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The Greener Inhumanity of Renaissance Pastoral:

A Posthumanist Reading of the Bucolic Literature of Early Modern England and Italy

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Abstract

In a new analysis of Renaissance pastoral that draws on ecocriticism, queer theory, and a historicist approach, this dissertation finds a green and inhuman world that opposes the modern view that humans differ significantly from, and enjoy a right of dominion over, nonhuman species and the environment. Through readings of English and Italian pastorals by William Shakespeare, Niccolò Machiavelli, Edmund Spenser, Torquato Tasso, John Fletcher, and others, this dissertation demonstrates that "nature" is not a physical environment that stands apart from humans and human culture, but a hereditary force that makes offspring resemble their parents, a procreative passion impelling all creatures to reproduce their kind, and an enchanted territory that worships the presiding monarch. The "biocentric" worldview represented in these works attenuates the species barrier between human and nonhuman, since humans are represented as animals whose behaviors are determined by forces, mainly relating to heredity and reproduction, external to reason and free will. At the same time, the pastoral view of nature fortifies social divisions within the human population, since class differences are regarded as analogous to (and caused by the same hereditary mechanism responsible for) differences in domesticated breeds of animals and stocks of plants. This dissertation builds on archival research on the manuscripts of Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale" to present an original interpretation of an under-examined poem in the context of Machiavelli's career. Through its novel application of queer theory and ecocriticism, and through its fresh historicization of nature in pastoral literature, this dissertation challenges traditional interpretations of pastoral while providing a new critical approach to this important early modern genre.

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Introduction

Reading pastoral works written in England and Italy between 1510 and 1610, this dissertation analyzes the meaning, position, and function of nature in Renaissance pastoral literature and its relation to the modern understanding of humans and the environment. This line of inquiry may baffle scholars who are familiar with the consensus interpretation that early modern pastoral works are "not a matter of nature poetry," as Paul Alpers puts it, but a matter of human politics and society, figured in writing about country shepherds (27). Under this interpretation, nature is the physical environment that exists apart from human society, and, consequently, if pastoral is about human society, then it is not about nature. But "nature" in the early modern period denoted not merely the nonhuman environment, but the creative power that governs the world and gives individuals and groups their distinctive identities. Renaissance pastoral is a form of a "nature poetry" under the earlier senses of "nature" because it presents nature as a force that creates and defines all worldly life, including human lives, whether in the woods or at court. And owing to pastoral writers' practice of attributing all manner of social and political phenomena to natural causes, their works do not oppose human society to nature, but, to the contrary, present human society *as* nature.

As a form of nature writing, Renaissance pastoral is both *green* and *inhuman*. Within the Environmental Humanities, green is the color of ethical and political awareness; it denotes equal respect for human and nonhuman worlds and a rejection of the belief that all humans, through an exceptional psychological profile (e.g., reason, immortal soul, capacity for free and moral action), have a special dignity, and elite moral status, vis-à-vis other animals. Renaissance pastoral is "green" not because it anticipates the desire for environmental justice today shared by many activists and their allies (it does not), but because it shows that human behaviors and

identities are determined by the same natural forces, mainly related to birth and breeding, that determine those of nonhumans. But this understanding of *nature* also makes Renaissance pastoral "inhuman"—not pertaining to an ordinary human type—since nature in pastoral works does not give rise to a universal human nature present in both the gentility and the commonalty, but rather to the different "natures" that distinguish the classes in regard to the virtues of mind and body.[1] As its central contribution to scholarship of the genre, this dissertation, "The Greener Inhumanity of Renaissance Pastoral," analyzes a pastoral discourse that attenuates the species barrier even as it strengthens the class barriers within the human population. Opposed to the model of human-centered liberalism of modern times, Renaissance pastoral presents a biocentric and illiberal world picture that includes all kinds of life except for a homogenous humankind.[2]

In regarding "nature" as a generative force that gives rise to kinds of living things, early modern pastoral works track the etymology of "nature." Through its Indo-European base *gen-*, *gno-*, *gn-* meaning "to produce, engender, beget," the word "nature" is related to a web of Latin, Greek, and Germanic words that include the *nascere* words (*natural*, *nation*, *native*), the *genos* words (*genitals, genre, generation, genealogy*), and the *kund* words (*kin, kind, child*) ("Kin, n."). "Nature" denotes relationships and actions related to sexual reproduction, such as "child" and "generation," and to group identity, such as "kind" and "nation." And these etymological connections suggest that the speakers of these languages regarded kinds as natural in the sense

[1] English does not have the words *ahumanity* or *anhumanity*, which might serve instead of "inhumanity" to denote the absence of a stable human identity in pastoral without the connotation of cruelty and barbarism. However, the edge in "inhumanity" may usefully provoke the reader to think about the historical difference of the early modern genre, since some of pastoral conceptions relating to the quasi-biological nature of group differences and of human animality may come across as "inhumane" by modern standards

[2] "Biocentric" is a modern term that refers to a perspective treating life in general, rather than just human life, as the central fact in the universe. It reflects the use of the word "biology," since the nineteenth century, to refer to the scientific study of phenomena manifested by living matter. But this usage breaks with the historical distinction, in ancient Greek and in post-classical European languages, between *bios* ("life, a course or way of life") and *zoe* ("animal life, organic life").

that they arise from patterns in reproduction. Reproduction and identity (or distinguishing attributes) are also prominent in the senses of "nature" that the *Oxford English Dictionary* records as common in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when English-speakers used the word to mean "semen," "menstrual discharge," "the female genitals, *esp*. those of a mare," "the sexual urge," and "the innate or characteristic disposition of a particular person, animal, etc" ("Nature, n."). "Nature" in these senses blurs the ancient Greek distinction between *zoe* (life in the physiological sense) and *bios* (a particular mode of life), since it refers both to the vital functions pertaining to animal reproduction, and to the related innate dispositions that are particular to individuals and give shape to their *bio*graphies (Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1097b-1098a; Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 1-2).

As we will see in Chapters 1 and 3, this general yet differentiating understanding of nature forms the ideological backbone of the pastoral romances, such as Philip Sidney's *Arcadia* (1580), Robert Greene's *Pandosto* (1588) and *Menaphon* (1589), Book VI of Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* (1596), and William Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale* (~1610). In these texts, nature is the hereditary force that, making "like beget like," generates the patterns of resemblance seen between children and parents, and between members of the same domesticated kinds—the "breeds," "races," and "stocks" that are also used interchangeably to refer to human and animal genealogical groupings. This hereditary force is illustrated by cross-species analogies that compare the breeding of the nobility and commonalty to plant and animal husbandry; and it structures the court-to-country narratives that bring gentlemen and shepherds together in situations "proving" that nature (heredity) dominates over nurture in the formation of an individual's character. In the romances, the *kindness* of nature justifies the privilege of the

gentility, since gentlemen belong to a distinct kind that makes them, by nature, more virtuous than common shepherds.

In pastoral dramas discussed in Chapter 2, including Torquato Tasso's *Aminta* (1573), Battista Guarini's *Il Pastor Fido* (1589), and John Fletcher's *The Faithful Shepherdess* (~1609), nature is the "law to love" that, instilling procreative desires in all creatures, is broadly incompatible with the human laws enshrining the values of virginity and chaste marriage. While the dramas present contrasting perspectives on nature's reproductive imperative, ranging from celebratory to condemning, they share view that humans do not differ significantly in their desires from beasts.

Departing from the earlier chapters' analysis of nature in the senses relating to genealogy and generation, Chapter 4 examines representations of human dominion over the natural world in pastoral panegyrics by Niccolò Machiavelli, Pierre Ronsard, and Edmund Spenser. In these poems, nature takes the form of the constituents of an enchanted territory, and the earth, air, vegetation, waters, and nymphs join the shepherd speaker in celebrating their godlike prince. In representing that dominion over nature belongs to an individual ruler, these works differ from a parallel tradition of early modern "reform" pastoral, in which authors, citing the Biblical book of Genesis, argue that dominion over the earth and animals is the birthright not only of princes and wealthy landowners, but of all humans as lineal descendants of Adam.

Whether a hereditary force that makes offspring resemble their kin or kind, a universal procreative passion that drives all creatures to mate, or a sentient territory that worships the sovereign who possesses it, nature in Renaissance pastoral is thus more than the physical environment that stands apart from humans and exists to be exploited by them. It is a power that

creates and shapes all dimensions of worldly life, including social and political life, but not a distinctly *human* life.

While this dissertation argues that Renaissance pastoral works do not yet recognize a discrete human identity that cuts across human groups, such as family and class, and that separates all humans from nonhuman nature, many scholars over the last century have argued that such pastorals represent human nature or the relationship between humans and nonhuman nature, or physical environment. In the major twentieth-century synoptic texts on pastoral—W. W. Greg's *Pastoral Poetry and Pastoral Drama* (1905) and Alpers's *What Is Pastoral* (1997)—the rustic setting and shepherd characters of pastoral express human nature in its simplest and most common form. Greg defines pastoral as the "expression of instincts and impulses deep-rooted in the nature of humanity" (2), while Alpers defines pastoral as a representative anecdote where the "central fiction" is that "shepherds' lives represent human lives" (27). For Greg and Alpers, as for many pastoral critics writing in the twentieth century, the shepherds of pastoral works do not stand for rural laborers, for disguised gentlemen, or for any specific historical or social population: they stand for the human species that transcends group differences. In making "the human" the center of literary significance, such pastoral criticism flows with the modern current of liberal anthropocentrism, where humans as a species have intrinsic moral value and special rights, including the right to use nonhuman species and the physical environment for human benefit.

This strain of strong anthropocentrism disappears in more recent ecocritical studies of pastoral, such as Todd Borlik's *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature: Green Pastures* (2011) and Ken Hiltner's *What Else Is Pastoral?* (2011). Borlik and Hiltner argue that Renaissance pastoral works refer to the relationship between humans and the early modern

physical environment, with some works expressing a nascent ecological consciousness. While their scholarship shows that early modern pastoral writers often expressed anxiety over man-made changes to the environment and skepticism over whether humans enjoy a right of dominion over nature, it nonetheless sees in early modern pastoral a distinct human identity and position relative to nonhuman nature.

This dissertation thus differentiates itself from previous scholarship of pastoral through its argument that these works open a window into a pre-Cartesian *zeitgeist* where "the human" as a distinct kind and natural identity is insignificant and suspect, and where natural processes, such as heredity and procreative passions, work on humans and nonhumans alike to determine the character and behavior of individuals and groups. This pastoral worldview resembles what Laurie Shannon has called early modernity's "zoographic" frame of reference, which led writers to compare humans with other species, rather than assert the strong human/animal binary that characterizes post-Cartesian culture (*Accommodated Animal*, 133). But in Renaissance pastoral, as we will see, the same material processes that lead writers to group humans with other kinds of life also lead them to divide humans into disparate social classes. In this regard, Renaissance pastoral acts as a discursive machine that generates the identities of gentle, base, sovereign, territory, creator, creatures—but no human-*qua*-human. In the modern period, this pastoral machinery gave way to what Giorgio Agamben calls the "anthropological machine," the discourse that produces and defines the human, and, by exclusion, the nonhuman (*The Open*, 33-38).

