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The Legacies of Liberation:
Revolution, Liberal Reformism, and Political Development in Southern Africa

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ABSTRACT

The political history of late twentieth-century Southern Africa was dominated by violent liberation struggles against settler-colonial domination in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. All five countries experienced prolonged settler colonialism, followed by conflicts in which revolutionary national liberation movements (NLMs) sought to both end settler-colonial domination and build more inclusive and equitable nations through rapid and basic structural changes. Between 1975 and 1994, these movements achieved political power in each country, and have since dominated the national political arena in the post-settler colonial period. However, the five countries charted divergent paths of political development marked by different state and social structures. In the last decade or so, three distinct political regimes have consolidated in the region, each characterized by varying degrees and patterns of political inclusion, structural inequalities, and national polarization. This include: less inclusive semi-democracies, with moderately unequal, post-racial societies (i.e., Mozambique and Angola); a militarized semi-authoritarianism, with the least unequal but extremely polarized society (Zimbabwe); and inclusive multiracial democracies, with highly unequal societies polarized by racial and post-racial class divisions (i.e., South Africa and Namibia).

What explains the dramatically contrasting trajectories of political development in post-settler colonial Southern Africa? Alternative explanations focus on diverse factors, including deterministic structural conditions of the settler-colonial period, politico-organizational factors related to the liberation struggles, and relatively recent political events unique to each country. This study takes a different, comparative-historical analytical approach. Central to this approach is a critical juncture period—the "liberation reform episode"—during which radical nationalist elites took control of state power in all five countries and pursued dramatically contrasting

reform strategies. Further, the study argues that the differing reform policy choices set the countries on political development paths that were path-dependent and that led to differing legacies of liberation. The critical-junctures framework of analysis adopted in developing the path-dependent explanation reveals that the distinct political legacies were a result of strategic choices made by political leaders during a well-defined episode of structural changes.

Radical liberation elites, the analysis shows, pursued sharply contrasting reform choices due to variations in structural conditions and the timing of liberation in each country. In some cases, they enacted *radical reforms*, involving rapid and basic restructuring of the state, the destruction of structural inequalities, and a high-modernist approach to nation-building seeking to homogenize subnational differences. The radical reform pattern was evident in Mozambique and Angola, where liberation leaders were less constrained by domestic-structural factors or the international context of the 1970s. In the remaining cases, political elites adopted *liberal reforms* characterized by gradual reforming of inherited state structures, reduction of racial and class inequalities, and promoting democratic nation-building accommodating subnational sentiments. The liberal reform package was implemented in South Africa and Namibia, where liberation leaders were far more constrained by structural factors and world-historical changes of the 1990s. In Zimbabwe, the international context of the 1980s permitted nationalist leaders to thwart the initial liberal reform choice, leading to a pattern of *stalled-liberal reforms* defined by less democratic state and nation-building and failure to reduce income, wealth, and land inequalities. The contrasting reform choices were contingent outcomes difficult to predict based on standard structural factors or ideological beliefs of liberation actors. Instead, a conjuncture of domestic-structural factors and world-historical period of the liberation reform episode defined distinct sets of opportunities and constraints that impinged on liberation elite choices.

The differing reform approaches, in turn, provoked varying patterns of backlash in the aftermath of the reform period. In the radical reform cases of Mozambique and Angola, radical state restructuring, coercive power consolidation, and high-modernist nation-building set into motion a violent *conservative backlash* by armed groups mobilizing traditional rural elites and the peasantry antagonized by radical agrarian reforms, the suppression of tradition, and centralized state policies. In contrast, liberal reforms in South African and Namibia generated a *social-democratic backlash* by the popular sectors, which reacted to deepening social inequalities, mass unemployment, widespread poverty, and neoliberal policies of the reform period. Finally, in the stalled-liberal reform case of Zimbabwe, neither fully liberal nor fully radical policies triggered a broad-based *liberal backlash* by the urban popular sectors as well as political and civic forces. In this context, less inclusive power-consolidation and nation-building strategies of the reform period ultimately gave rise to liberal demands for political, civil, and human rights, on the one hand, and the liberal approach to inherited structural inequalities, poverty, and development left the urban popular sectors disaffected, on the other.

The distinct backlashes led to counter-responses from national governments. In Mozambique and Angola, governments counterreacted to the conservative blowback with political and economic liberalization, involving renewed political inclusion, the restoration of traditional and religious privileges, and transition to market economies. However, authoritarian and violent legacies of the reform period hindered the emergence of fully inclusive political regimes and the bridging of deep-seated political cleavages from the reform years. In South Africa and Namibia, the social-democratic challenges prompted renewed efforts for the reduction of structural inequalities and expanding opportunities for the urban and rural black poor. However, while helping solidify inclusive multiracial democracies, the liberal legacies of the

reform period reproduced racial and intra-black disparities that further deepened polarization. Lastly, in Zimbabwe, the government's response to the liberal backlash involved political and economic liberalization alongside a violent redistribution of white-owned land and renewed political exclusion. The authoritarian response reproduced repressive and militarized state structures, while renewed exclusion and highly inequitable land redistribution further deepened racial, class, and regional polarizations. The stable structures emerging from the resolution of the dynamic of reactions and counterreactions embody the enduring legacies of liberation that dominate present-day Southern Africa.

The argument differs from conventional approaches to political change in post-settler colonial Southern Africa. Firstly, despite share antecedents of the settler-colonial period and the revolutionary struggles, post-liberation Southern Africa has been characterized by varying development trajectories that are path-dependent. Secondly, these processes and their outcomes are attributed to the critical juncture of liberation reforms that strongly shaped the state and socio-structural legacies of twentieth-century liberation struggles. Whereas the political-regime legacies closely resemble state structures of the reform period and its aftermath, the patterns of social inequalities and polarizations, that bear diminished socio-structural features of the late settler-colonial period, echo social structures and conflicts arising from the reform period. Lastly, the analysis shows that liberation ideology and legitimacy once exploited by political elites no longer serve as reliable mechanisms of institutional stability and reproduciton. In recent decades, this rested on the former liberation parties' control over state power and resources, and varying degrees of democratic contestation, patronage, political cooptation, and state violence.

The critical-juncture approach shifted analytical focus to the turning point of national liberation as a foundational episode with far-reaching implications. The argument is illustrated

with rich archival and quantitative data that allowed evaluating—at a fine-grained level of analysis—rival explanations emphasizing background conditions of settler colonialism, political differences among the liberation parties, or relatively recent political events. The evidence strongly supports my argument that the contrasting legacies of liberation are rather outcomes of varied reform approaches of the liberation reform period.

Beyond providing an empirically grounded theory of political development in postcolonial Southern Africa, the analysis yields implications of broader relevance for comparative politics and historical sociology. It specifically offers insights and propositions for analyzing long-run impacts of decolonization in Africa, especially instances of violent decolonization in certain African and non-African countries, as well as revolutions, conflict, and other periods of abrupt change during the postcolonial era in others. This can be achieved by applying the critical-junctures framework to specific junctures involving conflict resolution, political settlement, and the subsequent dynamics of post-conflict scenarios. Finally, by emphasizing the role of leadership and strategic choice during episodes of major change, the study will contribute to comparative-historical and path-dependent explanations of political development. In sum, this study offers insights with broader implications not just for state and society Southern Africa, but for understanding decolonization legacies, conflict dynamics, and major transformative episodes across diverse contexts.

PREFACE

The origins of this study can be traced to my upbringing and political maturation in post-liberation Eritrea. The country achieved de facto independence from Ethiopian rule in 1991, after a thirty-year revolutionary struggle—one of the aberrant cases of decolonization and longest nationalist conflicts in Africa. During my undergraduate years at the University of Asmara in the early 2000s, I decided to study political science because I believed that the major would allow me to better understand—and help address—the pressing reform, developmental, and nation-building challenges faced by the young nation. However, amidst national unrest and student protests, I developed a strong interest in becoming a scholar; my intellectual curiosity in post-liberation state and society deepened with a sad turn in political events. The initial optimism and national euphoria following liberation gave way to disappointment as Eritrea became entangled in a violent conflict with Ethiopia and, in the early 2000s, fell under the grip of a repressive dictatorship led by Isaias Afwerki, a once-heroic figure of the liberation struggle. I found myself grappling with questions: What had gone awry? How had the Eritrean people's unity, resolve, and ingenuity, which had been instrumental in achieving the hard-won freedom, seemingly vanished? Why a formerly pragmatic nationalist leadership failed to learn from the basic political mistakes and leadership failures that had plagued much of postcolonial Africa?

My pursuit of better understanding Eritrea's post-liberation travails led me to other parts of Africa where anticolonialist struggles had ended European domination. While the limited scholarship I was able to cautiously access and read provided solid analysis of wicked effects of the armed struggle in the country's descent into political oppression and militarism, it lacked a comparative perspective that could contextualize the nation's post-liberation situation in relation to other historical or contemporaneous instance of liberation. I delved into the aftermath of

liberation struggles of the PAIGC (Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde), FRELIMO (Mozambique), MPLA (Angola), and SWAPO (Namibia). I was particularly drawn to post-apartheid South Africa, which remained prominent in public discourse and news coverage of political events. As a college senior, I borrowed from a political science lecturer a Newsweek magazine that contained an analysis of Nelson Mandela's autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, detailing the story of his life, anti-apartheid struggle, and inspirational leadership. I gained a nuanced understanding of how South Africa's history of white-minority rule, the ANC's liberation struggle, and the nation's democratic path after apartheid differed from Eritrea's experience and that of other countries. I came to appreciate the importance of both inherited structural conditions and challenges, as well as the pivotal role of leadership and choice at critical turning points.

During my postgraduate studies at the University of Osnabruck (Germany), I wrote an MA thesis exploring the rise of illiberal democracy in post-Cold War Africa with a case analysis of post-1991 Ethiopia. Besides informal institutions of neopatrimonialism emphasized by scholars of African democratization, I shed light on the violent and authoritarian legacies of liberation struggles as an important factor in the consolidation of electoral or competitive authoritarian regimes in post-transition Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and other post-liberation contexts. In retrospect, I consider my time in Osnabruck as a personal "critical juncture." It was during this period that I was acquainted with comparative-historical analysis as an old and distinguished analytical tradition. This approach appealed to me because it seamlessly fused both comparative and historical perspectives that long fascinated me. Additionally, I engaged with scholarship on structure, agency, and path dependence in political development, and encountered Latin American political studies by Ruth B. Collier and David Collier (1991), *Shaping the Political*

Arena, and James Mahoney (2001), *The Legacies of Liberalism*, that introduced me to the idea of critical junctures and decisively influenced by intellectual trajectory.

This exposure, along with a burgeoning debate on the 'limits' of liberation in Southern Africa, solidified my interest in pursuing a comparative-historical examination of political development in post-liberation Africa on a broader scale. It became apparent to me that, although scholars recognized the historical import of liberation struggles, they often relegated this period to a mere backdrop for understanding post-colonial political dynamics. Besides the notable absence of a well-structured analytical framework, the existing scholarship on post-liberation politics in Africa predominantly comprised isolated case studies devoid of comparative insights. Furthermore, I came to realize that political science research on regime studies depicted a general picture of invariably stable party regimes in post-liberation contexts, while social scientists focusing on revolutionary struggles in Southern Africa emphasized durable authoritarianism as the typical legacy of violent liberation struggles. I was convinced that, through a rigorous application of a critical-junctures framework, I could develop a more adequate explanation of twentieth-century liberation struggles and their legacies. I could analyze the differences (and similarities) in post-liberation political development in Africa by employing the analytical tools and techniques of comparative-historical analysis. Armed with a deeper knowledge of anticolonialist liberation struggles in Africa, I found the idea of applying the basic analytic framework of critical junctures to a number of African cases irresistible.

Driven by this motivation, I decided to pursue graduate studies at Northwestern University, with the hope of working with James Mahoney and William Reno. I hold an immense debt of gratitude to Jim, who continues to make Northwestern the best place for comparative-historical methods, for his mentorship and unwavering support of my plan to carry

on a comparative-historical study of five (initially six) countries. His foundational methods seminar— "Methods of Comparative Analysis"—was instrumental in equipping me with small-N and case-study methods that proved essential. His thoroughgoing feedback throughout the research and writing phases took my conceptual and theoretical thinking to ever higher levels. I also had the privilege of working with Will who, while affording me a sound dose of intellectual freedom and an opportunity to learn closely from his reputed fieldwork expertise and exploits, consistently urged me towards crafting a more parsimonious argument and challenged me with rival explanations to sharpen my argument. His idea of "majority rule" and "reformist" rebels in his seminal work, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (2015), conceptually served as an illuminating launching point for my study. Ana Arjona's incisive feedback at different stages was equally invaluable. In particular, she rigorously pressed me on conceptualization, measurement, and validity issues that greatly enhanced my analysis. I will remain profoundly grateful for the time, support, and generosity all three had unreservedly extended to me.

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LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

AMCU	Mineworkers and Construction Union
ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	ANC-Youth League
BBBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAs	Communal Areas
CC	Constitutional Commission
CHA	Comparative-historical analysis
COREMO	*Comite Revolutionario de Mocambique*
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPLA	*Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola*
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Program
FAPLA	*Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola*
FLNA	*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*
FPLM	*Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique*
FPTP	First Past The Post
FRELIMO	*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*
FYDP	Five-Year National Development Plan
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GEAR	Growth, Equity, and Redistribution
GNU	Government of National Unity
GUMO	*Grupo Unido de Mocambique*
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LPM	Landless People's Movement
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-A	Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance
MDM	Mass Democratic Movement
MFA	Movimento das Forças Armadas
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NDF	Namibian Defence Forces
NDP	National Development Plan
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEC	National Executive Committee
NEFF	Namibian Economic Freedom Fighters
NLMs	National liberation movements
NNP	New National Party
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
NUMSA	National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa
NUNW	National Union of Namibian Workers

OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
PAIGC	*Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*
PF-ZAPU	Patriotic Front- Zimbabwe Africa People's Organization
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PRE	*Programa de Reabilitação Econômica*
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Program
Renamo	*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*
RET	Radical Economic Transformation
RF	Rhodesia Front
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defence Forces
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SEF	*Programma de Saneamento Economico e Financeiro*
SPYL	Swapo Party Youth League
SWANU	South West African National Union
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
TAs	Traditional Authorities
TNDP	Transitional National Development Plan
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TTLs	Tribal Trust Lands
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNITA	*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*
UPA	*União das Populações de Angola*
VIDCOS	Village Development Committees
WADCOS	Ward Development Committees
WBWS	Willing buyer, willing seller
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe Africa People's Organization
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

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CHAPTER ONE

THE LEGACIES OF LIBERATION: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Between the early 1960s and late 1980s, prolonged settler colonialism in Southern Africa led to violent liberation struggles against determined settler-colonial oppression and exploitation in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.[1] In all five countries, colonial or White-minority regimes averse to decolonization and black majority rule provoked mass-mobilizing politico-military struggles in which revolutionary national liberation movements (NLMs) sought to end settler-colonial domination and to radically transform inherited, racially exclusionary state and social structures as a precondition for building non-racialist, equitable, democratic national societies. Furthermore, the victorious revolutionary NLMs that successively displaced settler-colonial domination and assumed political power between the mid-1970s and early 1990s (see Table 1.1) have since dominated the national political arena in all five countries.

Yet, despite these historical commonalities, the five countries have been marked by divergent paths of postcolonial political development. The more enduring legacies of liberation that have consolidated in the past decade in some (i.e., Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe) or have been in the process of consolidation in others (South Africa and Namibia) strikingly vary despite similar settler-colonial antecedents or shared political, organizational, and ideological attributes of the liberation parties. Three different political regimes—with contrasting patterns of political inclusion, structural inequalities, and national polarization—can be identified: *less inclusive semi-democracies* with moderately unequal, post-racial societies (i.e., Angola and Mozambique), a *militarized semi-authoritarianism* with the least unequal but extremely

[1] Throughout the colonial period, Zimbabwe and Namibia were known as Southern Rhodesia (and simply Rhodesia after 1964) and South West Africa, respectively. I use these names in this and the subsequent two chapters except when usage of the country names is appropriate. Moreover, for the sake of consistency, I use interchangeably the terms ‘settler colonialism,’ ‘settler-colonial’ rule, and minority regimes in reference to the pre-liberation period notwithstanding important distinctions in settler-colonial institutions during the late-colonial period (see Chapter 2).

polarized society (Zimbabwe), and *inclusive multiracial democracies* with highly unequal societies polarized by racial and post-racial class divisions (i.e., South Africa and Namibia).

What explains the differing legacies of liberation in post-settler colonial Southern Africa? Dominant approaches understand the cross-national variations in terms of either deterministic structural factors of the settler-colonial period, or politico-military origins of the liberation political parties-turned-to-governments, or relatively recent political events unique to each country. Moreover, the more influential explanations were generated through ideographic case studies with limited external validity. To be sure, comparative perspectives are not entirely lacking. However, some scholars draw on insights from contexts of armed struggles in postcolonial Eastern Africa, committing the cardinal methodological sin of 'conceptual stretching;'[2] some others who avoid this pitfall traditionally analyze the Lusophone and Anglophone countries separately; and still others overgeneralize from obvious cases of political instability and authoritarianism (i.e., Zimbabwe) when predicting the likely outcomes of recent events or future developments in cases of later decolonization (i.e., South Africa and Namibia).

This study emphasizes contingent reform-policy choices of a foundational period—the 'liberation reform episode'—in each country. I conceptualize this period as a critical juncture, generally understood as a well-defined episode of major institutional changes "hypothesized to produce distinct [and enduring] legacies."[3] I show that, with the end of settler-colonial rule, Southern Africa liberation elites adopted 'radical' or 'liberal' reform packages due to distinctive sets of opportunities and constraints defined by differing *mode* and *timing* of national liberation.

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[2] Giovani Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (Dec. 1970): 1033-1053.

[3] Ruth B. Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 29. For the latest and differing views on critical junctures, see L. Garcia-Montaya and J. Mahoney, "Critical Event Analysis in Case Study Research," *Sociological Methods & Research* (2020): 1-45; D. Collier and G. L. Munck, eds., *Critical Junctures and Historical Legacies: Insights and Methods for Comparative Social Science* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).

In Mozambique and Angola, a collapsing state, underdeveloped economies, and weak settler capital paved the road for a militarized mode of liberation in a Cold-War setting that allowed the pursuit of *radical reforms*. In South Africa and Namibia, by contrast, the presence of a strong settler state, advanced capitalist economies, and a powerful capital on the eve of liberation led to a negotiated mode of liberation in a far more constraining post-Cold War world-historical setup. This forced political leaders to abandon their radical reform ambitions and adopt *liberal reforms*. In Zimbabwe, similar antecedent conditions resulted in a negotiated liberation, but a less constraining international context of the 1980s allowed nationalist leaders to thwart the initial liberal policy choice, producing a pattern of *stalled liberal reforms*. In sum, the distinctive historical antecedents of the pre-reform period crucially conditioned liberation-elite choices; but they do not directly explain the divergent paths of political development.

The alternative reform approaches generated a dynamic of political reactions and counterreactions—a reactive sequence—that dominated the aftermath of reforms. This dynamic was defined by strong *patterns of backlash* to the reform period; governments counterreactions with renewed policy or institutional reforms; and institutional reproduction. Radical reforms (i.e., Mozambique and Angola) triggered a violent *conservative backlash* rooted among disaffected rural traditional elites and the peasantry, which led to political liberalization, renewed inclusion, and transition to market economies. In dramatic contrast, liberal reforms (i.e., South Africa and Namibia) generated a *social-democratic backlash* by popular sectors against deepening racial and class inequalities, mass unemployment, and persistent poverty, to which governments counterreacted with renewed liberal efforts at greater redistribution (e.g., income, land), poverty reduction, and welfare for the urban and rural poor. Finally, stalled-liberal reforms (Zimbabwe) activated a *liberal backlash* by diverse pro-democracy forces to which the government responded

with renewed repression, partial inclusion, and radical redistribution of white-owned land. In each country, the resolution of the conflict was marked by reproduction of state institutions and patterns of national polarization that defined the reform period and its aftermath. These more stable state and social structures represent the ultimate legacies of liberation in the region.

I illustrate the argument with rich qualitative and quantitative data (over 20,000 pages) that encompass official documents of the settler-colonial regimes; statements on the political and socioeconomic goals of the liberation movements; and material on the reform policies, programs, and strategies of post-liberation governments. The study employs small-N methods associated with comparative-historical analysis (CHA), a macro-oriented historical inquiry of large-scale processes that unfold over time and across cases. The analyst draws causal inference through a combination of broad cross-case comparison and highly contextualized within-case analysis. I use cross-case methods to identify regularities and formulate hypotheses, and within-case and counterfactual methods to test hypothesized causal connections and evaluate rival explanations.

The analysis provides an empirically grounded theory of political development in postcolonial Southern Africa. Yet, it offers some key insights of broader relevance for scholars of comparative politics and political development. First, it generates insights and propositions for the analysis of long-run legacies of decolonization in Africa, particularly in countries that decolonized through violent conflicts or that underwent major, discontinuous change during the postcolonial period. Second, the critical-junctures framework of analysis demonstrates the importance of episodes of conflict resolution, political settlement, and post-conflict dynamics for the legacies of revolutions, prolonged conflicts, and other episodes of basic change. Finally, stressing the importance of leadership and strategic choice during major episodes of change, the study will enrich comparative-historical and path-dependent studies of regime development.

1.1 The Historical Puzzle

Beginning in the early 1960s, Southern Africa experienced violent anti-imperialist uprisings—so-called Southern Africa's Revolutions or the Thirty Years' War[4]—against lingering settler-colonial regimes in the region. During this period, radical national-liberation movements (NLMs) mounted mass-mobilizing and violent struggles against the last "White redoubts" of European colonialism in the Portuguese "overseas provinces" of Angola and Mozambique and settler-ruled South Africa, South West Africa,[5] and Southern Rhodesia. the five countries had shared historical antecedents of racialized structures of economic exploitation and cultural oppression of the black majorities notwithstanding some important distinctions between Portuguese overseas settler colonialism, on the one hand, and the system of "internal colonialism" by White minorities in South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, on the other. The political economy of the settler states in the late settler-colonial period was commonly based on extensive land dispossession, labor exploitation, and political disenfranchisement of non-White racial groups. In all five countries, the settler-colonial regimes hostile to racial equality managed to "ride out the winds of change"[6] in the postwar decades by means of institutional reforms that firmly institutionalized racial differences and the violent repression of black mobilization that stifled prospects for majority rule or African self-rule.

In all five countries, this gave rise to the historic struggles for national liberation beginning in the early 1960s. Moreover, in the course of the ensuing politico-military struggles, the more radical NLMs came to dominate the armed revolutions (Table 1.1). Commonly

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[4] Arrighi and Saul, "Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa," 1969; John S. Saul, *Recolonization and Resistance: Southern Africa in the 1990s* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1993), pp. 1-34.

[5] South West Africa was technically a South African occupied territory after WWI. However, the settler minority maintained total political and economic power under South African tutelage and the latter sought to fully incorporate the territory. Hence, it is more a case of White-minority rule than external imperial domination.

[6] Thomas H. Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1978).

embracing Marxist-Leninist ideological principles, structures, and goals, these movements adopted more or less radical strategies and end-goals formalized in the Soviet-inspired theory of National Democratic Revolution (NDR). Their leaders generally viewed the national revolution as a two-stage process of genuine national and social liberation: (a) attaining national freedom through protracted "people's war" mobilizing the national petty bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants under a vanguard party, and (b) afterwards pursuing far-reaching political, economic, and societal transformations by destroying the inherited state and social structures undergirding settler-colonial exploitation, inequities, and prejudices.[7] In all five countries, the radical NLMs achieved political freedom from settler-colonial domination between 1975 and 1994. However, their leaders rather pursued different state, political, and socioeconomic reforms thereafter.

Table 1.1: Settler Colonialism, Liberation Struggles, the Liberation Reform Episode, and Radical NLMs in Southern Africa

	Settler Col. Period	*Liberation Struggle*	*Liberation Episode*	*Radical National Liberation Movement (NLM)*
Angola	1498 – 1975	1961 – 1974	1975 – 1982	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA)
Mozambique	1575 – 1975	1962 – 1974	1974 – 1983	*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO)
Zimbabwe	1888 – 1980	1964 – 1979	1979 – 1990	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
Namibia	1884 – 1990	1966 – 1990	1989 – 2004	South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)
South Africa	1652 – 1994	1961 – 1990	1990 – 2004	African National Congress (ANC) & South African Communist Party (SACP)

Each of former liberation political parties have also dominated the national political arena since the end of settler-colonial rule. Yet, as I argue in the analysis to come (Chapter 7), they have done so in strikingly diverse ways and through diverse political institutions. As shown in Fig. 1.1 and Table 1.2, today the countries are defined by different levels of political and civil liberties, with South Africa and Namibia representing some of the most open democracies in

[7] On the NDR theory of revolution, see Roger Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa* (Durban: James Currey, 2013), pp. 74-7; Joe Slovo, *The South African Working Class and the National Democratic Revolution* (Cape Town: South African Communist Party, 1988).

Sub-Saharan Africa while Zimbabwe stands out as one of the most repressive and violent regimes after steady democratic backsliding in recent decades. Further, the countries are characterized by varied levels and patterns of social inequalities and polarization. Whereas in Mozambique and Angola such disparities are intermediate and largely post-racial in nature, they are starkly high and both racial and post-racial in composition in South Africa and Namibia. These striking regime and socio-structural variations across the countries represent an important empirical puzzle given their shared historical antecedents of prolonged settler colonialism as well as revolutionary parties with shared political values, goals, and organizational structures.

Figure 1.1: Patterns of Electoral Democracy since the Liberation Reform Period



Source: Michael Coppedge, et al, "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v13" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. V-dem database (www.v-dem.net).

Table 1.2: Social Inequalities: 25-30 Years After Liberation

Country	*Gini Ratio (Year)*	*Rank*
Angola	0.43 (2008)	5
Mozambique	0.46 (2008)	4
Zimbabwe	0.50 (2006)	3
Namibia	0.55 (2018)	2
South Africa	0.63 (2020)	1

Source*:* The World Bank, "Poverty and Inequality Platform," pip.worldbank.org.

This project has been motivated by this empirical puzzle and develops a theory of political development in post-liberation Southern Africa. What caused the divergent paths of political development in post-settler colonial Southern Africa? What conceptual and theoretical approach should be adopted for formulating a more adequate explanation? In this study, I propose a new theoretical approach that draws analytical focus to a critical juncture of liberation period reforms following the end of settler-colonial rule, and provide a path-dependent explanation of post-liberation political change. In other words, the divergent trajectories of political development in all five countries followed a dynamic of political reactions and counteractions set into motion by political choices made during the critical juncture. Before I introduce my argument, and the empirical and methodological approach, I will assess next the contributions and shortcomings of alternative approaches and explanations.

1.2 EXISTING ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

Dominant explanations variously stress the importance of revolutionary change, historical structures, rebel organizations, and international factors. I assess these approaches in view of (1) what explains, overall, the sharply contrasting legacies of liberation? and (2) why Southern African liberation leaders pursued different reform packages after assuming political power?

1.2.1 Social Revolutions and Radical Change

Sociological theories of revolutions address the nature of changes that follow successful national social revolutions. Leading thinkers have emphasized that social revolutions involving lower-class mobilization naturally lead to complete breakdown of old state and social structures.[8] In fact, scholars agree that the defining attribute of social revolutions is "rapid, basic

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[8] The most influential statements were made by none other than the original theorists of social revolutions, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* (1948).

transformations of a society's state and class structures."[9] Moreover, according to sociologists and political scientists, modern social revolutions produce socialist dictatorships[10] or political regimes with highly centralized states[11] and heightened political participation,[12] and rarely result in liberal democracies. Most recently, Levitsky and Way argue that "revolutionary regimes" endure challenges—such as severe economic crises, large-scale popular uprisings, and international isolation—most authoritarian regimes fail to survive. The durability of revolutionary regimes stem from their political origins in "sustained, ideological, and violent struggle from below," that defined classical social revolutions and twentieth-century national liberation struggles in Southern Africa, and their establishment "accompanied by mass mobilization and significant efforts to transform state structures and the existing social order."[13]

The above theories offer key insights and tools to understand the political legacies of revolutionary struggles in Southern Africa. In particular, Theda Skocpol's emphasis on the state as a key factor in revolutionary outbreak and post-revolutionary state-building strategies underscores the centrality of the state in studying the different political routes to liberation and post-liberation reform strategies in southern Africa. Moreover, Skocpol's comparative-historical approach that underscored structural and temporal factors urges scholars to investigate the structural conditions, international factors, and the world-historical context that variously shaped the processes and outcomes of southern African revolutionary struggles.

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[9] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4.
[10] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
[11] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions,* 1979; see Part II on post-revolutionary changes and state-building.
[12] S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), see Ch. 5.
[13] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 24 (July 2013), p. 5, and *Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022).

Yet both old and new theories of social revolutions are unsatisfactory with regards to Southern Africa. The causal claims have a narrow scope condition—i.e., 'successful' national social revolutions involving rapid and basic transformations of state and social-class structures—that exclude South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe as instances of 'unsuccessful,' 'partial,' or 'non-social' revolutions. In these cases, too, revolutionary movements espousing radical agendas seized state power and pursued far-reaching, albeit less radical, structural changes. Apart from the most recent studies, sociological theories are a poor guide to long-term political outcomes. Skocpol, following B. Moore Jr., reasoned that the outcomes of national revolutions depend on the level of modernization; if national wealth is relatively widely spread, no revolutionary regime would successfully take over the economy, leading to a capitalist system that protects private property (e.g., France), but where industrialization had commenced and economic production is concentrated (in large factories, railroads, electrical power plants), a revolutionary regime would easily seize the economy to establish socialist dictatorship as in Russia and China.[14] This hypothesis is compelling especially insofar as differences between modern and pre-industrial economies and revolutionary outcomes are concerned. Paradoxically, the structural conditions favorable to socialist revolution were present in the countries that experienced liberal reforms especially South Africa and Zimbabwe. as Chabal argued, "the context within which the Lusophone anti-colonial struggles took place made it improbable that it could ever engender full-fledged revolutions ... it was always highly unlikely that the Lusophone anticolonial wars would bring about any 'transition to socialism' …"[15]

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[14] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 162-63; also Jack. A. Goldstone, "An Analytical Framework," in J. A. Goldstone, T. R. Gurr, and F. Moshiri, eds., *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 47.

[15] Patrick Chabal, "The End of Empire," in P. Chabal, *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), p. 20.

The emphasis on structural determinants also downplays agency and contingency in revolutionary processes and outcomes.[16] Recent sociological theories focus on more dynamic factors such as revolutionary organization and leadership, ideology, and class coalition to explain variations in revolutionary process and outcomes.[17] Levitsky and Way crucially underscored the importance of leadership, crises, and unforeseen events that define post-revolutionary situations and long-term regime development.[18] As Goldstone (1991) emphasized, the immediate reform outcomes of Southern African liberation struggles were influenced more by contingent events than by past ideological and political considerations. While organization and leadership are necessary for revolutionary collective action, the presence of professional revolutionaries is rarely sufficient for revolutionary change.[19] Militant politico-military organizations and radical leaders committed to revolutionary change were present in all five countries. Such unforeseen factors as state collapse, external intervention, and the international state system were as important in the violent seizure of state power and the unleashing of revolutionary changes in Angola and Mozambique. As Skocpol and Goodwin succinctly underscore, by way of paraphrasing Karl Marx, "Revolutions are ultimately 'made' by revolutionaries, but not of their own free will – not within political contexts they themselves have chosen."[20]

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[16] For this critique, among others, see Jack A. Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 139-87; John Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?," *Sociological Theory* 11 (1993): 1-20; Jeff Goodwin, "State-Centered Approaches to Social Revolutions: Strengths and Limitations of a Theoretical Tradition," in John Foran ed., *Theorizing Revolutions* (London: Routledge, 1997): 11-37; Jeff Goodwin, "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994): 731-66; Eric Selbin, "Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In," in John Foran ed., *Theorizing Revolutions* (London: Routledge, 1997): 123-36; W. H. Sewell, Jr., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," *Journal of Modern History* 57, 1 (March 1985): 57-85.

[17] For a comprehensive treatment, see Jack A. Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions," in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 41-90; and "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics* 32(April 1980): 425-453.

[18] Levitsky and Way, "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes," 2013, and *Revolution and Dictatorship,* 2022.

[19] Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*, pp. 259-78.

[20] Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," pp. 264-265.

Ideology crucially shapes the agendas and strategies of revolutionary actors.[21] The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique was as necessary for socialism in post-liberation Angola and Mozambique as the *non-racialism* of the ANC in South Africa for an inclusive multi-racial democracy in post-apartheid South Africa. Yet revolutionary ideology does not go far enough to explain contrasting policy choices adopted by Southern African liberation elites. All five movements were strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninism principles of class struggles and revolutionary transformation. The liberation elites had similar class backgrounds and radical ideological beliefs. Yet, for the majority, there is no correlation between their radical goals of the struggle period and their reform choices following national liberation. Revolutionary leaders in the region, to quote Skocpol, "ended up accomplishing very different tasks and furthering the consolidation of quite different kinds of new regimes from those they originally (and perhaps ever) ideologically intended."[22]

In Marxist theory, the vehicle for successful revolutionary change is class conflict and lower-class mobilization. Marxian scholars of Southern Africa expected that class contradictions that underlaid settler colonialism in the region and subsequent lower-class revolts would pave the road to revolutionary change and socialism in all countries. For some, the explosive mix of racial and class conflicts resulting from "accumulation by dispossession" and continued racial subjugation in the region would inevitably provoke radical revolutions bent on displacing the exploitative political, economic, and social structures of settler colonialism.[23] For others, the

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[21] For example, W. H. Sewell, Jr., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," 1985; Jack Goldstone, "An Analytical Framework," 1991, pp. 47-51; John Foran and Jeff Goodwin, "Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition Fragmentation, War, and the Limits of Social Transformation," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 210-211; Eric Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

[22] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 1979, pp. 170-171.

[23] E.g., Bonnie Campbell, *Libération Nationale Et Construction Du Socialisme En Afrique: Angola, Guinée-Bissau, Mozambique* (Montreal: Éditions Nouvelle Optique, 1977); Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973); Basil Davidson, "African Peasants and Revolution," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 1 (1974): 269-90; Thomas Henriksen, "People's War in Angola, Mozambique, and

revolutionary struggles themselves would set into motion a "historical causation"—i.e., the development of people's wars involving the radicalization of peasants and the emergence of a "revolutionary class alliance" of a petty bourgeois, workers, and peasants; the birth of revolutionary parties proclaiming Marxist ideology—that, as in China and Vietnam, would inexorably culminate in revolutionary upheavals and the construction of socialist orders in post-colonial Southern Africa particularly in Portuguese Africa.[24]

Yet, racial and class conflict, lower-class mobilization, and broad revolutionary coalitions were not sufficient for the revolutionary culmination of all Southern African national struggles. Obviously, not all the countries possessed the sort of socioeconomic structures, contradictions, and class conflicts favorable to radical changes in the Russian, Chinese or Cuban mold.[25] Paradoxically, however, liberation struggles culminated in radical changes in countries with backward economic and class development (i.e., Angola and Mozambique) instead of the other three countries, especially South Africa, with advanced capitalist economies, flagrant racial inequalities, and saturated social contradictions. It is, therefore, crucial to look beyond the standard economic and social class variables that, in Marxist thinking, correlate with revolutionary change for the actual structural factors that presented liberation elites with different sets of opportunities and constraints in the Southern African context (see chapters 2-3).

Guinea-Bissau," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (1976): 377-399; Thomas H. Henriksen, "Marxism and Mozambique," *African Affairs* 77 (1978): 441-462; Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo, and Anthony R. Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976); James Mittelman, *Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism: Mozambique and Tanzania* (Academic Press: New York, 1981).

[24] For a critical perspective, see P. Chabal, "People's War, State Formation and Revolution in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola," *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 21 (1983): 104-25. For the argument, besides Chabal, see also G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, "Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa," *The Socialist Register* 6 (1969): 137-188.

[25] For example, Chabal, "The End of Empire," p. 20; P. Chabal, *Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation* (London: MacMillan, 1992); Fred Curtis, "Race and Class in South Africa: Socialist Politics in the Current Conjuncture," *Rethinking Marxism* 1 (1988): 108-34.

1.2.2 Structural Legacies and Continuities

Social scientists also focus on antecedent conditions of settler-colonial society in an attempt to make sense of differences in post-liberation Southern Africa. For one, although concerned more about revolutionary causes and processes, sociological theories of revolutions after Barrington Moore Jr. emphasized that old state structures may define the processes and outcomes of revolutions.[26] Revolutionary uprisings often fizzle out in the periphery if states maintain cohesive elites and fiscal capacity, but if states suffer intra-elite divisions, institutional ineffectiveness, and sudden collapse, it paves the way for revolutionary change.[27] As such, scholars showed, colonial and postcolonial neopatrimonial states—with limited avenues for popular participation or limited military-administrative resources and external fiscal dependency—were particularly vulnerable to revolutionary crises and overthrow.[28]

I build on these insights as old state structures are key to analyzing Southern African revolutionary movements and post-revolutionary state-building. Distinctive structure and capacities of the settler-colonial states variously shaped the evolution of Southern African liberation struggles, and ultimately the scope and nature of reforms (see chapter 3 on the different routes to national liberation). For these reasons, and following major theoretical works on revolutions, I adopt a state-centered approach that focuses on the settler-colonial state's structures of exploitation and oppression as well as the liberation elites' drive to reform and deploy the state for far-reaching changes.[29] Nevertheless, my analysis is focused more on how

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[26] E.g., Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 1979; Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); also, Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in P. B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge Univesity Press, 1985): 3-37.
[27] Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumualtion in the Study of Revolutions," p. 82.
[28] Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 275; Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis," pp. 74-5; and "Revolutions and Superpowers," in J. R. Adelman, ed., *Revolutions and Superpowers* (N. York: Praeger, 1986): 38-48.
[29] See Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 1979; Levitsky and Way, "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes," 2013.

state structures shaped the development and conclusion of revolutionary struggles than with revolutionary causes. It also considers the state in conjunction with domestic economic structures as well as international settings in analyzing the origins of varied reforms approaches.

Social scientists also emphasized the significance of inherited state and social structures for post-revolutionary state and regime institutions. Whether a revolution would result in a democracy or dictatorship, for example, social-revolutionary scholars stress that "democratic values and institutions are far more likely to take root in societies with some democratic tradition" than in those "whose political traditions are almost wholly autocratic."[30] Some Southern Africa scholars make similar arguments to suggest that whereas liberal political and economic systems in post-liberation Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia has to do with a British tradition of property rights and representative institutions,[31] socialist regimes in post-liberation Angola and Mozambique were causally linked to a heritage of extractive institutions and corporatist authoritarianism of old and *Estado Novo* Portugal.[32]

Historical legacies mattered in varied ways. However, any analytical approach that prioritizes antecedent historical conditions is a poor guide to understanding political development in Southern Africa after the liberation episode (see Chapter 2). For one, Marxist-inspired twentieth-century revolutions and violent anti-imperialist Third World revolutions rarely, if ever, led to liberal democracy irrespective of historical conditions.[33] While leftist ideologies precluded the emergence of democracy and capitalist economy,[34] military violence that accompanied revolutions and post-revolutionary state-building nurtured conflicts leading to

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[30] T. R. Gurr and J. A. Goldstone, "Comparisons and Policy Implications," in Goldstone, Gurr and Moshiri eds., *Revolutions of Late Twentieth Century*, p. 343.
[31] This is implicit in the various analysis including, for example, Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, 2013.
[32] E.g., P. Chabal, "The Construction of the Nation-State," Chabal, *History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, 42-50.
[33] Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," p.168.
[34] E.g., Theda Skocpol, "Did the Civil War Further American Democracy? A Reflection on the Expansion of Benefits for Union Veterans," in Theda Skocpol, George Ross, Tony Smith and Judith E. Vichniac eds., *Democracy, Revolution, and History* (Ithaka: Cornell University Press, 1998): 73-101.

highly durable autocracies.[35] Revolutionary outcomes are thus better understood if treated as endogenous to the processes of revolution and post-revolutionary state-building.

The distinctions between British and Portuguese colonial heritages also rest on problematic, if not entirely erroneous, assumptions. While South Africa inherited a complex heritage of Dutch, British, and settler domination marked by representative institutions and violence, dispossession, and exclusion of non-whites, Namibia (former German colony), if any, had no history of liberal and representative institution until late 1960s. Moreover, whether the racially exclusive and highly repressive settler regimes that dominated South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe for most of the twentieth century bequeathed a legacy favorable to liberal democracy is open to question. White-minority domination in the latter cases was maintained through violent dispossession, exploitation, and sweeping exclusion of black majorities—racial domination much more insidious and refined than in the Portuguese territories. In general, settler colonialism fostered endemic inequalities, political divisions, and violence that continue to scuttle progress towards democratic and equitable societies in the region.[36]

1.2.3 War-Time Institutions and Authoritarianism

In recent decades, political scientists have produced a commendably rich scholarship on war-time rebel structures, ideology, and actors.[37] The political, administrative, and economic

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[35] Levitsky and Way, "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes," 2013; J. Lachapelle, S. Levitsky, L. Way, and Adam E. Casey, "Social Revolution and Authoritarian Regime Durability," *World Politics* 74 (Oct. 2020): 557-600.
[36] See, for instance, John S. Saul and Patrick Bond, *South Africa - The Present as History: From Mrs Ples to Mandela and Marikana* (Suffolk: James Currey, 2014); Thiven Reddy, *South Africa, Settler Colonialism and the Failures of Liberal Democracy: Settler Colonialism and the Failures of Liberal Democracy* (Zed Books, 2015).
[37] This literature is too vast and rich to succinctly reproduce here. For systematic analysis, see A. Arjona, N. Kasfir and Z. Mampilly, eds., *Rebel Governance in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 21-46) and Z. C. Mampilly and M. A. Stewart, "A Typology of Rebel Political Institutional Arrangements;" *Journal of conflict Resolution* (2020): 1-31; also see, Z. C. Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); A. Arjona, *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); and M. Woldemariam, *Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

structures rebels establish to maintain war-time authority, they hypothesize, serve as blueprints for post-conflict state-building and governance, often laying a foundation for strong authoritarian regimes.[38] Remarkable differences in post-conflict structures are linked to such variations as rural vs. urban mobilization, stationary vs. predatory rebels, rebel "communal structure", and civilian-military leadership relations within rebel groups.[39]

These hypotheses have wider applicability but limited predictive power concerning post-conflict reforms, processes, and structures in the Southern African context. First, insofar as war-time structures are reflections of guerrilla ideologies, "strategic objectives," and "local conditions,"[40] post-war institutions are unlikely to be replicas of war-time structures as political goals and conditions change in post-conflict circumstances. Revolutionary guerrillas, for example, rarely maintain war-time organizational structures and, once they control the state and face urban challenges, civilian mobilization in rural areas. Very often, in fact, revolutionaries dial down ideological militancy and popular participation after successful power consolidation. Moreover, ideological goals and strategies shift as leaders contend with post-revolutionary imperatives and complex internal and external conditions that defy rarefied ideological principles. Finally, the dynamics of post-war transitions fare better in explaining emerging state institutions and state-society relations. In short, it is difficult to infer post-liberation outcomes

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[38] Christopher Clapham, "Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies," in C. Clapham ed., *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), p. 8; William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Terrence Lyons, "From Victorious Rebels to Strong Authoritarian Parties: Prospects for Post-War Democratization," *Democratization* 23 (2016): 1026-41; Kai Thaler, *From Insurgent to Incumbent: State Building and Service Provision after Rebel Victory in Civil Wars* (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 2018).

[39] E.g., Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968. Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa*, 2011; C. Day and M. Woldemariam, "From Rebelling to Ruling: Insurgent Victory and State Capture in Africa," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (2021) DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2021.1980978. R. Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power,* assertively makes the point while arguing that political differences (and similarities) of the ANC, ZANU-PF, and SWAPO, embedded in post-liberation politics and policies, bear "the stamp of history" of each movement (p. 42).

[40] Mampilly and Stewart, "A Typology of Rebel Political Institutional Arrangements," p. 3.

from insurgent mobilization or structures since differing domestic structures, power arrangements, and external factors could yield to varied institutional outcomes.[41]

A related, but distinct, hypothesis emphasizes a correlation between the militant origins of national liberation movements and durable authoritarian or dominant-party regimes in post-liberation contexts in Africa. The internal character of liberation movements (e.g., internal hierarchy, democratic centralism, and secrecy), the political norms of violence,[42] and often violent power consolidation after liberation[43]—are deemed to undergird former liberation fronts' repressive hegemony over the national political arena. Political challenges to constitutionalism, democracy, and good governance in Southern Africa are considered symptoms of an anti-democratic, 'liberation' political culture cultivated during the militant struggles.[44]

No serious analyst can afford to ignore the internal political structures, culture, and mores of former liberation movements. However, this study departs from the rebel-governance paradigm because, first, it is concerned with explaining political differences (and their linkage to

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[41] Chabal, "People's War, State Formation and Revolution in Africa," 1983 and Norma J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (New York: Cambridge Universitry Press, 1992).
[42] Sara Rich Dorman, "Born Powerful? Authoritarian Politics in Postliberation Eritrea and Zimbabwe," in K. Deonandan, D. Close and Gary Prevost eds., *From Revolutionary Movements to Political Parties: Cases from Latin America and Africa* (London: Springer, 2007): 157-79; M. A. Mohamed Salih, "African Liberation Movement Governments and Democracy," *Democratization* 14 (2007): 669-85; Christopher Clapham, "From Liberation Movement to Government," in *Past Legacies and the Challenge of Transition in Africa* (The Brenthurt Foundation Discussion Paper, 2012); Lyons, "From Victorious Rebels to Strong Authoritarian Parties," 2016; William Gumede, "The Democracy Deficit of Africa's Liberation Movements Turned Governments," *Politikon* 44 (2017): 27-48; and John Markakis, "Liberation Movements and the 'Democratic Deficit'," in Redie Bereketeab, ed., *National Libration Moivements as Governments in Africa* (New York: Routeldge, 2019): 33-40.
[43] For example, Sara Rich Dorman, "Post-Liberation Politics in Africa: Examining the Political Legacy of Struggle," *Third World Quarterly* 27 (2006): 1085-1101; T. Lyons, "The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian Politics," *Comparative Politics* 48 (2016): 167-184.
[44] See, for example, Henning Melber, "From Liberation Movements to Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa," *African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie* 6 (2002): 161-72, and *Understanding Namibia: The Trials of Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); André Du Pisani, "The Politics and Resource Endowment of Party Dominance in Namibia: The Past as the Present and the Future?," in Nicola de Jagerand and Pierre Du Toit eds., *Friend or Foe? Dominant Party Systems in Southern Africa: Insights from the Developing World* (New York: UCT Press, 2013): 132-48; Roger Southall, "Democracy at Risk? Politics and Governance under the ANC," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 652 (2014): 48-69, and *Liberation Movements in Power*, 2013; Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014); Annemie Britz and Josephat Tshuma, "Heroes Fall, Oppressors Rise: Democratic Decay and Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe," in Nicola de Jager and Pierre du Toit eds., *Friend or Foe?*, 2013, pp. 171-94.

the liberation episode) rather than merely highlighting commonalities across post-liberation Southern African contexts. To that end, and secondly, it draws attention to different approaches to political and socioeconomic reforms after protracted politico-military struggles to better understand the legacies of liberation. I draw on Levitsky and Way, who emphasize patterns of power consolidation and state-building after liberation as key variables in explaining post-revolutionary regime development even though their analysis is limited to cases they consider as successful "social revolutions," i.e., Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.[45]

This study, thirdly, employs a more refined definition of "liberation struggle," which excludes a wide range of African NLMs that, unlike the Southern African revolutionary NLMs, did not originate in reaction to settler-colonial domination and aspired for revolutionary transformation of associated structures.[46] Major hypotheses on post-liberation politics and society in Southern Africa are based on conclusions drawn from a broad range of Africa liberation struggles with few, if any, commonalities. Broad generalizations neither undesirable nor necessarily faulty. But valid conceptualization and measurement are necessary for making valid descriptive or causal inferences. Not only are the cases studied here historically, culturally, and geographically bounded, they also are particular instances of violent revolutionary mobilizations against the last "White redoubts" of European colonialism in Africa, seeking to dismantle exploitative state and societal structures, and to herald genuine social emancipation, dignity, and equality of all races.

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[45] Steven. R. Levitsky and Lucan. A. Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, 4 (December 2012): 869-889.

[46] The common usage of the concept 'liberation struggle' or 'national liberation movements' is a textbook example of *conceptual stretching*. For a superb conceptualization and typology of different liberation movements in post-colonial Africa, see Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa*, who defines the cases of this study as "anti-colonial rebels" (in Angola and Mozambique) and "majority-rule rebels" (in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) that originated as militant nationalist movements for decolonization from colonial or White minority rule.

For all its analytical strengths, another challenge for the rebel-to-state paradigm arises from its sheer focus on legacies of guerrilla structures and ideologies. The wars of liberation in Southern African brought fundamental changes in prevailing state structures, societal relations, and modes of production that set into motion large-scale processes, which require an analytical framework that goes beyond war-time actors and structures. In analyzing the causes behind different policy approaches taken at liberation or the subsequent processes of political change, legacies of violence should be considered in conjunction with other equally important political, societal, and economic factors. An alternative approach centered on post-revolutionary political actors, events, and process goes a long way to better explain the outcomes of Southern African liberation wars. Likewise, a wider focus on state and social structures—as opposed to narrow concerns with party politics or democracy—can sufficiently capture complex national political processes in post-settler colonial Southern Africa.

1.2.4 International Factors

International factors, such as interstate power relations, uneven capitalist development, and external dependency, have attained prominent status in the analysis of revolutions since the seminal work of Theda Skocpol, who argued that "[t]ransnational relations contributed to the emergence of all social-revolutionary crises and have invariably helped to shape revolutionary struggles and outcomes."[47] Scholars have since stressed the role of great capitalist powers, e.g., U.S. support for dictators and eventual withdrawal, for the successful culmination of Cuban, Iranian, and Nicaraguan revolutions,[48] while political analysts pointed to Soviet, Cuba, or Chinese hand behind African, Asian, and Latin American insurgencies.

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[47] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 19.
[48] Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," pp. 259-60; Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumualtion in the Study of Revolutions," p. 74.

Africanist scholars thus variously suggested that external factors critically defined the course and outcomes of Southern African national-social revolutions. Some credited the radically transformative Angolan and Mozambican revolutions to Soviet and Cuban support, while others blamed the culmination of the Zimbabwean and South African revolution in liberal reforms on Western powers and global capitalist pressure. This echoed a widely held view in the 1970s that pre-capitalist African conditions, Africa's dependent position in the world-capitalist economy, and the "extroverted" nature of African states presented formidable obstacles to successful revolutionary change.[49] And external constraint on African agency have only exacerbated after the 1970s with the growing economic muscle of global financial institutions that pushed free-market, neoliberal economic, social, and political agendas.

This study takes seriously international factors and world-historic changes. In the final analysis, as Skocpol emphasized, "[no] valid theoretical perspective on revolutions can afford to ignore the international and world-historical contexts within which revolutions occur."[50] But I part ways with commonplace arguments that international factors shaped the processes and outcomes of Southern African revolutionary struggles in a determinative and invariable manner . Time and again, external powers have proven unable to prevent or reverse revolutions as with France in Vietnam and Algeria and the United States in Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua.[51] Despite heightened international pressure for economic and political liberalization since the 1990s, ruling elites in sub-Saharan Africa have managed to defy, or manipulate to their advantage, international inducements for political and economic liberalization.[52]

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[49] E.g., Chabal, *Power in Africa,*1992; Davidson, "African Peasants and Revolution," 1974; Jean-Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (Malden: Polity Press, 1994).
[50] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 24.
[51] Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 260.
[52] See Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); also Bayart, *The State in Africa*, 1993.

Transnational factors should be analyzed in conjunction with, not as substitutes to, domestic conditions. Further, it is crucial to elaborate how changing international political, military, and economic dynamics affected anticolonialist political and military struggles in Southern Africa at different point in historical time. Of particular significance were major world-historical developments (i.e., the demise of the Soviet Union and world socialism) and the global expansion of neoliberalism during late twentieth century. One could imagine a radical path in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia in the absence of the epochal international transformations that overlapped with the liberation in the 1980s-1990s and the vice versa in Angola and Mozambique in mid 1970s in a counterfactually different world setting. The world-historical timing of liberation affected, on the one hand, "the models of political-party organization and of ways for using state power"[53] and, on the other, the economic and state-building approaches that were available to liberation leaderships.

1.3 TOWARDS A NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH

I employ a new framework of analysis that focuses on a reform period following national liberation in each country. During the liberation reform episode (see Table 1.1), nationalist elites in all five countries assumed state power with the end of settler-colonial rule and implemented varying reform policy packages that last for several years. The emphasis on this well-defined historical episode that I conceptualize as a *critical juncture* is justified by the fact that Southern African liberation elites adopted dramatically contrasting reform approaches that set off the countries in diverging paths of political and institutional development. In this section, I outline the conceptualization of the liberation reform episode as a critical juncture as the basis of a new theoretical approach to Southern Africa's struggles for liberation and their political legacies.

[53] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 173.

1.3.1 The Liberation Episode as a Critical Juncture

Both historians and social scientists deem the period of national and class revolutions as a formative episode in the political history of Southern Africa. While not negating the historical importance of the struggle period, this study shifts analytical focus to the liberation reform episode following the politico-military struggles. It is during this period of historical reforms that differences emerged between the liberation movements regarding how they achieved and consolidated political power, the reforms they introduced, and the kind of state institutions they crafted to maintain power and carry-on reforms. In other words, this period is more foundational to understand differences in the long-run institutional implications of the liberation struggles. It represents a critical juncture or a well-defined period of institutional changes that unfolded in different ways in each country and in turn set off different trajectories with "distinct" and "enduring" legacies.[54] Such episodes are "critical" in the sense that "once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial choice point when multiple alternatives were still available."[55] The core argument is that the contrasting legacies of liberation in present-day Southern Africa are long-term outcomes of these episode. Therefore, a systematic analysis of the dynamics of this episode is theoretically warranted.

The analytical importance of critical junctures derives from two defining properties of the concept. First, critical junctures are moments of heightened contingency and "relative structural indeterminism," with political actors shaping "outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion than normal circumstances permit."[56] During such moments of disjuncture, flux, or crisis, the

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[54] For this definition, see Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, pp. 29-31 and David Collier and Gerardo L. Munck, "Building Blocks and Methodological Challenges: A Framework for Studying Critical Junctures," *Qualitative & Multi-Method Research*, 15 (Spring 2017), p. 2.
[55] James Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 6-7.
[56] Ibid., p. 7.; also, see Garcia-Montaya and Mahoney, "Critical Event Analysis in Case Study Research," 2020.

influence of structural factors (i.e., economic, organizational, cultural, etc.) over political action are "significantly relaxed for a relatively short period," leading to substantially increased range of policy choices available to powerful actors. Crucial decisions are "taken in a situation of high uncertainty and unpredictability, given the relaxation of the 'normal' structural and institutional constraints on action."[57] Second, strategic choices made during critical junctures are momentous for subsequent events; they set into motion path-dependent processes marked by relative determinism, because "once an option is selected, it becomes progressively difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available."[58]

The Historical Contingency of Liberation Reforms

Debates over the political outcomes of Southern African liberation struggles center on the casual significance of antecedent conditions or institutional attributes of the liberation movements themselves. Radical Southern Africa NLMs were spurred by similar structural conditions of settler colonialism and goals of radically transforming racist settler-colonial state and social structures. Thus, standard variables related to the structures of settler-colonial domination or revolutionary ideology cannot explain differences in reforms pursued by liberation elites. Rather, whether liberation elites opted for a radical or liberal approach during transition from settler-

[57] Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," *World Politics,* 59 (2007): 341-369, p. 343. There are diverging views of contingency, with some scholars arguing that actor decisions during critical junctures are strongly shaped by structural antecedents; see David Collier, "Critical Juncture Framework and The Five-Step Template," in Collier and Munck, eds., *Critical Junctures and Historical Legacies*, p. 36; Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, "Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, (2010): 886-917. Even though antecednet conditons played important role in conditioning Southern african liberation elites' policy choices (see chapter 3), the reforms cannot be explained by standard structural factors that scholars thought would lead to a particular political outcome in each country. In addition, indeed the range of policy options available to political actors and the choices actors make can be influenced, to varying extents, by historical antecedents or events temporally preceding the critical juncture. However, actors enjoy greater degree of agency during critical junctures, shaping "outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion than normal circumstances permit" because of "the [relative] relaxation of the 'normal' structural and institutional constraints on [voluntary] action." See Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism*, p. 7, and Capoccia and Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures," p. 355.

[58] James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," *Theory and Society*, 29 (2000), p. 513.

colonial rule was contingent on the particular set off opportunities and constraints they faced. The reform choices were historically contingent in the sense that not only had liberation leaders greater political discretion during the liberation episode, but also the reforms they pursued were not anticipated by relevant theories.[59] Marxist and structuralist theories predicted that the revolutionary conflicts were more likely to culminate in radical change in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which had advanced capitalist economies, higher social inequality, and sharp racial-class contradictions than in Angola and Mozambique, with agrarian economies, underdeveloped working class, and lower social inequalities (see Chapter 2).

Figure 1.2: The Mode and Timing of National Liberation
and Corresponding Elite Policy Choices

	Mode of Liberation	*Timing of Liberation*	*Reform approach*
Mozambique (1975)	Military	Cold War	**Radical**
Angola (1975)	Military	Cold War	**Radical**
Zimbabwe (1980)	Negotiated	Cold War	**Stalled-Liberal**
Namibia (1990)	Negotiated	Post-Cold War	**Liberal**
South Africa (1994)	Negotiated	Post-Cold War	**Liberal**

At the concluding stage of the struggles, Southern African nationalist elites came to contend with distinct state structures, national economies, and dominant class interests in each case. At the moment of liberation, Angola and Mozambique had a weak and collapsing colonial state along with backward national economies dominated by metropolitan (Portuguese) capital interests. By contrast, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa, had structurally powerful, if significantly weakened, settler states, more or less advanced capitalist economies, and powerful settler and international capital dominating capitalist agriculture, mining, and industry. The distinctive constellations of domestic-structural factors defined elite policy preferences in a contingent manner that resulted in a militarized or negotiated mode of national

[59] See Garcia-Montaya and Mahoney, "Critical Event Analysis in Case Study Research," pp. 9-10.

liberation (Figure 1.2). The background factors presented revolutionary elites with different sets of opportunities, resources, and challenges that determined whether liberation leaders opted for a radical policy option, which was associated with a militarized mode, or a liberal policy option, that was linked to a negotiated mode of national liberation.

The *mode of liberation* allows us to understand *why* liberation elites initially adopted a radical or liberal reformist choice despite their long-held goals for rapid and basic transformation of inherited state, economic, and class structures. First, the settler-colonial state in Angola and Mozambique had been weakened and disintegrating at the tuning point of decolonization, providing liberation leaders with greater autonomy to seize power and pursue a radical reform agenda. By contrast, the settler state in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa remained militarily superior and structurally coherent, albeit at varying degrees, which prevented liberation actors from controlling full political power and acting on their radical agendas. Further, the foundations of the old state influenced the policy choices because Southern African radicals envisaged building strong states to carry on wide-ranging socioeconomic changes. Angolan and Mozambican liberation elites were hard pressed to dramatically restructure and rebuild the disintegrating state in order to fulfil their reform ambitions and to fend off military threats. This entailed strengthening and expansion of the state's administrative, security, and military capacities that favored a radical reforms package. On the other hand, Zimbabwean, South African, and Namibian leaders faced less urgent administrative or military challenges to dramatically restructure the old state—circumstances that favored liberal reformist.

Second, in the Angolan and Mozambiquan cases, the national economies were poorly developed, predominantly agrarian, heavily dependent on Portugal, and collapsing at the turning point of liberation. This convinced revolutionary elites of the necessity for rapid state

intervention, radical agrarian reforms, and the nationalization of most industry to revitalize national economies and to pursue rapid socialist development. In juxtaposition, despite important variations, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa had relatively far more developed national economies based on capitalist agriculture, mining, and industry. This meant that not only were liberation elites eager to avoid the disastrous economic consequences of radical policies in Angola and Mozambique previously, but also to foster capitalist development that would allow the gradual reduction of poverty, unemployment, and social injustices before future transition to socialism. Additionally, Southern Rhodesian and South West African economies were closely integrated and dependent on the South African economy, which meant that Zimbabwean and Namibian leaders had to exercise caution regarding radical measures that would certainly instigate the ire of the South African apartheid regime and settler capital.

Last, liberation elites had to contend with the interests of dominant capital whose influence sharply varied among the countries. Overall, liberation leaders were wary of settler and foreign capital flight with the fall of settler-colonial rule and in particular in the event of pursuing radical reforms. In Angola and Mozambique, the weakness of settler capital and abrupt departure of metropolitan capital amid conflict-ridden transitions forced liberation governments to intervene with radical economic policies (e.g., nationalization of industry, capital expropriation, and collectivization of rural agriculture) to stem economic disruption and restore productivity. However, the national economies of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa were long dominated by powerful settler and international capital, which sued for negotiated transitions to majority rule to avert the dangers of revolutionary change. The imminent danger of confrontation with a dominant class, and ensuing economic havoc, forced liberation elites to consider a liberal policy option acceptable to vested capitalist interests.

Liberation elite choices were therefore rooted in the antecedent conditions of settler rule. Yet, neither such conditions nor rebel institutions made the adoption of a particular policy choice inevitable, which underscores the contingent nature of the strategic choices made by Southern African liberation elites. It is entirely plausible that Angolan and Mozambican leaders could have adopted liberal reforms, while South African and Namibian leaders pursue radical reforms, under slightly redefined circumstances of national liberation. Nationalist elite thinking and policy preferences were influenced by political considerations immediately surrounding liberation, such as latest economic trends, external military threat, and external dynamics. These circumstances significantly differed across the cases in conjunction with the timing of national liberation in particular. Therefore, the mode of liberation that crucially defined the initial policy choices was not sufficient to understand the alternative radical, liberal, and stalled liberal reforms that defined the liberation episode in each country (see Table 1.3). For this, we have to consider the historical timing of national liberation.

The *timing of liberation* refers to the world-historical setting in which liberation took place. Since the anti-imperialist struggles were deeply entangled in ideological conflicts between the capitalist West and the anti-imperialist Soviet bloc, the conjuncture between transition from settler-colonial rule and simultaneous changes in the international state system as well as world-capitalist economy strongly conditioned the perceptions and strategies of liberation elites. The timing of liberation in each country coincided differently with the global rise of neoliberalism, the Cold War's ending, and demise of Soviet Communism in late-twentieth century. The liberation of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 occurred before these world-historical changes, amid tense East-West confrontation and military intervention in the region. The timing favored radical change, because—with support from the Soviet bloc, Cuba, and other communist

countries—liberation elites were confident in pursuing socialist development and authoritarian nation-building. In addition, confronted by counterrevolutionary challenges from Western-backed Apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia, revolutionary leaders perceived that their survival and reform objectives depended on strong states with authoritarian grip over society.

The coincidence of South African and Namibian decolonization with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and Soviet communism, by contrast, made radical options politically costly if not impossible. In these cases, the changing global state system, together with the dissipation of counterrevolutionary threats in the region, rendered socialist development and coercive state-building ill-advised and counterproductive. Moreover, unlike their counterparts in Angola and Mozambique, liberation elites this time had to contend with a world economy increasingly dominated by neoliberal ideas and international financial institutions pressing for free markets, besides a worldwide wave of democratization[60]—in general, an international context hostile to path of radical political and societal reordering available in previous decades. In particular, economic issues that were critical in elite calculations became acute in the 1980s and 1990s when access to international capital and aid became tied to liberal pro-market conditionalities.[61] In Zimbabwe, liberation leaders derailed full implementation of liberal reforms because the reform period in the 1980s coincided with Cold War conflicts and socialist influence in the region. "In the final analysis," as Skocpol aptly emphasized, "the outcomes of social revolutions

[60] See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) on this global wave of democratization after mid-1970s and, on the external dynamics that engendered this process in Africa, see Bratton and Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 1997.

[61] On the role of international pressure against genuine transformation in South Africa and Namibia, see John S. Saul, "Liberation without Democracy? Rethinking the Experiences of the Southern African Liberation Movements," Paper presented at the Democracy: Popular Precedents, Popular Practice and Popular Culture, Johannesburg, South Africa,13-16 July, 1994; John S. Saul, *Liberation Lite: The Roots of Recolonization in Southern Africa* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2011); John S. Saul and Chris Saunders, "Mugabe, Gramsci, and Zimbabwe at 25," *International Journal* (Autumn 2005): 953-75. It is also worth noting that the influence of international financial institutions and the global expansion of neoliberalism made socialist development in post-revolutionary Angola and Mozambique increasingly unviable in the 1980s.

have always been powerfully conditioned not only by international politics but also by the world-economic constraints and opportunities faced by emergent new regimes."[62]

The range of realistic policy options available to Southern African radical actors were thus contingently defined by the mode and timing of national liberation.[63] On the one hand, a militarily driven liberation marked by state breakdown and Cold War international context was sufficient to persuade revolutionary leaders to embark on radical change (i.e., Angola and Mozambique). On the other hand, a negotiated liberation in a post-Cold War international context, with a state capable to avert a guerrilla takeover and to orchestrate a political settlement, was sufficient to dissuade liberation elites from pursuing a revolutionary agenda (the case of South Africa and Namibia). If liberation occurred before state breakdown and in a Cold-War international environment, however, the new leaders settled for a liberal approach that they eventually derailed in favor of radical measures in some reform areas (i.e., Zimbabwe).

Critical Events and Path-Dependence

The second defining logic of critical junctures is that relatively short phases of instability are followed by long periods of institutional stability and reproduction. In Pierson's words, such episodes are 'critical' because they "place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter."[64] Contingent choices made during critical junctures activate processes marked by relative determinism or path-dependent inertia because, according to Mahoney, "once an option is selected, it becomes progressively difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available."[65] Political change in post-liberation

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[62] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 23.
[63] The relationship is a logical "AND" indicating mode and timing of liberation (e.g., X_1 AND X_2) are sufficient for the policy outcomes (Y_1, Y_2, Y_3) that defined the liberation episode in each country.
[64] P. Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, & Social Analysis* (Princeton: Prin. Uni. Press, 2004), p. 135.
[65] Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," p. 513.

Southern Africa exhibits a logic of path-dependent development that tracks a chain of events linked to the policy choices made at the turning point of liberation. Figure 1.3 sketches the analytical structure of the critical juncture argument.



Figure 1.3: Structure of the Path-Dependent Explanation of Political Change in Southern Africa

Theorists of path dependence distinguish between 'self-reinforcing' and 'reactive' sequences for long-term production and reproduction of institutional arrangements produced by initial choices.[66] The (re)production of some structural patterns of the liberation episode took place through mechanisms associated with self-reinforcing processes, i.e., legitimacy and power-distributional mechanisms whereby certain popular ideas associated with liberation as well as empowered elites and popular groups ensured institutional reproduction. I argue that liberation ideals and credentials that scholars often attribute to enduring political hegemony of the former liberation parties were crucial during the reform episode and its immediate aftermath. In subsequent decades, liberation ideals and popular legitimacy had little political traction

[66] On self-reinforcing mechanisms, see Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review,* 94 (2000): 251-267. See on both self-reinforcing and reactive sequences, Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," 2000. Different mechanisms of reproduction can be understood in terms of rival—not as necessarily mutually exclusive—explanations about the reproduction of a given institutions, as suggested by Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism*, 2001, p. 9.

particularly in the countries that decolonized earlier, and the historic liberation struggles became 'ancient history' to younger generations. I argue that institutional stability and reproduction depended on authoritarian repression, elections, and vast patronage, with the particular mix of mechanisms defined by the overall political regime system in each set of countries.

The causal process following the reform period was rather dominated by a political dynamic of reaction and counterreactions—or 'reactive sequences'—that tend to reconfigure, not reinforce, initial structures produced by a critical juncture. A reactive sequence involves a temporal chain of events that tend to "*transform* and perhaps *reverse* early events."[67] In this regard, initial choices or "initial disturbances are crucial not because they generate positive feedback, but because they trigger a powerful response … action and traction move the system in a new direction but not one that reinforces the first move."[68] Reactive sequences are particularly dominant in the aftermath of social revolutions because fundamental structural changes often trigger a powerful reaction by marginalized political, economic, or social actors.[69] In Southern Africa, even though the reform period saw revolutionary transformation in fewer cases, the end of settler-colonial rule generally involved historic changes that provoked a causal dynamic of reactions and counterreactions. In all five countries, the varied reforms set off backlashes by marginalized political groups or popular sectors that, in turn, invited counter-backlashes by governments. This reactive dynamic led to institutional adaptations, transformations, and reproduction that ultimately yielded to relatively stable structural outcomes.

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[67] Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," p. 526, *italics* in original. Such sequences are "'reactive' in the sense that each event within the sequence is in part a reaction to temporally antecedent events. Thus, each step in the chain is 'dependent' on prior steps." p. 509.
[68] Paul Pierson, "Not Just What, But When: Issues of Timing and Sequence in Comparative Politics." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Boston, September 1998, p. 21.
[69] See Levitsky and Way, *Revolution and Dictatorship*, 2022.

Now that the basic concepts and theoretical principles that shall guide the analysis have been introduced, I shall present the path-dependent argument by discussing the different reform approaches and their legacies.

1.4 THE PATH-DEPENDENT EXPLANATION

The basic argument of this study is that the legacies of liberation in Southern Africa have differed widely because of contrasting reform approaches adopted during the critical juncture of the liberation reform episode in each country. The rather contingent policy choices set into motion path-dependent trajectories of political change with dramatically differing outcomes. In this section, I outline the path-dependent explanation outlined in Fig. 1.3 by briefly presenting the contrasting reform packages first and the differing political legacies that followed next. The three types of the reform packages mentioned above will be analyzed in-depth in Chapters 4-6 (Part III), and their political and institutional legacies in Chapters 7-8 (Part IV).

1.4.1 The Reform Approaches of the Liberation Episode

Prior to the liberation episode, Southern African national revolutionaries aspired to initiate rapid and fundamental transformations of highly oppressive, deeply racialized state structures and unequal social relations that prevailed during the late settler-colonial period. Yet, for historically contingent reasons that have been discussed earlier, the victorious nationalist elites pursued three different reform approaches—i.e., radical, liberal,[70] and stalled-liberal reforms—following national liberation. As summarized in Table 1.3, I conceptualize each approach as a policy package with three major dimensions relating to restructuring inherited settler-colonial state

[70] The term 'liberal' as used in this study denotes a reformist—as opposed to a revolutionary—approach to change that encompassed, on the one hand, the political tenets of classical liberalism (i.e., civil liberties, political rights, and constitutionalism) and, on the other, market-oriented neoliberal economic principles of privatization, deregulation, and liberalization. The literature on Southern Africa uses 'liberal' to refer to reforms during the liberation episode in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, but largely in the narrower 'neoliberal' sense of the term.

structures, transforming socio-structural inequalities, and redefining the conception of race and nation as part of a nation-building agenda.

Table 1.3: Overview of Reform Policies of the Liberation Reform Period

Policy Measures	Radical Reforms [Moz. & Angola]	Stalled Liberal Reforms [Zimbabwe]	Liberal Reforms [SA. & Namibia]
National liberation & majority rule (1)	YES	YES	YES
Dissolution of racially oppressive laws (2)	YES	YES	YES
Rapid reorganization of old-state structures (3)	YES	YES	NO
Coercive consolidation of state power (4)	YES	YES	NO
Nationalization of industry & capital (5)	YES	NO	NO
Rapid national income redistribution (6)	YES	NO	NO
Radical agrarian and land reforms (7)	YES	NO	NO
Democratic & inclusive nation-building (8)	NO	NO	YES
Policies for racial & national reconciliation (9)	NO	NO	YES

NOTE: (i) Indicators 3-4 measure state reforms, 5-7 capture social and economic reform policies, and 8-9 estimate nation-building reforms. (ii) Indicators (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7) are largely categorical variables with YES/NO indicating present/absent for each policy. Indicators (3), (4), (8), and (9) are continuous variables in which NO indicates from 'no' reforms to 'less significant' reforms, and YES signifies from 'more significant' reforms to far-reaching changes.

In all five countries, liberation leaders successfully achieved (a) their major goal of national freedom from settler-colonial domination and (b) the dismantling of racially repressive economic and social laws (e.g., exploitative Land and Labor Acts and racist citizenship laws) that underpinned the subjugation, exploitation, and marginalization of blacks and 'people of color.' National liberation entailed principally freedom from Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, and majority rule from minority settler oligarchies in the cases of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Regarding most other issues, however, liberation elites took reform measures of varying degrees and scope, with the range of change being rapid and wide-ranging with the radical reform approach, and gradual, tentative, and of limited scope with the liberal reform approaches. Table 1.3 summarizes the varying policy reform measures.

The immediate goal of liberation leaders was to restructure the state and consolidate their power in the process. In the context of radical reforms, liberation leaders drastically reshaped the

foundations of the settler-colonial state, and established new administrative and political structures that enhanced the popular incorporation of formerly marginalized racial groups and lower classes. Moreover, the state apparatus was further centralized and expanded to carry on revolutionary change, oversee economic planning and development, and provide expanded public services. With liberal reforms, by contrast, preexisting state structures were largely maintained, and the civil service, police, and judiciary were deracialized and restructured gradually. Nor was the state further centralized although equal representation and participation of non-whites was quickly granted, along with expanded social services, employment opportunities, and social protections for Africans. This, too, was the case with stalled-liberal reforms in Zimbabwe; but national elites in this context gradually ditched the liberal reformist measures in favor of rapid Africanization of the civil service, greater power centralization, and expanded state role into economic and social spheres.

Moreover, liberation elites in Angola and Mozambique applied military power to consolidate power in the face of grave military threats, neutralize opposition to radical reforms, and subdue challenges to the state's increasing social influence, leading to highly militarized state structures. In South Africa and Namibia, liberation elites instead took control of the state through democratic elections as part of a negotiated political settlement and, thus, consolidated power largely peacefully initially, with the reform process being contested by organized political actors and independent centers of social power, such as civic organizations, traditional elites, and churches. This minimized the potential for state militarization and violent penetration of society that characterized radical reforms. In Zimbabwe, however, besides the electoral process and over the course of time, political elites used military force to suppress serious political threats to their

power and to marginalize and eventually subdue a rival liberation movement. This led to increased state militarization and the derailment of the liberal reformist path.

The next impending goal of Southern African liberation leaders' was to try and transform deeply unequal social structures as well as promoting nation-building efforts. In the context of radical reforms (i.e., Mozambique and Angola), liberation governments carried—with varying degrees of success—revolutionary economic and social reform measures, including the nationalization of industry, banking, and metropolitan capital and settler land, and the establishment of state collective farms, rural cooperatives, and communal villages in an attempt to reduce inherited structural inequalities and to orchestrate rapid and equitable national development. They also socialized health, education, and other services in order to ensure equitable access by formerly marginalized natives as well as the urban and rural lower classes.

In dramatic contrast, liberation governments in South Africa and Namibia implemented neoliberal socioeconomic reforms that sought to balance capitalist development with redistributive demands. Rather than nationalizing and socializing the economy, liberation leaders in these contexts attempted to reduce stark racial inequalities and improve black socioeconomic conditions through market-friendly reform policies, including affirmative action measures, black economic empowerment programs, promoting black land and business ownership, and expanded and deracialized social service delivery. They also carried out liberal land reforms based on a "willing-buyer, willing-seller" market mechanism, which safeguarded the land ownership rights and other economic privileges of settler minorities. In in the case of stalled-liberal reforms (i.e., Zimbabwe), liberation leaders largely adhered to the reformist approach to socioeconomic issues, but they failed to promote black business or to carry meaningful land redistribution. In sum, whereas radical reforms sought to rapidly destroy preexisting racial and class disparities,

socialized inherited national economies, and promoted pro-lower-class policies, liberal reforms attempted to gradually reduce racial inequalities by fostering capitalist development, hatching a black middle class, and job creation and service delivery—strategies crafted in view of neoliberal pressures from domestic and foreign capital, Western financial institutions, and donors.

Finally, liberation governments adopted nation-building measures that differed in their approach towards racial, ethnics and regional differences and politico-administrative structures. In the cases of radical reforms, revolutionary leaders pursued more hegemonic and high-modernist nation-building programs, which disregarded and marginalized subnational identities; channeled inclusion and participation through party and state structures; and dismantled traditional administrative structures (e.g., colonial-era provincial divisions, traditional elites, and tribal authority) that fostered social conflict in colonial society. Overall, political elites pursued a coercive one-party nation-building model with extensive political mobilization, reeducation, and reorganization—matched by the violent suppression of subnational affiliations or organizations—to bridge deep-seated racial, ethnic, and regional divides.

With liberal reforms, on the other hand, national leaders adopted broadly inclusive and pluralist nation-building which provided special political rights and guarantees to formerly privileged settler minorities (e.g., proportional representation and protection of land rights), tolerated political and social dissent, and largely accommodated inherited administrative structures such as traditional elites and certain authority systems such autonomous chiefdoms. Liberation elites in this path avoided hegemonic one-party nation-building and the attendant repression of racial, tribal, or ethnic divisions inimical to national cohesion. In the case of stalled-liberal reforms, however, the liberation government eventually repudiated constitutional guarantees to the settler minority and cracked down on political pluralism, increasingly veering

towards a less inclusive, dominant-party nation-building model. However, the departure from liberal nation-building hardly matched the violent and repressive state-building approach that characterized the reform period in Mozambique and Angola.

In sum, the reforms adopted by Southern African liberation leaders widely varied in terms of state reforms, socioeconomic change, and nation-building. It is important to note that this conceptualization of the different reform approaches is based on reform measures taken during the liberation episode (see Table 1.3). Policy shifts after the reform period or new reforms adopted several years later (e.g., transitions from socialism in Mozambique and Angola after 1989, fast-track land reforms in Zimbabwe in early-2000s,) are not part of the definition of radical, liberal, and stalled-liberal reform approaches. Latter policies and events are rather part of the backlashes of the aftermath period provoked by the reforms. Furthermore, the concepts are designed to facilitate comparison by capturing broader patterns of change that characterized the five post-liberation Southern African countries. It would be foolhardy to deny important cross-national distinctions in contexts of the radical or liberal reform approaches, which will be highlighted in the in-depth case analysis later on.

1.4.2 The Legacies of Liberation Reforms

The contrasting reform approaches initiated divergent paths of political development that led to distinct political and structural legacies. First, I define ‘legacies of liberation’ as (1) the state structures and patterns of political inclusion and contestation that define the political regimes,[71] and (2) patterns of structural inequalities and political polarization in each country. Second, the

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[71] I employ Schmitter and Karl’s definition of political regime as an arrangement of political institutions that “determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions.” See Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, “What Democracy Is ...And Is Not.” *Journal of Democracy* 2 (1991):75-88, p.76.

overall political dynamic and structures that dominate the post-reform decades are considered as the broader legacies of liberation. However, it is important to distinguish between the political structures that emerged from the reform episode (i.e., initial structures), which underwent differing transformation, and those that crystalized in more recent decades or years as the more stable, long-run legacies (i.e., legacy structures).

Table 1.4: Overview of the Liberation Reform Period and Its Legacies

		Legacies of Liberation	
Case	**Liberation Episode** →	**Initial Structures** →	**Legacy Structures**
Mozambique	1974 – 1983	Socialist dictatorship (1977 – 1990)	Inclusionary semi-democracy (2008 – Present)
Angola	1975 – 1982	Socialist dictatorship (1977 – 1990)	Inclusionary semi-democracy (2012 – Present)
Zimbabwe	1979 – 1990	Electoral authoritarian (1985 – 2000)	Militarized semi-authoritarianism (2013 – Present)
Namibia	1989 – 2004	Electoral democracy (1990 – 2005)	Inclus. multiracial democracy (2019 – Present)
South Africa	1990 – 2004	Electoral democracy (1994 – 2009)	Inclus. multiracial democracy (2018 – Present)

Table 1.4 gives an overview of the liberation reform episode and its broader legacies. The long-run legacies solidified with the end of the 'aftermath' period—or the intervening phase between the critical juncture and its long-run legacies during which the political reactions and counterreactions played out.[72] As shown in Chapter Seven, whereas the early political dynamics of the aftermath period overlapped with the critical juncture in Mozambique and Angola

[72] I borrow from recent theorizations of critical junctures that draw analytical distinctions between the 'aftermath' and enduring legacies, or 'heritage,' of a critical juncture. See David Collier, "Critical Juncture Framework and the Five-Step Template," pp. 42-3. Collier articulates a five-stem template in critical juncture analysis—i.e., antecedent conditions, cleavage or shock, critical juncture, aftermath, and heritage—which might be impractical to apply in every case but allows for a more rigorous analysis. The five-step framework is a more refined and expanded version of a three-step template—i.e., cleavage, critical juncture, and legacy—proposed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in a classical analysis of party systems and cleavages in Europe. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

(because the reforms instantly triggered a violent rural backlash), in the remaining cases such dynamics unfolded exclusively in the aftermath of the reform period. Finally, it is important to highlight that, in all five countries, the liberation political parties that oversaw the reform episode continued to dominate state power during the aftermath period and in subsequent years.

The dynamics of the aftermath period can be seen as a chain of causally and temporally ordered events in each country. This involved the emergence of a backlash to the reform period, that caused major national political and/or economic crises; a counterreaction by the liberation governments with policy and institutional redefinitions, adjustments, and reconfigurations; and the reproduction of state and social structures at a subsequent stage (see Figure 1.4). The overall dynamic was driven by a logic of 'reactions' and 'counterreactions'[73] between governments and different national actors that pushed for political and economic liberalization (Mozambique and Angola), progressive economic and social policies (South Africa and Namibia), or democratic incorporation (Zimbabwe). the more enduring legacies of liberation took shape with the resolution of the reactive sequences.

The *pattern of backlash* is the key variable to understand the dynamics of the aftermath period. The nature, evolution, and structural outcomes of the backlashes reflected the reform packages that sharply differed in terms of the nature of state reforms, socioeconomic change, and nation-building. Radical reforms (i.e., Mozambique and Angola) quickly set into motion a "conservative backlash" by politically excluded, reactionary Afro-nationalist armed groups mobilizing rural upper-class elements and sections of a peasantry profoundly antagonized by revolutionary changes in the countryside. Because the reform period caused the destruction of historical racial and structural inequalities, the backlash stemmed in large part from radical state reforms, violent power consolidation, and exclusionary nation-building that marginalized major,

[73] See Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism*, chap. 2; Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, pp. 29-31.

ideologically conservative sociopolitical actors or groups. The violent, conservative backlash engendered profound political and economic crises that, beginning in the late 1980s, forced liberation governments to introduce renewed reforms in favor of political liberalization, the incorporation of traditional authorities, and transition from socialist to market economies.



Figure 1.4: The Patterns of Reaction, Counterreaction, and Structural Reproduction of the Aftermath Period

Liberal reform choices, by contrast, generated a non-violent political backlash in general. The specific nature of the political reaction was determined by whether liberation elites fully implemented (i.e., South Africa and Namibia) or somehow stalled (i.e., Zimbabwe) the liberal reforms. Fully implemented liberal reforms in South Africa and Namibia activated a “social democratic backlash” in the aftermath of the reform period by chiefly urban popular sectors economically disenfranchised by neoliberal reform measures. In these contexts, gradual state reforms and inclusive nation-building during the reform period precluded the development of a

potentially violent backlash by marginalized political or ethnoregional forces. Yet, the persistence of historical racial disparities and the emergence of intra-black class inequalities triggered a leftist backlash by middle and lower classes and community movements of urban and rural black poor. The progressive backlash against enduring inequalities, mass poverty, and poor service delivery forced liberation governments to undertake renewed measures for more equitable income and wealth distribution, access to land, and the provision of affordable housing, electricity, water, and other services to historically marginalized black majorities.

Lastly, stalled-liberal reforms in Zimbabwe generated a "liberal backlash" by a wide range of popular-sector and pro-democratic forces in the aftermath of the reform period. The backlash was instigated in the early 1990s as a leftist reaction by urban middle and working classes profoundly alienated during the reform period and subsequent neoliberal structural adjustments. The largely labor-led backlash eventually turned into a broader democratic mobilization by a wide array of political and civil-society groups pressing for political democracy, human rights, and social justice. The reaction was multifaceted precisely because the reform period was defined by relatively repressive state structures, largely exclusive nation-building, and limited redistribution of income, wealth, and land. Not only had the reform period led to less democratic state structures (as in Mozambique and Angola), but it also reproduced historical racial inequalities and widened intra-blacks disparities (as in South Africa and Namibia). The government counterreacted to the liberal backlash with political liberalization, the expropriation of white-owned agricultural land, and renewed political exclusion.

The resolution of the backlashes at subsequent stages led to the reproduction of state institutions and patterns of polarization that characterized the reform period and its aftermath. In Mozambique and Angola, political liberalization and institutional reforms saw the establishment

of less inclusive, semi-democratic institutions because the authoritarian and violent legacies reduced the likelihood of fully inclusive political regimes. This were accompanied by new post-racial social inequalities that emerged with transition to free-market economies, and moderate patterns of polarization with violent undertones from the reform period. In South Africa and Namibia, liberal responses to the backlash further solidified the inclusive multiracial democracies inherited from the reform period. Yet, enduring racial disparities and new class inequalities reproduced highly unequal social structures polarized by both old (racial) and new (post-racial) social conflicts. Lastly, in Zimbabwe, a violent government reaction reproduced repressive and increasingly militarized state structures, coupled with less unequal but extremely polarized social structures with post-racial, class and rural-urban divisions.

1.5 EMPIRICAL APPROACH

This project is a qualitative comparative study of the historical causes and development of varied political legacies of liberation in Southern Africa. The core argument is that the legacies of twentieth-century liberation struggles in the region are markedly diverse, and the historical cause of the divergent patterns of political development lies in historically contingent policy choices taken by nationalist elites at the turning point of national liberation. In order to develop the explanation, I adopt methods of comparative-historical analysis (CHA) which is a mode of historical inquiry appropriate for studying a configuration of macro-conditions and large-scale processes that unfold over time and across small number of cases. In what follows, I describe the research design and data for the project and CHA methodology in greater detail.

1.5.1 Research Design and Data

The small-N methods employed in the study are elaborated in the next sub-section. In this sub-section, I will describe the research design including case selection, measurement and operationalization of key variables, and data. The case-selection procedure is straightforward in that it is based on the concept of "liberation struggles" in Southern Africa and the analysis encompasses all cases of twentieth-century violent and mass-mobilizing "liberation struggles" against settler colonialism and settler minority regimes in the region. The conceptualization also defines the scope conditions of the explanation. The theory will have a direct relevance for African countries that underwent similar processes of revolutionary decolonization and with NLMs with anticolonial origins, such as Algeria, Guinea-Bissau and Capo Verde, Eritrea and more recently South Sudan. Meanwhile, the exclusion of these cases from the analysis allows for a controlled comparison of geographically, historically, and socially bound set of cases that reduce the influence of confounding variables. The argument will have a fairly strong relevance for African countries with NLMs with postcolonial origins and far-reaching reformist agendas, such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda.

The reform approaches of the critical juncture of liberation episode in Southern Africa represent the independent variable. I define a *reform approach* as a set of interrelated reform-policy choices, measures, and strategies adopted by Southern Africa elites in their attempt to reform and consolidate state power, pursue socioeconomic changes, and foster nation-building following the end of settler-colonial domination. I measure each reform approach by coding it against nine indicators in four main categories: the achievement of the basic goal of majority rule, the reorganization of settler-colonial state structures, reforming inherited socioeconomic structures, and building more cohesive national communities (see Table 1.3). Whereas the

measurement of all indicators is presented in a nominal scale, several of the indicators (e.g., state power consolidation, land and income redistribution, political inclusion) lend themselves to an interval scale that will be apparent in the in-depth analysis of the reform approaches (Chapters 4-6). The analysis accords equal importance to the divergent patterns of political change (Ch. 7) following the reforms as well as the ultimate structural outcomes (Ch. 8). I identify patterns of conservative, social-democratic, and liberal backlash as the causal mechanism that link the reform approaches to the legacies. I code the outcome variable—legacies of liberation—inclusiveness of state-regime institutions, structural inequalities, and national polarization.

The analysis relies primarily on historical archival evidence. I conducted archival fieldwork at various points in time, between Summer 2018 and Winter 2023, in major archival collections in Southern Africa (all five countries), North America, and Western Europe (see Reference). This was supplemented by a 'remote fieldwork' necessitated by Covid-19 pandemic, after 2020, that made 'traditional' fieldwork a daunting task initially but opened new, if limited, avenues as some libraries and archival collections became receptive to online access. In the process, I collected a large database of historical records (over 20,000 pages) of the late-colonial period, the reform period, and subsequent decades in each country. The largest of the dataset is made of records of the pre-liberation NLMs/parties (from the struggle period) and post-liberation parties and governments that encompasses party manifestos, conference minutes, communiqués; government declarations, presses, and reports; parliamentary records; official and unofficial correspondence; and newspaper analysis. The sources opened a rare window into the thinking and calculations of Southern Africa's liberation elites with regards to their long-term goals, the respective opportunities and constraints they faced at national liberation, and the distinctive reform choices, policy measures, and programs they embarked upon as a result. I supplement and

triangulate the rich archival evidence with statistical data on socioeconomic variables, political competition and participation, and societal polarization from economic historical publications, public records, or large datasets (e.g., World Bank data, V-Dem database).

1.5.2 Comparative-Historical Analysis

This study employs small-N comparative methods associated with comparative-historical analysis (CHA). CHA is a macro-oriented mode of historical inquiry concerned with causal analysis in a small number of comparable cases, and places "emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison."[74] Several notable studies of political development in Southern Africa can be viewed as comparative-historical in their approach. However, most analysts fail to explicitly specify the methods they employ to make descriptive or causal inferences. In an effort to avoid similar pitfalls and to justify the methodological choice, this section specifies the comparative methods employed in this study.

