitions, with 147 from the coalition also played an essential role in other key areas, flying 80 percent of all air refueling, almost 75 percent of aerial surveillance, and 100 percent of the electronic warfare missions with its EC-130s and EA-18Gs (Christopher Chivvis 2014).⁴²⁹

On 23 March 2011, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector (OUP), charged with the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1973's no-fly zone over Libya, arms embargo, and protection of civilians. By the end of March 2011, Odyssey Dawn officially ended, and OUP had full responsibility for had three distinct activities: Enforcing an arms embargo in the Mediterranean

⁴²⁷ Song, Yanan. 2016. "The US Commitment to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period - A Case Study on Libya." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 14 (1): 83-113. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2015.1125165>. P. 85., P. 92.

⁴²⁸ Lizza, Ryan. 2011. "Leading From Behind." *The New Yorker*. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/leading-from-behind#ixzz222FX0h6x>.

⁴²⁹ Chivvis, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 89..

Sea to prevent the transfer of arms, related materials and mercenaries to Libya. Enforcing a no-fly zone to prevent aircrafts from bombing civilian targets. Conducting air and naval strikes against military forces involved in attacks or threatening to attack Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas (NATO 2019d).⁴³⁰ After the handover from Operation Odyssey Dawn to OUP, about two-thirds of the strike sorties were shouldered by France and Great Britain, the rest by Italy, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden (which is not a member of NATO), and Belgium (Gaub 2013).⁴³¹

NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) began with a distinctive advantage on the battlefield after the US-Led coalition completed its task. Additionally, NATO's military intervention had broad regional support, UNSC approval, and international legitimacy which unlocked the opportunity for reticent Allies to obtain sufficient political will for NATO to reach consensus.

Building Consensus

The day after Resolution 1973 passed, NATO ambassadors convened in Brussels to discuss NATO's options. The big issue was whether or not the operation would be carried out under NATO, the EU, or in a coalition of the willing format. Over the weekend, Ivo Daalder, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, who was originally skeptical about the intervention, began a full-court press to transfer operations to NATO. Three basic camps had already begun to emerge.

⁴³⁰ NATO. 2019. Operations and Missions: Past and Present. In *NATO Encyclopedia*, edited by Public Relations. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. P. 301-4.

⁴³¹ Gaub, Florence. 2013. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector*. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11532>. P. 7.

The first camp, led by the United States and Britain, advocated for NATO to lead to the operation. NATO had been planning for the possibility of military intervention for several weeks. Simultaneously, the EU developed plans for the humanitarian aspects of the fallout from conflict, creating a little competition between the two organizations. However, Secretary Rasmussen and NATO Allies like Turkey and Norway, who were outside the EU, pushed for the Libyan intervention to be under NATO control to influence the process and strategic objectives. Lastly, European nations preferred to work through NATO because of trust and familiarity with its protocols over the EU's less robust structure articulated support of the United States position (Chivviss 2015).⁴³²

Turkey and Italy shared an initial hesitancy for intervention in Libya because of strong economic ties. Early in 2011, Turkish public opinion was against intervention. Turkey had more than \$10 billion in investments in Libya and thousands of Turkish citizens in the construction and other industries. Before the Day of Rage, Ankara kept close contact with the Qaddafi regime. Turkey eventually offered to contribute noncombat assets to the operation (Haesebrouck 2017; Christopher Chivvis 2014).⁴³³

Italians wanted a more restricted interpretation of Resolution 1973 to protect their interests in Libya and supported using NATO in the hope that this would increase their influence over operations. UNSC Resolution 1973 left room for broad interpretations that made Rome uncomfortable. Additionally, the Italian officials raised questions about the implications of the mission for future operations aimed at protecting civilians. Nonetheless, the Italians knew it would

⁴³² Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 71-9.

⁴³³ Haesebrouck, Tim. 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (10): 2235-2261. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715626248>. P. 2252.

Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 72-74..

have a greater say on the strategic objectives within NATO than the EU (Croci and Valigi 2011; Christopher Chivvis 2014).⁴³⁴

Several smaller states joined the pro-NATO camp because it was easier for them to participate politically. The combination of a UNSCR authorization and NATO consensus provided legitimacy domestically to multiple national capitals. The pro-NATO camp ranged from Western European nations like the Netherlands and Belgium to the Nordic countries of Norway and Denmark.

The second camp, led by Germany, was against the intervention but not prepared to block a NATO action. The Germans explained they had no intention of supporting any military action in Libya but agreed to join consensus and allow NATO to play a role. Central and Eastern European countries joined Berlin's position for two reasons. First, many could not participate because they lacked the requisite naval and air assets to participate. Second, the perception that the intervention might detract from NATO's readiness for territorial defense and potential Russian aggression (Hallams and Schreer 2012; Christopher Chivvis 2014).⁴³⁵

Finally, the French led the third camp that was firmly in favor of intervention but against using NATO. First, they cited potential delays inherent in NATO's bureaucracy and the challenges that had arisen in the 1999 Kosovo operation. During Operation Allied Force, operational and strategic level military leadership complained post-war that the practice of giving NATO governments the right to scrutinize choices of military targets impacted mission effectiveness

⁴³⁴ Croci, Osvaldo, and Marco Valigi. 2011. "Italy and the International Intervention In Libya." *Italian Politics* 27: 191-206. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/43486407>. P. 200-1.

Chivvis, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 74.

⁴³⁵ Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313–27. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x>. P. 322.

Chivvis, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 75-6..

negatively. The French also claimed the Alliance's poor reputation in the Arab world would undermine the operation's legitimacy and would limit the participation of Arab partners. Turkey's open support of the NATO operation alleviated France's claim of Arab-state distrust.

The tension between France's resistance to using NATO created a stalemate between the Alliance and Paris. The breakthrough came on Thursday, March 24, in a phone call brokered by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton where she had the French, British, and Turks discuss terms to move forward together united. The French accepted that all three aspects of the military missions outlined in Resolution 1973 would fall to NATO. Subsequently, the Turks agreed not to use their position on the NAC to meddle or otherwise hold them up. Additionally, the phone led to the creation of a contact group for Libya. The organization would bring NATO, EU, and regional stakeholders to the negotiating table to establish political goals and strategic guidelines for how the international community would coordinate its support to end the Libyan crisis (Chivviss 2015).⁴³⁶

NATO Allies reached a unanimous agreement on 27 March to direct NATO to assume command and control of the civilian protection. The next day, President Obama completed transferring the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1973 from the United States to NATO (Song 2016).⁴³⁷ Operating under the NATO flag made it easier for Britain, France, and the United States to convince their partners to remain committed to the military operation, not least over the summer when support for the mission started to wane (O'Donnell and Vaisse 2011).⁴³⁸

⁴³⁶ Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 71-9.

⁴³⁷ Song, Yanan. 2016. "The US Commitment to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period - A Case Study on Libya." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 14 (1): 83-113. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2015.1125165>. P.97.

⁴³⁸ O'Donnell, Clara, and Justin Vaisse. 2011. "Is Libya NATO's Final Bow?". Brookings Institute. Last Modified December 2, 2011. Accessed February 15. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-libya-natos-final-bow/>.

Overall, OUP's consensus process illustrates the unique combination of political cooperation and military participation NATO facilitates for its members. While Germany, Poland, and other central and eastern European nations were not supportive politically or militarily of OUP, NATO's rules and norms allowed for Allies to find a workable solution for all involved. As a Networked Ally, Germany's position not to stop consensus proved valuable for the viability of OUP. Without Germany being amenable to the political will of other strong nations, Brussels would have been unable to create an out-of-area activity.

Additionally, Poland rooting its objection to OUP in its distraction from NATO's ability to provide territorial defense follows the expectations for a Fair-Share Ally. Warsaw's primary goal in NATO is to modernize its military and defend against Russian aggression. However, Poland fears abandonment from militarily strong NATO Allies like France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Therefore, they were reluctant to use their veto once the Triumvirate expressed interest in an out-of-area activity in Libya. France's advocacy for a coalition of the willing demonstrates how a Networked Ally can be a barrier to consensus when its national interests conflict with NATO's organizational will. However, once Paris relented, NATO found consensus quickly.

Helpful Allies like Belgium, Norway, and Denmark influenced the Triumvirate to pursue a UNSC resolution by offering their political and military support. Despite supporting the operation internally, neither country could provide substantial support without international legitimacy from the UN. UNSC Resolution 1973's ability to unlock middle-tier Allies participation reaffirms one of Embeddedness Theories' assumptions. Nations with high

diplomatic embeddedness need political cover and a clear call to action from the international community to reduce the level of national caveats on its military for an out-of-area activity.

Motivated Allies like Canada, Turkey, and the United States demonstrate how important domestic consent is to their participation and advocacy for a NATO out-of-area activity. Canada pushing early to lead a military intervention in Libya, provided a lubricant for consensus. Ottawa's willingness to participate solidified its relevance as a capable NATO Ally and supporter of the United States interests. Turkey's reversal from an opponent of intervention to a reluctant supporter turned the perception of NATO's intervention internally with France and externally with the Arab and Muslim world. Their support defeated the French argument that Arab states had a negative view of NATO. The United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Jordan all participated in Libya (I. Daalder and Stavridis 2012).⁴³⁹ Lastly, the United States shift from anti-intervention to a designer of UNSC Resolution 1973 illustrates its influence within the Alliance's consensus process. Before Washington took the lead on incorporating the various stakeholders' inputs and thereby constructing an out-of-area activity, NATO could not achieve consensus.

Table 20 illustrates each NATO Ally's consensus category according to the quantitative model, how the country obtained sufficient political will, the total number of troops in Operation Unified Protector, and the level of relative contribution. The main findings are that half of the NATO Allies did not participate. Only 14 out of 28 members contributing military assets or bases to the operation. Additionally, only six European nations (Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Norway and Denmark) contributed to the strike missions (Hallams and Schreer 2012)⁴⁴⁰ However, of the

⁴³⁹ Daalder, Ivo, and James Stavridis. 2012. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 91 (2): 2-7. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23217215>. P. 5.

⁴⁴⁰ Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313-27. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x>. P.322.

12 countries that flew sorties, eight provided more than their expected share to the operation. Highlighting that the operation had high salience in those eight countries. Additionally, the operation reflects the United States goal of being influential but not leading because they only provided 33% of the total troops in OUP and its contributions were within the range of its proportion of total NATO troops.

Name	2010 Consensus Category	2011 Consensus Category	Sufficient Political Will	Troop Contribution 2011	Relative Contribution
Albania	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Belgium	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	160	Over-Provide
Bulgaria	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Canada	Fair-Share	Motivated	Yes – Domestic Consent	260	Over-Provide
Croatia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Czech Republic	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Denmark	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	120	Over-Provide
Estonia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
France	Networked	Networked	Yes – Domestic Consent	1700	Over-Provide
Germany	Networked	Networked	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Greece	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	20	Under-Provide
Hungary	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Iceland	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Italy	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	680	Over-Provide
Latvia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Lithuania	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Luxembourg	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Netherlands	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – UNSCR	140	Over-Provide
Norway	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – UNSCR	120	Over-Provide
Poland	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Portugal	Helpful	Helpful	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Romania	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Slovakia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Slovenia	Fair-Share	Fair-Share	Yes – Org Will	0	Under-Provide
Spain	Networked	Networked	Yes – UNSCR	120	Under-Provide
Turkey	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Org Will	380	Under-Provide
United Kingdom	Networked	Networked	Yes – Domestic Consent	860	Over-Provide
United States	Motivated	Motivated	Yes – Domestic Consent	2220	Provide

Table 20 - OUP Consensus Categories and Contributions: The Table illustrates each NATO Ally's Consensus Category according to the quantitative model. The numbers reflect NATO Allies troop contributions to NATO Operation Unified Protector (OUP) from 23 March – 31 October 2011, according to the RAND report on OUP.