Further, by analyzing texts that meet the traditional criteria for the pastoral genre, this dissertation also differs from previous ecocritical studies of pastoral, which have analyzed texts that are "pastoral" only in the broader sense of having to do with the country rather than the

city.[3] For example, in his chapter on Renaissance pastoral, Borlik explains that he chooses not to "corral the pastoral into a narrow formula" and instead finds "the pastoral brand on any text where humans roam through a nonhuman landscape" (140). The "narrow formula" for pastoral refers to the rule that pastoral works belong to a specific historical form originating in ancient Greek and Roman poetry about herders of sheep, goats, and cattle, such as the *Idylls* of Theocritus and the *Eclogues* of Virgil. Generally, a text is pastoral if it represents shepherds, or some equivalent herdsman of domesticated ruminants; as Leo Marx concisely defines the genre, "no shepherd, no pastoral" (Gifford 1). Returning pastoral back to its narrow generic fold of literature about shepherds, this dissertation offers an ecocritical analysis showing how pastorals and our evolving understanding of them relate to the modern neoliberal order, which recognizes that humans, through their unique psychological and spiritual qualities, have a right to use the earth and animals for their purposes.

Expanding Ecocriticism's Footprint into Renaissance Pastoral

Ecocriticism is a field of literary study that examines representations of humans' relationship to "nature," where the latter term typically denotes physical spaces that are separate from humans, and from human culture and industry. In *The Ecocriticism Reader* (1996), Cheryll Glotfelty, an early pioneer in the movement, defines ecocriticism as the study of "the relationship between literature and the physical environment," a study she later elaborates as a "practice that would take as its subject the interconnections between human culture and the material world, between human and nonhuman" ("A Guided Tour," 28). This method reflects ecocriticism's "home" in the study of Romantic literature, which includes texts, such as Wordsworth's sonnet "The World Is Too Much with Us," representing humans in relation to their environment,

[3] This criticism is analyzed in more detail in the following section.

especially as that relationship was transformed, in the nineteenth century, by industry and urbanization. Scholars designed ecocriticism for modern literature that represents subjects as *human*—a homogenizing species identity that absorbs the perspectives of diverse individuals and groups—and that represents nature as a material environment in and on which humans act. In the last half century, as societies have become conscious that modern human activity destabilizes the very environment on which they depend, ecocritics have reinforced the notion that humans act independently of nature when they represent societies as having a choice over whether to save or to continue degrading the environment. In a 2017 statement on the "task of ecocritics," Barry and Welstead assign ecocritics the job of assessing literature's part "in forming our view of the environment and in particular to uncover any dissonance between these views and the way we must now see the world if we are to avoid catastrophe" (3). For ecocritics, nature is the imperiled physical environment that might be saved if humans ("we") see the world in the right way.

Ecocriticism's methodological focus on the relationship between human life and nonhuman nature may therefore explain why ecocritics have largely avoided Renaissance pastorals, such as Tasso's *Aminta* and Fletcher's *The Faithful Shepherdess*, which depict pagan shepherds in forests and fields that are so crowded with allegory and myth that they seem to bear no relation to real physical environments. Pastoral's slender relation to actual pastures was famously criticized by Raymond Williams, who in the proto-ecocritical analysis of pastoral, *The Country and the City* (1973), dismisses Renaissance pastoral as aristocratic allegories and "court games" only superficially related to the pastoral and georgic poetry by Theocritus and Virgil, which had embodied real modes of agricultural production: "What happened in the aristocratic transformation was the reduction of these primary activities to forms, whether the 'vaile' of allegory or the fancy dress of court games" (21).

Later ecocritics signal their tacit agreement with Williams by eschewing allegorical and courtly pastorals and delivering ecocritical readings of pastoral that analyze, for the most part, texts that are concerned with nature in the sense of the nonhuman environment. In his chapter on pastoral in *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature*, Borlik reads Spenser's *Legend of Temperance* and Milton's *Comus* as attacks on the air pollution created by the early modern coal industry and argues that these "pastorals" satirize overconsumption and inculcate ecological virtues of temperance and stewardship. In *What Else Is Pastoral?*, Hiltner argues that Renaissance pastoral uses an aesthetic of gesture—rather than an aesthetic of mimetic representation—to reveal an emergent consciousness of environmental changes. For Hiltner, Ben Jonson's country house poem, "To Penshurst," expresses the author's anxiety about suburban sprawl in London, and John Evelyn's *Fumifugium* protests the air pollution caused by coal burning in early modern London. And Robert N. Watson, interpreting the pastoral quest for "the simple life" in *Back to Nature*, argues that writers, frustrated by the epistemological uncertainty that characterized urban and courtly life, idealized going "back to nature" as a means of finding unmediated knowledge in the physical environment. All of these critics assume that "nature" in Renaissance pastoral refers to a nonhuman environment and, relatedly, to simpler way of living (or thinking) that is opposed to human activity in a modern urban setting.

Hiltner and Borlik remind us that there were man-made changes to the environment in early modern Europe, and that writers express a nascent environmental consciousness in poems referring to these changes. However, their loose use of the term "pastoral" reflects the tendency of literary critics to "search for 'versions of pastoral' in the most unlikely places," as Annabel Patterson puts it (7). So far, ecocritics have not answered the question of how to do an ecocritical reading of works meeting the strict "no shepherd, no pastoral" definition of pastoral—the

eclogues, lyrics, dramas, and prose romances depicting shepherds in their relation to "nature," which, as we will see, figures in these texts not as a physical environment but a biological force that shapes and determines all worldly phenomena.

Prehumanist Pastoral

It is the argument of this dissertation that Renaissance pastoral is "prehumanist" on two counts. First, these texts are free of the belief, often associated with "Renaissance humanism," that humans differ from other creatures because they are capable of rational, free action and consequently enjoy a special dignity, or elite moral value, vis-à-vis unreasonable creatures. Second, because these texts predate the modern concept of biological species, they do not yet show the influence of the belief that species identity, or the ability to interbreed, is the preeminent establisher of natural kind—that being born a human tells us more about an individual's qualities and traits than being born into a particular lineage, "race," stock, or family.[4] Opposed both to the humanist notion that humans are psychologically exceptional in creation and to the post-Enlightenment understanding that human species identity is paramount, Renaissance pastoral presents a world where the actions of gentlemen, shepherds, and beasts are similarly constrained by their respective natures, and where species identity matters less than class identity.

Though generally absent from pastoral texts, human psychological exceptionalism is prominently affirmed in landmark humanist texts, such as Pico della Mirandola's 1494 "Oration

[4] In early modern English, the word "race" designated any group of people, animals, or plants connected by common descent or origin and is used synonymously with "lineage" and stock"; it did not have its modern senses relating to sets of ethnic, geographic, and cultural differences within the human population ("Race, n.6"). While "race" in Renaissance pastoral manifestly lacks its modern designations of continental and religious differences, it does show the beginnings of the modern tendency to tie physical and behavioral characteristics to a lineage. The emergence of this quasi-biological understanding of race in early modernity is discussed by Jonathan Burton and Ania Loomba (1-36) and David Nirenberg (248-249).

on the Dignity of Man" and Descartes's 1637 *Discourse on the Method*. Both Pico and Descartes take the position that humans differ from beasts because, while beasts are constrained in their actions by their corporeal nature, humans alone can act freely—can choose one course of action over another—owing to their ability to reason. In this version of humanism, the soul gives humans access to an incorporeal and immaterial dimension of being, a space of spirit and intellect that exists above and apart from the created order of nature, or from what we can anachronistically refer to as the biological world of living organisms.

However, in recent decades early modern scholars have attended to writers and cultural traditions that take "materialist" or "embodied" views, in which human psychology is subject to the natural order, rather than emanating from an incorporeal soul and rational mind. In *Humoring the Body*, Gail Kern Paster shows that the notion of a rational and self-determining human subject was at odds with humoralism, the theory that bodily passions, or humors, determined the desires and behaviors of all living things. Cross-species identification is so commonplace in early modern writing because many period writers believed that humans and animals shared the same humoral constitution and therefore had analogous emotional profiles. In her books *Perceiving Animals* and *Brutal Reasoning*, Erica Fudge analyzes the supposedly human-defining discourse of rationality in early modern culture and finds that, while writers represented that the potential for reason places humans above animals in the natural hierarchy, some also represented that humans who behaved irrationally—through madness, puerility, or vice—undid their humanity and descended to a level beneath the beast. This instability in the human/animal boundary has been elaborated by scholars such as Jean E. Feerick and Vin Nardizzi who stress the degree of creaturely "overlap," or "human indistinction," in writings where humans share with plants and animals vegetative and sensitive souls, and do not always realize their potential for an

intellective soul. Moreover, Shannon has shown that the ideology of human exceptionalism was wholly overturned by writers who, contrasting the natural sufficiency of beasts with the natural insufficiency of humans, found humans to be the "negative exception" because they are uniquely dependent on culture and technology for their survival (*The Accommodated Animal*; "Poor, Bare, Forked"). In light of these and other investigations highlighting early modern psychological materialism and representations of human animality (and sub-animality), some scholars now see early modernity as the birthplace not of humanism, but of what scholars today call *posthumanism*, a reactionary philosophy that, as Cary Wolfe describes it, "opposes the fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy inherited by humanism itself" (7).[5]

Furthering the scholarship on human animality in Renaissance literature, this dissertation identifies additional "prehumanist" theories of behavior—such as proto-hereditarianism and the belief in a universal reproductive tendency—that are instantiated in representations in which humans do not act freely and thus differently than beasts, but are similarly constrained by the natural order and can be classified, as Fletcher's Satyre puts it, as "a kind of Beast" (5.2.34; 566). According to the proto-hereditarian principle of "like begets like," people do not engage in self-determination; rather, they behave in accordance with the dispositions and inclinations that they inherit at birth and that are consistent with their ancestral kind, or lineage, just as the behaviors and traits of breeds of dogs and races of horses are consistent with their pedigrees. In the pastoral world, sheep, dogs, and horses are not the only domesticated animals who have been bred into different kinds: humans too are "livestock," and the gentility and commonality are also domesticated kinds, or breeds.

[5] See also Joseph Campana and Scott Maisano, "Introduction."