Macro-Causal versus Net-Effects Analysis

CHA methodology is defined by three traits: focus on macro-processes and outcomes, attentiveness to time and process in politics, and emphasis on systematic and empirically grounded analysis of cases similar in some ways but different in others.[75] The CHA inquiry is "macroconfigurational" in its approach which have important methodological consequences. This means, on the one hand, an emphasis on aggregate cases (such as countries, social movements, empires) as well as large-scale factors and processes that generate macro-level

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[74] James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, "Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas," in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, eds., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, p. 3.
[75] See Mahoney and Dietrich, eds., *Comparative Historical Analysis*, chap. 1; James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

outcomes or that are outcomes themselves of large processes.[76] The analysis here is framed at country-level and is concerned with explaining macro-level socio-political changes that were part and outcomes of a macro-process, i.e., national-social revolutions. Yet, macro-level emphasis does not mean individual actions hardly matter. In fact, CHA analysis takes into consideration micro-level actors and processes that matter in the context of macro-structures. Focus on the critical juncture of liberation is primarily an attempt to identify such actors and emphasize agency and choice during a brief episode of structural indeterminism or flux.[77]

On the other hand, CHA analysis—and methodology—is concerned with "configurational analysis" and helps better explain causal complexity and equifinality.[78] CHA inquiry focuses on multiple causal factors because large-scale process or outcomes (such as national-social revolutions, state-building, and democratization) are "aggregated combinations of multiple events and processes."[79] Moreover, the configurational approach to causation is compatible to causal complexity in real world; that is, "a situation in which an outcome may follow from several different combinations of causal conditions, that is, from different causal 'recipes'."[80] This sharply contrasts with the net-effects approach to causation that defines conventional quantitative analysis; the analyst assumes that the effect of each independent

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[76] The alternative is a micro-foundational approach—or methodological individualism—that centers individual actors as the most valid basis for causal analysis. On macro-casual orientation of CHA and the micro versus macro-foundational divide, see Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney, "Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science," in Mahoney and Thelen, eds., *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, pp. 3-36; and K. Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Political Science Review,* 2 (1999): 369-404.
[77] See Thelen and Mahoney, "Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science," p. 6; Giovani Capoccia, "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change," in Mahoney and Thelen, eds., *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, p .168
[78] See Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 51-60.
[79] Thelen and Mahoney, "Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science," p. 6.
[80] Charles Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 23; see also, Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1987), p. 19.

variable is same across all contexts and estimates its net effect on the dependent variable.[81] In the qualitative tradition including CHA, by contrast, the analysist is interested in assessing the effects of configurations of variables instead of average treatment effects, because a given variable's effect depends on context. CHA analysts also establish whether a given variable (or a combination of variables) is a necessary, sufficient, or necessary and sufficient cause of the outcome in question, and that consequently there are different paths to the same outcome.[82]

Given this, CHA provides distinctive research tools for investigating the sort of large-scale socio-political processes that unfolded in conjunction with Southern African liberation struggles. Not only do few, if any, analysts explicitly apply comparative methods, but most, including case-oriented, studies of post-liberation politics and society in the region tend to separately estimate the impact of a single factor (e.g., rebel structures) to explain variations in outcome (e.g., democracy). The net-effect approach is ineffective—if not counterproductive—to understand, in a holistic fashion, multifaceted legacies of the liberation episode. Compared to statistical analysis, the macro-configurational CHA approach is thus methodologically superior for studying the configuration of political and socioeconomic conditions that defined the liberation-episode reforms and their outcomes. It allows the researcher to "produce explanations that account for every instance of a certain phenomenon."[83]

Small-N comparative methods draw causal inference through a combination of broad cross-case comparison, counterfactual methods, and highly contextualized within-case analysis. Comparative-historical analysts typically formulate hypothesis using John Stuart Mill's methods for controlled comparison: i.e., "method of agreement" and "method of difference."[84] On the one

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[81] Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry,* 2008, p. 112.
[82] Goertz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, p. 224.
[83] Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, p.16.
[84] On Mill's methods, see Ibid., pp.36-42; Goertz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, pp. 87-90.

hand, the analyst applies Mill's first method to establish that cases which share a similar outcome also share similar hypothesized causal factor(s), albeit varying in other ways. I use this method primarily to explain similar development trajectories of Angola and Mozambique as well as South Africa and Namibia. On the other hand, the analyst uses Mill's method of difference to compare and contrast cases where both the outcome and hypothesized causal factor(s) are present against cases where both the outcome and the hypothesized factors are absent, despite the fact that both sets of cases may be similar in many other conditions. I apply this method to compare cases with a specific reform approach to cases with a different approach and outcome while carefully controlling for confounding conditions through (paired) comparisons.

I employ a third Millian method—i.e., indirect method of difference or joint method—that, even though rarely employed, is stronger for analyzing causal relationships not amenable to experimental manipulation, and for eliminating competing hypotheses.[85] Similar in logic to statistical techniques, the analyst first applies the method of agreement to establish that cases which share a similar outcome also share similar hypothesized causal factor(s). In the second step, she uses the same method to verify that other cases which lack the outcome of interest also lack the hypothesized causal factor(s). In essence, the indirect method uses negative cases to validate inferences drawn from positive cases. I use this method to compare positive cases where the hypothesized cause and outcome is present with negative cases where both the hypothesized cause and outcome is absent in order to support/undermine the presence/absence of the hypothesized causal relationship and to test rival hypotheses for each pair of cases.

[85] Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, pp. 38, 40.

The strengths and weaknesses of Mill's methods have been widely debated.[86] The main critique of the small-N method is "the small-N, many variables," that is, there are many independent variables than there are cases. The degrees-of-freedom problem is no more a valid critique of small-N studies. Qualitative methodology maintains an approach to causal analysis different from statistical regression, and employs uniquely qualitative methods (e.g., within-case and counterfactual tools) to increase diversity and to gather unique pieces of evidence critical for making inference.[87] Moreover, certain research questions cannot be tackled through statistical or QCA methods. The small-N comparative method, as Skocpol and Sommers put it, is "a kind of multivariate analysis to which scholars turn in order to validate causal statements about macro-phenomena of which, inherently, there are too many variables and not enough cases."[88]

Nonetheless, two important methodological weakness associated with this study can be underlined. First, small-N comparison is premised on the assumption that the cases being investigated can be considered relatively *equivalent*, that is, they share a great deal of contextual conditions to allow for valid comparison. Second, it is found on the assumption that cases are relatively *independent* of one another, i.e., the cases maintain minimum influence or interaction with one another so that the outcome of interest can indeed be considered a result of the hypothesized cause rather than of influence of one case over another.[89]

In this study, the issue of non-equivalence is far more of a concern than interdependence. Spatial heterogeneity is an ever-present challenge to controlled comparison, and it would be naive to assume that the Southern African countries were homogenous in historical antecedents.

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[86] For limitation of Mill's methods, see Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, 1987; Arendt Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, 8, 2 (1975): 158-177.
[87] See Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry*, p. 147; Goetz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, p. 10.
[88] Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 22, 2 (1980), p. 182.
[89] The assumption of causal equivalence or "unit homogeneity" is basic to standard statistical analysis. For critical discussion of the assumption with respect to qualitative methods, see Henry E. Brady & David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2nd Ed., 2010), p. 40.

Nonetheless, the fact that this study is concerned with a small number of historically, culturally, and spatially bound countries allows to control for potential spatial and temporal confounders. The cases under investigation, compared to other African countries, share important historical and societal similarities, especially modes of production, racial-class structure, and political cleavages associated with settler colonialism. Moreover, for the time-period on which this analysis focuses, all five countries experienced similar dynamics of delayed decolonization and a shared historical episode of radical and sustained anti-colonial mobilization. Last, since no inquiry can successfully control for all possible contextual variations among cases, the effects of any important variations will be carefully considered and vetted in the analysis.

Cross-case small-N methods are most important in discovering causal patterns and formulating causal propositions. Comparative-historical researchers employ highly contextualized within-case analysis to compensate for what small-N methods cannot not perform, i.e., testing propositions. Especially when N-size is too small, according to Goertz and Mahoney, "it is unrealistic to believe that [the] small-N comparative methods—by themselves—offer a strong basis for most kinds of causal inference. Without any within-case analysis, the leverage gained for testing explanations when moving from one case to three or four cases is modest."[90] Within-case analysis compensates for this weakness by allowing testing the validity of causal claims in each case or pairs of cases.

Within-case analysis forms another key comparative-historical method to validate causal connections identified through cross-case analysis. This method involves a "sustained" analysis of single cases through process-tracing and counterfactual thinking.[91] In using this method, the analyst develops and tests alternative explanations by tracing—overtime—the processes that link

[90] Goetz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, p. 89.
[91] Ibid., p. 89.

initial events to subsequent outcomes for a case or pair of cases. This procedure is so critical to hypothesis testing in that it enables the analyst to locate the causal mechanism between the hypothesized cause and outcome, thereby testing for any spurious correlation. To do so, the analyst carries out process-tracing tests in which specific within-case observation or diagnostic pieces of evidence may support or undermine the hypothesized causal linkage.[92] Historical "narrative" is used to uncover the causal mechanism essential for making causal generalizations.

Within-case process tracing is a valuable tool in CHA precisely because of the latter's emphasis on process, historical unfolding of events, and outcomes whose causes are located in distant historical events. CHA scholars distinguish between two basic logics of process tracing. On the one hand, the analyst uses inductive process-tracing for *theory development* by generating propositions through the identification of causal connections (i.e., sequences or processes) between earlier events and subsequent outcomes. On the other hand, the analyst conducts deductive process-tracing for *theory testing* by deducing, from "basic premises," specific causal claims that are validated or invalidated through process-tracing tests.[93] In an historical explanation, the researcher tests whether a given cause or package of causes is a necessary, sufficient, necessary and sufficient, INUS or SUIN cause of the outcome of interest.[94]

In this analysis, within-case methods go hand in hand with Millian cross-case methods. In comparative-historical inquiry, within-case analysis is not a substitute for cross-case comparison. It serves to test causal claims generated through aggregated comparisons of case or pairs of cases. When the analyst cannot increase the number of cases to gain causal leverage, as in

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[92] See Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing and Causal Inference," in Brady and Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, pp. 207-220; Goetz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, pp. 100-114; David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science & Politics,* 44, 4 (2011): 823-830.
[93] Tulia Falleti and James Mahoney, "The Comparative Sequential Method," in Mahoney and Thelen, eds., *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, p. 229.
[94] See James Mahoney, Erin Kimball, and Kendra L. Koivu, "The Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences," *Comparative Political Studies*, 42, 1 (2009): 114-146; Rodrigo Barrenechea and James Mahoney, "A Set-Theoretic Approach to Bayesian Process Tracing," *Sociological Methods and Research,* 48, 3 (2019): 451-484.

quantitative analysis naturally, and should the number of cases remain too small, the "main basis" for causal inference must derive from within-cases analysis.[95]

Idiographic and Nomothetic Explanations

CHA methods also allow building mid-range explanations that mediate between idiographic case studies, on the one hand, and nomothetic explanations, on the other. Case studies predominate descriptive and causal analysis of political development in post-liberation Southern Africa. These studies, no doubt, provide highly contextualized insights of events, processes, and outcomes of interest in a particular country. Yet not only are insights derived through case studies too particularistic to offer ideas about other countries, but arguments derived from one case are also presented as true about other contexts or even as explanatory models to predict outcomes in other cases. The development trajectory of post-2000 Zimbabwe, in particular, has often been treated an illustration of ultimate political outcomes in South Africa and Namibia. In addition, Namibia has been treated as a non-important case, as a shadow of South Africa, to help understand post-liberation Southern Africa. Comparative studies that consider more than one case also rarely cross "historical" boundaries between Anglophone and Lusophone Africa.

However, overgeneralization is also equally common in the study of liberation struggles and their legacies. This problem is particularly common among scholars who focus on organizational structures, violence, and authoritarian political values of liberation movements to make the general claim that, from Rwanda and Uganda to the Southern African countries, post-liberation contexts are invariably dominated by authoritarian politics. Others, based on the analysis of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, suggest that the regime outcome of armed

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[95] Goertz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, p. 87; also D. Collier, H. Brady, and J. Seawright, "Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology," in Brady and Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, p. 185.

struggles (followed by coercive state-building) is durable authoritarianism immune to military coups, elite defections, and popular uprising. On the opposite end, large-N studies of regime transitions subsume Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe under the independent variable of "party regimes" to make the general claim that such institutions, in average effect, associated with less autocratic breakdown.[96] Not only does such general claim have nothing to say about the other democratic post-liberation countries, but it also obscures the historical particularity of these post-liberation regimes and thereby the causal mechanisms specific to the context.

This study seeks to offer a mid-range explanation based on all instance of "liberation" in Southern Africa. CHA methods are uniquely strong to avoid the pitfalls of idiographic and nomothetic approaches. The focus on spatially and temporally bound cases allows for generating explanations based on valid conceptualization—or avoid conceptual stretching—and broadly generalizable across the cases. Moreover, unlike in statistical analysis, the small size of cases allows to identify alternative paths as well as causal mechanisms at work by studying every case deeply and by making systematic comparisons of similar and contrasting cases.[97] The cases are grouped in terms of the specific reform approach (i.e., radical, liberal, and stalled-liberal) and the subsequent pattern of development. This helps to overcome the limitation of idiographic studies by allowing to generalize about cases with similar reform approaches and their outcomes. It also enables to identify and explain multiple developmental paths for the Southern African countries and to avoid the pitfalls of nomothetic analysis an example of which include claims of durable authoritarianism based on inductive analysis of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.

Temporal Analysis

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[96] E.g., Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12: 2 (2014): 313-331.
[97] See Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, "Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agenda," p. 13.

This study suggests that different paths of political change in post-liberation Southern Africa are causally linked to variations in the unfolding of the liberation struggles and the timing of national liberation. Given this, CHA is a suitable approach as it is concerned with temporal processes, and furnishes special analytic tools to understand the causal importance of historical events and processes that "unfold over time and in time."[98] This temporal orientation of CHA contrasts with quantitative approaches, which rely largely or exclusively on cross-sectional data for inferential purposes, and provide a rather static, '"snapshot" view of political life'.[99] Unlike CHA, statistical approaches—by virtue of the analytic tools, methods, and large sample size—are ill-equipped to situate variables in their proper temporal context or to assess temporal connections among them.

CHA avoids these methodological pitfalls through focus on the "structure" as well as the "timing" of events and their potential effect on the outcome of interest.[100] A given causal factor (or process) may vary in its temporal structure, i.e., duration, order, and pace. This variation potentially effects an outcome "because temporal structure can shape the form and nature of causal effects and because the temporal structure of events and processes can be important outcomes worth of explanation in their own right."[101] One cannot understand the origins of radical and liberal types of change following liberation struggles without due attention to the duration or pace of the liberation episode. A shorter critical juncture increased the likelihood of radical change because national liberation would take place early in a Cold-War context, whereas a longer critical juncture increased the probability of liberal approaches because it would push

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[98] Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, "Comparative Historical Analysis," p.12; also, see Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," 1999.

[99] Paul Pierson, "Not Just What, but *When:* Timing and Sequence in Political Processes," *Studies in American Political Development*, 14, 1 (Spring 2000), p. 72. J. Harsanyi put this dichotomy between statistical and historical explanation as "static" versus "dynamic" explanation: "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science," *Behavioral Science,* 5, 2 (1960): 136-45. Thelen gives an overview of earlier efforts in political science that stressed the role of sequencing and timing in politics; K. Thelen, "Timing and Temporality in the Analysis of Institutional Evolution and Change," *Studies in American Political Development*, 14, 1 (Spring 2000): 101-108.

[100] Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, "Comparative Historical Analysis," p. 12.

[101] Thelen and Mahoney, "Comparative-Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science," p. 22.

the point of national liberation to a different world-historical period hostile to radical change. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, radical and liberal reformist approaches differed in measurement and legacies because they clearly differed in the scope and pace of change.

Moreover, in CHA, the causal effect of a given event (or outcome) may depend on its "temporal location," i.e., timing and sequencing. In other words, a variable can have different causal effects depending on the temporal context and the sequence (vis-à-vis other variables) in which it occurs.[102] In this analysis, the hypothesized causal event or process (i.e., the liberation struggle) is suggested to have different initial outcomes (i.e., radical or liberal change) because of the timing of the event's conclusion and the sequencing of different dimensions of change. CHA methods (such as sequence analysis, process tracing, counterfactual methods) are superior to average-effect estimation methods in variable-oriented research in sufficiently assessing this critical temporal variability in the liberation episode and its consequence. It was historically entirely possible for liberation elites in Angola and Mozambique to adopt liberal (or other non-radical) approaches were it not for the early timing of national liberation, just as it was equally possible for radical (or other non-liberal) approaches in South Africa and Namibia if not for the actual timing of liberation. Moreover, as in Zimbabwe, liberal reformism in the latter cases would have been aborted had they occurred in a different (pre-1989) temporal context.

In CHA, the temporal dimension of independent variables (i.e., events or processes) matters in yet another way—the sequencing and conjuncture of two or more variables. CHA tools and procedures are crucial to assess the consequence of two variable occurring in a certain temporal order than in another or interacting in a given episode than in another. Theoretical tools available in CHA research (such as critical junctures, timing and sequencing, and path

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[102] Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 54; Falleti and Mahoney, "The Comparative Sequential Method," 2015, p. 213.

dependence) provide valuable tools for "framing and structuring" explanations that capture the effect of sequencing and temporal interaction of causal variables.[103] This analysis employs the concepts of critical junctures and path-dependency (tools associated with each theoretical apparatus) to systematically explore the liberation episode and the divergent (and similar) paths of change in its aftermath. CHA provides concepts and tools invaluable for evaluating the contingency of liberation outcomes, conceptualizing radical, liberal, and stalled-liberal reform approaches, and the conjuncture of domestic and international processes that prompted the different reform approaches.

1.6 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

The analysis to come will attempt to develop the theoretical arguments and analytical tools outlined in this chapter. Because the critical juncture is central to the argument, the analysis is organized into parts ordered in view of their chronological and empirical relationship to the critical juncture. Part II, which includes Chapters 2 and 3, focuses on the historical antecedents of settler colonialism and the dynamics of the liberation struggles. Chapter 2 discusses the historical conditions that characterized Portuguese and White-minority domination, with a particular focus on state structures, the mode of production and exploitation, and native policy in each country. Chapter 3 presents the different paths to national liberation and the historical factors that influenced elite calculations in adopting a specific reform-policy option.

Part III focuses on the alternative—radical, liberal, and stalled-liberal—approaches to change that characterized the reform period. In this part, Chapters 4-6 elaborate separately each

[103] Thelen and Mahoney, "Comparative Historical Analysis in Contemporary Political Science," 2015, p. 22; also, Falleti and Mahoney, "The Comparative Sequential Method," 2015.

of the three reform approaches with particular emphasis on state and power consolidation, socioeconomic changes, and nation-building strategies, as outlined earlier.

Part IV analyzes the legacies of the differing reform approaches. The main focus in this part is on the aftermath period between the reform episode and the point when the dynamic of reactions and counterreactions gives way to more enduring structural patterns in each country. Chapter 7 traces for all five countries the institutional structures and political reactions that emerged in the aftermath of liberation episode. Thus, the causal mechanisms that link the varied reform approach to the ultimate structural legacies are highlighted in each set of cases as are the more stable institutions that emerged at the end of the aftermath period. Chapter 8 attempts to highlight the structural similarities and differences of the ‘final’ legacies of liberation prevailing in present-day Southern Africa.

Finally, by way of conclusion, Chapter 9 summarizes the path-dependent argument and considers theoretical and methodological implications of the study. It also outlines scope conditions for external validity of the theory and highlights tools and strategies for applying critical-juncture analysis to related episodes of basic institutional change, such as national revolutions, prolonged civil wars, and political settlements.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL CONDITIONS OF SETTLER-COLONIAL DOMINATION

Southern African has a long history of settler colonialism predating the late nineteenth-century "Scramble for Africa." The initial antecedents of this period are rooted in pre-modern European conquests, settlement, and exploitation between 1500s-1880s in parts of what would form modern Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. These antecedents fully subsumed these countries as well as Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa after the Berlin Conference (1884-5) of European powers to carve up Africa.

This chapter discusses the aforementioned historical antecedents before national liberation in Southern Africa. The antecedent conditions of settler colonialism in all five cases were characterized by largely similar patterns of racial exploitation, exclusion, and domination over majority Africans and other non-White groups. In the first half of the twentieth century, settler-colonial regimes emerged in all cases based on racial domination and exploitation and with racially exclusionary state and political institutions. These regimes were politically rigid and recalcitrant to change that, when peaceful decolonization ensued in other parts of Africa, anti-colonial liberation struggles began in early 1960s to bring to end continued racial domination and exploitation in the region. As such, a careful consideration of the antecedent settler-colonial conditions is required to better understand the emergence, development, and outcomes of the national-liberation struggles.

The antecedent conditions nevertheless varied in important ways that matter for analyzing change during the liberation episode. At a rather superficial level, they can be classified into Portuguese "ultra colonialism" (i.e., Angola and Mozambique), Dutch and/or British settler colonialism and subsequent settler domination (namely, South Africa and Southern

Rhodesia), and German settler colonialism and South African settler rule (i.e., South West Africa). But the more substantive distinctions relate to the specific institutions of racial domination and exclusion based on principles of racial assimilation and incorporation (Angola and Mozambique), racial segregation and 'separate development' (South Africa and South West Africa), and racial segregation and multiracialism (Southern Rhodesia). Furthermore, these regimes of racial domination were defined by low, high, and moderate levels of socioeconomic modernization and racial inequalities, respectively, during the late settler-colonial period.

This chapter analyses such conditions with specific reference to the state structures, settler-colonial exploitation, and racial exclusion before the liberation episode. This, first, will provide an essential backdrop to analyze change during the liberation episode that would take place in each case in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Only then can we fruitfully assess major hypotheses of socio-political change—both Marxist and liberal—that assign central explanatory role to institutions of racial domination and/or socioeconomic modernization to explain variations in the dynamics of change during the liberation episode or after. The comparative and historical analysis of the settler-colonial period assesses whether and how radical, liberal, and stalled-liberal reform approaches that characterized the liberation episode in each case might be causally linked to state, economic, and social institutions defining the settler-colonial period.

The analysis of the settler-colonial period, secondly, is crucial to verify the causal status of the liberation episode as a critical juncture. At the end of the chapter, a comparative assessment of major structural variables emphasized by rival hypotheses shows that most of the socioeconomic variables hardly predict the types of change that defined the liberation episode; only settler-colonial state capacity covaries with radical and liberal change. This underscores that

reform approaches adopted during the liberation episode were contingent outcomes. To be sure, the specific reform options available, and the strategic choices made, during the liberation episode were deeply rooted in preliberation events and processes. Yet antecedent conditions are a poor guide for a theory of radical and liberal change in Southern Africa after the settler-colonial period. Indeed, against theoretical predictions and political expectations, radical change took place in Angola and Mozambique with more liberal settler-colonial institutions and lower levels of modernization, and liberal change in South Africa, South West Africa, and initially Southern Rhodesia with highly racist, unequal, and more modernized settler-colonial conditions. This is not to suggest that radical and liberal reformist types of change were random occurrences; but rather contingent outcomes whose causes had less to do with many standard variables associated with the settler-colonial period.[1]

Finally, the analysis of settler-colonial antecedents provides a "baseline" against which liberation-episode reforms and their legacies can be assessed. The scope and nature of change that defined the liberation episode in each case can be fully appreciated in view of the prevailing political, social, and economic conditions.

2.1 THE INITIAL HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Settler colonialism in Southern African long predated the Scramble for Africa. Portuguese colonization in parts of modern Angola and Mozambique since the early sixteenth century as well as Dutch and subsequent British colonialism in modern South Africa since 1652 represent the initial antecedents of modern settler-colonial domination in the region. These were defined by distinct patterns of settler-colonial exploitation and racial domination.

[1] I am indebted to Jim Mahoney for this profound theoretical insight on "contingency." See also James Mahoney, *The Logic of Social Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), p. 272.

In the Portuguese territories, with effective colonization limited to few settlements such as Luanda, Quelimane, Sena, and Tete, colonial exploitation took through slave exporting and mining and land and labor exploitation was far less extensive than in the Dutch Cape later on. Colonial policy based on notions of racial equality—i.e., *lusotropicalism*—encouraged racial miscegenation and assimilation of natives. However, colonial society was deeply racist and unequal that, after mid-seventeenth century, a color-based racial order consisting of settlers, mulattoes (or colored), and black Africans developed, which would characterize colonial society in subsequent centuries. A minority of settlers and *assimilado* ('civilized' coloreds and blacks) dominated economic and political institutions, and ruthlessly exploited natives using taxation and forced labor in colonial plantations, mines, and military.[2]

The colonial state was ineffective, leaving the dominant minority with substantial autonomy particularly in Mozambique. Here, colonial influence was much more tenuous, and reduced to *prazos* or large, settler-controlled feudal estates in the Zambezi valley (central Mozambique) based on the exploitation of land and African peasants (*colons*).[3] The *prazos*—a defining feature of the initial antecedents in the Portuguese colonies—represented a settler community independent of the metropole that, unlike in South Africa, vanished with renewed Portuguese colonization in the late-nineteenth century.

In South Africa, the initial antecedents that developed in the colonial Cape under Dutch (1652-1795) and, after 1805, British settler colonization were marked by extensive European settlement, land dispossession, and labor coercion in part because settler-colonial accumulation

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[2] See James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962), ch. 2-3. On race relations, see Gerald J, Bender, *Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), who described *lusotropicalism*, coined by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, as:

> … the ideology which used to explain and justify the Portuguese presence in Africa … because of the (asserted) historically unique absence of racism among the Portuguese people, their colonization of tropical, non-European territories was characterized by racially egalitarian legislation and human interaction. (p. 3).

[3] See Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, pp. 55-65.

and exploitation was based on wheat and wine production and sheep and cattle ranching. Moreover, growing demand for land and free labor with rapid demographic increase of settlers set into motion an overriding dynamic of violent settler-colonial expansion, dispossession, and subjugation of natives to slave or indentured servant status, which subsumed the eastern Cape in the first-half of the nineteenth century and the rest of South Africa in the second-half.[4]

Colonial society in the Dutch Cape was racist and slave-based, with a white-settler minority dominating political and economic power, and an oppressed majority deprived from basic socioeconomic rights. After early nineteenth-century reforms, the master-servant relations that defined the cast-like colonial racial order were maintained using such labor-repressive institutions as native contract labor, passes, and vagrancy laws.[5] Likewise, the state was racially exclusionary, especially after 1783, when settlers gained certain economic and political rights. Compared to the Portuguese territories, settlers developed early political autonomy and, in the second-half of the nineteenth century, independent states after Dutch speakers (Afrikaners) of the Cape fled *en masse* into the interior to escape British rule and thereby "recreate the [racial] relations that existed before [liberal] British reforms in the Cape Colony."[6]

The Afrikaner states—i.e., the Natal republic, Orange Free State, and South African Republic (see Map 2.2)—broadcasted racist political, economic, and social institutions of the Dutch Cape. Following subjugation, Africans were dispossessed of their land and cattle, fully excluded from cultural and political life, placed under a "coercive labor regime" involving native labor contracts, passes, and hut tax. In the Natal, that fell to British rule in 1842, blacks, as in the

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[4] J. D. Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1994, Second Ed.), pp. 25, 42-51, 71-81; T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History* (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1987, Third Ed.), pp. 46-53.
[5] H. Giliomee and B. Mbenga, *New History of South Africa* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2007), pp. 53-7. T. R. H. Davenport & C. Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 5th ed.), pp. 34-5.
[6] L. Thompson, *A History of South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 103; also see Davenport, *South Africa,* 1987, pp. 34-5, 39.

eastern Cape, were driven into tiny native reserves indirectly governed through colonial native administration. The goal was to free up land, destroy the African peasantry, and secure cheap native labor supply[7], institutions elaborated after gold discoveries in the Transvaal (1886) and to constitute the heart of twentieth-century racial segregation and exploitation in the region.

2.1.1 Nineteenth-Century Reforms and Transformations

As of early nineteenth century, the traditional forms of settler-colonial domination underwent major transformations initiated by liberal colonial reforms. In the Portuguese colonies, this began with the rise of a liberal monarchy in Portugal (1822) and involved the banning of slavey (1836) and the oppressive *regime dos prazos* in central Mozambique (1832), as well as efforts to develop an effective colonial administration and increase white settlement. Thus, the liberal regime promoted agricultural exploitation and liberal race relations in the "overseas provinces" where settlers, creoles, and assimilated blacks enjoyed equal legal rights at least in theory.[8] Nonetheless, colonial expansion was slow (Map 2.1), and such reforms were less efficacious in either reinvigorating settler colonization or protecting the 'uncivilized' native. Exploitation in the guise of civilizing the native—the premise of Portugal's paternalistic native policy—intensified with increasing land and labor exploitation albeit to a lesser extent than in the Cape or Afrikaner settler-colonial states.

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[7] See Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, 2000, p. 109; N. Etherington, P. Harried, and B. K. Mbenga, "From Colonial Hegemonies to Imperial Conquest, 1840-1880," in C. Hamilton, B. K. Mbenga, and R. Ross, eds., *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 338-65.

[8] Duffy *Portugal in Africa*, 1962, pp. 67-70, 94-95; see also Carlos Jose C. G. Fortuna, "Threading Through: Cotton Production, Colonial Mozambique, and Semi-Peripheral Portugal in the World Economy" (Ph.D. Diss., State University of New York, 1989); and Douglas Wheeler, "*The Portuguese in Angola 1836-91: A Study in Expansion and Administration*" (Ph.D. Diss., Boston University, 1963).

Map 2.1: Late Nineteenth-Century Portuguese Settler-Colonial Expansion

Source: Duffy, *Portugal in Africa*, p. 112.

In South Africa, more effective liberal British reforms led to the emancipation of slaves and serfs after late 1820s, and the dissolution of repressive land and labor institutions of the Dutch Cape. Moreover, the British granted individual and property rights for Whites and the Cape Colored, and in 1853, a representative government and a non-racial franchise for propertied male adults.[9] Liberal historians, such as W. M. Macmillan and Eric Walker, contended that the racial order of twentieth-century South Africa emerged on the rubble of nineteenth-century 'multiracial' Cape Colony, from an illiberal 'frontier tradition' of the Boers resuscitated by the Boer republics following the Great Trek.[10] Yet Cape liberalism was 'ambiguous' and contradictory; the race-class contradictions spawned large-scale dispossession and subjugation throughout South Africa.[11] Like in post-emancipation United States later on, racial oppression of

[9] See Davenport, *South Africa*, 1987, pp. 46-9, 98-100; Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, 1994, pp. 42-9.
[10] For this interpretation, see Timothy Keegan, *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order* (Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip, 1996), pp. 1-14.
[11] This is also the interpretation of revisionist 'radical' historians such as Bernard Magubane, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid," *Economy and Society* 1, 4 (1972): 425-456; Martin

the Cape Colored and blacks took ever subtler forms (e.g., apprenticeship, contract labor, pass laws), on the one hand, and politically empowered settlers used property qualifications and voter suppression to disenfranchise non-Whites, particularly after mid-1860s, on the other.[12]

Map 2.2: Late Nineteenth-Century Settler-Colonial Expansion in South Africa



Source: Shula Marks, "Southern Africa, 1867-1886," in R. Oliver and G. N. Sanderson, eds., *The Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 384.

In British Natal, a representative government was established in 1856 with similar race-based franchise restrictions. But the settler state was much more exclusionary from the outset. What is particularly notable in Natal's case, since the 1840s, was the institution of indirect native administration that developed into a full-blown system of separate governance of races, with Africans sequestered in Native Reserves supplying low-cost labor to the settler economy. Natal's indirect rule had often been portrayed as the more rigid progenitor of twentieth-century "institutional segregation" in South Africa compared to a liberal "multiracial" British Cape with

Legassick, "Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 1 (1974): 5-35; Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, eds., *Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870-1930* (New York: Longman, 1982).

[12] See Davenport, *South Africa*, 1987, pp. 107-109, 112, 118; Thompson, *History of South Africa,* 2000, pp. 60, 65.

a tradition of direct rule.[13] Nevertheless, by the late-nineteenth century a segregated native administrative system also developed in the Cape, while Cape liberalism had "shriveled" and its black franchise was "whittled almost out of existence."[14] Whether in the British Cape, Natal, or the Afrikaner republics, during the second-half of the century "the foundations of racial segregation as a politics of order were … laid down just as firmly as were the foundations of a cheap labor system."[15]

2.2 ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS BEFORE LIBERATION

The process of settler-colonial expansion in Southern Africa came to a head during the closing decades of the nineteenth-century after the Berlin Conference (1884-85) to carve up Africa among major European powers. In the Angolan, Mozambiquan, and South African cases, this involved the subjugation of hitherto uncolonized areas and the imposition of oppressive settler-colonial institutions that had been shaping since early nineteenth century. This process was accelerated in South Africa by gold and mineral discoveries, which prompted British annexation of Afrikaner republics by the turn of the twentieth century and rapid dispossession and proletarianization of African peasantry. In the Southern Rhodesian and South West African cases, it involved the imposition settler-colonial and racial domination—under British and German colonization—akin to those that had been consolidating in South Africa.

The settler-colonial and racial structures that took hold since the late-nineteenth century represented the antecedent conditions prevailing before the liberation episode in each country. These conditions were defined by patterns of settler-colonial exploitation, state structures, and

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[13] For example, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and The Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 62-71.
[14] Davenport, *South Africa*, 1987, p. 119.
[15] John S. Saul, "The Making of South Africa … and Apartheid, to 1970," in J. S. Saul and Patrick Bond, *South Africa: The Present As History* (Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2014), p. 27.

race relations that were largely similar but distinct in some respects. In view of this, the settler-colonial conditions can be grouped into three categories: (a) Racial domination and integration, i.e., Angola and Mozambique, (b) Racial segregation and 'separate development,' namely, South Africa and South West Africa, and (c) Racial segregation and multiracialism, i.e., Southern Rhodesia. In analyzing each category, similarities and differences in land and labor exploitation, state structures, and racial exclusion are discussed in order to assess whether, and which, structures linked to the antecedent conditions mattered in determining the types of change that characterized the liberation episode in each case.

2.2.1 Racial Assimilation and Inclusion: Angola and Mozambique

The period after the late-nineteenth century is viewed as a 'new era' of Portuguese colonialism albeit marked continuity with the initial antecedents. I focus on the monarchical period (1880s-1910), when 'modern' colonial policies for extensive Portuguese colonization were initiated, and the Estado Novo period (1930-1975), when the defining antecedents of the preliberation period were firmly consolidated. Substantial changes that take place after 1960 are considered separately in a later section on late-colonial developments.

During the new wave of settler-colonial conquest, the Portuguese monarchy, more aggressive and exploitative institutions developed that were in sharp break with the nineteenth-century liberal reforms and that would indelibly define settler-colonial policies in twentieth-century Angola and Mozambique.[16] These policies, encapsulated in the Colonial Reform Act of 1907, laid the basis for greater settler-colonial exploitation, including expanded Portuguese settlement, agricultural development (e.g., coffee, sugar, cotton), and native exploitation through taxation, forced labor, and vagrancy laws. However, settler-colonial expansion in Angola and

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[16] I will use the terms "colony" and "overseas province" interchangeably because colonial policy either lacked clear preference or used one or the other term at different periods under consideration.

Mozambique during this period was gradual and less extensive[17] compared to, as we shall see, large-scale land dispossession, native reserves, and large-scale proletarianization of black peasantry in contemporaneous South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia.

The pre-republican regime nevertheless developed an extensive "coercive" labor regime. The new generation of colonizers viewed colonization as "a twofold process of economic development and cultural [civilization] and that forced labor contributed to both."[18] This underpinned a highly repressive labor system that, *even after* liberal reforms by the first republican government after 1910, was *condemned as a "modern slavery."*[19] *Non-assimilado* natives were required to fulfil obligatory 'contract labor' for planation agriculture, public works, and 'principal' settler businesses. In Mozambique, a state-regulated migrant labor to the Transvaal mines represented another system of native labor exploitation .[20] The first republican government sought to reform the repressive labor regime with new policies for protecting natives from abusive labor policies and practices.[21]

Native policy was based on principles of racial assimilation and direct rule. However, liberal notions of racial equality were abandoned in the 1890s as hindrances to native exploitation seen as essential for the development of Portugal and the provinces. This imperative, together with Portuguese colonial philosophy that the African could be 'civilized through work,' led to not only racial discrimination and unfettered exploitation, but also to the exclusion of the 'uncivilized' native from civic institutions. Whereas areas with substantial white and 'civilized' population were provided with local councils (*concelho*), the native was placed under an

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[17] See James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), ch. 9-10.
[18] L. W. Henderson, *Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict* (Ithaka: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 120.
[19] Henry M. Nevinson, *A Modern Slavery* (New York: Schocken, 1968) and Edward A. Ross, *Report on Employment of Native Labour in Portuguese Africa* (New York: The Abbott Press, 1925); also, see Eric Allina, *Slavery by Any Other Name: African Life Under Company Rule in Colonial Mozambique* (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2012).
[20] See Duffy, *Portugal in Africa*, pp. 129-136; Henderson, *Five Centuries of Conflict,* pp. 121-3.
[21] Ibid., p. 255.

autocratic circumscriptions (*circunscrições*) under White officials (*administrador*) akin to paramount chiefs.[22] Ideas of White supremacy and racial segregation that swept early twentieth-century Southern Africa, and a growing settler population, especially in Angola,[23] rendered notions of racial tolerance, miscegenation, or protection of Africans increasingly untenable. Yet, unlike the other cases, racism and racial segregation was not institutionalized in settler-colonial Angola and Mozambique.

Map 2.3: Colonial Angola (1939) and Colonial Mozambique (1937)

[22] Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, pp. 242-4.
[23] Andrew Roberts, "Portuguese Africa," in A. D. Roberts, ed., *The Cambridge History of Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Vol., 7), p. 525.

Source: Roberts, “Portuguese Africa,” pp. 522, 502.

The Estado Novo regime—or the Second Republic—like the monarchy, rejected liberal racial egalitarianism as obstacles to colonial exploitation, development, and close integration of the colonies with the ‘mother country.’ The principles that would determine colonial policy to the early 1950s were summarized by Duffy as follows:

> the goal of Portuguese policy is to bring about the integration of the native peoples into the Portuguese nation; this goal “must be pursued prudently, always keeping in mind that the natives have a culture, a social organization, and a law of their own which must be respected and maintained”; the obligation of the state is to protect the African in his primitive condition against the abuses and control of the colonists, to protect his property, and to supervise his labor contracts with *não-indígenas*; the African’s assimilation is to be obtained through the Portuguese language, education, instruction, and Christianity; the African is guaranteed, once he has acquired a civilized way of life, the same juridical privileges as a born Portuguese.[24]

[24] Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, pp. 294.

The state structures, race policies, and land and labor exploitation of the Estado Novo regime, as the Colonial Reform Act of 1930, reflect these principles of non-racialism and racial inclusion. Institutions of the settler-colonial state were based on unified direct administration of White settlers and African natives. In theory, however, the latter belonged to a domain of custom separate from that of the non-native*;* yet there existed neither a native legal code separate from Portuguese common law nor a separate native administrative authority. As the 'civilizing mission' progressed, the circumscriptions in African areas were displaced by *concelhos* that dominated in non-native areas as instruments of limited self-government.[25] The New State's native policy sought to "reach the goal of cultural equality by establishing a regime of clear administrative inequality."[26] Thus, the colonial population was divided into two judicial categories: the *indígenas* (unassimilated persons of the Negro race) and *não-indígenas* (Whites and the assimilated Africans and mulattoes). The proclaimed goal was to eliminate the *indígena* group and full integration into Portuguese national culture, accomplished gradually through 'selective assimilation' of few 'civilized' individuals.[27]

Two important points are worth emphasizing at this stage. First, culture, not color, formed the basis of institutional exclusion and exploitation of blacks and coloreds; native custom would be suppressed and the native gradually incorporated into a 'multiracial' Portuguese nation. Racial miscegenation was common, the colored and assimilated blacks were accepted as full Portuguese citizens, and *the* provinces were "free from the extreme racial prejudices which dominate[d] life and thought" in South Africa.[28] Second, the settler-colonial state in Angola and Mozambique was autocratic and corporatist, which impeded the development of strong settler

[25] Ibid., pp. 281-8, 300-03.
[26] Dufy, *Portugal in Africa*, p. 161.
[27] Ibid., p. 162.
[28] See *Duffy, Portuguese Africa,* pp. 297-9.

power or representative institutions. In each province, a Legislative Council provided the settler minority with some political voice in colonial matters. But the council was nothing more than a symbol of participation and a "safety valve for local sentiments" of overseas residents.[29]

Colonial land and labor exploitation increased during this period. As before, however, colonial land dispossession remained comparatively low by even as late as the early 1970s, hampered in part by Portugal's own limitations to pursue ambitious colonization policies and in part by settlers' aversion to agriculture.[30] Most policies that could have driven the African peasantry to the labor marker (e.g., native reserves) were not implemented in any systematic fashion well until mid-1950s.[31] In fact, in sharp contrast to other settler-colonial regimes in the region, the Estado Novo regime supported the development of a modern peasant society—through Portuguese agricultural colonization as well as the establishment of African agricultural villages (*colonatos*)—as crucial to the natives' "economic and spiritual" assimilation. This nevertheless hardly shielded the African farmer from taxation, compulsory cultivation of export crops (e.g., cotton, rice, cashews), and an exploitative labor regime.[32]

Labor policy continued to represent the most oppressive and widespread mode of settler-colonial exploitation in Angola and Mozambique. The native had a moral 'obligation to work,' which was deemed by colonial philosophy as necessary to fulfil the twin goals of economic development as well as the cultural assimilation, without, at least in theory, overt settler abuse and exploitation. The Colonial Reform Act (1930) established that native labor rested on

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[29] Ibid., pp. 285, 286.

[30] For example, by 1967, Portuguese planters in Mozambique controlled more than 50 precent of land in the fertile provinces of Gaza, Manica and Sofala, Lourenco Marques, and Zambezia. By the 1960s, 3,000 European planters and farmers controlled most land in Mozambique; the average European holding was 1,405 acres as compared to 3.5 acres for an African family. See Allen Isaacman, *A Luta Continua: Creating a New Society in Mozambique* (New York: State University of New York, 1978), p. 11; Barbara Isaacman and Allen Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 43.

[31] Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, p. 307; Roberts, "Portuguese Africa," p. 497.

[32] See Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, 308-10; Basil Davidson, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa," in Michael Crowder, ed., *The Cambridge History of Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, Vol., 8), p. 760.

'individual liberty,' to be used only for public and collective interest, and outlawed the recruitment of native labor for private interests, unpaid African labor, and other abuses.[33] In practice, the use of unpaid native labor for private interests, with the colonial administration central role in labor recruitment and regulation, continued.

As colonial settlement and development intensified since the 1940s, the native was increasingly viewed as the *mão de obra* (manpower) for European farms and plantations. Indeed, Africans were not sequestered into native reserves to free up agricultural land, destroy African competition, and regulate labor as in South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. But natives were burdened by a comprehensive 'obligatory labor' regime, enforced through an elaborate pass system and a state administration that, penetrating every African village, efficaciously recruited labor for public and private use. Every male *indígena* carried a *caderneta* (or pass) that recorded employment and taxation history and restricted movement to the village. Natives were exempted from the 'moral obligation' to work and other economic compulsions only if they achieved an *assimilado* status and owned property or pursued a profession.[34]

During the post-war period, both Angola and Mozambique experienced moderate socioeconomic change and urbanization resulting from development investments, colonial economic liberalization, and increasing White settlement, which stimulated the expansion of commercial agriculture, mining, and local manufacturing particularly in Angola.[35] At the same time, racial discrimination increased and an informal 'color bar' between the settler minority and the majority natives developed. Very slow assimilation and the rising tide of anticolonialism induced some changes in race policy in the 1950s. The government redefined the colonies as

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[33] Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, pp. 319-20, 325.

[34] Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, pp. 303-4, 323-7; Henderson, *Five Centuries of Conflict,* pp. 124-5; Norman A. Bailey, "Native and Labor Policy," in David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 168.

[35] See Dufy, *Portugal in Africa*, pp. 191-206.

'overseas provinces' and expanded the *concelho* to a large number of Africans; abolished the indígena category; redoubled modern educational, medical, and social services for Africans; and adopted a policy of *assimilação uniformizadora* (general assimilation) that extended Portuguese laws and civic rights to all African subjects.[36]

For most scholars, Portuguese settler-colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique was just as racist and oppressive as the other settler regimes in Southern Africa. However, it was characterized by principles and policies of multi-racialism and racial inclusion. Culture, not race, formed the official basis of racial exclusion and exploitation; native policy was based on direct administration; and settlers lacked democratic rights to develop autonomous political or state institutions. The resulting state and social structures were markedly different from those that developed in South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, as we shall discuss next. Yet late-colonial Angola and Mozambique were arguably no less racially oppressive and exploitative, nor racial grievances in the 1950s any less explosive, that as in the other cases, the antecedent conditions gave rise to anti-settler colonial armed struggles in early 1960s.

2.2.2 From Racial Segregation to Separateness: South Africa and South West Africa

In South Africa and South West Africa, settler-colonial domination was firmly established between the last decades of the nineteenth and the turn of the twentieth centuries. Whereas South Africa was subsumed under British imperialism after the subduing of African chiefdoms in the eastern Cape and Natal and the Afrikaner settler states, South West Africa fell under German settler colonialism. The structures of settler-colonial domination that emerged from these political developments—and settler capitalism unleashed by the 'mining revolution' in the

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[36] Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, pp. 296-7. Also, see Michael A. Samuels and Norman A. Bailey, "Education, Health, and Social Welfare," in Abshire and Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, pp. 178-201.

Witwatersrand, Transvaal, after 1887—represent the antecedent conditions of the liberation episode. Based on defining processes, I divide this period into a Segregation Phase, that formally began with the birth of the Union of South Africa (1910), and an Apartheid Phase from 1948 to the early 1990s, with post-1960 changes considered later.

Following imperial conquest, the British brought together the Cape, Natal, Orange River, and Transvaal to form the Union of South Africa.[37] From the outset, the union was a 'whites only' state founded on mutual English and Afrikaner fears of the black majority. The foundations of racial supremacy and segregation were laid down by the South Africa Party (1910-1924) and its Afrikaner leaders, Louis Botha and Jan C. Smuts. According to Smuts, the goal of nation-building was to keep the 'white' and 'non-white' races segregated, and to exclude 'non-whites' from "common citizenship" while "keeping [blacks] apart as much as possible in our institutions."[38] Only Whites were eligible for citizenship, voting, and socioeconomic rights. Only in the Cape had some Africans and Coloreds retained voting rights,[39] obliterated in subsequent decades with ever growing racism and political exclusion of non-whites.

To stabilize racial domination and exclusion, the African majority had to be placed under native administration. This is 'institutional segregation' distinct from 'territorial segregation' that had been applied to the 'native question' in nineteenth-century South Africa. Referencing Jan Smuts, Mamdani summarizes the nature and rationale of 'institutional segregation' as follows:

> The problem with "territorial segregation," in a nutshell, was that it was based on a policy of institutional homogenization. Natives may be territorially separated from whites, but … As the economy became industrialized, it gave rise to "the color problem," at the root

[37] With the Act of Union, South Africa became a self-governing commonwealth under the British Crown before it attained full independence in 1931. Even though this sets South Africa apart from all other cases, the institutions of settler-colonial domination and exploitation, described as colonialism of a "special type," were hardly different.
[38] Jan C. Smuts, *Greater South Africa: Plans for a Better World* (Johannesburg: Truth Legion, 1940), p. 18; also P. Walsh, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912-1952* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 53; A. W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, The United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 5.
[39] See Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, pp. 154-7.

> of which were "urbanized or detribalized natives." Smuts' point was *not* that racial segregation ("territorial segregation") should be done away with. Rather it was that it should be made part of a broader "institutional segregation." The way to preserve native institutions while meeting the labor demands of a growing economy was through the institutions of migrant labor…[40]

Natives were excluded from representative institutions and put under a despotic "Native Authority" regime of native commissioners (white men) and chiefs that ruled by decree and custom. The separate and exclusionary political regime was generalized by the Native Administration Act (1927), which also removed black representation by establishing a Native Conference separate from the national parliament. The tribalized Native Authority system served to, on the one hand, reinforce "institutional segregation" and codify native divisions and, on the other, to effectively manufacture and regulate a large, cheap, demobilized black labor.[41]

The exploitation of land and native labor was intertwined with native exclusion and administration.[42] For this, a range of 'extra-economic compulsions' were devised to compel the native into the labor market,[43] and thereby preserve settler economic domination, of which the wholesale appropriation of land was the chief method. To this end, the Natives Land Act of 1913 restricted black landownership to 'native reserves' that amounted to less than 7.3 percent of the total land area (Map 2.4), and considered, economically, "little more than labor reserves for white South African mines, industry, and farms."[44] Blacks outside reserves were reduced into wage or tenant laborers for white farmers. The economic rationale was to destroy African

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[40] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, pp. 5-6.
[41] Ibid., pp. 28, 145-65.
[42] In fact, the 'native question' was synonymous with the 'labor question' that was in turn a 'land question.' See J. C. Smuts, *Africa and Some World Problems, Including the Rhodes Memorial Lectures Delivered in Michaelmas Term, 1929* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929) and South West Africa, *Report of the Administrator, 1919* (U. G. 40, 1920).
[43] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject,* ch. 5.
[44] Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa,* p. 157; Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, p. 163.

competition to White farmers and to "impoverish the African peasantry" to such a degree that it "would be compelled to work for the Europeans, in the mines or on the farms."[45]

Native labor formed the other pillar of settler economic power and exploitation. To this end, old institutions of labor control (e.g., pass laws, contract labor) were nationalized; the 'color bar' prevalent in the mining industry was extended to manufacturing and public works; strikes by African mineworkers were criminalized; and skilled jobs, higher wage, and unionization rights were preserved for white workers. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and successive labor policies excluded African workers from the definition of 'employees' and thereby restricted bargaining power to White and Colored unions.[46] Meanwhile, staggering landlessness, poverty, and unemployment in the reserves caused black influx to urban centers, now exclusive 'white areas,' in the 1920s. This, and the incentive for effective utilization of growing black labor, led to a corpus of pass laws, rooted in eighteenth-century Dutch Cape-slave regulations, that resulted in greater urban segregation and draconian black labor policies. For example, by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, Africans were required to carry work permits and passes, reside in segregated urban 'locations,' and "had no permanent rights in the towns and no justification in being there unless needed by the whites as units of labor."[47]

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[45] Jack Goddis (1960, p. 8) quoted in Robin Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 24. On the dramatic decline of black peasantry in South Africa and Southern Africa writ large between the 'mineral revolution' and the interwar period, see Colin Bundy, *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
[46] See Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, pp. 167, 169; Davenport, *A Modern History,* pp. 258-9, 530-2.
[47] Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, p. 169.

Map 2.4: Land Distribution in South Africa and South West Africa (1939)



Source: N. Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, 5th ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), p. 56.



Source: P. Hayes, J. Silvester, M. Wallace, and W. Hartmann, eds., *Namibia Under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915-46* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998), p. xv.

In South West Africa, more or less segregationist and exploitative settler-colonial policies were simultaneously instituted under German settler colonialism, 1884-1914. A highly repressive settler-colonial regime was established in the *Polizeigebiet* or 'Police Zone' (regions south of solid curve-line, Map 2.4), where natives were violently dispossessed of their land and livestock and relocated into poor, marginal reserves. All non-whites—i.e., Africans and Colored—were fully excluded from legal, administrative, and subsequently political structures and, following the Natal and Cape precedents, placed under territorially and institutionally segregated Native Authority system. Similarly, a franchise introduced in 1909 was restricted to propertied white men, giving a small number of settlers disproportionate political and economic power over majority non-whites thoroughly deprived of any agency.[48]

A coercive native labor regime was also institutionalized to provide cheap labor for mining and settler agriculture as well as to protect settler farmers from African peasant competition. Thus, Africans were barred from land and cattle ownership in the Police Zone, where nearly all native land was transferred to settlers and concession companies, and subjected to a draconian regime of contract labor, passes, and vagrancy laws, particularly after a Native Ordinance of 1907. Areas north of the Police Zone were designated as 'natural' reserves under native administration supplying unskilled migrant labor.[49] After the territory's occupation by South Africa in 1914, the oppressive settler-colonial arrangements were aligned with South African laws and reinforced during heightened racial segregation after mid-1920s. After World

[48] Andre Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1986), p. 24; Marion Wallace and John Kinahan, *A History of Namibia: From the Beginning to 1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 149, 197-8.

[49] H. Bley, *South-West Africa Under German Rule*, *1894-1914* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 170-3, 226-48. On German colonization, see, G. Sudholt, *Die Deutsche Eingeborenenpolitik in Sudwestafriak von den Anfangen bis 1904* (Hildesheim: Geoge Olms Verlag, 1975); J. Zimmerer, *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (Muenster: Lit, 2004); U. Kaulich, *Die Geschichte der ehemaligen Kolonie Deutsch-Suedwestafrika (1884-1914)* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2000); and G. Steinmetz, *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German State in Qingdao, Samoa and Southwest Africa* (Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press, 2007).

War I, South Africa secured the right to administer South West Africa as a League of Nations Mandate before it eventually annexed the territory unilaterally.

In 1924, the Both-Smith government was replaced by a conservative pro-Afrikaner National Party of Prime Minister J. B. M. Herzog. In this new phase of segregation, the 'color bar' was extended to all facets of society and new social controls instituted, including curbing urban flow, forced removal of 'surplus' blacks to reserves, and urban residential segregation. To also undermined a tenuous African vote, Herzog's government enfranchised white women (1930), thereby reducing the African electorate from 3.1 percent to 1.4 percent, and revoked property qualification for white male voters (1931) in the Cape and Natal. By the early 1940s, the government attempted to disenfranchise and segregate the Cape Colored, and enacted laws impeding the economic and residential rights of Natal Indians. [50] In South West Africa, now incorporated as South Africa's fifth province, the government actively implemented the same segregationist policies that were inherently adverse to promoting, as the mandate system required, "the material and moral wellbeing" and "social progress" of natives.[51]

Faced with the socioeconomic woes of the Great Depression and growing 'poor whites' in urban centers, a new government of Herzog and Smuts' Union Party formed in 1933 further reinforced the segregationist and repressive labor frameworks in place. The Natives Representation Act of 1936 removed the sliver of black voters in the Cape from the common-roll franchise. The Natives' Trust and Land Act of 1936 doubled African land in the reserves to about 13.5 percent in order to curb urban influx and remove 'undesired' blacks from cities. In urban areas, the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 prohibited African immigration to cities

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[50] Davenport, *A Modern History,* pp. 311, 315, 348-353; Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, pp. 172-4.
[51] Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, pp. 282-3, see also J. H. Wellington, *South West Africa and Its Human Issues* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 272-83; J. Goldblatt, *History of South West Africa: From the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century* (Cape Town: Juta and Co. Ltd., 1971), pp. 226-8.

and allowed for the deportation to reserves of Africans whose labor was deemed unwanted.[52] Similar polices of urban segregation and reserve expansion were implemented in South West Africa; the coercive labor regime subsumed the northern areas that, integrated in the 1930s under the Native Authorities, represented the largest reserves of native labor.[53]

Racial segregation and exclusion in South Africa and South West Africa took a new turn with the 1948 electoral victory of the Afrikaner ultranationalist (*Herenigde*) National Party (NP) on the heels of growing liberal influences and threats to White supremacy. Institutionalizing *Apartheid* during subsequent pre-liberation decades, the National Party sought to fortify racial exclusion and settler power through strict segregation of society and White monopoly over the state in South Africa and South West Africa.[54] Existing black labor, residential, and property laws were elaborated and strictly implemented to reverse growing black urbanization and working-class militancy. The government also thoroughly systematized, "applied rigidly and dogmatically" segregation in accordance to apartheid theory of racial "separateness." Between 1948 and late-1950s, it defined and organized society into White, Colored, Indian, and African groups by establishing separate (urban) residential areas for each group; criminalizing racial intermarriage; and the segregation of public facilities, schools, universities.[55]

Apartheid held an even more racist view of the state and national community, i.e., an Afrikaner republic exclusive of all non-white 'races.' To this end, the government abolished the Natives Representation Council and grouped the native reserves into ten territories each in South

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[52] Giliomee and Mbenga, *New History of South Africa,* pp. 283, 287; William Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 2nd Ed.), pp. 114-27.
[53] Du Pisani, *The Politics of Continuity and Change*, pp. 57-62; Wallace & Kinahan, *History of Namibia*, pp. 234-8.
[54] The NP's goal was to advance Afrikaner class and political interests vis-à-vis English economic hegemony. For this interpretation, See Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934-1948* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983), p. 16; see also Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa: 1919-36* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989); Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism," in S. Marks and S. Trapido, eds. *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (New York: Longman, 1987), pp. 10-22.
[55] See Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa,* pp. 193-200; Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, pp. 190-7.

Africa and South West Africa. With the Bantu Authorities Act of 1953, each native reserve was defined as a 'homeland' of an African 'nation' allowed to develop into a self-governing Bantustan—a legal framework that would serve as the basis for a policy of independent African Homelands beginning in the 1960s. Furthermore, in 1954, the government recognized the Colored as a 'race' group separate from Whites before it eliminated residual Colored political rights and thereby obliterate a residue of multiracial nineteenth-century Cape Franchise.[56]

In a nutshell, segregation and 'differential development'[57] through indirect native rule characterized settler-colonial in South Africa and South West Africa in sharp contrast to racial inclusion and assimilation characteristic of Angola and Mozambique. A traditionally autonomous settler minority in control of independent states during the late settler-colonial period is another distinct attribute of antecedent conditions in the former cases. These antecedents generated a radical opposition to racial apartheid in the 1950s to which the regime responded with increasing repression and further balkanization of the countries into a dominant White state and Bantustan states dependent on it.

2.2.3 From Racial Segregation to Multiracial Cooptation: Southern Rhodesia

The antecedent conditions of settler-colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia before the liberation episode were similar to those of South Africa and South West Africa. For analytical purposes, two separate phases can be identified in the settler-colonial period: British South Africa Company rule (1890-1922) and Responsible Government (1923-1980). Late-colonial changes after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 are explored in the next section.

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[56] Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, pp. 191; Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa,* pp. 200-1.
[57] Smut's 1929 Oxford lectures quoted in Marks and Trapido, "The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism," p. 9.

The foundations of settler-colonial domination were laid down under the BSAC company, entrusted by the British crown with colonial occupation and administration of Southern Rhodesia. From the outset, the process involved violent appropriation of African land and cattle, imposition of taxes, and the extraction of cheap black labor from 'native reserves.' The principal modes of settler-colonial accumulation and exploitation—i.e., mining and eventually settler agriculture—required extensive land dispossession, labor coercion, and a repressive native administration. By the late 1890s, most agricultural land had been violently transferred to settlers, and following the South African precedent, the black population moved into 'native reserves' located in marginal areas in the aridic low veld, far from major transportation networks and urban areas on the central Highveld (see Map 2.5).[58]

Native land and labor policies became much more exploitative after 1908 with colonial policy shift from mining to settler agriculture. The new 'white agricultural policy' sought to develop settler farming through, on the one hand, *inter alia* increased European settlement and greater land acquisition coupled with agricultural training, extension, and credit services for settlers, and the development of irrigation and transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, a raft of draconian economic and social laws was passed to undercut competition from African producers by essentially crippling African farming and economic self-sufficiency. Over the next decade, interlocking measures—such as efforts to reduce the size of reserves, 'squeeze' black farmers, black exclusion from modern services, and increased hut taxes—pushed Africans into a "coercive labor regime" at starvation wages and massive proletarianization of black peasantry.[59]

[58] Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia,* pp. 56-63, ch. 2-5; Ian Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle* (New York: Longman, 1988), p. 65.
[59] See Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia,* ch. 4-5; also I. R. Phimister, "Peasant production and Underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1914," *African Affairs*, 73, 291 (1974), p. 221; G. Arrighi, "Labor Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia," *Journal of Development Studies*, 6, 3 (1970): 197-234.

Map 2.5: Land Control After the Land Apportionment Act of 1930



Source: Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*, p. 184.

Issues of state-building and citizenship were not crucial during this period because the state was essentially a colonial entity embodied in the Company's administration. Yet the emerging structures were racially segregated and dominated by the settler minority. In 1899, a franchise modelled after the Cape Franchise provided settlers with a Legislative Council to protect their political and economic interests. Excluded through high property and educational qualifications, the black majority was put under a separate native administration in "Tribal Trust Lands" fashioned after the Natal system of indirect native administrative.[60]

In 1923, Southern Rhodesia became a 'self-governing' British colony with Responsible Government. As in South Africa, the passing of effective political power onto white settlers ushered a new phase characterized by heightened racial segregation and exploitation well until the early 1950s. The settler government implemented oppressive laws (e.g., the Native Affairs Act of 1927) meant to curb African economic competition and urbanization by bolstering native

[60] Eshmael Mlambo, *Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright* (London: C. Hurst, 1972), pp. 1-13; Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, pp. 31-3; Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*, ch. 5 & 6.

authority in the reserves, the prohibition of African residence in European Areas or land purchase outside Native Purchase Areas, and stricter regulation of native labor through passes, vagrancy laws, and other restrictions.[61]

Racial segregation became national policy amid destabilizing economic and social impacts of the Great Depression. A series of discriminatory state policies effectively destroyed African agriculture that, together with overcrowding and degradation in the Reserves, prompted rapid proletarianization of black peasantry.[62] The 1930 Land Appropriation Act allocated 51 percent of total land area to about 50,000 whites and 29.8 percent to more than 1 million Africans.[63] Moreover, previous land and labor policies were tightened, and new segregationist legislation enacted (e.g., the Native Registration Act of 1936), to offset native economic threat to settler interests as well as to tightly control African urban movement and migrant labor. Furthermore, Africans were prevented from competition for skilled jobs by a 'color bar' in the labor market, and with the Industrial Conciliation Act (1934), excluded from the definition of worker and thereby barred from trade unions.[64]

The Responsible Government Act (1923), like the Union Act of South Africa, also defined issues of race and citizenship in exclusive terms. This set the stage for a racial order formalized under Prime Minster Godfrey Huggins (1934 -1953), a leading proponent of white power and segregation. Huggins' government promoted a doctrine of 'parallel development' or 'two-pyramid' policy that would protect European supremacy without black competition and ensure "gradual differential development" of natives who could now become lawyers,

[61] Palmer, *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia,* p. 135; Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe,* p. 149.
[62] Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, pp. 183-8.
[63] Alois S. Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 61.
[64] Ibid., pp. 192-3.

journalists, etc., but within their own social pyramid under white tutelage.[65] This guarantee both wholesale disenfranchisement and continued exploitation of the marginalized African majority. Native policy classified the population into three racial groups of Europeans, Asians and Colored, and natives, with the latter subdivided into the Ndebele and Shona ethnic groups.

Southern Rhodesia experienced rapid urbanization, industrialization and commercial agricultural expansion during the postwar years. As in Apartheid South Africa and South West Africa, this spurred further segregation and stricter labor controls.[66] However, Southern Rhodesia moved from ‘separate development’ to a ‘racial partnership’ approach that loosened urban segregation and permitted restricted political participation of blacks through the incorporation of ‘civilized’ educated blacks as ‘junior partners’ in a white-ruled country. A ‘B’ Roll with lower voter qualifications for Africans was introduced and Africans allowed access to better health, education, and welfare services especially in urban areas.[67] However, segregation persisted through “petty” apartheid and the liberal multiracial experiment, like in pre-apartheid South Africa, rather generated a settler backlash that brought to power in 1962 the racist Rhodesia Front (RF) party in favor of unfettered minority domination.

The antecedent conditions of settler-colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia were defined by racially segregation, politically exclusive, and exploitative state and economic institutions. Nevertheless, these institutions, and the level of modernization during the late-colonial period, were less pronounced than those of post-war South Africa and South West Africa. Racial policy

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[65] See Southern Rhodesia, *Statue Law of Southern Rhodesia: vol. 7* (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1963); also R. Gray, *The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 152.
[66] Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, pp. 83-107.
[67] For the period of the Central African Federation (1953-63) that encompassed the Southern and Northern Rhodesias and Nyasaland, see Mlambo, *The Struggle for a Birthright*, pp. 60-62; H. Holderness, *Lost Chance: Southern Rhodesia, 1945-58* (Harare: Zimbabwe Pub. House, 1985), p. 107.

oscillated between nineteenth-century Natal "institutional segregation" and Cape *multiracialism.* The liberation struggle began in 1964 in reaction to continued racial exclusion.

2.2.4 Reforms in the Late-Colonial Period

Beginning in the late 1950s, in reaction to a host of internal and external factors, settler-colonial regimes of Southern Africa introduced major policy changes that significantly redefined antecedent settler-colonial conditions discussed previously. These changes were liberalizing in some cases and reactionary in others, and thus had different consequences.

In the Portuguese overseas provinces, following some constitutional reforms in 1961-62, the government repealed the Native Code (1954) to grant all inhabitants the same civic rights; liberalized restrictions on African landholding; and repealed the 'moral obligation' of Africans to work along with the pass laws. In another set of reforms in 1971-72, the overseas provinces' right to some degree of autonomy from Lisbon was recognized, while the franchise was expanded allowing more blacks to vote for provincial legislatures.[68] These institutional changes, and efforts in the 1960s to grow the provinces' economies and to expand public services, were nonetheless meant to allay international criticism, to quell the armed resistance, and to thereby perpetuate the settler-colonial status quo.

In the South African and South West African cases, such changes involved a shift to 'Grand Apartheid' initially. Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd (1958-66), the chief architect of apartheid as the former Minster of Native Affairs, introduced in 1959 apartheid's new principle of 'separate development' of the races. To this end, the native reserves were reorganized into twenty Bantu 'homelands' set to be independent nation-states after a period of constitutional development (Map 2.6). This resulted in stripping blacks of basic rights, including South African

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[68] See Davidson, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa," pp. 772-3; Bailey, "Native and Labor Policy," pp. 166-9.

citizenship, as well as increased land dispossession, labor controls, and heightened racial segregation following large-scale removals of black communities from European areas. The primary economic purpose of the reserves thus changed from labor supply to “dumping areas” for unproductive blacks deported from European areas.[69] But the Homelands served a larger political agenda as safety valves for growing African militancy by diverting black grievances to Homeland governments. Political apartheid, too, was hoped to be seen as a legal solution to racial segregation and as an instance of internal decolonization—something in accord with international principles—to thereby mute growing international censure.

Map 2.6: Bantu Homelands in South Africa and South West Africa, 1984

Source: Davenport, *South Africa*, p. 414.

[69] Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, pp. 320, 216-18.

The regime loosened oppressive labor and segregation framework after 1973, however. In reaction to growing dependence on black and brown labor with rapid economic change, the government increased educational opportunities for urban Africans to upgrade black skills; and reversed or liberalized laws that upheld the employment 'color bar' and that restricted urban residency of migrant workers or multiracial trade unions. Moreover, the government of P. W. Botha (1978-89) established in 1983 three separate White, Colored, and Indian parliaments to permit political voice for the two latter groups.[70] Yet this move towards multiracial was superficial because blacks were fully excluded, as the government pushed 'separate development' to its logical conclusion (i.e., independence for the Homelands), and because the legal infrastructure of segregation and white supremacy was fully protected well until the eve of national liberation.

In Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith's (1964-1979) Rhodesian Front regime reverted to segregation after a unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965 in denial of majority rule. This involved stringent policies to restrict African, Asian, and Colored access to land; tighten the employment color bar and segregation of public facilities; and to systematically undermine African farming.[71] Smith's government also retracted constitutional reform proposals previously made in 1961 in favor of multiracial inclusion and gradual black enfranchisement, and took steps to solidify Southern Rhodesia to a 'white man's country.'

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[70] Ibid., pp. 223-4, 227-9, 236.

[71] See Mlambo, *The Struggle for A Birthright*, ch. 10; A Shutt, "'We Are the Best Poor Farmers': Purchase Area Farmers and Economic Differentiation in Southern Rhodesia, c.1925-1980" (D.Phil. Thesis, University of California, 1995), pp. 190-237.

2.3 ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

Now that the similarities and differences in patterns and structures of settler-colonial domination have been sufficiently delineated, it is possible to assess how the settler-colonial antecedents had—or should have—affected change during the liberation episode. Reliable statistical data for all the countries and relevant time periods are rarely available for most variables. However, the goal of the present discussion is to compare cross-sectionally key structural variables prevailing during the late-colonial period, and assess their impact on change in view of hypotheses emphasizing a particular variable or a set of variables. Table 2.1 presents cross-sectional qualitative estimates for such political, economic, and social variables to rank-order the countries based on antecedents that required or favored least (liberal) change to antecedents that required or favored most (radical) change. These estimates are fairly reliable as they were generated using reliable country monographs and/or from widely used statistical sources (see Table 2.2).

Dominant theories of change suggest that, as discussed in the previous chapter, various variables of the pre-liberation period should explain the type of change in the aftermath of Southern African liberation struggles. Most of the variables in Table 2.1., including settler-colonial exploitation, racially exclusive state institutions, racial inequalities, and black poverty as well as modernization factors, such as urbanization, industrialization, and large working class were hypothesized to favor radical change. Others, such as heightened racial exclusion, land or income inequalities, and widespread black immiseration, required or at least justified radical change. Theoretically, the only antecedent not positively correlated with radical change is an effective settler state (4). The outcome to be explained is the scope of change undertaken during the liberation episode. This, as defined in the previous chapter, can be radical change in which

case liberation leaders effected dramatic state, social, and economic transformations of revolutionary scope or liberal change whereby liberation elites adopted less comprehensive and gradual changes of reformist nature.

Table 2.1: Scores for Antecedent Conditions Before the Liberation Episode

	ANG.	MOZ.	S.RH.	S.W.A.	S.AF.
Settler-Colonial Exploitation					
Land dispossession (1)	3	3	4	4	5
Labor coercion (2)	2	2	3	4	4
State Institutions					
Racial exclusion (3)	3	3	4	5	5
Ineffective settler state (4)	5	5	2	1	1
Socioeconomic Change					
Modernization (5)	2	1	4	3	5
Racial inequalities (6)	3	2	4	5	5
Black poverty (7)	2	2	4	5	5
TOTAL SCORE	20(4)	18(5)	25(3)	27(2)	30(1)

NOTE: 1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, 5 = very high

Table 2.2: Racial Inequality and Modernization Before the Liberation Episode

	White settlers (share of pop.)	Land distr. (share of white land)	Income distribution (top 10% share)	Social and economic Modernization	
				Agriculture (% of GDP)	Urbanization (% of urban pop.)
Angola	8.9	- 50	-	22.50	14.96
Mozambique	2.5	- 50	-	25.00	8.99
Southern Rhodesia	4.6	~ 50	62.0	18.59	19.87
South West Africa	6.5	+ 70	71.5	7.39	26.37
South Africa	13.7	+ 80	85.9	4.90	51.51

Note: Data on social and economic modernization is from the World Bank Database (https://data.worldbank.org/) except for Angola and Mozambique. For these cases, figures of share of agriculture (and fisheries and forestry) are derived from country studies and government reports like the remaining measurements. Most of the stats are for 1-5 years before the liberation episode in each case.

To begin with, all five Southern African cases had sufficient conditions that either favored revolutionary change or required radical measures to bring about meaningful change. Paradoxically, however, such change took place in Angola and Mozambique with conditions least favorable to radical outcomes or required the most far-reaching measures. First, the level of race (and class) inequalities, racial oppression, and black impoverishment before the liberation episode were lower. In these cases, native land dispossession and proletarianization was far less extensive in the first place, and racist restrictions on black land ownership and labor were

significantly liberalized, and social services for Africans considerably expanded, with late-colonial reforms. Second, late-colonial Angola and Mozambique had significantly lower levels of modernization despite considerable socioeconomic transformation in commercial agriculture, manufacturing, and urbanization during the post-war decades. The is particularly true of Mozambique, where agriculture engaged about 90 percent of the population on the eve of liberation.[72] Both, therefore, lacked advanced national economies closely integrated into the global market or a large urban working class hypothesized as favorable conditions to a revolutionary outcome (see Chapter 1).

Pre-liberation South Africa and South West Africa, by contrast, contained nearly all conditions that favored revolutionary change and/or called for, in the eyes of most liberation elites and progressive anti-apartheid forces, fundamental structural changes to build more inclusive, just post-racial states and societies. Both South Africa and South West Africa were the most unequal in preliberation Southern Africa owing to very high levels of race-based discrimination and (land and wealth) inequalities. Until national liberation, whereas the settler minority controlled at least over two-thirds of land, the national economy, and first-world public services, the black majority comprising at least over three-quarters of the population with less than one-fifth of the land, non-existent basic public services, and subjected to continued segregation and labor exploitation, lived in abject poverty, disease, neglect, and violence in strategically impoverished rural Homelands or urban townships.[73]

In addition, South Africa and, to a large degree, South West Africa were the most modernized of all other cases. South Africa underwent rapid social and economic change,

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[72] See Dufy, *Portugal in Africa*, pp. 191-206; Dongen, "Physical, Human, and Economic Setting," in Abshire and Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, pp. 9, 16.

[73] On the social and economic legacy of apartheid, see Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, pp. 265-8, 282-7; Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, pp. 201-27; on income inequality, Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, *Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), especially ch. 3-4 & 6-7.

including agricultural commercialization, manufacturing, and urbanization between the 'mineral revolution' of 1880s and mid-twentieth century. Manufacturing (and mining) began to contribute twice the GDP share of agriculture by 1950 and employed most of the population that, by the late 1980s, had already been mostly urbanized.[74] South West Africa also enjoyed considerably rapid economic change and urbanization since the post-war period; agriculture accounted for less than 10 percent of GDP although the share of manufacturing was slightly higher and that of urban population small before liberation. Overall, however, South Africa and South West Africa had higher rates of urbanization, industrialization, and a far larger working class, with national economies dominated by large capital and highly integrated into the global market. These structural changes combined with explosive social conflicts, economic decline, and mass mobilization in the 1980s to produce a revolutionary crisis expected to culminate into rapid and basic changes.[75] For the majority blacks, the structural inequalities and conflicts would unacceptably persist without radical reconstitution of the state and redistribution of wealth.

Southern Rhodesia also maintained settler-colonial conditions that favored revolutionary change albeit to a lesser degree than South Africa and South West Africa. First, the racist framework of black exploitation and exclusion—and corresponding high racial inequalities—persisted despite some moves towards racial equality and majority rule in the late 1970s. The settler minority representing less than five percent of the population controlled more than-half of the land (see Table 2.2), and maintained an average income more than ten times greater than that

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[74] See Marks and Rathbone, "Introduction," p. 2; C. Feinstein, *An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 113, 121, 180; Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, pp. 170-200; Giliomee and Mbenga, *New History of South Africa*, p. 254. On modernization and its origins, dynamics, and consequences, see Marks and Rathbone, eds., *Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa.*

[75] On structural conditions, such as fiscal pressure, elite divisions, and deep racial-class inequalities, that heightened revolutionary potential in South Africa in the 1980s, see for example C. R. D. Halisi, P. O'Meara, and N. B. Winchester, "South Africa: Potential for Revolutionary Change," in Jack A. Goldstone, Ted R. Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, eds., *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): 272-97.

of the blacks.[76] Second, Southern Rhodesia underwent fairly rapid economic and social modernization during the late-colonial period particularly with rapid industrialization, urbanization, and economic expansion during the postwar decades. It had an advanced industrial sector with manufacturing output surpassing agriculture and mining output combined by mid-1970s, and a much higher proportion of urban population than Mozambique or Angola.[77] It was the paradox of the presence of such structural conditions and contradictions ideal to a revolutionary outcome and yet liberal reforms at liberation that led scholars to view Zimbabwe as a *sui generis* of revolutionary social theory, "an unusual case of revolutionary violence resulting in reform."[78]

Major socioeconomic variables therefore do not covary with the type of change during the liberation episode. Let us now turn to major political variables, i.e., political inclusiveness and institutional capacity of the settler-colonial state. Again, racially exclusive institutions were much more marked in pre-liberation South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia than in pre-liberation Angola and Mozambique. In the latter cases, state institutions and laws were relatively inclusionary in the first place, and rendered more racially undifferentiating and inclusive after major political reforms in the early 1960s. In South Africa and South West Africa, by contrast, under political apartheid non-black minorities were granted limited political rights while blacks were expelled from the national state as citizens of Bantustan states. Moreover, the

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[76] Scarritt, "Zimbabwe: Revolutionary Violence Resulting in Reform," in Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, eds., *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*, p. 239; Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society* (New York: Printer Publishers, 1989), p. 42.

[77] See A. S. Mlambo, E. S. Pangeti, and I. Phimister, *Zimbabwe: A History of Manufacturing: 1890-1995* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2000), ch. 2-3; M. A. H. Smout, "Urbanization of the Rhodesian Population," *Zambezia*, 4, 2 (1975-6): 79-91; also M. O. West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

[78] Scarritt, "Revolutionary Violence Resulting in Reform," p. 270; also, see L. H. Gann and T. H. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush* (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 117; I. Phimister, "The Combined and Contradictory Inheritance of the Struggle Against Colonialism," in C. Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1988): 8-17.

pre-liberation societies in these cases were so deeply divided along race. Thus, bringing about meaningful political change, the eradication of deep-seated racial, tribal, and territorial divisions, and the dismantling of pro-status quo traditional and ruling elites in the 'homelands' required a radical state-building approach, e.g., the centralization of state power, destroying rival social-power centers, and mass-mobilization and incorporation into the state.

The institutional capacity of the settler-colonial state similarly differed across the cases. Yet, it maintains a positive correlation with the type of change that characterized the liberation episode: i.e., weak settler state with radical change and strong settler state with liberal change. As discussed earlier, the settler minority in Angolan and Mozambique had no history of fashioning its own state and political institutions. With the weakening of the Portuguese colonial state on the eve of the liberation episode, settlers lacked political power to defend their interests or to force a political settlement favorable to liberal change. This was precisely the case in South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. In these cases, settler minorities had built strong state administrative and political institutions that enabled them to avert premature revolutionary crisis and the prospect of far-reaching changes potentially undermining their political, economic, and social privileges.

Finally, some analysts have also sought to explain variable political change in post-liberation Southern Africa in terms of the size of the settler population. In other words, the absence of radical change in South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia was the outcomes of, at least in part, supposedly larger settler minorities. Such conclusions lack either sound or strong empirical support for two main reasons. First, as Table 2.2. shows, late-colonial Angola had a much larger settler population than both Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. Second, the settler minority was generally small in all cases to be the sole cause of wide

variation in liberation outcomes. The comparative-historical account of settler political autonomy and institutions in previous sections indicates that the historical development of a settler state, not the numerical size of the settler minority, was a more important antecedent factor.

2.4 CONCLUSION

The preceding comparative-historical analysis have shown that the five post-liberation Southern African countries had maintained similar antecedent conditions of settler-colonial domination that gave rise to revolutionary struggles in the early 1960s for the sake of fundamental structural changes. The analysis has also drawn important distinctions among the cases based on racial exclusion and exploitation that deepened during the late settler-colonial decades: i.e., racial assimilation and incorporation (Angola and Mozambique), racial segregation and apartheid (South Africa and South West Africa), and racial segregation and limited multiracialism (Southern Rhodesia). These categories correspond with different rates of modernization and racial inequalities that prevailed before the liberation episode.

Nonetheless, none of the socioeconomic variations—that is, settler-colonial exploitation of land and labor, racial oppression and inequalities, and modernization—positively correspond to the kind of change that defined the liberation episode. In fact, the cases with extreme racial oppression and exclusion as well as generally higher modernization levels experienced liberal change (i.e., South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia) vis-à-vis the cases with less pronounced settler-colonial racism and exclusion as well as lower modernization that underwent radical change (i.e., Angola and Mozambique). This, first, indicates that major standard (structural) variables presumed as sources of variation in the liberation episode lack the exaggerated explanatory power often ascribed to them. Second, the fact that most antecedent

conditions hardly predicted the scope of change defining the liberation episode in each case underscores the contingent origins of the reform choices undertaken by liberation elites.

The institutional capacity of the settler-colonial state is the only antecedent condition that clearly covaries with radical or liberal change across the cases. A strong state controlled by a White-settler minority, that had developed political autonomy and/or independence from the former colonizing power, as in the former non-Portuguese colonies, successfully averted revolutionary change at liberation. This is consistent with studies of social revolutions that, since Skocpol's seminal analysis, have shown that weak administrative, military, and fiscal capacity of the state is a necessary condition for the development of a revolutionary crisis and culmination of social-revolutionary change.[79] How the state mattered in shaping both the evolution of the national-liberation struggles, and consequent elite-policy choices, in Southern Africa are analyzed in the next chapter.

[79] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, ch. 2; on how state strength interacts with other factors, see Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions," p. 80-3.

CHAPTER THREE

PATHWAYS TO NATIONAL LIBERATION

In all five countries, the antecedent conditions of the late settler-colonial period gave rise to struggles for national liberation in the early 1960s. The ensuing political and military struggles against minority regimes averse to peaceful decolonization—more or less dominated by the 'revolutionary' national liberation movements (NLMs) imbued in Marxism-Leninism—successfully brought to end the systems of settler domination and exploitation between 1975 and 1994. At the same time, in all five countries the radical NLMs and their leaders seized state power, which they envisioned to deploy for revolutionary goals of basic transformation of oppressive state, racial, and social class structures. Their twin revolutionary goals included achieving majority rule and, then, building more egalitarian and inclusive, multiracial nations.

However, *how* and *when* Southern African revolutionary NLMs achieved national liberation, and the *kind* of reform policy choice their leaders adopted, sharply differed among the individual countries. This chapter analyzes the distinct pathways to national liberation in Southern Africa in order to explain the historical origins of the three reform approaches that defined the liberation episode: radical reforms (i.e., Angola and Mozambique), liberal reforms (in South Africa and Namibia), and stalled-liberal reforms (i.e., Zimbabwe).[1] It does so by employing a conceptual apparatus with two dimensions: (1) the *mode* and the *timing* of national liberation, and (2) the domestic structures of *state power, economic structures,* and *dominant-class interests* prevailing on the eve of national liberation. Whereas the domestic-structural antecedents of the settler-colonial period were necessary conditions for defining the mode of liberation, which conditioned liberation-elite policy choices for radical or liberal reform options

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[1] Such different country names as Rhodesia (after Northern Rhodesia became independent as Zambia in 1964), Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (after 1978), and Namibia (after 1968) appear in the literature of this period. Except for where it is appropriate, for the sake of consistency, I retain the old names for the analysis of the pre-liberation period.

initially, the mode and the timing of national liberation were sufficient conditions in shaping reform dynamics of the liberation episode in each country.

Table 3.1: The Modes and Timing of National Liberation and Corresponding Reform Approaches

	Mode of National Liberation	*Timing of National Liberation*	*Reform Approach*
Angola (1975) Mozambique (1975)	Driven by 'external' politico-military struggle; liberation elites captured state power by military means without political settlements.	Liberation in a Cold-War context and regional conflicts; reform episode closed before global rise of neoliberalism.	Radical Reforms
Rhodesia (1980)	Achieved through external armed struggle with influential 'internal' opposition; liberation leaders assumed power democratically after a negotiated settlement.	Liberation amid Cold War tensions, but diminishing settler dominance in the region; liberation episode coincided with rapid international changes.	Stalled-Liberal Reforms
South West Africa (1990) South Africa (1994)	Driven by a combination of 'external' and powerful 'internal' struggles; liberation elites took power through non-racial elections following negotiated settlements.	Liberation in a post-Cold War context free from regional conflicts; reform episode after the demise of world socialism and the rise of neoliberal global hegemony.	Liberal Reforms

Based on the *mode* and the *timing* of national liberation, three distinct paths can be identified that correspond with the three reform approaches (Table 3.1). In Angola and Mozambique, revolutionary elites achieved national liberation in a route shaped exclusively by the 'external' armed struggles that culminated in a militarized mode of liberation, and much earlier in a Cold-War international setting with tense conflicts and the preponderance of white-settler regimes in the region. In Southern Rhodesia, liberation took place through a distinctive path involving guerrilla insurgency and limited 'internal' political mobilization, that concluded in a negotiation mode of liberation amid external confrontations and white supremacy. In South Africa and South West Africa, liberation elites attained power in a route defined by less effective external struggles and powerful 'internal' mobilization, which resulted in a negotiation mode of liberation in a post-Cold War, neoliberal world-historical setting free from regional conflicts and

white-settler power. The different pathways to national power presented liberation elites with distinctive sets of threats and opportunities—both domestic and external—that conditioned their reform policies, programs, and strategies during the liberation episode.

Table 3.2: State, Economic, and Dominant-Class Structures at National Liberation

Reform Approach	***State Power***	***Economic Structure***	***Dominant Capital***
Radical reforms (Angola and Mozambique)	Historically weak state; militarily weakened and collapsing to prevent seizure of power at liberation.	Less developed national economies based principally on settler and African agriculture.	Metropolitan/Portuguese capital dominated economies; settler and metropolitan capital departed at liberation.
Liberal reforms (S. Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa)	Historically strong state; it thwarted military challenges and revolutionary takeover of power at liberation.	More developed economies variously based on settler agriculture, mining, & industry; South African capital dominated the first.	Powerful international and settler capital with long-established economic dominance; capital pressured for negotiated transition to majority rule.

Yet, it is difficult to fully understand the different pathways without the prevailing state, economic, and capitalist-class structures on the eve of national liberation. Based on *domestic-structural factors* prior to the reform period, the countries fell into two broad categories that correspond to radical and liberal policy choices (Table 3.2). On the eve of liberation, Angola and Mozambique had a weak and collapsing colonial state, poorly developed national economies, and a dominant metropolitan/Portuguese capitalist class. By contrast, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa, had a structurally powerful—if significantly weakened—settler states, more or less advanced capitalist economies, and a powerful settler and international capital dominating commercial agriculture, mining, and industry. The contrasting structural conditions presented revolutionary elites with different sets of obstacles and challenges in their path to power as well as different resources and opportunities thereafter. As a consequence, as shown in Table 3.2, the different domestic constellations of state power, economic development,

and capital interests determined whether liberation leaders opted for a radical or liberal reforms approach at the beginning of the liberation episode.[2]

The background conditions allow us to understand *why* liberation elites adopted different reform options despite their long-held goals for basic and rapid transformation of inherited state, economic, and class structures. First, the colonial state in Angola and Mozambique had been both institutionally weakened and disintegrating at the tuning point of decolonization, allowing liberation movements to seize full power and pursue a radical reform option. Rapid disintegration of existing state institutions, along with the abrupt departure of bureaucrats, managers, and technicians, as well as escalating counterrevolutionary threats also necessitated rapid state building that went hand in hand with a radical option. In Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa, by contrast, the settler state's administrative, security, and military capacity had been significantly diminished, albeit at different degrees, on the eve of national liberation. However, the state and its settler constituency with a long tradition of self-rule and military organization presented formidable obstacles to liberation elites' drive to political freedom and the adoption of revolutionary reforms—hence, the liberal reform option.

Second, in the Angolan and Mozambiquan cases, the national economies were poorly developed, predominantly agrarian, heavily dependent on Portugal, and collapsing at the point of liberation. This underscored the necessity for rapid state intervention, radical agrarian reforms, and the nationalization of most industry to revitalize national economies and to pursue rapid socialist development. In juxtaposition, despite important variations, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa had relatively more developed national economies based on

[2] My logic draws from Giovanni Arrighi's categorization of settler-colonial structures based on modes of production and dominant class interests—and their implications for state institutions, economic change, and black classes—in his path-breaking analysis of settler political economy in Southern Rhodesia. See G. Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967).

capitalist agriculture, mining, and industry. This meant that it was politically expedient for liberation elites both to avoid the potentially disruptive economic consequences of radical policies previously seen in Angola and Mozambique, and to foster capitalist development that would allow the gradual reduction of inequalities, poverty, and mass unemployment among the African masses before possible transition to socialism. Additionally, Southern Rhodesian and South West African national economies were closely integrated to—and highly dependent on—the South African economy, and thus vulnerable to South African destabilization and capital flight in the occasion of radical measures.

Last, liberation elites had to contend with dominant-class interests—i.e., capital—whose influence also sharply varied on the eve of decolonization. Southern African liberation leaders were wary of settler and foreign capital flight in the event of radical policies. In Angola and Mozambique, however, the weakness of settler capital and abrupt departure of metropolitan capital amid volatile decolonization processes forced liberation governments to intervene with radical policies (e.g., nationalization of industry, expropriation of capital, and collectivization of rural agriculture) to stem economic collapse and restore productivity. In Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa, however, the national economies were long dominated by powerful settler and international capital, which sued for negotiated transitions to majority rule in bid to avert the dangers of revolutionary change. Further, the risk of confrontation with a powerful non-metropolitan capital, and ensuing economic havoc, forced liberation elites in these cases to consider a liberal policy option acceptable to vested capitalist interests.

This analytical approach differs from common approaches to the struggles for national liberation and their outcomes in Southern Africa. First, I focus on the 'revolutionary' NLMs—which dominated the external politico-military contests and assumed state power in all five

countries—in lieu of various reformist, pan-Africanist, traditionalist 'non-revolutionary' NLMs opposed to the non-racialist, modernizing, and socialist goals of the former.[3] Secondly, I place due emphasis on the 'internal' political process—or lack thereof—within the state's realm because the more or less instrumental 'external' politico-military dynamics are insufficient to fully fathom the different paths to political freedom in Southern Africa.[4] Thirdly, I avoid the common analytical pitfall of separate treatment of the guerrilla dynamics and the national-domestic structures. Finally, in analyzing the reformist nature of the liberation episode in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa, my analytical approach emphasizing external and domestic-structural conditions differs from scholarly efforts that singularly focus on the institutional constraints imposed by the negotiated settlements. Explanations premised on the decolonization settlements *per se* somewhat misconstrue an *effect*—institutional structures resulting from negotiated liberation—for a *cause*. In this study, the reform approaches represent the *actual* cause shaping dynamics of the reform episode and its aftermath.

The analysis to come is organized into two parts for each set of countries. The first part analyzes the pathways to national liberation, from the launching of the politico-military struggles to political freedom; and the second part analyzes the historical timing of national liberation and the domestic-structural factors that conditioned liberation-elite policy choices.

3.1 POPULAR STRUGGLES AND REVOLUTIONARY DECOLONIZATION: MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA

[3] See B. Davidson, "African Peasants and Revolution," *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1 (1974), 269-290, and J. S. Saul, *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique* (New York: Monthly Press Review, 1985).
[4] This is as true about 'committed' or Marxist scholars of the nationalist struggles as for liberal scholars, who nowadays emphasize the liberation organizations' structures, political values, and strategies.

Despite important distinctions that shall be highlighted, only Mozambiquan and Angolan revolutionary NLMs succeeding in waging more effective politico-military campaigns in their 'national and class' struggles in Southern Africa. The overall pathway to national liberation in these cases was thus characterized by intensive 'external' armed struggles, the absence of 'internal' political mobilization, and a militarily determined pattern of liberation. For 'activist' Marxist historians and analysts 'committed' to the cause of Southern African anti-colonialist struggles, the Mozambiquan and Angolan revolutions were highly radicalized and mass mobilizing People's Wars, and destined to culminate in revolutionary transformations of inherited state, political, and social-class structures. This hypothesis merits careful assessment because it is not substantiated by historical evidence, on the one hand, and it is both reductionist and over-deterministic, on the other.[5] We will, therefore, return to the origins, development, and conclusion of the liberation struggles in the next sub-section.

3.1.1 'People's Wars' and Revolutionary Change?

The revolutionary NLMs in Southern Africa sought to wage effective 'people's wars' or popular "armed resistance fought on guerrilla lines but centrally organized, commanded, and disciplined" by a revolutionary party.[6] The leaders must develop revolutionary vanguard parties mobilizing the mass of lower classes of workers and peasants, on the one hand, and wage a protracted peasant-based guerrilla campaign exemplified by the Chinese and Vietnamese national-social revolutions, on the other.[7] This entailed the establishment of 'liberated zones' with popular democratic structures, basic social services, and revolutionary programs of collective farming,

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[5] The deterministic logic also resonates with recent scholarship preoccupied with former rebel structures, actors, and ideologies to make sense of postliberation state institutions, policies, and political processes (see Chapter One).
[6] Basil Davidson, *The People's Cause: A History of Guerrillas in Africa* (Essex: Longman, 1981), p. 157.
[7] For original statements of the NLMs, see A. de Bragança and I. Wallerstein, eds., *The African Liberation Reader, Vol. 3: Documents of the National Liberation Movements* (London: Zed Press, 1982), especially ch. 6, 7, and 8.

land redistribution, and class and gender emancipation.[8] This dialectic of armed struggle, it is argued, would generate a feedback mechanism of expanding popular participation with ever growing radicalization of the NLM's 'petty bourgeois' leadership, strategies, and programs.

This 'logic of protracted struggle'—also, the 'radicalization thesis'—formed the basis of arguments that drew a causal linkage between relatively extensive politico-military mobilization in Mozambique and Angola and the revolutionary transformation after liberation.[9] According to this hypothesis, first, 'new' post-liberation state and social structures emerged in these cases because the liberation parties had evolved socialist political, administrative, and socioeconomic structures in the liberated areas. Second, the postcolonial state was uniquely controlled by a distinctive 'revolutionary class alliance' of a progressive petty-bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants forged in the national and class mobilizations for the 'people's wars.' Finally, it is argued, even the material basis of the post-independence states was new because economic mobilization and self-sufficiency in the liberated areas led, following liberation, "to changes in the aims as well as in the organization of economic production and distribution."[10]

The premise and logical conclusions of the thesis raise several questions: To what extent, and effect, had the Angolan and Mozambican NLMs approximated the theory and practice of a 'people's war'? Were FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*) and MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola*) equally successful in mobilizing various national and class forces, in building coherent political parties, in controlling liberated areas, and in implementing transformative programs therein? Furthermore, as Chabal questioned, is there a

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[8] See Patrick Chabal, *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (New York: Cambirdge University Press, 1983), pp. 86, 105-124; Davidson, *The People's Cause*, pp. 159-68.