Additionally, the model delineates if each nation obtained sufficient political will according to Embeddedness Theory's expectation for that Consensus category. For countries that switch categories between 2010 and 2011, the 2011 expectations were used. The Troop Contribution column reflects the total amount of troops that a nation provided to OPER. The Relative Contribution column explains if that country's contributions fell into the realm of Over-Provide, Provide, or Under-Provide. Over-Provide means a nation gave more to the operation than its share of total NATO forces. Provide means the country supplied between half and its expected proportion of resources to the operation. Under-Provide means the Ally the resources provided to the operation are less than half of its proportion of NATO's total resources.

Conclusions

Operation Unified Protector (OUP) demonstrates why the overlapping interests between multiple groups are the key to understanding when NATO decides to take action. Like OPER, NATO's mission in Libya was a new endeavor. OUP was the Alliance's first combat operation against an Arab country. The first time the United States "led from behind" and the first time the concept of the UNSC's responsibility to protect was applied to support a civilian population. (Gaub 2013).⁴⁴¹ OUP turned out to be one of NATO's shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, the mission had the aim to protect civilians from the air and sea (Gaub 2013).⁴⁴²

Embeddedness Theory explains how despite the United States' apprehension to intervene in Libya with military action, its common interest with France and the United Kingdom provided the initial spark for the Alliance to create an out-of-area activity. The Obama administration was shifting its efforts towards China and the west and could not lead a third significant effort in the Middle East (Hallams and Schreer 2012).⁴⁴³

France wanted to restore its historical influence in Northern Africa that weakened after not intervening in Egypt and Tunisia by addressing Libya (Davidson 2013).⁴⁴⁴ With France leaning forward and the United Kingdom's desire to intervene to prevent a safe haven for terrorists, the

⁴⁴¹ Gaub, Florence. 2013. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector*. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11532>. P. iii.

⁴⁴² Gaub, Florence. 2013. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector*. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11532>. P. vii.

⁴⁴³ Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313–27. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01073.x>. P.318-20.

⁴⁴⁴ Davidson, Jason. 2013. "France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26 (2): 310-29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.784573>. P. 314-7.

United States found itself playing negotiator. The United States found a way to balance its national interests in Libya with the broad spectrum of intervention and pacifism expressed by NATO Allies.

Canada and Italy supported the Triumvirate's interests in Libya's growing humanitarian crisis, but Germany did not, creating a rift within the Principals. Italy and Canada saw the operation as an opportunity to raise their profile in NATO by being important figures and gaining credibility with the United States through participation (Domansky, Jensen, and Bryson 2012). Eventually, Italy hosted the command center, and a Canadian general led the operation.

However, Germany was leery of intervention because Chancellor Merkel was skeptical that the proposed intervention would not turn into regime change and occupation with troops on the ground in Libya. As a result, Germany wanted distance from the operation, removing its forces in the out-of-area activity, and abstained from voting with NATO Allies in the UNSC Resolution 1973 (Chivviss 2015).⁴⁴⁵

Operation Unified Protector demonstrates that the Principals can design a ZOPA if only one of the six objects to an out-of-area activity. Despite Germany's protest about the use of military forces, the other principals could craft an operation and UNSCR that insulated Berlin politically and operationally while accomplishing their objectives.

NATO's internal consternation around obtaining a UNSCR authorizing the use of force was paramount for creating sufficient political will and achieving consensus for multiple reasons. First, it provided international legitimacy for numerous European countries. Second, it offered clear military parameters for military leaders to follow by eliminating the possibility of ground troops in Libya. Third, it provided the pathway for an official transition from a coalition led by

⁴⁴⁵ Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 42, P.61-64, P. 75.

the United States to a NATO operation managed by the Canadians. All three contributed to each NATO Ally obtaining the political will to support the out-of-area activity (Chivviss 2015).⁴⁴⁶

The creation of a Contract group to appease the tensions raised by Germany, France, and Turkey over the Libya intervention illustrates how side deals are necessary to build consensus and pass international policy. The French desire to promote the EU's developing independent security apparatus, with the Turk's apprehension to support the intervention, caused great turmoil highlighting the potential conflicts between Networked (France) and Motivated (Turkey) Allies. The Networked Ally's propensity to use EU resources and the Motivated Ally's preference for NATO assets illustrates a tension point in the alliance. Germany's refusal to participate but willingness to go along with the institution shows how tenuous out-of-area activities can be because the operation almost didn't happen because of one powerful countries demands.

NATO's ability to create, develop, and execute OUP demonstrates Embeddedness Theory's explanatory power. It highlights how nations outside of the United States greatly influence how the Alliance functions. Additionally, it highlights the United States' operational weight because, without their participation, NATO would have been unable to execute the mission. Further, OUP demonstrates how the Alliance crafts its activities based on the interests of the Principals. Germany's refusal to participate placed a burden on the other five countries to figure out how to execute a mission without one of the most influential allies. The United States' unwillingness to lead a coalition forced Washington to create a Contact Group and shadow diplomacy to quell tensions between the French, Italy, Turkey, and other regional Allies to ensure NATO would be the institution that led the mission. Embeddedness Theory typology helps practitioners understand

⁴⁴⁶ Chivviss, Christopher 2015. *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P. 72-8.

how influential actors put out-of-area activities together by finding overlapping interests and coalescing member interests.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

“NATO and each of its member states are still struggling to figure out what useful role, if any, the alliance can play in post-Cold War Europe and how it can continue to function as a military alliance in the absence of an identifiable military threat.”

Ted Greenwood
NATO's Future, 1993

“The conventional policy debates about NATO'S uncertain future focus on the challenge that terrorism poses to the alliance's military missions and capabilities, as well as on which countries should be next in line for accession-both key topics at the November NATO summit in Prague. But these debates lose sight of a more fundamental problem: the very qualities that make NATO work are at risk. NATO is a uniquely effective multilateral military alliance precisely because it is a political security community of countries with common values and democratic institutions. NATO works only because it is both military and political in nature. Dilute NATO'S political coherence, and the result will be a one-dimensional traditional military alliance that cannot operate effectively.”

Celeste Wallander
NATO's Price, 2002

“Since Russia's illegal annexation of parts of Ukraine, the question of NATO's tasks and missions is back on the agenda. Some NATO allies favor a “back to basics” approach with an Alliance that concentrates on its defense mission according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. However, Putin's neo-imperialist course is not the only reason for a profound reassessment of NATO's future role.”

Karl-Heinze Kamp
From Wales to Warsaw: NATO's Future beyond the Ukraine Crisis, 2014

Throughout the 21st Century, the international security system has eliminated the Cold War era organizational silos where institutions like OSCE, UNSC, EU, and NATO had a default role that the world recognized. Instead, modern global policy, especially in the realm of security, is developed via organizational constellations where each country maximizes its interests via the advantages each institution provides (Geddes 1999; Pape 2005a; Hofmann 2009).⁴⁴⁷ As a result, many institutions have ambiguous relationships with NATO, like the CSDP and UNSC.

As a collection of countries with shared values that manage a military alliance through consensus and allow each Ally to contribute to an action plan within its maximal domestic political constraints, NATO is an organization beholden to its members' collective will. Therefore, NATO acts when its influential members' interests overlap, and they can agree to use the organization's framework to coalesce coherent strategic objectives. Embeddedness Theory's typology explains NATO decides to take action when an issue has overlapping interests with the most powerful members, influential allies design a plan that accommodates their needs, the collective acquires sufficient political will, and all Allies work together to achieve consensus. Without all four, NATO falls short of deciding to pursue an activity out-of-area.

Case Analysis Findings

⁴⁴⁷ Geddes, John. 1999. "Mission: 'Human security'." *Maclean's*, 1999 Apr 26, 36.

Hofmann, Stephanie C. 2009. "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP." *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (1): 45-52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40407213>. P. 49.

Pape, Robert. 2005. "Soft Balancing against the United States." *Quarterly Journal: International Security* 30 (1): 7-45. <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894607>. P.9-10.

Kosovo (KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF), Iraq (NTM-I), Pakistan (OPER), and Libya (OUP), provide a diverse set of circumstances and confirm how the four necessary decision-making elements need to be present or else NATO fails to materialize an out-of-area activity. Additionally, the cases reveal why, until the situation sufficed each element's criteria, NATO could not achieve consensus.

Together the five cases demonstrate Embeddedness Theory predicts when NATO decides to act out-of-area more often than Hegemonic Power or Convergence Theories. Hegemonic Power Theory's assumption that the United States drives NATO's policies and interests is disproven in how NATO selected Libya as an area of interest and developed Operation Unified Protectors parameters. NATO's Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) demonstrates how despite the United States' demands, the Alliance lacked the political will because there was disunity amongst the Triumvirate, a stark divide amongst the Principals, and no UNSCR to legitimize out-of-area activities. Therefore, consensus building was impossible.

Similarly, Preference Convergence Theory assumes that NATO out-of-area activities come together naturally, therefore, negating actors' agency and the reality that some members carry more weight than others. The Alliance's desire to take over ISAF was due to influential actors (Canada, France, and Germany) wanting to change the UN mission's course in Afghanistan. Without their interests and willingness to navigate policymaking in the United Nations, the United Kingdom, and the United States, NATO would not have taken control of ISAF.

Lastly, Preference Convergence fails to address or anticipate the side-payments, coercion, or institutional pressures applied to get other Allies to acquiesce to the organization's will. Greece and Spain complying with the Alliance's KFOR mission but maintaining their right not to recognize Kosovo illustrates the trade-off inherent in multilateral negotiations. Additionally, the

United States brokering a deal to ensure that NATO ran OUP provides insight into the deal-making influential countries use to affect creating of an out-of-activity.