The notion of a universal reproductive tendency posits that people do not control their desires, but (sometimes for better but often for worse) are ruled by nature's "law to love," which commands all creatures to beget their kinds. When characters in these works resist their passions, such as Amarillis in *Il Pastor Fido* or the chaste shepherds in *The Faithful Shepherdess*, it is not through the use of human reason, but through, respectively, the unique virtue of the nobility, or the prayers and herbal remedies that cool the "heats" of the blood. That is, while these love stories oppose the freedom of self-control to the enslavement to the passions, they do not represent that self-control is either available to all humans or that it distinguishes human from beast; it is a state that is associated, for Guarini, with "soules well-borne" (3.4.21; 108), and, for Fletcher, with a physiological state of humoral temperance that is available to shepherds and woodland creatures alike through supernatural grace and proper diet.

Beyond its emphasis on the representation of psychological materialism and human animality in early modern literature, this dissertation argues that early modern ideas about heredity and social class prevented early moderns from recognizing species (interbreeding populations) as an important natural kind, and, relatedly, from showing much regard for the species difference between humans and nonhumans. The traits that early moderns cared about—dispositions to virtue, beauty, strength, courage, wit, courtesy, etc.—were said to be transmitted from parents to children, along class lines, just as traits were transmitted along breed lines in domesticated animals. In Renaissance pastorals and related works, humans' ability to interbreed is a *danger* because it threatens to destroy gentle lineages (and the virtues they purportedly transmit) through base admixture. According to the writers of these texts, historical patterns of marriage had generated, within the human population, natural class differences that foreclosed a homogenous human identity that transcended differences in social rank, differentiating humans,

as an interbreeding species, from nonhumans. That is, in a "prehumanist" world where class identity was paramount, human species identity was, at best, relatively insignificant, and, at worst, a threat to the social order.

Through its representations both of human animality and of insuperable differences within the human population, Renaissance pastoral instantiates the period belief that, as Michel Montaigne puts it in "Of Inequality," "there is more difference between such and such a man, than there is between such a man and such a beast" (340). For Montaigne, as for pastoral writers, humans did not, as a population, differ much from animals; and within the human population, the difference between two individuals could be greater than the difference between some humans and some animals.

Renaissance Pastoral's Queer Critique of Speciesism

Montaigne's view—that men did not differ significantly from beasts—fell out of favor in modernity, when intellectuals widely accepted the reproduction-based conception of species, which defines species as "groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations."[6] As I will show in this section, the reproduction-based species concept represents an early form of heteronormativity, that is, the range of cultural forms and representations that marginalize non-reproductive identities and present heterosexual relationships as the only natural and desirable form of identity. I also show that the heteronormativity underlying the species concept is taken further, and projected onto the entire biotic community, when humans engage in speciesist

[6]This is the definition of species from Ernst Mayr's 1942 *Systematics and the Origins of Species* (120) and is, as we will see, consistent with the definition of species given by early modern naturalists, such as Buffon. Organisms that reproduce asexually are only the beginning of the problem with this interbreeding species concept, which is overviewed in its historical and philosophy of science contexts by Richard A. Richards in *The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis* and John S. Wilkins's *Species: A History of the Idea* and *Defining Species: A Sourcebook from Antiquity to Today.*

ethical reasoning, denying or according legal consideration to organisms based on whether they interbreed with humans. In contradistinction to the heteronormativity underwriting the species concept and speciesist ethical thinking, pre-Enlightenment pastoral took a broader, "queerer" view of natural group identity, regarding heterosexual reproduction warily, and accommodating a range of non-reproductive relationships and identities.

Departing from earlier philosophers' more pluralistic taxonomic systems, early modern naturalists such as John Ray, Linnaeus, and the Comte de Buffon ushered in a new system of biological classification that understood *species*, the most basic and "least inclusive" grouping of living things, as groups in which the ability to reproduce signaled the members' descent from generations of interbreeding ancestors (Richards 197; Wilkins, *Species*, 9). They were preceded by philosophers, such as Aristotle, Boethius, and Locke, who used "species" to refer to any differentiated subdivision of a broader class of things, which could be logical, aesthetic, and social things as well as living things. Anticipating the modern reproduction-based concept of species, some of the earlier philosophers had linked the persistence of morphological similarities over time to biological reproduction. Aristotle, for example, uses *genos* to refer to the lineages, races, or families of organisms who resemble each other through the process of biological generation (Richards 29). These lineages, races, and families refer to groups more specific, and more sensitive to regional and social differences, than the groups that can interbreed. But for the later naturalists, the ability to interbreed was the main and often only establisher of species membership. In *Histoire naturelle*, Buffon writes that we "should regard two animals as belonging to the same species, if, by means of copulation, they can perpetuate themselves and preserve the likeness of species; and we should regard them as belonging to different species if they are incapable of producing progeny by the same means" (qtd. Wilkins, *Defining Species*,

76). In this conception, reproduction is so normal that it literally defines natural identity. And this reproduction-based conception of species has been largely upheld by biologists during the twentieth-century synthesis of biology and genetics. Because reproduction transmits genetic material, interbreeding organisms share distinct genetic profiles; the ability to interbreed is a good predictor of individuals' genetic similarity.

Scientists have used, and continue to use, the ability to interbreed as the criterion for membership in *Homo sapiens*. In the nineteenth-century debates over how to classify the major continental human populations, Charles Darwin cited *inter*fertility among different human populations to support that they represented different races of the same species (170-171). Others, however, alleged evidence of *in*fertility between members of different populations as proof that different subgroups represented different species (Graves 64-65; McWhorter 73-101). Today, the interbreeding criterion for membership in *Homo sapiens* has had a resurgence, as evolutionary biologists debate whether ancient hominids—the Neanderthal, Denisovans, and other archaic "ghost" populations (whose existence geneticists can only infer from statistical analyses of modern human genomes)—represent different species within the genus *Homo*, or whether the growing evidence of interbreeding with modern humans means that they belong to *Homo sapiens* (Reich 55-56). Outside of these niche arguments about the species status of ancient hominids, there is universal agreement that *Homo sapiens* exists as a real and clearly defined species. Philosophers and ethologists (biologists who study animal behavior) may debate whether all humans differ greatly from nonhuman species in their capacities for free action, language, tool use, self-awareness, and relating to others (Ferry 5; Wolfe 40-42). But there is widespread agreement that the living world is naturally organized into reproductive

communities, or species, and that humans as a species differ from nonhumans in this reproductive and biological sense.

Although theories of human rights do not usually define humans biologically, heteronormativity raises its head in their references to "the human family" and the myths of common descent from a primal couple. In the Abrahamic religions, humans inherit their right to dominion over the earth and animals through their descent from Adam. In Genesis 1:26, God creates Adam in his image and grants him dominion over the earth and all that moves on it: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the livestock, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth" (Modern English Version). As we will see in Chapter 4, seventeenth-century reformers, such as the Digger-leader Gerrard Winstanley, used Genesis to argue that all men, as descendants of Adam, and not only the landed gentry, enjoy a God-given right to earthly dominion; "for surely," Winstanley writes, "the earth was made by the Lord, to be a common Treasury for all, not a particular Treasury for some" (57). In the twentieth century, the equal rights of all humans were affirmed in major international agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which recognizes the "inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" ("Preamble"). In this context, "the human family" is synonymous with the human species; both refer to the group of individuals descended from a common human ancestor. But the phrase "the human family" also evokes the modern sense of family, the two-parent household with children, and reminds us that "the human family" is brought into being by thousands of generations of reproductive, cross-sex relationships.[7] And because human rights are transmitted through such

[7] In *Keywords*, Williams links the small kin-group definition of "family"—father, mother, and children—to

relationships, the notion of human rights affirms the privilege of heteronormativity in organizing communities and deciding who is included in, and who is excluded from, the group benefiting from legal protections.

The role of species in maintaining the human/animal difference has come under fire from bioethicists and animal welfare activists, who do not take aim at the definition of species, but at what they see as the arbitrariness of using it as the basis for granting or denying ethical consideration or legal protection to nonhuman organisms. In *Animal Liberation*, Peter Singer popularized the term "speciesism" for this form of discrimination, which asserts that humans may ethically disregard the interests of some organisms if they are members of a different species than *Homo sapiens.* There are, for example, cases where a human individual is seriously injured—the infant born with hydrocephaly, the comatose individual with no hope of recovery—and has lesser capacity for self-awareness, independent action, and communication than many animals, such as chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs (18). And yet, the law, reflecting the value of the dignity of *human* life, prohibits doctors from euthanizing such human individuals—even when their guardians want that option—while it permits the killing of chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs. In cases like these, the law does not accord legal rights based on a subject's actual capabilities or interests, but instead on the basis of species. And that, according to Singer, is pure speciesism, analogous to racism and sexism because it discriminates against an individual on the basis of a group identity instead of on the basis of the individual's capabilities and interests.

To this ethical critique of speciesism, queer theory brings a historically attuned perspective on the role that sexual reproduction has played in shaping group identity and, thus,

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the nineteenth-century development of capitalism and the rise of small households supported by a man's wage labor. He notes that, before the nineteenth century, "family" referred to a household, the group of people in close relationship to each other but not necessarily related by blood (131-134).

the allotment of privileges and rights. Speciesism is the most recent iteration of a historical trend in which groups privilege the interests of those most closely related to them—related through generations of heterosexual reproduction—above the interests of those more distantly related. Family, tribe, class, and race all, at some level and to some extent, resemble species because they are reproductive relationships based on lineage and interbreeding. There is, for example, only a difference of degree between the biological species concept and the early modern concept of social class, as expressed by Thomas Petty, whose criteria for membership in the gentility included "consanguinity or affinity by marriage to and with many other gentlemen, and for many yeares past" (qtd. Shapin 53). In this way, species takes the genealogical thinking of earlier cultures to its logical conclusion and maintains the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by stipulating that the ability to reproduce *alone* determines membership in the group. And this dissertation will use queer theory, as a critical activity based on subverting heteronormativity, to call into question the ethical validity of using reproductive sex to create a species hierarchy that asserts that some organisms, because they cannot interbreed with humans, are less deserving of life and of our consideration of their interests.