[9] By the same logic, as we shall see below, the absence of radical change in the other cases was explained as a function of limited radicalization during the liberation struggles. This section draws on arguments by Patrick Chabal, "People's War, State Formation, and Revolution in Africa," 1983.

[10] For elaboration, see Chabal, "People's War, State Formation, and Revolution in Africa," p. 109-110.

causal 'correlation' between "the success of a nationalist war, the distinctiveness of the post-colonial state, and the potential for revolution" in these cases?[11] Lastly, is it valid to explain the radical outcomes on the sole basis of the 'external' national liberation struggles?

Indeed, as the 'radicalization thesis' asserted, FRELIMO and MPLA were comparatively far more successful in waging anti-colonial national struggles than their Rhodesian and, by a large margin, South African and South West African revolutionary allies. Yet, first, not only were the two liberation movements less successful in adopting and developing the strategies and tactics of a 'people's war,' especially Mao's third and final stage of 'strategic offensive' where the guerrillas succeed, to quote General Lin Biao of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in "encircling the cities from the countryside." For all its politico-military sophistication and effectiveness, even FRELIMO did not engage in conventional warfare tactics and strategy viewed in 'people's war' doctrine as a prerequisite to the 'highest form of revolution.'[12] Furthermore, the two sister NLMs greatly varied from each other in several respects as the MPLA in particular decisively failed to win national support or to forge a cohesive revolutionary vanguard party to wage a sustained popular armed struggle. [13]

Second, as Chabal pointed, FRELIMO and MPLA lacked the structural conditions favorable to mass-mobilizing national-social revolutions. The *ancien régime* in Portugal scarcely suffered serious internal crises; settler colonial rule hardly led to massive economic exploitation and wide-spread social disruption as in colonial Vietnam, for example; and the countries were not facing agricultural collapse and famine as in pre-revolutionary Russia or China. In short, neither domestic contradictions and international economic pressures stressed by students of

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[11] Ibid., p. 110.

[12] Moa Tse Tung theorized three phases of a victorious people's war: 'mobile war,' 'guerrilla war,' and 'regular war.' See T. H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), pp. 42, 206.

[13] See Henriksen, "People's War in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau," 1976.

revolutions as ‘revolutionary pre-conditions’ nor nationwide social-class structures or national cultures were present in settler-colonial Angola and Mozambique. It logically follows, then, the revolutionary nationalists were not able to mobilize the population on the basis of economic and social grievances necessary for twentieth-century revolutions.[14] As a consequence, the MPLA in particular hardly underwent a radicalization process deemed necessary for the articulation and implementation of revolutionary political, socioeconomic, and cultural programs.

Third, and as consequence, revolutionary changes carried out in the liberated areas were limited in the sense of ‘people’s war’ theory. Ironically, the NLMs relied on traditional authorities and social symbols—the nemeses of social modernization and agents of settler-colonial domination—as instruments of mobilization, while the new ‘village committees’ that formed “the linchpin of local administration in the liberated areas” hardly acted as agents of fundamental socio-political change. Peasant consciousness in these areas merely “amounted to a desire for a return to ‘traditional’ socio-political institutions rather than for integration into a modern socialist party organization.”[15] Radical economic programs, too, were stifled owing to the absence of private African land ownership, the availability of rural food, and villagers’ grievances directed at, not traditional patterns of rural agriculture, but “the most obvious abuses of the colonial economy, most notably plantation labor and taxation.”[16] Not only was the African peasantry ‘not revolutionary,’ as Amilcar Cabral famously underscored following Karl Marx,[17] and ‘land to the peasantry’ slogans served no revolutionary purpose, but the liberation movements could not afford to alienate rural peasants through sweeping rural reforms.

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[14] Chabal, “People’s War, State Formation, and Revolution in Africa,” p. 120; see also Henriksen, “People’s War in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau,” and *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, p. 214.
[15] Chabal, “People’s War, State Formation, and Revolution in Africa,” p. 119.
[16] Ibid., p. 120; see also Henriksen’s critique of the extent of reforms in liberated areas, “People’s wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau,” p. 388.
[17] Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea: An African people’s Struggle* (New York: Monthly Review Press), p. 50.

To sum up, efforts to explain away the origins of the radical approach that characterized the liberation episode in Angola and Mozambique through mere reference to 'radicalization' of the armed struggles are, however sophisticated, woefully inadequate. Neither of the movements achieved the kind of radicalization characteristic of paradigmatic anti-imperialist 'people's wars' in twentieth-century Asia. Furthermore, the liberation movements widely differed from each other in prosecuting the liberation wars and implementing basic changes in liberated areas. In this respect, the MPLA was closer to ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe) than to FRELIMO or the most radicalized PAIGC (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) that even undertook extremely limited structural changes after national independence. The fact that MPLA's leaders pursued a radical approach at liberation—but not ZANU-PF or PAIGC—underscores the limited explanatory power of the 'radicalization thesis.' Struggle-time popular mobilization, participation, and transformation of social relations was not a guarantee for radical state-building and class transformation following the liberation struggles. As Chabal put it, "[s]imply to *assume* that a people's war leads *ipso facto* to the formation of a radical post-colonial state which holds the key to a successful transition to socialism is not good enough."[18]

To explain the historical cause of the radical approach in Angola and Mozambique, it is important to understand the actual struggle process leading to liberation, the timing of national liberation, as well as the state, economic, and dominant-class structures of the pre-liberation period. As we shall explore next, the paths to national liberation were distinctive, but both countries had a military-driven mode of national liberation that took place in a Cold-War world-historical setting, as well as shared domestic-structural conditions before the liberation episode. The radical approach had its genesis in these historical commonalities of the cases.

[18] Chabal, "People's War, State Formation, and Revolution in Africa," p. 110.

3.1.2 Mozambique: National 'Popular Revolution' (1962-1974)

The radical approach that characterized the liberation episode in Mozambique was an outcome of a militarily determined mode of liberation and a Cold-War world context with which it coincided. The political path that defined the distinctive pattern and timing of national liberation was distinctly characterized by relatively the most unified and radicalized nationalist 'popular revolution' in Southern Africa. To better grasp the origins of the radical approach, therefore, it is crucial to examine the dynamics of the liberation struggle shaped by FRELIMO's much more effective politico-military campaign against the Portuguese settler-colonial state, without a corresponding 'internal' process of political cooptation and mobilization.

In the late 1950s, harsh political repression by secret police rendered political or cultural organizing in the Portuguese Overseas Provinces increasingly impossible for blacks and white settlers alike. With political challenges compounded by low literacy, striking geographical-cultural disconnectedness, and a migrant labor system to neighboring countries that urban stunted trade-union development, the earliest nationalist political parties that laid the basis for the revolutionary struggle in Mozambique thus all emerged outside the colony.[19] Three such small exile parties—each stemming from the southern, central, and northern parts of colonial Mozambique and each forming in Rhodesia, Malawi, and Tanzania and Kenya, respectively—merged together in June 1962 to form FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. A 'critical precursor' to the nationalist mobilization—and an epitome of the colonial state's iron control—was the Mueda Massacre (1960) when the local administration brutally repressed civilians

[19] The best accounts on the origins and early development of Mozambique's nationalist revolt include Barry Munslow, *Mozambique: The Revolution and Its Origins* (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1983); and John A. Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Firsthand account by FRELIMO's first leader is also available in Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (London: Zed Press, 1969), chapters 5-7.

demanding the alleviation of inhumane social and economic conditions, transforming a localized 'social problem' into a national political issue that set off the ensuing war of liberation.[20]

The liberation movement had auspicious political beginnings and organizational development compared to the other Southern African NLMs. Mozambican radicals, reformists, and traditionalists had the fortune of coming together under the leadership of a unifying national figure, the American-educated Dr. Eduardo Mondlane,[21] as well as a progressive Tanzania government that provided liberation elites with a hospitable and strategic sanctuary from the outset. From here, FRELIMO formally launched its armed struggle in 1964 and rapidly infiltrated Mozambique' northern Niassa and Cabo Delgado districts. Like all the NLMs at their initial stages, however, the movement was torn by internal dissension, strife, and disunity for much of the decade. Personal, ethnic, and ideological differences certainly mattered, but the internal divisions stemmed in large part from regional divisions embodied in the formative organizations as well as in dominance by more educated *mestiço* and *assimilado* intellectuals from the southern districts with better access to colonial and mission schools. Despite the international contradictions and setbacks, the movement still made unrivalled politico-military advances during this contentious phase of the struggle. By 1968, FRELIMO guerrillas drove south Portuguese forces—and established liberated areas—in parts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, and opened up a third front in the strategic central Tete district in the northwest (Map 3.1).[22]

The early contradictions were nonetheless also related to differences over strategy, tactics, and long-term goals of national liberation. Was a protracted people's struggle necessary

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[20] Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique*, p. 21; Munslow, *The Revolution and Its Origins*, p. 11.

[21] Mondlane was one of few black Africans to receive higher education outside Portugal, where most future leaders of the NLMs (e.g., Amilcar Cabral of PAIGC, Agostinho Neto of MPLA, and Marcelino dos Santos in FRELIMO) received high education. Mondlane received a Ph.D. in Sociology from Northwestern University (1960) and went on to work for the UN and Syracuse University before he was elected as FRELIMO's first president in 1962.

[22] See Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, pp. 36-40.

or armed agitation and propaganda sufficient to achieve national independence? Was the party to be a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary vanguard embracing radical social goals or a broad church of disparate national and class elements? Was the party ought to be an Africanist organization advancing an exclusive racial agenda or a multiracial movement embracing progressive elements irrespective of race? Was the end-goal of the struggle mere political independence or far-reaching political, social, and economic changes in a path to socialist development? All Southern African liberation movements were plagued by such divisions and conflicts at their early, and in some cases even at later, stages of the nationalist struggle.

The internal contradictions and crises of FRELIMO were decisively resolved in favor of an ambitious revolutionary agenda after the radical wing of better educated members, represented by Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos, emerged victorious in power struggle following Mondlane's assassination in 1969. In the Second Party Congress (1968), symbolically held in a liberated area in Niassa, the radical elites defined the revolutionary struggle in class—not racial—terms as an anti-imperialist struggle for an egalitarian, non-racialist society. They also adopted a Maoist 'revolutionary line' in favor of intensifying the liberation war with 'mass mobilization' as a precondition for victory. Their strategy rested on integrating peasants into the struggle through 'mass participation' and the implementation of a 'revolutionary social program' with 'popular democracy' in liberated areas.[23] This provided impetus to FRELIMO's politico-military struggle that in turn greatly radicalized the movement.

The internal changes initiated the second and final phase of the struggle after 1969. The radical elite's Marxist-Leninist strategies and programs of liberation were further articulated, consolidated, and put into practice in rural areas under the movement's control. The ideas were formalized in the Soviet-inspired National Democratic Revolution (NDR) theory, which saw the

[23] Davidson, *The people's Cause*, p. 135; Davidson, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa," p. 799.

revolutionary struggle as a two-staged "bourgeois-democratic revolution" against colonial domination and "socialist revolution" against class exploitation. In Marxist-Leninist parlance, because imperialism had hindered the development of capitalist conditions and the proletariat necessary for socialist revolution in the colonies, a 'patriotic' national bourgeoisie mobilizes the masses for a 'democratic national revolution' in alliance with the subordinated national classes. Following national liberation, the forces of production must be developed under capitalist auspices during a 'national democratic' phase before a transition to socialism.[24]

Map 3.1: FRELIMO Guerrilla Penetration After Late 1973



Source: Davidson, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa," p. 791.

[24] Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, p. 213; also, Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 74-7.

After late 1960s, the movement was thus increasingly radicalized after mostly exile-based reformist and conservative old-guard were outflanked by militant leaders in direct charge of the armed struggle in the *maquis*. Many of the founding leaders were of less educated, poor social backgrounds from northern and central Mozambique. The 'right' dissidents formed the non-revolutionary COREMO (*Comite Revolutionario de Mocambique*) in 1965 in Zambia as a traditional Africanist party advocating limited goals of political independence through, if necessary, a 'neo-colonial' compromise solution with the Portuguese. This reformist NLM represented the only tangible politico-military opposition to FRELIMO elites' revolutionary strategies and agendas of national liberation. The movement quickly fell to political and military irrelevance to only resurface at national liberation as a counterrevolutionary force.[25]

In the early 1970s, the front consolidated its revolutionary program in the liberated zones, synthesizing abstract socialist principles with local Mozambican social conditions as well as specific challenges of the struggle itself. The reforms involved dismantling structures upholding traditional authority and rural social inequalities based on class, gender, and other forms of traditional exploitation. In the liberated areas, elected people's councils and administrative committees were established (to replace the local colonial structure of *chefe do posto*, *regulos,* and appointed chiefs); basic educational and health programs provided; and some agricultural reforms introduced to reduce land inequalities.[26] Cultural programs infused a sense of nationhood by attacking inter alia exploitative customs, divisive attitudes, and illiteracy. The end-goal was to

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[25] See Marcum, *Conceiving Mozambique*, pp. 17-71; Henriksen, *Mozambique*, pp. 179-183
[26] Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900-1982,* pp. 88-99; also, see Barry Munslow, ed., *Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1985), chapters 1-2.

forge an 'alternative society' based on 'popular democracy' and a 'modernizing and egalitarian culture'—a template for post-liberation nation-building.[27]

The political achievements went hand in hand with military advances despite periodic setbacks. With FRELIMO plans to thrust south from the northern districts repeatedly frustrated by the Portuguese army, the organization shifted its focus to Tete district in the northwest. From here, guerrilla forces (the *Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique*, FPLM) gradually expanded the war south of the Zambezi River, striking at the white settler highlands and the heart of the colonial economy and strategic infrastructure in central Mozambique. Thus, before the Caetano regime's downfall in April 1974 in a coup by radical officers of the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas), disillusioned with the anti-colonial wars in Africa, FRELIMO had begun infiltration and mobilization in major urban centers, like Beira and Lourenco Marques, the colonial capital, in political preparations for the final push in the war of national liberation.[28]

The 'internal' process was less consequential in Mozambique and Angola, but crucial to understand the course of events at the point of liberation. Internal repression by the corporatist Estado Novo dictatorship as well as the political disorganization of settlers allowed the 'external' struggle process to determine the road to national liberation and the ultimate policy option. The settler-colonial state reacted to the outbreak of the armed struggles with the liberalization of racial laws, abolition of forced labor, and 'development' and social-welfare programs to win African 'hearts and minds' (see chapter two). Over time, it responded with heavy-handed counter-insurgency measures (e.g., the *aldeamentos* or 'fortified villages,' fostering ethnic conflict), besides futile attempts to nurture an integrable bourgeoisie of assimilated *mestiços* and

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[27] Davidson, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa," pp. 802, 803; Basil Davidson, "Practicing What You Preach," in Davidson, Slovo, and Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*, pp. 68-75.
[28] See Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900-1982*, pp. 105-106.

black *assimilados*.[29] Yet the regime's 'tight rein' on African dissent as well as settler political mobilization effectively precluded the maturation of an internal process with actors strong enough to counteract the radical liberation elite.

The result is that, when Lisbon halted war following the MFA coup, there were no effective settler organizations or conservative African opposition to seriously contest the decolonization process. This paved the way for a non-negotiated liberation and FRELIMO's unmitigated capture of power. A deal signed by the MFA regime and FRELIMO in September 1974 on the transfer of power was nothing more than an arrangement for a ceasefire and the technicalities of Portuguese withdrawal, and consequently did not impose any conditions on post-liberation institutions, policies, and priorities of the liberation elites. the state was militarily weakened to impose a 'neocolonial' solution. Various conservative white settler and African groups, that sprung up after the MFA coup, lacked a history of political mobilization and organization to influence the course of events and, for that matter, the pattern of liberation. A right-wing settler movement determined to perpetuate white supremacy staged an abortive coup in Laurenço Marquez in futile attempt to seize administrative and security control and establish a Rhodesia-style settler state.[30] As a consequence, at independence on June 25, 1975, FRELIMO leaders, having imposed their authority throughout the country during the transition period, took full control of political power at the exclusion of less strong rival actors.

The non-negotiated mode of liberation set the stage for the radical approach that defined the liberation episode in Mozambique. Elite policy choices can be fully understood in conjunction with the world-historical timing of liberation as well as the state power, economic

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[29] Ibid., pp. 100-105.
[30] Henriksen, *Mozambique*, pp. 221-4; and *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, pp. 85-88.

structure, and dominant-class interests prevailing at national independence, which we will return to after exploring the road to national liberation in Angola.

3.1.3 Angola: Divisive and Violent Route to Liberation (1961-1975)

The radical approach that defined the liberation episode in Angola was, as in Mozambique, linked to a militarized mode of national liberation amid East-West conflicts. However, the historical road to national independence in Angola was characterized by (1) three NLMs with clashing elites, ideologies, and ethno-regional bases, (2) persistent political and military setbacks to the revolutionary MPLA movement, and (3) a violent struggle for power among the liberation movements—and their external backers—on the eve of national liberation.

For analytical purposes, the more complex road of national liberation in Angola can be categorized into two phases. The first phase (1961-1965) was defined by a 'two-party insurgency' when two contending movements sought to mount classic hit-and-run guerrilla attacks in the northern districts of Angola.[31] Like in Mozambique, historical and colonial socioeconomic variations among northern, central, and southern regions had their stamp on the genesis of separate Angolan nationalist movements and enduring divisions in the anti-colonial struggle.[32] Yet the process in Angola was set into motion by a dramatic 'anticolonial explosion' that began in January 1961 with a revolt by cotton plantation workers in Baixa de Cassanje,

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[31] John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962–1976* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1978), p. 4.

[32] The most comprehensive and authoritative study of the historical origins of the nationalist struggle is John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Volume 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950–1962* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969). Marcum identified three 'streams' of Angolan nationalism: i.e., Luanda-Mbundu, Northern-Bakongo, and, since the rise of a third major NLM, Southern-Ovimbundu. He and, subsequently, other Western scholars characterize the divisions as rooted in disparate ethno-nationalisms in the first place. However, the differences were in large part products of colonial penetration, modes of production, and socioeconomic change under colonialism that varied among the regions (see Chapter Two). The Angolan NLMs were rather "coalitions of class and regional interests, which tended to vary over time and which used ethnic ideological appeals only to a limited extent." See W. G. Clarence-Smith, "Class Structure and Class Struggles in Angola in the 1970s," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 7 (Oct., 1980), p. 116. Furthermore, compared to Southern African settler-colonial contexts, educational deprivation and an extremely repressive political environment under the Estado Novo regime precluded the evolution of early cultural and political associations into territory-wide organizations of nascent nationalism.

northern Malanje. In February, in a 'consciously nationalist rising' that shattered the myth of multiracial harmony in Lusophone Africa, MPLA militants stormed Luandan prisons to free political prisoners. Some party partisans escaped the ensuing repression by the state to organize a guerrilla insurgency in remote inaccessible hills in the Dembos region. In March, another uprising broke out in coffee plantations in the northern districts partly directed by militants of the UPA (*União das Populações de Angola*), a political party of Bakongo émigré refugees in Zaire.[33]

In the aftermath of the colonial repressions, the MPLA and UPA launched separate armed struggles from exile. The MPLA—operating clandestinely in Luanda in 1956 until its move to Léopoldville (Zaire) in late 1962—was led by a better educated, *mestiço-assimilado* elite of Luanda-Mbundu roots in Central Angola. The exiled party leadership under Dr. Agostinho Neto formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary program that adhered to multiracialism from the outset, and rebuilt the party to a 'national liberation front' as a vehicle of national and class revolution. Its strategy emphasized mobilizing the 'popular masses' through the formation of party-affiliated women's, youth, and worker's organizations, and to overcome the party's exclusive urban origins, developing a new program of land reform, improved social services, and national-cultural revival to mobilize the rural peasantry. A newly established party army (EPLA: *Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola*) launched guerrilla warfare in Jan. 1963 in the northern Cabindan enclave.[34]

Revolutionary elites in Angola nonetheless met extremely trying conditions stemming from a hostile frontline state. The MPLA was effectively shut out by Zairian government and the UPA from operating in northern Angola or reinforcing its partisans in the Dembos-Nambuangongo area in west-central Angola (see Map 3.2). Its Luanda-Mbundu urban origins,

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[33] Davidson, *The People's Cause*, p. 129.
[34] Ibid. p. 130; Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962–1976,* pp. 27-32.

multiracial and Marxism agenda, and relations with the Soviet bloc earned MPLA the hostility of a pro-West Zaire that backed the traditional Africanist, non-revolutionary UPA elite from northern Angola.[35] A remarkable leap in MPLA's politico-military development came with the independence of Zambia (1964) that allowed the front to open a new front in the eastern districts after 1965. Yet, despite its pro-peasantry programs and nationalist appeals, continued dominance by overwhelmingly urban-Mbundu, *mestiço-assimilado* intellectuals "continued to impede the movement's political appeal" among the rural Bakongo in the north and the more populous Ovimbundu of the central Angolan highlands.[36] As a result, the MPLA fell short of waging an effective guerrilla campaign during this phase albeit a militant and sophisticated leadership with a well-defined revolutionary strategy and growing African and socialist support.

Map 3.2: Areas of MPLA and UPA/FLNA Guerrilla Infiltration



Source: Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962–1976,* p. 47.

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[35] See Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962–1976,* pp. 46-61.

[36] Ibid., p. 29.

The UPA—henceforth, FLNA—was led by a traditional-rural-ethno-populist black elite with Bakongo émigré-refugee backgrounds. Holden Roberto, a younger party leader who would hold an iron-grip on the FLNA throughout the struggle period, was a Bakongo émigré educated in colonial Léopoldville as opposed to the urbane MPLA leaders exposed to western education and cultural influence.[37] Initially inspired by the revival of the old Kongo Kingdom, the party envisioned the anticolonial struggle as "the champion of an indigenous national culture based upon 'Negro-African civilization,'" as a means for the "total destruction of colonial culture and racism." It adopted a 'rudimentary' political program with narrow goals of national independence, agrarian reform, economic development, and pan-African unity—not a multiracial, socialist society.[38] The failure to develop a progressive national ideology, democratic party structures, and a program of peasant politicization and mobilization within Angola, inter alia, occasioned the FLNA's gradual decline after 1964. Furthermore, its Bakongo regionalism fostered internal contradictions that gave rise in 1966 to a third major, largely Ovimbundu-based liberation front, i.e., the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA).

The early phase of 'two-party insurgency' ended with politico-military reversals, decline, and fragmentation. The second phase (1966-1975) was characterized by a deepening 'tripartite' competition and conflicts among the MPLA, FLNA, and UNITA, on the one hand, and the MPLA's decline after several years of politico-military resurgence in the late 1960s, on the other. After mid-1960s, besides securely establishing its presence in the Dembos-Nambuangongo countryside, the MPLA finally overcame its guerrilla paralysis by launching an Eastern Front in Moxico and Cuando Cobango, and ultimately Lunda, Melange, and Bié districts. The strategic breakthrough presented the party with the historic opportunity to break out of a narrow Luanda-

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[37] The UPA joined other small northern parties to form the FLNA (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*) in 1961. See Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962–1976,* p. 61.
[38] Ibid., p. 56.

Mbundu ethno-regionalism it had been associated with, and to finally tap into its political strongholds in central and western regions.[39] With a less hostile host state and an unobstructed access to the eastern districts, MPLA elites sought to finally anchor the party in a liberated zone so as to consolidate the party's Marxist-Leninist-Maoist credentials and its multiracial, egalitarian, and anti-imperialist long-term national and class objectives. Revolutionary social programs of limited degree were experimented among the peasantry with emphasis on principles of self-reliance, peasant cooperatives, social liberation, and national unity.[40]

Yet, the MPLA movement's politico-military evolution was comparably constrained and tortuous. Its new edge was undercut by the wide dispersion of party leadership, structures, and operations externally and internally, besides Zairian hostility. Furthermore, a difficult terrain and sparse population in the east and southeast compounded challenges to conducting guerrilla operations across a vast region. Determined efforts to draw recruits and supplies from more densely populated west-central heartlands and the Atlantic seaboard cities bore no fruit before as late as 1974.[41] Finally, the MPLA met fierce competition for influence over various ethno-linguistic groups of eastern and southeast Angola where UNITA grounded itself relatively easily. In sum, a sprawling organizational structure, enduring dominance of highly educated mestiço-assimilado elites, and military reverses in the Eastern Front, which collapsed in the early 1970s, engendered deep internal contradictions and politico-military decline of the organization. After 1972, the MPLA "underwent a new internal crisis that left it almost fatally fragmented on the eve of the Lisbon coup of April 1974."[42]

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[39] Basil Davidson, "Walking 300 Miles with Guerrillas Through the Bush of Eastern Angola," *Munger Africana Library Notes* (Pasadena, California), no. 6 (April 1971), p. 9.
[40] See Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare,* pp. 199-200; Davidson, *In The Eye of The Storm: Angola's People* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1972), pp. 251-74.
[41] Davidson, *The People's Cause*, p. 131.
[42] Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962–1976,* p. 197

Angolan liberation elites were less successful in adapting strategies and tactics of a people's war. But so were their non-revolutionary adversaries. Unable to overcome its narrow Protestant-Bakongo foundations and its Afro-nationalist, anti-Marxist, rural-peasant orientation, the FLNA was reduced to a Zairian proxy bent on hampering or destroying the MPLA and capturing power in the event of Portuguese pullout.[43] UNITA's leaders shared FLNA leadership's rural-ethnopopulist-uniracial social backgrounds and strong resentment against the MPLA's multiracial, socialist, and modernizing ambitions. However, embracing principles of anti-Soviet 'social imperialism,' Maoist peasant mobilization, and decrying 'exile politics,' in the early 1970s UNITA successfully established itself among a multi-ethnic peasantry in east, central and southern Angola[44]—a political attribute that would render it a force in the post-liberation civil war. Yet the latter did not make much politico-military headway either, and at the demise of the Estado Novo regime, in April 1974, Angolan national revolution was at an impasse with the three movements "locked in a relentless, draining competition for power."[45]

The 'internal' process, as in Mozambique, constituted no influential dynamic in the road to liberation. As noted previously, the state sought to win the hearts and minds of Africans through such policies as the liberalization of 'contract labor,' expanded social and economic 'development' programs, and, in 1972, limited expansion of black franchise.[46] Furthermore, by the late 1960s the 'colonial-military complex' sought to nurture a coffee-producing capitalist class of black peasants ('kulaks') based in northern Angola with a stake in the settler-colonial economy. In particular, the development of an inter-racial petty bourgeoisie was hoped to weaken the appeal of radical nationalism in favor of a future multiracial society preserving settler

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[43] Ibid., pp. 185-191; Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm*, pp. 205-228.
[44] Ibid., pp. 191-7.
[45] Ibid., p. 210.
[46] See Davidson, *In The Eye of The Storm,* pp. 290-8.

privileges.[47] None of these policies set into motion an 'internal' process with powerful black or multi-racial political actors able to contest the final stage of the struggle. The numerically larger settler minority hoped to exploit tensions among the liberation movements, and thereby emerge as a 'fourth force' in control of a new multiracial state in Southern Africa. This—and an abortive right-wing settler putsch to seize power in a Rhodesian-style unilateral declaration of independence from Lisbon—failed to materialize because while the settler minority lacked the political tradition and independence to organize, the liberation movements found powerful external allies to try and determine the course of events in their own.[48]

Map 3.3: The Politico-Military Situation in Angola in 1970-1975



Source: Davidson, "Portuguese-Speaking Africa," p. 792

[47] David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1992), p. 44; F. W. Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola 1974-76: An Essay in Political Sociology* (Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1979), p. 14, 21.
[48] Ibid., p. 47; Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola 1974-76*, pp. 39-46.

The mode of liberation was thus determined entirely by the ‘external’ dimension of military conflict. But, unlike in Mozambique, the concluding stage saw a fierce military contest among the three liberation organizations (Map 3.3). The MFA government in Lisbon and the Angolan liberation movements concluded a deal—Avlor Agreement, January 1975—for establishing a transitional coalition government to prepare the stage for elections before national independence, set on November 11. The arrangement did not try to provide political and economic protections for the settler minority, by imposing constitutional constraints on post-liberation changes, nor did it achieve its narrow political goal. Its preference for a ‘neocolonial solution’ notwithstanding, the powerless Portuguese administration at this stage only strove to secure a political solution that would have the three NLMs share power to maintain national unity. Political competition during the first half of 1975 gave way to violent confrontation among the liberation movements, which turned to military means to consolidate power in Luanda and to establish supremacy in other parts of the country.[49]

Most Western analysts and historians understood the conflict surrounding Angola’s liberation in terms of external ideological and ethno-regional confrontation. However, the civil war was primarily a military clash over alternative policy options for post-liberation Angolan state and society. A ‘conservative’ option, represented by the FNLA, emphasized a society based on racial non-discrimination and capitalist economy through the political integration of the non-white bourgeoisie and the protection of settler economic privileges. A ‘reformist’ option, advanced by UNITA, stressed for gradual reduction of inherited social inequalities by benefiting hitherto marginalized racial and class groups, especially the peasantry, in a context of capitalist development underwritten by white and foreign capital. The ‘radical’ option, represented by the

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[49] For a widely accepted account of the conflict, see Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962-1976,* pp. 255-75 and Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola 1974-76,* pp. 59-80.

MPLA, envisioned rapid and fundamental transformation of existing social structures by destroying the capitalist relations and associated unequal racial-class structures—a position that alienated the MPLA from whites despite its liberal racial views. In this approach, basic change could be achieved through socialist development and the mobilization of the urban working-class, the peasantry, and the national petty bourgeoisie.[50]

The MPLA eventually emerged victorious amid a civil war muddled by intensive external ideological and military intervention.[51] Needless to say, therefore, the radical option that defined the liberation episode in Angola was an outcome of a very contested, violent, military-driven pattern of liberation in Southern Africa. We can understand fully the factors conditioning the radical approach after we examine the temporal context of national liberation and the liberation episode writ large in both Angola and Mozambique.

3.1.4 The Timing of National Liberation

The world-historical context of liberation in Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s afforded liberation-elite with a distinct set of opportunities and constraints. The prevailing international political and economic systems as well as dominant ideas, principles, and structures undergirding them strongly conditioned their strategies of power consolidation and policies of socioeconomic change, national development, and nation-building.

First, and foremost, the bipolar Cold-War context both presented Angolan and Mozambican nationalist elites with serious threats and opportunities to exploit. On the one hand, liberation elites faced counter-revolutionary challenges from South Africa, Rhodesia, and (in the Angolan case) Zaire and their imperialist allies. To contain an 'advancing tide' of radical black

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[50] See Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola 1974-76,* pp. 45-46, 59-60.
[51] Whereas the FLNA and UNITA drew Zairian, South African, American, and Chinese military support, the MPLA received mainly Cuban, Soviet, and Eastern European backing.

nationalism following the Portuguese empire's collapse and to undercut aid for militant anti-apartheid movements, South Africa pursued a comprehensive campaign of 'destabilization' against the liberation governments, and in the Angolan case, overt military invasion to install a moderate regime.[52] Liberation elites reacted to the external and internal threats with establishing strong security apparatuses and violent internal repression that necessitated radical measures of state-building and tightened societal control. On the other hand, their alignment and increasing dependence on the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc to meet counterrevolutionary threats meant that liberation elites saw political savviness—and in part pressure—in pursuing increasingly anti-capitalist policies. The military hostility from South African and Rhodesian white-settler regimes—and their Western allies—was too overwhelming for liberation leaders not to exploit East-West differences albeit their non-alignment rhetoric.

The second factor that conditioned liberation-elite calculations was the world economic system and prevailing ideas of underdevelopment. Prominent at this point was the 'dependency theory', which held that Third-World underdevelopment could be overcome only by dissociation from exploitative center-periphery relations of the imperial past, the redefinition of domestic relations of production, and pursuing import substitution strategies at the very least. The notion of 'economic independence' from conditions of dependent development undergirding neo-colonial relations that hamstrung postcolonial African countries strongly resonated with the anti-imperialist convictions and goals of liberation elites who, at decolonization, were confronted by utterly underdeveloped, distorted, and dependent national economies serving Portuguese, South African, and Western capitalist interests.[53] Further, rapid socialist development exemplified by

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[52] J. Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbor: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana Uni. Press, 1986); S. Onslow, "The Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Nationalism, and External Intervention," in S. Onslow, ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 9-35.
[53] See, for example, Davidson, "Angola Since Independence," *Race and Class*, 19, 2 (1977), pp. 139-40.

swift Soviet industrialization had not been discredited as yet, as it would a decade later, as an alternative 'developmental model' to dependent capitalist development.

The international economic system with which the liberation episode in Angola and Mozambique coincided was also more permissive to statist and socialist development. National-liberation leaders were far less concerned with accessing Western markets, development aid, and capital investment while pursuing socialist development compared to their Zimbabwean, South African and Namibian comrades-in-arms, in the 1980s and 1990s, in an international economy increasingly dominated by neoliberal ideas and international financial institutions, chiefly The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their freedom of action to implement non-marked policies in the 1970s became abundantly evident when the Angolan and Mozambican governments were forced by international duress to forego on radical reforms after 1982-1983 and gradually liberalize their economies beginning in the late 1980s (see chapter 7).

Finally, national liberation in Angola and Mozambique also took place in an international context receptive to non-liberal state and nation-building. Social revolutionary and authoritarian approaches to political and social modernization that dominated in the twentieth century continued to have strong appealed to state-builders in the developing world, while one-party nation-building model dominant in postcolonial African still remained a legitimate vehicle of consolidating national unity, political domination, and national development. To liberation elites, only radical and coercive mechanisms of social and institutional reconstruction could meet the daunting tasks of dismantling traditional and divide-and-rule structures of colonial domination, which stocked political instability and civil wars after liberation.[54]

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[54] Davidson, "Angola Since Independence," p. 140; Isaacman & Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900-1982,* p. 111.

3.1.5 State Power, Economic Structure, and Capital

The timing of national liberation was nonetheless insufficient to understand why liberation elites opted for a radical policy option in the first place. A closer examination of domestic-structural conditions related to state power, economic structure, and the role of dominant classes shines a spotlight on factors that conditioned elite thinking at the point of liberation.

In the Angolan and Mozambiquan cases, first, both a structurally weak state and state-building imperatives favored the adoption of a radical option. The colonial state was decisively weakened militarily and rapidly disintegrating to prevent liberation elites from capturing power and enact their radical plans. The rather leftist MFA leaders in Lisbon were averse to neocolonial arrangement, while the settler minorities were historically unorganized and, about 80 percent being recent immigrants, not as well established—in administrative, economic, and cultural sense—to put up a countervailing political force at liberation as in the other Southern African countries. On the other hand, once in control of the state, liberation governments also faced serious counter-revolutionary challenges from old and new opponents directly supported by anti-revolutionary South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Zaire. Taking place in a backdrop of abrupt departure of civil servants and the consequent collapse of the old state, liberation elites were hard-pressed to rapidly (re)build state structures in order to consolidate their power, restore public services, and ward themselves off counterrevolutionary threats. This favored the pursuit of a radical approach to change overall that entailed rapid transformation of old state structures.

The economic structures of Angola and Mozambique similarly favored a radical policy option. The national economies liberation leaders inherited were ‘underdeveloped and distorted’ by “four hundred years of Portuguese rule and more than a half century of colonial-capitalist

penetration."[55] With largely pre-capitalist economies based principally on agriculture, Angola and Mozambique were among "the poorest countries in Africa" and extremely dependent on the Portuguese economy.[56] Thus any hopes of overcoming the structural underdevelopment and handicaps rested on drastic reorientation of the mode and relations of production after liberation. Such imperatives for rapid economic restructuring and national developed were in line with the ideological commitments of the liberation movements, besides the fact that liberation elites at this historical stage did not face international constraints to socialist development.

Yet nothing was deterministic about the liberation elites' economic policy choices. Liberation leaders were cautious about the inherently disruptive effects of radical socioeconomic policies, and thus did not immediately embark on sweeping socialist policies. Their hand was forced by rather contingent factors linked to the mass exodus of settlers amid the political uncertainty surrounding liberation. the departure of engineers, mechanics, accountants, and agronomists along with the abrupt withdrawal of capital, acute dearth of technicians and professionals who managed the settler-colonial economies, as well as the destruction of factories, farm equipment, trucks, machinery, cattle by departing owners and technicians simply led to sudden industrial and agricultural collapse. The economic plight was exacerbated by a bloody civil war in Angola and, in Mozambique, by the loose of critical revenues in port fees, freight charges, and migrant-worker remittances from Southern Rhodesian and South Africa, which attempted to wreck the Mozambican economy through economic and military destabilization.

Liberation leaders responded to the economic disruption with 'intervention' policies, whereby the state assumed temporary responsibility for abandoned business in Mozambique, as well as the collective management of farms, factories, and businesses through new administrative

[55] Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900-1982*, p. 145;
[56] Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire* (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1984), p. 15

commissions, people's committees, and rural cooperatives.[57] Even though such policies were in line with liberation elites' long-held socialist goals, the reactive and sweeping manner of their implementation demonstrates the contingent nature of elite decisions at liberation contrary to the ideological determinism with which scholars associate them.[58] Liberation governments, especially FRELIMO's, promised the protection of settler property (and foreign capital) in hope that settlers would stay and be part of non-racialist nation-building and development. But the flight of settlers and capital stemming from fear of capital expropriation and black competition was unabated. The resulting decline of agricultural and industrial productivity persuaded liberation leaders to responded, in 1977, with full nationalization of industry and social services, the expropriation of capital, and the collectivization of rural agriculture.

Finally, the balance of class power on the eve of liberation also favored a radical policy option. The economically dominant class in pre-liberation Angola and Mozambique was Portuguese *metropolitan* (imperial) capital which particularly dominated capitalist agriculture in each country. On the last decade before liberation, with decolonization looming large on the horizon, however, metropolitan capital had shifted its interests from the colonies to the common European market. One the other hand, settler capital in these cases was extremely weak and subordinate to colonial capital;[59] the political influence of non-metropolitan foreign capital—mainly South African, British, US, and West German—was also too limited, because Portugal opened the provinces to foreign investment in certain areas (e.g., oil [Angola], mineral extraction, hydroelectricity, and transportation) only after 1961 in reaction to the beginning of

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[57] Isaacman & Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution*, pp. 145-6; Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire,* pp. 47-8.
[58] The best firs-hand primer in elite reasoning and actions is Samora Machel, *A Nossa Luta* (Maputo, 1975).
[59] K. Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14 (Dec., 1976), p. 598. Portuguese settlers in the colonies were predominantly capital-less professionals, peasant farmers, and shopkeepers—hence the FRELIMO characterization of Portuguese settler colonialism as 'shopkeeper colonialism'—and the development of settler business, plantation agriculture, and manufacturing was thwarted by official favoritism towards metropolitan capital.

the liberation struggles.[60] Therefore, domestic and international capital was too weak to dictate a capitalist solution at national independence. Liberation elites could relatively easily pursue radical economic measures that impinged on dominant class interests.

Several scholars argued that the radical policies were somehow linked to lower-class power, which is not implausible given that the working and peasant classes had prominent place in party and state structures after liberation. Nonetheless such conclusion is not borne out in the historical evidence. First, owing to limited capitalist development and colonial policies that strove to consolidate conservative peasant societies (to preclude the development of a landless proletariat) in previous decades, the working class in these countries was 'insignificant' in size and in 'a disorganized state,' with poorly developed class consciousness,[61] at liberation to be the driving force behind radical policies for income redistribution and the socialization of production. Second, having faced far less land dispossession and proletarianization during the late-colonial period, the rural peasantry in Angola and Mozambique had indeed retained greater economic and political influence than that of South Africa, South West Africa, and even Southern Rhodesia. Yet, the rural peasantry was at best indifferent and in some instances overtly resistant to radical rural policies that in reality grievously affected its traditional communal ownership of production, economic independence, and traditional values.[62]

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[60] See Karel Holbik, "Angola: Economic and Social Reforms," *Intereconomics*, 4 (1969): 159-166; D. Abshire, "Minerals, Manufacturing, Power, and Communications," in Abshire and Samuels, *Portuguese Africa*, pp. 294-319;
[61] Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982,* p. 110; Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, *Der Entkolonisierungskonflikt in Angola* (München: Weltforum-Verl., 1979), pp. 72-81; Clarence-Smith, "Class Structure and Class Struggles in Angola in the 1970s," 109-126.
[62] On the limits of class alliance and peasant political conservatism, see Chabal, "People's War, State Formation, and Revolution in Africa;" on peasant alienation, see Merle L. Bowen, *The State Against the Peasantry*: *Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000).

3.2 RURAL INSURGENCY AND NEGOTIATED LIBERATION: SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The initial liberal policy choice in Southern Rhodesia was an outcome of a negotiated mode of liberation that saw liberation elites assume state power through an inclusive political settlement. To be sure, the revolutionary movements waged more effective rural insurgency than their South African and South West African comrades-in-arms. Yet, the military effectiveness and national revolutionary mobilization hardly matched the Mozambican and Angolan liberation struggles. Thus, the road to national liberation in Rhodesia represents a distinct pathway of moderate rural guerrilla insurrection followed by a negotiated liberation. It was characterized by (a) an external struggle contested by two revolutionary liberation movements; (b) a considerably influential internal process dominated by a conservative black 'internal opposition;' and (c) a 'neo-colonial' political solution defined by both domestic and regional dynamics. We will return to this after considering an influential thesis that sees the stalled-liberal approach of the liberation episode as an outcome of a somewhat less radicalized, bourgeois-led political revolution.

3.2.1 A Bourgeois Political Revolution?

Many scholars from North America and Western Europe considered the 'nationalist' struggle in Southern Rhodesia as an 'unfinished' revolution. In particular, leftist analysts held that the structural changes in its aftermath amounted to little more than a political revolution that saw a black petit-bourgeois elite rising to power. In a representative exposition, André Astrow argued that "little meaningful change" actually took place because

> … the state apparatus has remained virtually intact and the basic economic structure of the country unchanged. While the white settlers have seen most of their privileges preserved, African workers who have gone on strike, and landless African peasants squatting on 'white' land, have been repeatedly faced with severe repression … the major land redistribution promised for so long by ZANU(PF) before the election has not come to pass. Moreover, not only has the [liberation] Government failed to promote socialism

> in Zimbabwe, but on the contrary, has successfully worked to strengthen its economic ties with imperialist countries, placing Zimbabwe firmly in the Western camp.[63]

For all their radical rhetoric, the Southern Rhodesian nationalist movements' program was a mere expression of the black leadership's petit-bourgeois class aspirations devoid of a genuine revolutionary program of national and social liberation representing popular aspirations of African workers and peasants. The nationalist struggle, it was argued, hardly "encompassed within it even the idea of a socialist revolution;" claims of a 'socialist thrust' overlooked the nationalist movements' 'ideological deficiencies' and their 'limited military and political capacity' to unseat the settler state.[64] Therefore, in Astrow's logic, the capitalist liberal reform approach that defined the liberation episode was "the predictable result of the nationalist leaderships' class interests and the nationalist movement's entire political strategy."[65]

Prominent proponents of the radicalization logic, like John S. Saul, posit that the anti-climactic denouement of the revolutionary struggle was a logical outcome of insufficient 'radicalization' of the nationalist parties. The NLMs—i.e., Zimbabwe Africa People's Organization (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU)—failed to wage a full-blown 'people's war,' which purportedly cleanses the national movement of petty bourgeois and traditional nationalist elements "not prepared to make the transition to a revolutionary practice."[66] Consequently, the nationalist parties, mired as they were in factionalism in the ranks of an African nationalist elite, remained wedded to the interests of educated black bourgeois

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[63] André Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* (London: Zed Press, 1983), p. 1.
[64] Ibbo Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," in Ibbo Mandaza, ed., *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1986), pp. 29, 30.
[65] Astrow, *A Revolution That Lost Its Way?*, p. 2.
[66] Saul, *The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp. 54, 85.

elements and rich peasants.[67] The result was, in Franz Fanon's words, 'false decolonization' or mere political revolution devoid of genuine racial, social, and economic transformations.

The claims about petty-bourgeois backgrounds of the national liberation leaders are certainly less debatable because such was the case with all revolutionary liberation elites in Southern Africa. But what is particularly less plausible are the assertions about the scope of change and the historical cause of the reformist approach in post-liberation Southern liberation. First, most foreign critics underestimate the profound changes of the liberation episode and the historical and structural constraints—especially the 'neo-colonial' political settlement at liberation—to far-reaching changes.[68] Race relations were transformed, while new educational, health, and state-building programs affecting the lives of previously oppressed majorities were both extensive and transformative. Thus, even if such programs and transformations could not be thought of as radically 'socialist,' they hardly imply that "there has been no change in the structure of the Zimbabwe political economy, in the balance between the various classes and fractions of classes and in their prospects and their reproduction, nor in the pattern of politics."[69]

Second, as noted earlier, nationalist radicalization is a poor measure of postliberation political, economic, and social changes. Interpretations premised on ideological 'deficiency,' a petit bourgeois leadership, or balance of class power during the liberation struggle are overly reductionist and deterministic in that they ignore broader structural factors as well as try to somehow read postliberation changes from a set of factors to do with external armed struggle. Several scholars correctly suggested, during the liberation episode, that the course of change and

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[67] John S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), ch. 5; Phimister, "The Combined and Contradictory Inheritance of the Struggle Against Colonialism," 1988.
[68] This is the perspective of Zimbabwean scholars writing during the liberation episode in Mandaza, ed., *The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986*; also, Colin Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital in Southern Africa* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishers, 1988).
[69] C. Stoneman and L. Cliffe, *Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics & Society* (N. York: Pinter Publishers, 1988), pp. 6-7.

transition to socialism would be contingent on conditions of the negotiated solution that led to decolonization in Southern Rhodesia as well as internal party politics, state structures, the influence of domestic and international capital, and regional dynamics.[70]

Moreover, to the extent radicalization was a relative concept and ideology conditioned elite policy preferences during the liberation episode, the national movement that assumed state after settler domination—i.e., ZANU-PF—was not far less radicalized or militarized during the struggle period. To be sure, liberation leaders like Robert Mugabe (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) did not display the kind of ardent Marxist-Leninist revolutionary views, sophistication, and partisanship characteristic of FRELIMO and MPLA's leaders. Yet, radical ideas abounded in their analysis of settler-colonial Southern Rhodesian society, its structural contradictions, as well as the formulation of strategies and tactics of liberation, including Maoist guerrilla doctrine and a future non-racialist, socialist society. In fact, after Mugabe's rise as to the helm in 1975, ZANU-PF was fairly radicalized with intensifying guerrilla struggle and rural peasant mobilization.[71] As a matter of fact, after liberation ZANU-PF's leaders rationalized their liberal policies precisely in accordance to the two-stage 'national democratic revolution' in which a capitalist mode of production is fostered following a national revolution to set the stage for transition to socialism.[72] As well shall in Chapter Six, the fact that such transition did not materialize had less to do with the liberation elite's lack of ideological resolve and vision than with world-historical political and economic changes that coincided with the liberation episode.

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[70] E.g., Mandaza, ed., *The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986*, 1986; Stoneman, ed., *Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital in Southern Africa*, 1988.

[71] Robert G. Mugabe, *Our War of Liberation: Speeches, Articles, Interviews 1976-1979* (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1983); A. de Bragança and I. Wallerstein, *The African Liberation Reader: The National Liberation Movements*, *Vol. 2* (London: Zed Press, 1982), e.g., ch. 3-4 on class analysis.

[72] See John S. Saul, "Zimbabwe: The Next Round," *The Socialist Register*, 17 (Sep. 1980) p. 173.

Last, that the black petty bourgeoisie was an obstacle to radical change is similarly questionable. Indeed, some tolerance to African agriculture, education, and urban trade since early 1950s gave rise to a substantial black middle class and an educated intelligentsia.[73] However, as Mandaza argues, racial segregation and black exploitation "pre-empted the development of an African bourgeois of any significance, and determined that even the African petit bourgeoisies would be weak."[74] Furthermore, the position of black bourgeoisie elements in ZANU-PF or, for that matter, ZAPU is no exception because Southern Africa's revolutionary NLMs were broad alliances of national and class forces led by nationalist intelligentsia with black working class and rural peasants forming the base of the national struggles. Nor were the reforms of the liberation episode a reflection of a powerful 'radicalized' black peasantry, as some historians emphasized; Norma Krieger has persuasively demonstrated that popular peasant mobilization in the struggle and its effect on post-liberation policies were somewhat overstated.[75] In general, the lower classes in Southern Rhodesia were historically weak to singularly determine the process and outcome of the liberation struggle because, as noted in Chapter Two, settler colonialism "disorganized and rendered incoherent the African wage-earning class, and caused the most serious impoverishment and proletarianization of the peasantry."[76]

In sum, the stalled-liberal approach adopted by Zimbabwean nationalists was certainly reformist in nature, but marked by fairly extensive structural transformations, especially

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[73] There was "just enough scope" for African agriculture in the native areas for a certain measure of class differentiation and maturation of private-sector petit bourgeoisie. See, John S. Saul, "Zimbabwe: The Next Round," p. 187. On historical development of black middle class, see West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class*, 2002.

[74] Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," p. 22.

[75] Terrence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study* (London: James Currey, 1985), emphasized the presence of an aggrieved, 'self-conscious, and 'even organized' peasantry with a radicalizing effect on the liberation movements and their later policies. However, such claims were refuted in a well-document and influential study of Southern Rhodesian peasant mobilization during the war by the political scientist Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[76] Mandaza, "The State & Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," p. 22; on labor union weakness, see L. Sachikonye, "State, Capital & Trade unions," in Mandaza, ed., *The Political Economy of Transition*, pp. 243-74.

considering that, by the conclusion of the liberation episode, the liberation regime drifted to more coercive state-building and socialist policies. To better understand the origins of the liberal policy choice, therefore, it is essential to explore the dynamics of the freedom struggle as well as the domestic structures that led to a negotiated mode of liberation.

3.2.2 'Divided Nationalism' and Negotiated Path to Liberation

In a distinctive pattern, liberation elites in Southern Rhodesia initially attempted to bring about majority rule through political reforms from within. Their pressure and widespread African protests from late 1960 on led to a new constitution (1961) in favor of incremental expansion of the franchise for Africans. This provoked a 'coalition of white reaction' that won power under the right-wing Rhodesian Front in December 1962. With this political setback, the black elite—already disillusioned with the 'racial partnership' policy of the 1950s—recognized the necessity of armed confrontation and launched the armed struggle from within the country. The national movement was nonetheless divided from the outset. The most militant elements, including the future independence leader, Robert G. Mugabe, broke away from ZAPU—founded in 1961—to form ZANU in 1963 promising to fully destroy the settler minority regime using military force.[77]

The two parties were banned, and their political leaders jailed in 1964. Unlike other Southern African NLMs apart from FRELIMO, the Southern Rhodesian movements found secure sanctuaries in next-door Zambia to launch their struggles that gained momentum after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. During the initial phase in the 1960s, the struggle remained an entirely military affair devoid of political preparation and mobilization of civilians. As Map 3.4 shows, small mobile ZAPU and ZANU armed units trained abroad infiltrated from

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[77] On the rise of more radical African nationalism demanding 'one man, one vote' and the end to colonialism since the late 1950s, see Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, pp. 134-48.

Zambia in the north for targeted attacks inside the country using hit-and-run guerrilla tactics.[78] The 'sabotage campaign' based on the Guevara-Debray *foco* approach failed to force the settler minority or British intervention to 'grant' independence under black majority rule.[79] Realizing that neither a few acts of sabotage nor international sanctions would bring down the Rhodesian Front regime, both parties began to build liberation armies—the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of ZANU and its ZAPU equivalent, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)—and seek support from various anti-imperialist forces for a protracted armed struggle. By late 1960s, it was clear that political divisions in the nationalist camp, failure to politicize the rural masses, and a settler state with powerful security and administrative apparatuses all conspired to bring the nationalist insurgency to a halt.[80]

A second phase of an intensified armed struggle began in 1972 after a strategic rethinking. Both ZANU and ZAPU—now with Chinese and Soviet military and material support, respectively—embraced a 'people's war' approach that gave primacy to 'politicizing and mobilizing' the people for a more effective military confrontation with the settler regime. This gained momentum after FRELIMO made remarkable politico-military advances in western Mozambique in the early 1970s, allowing ZANU to penetrate and eventually establish semi-liberated areas, with new administrative and political structures such as people's committees and youth organizers, in the northeast and eastern regions. As Map 3.4 shows, ZAPU continued its struggle in western parts of the country in the main, albeit without success in establishing similar

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[78] Oddly, ZAPU, with its South African ANC ally, sought to adopt conventional strategies. On the early guerrilla insurgency, see K. Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe: The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia Since UDI* (London: Rex Collings, 1975); A. Seegers, *Revolution in Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe 1965-1980* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Loyola University, 1984); and J. K. Cilliers, *Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
[79] Even after 1965, Southern Rhodesia remained formally a British colony with its constitutional destiny supposedly in the hands of the British Parliament, which had surrendered effective power to the settler minority in 1923. At this stage, the British adopted a policy of "no independence before majority rule" (NIBMAR) in Southern Rhodesia.
[80] See Lionel Cliffe, "Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance," in Cliffe ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, pp. 24-5; Davidson, *The People's Cause*, p.144.

revolutionary structures in areas of control or influence, causing the rival NLMs to embed themselves in separate—and increasingly Shona vs. Ndebele-speaking—territories.[81]

The nationalist movements significantly expanded their politico-military influence in the latter 1970s albeit at varying degrees. As noted earlier, the degree of 'radicalization' of the movements and mobilization of the rural peasantry was a subject of sustained debate in Zimbabwean post-liberation studies. In any case, Southern Rhodesian NLMs were less successful than their Mozambican and Angolan partners in securing extensive peasant mobilization and developing 'liberated zones' even during the heightened stages of the struggle in late 1970s.[82] This is often justified in terms of the political will and organization capacity of liberation actors. However, as the next analysis of South Africa and South West Africa amply demonstrates, the varied degrees to which Southern African NLMs succeeded in popular mobilization and territorial liberation was also contingent on national structural conditions, besides the settler-colonial state itself. In Southern Rhodesia, ZANU was able to establish a patchwork of semi-liberated areas in most Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs); but establishing large, fully liberated zones was very difficult given "the dense infrastructure of settler control and the scattered character of the land allotted to Africans."[83] Settler-colonial legislation resulted in the occupation of large swaths of land by settler farmers and the creation of discrete pockets of African reserves (the TTLs) that depended on settler infrastructure and economy. This contrasts with the Portuguese colonies where no extensive peasant dislocation and land enclosures took place, allowing for large, fully liberated rural areas in remote parts of the countries.

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[81] See Cliffe, "Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance," pp. 26-31; Anthony R. Wilkinson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," in Davidson, Slovo, and Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), pp. 256-275.
[82] See Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War,* 1994.
[83] Saul, *Zimbabwe: The Next Round*, p. 1840; Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 25.

Map 3.4: Areas of Guerrilla Penetration and Influence During the Struggle



Source: Astrow, *A Revolution that Lost Its Way?*, p. 152.

Nonetheless, Southern Rhodesian NLMs were also plagued by chronic internal contradictions, dissension, factionalism, and inter-NLM conflicts that festered during the first half of the 1970s. As in Angola, the nationalist arena was marked by an enduring political divide that stemmed from the early ZANU-ZAPU split and frequently threatened to derail the struggle. Oddly, the mission-educated leaders had shared petty-bourgeois backgrounds, and liberal views of racial equality before espousing variants of Marxist-Leninist principles of national and social liberation. Rather than difference over ideology, strategy, and goals of national liberation that bitterly divided other Southern African NLMs, the longstanding divisive issue rested on the question of nationalist leadership and the degree of militancy as the armed struggle intensified.[84] This was further reinforced by—and fueled—growing ethno-regional disparities between ZAPU and ZANU. Furthermore, each party was riven by personal, generational, class, and ideological

[84] Cliffe, "Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance," pp. 32-3.

contradictions and conflicts over strategy and goals of the national struggle, sometimes advertently cultivated by leaders of the Frontline States, i.e., Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and after 1975, Mozambique.[85] The history of persistent nationalist division would prove important in conditioning elite power consolidation and nation-building strategies after liberation than what is often sees as limited radicalization of the nationalist movements.

An influential 'internal' process is another feature of the road to national liberation in Southern Rhodesia. Even though of secondary importance vis-à-vis the 'external' politico-military struggles, the internal dynamic proved significant in shaping political dynamics on the eve of liberation and the political settlement that defined decolonization. The settler state sought to undermine radical elites by cultivating and coopting a black bourgeoisie, particularly after the collapse of Portuguese rule. Internal black mobilization was catalyzed by a British-sponsored constitutional proposal—the Pearce Proposal of 1971—for incremental progress towards majority rule, which ignited violent urban demonstrations in mainly Salisbury (Harare), Umtali, and Gwelo (Gweru).[86] However, a widening rift developed between the 'external' parties and the 'internal' black opposition led by a United Methodist Church Bishop, Abel Muzorewa, who mobilized a conservative coalition of rural landlords, traditional chiefs, and urban petty bourgeois opposed to the NLMs' radical program. In 1978, RF party leaders and Muzorewa reached an Internal Settlement for a sham black-led government that preserved white economic and political domination in the guise of a 'racial partnership' government.[87]

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[85] See D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981); M. Sithole, "Class and Factionalism in the Zimbabwean Nationalist Movement," *African Studies Review*, 27 (March, 1984): 117-125; N. Kriger, "The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles Within the Struggle," *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 14 (Jan., 1988): 304-322; M. Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle* (Harare: Rujeko Publishers, 1979); E Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union, 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005).
[86] M. Meredith, *The Past Is Another Country -- Rhodesia: UDI to Zimbabwe* (London: Pan Books, 1980), p. 93; J. Todd, *The Right to Say No* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972).
[87] Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 24.

The so-called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government failed to secure internal and international support. Yet, the internal political force provided the settler state with a leverage to offset liberation-elite influence in a negotiated settlement. The conflict nearly stalemated in 1979 with neither the government nor the NLMs anticipating outright military victory. Meanwhile, cross-border raids by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa after 1977 extended the war to the Frontline States, severely threatening the economic and political stability of Zambia and Mozambique in particular. The resulting pressure on the NLMs, together with their own relative politico-military weakness, forced liberation elites to accept, in late 1979, a settlement with the settler regime and its allied reformist 'internal parties' in the British-sponsored Lancaster House Conference, which defined a liberal politico-legal framework for a negotiated national liberation.

The Lancaster House Agreement tied liberation elites to a liberal policy option in three ways. First, it committed the liberation fronts to a peaceful transition through multiracial elections. The ZANU won a majority in the 1980 elections, but with 'profound constraints' imposed on what the liberation government could accomplish. Second, the settler minority was provided with 'constitutional safeguards' involving twenty reserved parliamentary seats for seven years; employment and pension rights of civil servants; and autonomy for the white-dominated judiciary, civil service, and national army. Last, a Bill of Rights provided protections for settler and foreign-capital interests and private property, especially land, forestalling any radical socioeconomic policies during the liberation episode. Counter to ZANU's revolutionary program of agrarian reform, the new government was restricted from involuntary acquisition of property for a ten-year period with the partial exception of 'underutilized' land. The transfer of land from whites was subject to 'willing seller, willing buyer' free-market mechanisms.[88]

[88] Southern Rhodesia, *Report of The Constitutional Conference* (London: Lancaster House, 1979).

The timing of national liberation was crucial in the liberation elites' liberal policy choice and its implementation. Zimbabwean leaders achieved national liberation in a regional-international setting that was more constraining in some ways but less in other ways. They accepted a liberal policy package as part of the negotiated liberation owing to external pressure. Yet, once in power, they hoped to subvert the liberal approach and gradually introduce radical reforms on a path to socialism. The world context was still more permissive in the early 1980s; the window to socialist transition as well as coercive nation-building was open as a result of which Zimbabwean leaders would engage in radical rhetoric, with some radical policy content, within the parameters of the liberal policy package. Nevertheless, their policy discretion was severely constrained by settler-ruled South African military threat and economic dominance in the region. Looming South African military and economic subversion, together with the economy's heavy dependence on South African capital, markets, and port transit,[89] in part restrained Zimbabwean leaders from embarking on full-blown radical socioeconomic reforms and in part justified their partly violent consolidate of power. All this led to stalling of the liberal reform approach in the course of the liberation episode as will be discussed in Chapter Six.

3.2.3 State Power, Economic Structure, and Capital

Liberation elites in Southern Rhodesia did not have the organizational strength to militarily capture political power and embark on a radical path of revolutionary change. But *why* they opted for a liberal policy option cannot be fully understood without the domestic structures of state, national economy, and dominant class power prevailing at moment of liberation. The presence of a strong settler state that hindered the NLMs' politico-military progress have already been highlighted. On the eve of liberation, the state maintained superior administrative, military,

[89] See Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 14.

and economic powers albeit a decade of guerrilla insurgency, international sanctions, and consequent economic crisis and isolation. The Smith regime continued to effectively repress and divide internal opposition, maintain administrative and security control over most of the country, and contain guerrilla advances, while creating grave military and economic danger to the NLMs' major backers, Zambia and Mozambique. Thus, with diminished external support and little prospect to overthrow the state, the liberation fronts succumbed to political pressure for a negotiated mode of liberation that precluded a radical policy option.

The settler state developed a sophisticated civil service with expansive economic and social mandates due to its historical role as an agent of settler prosperity and privileges, in creating 'Socialism-for-the-Whites' system,[90] as well as post-1965 international sanctions that heightened economic regulation and 'import substitution' policies by the government. Inheriting such state structures intact was certainly in the interest of liberation-elite goals to redress racial and class inequalities, expand social services, and transition to socialism. This favored gradual reform of the state as the liberal policy option required. However, entrenched agents and structures of the old state also eventually imposed serious bureaucratic and legislative constraints on the liberation government's progressive and potentially transformative programs within the liberal policy framework. In many ways, the post-settler colonial state became "the agency through which international capital hoped to maintain Zimbabwe under imperialist hegemony" and a vehicle furthering "the class interests of the African petit bourgeoisie."[91]

The prevailing economic and dominant-class structure similarly minimized the likelihood—and in some respects the necessity—for revolutionary change. As noted in the previous chapter, Southern Rhodesian economy had undergone major structural changes, along

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[90] Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 85.
[91] Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," pp. 49-50, 51.

with changing importance of domestic-settler and international capital, that conditioned elites thinking at liberation. Before liberation, Southern Rhodesia had the second most developed and industrialized national economy on the continent, after South Africa, with extensive commercial agricultural sector, mining, and a fast-growing manufacturing that made up 26 per cent of GDP, and advanced technology and manpower. The 'semi-peripheral' capitalist development paradoxically presented liberation elites with

> … an historically unprecedented challenge for transition in the form of unfamiliar opportunities and constraints. The experiences of other African governments, except in so far as they point to pitfalls, offer few models relevant to the Zimbabwe case. The new leadership is faced with a unique situation that requires a unique strategy. At a general level, the challenge differs from other 'developmental revolutions' which are concerned with bringing about socialism without a capitalist stage. In Zimbabwe the immediate issue is how to redistribute opportunities for production and services, and thereby convert capitalism to the benefit of groups in society who have hitherto been excluded.[92]

Liberation leaders needed to adjust their socioeconomic goals to this reality. A radical socialization of the national economy would destabilize agriculture, industry, and overall economic productivity, jeopardizing mid to long-term economic growth and the improvement of black conditions. Furthermore, in the occasion of radical measures the prospect of white flight before the development of black skills presented serious policy issues surrounding "manpower for the maintenance of industries, mines, and government."[93] The settler population was generally 'economically indispensable' since it controlled large capital in commercial agriculture, mining, and to some extent industry, while white farmers produced 75 per cent of total food-crops on which the black population came to depend.[94] In juxtaposition to the previously liberated Angola and Mozambique with backward pre-capitalist economies and

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[92] Michael Bratton, "Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 19 (Sep., 1981), p. 459.
[93] Colin Stoneman, "Foreign Capital and the Reconstruction of Zimbabwe," *Review of African Political Economy*, 11 (Jan. - Apr., 1978), p. 79.
[94] Bratton, "Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics," pp. 455-8.

relatively poorer settler minorities, these issues were "an order of magnitude more serious" not only because of the relative advancement of the economy and unskilled black manpower, but also "because of continuing foreign, especially South African interest, which could in the last resort lead to military intervention."[95]

Figure 3.1: Foreign Capital in Southern Rhodesia Before Liberation

Year	Total Capital Stock	Domestic Capital	Foreign Capital Stock*			Source
			Total	UK	SA	
1935	£35[a]	—	—	—	—	Frankel[1]
1935-39	£60[b]	—	£42-45	—	—	Stoneman[2]
			£60	—	—	Stoneman[5]
1945	£60-80	£12-26 (20-30%)	£48-54	—	—	Stoneman[2]
1953	—	—	£200	—	£50 (25%= 1956)	Stoneman[2]
1963	—	—	£350	—	£100	Stoneman
1965	—	—	—	£200	—	*Financial Times*[4]
				£150-200	£100	Stoneman[2]
			£400			Stoneman[5]
1974	—	—	£550-600	£225-300	£200	Stoneman[5]
1978-79[c]	$2,250-2,750 (est £1,845-2,255)	$750 (est £615)	$1,500-2,000 (est £1,230-1,640)	$815 (£717)	$583 (£478)	Stoneman[6]

Source: Astrow, *A Revolution That Lost Its Way?*, p. 61.

Liberation elites saw a solution in a liberal policy option. Such a choice would guarantee property rights and economic stability essential for generating opportunities for blacks and public revenues for rapid service expansion and rural development. The new government could capitalize on a capitalist economy and settler skills, manpower, and capital while at the same time redistributing income and social benefits to formerly excluded groups to gradually reduce racial inequalities. After all, capitalist development meant that the policy concern should be less about rapid development of a backward economy, like Mozambique and Angola, as it was about sustaining continued economic expansion coupled with steady reduction of racial inequalities. The relatively propitious economic conditions—combined with the prospect of settlers departure

[95] C. Stoneman and R. Davies, "The Economy: An overview," in Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Inheritance*, p. 123.

and South African economic destabilization—compelled liberation elites to compromise with the settler regime in favor of a liberal approach.

Finally, the strength of entrenched international and settler capital interests was sufficient to block a radical reform path. The white nationalist Rhodesian-Front rule oversaw the expansion of state and settler capital; yet a largely *non-metropolitan* foreign capital maintained a dominant and expanding position in the national economy (see Fig. 3.1). In late 1970s, foreign capital controlled about two-thirds of the economy, while the influence of South African, US, and Western European capital surpassed that of British metropolitan capital.[96] Foreign capital—along allied non-agricultural settler capital—demanded a liberal settlement that would allow its continued exploitation of the country. Liberation elites needed to avert sudden withdrawal of capital; by pursuing even merely 'egalitarian policies,' they could "expect to provoke counter-measures from foreign capital, and any attempt at real control or nationalization could well be met by full-scale economic war [from South Africa]."[97] Besides, policies adverse to capitalist interests risked the deprivation of capital flows, loans, and aid from home governments as indicated by the experience of next-door Mozambique, whose leaders who were keen to end the regionalized war and knew too well the price of radical policies pressurized Robert Mugabe to accept the Lancaster House settlement. In short, dominant capital and white commercial farmers needed assurance that majority rule would not come with revolutionary changes.

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[96] See Stoneman, "Foreign Capital and the Reconstruction of Zimbabwe," pp. 63-72, and "Foreign Capital and the Prospects for Zimbabwe," *World Development*, 4, 1 (1976), 25-58; Duncan Clarke, *Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, I980).

[97] Stoneman and Davies, "The Economy: An overview," p. 123.

3.3 "ARMED PROPAGANDA" AND NEGOTIATED LIBERATION: SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA

The pathway to national liberation from settler domination in South Africa and South West Africa was the most drawn-out but least developed in politico-military terms in the region. These cases stand on the polar opposite from Mozambique and Angola in that the politico-military achievements of the revolutionary national movements were limited in terms of the scale of guerrilla insurgency, party radicalization, and rural mobilization for popular national struggle. The African National Congress (ANC) and South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) evidently failed to develop higher levels of political, military, and ideological sophistication to dismantle the settler-colonial state and carry out far-reaching transformations. As such, the liberation elites attained power in a negotiated mode of liberation that severely and increasingly constrained their freedom of action during the liberation episode in the 1990s.

In this regard, the pattern was similar to the negotiated end to settler domination and its liberal reform outcome in Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the road to liberation in South Africa and South West Africa was distinct in a number of ways germane to the analysis: (a) 'external' national struggles defined by unsophisticated 'armed propaganda' strategies; (b) relatively powerful 'internal' mobilizations and international changes decisive in bringing down settler rule; and (c) negotiated transitions to majority rule through 'neocolonial' political settlements involving settler regimes, liberation elites, and other national actors.

3.3.1 Exile Politics and 'Armed Propaganda'

Like other Southern African revolutionary NLMs, liberation elites in South Africa and South West Africa resorted to armed struggles in the early 1960s in reaction to the Apartheid regime's violent repression of popular opposition to ever oppressive racist laws and demands for political

reforms. But they were the last to achieve national liberation and state power. Given the sheer length of the struggle period, it is helpful to distinguish between a first phase (1961-1974) of 'armed propaganda' and a second phase (1975-1990) when liberation-elite attempts to launch 'people's wars' failed before intensive internal mass mobilizations (especially in South Africa) and wider international political changes paved the road to negotiated national liberation.

PHASE I – 1961–1974: South African and South West African revolutionary NLMs construed their causes as struggles for majority rule and racial equality, as well as, in the latter, for independence from external (South African) colonization. In South Africa, moreover, the liberation struggle had historical antecedents of long-standing national opposition to racial segregation and apartheid during the first half of the century. There were nation-wide urban opposition and rural peasant insurrections and the ANC (1912) and the South African Communist Party (SACP, 1921)—the would-be revolutionary NLMs—existed long before the liberation struggle commenced. The immediate antecedents include growing political campaigns and labor strikes in the 1950s, with corresponding state violence, which came to ahead in early 1960 in the Sharpeville Massacre when black protests against pass laws were met by bloody repression.[98] This marked a strategic turning point from liberation leaders' standpoint because, in its resolve to "smashing the black opposition totally," the state "finally sealed off all avenues for effective opposition without the element of organized force."[99]

This forced the ANC and SACP (of mainly white militant socialists) to go underground and launch the struggle, in December 1961, with a joint guerrilla army—*uMkhonto we Sizwe*—

[98] For the historical origins and development of 'black' resistance, see M. J. Murray, ed., *South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition* (Cambridge: Schenkman Pub. Company Inc., 1982); S. Marks and S. Trapido, eds., *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (New York: Longman Inc., 1987); T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (Braamfontein: Ravan Press Ltd., 1990); T.R. H. Davenport and C. Saunders, *South Africa: A Modern History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 5th ed.), ch. 12, 14-15.
[99] J. Slovo, "South Africa: No Middle Road," in Davidson, Slovo, and Wilkinson, *The New Politics of Revolution*, p. 171.

that started a sabotage campaign against government installations in a last-ditch effort to 'bring the [minority regime] to its senses' before the onset of a full-scale guerrilla war. At the same time, the non-revolutionary Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) launched its own struggle of indiscriminate attacks on government and white civilians. Leaders of the ANC-SACP alliance, such as Nelson Mandela, O. R. Tambo, and Joe Slovo, were of educated, middle-class backgrounds and predominantly Transkei/Cape origins with the aim of dislodging, in SACP terminology, 'Colonialism of a Special Type' between a capitalist 'White South Africa' and an oppressed, exploited 'Non-White South Africa.' Their principles and goals were formalized in the Freedom Charter (1955), which defined the mass struggles as national (racial) as well as class struggles for establishing a multi-racial and egalitarian society under majority rule.

On the other hand, PAC leaders, such as Robert Sobukwe and, later, Potlake Leballo, had "a rural upbringing in the more harshly polarized racial climate of the Free State and the Transvaal … relatively modest professional qualifications and career achievements; and at best superficial social contacts with whites." The PAC broke away from the ANC in 1959 in opposition to the latter's non-racialist motto of equal rights for all races in South Africa. Like other non-revolutionary NLMs in the region, it set explicit racialist goals of wresting state power for the exclusive political, economic, and cultural advancement of Africans.[100] Thus, the armed wings of the opposing nationalist organizations waged separate and clashing struggles based on conflicting strategies that reflected "the fundamental ideological and strategic differences which existed between their parent organizations before their banning."[101]

In South West Africa, the antecedents of the liberation struggle were not dissimilar from the other cases in that neither mass struggles nor nationalist movements had evolved before

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[100] See Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945*, pp. 81, 80-85.
[101] Ibid., p. 231, chapter 10.

liberation-elites' decision to take the armed route. Only in 1959 had more radical intellectuals from central and southern parts of the country formed the South West African National Union (SWANU) as 'an umbrella organization' to bring "different elements of anti-colonial resistance into a single nationalist organization." Then, in 1960, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) emerged from a regional association found by Ovamboland students and migrant workers in Cape Town, many active within the ANC, ANC Youth League, and South African Unions. Unlike the SWANU elite that aspired to provide the liberation struggle a national, militant, and progressive basis, SWAPO leaders were of rural social backgrounds with marginal urban experience or contact with whites. As such, the latter was, at first, more an Africanist organization with vaguely and narrowly defined goals of national liberation as black rule. [102] During the first half of the 1960s, both organizations merely strove, separately, to stir civil disobedience at home and to petition the UN to help end South African rule.

The South African liberation organizations launched their politico-military struggles from exile after 1965 after their internal structures had been destroyed, most of their leadership imprisoned, and/or the underground resistance effectively crushed by the state. In the South West African context, the internal repression and full shift to external activities took place after SWAPO's guerrilla activities in 1966 prompted sweeping domestic repression using, as in South Africa, draconian Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Acts. Thus, like other Southern African NLMs, the NLMs shifted their focus to rebuilding their structures in exile, training military recruits, and securing external assistance for "armed propaganda" campaigns as prelude for popular struggles. Nevertheless, South African and South West African liberation leaders faced much more daunting challenges in their efforts from exile at this stage. Both countries

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[102] Peter H. Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance in Namibia* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1988), pp. 41, 43; Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 130-34.

were surrounded by a *cordon sanitaire* of hostile Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian settler-colonial regimes allied to South Africa and, by newly independent states like Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland that remained South African economic dependencies and military hostages to afford the fledgling NLMs with political or military sanctuaries.

This setback threatened the politico-military development of the respective liberation struggles. In the latter 1960s, South African revolutionary NLMs sought to build their external and internal structures from their bases in Tanzania, with external assistance from the Soviet bloc, European social democrats, and newly independent African states. The strategy was to infiltrate back small armed units for sabotage campaign given the near impossibility to base permanently uMkhonto guerrillas inside the country for a sustained guerrilla warfare. For liberation elites, acts of 'armed propaganda' would politicize and mobilize—or 'detonate'—the masses in preparation for protracted people's war. Such efforts were less successful; uMkhonto guerrillas were deployed in military operations with ZAPU forces in western Zimbabwe in hopes of forging a revolutionary armed force infused with doctrines of rural-based guerrilla warfare and boosting the ANC's position with the OAU African Liberation Committee vis-à-vis the African nationalist PAC that easily rallied pan-Africanist solidarity. [103]

The relative politico-military inertia and consequent widespread rank-and-file disaffection forced a strategic rethinking after ANC-SACP leaders took important structural reforms at the Morogoro conference (1969). Besides reforms to redress internal contradictions over strategy and internal democracy, the ANC opened its external structures to whites, Indians, and coloreds, and adopted a 'Revolutionary Programme' said to provide an 'elaboration of [the Charter's] revolutionary message' on such questions as land reform, racial minority rights, and

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[103] For the early strategies and contextual challenges to the ANC-SACP campaign, I liberally draw on Joe Slovo, the foremost theorist, SACP leader, and uMkhonto commander, in "South Africa: No Middle Road," pp. 179-206.

the future political economy. Such programmatic reorientation nonetheless did not mount to the kind of ideological radicalization its counterparts, like FRELIMO and MPLA, underwent at the decade's end, for it fell short to "draw out the more radical implications of the Charter" or to renounce "the preservation of a form of welfare state capitalism in South Africa."[104]

The organizational and strategic changes did not provide much politico-military impetus. The fortunes of uMkhonto waned with ZAPU's politico-military decline in early 1970s. Internal activists moderately succeeded in re-establishing ANC's internal networks but hopes for internal mobilization and effective guerrilla war were revived only with the collapse of the Portuguese empire. In particular, FRELIMO's accession to power following Mozambican liberation, together with the exodus of vast numbers of youth following the Soweto Uprising (1976), created conditions favorable for the resumption of sabotage campaign during the second phase. Meanwhile, questions of white involvement in the ANC led to renewed internal crisis and subsequent expulsion in 1975 of several so-called 'ANC African nationalists.' Like the PAC leaders two decades earlier, the latter called for reconstituting the ANC as 'an authentic nationalist organization' free from the influence of the SACP.[105] Together with previous political measures that broadened the national and radical basis of the ANC, the rift pushed the movement further left albeit the absence of sharp ideological reorientation during the struggle.

The PAC had had a much more turbulent and demoralizing exile history. Initially, it successfully attracted widespread African, Western, and Chinese support, besides establishing close ties with several other non-revolutionary NLMs, such as the FLNA and UNITA in Angola, and COREMO in Mozambique. It pursued similar strategies of guerrilla infiltration and sabotage from its bases in Tanzania and (after 1967) Zambia, but with strict adherence to 'dogmatically

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[104] Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945*, pp. 299-301.
[105] Ibid., pp. 297, 303.

Maoist' principles to base the struggle among a rural peasantry—an indication of the original leadership's rural backgrounds. But the PAC was far less fortunate during the first phase; it was 'all but destroyed' by relentless leadership conflicts and internal dissention, and consequently failed to exploit the changed circumstances of mid-1970s owing to failure to implement any serious organizational reforms, the loss of OAU financial support, and its close connections to Africanist organizations hostile to the now-victorious, multiracialist FRELIMO and MPLA in Mozambique and Angola, respectively.[106]

In South West Africa, with SWANU failing to establish a guerrilla army or broad-based national mobilization, SWAPO emerged as 'the sole and authentic' representative of the people, receiving financial and military assistance from the OAU and its African Liberation Committee. Establishing its political and military bases in Dar es Salaam (and later Lusaka), SWAPO finally launched the guerrilla struggle in 1966 after abandoning hopes of bringing international pressure to bear on South Africa for a peaceful decolonization. Like the ANC, the liberation movement carried on an "armed propaganda" campaign from exile that gained momentum after 1968. Small guerrilla units of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)—SWAPO's armed wing—infiltrated through the Caprivi Strip and southern Angola to sabotage government facilities, assassinate state agents, and attack police stations in classic hit-and-run guerrilla warfare.

In early 1970s, SWAPO influence expanded across the northern regions but fell short of establishing permanent control in even remote rural areas.[107] Like in the South African context, determined efforts to wage an effective politico-military struggle inside the country were hampered by the military prowess of the settler state and the presence of a hostile settler-colonial

[106] Ibid., pp. 203-316.
[107] For a systematic account of SWAPO's politico-military struggle, see Susan Brown, "Diplomacy by Other Means: SWAPO's Liberation War," in C. Leys and J. S. Saul, eds., *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995), 19-39.

regimes in Angola, besides an open and flat landscape unsuitable to guerrilla warfare. Thus, the liberation movement's 'remarkable accomplishment' was arguably a diplomatic challenge to South Africa's illegal occupation and white settler domination. The distinctive international status of South West Africa 'forced a strategic dualism' on the liberation movement to, besides the armed struggle, mobilize Western and socialist support for its cause that would have decisive implications for the path to liberation.[108] Furthermore, as the more radical SWANU fell to irrelevance, SWAPO hardly experienced serious competition or internal radicalization albeit military setbacks and deep internal contradictions between late 1960s and early 1970s.

PHASE II – 1975–1990: The collapse of settler-colonial domination in Angola and Mozambique marked the beginning of the second phase of struggles against apartheid rule. Together with the American defeat in Vietnam in 1975, this had seismic implications that tipped the balance of forces in the region in favor of Southern Africa freedom struggles. The removal of a buffer zone of hostile settler-colonial administrations, and the installation of allied liberation governments, meant that South African and South West African liberation organizations could now realistically expect to wage effective popular armed struggles within their countries.

In the case of South Africa, both the regional changes and the exodus of vast numbers of politically energized young people escaping violent repression following the Soweto uprising (1976) reinvigorated uMkhonto's insurgent activities. The sabotage campaign reached its limit, and liberation elites made a strategic turn in 1978 from 'armed propaganda' to a 'people's war' strategy involving the formation of local defense units and street committees that would serve as catalysts of a popular revolutionary uprising.[109] The extent the popular uprisings that broke out

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[108] J. Saul and C. Leys, "SWAPO: The Politics of Exile," in Leys & Saul, eds., *Namibia's Liberation Struggle*, p. 40.
[109] Steven Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile* (London: James Currey, 1992), chapter 5.

in the early 1980s were planned and organized by the ANC and SACP remains a matter of some debate. What is less disputable is the fact that the South African NLMs never transitioned to higher stages of peoples struggle involving popular politicization, revolutionary structures, and reforms in liberation rural areas in the way Mozambican, Angolan, and, to some degree, Southern Rhodesian revolutionary NLMs had.

Whereas some analysts point to limited radicalization of party and leadership, most others highlight Pretoria's repressive domestic and regional counter-insurgency strategies. However, part of the explanation for the failure to mount a paradigmatic people's war must lie in the country's internal socio-economic conditions and structural changes during the late settler-colonial period. The rural African population fell in size with the decline of black peasantry at the beginning of the century and with high urbanization and industrialization during the post-war decades. The surviving rural peasantry was enclosed in scattered reserves—at this point, 'bantustan' Homelands—with far less economic and political independence than the Southern Rhodesian peasantry.[110] Therefore, as Lodge emphasized, South Africa from the outset:

> [did] not provide the terrain or local conditions which allowed the establishment of successful guerrilla insurgencies in, for example, Mozambique and Angola. There, nationalist parties could initially base their struggles in superficially administered and economically fairly self-sufficient remote rural communities. In South Africa a repressive system of controls on popular mobility and political expression extends to the reserves where, for the most part, people live on the edge of starvation, dependent on migrant earnings. There is not group comparable to the 'middle peasantry' which comparative analyses of rural revolutions have found to be vital to the successful guerrilla movement. In the towns, influx control and an extensive system of police informers served to inhibit political activity, as did the fear and demoralization engendered by new security legislation and police powers.[111]

For that matter, by mid 1980s, South African liberation elites turned their strategy to popular urban insurrection, expecting to exploit intensifying resistance by workers, students, and

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[110] See Colin Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry," in Murray, ed., *South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition*, 211-236.
[111] Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945*, pp. 295-296.

civil society in peri-urban townships and rural Homelands. The strategy was to channel the internal upheaval to a mass-based urban People's War and seize power in a Bolshevik-style revolutionary uprising. This was aborted by government destruction of external ANC structures, and forced withdrawal from Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana. With equally intensifying internal repression and weakness of internal underground structure, uMkhonto guerrilla activity came to play a secondary role to the mass democratic opposition. Thus, the ANC-SACP alliance sought to deepen internal resistance to render the country ungovernable and bring the regime to a negotiating table.[112] As a consequence, in South Africa the external armed struggle and 'internal' mobilization practically converged into a single political process on the eve of liberation in a pattern uncommon to liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

Most scholars consider the abortive national-social revolution and its liberal outcome as an outcome of somewhat non-radicalized petit bourgeois leadership and ideological ambiguity. Indeed, as Lodge concluded, even after the Morogoro reforms, the ANC's "ideological position remained noticeably conservative (and realistic). It's essentially nationalist character remained unchanged."[113] Be that as it may, however, a mechanical approach to war-time militancy and elite policy choices at liberation is reductionist and inadequate as noted before. Furthermore, the vying between national-liberation versus class struggle for centrality and the dominance of 'petit bourgeois' leadership were common phenomena among Southern Africa's revolutionary NLMs. Charges of petit-bourgeois domination are often exaggerated because, as Slovo asserted, "insofar as we can speak of an African bourgeoisie at all, it [was] pathetically small and [had] arrived too late on the historical scene to play a classic class role either as a leading element in the national

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[112] T. Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994," in R. Ross, A. K. Mager, and B, Nasson, eds., *The Cambridge History of South Africa: Volume 2, 1885-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 461-5.
[113] Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945*, pp. 301-2.

struggle or as [its] main beneficiary."[114] Like in Southern Rhodesia, the development of an African middle class was thwarted by thorough black exclusion from rural land ownership, skilled jobs, and urban residential rights.

Finally, the ANC indeed did not embrace socialist identity in a pattern atypical to the region's revolutionary NLMs that exhibited varied degrees and hues of Marxism-Leninism. Notwithstanding the fact that Southern African liberation elites attached much instrumental value to radical ideology, strong radical influences on the movement are nonetheless undeniable. After all, the ANC was home to communist elements, communist leaders, and it maintained an enduring, close relationship with the pro-Soviet SACP party, which, at any given time, "could count among its membership most of the ANC's national executive."[115] The evidence suggests that the ANC's ambivalence towards communism was rather political. Its black nationalist inclination, as scholars rightly suggest, was in large part a strategic choice stemming from the fact that racial oppression was national (not class) in the main, and that the PAC, questioning the ANC's African 'authenticity,' vied for domestic as well as external pan-African support at the early stages of the struggle.[116] Despite being a broad church of national and class forces, the ANC was by no means a reactionary Africanist party because its organizational history was punctuated by expulsions of black nationalists beginning with PAC in late 1950s—and not socialists or communists—and stamped with progressive, non-racialist, revolutionary principles.

In the last analysis, therefore, the liberal approach of the liberation episode could not be pinned down to ANC-specific ideological or organizational attributes. The simple, but salient, fact is that ANC leaders recognized the significance of revolutionary theory as an instrument of popular mobilization as well as social change in the same way as the other revolutionary allies

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[114] Slovo, "South Africa: No Middle Road," pp. 142-43.
[115] Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994," p. 432; see Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, 1992.
[116] For example, Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945*, p. 298.

did. And such thinking was grounded on the SACP's 'two-stage' national democratic revolution (NDR) theory: i.e., a struggle for national democracy first and, once that was achieved, a class-defined revolution for socialism next. Not all ANC elites necessarily shared the 'stageist' framework, but that national liberation would involve socioeconomic emancipation, the nationalization of industry, and the redistribution of land was a widely shared, official position.[117] Moreover, under Soviet-East German influence and hostile conditions of struggle, the ANC "transmogrified into a tightly-knit, highly centralized vanguard party," based on internal democratic centralism, "with policy largely devised behind closed doors and then passed down to the lower ranks…"[118] Therefore, the ANC was arguably no more liberal than other revolutionary NLMs in the region, and it, too, was permeated by strong authoritarianism resurfacing during major episodes of internal dissent and suppression in exile.

The armed resistance in South West Africa also intensified with the liberation of Angola. Besides direct lines of command and supply from Angola, SWAPO could now access the Ovambo region, its primary support base with half of the country's population, and receive large number of recruits escaping the brunt of military and police repression. Thus, PLAN forces began to expand their guerilla campaign in northern areas; to carry on 'political activation' as a prelude for armed struggle using conventional capabilities; and to strike into white farming areas south of the Red Line. But politico-military progress was stalling by late 1970s. The Botha government's 'total strategy'—of domestic reforms to win 'hearts and minds' coupled with brutal repression by state police and security forces—as well as South African military occupation of southern Angola and the imposition of a martial law in the northern-half of the

[117] Joh S. Saul, "The Transition: The Players Assemble, 1970-1990," in Saul and Bond, *South Africa - The Present as History*, p. 94; Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945,* p. 302.
[118] John Daniel, "The Mbeki Presidency: Lusaka Wins," in Government of South Africa, *South African Yearbook of Internal Affairs, 2001/12* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2002) pp. 9-10.

country deterred PLAN's guerrilla incursions and popular rural support. After 1985, SWAPO was bogged down in a 'conventional' regional war in Angola between Soviet-backed Angolan and Cuban forces and South African-UNITA army with Chinese and US support.[119] The path to national liberation was cleared with an international settlement of this conflict following South Africa's 1988 military defeat at Cuito Cuanavale.

The nationalist struggle thus did not transition to a people's war as in South Africa. Yet, unlike the ANC, the SWAPO underwent considerable organizational changes and radicalization during the second phase, explicitly adopting Marxist-Leninist vanguard party structures and a radical political program for a socialist society.[120] It also developed a broad-based national support to emerge as a formidable politico-military organization without serious national rivals. This arguably raised SWAPO elite's incentives to demobilize 'internal' party structures and domestic resistance groups that could have potentially challenged their supremacy within the country. In a pattern paradigmatic to Southern Africa's liberation movements, the logics of protracted struggle imbued SWAPO with a militaristic culture that surfaced during episodes of internal factionalism and violent repression. Like in the ANC, the older, relatively conservative, Ovambo-dominated 'nationalist' leadership around Sam Nujoma endured 'leftist' challenges by more militant, better educated, second-generation freedom fighters.[121]

Therefore, with the external liberation struggles derailed or stalemated, the path to national liberation in both South Africa and South West Africa was shaped by internal (and international) dynamics that gathered momentum in mid-1980s.

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[119] See Brown, "SWAPO's Liberation War," pp. 23-37.
[120] SWAPO, *Political Programme* (Lusaka: SWAPO, 1977), p. 6.
[121] See Saul and Leys, "SWAPO: The Politics of Exile," pp. 46-58.

3.3.2 South Africa: Urban Insurgency, Popular Resistance, and 'Negotiated Revolution'

In South Africa, the last steps to national liberation were distinctly dominated by an 'internal' mobilization of political, labor, and students movements variously allied to different external NLMs. A reactionary force of bantustan leaders, ethnocentric parties, and traditional authorities allied to the settler-colonial regime was important part of this dynamics. The internal process began in large part in the 1970s, after a 'decade of silence,' in conjunction with the regime's continuous efforts to reform and adjust Apartheid to changing internal conditions.

The 'bantustan' policy led to the balkanization of the African population and emergence of a powerful conservative bloc of bantustan politicians and administrators, traditional chiefs, and black businessmen in the rural homeland. An example of this was Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland (1975-1994), and his Inkatha Freedom Party, a self-styled 'cultural and liberation movement,' which would grow in the 1980s to the largest conservative internal African organization in the country. This mobilization served to divide and weaken African opposition; for example, in late 1980s armed clashes between Inkatha and the uMkhonto brought the country to the brink of a civil war. On the eve of national liberation, the conservative African bloc counteracted—in alliance with the state and right-wing settler groups—the political and military muscle of the ANC and its internal political allies.[122]

On the other hand, it became apparent after the Soweto uprisings (1976) that repression was inadequate to remedy apartheid's internal contradictions, to quell rising domestic opposition, or to assuage growing international opposition. To this end, the government of the hawkish P. W. Botha (1978-1988) devised a comprehensive national policy—i.e., the 'total strategy'—against a perceived 'total onslaught' by revolutionaries from within and outside, which "combine[d] effective security measures with reformist policies aimed at removing the grievances that

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[122] See, Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, pp. 143-44.

revolutionaries could exploit."[123] The strategy involved basic reforms 'to win hearts and minds' coupled with heightened repression. The government, *inter alia*, liberalized pass laws, ended white-job reservation, and in order to meet industrial demands for a permanent, semi-skilled black workforce as well as to enhance state control over labor, recognized African unionization rights. With improved educational opportunities, these changes were expected to midwife a black middle class and thereby "intensify [black] class differentials while reducing the racial ones."[124]

The end-goal was to restructure apartheid in ways short of impinging on white supremacy. As such, the reforms—and repression—had precisely the opposite effect of economic and political stability. For instance, African migration to urban centers and the legalization of African unions spurred the emergence of powerful national labor unions with broader political interests and allegiances to the liberation organizations. The new conditions provided an impetus for widespread labor strikes, student demonstrations, and general mass protests that brought about the desegregation of hospitals, schools, beaches, and other public facilities.[125] The tide of resistance evolved to a vigorous popular struggle by mid-1980s after some constitutional changes, that re-enfranchised the Colored and Indian groups, proved nothing more than mechanisms for "sharing power without losing [white] control," creating a rift in the black majority, and reinforcing the conservative black ruling class.[126] The various progressive, multi-racial civic, church, students', workers', and other organizations formed, in 1983, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which played a critical role in both denying legitimacy to the

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[123] M. Swilling and M. Phillips, "State Power in the 1980s: From 'Total Strategy' to Counter-Revolutionary Warfare," in J. Cock and L. Nathan, eds., *War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), p. 136.