Campaign	Issue Selection	ZOPA Creation	Sufficient Political Will	Building Consensus
KFOR	ET HPT PCT	ET HPT	ET HPT PCT	ET
ISAF	ET HPT	ET HPT	ET HPT PCT	ET
NTM-I	ET PCT	ET HPT	ET	ET
OPER	ET HPT PCT	ET	PCT	ET PCT
OUP	ET	ET HPT	ET HPT	ET

Table 21 - Five Case Studies Results: The five cases reveal which theories exhibited the observable implications used to test Embeddedness Theory (ET) against Hegemonic Power theory (HPT) and Preference Convergence theory (PCT). The five cases vary between duration, location, and mission type. Each column displays the theories that provide valid predictions for each case and the four elements that must be present for NATO to decide to pursue an out-of-area operation according to Embeddedness Theory (NATO 2019d).⁴⁴⁸

Table 21 illustrates the case study results for how each of the three theories, Embeddedness, Hegemonic Power, and Preference Convergence, explain the four variables that lead to crafting an out-of-area activity. The table demonstrates that Embeddedness Theory holds for all but one element of one case: sufficient political will during the Pakistan Earthquake Relief (OPER) mission. Embeddedness Theory stipulates an Article 5 attack or UNSCR must be present for NATO to obtain legitimacy and convince their constituents that the out-of-area operation is in its national interests. Neither were present but, NATO developed an out-of-area humanitarian mission for the first time in the Alliance's history. However, it should be noted that NATO was resistant to sending troops to Pakistan to support Earthquake relief efforts until the United Nations made a direct appeal to NATO for support beyond strategic lift.

Embeddedness Theory's durability and flexibility across the five cases demonstrate it has explanatory power for explaining NATO's decision-making process for out-of-area activities.

⁴⁴⁸ NATO. 2019c. Operations and Missions: Past and Present. In *NATO Encyclopedia*, edited by Public Relations. Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. P. 423 – 445.

Despite the range of activities, regions, and interests, Embeddedness Theory provides a useful framework for NATO practitioners, military members, and scholars moving forward.

Consistent Themes in the Case Studies

Being a Member of NATO is like Being a Member of Augusta National

In the 21st-Century, being a member of NATO is like being a member of the Augusta National Golf Club. Augusta National is one of the most elite private institutions. It has one of the world's premier golf courses that host one of the four major professional golf tournaments annually (Nylund 2003; Owen 1999).⁴⁴⁹ The invite-only club, which hosts the Masters golf tournament, has an impressive list of members. Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Roger Goodell, Lynn Swann, Walter Driver, and William Morris III are just a few celebrities, titans of industry, and patriarchs of established families who are members (Buteau and Paskin 2015).⁴⁵⁰ NATO is an invite-only institution, where current members unanimously approve the addition of prospective nations. NATO has six members in the Group of Seven (G7) and six of the world's top twelve militaries (Global-Firepower 2020).⁴⁵¹ Lastly, NATO members enjoy peaceful interactions within the alliance, which provide each member opportunities to improve international standing on the

⁴⁴⁹ Nylund, David. 2003. "Taking A Slice At Sexism: The Controversy Over the Exclusionary Membership Practices of the Augusta National Golf Club." *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 27 (2): 195-202. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0193732503251886>.

⁴⁵⁰ Buteau, Michael, and Janet Paskin. 2015. "118 Rich and Powerful People Who Are Members of Augusta National." Bloomberg Research. Last Modified April 10, 2015. <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-augusta-national-golf-club-members/>.

⁴⁵¹ Global-Firepower. 2020. "Military Strength Ranking." <https://www.globalfirepower.com/coalitions.asp>.

world's stage. The transatlantic alliance is an impressive institution with substantial political, military, and economic reach.

Joining Augusta National and NATO have social benefits, which are difficult to quantify. Both organizations provide a venue for their members to interact privately and a vetting process to validate new members' usefulness. Augusta offers the most significant members opportunities to collaborate under the club's banner, wearing their signature green jackets (Sirak 2019; Owen 1999).⁴⁵² Additionally, members can disagree about the appropriateness of an activity for Augusta National's brand but use the discourse to form a contingent of supportive members who execute the activity away from the club. NATO has a social factor that allows its members to use the institution to directly or indirectly coordinate activities. Former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR), Admiral (ret) James G. Stavridis, alerts that describing NATO as just a military alliance is laughable because it uses a framework that requires political negotiations and compromises among several sovereign states. NATO's decision-making process is highly political even when it presents results as a military decision (Stavridis 2016).⁴⁵³

Despite equal access to the facilities, there are tiers of members within Augusta National club. Presumably, Bill Gates and Warren Buffett would receive preferential treatment due to their resources, reputation, and reach with little resistance from the club or other members. The priority extends beyond access within the club and includes how the institution operates. If a less influential neophyte Augusta member wanted to change the menu at the corporate sponsors' dinner during the

⁴⁵² Owen, David. 1999. *The Making of The Masters*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks.

⁴⁵³ Stavridis, James. 2016. *Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain (Forward)*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Masters, the club would not be inclined to implement his suggestion. However, if Bill Gates and Warren Buffett jointly made the same request, their clout forces the club to honor their wishes.

Stanley Sloan explains while the North Atlantic Council (NAC) requires consensus for all policies, there are tiers of influence because nations with the requisite resources needed to implement policy have a more significant impact on shaping strategic objectives within the alliance (Johnston 2017).⁴⁵⁴ From 1999 – 2016, the Principals account for 84% of NATO's total GDP and 90% of military spending within the organization (World-Bank 2020).⁴⁵⁵ Over the same period, they account for 64% of NATO's available troops and 86% of NATO forces deployed outside of member's borders (Chipman, Giegerich, and Hackett 2019).⁴⁵⁶ Therefore, the Principals are the primary influencers and implementors of NATO's policy who take charge of creating the ZOPA because they will ultimately be the members responsible for executing most of the tasks.

More than its member networks, Augusta National's connection to the game of golf and exclusivity are its hallmarks that attract and retain members. Hypothetically, if Augusta National wanted to expand its footprint into tennis and swimming under its brand, the club could be successful with its resources and clientele. However, it is unclear how the members would use the new services. One member could prioritize golf and neglect the new activities, another member could use all three equally, and a third member could concentrate on golf and socializing. Regardless of success achieved in its latest endeavors, the club's non-negotiable is providing a world-class golf facility capable of hosting the Masters because that is the club's original purpose, which sustains current members and attracts new ones.

⁴⁵⁴ Johnston, Seth. 2017. *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance*. JHU Press. Chapter 3.

⁴⁵⁵ World-Bank. 2020. "World Bank Datasets." The World Bank. Accessed February 1, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

⁴⁵⁶ Chipman, John, Bastian Giegerich, and James Hackett. 2019. In *The Military Balance*. London: Institute for Strategic Studies.

Although the Augusta National expansion scenario is fictitious, the expansion of NATO's responsibilities is not. For its first 42 years, NATO relied on mutual support to deter Soviet aggression. The threat of overwhelming retaliation protected NATO member territories from the Soviet Union and other state actors throughout the Cold War. Although NATO anchors itself as a defensive alliance, after the Cold War, the institution began to look for ways to increase its influence. In 1991, NATO published its first Strategic Concept. The document expressed NATO's goal of operating as a defensive alliance committed to collective defense to expand European security through cooperation with former adversaries. Furthermore, the heads of state explained NATO needed to remain flexible to address the developing international politico-military environment (NATO 1991).⁴⁵⁷

In 1999, the Alliance's 50th anniversary, NATO published its second Strategic Concept. The document broadened its security interests from the collective defense of each member's territory to political, economic, social, and environmental factors affecting its members. Additionally, it identified threats like terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, financial fragility, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction as causes that warrant NATO's attention (NATO 1999b).⁴⁵⁸ The Alliance expanded numerically from 16 countries in 1999 to 28 in 2009 by recruiting former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations to join. Over the 2000s decade, the Alliance extended its sphere of influence in three ways. First, NATO took military action under Article 5 outside of its borders to combat political instability and non-state actor terrorism in Afghanistan. Second, the transatlantic alliance embarked on maritime missions

⁴⁵⁷ NATO. 1991. *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*. edited by NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Brussels, Belgium. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.

⁴⁵⁸ NATO. 1999. *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. In *Press Release NAC-S(99) 65*, edited by NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Brussels, Belgium. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm.

in the Mediterranean Sea and the Horn of Africa. Third, NATO committed troops and resources to help the United Nations execute various tasks in Africa.

In 2010, NATO produced its third Strategic Concept. The alliance announced three core principles that would guide NATO's efforts through 2020: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Collective defense maintains the alliance's original Article 5 commitment where the Alliance views an attack on one ally's homeland, cybersecurity, or natural resources as an attack on the entire Alliance. Crisis management recognizes that it is in the alliance's best interest to prevent, stabilize, and settle conflicts worldwide that affect transatlantic security. Cooperative security is the alliance's intent to participate in political and defense situations beyond its borders that affect NATO members (NATO 2010a).⁴⁵⁹

The evolution of NATO's Strategic Concepts illustrates three items. First, NATO's priority is reminding all members and the world that collective defense through Article 5 is an enduring feature of the alliance. Second, the institution prides itself on its ability to come together, consult, and pivot its priorities to fit its members' needs. Third, NATO has interests beyond its member's borders. The shifts provide the opportunity for competing preferences amongst Allies. Despite the assortment of interests within the alliance, NATO has approved 23 operations in 18 regions worldwide outside the transatlantic region. NATO overcomes divergent interests and decides to act out-of-area due to its core function mutual support.

⁴⁵⁹ NATO. 2010. Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept: for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. edited by NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

NATO's Core Feature – Mutual Support

In the 21st-Century, NATO mutual support has three elements: a commitment to consensus decision-making, collective defense through Article 5, and creating a security community. Social psychology research shows that groups working under a unanimous decision requirement increases the likelihood of information sharing, alleviates negative consequences with deviance, and improves the overall decision outcome (Rijnbout and Mckimmie 2014).⁴⁶⁰ By requiring consensus, NATO activities are inherently political. The “all for one” and “one for all” provision protects the sovereignty of each member (Sloan 2016).⁴⁶¹

Lastly, the regional stance gives any NATO activity more gravity on the world's stage because all members agree on the organization's position. There is a difference between NATO embarking on a mission in Afghanistan and a coalition of the willing conducting an operation in Iraq led by the United States and the United Kingdom. The first has international legitimacy because a multinational institution approved the operation through a globally recognized process. The second is an ad hoc group of nations coming together to address a shared threat.

NATO's decision-making process has two distinct parts. First, influential nations setting NATO's agenda with the Triumvirate establishing common interests and the Principals working together to create a ZOPA. Second, internal deal-making, where countries obtain sufficient political will to commit resources and Allies build consensus through institutional pressure and side-payments. The two distinct phases allow for open dialogue that enables the organization to

⁴⁶⁰ Rijnbout, Jasmine, and Blake Mckimmie. 2014. "Deviance in Organizational Decision Making: Using Unanimous Decision Rules to Promote the Positive Effects and Alleviate the Negative Effects of Deviance." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 44 (7): 455-463.

⁴⁶¹ Sloan, Stanley. 2016. *Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 6-11.

plan for the first, second, and third-order effects of an out-of-area activity from NATO's perspective.

Article 5 is the foundation of the NATO alliance. NATO's internal documents describe Article 5 as the enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the alliance (NATO 2019b).⁴⁶² Despite the various adaptations during the Cold War, increases in scope, and breadth of members, Article 5 remains the bedrock of NATO (Johnston 2017).⁴⁶³ Initially, Article 5 aimed to create a pact between North America and Western Europe to counter potential Soviet aggression. Even though the Cold War has ended, the commitment sends a clear signal to potential enemies that an attack on a NATO member will result in consequences. The pledge from the alliance made NATO membership appealing to central European and Baltic nations in the 1990s. The desire to enter the club incentivized nations to meet the minimum requirements to gain NATO approval (Poast and Chinchilla 2020).