Before and apart from this marriage of reproduction and human identity, Renaissance pastoral and related works represented that sexual reproduction at the species level *threatened* the diversity of domesticated kinds that characterized urban societies and agriculture. A 1586 heraldry manual by John Ferne defends laws penalizing *disparagement* (unequal marriages between gentle and base) on the ground that "unegall copling" produces hybrids, mongrels, and the "monstrous mule," leveling the difference between kinds and engendering the "confusion of al things" (11-12).[8] For Ferne, sexual reproduction is not constitutive of natural identity, but is

[8] *Disparagium* and *disparagement* were the technical terms for unequal marriages between persons of

the physiological process by which the crucial domesticated genealogies—kinds, breeds, stocks, etc.—are propagated or destroyed. To the extent that marrying or breeding two members of the same kind preserved that kind, sexual reproduction was good. But in cases where two members of different kinds interbred, sexual reproduction was bad. Accordingly, Ferne and other writers disapprove the disparaging marriages and animal crossbreeding that mix and "confuse" kinds that they believe ought to remain distinct. The problem of disparagement is integral to the court-to-country narratives of the pastoral romances, where shepherds mingle with the nobility, leading to cross-class love conflicts in which the prospect of a reproductive union between shepherdess and prince threatens the perpetuation of a noble lineage. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, in *The Winter's Tale*, King Polixenes objects to the marriage between his son, Prince Florizel, and the ostensibly low-born shepherdess, Perdita, on the basis of his paternal right to "fair posterity"—implying that the children resulting from the disparaging marriage would be "unfair": a hybrid of gentle and base that, blending the qualities of the two parents, would unjustly or unfairly eradicate Polixenes's fair or noble kind (4.4.415).[9] Thus, notwithstanding the scriptural account of humans' common descent from Adam, many early moderns did not believe that humans (or dogs, horses, or other domesticated kinds) were, or should be, interbreeding populations.

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different rank. The Magna Carta prohibited lords from disparaging their wards by marrying them to a person of a lower rank (Radin 606). Over the long sixteenth century, with the decay of feudalism and the gradual rise of the merchant class, the legal prosecution of disparagement declined. Radin writes that, at this time, "the only sanction against disparagement was social disapproval" (615). In Ferne's heraldry book, we find that the comparison of children of unequal marriages to mongrels was one way in which society showed that it disapproved unequal marriages.

[9] All quotations and parenthetical citation of *The Winter's Tale* are drawn from the Arden 3rd series edition, ed. John Pitcher (2010). Unless otherwise noted, subsequent quotations and citations from Shakespeare's texts refer to the *The Norton Shakespeare*, 2nd edition, Stephen Greenblatt, et. al., eds. (2008).

Renaissance pastoral is "queer" because it puts forward a pluralistic conception of identity that operates at levels both more particular and more general than the modern biological concept of an interbreeding species. Toggling between the more specific kinship lineages, and the more general grouping of creature, pastoral texts link individuals' traits and behaviors to a social identity (their kin or class), or to an animal identity that is present in all living creatures. But they do not present individuals as having a nature that they share only with the reproductive community of humans. While pastoral texts thus represent social classes and animal breeds as genealogical groupings based on birth and breeding, their understanding of natural identity is incompatible with the modern understanding that the ability to interbreed *alone* defines natural identity, even less the postmodern celebration of hybrids. Through their heterogeneous conception of *kind*, such early modern works regarded as important the signature characteristics and distinct lineages *within* interbreeding populations.

Furthermore, by narrowly delineating the social context in which reproduction is desirable, and by representing cross-sex relationships as a *means of propagation* rather than as constitutive of personal identity, such pastorals permit the expression of non-reproductive relationships and identities that are often foreclosed in a modern heteronormative and speciesist culture, where heterosexuality is regarded as paramount for its role in perpetuating the species.[10] In the Italian pastoral dramas, the application of "nature's law to love" is limited to the wayward youth of noble families, who must be corralled into the appropriate dynastic marriages. For the Satyrs and humbler shepherds, such as Tasso's pastoral persona Titiro, who lead lives either of voluntary or involuntary celibacy, nature's procreative imperative is nugatory. In the egalitarian pastoral society depicted in Fletcher's *The Faithful Shepherdess*, there is no nobility and

[10] This later point is explored by Ladelle McWhorter in "Enemy of the Species," 73-101.

therefore no noble lineage that must be conserved through the dynastic marriage of two heirs. The work instead idealizes chastity, a form of identity not defined by cross-sex behavior, in its heroine, Clorin, who has renounced sex and heals a group of lusty young shepherds from the "disease" of sexual desire (2.2.12; 2.3.22, *et passim*). In the pastoral panegyrics, such as Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale" and Ronsard's *Eclogues*, the sentient natural world joins the shepherd speaker in a cross-species and same-sex expression of love for the beautiful young ruler. While scholars such as Stephen Guy-Bray, Bruce R. Smith, and Nardizzi have described the queer history of pastoral that comprises representations of same-sex, and mostly male, eroticism, this dissertation argues that the queerness of pastoral extends beyond homoeroticism, inhering in depictions of selective breeding and of chastity that are orthogonal to and transcend reproductive heterosexuality. On the whole, these sexual dynamics resemble those of Shakespeare's *Sonnets*, where the principle that "[f]rom fairest creatures we desire increase" restricts sexual reproduction to a vaguely eugenic project of breeding the nobility, and this containment creates a queer space for identities and communities that are not defined by cross-sex roles and reproductive behaviors (1.1.4).

In casting indiscriminate reproduction as a threat to the survival of diverse kinds, Renaissance pastoral offers a concrete, historical example of the kind of "queer" resistance to heteronormativity that Lee Edelman theorizes in *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive.* Edelman shines a light on the extent to which heterosexual reproduction implicitly shapes modern political discourse, a phenomenon he terms "reproductive futurism," which is the belief that the purpose of political action is to create better futures for children. In the seemingly apolitical appeal, "it's for the children," people use the principle of children's future wellbeing to rationalize political agendas and the organization of communities according to principles of

heterosexual reproduction. Using the "the Child" with a capital "C" to refer to the embodiment of the heterosexuality that structures the social order, Edelman writes that "the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought" (2). In the Child whose future wellbeing trumps all, the terms of reproductive futurism preserve "the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable … the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations" (2). While Edelman does not embark on an ecocritical or posthumanist analysis of reproductive futurism, the generic Human Child's ability to embody the political future represents the triumph of species—the grouping of organisms according to their ability to produce and preserve their kind through sexual reproduction—over more restrictive groupings, such as family, class, and nation, and its triumph over more inclusive groupings that cross the species/reproduction barrier. This would include groupings such as, for example, animals whose interests we can and should consider because they have awareness of their own wellbeing or suffering. The seemingly unideological appeal, "it's for the children," refers to human children, and expresses the belief that we should take political action to ensure the future wellbeing of the human species. The terms of reproductive futurism thus preserve not only the absolute privilege of heteronormativity, but also of speciesism, by limiting our political action and moral consideration to the next generation of our reproductive species community.

The Anthropocentric Shift in Modern Literary Criticism of Pastoral

Between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, pastoral criticism undergoes a major shift, in which writers and scholars go from viewing the genre as representing disparate classes of people with little similarity to one another, to seeing it as representing a universal human nature common to all social classes. This shift coincides with the emergence of the modern belief, popularized by Descartes, that all humans differ from animals in regard to their common and

equal possession of a rational soul that gives them free will and self-awareness.[11] It further parallels the rise of what Bruno Latour calls the "modern constitution," which divides the world into humans subjects—beings who have moral agency and political rights—and nonhuman objects—the material world of nature and animals that exists as a setting and a resource for human life (13-15). But pre-Cartesian, early modern discussions of pastoral do not register an awareness of universal human characteristics; pastoral writers instead regard the genre as depicting various social types—gentle and base, urban and rural—that differ profoundly from one another but also share a common biological nature with animals. Illiberal yet "biocentric," the early modern critical writing about pastoral affirms that gentlemen are innately more virtuous than commoners at the same time it affirms that all living things share a common creaturely identity.

By the twentieth century, the pastoral form had become, for critics, a literary representation of the human nature present in people of all economic and social backgrounds: it is an expression of "instincts deep-rooted in the nature of humanity" (Greg 2), an imaginary shepherd world that "symbolically reflect[s] and concentrate[s] important aspects of the human condition" (Chaudhuri 5), a literary landscape where "the human centers are herdsmen or their equivalents" (Alpers 28); and the "activity that [pastoral] designates describes a process by which human discourses apprehend something called 'the world', inclining it so that it comes to

[11] Descartes begins the *Discourse on the Method* (1637) by stating his belief that the capacity for reason is equal in all people and that reason alone differentiates men from beasts: "Reason … is naturally equal in all men … the diversity of our opinions does not arise from the fact that some people are more reasonable than others, but solely from the fact that we lead our thoughts along different paths and do not take the same things into consideration; … inasmuch as [reason or sense] alone makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts, I prefer to believe that it exists whole and entire in each of us" (1-2). Critical discussions of the historical shift from Renaissance embodiment to Cartesian dualism can be found in Gail Kern Paster's *The Body Embarrassed*; Michael Schoenfeldt's *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England*, David Hillman's *Shakespeare's Entrails*; Shannon's *The Accommodated Animal*, and Michael Slater's "The Ghost in the Machine."

bear on and speak on human concerns" (J. Yates 109).[12] In these interpretations of pastoral, the anthropocentric impulses of modern liberalism become visible to us. They constitute an interpretative tradition that reaches back to Jacob Burkhardt's discussions of Renaissance bucolic verses in *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860).[13] There, Burckhardt surveyed changes in cultural representations of man in Renaissance Italy, and argued that, beginning in late *quattrocento* Florence at the court of Lorenzo de' Medici, poets began to write verses about shepherds and peasants that, unlike the allegorical eclogues in imitation of Virgil, used rural poetry to affirm the fundamental dignity of humanity. Marking the moral progress of the West as it moved away from an elitist and illiberal ideology that divided people by sex and class, the poems thus show a "wholly modern tendency to put oneself into the position of another class" and evidence a historical social trend in Italy where "differences in birth lost their significance" and where the old "logical notion of humanity … became fact" (228-229). For Burckhardt, pastoral showed that people of different classes could identify with each other as humans rather than focusing on insuperable social differences; pastoral thus embodied the notion of humanity that had formerly existed only logically, as an abstraction without any bearing on how people actually saw and represented each other.

For many early modern writers and scholars, by contrast, the belief that poets should follow decorum (the art of matching style to the nature of the subject) led to the concomitant

[12] The literary criticism discussed in this section constitutes one of two major strains of twentieth-century pastoral criticism. The second, the historicist criticism of pastoral, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. While historicist critics, such as William Empson, Leo Marx, Raymond Williams, and Louis Adrian Montrose, essentially agreed with the literary critics cited here that Renaissance pastoral texts represent shepherds as gentle, they argued that the gentle shepherd character contradicted the class orthodoxy of the period holding that agricultural laborers were incapable of gentle behavior. For Empson and Montrose, such representations suggested that pastoral works performed the ideological function of legitimizing the class structure by obfuscating and mediating class differences.