[124] J. Hyslop, "School Student Movements and State Education Policy, 1972-87," in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen, eds., *Popular Struggles in South Africa* (London: James Currey, 1988), p. 190.

[125] For a comprehensive analysis of the popular struggles of the 1980s, see T. Lodge and B. Nasson, *All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1991); Anthony W. Marx, *Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[126] M. J. Murray, *South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny* (London: Verso, 1987), pp. 112, 123; Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, pp. 134, 137. See Chapter Two on late-settler colonial reforms.

recent political reforms and eclipsing the Black Consciousness ideology of the mid-1970s in favor of the ANC's non-racial charterist tradition.[127] Another key actor that bolstered the ANC-SACP position was the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) formed in 1985 as the largest trade union federation in the country.

The internal insurrection came to overshadow the 'external' politico-military struggle. The ANC pursued a two-pronged strategy besides the sabotage campaign. On one hand, it intensified the popular resistance in a bid to maintain pressure on the state, and to expand its internal structures in often violent contests with the Africanist PAC and, in KwaZulu and the Rand, the ethnic-Zulu Inkatha party. The movement adapted its liberation strategy as the 'capture of power' by means of "mass action involving revolutionary force, such as land occupation, factory occupation, people's control of the township," with uMkhonto armed offensives for 'breaking up' the state's power structures.[128] On the other hand, by late 1980s, the ANC pushed for a negotiated settlement with the support of large business, student, church, and trade union leaders, discounting its goals of overthrowing the regime and, reading the signs on the fast-changing international arena, downplaying socialist objectives in favor of liberal democracy.[129]

The popular resistance nearly defeated the 'total strategy.' As an example, violent revolts against corrupt administration and poor public services in the townships of the Vaal Triangle (Transvaal) in late 1984 spread to the Orange Free State, the eastern Cape, and finally to Cape Town and Natal, engulfing both peri-urban townships and rural homelands. The formal machinery of local government broke down in parts of black townships, where informal grassroots organizations calling for 'people's power' took over. A power equilibrium set in after

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[127] See J. Seekings, *The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), p. 292; also M. Swilling, "The United Democratic Front and Township Revolt," in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen, eds., *Popular Struggles in South Africa* (London: James Currey, 1988), 90-113.
[128] ANC, *Commission on Strategy and Tactics: National Consultative Conference*, June 1985, p. 16.
[129] Lodge, "Resistance and Reform, 1973-1994," pp. 464-466.

the government regained control through heightened repression of the internal resistance.[130] The door to negotiations was unlocked after the reformist Transvaal National Party leader, F. W. de Klerk, who unseated the hardliner P. W. Botha in August 1989, unbanned the liberation movements in February 1990 and dismantled the key foundations of apartheid, such as the Group Areas Act, the Land Act, and the Population Registration Act, in the following year.[131]

The transition to majority rule took place after complex all-party negotiations (1990-1994) that yielded to a negotiated mode of national liberation. First, despite spiraling violence that brought the country to the brink of a civil war, the final route to national liberation was the most inclusive, consensual, and democratic, encompassing most key political players committed to a united, democratic, and non-racial state. Second, the negotiated end of settler domination in South Africa was a paradigmatic 'elite transition,' driven by contending domestic actors, and for that matter *sui generis* in Southern Africa.[132] Yet, the settlement was made possible by the resolution of regional conflicts and changing international power relations, on the one hand, and the outcome was a liberal approach, just like the externally imposed political settlements in Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, on the other. Last, the ANC averted the kind of pressure ZANU-PF and SWAPO elites endured to reject various National Party demands (e.g., group representation, minority veto power, weak federal government) that would compromise genuine majority rule. Nelson Mandela and his allies led a 'rolling mass action' of strikes, protests, and boycotts to exert pressure on the ruling elite and its Bantustan black stooges—hence the protracted nature of the transition negotiations.

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[130] See J. Seekings, "Political Mobilization in the Black Townships of the Transvaal," in P. Frankel, N. Pines, and M. Swilling, eds., *State, Resistance and Change in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1988), 197-288; P. Frankel, "Beyond Apartheid: Pathways for Transition," in Frankel, Pines, and Swilling, eds., p. 280.
[131] T. R. H. Davenport, *The Transfer of Power in South Africa* (Cape Town: D. Philip, 1998); A. Sparks, *Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Negotiated Revolution* (Sandton: Struik Book Distr., 1994).
[132] P. Bond, *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000); F.V.Z. Slabbert, *The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition* (London: Penguin, 1992).

The negotiated pathway to liberation led to a liberal approach for several reasons. First, the ANC assumed political power through elections (1994) in a government of national unity for a five-year period as provided by the negotiated settlement. Furthermore, liberation elites accepted the integration of old state structures into new ones along with job security for civil servants, judges, police, and military personnel, which precluded dramatic state restructuring or power consolidation associated with the radical approach. Second, a Bill of Rights guaranteed protection of property rights and free enterprise against the nationalization of land, industry, and mines—in a dramatic shift away from the Freedom Charter's principles to share the country's wealth and resources through the transfer of ownership of the mines, the banks, and monopoly industry to the people.[133] This too aborted rapid and basic transformation of vast racial, class, gender, and geographic inequalities, and a socialist path of national development. Third, and last, the settlement set the stage for a democratic and inclusive nation-building with a constitution that guaranteed fundamental freedoms and rights, racial power-sharing (until 1999), and the protection of minority culture, customary law, and traditional authorities.[134]

3.3.3 South West Africa: 'International Settlement' and Negotiated Liberation

In South West Africa, internal resistance began in the early 1970s with widespread labor, student, and youth mobilization. Pretoria's 'total strategy' policies spurred a widespread and sustained wave of popular and worker resistance in the 1980s.[135] This helped to undermine South Africa's hold on the territory; but, unlike South Africa, the 'internal' process in general was less influential, and SWAPO's influence in the internal mobilization marginal, to determine the route to national liberation. This stemmed in large part from the absence of comparable urbanization,

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[133] African National Congress, *The Freedom Charter* (Kliptown: Congress of the People, 1955).
[134] Davenport, *The Transfer of Power in South Africa*, ch. 3-4; Davenport & Saunders, *A Modern History*, ch. 19.
[135] See Wallace, *History of Namibia*, pp. 274-304.

industrialization, and proletarianization, on the one hand, and persistent international opposition to South Africa's Bantustan policy in South West Africa, on the other.

The internal process is nonetheless crucial to understand the negotiated mode of national liberation. The 'total strategy' policies aimed to downgrade the radicals liberation organizations by cultivating a black middle class and strengthen conservative-reformist forces with stakes in the settler-colonial status quo. This meant to defeat the MPLA—and SWAPO—and to install a friendly black government in Angola to effectively undercut the latter's politico-military advances, as well as, internally, to implement the Odendaal Report (1964) to develop the Native Reserves to independent ethnic homelands. The regime abandoned, under growing UN opposition, its 'bantustan' project to break up the territory to pursue, in its place, a federation of the settlers and the ethnic homelands—an ethnic-balancing formula designed to undermine black threat to the political power or socioeconomic privileges of the white minority.[136]

The result was the so-called Turnhalle initiative of late 1970s to secure a 'neocolonial' internal settlement of all 'moderate' racial and ethnic forces. The scheme did not pave the way for a 'unilateral declaration' of independence of settler-dominated South West Africa. Rather, it divided the settler minority between two camps, and attracted further condemnation by the UN, which passed Resolution 435 (1978) that called for UN-sponsored elections for transition to majority rule. The constitutional process led to the emergence of a multiracial reformist alliance—i.e., Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)—that won a resounding victory in 1978 elections to form a new government dominated by the South West African National Front. But Pretoria backtracked on the plan for unilateral independence. With ZANU's sweep to victory in 1979, South Africa felt that the DTA's popularity "might be as insubstantial as [Abel] Muzorewa's in Zimbabwe" and that, like ZANU, the SWAPO could sweep UN-supervised free

[136] Omer-Cooper, *History of Southern Africa*, p. 287.

elections.[137] South Africa increasingly insisted (with the Reagan administration's support) on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola as a precondition for a general settlement.

The DTA splintered and declined in early 1980s. Using a new 'transitional government' initiative, South African proceeded to establish in 1985 a new 'neocolonial' regime with a view to its leading the country to independence as an ethnic federation. This last attempt also floundered because the 'transitional government' lacked international acceptance and the new grouping of anti-SWAPO parties, the Multi-Party Conference (MPC), lost the support of South Africa because, internally divided, it failed to provide in its constitutional proposals sufficient safeguards for group political rights.[138]

A stalemate in the internal process followed as protests and strikes intensified in the later 1980s and the state responded with brutal repression. Faced with domestic upheaval, international disinvestment, and economic downward spiral, South Africa finally let the transition to majority rule after it lost upper military hand in southern Angola. The resulting 'international settlement'—the New York Accords, 1988—jointly sponsored by the US and USSR to end the Angolan war, provided for the withdrawal of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) and Cuban troops from Angola, and for the implementation of Resolution 435 for the peaceful decolonization of South West Africa under the auspices of a UN Transitional Assistance Group.

The negotiated mode of liberation, that resulted from broader regional and international dynamics, severely circumscribed elite policy options. First, the 'international settlement' was practically imposed on liberation leaders, who were not signatory to it, in the first place. Second, the transition process was skewed in favor of the 'internal' conservative actors because South

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[137] Ibid., p. 288.
[138] Ibid., p. 290.

Africa maintained administrative and security control during the transition, which torpedoed chances "to counterbalance structures of social control that Pretoria has spent decades implanting on the ground…"[139] Finally, in the non-racial elections of 1989, that paved the way for national liberation on March 21, 1990, SWAPO did not win the two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendments after liberation. Thus, new institutions and terms of post-liberation change were subject to negotiations and compromises among liberation leaders and a reformist-conservative opposition. The resulting liberal reform approach committed liberation elites to democratic state and nation-building based on racial reconciliation, proportional representation guaranteeing minority rights, and respect for civil and political rights enshrined in a Bill of Rights. Liberation elites also relinquished their goals of radical socioeconomic changes, land redistribution, and the nationalization of mines and industry. As in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, land transfer was grounded on the "willing seller, willing buyer" free-market principle.

In conclusion, the liberation episode constituted a critical juncture in the national histories of South Africa and South West Africa even though most critics underestimate the scope of political, social, and economic transformations of this period. The liberal approach resulted in relatively extensive changes than a mere petty-bourgeois 'political revolution' would engender (see Chapter Five). Moreover, the historic source of the liberal policy option lied in rather contingent factors rather than supposedly insufficient radicalization of the liberation forces or self-interested petit-bourgeois elites.

3.3.4 The Timing of National Liberation

An explanation of why liberation elites ended up pursuing a liberal approach is incomplete without reference to the world-historical context of the liberation episode. National liberation in

[139] Saul, *Recolonization and Resistance*, p. 12.

these cases took place in a new post-Cold War international order, with the liberation episode, in the 1990s, coinciding with 'the most reactionary period' for twentieth-century revolutionary forces.[140] Foremost, with Gorbachev's Perestroika in the late 1980s and subsequent collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes, Southern African liberation elites lost their strategic and ideological world allies, and rendered vulnerable to Western capitalist pressures. South African and South West African liberation governments fortuitously escaped the counterrevolutionary destabilization and ideological conflicts that previously derailed or precluded radical liberation programs. Yet the fall of the Eastern bloc and the discrediting of socialism was a major setback to their revolutionary aspirations.[141]

Furthermore, the international economic setting had dramatically changed, and liberation elites had to contend with a far more constraining economic environment. At this stage, the Bretton Woods institutions were practically in 'direct' control of national policies, and the Washington Consensus (i.e., fiscal austerity, liberalization, property rights entrenchment, etc.) had taken firm hold on macro-economic decision-making among Western banks, donors, and national governments alike. Liberation elites could not afford to drive away foreign investment should they hope to restore economic growth to tackle abject poverty, unemployment, and gross racial inequalities. Defying neoliberal principles was tantamount to wittingly blocking vital investment capital, development aid, and financial loans—all conditioned on good governance,

[140] Ben Turok, *From The Freedom Charter to Polokwane: The Evolution of ANC Economic Policy* (Cape Town: New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy, 2008), p. 44.
[141] On the implications of international changes on Southern African liberation, see Saul, *Recolonization and Resistance*, ch. 2. Further afield, and at this historical juncture, more radical and politico-militarily powerful Eritrean and Ethiopian liberation movements—i.e., the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and Tigray People's Liberation Front—similarly disavowed their Marxist-Leninist national-cum-class revolutionary goals irrespective of their capturing full power militarily and non-negotiated modes of national liberation.

liberalization, and market-friendly structural adjustments.[142] In short, the radical policy option was no longer available to South African and South West African liberation elites.

Finally, historic world and regional political changes in the 1990s rendered revolutionary and authoritarian means of social transformation or nation-building less palatable. The initiation of the liberation episode in South Africa and South West Africa corresponded with the beginning of the "third wave" of democratization that swept away hitherto dominant one-party, military, and personalist regimes.[143] Thus elite thinking was conditioned by an international upsurge of electoral democratic, liberalization, and a dominant discourse of good governance and human rights.[144] What is more, the regional conflicts and counterrevolutionary threats that endangered Angolan, Mozambican, and Zimbabwean elites had subsided at this point that liberation leaders now lacked political grounds for coercive power consolidation and stringent societal control to stifle internal and external dangers to nation-building.

Scholars of southern Africa point to certain distinctions in the political settlements for liberation in South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia to justify the unsuccessful implementation of the liberal reform approach in the latter case. For Southall, for example, the liberation institutions in the former cases "were founded far more firmly upon principles of constitutional rather than parliamentary supremacy" that safeguarded democracy, and that "the constitutions entrenched provisions for minority representation."[145] Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how such institutions would hold in rather a different regional setting or world-historical period. Furthermore, the extent to which the Lancaster House constitution was more

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[142] See Turok, *From The Freedom Charter to Polokwane*, ch. 3.
[143] See Bratton and Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa,* 1997.
[144] Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 149; N. Etherington, "Explaining the Death Throes of Apartheid," in N. Etherington, ed., *Peace, Politics and Violence in the New South Africa* (London: Hans Zell Publishers, 1992), 102-120.
[145] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 67, 68.

majoritarian, as Southall points, is debatable at best, because power-sharing and settler minority representation in post-liberation South Africa and South West Africa were similarly set for a short transitional period and eventually replaced by majoritarian institutions.

3.3.5 State Power, Economic Structure, and Capital

In explaining the historical causes of the liberal approach in South Africa and South West Africa, analysts place greater emphasis on ostensibly petty-bourgeois leaders in much the same way as Marxist analysts emphasized political radicalization of the liberation struggles to explain the origins of the radical approach in Angola and Mozambique. The above discussion has nonetheless demonstrated that the ANC and SWAPO had adapted Marxist-Leninist internal party structures, revolutionary agendas for post-liberation change, and the ANC had sidelined at different historical intervals Africanist elements opposed to non-racialism, socialism, and the theoretically intertwined nature of national and social liberation. Therefore, the liberal policy option adopted by South African and South West Africa liberation elites is better explained in conjunction with the specific state structures, national economies, and dominant-class interests that contingently shaped elite thinking at the liberation juncture.

These cases represent an instance of the most powerful state on the eve of national liberation and the failure of NLMs to pose serious military challenges to it. As such, liberation elites negotiated their way to power and subsequently contended with old state structures, agents, and legislation opposed to radical state and socioeconomic changes. The settler regime was in firm control of still-intact administrative, military, legal state apparatuses; the settler minorities had a sense of national attachment and nowhere to return to; while right-wing settler groups with traditions of military mobilization threatened a civil war, in sharp contrast to a militarily defeated or, at least, crippled Portuguese state, falling state structures, and disorganized, new-immigrant

settler minorities in Angola and Mozambique at liberation. This, together with a counterrevolutionary bloc of Bantustan governments and political parties, frustrated liberation-elite ambitions to seize state power and enact radical reforms. Substantial compromises were made to a settler ruling elite still in a "position of dominance" to ensure the transfer of power "peacefully and in an orderly way."[146] It is also the case that liberation elites in these contexts had no pressure to rapidly build new state structures given that they inherited strong state structures or faced no serious counterrevolutionary threats.

The national economies in these cases also circumscribed liberation elites to a liberal policy option. As seen in Chapter Two, the South African economy underwent rapid development and structural transformation in the second-half of the twentieth century that, before liberation, manufacturing output (31 percent of the national GDP) surpassed that of mining and agriculture. In short, South Africa before the liberation episode was a regional industrial powerhouse, an advanced capitalist economy primarily based on a mining-industrial complex, finance, and commercial agriculture. Therefore, not only had state-led development approaches been progressively discredited in the 1980s, but liberation elites had to also accept the undeniable fact that the capitalist economy provided, at least short-term, the best odds of national development, reduction of racial inequalities, and steady alleviation of black conditions. Even though the social and political struggles on the eve of liberation bestowed ANC leaders with a 'radical mandate,' it was clear to them that even a minimally progressive agenda would require carefully balancing redistributive imperatives with capitalist growth.[147]

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[146] President F. W. de Klerk in the *Die Burger*, March 31, 1990, quoted in Johannes Rantete and Hermann Giliomee, "Transition to Democracy Through Transaction?: Bilateral Negotiations Between the ANC and the NP in South Africa," *African Affairs*, 91 (1992): 515-542.
[147] Bond, *Elite Transitions*, p. 4; Turok, *From The Freedom Charter to Polokwane*, p. 47.

Indeed, capitalist expansion afforded the only hope for rapid alleviation of mass poverty, black underemployment, and the expansion of basic health care, education, housing, electricity, and water supplies in townships and rural areas. Yet this was not guaranteed without major restructuring of an economy in decline for two decades (Figure 3.2). The apartheid economy ailed from major structural distortions associated with the dearth of semi-skilled labor, a stunted domestic market (due to impoverished black population), protective tariffs, and international sanctions, disinvestments, and boycotts. Besides, the internal political crisis and international anti-Apartheid campaign caused effective withdrawal of foreign capital and the concentration of domestic capital in few state and private conglomerates.[148] Resolving these contradictions required "structural change and investment programs," which in turn required close collaboration with big business and industry by safeguarding its demands for the protection of free enterprise and property rights. Furthermore, ANC leaders needed to woo back international investment, resuscitate foreign trade, and reengage the IMF and World Bank whose financial assistance was subject to embracing (neo)liberal structural adjustments and policies.

Figure 3.2: South African Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Trends



Source: Feinstein, *An Economic History of South Africa*, p. 147.

[148] Feinstein, *An Economic History of South Africa*, ch. 9-10; R. Davies, D. O'Meara, and S. Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa: Reference Guide to Movements, Organizations, and Institutions* (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 58.

Liberation elites in South West Africa inherited a similarly distorted and stagnant national economy. The country was certainly not as industrialized and modernized as pre-liberation South Africa or Southern Rhodesia; the national economy was only moderately developed and heavily dependent on mining, which contributed 29.1 percent of GDP (1989), followed by agriculture and fisheries (11.3 percent).[149] Yet, the country's economy was relatively advanced enough than pre-liberation Angola and Mozambique, and closely integrated to—and deemed a 'branch plant economy' dependent on—the South African economy. This meant that the prospect of economic development and the reduction of black poverty, gross racial inequalities, and black underemployment was contingent on maintaining the capitalist mode of production and friendly ties with Apartheid South Africa and South African capital. The liberation elite "had little choice but to dilute its previously socialist image, to accept that it would have to continue to trade with its apartheid neighbor, and to submit to pressure from [international] sources to adopt pro-market policies."[150]

Last, the dominant class interests were sufficient to block the path to a radical approach. Despite important distinctions, pre-liberation South Africa and South West Africa had an entrenched national capitalist class, with a significant portion of it based in economically indispensable settler minorities, that prospered under 'racial capitalism' and that massively consolidated itself with the withdrawal of foreign capital in the late settler-colonial period. Thus, domestic capital had an influential role in the negotiated liberation, especially in South Africa where ('English') manufacturing capital—as opposed to a state-allied (largely 'Afrikaner') agricultural and mining capital—long resented apartheid and labor laws that impinged on the development of skilled black workforce and domestic markets. A growing size of capital long

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[149] Economic Intelligence Unit, *Namibia Country Profile: Annual Survey of Political and Economic Background 1989-92* (London: EIU, 1991), pp. 10-13.
[150] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 85.

saw its interests better advanced in a deracialized capitalism and demanded for reforms to offset a revolutionary crisis, a clear danger to the capitalist system.[151] Beginning in 1985, in reaction to escalating labor and political turmoil, capital paradoxically turned more and more to the ANC for avenues of peaceful transition to majority rule that would safeguard capital interests in a color-blind capitalist economy. In dramatic policy shifts, ANC leaders succumbed to the pressure of a powerful national capitalist class because accommodating capital interests was essential for future socioeconomic progress, on one hand, and friendly ties with capital was hoped to further their popular support and claims to political power, on the other.[152]

In the South West African case, capital interests played less of an active and visible role in the negotiated transition to majority rule. But, given that South African and Western mining-industrial, banking, and insurance capital (e.g., the Anglo American Corporation, RTZ group, and Newmont) controlled the country's economy, it is hard to ignore the influence capitalist class interests exerted on their governments' foreign policies and, for that matter, the 1989 'international settlement.'[153] Consequently, private enterprise and property rights in a deracialized capitalist economy writ large were guaranteed as a precondition to the termination of South African rule, in effect safeguarding dominant capital interests from radical wealth redistribution or the nationalization of the economic commanding heights by incoming liberation government. After winning the transition elections, SWAPO leaders made huge concessions in

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[151] See Davis, O'Meara and Dlamini, *The Struggle for South Africa*, p. 58; Dan O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996); Jill Nattrass, *The South African Economy: Its Growth and Change* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 86-7; Herman Giliomee, "The Afrikaner Economic Advance," in H. Adam and H. Giliomee, eds, *The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1979), 145-176.
[152] See Dale McKinley, *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 109; John S. Saul, *The Next Liberation Struggle: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), p. 203; Sampie Terreblanche, *Lost in Transformation: South Africa's Search for a New Future Since 1986* (Johannesburg: KMM Review Pub., 2012).
[153] See R. H. Green, "Foreign Economic Interests and Genuine Namibian Independence: Conflicts of Interest," unpublished, 1988, pp. 3-11; Allan D. Cooper, ed., *Allies in Apartheid: Western Capitalism in Occupied Namibia* (London: MacMillan Press, 1988); Gail Hovey, *Namibia's Stolen Wealth: North American Investment and South African Occupation* (New York: The Africa Fund, 1987, Second Ed.).

the inter-party negotiations that saw such guarantees enshrined in the new constitution and new socioeconomic programs lest they antagonize international and settler capital.

In these cases, therefore, powerful national capital—together with rapidly changing international political and economic environments—left liberation elites with no room to maneuver but to backpedal on radical social and economic programs. Before his release from prison in 1990, Nelson Mandela affirmed "the nationalization of the mines, banks and monopoly industry" as the official ANC policy wherein "a change or modification of … views … is inconceivable." But, reading the writing on the wall, the ANC leadership came to accept the reality of accelerating global interdependence and free markets, as echoed in Mandela's plea to his colleagues later: "we either keep nationalization and got no investment, or we modify our attitude and get investments."[154] In a similar vein, avoiding all mention of socialism in its economic policy statements by 1989, the 'Marxist' SWAPO made clear that it only hoped to "achieve a measure of national control over the country's resources" and to balance the demand for social justice with economic growth, private profit, and pro-market policies.[155]

3.4 CONCLUSION

Revolutionary NLMs in late-twentieth-century Southern Africa achieved national liberation through diverse routes and in changing world-historical contexts. This shaped the different reform approaches pursued by revolutionary national elites during the reform episode. In Angola and Mozambique, a militarized pattern of liberation in mid-1970s, in an international context that was more permissive and fraught with regional military threats, allowed—and pressurized—liberation elites to implement a radical reform option. In Southern Rhodesia, majority rule was

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[154] Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk To Freedom* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1994), p. 526; Anthony Sampson, *Mandela: The Authorized Biography* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1999), pp. 434-5.
[155] *Africa Contemporary Record (ACR) 1990-92*, B629.

achieved after a negotiated settlement that imposed on liberation elites a liberal policy option. But the liberal choice would not be pursued to its logical conclusion—hence, stalled-liberal reforms—because of a less constraining international environment as well as ongoing military and ideological conflicts in the region. Finally, in South Africa and South West Africa, a negotiated pattern of liberation in the early 1990s in a world-historical context that was far more constraining but not beset by regional and global East-West military tensions compelled liberation leaders to consider a liberal reform option.

Why Southern African liberation elites selected a radical or liberal policy option at a turning-point of liberation cannot be sufficiently understood without the prevailing domestic constellations of state power, economic development, and dominant-class interests. Angola and Mozambique had a weak and collapsing settler-colonial state along with backward national economies dominated by metropolitan/imperial capital that frantically departed on the eve of liberation. One the other hand, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and, most of all, South Africa, had a stronger settler state, more or less advanced capitalist economies, and an entrenched settler and non-metropolitan international capital. The contrasting domestic-structural antecedents presented liberation elites with diverse obstacles and challenges as well as different sets of resources and opportunities to exploit. The absence of a strong state as well as stable national economies and capital in the former cases meant that liberation leaders had limited constraints—and greater pressure—to embark on radical state-building, wealth redistribution, and national development. By contrast, the presence of a resilient state as well as advanced domestic economies and capital in the latter cases meant that liberation elites encountered formidable obstacles to radical change, and had grounds to consider a liberal policy option to avoid wrecking national economies or driving out capital.

CHAPTER FOUR

RADICAL REFORMS: MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA

The liberation-reform episode in Mozambique (1974-1983) and Angola (1975-1982) was marked by more or less *radical* measures to rapidly transform the inherited state and socioeconomic structures, and to pursue authoritarian one-party nation-building. The FRELIMO leadership launched much more dramatic, comprehensive, and systematic structural changes akin to the revolutionary administrative and socioeconomic reforms introduced in liberated areas during the anticolonialist struggle. Faced with greater internal and external threats, MPLA leaders in Angola were less successful in planning and implementing equally thoroughgoing changes. Reforms were delayed by administrative havoc, economic destruction, and social dislocation wrought by a brutal military conflict with counter-revolutionary rivals and their imperialist regional allies; in general, the liberation episode was dominated by military conflict that detracted from equally wide-ranging transformations.

Yet, the reform period in both Mozambique and Angola was defined by *similarly* dramatic structural changes—broader common features and dynamics that the analysis focuses on while highlighting important variation between the countries during the reform years. Liberation leaders sought to fundamentally *transform*—not *reform*—the colonial state and the "political, administrative, cultural, financial, economic, educational, juridical and other systems integral to [it]."[1] To this end, the surviving ramparts of the old state machinery were destroyed, and deracialized structures (organized along principles of popular democracy) established in its place. They also deployed sheer military force to consolidate political power, besides mobilizing grassroots party structures of *poder popular* (people's power) in factories, towns, and villages.

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[1] Samora Machel, FRELIMO's leader and president of liberated Mozambique (1975–1986), S. Machel, *Mozambique: Revolution or Reaction* (Richmond: LSM Press, 1975), p. 12.

The reforms were also defined by aggressive socioeconomic changes, which include the destruction of settler-colonial capitalist relations of production, socialist agrarian and land reforms, and the expansion of socialized education, healthcare, and development programs to benefit the vast masses of people. As in the arena of state reforms, these policies began as contingent measures when the new governments took over abandoned enterprises, settler farms, and large plantations in order to avert economic collapse occasioned by the hasty departure of settlers and foreign capital. Only later, in 1977, did liberation elites began implementation of more deliberate, ideologically-driven policies for the nationalization of economic commanding heights, expropriation of colonial capital, and central economic planning to destroy capitalist relations of production and to build a classes society based on the ideals of scientific socialism. They also implemented ambitious agrarian reforms for the "socialization of the countryside" through large state farms, peasant cooperatives, and *aldeia communal* (communal villages).

Finally, nationalist leaders in Mozambique and Angola sought to build more unified multiracial 'nations' through emphasis on racial equality, extensive cultural-educational campaign for national integration, and the suppression of polarizing racial, ethnoregional, and religious differences. However, their approach to nation-building was marked by violent repression and exclusion of political rivals, civil society, and autonomous social actors. They institutionalized Marxist-Leninist party-state political regimes supposedly to balance political representation with imperatives for consolidating national unity. To this end, the mass-mobilizing liberation movements redefined themselves as vanguard parties, the leading force of state and society, leaving their leaders in control of highly centralized regimes necessary for instigating revolutionary political, economic, social changes.

Most historians and social scientists concur about the radical nature of post-independence reforms in Mozambique and Angola. Yet, some point to agricultural and general economic decline of the reform episode to suggest that the structural changes were scarcely far-reaching. From a comparative perspective, as this chapter shows, the reforms were nonetheless by far the most dramatic and most momentous in Southern Africa in the aftermath of white-minority rule. Furthermore, scholars too often understood the reform policies as choices predetermined by underlying structural conditions and/or the ideological beliefs of the political elites. Even though crucial in shaping dynamics of the radical reform period, these variables were not the actual *causes* of the reform choices. Instead, political elite decisions were contingently defined by internal and external circumstances immediately surrounding the liberation episode. For instance, the nationalization of abandoned enterprises, collectivization of settler farms, and socialization of services in the immediate post-liberation years—that paved the way for more coordinated and aggressive policies beginning in 1977—were prompted by extensive economic sabotage, infrastructural breakdown, and rapidly falling agricultural and industrial productivity with the departure of settlers and colonial capital.

The underdeveloped antecedent conditions of settler colonialism in pre-liberation Mozambique and Angola, which Marxist scholars emphasized, were also least conducive to revolutionary change compared to the other three cases. Indeed, elite preferences and actions during the reform episode were conditioned by the prevailing historical antecedents. Yet, the revolutionary measures in the former cases were not the outcomes of conditioned (such as capitalist relations, class conflict) considered necessary for revolutionary change. Rather, Mozambican and Angolan elites adopted drastic legislative and policy instruments because of contingent events linked to the disruptive pattern of liberation, on the one hand, and extremely

underdeveloped settler-colonial economies that liberation elites did not see fit to preserving and reform, unlike their Zimbabwean, South African, and Namibian counterparts, on the other. The chapter will highlight the distinctive structural variables of the settler-colonial era for the sole purpose of highlighting the background context against which important elite decisions were implemented, and not to suggest the same variables were the cause of the radical policy choice.

Finally, the reform dynamics cannot be fully understood without the world-historical context of the liberation-reform episode, which presented nationalist leaders with a unique set of constraints and opportunities that favored radical reforms. The reform episode coincided with escalating regional and international military conflicts. Alarmed by the 'advancing tide' of militant black nationalism after the downfall of Portuguese rule in the region, settler regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (until 1980), Mobutu's Zaire, and their Western imperialist allies instigated relentless economic and military destabilization campaigns—and direct South African military intervention in Angola—to overthrow the liberation regimes. This compelled political elites to counteract with radical measures of power consolidation, the establishment of strong security apparatuses, and violent repression of internal dissent.[2] Moreover, the influence of Soviet and Eastern European socialist regimes that provided with critical assistance, dependency theory that called for a rupture with neo-colonial world capitalist relations, and an international economic system less fettered by neoliberal constraints—all presented an external context permissive to revolutionary changes.

4.1 RAPID AND BASIC STATE-STRUCTURAL REFORMS

[2] On the regional and international context of the liberation episode, see Chabal, "The Construction of the Nation-State," pp. 72-87; Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbor*, chapters 12-13; Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence* (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 115-30.

Rapid deracialization and democratization of the state following national liberation was one of the principal goals of Southern African national revolutionary movements. Doing so required complete destruction of the racially exclusionary and authoritarian settler-colonial state and extending control over 'all levers of power' in state and society, as the Mozambican revolutionary leader, Samora Machel, asserted: "The old state is to be destroyed and replaced by a new [racially inclusive] one."[3] In Mozambique and Angola, nationalist elites launched radical measures for revolutionary transformation of the state against a backdrop of the militarized mode of national liberation that, on the one hand, did not involve constitutional restraints on political action, and on the other, resulted in the rapid breakdown of the colonial state machinery, which necessitated drastic measures to establish new administrative structures. Their end-goal was to establish a strong state that could be harnessed as an instrument to smash settler-colonial power structures, broaden opportunities for marginalized black majorities, and create conditions for an inclusive socialist national development.

The state structural changes were far-reaching in Mozambique than in Angola. But the overall pattern was marked by dramatic reconfiguration of an 'antiquated,' 'cumbersome,' 'extraordinarily bureaucratic' state apparatus[4] as well as the violent consolidation of political power by liberation elites. In Mozambique, the FRELIMO party, which inherited most of the machinery of the old state intact, cemented power relatively quickly to carry on far-reaching and orderly state reforms. Securing the unconditional transfer of power in the Lusaka Agreement of September 7, 1974, with the Portuguese revolutionary regime, FRELIMO's leadership under Machel marginalized all organized opposition during the nine-month transitional period to assert, on the eve of liberation, uncontested political and military powers countrywide. An abortive

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[3] Samora Machel in a speech to the 8th session of FRELIMO's Central Committee, in *Notícias,* 1976 Special Issue.
[4] See Chabal, "The Construction of the Nation-State," p. 43.

putsch in September in Lourenço Marques (after 1976, Maputo) by right-wing settlers—and conservative black parties, including the principal non-revolutionary NLM, *Grupo Unido de Mocambique* (GUMO)—led to the ensuing suppression of internal challenges to FRELIMO's supremacy. In subsequent months, the entire 'internal' political opposition (both white and black) as well as the 'external' anti-revolutionary nationalist rivals were neutralized,[5] leaving FRELIMO leaders in firm control of political power at national independence on June 25, 1975.

Political elites then proceeded to solidify power through a combination of state reforms, grassroots political mobilization, and suppression of the church, traditional elites, and civil society. The political measures were consistent with their radical ideological goals, strategies, and tactics. However, the policies were largely spurred by the sudden collapse of state authority and dearth of educated manpower following the flight of Portuguese civil servants. Liberation leaders mobilized *poder popular* by establishing *Grupos Dinamizadores* ('dynamizing groups'), grassroots party structures in towns, factories, and villages, instrumental in rallying public support to assert government authority, penetrating ramparts of the settler-colonial bureaucracy, implementing reform policies, and increasing agricultural and industrial productivity through collective production.[6] After the Third Party Congress in February 1977, the ad hoc grassroots party structures were subsumed into party cells or branches that cemented centralized party control over the state, the economy, and society by extending party tentacles "into factories, state institutions, cooperatives, schools, defence forces and the neighborhoods, in principle into any place of work or residence."[7] Finally, the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) and the

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[5] See Mittelman, *Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism*, pp. 60-101; Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 36-49.
[6] Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 36-9, 40-41; Barry Munslow, ed., *Africa: Problems on the Transition to Socialism* (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 119.
[7] Bertil Egerö, *Mozambique: A Dream Deferred -- The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975–84* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Inst. of African Studies, 1987), p. 110; also, see Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence,* p. 70; Keith Somerville, *Angola: Politics, Economics and Society* (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1986), p. 81.

Youth Organization (OJM) were also pivotal in cementing FRELIMO power and advancing its socioeconomic reform agendas.[8]

The process was similar in Angola although liberation elites faced powerful military opposition amid intensifying national conflict. The collapse of the 'tripartite' transitional government in which the national movements shared power and hasty withdrawal of Portuguese troops (see chapter 3) ignited a bitter civil war—the Second War of National Liberation, August 1975 to April 1976—between the MPLA and its traditionalist and 'reformist' liberation-struggle opponents, i.e., FLNA and UNITA. By mid-July 1975, the MPLA's FAPLA forces drove out of the capital the latter groups, which began to receive direct South Africa and Zairian military backing and extensive American financial and military support in efforts to install a conservative neo-colonialist regime in Luanda. Nearly dislodged from power on the eve of national liberation, on November 11, 1975, by coordinated offensives by South Africa and UNITA from the south and FLNA-Zairian forces from the north, the MPLA government solidified its hold over much of the country by mid-1976 with massive Soviet military assistance and the support of a three-thousand strong Cuban force.[9] But the contest for power by UNITA and military threat from South Africa, which withdraw to southern Angola, persisted throughout the reform episode.

Further, as in Mozambique, political elites in Angola cracked down on a wide array of political and social forces, including *ancien régime* and traditional leaders, the clergy, property-holders and businessmen. Even though Angolan leaders avoided outright assault on religious institutions and freedoms of worship, for example, they circumscribed the social influence of religious authorities, especially the Roman Catholic Church—an integral part of the exploitative settler-colonial regime and formidable opponent of the revolutionary changes—which lost its

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[8] John S. Saul, "The Politics of Mozambican Socialism," in David Wiley and Allen R. Isaacman, eds., *Southern Africa: Society, Economy, and Liberation* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1981), pp. 156, 159.
[9] For a detailed account of events of this period, see Marcum, *Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare*, pp. 263-81.

privileges in African education, land ownership, and tax exemption.[10] Like previous reforms introduced in some liberated areas during the anti-colonialist struggle, political elites also stripped traditional leaders of their administrative power, control over communal land, and social prestige they had mustered as agents of settler-colonial rule. The assault on religious and traditional institutions were far more relentless in the case of Mozambique.[11]

The civil war and continued South African aggression against the MPLA government throughout the liberation episode rendered the intertwined processes of power consolidation and state-rebuilding much more contested, faltering, and incomplete in Angola. Yet, as in Mozambique, Angolan elites pursued similar strategies of political education and mobilization in establishing their authority. The MPLA mobilized structures of *poder popular* in the coastal urban centers and among the large working poor of the *musseques* ('shantytowns') in Luanda; established popularly elected People's Commissions (grassroots structures parallel to FRELIMO's dynamizing groups) to spread influence following independence; and organized a Department for the Organization of the Masses to disseminate party ideals at neighborhood and village levels. In rural areas, newly established production councils stimulated economic production while People's Defense Organizations maintained security in newly liberated areas. As in FRELIMO's case, mass organizations of the Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA), the MPLA-Youth (JMPLA), and the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA) helped further cement the party's influence and control in diverse social sectors.

Yet, contrary to the internal coherence of FRELIMO elites, MPLA leadership's power consolidation was also impeded by internal power struggles and escalating violence in the wake

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[10] See Irving Kaplan, "The Society and Its Physical Setting," in I. Kaplan, ed., *Angola: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1978), pp. 105-112.
[11] Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 86-7; M. Newitt, "Mozambique," in Chabal, *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa,* pp. 199-200; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 157-61.

of liberation. The party's predominantly assimilado leadership around Agostino Neto faced down a major internal challenge in February 1976 when ultra-leftist groups—i.e., the Active Revolt faction of the MPLA and the Organization of Angolan Communists—exploited spiraling popular discontent with economic hardships in the *musseques* and allegedly rising 'new bourgeoisie' of civil servants.[12] A more serious threat came to a head when, in May 1977, sections of the armed forces led by Nito Alves (Interior Minister and MPLA Central Committee member) staged an abortive coup against Neto, with a strong backing of party sections in Luanda and the trade unions. Attacking the disproportionate power of whites and *mestiços* 'counter-revolutionaries' in the party and government as well as purportedly 'bourgeois' civil servants, the Africanist mobilization represented the last major challenge to the party's program of racial unity and revolutionary alliance of the petit bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants. The revolt was put down in a bloody repression followed by wide-ranging purges of suspected dissidents within the MPLA, the People's Commissions, the army, and the workers union.[13]

In both Mozambique and Angola, the coercive consolidation of power was coupled by aggressive legislation to fully "decolonize the state," by dismantling the political, administrative, and legal foundations of the settler-colonial state.[14] The state reforms in these contexts, as some analysts argue, hardly involved fundamental restructuring of the state because of the loss of territorial control and spiraling military challenges to the revolutionary governments especially in the Angolan context.[15] In reality, however, serious destabilization in Mozambique's case occurred at later stages of the reform period to preclude comprehensive administrative reshuffling at the beginning. The absence of drastic "territorial reorganization" scholars

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[12] Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 48, 49.
[13] Ibid., pp. 50-52.
[14] Samora Machel in *Notícias*, 24 Sep. 1974, quoted in Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 49.
[15] E.g., James D. Sidaway and David Simon, "Geopolitical Transition and State Formation: The Changing Political Geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 19 (March 1993): 6-28.

emphasize was also in large part a result of the colonial state based more on integrated and centralized administrative, political, and legal state foundations and less on fragmented bantustan entities that defined settler-colonial states in South Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. Further, not only had the settler-colonial state structures disintegrated at liberation to necessitate its systematic destruction, but Mozambican and Angolan nationalist leaders also implemented state reforms that were generally ambitious by comparative African standards.

In Mozambique, a new civil service of party cadres and ex-army officers displaced the preexisting local administration. The liberation government encouraged the formation of popularly elected 'popular power' structures in order to transform the anti-democratic nature of the old state as well as tackle the dearth of skilled personnel stemming from the sudden departure of Portuguese civil servants, settlers, and educated *mestiços* and *assimilados*. The dynamizing groups served as new democratic channels for surging popular participation while dislodging residual state structures, on the one hand, and for preventing violence and economic sabotage and enforcing new government directives, on the other.[16] In essence, therefore, state reforms were conceived less as territorial reorganization on which critical scholars focused, and more as attempted wholesale destruction of the settler-colonial structures of racial exclusion, capitalist exploitation, and traditional oppression as condition for basic socioeconomic transformation, democratic people's power, and socialist development.[17]

Democratization of the rigidly authoritarian settler-colonial state represented the central goal of the reforms. But, in the case of radical reforms, democracy was construed in a narrow Marxist-Leninist sense of Popular Democracy as a controlled political incorporation of the populace into the state as a necessary stage for Socialist Revolution. Thus, in Mozambique, the

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[16] Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 51-2
[17] Ibid., p. 70

new structures of popular power—i.e., *Grupos Dynamizadores*, *reunião* (mass meeting), mass organizations—acted as mechanisms for "mass-mobilization and popular participation in the decision-making process," especially of the popular classes of peasants and workers, which, formerly denied access to political power, were afforded a measure of control over state power.[18] After 1977, as discussed in the last chapter section, institution of representative democracy in the form of popular assemblies were developed at national, provincial, district, and local levels.[19] These changes based on universal adult suffrage dramatically democratized the state even though direct voting and genuine popular power were limited to the local level.[20]

In Angola, state reforms bore similar features despite being more haphazard and violently contested. Besides enormous shortage of educated blacks, here democratic state reforms were hampered by administrative breakdown, internal party conflicts, and escalating civil war following liberation. However, the leadership implemented some far-reaching institutional changes that refashioned the old state administration that crumbled amid bloody conflicts on the even and aftermath of national liberation. Following the first national constitution ratified in 1976, the surviving settler-colonial administrative machinery was mostly substituted by people's commissions (basic unit of *poder popular*) at provincial, district, and commune levels, elected at the level of villages (*povoacoes*) and neighborhoods (*bairros*). National, provincial, and local assemblies elected through universal suffrage were established in 1980, in accordance with constitutional changes introduced in 1977, after delays stemming from the leadership's distrust of less centralized *poder popular* that previously sprung up during the liberation turmoil and provided a conducive ground for the abortive 1977 Alves coup. As in Mozambique, the democratization of the state through institutions of people's democracy served to ensure

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[18] Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 25.

[19] See Egerö, *The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975–84*, pp. 120-30.

[20] See Ibid., pp. 42-6; Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 71-2.

centralized and total party control over the state and society. Party officials effectively controlled direct local elections, while the national People's Assembly was filled by party stalwarts.[21]

Another important dimension of the rapid and basic state reforms in Mozambique and Angola was the elimination of indirect-rule structures and traditional power structures of rural society. Even though the territorial shape of the structure was largely maintained, the reforms attacked the politico-social basis and structure of its authority. The local administrative system was fully reinvented, while the colonial-era *regedorias* (chieftaincies) and *régulos* (chiefs) stripped of power particularly in post-independence Mozambique.[22] Ethnic, regional, and religious divisions that formed the foundation of colonial divide-and-rule administrative system also came under sustained attacks. Moreover, beginning in 1977 in Mozambique and in 1978 in Angola, the oppressive colonial justice system was democratized and rendered more just as reforms that instituted 'popular justice' based on People's Courts allowed the overwhelming majority previously subject capricious laws to access justice.[23]

In sum, the radical reform period in Mozambique and Angola was characterized by ambitious state-structural transformations that resulted in highly centralized, expanded, and racially inclusive states. At latter stages, political leaders launched 'rectification' campaigns to solidify the changes by tackling disloyalty, inefficiency, and corruption in party and state structures.[24] There was little continuity with settler-colonial state structures even in post-liberation Angola where state structural reforms proved less thoroughgoing. In both cases, the reforms excluded a broad array of societal actors, such as former civil servants, property owners,

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[21] See Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 106-111.
[22] Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 51.
[23] See Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900–1982*, pp. 132-7; Margarita Dobert, "Government and Politics," in Kaplan ed., *Angola: A Country Study*, pp. 151-4.
[24] Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 58; M. R. Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975–1985* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986), Research Report No. 75, p. 35.

church members, and traditional chiefs opposed basic transformation in rural areas. Together with the centralization of power that enabled liberation governments to carry out their ambitious reform agendas, the power changes triggered violent opposition grounded in traditional sociopolitical structures (see Chapter 7)—a situation compounded by radical socioeconomic changes and resulting decline in agricultural decline in the countryside as we shall discuss next.

4.2 RAPID AND BASIC SOCIO-STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Liberation governments also adopted revolutionary measures for fundamental socioeconomic transformation necessary for realization of the second objective of the national revolutionary struggles, i.e., 'social liberation.' Like the dramatic state reforms, the more or less radical socioeconomic changes were ambitious and sustained in Mozambique than in Angola. Rather than preordained ideological and political guidelines, the reforms began in the form of contingent 'intervention' measures taken by the state to stem unforeseen industrial and agricultural decline amid turbulent decolonization processes. Only later and gradually had liberation governments become more systematic and comprehensive in their reform approach when, in 1977, they began in earnest to nationalize industry, banking, transportation, and other modern economic sectors; 'socialize the countryside;' and implement programs of equitable distribution, even national development, and rural modernization. Broadly, the reform measures sought to destroy capitalist relations of production as a precondition for more equitable societies and, following a period of mixed accumulation, to initiate rapid, balanced, state-driven national development along 'scientific socialist' principles. The concrete policy measures taken by political leaders include mainly (1) the nationalization of industrial, financial, and service sectors; (2) socialist agrarian and rural transformations, and (3) social service expansion and rural development programs.

4.2.1 Destruction of Capitalist Relations of Production

The 'extractive' settler-colonial economies in Mozambique and Angola were not only highly distorted but extremely underdeveloped before national liberation. The industrial sector was retarded and dependent on unskilled labor; cash-crop export-oriented agriculture was not meeting internal consumption demands; and the economies were dependent on supplying raw materials to Portugal as well as labor and transit services to advanced (settler) economies in the region. The vast majority of Africans were excluded from the modern sector and unemployment was exceedingly high. The countries' development prospects were also dependent on a white-settler technical and managerial class, and externally on the Portuguese market as well as South African and Southern Rhodesian capitalist interests.[25] It was against this backdrop of staggering structural deficiencies, racial exploitation, and 'uneven development' patterns that Mozambican and Angolan leaders took drastic steps to destroy the semi-capitalist relations to pave the way for inclusive, socialist national development.

It is important to underscore, however, that the initial policy choices were dictated by neither such deterministic conditions nor socialist ideological belief. Revolutionary leaders were initially hesitant to launch full-blown socialist measures that would scare away capital and thereby undermine economic reconstruction. "Neither collectivization of farms nor planned nationalization of enterprises," as one scholar of Angola argued, "was attempted as a deliberate and planned exercise in the first few years."[26] Their hand was forced by pressing human and political challenges at national liberation. The hasty departure of settlers, who had privileged

[25] This was undoubtedly the case with Mozambique, but Angola's economy was also just as dependent on the white minority-ruled countries. By the late-colonial era, South African capital had large investments in Angola's mining, manufacturing, and transportation. Besides, not an insubstantial Angolan migrant labor worked in South Africa and South West Africa; the southern Huila and Kunene provinces alone supplied 12,000 or so migrant workers annually. See Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline* (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 109, 137.
[26] A. T. Kaure, *Angola: From Socialism to Liberal Reforms* (Harare: Sapes Books, 1999), p. 37.

access to education, created an acute dearth of technicians, engineers, mechanics, agronomists, and skilled labor and capital. Departing settlers destroyed factories, farm equipment, machinery, livestock, and other immobile assets. All this left the national economies devastated as industries collapsed, large farms lacked managers and technicians, social services disintegrated, and food-marketing and distribution chains in rural areas all but collapsed.[27]

Major reform measures of the 'intervention' process in the early years reflected political leaders' cautious efforts to restore economic production to pre-liberation levels. Beginning in early 1975 the liberation government in Mozambique took charge of abandoned and sabotaged enterprises (e.g., insurance, oil sector, most banks, and import-export companies), large plantations, and settler farms among others. Similarly, the MPLA government in Angola too placed under state direction abandoned factories, national banks, foreign trade, and large farms following the Law of State Intervention (Feb. 1976), which allowed for the nationalization and confiscation of abandoned private property and Portuguese capital. In addition, both governments nationalized the racially skewed and failing public services to provide free access to primary education, healthcare, and urban housing.[28] Therefore, even though nationalist leaders were committed to building socialist economies, their initial economic approach was extremely cautious that they refrained from fast-track redistribution and full economic nationalization. In the short-term, as Agostino Neto stressed in 1976, ideology must be 'sacrificed' for production, nationalization and agricultural collectivization deferred, to immediately increase production and facilitate national reconstruction before full-fledged transition to socialism.[29]

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[27] In Mozambique, for example, manufacturing declined by 50% in 1973-76, while the agricultural sector was nearly paralyzed by the neglect of commercial farms and transportation. In Angola, manufacturing virtually collapsed during this period. See Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 63; Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy*, pp. 19, 25-7.

[28] Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, p. 75; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 132; Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 67; Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 112.

[29] Quoted in D. Ottaway and M. Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York: Africana, 1981), p. 132. Even later policies were shaped by contingent events, as one observer suggested with regards to Mozambique's government decision in

The initial measures paved the way for more radical reform policies. It became increasingly clear that settler and capital flight was irreversible, while moderate measures had been both turning ineffectual and foreclosed by surrounding political circumstances. Further, relentless economic and military attacks by South Africa and Rhodesia exposed the governments to heightened influence of the Soviet bloc that provided with critical military, economic, and technical assistance. Thus, FRELIMO adopted in its 1977 party congress a radical economic policy "aimed at the construction of an independent, planned and advanced economy, capable of satisfying the basic needs of the People, and achieving the conditions for the passage to the higher stage of the socialist revolution." To this end, increasing number of firms in "all strategic sectors of the economy" were nationalized, industrial and agricultural production reorganized under collective workers' management,[30] and measures taken for long-term development of heavy industry viewed as key to overcome "economic and technological dependence."[31]

The MPLA government, having nationalized enterprises of strategic economic importance between early 1975 and 1976, also set out similarly ambitious goals for a planned economy "with agriculture as its basis, and industry as the decisive factor." the strategies and tactics were outlined more clearly in the 1977 party congress which included, but not limited to, the achievements of 1973 production levels, the intensification of nationalization and confiscation, rigorous economic planning, and ending especial trade relations with Portugal.[32]

The implementation of sweeping economic reforms thus began in earnest in 1977, which marked the beginning of transitions to socialism. The Mozambican government unleashed a

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Dec. 1977 to place strategic industries under state direction: the timing of the decisions was "dictated less by the exigencies of socialist ideology than the imperatives of national survival in the context of a hostile southern Africa." Quoted in Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 62.
[30] Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, pp. 75, 76.
[31] *Tempo*, 333, 1977, 24-25 and 34-55; Departmento do Trabalho Ideologico da FRELIMO, *Documentos do 3º Congresso da FRELIMO: Directivas Economicas e Socias* (Maputo, 1977), 32-90.
[32] MPLA, *Documents of the MPLA Central Committee Plenary, 23-29 Oct. 1976* (London: Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Information Center, 1976), pp. 10-11.

wave of nationalizations in late 1977, which targeted, among other areas, the oil and mining sectors, the banking sector, and foreign-owned navigation, cement, and metal enterprises—essentially industries of strategic importance to the national economy.[33] A new program (1978) reaffirming the government's goal of socialist development stressed the necessity that "the economy be centrally planned and directed by the state" and "the state-owned sector of production [to] become dominant and determinant."[34] A ten-year National Plan (1979) outlined three major strategies to implement the party's radical directives: heavy industrialization of the country, the "socialization of the countryside," and development of the forces of production. The consequence is that, by 1981, the state sector in Mozambique accounted for a large proportion of total industrial output (65 percent), transport and communication (85 percent), and construction (90 percent) while employing most of the modern sector workforce.[35]

The liberation government in Angola took a similar direction. In the first half of 1978, the nationalization of commercial banks and insurance companies was completed. By the year's end, the government placed under full state control most small to medium-scale industrial, mining, and trading enterprises save the non-Portuguese foreign capital, and brought under partial ownership the oil industry, diamond mining, and other large-scale private businesses.[36] As a result, in mid-1979, 71 percent of all production companies had been nationalized, and a further

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[33] These measures are elaborated in, inter alia, FRELIMO's "Economic and Social Directives of the 3rd Party Congress" (1977), "Plano Prospectivo Indicativo" (1980/1), and MPLA's "Resolution on Economic Policy" of the Central Committee plenum (Oct. 1976) and "Central Committee Report and These on Education (1977).

[34] FRELIMO, *Central Committee Report*, 1977, pp. 43, 46.

[35] M. Mackintosh & M. Wuyts, "Accumulation, Social Services & Socialist Transition in the Third World: Reflections on Decentralized Planning Based on the Mozambican Experience," *J. of Dev. Studies* (1988): 136-179.

[36] Overall, a total of 5,000 industrial-commercial enterprises, including sugar processing, textiles, ironworks, and vehicle assembly, were fully nationalized between 1975 and 1980. See Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 135; M. R. Bhagavan, *Angola: Prospects for Socialist Industrialization* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1980), p. 190, and *Angola's Political Economy 1975–1985*, p. 38. Nationalization excluded non-Portuguese foreign capital which, along with a 1979 law meant to attract foreign capital, clearly indicates the limits of ideology—and the primacy of political pragmatism—in dictating policy choices of the liberation episode. In similar vein, the Mozambican government encouraged foreign capital to stay, while possibly limiting nationalization to strategic enterprises or those affected by economic sabotage and mismanagement.

seven percent jointly owned by the state and private interests. Private ownership of the means of production diminished to a minimal; in the end of 1981, the expanding state manufacturing sector reportedly produced 64 percent of manufacturing products and employed seventy-five of the industrial workforce.[37]

Most scholars question the degree in which the above reforms were comprehensive, transformative, and successful. However, the evidence of increased investments in industry, agriculture, and other sectors in ambitious state-led growth plans shows otherwise (see Table 4.1). Liberal and conservative critiques highlight that industrial and agricultural productivity during the reform period never reached pre-national liberation levels.[38] Mozambican and Angolan leaders remarkably rebuilt damaged industry and infrastructure, diversified exports, and expanded black education and skill-training. On balance, by the late 1970s, the reforms reversed downward industrial and agricultural spiral, and substantially raised short-term production despite inherited structural challenges, technical and managerial deficiencies, and external market constraints, while achieving 'spectacular successes' in some sectors, such as textiles, commercial agriculture (Mozambique), and oil and diamond production (Angola).[39]

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[37] See Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, pp. 133-4. The varied degrees of state control over the commanding heights of the economy are shown below by Bhagavan, *Prospects for Socialist Industrialization*, p. 19:

Branch	Percentage share of state-ownership
Mining	
Oil	51
Diamonds	61
Consumer goods manufacture	
Sugar	100
Edible oil	37
Margarine	76
Textiles	100
Matches	67
Soap	55
Leather shoes	52
Beer	85
Cycles and motorcycles	100
Intermediate goods manufacture	
Cement	58
Paper and pulp	100
Plywood	100
Iron articles for the construction industry	100
Metal sheets for wrapping	98
Capital goods manufacture	
Assembly of motor vehicles	100
Repair and maintenance of ships	100

[38] E.g., World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981).
[39] See Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, pp. 61-2, 64; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 136-7, 139, 142-7.

Conservative critiques of the reforms who reference the terminal economic crises that hit the countries in the early 1980s conveniently overlook the early reform successes, while underestimating the devastating effects of ongoing civil wars, external economic sabotage,[40] and slump in world commodity markets with rising oil prices.

Table 4.1: State Investments in the Late Reform Period in Mozambique (*mil. meticais*)

Sector	*1978/79*	*1980*	*1981*	*1982*
Agriculture	1,095	2,271	4,181	4,826
Industry and Energy	561	1,227	3,349	3,393
Transport and Communication	177	155	345	468
Construction	5,457	3,346	3,270	2,424

Source: Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 100.

The reforms had profound repercussions for inherited relations of production and power. By the end of the liberation episode, the distorted, backward, and racially exclusionary settler-colonial economies were drastically transformed in line with the reform goals. A principal gauge of this change was the increased economic control African majorities came to have in the modern sector—a change construed in socialist parlance of the governments as workers' 'collective control' over the means of production—as well as the elimination of external dependency on Portuguese skills. The economic empowerment of formerly oppressed and excluded majorities, largely in the form of "incorporation of workers into the decision-making process," led to improved working and living conditions, equitable opportunities and resources, and improved wellbeing in towns and cities in particular.[41] Further, the structural changes also nearly closed the gap in inherited income and wealth (especially racial) inequalities while ambitious reform and development programs improved the living standards of the majority.

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[40] Like Angola, Mozambique, hit hard by drought and floods in late 1970s and early 1980s, also suffered adversely since border closures in 1976 and escalation of military conflicts with Rhodesia and South Africa. The loss of transit traffic, tourism, and migrant labor services resulted in estimated pound 250 million deficit, along with extensive infrastructural damage; see Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 106.

[41] See Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, pp. 60-1, 64-5.

4.2.2 Socialist Land and Agrarian Reforms

The structural transformations in the non-agricultural sector were complemented by equally far-reaching changes in rural agriculture and relations of power. The initial policy measures for nationalization of abandoned settler farms, establishment of state farms, and agricultural cooperatives immediately following liberation were contingent decisions in reaction to a precipitous decline in agricultural production.[42] Table 4.2a shows the decline in agricultural output with the conclusion of settler-colonial rule in both Mozambique and Angola. Only later did liberation leaders fully launch deliberate socialist policies (i.e., farming cooperatives, peasant cooperatives, and communal villages) in determined efforts to radically transform agrarian relations of production and traditional rural social structures in the countryside.

The initial reform measures focused on reorganizing the formerly settler-dominated commercial agriculture into large state farms and production cooperatives. The government in Mozambique took control of approximately 2,000 abandoned smallholder settler schemes and large colonial plantations, located mostly in the southern and central provinces where settler agriculture predominated, "to prevent the total paralysis of the cash crop sector, to curtail widespread plundering and economic sabotage, and to stem growing despair among the large unemployed work force."[43] A large number were turned into large state farms for the production of rice, tea, cotton, and other cashcrops in, for example, the Limpopo valley, Zambezia, and Nampula provinces. Moreover, production cooperatives were established on some farms, including among rural peasants who were allowed to also cultivate small private landholdings

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[42] In both countries, agricultural production was devastated by the collapse of settler agriculture; the end of 'contract' labor; the breakdown of rural marketing and distribution systems key to peasant agriculture; and economic destabilization by South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. See Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900–1982*, p. 146; Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 58; Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975–1985*, p. 19.
[43] Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 55.

(*shambas*). However, the policy priority to well the end of the reform episode remained state farms, which accounted for most investments in the expansion of cultivated land and agricultural mechanization.[44] Consequently, the state-farm sector grew from 100,000 hectares in 1978 to 140,000 hectares in 1982 to become the dominant producer of commercial crops.[45]

Table 4.2a: Decline in Agricultural Exports in Mozambique (in 1000 tons)

	1973	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*	*1982*
Cotton	51.0	17.8	16.3	6.3	12.8	16.1	5.7	1.5	13.7
Cashew	29.0	21.2	21.1	17.0	18.4	17.1	15.6	12.2	16.7
Tea	17.5	11.0	12.7	12.3	13.5	23.3	30.0	16.0	25.1
Sugar	178.9	50.7	71.9	37.4	24.6	118.7	63.8	63.1	28.5
Copra	48.2	30.5	41.1	36.5	34.4	29.1	19.4	12.2	12.2
Sisal	19.8	11.7	10.1	13.9	11.3	14.0	7.0	5.8	5.7

Source: Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 108.

Table 4.2b: Decline in Principal Commercial and Traditional-Sector Crops in Angola (in 1000 metric tons)

	1973	*1975*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*
Maize	430	450	400	300	300
Coffee	210	72	50	60	40
Cassava	1,630	1,600	1,700	1,800	1,850
Cotton	79	33	26	26	22
Sugarcane	967	470	450	420	450
Sisal	60	15	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: Scott, *Political Development in Afromarxist Regimes*, p. 259.

The revolutionary government in Angola, too, nationalized a large proportion of the land abandoned during the colonists' exodus. Between 1975-1980, the state acquired control of some 6,000 smallholder European farms and large colonial plantations.[46] As in Mozambique, most confiscated land was converted to large-scale, mechanized state farms—developed with Soviet, Bulgarian, and GDR financial, technical, and training assistance—located mostly in the Malanje region, and the central and southern plateau, which suffered large-scale expropriation of land during the colonial epoch. On the other hand, MPLA activists set up less mechanized (pilot)

[44] See Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*, p. 149; Marc Wuyts, *On the Question of Mechanization of Mozambican Agriculture* (Maputo: Eduardo Mondlane University, 1979), p. 12.
[45] FRELIMO, *Out of Underdevelopment to Socialism: Report of the Central Committee Fourth Congress* (Maputo, Mozambique, 1983), p. 27.
[46] M. R. Bhagavan, "Establishing the Conditions for Socialism: The Case of Angola," in B. Munslow, ed., *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism*, p. 170.

cooperative schemes on abandoned settler farms in Huambo, Malanje, and Cuanza Norte regions. In most areas, members of rural cooperatives were allowed to hold small private farms to boost subsistence production—a reform pattern that spread all over the country although concentrated in the central and southern plateau with most settler agriculture and peasant resettlement.[47] The 'interventions' were not as extensive as in Mozambique; by the end of 1977, only a quarter of the pre-liberation commercial farms (total 8,000) had been put back into operation and about 150 cooperatives officially established.[48]

The initial shorter-term strategies for the revitalization of agricultural production culminate in long-term policies to modernize agriculture, 'socialize the countryside,' and thereby transform rural social structures. As seen chapter three, with highly uneven development between a privileged European commercial agriculture and marginalized African farming upon which 80 percent of the rural population subsisted, the inherited agricultural system was fraught with structural distortions and underdevelopment. As a result, on the eve of liberation the countries depended on basic food imports from the metropole and neighboring countries.[49] Political leaders adopted strategies that would tackle head-on the structural contradictions and lay a platform for the 'integrated development' and socialization of the agricultural sectors. The objective conditions certainly necessitated drastic agrarian measures but not necessarily socialist policies. In fact, generally the capitalist conditions requisite for transition to socialist economies were most absent in these cases than other post-liberation contexts in the region.

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[47] See Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 139.
[48] Donald P. Whitaker, "The Economy," in Kaplan, ed., *Angola: A Country Study*, p. 207.
[49] See T. A. Kofi, "Prospects and Problems of the Transition from Agrarianism to Socialism: The Case of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique," *World Development*, 9, 9-10 (1981), pp. 682-865; B. Munslow, "State Intervention in Agriculture: The Mozambican Experience," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 22, 2 (June 1984), p. 202; T. H. Henriksen, "Marxism and Mozambique," *African Affairs*, 77, 309 (Oct., 1978), pp. 451-2.

Table 4.3: Rapid Expansion of the State Farming Sector in Mozambique (share of marketed crops)

	1970		*1980*		
	Private	*Peasant*	*State*	*Private*	*Peasant*
Total	*69*	*31*	*52*	*10*	*38*
Cotton	35	65	45	10	45
Sugar	100	-	85	15	-
Cashew	10	90			100
Tea	100	-	90	10	-
Sisal	100	-	30	70	-
Copra	80	20	20	40	40
Rice	60	40	80		20
Tobacco	80	20	55	40	5

Source: Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, p. 100.

The new reform plans centered on the development of state farms, cooperatives, and communal villages (*aldeias communais*) based on collective farming. The nascent state farming sector was considered key to solving shortages in export crops and urban food as well as curb rising unemployment and influx from rural areas. In the long-term, it would be the 'dominant and determinant' factor in national economic development; it would boost agricultural output through scientific methods, management, and mechanization of production as well as engender far-reaching rural transformation.[50] Through modern technology and raising rural class consciousness, state farms would have 'dynamic effects' on the surrounding backward countryside; they were expected to "develop new agricultural techniques, breed high-yield seeds, and train agricultural personnel, all of which would be available to help adjacent communal villages increase their productivity."[51] As a result, after 1977, the modern state sector in Mozambique absorbed large proportion of state agricultural investments, and came to dominate the production of marketed crops during the reform years (see Table 4.3). In Angola, development was hampered by decline in labor for coffee plantations and continued conflict.[52]

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[50] FRELIMO, "Economic and Social Directives," in *Tempo*, 333 (Feb. 20, 1977), p. 44.
[51] Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982*, p. 148.
[52] Munslow, "State Intervention in Agriculture," p. 217; Catherine V. Scott, *Political Development in Afromarxist Regimes: An Analysis of Angola and Mozambique* (Ph.D. Diss., Emory University, 1986), pp. 160-1, 153-7.

The agrarian reforms also included the collectivization of peasant agriculture through rural cooperatives seen as the 'vanguard sector,' a less destabilizing strategy to modernize rural agriculture through voluntary peasant involvement and to "introduce the new socialist production relations into the countryside" without modern technical skills and complex administrative machinery.[53] Drawing on its history of agrarian reforms in liberated zones, the FRELIMO leadership launched overambitious programs involving the development of cooperative farms and communal villages. Compared to the cooperatives program of the early-postliberation years based on abandoned settler farms, this was an all-encompassing process of gradual collectivization of small and medium-size peasant family holdings in the countryside. Through slow politicization and voluntary mobilization, peasants were organized into intermediate 'pre-cooperatives' of 200-500 rural workers or peasants to learn collective production with state technical, managerial, and material assistance as a prelude to full-scale cooperatives.

Yet, as in any other revolutionary context, the threat of force was instrumental to weaken peasant resistance, especially in the southern and central provinces without past record of forced peasant resettlements or collectivization in liberated areas unlike the northern Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete provinces. the use of force was also decisive to break the power of traditional chiefs and African capitalist farmers, who had acquired substantial holdings and exploited African labor under settler-colonial rule, and traditional customs related to land tenure. In urban areas, the unemployed, prostitutes, and other groups were forcibly transferred to rural cooperatives in production campaigns reminiscent of the Great Leap Forward in revolutionary China. Thus, a large number of communal villages and rural cooperatives were organized (see Table 4.4). The drive was hampered by policy emphasis on the state sector and intensifying rural

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[53] FRELIMO 3rd Congress Central Committee Report (MAGUC 1978), p. 46; JPRS 4-14-78 70955, no. 1912: "Agricultural Seminar Discusses Formation of Cooperatives." *Jornal de Angola*, 3-2-78 (1980), in Scott, p. 152.

insurgency; but renewed vigor for greater collectivization with a belated shift in emphasis (1982) to support the cooperative, family, and private sectors.[54]

Table 4.4: Number of Communal Villages and Agricultural Cooperatives in Mozambique, Mid-1982

Province	No. of Comm. Villages	Pop. of Comm. Villages	% of Rural Population	No. of Cooperatives	No. of Pilot Cooperatives
Maputo	22	17,873	3.64	8	4
Gaza	139	298,812	30.15	32	6
Inhambane	47	73,352	7.36	13	3
Sofala	88	106,139	9.47	28	5
Manica	111	143,541	22.39	32	4
Tete	40	84,558	10.18	23	4
Zambezia	39	49,220	4.97	22	5
Nampula	260	154,186	6.42	32	4
Cabo Delgado	543	815,551	86.77	18	4
Niassa	63	63,215	12.30	21	5
Total	1,352	1,806,447	19.12	229	44

Source: Isaacman & Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*, p. 155

The liberation government in Angola implemented similar strategies even though the development of production and peasant cooperatives proved less extensive largely for similar reasons. To spread the cooperatives movement nationwide, beginning in 1977, well-trained 'rural dynamizers' began to mobilize and educate peasants in the organization of production associations. The development of cooperatives took place gradually in three stages: peasant 'associations' in which members contributed towards purchasing farm equipment while preserving individual property; semi-socialist 'first degree cooperatives' where workers could devote 50 percent of their time to cooperative production; and socialist 'second degree cooperatives' where members would entirely work for cooperative production.[55] Peasant associations sprung across the country; women's cooperatives developed around big towns; and resettlement cooperatives were founded in southern Kunene and Kunado Kubango regions for

[54] Munslow, "State Intervention in Agriculture," pp. 217, 219; M. L. Bowen, *"Let's Build Agricultural Producer Cooperatives": Socialist Agricultural Development Strategy in Mozambique, 1975–1983* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1983), pp. 124-5.

[55] Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 140.

peasants displaced by South African and UNITA attacks, and in northern regions for Angolans returning from Zaire. By late 1980, there were about 304 production cooperatives, most operating in Uíge, Malange, and Luanda, and 2,542 peasant associations.[56]

The Communal Villages (*aldeia communal*) represented a more ambitious dimension of agrarian and land reforms of the liberation episode. In reality, the rural cooperatives and communal villages served as complementary rural reform strategies. Yet, communal villages (with cooperatives as their economic base) were seen as vehicles for a program of fundamental rural development, social transformation, and political change. On one hand, besides improving peasant self-sufficiency and agricultural production, they would serve as 'the base' for political mobilization of peasants to vanquish reactionary colonial and traditional social institutions as well as "the development of the productive forces of the countryside" in order "to change all aspects of rural life." The movement of a scattered populations into large rural communities was also essential to meet the health, educational, and 'cultural needs' for improved quality of life.[57] On the other hand, they provided the leadership, that faced a dearth of material, organizational, and human resources, with centralized political and administrative control over a change-averse peasantry necessary for the 'modernization' and 'socialization' of the countryside.[58]

As Table 4.4 indicates, beginning in 1976, a large number of peasants in Mozambique were move to large self-reliant rural communities equipped with popular governance structures, consumer cooperatives, and new public services. The progress was modest relative to the overambitious plans for total villagization of the countryside; besides, fewer communal villages had agricultural cooperatives by the end of the reform period. In Angola, the effect was minimal

[56] Ibid., p. 141.
[57] FRELIMO, *Report of the Central Committee to the Third Party Congress* (1977), p. 46. Also, see Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900–1982*, pp. 152-3; M. G. Spaven, *Rural Resettlement and Socialist Construction: Communal Villages in Mozambique* (Ph.D. diss., Aberdeen University, 1981), p. 44.
[58] Samora Machel in *Noticías* 26, October 1982.

with most cooperative and communal-village schemes concentrated in areas most affected by colonial resettlement or the post-liberation conflict in the central and southern plateaus.[59] In general, poor policy implementation because of weak administration; dearth of qualified agronomists, bookkeepers, and technicians; and negligence of the private agricultural sector led to limited progress. Without fertilizers, tractors, and other technical inputs forthcoming from government, peasants lacked real incentive in cooperative and villagization schemes, and easily stuck to small family plots or entirely abandoned village cooperatives amid havoc unleashed by brutal insurgencies in the countryside in the latter part of the liberation reforms episode.[60]

Some analysts underline the above shortcomings in policy implementation to cast doubt on the radical nature of the agrarian and rural changes.[61] In the final analysis, however, the agrarian reforms in Mozambique and Angola were by far the most revolutionary of the liberation-episode reforms in Southern Africa. In general, the reform policies averted threatened economic and sociopolitical turmoil caused by acute food shortages, urban influx, and rising unemployment in the immediate aftermath of liberation. Further, while agricultural output showed steady growth during the radical reform episode despite not surpassing 1973 levels, remarkable achievements were made in several sub-sectors, especially in Mozambique, before devastating effects of drought, insurgency, and fall in world export prices in early the 1980s.[62] Finally, the reforms had lasting repercussions for agrarian as well as rural social structures, besides the immediate dissolution of exploitative agrarian policies and relations of production of the settler-colonial era. The destruction or weakening of the traditional ruling class (i.e.,

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[59] Munslow, "State Intervention in Agriculture," 217; Scott, *Political Development in Afromarxist Regimes*, p. 153.
[60] See Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*, pp. 155-7; Scott, *Political Development in Afromarxist Regimes*, pp. 152-3, 163. Rural reforms in Angola also received lesser attention most likely because the government generated large revenues from oil and diamonds, and because agriculture held less sway in the national economy compared to Mozambique.
[61] For example, Scott, *Political Development*, chapter 4; Chabal "The Construction of the Nation-State," pp. 64-72.
[62] See Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution 1900–1982*, p. 149-50.

traditional chiefs, village headmen, and black kulaks), subjugation of women, and other oppressive communalistic institutions meant profound changes in rural social structures.[63]

In other words, catastrophic agricultural and economic crises by the end of the reform period is strong evidence of the transformative nature of the reforms.[64] Two related and important points are worth underscoring at this stage. First, the decline in agricultural output itself and active rural peasant resistance exploited by counterrevolutionary proxies during the reform period is further evidence that the reforms profoundly shook up the old agrarian social order. Such interpretation—and the fact that revolutionary changes almost always had devastating effects on agricultural and overall economic productivity—undercuts assumptions that emphasize the failure—and therefore, non-radicalness—of the reforms to achieve, in reality, overambitious goals. The reform policies were remarkably far-reaching such that the endpoint of the liberation episode was precisely marked by major policy shifts—the halted, slowed down, or abandoned implementation of reform measure—to counter deepening economic and political crises. In its Fourth Congress, April 1983, the FRELIMO leadership resolved against continued or new reform projects in favor of tackling the collapse in food production through decentralized planning, strong private sector support, ceasing expansion of state farm sector, and reduced

[63] See Ibid., pp. 157-8; Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, chapter 5; Munslow, "State Intervention in Agriculture," p. 207; Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy*, pp. 18-9.

[64] The figures below show overall agricultural and economic decline during the reform period in Mozambique. See H. Abrahamsson and A. Nilsson, *Mozambique: The Troubled Transi*tion -- *From Socialist Construction to Free Market Capitalism* (London: Zed Books, 1995), p. 54.

	1973	1974	1975	1977	1981	1983	1985	1986
Production GSP (billion meticais, 1980 prices)	112	92	71	75	84	64	54	56
of which:								
Agriculture	37	32	25	31	31	24	25	25
Industry, fishing	42	35	28	28	34	23	15	15
Transport	12	11	9	7	9	6	4	4
Exports ($ million, current prices)	226	296	185	153	280	132	77	79
Imports ($ million, current prices)	465	460	395	336	801	636	424	543
Exports/imports (%)	49	64	47	45	35	21	18	15

restrictions on private farming.[65] By the same token, the MPLA Central Committee adopted in Feb. 1983 a "crisis plan," which cut back investments in reform and development projects underway in order to tackle a national crisis in production and distribution.[66]

Secondly, the revolutionary agrarian reforms precluded private land redistribution viewed by some critiques as yet another indicator of the reforms' liberal and less momentous nature. Instead, the liberation governments abolished private ownership of land in favor of collectivization of agriculture with the will of peasants—a strategy basically in accord with the revolutionary nature of the reforms. Given the legacy of land dispossession and inequalities in ownership, "any sweeping land reform designed to reallocate private property would be not only divisive, but foreign to socialist principles." The only way to revert expropriated land "to the peasants on a massive scale, but collectively" is through cooperatives, which provided a 'middle road' that did not conflict with peasants' traditional property rights or the liberation leaders' socialist goals for equitable income and wealth distribution.[67] This, together with the socialization of the economy and social services, would help to both obliterate preexisting inequalities and stem the rise of new ones because "economic growth without socialization would lead to [renewed] class differentiation in the countryside."[68]

4.2.3 Destroying Structural Inequalities

An important aspect of the revolutionary socioeconomic reforms concerned liberation elites' plan to swiftly remove structural inequalities of the settler-colonial period and to promote

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[65] See FRELIMO, *Building Socialism: The People's Answer* (Maputo: INLD, 1983); *Out of Underdevelopment to Socialism* (Maputo: INLD, 1983); and *FRELIMO Party Programme and Statutes* (Maputo: INLD, 1983).
[66] See Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy 1975–1985*, pp. 31-2.
[67] Agostino Neto (1978) quoted in Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 140. Therefore, the reason for collapse in agricultural production and peasant hardships was hardly, as some suggest, policies to "squeeze" the peasantry in, following Soviet development strategies, crude efforts at 'primitive socialist accumulation' especially in Angola; see, for example, Chabal, "The End of Empire," p. 28; Bowen, *The State Against the Peasantry*, 2000.
[68] Marcelino dos Santos, FRELIMO's lead Marxist ideologue, Minister of Economic Development in the 1970s, and politburo member in charge of the economy in the early 1980s in Hall and Young, *Moz. Since Independence*, p. 103.

equitable distribution of national resources, opportunity, and development. In these cases, on the one hand, the departure of most settlers, Asians (Mozambique), and a small number of *misticoes* and *assimilados* precluded the necessity of wealth redistribution and, on the other, the inheritance of poor national economies as well as severe economic decline rendered redistributive policies unrealistic. Therefore, the main thrust of policies for equitable distribution of income and wealth involved the socialization of public services, the expansion of primary education, healthcare, and urban housing, as well as rural development programs.

Additionally, undergirding these policies that were far ambitious in Mozambique was a socialist agenda for the construction of a 'new society' free from capitalist 'exploitation of man by man,' poverty, tradition, and discrimination on grounds of race, class, or gender. The second principal goal of national liberation ideology in southern Africa was the necessity of a struggle for "social liberation" that must be pursued once "political liberation" from racially oppressive regimes had been achieved. The radical socioeconomic measures pursued by Mozambican and Angolan leaders called for a classless society by dramatically destroying the settler-colonial capitalist structures undergirding class, racial, and other forms of exploitation as opposed to affirmative-action and 'black empowerment' policies that entailed gradual reduction of grotesque racial disparities in income, wealth, and employment in the context of liberal reforms. Explicitly couched in orthodox Marxist theory of class struggle, both the parties and the State emphasized the importance of destroying the old class structure and elevating the workers and peasants, respectively defined as the 'leading force' and the 'principal force' under the vanguard party's leadership, in the struggle for revolutionary transformations.[69]

[69] According to Mozambique's liberation constitution, "power belongs to the workers and peasants, united and led by Frelimo." As per the Party Program, "The working class is the leading force of the Mozambican revolution ... It alone is capable of embracing the whole process of transformation of nature and society and of promoting and guiding this process … The peasantry, which is the most numerous stratum of our population, is the principal force

To this end, the governments abolished private school and healthcare during 1974 to 1976. In reaction to the flight of settlers and the absence of educated Africans, public services were fully socialized to guarantee the socioeconomic rights of all citizens to universal education, medical care, housing, and freedom from hunger.[70] In subsequent years, liberation governments took deliberate long-term measures to eradicate structural inequalities and improve basic conditions of the poor majority in both urban and rural areas. With less pronounced racial inequalities of the late-colonial era further blunted by departure of the settler minority, national leaders turned their attention to class and geographic inequalities.[71] Efforts to improve living standards of the majority paid particular focus on improving socioeconomic conditions of the lower classes (especially the urban working class in Angola) by "increasing workers' share in planning and controlling production" as well as affirmative policies including increased minimum wage, subsidization of consumer goods, and expanded social benefits.[72]

Other political measures sought to simultaneously destroy the old 'colonial bourgeoisie' and to prevent the rise of a new one. In Mozambique, the local capitalist class was made all but disappear with the nationalization of the means of production, land, legal services, and rented property in the immediate aftermath of liberation; remnants of 'petite bourgeoisie' elements (i.e., state bureaucrats, managers, technocrats, businessmen) were weakened in subsequent years by relentless anti-bourgeoisie government campaigns.[73] In Angola, similar interventions

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of the revolution in our country. It constitutes, in alliance with the working class, the political basis of people's democratic power." Quoted in Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire,* p. 177. Strikingly similar claims abound in the Angolan constitution and MPLA's political statements, including a stress on dictatorship of the proletariat.

[70] See Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 67; Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, pp. 112, 114.

[71] The policies were conditioned by the distinctive legacy of Portuguese settler colonialism, i.e., overlapping race, color, and class inequalities as well as African deprivation. The education and health systems concentrated in urban areas were designed to serve the settler minorities; pre-liberation Mozambique and Angola suffered some of the lowest development levels, geographic imbalances, and rural-urban disparities. See Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, pp. 12-13; Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, p. 56; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 71-3.

[72] Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, pp. 179-80; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 73-6.

[73] Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, pp. 185-201.

transformed the preexisting class structure even though a combination of factors—i.e., internal party factionalism, shortage of educated blacks and party cadres, and continued presence of capitalist multinationals—allowed the re-emergence of elements of the colonial bourgeoisie and a 'national petty bourgeoisie' in the state and private arenas. Added to these factors was the MPLA leadership's dogmatic adherence to the NDR theory, which called for welcoming the 'patriotic petit bourgeoisie' into the worker-peasant alliance during the transitional phase of national 'popular democracy,' reconstruction, and transition to socialist. Yet, like Samora Machel, A. Neto and his successor made determined efforts to curtail development of a wealthy class in party echelons, state bureaucracy, and the private sector.[74]

In rural areas, liberation leaders sought to dismantle preexisting social inequalities and prevent future rural class differentiation through the "socialization of the countryside." The nationalization of land served to preclude grabbing of abandoned settler land by individual peasants, especially middle or upper-class black farmers, who prospered during the late-colonial period. the policy retarded the development of a 'rural bourgeoisie,' which could grow under the auspices of rich black farmers (kulaks) and in the void left by settlers. In particular, FRELIMO maintained hostile policies meant to weaken the colonial administrative *régulos*, rich peasant farmers, and miners well until policy modifications (e.g., land to middle farmers) in the early 1980s to stimulate agricultural productivity. Rural reform and development policies sought to empower poor peasants through state provision of agricultural credit, inputs, and equipment to cooperatives.[75] Such measures were far-reaching and more successful in Mozambique than in Angola where government influence was stifled by military conflict.

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[74] See MPLA, *Central Committee Report and These on Education* (London: Mozambique, Angolan and Guinea Information Centre, 1980), p. 31; also, Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, pp. 172-6.
[75] Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, pp. 180-183; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 74.

Liberation governments also sought to rapidly transform general conditions of the poor majority by waging a war on poverty, underdevelopment, and tradition in the countryside. The thrust of this drive was vigorous national campaigns for the expansion of schools, clinics, clean drinking water, and affordable housing from which the vast majority in urban townships and rural areas alike had long been deprived. Notwithstanding acute shortage of resources, the FRELIMO government allotted the second largest share of annual national budget (about 30 percent) for expanded school enrollment, primary healthcare, and housing. The measures resulted in arguably the most remarkable outcomes of the liberation-period reforms. With the dramatic increase in primary school enrollment and literacy campaign in factories, shanty towns, and communal villages, the national illiteracy rate sharply dropped in the first five years.[76] Having rendered medical services virtually free in 1977, the government dramatically expanded primary healthcare to rural areas and shantytowns; reestablished a national health system devastated by the departure of all but thirty doctors; and launched an ambitious national vaccination campaign that reached more than 90 percent of the population in 1979.[77]

In Angola, South African and UNITA the military threat preoccupied the leadership and scuttled altogether rural development in central and southern regions. However, the government set out to "transform the lives of the vast majority of Angolans, who had been living in a situation of massive deprivation, ignorance and poor health under the Portuguese."[78] Having launched a national campaign against illiteracy in November 1976, it established a national educational system and came "to broaden the social base of education."[79] After December 1977, it introduced an eight-year free basic education, an expanded secondary and university education,

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[76] Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism To Revolution, 1900–1982*, pp. 138-9. Also, Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 55-58.
[77] Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire*, pp. 55-63, 278.
[78] Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 154.
[79] Ibid., pp. 115, 116.

and national adult literacy program focused on the formerly deprived peasant masses.[80] The government also embarked on developing a broad-based healthcare system from a nearly non-existent colonial inheritance built for the settler minority and left in ruins by settler departure and the civil war. It declared healthcare as a basic right of all Angolans enshrined in the 1975 Constitution; launched a mass national vaccination campaign in 1977; and with massive support from Cuba and other socialist countries, established a National Health Service with numerous health posts, barefoot doctors, and distribution centers in rural areas.[81]

The structural changes were part of Mozambican and Angolan liberation leaders' broader agenda to engineer a 'new society.' Along with the measures to fundamentally transform social relations of production, the expansion of basic services was part of political leaders' quest for social modernization, balanced rural and national development, and secular nation-building. For instance, post-liberation education—conceived as the principal 'base' for the propagation of revolutionary change, an instrument for creating a 'new man,' and building socialist society—was expunged of its colonial foundations designed to produce "little black Portuguese;" rendered a free basic right with secular foundations; and actively employed to propagate a new national cultural heritage to de-romanticizing the oppressive and "traditional-feudal" past.[82] The socioeconomic reforms emphasized equality of race, class and gender; bridging rural-urban and regional disparities; and "balanced regional development" through equitable resource distribution, service provision, and inclusion.[83]

[80] As a result, already by 1977, primary school enrollment increased to 1,000,000 and secondary school to 105,000, each from 500,000 and 72,000 in 1973, respectively. See Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, p. 114.
[81] Ibid. pp. 111-4.
[82] See Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, pp. 71-2; Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 54, 56-7, 86-7; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 153, 156.
[83] Hanlon, *The Revolution Under Fire,* p. 65; Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline,* p. 111.

4.3 A HIGH-MODERNIST APPROACH TO NATION-BUILDING

In a third major dimension of the radical reforms, Mozambican and Angolan leaders embarked on an aggressive nation-building against a backdrop of deep-seated racial, ethnic, and regional schisms fostered by divisive settler-colonial policies. The construction of unified, inclusive multiracial 'nations' constituted an integral goal of revolutionary national liberation ideology in Southern Africa. It was in this arena that revolutionary leaders in these cases acted upon their well-defined ideological principles—i.e., a Marxist-Leninist party-state approach to nation-building—even though their choices and strategies were certainly determined by the historical circumstance of the radical reform episode. They attempted to foster national identity and unity through such policy instruments as racial reconciliation and settler inclusion; the destruction of divisive settler-colonial structures based on racism, tribalism, and regionalism; and development of party-state institutional frameworks that would balance between conflicting imperatives of political participation and the consolidation of national unity.

Liberation leaders adhered to a non-racialist conception of citizenship as the foundation of 'inclusive' nation-building. The non-negotiated mode of liberation—along with the rapid emigration of most settlers for fear of black hostility, retribution, and 'reverse racism'—precluded constitutional mechanisms guaranteeing special political rights for the minority white communities or other subnational groups. The radical reforms were thus defined by a blind non-racialism that rejected differences among racial groups that could jeopardize racial equality and national integration. Instead, the governments recognized the citizenship and property rights of settlers while ensuring white representation in both party and state power. this was particularly the case in Mozambique where FRELIMO recruited to power positions a disproportionately large number of white militants because the party leadership was historically black dominated,

and because the MPLA had contained in its power ranks prominent white and mulatto intellectuals. Besides, the governments waged vigorous 'antiracialist campaigns' to attenuate old racial differences and new anti-white racism in the early post-independence years.[84]

Nevertheless, the seemingly liberal approach to racial differences did not extend to ethnic, regional, or religious categories. In this regard, nation-building in Mozambique and Angola was an exclusionary political project that sought to quash political and cultural pluralism as roots of subnational divisions inimical to national unity. Most scholars interpret the choice in terms of a backdrop of an "exceedingly burdensome" legacy of minimal territorial-socioeconomic integration[85] as well as the liberation parties' varying national political capital. The FRELIMO party enjoyed a relatively broad-based national legitimacy and politico-military prominence it could capitalize on to embark on nation-building after independence; however, having failed to bring together the various nationalist strands in the country, the MPLA tenuous 'national' credentials were further undermined by its bitter post-liberation contestation with the FLNA and UNITA.[86] Yet, the background factors by no means predetermined political elites' policy choices, strategies, and accomplishments. Their actual choices were rather "strongly influenced" by contingent "historical circumstances" including the world-historical period of the reform episode in which one-party nation-building template predominated.[87]

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[84] Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, pp. 26-8; Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution*, p. 113.
[85] Mozambican leaders were confronted by low national integration—and lack of administrative and transportation infrastructures to bridge—between national regions north and south of the Zambezi River. The country was divided into three historical regions (south, center and north) with economies closely integrated into adjoining South Africa, Rhodesia/Malawi, and Tanzania. Likewise, Angola was deeply divided into three main socio-ethnic territories that came to be associated with mutually antagonistic nationalist parties during the anti-colonial struggle (see Chapter 3). The regional socioeconomic differences, broken bridges among the liberation parties, and degeneration of the liberation war into a brutal civil war after national freedom meant that the MPLA had to contend with, at best, minimal foundations of statehood. See Chabal, "The Construction of the Nation-State," pp. 48-9.
[86] Ibid., p. 46.
[87] Ibid., p. 54.

Notwithstanding the distinctive historical and national conditions, the nationalist leaders thus adopted radical strategies of nation-state construction that eschewed political differences and consensus. First, as seen earlier, Mozambican and Angolan elites suppressed, marginalized, and/or excluded from power rival anticolonial movements or other organized opposition as fundamental threats to national integration, unity, and political stability. Secondly, liberation leaders incapacitated independent centers of social power potentially opposed to secular nation-building and social modernization. The Catholic Church, traditional institutions, and other social groups previously associated with divide-and-rule structures of the settler-colonial period were condemned as roots of persisting—racial or ethnoregional, rural-urban, 'traditional' vs. 'modern'—schisms that formed formidable challenges to political leaders' drive for national cohesion and modernization. Religious institutions were also stripped off their historical role in the provision of education, healthcare, and welfare to African because it was critical that alternative centers of loyalty to the 'national' state be eliminated, bastions of tradition destroyed, and a new generation forged by employing modern state-run education as an instrument to develop national consciousness.[88]

Third, liberation governments waged relentless national campaigns against "racism, tribalism, and regionalism"—the nemesis of national unity and modernity. To avoid the deepening of subnational sentiments, they "rejected any division of authority and responsibility among different racial and ethnic groups or any other artificial balancing act that would fragment rather than unify."[89] The equality of all ethnic (and racial) groups was enshrined in the new constitutions; party structures (e.g. the Central Committees) and state institutions were made to display a representative national image especially of ethnic groups and regions historically less

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[88] See Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 83-88; MPLA Report of the First Congress of the MPLA (Dec. 1977), especially the "Essential Objectives and Tasks of the Phase of National Reconstruction."
[89] Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982*, p. 112.

incorporated by the respective movements.[90] Popular elections beginning in 1977 were used to generate broad national participation and descriptive representation of all ethnic groups in local, provincial, and national political structures.