The institutionalized commitment to compromise and guarantee of mutual support solidifies NATO as a mature security community. In 1957, Karl Deutsch defined a security community as a group of people integrated by a sense of community and a promise between members to resolve issues without violence (Deutsch 1954).⁴⁶⁴ No violent conflict has emerged between two NATO members. Membership in NATO serves as an armistice between members and establishes a norm of collaboration and finding solutions through non-violent means (Adler

⁴⁶² NATO. 2019b. "Collective Defence - Article 5." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last Modified November 25, 2019. Accessed March 1, 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:~:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20All%20attacked.

⁴⁶³ Johnston, Seth. 2017. *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance*. JHU Press. Chapter 7.

⁴⁶⁴ Deutsch, Karl. 1954. *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement*. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday. P. 6.

2008).⁴⁶⁵ By guaranteeing peaceful exchanges and collective security, NATO membership offers its members economic opportunities and diplomatic ties across Europe (Grillot, Cruise, and D'Erman 2010).⁴⁶⁶

Overall, the promise of finding peaceful means to settle disputes and developing networks of trust is a feature that unifies NATO Allies and attracts new members. Additionally, NATO's decision-making process allows the Principals to collaborate with its Transatlantic Allies to ensure actions take place that either support each other's interests or, at a minimum, do not harm another Principals' interests. Moreover, the countries outside of the Principals maximize their foreign policy position by utilizing the rules and norms to advocate and strengthen their political and military positions. Lastly, the consistent dialogue and interactions between all NATO members create a confidence factor that is difficult to recreate given the institution's 70-year history.

Revelations for Future Research

Tension between NATO and EU

While the Triumvirate's superior resources and Principals' influence gap create levels of sway within NATO, the functionality of the organization's decision-making process for out-of-area

⁴⁶⁵ Adler, Emanuel. 2008. "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation." *European Journal of International Relations* 14 (2): 195-230. P. 197.

The exception to peaceful exchanges would be the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus which was covered in Chapter 2.

⁴⁶⁶ Grillot, Suzette, Rebecca Cruise, and Valerie D'Erman. 2010. "Developing security community in the Western Balkans: The role of the EU and NATO." *International Politics* 47 (1): 62-90. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2009.26>. P. 62-3.

activities hinges on the institution's internal deal-making, political will, and reaching consensus. Even though the quantitative model had relatively frequent movement between tiers of Expeditionary Embeddedness, nations stayed in the respective level of Diplomatic Embeddedness.⁴⁶⁷ Additionally, the stable proportion of shared international organizations highlights a natural tension between NATO and the EU's Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP).⁴⁶⁸

During the Cold War era, the international security system had silos where each organization had a default role that the world recognized. In the 21st Century, powerful actors triangulate international organizations to maximize their interests via the advantages each institution provides (Geddes 1999).⁴⁶⁹ As a result, many multilateral security organizations have complicated relationships, like the CSDP and NATO as well as NATO and the UNSC.

The uneasiness on out-of-area activities between the CSDP and NATO starts with the divide between two factions in the Principals. Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom are in Group one. Group two is France, Germany, and Italy. Group one is only in NATO, and Group two is in both.⁴⁷⁰ While the different member configuration has not crippled either organization, each has separate interests that clash at times. With both organizations operating on consensus and mobilizing forces via member contributions, there is a natural battle for resources and autonomy.

⁴⁶⁷ The exception to this statement is Greece and Norway which moved between levels of diplomatic embeddedness.

⁴⁶⁸ The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009, renaming European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It provides for the creation of the European External Action Service. Commission delegations in countries outside the EU become EU delegations on defense. Similar to the partnership for peace program in NATO.

⁴⁶⁹ Geddes, John. 1999. "Mission: 'Human security'." *Maclean's*, 1999 Apr 26, 36.

⁴⁷⁰ The United Kingdom was in both until Brexit. However, the United Kingdom has always championed NATO as the primary security organization for Europe due to its close ties with the United States.

Competition arises through turf battles and hostage-taking as states maneuver within each organization to promote their specific policy preferences even as a certain degree of cooperation is achieved by muddling through. Turf battles arise when the German and French use soft balancing and positional power in the EU to increase their range of influence away from the United States via excluding NATO (Pape 2005a; Hofmann 2009).⁴⁷¹ Hostage-taking occurs when nations like Turkey, who are only in NATO, hold the institution captive by using its veto to limit the reach of the CSDP. The tactic adds complexity to out-of-area activities and crisis management making policy creation inefficient (R. Krebs 1999; Pape 2005a; Hofmann 2009).⁴⁷² Muddling through is the informal process of managing turf battles and hostage-taking, where countries in both organizations find side-payments and deals to cooperate (Hofmann 2009).⁴⁷³

The combination of Diplomatic Embeddedness and organizational survival creates tension between countries, placing stress on individual policymakers and nations to overcome structural problems. Future research on defining tasks that default to one organization would benefit the Transatlantic alliance and make policymaking around out-of-area activities more efficient.

Table 22 lists each Ally's Consensus Category, Diplomatic Embeddedness tier, membership status in CSDP, and the percentage of NATO's total forces. The table reveals three observations that require further exploration in the future. First, the four largest militaries in NATO but outside of CSDP are the United States, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Together these four countries are 1.5x the size of CSDP total forces, which combines 19 national

⁴⁷¹ Pape, Robert. 2005. "Soft Balancing against the United States." *Quarterly Journal: International Security* 30 (1): 7-45. <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894607>. P. 9-11.

⁴⁷² Krebs, Ronald. 1999. "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict." *International Organization* 53 (2): 343-77. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550904>. P. 369-71.

⁴⁷³ Hofmann, Stephanie C. 2009. "Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP." *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (1): 45-52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40407213>. P. 47.

militaries.⁴⁷⁴ Additionally, Canada, Turkey, and the United States are in the Motivated Category for consensus building, making them willing to achieve foreign policy objectives outside of NATO's structure. Even though the United Kingdom is a Networked country, Brexit could shift the British approach to European security and change the balance of influence when NATO and CSDP interact. The United Kingdom could begin to move from appeasing to obstructing France and Germany's preference to use CSDP for certain security tasks.

Second, Poland is a country with a large military, is in the Fair-Share category making the Poles more prone to support the United States' security position but are members of the CSDP. With one of the top ten force strengths in NATO and the sixth largest military in the CSDP, Poland maintains a unique position that could influence both institutions moving forward. As a nation that initially joined NATO for the Article 5 guarantee, opportunity to connect with the west, and modernize its military, Poland has the chance to impact European security moving forward after Russian aggression in 2008 in Georgia and 2014 in Ukraine. As one of the first members to join NATO post-Cold War and an influential member of the Bucharest Nine working group within NATO, Poland has the military power and political sway to influence central and eastern European security policy (Terlikowski et al. 2018; Gerasymchuk 2019).⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁴ Canada, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have combined forces larger than the combination of French, German, and Italian militaries. Canada, Turkey, UK have 570,550 troops, versus France, Germany and Italy have 554,250.

⁴⁷⁵ Gerasymchuk, Sergiy. 2019. *Bucharest Nine: Looking for Cooperation on NATO's Eastern Flank?* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Kyiv: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung). <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/15574.pdf>. P. 8

Terlikowski, Marcin, Veronika Józwiak, Łukasz Ogrodnik, Jakub Pieńkowski, and Kinga Raś. 2018. "The Bucharest 9: Delivering on the Promise to Become the Voice of the Eastern Flank." *The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)* 164 (4). <https://www.pism.pl/file/8b1e67c8-f38c-4853-95d6-350588587f6c>. P.2.

Name	Consensus Category	High DE	Low DE	CSDP Member	Percentage of NATO Total Forces*
Albania	Fair-Share		X		0.25%
Belgium	Helpful	X		X	0.92%
Bulgaria	Fair-Share		X	X	0.98%
Canada	Motivated		X		1.97%
Croatia	Fair-Share		X		0.49%
Czech Republic	Fair-Share		X	X	0.69%
Denmark	Helpful	X			0.52%
Estonia	Fair-Share		X	X	0.20%
France	Networked	X		X	6.34%
Germany	Networked	X		X	5.52%
Greece [^]	Motivated		X	X	4.47%
Hungary	Fair-Share		X	X	0.83%
Iceland	Fair-Share		X		0.01%
Italy	Networked	X		X	5.45%
Latvia	Fair-Share		X	X	0.17%
Lithuania	Fair-Share		X	X	0.53%
Luxembourg	Fair-Share		X	X	0.03%
Netherlands	Helpful	X		X	1.11%
Norway [^]	Helpful	X			0.78%
Poland	Fair-Share		X	X	3.10%
Portugal	Helpful	X		X	0.92%
Romania	Fair-Share		X	X	2.20%
Slovakia	Fair-Share		X	X	0.50%
Slovenia	Fair-Share		X	X	0.24%
Spain	Networked	X		X	3.85%
Turkey	Motivated		X		11.10%
United Kingdom	Networked	X			4.76%
United States	Motivated		X		42.09%

Table 22 - Diplomatic Embeddedness Scores 1995 – 2015: The table illustrates the countries in alphabetical order, their accession year, level of Diplomatic Embeddedness (DE), membership in the Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP), and nation's percentage of NATO's total troops. The DE metric is the proportion of total international governmental organizations (IGOs) a country participates in when four or more Principals are present. The metric signifies common interests and arenas where Principals can identify issues, gain more information, and make side payments with the respective NATO member. HDE illustrates a country is present in more than 83% of the total IGOs when four or more Principals are present. Low DE means a nation shares 83% or less. "[^]" Greece and Norway are the only countries that have years with high and low DE. Greece's split of HDE/LDE was 47.6%/52.4%. Norway's split was 67.6%/33.4%. All other nations were in the high or low tier of DE 100% of the time. "^{**}" The percentage of total forces uses total active-duty troops in 2016 according to the Military Balance Journal.

Poland's national security interests could influence how CSDP and NATO collaborate in the future.

Poland invoking Article 4 in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea led to the creation of NATO's

Enhanced Forward Presence Mission that counters potential Russian hostility by stationing

battalion-sized tasks forces in Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (Leuprecht and Sokolsky 2017; Zapfe 2017).⁴⁷⁶

Third, the divide between high and low Diplomatic Embeddedness highlights a discrepancy in military capabilities. Low Diplomatic Embeddedness countries have a force strength 2.3 times the size of their counterparts. Even taking the United States out, countries with low-Diplomatic Embeddedness still have a force strength of 92% of countries with high-Diplomatic Embeddedness scores. Implicitly, the table infers countries with the highest number of ties with the European Powers (Italy, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) have less capable militaries than nations with links to the United States. Therefore, delineating specific roles for the CSDP is critical for the institution's future, especially in light of the United Kingdom, the United States' closest military ally, leaving the EU.