[13] Other works of pastoral criticism in this tradition include Frank Kermode's *English Pastoral Poetry* and Hallett Smith's *Elizabethan Poetry.*

belief that pastoral poets should represent shepherds as ignorant and base in accordance with their nature. For these writers, there is no universal human nature, but rather a diversity of human natures that reflects differences in ancestry and economic situation. In his 1537 commentary of Virgil's *Bucolica*, Ludovicus Vives notes that Virgil shows "excellent decorum" when his shepherds say rude and ignorant things, as when, in the first eclogue, the shepherd Meliboeus speaks ignorantly of the state affairs of Rome, since it is "natural and usual" for shepherds not to be "inquisitive and curious of forraine matters" (16).[14] The assumption that the social classes have different natures and should be represented accordingly also underlies the criticisms of pastoral dramas showing shepherds speaking and behaving like gentlemen. In a 1586 *Discorso*, Jason Denores—the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Padua—takes aim at pastoral dramas that show shepherds performing roles that, in Denores's view, are "proper" to the nobility (41).[15] Shepherds, a "species of peasant," are "by nature extremely lazy, as Aristotle observes in the first book of the *Politics*" and therefore are "incapable" of the kinds of worldly actions attributed to them in pastoral dramas, such as leaving their village and traveling abroad. Pastoral dramatists violate verisimilitude when they attribute noble thoughts and speech to shepherds, such as "abstract reasoning, discourses on celestial matters, prudent thinking, and the gravest sentences."[16] Similarly, Ben Jonson sees pastoral writers as committing a basic category error when they ascribe the attributes of gentlemen to shepherds: "Lucan, Sidney, Guarini make every man speak as well as themselves, forgetting decorum; for Dametas [a farcical shepherd in

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[14] The translations of Denores's *Discorso* and Guarini's "Il Verrato" are my own. I have included in footnotes the Italian original for the longer citations.

[15] For an English-language account of the literary polemic between Denores and Guarini, see Bernard Weinberg, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance*, especially 26-30 from vol. 1, and 656-662 from vol. 2.

[16] "... senza verisimilitudine, attribuendo a' pastori ragionamenti alti, discorsi delle cose celesti, concetti, prudenti, e sentenzie gravissime" (41).

Sidney's *Arcadia*] sometimes speaks grave sentences" (411). For writers like Vives, Denores, and Jonson, the verisimilar representation of nature *is* the verisimilar representation of social differences. This elitist and class-centered class ideology and aesthetics clashes with the human-centered aesthetics of post-Romantic pastoral critics, for whom nature presents at the level of interbreeding species, and who accordingly interpret the gentle shepherd as representing a common human nature that transcends social differences.

Counterintuitively, the belief that the social classes are innately different also underlies the defenses of pastoral mounted by the dramatists who were accused of violating decorum and verisimilitude. Guarini defends pastoral by arguing that pastoral dramas represent shepherds as the noble flock-owning shepherds that existed in pagan antiquity, and not the base "*contadini*" or rural peasants of the present era. Responding to Denores in his 1588 "Il Verrato," Guarini accepts the claim that it would be immoral to dramatize the lives of shepherds if ancient shepherds were as "vile" as modern peasants ("*Contadini*"), but asserts a "*gran differenza*" exists between the early modern peasants and pagan herdsmen.[17] Shepherds of antiquity were not as "dirty and rude like you all suppose, but many of them by birth, by manners, and by spirit were not only gentle but noble" (*ibid*.). This critical perspective hinges on a theory of civilizational development in which the different populations of the urban nobility and the rural peasantry arose only after agriculture's widespread adoption and the ensuing concentration of wealth in cities. Moreover, this perspective is shared by English writers who regard the ancient shepherd as

[17] "Se buone intendete per semplici ci potremmo agevolmente accordare, ma avvertite, che voi accoppiate Pastori, & Contadini, & io ci fo una gran diferenza, percioche non tutti i Pastori sono simili à Contadini, ma tutti i contadini sono ben vili, & tutti i Pastori non furon al tempo antico sucidi, & rozzi, come voi vi pensate, ma molti di loro, & di nascita, & di costumi, e d'animo ... non pur gentili ma grandi" (*Il Verrato*, 41). Guarini responded to Denores in *Il Verrato* (1588) and *Il Verrato Secondo* (1593), which he revised and reprinted in the *Compendio della poesia tragica* (1601).

representing a transhistorical ideal of *gentility*—not humanity—because he is a property owner who lives a life of leisure and aesthetic recreation.[18] Literary shepherds can be gentle, amorous, and musical because they represent ancient shepherds, who, are the "owners of their flocks, not hirelings," as Fletcher puts it in his "Letter to the Reader" that introduces the first print edition of *The Faithful Shepherdess* (497).

Manifesting the simultaneously inhuman and green character of early modern pastoral, Vives, in his commentary on Virgil's *Bucolica*, reads the herdsman Tityrus as representing a nature that is common to all creatures, in order to vindicate Virgil of misattributing noble behaviors—intercity travel and a desire for liberty—to a simple shepherd.[19] In Virgil's first eclogue, Tityrus says that he traveled to Rome to regain his "Liberty"—that is, the right to continue grazing his cattle on lands that he has lost in a mass reallocation of farms to veteran soldiers returning from wars. According to Vives, Virgil has given Tityrus a plausible pretext for traveling to Rome because "all creatures as well reasonable, as others" naturally prefer freedom to bondage; this preference is "imprinted" in their dispositions, and the truth of it is made plain by the daily experience of seeing birds and beasts in captivity seeking to regain their "first estate and freedom":

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[18] English writers often associated the ancient shepherd with property ownership and other markers of gentility. In the *Art of English Poesy* (1588), George Puttenham explains that, before the shepherd owned flocks, there was "none owner in the world, quick cattle being the first property of any foreign [not one's own] possession" (127). The narrator of Sidney's *Old Arcadia* (c.1580), introducing a set of eclogues sung by Arcadian shepherds, cautions his reader not to marvel at the excellent singing ability of the Arcadians, who "were not such base shepherds as we commonly make account of, but the very owners of the sheep themselves" (50). In *As You Like* It, Shakespeare alludes to the difference between the ancient and modern shepherds when he represents Silvius in the style of the ancient shepherd who has the means to buy Corin's master's sheep cote and flock but is so besotted by his unrequited love for Phoebe that he "little cares for buying anything" (2.4.85). Corin, by contrast, represents the common shepherd precisely in his flockless status: "I am a shepherd to another man / And do not shear the fleeces that I graze" (2.4.73-74).

[19] *Bucolica Virgilii interpretatio* (Basil, 1537); English translation by "W.L.," *Virgils Eclogues Translated into English* (London, 1628).

> *My freedom &c.* A specious tittle [a fairly calculated little thing], and a very reasonable pretext, and such as might easily pierse the simple minde of a shepheard; it being even imprinted in the disposition of all creatures as well reasonable, as others, naturally to affect freedome: which principle is found most true by daily experience, in such birds, and beasts, as by mans art are reclaimed, how loath they are to yeeld unto bondage; and being subdued, if never so little left to themselves, how soone they apprehend their first estate and freedom, and how warily they preserve themselves from being enthralled again. (18)

Vives alludes to the belief that humans, as reasonable creatures, differ from nonhumans when he says that nature imprints a preference for freedom "in the disposition of all creatures *as well reasonable, as others*." But, in contrast to later writers, who think that human reasonableness allows humans to operate on a higher plane of moral action that is inaccessible to animals lacking reason, Vives mentions reasonableness only to say it is irrelevant because it does not affect a creature's disposition "naturally to affect freedome." The simple-minded shepherd's trip to Rome signifies not human rationality, but a pan-species preference for freedom over "bondage." Denying the relevance of the species barrier separating human from nonhuman, this complexly pejorative gloss does not "dehumanize" the shepherd because it does not refer to a human standard that the shepherd fails to meet. Rather, it reinforces the notion that shepherds are simple-minded because their behavior reflects the natural inclinations shared by all creatures.

Alpers analyzes the same passage from Virgil's first eclogue in his influential 1997 genre study, *What Is Pastoral?*, and the juxtaposition of Vives and Alpers calls attention to the simultaneously homogenizing and speciesist aspects of the human-centered morality and aesthetics that distinguish twentieth-century pastoral criticism from the "inhuman" criticism of

early modernity. Alpers uses Kenneth Burke's idea of a "representative anecdote"—an anecdote that takes a specific "selection of reality" and makes it representative of a general category—to cast pastoral as a representative anecdote where the "central fiction" is that "shepherds' lives represent human lives" (27). Virgil's first eclogue makes explicit the "human condition" of dependency and victimization, since Tityrus depends on his powerful patron in Rome for his leisure and freedom, while Meliboeus is a victim of the Roman policies that reallocated his home and lands to soldiers returning from wars (25). In contrast to Vives, who reads Virgil as representing Tityrus and Meliboeus as "rude and ignorant" and exhibiting "rustical speech" in order to capture the perspective of a specifically rural type of person (17-18), Alpers offers a homogenizing version, where the separate classes are made uniform through the categorical integrity of the human. The herdsmen's experiences of dependency and victimization are not specific to their social background or historical situation, but are "common enough to show why this eclogue exemplifies Empson's dictum that 'you can say everything about complex people by a complete consideration of simple people'" (24). By regarding as significant those experiences that are common to humans, Alpers occludes the significance of those experiences that are uncommon, atypical, or specific to a particular early modern population.

Moreover, by treating situations of dependency and victimization as common human experiences, Alpers overlooks that animals and humans alike experience dependency and victimization and implies that the animal experience cannot be represented by a human character. Vives, by contrast, reads Tityrus's trip to Rome to secure his liberty as *resembling* the experience of birds and beasts that, if captured, seek out the first opportunity to regain their "first estate and freedom" (18). Because Vives does not limit the significance of literature to the representation of human lives, he can attend to those experiences that are common to people and animals. But

Alpers assumes that humans are the primary or only holders of literary and moral significance and thus excludes those experiences that cross the species barrier from his sphere of consideration. While Alpers presents his interpretation of pastoral as a non-ideological alternative to the new historicist readings that link pastoral texts to their ideological contexts and historical situations (xi), his interpretation actually affirms the historically situated anthropocentric ideology that human life is inherently more valuable than nonhuman life in his understanding of pastoral as texts where the "human centers are herdsmen or their equivalents" (28).[20]

Versions of Nature in Renaissance Pastoral

Following upon this dual methodology of sexuality theory and historicized ecocriticism, the chapters of this dissertation examine how early modern nature is represented and what it signifies in the pastoral panegyrics, romances, and dramas that were written in Italy, England, and France roughly between the 1510s and 1610s. The primary stress is on English pastoral, with a secondary accent on Italian pastoral. This arrangement reflects the current of literary influence that flowed from Italy to England, as English writers translated and adapted popular Italian pastorals and works of gentility literature—the treatises on nobility and courtesy books

[20] Alpers does not, in his Introduction, name the new historicist works on pastoral against which he positions his own "formalist account of pastoral and its literary history" (x); but he does direct the reader to his 1985 article, "Pastoral and the Domain of Lyric in Spenser's *Shepheardes Calender*," which argues that the new historicist readings of *The Shepheardes Calender* "give an inadequate account of its place in literary history, because what is at stake in that argument in the situation of poetry in Elizabethan culture, not the character of pastoral in and of itself" (xi). In that article, he refers to historicist interpretations of pastoral by Montrose, Richard Helgerson, and David L. Miller. In an essay that addresses Alpers's contribution to the debates over the politics of early modern pastoral, Patrick Cheney writes that Alpers's approach is "neither strictly idealistic nor ideological" (in contrast to historicist interpretations of the genre), but he aptly implies that Alpers's version arises from a preference for democratic and populist politics: "if this version has a politics, it is a populist or democratic one, about us all, not just poets in relation to monarchs: it is a pastoral of the people" (215).

containing the arguments for natural nobility and baseness that pervade, in particular, the English pastoral romances.