Yet, at the same time, liberation elites ironically rejected political differences based on race, 'tribalism,' or region. As Samora Machel emphasized, "For the nation to live, the tribe must die"[91] during "the struggle against racism and tribalism" following independence:

> … It is necessary to wage a constant battle against all divisive situations and tendencies. … It is imperative that all [racial, tribal, regional] peculiarities give way to real unity between Mozambicans. We do not know tribes, regions, race, or religious beliefs. We know only Mozambicans who are equally exploited and equally desirous of freedom and revolution.[92]

In these cases, with the departure of most settlers, potentially divisive ethnic and ethnoregional cleavages presented a principal obstacle to nation-building. Liberation governments typically employed military force to weaken actual or perceived subnational mobilization. Yet, they also employed a range of political instruments to diminish the political appeal of ethnicity and regionalism. Vigorous national campaigns including political tours by high-level party leaders, radio broadcasts, and newspapers were used to bridge subnational barriers and inculcate a sense of nationhood. Similarly, grassroots party structures in rural communities, factories, and urban neighborhoods "sought to dispel pejorative ethnic stereotypes and emphasize the value of national unity."[93] Educational and language policies were deployed to actively nurture a sense of common national inclusion and identity. Both governments adopted Portuguese as the official national language; the absence of African languages transcending

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[90] Ibid., p. 113.
[91] Samora Machel quoted in Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, p. 135.
[92] Samora Machel, "The People's Republic of Mozambique: The Struggle Continues," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 4 (Nov., 1975), p. 23; also see MPLA, *MPLA Frist Congress: Central Committee Report and Theses on Education* (London: Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau Information Center, 1977), p. 9.
[93] Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, p. 29; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 91.

ethnic or regional differences "raised the prospect that selection of any regional language would heighten particularist tendencies and frustrate the process of national integration."[94]

Meanwhile, liberation government launched multi-pronged cultural programs to develop a monolithic 'national culture' with which all Mozambicans and Angolans could identity. For example, beginning in 1977, in Mozambique a national network of cultural centers (*casas de cultura*) were established in rural areas and cities to "popularize and incorporate" cultural and musical heritages of diverse ethnic groups and regions into a "new national synthesis," and to instill revolutionary national values emphasizing anticolonial Mozambican nationalism, unity, class struggle, and women's emancipation.[95] In Angola, a 'cultural liberation' or renaissance program was launched to rediscover a rich national past buried by colonial racial ideology, and to propagate a shared Angolan national destiny.[96] Finally, city streets, cities, and other locales were purged of their European-colonial names, symbols, and representations as part of a decolonization—often (re-)Africanization—of public spaces, institutions, and 'national' historical memory.[97] Overall, the 'national' cultural programs represented an authoritarian 'high modernist' project for socio-political uniformity, cohesion, and modernization that shunned cultural pluralism, rediscovery, and traditionalist revival.

4.3.1 The Party-State System and Nation-Building

A central feature of the authoritarian nation-building reforms in Mozambique and Angola was the establishment of party-state structures. For Southern African revolutionary national leaders,

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[94] Isaacman, *A Luta Continua*, pp. 29-30.
[95] Isaacman and Isaacman, *From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982*, p. 30.
[96] Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, pp. 123-4.
[97] During a 2018 fieldwork in Maputo (Mozambique), I was struck by the revolutionary nomenclature of streets as an enduring legacy of the radical reform period. Without exception, the street names still bear K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, and other icons of twentieth-century world Marxist and socialist revolutions; key historical events, dates, and figures of the Mozambican revolutionary struggle; and the radical political aspirations and goals of the reform period. Perhaps, Maputo stands as the most Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary of world cities today.

the construction of a party-state political regime was an essential instrument for advancing the intertwined post-independence goals of national political building as well as rapid socioeconomic changes during the first national reconstruction phase of the 'national democratic revolution.' It involved the creation of centralized 'political and administrative structures' that would enable the would-be 'vanguard' parties to exert a high degree of control over the state and 'virtually all levels of society' for achieving ambitious political, economic, cultural transformation. As Patrick Chabal cogently described it:

> … the path ahead required not just a one-party state but the dominance of the party over the state. For them, the model of nation-building was not primarily what had taken place in the rest of Africa but, more significantly, what had occurred in the 'socialist' world beyond the continent. As a result, the constitutional arrangements of … the countries started from two fundamental premises: the first, that nation-building and socio-economic transformation went hand in hand; the second, that the party was the 'leading' political force. What this implied was that the task of creating the nation-state could not be dissociated from that of transforming society (dubbed the 'transition to socialism') and that both would be achieved by a state firmly controlled by the ruling party. … there was an emphasis on leading role of the nationalist party, up on which all responsibilities now fell. The nation, therefore, would be in the image of the party.[98]

The party-state relations and the overall political regime were governed by the Marxist-Leninist principle of 'democratic centralism' in which (i) the state apparatus must be subordinated to the revolutionary 'vanguard party' at all levels, serving as "a channel for central directives [from the party's Politburo] downwards,"[99] and (ii) power is hierarchically organized in a rigid top-down structure. As "the principal instrument for carrying out revolutionary change," the 'revolutionary democratic' State must simply embody Party power, principles, and objectives to end all forms of exploitation, oppression, and racial discrimination; extend people's

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[98] Chabal, "The Construction of the Nation-State," pp. 51-52.
[99] Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 71, 72; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 90. The idea of 'democratic centralism' is succinctly described by E. H. Carr as the:

> … double process by which authority flowed upwards from party cells in town or factory or village through intermediate local or regional committees till it reached its apex in the central committee which was the organ of the sovereign congress, and discipline flowed downwards through the same channels, every party organ being subordinated to the organ above it and ultimately to the central committee. Carr, 1966, vol. 1, p. 195, quoted in Somerville, p. 91.

democratic power; and promote even national development in a road to socialism.[100] State power, formerly an instrument of the settler-colonial bourgeois class, "belonged to the workers and peasants united and led by the [vanguard party], and exercised through the organs of people's power." The Party was "the real power center of society", "the leading force in the revolution" of workers, peasants, and progressive national petty bourgeoisie.[101]

Ideology undoubtedly played a central role. Yet the choice was powerfully conditioned by the political circumstances of the liberation-reform episode. In the latter 1970s, a one-party system of different ideological hues still dominated in Sub-Saharan Africa as a popular vehicle of political domination and national consolidation by independence leaders. More importantly, in a region fraught with ideological conflicts, revolutionary leaders in Mozambique and Angola faced grave political and military dangers to their political legitimacy, control, and quest for revolutionary change. In particular, relentless South African 'destabilization' efforts to discredit and destroy liberation governments certainly forced national leaders to try muster high political and societal control through highly centralized one-party structures. Moreover, external threats certainly rendered political leaders more amenable to the Soviet bloc, which provided with critical military and economic assistance at this stage. It was hardly surprising that they embraced the Soviet-model 'vanguard party' leading a worker-peasant democratic dictatorship based on classical Marxist-Leninist teachings of 'democratic centralism'.[102]

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[100] See MPLA, *Central Committee Report and Theses on Education*, pp. 15-16.

[101] Article 2 of the independence Constitution of Mozambique (1975), cited in Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 70, also MPLA 1977, *Central Committee Report and Theses on Education*, p. 15.

[102] See Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, p. 62; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 101; also K. Somerville, "The U.S.S.R. and Southern Africa Since 1976," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 22, 1 (March 1984). The ideological belief that only the 'vanguard' party of the working class could fulfill the national democratic revolution stemmed from Lenin's "Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress" for the 1921 Communist Party Congress. For Lenin, "only the political party of the working class … is capable of uniting, training and organizing a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that along will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petit-bourgeois vacillations of this mass" (Lenin, 1960–70, vol. 32, p. 244). In *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, Lenin added that this could only be achieved after

Institutional foundations of the party-state system had been laid down with the pre-1977 state structural reforms. After consolidating their power, political leaders proceeded with deliberate measures to reinforce the 'vanguard' character of the political parties and develop corresponding national political structures. The party congresses held in 1977 formalized the party-state structures and articulated rather 'orthodox' Marxist-Leninist principles guiding party-state relations. The heretofore all-inclusive 'mass' movements transformed themselves into closed 'vanguard' parties—now, the Frelimo Party (PF) and *MPLA-Partido Trabalhista* (MPLA-PT)—based on a small socio-political base of militant workers, peasants, and patriotic petit-bourgeois elements.[103] Redefined as "the leading force of the State and Society" in a historical march from colonial capitalism to socialism, the Party determined the basic orientation of the State, defined government policy, and set up overall national goals.[104] All paths of power converged into the Party's Politburo and Central Congress through the structures of 'popular power' and revolutionary national democracy.[105]

The structures of popular democracy—i.e., People's Assemblies—were established in 1977 in Mozambique and in 1980 in Angola under Neto's successor, José Eduardo dos Santos. Substituting the ad hoc *poder popular* structures of early post-liberation years, the People's Assemblies were different from democratic legislative institutions that would later define liberal political reforms in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia. Placed under strict party guidance and mostly indirectly elected, their chief function was to "guarantee the participation of and integrate the broad masses into the process of transforming society, and into building

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the creation of a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry;" cited in J. F. Hough and M. Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 74.

[103] See FRELIMO, *Documentos Base da FRELIMO, 1* (Tempográfica: Maputo, 1975); and *Guia Para o Estudo das Teses*, FRELIMO Tereceiro Congresso (Maputo, 1976); MPLA, *MPLA Frist Congress: Central Committee Report and Theses on Education* (London: Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau Information Center, 1977), pp. 35-6.

[104] FRELIMO, *Estatutos e Programa* (Maputo, 1983); MPLA, *Documents of the MPLA Central Committee Plenary, 23-29 October 1976* (London: Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau Information Center, 1976), pp. 7-8.

[105] See Egerö, *The Political Economy of Democracy*, p. 109; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 92.

socialism."[106] They served as the nexus between the vanguard party and the 'popular masses,' together with the mass organizations of women, youth, and trade union associations. Moreover, the Assemblies oversaw the state apparatus and the implementation of party programs; village and urban assemblies were responsible to "promote social progress, the consolidation of state power, increased production and productivity, the development of collective work and improvement of material and cultural conditions of life in their respective areas."[107]

Political leaders undertook further measures that sought to reinforce party-state structures during the late-1970s and early-1980s. In particular, they carried sustained 'party rectification' activities (e.g., curtailing internal factionalism, corruption, petit-bourgeois influence) to enhance party cohesiveness while institutionalizing party power in various social sectors (e.g., the defence forces, production sectors, etc.), neighborhood committees, and peasant associations. There were also determined efforts to solidify party control over the state (especially anti-reform public service), and to expand popular assemblies in communal villages and remote rural areas affected by counterrevolutionary destabilization.[108] Party consolidation among the peasantry remained weak even after 1980, especially for the MPLA, which led to increasing identification of the parties with the interest of urban workers, intellectuals, and state functionaries.[109]

In a comparative perspective, one-party systems that dominated postcolonial Africa were meant to cement elite and national unity through elite-level inclusion. Its Marxist-Leninist underpinnings rather laid emphasis on class conflict and class representation in bid to transcend

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[106] FRELIMO, *Estatutos e Programa* (Maputo, 1983); see also FRELIMO, *O Partido e as Classes Trabalhadoras Moçambicanas na Edificação da Democracia Popular* (Maputo: Relatório do Comité Central ao III Congresso da FRELIMO, 1977b).
[107] Principles of Frelimo (1979), p. 25, quoted in Egerö, *The Political Economy of Democracy*, pp. 120-2; Article 37 of Angola's constitution (1980) cited in Wolfers and Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline*, pp. 185-8.
[108] In Mozambique, the number of people's assemblies by 1980 had spread throughout the country and grown to over 1,300, while in Angola the Central Congress expanded from 300 delegates in 1977 to 463 in 1980 after the expansion of young militant workers' influence in the party; See Egerö, *The Political Economy of Democracy*, pp. 124, 126; Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 87-90, 92-7.
[109] Somerville, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 104-5.

'reactionary' ethnic, regional, or religious resentments and conflicts.[110] The 'centralist' party-state structures certainly suppressed such polarizing identities while allowing Mozambican and Angolan leaders to gain unparalleled power over the state and society, which was necessary for launching their agendas for radical transformation. The attendant repression, marginalization of political rivals, and the overall social polarization resulting from radical reforms also triggered a violent backlash by counterrevolutionary armed guerrillas that—by exploiting peasant-based disaffection with agricultural collectivization, forced villagization, and hostility to 'traditional' political customs in the countryside—destroyed any hopes of consolidating national unity. In fact, lingering conflicts of the struggle period fed into a political backlash following liberation, especially in Angola where even consolidation of the territory into a single 'unified political entity' seemed unlikely by the conclusion of the reform period.

4.4. CONCLUSION

During the liberation-reform episode, revolutionary leaders in Mozambique and Angola launched more or less radical reform policies. They rapidly restructured the settler-colonial state machinery and consolidated political power largely by means of sheer force. They also destroyed inherited capitalist relations of production and established state-planned socialist economies; unleashed radical land and agrarian reforms; and sought to establish classless societies through the expansion of socialized public services and equitable development programs. Finally, Mozambican and Angolan liberation elites suppressed political and cultural pluralism in efforts to building non-racialist, unified nation-states under a party-state regime framework. The reforms, which dramatically transformed inherited state, racial, and class structures, led to the

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[110] See Egerö, *The Political Economy of Democracy*, p. 122.

consolidation of repressive state institutions and the exclusion of conservative groups, that prompted a violent backlash against the revolutionary regimes before the reform period ended.

Most analysts interpreted the radical strategies as outcomes of the nationalist leaders' Marxist-Leninist ideological beliefs and agendas. Such explanations lent rather exaggerated causal power to preconceived revolutionary beliefs and goals of Southern Africa's liberation actors. To be sure, the reform programs strategies of Mozambican and Angolan leaders were guided by their radical ideological principles and promise of liberation. Nonetheless, the historical evidence presented in this chapter strongly supports the hypothesis of this study that the policy choices were rather contingently defined by domestic and external circumstances immediately shaping the reform period. The policy instruments with which—and the extent to which—political elites successfully pursued their radical reform ambitious can be better understood if we fathom the specific set of opportunities and constraints (i.e., settler and capital flight, counterrevolutionary challenges, and economic and military destabilization by settler regimes) they grappled with during the liberation episode.

The analysis, moreover, demonstrated that the radical reform period in Mozambique and Angola were indisputably by far the most dramatic, comprehensive, and overambitious structural transformations in all five Southern African countries. The settler-colonial state structures, race-class relations, and capitalist economic structures were largely destroyed by the end of the reform period. The rapid pace, basic, and broad scope of the radical reforms—and the violent, conservative backlash they triggered—sharply contrasts with the reformist pattern of change of the liberal reform period in South Africa and Namibia.

CHAPTER FIVE

LIBERAL REFORMS: SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

In South Africa and Namibia, the liberal reform episode was characterized by measures to gradually *reform* the inherited state, economic, and social structures. In these cases, national elites were severely constrained by the liberal policy choice they had adopted in conjunction with the negotiated pattern of liberation, as well as by a neoliberal world context of the 1990s that circumscribed their ability to ultimately redefine or, as in Zimbabwe's case in the 1980s, to thwart the liberal reform choice. Thus, with state reforms, the ANC and SWAPO leaders reshaped the old state structures by means of gradual deracialization of civil-service systems and liberal local government reforms that lasted throughout the liberation episode. Political elites in these contexts also established, and consolidated, political power through democratic elections, electoral dominance, and the liberal incorporation of diverse political and social forces.

Further, the liberation governments pursued liberal socioeconomic reforms within a 'redistribution after growth' policy framework. They adopted pro-capital reform policies meant to accelerate economic growth, within the parameters of the preexisting capitalist economies, and thereby reduce entrenched racial inequalities and poverty among historically marginalized black majorities. They attempted to reduce scandalous social inequalities by implementing moderate redistribution programs, such as 'black empowerment' policies; affirmative action in jobs, public services, etc.; and market-led land and agrarian reforms devoid of ambitious rural development and transformation strategies previously seen in Mozambique and Angola. In the second-half of the 1990s, the new governments shifted policy emphasis from 'progressive' reform agendas further into more pro-growth, 'Washington Consensus' policies for macroeconomic stability particularly in South Africa after 1997.

Last, in the arena of nation-building, South African and Namibian leaders also adopted liberal political strategies to bring together societies deeply divided by decades-long policies of racial segregation and balkanization of Africans into tribal homelands. Broadly, they pursued policies of 'national reconciliation,' tolerance, and inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in democratic state structures as a foundation of more cohesive, non-racial national communities. The democratic and multiculturalist approach often exemplified by the South African notion of an all-inclusive 'rainbow nation,' sharply contrasted with the more repressive nation-building in Mozambique and Angola intolerant to ethnic, regional, and cultural heterogeneity.

The duration of the reform period in these cases was characteristically drawn-out and lacks a well-defined endpoint precisely because of the slow and less dramatic nature of the reforms. In each case, the onset of the liberal reformist period was defined by the beginning of transition to majority rule (1989 for Namibia, and 1990 for South Africa); but its endpoint was not as sharply defined as by the remarkable departures from radical reforms in Mozambique and Angolan in the early 1980s. In this study, the 2003-2004 period marks the conclusion of the reform period in both countries. The reform period overlaps with the government of President Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) and President Thabo Mbeki's first administration (1999-2004) in South Africa, and the government of Sam Nujoma (1990-2005) in Namibia. To be sure, reforms were continued in both countries in subsequent years. Yet, new policies at this stage were largely policy feedbacks to the reform period and, as such, are considered in this study as part of the reactions and counterreactions set into motion by the liberal reforms.

The liberation-reform episode in these cases is far too often understood as simply a period of neoliberal economic structural adjustments and social policies. Such understanding is not entirely inaccurate given how pro-capitalist reforms dominated the reform years which, along

with intrusive Western and 'neocolonial' policy influences, aborted prospects for 'genuine' liberation with far-reaching structural transformations.[1] Yet, the actual wide-ranging reforms cannot be *reduced* to mere pro-market liberalization, deregulation, and privatization policies. Political elites equally strove to deracialize the national economies and redress entrenched racial imbalances in income, wealth, social services, and so on. Further, the reform episode was defined by liberal strategies of state reform, power consolidation, and nation-building by the ANC and SWAPO movement leaders. Therefore, in this study I use the term 'liberal reforms' to denote an overall *reformist* approach to change, encompassing the political beliefs (most notably, property rights and civil liberties) as well as free-market principles of classical liberalism.

As with the other three countries, both internal and external factors were critical in the way the reform period played out in these cases. However, its coincidence with the global rise of neoliberalism and international financial institutions rendered it exceedingly difficult for liberation elites to embark on even moderately progressive reforms lest they unnerve domestic and foreign capital. As such, the governments adhered to a '*pragmatic liberal approach*,'[2] whereby they explicitly indicated the importance of private sector and foreign investment as principal generators of economic growth, while putting nationalization off the reform agenda. Internally, the liberal reformist choice resulted from a distinctive set of opportunities and constraints (see Chapter Three) as opposed to either the absence of political commitment to radical transformations on the part of the leaders or, as neo-Marxist analysts suggest, the hijacking of policy by an 'unpatriotic' bourgeoisie in the course of reforms. This is not to suggest

[1] See Saul, *Recolonization and Resistance*, 1993; and John S. Saul, *A Flawed Freedom: Rethinking Southern African Liberation* (London: Pluto Press, 2014).
[2] Sam Nujoma in 'Opening Address by the President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma,' delivered in the National Union of Namibian Workers Economic Conference, Katutura, 2-4 October 1992.

that class forces were not as important during the reform period or its aftermath when liberation governments confronted political backlashes from the urban lower classes.

The reforms formally adhered to non-racialism and racial equality. Yet, compared to Angola and Mozambique, the reform period in South Africa and Namibia was powerfully shaped by the negotiated settlements—widely understood as informal 'racial bargains'—that inaugurated the transitions from white-minority to black-majority rule. The 'racial bargains' entailed that while political power would be transferred to blacks, the white minority would (at least momentarily) retain control over the economy with increased black participation and ownership. In other words, the reform process was characterized by a striking disjuncture such that the transfer of political power to blacks was 'abrupt, decisive, and irreversible,'[3] but socioeconomic changes were exceedingly gradual, tentative, uneven, and less far-reaching. The 'racial bargains' consequently had strong impact on the reforms for they, as Southall rightly asserts, were founded on stronger foundations (compared to Zimbabwe), not least because of the white settlers' larger size and, for the majority, no sense of another 'home' to emigrate[4] to as settler minorities in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe had done with the advent of black rule. Yet, their causal significance should be understood in conjunction with the external geopolitical and economic realities of the liberation episode.

Finally, the reform period in South Africa and Namibia was characterized by important distinctions sufficiently highlighted in the analysis. Most of all, liberation leaders in Namibia were able to launch reforms from the outset, consolidate power relatively rapidly, and dominate the national political arena. In this study, I place emphasis on general conceptual categories or shared empirical features of the reform periods. Only then can we put into perspective *why* the

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[3] Giliomee and Mbenga, *New History of South Africa*, p. 435.
[4] See Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 141.

liberation-reform episode in both countries led to shared political structures and dynamics in its aftermath that, in turn, set the countries down similar paths of political development.

5.1 LIBERAL POWER CONSOLIDATION AND STATE REFORMS

The liberal reforms in South Africa and Namibia were defined by democratic consolidation of power and gradual reorganization of old state structures. The victorious national movements and their leaders seized political power through the first non-racial, 'liberation' elections and, in subsequent years, cemented it through dominance of the electoral arena and the extension of control over trade unions, civil society, and other social sectors. In other words, despite some cross-national distinctions, political elites in these countries relied principally upon 'political means of domination' and liberal state reforms that furthered their authority. The overall process of non-violent power consolidation and state reforms was carried against the backdrop of liberal institutional constraints as well as a relatively stable regional context free from bloody liberation and postliberation conflicts. It is analytically helpful to consider first the patterns of democratic power consolidation before examining the liberal state reforms.

5.1.1 Political Power by the Ballot

Political elites in these cases cemented power by a two-fold strategy. First, they used their popularity to win the transitional elections to assumed state power. Faced with harsh political and constitutional constraints, subsequently the liberation parties set out "to consolidate their hold on power by increasing their majorities in (and between) subsequent elections, and in so doing, to establish their political hegemony."[5] Second, they employed strategies of political incorporation, cooptation, and partnership with disparate political and social forces to gradually

[5] Ibid., p. 98.

extend and entrench their power over society. The SWAPO and its leaders were comparably more effective than the ANC in establishing a dominant position following political liberation. Drawn-out transition negotiations and the ANC's internal incoherence had substantial bearing on a lengthy process of power consolidation and overall reforms in South Africa.

The negotiated mode of liberation in Namibia was an outcome of an 'international settlement' of a regional and international Cold-War conflict playing out since the independence of Angola and Mozambique (see Chapter Three). As such, SWAPO leaders assumed state power in accordance with a transitional framework that culminated in 1990 in the established of a SWAPO-led majority government in a relatively shorter time. Attempted by SWAPO to establish military influence inside the country during the transition were aborted, and its demands for an FPTP electoral system rejected, by South Africa and its 'internal' allies. The latter reasonably feared that the liberation party could obtain a two-thirds majority that would allow it to impose a new constitution and initiate unilateral amendments thereafter.

The 'liberation' elections were held in Nov. 1989. The SWAPO party won a majority to assume state power upon the declaration of national freedom (March 21, 1990), but it failed to win the two-third majority required to (re-)write the new constitution on its own. The internal opposition, led by the conservative multi-ethnic Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), secured enough seats to counterbalance SWAPO power grab in the constitution-making process. The ensuing constitutional bargaining among liberation leaders and their conservative and liberal opponents resulted in a "a unitary and democratic state, an independent judiciary, a bill of fundamental rights, universal elections, and the separation of powers …"[6]

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[6] Ibid., pp. 99, 100.

Table 5.1: Rapid Electoral Dominance by the SWAPO Party in Namibia: Elections for the National Assembly, 1989-2004

	1989			**1994**			**1999**			**2004**		
Political Party	*Valid Votes*	*Share of Votes*	*No. of Seats*	*Valid Votes*	*Share of Votes*	*No. of Seats*	*Valid Votes*	*Share of Votes*	*No. of Seats*	*Valid Votes*	*Share of Votes*	*No. of Seats*
SWAPO	384,567	57.32	41	361,809	72.72	53	408,174	76.15	55	620,609	75.83	55
DTA	191,532	28.55	21	101,748	20.45	15	50,824	9.48	7	42,070	5.14	4
UDF	37,874	5.64	4	13,309	2.68	2	15,685	2.93	2	30,355	3.71	3
COD	-	-	-	-	-	-	53,289	10.05	7	59,464	7.23	5
NUDO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34,814	4.25	3
Others	56,857	8.5	6	12,779	2.57	1	8,064	1.5	1	31,127	3.81	2
Total	670,830		72	489,645		72	536,036		72	818,439		72

Source: Melber, *Understanding Namibia*, p. 138; Graham Hopwood, *Guide to Namibian Politics* (Windhoek: Namibia Institute for Democracy, 2009).

Table 5.2: Emerging Electoral Dominance of the ANC in South Africa: Elections for the National Assembly, 1994-2004

	1994			**1999**			**2004**		
Political Party	*Valid Votes*	*Share of Votes*	*No. of Seats*	*Valid Votes*	*Share of Votes*	*No. of Seats*	*Valid Votes*	*Share of Votes*	*No. of Seats*
ANC	12,237,655	62.65	252	10,601,330	66.35	266	10,880,915	69.69	279
NP	3,983,690	20.39	82	-	-	-	-	-	-
NNP	-	-	-	1,098,215	6.87	28	257,824	1.65	7
IFP	2,058,294	10.54	43	1,088,664	8.58	34	1,088,664	6.97	28
DP	338,426	1.73	7	-	-	-			
DA	-	-	-	1,527,337	9.56	38	1,931,201	12.37	50
Others	915,433	4.68	16	1,378,783	8.62	34	1,454,067	9.3	36
Total	19,533,498		400	15,977,142		400	15,612,671		400

Source: John Daniel and Roger Southall, “The National and Provincial Electoral Outcome: Continuity with Change,” in R. Southall and J. Daniel, eds., *Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2009), p.

Against this backdrop, SWAPO solidified its position in subsequent years by increasing its parliamentary majority in largely free and fair national elections (Table 5.1). This was reinforced by the party's successive victories in elections for Regional Councils and numerous local governments, as by the appointment of Regional Council representatives to a National Council, the upper house of the parliament, that extended the ruling party's political influence. The liberation government occasionally deployed undemocratic means, such as opposition intimidation in the 1999 elections, repression of dissent in its northern strongholds and of Caprivi separatists, and the threat of force against potential challengers.[1] On the whole, however, the consolidation of political power was bounded by constitutional constraints and primarily founded upon broad popular support for SWAPO rather than routinized political and military repression.

The pattern was broadly similar in South Africa despite being too complex. Here, liberation leaders including of the ANC, its 'Left' allies, and the non-violent Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) assumed political power after protracted four-year all-party negotiations (1990-1994), during which the ANC made substantial concessions for power-sharing, regional autonomy, minority rights, and the constitution-making process itself.[2] The outcome was a liberal, 'interim' constitution (late 1993), which made provisions for, *inter alia*, proportional representation, a two-thirds parliamentary majority for major amendments, and a Bill of Rights that entrenched civil and economic rights. A 'sunset clause' safeguarded the jobs of white civil servants, judges, and military personnel, while stipulating a five-year power-sharing in a Government of National Unity (GNU) consisting of all political parties obtaining at least twenty

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[1] Ibid., pp. 100-102.

[2] The origins, dynamics, and outcomes of the violence-ridden and drawn-out all-party negotiations, which began formally in May 1990 and culminated in the first non-racial elections of April 1994, are impressively documented in Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*; Steven Friedman, ed., *The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993); S. Friedman and Doreen Atkinson, eds., *The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement* (Joh.: Ravan Press, 1994). Also, Hassen Ebrahim, *The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Richard Bauman and David Schneiderman, "The South African Constitution in Transition," *Review of Constitutional Studies*, 3 (1996): 1-17.

seats in the first non-racial elections held in April 1994. The provisions severely curtailed political leaders' freedom to rapidly consolidate power and restructure the old state machinery.

Political power was transferred from the racial oligarchy to a pan-racial majority government after the universal franchise in which the ANC won a majority, which allowed it to dominate the GNU encompassing its bitter former enemies, the National Party, whose reformist leader de Klerk became a Deputy President to Nelson Mandela, and the IFP party of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Despite securing an indisputable majority, the ANC fell short of the two-third majority, to drive singlehandedly the constitution-making process without the support of other political parties, and lost control of Western Cape province to the *New* National Party (NNP) and KwaZulu-Natal province to the IFP. The result is that the ANC was effectively deterred from trying to impose its power at national, regional, and local levels in a sweeping fashion—a situation that began to change after the NNP withdrew from the unity government in 1996 and the ANC weakened opposition strongholds in the provinces in the early 2000s.[3]

Thus, the transitional elections were a key to political power for South African and Namibian majority-rule leaders. In subsequent years, the ANC was less successful in expanding its popular base (see Table 5.2) compared to SWAPO, which dramatically expanded its popularity to garner overwhelming majorities in latter elections of the reform period. Both parties needed to deliver on promises of law enforcement, service provision, and economic growth, issues rendered far more salient by high levels of violence, unemployment, and poverty that continued to ravage the post-apartheid societies in both countries. The ANC marginally increased its majority in the second non-racial elections (1999) largely because of its popularity amongst blacks as a victorious liberation movement rather than a track-record of reforms and the fulfillment of popular aspirations. While its power remained curbed in certain provinces, at the

[3] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 105.

national level, its appeal among Whites, Coloreds, and Indians, who feared a 'one-party' domination and radical redistribution by an African-dominated government, was seriously hampered by the emergence of the opposition Democratic Alliance party.[4]

The ballot box represented the main instrument for capturing and consolidating political power in the context of liberal reforms. Whereas SWAPO successfully solidified power in national and local institutions fairly rapidly, the ANC achieved this belatedly, in the early 2000s, by exploiting national electoral and local-government reforms.[5] In the process, as a result, the former national liberation movements transformed themselves into effective 'electoral machines' as opposed to, as was the case with FRELIMO and MPLA, 'vanguard' parties steering radical state, economic, and social structural transformations. Since electoral dominance was not sufficient to entrench state and social powers necessary for basic, if gradual, structural changes, nationalist leaders in South Africa and Namibia also embarked on ultimately concentrating state power as well as establishing dominant power over postliberation society. Yet, unlike in Angola and Mozambique, these tasks were accomplished by liberal means that conformed to the constitutional and democratic limitations of the liberal policy choice. This was a product of both the institutional constraints inherent to the liberal reform option and the absence of internal and external military threats to the liberation governments.

5.1.2 Liberal Social Incorporation and Domination

To solidify their authority and instigate basic structural transformations, Southern African leaders aspired to secure control over 'all levels of society.' In the contexts of radical reforms, this was achieved by means of coercive suppression of old and new political opposition, the subduing of autonomous social actors and the popular mobilization of society under the auspices

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[4] J. S. Saul, "The Apartheid Endgame, 1990-1994," in Saul and Bond, *The Present as History*, pp. 141-2.
[5] See Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 104-5.

of centralized party-state structures. In the context of liberal reforms, liberation leaders' freedom of action was severely constrained to pursue repressive strategies against rival national liberation movements, parliamentary opposition, or the trade unions, civics, churches, and so on. Establishing political support among diverse social forces was crucial because these forces, that previously constituted a united anti-apartheid front along with the NLMs, began to advance conflicting demands and voice dissent during the reform episode. Additionally, the reforms also left some groups disaffected or alienated, sowing divisions in the ranks of the broader national liberation alliance or activating new bottom-up challenges.[6]

Against this backdrop, South African and Namibian leaders sought to entrench their social influence through strategies of incorporation, alliance formation, and cooptation of diverse social forces. A principal target representing a major social force was organized labor, which the ruling parties brought under control by forging close alliances with the trade unions. This was achieved relatively easily by SWAPO because the less formidable National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) continued to maintain its subordinate affiliation with the party. On the other hand, recognizing the trade unions' larger size, assertive labor power, and pivotal role in the anti-Apartheid struggle, the ANC formalized its relationship with organized labor through formal power alliance (i.e., the Tripartite Alliance) with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the SACP party. Consequently, COSATU exerted greater policy and political influence during the reform period; nonetheless, just as the NUNW, the trade union was instrumental to cultivate ANC support among organized labor and offset potential leftist challenges. In sum, varied incorporation of labor unions was crucial in, on the one hand, mobilizing popular support for the ruling parties during elections and, on the other, disciplining an otherwise assertive social force adversely affected by pro-capital reform policies.

[6] Ibid., p. 174.

The broader civil society largely disengaged from politics following national liberation, but it represented another major political frontier. The SWAPO government denounced as 'unpatriotic,' and marginalized, groups critical of its policies. In general, however, the new governments sought amicable relations with business associations, commercial farmers, various other civil society groups representing sectoral interests. Most such groups received policy preference, funding, and organizational support from the state, while their leaders were coopted into government or party power positions. In South Africa, the ANC "moved swiftly to transform the adversarial relationship between state and much of civil society" by, among other strategies, repealing repressive legislation of the old regime, establishing 'reciprocity' between NGOs and government, and strengthening the financial viability of civil society organizations.[7] All these measures enabled the new political elite to both embed power within society as well as build a broader societal coalitions in support of the liberal reform agenda.

In the rural areas, the absence of radical rural and agrarian reforms meant that the peasantry would not be a potential base of opposition as in Mozambique and Angola. At any rate, however, extending authority to the rural areas was by no means without significant challenges in the context of entrenched traditional chiefs and quasi-autonomous Homeland governments—a situation compounded by the NLMs' s shallow penetration of rural areas during the armed struggle, especially with the ANC whose historical stronghold were the urban labor and social movements against white-minority rule. Liberation leaders weakened chiefly authority and gained political hold in the rural areas by a combination of cooptation, persuasion, and intimidation strategies. Initially, they set out to curtail the power of chiefs while preserving chiefly authority as an important instrument of consolidating state power and local authority. This helped to preclude the rise of serious political or military backslash rooted among the rural

[7] Ibid., pp. 178-80, 182, 184-6.

peasantry during the reform years. In later years, the realization of limited state power and the potential of chiefs to cause rural instability led liberation governments to reconcile and reincorporate traditional elites. They ultimately "moved beyond [their] suspicion of traditional leaders to embrace them as allies in cementing [their] political control over the rural areas…"[8]

Finally, South African and Namibian leaders employed identical strategies and tactics of accommodation towards potential sources of organized opposition. They incorporated into the new state structures the apartheid military and security forces as well as most bantustan elites, which proved critical in offsetting the threat of continued violence or subversion of majority rule by powerful conservative forces in early years of the reform period. Moreover, the power-sharing arrangements brought progressive and liberal non-black political elites onboard the post-liberation governments. In South Africa, Mandela and his moderate allies within the ANC made additional concessions in the form of meaningful power decentralization and provincial autonomy to allay white-minority fears of black domination, defuse right-wing white separatist threats, and assuage conservative bantustan elites. Thus, the administrative structures of the homeland governments were incorporated into the reformed state structures, and some of their independent-minded leaders guaranteed actual power or policy influence.

5.1.3 Liberal State Structural Reforms

Likewise, liberal reformism in South Africa and Namibia was defined by gradual reshaping of apartheid state institutions and democratic centralization of state power. Liberation elites achieved this through three major political strategies: (a) constitutional restructuring of national state institutions, (b) 'transformation' of white-dominated civil services, and (c) extensive local government reforms. Only gradually—and amidst strong political contestation—did political

[8] Ibid., p. 202, pp. 197-200.

leaders extend full control over key institutions of state power, and fully displace the autocratic, racially-segregated, and tribally-defined local authority systems in favor of racially integrated, democratically instituted state structures. The liberal state reforms, which lasted throughout the liberation-reform episode, starkly differ from the rapid and basic transformation of inherited state structures largely accomplished at the outset of the reform period in Mozambique and Angola.

a) Democratic Centralization of Power

With liberal reforms, liberation elites gained control over centralized state power through gradual institutional reforms because of serious political constraints on their ability to secure control on the 'levers of state power.' Such constraints were more elaborate in South Africa in the form of the 'sunset clause' that required provisional power-sharing among black and white, a whopping two-thirds for constitutional changes, and court review of new laws and executive action. In the Namibian case, the transitional settlement did not lay down formal power-sharing arrangements, but the inclusion of white-minority elites in a truly multiracial cabinet, and the protection of white jobs in the civil service, police, the judiciary as part of the 'racial bargain'—and in the interest of national 'reconciliation,' representation, and stability[9]—meant that political leaders were denied unrestrained influence over the state.

Consequently, the process of state reforms and power consolidation was gradual and democratic. In South Africa, where the process proved more complex and long drawn-out, it started in earnest in 1996 when the ANC gained upper hand over the main opposition parties in the deliberations that culminated in a 'final' constitution. The latter resembled the liberal 'interim' document. However, the ANC crucially frustrated demands for provincial autonomy short of federalism and the entrenchment of permanent power-sharing in constitutional changes

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[9] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 141-2.

that paved the way for the recalibration and centralization of state power at the hands of liberation leaders. This time ANC leaders exploited the party's parliament majority to finally adopt a unitary constitution with 'federal fig leaves' and end power-sharing with the 1999 elections. The ANC's almost two-third majority in the National Assembly and a weakened political opposition after the elections set the stage for ever growing party domination of the state in a virtual dominant-party democracy.[10]

In Namibia, a system of checks and balances, universal elections, a bill of fundamental rights, and an independent judiciary formed powerful constraints on SWAPO leaders' more hegemonic temptations. However, with a final constitution (1990) without provisions for power-sharing, and the establishment of a unitary state at the outset, the leadership quickly moved to entrench itself in state power, which was also enhanced by the ruling party's comparably greater internal coherence. The SWAPO thus established its dominant party status through elections much earlier, and went on to use state power to systematically weaken and attack the legitimacy of potential challengers. Furthermore, it used its dominant parliamentary majority to solidify its power by means of eroding checks and balances, judicial independence, and other constraints on executive power.[11] Similar political strategies were employed by the ANC leadership, but mostly during the latter reform years and with much less effectiveness.

The leadership of Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), unlike Sam Nujoma's in Namibia, was crucial in strengthening democratic institutions following liberation. Efforts to centralize power gained momentum in the immediate post-Mandela years, even though the process of party-building and extending party power 'over all levers of power' had begun much earlier, steered by

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[10] See Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa,* pp. 569-80.
[11] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 146, 151-2; Henning Melber, "Limits to Liberation: An Introduction to Namibia's Post-Colonial Political Culture," in H. Melber, ed., *Re-Examining Liberation in Namibia: Political Culture Since Independence* (Uppsala: Nordic African Institute, 2003), 9-25.

Thabo Mbeki, who was the deputy president since 1994 but with de facto control over the party and the government. After 1997, the ANC's reputed long 'tradition' of internal democracy was cast aside when the Marxist-Leninist principles of 'democratic centralism' were reasserted to foster party cohesion, discipline, and central direction as preconditions for the movement's ability to orchestrate basic state and societal 'transformation.' The measures led to centralized executive power in the hand of President Mbeki (1999-2008) and greater discipline in the party that had been plagued by factionalism and corruption. In the early 2000s, the ANC established a dominant position within the state in part by means of undermining the opposition, clamp downing on parliamentary independence, and building a deferential judicial system.[12]

The gradual institutional changes enhanced liberation elites' influence over the state and its goals. However, compared to Mozambique and Angola, the changes hardly provided political leaders with unconstrained control over 'the levers of state power' in the guise of orchestrating far-reaching changes. The ANC leadership was more affected by this and consequently adopted in 1997 a strategy of 'cadre deployment' as a means of 'capturing' and 'transforming' the state machinery by extending the liberation movement's power "over all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, the parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on.[13] With this strategy, party cadres were deployed in strategic positions within the state and the private sector. The rationale was that while the state was neither fully transformed as yet nor represented all South Africans, the civil service could potentially undermine the liberation government. The strategy, much less articulated in SWAPO's case, enabled the parties to make big inroads into the state machinery and vast number of parastatals. In reality, however, blurring the line between party

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[12] Ibid., pp. 146-7, 152-8.
[13] ANC, "The State, property Relations, and Social Transformation," *Umrabulo*, 5 (1998).

and state had the effect of paradoxically undermining state power and prospects of launching meaning socio-structural changes, while fostering popular grievances for 'cadre deployment' turned into "an instrument for patronage, material accumulation, and upward mobility."[14]

Liberal analysts infer to some of the illiberal strategies to conclude that, like the other political organizations, the ANC and SWAPO cemented power by more or less authoritarian strategies. However, the cross-national variations are evidently stark. In the South African and Namibian contexts, the consolidation and centralization of state power was both substantially limited in degree and accomplished within the constitutional parameters of the liberal policy choice. The process was contested by political opposition, social actors, and powerful chiefs in the regions. So was the pattern of reforms in the arena of racialized civil service systems.

b) Deracializing the Civil Service

Given the reformist nature of liberal reforms, political leaders in these countries sought to deracialize the inherited bureaucracy, law enforcement, and judiciary that survived the process of national liberation largely intact. Of all the five countries, pre-liberation South Africa and Namibia had the most bifurcated administrative systems—i.e., a modern civil service for white areas and traditional governance in ethnic homelands—that warranted far-reaching institutional reforms. It was imperative to draw entirely new regional councils and associated administrations, and to 'refashion' the system of local government. Yet, not only had the liberation governments lacked in a large number of well-educated blacks; but the 'racial bargain' that protected the rights of white civil servants was also a hindrance to far-reaching public service reforms. Further, the absorption of a large number of old-regime personnel also created internal tensions that hampered accelerated integration of disparate civil service structures during the reform years.

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[14] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 135.

The new governments thus pursued 'affirmative action' policies for the gradual deracialization of the white-dominated public services. In South Africa, where the pensions and five-year employment security of white civil servants was safeguarded by the 'sunset clause,' reformers set out to gradually transform the racial profile of the state administration by reducing the size of white personnel, especially at senior levels, and multiplying the number of black public servants.[15] Such goals and the 'affirmative action' measures originally appeared in the liberation government's first major program for socioeconomic reforms, the 1994 White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Program. A White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995) emphasized the creation of a 'genuinely' multiracial public administration broadly representative of the diverse populace, a reform objective reaffirmed by the 1996 constitution. Later, another White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service (1998) drew together various reform instruments, while an Employment Equity Act (1998) set out concrete goals for promoting racial equity in workplace and redressing racial imbalances by 'affirmative action' in the recruitment, promotion, and professionalization of non-white personnel.[16]

The reforms gained momentum during the Mbeki presidency which was often associated with a drive for drastic Africanization of the public service. Overall, the measures significantly transformed the racial composition of the bureaucracy where Africans actually represented the largest racial group prior to 1994 but, together with other blacks, were confined to lower, non-managerial positions. In early 1999, whereas the proportion of whites declined to 18 percent of all civil servants following a mass removal of white civil servants through early retirement packages, the size of black, colored, or Indian in management remained 56 percent.[17] The civil

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[15] Ibid. 142-3.
[16] Chantal Milne, "Affirmative Action in South Africa: From Targets to Empowerment," *Journal of Public Administration*, 44, 4 (Dec. 2009), pp. 973-5.
[17] Giliomee and Mbenga, *New History of South Africa*, p. 422.

service and managerial ranks of state parastatals were drastically altered such that, overall, the public service nearly reflected the country's societal cross-section. Yet, the top and middle levels were not rendered as racially representative, as Table 5.3 indicates. As late as 2006, while whites (9.6 percent) represented over 13 percent of overall public servants, Africans (73 percent) were fairly represented only in the lower rungs.[18]

Table 5.3: Racial Breakdown of Management in the South African Public Sector (%), 1995-2001

	Public-sector managers (all levels)		Public-sector senior managers	
	1995	2001	1995	2001
African	30.0	51.1	33.3	42.7
Colored	6.7	6.6	2.0	5.8
Indian	3.4	5.7	2.0	6.0
Total black	40.1	63.4	37.3	54.5
White	59.9	36.6	62.7	45.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Seekings & Nattrass, *Class, Race & Inequality in South Africa*, p. 313.

Similar policies were taken to reform the public service in Namibia. Because the transitional settlement had protected the employment rights of old-regime civil servants, the reforms unfolded gradually subject to liberal legislation. A Public Service Commission was established to implement affirmative-action policies designed to render the civil service more representative of the country's multiracial demographic profile. The reform measures, which culminated in the passage of an Affirmative Action Act (1998), required that blacks (i.e., Africans and Coloreds) and women be given preferential treatment in appointments and promotion. Besides, given extremely limited educational and professional opportunities afforded to Africans, policies for the recruitment and promotion of members of previously disadvantaged social groups were substantially relaxed.[19]

[18] See V. Naidoo, "Assessing Racial Redress in the Public Service," in A. Habib and K. Bentley, *Racial Redress and Citizenship in South Africa* (Cape Town: HSRC, 2008), p. 103; Milne, "Affirmative Action in South Africa," p. 980.
[19] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 144.

As a result, by 1996, people of such background occupied about 70 percent of management positions in a racially integrated post-liberation civil service. The proportion of white, who occupied all central government managerial positions at independence, was significantly reduced but, as in South Africa, whites continued to be 'slightly over-represented' in the civil service and state-owned enterprises especially at high managerial levels.[20] Therefore, in both Namibia and South Africa whites remained slightly overrepresented by the end of the liberation-reform period. However, as Southall correctly argues, with whites overwhelmingly seeking careers in the private sector instead, the public service in both countries had increasingly become a 'black territory.'[21] It arguably served as the most suitable arena to redress racial inequities and promote 'black economic' we shall discuss in the next section.

c) Local and Regional Government Reforms

Reforming local and regional government structures was central to deracialize and democratize the inherited state. This was paramount in the South African and Namibian contexts due to a legacy of racially separate administrative systems; corrupt, authoritarian, and pre-bureaucratic authority systems in the homelands; wide inequalities in wealth and service provision among adjacent black and white areas; and in the South African context, widespread breakdown of state authority on the eve of political liberation. Reforming the state at local, district, and provincial levels was thus imperative to both uproot the entrenched legacies of apartheid rule and establish state structures capable to implement broader reforms and expand opportunities for the marginalized African majorities. The amalgamation of segregated administrative systems, the incorporation of homeland administrations and 'traditional authorities,' and the promotion of

[20] See Herbert Jauch, *Human Resource Development and Affirmative Action in Namibia: A Trade Union Perspective* (Windhoek: Labor Resource and Research Institute, 1999).
[21] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 144.

local democracy formed the thrust of the reforms. Since the reforms in Namibia followed a similar pattern, save for an abortive decentralization policy,[22] the following analysis necessarily focuses on South Africa for adequate elaboration.

The most important local and provincial government reforms were introduced mostly in the late 1990s. Until 1998, post-liberation local state structures bore major continuity with their predecessor except for the removal of the architecture of the former homelands. Reformers tried to integrate "several separate civil services from the old white provincial bureaucracies, whatever administrative arrangements may have existed for Indians and Colored people, and the former homelands, each of which had developed their own managerial styles and most of which lacked technical skills and professional integrity."[23] The former system of provinces (4), 'independent' Homelands (4), and autonomous Homelands (6) was replaced by nine new provinces (see Map 5.1), with democratically elected legislatures, premiers, and executive councils that maintained significant discretion on policy implementation, which certainly frustrated the elites' ambitious for power centralization and social 'transformation,' particularly in the opposition-controlled Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal provinces in the 1990s. Further, with their boundaries drawn by closely following previous development regions, most provincial governments were hamstrung by poor revenue bases, corrupt bureaucracies, and incompetent personnel.[24]

Local government reforms were even more gradual and less thoroughgoing in South Africa. The reorganization of desegregated local, district, and municipal administrations proved a more daunting task mainly because of vast inequities in wealth and service provision among white and black areas, and consequent conflicts over equitable allocation of resources. The

[22] See Graham Hopwood, *Regional Councils and Decentralization: At the Crossroads* (Windhoek: Namibia Institute for Democracy and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2005).
[23] T. Lodge, *Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 32.
[24] Ibid., pp. 32-53.

reform policies sought to achieve racial integration of local governance institutions, equitable redistribution of resources, expanded public services to formerly deprived black populations, and in rural African areas, the democratization of autocratic 'traditional authorities.' In 1993-1994, new legislation replaced segregated local councils in white towns, colored townships, African locations, and rural areas by an integrated non-racial system. Following non-racial local elections in 1995, elected local, district (rural area), and municipal (urban area) councils were then established. Whereas the previously segregated local governments in cities were gradually integrated, in rural African areas local government combined new elected councils, responsible for public services, with old system of 'traditional authorities' overseeing customary law.[25]

Local government reforms were hinged on the principle of empowering formerly deprived groups, democratizing local authority, and the removal of spatio-racial disparities. However, there was little success in narrowing glaring inequalities in service provision or alleviating poverty in black townships and former homelands. One strategy to meet the municipal challenges with inadequate administrative and revenue sources was the application of 'cross-subsidization' or revenue transfers from wealthier to poorer neighborhoods. Yet, higher taxation of white areas hardly corresponded soaring popular demands for better services in black areas. Moreover, the new municipal structures became progressively weak, inefficient, and corrupt; many smaller councils became "hopelessly bankrupt and almost dysfunctional,"[26] and only in few provinces (i.e., Gauteng, Western Cape, and Northern Cape), that were wealthier and less encumbered by the legacies of homeland administration, did they fair relatively well. In turn, municipal authorities sought out private capital to help finance major development projects and,

[25] Davenport and Saunders, *South Africa*, pp. 579-80.
[26] See Lodge, *Politics in South Africa*, p. 91.

after 1995, desperately 'corporatized' or privatized a range of municipal mandates, such as electricity and water provision, road maintenance, and bus services.

The market-based reforms starkly differ from the socialization of public services in post-liberation Mozambique and Angola—and were clear evidence of the growing influence of neoliberal reform policies in the course of the reform episode as we shall see shortly. In 1998, the government introduced a comprehensive reform program designed to address continued, apartheid-like 'spatial separations and disparities between towns and townships.' It sought to reconfigure local institutions through the establishment of large municipalities vested with greater powers, developmental and socially inclusive local authorities, and the empowerment of poor communities through 'cross-subsidization' and central government development investments.[27] The reforms, put into effect with local elections in 2000, resulted in more streamlined and improved local governance structures. The changes were nonetheless hardly transformative because inherited patterns of authoritarian decisions-making, misgovernance, and racial disparities persisted in the aftermath of the reforms.

Traditional authorities that represented a main element of local state reforms were one such structure that endured the reform period. For recollection, radical state reforms in Mozambique and Angola sought to obliterate the administrative and social bases of comparably weak local chiefs and headmen of the settler-colonial era. With liberal state reforms in South Africa and Namibia, where 'traditional authorities' had in fact maintained almost despotic economic, social, and political powers in former African areas, liberation government rather accommodated 'progressive' chiefs and 'reactionary' chiefs in the new local and regional authorities. Indeed, as Southall cogently argues, liberation leaders:

[27] Ibid., pp. 91-3.

> … had to decide how and whether to implement systems of local democracy, and how these might be combined with established systems of rural governance. Broadly, the answer was to erect a system of dual authority, whereby popularly elected local governments were granted responsibilities for delivery of services, while traditional leaders retained significant authority over the allocation of communal lands, administration of customary law and officiating over community functions. Within this context, it is possible to identify a significant drift towards a *de facto* if not *de jure* restoration of authority to the chiefs, both to compensate for failures of service delivery and to shore up the writ of liberation government rule in rural areas.[28]

Thus, initially, local government reforms in South Africa and Namibia attempted to diminish the power of traditional chiefs. The 'interim' constitution of South Africa (1994) restricted the influence of 'traditional authorities' to the administration of customary law in their communities; consequently, the latter lost access to central government sources and jurisdiction over service provision, development, and law enforcement. However, traditional leaders continued to play important role in large part because of poorly governing local councils. Despite their diminished influence in national or provincial politics, they were accorded constitutional recognition and, as such, incorporated into the new local government and development frameworks. The 'final' constitution (1996) provided for a National House of Traditional Leaders with an advisory capacity. Therefore, while democratic elections seemed to be entrenched in local state structures, a form of Tribal Authority continued to operate, and even allocate communal tenure land, in rural areas without well-developed local councils.[29]

The reform period saw the gradual restoration of traditional-elite power. In a drastic policy shift in 1998, a White Paper on Local Government granted chiefs major role in rural councils and communities in reaction to dysfunctional elected councils and chiefly opposition to the councils. Under the auspices of so-called 'cooperative governance,' the government backtracked on its liberal reform agenda to curtail the power of traditional authorities and to

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[28] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 196 (*italics* in the original source).
[29] Ibid., pp. 197-8; Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 167.

thereby enhance local democracy. The changes crystalized in 2003 with major local governance legislation that saw the establishment of mostly unelected traditional councils, for ‘traditional’ community areas, with ‘enormous and unprecedented’ powers over communal land. The formal restoration of traditional authorities proceeded apace in subsequent years.[30]

In brief, instead of rooting out what Mamdani characterized as a colonial system of ‘decentralized despotism’ founded on chiefly authority in rural areas,[31] liberal reforms in South Africa and Namibia effected superficial changes in authoritarian traditional structures that undergirded racial segregation and bantustan separatism. The (re)institutionalization of colonial indirect-rule had the effect of curtailing popular democracy in rural areas and hampering the capacity of a centralized state to enact far-reaching socioeconomic changes in the countryside.

5.2 NEO-LIBERAL SOCIOECONOMIC REFORMS

The pursuit of sweeping socioeconomic transformations was no less, if not more, warranted in these cases. Yet, as we noted before, South African and Namibian leaders “faced a highly organized and powerful white economic power bloc and an international environment that demanded free-market liberalization and would obstruct any contrary major reforms.”[32] Hence, they abandoned long-held plans for the nationalization of the economic commanding heights, the radical redistribution of income, the nationalization of land, and accommodated big capital to gradually reform ‘racial capitalism’ and thereby reduce racial inequalities and poverty among blacks.[33] The (neo)liberal policies dramatically contrast with the destruction of capitalist

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[30] Ibid., pp. 198-200. In a similar fashion, in Namibia a Traditional Authorities Act of 1995 and subsequent legislation provided for the recognition, and augmented powers, of traditional chiefs.
[31] See Mamdani, *Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, 1996.
[32] Turok, *The Evolution of ANC Economic Policy*, p. 111.
[33] On highly collaborative liberation government—business relations, see Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 212-7; also, Scott Taylor, *Business and the State in Southern Africa: The Politics of Economic Reform* (London:

relations of production, the nationalization of capital, and the abolition of private property in the context of radical reforms.

The liberal reform episode was thus defined by policy measures to preserve capitalist relations of production, foster economic growth, and reduce historical inequalities and black deprivation. The apparently redistribution-after-growth reform framework prescribed that only after the economy grows would government embark upon income redistribution, social welfare, and expanded public services. The new state should nurture a black middle class from which wealth would trickle down to the majority poor—a policy ironically reminiscent of apartheid-era strategies to hatch a black capitalist class to moderate radical nationalist and redistributive demands. The concrete reform policies included: deracialization and liberalization of distorted capitalist economies, *black economic empowerment* (BEE), and liberal land and agrarian reforms, and the provision of deracialized, equitable and expanded public services. From the outset, political leaders adhered to prevailing global neoliberal principles of privatization, market liberalization, financial deregulation, and the entrenchment of property rights.

5.2.1 Capitalist Growth with Limited Redistribution

The liberal reform policies were certainly deeply rooted in the antecedent conditions. The highly distorted, inward-looing apartheid economies were in deep recession to provide a sound basis for progressive income redistribution and equitable development. Despite being the most advanced and with the most potential for income redistribution, the South African economy had been paralyzed by protective tariffs and high wages, restricted access to international markets, and overaccumulation with a stunted domestic market. The economy suffered from very low growth rates and extremely high racial inequalities. Inheriting a national economy with identical

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Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007); Antoinette Handley, "Business, Government, and Economic Policy-Making in the New South Africa, 1990-2000," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43, 2 (June 2005): 211-39.

distortions, high racial inequalities, and with limited industrial, mining, and commercial basis, Namibian national leaders were even 'massively circumscribed' in their freedom of action. Overdependence on South African markets, capital, and technology, and the withdrawal of South African budgetary represented an additional set of reform challenges.

Against this backdrop and harsh external neoliberal policy constraints, liberation elites need to balance economic growth with redistributive demands. This goal dominated policy debates at the onset of the reform period. For the new governments, postponing redistribution and welfare-spending would be a politically 'risky policy' while concentration on improving the conditions of the poor majority "would have rapidly exhausted [their] financial resources and neglected the structural reforms that were essential for growth."[34] Ultimately, however, redistribution was deprioritized because the prospect of sustained economic reform and growth, essential for gradual reduction of racial inequalities, black unemployment, and widespread poverty, depended upon attracting international assistance and increased foreign investment. Both governments, therefore, pursued policy frameworks that seemingly integrated reconstruction, development, and redistribution, but in essence (and increasingly so overtime) were explicitly market-driven in their approach to socioeconomic reform.[35]

In South Africa, the government adopted in 1994 a *Reconstruction and Development Program* (RDP), which was originally a remarkably progressive ANC policy document shunted of more radical exhortations for 'growth through redistribution.' The policy framework emphasized combining 'growth with development' as a precondition for more equitable society through the alleviation of poverty and the reconstruction of the economy. The more centrist

[34] Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, pp. 278-9.
[35] The most important policy documents are: The Parliament of The Republic of South Africa, "White Paper on Reconstruction and Development," *Government Gazette*, vol. 356, Notice No. 1954 of 1994; Government of the Republic of Namibia, *First National Development Plan (NDP1): 1995/1996–1999/2000* (Windhoek: National Planning Commission, 1996).

proponents (T. Mbeki and his policy advisors) prioritized growth and macro-economic stability over redistribution. But economic growth must be linked to broader development for growth without development would fail to bring about 'structural transformation'; purely pro-growth policies would accentuate existing inequalities and maintain mass poverty. Central planning was not more an option, but government would play 'a major enabling role' in syncing growth with economic development and socioeconomic change, while a reduced public sector would promote efficiency, job creation, and affirmative action to 'empower the historically oppressed.'[36]

The RDP program defined the reform agenda in South Africa for the 1994-96 period. For increased investments in manufacturing, job creation, and basic services, the government began to liberalize the economy, markets, and restrictions on foreign capital. It also liberalized labor while pushing for progressive labor policies—that stressed education, training, a 'living wage', and collective bargaining—affirmative action measures for skill development and non-discrimination in hiring and promotion.[37] In the agricultural sector, new policy measures removed subsidies and controls while providing for extension services for 'poor farmers' and women. Government acted as central to achieving RDP goals including through assisting small (especially black-owned) businesses with the allocation of contracts and access to banks loans. Yet the private sector was encouraged to act as a major partner in promoting reconstruction as well as in fulfilling basic needs for the vast masses of poor people.[38]

The market-driven reform policies and strategies led not surprisingly to a liberalized economy when the RDP program was abandoned in 1996. However, popular demands for 'better life for all' were far from being assuaged even though there had undoubtedly been remarkable expansion in education, primary healthcare, low-cost housing, piped water, electricity, and so on

[36] For this interpretation, see Lodge, *Politics in South Africa*, p. 54-5.
[37] Ibid., p. 55-6.
[38] See Turok, *The Evolution of ANC Economic Policy*, ch. 4; Bond, *Elite Transition*, ch. 3.

by the late 1990s. The level of government expenditure itself remained more or less while government deficit was substantially reduced between 1996 and 2001.[39] Consequently, there was minimal progress in reducing historical inequalities in income, employment, public services, and overall poverty when the RDP program was replaced by a full-blown neoliberal policy framework. In fact, apartheid-like racial inequalities persisted, inequalities among blacks widened dramatically, and non-whites (especially Africans) were disproportionately unemployed as before.[40] The liberal policy interventions and their socioeconomic outcomes thus sharply differ from the radical reforms that destroyed enduring racial and class inequalities.

In Namibia, the liberation government hardly developed a comparably holistic reform policy framework. Even though the formulation of reform programs involved the participation of both big business and labor as in the ANC's case, SWAPO's macro-economic policies "were aggressively pro-market, with little impact made by 'planning.'"[41] As in Zimbabwe during the reform episode, the government spoke of a "growth with equity" approach to reform and development set out in five-year National Development Plans. Yet, as was the case in South Africa, it pursued rather growth-oriented neoliberal reform and reconstruction strategies, with economic growth through the attraction of foreign investment as the most important reform goal. In the early reform years, the government pursued four major reform goals specified in the *First National Development Plan* (1995): increased economic growth, creating employment, reducing inequalities in income distribution, and cutting poverty.[42] The means for basic structural transformation would be sought on the basis of generating economic growth.

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[39] Ibid., pp. 57-60.
[40] Ibid., pp. 67-8; Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, p. 280.
[41] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 86.
[42] See Government of the Republic of Namibia, *First National Development Plan (NDP1)*, p. 39.

The reforms certainly liberalized the economy as in South Africa and generated considerable growth during the liberation episode. For the first two decades since 1990, the economy grew by an average 3.6 percent every year, leading to steady rise in average per capita income.[43] However, the liberal measures were ineffective to engender basic transformation in inherited economic structure and to thereby spur reconstruction and inclusive development, the reduction of gross social inequalities, and the elimination of poverty. By the early 2000s, the national economy still remained over-dependent on a declining mining sector, while efforts to expand the manufacturing sector proved disappointing. Consequently, employment rates in the 1990s remained lower than those in the previous decade and unemployment level almost doubled between 1995 and 2004, i.e., 37 percent by less restrictive measurement.[44]

For two-thirds of the population lived in rural areas and a large number of Namibians depended on subsistence farming, dismantling inherited inequities in the agricultural sector and enhancing productivity was more important for equitable development in Namibia. Yet, the government introduced agrarian and land reforms (see land reform below) that were rather belated and poorly defined.[45] As a result, the agricultural sector performed poorly during the reform years to become, as government policies underscored, the engine of post-liberation economic growth and poverty reduction. Additionally, in the absence of meaningful structural reforms, the agriculture sector remained dominated by settler commercial farming and devoted largely to livestock production like since before liberation.[46]

In sum, liberal socioeconomic reforms in Namibia helped in reducing inherited inequalities and poverty. Much like in post-liberation South Africa, however, ‘apartheid patterns’

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[43] R. Sherbourne, *Guide to the Namibian Economy 2010* (Windhoek: Inst. for Public Policy Research, 2010), p. 6.
[44] See Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 86-7.
[45] Sherbourne, *Guide to the Namibian Economy 2010*, pp. 81, 84
[46] Ibid., p. 79. Despite significant growth in the overall national economy after 1995, agriculture grew by less than 1.7 percent and subsistence agriculture by mere 0.4 percent annually.

of inequality persisted during the reform period and its aftermath; along with South Africa, Namibia (with 0.63 inequality index) had one of the most unequal and 'most polarized' societies worldwide.[47] The neo-liberal constraints on state action to bring about fundamental structural transformation hardened with the government's turn to international financial institutions in the early 2000s and adoption of market strategies to substantially reduce social spending. The embracing of heavily neoliberal policies by South African leaders had already taken place with a dramatic policy shift in 1996 that deprioritized income redistribution and welfare policies.

5.2.1.1 The '1996 Class Project' in South Africa

The latter part of the reform period saw further drift towards orthodox neoliberal reform policies. This was particularly the case in South Africa with the so-called '1996 class project' and the abandonment of social equity and inclusive development goals. The failure to meet growth targets, attract foreign investments, and reduce inequalities led the government to ditch the more Keynesian RDP reform agenda and espouse Washington-Consensus policies unabashedly structured in favor of foreign and local capital. It adopted an altogether neoliberal policy framework, the *Growth, Equity, and Redistribution* (GEAR) program, which emphasized market growth over immediate alleviation of poverty. The new approach was expected to create a "mutually beneficial accommodation with domestic and international capital, in which drastic and conservative economic adjustments could be reconciled with the goal of quickly engineering a black capitalist class and achieving social upliftment."[48]

Let us first consider the determinants of the policy turn-around that crucially highlight contingency and choice of the reform episode. Dubbed as 'the 1996 class project', GEAR was

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[47] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 87-8.

[48] Hein Marais, *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change* (Claremont: University of Cape Town Press, 2011), p. 109.

seen by some as the ultimate triumph of a capitalist petit bourgeoisie within the ANC. The more satisfactory explanation nevertheless lays in the political dynamics of the reform episode itself. First off, the initial liberal choice taken by liberation elites had a lock-in effect in that the next steps were most likely to lead to a more liberal direction given its neoliberal world-historical context. Both the structures that produced the liberal reform choice in the first place and new structures produced by the choice itself all favored progressive movement down a (neo)liberal path. The pro-market strategies had returned the economy to growth levels, which suggested to policymakers that faster growth could be achieved if remaining economic restrictions were removed. Secondly, international factors conspired with domestic events to cement an orthodox neoliberal reform agenda. At this point, the influence of the international financial institutions had intensified to bring enormous pressure to bear on a government frustrated by negligible economic progress and persistently high inequalities and unemployment.[49]

Last, the crystallization of a class coalition around the liberal reforms was crucial in shaping the reform dynamics. Some analysts point to the absence of marked changes in the ruling Tripartite Alliance or the ascendancy of a particular group within the ANC—historically a 'broad church' movement of oppressed classes and national groups—at this juncture to down play class factors.[50] Yet, class dynamics cannot be underestimated at this stage when the introduction of GEAR itself coincided with a rising black middle class and deepening relations between political and business elites. The 'class project,' as leftist critiques charged, was basically driven by big capital and an aspirant black capitalist class championed by Vice President Thabo Mbeki and a centrist group of leaders in charge of economic ministries and institutions. As Habibi and Taylor asserted, GEAR reflected "a changing balance of class forces

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[49] See Turok, *The Evolution of ANC Economic Policy*, pp. 57-8; Bond, *Elite Transition*, p. 36.
[50] For example, Lodge, *Politics in South Africa*, pp. 30-1 in his analysis of 'Who rules South Africa?'

in South Africa whereby capital has gained the upper hand over the country's reconstruction and development needs."[51] Not incidentally, the SACP and COSATU were alienated by GEAR—from its formulation through its implementation.[52]

The GEAR framework simply 'codified' liberalization as the 'official policy' and accelerated economic growth as the reform-policy priority. The actual policy instruments, in Southall's words, represented a full-blown 'neoliberal menu'[53] that, in short, pushed the realization of socioeconomic equality, justice, and empowerment to the policy backseat. The new policy framework, unlike the ill-fated RDP program, "set no redistributive targets and demurred on the linkage between growth and income redistribution;" redistribution would supposedly naturally occur from job creation and targeted public expenditure, which would allow wealth trickle down without extensive state and the public sector interference.[54] Thus, after 1997, the government embarked on unrestrained liberalization, deregulation, and extensive privatization of a hitherto inward-looking and highly protectionist South African economy.

Nonetheless, as was the case in Namibia, the neoliberal reforms failed to effect 'fundamental transformation' of the national economy, which remained as much white-minority dominated and concentrated in the mineral-energy complex (MEC) as in prior decades, or to advance modest objectives of speedy economic growth, employment creation, and diversification through the development of an export-driven manufacturing sector. The uneven development patterns of the late settler-colonial era persisted in the form of 'two economies.' The economy began to expand significantly in the first-half of the 2000s; yet, actual GDP growth rate (average

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[51] Adam Habib and Rupert Taylor, "Daring to Question the Tripartite Alliance: A Response to Southall and Wood," *Transformation*, 40 (1999), p. 115.
[52] See Patrick Bond, "Contradictions Subside Then Deepen: Accumulation and Class Conflict," in Saul and Bond, *South Africa – The Present as History*, p. 150, Turok, *The Evolution of ANC Economic Policy*, p. 116.
[53] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 91-2.
[54] Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, pp. 113, 116.

3 percent) in the 1995-2003 period was much lower than planned targets and precariously driven by primary commodity exports.[55] Moreover, despite some progressive labor legislation, racial inequalities in employment persisted while unemployment rates increased (up to 37 percent in 1999) and remained consistently higher over the next decade.[56]

The genuine socioeconomic change was thus hampered. Neoliberal measures resulted in "the persistence of inequality, unemployment, poverty, and the huge costs of consequent social problems such as crime, Aids, and disease."[57] Under Mandela's presidency, relatively expanded public investments in healthcare, clean water, electricity, state-subsidized housing, and a social grant program contributed to improved life for the majority poor. Such measures were, at best, tenuous from the outset and, at worst, increasingly sacrificed for macroeconomic stability to bring about far-reaching changes, especially in the absence of comprehensive development programs that could widen mass access to education, healthcare, housing, clean water, etc.[58] To make matters worse, since late 1990s, public services progressively deteriorated such that poverty rates increased by the concluding phase of the liberation episode.[59] The government made a rhetorical return to the RDP program in 1998-99; however, only the more 'neo-liberal features' of the document were implemented, and commitments to meeting and expanding basic needs were, in the main, abandoned.[60]

The socioeconomic reforms, as in Namibia, reproduced high inequalities exhibiting 'strong racial and spatial patterns' of the late settler-colonial stage. From the outset, as Spark noted, "a new class stratification [was] gradually beginning to overlay South Africa's old racial

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[55] See Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 93, 95.
[56] See Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, p. 118; Bond, "Contradictions Subside Then Deepen," pp. 152-5.
[57] Turok, *The Evolution of ANC Economic Policy*, p. 135.
[58] See Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, chapter 10; Bond, *Elite Transition*, chapter 4.
[59] Ibid., pp. 204-5.
[60] Bond, "Contradictions Subside Then Deepen," p. 151

strata, never completely eliminating the old divisions but blurring them and adding a different dimension."[61] And by mid-2000s, the stark apartheid patterns of racial inequality persisted as the wealthy still remained overwhelmingly white while the poor almost exclusively African and Colored.[62] In both South Africa and Namibia, the reforms also led to widening class inequalities among blacks as a small, but fast growing, black bourgeoisie and lower-middle classes were nurtured in the public and private sectors. This was in part occasioned by yet another component of the liberal reforms in South Africa and Namibia, i.e., black economic empowerment program.

5.2.2 Black Economic Empowerment – BEE

The strategy of 'black empowerment' served as a pragmatic approach to deracializing settler-colonial capitalism without scaring away large-scale capital. It was imperative that liberation governments harness state power to afford blacks with new economic opportunities in part because—without extensive settler departure with national liberation—the national economies would remain under white domination and in part because aspirant black capitalists lacked capital and other resources to compete independently. For large-scale capital, black advancement was key to moderate mass aspirations and leftist demands for radical redistribution and nationalization policies. In particular, promoting sections of black business would help 'entrench conservative interests' and "serve as a buffer against more extensive assaults on the structure of ownership and modus operandi of corporate capital.[63]

The strategies for 'black empowerment' expanded from initial policy measures for expanding black ownership, management, and control in the economy to employment equity, skill development, enterprise development, and so on for the historically disadvantaged. The

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[61] Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, p. 238.
[62] See Seekings and Nattrass, *Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa*, pp. 303-13.
[63] B. Fine and Z. Rustomjee, "Debating the South African Minerals-Energy Complex: A Response to Bell and Farrell," *Development Southern Africa*, 15, 4 (Summer 1998), p. 699.

program was more well-defined, comprehensive, and introduced much earlier in South Africa, where capital actively charted a path for negotiated transition to majority rule and subsequently took proactive measures for 'black empowerment' during the transition years. Thus, in the early phase that lasted until 1997-98, large-scale capital in South Africa "masterminded and initiated the initial deals in the absence of an overarching framework." In most part, large white corporations handed out shares to aspiring black elites, some prominent ANC leaders included, with the principal goals of rapidly assembling a black African bourgeoise sympathetic to capitalist interests in the context of black rule.[64] Big capital capitalized on BEE policies to neutralize radical economic ambitions within the ANC and its Leftist allies, secure influence in policy formulation, and benefit from contracts under the liberation government.[65]

On its part, the liberation government sought to empower blacks by means of deracializing the state, public enterprise, and the private sector. The political agenda in the eyes of liberation elites was that the strategy would help launch "the rapid emergence of a black African bourgeoisie sympathetic to the ideals of national liberation," a 'patriotic bourgeoisie' that "would challenge or even displace the incumbent white [capitalist] elite."[66] Besides advancing blacks in the civil service as discussed earlier, thus ANC-led government exploited an extensive parastatal sector inherited from apartheid to expand the black middle class by appointing blacks in managerial positions as well as privatization and procurement schemes. The advancement of blacks within the state-owned enterprises served as springboard for aspiring black capitalists to move into the private sector as shareholders, directors, and executives.

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[64] Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, p. 140.
[65] M. Mbeki, *Architects of Poverty: Why South African Capitalism Needs Changing* (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2009), pp. 66-74.
[66] Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, p. 140.

The measures enabled a small class of black political and business elites make inroads in the mining, finance, manufacturing, and other sectors of the economy. However, the impact was minimal especially in the private sector, and the scope of empowerment too narrow because of exploitation by those with political connections within the ANC and the state. The resulting disenchantment among marginalized elements of the black business class led to the second, 'broad-based' BEE phase in which the state vowed to adopt a more interventionist strategy. A Black Economic Empowerment commission (1998) called for the "adoption of a wide-ranging, state-driven program which would set guidelines and regulations, fix targets, and establish obligations for the private sector, public sector, and civil service over a ten-year period."[67] The Mbeki government introduced a series of legislation, beginning in 2001, for a Broad-Based BEE (BBBEE) program with relatively rigorous racial equity and empowerment measures for 'increased black ownership, recruitment, and other targets' required by capital to meet.

The public sector had been transformed at the conclusion of the reform period by rapid black advancement (see Table 5.4). However, government measures were less effective at deracializing the private sector, much less to advance black control of the 'commanding heights of the economy.' There was little transfer of wealth to black business; in fact, black empowerment policies continued to serve as vehicles for 'elite enrichment' in a crony capitalism by a small, politically connected black capitalist class, which failed to distinguish itself from the incumbent white 'economic oligarchy' or to constitute 'a driving, economically productive force.'[68] Moreover, affirmative action in employment and promotion effected visible changes in racial representation in the private sector but at a much slower pace. By mid-2000s, blacks (and women) at management levels constituted a small percentage of executives; while the majority

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[67] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 221-2.
[68] M. Mbeki quoted in Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, p. 143.

of blacks remained concentrated at lower levels, whites dominated the top and middle-level positions for all occupational categories.[69] The failure to systematically redress racial imbalances—and the elitist nature of empowerment policies—inaugurated in 2003 a third phase of a more comprehensive BBBEE implemented in the aftermath of the liberation episode. However, at this stage the reform period had deepened a distinct pattern of racial and class inequalities that gave rise to a pro-redistribution popular backlash that resulted in the demise in 2007 of Thabo Mbeki as party and government leader.

Table 5.4: Changes in the Racial Composition of South African Public Service

	1995 % (total)	2001 % (total)	2005 % (total)
Blacks	75.3 (954,994)	84.8 (869,6300)	86.2 (-)
Whites	24.7 (312,772)	15.2 (155,507)	13.8 (-)

Source: Milne, "Affirmative Action in South Africa," p. 978, and Naidoo, "Assessing Racial Redress in the Public Service," p. 111, for 2005.

In Namibia, no well-articulated and comprehensive framework for black empowerment was developed during nearly a decade-and-half of reforms. The liberation reforms period was mainly defined by 'piecemeal measures' relating to affirmative action, land reform, the fishing sector, and loan schemes.'[70] The government pursued policies aimed at promoting black business and uplifting the mass of poor blacks without clear references to BEE until the establishment of a black empowerment commission (1998) in South Africa. In the early 2000s, it embarked on a more ambitious promotion of black economic interests but still without a clearly defined policy framework for broad-based black empowerment. The policy vacuum led more and more (financial sector) capital to voluntarily formulate own black empowerment charters following the

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[69] See Geoffrey Modisha, "Affirmative Action and Cosmopolitan Citizenship in South Africa," in Habib and Bentley, eds., *Racial Redress and Citizenship in South Africa*, pp. 163-7.
[70] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 225.

example of its counterpart in South Africa. Yet, capital too had begun to take serious initiatives to introduce own BEE measures only in the early 2000s.[71]

Limited available evidence indicates that a raft of 'affirmative action' measures taken between the early 1990s and the early 2000s led to substantial 'Namibianization' of the fishing industry (a major sector in Namibia), the empowerment of communal farmers and of black Namibians in commercial farming through an agricultural loan scheme, and considerable increase in local ownership in the banking sector.[72] As in South Africa, the bureaucracy and a State-Owned Enterprises sector played a critical role than the private sector in providing blacks with access to skills, income, and capital. Moreover, the black empowerment strategies were fraught with similar shortcomings that thwarted the BEE program in South Africa: i.e., the enrichment of political elites, rent-seeking, and widening black class differences. The government's efforts to reverse racial imbalances without "any overall coherent, transparent, and accountable policy framework" allowed a small class of black political and business elites close to political power to reap the rewards.[73]

Overall, the reform policies fell far short of effecting broader redistribution and empowerment for meaningful 'racial redress' which, together with the absence of a resolute government agenda for basic socioeconomic transformation, contributed to the persistence of racial inequities and the emergence of new class inequalities.

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[71] See Sherbourne, *Guide to the Namibian Economy 2010*, pp. 385-8.
[72] For a detailed examination, see N. Shejavali, "2 BEE or Not 2 BEE?: An Eclectic Review of Namibia's Black Economic Empowerment Landscape," IPPR Research Report No. 10 August 2007; F. Fleermuys et al, "Overview of Broad-Based Economic Empowerment in Namibia," in Bank of Namibia, *Broad Based Economic Empowerment: Experiences From Other Developing Countries* (Windhoek: Bank of Namibia 2007), 13-63.
[73] Sherbourne, *Guide to the Namibian Economy 2010*, p. 383.

5.2.3 Liberal Land and Agrarian Reforms

Radical redistribution of land served as a fiery mobilizing cause of all the revolutionary struggles in Southern Africa. Analysts far too often emphasize antecedent conditions or the absence of popular demand for radical land redistribution to explain the liberal land and agrarian reforms in these countries. As shown in Chapter Two, however, of all the five countries South Africa and Namibia had the worst racial imbalances in land use and ownership, with most productive land reserved for settler agriculture, by the late settler-colonial era. This clearly warranted the sort of radical land and agrarian transformations that defined the liberation episode in Mozambique and Angola. Yet, the reform years in South Africa and Namibia were marked by liberal, 'market-led' land reforms, which eventually shifted emphasis from addressing land inequalities to cultivating a class of black commercial farmers.

The liberal land reforms were defined by the liberal reform choice writ large and the distinctive dynamics of the reform period. Having assumed power after political settlements, liberation leaders were tethered to 'entrenched property rights' and a 'liberal, market-driven approach' to land reform based on 'willing buyer, willing seller' (WBWS) principles. Wholesale land expropriations were barred by constitutional 'property clauses' and land for redistribution must be purchased from willing sellers through 'just' and 'equitable' compensation.[74] On the other hand, harsh neoliberal policy constraints imposed by the international financial institutions at this stage aborted prospects for far-reaching land and agrarian reforms in the countryside. Forced expropriations of settler farmland in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s served the liberation

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[74] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 232-3; P. Kaapama, "Commercial Land Reforms In Postcolonial Namibia: What Happened To Liberation Struggle Rhetoric?," in Melber, ed., *Transitions in Namibia,* pp. 33-4.

governments as a rude awakening to the potentially 'disastrous impact' of radical land reforms "upon investor confidence and international reputation."[75]

The liberal reform policies in South Africa and Namibia were thus characterized by a slow, marked-driven approach to land and agrarian reform. In Namibia, a government-sponsored consultative National Conference on the Land Question (1991) striving to achieve a national consensus on postcolonial land reforms laid down the legislative and policy instruments for liberal land reforms. The resolutions stressed the importance of redressing past injustices in land ownership as well as the adoption of a willing buyer-willing seller strategy, which came to undergird major legislation in subsequent years.[76] The policy focus was the redistribution of 'underutilized' (white-owned) commercial land and the empowerment of the historically marginalized groups, with the overall objective of nurturing a class of black commercial farmers and freeing up farmland in communal areas for small-scale farmers. The government introduced a land resettlement program (2001) to resettle landless small-scale farmers on newly acquired land, and an Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS, 1992) to extend state subsidies, loans, and extension services to the black and communal farming sector.[77]

The reform and rural resettlement process had little impact on imbalances in agricultural land use and ownership in Namibia. Between 1992-2003, only some 3.1 million hectares of land were purchased under the AALS scheme, which prompted at the 2002 SWAPO Congress exhortations for increase resources and accelerated land reforms. The government acquired only 90 farms throughout the country in the first ten years of independence—a pace that only 900 farms (less than 20 percent of the total number of commercial farms) would be acquired in 100

[75] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 233.
[76] These were the Land Reform Act of 1995, White Paper on Resettlement Policy (2001), and the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002. See Sidney L. Harring and Willem Odendaal, '*One Day We Will All Be Equal': A Socio-Legal Perspective on the Namibian Land Reform and Resettlement Process* (Windhoek: Legal Assis. Centre, 2002), p. 31.
[77] See Kaapama, "Commercial Land Reforms in Postcolonial Namibia," pp. 39, 43.

years. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation was unable to meet its anticipated target for the redistribution of 9.5 million hectares (approximately 25 percent) of commercial agricultural land within five years of the Second National Development Plan (2000–2005).[78] The land reform program was hampered as much by the government's reluctance to irritate foreign donors, financial constraints to purchase farms, and the recognition of the commercial sector's dominant role in agriculture production as by corruption and self-enrichment by an emerging black agricultural elite at the expense of the landless majority poor.[79]

Liberal land reforms in South Africa had similar outcomes but took a distinctive approach. Whereas the SWAPO government in Namibia adopted a reform strategy whereby the state assumed responsibility for land acquisition and redistribution as in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, the ANC government embraced a World Bank-approved reform program which envisaged limited role for the state "whereby it would provide grants to prospective beneficiaries of land distribution who would buy land from sellers directly."[80] Further, the program distinguished between three kinds of land reforms: (i) 'land redistribution' or the transfer of white-owned commercial land to African users; (ii) 'land restitution' or the restoration of land or financial compensation to victims of forced dispossession; and (iii) 'tenure reform' within and outside the former ethnic homelands.[81] The reform-policy framework, the White Paper on South African Land Policy, was adopted in 1997 after a lengthy consultation process involving *inter alia* rural communities, commercial farmers, and international donors and financial institutions.

Land redistribution formed the thrust of the 'market-led' land reform program. In its early phase (1994-1999), the redistribution program had a twofold purpose to transfer land to the

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[78] Southall, Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 240-1; Harring and Odendaal, *A Socio-Legal Perspective on the Namibian Land Reform and Resettlement Process,* p. 96.
[79] Ibid, p. 241; also, see Kaapama, "Commercial Land Reforms in Postcolonial Namibia," p. 40.
[80] Ibid., p. 233.
[81] Bond, *Politics in South Africa*, p. 72.

landless to ameliorate historical inequalities, and promote smallholder farming to enhance agricultural production. [82] Redistribution was facilitated by a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) scheme, whereby government distributed small grants to poor households for land purchase. Even though the process became relatively extensive in the late 1990s (see Figure 5.1), less than one percent of total commercial farmland had been redistributed in 1999—a small fraction of the original target to transfer at least 30 percent of the country's commercial land to the rural poor within the first five years of the program.[83] Efforts were hampered as much by the government's inadequate institutional, technical, and financial resources as by the deregulation of the agricultural sector and drastic cuts on agricultural budget in conjunction with the GEAR reform-policy framework.[84]

Figure 5.1: Patterns of Land Reform in South Africa, 1994-2002



Source: Hall, "A Political Economy of Land Reform in South Africa," p. 216.

The shortcomings prompted a major policy shift in 1999. During the second phase (1999-2004) of land reforms in South Africa, a new Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program adopted in 2000 shifted policy focus from the transfer of land to the poor and

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[82] Ruth Hall, "*Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa: A Status Report 2004*," University of the Western Cape, Research Report No. 20*,* December 2004, pp. 5-6.
[83] Bond, *Politics in South Africa*, pp. 73, 75.
[84] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 242.

landless to the development of a class of black capitalist farmers[85]—a pro-market approach consistent with changes in macro-economic policy discussed earlier. As Figure 5.1 shows, land transfers picked up pace under the new program, which largely displaced the pro-poor SLAG program, aided by increased agricultural budgets as well as improved service delivery, employment creation, and poverty reduction in areas of redistribution and settlement that lacked in the SLAG program. However, the scale of land transfers after 2001 declined below the annual rate (2.1 mil. hectares) required to realize the revised target of redistributing 30 percent of agricultural land by 2015. Ever fewer poor people benefited from the market-driven reform program by the end of the reform episode; moreover, more than half of land transfers were made in the semi-arid Northern Cape province.[86]

Land restitution unfolded at an even slower pace. Contrary to claims of the absence of popular demands among the rural poor for radical land redistribution in South Africa and Namibia, the forced removals of black people to enforce racial segregation—and to consolidate the bantustan homelands in the second-half of the twentieth century—furnished a potent base for popular pressure in the 1990s. The ANC government adopted in 1994 a restitution policy to restore the land rights of people unjustly dispossessed since the Natives Land Act (1913). But the program was paralyzed by both the property rights constraints on land reform as well as the technical complexity of the process itself. After 1999, the program gained momentum after the adoption of an 'administrative route' whereby the state sought negotiated settlements with claimants in leu of a 'court process.'[87] Yet, whereas urban claims to residential land were often resolved, rural claims by entire communities to large tracts of rural land were left almost

[85] Ruth Hall, "A Political Economy of Land Reform in South Africa," *Review of African Political Economy*, 31, 100 (June 2004), p. 216.
[86] Ibid., p. 216; Hall, Land *and Agrarian Reform in South Africa*, pp. 8-9, 26.
[87] Ibid., p. 217.

unaddressed. Moreover, as with land redistribution, land transferred to black through restitution was a 'low-value' land disproportionately located in semi-aridic parts of the country, leaving largely untouched 'high-value' commercial farmland owned by white farmers.

Finally, the reform of land tenure in the former homelands signaled attempts at broader land and agrarian changes in the countryside. However, securing the ownership rights of labor tenants and farm dwellers proved exceedingly difficult owing to its inherent contradictions with the property rights guarantees of the overall liberal reform choice. On the other hand, expectations of tenure reform in the communal areas, where land ownership rights were most insecure and the system of land administration had all but collapsed before liberation, were also not acted upon for the better part of the liberation period. A policy introduced in 2001 failed to grant ownership rights to land occupants for it instead transferred land to 'traditional African communities' as communal property and thereby guaranteed chiefly control over communal land.[88] Consequently, preexisting social structures in rural areas were entrenched and problems of landlessness and poverty in the overcrowded former 'native reserves,' which continued to house nearly a third of the black population during the reform years, persisted as ever.

In sum, liberal land reforms in both Namibia and South Africa strikingly contrasted with the radical land and agrarian transformations in post-liberation Mozambique and Angola. The market-led reform strategies were pursued without a clear policy framework for wide-ranging land and agrarian reforms as a means of poverty reduction and rural development. Whereas the program in Namibia lacked in legislation for tenure reform in the communal areas, land reform in South Africa proceeded in the absence of policies for broader rural resettlement and development. Therefore, in both countries the reform policies contributed to the reproduction of preexisting racial inequalities, the rise of new class inequalities, and the persistence of poverty in

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[88] Ibid., pp. 218-9.

the former rural homelands. The resulting racial and class polarization over land engendered a strong leftist political backlash against the governments in the first half of the 2000s.

5.3 NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND INCLUSION AS NATION-BUILDING

In a third defining feature of the liberal-reform episode in South Africa and Namibia, nationalist leaders pursued an all-inclusive, democratic approach to nation-building. The historical antecedents would have warranted some radical political measures against arguably the most deep-seated racial, ethnic, tribal, and other divisions in the region under settler-colonial rule. Whereas liberation leaders in Angola and Mozambique contended more with a legacy of low socio-economic and geographic integration, their allies in South Africa and Namibia inherited systematically racialized and tribalized societies after nearly a century of racial segregation and apartheid divide-and-rule policies, which created much deeper fault-lines among not only Black and White, but also Black against Black, Colored against Indian, and so forth. The policy of 'separate development' engineered bantustan homelands designed to perpetuate immutable inter-African divisions and thereby white-minority supremacy (see Chapter Two).

Following liberation, political elites set out to erase the legal and physical underpinnings of deep-seated racial, ethnic, and regional differences (see Map 5.1). However, ANC and SWAPO leaders pursued broadly inclusive, multi-culturalist nation-building projects that rested on the recognition, not displacement, of political and cultural pluralism—an approach diametrically opposed to the radical nation-building projects in Mozambique and Angola characterized by intolerance, repression, and violent exclusion of subnational identities. Liberation leaders in the former pursued a 'policy of national reconciliation' and political inclusion as means to forge national unity and identity. They adopted distinctive legislative and

policy instruments to build an overarching 'national culture' encompassing the historical and cultural heritage of diverse racial, ethnic, and regional subcultures. The cross-national distinctions receive due attention, but the analysis focuses more on general conceptual categories that help to understand the shared political features and outcomes of the reform period.

5.3.1 The 'Rainbow Nation': South Africa

The underlying premise of the policy of 'national reconciliation' popularized by Nelson Mandela is that it was essential to come to terms with past injustices, divisions, and conflicts to chart a new path of harmonious coexistence among previously antagonistic racial, ethnic, regional, and other national groups. The envisaged more just, inclusive, non-racial national community transcending a history of strife and conflict was conceptualized as a 'Rainbow Nation' of South Africa. As a metaphor, the 'rainbow nation' symbolized "a range of cultural groups represented by discrete colors and hues which blur into one another" and the 'co-existence,' unity, and 'representation' of different cultures and of "a shared South Africanness."[89] The construction of such nation hinged on multiculturalism, that fosters the twin imperatives of, on the one hand, a sense of belonging to "the broader South African community" and, on the other, the existence of "cultural diversity and accommodate group identities such as cultural or ethnic minorities."[90]

To this end, Mandela's government pursued a multitude of measures to enhance national reconciliation, unity, and inclusion. The ANC (and rival) elites accepted a five-year interim Government of National Unity inclusive of all parties with a minimal threshold of popular support in the historically inclusive 1994 elections. The ANC shared power with its former adversaries in a multiracial consensus government, while incorporating into the liberation

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[89] Garry Baines, "The Rainbow Nation?: Identity and Nation Building in Post-Apartheid South-Africa," *Mots Pluriels*, no. 7 (1998), p. 9.
[90] Ibid., p. 5.

government leaders of the bantustan homelands as well as the anti-apartheid social and labor movements alike. The process included all major parties in a governing coalition that fostered "cross-ethnic and cross-racial compromises and alliances."[91] Minority-group rights were guaranteed, while the new state and national institutions were made to serve as arenas of political representation and inclusion of various political actors, groups, and organizations. For example, the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) incorporated forces from the old South African Defence Force (SADF), the uMkhonto we Sizwe guerrilla army, the PAC's Azanian People's Liberation Army, and the four 'independent' homelands.