Since 1998 the United States' conditions its support for CSDP and its use of NATO assets in EU-led operations on the "three D's:" 1) No decoupling from NATO 2) No duplication of NATO command structures or alliance-wide resources, giving NATO the first right of refusal on European Security missions and 3) No discrimination against European NATO countries that are not members of the EU (Archick and Gallis 2005).⁴⁷⁷ Despite this agreement, the two organizations have created institutional and functional isomorphism with crisis management. However, due to the United States military superiority, NATO is more capable of conducting high-intensity combat operations (Cladi and Locatelli 2020; Hofmann 2011).⁴⁷⁸ Moving forward, both organizations need

⁴⁷⁶ Leuprecht, Christian, and Joel Sokolsky. 2017. "An Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics: Canada's Enduring Commitment to Transatlantic Security." *Atlantisch Perspectief* 41 (5): 21-26. <https://doi.org/10.2307/48581377>. P. 23-5.

Zapfe, Martin. 2017. "Deterrence from the Ground Up: Understanding NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence." *Survival* (00396338) 59 (3): 147-160. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1325604>. P. 147-8.

⁴⁷⁷ Archick, Kristin, and Paul Gallis. 2005. *NATO and the European Union*. CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service). <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA469417.pdf>. P.13-15.

⁴⁷⁸ Cladi, Lorenzo, and Andrea Locatelli. 2020. "Keep Calm and Carry On (Differently): NATO and CSDP after Brexit." *Global Policy* 11 (1): 5-14. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12747>. P. 10-11.

to establish roles and responsibilities that complement each other to reduce the burden on middle and smaller countries with increasingly thin military budgets. As the research shows, the Triumvirate must align their interests, and the Principals have to design a comprehensive ZOPA for NATO to have a workable plan. Without clear lanes that delineate tasks between the two organizations, NATO's most influential members cannot create out-of-area activities and secure the transatlantic region.

Re-Evaluating Sources of Legitimacy

The research illustrates where common interests are needed for NATO to act out-of-area and how NATO has spheres of influence (Triumvirate, Principals, and remaining NATO members) that impact out-of-area policy at different magnitudes. Additionally, whenever the Alliance planned to take kinetic action, out-of-area obtaining legitimacy proved to be a consistent stressor. Through the case analysis, the Alliance's political will as a whole hinged on obtaining international legitimacy via a UNSC Resolution with Article 39 Designation and Chapter VII Directive. Tying the organization's interests and ability to operate outside of its borders to the UNSC is problematic for future NATO out-of-area activities.

The rules and regulations for the UNSC are under Chapter V, Article 27 of the UN Charter. The UNSC has five permanent and ten non-permanent seats. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States maintain the five permanent seats. The ten non-permanent

members have two-year appointments and represent five regions: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Caribbean, and Western Europe. On top of their stable seats, the permanent members of the UNSC, known as the P5, have veto power over meaningful resolutions, which include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, international sanctions, or military action authorizations. Conversely, the non-permanent members do not have veto power (Landgren 2020).⁴⁷⁹ Implicitly, for an issue to gain legitimacy through the UNSC, it must fall in line with P5's interests and the international community. The structure of the UNSC echoes NATO's consensus but on a global scale. Like NATO's silence procedures, an abstention in the UNSC functions as tacit approval.

The legitimacy of the P5 originates from each country's international power when World War II ended, and the international community established the United Nations. The P5 had a disproportionate amount of economic and military power in 1945 and gained legitimacy through their perceived place in the global hierarchy. The UNSC and the P5's veto power serves as a symbol for the social contract established by the UN Charter. The UNSC establishes a relationship where the powerful countries work together to provide a safe and secure world. As a result, countries lower in the hierarchy will acknowledge their leadership as legitimate and comply with the rules established through the United Nations Charter and UNSC (Hurd 2002).⁴⁸⁰

However, since the end of the Cold War, the intensity of P5 interests shape the approval of security council resolutions authoring the use of force (Allen and Yuen 2014).⁴⁸¹ The veto shields

⁴⁷⁹ Landgren, Karin. 2020. *The Veto*. United Nations Security Council (New York, NY: The Security Council Report). <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php>. P.2.

⁴⁸⁰ Hurd, Ian. 2002. "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council." *Global Governance* 8 (1): 35-51. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-00801006>. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800326>. P. 35-6.

⁴⁸¹ Allen, Susan, and Amy Yuen. 2014. "The Politics of Peacekeeping: UN Security Council Oversight Across Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (3): 621-32. <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12086>. <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/58/3/621/1797809?login=true>. P. 630.

the P5 and its allies from collective security enforcement. More importantly, there is no accountability measure for the P5 because the rules are not binding. The UNSC is not accountable to other international institutions like the International Court of Justice or the General Assembly. Recent use of the veto by Russia (Syria), China (Myanmar), and the United States (Israel) illustrate the UNSC is not a pure source of international legitimacy. While the UNSC has broadly created resolutions to address conflicts that create large numbers of refugees and alter broad international interests, ultimately, the P5 uses its institutional powers within the council to protect their national interests whenever other countries threaten them (Frederking and Patane 2017).⁴⁸²

Conflating the concept of the legitimate use of force with what is lawful, as agreed upon by a small number of major international actors, overlooks those situations in which legal standards are rendered instruments of political deception and manipulation in the hands of the most powerful actors (Bjola 2005).⁴⁸³ Moving forward, NATO should look to define legitimacy for out-of-area activities based on an internal legal standard. While obtaining UNSC Resolutions to address Bosnia set a template for NATO conducting operations outside of its members' borders, it is becoming increasingly difficult to use that standard given the recent Russian assertiveness and rise of China. Allowing China and Russia to dictate what Brussels and NATO member capitals deem appropriate could have dire consequences for transatlantic security.

Creating a new public standard would supplement the perception of credibility European domestic populations give the UNSC. Potentially, the Blair doctrine or Bjola's deliberative standards of legitimacy could be a starting place for Allies to deliberate in the NAC. The Blair

⁴⁸² Frederking, Brian, and Christopher Patane. 2017. "Legitimacy and the UN Security Council Agenda." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 50 (2): 347-53. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909651600278X>. P. 350-52.

⁴⁸³ Bjola, Corneliu. 2005. "Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2): 266-303. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052968>. P.293.

Doctrine, initially conceived to explain the United Kingdom's support for Operation Allied Force, set the framework for Prime Minister Tony Blair's foreign policy. While Blair supported the Iraq War in 2003, strict use of his test in hindsight would challenge the legitimacy of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (Atkins 2006; Danchev 2007).⁴⁸⁴ Similarly, Bjola's deliberative standard of legitimacy supports NATO's use of force in Kosovo but does not support OIF (Bjola 2005).⁴⁸⁵

Name	Legitimacy Concept	Test
Blair Doctrine	Five questions create a standardized checklist to follow when evaluating the use of force out-of-area.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Are we sure of our case? 2) Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? 3) Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? 4) Are we prepared for the long term? 5) Do we have <i>transatlantic</i> interests involved?
Bjola's Deliberative Standards	Three legal standards set levels for politicians to evaluate when contemplating the use of force out-of-area	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Accuracy of Justification <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is the NATO Ally expressing genuine concerns, or are they used only as a disguise for other interests? 2) Deliberative Context <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Do actors have equal rights in presenting and challenging arguments, or are some of them kept outside the debate? 3) Argumentative Reasoning <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - are participants open to the arguments of the others, or are they just engaged in rhetorical action?

Table 23 - Potential NATO Legitimacy - The table delineates two potential tests to evaluate out-of-area activity. The Blair Doctrine is a test that could work for the NAC's evaluation of an out-of-area operation. The Bjola Deliberative Standards serves as an internal test when a NATO member evaluates the security claims of another NATO Ally proposing an out-of-area activity.

⁴⁸⁴ Atkins, Judi. 2006. "A New Approach to Humanitarian Intervention? Tony Blair's 'Doctrine of the International Community'." *British Politics* 1 (2): 274-283. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.bp.4200023>. P. 277-81.

Danchev, Alex. 2007. "Tony Blair's Vietnam: The Iraq War and the 'Special Relationship' in Historical Perspective." *Review of International Studies* 33 (2): 189-203. <http://www.jstor.org/turing.library.northwestern.edu/stable/40072161>. P. 197-200.

⁴⁸⁵ Bjola, Corneliu. 2005. "Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics: A Communicative Action Perspective." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (2): 266-303. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052968>. P.292.

Table 23 lays out the potential application of the two frameworks. Blair's test lends itself to examining the justification of an out-of-area activity during debates in the NAC. For the application of the test to justify an out-of-area activity, NATO has to answer all five questions in the affirmative. Bjola's standards help each member evaluate other Allies' claims about security concerns. After assessing the three elements, a NATO Ally can determine its level of support for an out-of-area operation proposal using Bjola's standards.

Tweaking the Consensus Rule

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has developed a tradition of making decisions by consensus. While not explicit, the impetus to use a less stringent form of unanimity comes from Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The article explains the alliance can add members through a unanimous vote of approval (Traugutt 2016).⁴⁸⁶ Consensus is an agreement reached by common accord because voicing an objection renders a proposal non-effective. The consensus requirement has proven durable despite serious internal rifts and multiple rounds of enlargement. When NATO announces a decision, it is the expression of all the sovereign states' collective will. NATO applies the consensus rule at every committee level, which implies that all of the institutions' decisions are joint decisions. (NATO 2020a).⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁶ Traugutt, Loren G. 2016. *Is Consensus Still Necessary Within NATO?* NATO Defense College. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10296>. P.1-2.

⁴⁸⁷ ----. 2020. "Consensus Decision-Making at NATO." NATO. Last Modified October 20, 2020. Accessed February 1, 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm#:~:text=Consensus%20decision%20making%20means%20that,to%20disagree%20on%20an%20issue.&text=The%20principle%20of%20consensus%20decision%20making%20applies%20throughout%20NATO.

While sticking steadfastly to the consensus rule creates a unique level of standing internationally, many experts and critics argue the need to reconsider and adjust the use of this decision-making tool (NATO 2020a; Rynning 2017; Michel 2014; Noetzel and Schreer 2009; Michel 2003). In one of his final interviews, former SACEUR James Jones explained that the alliance should reexamine if the consensus rule had to be used at every committee because the bureaucracy was limiting the agility of the alliance's decision-making process.

The Alliance's decision making needs to be more agile, and we need to get away from the idea that the "consensus rule" needs to apply in all of the Alliance's many committees. The 350 committees in NATO behave as if they see themselves as mini-NACs — little versions of the North Atlantic Council that must operate on the same consensus system as the NAC itself. This means that slow and painful lowest-common-denominator decision-making prevails. The principle of consensus has been stretched to its limit. Consensus should not be regarded as necessary at the committee level (Yost 2008).⁴⁸⁸

The critiques of NATO's consensus rule land in one of three broad buckets, which General Jones alluded. First, the size of NATO creates a diverse set of interests which is often too challenging to coalesce unless the organization takes a lowest-common-denominator approach. Second, the consensus rules restrict the agility of the alliance to make quick decisions. Third, the number of security concerns is significantly larger today than during the Cold War during NATO's first 40 years (Yost 2008; Michel 2014, 2003; Traugutt 2016). While eliminating the consensus rule would fundamentally change the "one for all and all for one" ethos of the organization, tweaking when and how the consensus rule applies could address these three concerns.