As will be plain to anyone familiar with the two colossal surveys of Renaissance pastoral that bookend the twentieth century—Greg's *Pastoral Poetry and Pastoral Drama* (1906) and Chaudhuri's *Renaissance Pastoral and Its English Developments* (1989)—Renaissance pastoral comprises a massive corpus of works, and no attempt is made here to be comprehensive. Instead, this dissertation examines important works in pastoral's main subgenres with the aim of showing that, through its complex understanding of nature's role in establishing and shaping human society as well as the dispositions and characteristics shared by all kinds of life, Renaissance pastoral does not presuppose or observe the division between human and nonhuman nature that has come to dominate biological, moral, and political discourses in the modern West.

Chapter 1, "Class Barriers and Species Crossings in Renaissance Gentility Literature and Pastoral Romances," argues that nature in the early modern pastoral romances and gentility literature is a hereditary force that makes all offspring—human and nonhuman alike—resemble their parents and kind. In the naturalistic framework put forward in the pastoral romances, courtesy books, heraldry writings, and nobility treatises, the gentry differ from the commonalty due to their greater disposition to virtuous behavior, which has allegedly been bred into gentle and noble lineages according to the same principles of generational similitude that animal breeders use to propagate desirable traits in breeds of dogs and races of horses. These works present the social classes as akin in important respects to animal breeds because both groupings are genealogically distinct populations where differences in breeding account for any variation in mental and bodily traits. The cross-species analogies in these works attenuate the species barrier between human and nonhuman, since all species are subject to the natural laws that determine

their mental and bodily traits. This nature-centered perspective simultaneously strengthens the barriers between social classes, since social stratification is said to result from natural differences that have been bred into the population over generations of assortative mating.

The force of heredity also structures the court-to-country narratives of the pastoral romances that are analyzed in the second part of the chapter. They intermingle gentlemen and shepherds in stories that "prove" nature's dominance over nurture. Prominent examples of this subgenre include Sidney's *Arcadia* (1580), Robert Greene's *Pandosto* (1588) and *Menaphon* (1589), and Book VI of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* (1596). In the foundling plot and other conventions of the pastoral romances, the discourse of "nature's kindness" denies that humans have any special freedom or dignity that exempts them from the material constraints of blood and descent that govern the rest of creation.

While in the pastoral romances nature is the hereditary force that makes offspring resemble their progenitors, in the pastoral dramas nature is the "law to love" that compels all creatures to pursue love as a means of reproducing their kind. Chapter 2, "Of Beasts, Gentlemen, and Shepherds: Love and Reproduction in Renaissance Pastoral Drama," examines the varying attitudes toward nature's "law to love" in three major Renaissance pastoral dramas, the *Aminta* (1573) by Tasso, *Il Pastor Fido* (1589) by Guarini, and *The Faithful Shepherdess* (~1609) by Fletcher. These pastoral dramas put forward subtly different answers to the question of what sort of relationship exists between beasts and people, and between classes of people, in regard to their instincts for love and procreation. As discussed above, the sexual dynamics in these plays clash with the heteronormative sexuality of modernity, and are in this respect "queer," since, in the Italian dramas, nature's procreative imperative is actionable only in the context of pressing heirs and heiresses to enter dynastic marriages, while celibacy is either the voluntary or involuntary

fate of humbler shepherds. The bimodal attitudes toward reproduction in these plays are not always rooted in the needs or desires of the individual, but are tied to a proto-eugenic ethics, where the society-wide good of propagating noble lineages overrides the desires of individuals.

The first part of the chapter focuses on the Italian dramas. In the *Aminta*, the perspective that men and women are animals controlled by an innate impulse to mate and procreate is integral to the play's critique of the young heiress Silvia's virginity as unnatural, and to the play's final affirmation of Silvia and Aminta's dynastic marriage as the fulfilment of nature's law to love. Countering Tasso's sensual and animalistic depiction of love and matrimony, Guarini's *Il Pastor Fido* links marriage to the human faculty of reason, since marriage assumes that people have the capacity to govern their animal passions, act rationally and in accordance with human laws, and be faithful to their lawful spouses. While for Tasso lawful marriage is merely the human expression of a pan-species instinct for love and childbearing, for Guarini marriage signifies the difference, and not analogy, between human and beast. However, because only the nobility are born with the rational souls that enable them to behave chastely, the human-beast division works to reinforce the class barrier between the humane nobility and the "beastly" underclass.

In *The Faithful Shepherdess*, Fletcher departs from his Italian models by introducing the humoral theory of psychology as the underlying material basis for sexual behavior, and this departure produces markedly different positions on the relationship between nature and society as well as the human-beast relationship. In the play, which is set in classless pagan society, a volatile humoral environment, rather than class differences, determines sexual behavior. Alcohol and meat heat the shepherds' bloods and incline them to lustful thoughts and actions. But society plays a positive, proto-Foucauldian disciplinary role by deploying religion and medicine (prayer

and anti-aphrodisiacal herbs) to cool their blood and make them chaste. In contrast to the Italian dramas, where virginity violates the procreative order of nature, *The Faithful Shepherdess* presents lust and extramarital sex as consequences of disruptions in the natural humoral equilibrium that accommodates virginity. Adapting the myth that wild beasts will not harm a virgin, Fletcher shows chastity to be a virtue, or power, that is recognized even by the beasts and spirits of the forest.

While the nature-versus-nurture plots and the cross-species continuities and analogies of the pastoral romances and dramas foreground resemblances between people and beasts, the gardening debate in Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*, the subject of Chapter 3, "Grafts Are Not Hybrids: Historicizing Plant and Animal Generation in *The Winter's Tale*," links the grafting of plants to human marriage, an analogy demanding attention to the ways in which plant propagation and reproductive marriage were commensurable or incommensurable, under the early seventeenth-century understanding of those phenomena. In the gardening debate, which occurs in Act 4, King Polixenes and the shepherdess Perdita discuss Perdita's refusal to cultivate carnations and gillyflowers. As we will see, scholars have for over a century assumed that Perdita condemns, and Polixenes defends, the art of crossbreeding or hybridizing plants. Further, because Polixenes has come to Perdita incognito to stop the prospective marriage between his son, Prince Florizel, and Perdita, scholars have further read this passage as containing a *sub rosa* commentary on the merits of the ostensible cross-class or "hybrid" marriage between the prince and shepherdess. According to consensus interpretation, this heavily coded exchange is ironic because both shepherdess and king appear to embrace positions on grafting that go against their immediate interests: Perdita's prejudice against hybrids would seemingly commit her to eschewing the marriage to a prince, while Polixenes's celebration of hybridity in plants would

seemingly commit him to celebrating the marriage of his "gentler scion" onto "the wildest stock."

However, this interpretation is anachronistic, as I argue in Chapter 3. The gardening debate cannot refer to plant hybridization because the play predates the discovery of artificial plant hybridization by over a century and the discovery of plant sexuality and reproduction by over half a century. As agricultural and literary writings from the period show, Shakespeare and other writers understood that grafts were not hybrids, but were a form of clonal propagation that differs from sexual reproduction in that it reproduces only the scion's kind and does not hybridize scion and stock. Guided by the question of what analogy can *The Winter's Tale* be read as posing between grafting and marriage if we understand grafting as early modern writers understood it, this chapter explores a number of new interpretations.

The fourth and final chapter, "The Mobility of Sovereignty in Renaissance Pastoral: Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale" and the Territory of Pastoral," shifts from the earlier chapters, which analyze the genealogical and generative representations of nature in pastoral romances and dramas, and turns to the representations of nature, in pastoral lyrics and eclogues, as the animal and territorial possessions of a shepherd or sovereign. This is the politics of pastoral—though not in the way that early modern critics of recent decades have typically formulated it.

The chapter brings together several sets of pastoral and related texts to tease out a tradition of pastoral politics built around legitimizing various forms of sovereignty, and to show how an obscure and neglected pastoral panegyric by Niccolò Machiavelli both adds to and subverts this tradition. The first half of the chapter discusses the changes in *who* is represented as the sovereign and *what* sovereignty is exercised over in courtly, panegyrical, and Biblical pastorals. While courtly and panegyrical pastorals legitimize forms of human dominion—the

shepherd's ownership of valuable ruminant herds, and the ruler's dominion over a territory—the pastoral eclogues that derive from the Biblical metaphor of the leader as a shepherd of men legitimize the political and spiritual power that a leader-*qua*-shepherd exercises over people. And in courtly, panegyrical, and Biblical pastorals, the representation of sovereigns as *individuals*—the literal shepherd, the territorial sovereign, and the metaphorical shepherd of men—contrasts with the representation of all humans as collective "lords" over the animals and the earth in seventeenth-century agrarian reform literature, such as Gerard Winstanley's *The New Law of Righteousness.* This contrast suggests a historical shift, from an illiberal culture that recognized the sovereignty of powerful individuals, to the modern liberal order, in which all humans are sovereigns with collective rights to use nature and animals to advance their interests.

The second half of the chapter gives an in-depth analysis of the pastoral panegyric, "Capitolo Pastorale," by Machiavelli, drawing on an archival examination of the two extant manuscripts of the poem. In the poem, a shepherd speaker sings the praises of a godlike youth, "Hyacinth," who is adored by the sentient natural world—rocks, air, plants, earth, forests—that he has recently come to rule. Although scholars debate this point, the poem's manuscript tradition and historical context indicate that Machiavelli wrote the poem for Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici in the same period, the early 1510s, that he dedicated *The Prince* to Lorenzo. The bucolic imagery in the poem sanctions the new prince's conquest of territory and thus participates in the pastoral tradition of normalizing ecological sovereignty as a necessary precondition for a successful state. However, "Capitolo Pastorale" is subversive, or "Machiavellian," because it denies that any prince or people enjoys a moral or legal claim to sovereignty over a territory. Representing earthly dominion as an act of violence, the poem decouples ecological sovereignty from a legitimizing moral framework and challenges the notion that any individual, group, or

species has a right to dominion over nature. Although scholars have in recent decades dismissed "Capitolo Pastorale" as a minor poem that Machiavelli likely wrote in his youth, my examination of Machiavelli's pastoral in the context of his more famous works demonstrates that the poem expresses key themes of Machiavelli's mature corpus, such as his arguments for political expediency over morality and his desire for Italian unification. My analysis also underscores the ecological dimension of these arguments, which are predicated on the notion that territorial dominion alone defines political power.