With radical reforms, political leaders pushed an exclusive nationalism centered on the ideals, symbols, and visions of the victorious revolutionary liberation movements. The one-party structures meant to engineer national cohesion thoroughly excluded old regime actors, non-revolutionary liberation movements, and political and civic associations, which deepened old and new divisions. In the context of liberal reforms, the liberal constitutional dispensation guaranteed participation in—and contestation of—the new national institutions, symbols, and historical narrative by various political and societal forces. Various actors (e.g., Africanist PAC party, the IFP party, and homeland elites) with political goals antagonistic to the ANC's were engaged in the process of nation-state construction. To foster unity and inclusion, following liberation the ANC itself came to balance and represent an amalgam of discrete actors (i.e., 'exile' leaders, the 'inxiles' or leaders of the internal mass movements) especially during the Mandela leadership.

The liberation government propagated an 'inclusive nationalism cognizant of cultural diversity.'[92] This was reflected in the new national symbols and ideals that were as broadly representative of the country's disparate racial, ethnic, and cultural groups as possible. For

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[91] See Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, p. 212.
[92] Ibid., p. 213.

instance, the new national flag symbolized the convergence of South Africa's diverse social groups on a road of national unity, while the new national anthem amalgamating lyrics of the apartheid state and struggle against it to emphasize national reconciliation and unity.[93] Additionally, the reforms involved neither a one-sided rewriting of national history nor the sweeping 'Africanization' and revolutionary rebranding of national institutions, symbols, holidays, cities, streets, etc. that defined the reform episode in Mozambique and Angola. Several decades later, for instance, Afrikaans and English names—the unpalatable vestiges of settler-colonial domination—continue to dominate the landscape features and public space.[94] following political liberation, the victorious popular movements' partisan narratives, ideals, and aspirations of the armed struggle and revolutionary change were not imposed as the sole ideational and cultural basis of nation-state construction.

Furthermore, attempts to redress past inequities and injustices constituted another strategy to strengthen national reconciliation and cohesion in a deeply polarized society. The redistributive measures discussed earlier were in part conceived as a means of forging 'social cohesion' requisite for cultivating national belonging and solidarity.[95] Yet, the more concrete strategy of national redress and reconciliation involved a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) formed in 1995 to investigate acts of political crime and violence during the liberation struggle. The process of revealing the truth by all parties, who fought for and against the apartheid regime, was deemed essential for achieving lasting political reconciliation and the birth of a new nation-state. The TRC's success in bringing about national or racial reconciliation was widely debated. It is worth emphasis that some of its very shortcomings (e.g., avoiding

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[93] Elirea Bornman, "National Symbols and Nation-Building in The Post-Apartheid South Africa," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 30 (2006), p. 384.
[94] Beinart, *Twentieth-Century South Africa*, p. 340.
[95] See V. Barolsky, "The 'State' of Social Cohesion: Re-Stating the Question of Social Cohesion and 'Nation-Building,'" in U. Pillay et al, eds., *State of the Nation: South Africa 2012–2013* (Pre.: HSRC Press, 2013): 378-398.

punishment of perpetrators or collective responsibility for apartheid crimes) stemmed precisely from its preoccupation with promoting forgiveness and reconciliation.[96]

Finally, the nation-building agenda in South Africa was informed by some form of multiculturalism. Principles of cultural diversity and equality were enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Of all four post-liberation countries, the liberal liberation constitution in South Africa recognized eleven national languages, with English as the official language of public record, and the right of groups to preserve and foster their cultural heritage. National provinces were granted with the right to make own language policies, and citizens the freedoms to use own language, participate in own cultural life, and associate with organizations representing ethnic, racial, linguistic community interests.[97] Therefore, South African liberation leaders clearly pursued liberal strategies to nurture unity among the country's heterogenous and deeply divided racial, ethnic, and cultural groups despite not explicitly espousing a policy of multiculturalism or federal system granting autonomy to provinces or cultural groupings.

In a nutshell, the liberal approach informed and reinforced by the principle of 'unity in diversity' dominated the process of constructing cohesive national identity in post-apartheid South Africa. Some scholars rightly insist that the ANC's commitment to non-racialism annunciated in the 1955 Freedom Charter had always been tempered by a powerful strand of Africanist vision of the 'imagined community' inherently in tension with the Charterist 'rainbow nation' idea of a multiracial national community.[98] Such claims find evidence in some ANC documents of the reform period, and the idea of 'African Renaissance' promoted by Thabo

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[96] This is consistent with other reform as well. Some critics rightly charged that the paramount goal of nation-building had supplanted the goals to address racial inequities; that the Reconstruction and Development Program was, at best, subordinated or, worse still, sacrificed for national/racial reconciliation requisite for nation-building. See, for example, Baines, "Identity and Nation Building in Post-Apartheid South-Africa," p. 7.
[97] Ibid., p. 5; Bornman, "National Symbols and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa," p. 385.
[98] See I. Filatova, "The Rainbow Against the African Sky or African Hegemony in a Multi-Cultural Context?" *Transformation*, 34 (1997): 47-56.

Mbeki, which celebrated a South African-ness constructed around values of the African majority or the assertion of "African hegemony in the context of a multicultural and non-racial society." However, at any rate, such rhetoric of exclusive African nationalism was hardly clearly articulated or asserted[99] to amount to an actual policy strategy, much less to compare to the political strategies characterized radical reforms or stalled-liberal reforms (in Zimbabwe) that rejected racial, ethnic, and cultural particularities as the antithesis of national unity and stability.

5.3.2 'Unity in Diversity': Namibia

Nation-building reforms in Namibia were similarly based on the principle of 'Unity in diversity' that undergirded the 'rainbow nation' model in South Africa. The overall policy framework was informed and reinforced by a policy of 'national reconciliation' entrenched in the liberation predicated on SWAPO's anti-colonial nationalism and its struggle ideals to presumably "combat any manifestations and tendencies of tribalism, regionalism, ethnic orientation, and racial discrimination."[100] The liberation government thus set out to pursue more decisive policy instruments to promote the ideal of a 'Namibian nation' by uprooting the divisive apartheid legacy through the deracialization and 'de-ethnicization' of both state and society. These reform measures included the instant abolition of homeland structures, drawing new administrative regions, and a policy of a neutral (English) national language.[101] It emphasized a dominant, nationalist 'national culture' as the sole basis of constructing a cohesive national polity.

[99] See Bundy, "New Nation, New History?: Constructing the Past in Post-Apartheid South Africa," in H. E. Stolten, ed., *History Making and Present Day Politics* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet), pp. 81-2.
[100] Swapo of Namibia, *Political Program of the South West Africa People's Organization* (Lusaka: SWAPO, 1976), p. 6. Also, see André du Pisani, "The Discursive Limits of SWAPO's Dominant Discourse on Anti-Colonial Nationalism in Postcolonial Namibia – A First Exploration," in A. du Pisani, et al, eds., *The Long Aftermath of War – Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia* (Freiburg: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, 2010): 1-40."
[101] See Ingolf Diener, "Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Towards Unity Respectful of Heterogeneity?' in I. Diener and O. Graefe, eds., *Contemporary Namibia: The First Landmarks of a Post-Apartheid Society* (Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan, 2001), pp. 252-3; Leif J. Fosse, "Negotiating the Nation: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Nation-Building in Independent Namibia," *Nations and Nationalism*, 3, 3 (1997), pp. 432-3.





Map 5.1: New Provinces in Post-Liberation South Africa and Namibia

In a major policy shift, in 1995, the government embraced the principle of 'Unity in Diversity' as a nation-building basis. The political shift might have been partly caused by the inherent limitations of anti-colonialism nationalism; that is, "once the state of colonial oppression had come to an end, the newly and hard-fought freedom allowed for multiple, political subject positions which go beyond the colonial dominator-dominated dichotomy and may be 'national' as much as they may be sub-national, regional and/or ethnic."[1] Yet, it was also likely that the less inclusionary political approach was in tension with the overall liberal policy choice and was difficult to sustain in a more liberal world-historical period of the liberation episode. Like in South Africa, the principles of cultural and political pluralism were entrenched in the Bill of Rights, emphasizing national reconciliation, unity, and equality irrespective of "race, color, ethnic origin, … or social or economic status" as well as the liberty "to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion…"[2] This, along with an external context of political and economic (neo)liberalism, certainly presented a major hurdle to imposing willy-nilly a hegemonic 'national culture.'

Nevertheless, the reform episode from the outset was defined by a policy of 'national reconciliation' and inclusion. Unlike in South Africa, the externally brokered settlement for majority rule did not require power-sharing among Namibia's major political actors. Yet, much as in South Africa, laying down the foundations of democracy and post-liberation national construction was a conciliatory and inclusive process that rested upon an 'elite' or 'transitional pact' comprising SWAPO and the conservative DTA which, as the official parliamentary opposition after 1990, certainly created obstacles to liberation leaders' propensity to monopolize

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[1] For example, Du Pisani, "The Discursive Limits of SWAPO's Dominant Discourse on Anti-Colonial Nationalism in Postcolonial Namibia," p. 32.
[2] Republic of Namibia, *The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia* (Windhoek: Government of Namibia, 1990).

the foundations and political vision for the new nation.[3] Therefore, notwithstanding SWAPO's hegemonic tendencies and the 'stigmatization' of political adversaries during the reform period, both the liberal nature of political reforms and the institutional arrangements that undergirded them were outcomes of an approach that was, on the whole, more consensual and inclusive.

Political leaders took various inclusive measures short of liberal power-sharing. The government avoided potentially polarizing investigation of past human rights violations; the dismissal of former (white) civil servants and military personnel who were integrated into the new Namibian Defence Force (NDF); and, while ending overt forms of racial discrimination, drastic socioeconomic measures that could certainly have alienated the settler minority from post-liberation nation-building.[4] Indeed, SWAPO elites displayed an 'exclusionist tendency' in defining the national flag, anthem, insignia, and public holidays that came to encapsulate the new nation.[5] Yet the process was by no means devoid of popular participation and consensus among diverse political and social forces. The language policy, key instrument of national identity formation and consolidation, guaranteed equal rights of all languages as means of school instruction while imposing English as a national language to defuse ethnic politics. Moreover, there was no sweeping Africanization or indigenization of public spaces, architecture, and natural landscape for the purpose of purging vestiges of settler-colonial rule.[6]

In 1995, the government embraced cultural and political pluralism as essential for national reconciliation and unity. New legislation accommodated, for instance, ethnic differences

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[3] On the negotiated constitution-making process, see Melber, *Understanding Namibia*, pp. 16-9.
[4] See Lauren Dobell, "Silence in Context: Truth and/or Reconciliation in Namibia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23, 2 (1997), p. 373; Fosse, "Negotiating the Nation," p. 435.
[5] H. Melber, "'Namibia, Land of the Brave': Selective Memories on War and Violence Within Nation Building," in Jon Abbink, Klaas van Walraven, and Mirjam de Bruijn, eds. *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History* (Boston: Brill, 2003), pp. 318-20, 326.
[6] See Fosse, "Negotiating the Nation," p. 444; Brian Harlech-Jones, "Language Policy and Language Planning in Namibia," in Joshua A. Fishman, eds., *Discrimination Through Language In Africa?: Perspectives on the Namibian Experience* (New York: De Gruyter Mouton, 1995): 181-207; David J. Fourie, "Educational Language Policy and The Indigenous Languages of Namibia," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 125 (1997): 29-42.

reified by settler-colonial policies and that came to dominate post-liberation politics. The Traditional Authorities Act of 1995 provided for the recognition of traditional leaders and 'traditional communities' as building blocks of the national whole, leading to 'the proliferation of kingdoms and chieftainships.' The Communal Land Reform Act of 2002 defined the territories of disparate ethnic communities in large measure based on apartheid-era homeland plans that sustained 'ethnic federalism.' Finally, in a major policy document, in 2004 the government envisage the Namibian 'nation' as a multi-racial and multicultural 'community of people' bonded by shared national 'values and aspirations.'[7]

Therefore, for all the political distinction, nation-building in Namibia bore affinities with the 'rainbow nation' paradigm in South Africa. It is worth noting that SWAPO's militant nationalist tendencies and inherent contradictions between a nationalist rhetoric for supra-national identity and the recognition of a multicultural community are undeniable. However, the former strand by no means predominated (as in Mozambique and Angola) or thwarted the liberal paradigm as in post-liberation Zimbabwe with which some scholars draw political parallels.[8]

5.4 CONCLUSION

The liberation episode in South Africa and Namibia was characterized by liberal reformist principles, policies, and strategies. Political leaders gradually reformed inherited states and consolidated power by non-violent means. Likewise, they deracialized and liberalized capitalist economies, sought to generate capitalist development as a means to uplift historically marginalized black majorities, and attempted to systematically redress racial imbalances in

[7] See Michael U. Akuupa and Godwin Kornes, "From 'One Namibia, One Nation' Towards 'Unity in Diversity'? Shifting Representations of Culture and Nationhood in Namibian Independence Day Celebrations, 1990-2010," *Anthropology Southern Africa*, 36, 1-2 (2013), pp. 13-5. Also, refer to Heike Becker, "Commemorating Heroes in Windhoek and Eenhana: Memory, Culture and Nationalism in Namibia, 1990- 2010," *Africa,* 81, 4 (2011): 519-543; and Michael U. Akuupa, *The Formation of 'National Culture' in Post- Apartheid Namibia: A Focus on State Sponsored Cultural Events in Kavango Region* (PhD Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2011).
[8] For example, Melber, "Selective Memories on War and Violence Within Nation Building," pp. 308, 322-3.

income and wealth by pursuing affirmative action policies, black economic empowerment, and liberal land reforms. Finally, they embarked on more inclusive nation-building projects tolerant to political and cultural pluralism by pursuing policies of national reconciliation and political inclusion. The liberal reforms reproduced inherited inter-racial inequalities and produced new inter-blacks class inequalities, giving rise in the aftermath of the reform period to a political backlash by popular sectors demanding greater equity and redistribution.

The liberal reform period in these countries was distinctively shaped by the original liberal policy choice in a world context of neoliberalism and Western hegemony after the demise of the Soviet Union, which provided Southern Africa's revolutionary liberation movements with vital military training, financial support, and future political template. A radical reform option was ruled out because of the inability of the liberation movements to seize power militarily, and because of a profoundly constraining post-Soviet and (neo)liberal international order. However, the liberal reformist choice was neither a predetermined outcome nor the only reform option available as is too often portrayed. The governments, at best, could have carried full-blown progressive reform agendas with the support of radical labor and social mobilizations, especially in South Africa where the ANC had full support of the Communist Party and the national labor unions. The door was not closed to redistribution and social justice-centered liberal policies notwithstanding internal and external constraints that favored domestic and international capital.

Therefore, the initial policy choice was critical in shaping subsequent choices and events of the reform period in Southern Africa, but it did so in the specific historical context of the liberation-reforms episode in each country. The reform period in Zimbabwe analyzed in the next chapter strongly demonstrates how nationalist political leaders continuously adjusted their policy choices depending on the set of opportunities and constraints at different historical episodes.

Chapter Six

Stalled Liberal Reforms: Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, the liberation episode was defined by a stalled-liberal approach to change. Like in South Africa and Namibia, the overall reform package was liberal reformist in nature. But it was *stalled* in the sense that: (1) major socioeconomic reform goals were not fulfilled, and (2) liberal means to state and nation-building were largely abandoned. Liberation elites set out with a liberal approach to state reforms, power consolidation, and inclusive multiracial nation-building. after assuming control over state power through 'liberation' elections (1980), they *gradually* deracialized the state, reformed local authority, and Africanized the public service, and continued to retain political power by democratic means to some degree. Moreover, Zimbabwean nationalist leaders embraced a 'policy of reconciliation,' which safeguarded the settler minority's political and economic rights and allowed the incorporation of diverse white and black elites into a unity government in efforts to attenuate historical racial, ethnic, and geographic conflicts and thereby foster national unity. In subsequent years, however, liberation leaders pursued increasingly violent, exclusionary, and polarizing political strategies.

In the arena of socioeconomic reforms, Zimbabwean leaders embarked upon liberal reforms whereby they sought to gradually reform and expand the racially-skewed capitalist economic system, while simultaneously attempting to reduce stark racial disparities in income and wealth. The main policy measures included black economic advancement; deracialized and expanded education, public health, housing, and employment for the previously marginalized African population; and moderately ambitious agrarian land reform and rural resettlement programs. The socioeconomic reforms were implemented within the parameters of a "*growth with equity*" framework that sought to balance incentives for capitalist growth with demands for socioeconomic redistribution. Because the reform episode occurred before neoliberal economic

principles had achieved global supremacy, the reform period in Zimbabwe saw expanded state role in the economy, that would necessitate neoliberal structural adjustments in the 1990s, and frequent emphasis by liberation elites on achieving a 'socialist and egalitarian society' as their long-term goal. However, the political rhetoric was not matched by tangible policy measures, for actual policies emphasized gradual redress of racial imbalances and increase in African participation and control of the economy without undermining the capitalist mode of production. Consequently, as in South Africa and Namibia, relatively 'little' was achieved in terms of transforming racial capitalism, narrowing grotesque racial income inequalities, or balancing lopsided patterns of land distribution and ownership by the end of the liberal reform episode.

The liberation-reform episode in Zimbabwe extended from the adoption of the liberal policy option, with the Lancaster House settlement (1979), to the lapsing of its terms against radical redistribution of land and private property in 1990. The reform policies and dynamics defining the reform period had been a subject of vigorous intellectual debate. Neo-Marxist analysts characterized the reform policies as progressive, at best, if not outright 'neo-colonial,' serving imperialist interests of foreign capital and a local petty bourgeoise.[1] Meanwhile, liberal Western observers pointed to liberation elites' socialist rhetoric, state domination of the market, and policy emphasis on redistribution as evidence of the 'radical' nature of the reform period.[2] Others scholars suggested that the reform period was marked by sheer 'ambiguity,' 'confusion,' and 'contradictions' in reform policies,[3] that at once sought to 'transform' historical inequities and safeguard the settler-colonial capitalist relations of production that undergirded them.

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[1] Prominent advocates of this position include Astrow, *A Revolution That Lost Its Way*; Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," pp. 21-74; Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, chapter 1.
[2] E.g., E. Hawkins, "Zimbabwe's Socialist Transformation," *Optima*, 35, 5 (Dec. 1987): 186-195; Eric Leistner, "Zimbabwe's Economy: Problems and Prospects," *Africa Insight*, 19, 3 (1989): 147-152.
[3] See Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society;* C. Sylvester, *Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

In general, I concur with the latter view but understand the policies and dynamics of the liberation episode as fundamentally those of a "stalled" liberal approach to reform. A liberal reform package coexisted with certain policy attributes of the radical reform approach that defined the liberation episode in Mozambique and Angola. In particular, as noted above, ZANU-PF leaders in Zimbabwe depended on increasingly exclusionary and militarized methods to reinforce their power and, especially after 1987, jettisoned the principle of national reconciliation to impose a hegemonic nation-building project. President Robert G. Mugabe and some militant party leaders also decried the reformist policy option as a Western 'imperialist' imposition, which should be subject to future adjustment and, if possible, even full reversal without provoking capitalist flight or South African retaliation.

Such measures, however, by no means constituted a full-blown radical approach because political leaders continued to uphold, if partially, liberal means to power consolidation and maintenance, state reforms, and land and agrarian reforms. Unlike in Mozambique and Angola, liberation leaders in Zimbabwe did not pursue a successful one-party nation-building program, and undertook some main drastic policies (e.g., major state institutional changes in 1987) that were consistent with the negotiated settlement that undergirded the original liberal policy choice. Overall, therefore, the stalled-liberal approach was *neither* fully radical *nor* fully liberal because, as in South Africa and Namibia, some illiberal power consolidation and nation-building strategies coexisted with (neo)liberal measures especially in the gradual transformation of inherited state and socioeconomic structures. As Stoneman put it, the political dilemmas and complexities of the reform period were such that the liberation government's efforts cannot be easily described as "either building socialism or consolidating capitalism."[4]

[4] Stoneman, "A Zimbabwean Model?" in Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, p. 4.

Last, as aptly depicted by Herbst, main policy properties of the reform period were interpreted in terms of an oft-referenced 'racial bargain.' According to the implicit bargain, whereas the black majority government would not swiftly Africanize the economy, because a massive flight of whites would have disastrous economic effects as in Mozambique and Angola and because the settler population would dwindle within a generation, whites could continue to operate their business and farms in the private sector, and lead their 'colonial' lifestyles.[5] Yet, however useful, such a description also underpins an unsophisticated misreading of the reform period. The overall policy choices and measures were uniquely shaped by a combination of the initial liberal policy choice and the wider political circumstances of the reform period. The rather contingent reformist policy option adopted initially in conjunction with the negotiated mode of liberation placed objective constraints on liberation elites' policy preferences and actions. Meanwhile, an external context of ongoing regional conflicts, and especially an ever looming threat of full-scale economic and military destabilization by Apartheid South Africa, and a rapidly changing international political and economic environment both dissuaded Zimbabwean liberation leaders from pushing with radical transformations in some areas (i.e., socioeconomic reforms), while simultaneously presenting them with grave threats as well as opportunities to stall the liberal approach in other areas, i.e., state and nation building.

6.1 QUASI-LIBERAL STATE REFORMS AND POWER CONSOLIDATION

In Zimbabwe, the process of restructuring the state and the consolidation of power by liberation leaders took a distinctive pattern. Notwithstanding the considerable politico-military influence in the countryside during the struggle era, ZANU-PF leaders could not rapidly seize state power and consolidate their authority by drawing on their political, administrative, and military

[5] Jeffrey Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1990), pp. 222-3.

capabilities. Instead, they took over the reins of state power after winning the first non-racial elections, and embarked on gradual state reforms that took place in two major phases: 1980-1987, when the government focused on dramatic 'Africanization' and expansion of the public service, and 1987-1990, when the Lancaster House Westminster parliamentary power structures were redefined, removing obstacle to unincumbered black majority rule and the centralization of power in the hands of liberation elites. Meanwhile, while political leaders largely adhered to democratic principles, they also increasingly employed coercive mechanisms to cement their political power and weaken potential opposition.

In Southern Africa, revolutionary NLMs and their leaders aspired to seize full control the state, rapidly deracialize its racist foundations, and deploy it as an instrument for fundamental sociopolitical change and national development. In the Zimbabwean case, the pace and scope of the reforms were shaped by the Lancaster-House constitution, which at least initially adversely constrained liberation leaders, on the one hand, and their embracing of a 'policy of reconciliation' to possibly mend racial and national divisions through inclusive state-building, on the other. Thus, until 1987, liberation leaders did not undertake measures to reshape the state, as defined by the Lancaster House constitution, at the national level. The latter provided for a bicameral parliamentary legislature which entrenched racial power imbalances and ethnic representation of the settler colonial period. Whereas twenty seats filled by a separate Whites-only roll were preserved for whites in the one-hundred seat (lower) House, a national-level Council of Chiefs with members from Matabeleland and Mashonaland was allowed to continue from the settler-colonial era.[6]

[6] See Pierre du Toit, *State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe* (Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 1995), pp. 240-1.

Yet, during this period, liberation leaders had greater discretion in reforming the public service and local government structures. The reforms took the form of rapid deracialization, 'Africanization,' and expansion of a white-dominated civil service and parastatals with the political objective of creating a wide "power base and framework of [local] government" that "reflect and attend to the aspirations of the mass of people."[7] Effected by a Presidential Directive (1980) requiring Africanization of senior government posts, the reforms fairly drastically transformed the size and racial composition of the civil service by 1984, as shown in Table 6.1. As the public service expanded considerably, the number of whites fell significantly while the proportion of black civil servants expanded dramatically including at higher administrative echelons.[8] In the parastatals, such as the national railways, agricultural marketing boards, and electricity authority, the process of Africanization similarly proceeded apace including in senior administrative and managerial levels.

The moderately rapid civil service transformation was occasioned by the presence of a larger number of well-educated and skilled blacks compared to the other four cases. Yet the reformist nature of the reforms meant a great deal of institutional continuity akin to South Africa and Namibia during the liberal liberation episode. The liberation government refrained from forcing whites civil servants to retire or resign because of the 'policy of reconciliation' and their indispensable skills. The Africanization of the civil service thus ultimately slowed down, and whites continued to occupy higher levels of the state bureaucracy, judiciary, and the security forces. On the other hand, a semi-autonomous Public Service Commission, established by Lancaster House constitutional provisions with considerable control over recruitment,

[7] I. Mandaza, "The Zimbabwe Public Service," Paper Presented at the United Nations Inter-Regional Seminar on Reforming Civil Service Systems for Development," Beijing, China, 12 August 1985.
[8] Ibid., p. 10; Nelson P. Moyo, "The Economic Crisis and Recent Trends in Public Sector Employment and Pay in Zimbabwe," *Memeo*, Sep. 1985, p. 5; Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe,* p. 30.

promotions, and appointments of senior personnel, hindered wholesale transformation or the deployment of party cadres into the old state machinery, as had resistance by conservative civil servants opposed to the liberation movement's ideals.[9]

Table 6.1: Changes in the Racial Composition of Zimbabwean Public Service

	1981		*1984*	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
(a) Permanent Secretaries				
White	17	57	4	14
Non-White	13	43	24	86
(b) Senior Management				
White	1,143	53	60	22
Non-White	129	47	209	78
(c) Professionals				
White	669	56	409	28
Non-White	524	44	1,057	72
(d) Technical				
White	419	41	181	13
Non-White	611	59	1,181	87
(e) Established Officers				
White	5,207	37	3,047	12
Non-White	8,711	63	22,814	82

Note: 'Blacks' also include so-called Coloreds and Asians.
Source: Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, *Annual Review of Manpower, 1985* (Harare: Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, 1985), p. 36

The early years also saw considerable restructuring and expansion of local government. This led to rapid political incorporation of a previously excluded black majority into the racially exclusive state bureaucracy as well as the dramatic expansion of education, public health, and infrastructure in both urban and rural areas. The reforms in this arena, too, were gradual and less far-reaching. The settler-colonial system of local government was restructured through the elimination of the racial basis of administration and political representation, and the replacement of authoritarian 'indirect rule' structures with fully elected representative bodies at district, village, and ward levels. In the rural areas, for example, a District Councils Act of 1980 provided for the establishment of popularly elected District Councils in lieu of African Councils for the

[9] See Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 93, 41; Lee Cokorinos, "The Political Economy of State and Party Formation in Zimbabwe," in Michael G. Schatzberg, ed., *The Political Economy of Zimbabwe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 46.

Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), and for elected Rural Councils in formerly Whites-only rural areas.[10] Yet, in reality, the dual systems of rural governance were largely kept intact until their integration through a Rural District Councils Act (1988). In the same vein, traditional leaders remained an important part of rural governance albeit some moves to circumscribe their influence and to impose centralized modern state structures.[11]

The consolidation of power took place in tandem with the liberal state reforms. Yet, ZANU-PF leaders embarked upon a rather increasingly authoritarian and violent process of consolidating and exercising political power along with attenuating democratic mechanisms.[12] Regular democratic elections played an important role in assuming and solidifying political power during the liberation episode. The liberation party, which won an absolute majority in the transitional elections to form the first liberation government, continued to enjoy popular support and electoral dominance in subsequent elections of the reform period (Table 6.2). However, from the outset, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party increasingly deployed violence to subdue organized black opposition both during and between elections. Furthermore, the party effectively marshaled state resources and institutions, such as the army, police, and intelligence services, to augment its electoral and political supremacy.[13] However, the government refrained from the kind of extremely militarized and violent strategies of seizing, solidifying, and maintaining political power that characterized Angola and Mozambique.

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[10] du Toit, *State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa*, pp. 243-4.
[11] Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 93, 102; Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, p. 85.
[12] M. Sithole, "State Power Consolidation in Zimbabwe: Party and Ideological Development," in E.J. Keller and D. Rothchild, eds., *Afro-Marxist Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987): 85-106. Scarritt, "Zimbabwe: Revolutioanry Violence Resulting in Reform," pp. 262-3.
[13] See M. Sithole, "The General Elections: 1979-1985," in Mandaza ed., *The Political Economy of Transition*, 75-97; Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, pp. 87-91; M. Sithole and J. Makumbe, "Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU(PF) Hegemony and Its Decline," *African Journal of Political Science*, 2 (1997):122-139.

Table 6.2: Parliamentary Election Results for Zimbabwe, 1985 and 1990

Party	1980			1985			1990[a]		
	Votes Cast	*% of Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes Cast*	*% of Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes Cast*	*% of Votes*	*Seats*
ZANU-PF	1,668,992	61.8	57	2,233,320	75.1	64	1,654,864	75.4	116
PF-ZAPU	638,879	23.6	20	558,771	18.8	15	–	–	–
UANC	219,307	8.1	3	64,764	2.2	–	9,551	0.44	–
ZANU-Ndonga	53,343	2.0	–	36,054	1.2	–	18,631	0.85	1
UNFP	5,796	0.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
ZUM				–	–	–	364,544	16.6	2
CAZ	–	–	–	18,731	52.4[b]	15	–	–	–
IZG	–	–	–	13,513	37.8[b]	4	–	–	–
Independents	–	–	–	1,486	4.2[b]	1	7,541	0.34	–
Other Parties	63,212	2.3	–						
Comm. Roll	–	–	–	376	0.01	–	494	0.02	–
White Roll	–	–	–	311	0.86	–	–	–	–

Note: [a] Unofficial. [b] For white-roll votes; all other figures are for common-roll votes.
Source: Sithole, "The General Elections, 1979-1985," pp. 79, 83. Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, p. 81.

The brutal suppression of PF-ZAPU's popular base in Matabeleland during the early 1980s serves as an illustrative example of ZANU-PF leaders' increasingly coercive efforts to delegitimize and destroy political and civic organizations outside the ruling party. From the outset the liberation government flexed its coercive muscle against black political organizations that represented serious challenges to its claims to national power and legitimacy. In 1982, PF-ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo and other leading party members were dismissed from Prime Minister Mugabe's cabinet, and several ex-ZIPRA commanders detained after arms caches were discovered on ZAPU-controlled farms and properties in Matabeleland. The ensuing armed insurgency by former ZIPRA soldiers (with possible backing by South Africa) provoked an extensive and bloody military campaign (i.e., the Gukurahundi) by Mugabe's government in Matabeleland and Midlands regions. The brutal crashing of popular dissidence in 1984 was followed by a virtual dismantling and forced incorporation of PF-ZAPU with ZANU-PF formalized in a 1987 Unity Accord.

In general, a combination of democratic and non-democratic strategies enabled ZANU-PF leaders to exert their supremacy over the state in an increasingly quasi-one-party system. The lapsing in 1987 of the Lancaster House Constitution clause that safeguarded settler economic and political rights paved the ways for major national-level state reforms that further reinforced their power. In 1987, the twenty reserved seats for Whites and, with it, the Whites-only electoral roll were abolished. Further, the Westminster parliamentary system was dismantled as the position of Prime Minister was replaced by an executive President with a six-year term of office. In 1989, the Senate was disbanded in favor of an expanded unicameral legislature encompassing a large proportion of delegates appointed by the President, and chiefs selected by national chiefs.[14] Moreover, political opposition, both black and white alike, was hounded into submission by late 1980s, and opposition parties barely contested the 1990 elections.[15]

The non-liberal mode of power consolidation also obtains to strategies liberation elites deployed to establish and solidify their popular base in, and ultimate hegemony over, society. Diverse professional and societal organizations—such as, trade unions, students, churches, and so forth—were central to the national liberation struggle, during which they typically subjected themselves to the political leadership of the competing NLMs, purportedly the embodiments of the oppressed nation, national unity, and the vanguards of national revolutionary struggle. Following liberation, however, the political loyalties and broad solidarity were susceptible to assertions of political independence, sectoral interests competing against each other and with the government's agendas, and bottom-up challenges by dissenting groups. The political and reform

[14] See Du Toit, *State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa*, p. 250; James Muzondidya, "From Buoyancy to Crisis," in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds., *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History From The Pre-Colonial Period to 2008* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), p. 181; I. Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye, eds., *The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate* (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1991).
[15] See Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe*, pp. 40-1.

choices made by liberation elites upon assuming state power more often than not disenchanted or even alienated most members of the broad nationalist alliance.

This was particularly the case in Zimbabwe owing to the mix of democratic and authoritarian tendencies during the reform decade. Political challenges from trade unions, students, churches, and other societal forces were met by growing coercion in the guise of national unity. Independent actors and centers of social power were gradually destroyed, and civil associations challenged to joining the ruling party in the interest of national unity and development. The threat of violence used to subordinate opposition political parties was deployed in urban areas to control workers, youth, and other civic organizations.[16] For instance, the government unilaterally established the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as the sole voice of national trade unions, subordinated the labor movement to the ruling party, and forcibly subdued a wave of labor strikes.[17] By the late 1980s, student protests at the University of Zimbabwe and generalized public discontent with high-level corruption and declining standards of living were put down by force, the private press and church leaders silenced, and civil society met with systematic state repression on the eve of the 1990 national elections.[18]

In rural areas, the political supremacy of the party and its government was not overtly challenged apart from Matabeleland as noted above. Yet, authoritarian strategies of solidifying political control or reshaping social behavior were common throughout the country particularly during electoral episodes. ZANU-PF elites leveraged on war-time political and administrative

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[16] Brian Raftopoulos, "Unreconciled Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in Zimbabwe," in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage, eds., *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004) pp. 4-5; L. Sachikonye, "State, Capital, and Trade Unions," in Mandaza, ed., *The Political Economy of Transition*, pp. 243-73.

[17] See B. Raftopoulos and L. Sachikonye, eds., *Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe, 1980-2000* (Harare: Weaver Pres, 2001).

[18] See J. Moyo, "Civil Society in Zimbabwe," *Zambezia* 20:1 (1993): 1-14; S. R. Dorman, "NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: From Inclusion to Exclusion," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29:4 (2003): 845-863.

structures, and on party penetration and dominance over state institutions, especially local administration, in the countryside. In reality, Village Development Committees (VIDCOS) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOS)—established after 1984 as vehicles of administration, democratic participation, and development policy in rural areas—remained partisan ZANU-PF committees and cells carried over from the liberation-struggle period.[19] These structures facilitated the effective government penetration of rural society and the concentration of power in party cadres to the detriment of liberal reform policies aimed to decentralize local government and democratize district administration vis-à-vis the racially bifurcated, unaccountable traditional authority system in the former native reserves. The power of chiefs was curtailed but not entirely disbanded during the reform period.[20]

In sum, therefore, the stalled-liberal approach was characterized by extensive, if gradual, transformation of state institutions and non-democratic strategies of power consolidation at both national and local levels. This pattern of state reforms and power consolidation produced fairly centralized and militarized state structures with important consequences for political regime institutions during and after the liberation episode. Moreover, quite unlike in South Africa and Namibia in 1990s, the reforms—together with a settler-colonial tradition of state-led development and active state economic interventionism—also led to dramatic expansion of new state's role in the economy, service provision, and rural development.

6.2 LIBERAL AND INCOMPLETE SOCIOECONOMIC REFORMS

The government set out to address inherited structural inequalities using a "growth with equity" policy framework for reform and national development. Its core premise was to balance demands

[19] A. Hammar, "Disrupting Democracy? Altering Landscapes of Local Governance in Post-2000 Zimbabwe," London School of Economics, Discussion Paper No., 9, June 2005, p. 19.
[20] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 196-7.

for income and wealth redistribution with creating conditions for capitalist economic growth. In many respects, the principles and objectives of such approach resembled to the neoliberal socioeconomic reforms characteristic of the liberation reform episode in South Africa and Namibia. Besides, the 'racial bargain' in Zimbabwe distinctively allowed for the rapid Africanization of the public sector without concomitant indigenization of the racially skewed capitalist economic sectors. Yet, Zimbabwean liberation elites were able to pursue a 'nationalist development' approach combining liberal growth strategies with more progressive, quasi-socialist redistribution measures geared at drastically improving the living standards of the historically marginalized African majority in the context of a capitalist economy. While accommodating the interests of dominant white-domestic and foreign capital, the socioeconomic reform measures sought to promote equitable development through the deracialization and rapid expansion of social services and rural development programs; black economic empowerment; and market-based rural land and agrarian reforms.

The initial liberal policy choice was implemented relatively unthwarted in this domain of reforms in post-liberation Zimbabwe. The policy moderation demonstrated the liberation leadership's acute realization that effective redistribution would hinge on continued capitalist growth and that the productive sectors (i.e., commercial agriculture, manufacturing, and mining) would continue to depend on foreign capital and white skills for the foreseeable future. The overarching concern was reconciling "the imperative to maintain white and international confidence in the economy on the one hand and satisfying the expectations and aspirations of the mass of the people on the other hand."[21] The reform period was, as Sylvester argued, marked by unavoidable policy contradictions in a "democratic socialist potpourri" under a liberation

[21] Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," p. 61.

government "cross-pressured by Marxist, authoritarian, and liberal goals [and influences]."[22] Much as in South Africa and Namibia, the result was the persistence of racial inequalities and distortions quintessential of the settler-colonial capitalist mode of ownership and production, as well as the deepening of intra-black class inequalities.

6.2.1 A Capitalist "Growth With Equity" Approach

The core policy tenets, objectives, and measures of this approach were articulated in the government's first development policy statement, i.e., *Growth With Equity* (1980), that laid out a liberal framework for socioeconomic reforms and national development with the parameter of the inherited capitalist economy. These were further reiterated and elaborated on in subsequent macro-economic policies in the *Transitional National Development Plan* (TNDP) and the *First Five-Year National Development Plan* (FYDP), both conceived in view of achieving the twin goals of growth and equity.[23] The overall liberal approach is evident in various social and economic policy domains, ranging from industrial development and the role of foreign capital; public services, infrastructural, and rural development programs; black economic advancement; to land and agrarian reforms during the decade of liberation reforms.

The effects of the liberal policy choice as well as the less constraining international setting of the reform episode (at least at the outset) is evident in liberation-elite thinking and strategies. According to the *Growth With Equity* policy document, the liberation government's long-term socioeconomic goals were "to end imperialist exploitation," to "establish progressively a society founded on socialist, democratic, and egalitarian principles," and to

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[22] Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, pp. 71, 72.

[23] Government of Zimbabwe, *Growth With Equity*; *Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85, Vol. 1* (Harare: Government Printers, 1982); *Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85, Vol. 2* (Harare: Government Printers, 1983); and *First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990, Vol. 1-2* (Harare: Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, 1986).

"achieve a greater and more equitable degree [sic] of ownership of natural resources including land; promote participation in, and ownership of, a significant proportion of the economy by nationals and the State."[24] Subsequent plans express similarly progressive socioeconomic goals, whilst underscoring the importance of "building upon and developing on what was inherited."[25] However, as contradictory as it sounds, the commitment to socialist transition was at best rhetorical and fraught with vast policy inconsistencies, as stoneman and Cliffe cogently put it:

> …the [national development] philosophy propose[d] planning and socialism, while the practice inhibit[ed] or humanize[d] capitalism, add[ed] a little state enterprise, and provide[d] social services, adding up to a national capitalism much like European welfare-state capitalism, but without the scale of productive capacity needed to sustain it. In fact, no third way [was] found between the Scylla of a potentially disastrous head-on confrontation with international capital and the Charybdis of acceptance of a neo-colonial status with benefits to a corrupted elite and nationalist rhetoric for the masses … this choice [was] made even more difficult by the very real threat of intervention by the South African state, and the negative example from Mozambique of the consequences of a precipitate white exodus.[26]

In reality, the emphasis of the growth-with-equity approach was on 'reconstruction' rather than (socialist) 'transformation;' on reforming the inequities and injustices of the settler-colonial period rather than fully destroying capitalist economic and class relations. First, economic reform policies eschewed the kind of radical socialist policies, to dramatically destroy settler-colonial structural inequities and lay the basis for socialist development, that defined the radical reform period in Mozambique and Angola. Rather, policy measures for economic reform and development in Zimbabwe aimed to promote "growth with equity" by mainly redressing the economic distortions and restrictions in industry, mining, and other sectors that stemmed from racially oppressive policies, international economic isolation, and the impact of the liberation war. The government thus created incentives to promote growth especially in manufacturing,

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[24] Government of Zimbabwe, *Growth With Equity*, pp. 1-2; and *Transitional National Development Plan,* p. 24.
[25] Government of Zimbabwe, *Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85, Vol. 1*, p. 1.
[26] Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 121.

which, as the leading sector of the economy, could create greater employment for blacks as well as generate revenues for income redistribution. It retreated from the state-led strategies of industrialization of the late settler-colonial period, abandoned some of its social policies after 1984, and at later stages, even embarked on the liberalization of foreign-exchange and trade regimes, in part in response to pressure from the World Bank and the IMF and in part to win the support of the vocal commercial farmers and foreign capital.[27]

The various policies underscored the importance of settler domestic and foreign capital in achieving capitalist growth with equity. Capital provided a nexus between generating requisite growth and enabling increased state redistribution of income and creation of expanded economic opportunities.[28] Therefore, a wide range of measures were taken to incentivize capital, and safeguard capitalist interests in industry, mining, and commercial agriculture, albeit state efforts to dilute the economic dominance of foreign capital through, *inter alia*, strengthening local capital, joint ventures and partial takeovers, and indigenization of management. During the reform years, the government cut back on subsidies for the poor, strove for balance of payments, repressed labor and froze minimum wages, and acted forcefully against squatters and land occupations by the poor.[29] Likewise, to foot large investments in restructuring and social service programs, it turned to Western donors by emphasizing the need for post-war recovery programmes rather than arguing for socialist transformation or massive land redistribution.[30]

As a result, and as an important indicator of the liberal nature of the reforms, relatively superficial changes in the inherited economic structure were made after a decade of reforms. The

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[27] Ibid., p. 137; Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, pp. 227-9. Also, see Xavier M. Kadhani, "The Economy: Issues, Problems, and Prospects," in Mandaza, ed., *The Political Economy of Transition*, pp. 99-140.
[28] See Government of Zimbabwe, *Growth With Equity*, paragraph 14; *Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85, Vol. 1,* p. 39; and *First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990, Vol. 1*, p. 2.
[29] See Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 124; Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, pp. 108-9.
[30] See Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, *Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD)—Let's Build Zimbabwe Together* (Harare: Government Printer, 1981).

pre-existing patterns of income (and wealth) distribution persisted because as late as 1988, a small class of white farmers and small black bourgeoisie (4 percent of the population) controlled the bulk of national resources and two-thirds of gross national income.[31] As Table 6.3 shows, international capital, especially British and South Africa-based multinational corporations, maintained its dominance over the economy; in 1985, an estimated 48 percent of manufacturing and an estimated 90 percent of mining was still owned by foreign multinationals.[32] This caused continued exclusion of blacks from more productive sectors of the national economy, and various measures for 'black empowerment' (see below) and indigenization of the private sector barely masked foreign-capitalist domination.[33]

Table 6.3: Estimates of Foreign Control in National Economy by Sector, 1986

	Agri.	Manuf.	Mining	Distr.	Transp.	Finance	Total
Domestic	55	48	25	75	65	25	50
Foreign	45	52	75	25	35	75	50
South African	35	25	35	15	15	0	24

Source: Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 114.

However, the reform period saw remarkable progress in narrowing racial and rural-urban disparities in public service provision. The liberation government invested heavily on expanding free education, healthcare, housing, roads, etc. for Africans as part of a relatively ambitious rural development program. Thus between 1980-1990, the number of primary and secondary schools rose by a remarkable eighty precent such that more Africans had access to education during the brief reform period alone than throughout the settler-colonial era. Moreover, the government transformed the highly unequal healthcare system by constructing health facilities throughout the country and promoting access to primary healthcare through free medical care for the poor, a

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[31] Stoneman, "The Economy," pp. 51-2; Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 125.
[32] Stoneman, "The Economy: Recognizing the Reality," in Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, pp. 54-5; Eco. Int. Unit, *Zimbabwe's First Five Years: Economic Prospects Following Independence* (London: The Unit, 1981), p. 87.
[33] See B. Raftopoulos and D. Compagnon, "Indigenization, the State Bourgeoisie and Neo-Authoritarian Politics," in Staffan Darnolf and Liisa Laakso, eds., *Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe: From Libeeration to Authoritarianism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 15-33.

minimum wage for workers, and affordable health services for the majority (Table 6.4). These measures were effective in nearly closing the racial gap in service provision that, by 1990, the country boasted, among other achievements, remarkable decline in child and maternal mortality rates as well as rapid increase in life expectancy.[34]

Table 6.4: Expansion of Rural Health Services in Zimbabwe, 1980-85

	Center Per 100,000 Peoples		*Percentage Increase*
Province	*1980*	*1985*	*1980-1985*
Manicaland	12.29	16.87	17.3
Mashonaland Central	7.64	13.38	75.1
Mashonaland East	12.59	19.28	53.1
Mashonaland West	9.54	14.77	54.8
Masvingo	7.71	12.17	57.8
Midlands	10.52	15.09	43.4
Matabeleland North	5.98	11.87	98.5
Matabeleland South	9.68	13.38	42.9
Zimbabwe	9.49	14.66	57.9

Source: Ministry of Health, *The Health Institutions of Zimbabwe* (Harare: The Ministry, 1985, mimeo); Government of Zimbabwe, *Main Demographic Features of the Population of Zimbabwe* (Harare: Central Statistical Office, 1985), pp. 62-77.

In the rural areas, the government embarked on a comprehensive rural development program premised on reducing 'gross imbalances' in development between rural and urban areas, on the one hand, and the white commercial and African peasant sub-sectors, on the other.[35] the thrust of the program—besides rural land reform and resettlement (see below)—was the reform and expansion to Africans of agricultural services, including "credit, marketing, research, and extension" programs; productive use of under-utilized land and the promotion of food security for the rural population; the "integration of the communal and peasant agricultural sectors;" and the development of water resources, elimination of diseases, and expansion of basic infrastructure.[36] The national development plan of 1986 placed emphasis on the reorganization of Communal Areas (CAs) through "the consolidation of villages and bloc farming," and

[34] Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, pp. 209-10; Muzondidya, "From Buoyancy to Crisis," pp. 167-200.
[35] Gov. of Zimbabwe, *Growth With Equity*, p. 9; and *Transitional National Development Plan, Vol. 1*, p. 24, 25.
[36] Gov. of Zimbabwe, *Growth With Equity*, pp. 4-5; and *Transitional National Development Plan, Vol. 1*, pp. 64-6.

developmental public schemes such as access roads, bridges, schools, clinics, and irrigation schemes as part of an 'integrated' rural development program.[37]

The reform period in Zimbabwe markedly differs in this particular liberal policy arena from that in South Africa and Namibia. The rural development program was nonetheless by no means radical as in Mozambique and Angola. It neither instigated dramatic rural socio-structural transformations nor "effectively transformed rural economies or lift millions of rural dwellers out of their condition of deprivation."[38] Its efficacity was circumscribed by overcaution against trampling on property rights and the capitalist structures of rural ownership and distribution as well as, as we shall discuss below, by failure to implement far-reaching 'land acquisition, resettlement, and development' policies necessary to effect fundamental rural changes. Further, with the 1986 national development plan, the government turned away from more transformative strategies and 'socialist idealism,' that imbued nationalist development policies of the early post-liberation years, to unequivocally free-market policies coupled with drastic reductions in government social expenditures[39]—a shift that testifies to growing neoliberal policy constraints and rising popular backlash.

6.2.2 Black Socioeconomic Advancement

As in the other cases Southern Africa, political leaders in Zimbabwe also inherited racially exclusionary national economies with high levels of income and wealth inequalities. Given the liberal policy constraints, as in South Africa and Namibia in the 1990s, the liberation government thus sought to 'deracialize' the pattern of income, ownership, and employment, and afford equitable economic opportunities for all races and classes in both public and private sectors. It

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[37] Government of Zimbabwe, *First Five-Year National Development Plan*, *Vol. 1,* p. 28.
[38] Muzondidya, *From Buoyancy to Crisis*, p. 170.
[39] Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, pp. 119, 121.

pursued this goal by means of broadening the economy and integrating blacks into the public and private sectors through such policy measures as black economic empowerment, the Africanization of public services, and the nurturing of a black middle class. With these measures, with the radical transformation of the mode of production off the agenda, the post-liberation government could hope to tackle the most glaring racial (and class) inequalities inherited from the settler-colonial period.

The principal target of deradicalization and 'black advancement' policies was the civil service and parastatals. The public sector was Africanized faster and extensively than any other sector as we have seen earlier. In the private sector, similar strategies provided avenues for relatively rapid advancement of Africans. By 1984, blacks came to dominate the professional, technical, and related occupations in the economy, representing up to 83 percent of total employees. Yet, without as effective legislation and 'white exit' after liberation as in the public sector, the change was less extensive and facilitated in the main by progressive racial legislation and an accelerated training and skill-upgrading of non-whites. As a result, the rapid Africanization of the public sector could be replicated in the private sectors. As late as 1985, whites still controlled 53 percent of the managerial, executive, and administrative occupations despite the fact that they represented only seven percent of total population, while blacks made up 92 percent of private-sector employees.[40]

Trends on black advancement improved marginally in the latter part of the reform period. In 1989, racial distribution at management levels was skewed in favor of whites: 62.5 percent in senior management, 35.5 percent in middle management, and: 22 percent in junior management versus 37.5 percent, 64.5 percent, and 78 percent for blacks, respectively.[41] In the aftermath of

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[40] Arnold Sibanda, "The Political Situation," in Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, p. 278.
[41] B. Raftopoulos, *Zimbabwe: Race and Nationalism in a Post-Colonial State* (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1994), p. 6.

the liberation episode, the level of black participation in all sectors of the national economy stood at only two percent in 1993. Racially discriminatory structures and practices—ranging from obstacles to securing loans from settler and foreign-owned financiers and banks to hostility from white capital—hindered black participation and black middle-class advancement, especially in the mining and manufacturing sectors.[42] The recruitment, appointment, and promotion of blacks somehow served as a 'window-dressing' for continued settler and foreign capitalist economic domination, fostering a petty-bourgeois 'comprador' class that linked monopoly capital with state elites and bureaucrats.[43]

The liberal option posed serious constraints to black advancement during the liberation episode. The government kept a blind eye to white and multinational capital critical to fulfilling its growth-with-equity goals. The political indifference was aggravated by growing linkages between sections of the state elite and large capital during the liberation episode. Within this context, capital's patronizing racial attitude towards blacks as well as blacks' lack of capital, academic training, and managerial expertise might have derailed rapid black progress in the private sector. This may explain why most black promotion took place at the lower and middle management of industry and commence, facilitated by the exit of lower-class whites, the most ardent opponents of black advancement who departed in larger numbers with transition to majority rule.[44] Yet the central obstacle was the lack of effective government policies to remove embedded challenges to racial equality and black promotion in an economy still largely in the hands of monopoly capital. The government's caution against antagonizing settler and foreign

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[42] See F. Maphosa, "Towards the Sociology of Zimbabwean Indigenous Entrepreneurship," *Zambezia*, 25, 2 (1998), pp. 176-8; P. Bond, *Uneven Zimbabwe: A Study of Finance, Development, and Underdevelopment* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1998).
[43] Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," p. 49; Sibanda, "The Political Situation," p. 277.
[44] Raftopoulos, *Race and Nationalism in a Post-Colonial State*, p. 7-8.

capital—and derailing racial reconciliation—worked against active state measures to nudge capital to undertake affirmative action or to enforce policies against black discrimination.[45]

The liberal reform measures had important political consequences. Fewer privileges elites of rich farmers and peasants, businessmen, and educated professionals benefited most from opportunities for black capital accumulation. Consequently, there was no significant narrowing of income and wealth gap between whites and blacks or between rich and poor blacks; an estimated three percent of the population (mainly white farmers and a small black bourgeoisie) continued to control the bulk of national resources and two-thirds of national income in the second half of 1980s.[46] In rural areas, land and rural development reforms rather empowered a small class of powerful black landowners. In urban areas, which were generally marginalized in the government's development planning, black dwellers struggled with growing problems with housing, transportation, and fast declining wages after the first two years of liberation reforms.[47] The outcome was the polarization of race relations, black class stratification, and rural-urban tensions during and in the aftermath of the liberation-reform period.

Two crucial points need to be made at this point. First, the liberation reforms in Zimbabwe hardly gave rise to a sizeable black middle class, other than the politically connected black business elite—of former party, government, and military leaders—that benefited from crony capitalism, unlike in South Africa and Namibia. The policy and ideological ambiguities described above certainly bode ill for black empowerment; the government's rhetorical commitment to socialism was rarely accompanied by effective policies to support the growth of

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[45] P. Bennell and B. Strachan, "The Zimbabwean Experience: Black Occupational Advancement," in P. Hugo, ed., *Redistribution and Affirmative Action: Working on South Africa's Political Economy* (Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1992), pp. 29-30.
[46] Stoneman, "The Economy: Recognizing the Reality," pp. 51-2.
[47] See J. C. Mafico, *Urban Low-Income Housing in Zimbabwe* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1991); J. Cobbing, "Review Article: The Imperializing of Zimbabwe," *Transformation*, 9 (1989), p. 85.

black entrepreneurs. More importantly, however, the ZANU-PF leadership was hostile to the development of a black capitalist class beyond its ambit. A black business class with an accumulation base independent of the state presented both an obstacle to potential transition to socialism and, by strengthening civil society, a credible political threat to state power. The result is that the government took extraordinary steps to prevent black business from developing independent economic power in the private sector.[48] Therefore, contrary to claims otherwise, the liberal nature of economic reforms cannot be the product of a petit bourgeoisie in control of the state or a middle class with strong influence on government policy.

Second, after mid-1990s, the government adopted a more comprehensive program of black economic empowerment (BEE) that favored 'indigenous' black business at the expense of white and foreign capital. However, these belated reform policies cannot be considered a defining property of the liberation episode in Zimbabwe unlike in South Africa and Namibia, where such policies and programs squarely fell within the temporal range of the liberation episode in these countries. In the former case, the BBE and other programs in the 1990s were in essence an *outcome* of the liberation episode, i.e., popular-sector backlash against the government engendered by persisting inequalities and deprivation (see Chapter Seven). As a matter of fact, a major political rift emerged between the political elite and black business groups due to the latter's strategic marginalization during the reform period. As such, the black middle class threw its economic weight behind the growing political opposition in the 1990s, which forced the government to adopt a black empowerment program.[49]

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[48] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 227; Taylor, *Business and State in Southern Africa*, p. 122.
[49] Raftopoulos, *Race and nationalism in a Post-Colonial State*, p. 9.

6.2.3 Rural Land and Agrarian Reforms

The 'land question' was a rallying cause during the anti-colonial struggle. The African majority was disposed of most land, and at liberation in 1980, about 6,000 white farmers occupied 15.5. million hectares (42 percent) of land, while millions of Africans were jam-packed in the small overcrowded native reserves. Furthermore, the white commercial sector had been well supported with public roads, railways, and state subsidies, preferential market prices, and extensions services, while the African peasant sector scattered in remote and poorer regions had long been deprived of *inter alia* transport infrastructure and vital agricultural services.[50]

Both ZANU and ZAPU were thus committed to radical land expropriation and redistribution. Yet, Zimbabwean leaders pragmatically' adopted liberal land-reform measures 'cautiously' implemented in efforts to strike a balance between agricultural 'productivity' and redistributive imperatives of the broader growth-with-equity policy framework. This approach was necessitated by the Lancaster House 'constitutional safeguards' that precluded a radical land and agrarian reform program during the reform decade. First, a Bill of Rights enshrined in the liberation constitution placed a ten-year guarantee for private property rights, ensuring that the majority government would not violate white farmers' privileges in land ownership until 1990. Second, the government could acquire land only on the basis of the 'willing-seller, willing-buyer' market principle except for 'under-utilized' land that it could acquire compulsorily, but with immediate compensation, for development and other public purposes. Therefore, *how much,* and *which,* land should be redistributed depended on the consent of white commercial farmers and the government's ability to pay for land at market prices and in foreign currency. Third, the repudiation of external (namely British) financial commitments to underwrite the land reform

[50] See Gov. of Zimbabwe [Rukuni Commission Report], *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure Systems* (Harare: Government Printer, 1991), p. 94.

program, as a condition of the negotiated settlement, effectively hampered meaningful land redistribution and broader agrarian reform.[51]

Faced with enormous political, legal and financial challenges, the liberation government thus strove for the gradual reduction of racial disparities in land ownership and the alleviation of landlessness in the Communal Areas (CAs) through the resettlement of rural and urban poor. The Resettlement Programme involved four reform strategies: (a) the transfer of white-owned land on a willing-seller market basis, (b) the resettlement of black peasants from CAs (formerly, TTLs); (c) the elimination of settler-colonial agricultural regulations that suppressed and discriminated against the peasant subsector; and (d) reforming land tenure in the overcrowded CAs. The overarching goal was to gradually integrate the commercial and communal subsectors, and to redress the lopsided patterns of land ownership and agricultural development, while restructuring inherited structures and modes of agricultural productivity.[52]

The land reform program was comparably more far-reaching than similar programs in South Africa and Namibia. Yet, both scholarly and policy assessments clearly indicate that, of all reform policies of the liberation episode in Zimbabwe, land reforms were the most 'liberal.' As Figure 6.1, land acquisition and resettlement were both modest, and land redistribution ultimately flattens off in the second half of the reform episode. In the first five years, the government acquired 2.5 million hectares for redistribution to some 35,000 peasant families, which fell short of its 1982 target to resettle 162,000 families within three years.[53] A new Land Acquisition Act (1985) provided for more effective reform instruments but, with economic and

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[51] For a comprehensive analysis of the 'land question' and the land reforms, see Sam Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe* (Harare: SAPES Books, 1995); and "The Land Question," in Mandaza, ed., *The Political Economy of Transition*, 165-202; C. Palmer, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990," *African Affairs*, 89 (1990): 163-181.
[52] See Moyo, "The Land Question," pp. 171-81. The reforms took place in the context of an agrarian structure with Communal Areas (CA), Large-Scale Commercial Farming (LSCF) areas, Small-Scale Commercial Farming (SSCF) areas, State Farms (inherited from the settler-colonial period), and Resettlement Areas established after liberation.
[53] Clever Mumbengegwi, "Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy," in Mandaza ed., *The Political Economy of Transition*, pp. 210-8.

agricultural productivity rebounding, the momentum for land redistribution waned momentarily. The government's *Five-Year National Development Plan* (1986-1990) laid out modest plans for land redistribution and the resettlement of 75,000 families in five years.[54] Overall, by 1990, the government had acquired only 3.5 million hectares of arable land, which represented merely 16 percent of the land owned by white commercial farmers in 1980, and resettled only 52,000 households or 32 percent of the 1982 three-year target.[55] Furthermore, only 19 percent of the land acquired was prime land in productive regions with the rest located in marginal rainfall areas often unsuitable for agriculture.

Fig. 6.1: Evolution of the Land Reform Program in the Reform Years



Source: Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 43.

The reform policies were paradoxically antithetical to ZANU-PF's revolutionary land and agrarian reform program. The policy emphasis was narrowly on 'settlement' rather than the broader issue of 'agrarian reform.' Consequently, in view of political leaders, the 'land question' remained "the biggest single [national] problem" by the end of the liberation episode.[56] The

[54] Gov. of Zimbabwe, *Five-Year Development Plan, 1986-1990, Vol. 1* (Harare: Government Printers, 1986), p. 26.
[55] Palmer, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990," p. 169; Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*, pp. 118-27.
[56] Robert Mugabe in *The Herald*, "Land distribution still major problem," 20 December 1989; also, see Palmer, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990," pp. 174-80.

Lancaster House restrictions on radical land redistribution lapsed in 1990, paving the way for historic amendments to the bill of rights to allow compulsory land expropriation. However, the renewed political attention on land—along with a Land Acquisitions Act (1992)—hardly marked a major shift from the liberal approach to land redistribution. Scholars point to comprehensive land reforms launched in 2000 as a distinctive feature of post-liberation transformations in Zimbabwe. Yet, both the second phase of land reforms in the 1990s and the belated expropriation of white-owned land cannot be considered as a defining policy property of the liberation episode. Rather, like more vigorous black empowerment policies launched after the mid-1990s, the later, more radical land reform policies in Zimbabwe were an *outcome*—not part—of the liberal land reforms and the political reaction they set into motion.

The reformist land and agrarian reform project helps to further understand the distinctive antecedent conditions and policy choices defining the liberation episode. In the Zimbabwean case, prior to liberation there existed a large landless peasantry with partial proletarianization compared to South Africa and Namibia. Notwithstanding this, Zimbabwean liberation elites were skeptical of a socialist agrarian transformation because of domestic capitalist and growing international constraints on such change. Juxtaposed to the mass-mobilizing strategies of socialist agrarian transformation in Mozambique and Angola, the reform program made 'marginal' achievements at best and was implemented technocratically, based on land availability and 'productivity' rather than popular land demands and participation. More 'socialist' aspects of the program (i.e., peasant resettlement, producer cooperatives, state farms) were scarcely implemented in commercial and communal areas, while private smallholding schemes dominated the land resettlement program.[57]

[57] Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*, p. 90.

The market-led land reform program also demonstrates the distinct constraints Zimbabwean national elites grappled with. This undoubtedly laid, as seen above, in the Lancaster House settlement that effectively put a comprehensive land and agrarian reform program off limits. The liberal option elites initially adopted in conjunction with the 'racial bargain' in effect "gave settler capital a decade-long period of consolidation, during which issues around radical restructuring of the legacy of economic inequality were effectively put on hold."[58] Hard economic and political considerations that compelled nationalist leaders to adopt a reformist policy choice at the outset dissuaded them from eventually pushing through effective land redistributive measures. Any reform program that remotely resembled 'radical' would undoubtedly have alienated large-scale white commercial farmers, white banking and business, international capital, and some middle-class blacks, and thereby torpedo the government's broader equity-with-growth goals. This policy dilemma was exacerbated by the international context of rising neoliberalism that coincided with the liberation reform episode in Zimbabwe. Land acquisition fell drastically after 1984 in important part because of budget cuts induced by neoliberal austerities of a 'home-grown' structural adjustment program.[59]

Finally, the reforms had important socio-political consequences. Relatively intrusive agrarian policies reinforced state and party dominance over the rural peasantry and the agrarian sector. The government's overriding preoccupation with the 'land question' produced an expansive state machinery—of ministries, departments, and parastatals overseeing agricultural and rural-development policies—with extended and deepening authoritarian grip in the countryside.[60] These were not comparable to the coercive state structures that developed in conjunction with radical agrarian policies in Angola and Mozambique. But the political

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[58] Raftopoulos, "Unreconciled Differences: The Limits of Reconciliation Politics in Zimbabwe," p. 2.
[59] Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*, pp. 19, 26.
[60] Moyo, "The Land Question," p. 166.

implications were dissimilar from the state structural outcomes of liberal land redistribution in post-liberation South Africa and Namibia. In Zimbabwe, agrarian reform had considerable impact on poverty alleviation and land access compared to the latter countries such that, despite failures to meet the stated policy objectives, by late 1980s the African peasant sector emerged as a major economic sector and Zimbabwe was hailed as an agricultural 'success story.'[61]

The reforms created a more polarized agrarian structure. The liberal reform measures reproduced preexisting racial inequities and conflicts in land ownership. At the conclusion of the reform period, the integration of commercial and communal subsectors was not materialized; by 1989, some 4,319 white commercial farmers controlled 29 percent of arable land, and the white commercial sector dominated as ever domestic food and export production.[62] Over 70 percent of land acquired for resettlement was located in agroecologically marginal southern regions outside the white commercial zone in the central highlands. Further, despite measure to redress racial bias in input application, producer pricing, service extension, and other regulations, the post-liberation state, much like its predecessor, provided white farmers with greater incentives and market protections, while farm credit in Communal and Resettlement Areas was directed more towards small and large black capitalist farmers, intensifying rural land and class inequalities.[63]

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[61] External observers deemed land acquisition and resettlement as a considerable success, e.g., John Cusworth and Judy Walker, *Land Resettlement in Zimbabwe: A Preliminary Evaluation* (ODA, Evaluation Report EV 434, London, September 1988); Dick Durevall, *The Zimbabwean Economy in the 1990s: Trade Liberalization and Land Reform* (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority, 1991); J. Herbst, "The Dilemmas of Land Policy in Zimbabwe," *Africa Insight*, 21/4 (1991): 269-276.

[62] Cliffe, "The Prospects for Agricultural Transformation in Zimbabwe," in Stoneman, *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, p. 309; Palmer, "Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990," pp. 167, 169.

Maize Production Per Hectare in Major Agricultural Sub-Sectors

Yield kgs/ha	*1983/84*	*1984/85*	*1985/86*	*1986/87*
Commercial Farms	2,600	5,500	5,000	3,600
Resettlement Areas	1,115	1,205	1,709	742
Communal Areas	600	1,500	1,300	500

Source: J. Cusworth, *Land Resettlement Issues* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, Agricultural Sector Memo, 1990), p. 5.

[63] Moyo, "The Land Question," pp. 183-8; Mumbengegwi, "Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy," pp. 217.

On the other hand, the uneven and unequal access to land produced new inequalities. Most Communal Areas, housing two-thirds of the population, were located in poorer natural regions and consequently benefited less from land reforms, leading to growing regional disparities. In the same token, uneven access to land, markets, and agricultural produce during the liberation episode contributed to marked rural class differentiation. In particular, that a limited number of households possessed large landholdings in the Communal Areas since late settler-colonial period, and former party and state officials enjoyed privileged access to land, reinforced a black landed elite that further polarized the agrarian class structure.[64] A related implication was the marginalization of peasant interests. Contrary to post-liberation Angola and Mozambique, and scholarly claims that the Zimbabwean peasantry wielded greater political influence on the state, the post-liberation state "found itself reduced to the role of mediator between the conflicting interests of the two agrarian classes."[65]

6.3 EXCLUSIVE NATIONALISM AS NATION-BUILDING

Nation-building strategies also encompass the contradictory and evolving nature of the stalled-liberal approach. At the beginning, ZANU-PF's leaders adopted a 'policy of reconciliation' and national unity as guiding principles for national reform and consolidation of a multiracial national community. Thus, the pre-1987 years were generally characterized by politics of reconciliation and inclusion—especially of white minorities—meant to foster racial and national cohesion against inherited racial, nationalist, ethnic and regional divisions.[66] Notwithstanding his party's resounding victory in the independence elections, Robert Mugabe formed a government

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[64] Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*, p. 61; Cliffe, "The Prospects for Agricultural Transformation," pp. 309-11; D. Weiner, "Land and Agrarian Development," in Stoneman, ed., *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, pp. 71-4.
[65] Mumbengegwi, "Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy," p. 219.
[66] See Robert Mugabe's speech on the eve of Independence Day on The *Chronicle* (Bulawayo), 18 April 1980.

of national unity in which white elites, Joshua Nkomo and other ZAPU leaders, and some other black figures outside the liberation movements were appointed to cabinet positions in efforts to foster racial and broader national reconciliation.

Furthermore, the liberation government guaranteed the political, economic, and cultural rights of the settler minority, including the reserved parliamentary seats, civil service employment and pensions, and the dominant economic position of whites. Besides, the formerly hostile ZANLA, ZIPRA, and Rhodesian armies were integrated into the new Zimbabwe National Army, and placed under General Peter Walls, former commander of the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) in the war against the liberation fronts. To bridge ethnic tensions, the liberation government also adopted a language policy which set Ndebele and Shona (alongside English) as official national languages, and emphasized the teaching of both languages, to develop a sense of cultural equality and national inclusion.[67] Likewise, school curriculum was designed to emphasize 'national unity, patriotism, civics and local history' even though curricular reform received marginal attention until after the Unity Accord. In general, as in South Africa and Namibia, the policy—which also recognized other minority languages for educational and media usage—promoted a pluralist approach to nation-building as opposed to the hegemonic and homogenizing pattern that defined post-liberation Angola and Mozambique.

The nation-building measures in Zimbabwe hardly exhibit a decidedly authoritarian 'high modernist' approach that marked the latter cases. Rather the reforms were distinctively moderate and rather 'disjointed' and 'superficial'[68] vis-à-vis the more ambitious and wide-ranging attempts to radically modernize and reorganize society. The policies involved measures too irresolute to fully rearrange the inherited, politically divisive politico-administrative structures (e.g.,

[67] See S. Makoni, S. Dube, and P. Mashiri, "Zimbabwe Colonial and Post-Colonial Language Policy and Planning Practices," *Multilingual Matters*, 7 (2006): 377-414.
[68] Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe*, pp. 43, 45.

customary laws, provincial boundaries) or to drastically degrade the authority of, and social allegiance commanded by, such non-state actors as traditional chiefs, religious leaders, or spirit mediums.[69] Likewise, gradual and less far-reaching measures were implemented to entrench a new national identity, including the abolition of Rhodesian national holidays and the changing of place names to rid of the symbols of an oppressive and divisive colonial past.[70]

Such measures were consistent with the moderate and inclusive nature of the liberal approach to nation-building in South Africa and Namibia. However, the stalled-liberal approach was markedly different in both its substances as well as achievements. The policy of racial reconciliation rang hollow in the face of continued racial inequalities and white domination of land and economy, which hampered progress towards a just, equitable, and multiracial national community. on the other hand, the liberation elite attempted "both to speak the language of unity through the policy of reconciliation, while chastising the white elite for their continued monopoly of the economy in the face of growing frustrations of their black counterparts."[71] This tension, together with the black government's long-term goal of socialist transformation, reignited the mistrust of whites who overwhelmingly supported Ian Smith's anachronistic party, Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (formerly, RF party), in the 1985 elections. Prime Minister Mugabe's ensuing charges of white 'betrayal' of his policy of reconciliation, and the 1987 abolition of reserved parliamentary seats, further alienated the white minority, which, reluctant to forgo its racial privileges, effectively retreated from active national politics to the detriment of an inclusive, multiracial nation-building agenda.[72]

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[69] du Toit, *State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa*, pp. 254-9.
[70] Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe*, pp. 42-3; Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, pp. 156-60.
[71] Raftopoulos, *Race and Nationalism in a Post-Colonial State*, p.1.
[72] Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, p. 80; Muzondidya, "From Buoyancy to Crisis," pp. 172-3.

Prospects for black reconciliation and unity were also slim from the outset. The government's approach was fraught with—and ultimately gave way to—political intolerance, exclusion, and repressive measures towards political, ethnic, or regional differences. Its overriding drive for political unity over pluralism and 'party unity' over national unity fueled the conflict between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU leaderships, which dealt a crushing blow to inclusive nation-building during the reform period. Mugabe poorly handled a series of events that culminated to the bloody Gukurahundi campaign: tensions in the new national army stemming from perceptions of preferential treatment of former ZANLA fighters; alienation and dissidence by former ZIPRA combatants; the dismissal (1982) of Joshua Nkomo and his supporters from cabinet for allegedly stoking Shona-Ndebele animosities; and the looming threat of civil war as South Africa sawed instability by exploiting the domestic divisions and arming dissidents. Thus, the non-democratic exclusion and persecution of ZAPU elites, the militarized pacification of Matabeleland and Midlands, and the withholding of social services and development projects in the region,[73] all further deepened ethnic and regional divisions that came to plague the nation-building program. The notorious Fifth Brigade military unit, which stamped out the anti-government dissidence, was almost entirely Shona in composition and openly justified its violence on ethnic grounds that, in turn, intensified Matabele regionalism.[74]

Other ill-conceived government policies also had polarizing effects. For instance, the use of ZANU-PF party slogans, songs, and political speeches that portrayed the party as 'the authentic liberator' fueled popular disgruntlement among PF-ZAPU Ndebele supporters. An exclusive nationalism and liberation narrative that denigrated ZAPU and other nationalist parties

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[73] Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 48; Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe*, pp. 39-40.
[74] See J. Alexander, J. McGregor, and T. O. Ranger, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2000), pp. 204-231; B. Lindgren, *The Politics of Ndebele Ethnicity: Origins, Nationalist, and Gender in Southern Zimbabwe* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Uppsala University, 2002).

while extolling the historical place of ZANU-PF—and of Shona (pre-)colonial heroes, cultural symbols, and monuments—in the African struggles (*Chimurenga*) against colonial and settler domination alienated disparate political and social groups.[75] Furthermore, uneven access to state resources, local power, and development during the reform period fueled a sense of marginalization, regionalism, and ethnicity by various ethnolinguistic groups in disparate regions.[76] In the southern borderlands, alienation from local government power, resources, and Shona administrative and cultural domination, nurtured grievances among ethnic minorities, such as the Shangani, Karanga, Tonga, and Venda.[77]

In sum, the strategies of the reform period in Zimbabwe reproduced preexisting racial and ethnic divisions while nurturing new schisms in the national political arena. Increasingly, the government failed to lay down foundations for a more 'cohesive nation-state' for its less consensual political measures and strategies "paid little attention to the ethnic, racial, gendered, and class configurations of the inherited state."[78] Together with zero-sum electoral politics, long-delayed and abortive attempt to consolidate a one-party state in the latter half of the 1980s further exacerbated the divisive and polarizing political outcomes of the stalled-liberal approach.

6.3.1 One-Party Nation-Building: An Unfulfilled Agenda

A unique attribute of the reform period in Zimbabwe is the liberation elites'—especially Robert Mugabe's—illusive drive for establishing a one-party state. Considered as the highest embodiment of national unity and vehicle for transition to socialism, the one-party state agenda

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[75] Norma Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 74-5; J. Alexander, "Dissident Perspectives in Zimbabwe's Post-Independence War," *Africa*, 68, 2 (April 1998): 151-182.
[76] See A. Alao, *Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 122-3; J. Muzondidya and S. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007," *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27, 2 (2007), pp. 291-2; M. Sithole "Ethnicity and Factionalism in Zimbabwean Nationalist Politics, 1957-79," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 3, 1 (1980): 17-39.
[77] Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe," p. 290.
[78] Muzondidya, "From Buoyancy to Crisis," p. 184.

received greater attention in the latter half of the reform period. Mugabe strategically refrained from actively pursuing this political ambition from the outset of the reform period because the Lancaster House arrangements effectively precluded major state institutional changes until 1987. Besides, for the liberation leadership, the economic and political cost of tampering with the Bill of Rights and private property were too high.[79] Whatever the actual deterrent might be, Mugabe and his more militant allies within the party expected to establish a *de jure* one-party system gradually, through electoral dominance, rather than by a political decree as in Angola and Mozambique. In light of the party's sweeping victory in the 1980 elections, it was likely that the party could subsequently win over the remaining one-third voters and that ZANU-PF's hegemony over the state (and society) would emerge from the 'will of the majority.'[80]

Political leaders thus pursued a twofold strategy of merging (and subordinating) state structures with party structures, and exerting political dominance over society. They nearly achieved the first strategy in the first five post-liberation years. The WADCOs and VIDCOs enabled the party to secure effective control over state structures in rural areas. The party proclaimed in its 1984 congress its supremacy over government bodies and its policy direction—measures presaging the one-party state.[81] To advance the second strategy, whilst hounding black opposition political parties, the government sought to destroy independent civil society associations and coaxed various professional and cultural organizations into joining the ruling party in the name of political unity and national development.[82] Yet, party dominance over society remained contested throughout the liberation episode especially in urban areas. Black opposition remained a vocal force within the state and society, while the electoral victory of

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[79] Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 87.
[80] Ibid., pp. 48-9.
[81] Ibid., p. 80.
[82] Dorman, "NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: From Inclusion to Exclusion," p. 846.

Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe in 1985 crashed any lingering hopes of ZANU-PF winning over the political support of whites. Moreover, while consolidating political dominance elsewhere throughout the country, ZANU-PF failed to dislodge ZAPU in Matabeleland where the latter won majority in the 1985 elections; its marginal popularity among the Ndebele further diminished with the Gukurahundi violence and ensuing regional marginalization.

Like other reform programs, commitment to the party-state agenda and the policy instruments for its realization were ambiguous. Unlike its Mozambican and Angolan counterparts, ZANU-PF's leadership failed to either articulate a resolute strategy of establishing a one-party regime or "make clear precisely how a future single party would fit into the larger scientific socialist picture."[83] With the electoral avenue to this goal closed after 1985, Mugabe's regime increasingly turned to violence against black opposition in communal areas and black townships as well as to increasing repression of independent social actors. Internal debates and pressures within ZANU-PF for instituting a *de jure* one-party state intensified after the 1988 Unity Congress,[84] which took place in the heels of PF-ZAPU's subornation and effective centralization of power under an executive presidency in 1987. The party had secured at this stage virtual dominance over state and society by both political, administrative, and military methods. By 1990, the leadership was close to legalizing a one-party state when the party nearly swept parliamentary elections in the same year, an outcome interpreted by President Mugabe as a mandate for legally instituting the one-party state.

The goal was never realized when it was officially abandoned in 1990. There might have emerged a *de facto* one-party state as most scholars argue. Yet, throughout the reform period, there was a considerable degree of political voice, contestation, and intra-party factionalism, and

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[83] Sylvester, *The Terrain of Contradictory Development*, p. 74.
[84] On this intra-party and national debate, see I. Mandaza and L. Sachikonye, eds., *The One-Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate* (Harare: Southern Africa Political Economy (SAPES) Trust, 1991).

extra-party challenge to ZANU-PF's hegemony by opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society. In addition, to the extent such system developed during the liberation episode, it was accomplished in large part through electoral and popular mobilization, political cooptation, and nurturing social 'consensus' around the party, which lessened the hegemonic and authoritarian excesses inherent to the party-state nation-building projects in Angola and Mozambique. The political contradictions were a defining feature of the stalled-liberal approach, and had distinctive influence on political-regime institutions taking shaping during and after the liberation episode.

Finally, scholars too often emphasize intra-party divisions and popular opposition as factors that impeded liberation elites' drive for the installation of a de jure one-party state in Zimbabwe.[85] However, much more pivotal were the original liberal reform choice and, as well shall briefly examine next, external developments coinciding with the liberation-reform period. By the late 1980s, epochal international changes were shaking communist party rule in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. Besides, the government was facing growing domestic economic and social crises it could not remotely hope to tackle without the cooperation of dominant Western capital, international banks, and donor agencies.

6.4 WHAT FACTORS SHAPED THE LIBERATION EPISODE?

As we have seen, the liberation episode in Zimbabwe was uniquely defined by a stalled-liberal approach to reforms. But what led to the initial liberal reform choice itself, and its derailing during the reform period? What factor shaped the political dynamics of the liberation-reform period? Analysts too often emphasized the Lancaster-House Constitution as the single most important determinant of the reform policies and dynamics of the liberation reform period.

[85] See, for example, I. Mandaza and L. Sachikonye, "The Zimbabwe Debate on the One-Party State and Democracy," in Mandaza and Sachikonye, eds., *The One-Party State and Democracy*, pp. 1-18.

Indeed, the objective institutional constraints "pervaded the process and structures through which the new state [had] sought both to consolidate national independence and provide a basis for genuine economic and social development."[86] Meanwhile, Neo-Marxist critics suggested that a petty-bourgeois domination of the liberation party and the state, foreign capitalist influence, and the absence of peasant or worker militancy during the reform period together explained why the Zimbabwean national revolution 'lost its way.'[87]

As the foregoing analysis has sufficiently elaborated, the domestic-structural factors relating to the Lancaster House arrangements, settler power, and a powerful capital were the most important factors that defined the course of the reform period. The initial reformist policy choice, as noted in Chapter Three, that stemmed from the negotiated settlement was a product of the presence of a moderately strong settler state, advanced capitalist economy, and a dominant class of domestic and foreign capital on the eve of national liberation. Once actors adopt a contingent policy choice during a critical juncture, it becomes progressively difficult to fully undo the initial choice or to pick up a previously available policy option.[88] Scholars of the reform period often underestimated how difficult it was for liberation elites to repudiate the liberation policy choice in its entirety or to select anew an entirely radical policy option in the course of the reform period. The reform choice produced structures and class interests that guaranteed the maintenance of its central features especially in the socioeconomic arena.

Overwhelming emphasis on domestic-structural conditions also obscured the external context distinctively shaping dynamics of the reform period. In particular, to fully understand why liberation elites stalled the liberal approach, it is crucial to consider regional factors and the

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[86] Ibbo Mandaza, "Introduction: The Political Economy of Transition," in Mandaza, *The Political Economy of Transition*, p. 2.
[87] See Astrow, *A Revolution That Lost Its Way*, 1983.
[88] See Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," 2000.

broader world context of the reform episode. On the one hand, the liberation government was particularly vulnerable to Apartheid South Africa's disproportionate economic influence and military aggression as white supremacy began to wane in the region. The Zimbabwean economy was heavily dependent on South African capital, trade relations, and port transit; South African companies controlled about a quarter of the country's productive capital,[89] which gave south Africa greater leverage against the new government. Further, the fact that Apartheid began to face an existential danger with the demise of Southern Rhodesia, the 'last buffer' against radical black nationalism, and Zimbabwe maintained a central geopolitical and economic influence in the region, meant that any radical moves risked a direct South African invasion to stem communist 'total onslaught.'[90] Hence, the liberation government was reluctant to act on its rhetoric of socialist transformation to avert the kind of South African economic and military destabilization that had been wreaking havoc on Mozambique since mid-1970s.

The broader international setting of the reform period also allowed stalling some aspects of the liberal-reform choice, but it progressively diminished prospects for radical change. Zimbabwean liberation elites faced a more constraining global political and economic context in the 1980s than their Angolan and Mozambican allies in the latter 1970s. In general, the liberation episode in Zimbabwe coincided with declining Soviet socialist influence, the rise of neoliberalism, and a fast-globalizing world economy increasingly governed by the international financial institutions and neoliberal economic principles. Together with the domestic-structural constraints, the international geopolitical and economic changes were crucial in dissuading political leaders from considering radical measures in the domain of socioeconomic change. In other words, the restrictive international-economic environment narrowed Zimbabwean leaders'

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[89] Stoneman and Cliffe, *Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 14.
[90] See Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbor*, 1986; John Dzimba, *South Africa's Destabilization of Zimbabwe, 1980-89* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).

choices to a more 'realistic range': that is, the "protection of [reformist] small gains" and "a defence of national capitalism" in the short-term, and the indefinite deferral of "the drive for significant growth, equity or socialism."[91] Nevertheless, it is worth underscoring the fact that the international setting would prove relatively less constraining than the one South African and Namibian liberation elites would face in the 1990s. Herein laid the source of policy discrepancies and aspiration for gradual socialist transformation on the part of Zimbabwean national leaders.

On the other hand, the domestic and external threats arising from a hostile regional setting forced the government to embark on coercive consolidation of state power. Apartheid South Africa sought to discredit black rule as dysfunctional, by fomenting domestic unrest and violence, and forestall the prospect of racial reconciliation in Southern Africa, besides attempting to leave the liberation governments preoccupied with internal problems that would drain their appetite and resources to support the anti-apartheid liberation movements. Thus, besides efforts to smother Zimbabwe's economy, Pretoria orchestrated direct military incursions and manipulated domestic tensions, while backing a reactionary insurgency to thereby blunt the black government's 'freedom of action' and contain the domino effect of 'inevitable black victory' in the region.[92] The insecurity prompted Mugabe's regime to crash domestic opponents and perceived threats to national unity such as the bloody repression in Matabeleland, where South Africa hoped to foment a counterrevolutionary insurgency in the first half of the 1980s.

The drift to authoritarian nation-building was also partly a product of a permissive regional-international environment as opposed to the professed Marxist-Leninist liberation ideology *per se*. The one-party regimes of postcolonial Africa had been widely unpopular at this point but not fully discredited as vehicles of post-colonial political and social modernization,

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[91] Stoneman, "A Zimbabwean Model?," p. 5; also, Stoneman, "The Economy: Recognizing the Reality," pp. 55-8; Nelson Moyo, "A Hostile World Economic Climate?" in Stoneman, *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, pp. 176-92.
[92] Michael Evans, "The Security Threat from South Africa," in Stoneman, *Zimbabwe's Prospects*, pp. 218, 222.

while the “third wave” of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa would gain momentum after 1989. It was in this external political climate that ZANU-PF’s leadership pressed, after 1987, for a one-party state. It also formally renounced this goal in 1990 precisely because of wider international changes at the tail-end of the liberation episode.

6.5 CONCLUSION

The liberation episode in Zimbabwe was defined by properties of a *stalled* liberal approach to reform. The imposition of a reformist approach upon liberation elites in conjunction with the Lancaster House settlement (1979) and the unique world-historical conjuncture of the reform period in the 1980s presented a unique set of opportunities and constraints that led to policy ambiguities, dilemmas, and contradictions. Political leaders pursued semi-liberal strategies of state reform and power consolidation that involved both authoritarian repression, exclusion, and incorporative democratic methods. They eschewed radical socioeconomic change in favor of balancing capitalist development with gradual reduction of historical inequalities through progressive reform measures. Finally, liberation elites adopted a liberal ‘policy of reconciliation’ for an inclusive, multiracial nation-building agenda, which unraveled at the onset of the reform period as ZANU-PF leaders increasingly turned to repressive strategies in an unsuccessful bid to establish a one-party system in the second half of the reform decade.

The reforms resulted in moderately repressive state structures, the reproduction of preexisting racial inequalities and the production of intra-black class inequalities, and the deepening of political cleavages. As we shall examine in the next chapter, these state structures and growing social polarization in turn set into motion a liberal backlash against the political regime whereby the urban popular sectors pressed for political liberalization, economic

inclusion, and expanded redistribution. Finally, the stalled-liberal approach of the liberation reform period was not a *political outcome* of state capture by a non-revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, foreign capital control of the state, or non-militancy of the lower classes during the reform years. In fact, unlike in South Africa and Namibia, the state had considerable autonomy from domestic capital and a high degree of independence from the middle and lower classes. Instead, the policy decisions and dynamics of the reform episode were contingently shaped by the initial liberal policy choice and its external context that presented liberation leaders with a distinctive range of pressures to navigate as well as opportunities to exploit.

CHAPTER SEVEN

REACTIVE SEQUENCES, RENEWED REFORM, AND STRUCTURAL REPRODUCTION

In all five countries, the liberation period reforms generated a chain of strong backlashes and counter-backlashes. The particular pattern of political reaction in each country depended on the nature of the reforms and the structures produced during the reform episode. For that reason, the aftermath of the critical juncture of reform was variously characterized by major episodes of political and economic liberalization (i.e., Mozambique and Angola), renewed liberal attempts at greater redistribution and social welfare (notably, South Africa and Namibia), and radical redistribution and renewed political exclusion (i.e., Zimbabwe). In each case, more enduring state institutions and patterns of social polarization were reproduced with the resolution of the dynamic of political reactions and counterreactions. These structures that resemble the state and social structures of the reform period in each case constitute the more enduring legacies of liberation that predominate present-day Southern Africa and are described in the next chapter.

This chapter analyzes the dynamics of the 'aftermath' of the reform episode: the intervening period between the critical juncture and its enduring structural legacies. First, whereas in Mozambique and Angola the early dynamics of the aftermath period overlapped with the critical juncture itself, in the remaining cases the dynamic of reactions and counterreactions of the aftermath period occurred after the reform period. Second, the aftermath period also differed in its duration and covers the following years: in Mozambique, from 1983 to 2008, when a decade-and-half period of competitive politics ended; in Angola, from 1982 to 2012, when a decade of state rebuilding and political incorporation concluded; Zimbabwe, 1990 to 2013, with the termination of an inclusive national government; South Africa, 2004 to 2018, with the ouster of populist President Jacob Zuma and the triumph of a liberal ANC wing led by President Cyril

Ramaphosa; and Namibia, 2004 to 2015, with the election of the reformist President Hage Geingob, to the 2019 national elections. Even though the entry or exit of certain political leaders serve as clear landmarks, demarcating the end of the aftermath period is largely based on broader dynamics that usher in the resolution of the reactive sequence and eventual crystallization of the legacy. Third, it is important to highlight that the liberation political parties that oversaw the reform episode continued to dominate state power during the aftermath period as well.[1]

Table 7.1 outlines the distinctive nature of the backlashes of the aftermath period and the structures that crystallized with its conclusion. The key variable to understand dynamics of this phase is *the pattern of backlash* triggered by the liberation reforms. In the context of radical reforms, liberation elites' radical state restructuring, power consolidation, and social intervention during the reform episode set into motion a violent *conservative backlash* in which armed groups mobilized the rural peasantry antagonized by radical agrarian reforms, the suppression of tradition and religion, and centralized state policies. The violent blowback caused profound political and economic crises to which the liberation governments counterreacted with political and economic liberalization, involving renewed political inclusion, the restoration of traditional and religious privileges, and transition to market economies. In dramatic contrast, liberal reforms generated a *social-democratic backlash* by the popular sectors, which reacted with often violent protests against deepening racial and class inequalities, mass unemployment, widespread poverty, and a host of neoliberal policies that adversely affected the historically marginalized black majorities. The popular challenge elicited renewed government efforts for the reduction of inequalities, poverty, and expanded opportunities for the urban and rural black poor.

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[1] During this period, some of the liberation parties modified their previous names indicative of the changing political dynamics. The MPLA in Angola dropped the revolutionary suffix of the reform period: Workers Party; FRELIMO in Mozambique adopted 'Frelimo Party,' and SWAPO in Namibia similarly adopted 'Swapo Party.'

Table 7.1: The Genesis, Actors, and Implications of Backlashes to the Reform Period

	Conservative backlash	*Social-democratic backlash*	*Liberal backlash*
Cause of reaction	Exclusion of conservative political actors and radical rural changes that alienated traditional elites and the peasantry	Deepening structural inequalities and rising unemployment, poverty, and poor service delivery among black majorities	Political exclusion, repression, and deepening structural inequalities, unemployment, and poverty among blacks
Main actors	Armed opposition groups mobilizing traditional elites, religious authorities, and rural peasantry	The popular sectors in general; specifically labor and social movements of the urban and rural poor, student mobilization	The urban popular sectors and democratic opposition mobilizing the urban middle and lower social classes
Main goals	Political incorporation, Africanization and democratization of the state, and capitalist economic development	The reduction of structural inequalities, poverty, unemployment, and affordable housing and equitable services	Political incorporation, democratization, and the reduction of inequalities, poverty, and better service delivery
Policy counterreaction	Political and economic liberalization, renewed inclusion and democratic state-rebuilding, and the incorporation of traditional authorities	Expanded redistribution (of income, wealth, land), broad-based black economic empowerment, job creation, improved social service delivery	Political and economic liberalization, black economic empowerment, radical redistribution of land, renewed repression and exclusion
Structural outcome	Narrowly inclusive state structures, moderately unequal and moderately polarized social structures	Broadly inclusive state institutions, highly unequal and highly polarized social structures	Exclusive and militarized state structures, less unequal but highly polarized social structures

Finally, in the context of stalled-liberal reforms, neither fully liberal nor fully radical policies of the reform period triggered a *liberal backlash*. It emerged among the urban middle- and lower-classes alienated by liberal socioeconomic reforms of the reform period and its immediate aftermath, and subsequently fueled by various civic and political forces pushing for democratic incorporation, greater redistribution, and expanded freedoms. Whereas liberation elites' resort to repressive strategies to solidify power during the reform period ultimately gave rise to liberal demands for political, civil, and human rights, on the one hand, the liberal approach to inherited inequalities, poverty, and development marginalized and disaffected the urban popular sectors, on the other. The conjuncture of political and societal reactions spurred a

broad-based liberal backlash that resulted in political liberalization, violent redistribution of white-owned agricultural land, and renewed exclusion and militarization of regime structures.

The resolution of the backlashes at a subsequent stage led to the reproduction of state institutions and patterns of national polarization that characterized the reform period and its aftermath. In Mozambique and Angola, liberalization reforms saw the establishment of democratic institutions and free-market economies, but the authoritarian and violent legacies precluded the emergence of fully inclusive political regimes or the bridging of deep-seated national cleavages. The parallel transition from socialism also gave rise to new class inequalities. In South Africa and Namibia, the social-democratic backlash further solidified the inclusive multiracial democracies inherited from the reform period; yet, unaddressed historical racial disparities and new class inequalities reproduced the inherited racial, class, and, in Namibia, ethnoregional polarizations. Lastly, in Zimbabwe, a violent government reaction to the liberal backlash reproduced repressive and increasingly militarized state structures, while renewed political exclusion and highly inequitable land redistribution further deepened racial, class, and regional polarization.