⁴⁸⁸ Yost, David. January 2008. *An interview with General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 2003-2006*. NATO Defense College, Rome. <https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=6>. P. 3-4.

Two recommendations could lessen anxieties and improve the selection, development, and pursuit of out-of-area activities while maintaining the institution's spirit of unity. First, create a mechanism that allows for coalitions of the willing within NATO. Second, limit the application of the consensus rule by instituting unique discretionary tools for the Secretary-General.

Traditional neorealist alliance theory explains coalitions are temporary, non-permanent arrangements formed when two or more states believe a common foe is a menace to their security (Layne 2000a).⁴⁸⁹ Although NATO has an all-for-one and one for all ethos, security issues impact nations differently. For example, the Bucharest Nine subcommittee is highly concerned with Russian aggression, and many countries in western Europe do not have the same level of worry about a military invasion from the east. Rather than have countries operate on a multilateral basis outside of NATO, it would behoove the institution to allow for coalitions within the organization to address specific security issues that substantially support niche transatlantic security concerns (Traugutt 2016; Michel 2014, 2003).

Scholars have various theories, but I offer combining the format used to create the United States-led anti-ISIS coalition and Leo Michel's NATO committee of contributors (NCC) idea.⁴⁹⁰ The new policy would stipulate once a significant quorum of members expresses an interest in a particular security issue (Michel stipulates one-third of members), the Secretary-General creates and chairs an NCC. After forming an NCC, the Secretary-General would define a specific task, role, and timeline for the coalition's formation to ensure a narrow scope for the operation. Once the timeline expires, the NCC dissolves.

⁴⁸⁹ Layne, Christopher. 2000. "US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 23 (3): 59-91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390008437800>. P. 60.

⁴⁹⁰ For more on Traugutt's idea read the following Article: Traugutt, Loren G. 2016. *Is Consensus Still Necessary Within NATO?* NATO Defense College. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10296>. P. 13-4.

The Secretary-General would brief Allies outside of the coalition regularly but would not allow them to impact the daily management of the NCC's activities. Nations outside of the coalition would have the option to join the NCC once they committed a proportional contribution to the operation. I define proportional as at least half the country's expected percentage of NATO troops. Therefore, if the coalition's operation required 10,000 troops and France wanted to join, using Table 22 proportions, France (6.4%) would have to pledge at least 320 soldiers before joining the NCC. This provision would require nations who are late adopters to put sufficient skin in the game and establish a minimum standard for participants. Expecting a requisite contribution discourages countries from joining an operation to meddle and bog down the NCC's decision-making process.⁴⁹¹

The NCC approach would lower infighting by allowing inspired members to pool resources and address sub-regional concerns. Simultaneously, the drawback of this approach is potentially eroding the ethos of regional legitimacy and togetherness if less than all members approve of an activity that takes place under the NATO banner. While the fear is logical, the proposal trades splitting the alliance temporary for greater agility and political cover. Internal coalitions of the willing allows national capitals to separate themselves from actions that constituents do not support but are necessary for transatlantic safety. Therefore, national leaders gain electoral protection and while allowing sizeable factions to promote their national interest while preserving NATO's unity.

NATO directs two actions to spur out-of-area activities: coordination amongst members and force generation for the common good. Therefore, creating a forum for nations to manage

⁴⁹¹ For more on the NCC idea read Michel's work in the following two articles:

Michel, Leo. 2003. "NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?" *Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University* 202 (August 2003): 1-8. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA421879.pdf>.

Michel, Leo -. 2014. *NATO Decision-Making: The Consensus Rule Endures Despite Challenges*. Edited by Sebastian Mayer. *NATO's Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision of Security*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

efforts within NATO balances both elegantly. The NCC provides a space for ten or more countries to collaborate while not forcing allies to participate politically or militarily if their constituents do not approve. However, if the geostrategic landscape changes, the new coalition mechanism allows nations to change their mind and add to transatlantic security. By mandating clear definitions, missions, roles, and most importantly, a timeline on coalitions of the willing, the NCC provides clear guidelines for the Alliance as a whole and limits infighting on the legitimacy of sub-regional security issues. With the NCC format, NATO could have quickly addressed developed forces to act earlier in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya without damaging relationships.

During the 2010 Strategic Concept development, then Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen commissioned a group of experts to look at ways to speed up NATO's decision-making process without altering the consensus rule. The experts made four recommendations: 1) Recognize that the NAC must approve any departure from the consensus principle. 2) Preserve the consensus rule for the most important decisions, such as those involving Article 5 commitments, budgets, new missions, or new members. 3) Identify means on less vital questions for Allies to register concerns short of a veto. 4) Establish the principle that the implementation of decisions arrived at by consensus should not be delayed by efforts to review those decisions at lower levels before they are carried out (NATO 2010b).⁴⁹²

Using the combination of the 2010 group of experts, Michel, and Traugutt's recommendations, I propose a Secretary-General Discretionary Tool (SGDT). The SGDT would grant the Secretary-General two broad authorities: 1) the ability to direct the preparation of necessary contingency operations and 2) the ability to shorten the committee process for certain

⁴⁹² NATO. 2010b. "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement." NATO. Accessed February 1. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm#p2.

high-priority decisions. Giving the Secretary-General, traditionally a European, the authority to plan allows for NATO to be prepared for new and emerging issues that may present a unique combination of security and political challenges for certain alliance members.⁴⁹³

Giving the Secretary-General the authority to plan without consensus shields national capitals from taking a stand on specific issues early that could be politically damaging later. Given the case studies, political leaders in each national capital are sensitive to security issues and look for ways to insulate themselves from negative blowback, like requiring UNSC Resolutions before offering public support. Putting the political burden on the Secretary-General gives legitimacy to the Alliance developing plans because the Secretary General's staff has the most knowledge of NATO's internal politics and what policy could achieve consensus. Therefore, Secretary-General has the most information on how NATO should proceed and plan for future threats. The Secretary-General could commission a NCC as previously discussed or direct the SACEUR to design a contingency plan around a particular topic or area of interest for the Alliance.

In the past, Secretaries-General have illustrated executive leadership to help the institution overcome internal friction to pass policy. For example, during Operation Allied Force, Secretary-General Solana used a "summary of discussion" to keep contentious decisions within the NAC. His tactic prevented cumbersome extra steps because the respective subcommittees must reach consensus to send it back to the NAC for further discussions (Traugutt 2016).⁴⁹⁴ Formalizing powers like this would prevent essential decisions from getting bogged down in the bureaucracy

⁴⁹³ Michel talks about this idea in the following two articles. However, he gives the broad planning to the SACEUR instead of the Secretary General. In my opinion, this places an undue burden on the SACEUR because he already wears two hats EUCOM commander and SACEUR. Therefore, to give him broad planning authorities within the institution clouds the motives of any plans he puts forward. Instead, giving this authority to the Secretary General maintains the democratic spirit of the institution giving the political leader the discretion to alter the organization's planning process.

⁴⁹⁴ Traugutt, Loren G. 2016. *Is Consensus Still Necessary Within NATO?* NATO Defense College. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10296>. P. 14-6.

of achieving multiple rounds of consensus unnecessarily. Providing more tools for the political leader of NATO to navigate consensus would supply an additional lubricant for NATO's process of selecting, developing, and pursuing out-of-area activities.

Closing

As Clausewitz explains, war is policy by other means. Therefore, coordinating military tasks that achieve political outcomes is fundamental to national and international security. The challenges, durability, and function of NATO have been widely discussed topics since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In an increasingly connected world, countries need a mechanism to comprehensively synchronize efforts to account for the political interest and military demands fully.

Although NATO has been able to overcome differences and agree to take action throughout the 21st Century outside of member's borders, the quantitative research and case study analysis reveals how the four decision elements can morph based on the issue. The typology laid out by Embeddedness theory stipulates four elements be present for out-of-area activities. They are overlapping interests in the Triumvirate, ZOPA design by the Principals (Triumvirate plus Canada, Germany, and Italy), developing sufficient political will, and a dedication to building consensus.

The pragmatic issue facing NATO Allies, not least among them the United States, is determining how vital transatlantic security is to their national interests. Additionally, the member countries must determine the extent to which NATO's legacy and mechanisms can help them address their security concerns politically and militarily. With this framework, practitioners, military officials, and diplomats can anticipate how NATO will make future decisions regarding

out-of-area activities and apply the topology to various security issues. Embeddedness theory lays a foundation for future leaders to continue and evolve the world's greatest alliance throughout the 21st Century.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:


BASE MODEL - LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Outcome Variable	100+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	1000+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	Log Total Forces (Continuous)	Over Provide (Dichotomous)	Provide (Dichotomous)	Under Provide (Dichotomous)
(Intercept)	-1.56 *	-2.26 *	-12.30 *	-0.92	0.01	1.91 *
	[-3.07; -0.06]	[-3.44; -1.08]	[-21.57; -3.04]	[-2.21; 0.38]	[-0.68; 0.70]	[0.29; 3.52]
Common Language with Target	-0.20 *	-0.08	-0.73	-0.05	0.00	0.04
	[-0.32; -0.08]	[-0.20; 0.04]	[-1.47; 0.01]	[-0.23; 0.14]	[-0.10; 0.10]	[-0.12; 0.21]
Log Target Aid (t-1)	0.09	0.12 *	0.83 *	0.06	0.02	-0.08 *
	[-0.01; 0.20]	[0.02; 0.22]	[0.10; 1.57]	[-0.01; 0.14]	[-0.02; 0.06]	[-0.16; -0.01]
Log Target Trade (t-1)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02 *	-0.01	-0.02 *
	[-0.02; 0.02]	[-0.01; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.09]	[0.01; 0.04]	[-0.01; 0.00]	[-0.03; -0.00]
Log US Trade (t-1)	0.03 *	0.02 *	0.14 *	0.03 *	0.00	-0.03 *
	[0.02; 0.04]	[0.01; 0.04]	[0.06; 0.22]	[0.01; 0.04]	[-0.01; 0.01]	[-0.04; -0.02]
Log US Aid (t-1)	-0.01 *	-0.01 *	-0.07 *	-0.02 *	0.00	0.01 *
	[-0.01; -0.00]	[-0.02; -0.01]	[-0.10; -0.04]	[-0.02; -0.01]	[-0.00; 0.01]	[0.01; 0.02]
Distance from US Security Position (t-1)	0.10 *	0.03	0.53 *	0.15 *	0.07 *	-0.22 *
	[0.01; 0.18]	[-0.03; 0.09]	[0.21; 0.86]	[0.06; 0.23]	[0.01; 0.13]	[-0.32; -0.12]
Log Military Personnel	0.16 *	0.06	0.88 *	-0.01	0.06	-0.06
	[0.09; 0.23]	[-0.02; 0.13]	[0.45; 1.30]	[-0.11; 0.10]	[-0.01; 0.13]	[-0.17; 0.05]
Log Military Expenditure	-0.01 *	-0.01 *	-0.00	0.03 *	-0.00	-0.03 *
	[-0.03; -0.00]	[-0.03; -0.00]	[-0.07; 0.06]	[0.02; 0.04]	[-0.01; 0.01]	[-0.04; -0.01]
Log Population	0.08 *	0.10 *	0.37	0.02	0.01	-0.04
	[0.01; 0.15]	[0.00; 0.20]	[-0.10; 0.85]	[-0.14; 0.18]	[-0.08; 0.11]	[-0.18; 0.10]
Log total GDP	-0.10 *	-0.07 *	-0.56 *	-0.05	-0.04 *	0.10 *
	[-0.15; -0.04]	[-0.13; -0.01]	[-0.92; -0.21]	[-0.15; 0.04]	[-0.08; -0.01]	[0.00; 0.19]
R²	0.24	0.31	0.32	0.13	0.04	0.12
Adj. R²	0.23	0.30	0.31	0.12	0.04	0.12
Num. obs.	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521
RMSE	0.44	0.31	2.40	0.46	0.35	0.47
N Clusters	28	28	28	28	28	28


Note: “*” signifies the coefficient has a p-value < 0.01 and a greater than 99% confidence interval.