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As a historicist analysis that is powered by queer theory and ecocriticism alike, this dissertation finds in Renaissance pastoral a green and inhuman world that opposes the post-Enlightenment view that humans, either through their biological status as an interbreeding species or through their exceptional psychological profile, differ significantly from, or have special rights of dominion over, the rest of creation. In Renaissance pastoral, nature comes in many guises, and there are no humans as such. Many of these guises follow the early modern senses of "nature" related to biological reproduction and to the innate dispositions of living kinds. In the pastoral romances, nature is the hereditary force that, making children resemble their parents, accounts for both the analogies between human marriage and plant and animal husbandry and for the differences between gentlemen and shepherds. In the conservative and pro-matrimonial pastoral dramas, nature is the "law to love," the procreative urge that is shared by all creatures but that is respectably satisfied only by the nobility, and, even then, only within the bounds of lawful marriage. And in the pastoral panegyrics, nature appears in the modern sense relating to the phenomena of the physical world collectively; however, through their representation of the physical world as the sentient subjects of a godlike sovereign, the

panegyrics instantiate the early modern perspective that dominion over nature belongs to an individual ruler and is not the intrinsic right of humankind. As we will see in detail in the chapters that follow, Renaissance pastoral is indeed a form of "nature writing," but it writes about the nature that produces *kinds* of creatures—gentlemen and shepherds, nobles and beasts, ancient swains and hirelings, sovereigns and subjects—but no humans *qua* humans.

Chapter 1

Class Barriers and Species Crossings in Renaissance Pastoral Romances and Gentility Literature

The pastoral romances, which first became popular in continental Europe in the sixteenth century with Iacopo Sannazaro's *Arcadia* (1504) and Jorge de Montemayor's *Diana* (1559), are long mixed prose and verse works that follow members of the gentry and nobility as they leave urban and courtly centers and come to reside with poor shepherds in the country. While the Elizabethan and Jacobean pastoral romances share with their continental models the genre's distinctive court-to-country narrative structure, their stories of royal foundlings, mistaken identities, and cross-class love affairs show a peculiar interest in the hereditary nature of the difference between gentlemen and shepherds. Their views about heredity and class reflect, as we will see, the quasi-biological theory of hereditarianism that was well within the mainstream of "gentility literature."[21] Reading pastoral romances in conjunction with related works of gentility literature in this period, this chapter shows that the virtues associated with gentility—courage, wit, beauty, courtesy, etc.—were understood to be natural in the sense that they were traits that were transmitted from parent to child, through the parents' "seeds," and had supposedly been bred into gentle lineages over many generations. As the frequent examples from plant and animal husbandry in these works suggest, these writers understood that humans fundamentally

[21] I use the term "gentility literature," rather than the more commonly used "courtesy literature," to refer to the heraldry writing, courtesy books, and treatises on gentility/nobility that proliferated in the sixteenth century. As I argue in this chapter, these texts record the belief that gentility and nobility referred to a group of people with a shared ancestry that naturally disposed them to virtuous behavior. The word "gentility" derives from the same Indo-European base *gen-/gno-/gn-* (meaning "to produce, engender, beget") that gave rise to a host of Latin, Greek, and Germanic words that suggest the role that birth and breeding has played in defining various group identities (the *nascere* words such as *nature, nation* and *native*; the *genos* words such as *gentry, genealogy, eugenic*; the *kund* words such as *kin, kind* and *child*). While "courtesy literature" emphasizes the courtly location of the nobility, "gentility literature" captures the generative conception of gentility that I focus on here.

resembled animals because their bodies and behaviors were determined by the germinal, or "genetic," material they received from their parents, and because the differences in kind within the larger interbreeding population—the differences between gentlemen and commoners—were analogous to the differences in domesticated breeds, races, and stocks of plants and animals. The cross-species analogies and "biocentric" perspective of these works weakened the species barrier between human and nonhuman since all creatures were subject to nature's tendency to make children resemble their parents in mind and in body. This perspective simultaneously strengthened the barriers between the social classes, since social stratification resulted from putatively innate differences in the bodies and minds of the gentility and commonalty.

In defending this natural concept of human nobility, pastoral romance writers were taking one side of a well-documented period debate over the legitimacy of the hereditary social order. As historians have shown, the sixteenth century was a period of robust social mobility, when the rapid rise and fall of gentle families was in part fueled by new wealth that enabled would-be gentlemen to buy titles from local heralds who were often willing to invent pedigrees for the right price.[22] The increase in the number of gentlemen, and the scandals surrounding the elevation of baseborn men to gentle rank, reduced the prestige of the gentry.[23] The legitimacy of the social order was also challenged by humanists and political reformers. Humanists had long maintained the Ciceronian position that nobility was nothing more than virtuous deeds, with the implication that the nobility of a virtuous man of base parents was greater than the nobility of the

[22] The classic account of early modern social mobility is chapter 3, "The Inflation of Honours," in Lawrence Stone's *The Crisis of the Aristocracy*.

[23] Stone writes that the "relaxing of standards by heralds was dramatized by the revelation in 1616 that Sir William Segar, Garter King of Arms, had been tricked by the York Herald into selling arms … to that overworked man, Gregory Brandon, the common hangman of London—the arms being those of the Kingdom of Aragon with a canton of Brabant" (68).

delinquent child of gentle parents.[24] And political reformers had for centuries argued that the institution of the gentry unjustly denied all men their equal rights as common descendants of Adam; their famous rhetorical question—"When Adam delved and Eve Span, who was then a gentleman?"—implied that God did not intend that a separate gentry class should exist (Vogt 102-124; Stone 27; Montrose, "Of Gentlemen," 430-433).

To answer these socioeconomic, rhetorical, and political challenges to the nobility, gentility writers drew on various "tropes of social hierarchy" to explain and justify class stratification.[25] Here I focus on the trope of *breeding nobility*, which was commonplace in the heraldry writing, courtesy books, and treatises on nobility that proliferated in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in Italy and in England. In these texts, writers contended that an individual's disposition to virtue was inherited at birth from his parents, and that a disposition to virtue had been bred into noble genealogies according to the same natural (hereditary) principles that determined the distribution of traits in the domesticated animal breeds and races. According to this proto-hereditarian view, the nobility deserved disproportionate wealth and influence

[24] Discussing in *A Social History of Truth* how humanists mobilized the concept of virtue to legitimize both the existing social order and to make sense of social change, Steven Shapin writes that the "Ciceronian tradition of unambiguously equating gentility with virtue was a robust, if eclectically deployed, ancient resource. Ancient stresses on virtue powerfully assisted in both the interpretation and legitimization of increasingly acknowledged contemporary tensions in the constitution and identification of gentry. The enumeration and annotation of virtues found in almost all early modern ethical literature derived overwhelmingly from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Cicero's *Offices*, and Seneca" (61). See also John Huntington's *Ambition, Rank and Poetry in 1590s England*, esp. chapter 3.

[25] In his book analysis of the discourse of social class in early modern courtesy literature, *Ambition and Privilege*, Frank Whigham examines in chapter 3, "Tropes of Social Hierarchy: Gentle and Base," the ideological tropes that writers used to reinforce the "absolute ontological distinction between the ruling class and its subjects" (63). In his discussion of three main tropes—"total mystery," "mystification of the contingent difference as absolute," and "mystified origins"—Whigham refers briefly to the biological element at play in writers' differentiation of gentle and base (71), but on the whole focuses on the context of social positioning rather than the natural (concerning heredity) discourse of breeding nobility that I examine here.

because they had been bred to be more virtuous than baseborn persons, and hence more capable of governing society for the benefit of all.[26]

In the Italian treatises on nobility, courtiers wrote dialogues in which characters debate rivaling theories of nobility, including the theory that the hereditary aristocracy is justified by the natural principles of heredity, according to which noble parents transmit their greater virtues to their children. These treatises on nobility, such as *Il Cortigiano* (1528) by Baldassare Castiglione and *Il Nennio* (1542) by Giovan Battista Nenna, were published in English translations by writers adjacent to the Elizabethan nobility. In 1595, a first edition of William Jones's translation of *Il Nennio* appeared, with commendatory sonnets by Edmund Spenser, George Chapman, Samuel Daniel, and Angel Day; a second edition followed in 1600. Similar views on the nobility are found in courtesy books, or the "mirror for princes" literature, such as *The Boke Named the Gouernour* (1531). There, Thomas Elyot traces the origin of nobility to antiquity, when antiquity when primitive societies rewarded especially virtuous men with titles and wealth; these men "ingendered" virtuous children, who transmitted their virtue and wealth to the next generation, in a process that Elyot refers to as "*Eugenia*," the Greek term for "good kinde or lignage" (126-127). And the genealogical, or "eu-genealogical," concept of nobility also appeared in heraldry writing, such as John Ferne's *A Blazon of Gentrie* (1586), which mainly concerned the technical description of the coats of arms that symbolically represented the rank and pedigree of knights, lords, and individuals otherwise "armigerous," or entitled to bear the arms that denoted gentle standing.

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[26] Describing the northern humanists' commitment to the traditional ordering of society, Quentin Skinner writes: "Having admitted that government ought to be placed in the hands of those with the greatest virtue, and having affirmed that those with the greatest virtue happen to be the nobility and gentry, they proceed to draw the pleasingly obvious conclusion: that in order to maintain the best-ordered form of political society, we ought not to tamper with existing social distinctions, but ought on the contrary to preserve them as far as possible" (238-239).