In sum, different policy aspects of the reform period decisively shaped the origins, nature, and structural outcomes of the respective patterns of backlash. The dynamic of reactions and counterreactions unfolded in three broad stages: the development of backlash, government counterreaction with policy and institutional adaptations, and the resolution of the backlash and institutional reproduction. The overall political dynamic was a path-dependent process driven by 'reactive' causal mechanisms.[2] Self-reinforcing mechanisms were important at earlier stages, because liberation ideals and popular aspirations embodied by the ex-liberation political parties were essential to the legitimacy and stability of post-liberation institutions. At later stages,

[2] See Mahoney, *The Logic of Social Science*, Chapter 11.

however, with the declining popularity and political legitimacy, the political parties' control over state power and resources served as key mechanisms of institutional reproduction. Incumbent power and patronage resources bolsters electoral dominance of the ruling parties in the context of the democracies; in the non-democracies, such resources were combined with electoral manipulation, violence, and extensive patronage to maintain and reproduce power. In large part, however, the broader dynamic was driven by reactive or negative feedback mechanisms.

The distinctive historical heritages and contextual factors of the countries (e.g., oil in Angola) were indeed crucial in shaping the political dynamics of aftermath period. Even so, it is worth emphasizing, the dynamic set into motion by the liberation reform episode in each country generated a path-dependent process with its own causal force and logic. This process is better understood as a set of reactions and counterreactions with distinctive stages, major transitions or institutional adjustments, and structural outcomes. As such, in the analysis to come, I focus on the path-dependent casual process as well as (in analyzing paired cases) on general analytical categories that illustrate the dynamic while highlighting contextual differences.

7.1 CONSERVATIVE BACKLASH AND RENEWED INCLUSION: MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA

In Mozambique and Angola, the liberation episode generated a violent conservative backlash that erupted with the onset of radical reforms. Besides, the reactions manifested as violent civil wars that caused utter economic ruin, and ever worsening social conditions in the immediate aftermath of the reform period. This in turn forced liberation elites to embark by the mid-1980s on a road of political and economic liberalization. Whereas the aftermath reforms ushered in a more inclusive electoral democracy in Mozambique in the 1990s, in Angola such changes crystalized in the 2000s due to continuation of the reactionary backlash. The reactive sequence

thus evolved from a violent backlash to a political opposition. The aftermath period was distinctly drawn-out in these countries and marked by two separate phases: (1) violent conservative reaction and liberalization, and (2) political reactions and structural reproduction.

7.1.1 Phase I: Violent Conservative Backlash and Liberalization

In both countries, the reactionary backlash began with the reform period and continued unabated to the early 1990s. Despite differing in some important political respects, the movements that directed the backlash were commonly 'anti-socialist,' 'anti-*mestiço*,' 'black-oriented,' and 'grounded in 'traditional' sociopolitical structures'[3] and a profoundly alienated rural peasantry. **(I)** In Mozambique, the government's ambitious socialist and modernizing goals alienated 'traditional' rural social, economic, and administrative structures. In particular, socialist policies of rural collectivization, cooperative production, villagization deeply antagonized sections of the peasanty and the elite class. The marginalization of conservative elites and peasants catalyzed to a violent rural backlash—by the Renamo or *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* armed group—in the central provinces, where the imposition of a new top-down political system and tight economic controls rekindled memories of the colonial state and its highly extractive policies. To make matters worse, during the liberation struggle, the Portuguese had forcibly resettled people in protected villages in the central provinces and propagated of Frelimo's 'southern bias.'

The liberation government retreated from radical reforms in 1983 in reaction to an intensifying crisis. Yet, the reform period had already set into motion an intensifying violent dynamic of reactions and counterreactions. Initially formed by Rhodesian intelligence as an agent of external destabilization, by 1977 Renamo infiltrated into central Mozambique, targeting agricultural cooperatives, economic and development infrastructure, and transport networks in

[3] Chabal, "The Construction of the Nation-State," p. 36.

Sofala and Manica provinces.[4] Even though orchestrated by Rhodesia and (after 1980) South Africa, the rural resistance was fundamentally a reaction to radical reforms, a violent manifestation of grievances among the rural peasantry, traditional chiefs, and other conservative actors. The armed opposition channeled a rural backlash by groups antagonized by Frelimo's "policy of compulsory villagization and attempts to collectivize agriculture, its assault on traditional practices and the removal of traditional chiefs, and its curbs on the Catholic Church."[5]

The armed reactionary backlash lost momentum with the demise of Southern Rhodesia in 1980. But Renamo reemerged in 1981 under the sponsorship of South Africa, which exploited the insurgency to undermine the liberation government and undercut the ANC's anti-apartheid struggle. The violent reaction thus intensified in the aftermath of the reform period as South Africa vigorously pursued a 'war of destabilization' against liberated Mozambique. In the rest of the decade, Renamo grew from a pseudo-terrorist, 'proxy' organization to a crudely anti-communist, much effective peasant-based insurgency with a vaguely defined pro-capitalist political program. The fact that it was a backlash to the radical reform was evident in its military strategies to destroy new state structures, new socialist relations of production, and transport infrastructure in rural areas.[6] Contrary to conventional portrayal of the backlash as little more than an externally instigated conflict, the root cause of the violent reaction lay in radical 'political choices' introduced in the countryside during the reform episode, and it was basically "grounded in the social fabric of rural Mozambique."[7]

(II) In Angola, the reform period similarly initiated a violent rural backlash with a more extensive external involvement. Whereas Frelimo imposed more transformative changes and

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[4] Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 117-20.
[5] Ibid., p. 137.
[6] Ibid., pp. 123-30.
[7] C. Geffray, *La cause des armes au Mozambique: Antropologie d'une guerre civile* (Paris: Karthala, 1990), p. 4.

rigid state bureaucracy in the countryside, the MPLA government was quickly plunged into a civil-cum-international 'war of intervention' that derailed major reforms and state control in rural areas. Lacking as broad national popularity and administrative control, the MPLA government was confronted by old liberation movements (i.e., UNITA and FLNA) that exploited ethnoregional and anti-revolutionary sentiments. Furthermore, besides a rural peasant-based opposition, it faced a shot-lived but serious backlash by the urban poor with the onset of radical reforms (see Chapter 4). The rural backlash was in some respects a continuation of intra-national conflicts of the struggle period and an integral part of Cold War conflicts.[8] However, after UNITA's withdrawal from the cities (1976) and the subduing of the urban mobilization (1977), the reaction developed, as in Mozambique, into a violent backlash based among a profoundly disenchanted rural peasantry in the central highlands and the southeast plains.

The MPLA was historically an urban party with its stronghold in Luanda, the Mbundu corridor, and southern coastal cities. The liberation government thus met a powerful backlash from most parts of the country. The MPLA's consolidation of power challenged from the outset by armed opposition and local hostility in the north and the central highlands. The backlash fast turned into a civil war not least because, while Renamo was a Rhodesian puppet during the reform period, UNITA was a former liberation movement with firm support among the majority Ovimbundu population and widespread international recognition.[9] At the onset of the reform period, Jonas Savimbi declared a 'black republic' in Huambo to replace the MPLA's allegedly pro-creole-mixed race-and-white socialist republic in Luanda. The predominantly Ovimbundu UNITA leadership sought to galvanize the wider African peasantry, as well as disparate racial, ethnic, and regional grievances with the MPLA's radical agendas. In particular, government

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[8] See Patrick Chabal, "The Limits of Nationhood," in Chabal, *A History of Lusophone Africa*, pp. 118-9.
[9] The FLNA, other serious contender from the struggle period, was virtually destroyed in 1975-76, and suffered further setbacks when the Mobutu regime in Zaire established cordial ties with the MPLA government in 1978-79.

policies to feed the urban masses antagonized the rural peasantry that turned more receptive to a rural movement that promised respect for African traditions and political autonomy.[10]

Most scholars suggest that the conflict was driven more by external clashes than internal political dynamics. The rural armed backlash was indisputably overshadowed by direct South African military presence in southern Angola from late 1970s to late 1980s. Nevertheless, this does not discount the fact that the conflict morphed into a rural backlash to the reform period that would outlast a similar dynamic in Mozambique. The South African and US-backed UNITA deployed Maoist strategies and own repertoire of anticolonial struggle to mount a rural revolution from self-reliant liberated guerrilla bases. From late 1970s on, it rallied widespread rural support in the central highlands—with a rear base in the remote southeast of Angola—by mobilizing peasants, traditional elites, and religious leaders disenchanted with centralizing and modernizing government policies.[11] As in Mozambique, government control outside the main urban centers was challenged while a large proportion of the rural population fell under UNITA's sway or fled the conflict to the cities. The conservative backlash that dragged to the next century outlasted the external geopolitical rivalries ordinarily viewed as its drivers.

(III) In both countries, the violent reaction prompted a counterreaction by liberation governments in the aftermath of the reform period. The halting or complete abandonment of radical reform policies in 1982-83 that marked the end of the liberation episode (see Chapter 4) were part of this response. In Mozambique, Samora Machel and his government introduced major changes in political direction to mitigate a virtual collapse in economic production and trade as well as to contain the military challenge. Frelimo's Fourth Part Congress in April 1983

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[10] Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique*, pp. 81-2.

[11] See Ibid., pp. 81-4; Justin Pearce, *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola, 1975-2002* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 93-106. For a comprehensive account of the war, refer to W. Martin James III, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990* (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 1992).

adopted new economic policies, including deprioritizing the state sector, greater scope for market forces, and the re-establishment of markets and the removal of price controls in rural areas. The domestic measures were coupled by decisions to join the IMF-World Bank system, the reactivation of economic relations with South Africa, and a general reproachment with the West to isolate Renamo.[12] The government also drew South Africa to a security agreement in 1984—the Nkomati Accord—that cut off overt military support to Renamo.

In particular, the government took deliberate political and economic measures to blunt peasant discontent. After the Fourth Party Congress, the Frelimo party sought to recast itself as a broad-based 'front'—as opposed to 'vanguard party'-ism of the reform period—inclusive of all classes, dropped its '*marxisant'* antagonism to organized religion, and reintroduced more tolerant, mass-based, and widely participatory popular institutions. These efforts were coupled by attempts to restructure the state so as to decentralize decision-making and to restore relationships with the peasantry.[13] Notwithstanding the extensive counterreactions, the violent reaction escalated in the latter half of the 1980s as did South Africa's destabilization of Mozambique in the post-Nkomati years. At this point, when South African strategy turned to more covert destabilization, the armed backlash and counter-backlash had developed its own internal dynamic. After the mid-1980s, the conflict engulfed most parts of the country as Renamo expanded widely to both southern and northern regions and entrenched itself in the countryside.[14] The intensifying backlash reduced effective state control to the coastal urban areas and devastated administrative, transport, and economic infrastructure. To make matters worse, in 1986, President Samora Machel was killed in an airplane crash engineered by South Africa intelligence forces which threatened stability of the Frelimo regime.

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[12] Hall and Young, *Mozambique Since Independence*, pp. 151-5.
[13] Ibid., pp. 156-8.
[14] Ibid., pp. 166-80.

The mounting pressures set into motion a series of responses that resulted in full transition to market capitalism and electoral democracy in the early 1990s. In the economic arena, the regime faced ever worsening economic and popular pressure. The conflict wrought havoc in the rural areas where most administrative, social, and political infrastructure built during the liberation episode was almost entirely destroyed. The economic decline since the reform period became desperate by mid-1980s (Fig. 7.1). Between 1981 and 1985, national GDP fell by eight percent annually, main agricultural crops fell by 25 percent, the balance of payments deteriorated, and consequently the government's budgetary position worsened. The government reacted with creeping economic liberalization policies in the face of IMF and the World Bank pressure. In 1987, with a neoliberal structural adjustment program (*Programa de Reabilitação Econômica*, PRE), state enterprises were privatized, price and market controls removed, public expenditures cut heavily, and economic management decentralized.[15]



Figure 7.1: Decline in the National Exports of Mozambique, 1973-89

Source: Abrahamsson and Nilsson, *The Troubled Transition*, p. 67.

[15] Ibid., pp. 196-7; also, for rural policy changes in particular, see Bowen, *The State Against the Peasantry*, ch. 7.

In the political arena, the party elite reacted with momentous liberal reforms. It oversaw a 'policy of Africanizing' the state (substituting whites and Asians with Africans) in efforts to blunt conservative demands to render the state more 'national.' The reformist Joaquim Chissano, who succeeded the hardliner Machel as party and state leader, pushed for a party perestroika to make Frelimo an open, participatory 'broad front' inclusive 'of all classes.' In a most dramatic move, the government mended relations with the Catholic Church by returning confiscated property, schools, and hospitals in 1987-88, and the restoration of some social legitimacy to all religious institutions. A drastic ideological shift was endorsed in the Fifth Party Congress of July 1989: all reference to Marxism-Leninism, 'scientific socialism,' class and internal enemies was expunged from party documents, while embracing free association, citizen rights, and minority groups as new party ideals. The party began to redefine itself as the representative of all 'social groups' in a one-party 'social democracy,' even though it retained long-held principles of democratic centralism and the party's 'leading role' in state and society.[16]

At the same time, the party-state was dismantled and replaced by 'democratic' structures in comprehensive constitutional reforms. To politically bankrupt Renamo, the party elite began to adopt Renamo's demands for democratic changes, which were brought forth in a revised constitution in 1990: the legalization of opposition political parties, separation of powers, election of the president by direct suffrage, sanctioning of private property, and the termination of Frelimo control over civil society. As the commitment to planned economy vanished, the party-state structures of the reform period were radically reversed by 'de-linking' Frelimo from state power, instituting representative institutions, and the recognition of an independent judiciary.[17] The institutional reconfigurations allowed for resolution of the conflict and

[16] Ibid., pp. 199-203.
[17] Ibid., pp. 208-12.

Renamo's incorporation as an opposition party in the early 1990s. As we shall see shortly, this began a new phase of political reactions and counterreactions during which deepening political and economic liberalization, alongside rising class inequalities, ultimately crystalize in more enduring structural legacies by the late 2000s.

In Angola, the comparatively less far-reaching nature of the radical reforms—and muted antagonism towards the Catholic Church, other religious institutions, and traditional authorities—certainly reduced the likelihood of a potentially explosive rural backlash. Moreover, the widespread violent conflict that affected much of the countryside in the early post-liberation years was, by the early 1980s, pushed to an isolated guerrilla insurgency in the far southeast of the country. However, the widespread disruption wrought by the reforms, as well as devastation of the ongoing civil war, created mounting economic and social pressures by the conclusion of the liberation episode. Besides, the campaign of destabilization led by South Africa forced the MPLA government to devote its scarce human and material resources to the war effort rather than to pressing policy matters. Basic aims to restore economic output to pre-independence levels and to defeat UNITA became increasingly unrealistic.

The government counterreacted with an abrupt departure from radical measures of the reform period. In early 1983, as in Mozambique, the ruling party adopted a "crisis plan," whereby investment in development projects was halted and policy emphasis shifted to addressing pressing economic and popular challenges. This included concentrating on improved food and consumer-goods supply to the rural (and urban) population, increased peasant food production, and the commercialization of peasant agriculture.[18] However, the backlash did not engender serious economic or political reforms before the mid-1980s. The government continued to pursue Soviet-style economic planning and maintain repressive part-state regime structures of

[18] Bhagavan, *Angola's Political Economy, 1975-1985*, p. 32.

the liberation reform period with the help of vast oil (and diamond) revenues and Cuban military forces. Unlike the less fortunate Frelimo regime, the MPLA could afford to ignore the decline in rural agriculture and sustain the population in especially the urban centers with import goods.[19]

The government opened the door for gradual economic reforms after 1985. At this point, the rural armed opposition was intensifying because UNITA influence was entrenched across much of southern and central Angola, and its forces beginning to expand north to the Zairian frontier. As opposed to the politically rudderless Renamo, the movement firmly established itself among the rural peasantry with a program for black power, participatory democracy, and economic capitalism. Meanwhile, the national economy furthered deteriorated owing to the inefficiencies of the command economy and disruption of the ongoing civil war; production in all sectors but the oil industry remained stuck at below reform-period levels, while arbitrary price controls and financial regulation contributed to the development of a huge parallel economy.[20] Further, the government began to feel the heat from falling global oil prices. The economic crisis and pro-market class interests closely linked to the MPLA ruling elite led to a shift away from the centrally planned economy.

In a major turning point, the Second Party Congress of the MPLA-PT in Dec. 1985 recognized the poor economic performance and resolved for gradual economic liberalization. The first economic reform program—the *Programma de Saneamento Economico e Financeiro* (SEF)—launched in 1987 paved the way for the restructuring and later privatization of state enterprises. In reality, the government implemented fewer economic reforms in 1985-91 but major shift to a capitalist economy occurred during these years, occasioned by prolonged economic malaise, domestic pressure, and international changes. The ruling party consistently

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[19] Chabal, "The Construction of the Nation State," in Chabal, *A History of Lusophone Africa*, p. 67.
[20] Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique*, p. 164; Tony Hodges, *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State* (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), p. 39.

clung to its basic Marxist-Leninist principles; the socialist program first outlined in 1976 had been updated and upheld by party congresses in 1977, 1980, and 1985. Party elites explicitly rejected socialism and embarked upon liberalization reforms in 1990-91—changes brought about in part by the radical changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe that discredited socialism.

In the political arena, the regime reacted at an even slower pace. Until the late 1980s, unlike Frelimo's pragmatism, the MPLA regime maintained its 'orthodox' Marxist-Leninist ideology, the party-state 'instruments of repression,' and direct control over administration, industry, education, culture, and associational life.[21] This had to do more with distinctive national contextual factors than with uniqueness in the reform period or the ensuing backlash. Besides extensive Cuban and Soviet external backing, the regime used oil revenues for patronage politics, to feed the urban population with imported goods, and buttress its military and security capabilities. Certainly, it escaped the kind of armed violence that devasted the Mozambican countryside in the 1980s. Yet, it continued to face a relentless violent backlash whose ending was contingent on lasting political reforms and national reconciliation. In 1990s, the MPLA abandoned the party-state system and, in 1991, allowed open political contestation in a multiparty system while speeding up full-blown economic liberalization.[22] However, unlike in Mozambique, the violent backlash endured the structural reforms and reconfigurations.

7.1.2 Phase II: Resolution of Backlash and Structural Reproduction

The later phase of the aftermath period was defined by the resolution of the conservative backlash and the reproduction of structural patterns of the reform episode. Due to differing national conditions as well as political dynamics that go back to the liberation episode, the political reactions with violent undertones unfolded during this phase in distinctive ways and

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[21] Chabal, "The Limits of Nationhood," p. 101.
[22] Hodges, *Anatomy of an Oil State*, p. 12

over different time periods: 1992-2009 in Mozambique, and 1994-2012 in Angola. In Mozambique, the political reactions and counterreactions took place in a relatively competitive political context that culminated in the late 2000s in a dominant party system with enduring national cleavages. In Angola, the violent reaction persisted through the 1990s, and a less open political environment prevailed, before more stable dominant party structures solidified in the next decade. In both countries, however, the resolution of the reactive sequence culminated in less inclusive state structures and political cleavages rooted in the reform period.

7.1.2.1 Mozambique: From Inclusion to Democratic Backsliding

In Mozambique, the chain of political reactions proceeded at a relatively quick pace in the 1990s. With the embracing of full-blown market economics and multiparty democracy, the dynamic of violence entered a new phase of non-violent political reactions and counterreactions by the end of which the more enduring legacies of the liberation consolidated. This phase of institutional reform and recalibration corresponded with the second half of Joaquim Chissano's leadership that ended in 2005. In subsequent years, the regime became progressively less competitive, Frelimo party dominance resolidified, and narrowly inclusive state structures reproduced, along with the political rifts, that resembled those produced during the reform period.

The conservative backlash was effectively brought to an end by a comprehensive peace settlement—the Rome Accord of Oct. 4, 1992—between the government and Renamo. Renamo was to be incorporated as a political party, and multi-party elections held in October 1993 under the auspices of a UN peacekeeping mission. A new (1990) constitution laid down the promotion of civil and political rights, national development, pluralism, and social traditions as the new foundations of the state, dramatically redefining its fundamental structure, roles, and relations with both the market and society. The changes represent the very opposite of the independence

constitution and the radical reform programs of Frelimo during the reform episode. the reflected the Renamo's poorly articulated political program that came to stress tradition, western liberalism, and capitalist economy. Even though broader external political and economic factors were certainly influential, the institutional reforms in essence were a direct reaction to the causes and drivers of the decade-and-half long violent rural backlash.

The political power of Frelimo was affirmed by elections (1994) that formed a linchpin of the conflict resolution process. With Renamo's transition to a center-right parliamentary opposition, the dynamic shifted from violent reaction to a political contestation with violent undertones. Comparative analysts often attributed the rapid shift to external factors, such as a robust UN mission, the absence of extractive resources, and the termination of destabilizing South African influence. These factors were most likely important but not determinative. What mattered most in shaping the course of events was certainly factors associated with reform period and its aftermath. Renamo had neither any nationalist credentials nor political goal to challenge Frelimo's historical place as opposed to the popular UNITA's challenge to MPLA national legitimacy and authority. Without UNITA's external patronage and mineral resources, Renamo reach a political cul-de-sac and entered the political arena. For its part, Frelimo was eager to end the conflict given the collapse in state authority and ever deepening reliance on international aid.[23] Finally, gradual political opening since mid-1980s set the stage for momentous political reforms, which effectively mooted the basis of Renamo's rural-traditionalist backlash.

Both the resolution of backlash and political dynamics in its aftermath were path-dependent on previous events. The political reforms led to state structures and societal divisions that echoed those that dominated the reform period and its immediate aftermath. Frelimo leveraged its control of a highly centralized state to reinforce its political and economic

[23] Chabal, "The Limits of Nationhood," pp. 131-2.

dominance. The Frelimo-Renamo division ethnic came to define post-backlash multiparty politics as repeatedly demonstrated in elections. In 1994, with 44.3 percent of the vote, Frelimo maintained clear majority in the three southernmost provinces (Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane) plus Maputo city and the two northern regions (Cabo Delgado and Niassa), which constituted the main support base of the party in previous decades. Renamo (with 37.8 percent) emerged popular in the rest of country with around 60 percent of the population, while winning huge majorities in the central provinces of Sofala, Manica, and Zambezia. Whereas urban areas rallied for Frelimo, most rural areas formed Renamo's electoral stronghold. As during the conflict, socioeconomic divisions remained important as social groups that felt excluded by Frelimo's policies voted for Renamo as a sign of protest. This trend only deepened in subsequent years in what appeared to be a continuation of the violent backlash by political means.

The institutional changes that enabled resolution of the violent reaction came to institutionalize centralized stated structures and the national cleavages. This further deepened the backlash in the form of political polarization. In the 1999 elections for the Assembly of the Republic, Renamo won a majority of the votes in six provinces with Frelimo winning in just five. The regional and rural-urban divisions of the conflict period seemed ossified for Frelimo made little progress in the central areas of the country.[24] The two main political parties had strikingly separate geographic bases: Frelimo drew support largely from the south and the far-northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, while Renamo's base was concentrated in central Mozambique and northern some rural areas. To make matters worse, the geographic and ethnic divisions overlapped with economic inequalities. The central and northern regions had higher poverty rates and less access to basic public services, while the southern provinces had only less

[24] Ibid., pp. 121-2.

than two-thirds of the population living below the poverty line.[25] Overall, as Frelimo's political support came largely from urban areas, Renamo appealed to mostly poor rural areas.

Furthermore, the legacy of a party-state regime of the reform period favored the reproduction of semi-democratic dominant-party state structures. It minimized the likelihood of decoupling of the party from the state as part of political liberalization that began in the previous decade. The Frelimo party retained full control over political power and state resources in a liberalized political regime with "a strong form of centralized presidentialism, in which the nation's chief executive forms the cabinet and appoints provincial governors, who in turn control appointments to every other administrative post, right down to the district level."[26] In the democratic but highly centralized and top-down state structures, the party retained full governing power including in the central and northern provinces where Renamo won majority. Frelimo governors were appointed to all provinces; the constitution did not provide for power-sharing or local autonomy; and the unicameral 250-seat national legislature and some elected municipal governments represented the only formal channels for the opposition.[27] The virtual exclusion of Renamo and its followers from political and socioeconomic influence served to preserve the inherited national cleavages and threat of violent backlash.

The serious challenge to Frelimo in the 1999 elections prompted an anti-democratic backlash from within the party. Political power was transferred from the 'reformist, technocratic, and state-centered' Chissano to a 'heavy-handed,' 'party-centered' Armando Guebuza, a former military general who assumed the state presidency in 2005. The latter revitalized the party,

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[25] J. Weinstein, "Mozambique: A Fading UN Success Story," *Journal of Democracy*, 13, 1 (Jan. 2002), pp. 150-1.
[26] Ibid., p. 152.
[27] Ibid. pp. 152-3.

restored its historical national liberation vision, and re-entrenched the party into the state.[28] As a result, Frelimo went from the brink of defeat in 1999 to large electoral victories in 2004, 2009, and 2014. This provided the party with a virtual monopoly on political power at the national, district, and municipal levels as Renamo's clout diminished and a 'Third Force' failed to materialize. Crucial was the expansion of the party's popular base and the incorporation of new social groups (e.g., the anti-revolutionary *régulos*, Indian merchant class, and powerful families in rural areas and small towns) albeit inherited historical divisions. Additional, and more decisive, factors include the party's partisan usage of state resources for patronage and personal mobility, its nationalist credibility, and regular resort to force.[29] The party's control over the state machinery and capacity for political mobilization were embedded in the legacy of party-state system of the reform period and its immediate aftermath.

The corresponding transition to market capitalism created new class divisions. Bereft of lucrative oil and diamond export revenues that enabled the MPLA government to eschew external pressure for rapid economic liberalization, the Frelimo government carried full deregulation and privatization of the economy in the 1990s in "one of the most rapid and successful privatization programmes in sub-Saharan Africa."[30] If radical socioeconomic policies of the reform episode had the effect of destroying historical inequalities, neoliberal economic reforms—and spectacularly sustained economic growth[31] for the first time since liberation—produced new social inequalities, poverty, and alienation of the rural and urban poor alike. As rising structural inequalities worsened in the post-2008 period (see Fig. 7.2), there emerged a

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[28] Adriano Nuvunga, "From Former Liberation Movement to Four Decades in Government: The Maintenance of the Frelimo State," in R. Bereketeab, ed., *National Liberation Movements as Government in Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 63-4.

[29] Ibid., pp. 65-6; Jason Sumich, "The Party and the State: Frelimo and Social Stratification in Post-socialist Mozambique," *Development and Change*, 41, 4 (2010), p. 683.

[30] Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), *Country Profile: Mozambique, 1998-9* (London: EIU, 1999), p. 17.

[31] Ibid., p. 10. Mozambican economy enjoyed an impressive nearly 10 percent annual GDP growth on average in the 1990s and an average 7.5 percent annual growth rates in the subsequent decade.

small wealthy class of politicians, bureaucrats, and private capital that disproportionately benefitted from privatization of state-owned enterprises, foreign investments, and joint ventures at the expense of ordinary citizens. Economic changes also gave rise to a small middle class highly dependent on, and subservient to, the regime as in Angola.[32]

Figure 7.2: Rising Inequalities in Mozambique, 1996-2020



Source: Barletta et al, "The Evolution of Inequality in Mozambique," p. 22.

The return of former settlers, growing number of white South Africans, and rebirth of colonial-era racial differences seemingly reintroduced racial inequalities of the settler-colonial period.[33] Even so, unlike in the aftermath of liberal reforms in South Africa and Namibia, the dominant form of inequalities in Mozambique (and Angola) after the 1990s was rather new patterns of class and rural-urban disparities developed in conjunction with unfettered privatization, massive foreign investment, and rampant corruption that benefited a wealthy business class closely connected to the party and the state. The working class and urban poor that dominated state policy in previous decades were now pushed out to a fast-expanding informal

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[32] See M. Anne Pitcher, *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975-2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 207, and "Party System Competition and Private Sector Development in Africa," *The Journal of Development Studies*, 53, 1 (2017): 1-17; Jason Sumich, *The Middle Class in Mozambique: The State and the Politics of Transformation in Southern Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[33] Pitcher, *Transforming Mozambique*, pp. 171, 237.

economy.[34] Ever growing hardship, pervasive poverty, and unemployment among the urban (and rural) poor ruptured Frelimo's historical alliance with workers and peasants. The Frelimo state's welfarist policies proved inadequate to defuse lower class discontent with neoliberal cuts on social spending and crony capitalism. The government thus faced down labor strikes in the 1990s and violent protests in subsequent decades, most notable of which was riots in Maputo in September 2010 spurred by price hikes and food subsidy cuts.[35]

Nonetheless, the changes did not result in a strong popular backlash owing to a combination of welfarist policies, government crackdown, and a less developed civil society. The deepening social inequalities added a new dimension to preexisting patterns of social divisions that formed the central axis of national polarization. In many ways, they came to overlap with, and reinforce, the historical, regional, and political differences that undergirded the Frelimo-Renamo national divide. While statist privatization and the survival of a large party and state business empire benefited groups loyal to Frelimo, development policies and private investments were biased towards urban and southern areas vis-à-vis the predominantly agricultural central and northern parts of the country. The closure of genuine political and economic opportunities to Renamo and its followers worsened the resentments.[36] Overall, these patterns of differentiation, exclusion, and polarization worsened in the 2005-2015 period that represented party hardliner Guebuza's administration.

The Guebuza administration also saw the reconsolidation of Frelimo power and the crystallization of the more durable legacies of liberation in Mozambique. The decade-long competitive politics in a two-party system concluded with a closure of the political arena and the

[34] M. Newitt, "Mozambique," in Chabal, *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, pp. 228-9.
[35] Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, *Politics in Southern Africa: Transition and Transformation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011, Second Ed.), p. 145.
[36] Ibid, p. 148; Pitcher, *Transforming Mozambique*, pp. 172, 239.

reproduction of more centralized state structures in an increasingly one-party democracy. Frelimo solidified its hold over the state in the aftermath of the 2004 elections. The 2009 national elections virtually cemented Frelimo hegemony and the enduring structure of national divisions. The party won nearly three-fourth of the parliamentary vote and swept the Provincial Assembly elections, while Renamo's electoral support dropped considerably not least because of unlevelled playing field and state repression.[37] This, along with the tendency to centralize power, allowed Frelimo to entrench itself and the centralized state structures. On the other hand, despite concerted efforts to win hearts and minds in the pro-Renamo central parts of the country, Frelimo's vote share in these and rural areas remained low.

The 2013 national elections represented a turning point in the consolidation of authoritarian regime structures and the 'pernicious' national polarization. Progressive decline in Frelimo's electoral appeal in the context of economic downturn led the party increasingly rely on reward and repression strategies using centralized and more authoritarian state structures. On the other hand, desperation with persistent exclusion and frustration of decentralizing state reforms caused Renamo to increasingly turn to violence and threat of violence that reverberated echoes of the civil war. Even though there was no return to full-blow violent backlash, this period saw the "escalation of state- and opposition-sponsored violence."[38] These developments represented the culmination of the heritage of liberation in the country. As elaborated later, the regime structures echoed the party-state structures of the reform period for Frelimo dominated all levers of state power and its leaders exerted centralized authority at all levels and with fewer institutional

[37] Ibid., p. 139; also, see Carrie Manning, "The Freedom House Survey for 2009: Mozambique's Slide into One-Party Rule," *Journal of Democracy*, 21, 2 (April 2010): 151-165.
[38] See M. Anne Pitcher, "Mozambique Elections 2019: Pernicious Polarization, Democratic Decline, and Rising Authoritarianism," *African Affairs*, 119/476 (May 2020), pp. 478-9.

checks. Moreover, the national cleavage based on regional, social, and historical divisions of the reform period persisted along with the development of new post-racial differences.

7.1.2.2 Angola: Delayed Inclusion and Semi-Authoritarian Stability

In Angola, like in Mozambique, the violent response to the reform period eventually led to political and economic liberalization. Starting in 1990, the MPLA under dos Santos finally jettisoned the Marxist-Leninist party-state system and the command economy with a view of resolving the national crisis and contending with rapid international changes. Nevertheless, in Angola the liberalization process neither brought to end the violent backlash nor immediately ushered in multiparty politics in the 1990s. In large part, the violent dynamic of reactions and counterreactions persisted well into the early 2000s. The continuation of the backlash meant further deepening of authoritarian state structures of the reform period and its immediate aftermath, and slightly delayed crystallization of the 'final' legacies of liberation.

The government reached a political settlement—the Bicesse Accord—with in May 1991. The abortive political accord provided for an eighteen-month transition period during which the rival armies would be integrated in a new national army, and, at the end, national elections be held under UN supervision. The constitutional reforms provided for a democratic state based on the rule of law, the introduction of a multiparty political system, and for the democratization and decentralization of local government.[39] Largely free and fair elections were held in September 1992 that returned dos Santos and the MPLA to political power. Yet, unlike Mozambique, a catastrophic civil war—this time fought in both rural and urban areas in the interior—broke out after Jonas Savimbi rejected the results and the government responded with a brutal crackdown.

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[39] See Hodges, *Anatomy of an Oil State*, pp. 50-1; Bauer and Taylor, *Transition and Transformation*, p. 166.

This stalled the political transition and prolonged the violent backlash in an on-again, off-again pattern as it defied political resolution and spiraled into a full-scale war by late 1998.[40]

The political reforms were stalled, and a more repressive political context prevailed by the decade's end. These events proved crucial for subsequent dynamics as we shall see. But first it is important to highlight the causes for the persistence of violence in Angola. Why did the conservative backlash in Angola become more 'intractable' compared to Mozambique? As noted previously, analysts too often emphasized the antagonistic parties' contrasting ethnoregional bases that originated in the colonial era and, most decisively, external strategic interests. In this particular regard, whereas the Mozambican government was financially drained and Renamo run off steam after South African withdrawal, the Angolan government used oil proceeds to bankroll its war machine while UNITA secured control of lucrative diamond fields in the northeast to substitute for the loss of foreign military assistance in the 1990s.[41] The conclusion is that none of the parties in Angola were hard-pressed to bring the violent conflict to an end.

Such factors and incentives were undoubtedly central to persistence of the backlash in Angola. Yet, of at least equal importance was the historical genesis and distinctive nature of the violent reaction itself. First, the conflict had deeper origins in the two former anticolonial liberation movements' disparate sociological roots, political bases, and antagonistic agendas that ignited a bloody conflict at national liberation. Consequently, the odds of reconciliation and political inclusion were comparably slim. Second, UNITA developed a political program and harbored a goal to oust a Creole-elite 'minority regime'—factors compounded by Savimbi's

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[40] See David Birmingham, "Angola," in P. Chabal, *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, pp. 173-84; Pearce, *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola*, ch. 7.

[41] For example, Chabal, "The Limits of Nationhood," pp. 117-8. This perspective was best exemplified by Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds., *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds* (Pretoria: ISS, 2000).

'absolute will to power' and UNITA's access to foreign support and conflict diamonds.[42] Developing as an agent of foreign destruction and too provincial to challenge Frelimo's national popularity, the program-less Renamo by contrast settled down when the opportunity arose. Finally, the ever more repressive MPLA elite introduced belated and less momentous political reforms as opposed to the more pragmatic Frelimo elites, which adopted irreversible and far-reaching liberal reforms that decisively tackled sociopolitical roots of the backlash.

The abortive political settlement led to a sequence of events that delayed full political liberalization. While resolution of the conflict in Mozambique paved a path to the most competitive political interlude (1994-2004) since liberation, enduring backlash served to reinforce militarized state structures of the previous period. The government counterreacted with renewed control over society through the repression of political and civil society, centralization of power in the presidency, and expansive patronage with oil and diamond largesse. As in Frelimo's case, the MPLA regime expanded political influence through a reproachment with the Catholic church, the reincorporation of *sobas* (chiefs), and the cooptation of opposition by means of oil rents and expansive party-state business empire. This led to the entrenchment of authoritarian party and state institutions in a liberal context. Further, continued conflict entrenched the political and regional divisions with their genesis in the liberation reform episode. In the 1992 elections, the towns overwhelmingly voted for the government while UNITA drew its support from the countryside—mainly its historical stronghold in the Ovimbundu highlands and eastern lowlands—and the southern business class.[43]

The violent rural backlash ended in 2002 and was followed by a decade of national reconstruction and delayed institutional reforms. The military defeat of UNITA, which like

[42] Ibid., p. 119.
[43] Birmingham, "Angola," pp. 172, 175-6; Hodges, *Anatomy of an Oil State*, pp. 52-3.

Renamo returned to the political arena as the main opposition party, and the dos Santos regime's defiance of international pressure for democratization thanks to oil revenues meant that the MPLA elite implemented reforms 'at its own pace,' controlled the degree of political openness, and delayed elections to "position itself favorably before the beginning of the move to multiparty politics."[44] The President and the party thus set out to reinforce control over the state apparatus, the postwar society, and reconsolidate power around the person and institution of the President than embark upon broader political liberalization and incorporation into participatory institutions. The regime used returns from rising oil prices in the 2000s to strategically coopt and weaken civil and political society; it deepened its grip through the 'party-ization'—*partidarização*—of public and social sectors through the infiltration of the public service, civil society, the media, and the national economy.[45]

As in Mozambique in the run up to the 2004 elections, the political elite also embarked up on restructuring and revitalization of the MPLA party—an urgent task because of dos Santos' personalization of power and marginalization of the party in previous decades. Party membership, structures, and influence were expanded through a combination of patronage, cooptation, and divisions of political opposition, the media, and associational life.[46] Thus, the much-delayed elections were held in 2008 in a political and economic context tightly controlled by the party and the state. Garnering 81.6 percent of the vote for the National Assembly, the MPLA had expanded its popular base, including in the UNITA-stronghold central highlands, but electoral alignments followed historical divisions of the backlash period.

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[44] P. Chabal, "*E Pluribus Unum*: Transition in Angola," in P. Chabal and Nuno Vidal, eds., *Angola: The Weight of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 10, 16.
[45] Jon Schubert, "'Democratization' and the Consolidation of Political Authority in Post-War Angola," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36, 3 (September 2010), pp. 665-6.
[46] N. Vidal, "The Angolan Regime and the Move to Multiparty Politics," in Chabal and Vidal, eds., *The Weight of History*, pp. 138-49; R. S. de Oliveira, "Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola," *JMAS*, 49, 2 (2011): 287-314.

The 'top-down' institutional reforms that culminated in a new constitution in 2010 cemented the dominant-party structures. The new constitution formalized centralized party and state structures in a competitive authoritarian regime with an all-powerful, indirectly elected, personalist president.[47] These structures were defined by blurred distinctions between the party, government, and the state. Two distinct factors linked to the reform period and renewed violent backlash led to the reproduction of more closed state structures following the resolution of the violent reaction in Angola. First, power personalization—and concentration of executive power enshrined in the new constitution—followed a historical pattern established during the liberation episode after an internal coup against Agostino Neto in 1977. This trend was reinforced by dos Santos after 1979 with the helped of oil rents and a series of political events: extraordinary war circumstances, rumblings of a coup (1984), the resumption of conflict in the 1990s, and derailed political reforms. Second, unlike in Mozambique, the Angolan army (a powerful regional force) was the strongest pillar of the regime and key in the reconsolidation of centralized state power.[48] Oil formed a critical mechanism in how these factors shaped political development in Angola.[49]

The process of tightly controlled economic liberalization gave impetus to even greater social inequalities and class differentiation (see Fig. 7.3). The presence of a small but vibrant private sector around mining since the reform period—and the ascendancy of a nationalistic black African faction within the MPLA in the Second Party Congress (1985)—had aided the emergence of new class interests in Angola. In previous decades, the rural-urban divide formed a major national cleavage. National development following independence was long concentrated in the coastal areas and urban centers under government control amidst the prolonged civil war.

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[47] See Bauer and Taylor, *Transition and Transformation*, pp. 166-8.
[48] Chabal, "Transitions in Angola," p. 12; David Sogge, "Angola: 'Failed' Yet 'Successful,'" Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), *Working Paper No. 81*, 2009, p. 12.
[49] See Christine Messiant, "The Mutation of Hegemonic Domination: Multiparty Politics Without Democracy," in Chabal and Vidal, eds., *The Weight of History*, pp. 93-123.

In general, the rural areas—particularly the conflict-torn central highlands—were left with devastated infrastructure, poor service delivery, and high poverty rates. State neglect of the farming sector in recent decades further contributed to decline in agriculture, which employed a large proportion (85 percent) of the population.[50] Ironically, rapid urbanization during the drawn-out conflict created a large urban population in shantytowns—the *musseques*—around Luanda and other cities which, together with the collapse of the social sector, eroded the traditional urban social base of the MPLA party.[51]

The historical polarization that drove the violent backlash persisted. But the transition to a free-market economy—and with it, a state-supported middle class—displaced the more egalitarian legacies of the reform period. Prolonged economic decline, social neglect, clientelist distribution, and rapid urbanization amid rural conflict had "pushed millions of Angolans to the borderlines of survival, while at the opposite extreme the dismantling of the former socialist system since the late 1980s and its replacement by a form of unregulated capitalism, distorted by cronyism, have created opportunities for enrichment on a fabulous scale by a small politically favored elite."[52] Full-blown privatization, rapid post-war growth, and a political-economy of centrally directed patronage nurtured "the accumulation of wealth by the politico-business elite."[53] A small class of elite families, businessmen, and an 'oil *nomenklatura*' or an emergent bourgeoisie of former politicians, military and security officers, and civil servants, accumulated massive wealth from acquisition of privatized state assets, state contracts, and access to state

[50] See Bauer and Taylor, *Transition and Transformation*, p. 177.
[51] Hodges, *Anatomy of an Oil State*, p. 54.
[52] Ibid., p. 21.
[53] Ibid., pp. 53-4, 56; T. Hodges, "The Economic Foundations of the Patrimonial State," in Chabal and Vidal, eds., *The Weight of History*, p. 175.

patronage.[54] In the absence of political accountability, the vast majority was excluded from the fruits of capitalist expansion and a large percentage of the urban populace below the poverty line.

After 2012, the rising discontent provoked popular mobilization that gained momentum with economic downturn in the post-2014 period.[55] Even so, the social contradictions neither generated the kind of vigorous popular backlash characteristic of South Africa and Namibia nor replaced the historical disparities of the liberation episode. Like in Mozambique, they came to overlap with, and accentuate, historical, ethnoregional, rural-urban divisions that drove the violent backlash. The salient divisions resurfaced particularly during elections, beginning with the 2008 elections, when the MPLA's solid victories in both rural and urban areas nationwide seemed to belie the historical political divisions. In reality, MPLA's wider electoral popularity was underpinned extenuating circumstances, most notably national peace and postwar economic boom, infrastructural development, and extensive patronage and a resulting weakened political opposition. Besides its exploitation of state administration and resources, the MPLA secured the rural vote through voter intimidation, threat of violence, and the cooptation of village *sobas*,[56] particularly in the UNITA social bases in the central highland provinces, Moxico, and Cuando Cubango. Similar patterns of polarization characterized the 2012 national elections, with the MPLA (71.84 percent of the votes) and UNITA (18.66 percent) forming the major voting blocks.

In conclusion, the end of the violent backlash in Angola hardly set the stage for broader political reforms and democratization unlike in pre-2004 Mozambique. The decade-long 'illiberal' institutional reforms and reconfigurations after 2002 reproduced centralized state structural patterns that originated in the reform period. The 'new' political system very much

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[54] See Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola Since the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), chapter 4.
[55] Ibid., ch. 4, p. 211.
[56] P. C. Roque, "Angola's Façade Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 20, 4 (Oct. 2009), pp. 143-4; Schubert, "'Democratization' and the Consolidation of Political Authority," p. 665.

retained its basic party-state characteristics of the reform period owing to the unique turn of events in the latter part of the aftermath period. The narrowly inclusive structures were consolidated in the past decade as the regime did not face strong political backlash and dos Santos was succeeded in 2017 by a party hardliner, President João Lourenço. The comparatively more centralized, authoritarian regime structures and the historical national divisions overlayed by emerging class inequalities represented the ultimate legacy of liberation.

7.2 SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC BACKLASH AND DEEPENING POLARIZATION: SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

In the context of liberal reforms, (1) the backlash emerged after the reform episode and as a social democratic reaction to socioeconomic ramifications of (neo)liberal reforms. Liberal state reforms and inclusive nation-building precluded the emergence of a reactionary backlash, as in Mozambique and Angola or, a liberal backlash as in Zimbabwe.[57] Therefore, the reaction rather came from the popular sectors (i.e., the lower class, lower-middle class, and the urban poor) economically disenfranchised by neoliberal policies of the reform years. Liberal reforms reproduced historical racial disparities and produced new class inequalities albeit strides made in reducing racial inequalities and mitigate black poverty. Further, (2) the aftermath dynamics in the context of liberal reforms did not entail momentous political and economic transitions at a later stage because of the liberal nature of the liberation episode. Instead, political elites responded to the social-democratic backlash with attempted greater redistribution of income and

[57] This does not mean though liberal reforms did not produce racial, ethnic, or regional tensions. Most notably, in Namibia, disparate ethno-racial minorities felt alienated by political and economic domination of the majority Ovambo group from the northmost regions. A sense of ethnoregional exclusion from the state-building project also led in 1998 to a brief secessionist uprising in the Caprivi Strip. In South Africa, Zulu and ultra-right White ethnonationalism formed centrifugal blocs in a more inclusive nation-building agenda. However, in both countries ethnic or regional grievances were not the central drivers of the leftist popular backlash to liberal reforms.

wealth. This led to the reproduction of the liberal state structures and high social polarization of the reform period and its aftermath.

7.2.1 Enduring Inequalities, Poverty, and Popular Backlash

As shown in Chapter Five, South African and Namibian liberation leaders deracialized the apartheid state and consolidated power through gradual reforms. Thus, state reforms and nation-building were basically liberal and broadly inclusionary to utterly alienate particular political or social groups. Besides, the critical juncture of reforms corresponded with a rather stable post-Cold War environment in the region that did not necessitate the building of strong military and security apparatuses. As such, the backlash in post-liberation South Africa and Namibia emerged gradually and principally among the urban popular sectors, which were adversely affected by enduring poverty, rising inequalities, and rampant unemployment among the historically marginalized black majorities. The liberal reform period and its aftermath was defined by the persistence of apartheid-like racial disparities and rising intra-black class inequalities (see Fig. 7.3), alongside consistently high poverty, unemployment, and poor service delivery.

Figure 7.3: Income Inequalities in Post-Liberation South Africa and Namibia



(I) The progressive social-democratic backlash developed earlier and in a more powerful fashion in South Africa. Its genesis lay in 'the 1996 class project,' whereby the ANC firmly embrace a neoliberal reform and development path. In 1994-99, post-apartheid 'new social movements' of diverse labor and social groups protested against neoliberal economic and social reform policies. Besides, the anti-leftist turn and blatant disregard of lower-class interests strained ANC's strategic alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) even though the potential for popular mobilization by the Alliance Left was blunted by Thabo Mbeki' "talking left, but acting right" policy strategy[58] and modest economic growth since the late 1990s. In the early 2000s, intensifying discontents gave rise to political and social movements with progressive policy demands;[59] community protests targeting failures of service delivery and the unaccountability of local councils spread like wildfire, many of these involving violent encounters with the authorities.[60] Meanwhile, workers became increasingly militant because the ANC's economic policies had failed to make a significant dent in apartheid-era unemployment levels, and employment became increasingly informal and precarious.[61]

The disparate racial and class discontents consolidated into a mounting popular backlash by the mid-2000s. The liberal reform period concluded with deepening structural inequalities, consistently high poverty, rising unemployment, and dwindling public service delivery

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[58] Patrick Bond, *Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa's Frustrated Global Reforms* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2004). Also, see John S. Saul, "Cry for the Beloved Country: The Post-Apartheid Denouement," *Monthly Review*, 52, 8 (1999): 1-51.

[59] This includes the Landless People's Movement (LPM), the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), and the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC).

[60] See P. Alexander, "Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa's Service Delivery Protests—a Preliminary Analysis," *Review of African Political Economy*, 37, 123 (March 2010): 25-40; Karl Von Holdt et al. *The Smoke That Calls: Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence and The Struggle for a Place in the New South Africa* (Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Society, Work, and Development Institute, 2011).

[61] C. Bischoff, "Cosatu's Organizational Decline and the Erosion of the Industrial Order," in V. Satgar and R. Southall, eds., *Cosatu in Crisis: The Fragmentation of an African Trade Union Federation* (Johannesburg: KMM Press, 2015): 217-246.

notwithstanding remarkable progress in reducing inherited racial inequalities and injustices. Historical patterns of racialized income inequality among Whites, Colored, and African blacks remained as stark as at the beginning of the reforms as new class differences among blacks deepened. During the reform period, the country's Gini coefficient widened from 0.56 (1995) to 0.73 (2005/06), ranking South Africa one of the most world's most unequal nations. The unemployment rate among blacks increased from 38.3 percent in 2007 to 40 percent in 2010 amid sluggish economic growth and general manufacturing decline since the reform years. Finally, poverty remained consistently high, and millions of black South Africans languished below the poverty line, notwithstanding some decline in poverty rates in the early 2000s.[62]

The deepening socioeconomic contradictions, alongside an economic slowdown, generated a vigorous leftist backlash in the second half of the decade. Even though the ANC maintained an increased majority after the 2004 national elections, its government faced escalating popular discontent and protests among urban and rural poor against a wide-ranging social and economic ills symptomatic of neoliberal reform policies. The reaction had two distinct popular sources. The first was based in popular mobilizations by non-organized popular sectors (of non-unionized, unemployed, or partly employed 'working poor') clamoring for jobs and social protection, and by community-based protest movements animated by disparate policy issues, such as racial disparities in land ownership and service delivery; unaffordable housing; poor local governance; crime and violence; and poverty, HIV/AIDS, and gender inequality. The upsurge in localized protests in early 2000s gave way to explosive local and broader community protests after the 2004 national elections, spurred by discontents with, among other issues,

[62] Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, pp. 176, 205, 208.

deteriorating service delivery, dysfunctional health and education systems, cronyism and corruption, and lack of popular voice in local development.[63]

The second source of the popular backlash lay in mobilization by organized labor against staggering joblessness, declining real wages, and a neoliberal labor market. In the run-up to the ANC's 2007 National Conference at Polokwane, the Alliance Left sought to fundamentally shift the party's national program through public campaign against the 1996 neoliberal Gear program, and for a return to the struggle-era agenda for 'national democratic revolution.' Further, in 2006-07, Cosatu and affiliated unions mobilized sustained anti-government protests to both advance working-class interests and to alter the balance of power within the Tripartite Alliance.[64] To this effect, the Alliance Left engineered the demise of Mbeki—the architect of 'the 1996 class project'—in 2007, and the rise of a more populist party leader, Jacob Zuma. In subsequent years, this current of the social-democratic backlash became less influential not least because Cosatu came to represent South Africa's rising black upper and middle classes and a shrinking section of the working class with formal-sector jobs. Popular power shifted to unions and unorganized labor outside Cosatu—and from the labor movement to other social sectors more broadly—amid increasing neoliberal casualization of labor and decline in union membership.[65]

The rising popular backlash engendered a government counterreaction. Mbeki' second term (2004-08) was defined by attempts to pursue a 'New Growth Path,' articulate a 'National Development Plan,' and build a 'developmental state' to achieve even development, broader redistribution, and a host of other state interventionist agendas. The response to labor challenges in particular involved renewed efforts for more equitable economic growth, job creation, wage

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[63] Ibid., pp. 449-59.
[64] Anthea Jeffery, *Chasing the Rainbow: South Africa's Move from Mandela to Zuma* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2010), pp. 258-62.
[65] See Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, pp. 440, 447.

subsidies, and an Expanded Public Works Program.[66] Other policy responses include enforcing the BBBEE Act of 2003 to expand black ownership, management, and employment in the national economy.[67] In 2009, Zuma's government inaugurated a new land-reform policy to sync liberal land reform with food security, rural development, and job creation—measures followed in 2011 by promises for radical reconsideration of market-driven land-reform approach of the reform period. It also adopted a 'restrained social-democratic' policy direction, which comprised an ill-fated 'War on Poverty' program (2008), increased social-security expenditures for poverty alleviation (2008), and reforming dysfunctional education and health sectors.[68]

The backlash also caused major changes within the ANC and its party programs. The party adopted a set of resolutions for a program of 'economic transformation,' which rested on Cosatu's key demands, especially increased labor market regulation, an expanded public works program, national health insurance, and an expansion of state economic planning.[69] The ANC's Strategy and Tactics document adopted at Polokwane stressed a 'social democratic' society as its goal, and the fundamental importance of state in economic change: "We are still at the beginning of the historic transformation of the economy called for in the Freedom Charter. … to create decent work for all and eliminate poverty, and to increase social equality … [which] will not emerge spontaneously from the "invisible hand of the market" … The State must play a central and strategic role …"[70] The new principles were central to the ANC's election manifesto for the 2009 national elections. Even so, the adjustments hardly constituted significant shift in the liberal

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[66] Ibid., p. 190; P. Bond, "Consolidating the Contradictions: From Mandela to Marikana, 2000–2012," in Saul and Bond, *South Africa – The Present As History*, pp. 176-7.
[67] See Roger Tangri and Roger Southall, "The Politics of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 34, 3 (2008): 699-716.
[68] See Marais, *The Political Economy of Change*, p. 440; Bond, "Consolidating the Contradictions," p. 186.
[69] Seekings and Nattrass, *Policy, Politics, and Poverty in South Africa*, p. 227.
[70] ANC, "Polokwane Resolutions," 2007, p. 16. Available at: www.anc.org.za.

policy path not to mention the 'pro-poor,' 'left turn' in the ANC the Alliance Left hoped for. This would generate a stronger wave of popular backlash in the next decade.

(II) In Namibia, political subordination of the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) to Swapo Party, and steadily improving living conditions during the reform period, precluded emergence of a forceful leftist backlash. But the end of the reform period was similarly marked by deepening contradictions after a decade-and-half of (neo)liberal reforms that catalyzed rising popular discontents. Like in South Africa, as Winterfeldt concluded, the liberal-reform choice engendered "the reproduction of fundamental relations of production and equally fundamental social relations along the lines of pre-independence peripheral capitalism, even though abrogating their previous racial bias." It revoked the liberation elites' "resolve to effect a smooth transition from national into social liberation."[71] The unemployment rate jumped from 36.7 percent in 2004 to 51.2 percent in 2008.[72] Income inequality dropped from 0.6 (1993/4) to 0.7 (2003/04), while poverty was cut from 58 percent to 38 percent during the same time period.[73] These gains during the reform period were remarkable, but Namibia (following South Africa) stood among the world's top-most unequal countries.

As a result, widespread popular discontent with deepening inequalities and soaring poverty rates was taking hold by the early 2000s. Even though popular-sector mobilization was less vigorous compared to South Africa,[74] it can be argued that the urban working and lower-middle classes formed the basis of the emerging popular backlash in the early post-reform years. The political elites' continued neoliberal policies and inability to tackle major structural

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[71] Volker Winterfeldt, "Postcolonial Dynamics of Social Structure in Namibia," in du Pisani et al, eds., *Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia*, pp. 139-40. See pp. 149-55 on post-settler colonial class differentiation.
[72] Sherbourne, *Guide to the Namibian Economy*, p. 66.
[73] Ibid., pp. 73, 76.
[74] The urban working class in Namibia was relatively miniscule because of lower urbanization, smaller and declining manufacturing sector, and as in South Africa, increasing casualization of labor during the reform period and its immediate aftermath. Its potential for mobilization was also stifled by the main trade union's (NUNW) close affiliation to the Swapo Party, split in the labor movement, and a premature civil society.

problems of massive unemployment, poverty, inequality, and low productivity produced a nascent popular backlash by various urban-based groups in the second half of the 2000s. On the one hand, trade unions campaigned against the government's cozy relationship with large-scale capital, while workers and the urban poor in townships began to engage in growing anti-government and anti-business strikes.[75] On the other hand, disaffected minority rural communities most affected by colonial land dispossession and various popular-sector groups (e.g., the Namibian Farm Workers Union) mobilized in favor of land repossession and coalesce into small political parties demanding radical land redistribution to the urban and rural poor.

The popular backlash did not cause far-reaching political instability unlike in South Africa. Nonetheless, it prompted a range of policy reactions on the part of the government and the ruling Swapo party. For instance, the government's national development framework—Vision 2030—stressed as its long-term goal that "Poverty is reduced to the minimum, the existing patterns of income-distribution is equitable, and disparity is at the minimum."[76] Black advancement measures came to represent key policy agenda of the government, which in 2006 began to emulate and lay emphasis on the South African Broad-Based BEE to steer the reform program towards poverty reduction than mere elite enrichment. At the same time, the government began to react to popular discontent with sluggish land reform and redouble efforts to purchase and redistribute white-owned commercial agricultural land. [77] The liberal policy adjustments were nonetheless not far-reaching enough to resolve the deepening structural crises. Consequently, the social-democratic reaction would gather momentum in the next decade.

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[75] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 181.
[76] Government of the Republic of Namibia, *Namibia Vision 2030* (Windhoek: Office of the President, 2004), p. 104.
[77] Sherbourne, *Guide to the Namibian Economy*, pp. 347-8, 386.

7.2.2 South Africa: Liberal Consolidation and Deepened Polarization

The decade between the ANC National Conferences at Polokwane (2007) and Nasrec (2017) was pivotal in consolidating socioeconomic contradictions of the reform period. Overlapping with the presidency of Jacob Zuma, this period in South Africa was marked by deep institutional crisis in the party, the state arena, and surging popular opposition. The popular backlash was defined by the weakening of the Alliance Left, with the implosion of the once revolutionary giant Cosatu, and more widespread labor and social mobilization. The period corresponded with the definitive "waning of any remaining illusions that the forces of 'liberation' led by the ANC would take South Africa to genuine freedom and a new society."[78] This catalyzed a vigorous social-democratic backlash involving trade-union mobilization, broad popular-sector struggles, and, after 2015, a radical movement for decolonization with deeper roots in the reform period.

The expected 'left turn' post-Polokwane did not materialize for the new party elite merely made strategic adjustments in the liberal path of the reform period. Besides, the democratic fabric of the state was severely eroded by endemic corruption and patronage, compounding poor policy implementation, dwindling service delivery, and elite and capital accumulation. This accelerated and consolidated racial and class contradictions of the previous two decades. As Fig. 7.4 shows, social inequalities stood out as one of highest in the world and only further deepened.[79] Race continued to matter as a key determinant, but intra-racial inequalities widened with the development of a small black business elite and black middle class broadly. Poverty rates remained stable but consistently high and intractable, especially in rural

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[78] P. Bond, "Uneven and Combined Resistance: Marikana and the Trail to 'Tunisia Day' 2020," in Saul and Bond, *South Africa -- The Present as History*, p. 242.

[79] See Statistics South Africa, "Inequality Trends in South Africa: A multidimensional Diagnostic of Inequality," Report No. 03-10-19, 2019. Available online: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-19/Report-03-10-192017.pdf. In the decade after the reform period, the Gini index went down slightly from 64.8 (2005) to 63 (2014). The World Bank, *Poverty and Inequality Platform*. At https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI.

areas, as approximately half (49.2 percent) of the adult population in 2015 lived below the upper-bound poverty line.[80] Meanwhile, with negative economic growth following the 2009 global financial crisis and steady deindustrialization of the economy, there was a rise of mass unemployment among blacks, with profoundly destabilizing political and social effects.

Figure 7.4: Rising Unemployment and Poverty in South Africa, 2005-2015



Source: The World Bank, "Poverty and Inequality Platform," https://data.worldbank.org/

As a consequence, a more diffuse but potent and ever widening anti-government backlash emerged in the post-Polokwane years (Fig. 7.5). First, as before, the lower-class constituency of the Alliance Left grew increasingly restless as the post-Mbeki 'leftward shift' hardly materialized, and the alliance was paradoxically marginalized from decision-making just as much by the new ANC leadership as by the old. However, the political clout of the Alliance Left diminished and the push for progressive policies by organized labor faced a major setback.[81] The traditional (mining and manufacturing) unions shrank as economic de-industrialized continued unabated; but above all, because the increasingly unpopular Cosatu suffered tumultuous internal conflicts after 2009, and ultimately seized by expanding public-sector unions that turned it into a

[80] Statistics South Africa, "Men, Women and Children Findings of the Living Conditions Survey 2014/15," Report No. 03-10-02 (2014/15), 2018. Available online: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-02%20.pdf.
[81] On the post-Polokwane years, see R. Southall and E. Webster, "Unions and Parties in South Africa: COSATU and the ANC in the Wake of Polokwane," in B. Beckman, S. Buhlungu, and L. Sachikonye, eds., *Trade Unions and Party Politics: Labor Movements in Africa* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2010), p. 145.

tamed Zuma lapdog.[82] The result is that the labor movement became less coherent but increasingly militant and spontaneous. The void created by Cosatu's eclipse was filled by the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), which intensified working-class struggle in the Minerals-Energy Complex sector and, and overall, challenged cozy state-capital relations, and the neoliberal ANC faction promoting a new National Development Plan (NDP)—a reincarnation of the neoliberal GEAR program of the reform period.

Figure 7.5: Trends in Popular Protests in South Africa, 2004-2013



Source: Seekings and Nattrass, *Policy, Politics and Poverty in South Africa*, p. 236

The internal conflict in Cosatu had far-reaching political implications. The Alliance Left's failure to effect decisive political shift to the left and the resulting strategic conundrum caused a rift in Cosatu between "those who want[ed] to see a thoroughgoing implementation of the Freedom Charter, thus a rejection of the GEAR that the NDP is, and those who [were] consciously or unconsciously defending South African capitalism."[83] It ended with the triumph of the pro-capitalist camp and marginalization of the ANC left faction, which widened the gap

[82] See Satgar and Southall, eds., *Cosatu in Crisis*, 2015.
[83] Cedric Gina, quoted in Bond, "Uneven and Combined Resistance," p. 241.

between the trade-union elites and the rank-and-file membership. The once pro-poor liberation movement lost vast sections of the middle- and working-class sectors, the marginalized, and the dispossessed. New formations emerged to its left, the most notable of which was the left-populist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party, which advocated the radical interpretation of the Freedom Charter for the nationalization of land and the commanding heights of the South African economy, and rapidly became the third major party. Finally, the Alliance Left was dealt a fatal blow by the BEE billionaire Cyril Ramaphosa's rise to renewed power in the ANC and his election to deputy presidency at the 2012 Mangaung ANC National Conference. The new balance of power stabilized momentarily the liberal path and the 'sweetheart' relations of organized labor elites with the state, the ruling party, and white-dominated big capital.[84]

The turmoil gave impetus to the second, broader backlash by non-aligned militant labor and community-based movements. The turning point was the explosion in August 2012 at Marikana, in the platinum belt northwest of Johannesburg, where a six-week wildcat strike ended in police massacre of thirty-four mineworkers. The event—arguably symptomatic of the epidemy of collusion between the political class and big capital—catalyzed a wave of less coherent, but increasingly violent, widening labor protests in townships, urban areas, and rural areas. In 2012-13, the protests in the mining belt culminated in a wildcat strike wave that spread to other popular-sector groups in both public and private sectors throughout the country. Labor lost institutionalized policy influence with NUMSA's expulsion from Cosatu in 2014, which sparked periodic wildcat strike activity by tens of thousands of workers that put unprecedented pressure on the government since the end of apartheid.[85] In early 2014, for example, the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), a breakaway rival of the Cosatu-aligned

[84] Ibid., p. 231.
[85] Ibid., p. 218.

National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), launched a 153-day labor strike across the platinum belt in what became the longest strike in South African history.

On the other hand, the government faced a heightened backlash from informal-sector workers, the unemployed, and poor citizens overall. The 'rebellion of the poor' that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the reform years gained momentum in the early 2010s (Fig. 7.5). The Zuma government's policies to combat inequality, poverty, and unemployment suffered from erratic enforcement, while his populist, pro-black redistributive policies rather benefited more educated blacks. Consequently, there was a groundswell of violent protests against dismal service delivery, mass unemployment, widespread poverty, distinguishing the post-Marikana period as one with the highest protest rates in South Africa.[86] While the so-called 'service delivery protests' often drew attention to failed municipal services and local corruption, they were motivated by broader issues ranging from land distribution to poverty to housing.[87] In a sense, they represented an intense backlash to socioeconomic legacies of the liberal reform and a neoliberally constrained state. The localized rolling protests presented a serious, socially destabilizing anti-government challenge from a wider cross-section of the popular sectors.

The economic and social causes of the backlash were compounded by the hollowing out of state institutions. The strategy of 'cadre deployment' used to exert ANC control on 'the levers of state power' had had corroding effects on state institutions. For all the rhetoric of building a 'developmental state' since Mbeki's last term, the state as a result was reduced to a 'feeding tough' for rent-seeking politicians, bureaucrats, and a corrupt system of 'tenderpreneurships'. This trend came to a head in the so-called 'state capture' under Zuma, whereby large capital

[86] Bond, "Uneven and Combined Resistance," p. 237; Seekings and Nattrass, *Policy, Politics and Poverty*, p. 222.
[87] Anthony Butler, *Contemporary South Africa* (London: Palgrave, 2017, Third Edition), pp. 139-40, 167.

exerted undue influence on government and its policies.[88] The ‘state capture’ scandal paralyzed the state and precipitated economic decline, as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were left devastated by corruption while poor accountability drained public revenues, stymied private investment, and worsened poor service delivery. It triggered a rift within the party that culminated in Zuma’s ouster in 2018, and gave impetus to the widening backlash.

The third aspect of the social-democratic backlash during this period was the ‘decolonization’ protests of 2015-17. This reaction was deeply rooted in the policy of racial reconciliation in the name of inclusive nation-building (see Ch. Five). It led to stark and sustained racial disparities in income, opportunities, and public services such that, by the mid-2010s, while whites dominated “the ownership of business, land and property,” the very poor were “still overwhelmingly black.”[89] Mbeki’s 1998 controversial depiction of a ‘two nation’ South Africa—divided between a ‘relatively prosperous’ White nation, and a lager ‘black and poor’ nation—remained poignant considering enduring racial inequalities that threatened the return of apartheid-era polarization. Profound inequalities among whites and blacks (especially Africans) continued “to stoke the fires of racial conflict.” By the end of the aftermath period, seemingly improved race relations became highly polarized. As Butler summed up, “racial antagonism is at least as sharp in urban areas, where White and Black rub shoulders in workplaces and increasingly in residential complexes, as it is in the still resolutely segregated rural areas and townships.”[90]

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[88] See Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, Chapter 11; Thula Simpson, *History of South Africa: From 1902 to the Present* (Cape Town: Penguin Books, 2021), Chapter 29.

[89] Butler, *Contemporary South Africa*, p. 78. On racial inequalities, see Statistics South Africa, “Inequality Trends in South Africa,” 2019, and for polarized race relations, see IRR, *Race Relations in South Africa: Sound but Fraying at the Edges* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2017).

[90] Ibid., p. 193; R. Southall, “Polarization in South Africa: Toward Democratic Deepening or Democratic Decay?” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681, (Jan. 2019): 194-208.

This polarization lay behind demands for radical socioeconomic and cultural liberation or decolonization. It provoked in 2015 a wave of student protests—the *Fallist* protests—that swept South African universities and colleges. The protests were ignited by a student demonstration at the University of Cape Town demanding the removal of a statue of the colonial icon, Cecil Rhodes. They spread nationwide because of rising tuition fees in the context of relative government underspending in tertiary education since the reform period, which left blacks in general and the lower classes in particular disadvantaged in higher education. Yet, fundamentally, the reaction was about stark inequalities, limited societal transformation, and continuing black exclusion within a still heavily white higher education system.[91] The Fallist protests can be considered a black backlash to the 'rainbow' principles of the reform period and its legacies of enduring racism and 'colonialism' in higher education institutions. It turned to a broader student movement against "not only the ongoing racism of their universities and society but also the complicity of their parents in the 'rainbow nation' politics of reconciliation that brought peace but not equality to [post-apartheid] South Africa."[92]

Overall, the intensifying popular opposition was evident in the ANC's dwindling electoral dominance and quest for new policy solutions (Fig. 7.6). The party's popular support base continued to shrink in the aftermath of the reform period, while opposition parties to its left and right progressively made inroads among organized workers, the precariat, the urban poor, the landless, and ethnoracial minorities. In the 2014 national elections, when ANC support dipped to its lowest since the 'liberation elections' two decades earlier, the center-right DA considerably increased its vote share, while the left-populist EEF obtained 6.35 percent, instantly becoming the country's second-largest opposition party. The declining trends worsened in the aftermath of

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[91] Southall, "Polarization in South Africa," p. 202.
[92] Mark Gevisser, *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2013), pp. 12-3.

the 2015-17 social turmoil and instability within the party. In the 2016 local elections, the ANC's vote share fell by eight percentage points across the country and to below 50 percent in the largest metropolitan areas, where power was passed over to opposition parties.[93] The pattern of vigorous contestation and the political elite's efforts to revitalize the liberal foundations of the state set the stage for crystallization of enduring democratic legacies of the reform period.

Figure 7.6: Declining ANC Vote Share in National and Local Elections, 2004-2019



Source: Lieberman and Lekalake, "South Africa's Resilient Democracy," p. 106

7.2.2.1 Liberal Structural Reforms and Reproduction

The heightened social-democratic reaction generated a political crisis within the ruling party. In the run-up to the 2017 national conference at Nasrec, a Zuma-allied faction pushed for 'radical economic transformation' (RET) through fast-track land reform and "indigenization." A reformist wing backing the liberal minded Cyril Ramaphosa, advanced an agenda for 'reform and renewal,' including state and party renewal, a more market-friendly approach to economic

[93] See Evan Lieberman and Rorisang Lekalake, "South Africa's Resilient Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 33, 2 (April 2022): 103-117.

policy, and inclusive economic growth, job creation, and service provision. In December, Ramaphosa was voted party president with a small margin of votes; a fine balance of power within the new National Executive Committee (NEC)—the party's chief executive organ—impeded Ramaphosa's reformist agenda, but the progressive weakening of the RET faction in subsequent years solidified the liberal legacy of the reform period.

The liberal reforms and adjustments under Ramaphosa's so-called 'new dawn' marked a turning point. On the one hand, he has sought to strengthen the liberal foundations of the state severely eroded under Zuma by strengthening the anti-corruption institutions, launching an investigation into 'state capture,' and improved governance mechanisms. Ramaphosa has also overseen unprecedented measures to reform and rebuild the ANC party, plagued by corruption and factionalism that consequently weakened state institutions.[94] Overall, his state reforms were moderately consequential at best until the balance of power within the party decisively shifted in his favor in late 2022. Yet, it can be argued, the reforms revitalized and stabilized the liberal state structures, especially the law enforcement, the judiciary, and local governance. This, alongside the historic decline of ANC dominance, facilitated the reproduction of the more inclusive liberal state structures, democratic contestation, and power-sharing of the reform period.

Besides, Ramaphosa's government has undertaken a number of economic measures aimed at stimulating economic growth, job creation, and equitable distribution against a backdrop of a decade-long economic downturn, and social reforms meant to raise the living standards of the majority poor. These marked-based policy measures proved far inadequate to systematically resolve structural problems that drove the leftist backlash in the first place. Yet, they certainly contributed to solidifying the liberal economic and social policy legacies of the reform period. For reassuring capital had been essential in achieving policy goals, radical

[94] See S. Naidu, "South Africa," in A. Awedoba et al, eds., *Africa Yearbook Online,* Vol. 18, 2021, pp, 1-6, 8.

resolutions taken at Nasrec, such as the "expropriation of [white-owned] land without compensation" and nationalization of some of the economic commanding heights (e.g., the Reserve Bank), were deprioritized and gradually abandoned as economically too risky.[95] This in effect amounted to, as Cosatu lamented, the return to the pre-Polokwane neoliberal development agenda and the 'resurfacing of 1996 class project.' Further, the prospect of resolving the socioeconomic contradictions were dashed as the slow rebounding of the economy was rocked by the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. The result was the consolidation of the patterns of high social inequalities and polarization of the aftermath period.

7.2.3 Namibia: Liberal Consolidation and Widening National Divisions

In Namibia, the social-democratic backlash matured as enduring inequalities, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, and deteriorating social welfare triggered urban lower-class and communal protests. The reaction developed into a relatively less, if increasingly, vigorous popular opposition. The political efficacy of the labor movement was diminished by structural factors and division of the national labor movement.[96] Moreover, uneven regional land dispossession during the colonial period, along with the ineffective land reform program and non-restitution of communal land, both directed the popular backlash to rural areas and rendered divided by regional, ethnic, or communal differences. However, urban land and social inequalities emerged as a potent force of popular mobilization in the mid-2010s in the heels of rapid urbanization.

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[95] See *Africa Confidential*, "Ramaphosa's win in ANC elections opens a door to policy shifts and reshuffles," 23 Dec., 2022. Available at: https://www-africa-confidential-com.

[96] See Herbert Jauch, "Between Politics and the Shop Floor: Which Way for Namibia's Labor Movement?" in Melber ed., *Transition in Namibia*, pp. 50-64; and *Namibia's Labour Movement: An Overview -- History, Challenges, and Achievements* (Windhoek: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, 2018), pp. 20-7.

This led to relative policy continuity and deepening socioeconomic contradictions. As Figure 7.7 indicates, inequalities worsened; poverty remained at chronically high levels; and unemployment began to rise again in the 2010s. The white minority continued to dominate national wealth, and a small black middle class developed at the expense of the vast black majority as Affirmative Action and BEE policies continued to benefit a parasitic political and business elite.[97] Meanwhile, inequalities in land (re)distribution persisted, forming the core of social contradictions and popular mobilization. Unlike renewed measures for more inclusive land redistribution in South Africa, in Namibia the anemic land reform program continued to advantage the new black elite and foreign capital.[98] Moreover, the government's opposition to land allocation to people and communities 'displaced' or 'dispossessed' of land in colonial times fostered a sense of discrimination against non-Ovambo minority groups in southern and central Namibia.[99] The discontent and conflicts precipitated to a growing rural popular opposition intertwined with urban lower-class protests.

Figure 7.7: Rising Inequalities and Unemployment in Namibia, 2005-2015

The urban and rural contradictions set the stage for a stronger backlash during President Hifikepunye Pohamba's second term (2010-2015) and his successor, President Hage Geingob. The main challenge came from non-organized labor and other social movements among the urban poor. Like Cosatu, the very rationale for the NUNW's strategic relationship—that is, close influence on party and government policies—severely undermined its autonomy and effectiveness of the broader labor movement. With the federation practically paralyzed, the non-

[97] H. Melber, "Namibia: A Trust Betrayed – Again?" *Rev. of Afr. Pol. Economy*, 38, 127 (March 2010): 103-11.
[98] W. Werner, *Missed Opportunities and Fuzzy Logic: A Review of the Proposed Land Bill* (Windhoek: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2010), *IPPR Briefing Paper* 51 (July).
[99] E. Gargallo, "Beyond Black and White: Ethnicity and Land Reform in Namibia," *Pol. Africaine*, 4(2010):153-73.

affiliated trade unions, and the unemployed and underemployed urban poor, formed the major force of the urban popular-sector blowback. At the same time, non-organized labor formed an important part of the anti-government backlash in the 2010s because, as union membership became restricted to permanent workers in 'traditional sectors' (notably, the public service, mining, fishing, and construction), the unemployed and casual workers came to form a larger proportion of the urban-popular sector.[100]

The broader urban lower-class backlash intensified after the late 2000s as the structural effects of the reform period solidified. It coincided with growth of the urban popular sector in conjunction to major structural changes, especially ongoing rapid urbanization, and, after 2009, with economic recession, rising unemployment, and growing inequalities and poverty.[101] The failure to address the land question, rampant corruption, and mismanagement of public resources further aggravated popular discontents. Disproportionately affected by the economic, social, and governance problems, the urban popular sectors—which included formal-sector, unemployed, and informal-sector workers, and the urban poor—staged a series of protests by teachers (2009), healthcare workers (2010), mineworkers (2011), construction workers (2012), and civil servants (2013). A major landmark in the urban popular sectors' challenge to liberal government policies was the 2015 Oshakati protest against food price increase. The government reacted with commitments to increase minimum wages, increased spending on health, education, and housing, and combat government corruption. Yet, as in South Africa, endemic corruption and neoliberal constraints on the state attenuated state capacity for policy implementation and service delivery.

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[100] See Jauch*, Namibia's Labour Movement*, pp. 20-1.

[101] The unemployment rate rose from 24.5 percent in 2008 to 28.2 percent in 2009. The poverty headcount ratio, or the number of people living on less than $1.90 a day, rose from 27.4 percent in 2008 to 29.7 percent in 2009. See Economist Intelligence Unit, "Namibia: Country Profile," 2010. Available at: https://country.eiu.com/namibia.

An equally stronger popular reaction to structural legacies of the reform period came from other popular-sector and rural social movements. Urban middle class discontents with enduring inequalities, unemployment, and poor service delivery birthed in 2014 an Affirmative Repositioning (AR) movement that advocated for land reform, youth empowerment, and social justice. The radical youth-led movement mobilized the biggest mass action since liberation, including a mass land occupation in Windhoek in 2015. In subsequent years, the movement morphed into a left-wing political party and expanded beyond its traditional educated, middle-class urban origins to a nation-wide mobilization of urban and rural poor, and from narrow urban-land activism to agitation for radical transformation through land reform, social justice and welfare, and better governance.[102] Meanwhile, corresponding the Fallist movement in South Africa, a radical decolonization movement sprung up from student protests against high cost in higher education. It turned to a nation-wide movement for, on the one hand, free education and affordable housing, job creation, and a more just and equitable society, and on the other, the decolonization of public space, removal of colonial monuments, and renaming city Streets.[103] This was in direct challenge to the legacy of policies of reconciliation of the reform period.

The rural dimension of the popular backlash was a direct reaction to land policies of the liberal reform period. It was closely linked to urban discontents because the persistence of the settler-colonial-era migrant labor system formed a bridge between rural workers and the urban-working class. The uneven patterns of settler-colonial dispossession caused high landlessness in the central and southern regions as opposed to the populous northern areas north of the historical

[102] In Nov. 2020, the founding leader of the AR movement, Job Amupanda, was elected mayor of Windhoek. He was Secretary for Information, Publicity, and Mobilization for the SWAPO Party Youth League (SPYL) before he and his radical allies left the party. See H. Becker, "Namibia's Moment: Youth and Urban Land Activism," *ROAPE Blog*, 18 Jan. 2016; T. Isbell, N. Alweendo, and M. Moosa, "Namibian's Look to Social Movement to Prompt Government Action on Land Reform," IPPR, Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 289, 29 Mar. 2019.
[103] See Heike Becker, "'Youth Speaking Truth to Power': Intersectional Decolonial Activism in Namibia," *Dialectical Anthropology*, 47 (December 2022): 71-84.

Red Line designated as African reserves. During the reform period, the liberation government rejected claims of 'ancestral lands' and ethnic considerations to supposedly avoid recreating ethnic Bantustans of the late settler-colonial era, to reinforce the 'policy of reconciliation,' and foster integrative nation building. Hence, land redistribution without regard to previous dispossession or preference for local communities left various minority communities in central and southern Namibia disillusioned with land policies that appeared to advantage the majority Ovambo from the northern areas as well as a new black landed elite.

The policies spawned ethnoregional and class grievances that went beyond the dominant race-based injustices. In the central and southern regions, the distribution of commercial farms led to a communal backlash to what was viewed as government partiality towards Ovambos and discrimination against "the real owners" of land. A case in point, Nama TAs protested against alleged economic marginalization of local communities in the south, and in 2008 the Democratic Party of Namibia emerged advocating fair treatment of the southern regions. In the Communal Areas (CAs), disputes over the recognition of TAs, overpopulation, and intercommunal conflicts triggered strong communal opposition to the government.[104] The later sticked to liberal land reform policies of the reform period that intensified the non-violent rural backlash evident in the development of communal movements, ethnoregional political parties, and polarized voting patterns. For example, in 2016, the dismissal of Deputy Minister for Land and Resettlement and Nama, Bernardus Swartbooi, caused country-wide protests among Nama and Ovaherero communities. Subsequently, Swartbooi founded the Landless People's Movement (LPM) with an agenda for the return of ancestral lands that gained a nationwide political traction.[105]

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[104] Gargallo, "Ethnicity and Land Reform in Namibia," pp. 161-5.
[105] Henning Melber, "The Political Economy of Namibia," Rift Valley Institute - UNICEF ESARO Country Paper, February 2018, p. 8; and "Colonialism, Land, Ethnicity, and Class: Namibia After the Second National Land Conference," *Africa Spectrum*, 54, 1 (2019), pp. 74-80.

Then Namibia, too, saw an expanding popular backlash with a strong rural dimension in the later part of the aftermath period. The Swapo Party's relatively stronger electoral popularity for much of the aftermath period clearly began to diminish with the post-2015 upsurge in popular mobilization (see Fig. 7.8). In the 2019 parliamentary elections, the party lost the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly it had held since 1994, while Geingob suffered the worst electoral outcome since national liberation.[106] The 2020 regional and local elections show a similar trend of eroding popular support for Swapo in the wake of the backlash. It vote-share sharply dropped from 83 percent (2014) to 57 percent, resulting in its loss of control over some provincial and local councils in especially the central and southern regions. Moreover, Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Swakopmund, and some other urban centers fell to opposition parties or party coalitions[107] in a clear indication of the urban and rural nature of the post-reform social-democratic backlash.



Source: The Electoral Commission of Namibia. www. https://www.ecn.na/

[106] Unlike in South Africa, the president is elected in direct polls separate from parliamentary voting. See H. Melber, "Namibia Since Independence," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History* (Oxford University Press, 2022. Web.), pp. 9-12.
[107] Ibid., pp. 13-4. Several of these parties were forged in the crucible of the popular backlash, including the AR movement, the Landless Peoples' Movement (LPM), and Namibian Economic Freedom Fighters (NEFF).

The popular reaction in Namibia, as in South Africa, did not result in the kind of major structural transformations previously seen in Angola and Mozambique. Instead, successive Swapo Party elites counterreacted with a series of policy redefinitions and institutional reconfigurations that stabilized the liberal path of political development. President Pohamba initiated reform measures for good governance, gender equality, and increased spending on housing and education to quell swelling popular discontent. In direct reaction to the intensified backlash, after 2015, President Geingob departed from his predecessors to shift emphasis from ‘Swapo is the nation’ to a ‘Namibian House’ incorporating all Namibians on an equitable basis. Further, he set out the reduction of social inequalities and poverty alleviation as central goals of his government, alongside an inclusive development vision—the Harambe Prosperity Plan (HPP)—with annual seven percent economic growth rate. His government also convened the Second National Land Conference (2018) which recognized issues of urban land and informal squatters, affordable housing, and of communal and ancestral lands.[108]

The consequence is the reproduction of liberal state structures and highly polarized social patterns with their pedigree in the liberal reform period. First, the liberal state institutions were reinforced as Swapo Party’s hegemony dwindled, and it began to share political power at the local, regional, and national levels. The party elite’s continued to adhere to the rule of law was crucial, not least because, as since the reform period, pursuing growth with ‘greater equity’ was contingent on the confidence of capital and goodwill of international donors. Reclaiming Swapo’s dominant status thus hinged on recovering from an ongoing economic recession and oiling its patronage machine. Further, the consolidation of a black capitalist class (state elites, black business, and large landowners) with intertwined interests with large capital came to form

[108] See Becker, “Youth and Urban Land Activism,” p. 2; Melber, “Namibia Since Independence,” p. 8; Melber, “Colonialism, Land, Ethnicity, and Class,” p. 78.

an important rampart against radical or populist tendencies alike. Second, a social structure with racial, class, and other divisions also crystalized as the defining legacy of liberation. Here, urban divisions coexisted with rural polarization between landless ethnic minorities and landed groups of white farmers, landed elites, and black settlers.

7.3 LIBERAL BACKLASH, MILITARIZATION, AND RENEWED EXCLUSION: ZIMBABWE

In Zimbabwe, the stalled liberal reforms generated a liberal backlash involving popular-sector groups and wide-ranging political and civic movements. The reaction emerged as a labor-led social democratic reaction to economic liberalization in the 1990s, and concomitant economic decline, rising poverty and unemployment, and neoliberal destruction of 'welfarist policies' of the 1980s. By the late 1990s, with increased government repression and deteriorating service delivery, the popular-sector mobilization evolved into a widened liberal backlash involving labor, students' and women's movements, and civic and opposition forces pressing for democratization, constitutionalism, and human rights respect. By the early 2000s, the disparate challenges converged into a political opposition as trade unions declined and civil society reeled from repressive state reaction. The aftermath period encompassed three distinct episodes: (1) reaction and liberalization (1990-1997), (2) intensified liberal backlash, polarization, and militarization of state structures (1998-2008), and (3) the reproduction of exclusionary and militarized structures (2008-13) as the ultimate legacies of liberation in Zimbabwe.

7.3.1 Liberal Backlash and Liberalization (1990-1997)

The reform decade was followed by a mounting political reaction. After 1990, the regime came under increasing pressure by popular-sector and civic groups demanding improved living

conditions, democratic incorporation, human rights, and so on. The economic and social changes of the reform period were modest and in large part 'short-term and welfarist in nature;' overall, the reforms "did not adequately address the serious challenges of land and economic-resource ownership, justice and equity, the reconfiguration of the nation-state, political inclusiveness and openness, or issues of nationhood and citizenship." The "postcolonial project of building a just, equitable and non-racial society was not achieved," and "the foundation of a truly democratic order was not laid."[109] The political and socioeconomic contradictions—and the ruling elite's continued rhetoric of one-party-state and socialist development—gave impetus to a growing political reaction by the late 1980s. The liberal backlash emerged amid economic decline and economic liberalization of the 'controlled economy' of the reform years in the 1990s.

The introduction of a neoliberal Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1991 eroded the limited socioeconomic gains of the reform years, reversed economic growth, and exacerbated income inequalities. Large numbers of workers were retrenched as industries closed down, and the urban popular sectors hit hard as generous public spending was severely cut in line with neoliberal austerity.[110] The deregulation of prices, the removal of subsidies on basic consumer goods, and decline in real wages caused severe hardships for workers, the unemployed, and the poor. Meanwhile, the quality of public services deteriorated, and cutbacks in state subsidies made health and educational services inaccessible to the majority of the poor and unemployed. Besides, the plight of the rural population also worsened as agricultural productivity declined as a result of a series of droughts as well as liberalization reforms that saw "the reduction in government extension and agricultural input services, the introduction of tight

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[109] Muzondidya, "From Buoyancy to Crisis," p. 199.

[110] Ibid., p. 188. Also, see A. S. Mlambo, *The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: The Case of Zimbabwe, 1990-1995* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1997), p. 91.

and more extensive credit, and the deterioration of rural roads."[111] This, along with the return of retrenched urban workers to rural homes, caused increased pressure on agricultural land that led to the repoliticization of still highly unequal and racially-skewed patterns of land ownership.

The growing unrest catalyzed a strong political backlash by broad political, economic, and societal forces from urban areas. Pushed to the brink by ESAP's neoliberal economic adjustments, labor led the way in what would eventually turn into a liberal backlash. In the early 1990s, workers and the unemployed moved to strike action in reaction to the impoverishing effects of ESAP. Distancing itself from the ruling party by the late 1980s, the ZCTU became more confrontational and, in June 1992, organized a march against the ESAP reform program that was brutally quashed by state police. However, labor became more and more agitated as real wages continued to decline. In the latter half of the decade, a wave of strikes emerged in all sectors of the economy underscoring widespread popular discontent. In June 1996, public-sector workers organized the largest strike by civil servants (i.e., teachers, doctors, nurses, and other public servants) in post-liberation Zimbabwe. The eight-week wildcat strike by civil servants was supported by student groups, human rights organizations, and churches. Further, the trade unions organized a series of public and private-sector strikes, which culminated in a general strike in Dec. 1997 that forced the government to abandon a new levy on workers.[112]

With increasing state repression, labor grievances shifted from narrow bread-and-butter issues to broader questions of socioeconomic reforms and democratization.[113] Consequently, a broad popular pro-democracy alliance emerged as workers' strikes were joined by other urban social groups, including the unemployed and students, and by civil society promoting human

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[111] Ibid., p. 189.
[112] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp. 98-9.
[113] On the Zimbabwean labor movement's role, see L. Matombo and L. Sachikonye, "The Labor Movement and Democratization in Zimbabwe," in Beckman, Buhlungu, & Sachikonye, eds., *Trade Unions & Party Politic*s, p. 109.

rights, democratic freedoms, and the rule of law. Student mobilization formed an integral part of the backlash since the late 1980s when students took prominent position in protesting government corruption and proposed constitutional changes in the one-party state debate, aligning themselves with labor and civic groups. After 1990, university students engaged in violent protests against the effects of economic liberalization on student welfare; and in the later 1990s, like labor, student mobilization shifted from parochial concerns with student food, accommodation, and grants to broader societal issues, linking their own demands with broader national political and economic issues. In the early 1990s, other broader civil society groups emerged to challenge the state for its progressive failure to uproot poverty, deliver decent services, and accommodate political dissent. Further, the previously acquiescent churches began active engagement in broader political, social, and economic affairs like the labor and student movements.[114] Overall, as the decade wore off, the government progressively faced mounting political reaction from a wide range of societal, civic, and political organizations concerned with social and economic issues, good governance, democracy, and human rights.

The nation-building approach based on the policy of racial reconciliation of the reform period also elicited a strong political reaction. The minority white's continued economic dominance became a target of rural and urban backlash. In the 1990s, land-hungry peasants invaded state-owned and private land spurred by slow-down in the land reform program, intensified pressure on land in communal areas, and economic liberalization. In reaction, the government introduced the Land Acquisition Act (no. 3 of 1992) designed to rid of the 'willing-seller, willing-buyer' principle of the reform period and empower the state to compulsorily acquire land for resettlement. Even so, very little progress was made in resettling some 110,000 families. Later in 1997, renewed attempts to nationalize a limited scope of land for resettlement

[114] See Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp. 99-112.

also failed because of financial and administrative shortcomings.[115] Consequently, the rhetoric of racial reconciliation became increasingly untenable, and racial polarization of Zimbabwean society deepened in the 1990s. To make matters worse, the ZANU-PF party elite seized on the land issue to whip up black racial grievances to mitigate the rising political challenges.[116]

Besides, dominant white capital and white privileges against the backdrop of mounting social and economic discontent began to draw growing racial resentment evident in attacks against white businesses. At the same time, the black business class marginalized during the reform years began to make demands for "greater black participation and control of the economy," while black affirmative action groups pressed for "the de-racialization of the ownership base of commercial farmland."[117] Initially, the aspiring black bourgeoisie directed its frustration against the government for failing to support black business development during the reform decade. But the black elite's main target was white capital for it charged white businessmen and farmers of institutional racism that allegedly hampered the development of indigenous capital. In July 1994, a coalition of black pressure groups staged protests in Harare "to denounce institutional racism in banks and other financial institutions." This further deepened racial polarization given the fact that Robert Mugabe opportunistically harnessed anti-white grievances in an exclusive black nationalism, and that little racial integration had taken place since liberation as many whites withdrew into their 'racial enclaves.'[118]

The government counterreacted to the backlash with repression, cooptation, and exclusion strategies characteristic of the liberation reform episode. It employed increasing

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[115] See Sam Moyo, "The Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 26, 1 (March 2000): 5-28; and *Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Land Use Change in the Mashonaland Provinces* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2000).
[116] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp. 86-7; Jocelyn Alexander, "State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe," *Review of African Political Economy*, 21, 61 (Sep. 1994), p. 338.
[117] Muzondidya, "From Buoyancy to Crisis," p. 191.
[118] Ibid., pp. 192-3.

violence against the urban popular-sector backlash for it was difficult to respond with progressive measures amid economic contraction and structural adjustment austerities. In the neoliberal 1990s, the government was as much constrained as the South African and Namibian liberation elites were during their reform episode. Hence, as urban popular-sector protests surged, the regime tightened political control through repressive laws that curtailed workers' right to strike and, where it failed, brutal force through police and army deployment. Besides, it strengthened its control over basic freedoms, the media, and civil society notwithstanding increased political contestation in this period. State structures were gradually militarized as Mugabe turned increasingly to the security and armed forces to quell the democratic backlash. In rural areas, the regime sought to reconsolidate its power by chiefly resuscitating relations with chiefs and reasserting 'chiefly authority over rural population.' To this end, it re-empowered traditional leaders through the Traditional Leaders Act (No. 25 of 1998),[119] which effectively marginalized the democratic local structures (i.e., the VIDCOs and WADCOs), and reversed some democratization of rural authority, of the reform period.