The three white columns reflect the three models, which have outcome variables that reflect absolute troop contributions to a NATO out-of-area campaign. The three grey columns reflect the three models which have relative contributions to an out-of-area campaign.

APPENDIX B: BASE MODEL – DOT AND WHISKER PLOTS



The Dot and Whisker Plot is reflecting the three models with absolute outcome variables. Over 100 is a dichotomous variable where 1 = nation contributes over 100 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Over 1000 is a dichotomous variable where 1 = nation contributes over 1000 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Log of Total Forces is a continuous variable which is the log of total forces contributed to an out-of-area campaign. When a variable has whiskers that fail to touch the center dotted line, the variables impact is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.



Over Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides more resources to a campaign than its expected proportion. If the United States accounts for 35% of NATO's total forces in a given year, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute a campaign, and the United States supplies 4,000 troops, then the United States over provided that year. Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides between its expected proportion and half of its expected proportion of forces to a campaign. For example, if Estonia accounts for 2% of NATO's total forces in a given year, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute a campaign, and Estonia's expected range of troops is between 100 and 200. Under Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides less than 50% of its expected value. For example, the United States and Estonia account for 35% and 2% of NATO's total forces available. An out-of-area campaign requires 10,000 to execute and the United States and Estonia supply 1,000 and 10 troops respectively, then both nations under provided.


APPENDIX C:
DIPLOMATIC EMBEDDEDNESS – LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Outcome Variable	100+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	1000+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	Log Forces Contributed (Continuous)	Over Provide (Dichotomous)	Provide (Dichotomous)	Under Provide (Dichotomous)
(Intercept)	-1.37 [-2.87; 0.13]	-2.22 * [-3.38; -1.06]	-11.32 * [-20.52; -2.12]	-0.68 [-1.95; 0.59]	-0.01 [-0.70; 0.68]	1.69 * [0.14; 3.24]
Diplomatic Embeddedness	0.58 * [0.09; 1.07]	0.11 [-0.21; 0.42]	2.96 * [0.59; 5.33]	0.71 * [0.23; 1.19]	-0.07 [-0.48; 0.35]	-0.64 * [-1.04; -0.25]
Common Language with Target	-0.16 * [-0.30; -0.02]	-0.07 [-0.20; 0.05]	-0.53 [-1.22; 0.17]	0.00 [-0.15; 0.16]	-0.00 [-0.10; 0.10]	0.00 [-0.15; 0.15]
Log Target Aid (t-1)	0.10 [-0.01; 0.20]	0.12 * [0.02; 0.22]	0.86 * [0.11; 1.60]	0.07 [-0.01; 0.14]	0.02 [-0.02; 0.06]	-0.09 * [-0.17; -0.01]
Log Target Trade (t-1)	0.00 [-0.02; 0.02]	0.00 [-0.01; 0.01]	0.00 [-0.07; 0.08]	0.02 * [0.01; 0.04]	-0.01 [-0.01; 0.00]	-0.02 * [-0.03; -0.00]
Log US Trade (t-1)	0.01 [-0.01; 0.03]	0.02 * [0.00; 0.04]	0.06 [-0.05; 0.17]	0.01 [-0.01; 0.03]	0.00 [-0.01; 0.02]	-0.01 [-0.03; 0.00]
Log US Aid (t-1)	-0.01 * [-0.01; -0.00]	-0.01 * [-0.02; -0.01]	-0.06 * [-0.09; -0.03]	-0.01 * [-0.02; -0.01]	0.00 [-0.00; 0.01]	0.01 * [0.01; 0.02]
Distance from US Security Position (t-1)	0.08 [-0.01; 0.17]	0.03 [-0.03; 0.08]	0.44 * [0.13; 0.75]	0.13 * [0.04; 0.21]	0.08 * [0.01; 0.14]	-0.20 * [-0.30; -0.11]
Log Military Personnel	0.10 [-0.00; 0.20]	0.05 [-0.03; 0.12]	0.57 * [0.09; 1.05]	-0.08 [-0.18; 0.02]	0.07 [-0.02; 0.15]	0.01 [-0.11; 0.13]
Log Military Expenditure	-0.01 * [-0.03; -0.00]	-0.01 * [-0.02; -0.00]	0.00 [-0.06; 0.07]	0.03 * [0.02; 0.04]	-0.00 [-0.01; 0.01]	-0.03 * [-0.04; -0.02]
Log Population	0.17 * [0.07; 0.27]	0.12 * [0.01; 0.23]	0.82 * [0.27; 1.38]	0.13 [-0.02; 0.29]	0.00 [-0.11; 0.12]	-0.13 [-0.28; 0.01]
Log total GDP	-0.15 * [-0.21; -0.09]	-0.08 * [-0.14; -0.01]	-0.83 * [-1.23; -0.43]	-0.12 * [-0.21; -0.02]	-0.04 [-0.08; 0.01]	0.15 * [0.06; 0.25]
R ²	0.24	0.31	0.32	0.14	0.04	0.13
Adj. R ²	0.24	0.30	0.32	0.13	0.04	0.13
Num. obs.	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521
RMSE	0.44	0.31	2.39	0.45	0.35	0.47
N Clusters	28	28	28	28	28	28


Note: “*” signifies the coefficient has a p-value < 0.01 and a greater than 99% confidence interval.

The three white columns reflect the three models, which have outcome variables that reflect absolute troop contributions to a NATO out-of-area campaign. The three grey columns reflect the three models which have relative contributions to an out-of-area campaign.

APPENDIX D: DIPLOMATIC EMBEDDEDNESS – DOT AND WHISKER PLOTS



The Dot and Whisker Plot is reflecting the three models with absolute outcome variables. Over 100 is a dichotomous variable where 1 = nation contributes over 1000 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Over 1000 is a dichotomous variable where 1 = nation contributes over 1000 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Log of Total Forces is a continuous variable which is the log of total forces contributed to an out-of-area campaign. When a variable has whiskers that fail to touch the center dotted line, the variables impact is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.



Over Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides more resources to a campaign than its expected proportion. If the United States accounts for 35% of NATO's total forces in a given year, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute a campaign, and the United States supplies 4,000 troops, then the United States over provided that year. Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides between its expected proportion and half of its expected proportion of forces to a campaign. For example, if Estonia accounts for 2% of NATO's total forces in a given year, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute a campaign, and Estonia's expected range of troops is between 100 and 200. Under Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides less than 50% of its expected value. For example, the United States and Estonia account for 35% and 2% of NATO's total forces available. An out-of-area campaign requires 10,000 to execute and the United States and Estonia supply 1,000 and 10 troops respectively, then both nations under provided.


APPENDIX E:
EXPEDITIONARY EMBEDDEDNESS - LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Outcome Variable	100+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	1000+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	Log Forces Contributed (Continuous)	Over Provide (Dichotomous)	Provide (Dichotomous)	Under Provide (Dichotomous)
(Intercept)	-1.51 * [-2.91; -0.12]	-2.25 * [-3.48; -1.03]	-11.87 * [-20.70; -3.04]	-1.20 [-2.41; 0.01]	0.19 [-0.59; 0.98]	2.00 * [0.44; 3.57]
Expeditionary Embeddedness	0.09 [-0.30; 0.48]	0.00 [-0.33; 0.34]	0.79 [-1.28; 2.86]	-0.51 * [-0.96; -0.06]	0.33 [-0.08; 0.74]	0.18 [-0.29; 0.65]
Common Language with Target	-0.20 * [-0.32; -0.08]	-0.08 [-0.20; 0.04]	-0.73 [-1.47; 0.01]	-0.04 [-0.22; 0.14]	-0.00 [-0.09; 0.09]	0.04 [-0.12; 0.21]
Log Target Aid (t-1)	0.09 [-0.01; 0.20]	0.12 * [0.02; 0.22]	0.83 * [0.10; 1.57]	0.06 [-0.01; 0.14]	0.02 [-0.02; 0.06]	-0.08 * [-0.16; -0.01]
Log Target Trade (t-1)	0.00 [-0.02; 0.02]	0.00 [-0.01; 0.01]	0.01 [-0.07; 0.09]	0.02 * [0.01; 0.04]	-0.01 [-0.01; 0.00]	-0.02 * [-0.03; -0.00]
Log US Trade (t-1)	0.03 * [0.01; 0.05]	0.02 * [0.01; 0.04]	0.16 * [0.04; 0.28]	0.01 [-0.01; 0.03]	0.01 [-0.00; 0.03]	-0.02 * [-0.04; -0.00]
Log US Aid (t-1)	-0.01 * [-0.01; -0.00]	-0.01 * [-0.02; -0.01]	-0.07 * [-0.10; -0.04]	-0.02 * [-0.02; -0.01]	0.00 [-0.00; 0.01]	0.01 * [0.01; 0.02]
Distance from US Security Position (t-1)	0.01 [-0.33; 0.35]	0.02 [-0.29; 0.34]	-0.21 [-2.18; 1.76]	0.63 * [0.22; 1.04]	-0.24 [-0.64; 0.16]	-0.39 [-0.82; 0.05]
Log Military Personnel	0.16 * [0.09; 0.24]	0.06 [-0.01; 0.13]	0.91 * [0.47; 1.35]	-0.03 [-0.14; 0.09]	0.07 [-0.00; 0.15]	-0.05 [-0.16; 0.07]
Log Military Expenditure	-0.01 * [-0.03; -0.00]	-0.01 * [-0.02; -0.00]	-0.01 [-0.07; 0.06]	0.03 * [0.02; 0.05]	-0.00 [-0.01; 0.01]	-0.03 * [-0.04; -0.01]
Log Population	0.08 * [0.01; 0.15]	0.10 * [0.00; 0.20]	0.36 [-0.12; 0.85]	0.03 [-0.13; 0.20]	0.01 [-0.09; 0.11]	-0.04 [-0.18; 0.10]
Log total GDP	-0.10 * [-0.16; -0.04]	-0.07 * [-0.13; -0.01]	-0.59 * [-0.95; -0.22]	-0.04 [-0.14; 0.06]	-0.05 * [-0.09; -0.02]	0.09 [-0.01; 0.19]
R²	0.24	0.31	0.32	0.13	0.05	0.13
Adj. R²	0.23	0.30	0.31	0.12	0.04	0.12
Num. obs.	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521
RMSE	0.44	0.31	2.40	0.46	0.35	0.47
N Clusters	28	28	28	28	28	28


Note: “*” signifies the coefficient has a p-value < 0.01 and a greater than 99% confidence interval.

The three white columns reflect the three models, which have outcome variables that reflect absolute troop contributions to a NATO out-of-area campaign. The three grey columns reflect the three models which have relative contributions to an out-of-area campaign.

APPENDIX F: EXPEDITIONARY EMBEDDEDNESS - DOT AND WHISKER PLOTS



The Dot and Whisker Plot is reflecting the three models with absolute outcome variables: Over 100 is a dichotomous variable where 1 = nation contributes over 100 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Over 1000 is a dichotomous variable where 1 = nation contributes over 1000 troops to an out-of-area campaign. Log of Total Forces is a continuous variable which is the log of total forces contributed to an out-of-area campaign. When a variable has whiskers that fail to touch the center dotted line, the variables impact is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.



Over Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides more resources to a campaign than its expected proportion. If the United States accounts for 35% of NATO's total forces in a given year, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute a campaign, and the United States supplies 4,000 troops, then the United States over provided that year. Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides between its expected proportion and half of its expected proportion of forces to a campaign. For example, if Estonia accounts for 2% of NATO's total forces in a given year, NATO requires 10,000 troops to execute a campaign, and Estonia's expected range of troops is between 100 and 200. Under Provide is a dichotomous variable where 1 = a nation provides less than 50% of its expected value. For example, the United States and Estonia account for 35% and 2% of NATO's total forces available. An out-of-area campaign requires 10,000 to execute and the United States and Estonia supply 1,000 and 10 troops respectively, then both nations under provided.


APPENDIX G

CONSENSUS CATEGORY COMPARISONS - LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Outcome Variable	100+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	1000+ Troops Contributed (Dichotomous)	Log Forces Contributed (Continuous)	Over Provide (Dichotomous)	Provide (Dichotomous)	Under Provide (Dichotomous)
(Intercept)	-1.50 *	-2.03 *	-11.80 *	-0.68	-0.21	1.89 *
	[-2.96; -0.05]	[-3.23; -0.83]	[-21.03; -2.57]	[-1.92; 0.55]	[-0.87; 0.45]	[0.40; 3.37]
Networked	0.08	0.16 *	0.40	0.15 *	-0.19 *	0.04
	[-0.05; 0.22]	[0.07; 0.25]	[-0.30; 1.10]	[0.00; 0.30]	[-0.33; -0.04]	[-0.12; 0.19]
Motivated	0.12	0.13 *	0.29	0.02	-0.18 *	0.17 *
	[-0.02; 0.26]	[0.03; 0.23]	[-0.38; 0.95]	[-0.13; 0.17]	[-0.32; -0.05]	[0.03; 0.30]
Helpful	0.13 *	-0.02	0.39	0.17 *	-0.13 *	-0.04
	[0.01; 0.25]	[-0.09; 0.05]	[-0.16; 0.95]	[0.03; 0.31]	[-0.24; -0.02]	[-0.16; 0.08]
Common Language with Target	-0.21 *	-0.11	-0.73 *	-0.01	0.02	-0.01
	[-0.35; -0.08]	[-0.22; 0.01]	[-1.44; -0.02]	[-0.18; 0.15]	[-0.07; 0.12]	[-0.16; 0.14]
Log Target Aid (t-1)	0.10	0.12 *	0.84 *	0.07	0.02	-0.09 *
	[-0.01; 0.20]	[0.02; 0.22]	[0.12; 1.56]	[-0.00; 0.14]	[-0.02; 0.05]	[-0.16; -0.01]
Log Target Trade (t-1)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02 *	-0.01 *	-0.01 *
	[-0.02; 0.02]	[-0.01; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.09]	[0.01; 0.04]	[-0.02; -0.00]	[-0.03; -0.00]
Log US Trade (t-1)	0.03 *	0.02 *	0.12 *	0.01	0.01 *	-0.02 *
	[0.01; 0.04]	[0.00; 0.03]	[0.01; 0.23]	[-0.00; 0.03]	[0.00; 0.02]	[-0.04; -0.01]
Log US Aid (t-1)	-0.01 *	-0.01 *	-0.07 *	-0.01 *	0.00	0.01 *
	[-0.01; -0.00]	[-0.02; -0.01]	[-0.09; -0.04]	[-0.02; -0.01]	[-0.00; 0.00]	[0.01; 0.02]
Distance from US Security Position (t-1)	0.13 *	0.08 *	0.62 *	0.15 *	0.01	-0.17 *
	[0.05; 0.21]	[0.01; 0.15]	[0.29; 0.96]	[0.05; 0.26]	[-0.05; 0.08]	[-0.26; -0.07]
Log Military Personnel	0.14 *	0.06	0.78 *	-0.05	0.09 *	-0.04
	[0.05; 0.22]	[-0.01; 0.13]	[0.35; 1.22]	[-0.14; 0.04]	[0.03; 0.15]	[-0.14; 0.06]
Log Military Expenditure	-0.01 *	-0.01	0.01	0.03 *	-0.01	-0.03 *
	[-0.02; -0.00]	[-0.02; 0.00]	[-0.06; 0.07]	[0.02; 0.05]	[-0.01; 0.00]	[-0.04; -0.01]
Log Population	0.12 *	0.09 *	0.52 *	0.10	-0.03	-0.07
	[0.04; 0.21]	[0.01; 0.18]	[0.02; 1.02]	[-0.04; 0.23]	[-0.11; 0.05]	[-0.20; 0.06]
Log total GDP	-0.12 *	-0.08 *	-0.65 *	-0.09	-0.01	0.10 *
	[-0.18; -0.07]	[-0.14; -0.01]	[-1.00; -0.31]	[-0.19; 0.00]	[-0.04; 0.02]	[0.00; 0.20]
R²	0.24	0.33	0.32	0.14	0.05	0.13
Adj. R²	0.24	0.32	0.31	0.13	0.05	0.13
Num. obs.	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521	1521
RMSE	0.44	0.31	2.40	0.45	0.34	0.47
N Clusters	28	28	28	28	28	28

Note: “*” signifies the coefficient has p-value < 0.01 and a greater than 99% confidence interval. The three white columns reflect the three models, which have outcome variables that reflect absolute troop contributions to a NATO out-of-area campaign. The three grey columns reflect the three models which have relative contributions to an out-of-area campaign. The baseline category in the model is Fair-Share (low-Diplomatic a low-Expeditionary Embeddedness). Therefore, all of the coefficients are relative to how that category performs in comparison.

APPENDIX H: CATEGORY COMPARISONS - DOT AND WHISKER PLOTS




The baseline category in the model is Fair-Share (low-Diplomatic and low-Expeditionary Embeddedness). Therefore, all of the coefficients are relative to how that category performs in comparison. When a whisker fails to touch the center dotted line, it is saying that the difference in coefficient is statistically significant when compared to the Fair-Share category. I have omitted the control variables, and variables approximating Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories from the dot and whisker plot for a cleaner visual.




The baseline category in the model is Fair-Share (low-Diplomatic and low-Expeditionary Embeddedness). Therefore, all of the coefficients are relative to how that category performs in comparison. When a whisker fails to touch the center dotted line, it is saying that the difference in coefficient is statistically significant when compared to the Fair-Share category. I have omitted the control variables, and variables approximating Hegemonic Power and Preference Convergence theories from the dot and whisker plot for a cleaner visual.

**APPENDIX I:
HISTOGRAM OF DIPLOMATIC EMBEDDEDNESS**



The histogram reflects the distribution of percentages used to make the 0.83 cut point for Diplomatic Embeddedness' high and low thresholds. The distribution shows a natural break in the metric between 0.75 and 0.85 based on the bins. Although the distribution is not perfectly normal, the natural cut point makes the high and low threshold reasonable.

**APPENDIX J:
HISTOGRAM OF EXPEDITIONARY EMBEDDEDNESS**



The histogram reflects the distribution of the differences between a NATO Ally's and the Triumvirate's security score used to create the cut point for Expeditionary Embeddedness' high and low thresholds. The distribution shows an inflection point between 0.75 and 1.0. The difference between the tallest bin and next is the largest drop in the distribution (200 to 130). Although the distribution is not perfectly normal, the majority of the observations are in the middle third of the distribution. Therefore, the 0.92 cut point makes the high and low threshold reasonable.

VITA

Nathan Dial is a 2010 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, where he earned a Bachelor of Science in Economics with a minor in Spanish. Additionally, Nathan has a Master's in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School. With a concentration in Political and Economic Development focusing on quantitative and qualitative analysis, his 2012 Policy Analysis Exercise created an evaluation tool for United States Southern Command to use when conducting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In November of 2013, Nathan completed the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program (ENJJPT), where he earned his Air Force pilot wings and received an assignment to fly the EC-130H out of Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (Tucson, AZ). During pilot training, he amassed 220 flying hours in T-6 and T-38 aircraft and became proficient in instrument and tactical formation flying. His training at ENJJPT makes him capable of flying any aircraft in the Air Force's arsenal. From April 2014 to July 2018, Nathan obtained 1600 total flying hours and 780 combat hours during three deployments to the Middle East. He is proficient in air-to-air refueling, instrument, and tactical flying.

In August of 2018, he started Northwestern's Political Science Ph.D. program where his primary field was Comparative Politics, and his secondary field was quantitative and qualitative methods. While at Northwestern, Nathan focused his studies on NATO in the 21st Century and sports analytics policy. He received acceptances to conferences for his work on NATO and quantitative analysis of the NBA's draft policy.

After completing his Ph.D., Nathan will return to active-duty service flying the RC-135 out of Offutt Air Force Base (Omaha, NE). He plans to command operational units and become a strategic planner for NATO policy at the Pentagon, NATO Headquarters, and United States European Command.

Peer Reviewed Publications:

Dial, Nathan. 2020. "What is the Impact of College Basketball on an NBA Career: An Analysis of McDonald's All-Americans from 2001 to 2012." *The International Journal of Sport and Society* 12 (1): 53-69. <https://doi.org/10.18848/2152-7857/CGP/v12i01/53-69>.

Op-Ed Publications:

Dial, Nathan. 2020. "I am Confused, Scared, and Afraid." *The Air Force Times*, June 27, 2020, Commentary. <https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/27/i-am-confused-scared-and-afraid/>.

Dial, Nathan. 2020. "Three Generations of Black Military Members Show the Progress That's Been Made, and The Path Forward." *The Air Force Times*. Last Modified July 5, 2020. <https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/05/three-generations-of-black-military-members-show-the-progress-thats-been-made-and-the-path-forward/>.

Dial, Nathan. 2020. "The Consequences of Implicit Bias at Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training." *Race Relations in the Air Force*. Sightline Media Group. Accessed July 12, 2020. <https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/12/the-consequences-of-implicit-bias-at-euro-nato-pilot-training/>.

Dial, Nathan, and Daniel Walker. 2020. "Institutional Racism is Boring." Sightline Media Group. Accessed August 16, 2020. <https://www.airforcetimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/16/institutional-racism-is-boring/>.