The government pursued some strategies of inclusion that were both non-democratic and narrow in racial, class, and political terms. In particular, the 'politics of inclusion' and reconciliation was abandoned as party elites charged whites for the country's economic woes in efforts to deflect rising popular discontent with the government's policies. While excluding some social or regional opposition groups from national 'development,'[120] the government cynically incorporated other black groups critical of white economic dominance and continued racial inequalities. It abandoned its reform-period alliance with white capital and increasingly utilized 'indigenization' to promote black economic interests and to build a 'distributional coalition'

[119] Ibid., pp. 196-9.
[120] See Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp. 84-5.

between the ruling party and indigenous business.[121] In Oct. 1997, Mugabe also brought into fold the radical Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA)—a much more serious political group that, albeit its closer relations to the party, joined the anti-government backlash calling rapid land and income redistribution to the poor. This represented a landmark in the dynamic of political reactions and counterreactions, for the government irreversibly embraced the radical land redistribution agenda while huge unbudgeted benefits and salaries to the veterans caused the economy to crash thereafter.[122] In general, the political elite's response triggered a renewed phase of heightened liberal backlash and deepening polarization.

7.3.2 Intensified Backlash, Militarization, and Exclusion (1998-2008)

The Mugabe regime sought to thwart the emerging democratic backlash through a "combination of strategic policy responses, rhetoric, and the selective distribution of benefits."[123] Consequently, from the late-1990s onwards, the reactive sequence entered a new period—known generally as the 'Crisis' in Zimbabwean studies—marked by heightened political confrontation and polarization over a conjuncture of manifold issues, actors, and contestations.[124] Yet, this time, the political reactions and counterreactions took place against a backdrop of an economic implosion (Fig. 7.9), following violent appropriation of white-owned commercial land beginning in early-2000. During this period, the political reactions were defined by three interrelated dynamics: (1) heightened popular sector struggles for democratic inclusion in the late 1990s, (2)

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[121] Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, p. 227.
[122] See Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp.81-3; Muzondidya, "From Buoyancy to Crisis," pp. 197-8.
[123] Ibid., p. 113.
[124] As Raftopoulos cogently argues, the crisis came to bear the complex legacies of the reform period:

> "…confrontations over the land and property rights; contestations over history and meanings of nationalism and citizenship; the emergence of critical civil society groupings campaigning around trade union, human rights and constitutional questions; the restructuring of the state in more authoritarian forms; the broader pan-African and anti-imperialist meanings of the struggle in Zimbabwe; the cultural representation of the crisis in Zimbabwean literature; and the central role of Robert Mugabe." Brian Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008," in Raftopoulos and Mlambo, eds., *Becoming Zimbabwe*, p. 202.

politically motivated violent land acquisition and redistribution in the early 2000s, and (3) state militarization, renewed political exclusion, and deepening national polarization.



Fig. 7.9: Economic Decline in Zimbabwe, 1990-2008 (annual GDP growth %)

Source: World Bank National Accounts data & OECD Nat. Accounts data files.

Heightened Mobilization for Democratic Incorporation

The liberal backlash intensified in 1998 in reaction to government intransigence as well as a worsening socioeconomic conditions. In Dec. 1997, ZCTU staged some one-hundred nation-wide 'stay-aways'; in January 1998, food riots against rising mealie-meal costs erupted in the capital-city, Harare, and smaller towns, such as Beitbridge, Chegutu, and Chinhoyi; and further protests flared up by the year's end despite increasing state brutality.[125] The unprecedented social protests were corresponded by the emergence of broad social and political movements among coalitions of workers, students, intellectuals, human rights organizations, churches, and women's groups. Until the mid-1990s, a multitude of civics, social, and NGO formations had concentrated on such disparate issues as development, gender equality, human rights, and so on. In subsequent

[125] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp. 117, 119. Popular protest in rural areas were less visible and mostly government-instigated; but there was a resurgence in land occupations, and commercial farmworkers emulating the urban popular-sector protests.

years, there emerged "strong social movements in the fields of labor, constitutionalism, and democratization,"[126] leading to the launching of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998 and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party in 1999 that would challenge the ruling ZANU-PF party during the next decade.

At this juncture, the most momentous development was the convergence of the challenges by organized labor and various other social movements into a more coherent political backlash for democratic change. The ZCTU played a leading role in this process after it momentarily grappled with the inherent tension between focusing on collective bargaining for labor interests and on national issues in broader alliance with other civics organizations. Frustrated by failed attempts at bargaining with the state, and with industrial action impeded by stringent state laws, the federation ultimately decided to "go beyond the shopfloor and bring their concerns in the national stage, thus politicizing the issues."[127] Aided by mounting labor militancy, union politicization, and capacity for national mobilization, ZCTU and its charismatic leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, played a key role in the launching in Jan. 1998 of the NCA, a civic constitutional reform movement inclusive of trade unions, academics, human rights groups, the churches, hundreds of NGOs, and disparate civic associations. The civic movement emerged in direct reaction to a host of power centralizing reforms of the reform period and its immediate aftermath, and came to embody the mounting democratic backlash of the late 1990s.

The formation of the broad-based NCA coalition represented a turning point in the dynamics of the aftermath period in Zimbabwe. Its diverse membership reflected the broad range of the economic, social, and political reactions to the reform period: "religious organizations, trade unions, professional associations, grassroots structures, media bodies, academic institutions

[126] Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008" p. 203.
[127] ZCTU, "Special General Council Meeting, 30th January 2008," quoted in ibid., p. 205.

and business, women's, students, and human rights organizations."[128] The NCA's primary goal was to help initiate an inclusive and broad-based constitution-making process in Zimbabwe through nation-wide public meetings, workshops, media campaigns, and other platforms of popular participation. Focused mainly on 'educating' citizens about the constitution, citizenship, and democracy, the movement broadened its national influence through the member organizations, especially the churches, the ZCTU, and, in rural areas, women's organizations and predominantly white commercial farmers. The labor movement became strongly committed to the NCA political process; in the perspective of its leaders, the "fundamental issue confronting Zimbabwe is how the rules of democratic governance are set."[129]

Relying less and less on sheer force during these years, the government counterreacted by launching its own Constitutional Commission (CC) in 1999 in efforts to regain control of the process and outcome of constitutional reform. From the viewpoint of the broad movement for constitutional reform, at the core of the national debate were "issues of citizenship, government accountability, and the broadening of the democratic space."[130] By contrast, the CC came to emphasize 'the problematic nature' of the Lancaster House constitution, castigated by party elites as not 'home grown' and inherently flawed.[131] The CC divided civil society as some groups allied themselves with the state process, which set the stage for two parallel constitutional processes: the NCA's initiative based on 'consensus building and people-centered process' and a relatively open and participatory, but inherently top-down, CC initiative.[132] The stakes were raised with the formation of the MDC in Sep. 1999 under the leadership of M. Tsvangirai, which

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[128] E. McCandless, *Zimbabwean Forms of Resistance: Social Movements, Strategic Dilemmas, and Transformative Change* (Ph.D. Thesis, American University, 2005), p. 209. Also, for the NCA's history, see Sara Rich Dorman, *Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Politics in Zimbabwe* (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2001).
[129] ZCTU, "Special General Council Meeting, 30th Jan. 1998," quoted in Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008" p. 208.
[130] Ibid., p. 209.
[131] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, p. 128.
[132] NCA, quoted in Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008" p. 209.

emerged out of the intertwined political reactions, in particular the labor and constitutional movements. The conflicting perspectives, motives, and political reactions of the 1998-2000 episode amounted to what Doman called 'the politics of polarization' when, in dramatic contrast to previous years, "relations between state and society became deeply polarized."[133] The party elite dismissed the NCA as nothing less than a divisive foreign agent, using political strategies and tactics reminiscent of exclusive nation-building of the reform period.

The mounting democratic opposition to the government came to a head with a constitutional referendum in February 2000. The relatively open and transparent process of the CC did not yield a democratic framework fully representative of popular opinion. The government 'distorted, ignored, or rejected' widespread popular demand for democratic government, especially for limitations on executive powers and the separation of power between the executive and legislative branches.[134] The CC's draft constitution submitted to a national plebiscite was thus dramatically rejected by a broad coalition of interests. This strongly underscored the strength of the democratic backlash represented, as it was, by 'the constitutional reform movement' coalesced around the NCA as well as the reformist MDC party representing a multi-class, cross-racial alliance.[135] The dynamics both further politicized the national body politic and intensified the political reaction to contradictory legacies of the liberation episode. The issue of land deepened the national political crisis and polarization in subsequent years.

Violent Land Acquisition and Redistribution

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[133] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, p. 115. For a different perspective that places emphasis on the 1997-2003 period as one when Zimbabwean politics was dramatically reconfigured, see A. LeBas, "Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe," *Comparative Politics*, 38, 4 (Jul., 2006): 419-438.
[134] Ibid., pp. 133, 135.
[135] See Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe*, pp. 232-3.

In response to the constitutional setback and real danger of losing state power, the Mugabe regime set out 'to rebuild and remobilize the nationalist coalition' demobilized during the reform period. In the party elites' viewpoint, confiscating the white-owned commercial land—an unfinished business of the reform years—would solidify regime power by burnishing its black nationalist credentials and weakening the white minority that formed a key force in the liberal backlash. Thus, the newly mobilized forces of war veterans and party activists were encouraged to invade white-owned land and unleash violence on the opposition following the humiliating referendum defeat. Farm invasions that began in Masvingo province rapidly spread to other regions as local groups of 'war vets' mobilizing peasants, commercial farmworkers, and unemployed youth embarked on a violent process of land occupations in a largely a state-led effort that continued sporadically until 2005. The state resumed control over the 'fast-track' land reform and resettlement program, whereby white-owned farms were compulsorily acquired and redistributed to landless families and for small-scale commercial farming.[136]

The 'fast-track' land redistribution occurred within the context of unresolved land inequalities of the reform period and its legacies. However, it was fundamentally a politically driven program for, as Raftopoulos asserts, it was centrally driven by regime imperative "to contain, coerce and demobilize the structures and support of the opposition…"[137] Additionally, the process was fundamentally exclusionary even though it transformed a highly unequal and racially-skewed land distribution of the settler-colonial period. Besides the party-state elite who took over the best farms, it empowered select regime-allied groups, especially the war veterans (who were given 20 percent of the land), rural elites including traditional chiefs, and a section of the rural poor. Excluded in the process were obviously white commercial farmers and black

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[136] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp. 143-6.
[137] Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008" p. 212.

farmworkers,[138] and the urban popular sectors that drove the political backlash. Tilting ZANU-PF's political gravity to rural areas afterwards, the process basically sharpened intra-black class inequalities and national political polarization including a stark rural-urban national divide.

The violent acquisition and redistribution of land had the overall impact of deepening authoritarianism and political exclusion during the latter aftermath period. ZANU-PF's ideology was "recast in more authoritarian, selective and racialized notions of citizenship and belonging, constituted around the centrality of the land question and the contribution of ZANU-PF to the liberation struggle."[139] The long-running, politically charged land question was used to counteract the mounting civic and political opposition by rebuilding a populist 'liberationist coalition' around exclusive black nationalism—essentially reconstituting the broad liberation coalition that ended settler-colonial rule. Such politically disloyal groups as whites, the MDC and the civic movement, and urbanites and farmworkers were branded as 'enemies of the nation,' and violently excluded, in some instance dispossessed. As Dorman aptly puts, "those who were willing to be mobilized in defense of the regime were rewarded with land, contracts, and employment."[140] While buttressing regime durability, the inherently political land redistribution process deepened the authoritarian, exclusionary, and inegalitarian legacies of the reform years.

Last, the belated radical land reform program was universally viewed as the most transformative event—perhaps a critical juncture—in post-independence Zimbabwe. However, the event was rather a dramatic climax of the broader dynamic of reactions and counterreactions, a crucial linchpin in the chain of events linking the critical juncture of the liberation episode to its more enduring legacy, which would consolidate in the decade or so following the onset of the violent land acquisitions. It marked a turning point from heightened liberal reaction to the

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[138] Ibid., p. 216; Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, pp. 144, 146.
[139] Ibid., p. 213.
[140] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, p. 141.

reconsolidation of repressive state structures. Indeed, land politics would have a strong bearing on subsequent dynamics of the aftermath period; yet its genesis and political significance cannot be properly understood without the broader political reactions and counterreactions that had been set into motion by the reform period and that had escalated in the late 1990s.

State Militarization and Deepened Polarization

The 2000-2008 period was defined by the reproduction of much more militarized and exclusionary state structures. Sara R. Dorman correctly characterizes the dynamics of this episode as 'the politics of exclusion.' However, such characterization rests on the assumption that the prior period was fully or partially inclusionary. In fact, Dorman viewed the reform-episode dynamics as 'the politics of inclusion' when, from a comparative and historical perspective, that foundational period was only partially inclusionary, and that the 'new' 'politics of exclusion' were rooted in far less democratic strategies of power consolidation and nation-building that defined it. Hence, the post-2000 phase saw the reconsolidation of narrowly inclusive, repressive legacies of the reform episode through (a) exclusion and cooptation of the democratic opposition as well as (b) thoroughgoing militarization of state structures.

Following the 2000 referendum surprise, the government moved to decisively crash the broad democratic mobilization. It constrained the opposition, civics groups, and press freedom through repressive legislation. Political violence and intimidation became ubiquitous as state agencies and the state-sponsored war veterans and ZANU-PF youth militias unleashed deadly violence against the opposition and its supporters in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections and during the 2002 presidential elections. Later in the 2005 parliamentary elections, violent reprisals were unleashed against the opposition in urban and rural areas following the

elections.[141] The level of state-sanctioned violence and human rights abuses in 2000-2002 was hitherto unparalleled in the aftermath period; but it was not without precedent for it actually echoed the Gukurahundi atrocities of the early reform period. In reality, the incorporative and exclusionary strategies with which ZANU-PF regained political dominance were, as Dorman cogently suggests, "in many ways a 'relaunch' of the old policies from the 1980s."[142]

The increasingly violent repression was corresponded by the increased militarization and weaponization of state institutions in reaction to popular democratic challenge. First, the regime 'expanded and consolidated' control over the electoral process to enable massive electoral manipulation and violence against dissent.[143] Second, the party elite set out in the infiltration and 'dramatic reorganization of state structures.' The 'white' judiciary—by far an island of institutional autonomy—was reformed to make it compliant to party dictates, the civil service was largely purged of opposition supporters, and local power was placed in the hands of regime-allied groups. The police, army, and public service was politicized from 2001 onwards, and the regime 'brought the chiefs back in' as reliable agents of authoritarian control in rural areas. Finally, and overall, the state structures were increasingly militarized across the board as Mugabe filled key state institutions with military personnel.[144] This not only permitted the decisive attenuation of the democratic backlash short-term, but would also have lasting implications in reproducing militarized regime legacies in Zimbabwe.

Having the economic power of the white minority broken, the regime also moved to re-incorporate, marginalize, or exclude the various forces materially autonomous of the state (i.e., unions, churches, and NGOs). For the regime had fewer resources to redistribute, especially with

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[141] Ibid., pp. 145, 156-8; Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008" pp. 214-5.
[142] Ibid., p. 188.
[143] Ibid., pp. 159-66.
[144] Ibid., pp. 168-9, 215; Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008" p. 213.

economic meltdown initiated by the land invasions, it deployed both divide-and-rule and exclusionary political tactics. It targeted the labor movement by means of attempted control over ZCTU and, failing that, the reinvigoration of a breakaway umbrella union. In the urban areas, where MDC support was dominant in the 2000s and the government was unbale to court the urban popular sectors with jobs, affordable housing, and service delivery, the ruling party sought to suppress the democratic rights of urban citizens and reduce the size of the urban poor by destroying shantytowns. Lastly, it weakened the social foundations of the backlash through legal repression, coercion, and divisions among the churches, NGOs, and other civil society groups.[145]

The liberal backlash deescalated thereafter but political polarization deepened. The fast-track land reform, which ruined the agricultural sector and shut off international investment and development assistance, crippled the national economy.[146] Besides, the declining health, education, and sanitation services in urban areas in particular had all but collapsed as the decade wore off. Hence, the labor movement found it extremely difficult to organize in a context of economic meltdown and rapid informalization of the economy; likewise, civil society was worn down by both vicious state repression and national economic deterioration to mount a broad political reaction as in the 1990s.[147] Consequently, the broad-based liberal reaction with far-reaching social and political underpinnings turned into mainstream political opposition led by the MDC movement. Even so, sustained economic crisis and deteriorating public services meant deep societal disaffection which resulted in ZANU-PF's near defeat in the 2008 elections.

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[145] See Ibid., pp. 170-85.
[146] For example, by 2006, GDP per capita was 47 percent lower than it was in 1980 and 53 percent below its 1990 peak; real wages and formal sector employment shrank; and 85 of Zimbabweans lived below the Poverty Datum Line in 2006, as the official inflation level reached 230 million percent in 2008. See P. Robinson, "Macro-Economic Paper Produced for the Zimbabwe Institute," Cape Town, 2007; G. Kanyenze, "The Labor Market, Sustainable Growth, and Transformation in Zimbabwe," unpublished paper, 2007.
[147] Raftopoulos, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008" pp. 218-9.

Political polarization—in the form of stark political and civil society divide between confrontational blocs of the two parties—deepened as state manipulation further radicalized the political opposition and deepened preexisting political cleavages.[148] The principal, longstanding racial cleavage ceased following the attacks on white farmers and capital that broke down the historical economic power of the white minority. Thus, more like in Mozambique and Angola, rather new post-racial class inequalities consolidated between a small prosperous black elite embedded in party-state structures and a vast poor majority as traditional class inequalities broke down amid political turmoil, sustained economic crisis, and deepening poverty during 'crisis' decade.[149] The rural-urban divided that emerged from the reform period also deepened in a context of exceptionally high rural-urban inequalities. Despite ZANU-PF best efforts to win over the urban middle- and lower-classes, its support remained clustered in rural areas (and Mashonaland, overall), boosted by the fast-track land reform, the incorporation of traditional chiefs, and patronage-based access to farming inputs, technical assistance, and markets. The MDC's political support became concentrated in major urban areas (and Matabeleland and parts of Manicaland). Owing to ethnic Ndebele resentment that went back to the reform period, the MDC developed widespread popular support in the two Matabele provinces.[150]

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[148] See LeBas, "Polarization as Craft," p. 421; and *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); A. LeBas and N. Munemo, "Elite Conflict, Compromise, and Enduring Authoritarianism: Polarization in Zimbabwe, 1980–2008," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 681, 1 (Jan. 2019): 209-226.

[149] Zimbabwe had one of the steepest HDI drops in the 2000s. Besides, unlike the other countries, overall income inequalities in Zimbabwe declined from a 0.59 for 1992-96 to 0.54 for 1997-2001, and further to 0.43 in 2011. See Frikkie Booysen, et al, "Trends in Poverty and Inequality in Seven African Countries," Presented in the 4th PEP Research Network General Meeting, June 13-17, 2005, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The World Bank, *Poverty and Inequality Platform*. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ZW.

[150] Moreover, ZAPU, the struggle-era nationalist party strongly identified with the Ndebele, had been revived since mid-2000s. See Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, p. 158; also, see Bauer and Taylor, *Transition and Transformation*, pp. 195, 207-8.

7.3.3 The GNU and Renewed ZANU-PF Dominance

The 2008-2013 period saw the crystallization and reproduction of the autocratic and polarizing legacies of liberation in Zimbabwe. The short interlude of a Government of National Unity (GNU) in which ZANU-PF's Mugabe and the MDC's Tsvangirai shared power brought to resolution the liberal backlash that dominated the preceding decade or so. Indeed, the political settlement did not necessarily bring to end the political conflict and polarization of the aftermath period. In fact, as Michael Bratton noted, "power-sharing served mainly to deter a political crisis rather than resolve it."[151] Yet the unprecedented political settlement represented a resolution of the liberal backlash because it brought to end, at least momentarily, years of political turmoil and precipitous economic decline of the aftermath period by defusing an electoral crisis in 2008 in which ZANU-PF lost parliamentary majority but dug deeper into its authoritarian playbook to maintain state power. It brought the antagonistic parties to share power and undertake basic institutional reforms that seemed near impossible earlier.

However, the so-called inclusive government saw the reproduction of authoritarian arrangements of the reform period and its aftermath. The promised constitutional and electoral reforms were neither far-reaching to attenuate ZANU-PF dominance nor put to full implementation. The flawed political pact allowed ZANU-PF to maintain its control over state institutions, particularly the core instruments of state violence. Its implementation "followed a similar pattern to the experiences of the 1980s—not so much giving the opposition access to power, as providing space for the dominant party to re-assert itself."[152] the dominant party elite called "upon established institutional and cultural legacies to reassert exclusive control of the

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[151] Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 141.
[152] Dorman, *From Liberation to Authoritarianism*, p. 189.

state."[153] As a result, in the lopsided 2013 elections, ZANU-PF declared a resounding victory in parliamentary, presidential, and local elections against the MDC parties that was on the brink of democratically seizing political power in 2008.[154] In a nutshell, the institutional adaptations and innovations ironically reproduced the militarized and exclusionary structures that had undergirded ZANU-PF's dominance as the ultimate legacies of liberation in Zimbabwe.

7.4 CONCLUSION

In all five countries, the liberation-reform episode set into motion a path-dependent dynamic of political reactions and counterreactions. The genesis, evolution, and outcomes of the reactive sequence depended on the varying reform packages implemented by liberation elites during the critical juncture of liberation reforms. In the contexts of radical reforms (i.e., Mozambique and Angola), revolutionary state and political changes instantly provoked a violent "conservative backlash" by politically excluded, traditionalist Afro-nationalist armed groups, mobilizing rural upper-class elements and sections of the peasantry deeply antagonized by radical rural changes. In dramatic contrast, liberal reform choices (South Africa and Namibia) generated a non-violent "social democratic backlash" in the aftermath of the reform period, because the urban popular sectors were economically disenfranchised by neoliberal socioeconomic reforms, and because state and nation-building reforms were democratic and broadly inclusionary. Lastly, in the context of stalled liberal reforms (i.e., Zimbabwe), the reform episode provoked a "liberal backlash" by a wide range of class, political, and civic forces disaffected either by liberal socioeconomic reforms that sustained inherited inequalities or by repressive state structures and exclusionary nation-building strategies.

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[153] Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 4.
[154] See B. Raftopoulos, "The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe: The End of an Era," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 4 (Dec., 2013): 971-988.

The diverse patterns of backlash led to differing government counterreactions in the latter part of the aftermath period, which in turn triggered a further chain of political reactions that yielded to resolution of the backlashes. The specific policy responses and institutional reforms adopted by governments at this stage very much depended on the drivers of the particular backlash they had faced. Thus, liberation governments in Mozambique and Angola counterreacted with political and economic liberalizations, which involved renewed political inclusion, transition to capitalist economies, and the incorporation of traditional and religious authorities. By contrast, political elites reacted in South Africa and Namibia responded to the social-democratic backlash with renewed efforts to reduce deepening social inequalities, unemployment, and poverty among black majorities in townships, urban areas, and rural areas. Finally, political leaders in Zimbabwe counterreacted with a blend of incorporative and exclusionary tactics of the reform period, involving broad liberalization measures alongside violent redistribution of white-owned land, renewed political exclusion, and militarization of state structures. In each country, by the conclusion of the aftermath period, the institutional innovations and reconfigurations led to the reproduction of political-regime structures and national polarization akin to those of the liberation episode and its aftermath. These more enduring state and social structures discussed in the following chapter came to represent the diverse long-run legacies of twentieth-century Southern African liberation struggles.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ENDURING LEGACIES OF LIBERATION

As shown in the last chapter, the reactive sequence that defined political dynamics of the aftermath of the liberation reform episode had culminated in more stable state and social structures during the past two decades. In all five countries, the core structural patterns of the critical juncture of liberation reforms were reproduced after an interval of institutional crises, reforms, and reconfigurations by political elites responding to varying patterns of backlash. The distinctive and more enduring structures that emerged from the dynamic of political reactions represent the ultimate legacies of liberation in present-day Southern Africa. This chapter describes at some length these structural legacies: (1) *less inclusive semi-democracies* with *less unequal and less polarized post-racial social structures* (i.e., Angola and Mozambique); (2) *inclusive multiracial democracies* with *highly unequal and highly polarized racial and class structures* (namely, South Africa and Namibia); and (3) a *militarized semi-authoritarianism* with less unequal but *highly polarized political cleavages* (Zimbabwe).

I conceptualize the dependent variable—enduring legacies—in such a way that, first, one could adequately comprehend the long-term outcomes of the varied state, political, and socioeconomic reform measures of the reform period. Secondly, the conceptualization allows one to compare, on the one hand, the political regime-related legacies to the state structures established during the reform period and, on the other, the socio-structural legacies to racial and class structures prevailing at the end of the settler-colonial period. Such exercise, I hope, will enable the evaluation of the core argument that the reform period in each country indeed represented a critical juncture. The analysis employs cross-national quantitative data for some key variables for the years 2014 to 2020. I use measures for electoral democracy and political

inclusion to evaluate the degree of political contestation and inclusiveness of the political regime. Further, I employ data for social inequalities and national polarization to assess levels and patterns of structural inequalities as well as associated lines of polarization in each country. The analysis underscores that the structural legacies of liberation in Southern Africa significantly vary in key state institutional, political, and socio-structural dimensions.

The chapter brings the analysis forward to the present political structures and processes that emerged with the resolution of the backlashes to the reform period. Two important points need emphasis for this purpose. First, the legacy structures are understood to have generally crystallized with the conclusion of the aftermath period covered in the previous chapter. As such, there is some overlap between the forthcoming analysis and the closing stretch of the aftermath period. The structures and political reactions of the aftermath are also considered broader legacies of liberation. However, the more durable structures consolidated in recent years represent the ultimate or enduring legacies of liberation. Secondly, whereas the ultimate legacies had consolidated in some cases during the past decade-and-half (i.e., Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe), in the other cases where the dynamics of the aftermath period have continued to play out until recent years, the consolidation of definitive legacy structures is not complete yet (i.e., South Africa and Namibia). The difference stemmed from how early the reform period had occurred previously rather than from ontological differences of the reform episode.

Finally, the analysis considers the main *mechanisms of reproduction* starting from when the more stable state and social structures were reproduced in the latter part of the aftermath period. I argue that, first, in general institutional reproduction in recent decades mainly rested on the former liberation parties' control over state power and resources. The liberation ideals, mass aspirations, and historic achievements that buttressed the popular legitimacy and stability of

liberation regimes during the reform years and its aftermath are no more the principal basis of power maintenance and reproduction, as conventionally stressed, especially in Mozambique and Angola where national liberation is a distant and vague memory. Secondly, the way political power and state resources have been maintained and deployed significantly varies, ranging from truly democratic means mainly (South Africa and Namibia) to gratuitous violence and patronage on the other extreme (Zimbabwe).

8.1 SHARED ANTECEDENTS, DIVERSE LEGACIES

In analyzing and comparing political development in the five countries, scholars have far more often emphasized the shared and prolonged political domination by the former liberation parties in all five countries. They depict a picture of durable political regimes that are either overtly authoritarian or indisputably democratic but, due to their violent origins, always at odds with formal democratic procedures and substantive principles. And this commonly stems, it is hypothesized, from the former NLMs' violent heritage and anti-democratic norms institutionalized during their armed struggles against settler-colonial domination (see Chapter 1 for literature review). In reality, and as empirically demonstrated in the previous chapter now, however, the former liberation parties have dominated the national political arena for several decades in so different ways and to so different extents. As a result, since the crystallization of the ultimate legacies of liberation, the countries have been characterized by considerably varied political-regime institutions, structural inequalities, and patterns of national polarization.

Tables 8.1-8.2 present empirical evidence based on cross-country measures for key political and socio-political indicators to substantiate this argument. The first set includes cross-national measures of political democracy and inclusion. The three sets of countries sharply vary

in patterns of democratic representation as well as the incorporation of disparate racial, ethnoregional, or social groups into the political regime or the national state structures. The legacies are defined by distinctive political-regime institutions with (i) moderate levels of democratic contestation and national inclusion in Mozambique and Angola, (ii) relatively high levels of political democracy and inclusion in South Africa and Namibia, and (iii) least competitive, militarized and highly exclusionary institutions in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the political structures in each country are consistent with the particular state and socio-structural patterns consolidated during the reform period and its immediate aftermath, even if the party-state socialist dictatorships dominant in post-independence Mozambique and Angola underwent considerable institutional changes since the late 1980s.

Table 8.1: Electoral Democracy and Inclusiveness, 2020

Country	Electoral democracy (1 = highest, 5 = lowest)	Political exclusion (1 = highest, 5 = lowest)
Angola	0.35 (4)	0.60 (3)
Mozambique	0.36 (3)	0.62 (2)
Zimbabwe	0.29 (5)	0.80 (1)
Namibia	0.65 (2)	0.41 (4)
South Africa	0.70 (1)	0.34 (5)

Source: Michael Coppedge, et al, "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v13" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. V-dem database (www.v-dem.net).
Note: (1) Data derived from v-dem "electoral democracy index" that measures the extent the chief executive is elected through regular free and fair elections, suffrage is extensive, and political and civil liberties are uphold. The value is an interval scale with "0.0" as least democratic and "1.0" as most democratic. (2) Data derived from v-dem "exclusion by political group index" for the degree individuals are denied access to services or participation in government based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The rating is in reverse interval scale from "0.0" for most inclusive to "1.0" for least inclusive.

Table 8.2: Structural Inequalities and National Polarization

Country	Gini index (Year) (1 = most unequal, 0 = least unequal)	Social polarization (0 = minimum, 4 = maximum)	Political polarization (0 = minimum, 4 = maximum)	National polarization (2020) (0 = minimum, 4 = maximum)
Angola	0.51 (2018) (4)	1.98	1.87	1.92 (5)
Mozambique	0.54 (2014) (3)	3.19	1.61	2.40 (3)
Zimbabwe	0.44 (2017) (5)	3.86	3.94	3.90 (1)
Namibia	0.59 (2015) (2)	2.21	2.43	2.32 (4)
South Africa	0.63 (2014) (1)	3.21	2.39	2.80 (2)

Source: (a) Gini Index: World Bank, *Poverty and Inequality Platform*. https://pip.worldbank.org/home. (2) Political polarization: M. Coppedge, et al, "VDem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
Note: Values for "national polarization" are self-generated from separate v-dem scores for "political polarization" and "polarization of society." The original score for "polarization of society" is an ordinal scale between 0 (most polarized) and 4 (no polarization). I first converted the scale for social polarization to 0 (min. polarization) to 4 (max. polarization), and then added each score with 'political polarization' to generate an average score reported as "national polarization" for each country.

The second set of measures captures socioeconomic inequalities and national polarization (Table 8.2). For these indicators, too, the legacies of liberation are characterized by variable levels and patterns of structural inequalities and associated socio-political polarization across each set of countries. The values covary with the political indicators (e.g., high political contestation and inclusion with wide structural inequalities in South Africa and Namibia), because the radical and liberal reform choices had inverse effects on democratic development and inherited structural inequalities in the aftermath of the reform period; for example, contemporary Mozambique and Angola maintain relatively low democracy and low social inequalities because radical reforms in thwarted democratic development and rise of inequalities especially before transitioning to market economies. Therefore, while the legacies of radical reforms in Mozambique and Angola have been defined by less unequal structures and lower polarization, the legacies of liberal reformism in South Africa and Namibia are associated with, as widely characterized, highly unequal and highly polarized societies. The inheritance of stalled-liberal reforms in Zimbabwe has been defined by the least unequal structures, because of radical land redistribution and sustained economic decline in recent decades (see Chapter 7), but

with high political polarization due to continued political exclusion and violence. In the rest of the chapter, I elaborate on the distinctive legacies of liberation in present-day Southern Africa.

8.1.1 Less Inclusive and Less Polarized Semi-Democracies: Mozambique and Angola

In Mozambique and Angola, narrowly inclusive state structures as well as less polarized national cleavages came to define the legacies of liberation. The structures bear the enduring legacies of the radical reform period, during which highly centralized and militarized party-state regimes were institutionalized, inherited racial inequalities of the settler-colonial period transformed, and rather some salient ethnoregional cleavages deepened. As seen in the previous chapter, the dynamic of reactions and counterreactions was dominated by a rural conservative backlash to the liberation government up until the 1990s, a reaction resolved in distinctive ways and had distinctive political implications. Nevertheless, the shared structural foundations of the reform period meant that political elites in both countries made similar institutional adaptations and adjustments that led to the reproduction of less pluralistic and less inclusive political regimes. The transitions from socialist to capitalist economies corresponding to political liberalization since the early 1990s also gave rise to new, but less stark, structural inequalities that came to define the structural legacies of liberation.

(I) Let us consider first the less competitive and less inclusive regime structures. For a start, with a tradition of blurred lines between party and state institutions, the state structures are dominated by the Frelimo and MPLA parties as centers of ultimate decision-making—an enduring legacy of the radical reform period. Second, despite the transitions to electoral democracy, the state institutions are highly centralized, with real political power residing in the party politburos than the one-chamber national legislatures. Whereas in Mozambique an

extremely limited degree of power decentralization and local power-sharing was introduced only in 2018, in Angola neither political power was devolved as part of the post-conflict institutional reforms in the 2000s nor local elections provided by the 2010 constitution ever held.[1] Last, the political regimes are far less competitive with low levels of electoral democracy overall (Table 8.1) because of less free and less honest elections, legal constraints on opposition, and limited checks on powerholders. In the last decade and a half, Freedom House consistently rated Mozambique as 'partly free' and Angola as 'not free,' indicating the absence of free and fair elections, constraints on political and civil liberties, and increased repression of protests against rising living costs, unemployment, and endemic corruption.

Besides, the political regimes are less inclusive and less participatory like the party-state structures of the reform period. On the one hand, the scope of national inclusion is limited in that key political actors and organized interests are excluded from power or policy influence. The pattern of inclusion is also party-centered or accomplished through party (rather than democratic state) institutions, an unmistakable political legacy of the liberation episode and its aftermath when the Frelimo and MPLA parties presented themselves as the sole legitimate vehicles of popular participation. Opposition parties, such as the Renamo and UNITA, and their supporters, are vilified with old rhetoric as 'unpatriotic,' traditional, and even 'national enemies,' and excluded from meaningful political representation, state resources, and socioeconomic opportunities.[2] On the other hand, however, the ruling political parties (and their regimes) represent by far the broadest cross-section of society—again a political trait of the reform period boosted, in recent decades, by the vigorous expansion of their popular bases to especially rural

[1] See Joseph Hanlon, "Mozambique," in Albert K. Awedoba, Benedikt Kamski, Andreas Mehler, and David Sebudubudu, eds., *Africa Yearbook Online*, Vol. 16, 2019, p. 4; Jon Schubert, "Angola," in Awedoba et al, eds., Vol. 17, 2020, p. 445. For an in-depth (albeit not most up to date) analysis of basic features of state and regime structures, see Bauer and Taylor, *Transition and Transformation*, pp. 131-6, 165-71.
[2] See Bauer and Taylor, *Transition and Transformation*, pp. 140, 142, 159.

areas and groups considered traditional strongholds of their historical political rivals. The Frelimo and MPLA parties are catchall organizations with a 'national imprint'[3] more extensive than at the turning point of national liberation.

The two countries seemed to diverge in the latter aftermath period owing to differences in the manner, timing, and outcome of resolution of the violent backlash. In the 1990s, Mozambique went down a path of much-touted democratization to appear among most democratic countries in Africa. This seemed to vindicate some Lusophone African historians and comparative analysts who emphasized differences between the parties and the regimes since the reform period. However, as shown earlier, the more salient regime institutions that finally crystallized with a facade of democracy share more commonalities in large part because of a shared structural heritage of party-state structures of the reform period. Even though relatively more open and tolerant than the MPLA, Frelimo's dominance over the national political arena has been similarly reproduced chiefly by means of systematic repression of dissent and partisan deployment of state resources and institutions.[4] Moreover, the 'oil factor' long emphasized in Angolan political development has been rendered moot because massive investments and exploitation of natural gas and mineral wealth since 2010 have become a powerful influence in Mozambican politics in general and Frelimo's power domination in particular.[5]

[3] See de Oliveira, *Angola Since the Civil* War, p. 19; Pitcher, "Mozambique 2019 Elections," p. 470. Both parties now transcend the rural-urban divide that so much shaped the backlash period. Prior to the liberation episode, whereas Frelimo entrenched itself among the rural peasantry in the north to wage a people's war, the Creole-led MPLA, founded in Luanda as an urban Marxist party in 1956, was not as successful in mobilizing a people's war during the liberation struggle or in penetrating and transforming rural society after independence. The dynamics of the reform period pushed both parties to urban centers whence they expanded once again to the rural areas in recent decades in bid to reconsolidate political authority and unify the 'nation,' removing an important historical variation stemming from political circumstances rather than ideological differences.

[4] Bauer and Taylor, *Transition and Transformation*, pp. 136-40; Pitcher, "Mozambique Elections 2019," p. 469.

[5] See Pitcher, "Mozambique Elections 2019," p. 476; Joseph Hanlon, "Mozambique," in Albert K. Awedoba, Benedikt Kamski, Andreas Mehler, and David Sebudubudu, eds., *Africa Yearbook Online*, Vol. 18, 2021, p. 11.

The main mechanisms of reproduction of the legacy are distinct from the mechanisms of production in previous decades. Political-elite control over the state's coercive apparatus and patronage machineries has formed a key mechanism of reproduction since the later phase of the aftermath period. From a comparative perspective, the semi-democratic regimes rely on intermediate levels of democratic recognition and authoritarian repression to gain and maintain power; the ruling Frelimo and MPLA parties undoubtedly win elections because of unrestrained partisan deployment of state resources as well as autocratic restrictions on political and civil liberties that create unleveled playing fields. Finally, a small political and business elite with vested interests in oil and mineral exploitation has been important to regime stability.[6] Therefore, the historic liberation ideals and ambitions of freedom embodied by the liberation parties still stressed as key sources of stability of the political regimes and undergirding state structures have become less and less relevant, particularly long after large-scale policy failures, regime crises, and tainted national popularity. In these contexts, twentieth-century liberation ideals and credentials are a distant national memory, with little appeal, if any, to younger generations grappling with poverty, unemployment, and denial of full freedoms in a globalizing world.[7]

(II) The legacies of liberation in Mozambique and Angola are also characterized by moderate social inequalities and national polarization (see Table 8.2). First, the social structure is defined by new post-racial inequalities in wealth and income distribution among the few rich and the majority poor, with a less discernible national middle class.[8] With old racial inequalities

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[6] S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 246-8; Soares de Oliveira, *Angola Since the Civil War*, chapter 4.
[7] E.g., R.S. de Oliveira, "The Struggle for the State and The Politics of Belonging in Contemporary Angola, 1975–2015," *Social Dynamics*, 42, 1 (2016): 69-84; P.C.J. Faria, "The Dawning of Angola's Citizenship Revolution: A Quest for Inclusionary Politics," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 39, 2 (2013): 293-311.
[8] According to The World Bank, the income share held by the highest 20 percent was 59.5 percent (2014) for Mozambique, and 55.6 percent (2018) for Angola. Moreover, 46.1 percent (2014) of Mozambicans and 52.9 percent (2018) of Angolans lived below the national poverty line of $3.65 per day. See World Bank, *Poverty and Inequality Platform*. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.DST.05TH.20.

having disappeared during the reform period, the legacy structures largely emerged with the turn to market economies—along with muted efforts at nurturing a black middle class—since the 1990s. Second, regional imbalances that emerged or solidified in the post-reform decades constitute another defining property because policy bias and decades-long destructive conflicts left some regions poorer than others, in terms of income, infrastructural development, and public services. This includes the Renamo stronghold regions in central and some northern parts of Mozambique, and the central highland and eastern districts, that harbored UNITA's rural backlash, and some northern regions, such as the oil-rich Zaire and Cabinda, in Angola. The regional imbalances tend to correspond to historical rural-urban disparities between wealthier coastal urban centers and poorer inland rural areas, especially in Angola.[9] In some part, the regional differences certainly originated in the settler-colonial period, but the current development-cum-political geographic differences no doubt solidified during the post-independence decades. Hence, the striking cross-national similarities considering Angola's much higher GDP and urbanization levels than Mozambique's poor economy and a two-thirds population living in rural areas.

The two countries maintain lower levels of national polarization that revolve around the regional imbalances and associated political fault-lines of the reform period. The tensions appear in bi-polarized party systems, with the ruling liberation parties and their historical rivals at the center of political contestation, conflict, and discernible national cleavages. In Angola's 2017 elections, for example, nearly all notable opposition parties had their origins in the regional-historical divisions of the conflict period, and UNITA mounted the strongest electoral challenge

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[9] See Ricardo Santos, Eva-Maria Egger, and Vincenzo Salvucci, "Horizontal and Intersecting Inequalities in Mozambique: 1997-2017," *WIDER Working Paper, No. 2021/106*, 2021; João Adolfo Catoto Capitango et al, "Inequalities and Asymmetries in the Development of Angola's Provinces: The Impact of Colonialism and Civil War," *Social Sciences*, 11, 334 (July 2022): 1-18.

to the MPLA party by drawing huge support from the provinces of its historical heartland, the Central Highlands.[10] In Mozambique, notwithstanding internal divisions within Renamo, the party similarly represented the major opposition challenge to Frelimo, and the historical conflict between the two parties based on historical, regional, and social tensions formed the main basis of national bi-polarization. Besides, the legacy in Mozambique has been marked by 'pernicious polarization,' with episodic violence between the two main parties, and the emergence of an additional explosive cleavage based on northern anti-state grievances.[11]

Last, the patterns of national inequalities and polarization in Mozambique and Angola are different from the predominantly racial conflicts of the late settler-colonial period. In both countries, today, class inequalities trump racial disparities with rural-urban/geographic imbalances representing the dominant form of structural difference. Besides, today's regional differences considerably differ from those dominant during the settler-colonial period. In Mozambique, the divide between disparate colonial regions (southern, central, and northern) closely incorporated into adjoining colonial territories still have some national resonance; yet more as a southern versus center-north division, and because of less inclusive development and nation-building policies that generated the violent backlash. In Angola, too, the historical divisions between northern, central, and southern parts that spawned rival nationalist movements in the late settler-colonial period are no more as clearly defined or as politically salient except the southern (Ovimbundu) cleavage rather sustained by policy choices of the reform period. In sum,

[10] J. Pearce, D. Péclard, R. Soares de Oliveira, "Angola's Elections and the Politics of Presidential Succession," *African Affairs*, 117, 466 (Jan. 2018), p. 155. The MPLA-UNITA division further solidified as, in the fourth post-war elections of Aug. 2022, the ruling MPLA party won 51 percent of the vote and UNITA, the main opposition party, secured 44 percent, its best results ever.

[11] See Pitcher, "Mozambique Elections 2019," 2020. Renamo resumed armed confrontation against the government in 2013/14 that lasted until 2019; unlike UNITA, since end the violent backlash in 1992, the party had maintained both elected MPs and a partisan army. The new cleavage that manifested as an Islamist insurgency in the northeast was also triggered in mid-2010s by regional political and socioeconomic grievances. In Angola, the national polarization has been less violent except for a separatist insurgency in the northern oil-rich Cabinda enclave that goes back to the liberation-struggle and liberation reform periods.

the post-racial patterns of social inequalities and polarization in these countries are considerably different from those inherited at national independence—and sharply contrast with entrenched racial and class inequalities that define the legacies of liberation in South Africa and Namibia.

8.1.2 Inclusive and Polarized Multiracial Democracies: South Africa and Namibia

The structural legacies of liberation in South Africa and Namibia which had fully crystalized by the latter 2010s have not fully consolidated as yet. In both countries, more than a decade of political and societal turmoil since the mid-2000s ultimately ended with relatively stable multiracial democracies as well as highly unequal and highly polarized social structures. These structures closely resemble the remarkably inclusive, liberal state arrangements and high racial-class inequalities of the reform period. Because the respective political elites could neither realistically pursue more progressive reforms in reaction to the popular backlash nor hope to maintain political dominance by authoritarian means without eliciting adverse reaction from large capital and the business class, upon whose confidence prospects for sustained economic growth and redistribution always hinged, they made less disruptive policy and institutional adaptations that, in turn, maintained and reproduced the liberal state institutions and polarized social relations of the aftermath period.

(I) Relatively more inclusive and competitive multiracial democracies characterize the liberation legacy in these cases. First, as during the reform period, the ruling ANC and Swapo parties maintain neither total control over state structures nor a monopoly on policymaking whether at local, provincial, or national level. Second, executive power is subject to checks and balances, for bicameral legislatures and fairly independent judiciaries play crucial roles, while political authority is fairly devolved and rigorously contested. In particular, in South Africa a

fairly decentralized, quasi-federal system of the reform period vests the provinces (with own legislatures and cabinets) with significant governing autonomy on education, health, and housing, among other policy areas. Therefore, political and civil society maintain significant influence on government policy, with opposition parties in fact controlling some municipal, district, and provincial governments. Finally, the political regimes are thus highly participatory (see Table 8.1) and, in recent years, political power became more contested as the opposition score major victories in local elections (especially in urban areas), albeit some concerns of democratic erosion in Namibia, and against the backdrop of world democratic backsliding.[12]

This is directly correlated with the strong democratic traditions of the liberation episode. Both South Africa and Namibia have remained part of a small set of consolidated electoral democracies—and an even smaller set of liberal democracies—that emerged from the 'Third Wave' of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. Since the liberation reform years, both countries have consistently been rated by Freedom House as 'Free.' As Angola and Mozambique turned increasingly less competitive with the consolidation of the legacies, in South Africa and Namibia the political dominance of the ruling liberation parities instead declined in recent years as the liberal structural legacies took hold. This has much less to do with the ANC and Swapo parties' supposedly faint liberal tradition from the struggle period, which have been documented as being just about anti-liberal as the other former liberation parties, than with the liberal legacies of the reform episode that made it difficult for them to establish complete and centralized power over the state and society.[13] This supports the principal proposition of this study that shifting analytical focus to the reform period and its aftermath provides stronger leverage to better understand the diverse legacies of liberation in Southern Africa.

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[12] See Evan Lieberman, *Until We Have Won Our Liberty: South Africa after Apartheid* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022); Lieberman and Lekalake, "South Africa's Resilient Democracy," 2022.
[13] See Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, chapters 6 and 7.

Both South Africa and Namibia are multiracial democracies where multiple races enjoy equal democratic rights and opportunities, albeit de facto inequalities, vis-à-vis thorough racial stratification and segregation of the late settler-colonial period. Besides, however, racial differences are still recognized and employed by state policies. This is another important legacy of the reform period, and a far cry from the liberation parties' struggle-era aspirations for 'non-racialism'—the idea of creating a society where race is no longer a factor. The reform-period policies meant to eliminate inherited racial inequalities ironically institutionalized racial differences, for race formed the very policy basis in the drive for equitable, just, non-racialist societies. Contrary to Mozambique and Angola, this goal was pursued with official employment of race—not social class—as the root of structural inequalities and the policy basis for racial redress. Today, just as during the reform period, affirmative-action policies benefiting blacks are formulated on the basis of racial and color considerations, and racial categories of the settler-colonial period are utilized in censuses, reports, and so on. Such race conscious policies seen by white liberal and conservative detractors as 'reverse apartheid' seem to ironically reproduce racialism and fuel racial polarization.

The mechanism of reproduction in these contexts include regular democratic elections and extensive patronage. The parties have maintained power by means of regular democratic elections relatively free from systematic irregularities, violence, and overt abuse of state resources common in the other three cases. However, as Southall argues, political and electoral dominance crucially depends on extensive patronage party machines built on incumbent access to "the administrative and financial resources of the state," corrupt money from private capital, and "party business empires whose purpose is to feed off the state, notably via their accessing of

tenders from parastatals."[14] The 'incestuous relationship' between party and state is not as amorphous as in Mozambique and Angola, but represents an important mechanism of power maintenance in democratic contexts as evidenced by endemic corruption and state-capture scandals of the past decade. At the heart of the patronage system are party, state, and black business elites aspiring for material accumulation and upward mobility. Even in these cases of late decolonization, therefore, the role of liberation credentials in generating political legitimacy and power is too limited especially among the 'born-free' generation. As Butler correctly asserts, in fact, a major political challenge facing the ANC—and for that matter, Swapo—is linked to a growing proportion of an electorate without "direct experience of the struggle for liberation" and "the fading morality of the struggle;" the movement's "tradition of reconciling diverse interests in the pursuit of 'national democratic revolution' has not survived generational change..."[15]

(II) Extremely high structural inequalities and low social cohesion define the democratic regime legacies of liberation in South Africa and Namibia (see Table 8.2). In fact, both countries have consistently ranked among the world's top unequal nation. Historical racial and new class disparities represent the most important axis of social and national polarization even though spatial or ethnoregional inequities and conflicts are prevalent. Racial inequalities in wealth and status remain today as wide, and as defining a feature of South African and Namibian societies, as they were at outset of the liberation episode. Despite considerable black economic advances since national liberation, the small white minorities respectively representing nine percent and seven percent of the populations in each country dominate the national economies and control incomes at least five times higher than the majority black Africans.[16] The enduring racial

[14] Ibid., p. 277.
[15] Butler, *Contemporary South Africa*, p. 131.
[16] The racial gap has been shown to be considerably higher than in the 1990s. For example, whereas white household incomes in South Africa were 4.3 times larger than black Africans in 1996, they had increased to 5.8

inequalities are undeniably rooted in the settler-colonial period as more or less universally assumed. Yet, with historical and comparative insights generated in this study, it can be argued that the current patterns and levels of inequalities are rather direct outcomes of the liberal reform period. Counterfactually speaking, radical or minimally progressive economic and social reform policies during this period could have led to far less stark socio-structural inequalities.

Massive new class differences among blacks that developed in conjunction with liberal reformist policies represents another defining property of the structural legacies in South Africa and Namibia. As opposed to Mozambique and Angola where recent capitalist transitions fostered some class differentiation, class stratifications in the former cases are visibly stark and complex encompassing as enlarged middle classes, for liberal reforms and capitalist development bolstered the accumulation of capital, economic empowerment, and upward mobility among blacks. For example, in South Africa, the class structure is composed of three broad strata of an affluent and increasingly deracialized upper class, the lower-middle and working classes, and the lower classes of working poor and the underclass least privileged since the reform period.[17] The rise of a 'new' African middle class is a defining feature of post-apartheid social change,[18] and a large black middle class constitutes a distinctive legacy of the reform period. In Namibia, too, the class structure has substantially changed since liberation that, today, like in South Africa, three broad class categories with a new black middle class can be identified.[19]

Further, and as a consequence, high levels of social and national polarization are the hallmarks of liberation legacies in these two countries. Historical racial cleavages still form a

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times higher by 2014. See South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), *The State of South Africa's Race Relations: Reasons for Hope* (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 2016), p. 316.

[17] See Jeremy Seekings, "Continuity and Change in the South African Class Structure Since the End of Apartheid," Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, *CSSR Working Paper No. 355*, March 2015.

[18] Roger Southall, *The New Black Middle Class in South Africa* (Rochester: Boydell and Brewer, 2016).

[19] Winterfledt, "Postcolonial Dynamics of Social Structure in Namibia," pp. 152, 154; H. Melber, "Not Every Shoe Fits Every Foot," *The Namibian*, 11 Sep. 2020. Avail. at: https://namibian.com.na/not-every-shoe-fits-every-foot/.

potent basis for political mobilization, while black elites and activists employ ‘racialized discourse’ to articulate grievances. In the South Africa context, albeit strong class differences that cross-cut racial divisions, “the country’s spaces remain highly segmented, with the large majority of the different racial groupings […] still living in areas that were racially demarcated and differentially serviced under apartheid.”[20] In both countries, growing racial divisions and polarization of politics occurred as the ruling parties turned increasingly to populist black nationalism while formerly more multiracial or predominantly non-black parties shifted further right to narrow, minority-white interests. This is particularly true the Democratic Alliance (DA) party in South Africa whose progressive pan-racial image has collapsed after 2016 with its failure to expand beyond its predominantly white and Colored support base or retain a small black leadership. The racial polarization coexists with divisive class conflicts that increasingly turned violent in recent years. In Namibia, tensions between minority black groups and the majority Ovambo ethnicity represent an important, if less salient, social cleavage.[21]

Lastly, the pronounced social inequalities and polarization in South Africa and Namibia are too often understood as legacies of the settler-colonial period. Indeed, deep-seated racial disparities and conflict in particular are rooted in settler colonialism and racial segregation of the apartheid period. Even so, racial and post-racial differences in these countries are more directly causally linked to the liberal-reform policy choices of the liberation episode. With the benefit of the comparative analysis of Mozambique and Angola, racial inequalities of the colonial period in these contexts endured precisely because of the liberal nature of social and economic reforms following national liberation. Inherited racial differences in income and wealth would have been drastically mitigated, if not completely destroyed, had liberation elites pursued far-reaching

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[20] Southall, “Polarization in South Africa,” pp. 204-5.
[21] See G. Toetemeyer, *Namibia 2021: Where-from and Where-to?* (Windhoek: The Namibian, 2021), pp. 25, 35.

reforms with regards to land, income distribution, and other inequalities. Besides, the social structures can no longer be considered as mere mirror-image of their settler-colonial foundations. Unlike before liberation, racial divisions "are cross-cut by the growth of a black elite and middle class."[22] The prevailing class structures are undeniably exclusive legacies of the political and socioeconomic reform choices of the liberation episode.

8.1.3 Exclusive and Militarized Semi-Authoritarianism: Zimbabwe

The structural legacies of liberation in Zimbabwe represent the least democratic state structures and the most polarized society of all five countries. The neither fully radical nor fully liberal nature of the reform period had a strong bearing on the consolidation of such structrues in the past decade. On the one hand, the largely illiberal and exclusionary pattern of power consolidation and state reforms in the 1980s left lasting legacies of authoritarian repression, exclusion, and extreme political intolerance. On the other hand, the rather liberal approach to inherited inequalities and socioeconomic development allowed the reproduction of highly unequal structrues that engendered renewed conflict, violent land redistribution, and political violence during the aftermath period, which in turn yielded to relatively less unequal but highly striking patterns of social and political polarization.

(I) The state structural legacies in Zimbabwe are the most authoritarian and most militarized of all five cases. The ruling ZANU-PF party maintains control over all levels of centralized state power by means of both repressive and incorporative methods. Consistentely rated by Freedom House as 'Not Free,' the regime is the least competitive and most exclusionary because of a highly constrained democratic space and institutionalized use of naked state violence against the opposition and its supporters. Elections are almost always marred by

[22] Southall, "Polarization in South Africa," p. 205.

irregularites and pre- and post-electoral violence that echo the violent practices of the reform period and its afteramth. Besides, both party structures and state institutions are least inclusive in that political and social groups deemed disloyal to ZANU-PF are fully excluded from access to political power and economic resources in rural and urban areas alike. As during the reform years, a form of exclusionary nationalism has been deployed to smear, repress, and exclude the political oppostion as 'enemies of the state' or 'foreign agents' bent on divinding the nation. The overall development path is peculiar in that Zimbabwe started out at liberation with a fairly open political regime—one of few long-standing multiparty regimes in African in the 1980s[23]—and gradually went down a path of growing autocratization during the aftermath period.

The military is a key actor in Zimbabwean politics. Here, the civilian party elite and the military maintain a symbiotic relationship in what has recently been accurately described as a party-military regime. Scholars universally trace the roots of the military's disproportionate political role to the armed stuggle. However, to be precise, this regime attribute in Zimbabwe actually developed in the reactions and counterreactions of the aftermath period. The military emerged as a politicized force and a key arbiter of politics since the late 1990s, when Mugabe became increasingly dependent on the army particularly during episodes of overt regime threat (e.g., the 2008 electoral defeat), while the armed forces came to have vested interests in preserving ZANU-PF rule as the generals became intricately absorbed into the party-state patronage system. The military has been a final arbiter of power in two ways. First, it plays a decisive and palpable role in maintaining the ZANU-PF regime; since 2002, it is common for military leaders to blatantly declare during elections that the army is "the final arbiter of who governs Zimbabwe," and that the opposition "will never ruel this couttry." Second, more recently

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[23] See Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, p. 7; Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990).

the armed forces became the kingmakers within the party itself as they provided a military solution to brewing intra-party battles over the succession of R. Mugabe in 2017. The army, which thwarted the rise to power of a younger generation of leaders lacking in liberation-war bona fides, installed Emmerson D. Mnangagwa—a liberation war veteran and former security chief—and expanded its influence in a military-civilian ruling coalition.[24]

In Zimbabwe's case, the use of violence thus represents the main mechanism of repoducing the semi-athoritrian regime structures. The populist liberation and anti-imperialist discourse of the Mugabe years that analysts oft emphasize rather served to justify the violent stratgies of power maintenance and opposition respression. The reproduction of increasingly autocratic regime institutions chiefly depended on unrestrained coercive force, electoral manipulation, and an extensive patronage system that sustains party-elite cohesion, fosters opposition factionalism and cooptation, and draws a modicum of electoral support through vote-buying,[25] all institutionalized during the aftermath period. According to Transparency International, Zimbabwe ranked 157th of 180 world countries in 2020 because of its highly endemic political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Patronage and institutionalized curruption around mining has been the main powerbroker both within and without the ZANU-PF party.[26]

(II) The liberation legacies in Zimbabwe are also characterized by extreme national polarization despite moderate social inequalities (see Table 8.2). Official policies to block the development of a black middle class during the reform period, and then the radical redistribution of white-owned land in the aftermath period, removed inherited racial inequalities while

[24] See Eldred V. Masunungure, "Zimbabwe's Predatory Ruling Coalition: Continuities Beyond Mugabe," in Eldred V. Masunungure, ed., *Zimbabwe's Trajectory: Stepping Forward or Sliding Back?* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2020), 106-31; P. Ruhanya, "The Security Sector: The Elephant in the Room?" in Masunungure, ed., *Zimbabwe's Trajectory*, 235-59.
[25] See Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*, pp. 286-7; Levitsky and Way, "Beyond Patronage," 2012.
[26] See, for example, *African Confidential*, "State corruption complicates succession battles," Vol. 55 No. 6, 14th March 2014; and "Mnangagwa's corruption double talk," Vol. 64, No. 11, 25th May 2023.

discouraging the emergence of stark black class inequalities found in South Africa and Namibia. As seen the previous chapter, dramatic economic decline in the 1990s and then total economic collapse in the 2000s was also an important factor in leaving Zimbabwe with the least unequal social structural legacies. Moreover, as a result, unlike South Africa and Namibia with which it shared structural commonalities from the settler-colonial period, Zimbabwe's largely new post-racial inequalities lack rigid multi-level class layering and, as in Angola and Mozambique, chiefly manifest in disparities between the rich few (mainly a parasitic political and business class) and the majority poor. These structures have their origins in the reform period and developed during the aftermath decades, underscoring the analytical significance of the reform period as a critical juncture.

Even so, the liberation legacy in Zimbabwe is marked by a pattern of deep national polarization. Of all five countries, the country maintains the highest levels of social polarization; Zimbabwean society is divided by serious difference in opinion on various national matters along racial, ethnic, regional, and other lines. Moreover, Zimbabwe exhibits the highest levels of political polarization in which ZANU-PF and the MDC-Alliance (now the CCC) represent two antagonistic national political blocs. According to Bratton and Masunungure's recent analysis of Afrobarometer survey results, Zimbabwe has two electorates, with the two main parties drawing support from two sharply different demographics: 73 percent in rural areas back ZANU-PF, while 72 percent in urban areas support the opposition parties. Besides, as the ruling party's support was concentrated among older generation, less educated rural demography, the opposition's supporters tended to be young, educated urban youth.[27] The national Partisan Trust Gap (a measure for social trust between individuals, trust between members of rival political

[27] Michael Bratton and Eldred V. Masunungure, "Heal the Beloved Country: Zimbabwe's Polarized Electorate," *Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 49*, September 2018, pp. 7-8.

parties, and popular trust in non-partisan state institutions) both widened over time and stood as the single highest among thirty-one African countries covered by the survey.[28]

The highly polarized socio-political structures are consistent with patterns of political exclusion, intolerance, and divisions of the reform period and its aftermath. Whereas polarization in Angola and Mozambique peaked up during the reform period and graudually subsided in subsequent decades, it sharply dropped during the reform years and only slightly intensified afterwards in South africa and Namibia. In Zimabwe, political polarization stayed exceptionally high during the reform period and worsened thereafter, in particular since 1998, when the democratic backlash intensified and the Mugabe regime reacted with extreme state violenece and renewed exclusion. Moreover, the lines of polarization considerably shifted from dominant race cleavages of the pre-liberation era to mainly ethnicity, region, and class thereafter to, more recently, stark the partisan cleavage of the latter aftermath period. Still, political intolerance and conflict[29] as well as longstanding rural-urban cleavage that defined the reform period nonetheless form a common thread of the evolving patterns of deep polarization in the country.

8.2 CONCLUSION

The enduring legacies of liberation in Southern Africa are diverse. First, even though the former liberation parties continue to dominate state and society in all five countries, this rests on dramatically varying state and regime srtuctures that range from the most democratic and inclusive in South Africa and Namibia to the most autocratic, violent, and exclusionary in Zimbabwe. Besides, the liberation legacies have been characterized by considerably varying levels and patterns of structural inequalities and national polarization. Secondly, whereas these

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[28] Ibid., p. 9

[29] See Eldred V. Masunungure, "Zimbabwe's Fragile Independence, 1980-2020," in Masunungure, ed., *Zimbabwe's Trajectory*, pp. 26-34.

legacies have only recently solidified in South africa and Namibia, they have undergone a process of consoildation in the remianing three cases. Liberation ideology and popular aspirations that political elites exploited during the reform period and its immediate aftermath is no longer a reliable source of institutional stability and reproduciton. Rather, as argued above, the key mechanisms of reprduction in all cases have to do with varying levels of democratic contestation, patronage and cooptation, and state violence.

Finally, the differing structural legacies maintain a positive causal relationship with the specific reform-policy package of the reform period, linked by the dynamic of reactions and counterreactions that propelled the path-dependent trajectories of political development. Overall, whereas the 'final' legacy of radical reforms is characterized by moderately democratic regime structures, and moderately unequal post-racial social structures, liberal reforms are linked to the most liberal and inclusive state structures, high racial and post-racial inequalities, and consequently high social incohesion. Meanwhile, the ultimate legacy of stalled liberal reforms has been marked by the most repressive regime institutions, low structural inequalities, and extremely high political polarization.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION: CRITICAL JUNCTRUES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

This study set out with a goal to offer a historical explanation for the diverse legacies of liberation in contemporary Southern Africa. The violent struggles for liberation that, in the late twentieth century, brought to end prolonged settler-colonial domination in the region—and in general, differing modes of decolonization in Africa—have been stressed as watershed moments in the political histories of the countries.[1] It can be said that there is a broad consensus among historians and social scientists about the long-lasting implications of the liberation struggles for postcolonial politics and society. However, scholars widely differ in their approaches to analyzing these events and their significance for political development. In general, and most importantly, social scientists failed to employ a rigorous conceptual framework that allows to systematically (1) isolate the causal power of the liberation struggles from antecedent conditions and (2) unpack the causes behind their varied (and similar) political legacies. Some excellent analyses of post-liberation politics in Southern Africa suffer from 'infinite regress' into the colonial past and/or dwelling in dynamics of the struggle period.

In this study, I explicitly adopted a critical-junctures framework of analysis that shifted analytical focus to the turning point of national liberation. The concept of critical junctures is built on the core idea that relative structural indeterminism during brief episodes of major discontinuous change allows powerful actors to make crucial political choices. It rests on a second assumption that actors' strategic choices made during critical junctures are momentous

[1] The most explicit statement on the long-term significance of varied modes of decolonization in Africa was made by Chris Allen, "Understanding African Politics," *Review of African Political Economy,* 22, 65 (Sep. 1995): 301-320. Few scholars viewed the violent liberation struggles as critical junctures; e.g. Dorman*, Understnading Zimbabwe*, 2016; Leonard Wantchekon and Omar Garcia-Ponce, "Critical Junctures: Independence Movements and Democracy in Africa," *IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc*, 2013. The most critical voice to this approach is Chabal, *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, 2002.

for future political events. Put in another way, critical junctures lock in place certain directions of change and foreclose others for a foreseeable future and thereby set countries in path-dependent development trajectories. In the first step, I argued that a well-defined episode of major reforms after the end of settler-colonial rule in each country represents a critical juncture. By focusing on this foundational episode, it is hoped, we can comprehensively and systematically understand the varied structural legacies of liberation in Southern Africa. In the second step, I have shown that the differing reform-policy packages adopted during the critical juncture strongly shaped postcolonial development paths of the countries. At differing points in time since the mid-2000s, there emerged in all five countries more enduring state and social-structural patterns, which represent the ultimate legacies of liberation in the region and that closely resemble the structural attributes of the reform episode and its aftermath.

I developed this argument through the application of small-N comparative methods of cross-case comparison and in-depth within-case analysis. The broad cross-case comparison focused on more aggregate variables and processes to identify causal regularities and formulate testable hypotheses. In this exercise, the systematic juxtaposition of the cases helped to generate new insights to evaluate rival explanations often derived inductively through simple case studies or deductively from theories generated elsewhere. At the same time, the analysis relied heavily on disaggregated within-case process tracing and counterfactual thinking to see whether hypothesized causal relations hold up against the empirical and historical details in each country. I illustrated the argument with rich qualitative and quantitative data, which encompass official documents of the settler-colonial regimes; statements on the political and socioeconomic goals of the liberation movements; and material on the reform policies, programs, and strategies of post-liberation governments. This data allowed me to evaluate at a fine-grained level of analysis rival

explanations emphasizing background conditions of settler colonialism or political differences among the liberation parties. The evidence instead supports my argument that the contrasting legacies of liberation are indeed outcomes of varied reform approaches of the liberation episode.

The study developed a novel explanation of political development in postcolonial Southern Africa using comparative-historical analysis, an approach uniquely suited to macro-historical inquiry of large-scale processes that unfold over time and across cases. The empirical and theoretical insights derived from the analysis will, I hope, have broader relevance for regime development, institutional change, and critical juncture analysis. First, the framework, key analytical concepts, and insights could be borrowed to analyze long-term effects of diverse decolonization processes in Africa, more broadly, and in particular, in countries that decolonized through violent struggles (e.g., Algeria, Guinea Bissau, and Eritrea) or experienced major institutional change after independence (e.g., Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda),. Second, the analysis will enrich, and help critically interrogate, extant explanations of twentieth-century revolutions, wartime institutions, and other similar episodes of basic change and their implications for diverse outcomes. Lastly, to further this endeavor, I will elaborate some methodological considerations for the application of the concept of critical junctures in the study of national-social revolutions, civil wars, and related episodes of major, discontinuous change.

In the sections that follow, I will recap the path-dependent argument of political change in Southern Africa, and then outline the relevant theoretical and methodological implications.

9.1 THE PATH-DEPENDENT EXPLANATION

The violent anticolonial struggles for liberation in Southern Africa—collectively known as the Southern Africa's Revolution—that commenced between the early 1960s and the late 1980s

represent a turning point in the region's twentieth-century history. Nonetheless, we can better explain and understand their diverse legacies if analytical focus is drawn to the liberation reform episode in their aftermath. This period represented a critical juncture that set off a political dynamic of reactions and counterreactions shaping postcolonial state structures and state-society relations in Southern Africa. In all five countries, liberation elites brought to end racial oppression and exploitation, and embarked upon wide-ranging state, social structural, and nation-building reforms during the reform episode. However, due to differences in the mode and the timing of national liberation, not all Southern African liberation leaders pursued their long-held revolutionary agendas of radical structural transformations for more equitable, inclusive non-racialist societies. Political elites rather adopted sharply differing reform choices that in turn set the countries in divergent, path-dependent trajectories of political and institutional change.

In Mozambique and Angola, national revolutionary leaders pursued radical reforms because of a military-driven mode of liberation in an ideologically charged international state context of the mid-1970s. On the one hand, a weak settler-colonial state, underdeveloped colonial economies, less entrenched metropolitan capital failed to prevent or dissuade liberation elites from seizing full political power and implement radical reforms. On the other hand, the timing of the liberation episode presented political elites with a unique set of opportunities and threats that resulted in the selection and sustained pursuit of radical reform measures. Therefore, Mozambican and Angolan leaders had a greater degree of freedom to try and dramatically transform oppressive state structures, destroy inherited racial and class structures, and violently exclude opposition to high-modernist nation-building. They swiftly reconstructed inherited state structures, while consolidating power by coercive means and exerting authoritarian control over society—strategies warranted by both the drive to penetrate and modernize society as well as

grave military danger posed by settler-colonial regimes in the region. Furthermore, liberation governments implemented—with varying degrees of success—radical socioeconomic reforms (e.g., nationalizing the national economic commanding heights, socialization of social services, and the collectivization of rural agriculture), besides forcefully suppressing polarizing racial, ethnoregional, and religious differences. In sum, the structural transformations saw the consolidation of socialist dictatorships, the destruction of inherited structural inequalities, and the establishment of centrally planned economies that outlived the reform period.

The reforms instantly provoked a violent conservative backlash that dominated the reform period and its immediate aftermath. Politically excluded conservative, Western and South African-backed armed groups mobilized traditional rural elites and rural peasantry alienated by socialist and modernizing reforms in the countryside. The ensuing bloody conflicts caused profound national crises that, after mid-1980s, the governments counterreacted with gradual liberalization reforms that led to liberalizing authoritarian party-state regimes, dismantling socialist economies, and the restoration of traditional and religious authority. The institutional reforms nonetheless did not dismantle the structural foundations of the radical reform period, which were reproduced at later stages of the aftermath period. The violent backlash in Mozambique was brought to end in the early 1990s with political reforms that ushered in a decade of remarkable democratic contestation and renewed political inclusion. Yet, this took place in a context of entrenched authoritarian legacies of the reform episode that, by the late 2000s, the centralized party-state structures and violent patterns of political polarization were reconsolidated. In Angola, the violent backlash that persisted into the early 2000s derailed democratization and allowed uninterrupted reproduction of structures of the reform episode. In both countries, these structures came to represent the ‘final’ legacies of liberation.

In South Africa and Namibia, liberation leaders adopted liberal reforms because of a negotiated mode of liberation and a constraining neoliberal international setup. Domestic-structural conditions of a strong settler state, more advanced capitalist economies, and a powerful settler and foreign capital prevented political elites from capturing state power and acting on their radical goals. Besides, dramatic world-historical changes—especially the fall of Eastern European communism, the rise of neoliberal ideology, and a global wave of democratization—in the 1990s made the pursuit of revolutionary changes exceedingly difficult. Nationalist leaders in these cases thus restructured the state and consolidated political power through gradual liberal reforms that—with more inclusive nation-building strategies and in the absence of grave external military threats—allowed for the consolidation of democratic state institutions and liberal constitutional arrangements. They also sought to gradually reduce inherited racial inequalities, poverty, and unemployment through black economic empowerment, job creation, market-based land reform policies, and more equitable service provision. In their view, the reinvigoration of capitalist development and accommodation of capital was essential to fulfilling socioeconomic aspirations of historically marginalized black majorities. However, with mounting neoliberal pressures, more progressive socioeconomic reforms that sought to balance economic growth with redistribution were prematurely abandoned. Consequently, the reform period witnessed the reproduction of inherited racial disparities, rising intra-black class inequalities, and deepening poverty in a context of capitalist national economies still dominated by white minorities.

The period of liberal reformism in these countries thus gave rise to a popular social-democratic backlash in its aftermath. For state reforms and nation-building were democratic in nature, political opposition to liberation governments emerged among the popular sectors most disillusioned with neoliberal policies. In particular, labor and social movements among the urban

poor mounted sustained and often violent anti-government strikes, protests, and demonstrations for service delivery, improved wages and jobs, affordable housing, and social security. The inequitable and racially skewed land ownership patterns also provoked land invasions and community protests in rural and urban areas. By the late 2000s, liberation governments counterreacted with liberal—but more progressive—policies to reduce enduring inequalities in income, wealth, and land ownership. However, the persistence of structural inequalities, deepening poverty, and unemployment amid economic stagnation catalyzed a more vigorous wave of popular mobilization in the 2010s. The pressure elicited renewed policy efforts for more equitable distribution of income and wealth, agricultural land, and better service delivery, as well as restrengthening state institutions, which had been corroded by endemic corruption or 'state capture' by private interests. The reforms and adaptations stabilized and reproduced liberal state foundations along with highly unequal socio-structural legacies of the reform period.

Finally, in Zimbabwe, a stalled-liberal approach to reforms characterized the liberation episode in the 1980s. In this context, political leaders initially adopted a liberal policy choice because, like their South African and Namibian allies later in the 1990s, they contended with a strong settler state, an advanced capitalist economy, and a powerful capital opposed to radical change. Liberation leaders found it politically expedient to accommodate capital and preserve the white-dominated economy lest they risked—as in Mozambique and Angola—the departure of educated settler workforce, capital flight, and ruinous economic havoc. However, liberation took place in an ideologically charged Cold-War international setting, with ongoing conflicts in the region and eminent military threat from Apartheid South Africa and its conservative proxies. This meant that Zimbabwean leaders were susceptible to political or military destabilization, and externally less constrained, to justify increasingly coercive power consolidation and authoritarian

control over society during the reform years. Thus, while sticking to liberal socioeconomic reform principles, they progressively abandoned democratic maintenance of political power and liberal nation-building strategies in the course of the reform period.

The reform period in Zimbabwe thus saw contradictory reform strategies that cannot be characterized as either fully liberal or fully radical in nature. Consequently, a more centralized electoral authoritarian regime dependent on violence was consolidated and, as in South Africa and Namibia, the socio-structural inequalities of the pre-reform era—especially the white minority's continued dominance of the economy and commercial agriculture—persisted after the reform period. This resulted in a conjuncture of political and societal discontents that provoked a broad-based liberal backlash after the reform period, which involved the mobilization of urban popular sectors (principally labor) for improved socioeconomic conditions, and diverse political and civic forces for constitutional reforms for democracy, human rights protection, and social justice after mid-1990s. The Mugabe regime counterreacted with both incorporative and exclusionary strategies that saw, in the early 2000s, the repression of opposition, violent appropriation and redistribution of white-owned farmland, and further militarization of state institutions. As the decade wore off, the economic meltdown following land invasions further deepened popular-sector and political opposition that prompted increasingly violent crackdown by the regime, stabilization of the military as a central institution in the regime, and deepening political polarization of the nation. After 2008, the dynamic of reactions and counterreactions yielded to the reinforcement of repressive state structures and vicious political polarization of the previous decade as the more enduring legacies of the reform period in Zimbabwe.

In sum, varying domestic-structural constellations of state power, economic development, and dominant class interests from the settler-colonial period conditioned elite reform-policy

choices at the turning point of national liberation. In addition, the world-historical circumstances in which political freedom was achieved, and with which the reform episode coincided, was a sufficient condition in defining the range of policy options available liberation elites and whether they adhered to their initial reform choice. The rather contingent policy choices set the countries down divergent tracks of path-dependent political development. The ultimate legacies of liberation that prevail in contemporary Southern Africa emerged with the resolution of distinctive dynamic of reaction and counterreactions that dominated the post-reform decades. In all five countries, the state and socio-structural legacies closely resemble those that emerged during the reform period and its aftermath, including even in Mozambique and Angola where socialist dictatorships preceded transitions to electoral politics in the 1990s.

9.2 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS

The comparative-historical analysis of political change in Southern Africa furnishes some key insights of broader theoretical and conceptual relevance. I conclude this chapter with some key theoretical and methodological considerations. The implications pertain: 1) the importance of a new analytical approach to the legacies of violence; 2) the pitfalls and paradox of political settlements; and 3) lessons in critical juncture analysis. While interrogating some key assumptions in the first two areas, I draw out some key insights, conceptual tools, and strategies which I hope will guide scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. As I make a case for a new approach to the analysis of post-conflict political change, I underscore some ideas for the adoption and application of the critical-junctures framework in analyzing the legacies of revolutions, generalized civil wars, and other episodes of conflict that cause major, discontinuous change. Last, I will stress some methodical considerations in critical-juncture analysis based on insights derived from its application to the Southern African context.

9.2.1 Towards a New Approach to Legacies of Violence

Analysts have by default harked back to war-time actors and structures as means to make sense of post-conflict politics. In more recent years, some scholars have drawn attention to victorious insurgent parties' violent power consolidation[2] and the imperatives of war-to-peace transitions following victory[3] to explain the emergence of stable authoritarian political regimes. The comparative and historical insights generated in this stud, to be sure, highlight the long-term importance of political and organizational attributes—such as cohesive leadership, discipline, instruments of violence—of political parties born in violent struggles. Yet, the analysis also challenges some assumptions of the rebel-to-government paradigm and encourage this welcome shift from war-time structures to post-conflict dynamics. The political history of liberation struggles in Southern Africa emphasizes the significance of such analytical shift. the former liberation political parties had shared institutional and ideological foundations, yet they ended up embracing dramatically different reform policies and institutions once in power. This led to divergent paths of political development notwithstanding the fact that the former liberation parties have dominated the national political arena in all five countries.

The implication is that the post-conflict episode of institution-building is critical, and agency should be understood in conjunction with structures that impinge on actors. Both conflict and post-conflict analysts often emphasize the behavior and strategic choices of organized actors with little attention to structural conditions. That liberation elites in Southern Africa embarked on contrasting reform approaches at the turning point of decolonization was a function of structural and temporal factors that presented political elites with differing sets of opportunities and constraints. Emphasis on post-conflict political reforms and processes offers a greater leverage to

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[2] See Levitsky and Way, "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes," 2013.
[3] See Lyons, "Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritarian Politics," 2016.

understand the short and long-term political consequences of conflicts. One could plausibly argue that the Southern Africa liberation movements that adopted liberal reforms had failed to develop conflict-time organizational capabilities to wrest power. However, looking at contemporaneous Eastern Africa where Marxist-Leninist NLMs, in Eritrea and Ethiopia for example, seized state power in the early 1990s but avoided radical reforms demonstrates the significance of structural conditions; there is no clear correlation between radical ideas of the struggle period and political choices after the conflict. In short, one cannot mechanically read post-conflict dynamics and structures from conflict-period structures and dynamics.

The concept of critical junctures provides an appropriate theoretical grounding for the proposed new approach to legacies of conflict and associated structural change. The defining feature of a critical juncture is the occurrence of rapid change followed by enduring consequences. National social revolutions entail basic and rapid transformation, and twentieth-century comparative-historical analysts of social revolutions worked with this assumption in analyzing the consequences of such phenomena although they did not clearly adopt the concept of critical juncture. In *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Moore (1966) argued that revolutions (the critical juncture) occurred in different ways, namely, bourgeois revolutions, revolutions from above, and revolutions from below. This difference led to contrasting political regimes (the legacy) in the twentieth century, notably democracy, fascism, and communism, respectively. Moore's approach stresses why the differing occurrence of some foundational episodes of conflict and transformation had profound implications for political development. It also highlights how distinctions in the critical juncture of bourgeois revolutions in England, France, and the US, for example, had distinctive effects on the democratic regime outcomes.[4]

[4] Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 1966.

Meanwhile, Theda Skocpol identified important variations in the political outcomes of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. In her analysis, the lower-class revolutionary struggles with otherwise similar causes and outcomes led to different state and regime structures: centralized state in France, dictatorial party-state in Russia, and mass-mobilizing party-state in China. Skocpol sees the political and class struggles of the revolutionary conflict as no less important for the differing outcomes. However, to understand the basic and enduring features of the outcomes of the revolutions, she stresses the significance of shifting analytical focus onto the distinctive ways with which the revolutions concluded and subsequent state-building efforts by revolutionary leaders. First, this approach aids to understand the most striking changes wrought in the structures of the state and society, which unfold in large part in the aftermath of revolutionary victories, and the differences in future political development. How revolutionary contests ended mattered immensely because, according to Skocpol, the initial revolutionary outcomes "did set limits for future developments" and "created new obstacles and opportunities for future political struggles."[5] Secondly, to understand differences in post-revolutionary changes in turn it is crucial to focus on structural factors—both Old Regime structures and the international context—instead of leadership ideological or political norms. This because political actors even with revolutionary ambitions "effect such transformations in only within the confines of historically given domestic and international situations."[6]

The scholarship on conflict and post-conflict politics has much to gain from such analytical approach. In particular, the rigorous application of concepts, tools, and strategies of critical juncture analysis would advance scholar efforts to understand the political consequences and legacies of episodes of protracted political conflicts, civil wars or coups accompanied by

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[5] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 281.
[6] Ibid., p. 280.

major institutional changes. A growing voice in conflict studies stresses the patterns of conflict resolution and regime transition as a crucial factor that determines the transformative effects of conflicts in general and their political consequences in particular. While few conflict studies have explicitly adopted a critical juncture analysis, Kai Thaler explores the analytical utility of the framework and its applicability to the study of civil wars and their consequences.[7] For this methodological intervention is new, I would like to wrap up this section by highlighting lessons in the application of critical juncture analysis in conflict and post-conflict studies. As a start, whether the actual conflict period or its aftermath or both can be conceptualized as a critical juncture is an open question with crucial analytical implications. The choice largely depends on the research goal and context in question. The conflict process itself could count as the critical juncture insofar as the changes in question take place within that timeframe. Otherwise, the episode of conflict resolution and post-conflict reforms is the critical event if, as with Southern African liberation struggles, the dynamics of conflict were similar, far-reaching reforms follow conflict resolution, and enduring political differences emerge as a result. A critical juncture is well-defined period of relative agency and innovation that generates an enduring legacy.

The application of critical juncture analysis also needs to be explicit with the causal processes that generate the legacy in post-conflict circumstances. I would like to stress two points in this regard because the theoretical work on critical juncture analysis provides clear directions concerning causal mechanisms. First, the factors that produced the initial structures in the aftermath of the critical juncture (or conflict) are not the same as those factors that reproduce its more enduring legacy long-term. In the Southern African context, for example, mechanisms related to the conflicts (i.e., liberation ideals, political culture, legitimacy) that were crucial in the

[7] Kai M. Thaler, "Civil Wars as Critical Junctures: Theoretical Grounding and Empirical Applications," Paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Sep. 15-18, 2022, Montreal.

political stability of post-conflict state and regime structures were downgraded and substituted by other mechanisms that reproduce the present-day legacies of liberation. Second, the mechanism of reactive sequences used to elaborate the post-liberation political dynamics in Southern Africa has a wider applicability in other post-conflict scenarios. By definition, conflicts take place over prevailing distribution of power and resources that favor the winners, which sets the stage for future struggles. they give rise to renewed conflict or political backlash by excluded groups or broad social backlash. The resulting dynamic of reactions and counterreactions contains the mechanism that yields to the more enduring legacy of the conflict period.

9.2.2 The Paradox of Political Settlements

The significance of political deals or elite pacts to peace, democracy, and human development is the bread and butter of political settlements analysis. The analysis of political change and development in Southern Africa highlights certain key attributes of political settlements while calling to question some core assumptions of political settlements analysis. First, a settlement that proves essential for political stability or democracy may have adverse consequences for economic and social progress—and for that matter for long-term peace and democratic development. The negotiated settlements that ended white-minority rule in South Africa and Namibia in the early 1990s have often been hailed as having laid solid foundations for unprecedented inter-racial coexistence and progressive multiracial democracies. However, the same settlements had also stifled genuine socioeconomic transformation in the countries. In fact, the racial or elite bargains served to reproduce enduring inequalities, uneven development, and high poverty among the historically marginalized black majorities, which came to threaten communal strife and democratic breakdown since the last decade. By contrast, abortive political settlements in Mozambique and Angola at independence had the opposite impact of dismantling

inherited structural inequalities and preventing (at least medium-term) the rise of new ones but at the expense of peace, socioeconomic progress, and democratic development.

The late twentieth-century political experience of Southern African countries underscores that a trade-off is an inherent attribute of political settlements. the imperative to design *inclusive* political compacts among powerful groups about the rules of the political and economic game creates a major dilemma of political settlements. But so does the need to imagining more comprehensive settlement frameworks that enhance broader goals of political order, democracy, and human development altogether. Perhaps, like Francis Fukuyama's realistic refrain that "all good things do not necessarily go together" with regards to the development of capable states, the rule of law, and democratic accountability, not all good things go together with political settlements. How realistic are political settlement frameworks that fulfil diverse and countervailing goals? Can elite pacts possibly promote political order, democratic development, and human progress at once? Can politically *inclusive* settlements be economically *developmental* settlements as well? Is it possible to balance or sequence conflicting conflict resolution, institution-building, and economic imperatives within the framework a settlement? The political settlements analysis has yet to exhaustively answer these and similar questions and Southern African provides crucial lessons to draw from.

Second, political settlements analysis is rightly concerned with the nature of political deals. If and whether a given elite pact is inclusive, sustainable, and has social foundation are central to the broader and long-term consequences of a political settlement. In Southern Africa, the more inclusive negotiated settlements in South Africa and Namibia laid solid foundations for political stability and liberal democracy because they rested on a process of protracted negotiations and compromise among major national actors. In South Africa, in particular, the

liberal the 'racial bargain' among white-minority elites and black majority leaders was broadly inclusive and formulated in drawn-out negotiations, deals, and compromises. The key political players had relative autonomy from external meddling to craft an ell-encompassing agreement that reflected the prevailing political and economic balance of power. Likewise, although an international and regional settlement was central to the story of sustainable settlement in Namibia, the ultimate institutional arrangements were conceived in political and constitutional dealings among the contending internal actors. The Lancaster House settlement (1979) in Zimbabwe's case was instead an externally (British) driven processes that failed to consider the actual power balance among major national players. An ill-conceived settlement was willy-nilly imposed on the black liberation organizations, lacking in a political and social foundation to sustain it. consequently, the rather *comprehensive* settlement set off a destructive course of political conflict, authoritarian repression, and economic ruin in post-liberation Zimbabwe.

In South Africa and Namibia, pressure from Western financial institutions and capital also led liberation leaders to abandon more progressive socioeconomic reform agendas in the course of the reform period. particularly, the so-called '1996 class project' in South Africa which dramatically shifted reform-policy priorities to neo-liberal economic growth. This came at a hefty political price. The resulting persistence of racial and class inequalities, poverty, and unemployment came to periodically shake in subsequent decades racial reconciliation, inclusive nation-building, and other foundations of the much-touted 1994 settlement. Today, it is less debatable that these issues represent a grave danger to South Africa's multiracial democracy.

9.2.3 Insights for Critical Juncture Analysis

The analysis of the legacies of liberation in Southern Africa demonstrates the analytical and theoretical leverage gained from the application of the critical-junctures framework of analysis.

The framework provides uniquely strong and rigorous analytical tools and techniques for the temporal and comparative understanding of historical legacies. For this reason, the concept of critical junctures continues to stimulate methodological debates and to receive broader scholarly reception outside its traditional disciplines of comparative politics and historical sociology. In this last section, I will highlight some key insights in critical juncture analysis that emerged from studying liberation struggles and their legacies in Southern Africa. This obtains to three key conceptual and methodological issues: 1) contingency as the defining attribute of critical junctures, 2) the mechanisms of institutional production, and 3) the idea of the 'aftermath'.

More recent thinking deems contingency or increased causal possibility characteristic of critical junctures as a 'problematic criterion' of critical juncture analysis.[8] Yet, agency and deliberative choice ought to be an essential condition of the definition because the observation of voluntaristic actors making momentous decisions during a hypothesized critical juncture not just helps the analyst to break the causal chain and avoid infinite regress.[9] Most importantly, doing so helps to establish the critical juncture as the actual cause of the hypothesized legacy. Making valid inferences depends on the ability to show X (the critical juncture) is the actual cause of Y (the legacy). A main inferential challenge in critical juncture analysis comes from backdoor factors or antecedent conditions. Even though structural conditions are crucial in shaping actors calculations, the assumption of contingency is essential to distinguish the critical juncture factors from antecedent conditions. By definition, critical junctures are characterized by permissive causal conditions that loosen structural 'constraints on agency or contingency' and thereby make change necessary for the outcome possible.[10]

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[8] See Collier "Critical Juncture Framework and the Five-Step Template," p. 36.
[9] Capoccia, "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change," p. 170; Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," p. 527.
[10] H. D. Soifer, "The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures," *Comparative Political Studies*, 45 (Dec. 2012): 1572-97.

The condition of contingency becomes a problem when contingency is narrowly construed as 'individual choice' free from structural constraints. At a basic level, agency and contingency in critical junctures should indeed be understood as the idea of a 'structured' choice.[11] without account of structural factors, it would be difficult to decipher why political actors in a set of cases make different choices at a critical juncture that would lead to different legacies. At a theoretical level, contingency constitutes a basic assumption essential to the understanding of critical junctures as moments of heightened agency, strategic choice, and potential divergence of convergence. A critical juncture is of causal significance to the extent that it produces a contingent outcome (X) that is unpredictable in view of established theoretical expectations or well-known causal variables.[12] It is this outcome (or X) that accounts for the legacy of the critical juncture. In the Southern African context, this assumption helped me explain the source of contrasting and rather puzzling reform choices. Structuralist explanations ruled the possibility of revolutionary transformation in Angola and Mozambique because of the absence of well-known structural factors, while predicting revolutionary situations in the other cases because of the presence of some of these factors.

Second, for some scholars critical junctures set into motion path-dependent sequences of institutional development and reproduction. Such processes are understood as driven either by self-reinforcing mechanisms that perpetuate the initial institutional choice or by reactive mechanisms that tend to undermine, transform, or even reverse the earlier structures. Even though scholars are less clear about the relationship between self-reinforcing and reactive causal processes, Mahoney's suggestion that the identification of different mechanisms of reproduction can be understood as rival—not necessarily mutually exclusive—explanations about path-

[11] Collier "Critical Juncture Framework and the Five-Step Template," p. 36.
[12] Garcia-Montoya and Mahoney, "Critical Event Analysis in Case Study Research," 2020.

dependence development in a given context.[13] The insights from Southern Africa both elaborate this proposition and provide additional ideas. Such mechanisms could coexist in a given context, and scholars would offer rival explanations should they emphasize one mechanism over the other. On the other hand, the differing mechanisms could dominate differing or alternating historical phases. In the analysis of Path-dependent political development in Southern Africa, it was shown that self-reinforcing mechanisms were prevalent at earlier stages, but reactive sequences predominated especially at later stages.

Lastly, and third, the 'aftermath' of the critical juncture is best understood if not always assumed as temporally necessarily exclusive with the critical juncture. In some contexts, the dynamics of the critical-juncture period are not mutually exclusive with dynamics of the aftermath period. In Southern Africa, the violent backlash that defined the aftermath period in Mozambique and Angola began at the outset of the reform period itself. The beginning of the aftermath period overlapped with the critical juncture itself. Meanwhile, the political reactions of the aftermath in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe unfolded after the end of the reform period. Therefore, in certain contexts, the dynamics set into motion by the critical juncture could start early before its end. But it is theoretically crucial that the dynamics of the aftermath period should endure longer than the critical juncture. Overall, the five-step template in critical juncture analysis stipulated by Collier[14] has to be approached with caution and attention to context.

[13] Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism*, p. 9.
[14] Collier "Critical Juncture Framework and the Five-Step Template," 2022.

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