The genealogical inheritance of nobility is also a central theme of the English pastoral romance. Philip Sidney's *Arcadia* (1580), Robert Greene's *Pandosto* (1588) and *Menaphon* (1589), Book VI of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* (1596), and William Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale* (~1609) depict nobility as an embodied disposition to virtue that wellborn children inherit from their parents (and this is the sense in which I use "nobility" in this chapter). Per the opening cantos to Book VI of *The Faerie Queene*, the virtue of courtesy abounds among the knights and ladies at court not because it is *acquired* there, but because "dame Nature" makes knights and ladies "goodly gracious … by kind" (6.2.1-2). That is, nature distributes virtues according to the kinship relations ("by kind") that make members of the same family resemble one another. In the world of pastoral romance, the identity of individuals is not fashioned by clothing, education, or a free-acting "self," but by birth unto gentle or base parents. The classic example this "nature passes nurture" thesis is the foundling plot, in which wellborn children are raised by shepherds but mature to exhibit the beauty and grace of their birth parents rather their foster parents (Tilley 491). With the foundling plot and related devices, pastoral romance writers denied the constitutive function of clothing and education that was sometimes claimed by early modern commentators, and instead stressed the centrality of nature and breeding as the material establishers of social identity.[27]

This chapter broadens criticism of the pastoral romance by means of an ecocritical perspective showing that early modern representations of social class were shaped by the belief that humans fundamentally resembled animals because their traits and behaviors were similarly

[27] As Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass write in the introduction to their book on the function of clothes in constituting Renaissance subjects, *Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory*, "it was investiture, the putting on of clothes, that quite literally constituted a person as a monarch or a freeman of a guild or a household servant" (2).

determined by heredity—by their parents' kind, breed, stock, or race. While scholars writing about pastoral romances have noted that social class is represented as natural in these texts, they have not examined in detail the ideas about heredity underlying these representations. These ideas about heredity have ecocritical significance because they reveal a distinctly early modern understanding of humans' proximity to animals—a sense of human animality that is opposed to the Cartesian notion that humans, in their capacity for free action and self-determination, differ from animals whose behaviors are determined by their nature. Drawing on heraldry writing and courtesy books to flesh out the ideas of the hereditary nobility and human animality in the pastoral romances, I show that early modern writers used "nature" to refer to a principle of generational similitude that makes all offspring—human and nonhuman—resemble their parents.[28]

Breeding Nobility in Gentility Literature

Early modern gentility writers predicated their claim that nobility was natural on two main ideas that I discuss in detail in the following paragraphs. First, mental traits were biologically inherited in the same way that bodily traits were (that is, transmitted through the parents' "seed"), so that sons resembled their fathers in their behavior, such as a disposition to virtue or vice, just as they resembled them in body. Making analogies between human and animal breeding, Italian gentility writers, such as Baldassare Castiglione, Hannibal Romei,

[28] It was only in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the formalization of biology and genetics as scientific disciplines, that the term "heredity" acquired its modern sense of the transmission of genetic information from generation to generation. However, natural philosophers going back to Epicurus had theorized about the natural processes responsible for the persistence in forms over time—according to the natural law that "like begets like"—that was clarified by modern geneticists and their discovery of the recombination and transmission of genes in sexual reproduction. For the history of heredity and theories of generation in relation to early modern literature, see Horst Breuer, "Theories of Generation in Shakespeare"; Jenny Davidson, *Breeding*, esp. chapter 1, "The Rules of Resemblance." For general historical studies of heredity, the classic work is Francois Jacob's *The Logic of Life* (1973); a more recent treatment is Staffan Muller-Willie and Hans-Jorg Rheinberger, *A Cultural History of Heredity*.

Giovan Battista Nenna, and their Tudor translators, emphasized that the differentiation between gentle and base was consistent with the natural principle—"like begets like"—that also governed the propagation of traits in breeds of animals and varieties of plants.[29] Second, the gentry were as a group ostensibly more disposed to virtue than the commonalty because the disposition to virtue had been gradually bred into them over time. Writers such as Thomas Elyot, John Ferne, and John Selden considered the various formal and informal prohibitions against disparagement (cross-class marriage) as having created two genealogically distinct groups with different characteristics.[30] In stressing the materiality and heritability of mental traits, these writers stand apart from later philosophers, such as René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, who viewed the rational and putatively incorporeal human mind as a source of free consciousness and self-determination that distinguished human psychic life from nonhuman life. The same biocentric analogies that crossed the species barrier to avow the role of nature and breeding in determining identity in all creatures also served to naturalize the class barrier between noble and base that was basic to early modern society.

In their argument that gentle parents biologically transmitted a virtuous disposition to their children, gentility writers such as Hannibal Romei and Francis Markham drew on a materialist theory of the mind that viewed human mental qualities as affective dispositions (temperaments, aptitudes, abilities) that were inherited at birth and varied across individuals and kinds. In Hannibal Romei's popular dialogue on courtesy, the *Courtier's Acadamie* (trans. John Kepers, 1598), the nobleman Varano argues that nobility is "not contrary to the lawes of Nature"

[29] Baldassare Castiglione, *Il Cortegiano* (1528); Hannibal Romei, *Discorsi Cavallereschi* (1585); Giovan Battista Nenna, *Il Nennio* (1542).

[30] Thomas Elyot, *The Boke named the Governour* (1531); John Ferne, *A Blazon of Gentrie* (1586); John Selden, *Titles of Honor* (1614).

because mental traits, such as an inclination to virtue, are passed from grandfather to father to son in the same way that bodily traits are:

> if we see by experience that in the sonnes bodies oftentimes, the similitudes of fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers are represented, why should we not graunt, that in the mind with the body conioyned the like may come to passe? & that in them the like inclination & facilities, sometimes vnto vertue, and otherwiles to vice, may appeare. (194)

Because the mind is "conioyned" with the body, Varano says that we can observe "similitudes" in mental inclinations as well as bodily traits across generations. Echoing Romei's language regarding the "conjunction" of mind and body in a discussion of the heritability of nobility in *Booke of Honour* (1625), Francis Markham uses the transgenerational transmission of mental traits to explain how "Antiquitie of bloode (by descending from Noble parents)" is one of the "lively roots" from which honor "grows" (10). He writes that "we daily see, that Fathers, Grandfathers, and great Grandfathers haue their Images and portraitures liuely presented in the bodies of their children; and why not then the vertues of their minds, being a thing so neere conioyned to the body" (*ibid.*). In arguing that the transmission of nobility was consistent with the everyday experience of seeing resemblances across generations, Romei and Markham employed an ancient discourse on the heritability of the material soul that Michel Montaigne drew on in his critique of the theory that human differed from animals because they possessed a rational and incorporeal soul. In *An Apology for Raymond Sebond* (1580), Montaigne argues that the faculties of the soul/mind ("ratiocinating, remembering, comprehending, judging, desiring") are materially based in the brain, as is evident from the impairment of these faculties following a head injury: "the seat of this power is the brain, as is clearly shown from the fact that wounds

and accidents affecting the head immediately harm the faculties of the soul" (123). Montaigne cites Lucretius's argument that mental qualities were inherited in the same way that physical qualities were: "Not only physical qualities were held to flow like this from father to son, but similar humours, complexions and inclinations of the soul"; as Lucretius says, the "soul is born from semen and grows with the rest of the body" (124). Gentility writers applied this theory of the material and heritable mind to group variation in mental characteristics in order to bolster their position that the nobility were born with a greater disposition to virtue.

Gentility writers thus understood an individual's mental characteristics—which are today commonly discussed in terms of individual psychology, selfhood, and personality, often in their social and historical contexts—as the material "dispositions," "inclinations," "humors," "affects," and "facilities" believed to be characteristic of a specific genealogical community ("race," "species," "kind").[31] In this view, somatic traits *disposed* or *inclined* an individual to certain behaviors, emotions, and abilities, in contrast to other psychological traditions, which held that these dispositions emanated from the disembodied seat of a rational soul, or the interior site of contention between id and ego. In Romei's *Courtier's Acadamie*, the nobleman Varano defends the institution of hereditary nobility against those who contend the institution was unjust because Nature, being a "kind mother to all, and a stepmother to none," would not make some naturally more disposed to virtue than others. Varano argues that Nature makes "necessary" traits "common to all," but creates variation in "accidentall and contingent" traits. Among these accidental traits are the various mental characteristics ("diverse dispositions," "divers temperatures [humors]," "divers inclinations") that vary across individuals of the same species or

[31] Kepers translates the Italian "*individui*" as "individuals," "*specie*" as "kind," and "*stirpe*" as "race" (*Discorsi* 142).

kind, and, being passed from parent to child, create distinct "races" with different mental characteristics ("from whence … some are esteemed of noble race, and other ignoble").[32] *Pace* the critics of hereditary aristocracy, "Nobilitie … is not contrary to the lawes of Nature" (194) because it is the parents' "seed" that makes progeny resemble their parents in body and mind. As Varano puts it, "Nature" works "by seed" to bestow

> diuers dispositions, some times good, some times bad: wherevpon indiuidualles of the same kinde (but especially in human kinde) as they are of diuers temperatures, so in them diuers inclinations, and in their mind different effects and affects are discovered: from whence … some are esteemed of noble race, and others ignoble … Nobilitie therefore is not contrary to the lawes of Nature: Because Nature made all thinges necessary, common to all, and those which are accidentall and contingent, shee left them subiect to instabilitie: for if we see by experience that in the sonnes bodies oftentimes, the similitudes of fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers are represented, why should we not graunt, that in the mind with the body conioyned the like may come to passe? & that in them the like inclination & facilities, sometimes vnto vertue, and otherwiles to vice, may appeare. (193-194)

Varano's account of how the natural variation in mental traits across individuals in the same "kind" ("*specie*") gives rise to different "races" ("*stirpe*") exemplifies the antithetical senses of the term "individual"—which could mean both "indivisible" and "differentiated" in early modern writing. In his influential 1992 article, "Shakespeare, the Individual, and the Text," Peter Stallybrass traced the expanded vernacular uses of "individual" from its original specialized

[32] Discussing the concept of race in pre-Enlightenment societies, Nirenberg notes that the etymology of the term "race"—from the Romance *raza*—seems to have expanded to human groupings from its original use in denoting breeds of horses (248-249).

sense in Trinitarian dogma (where "individual" often appeared as an adjective describing the relation between the three parts of the Trinity). It was not the case that an older, religious meaning of individual (indivisible) was being replaced by a new modern and secular meaning (individuated, separate, differentiated), but often that early modern writers used "individual" ambiguously to mean both "same" and "separate" at the same time. Here Varano applies these antithetical senses of "individual:" individuals are *indivisible* from other members of the species insofar as they have certain "necessary" traits in common, but they are *differentiated* from other members of the species according to "accidentall and contingent" traits—such as a noble disposition to virtue—that vary by subgroups ("race") within the species, such as noble and ignoble. Individuality refers to sets of necessary and accidental traits that simultaneously identify someone as a member of a general kind or species and differentiate him as a member of a smaller subgroup.

Plant and animal agriculture were also used to show that nobility was transmitted through human lineages according to the same natural principle that made "all creatures" resemble the other members of their particular "race." In Castiglione's *Courtyer*, the nobleman defending the blood-and-lineage definition of nobility, Count Canossi, maintains that the ideal courtier is a gentleman born of a good house because, "for the moste parte," nature makes men resemble their ancestors just as nature makes plants and animals similar to the "race" or "stock" they come from:

> Because nature in euery thing hath depely sowed that priuie sede, which geueth a certain force and propertie of her beginning, vnto whatsoeuer springeth of it, and maketh it lyke vnto her selfe. As we see by exaumple not onely in the race of horses and other beastes, but also in trees, whose slippes and graftes alwayes for

> the moste parte are lyke vnto the stocke of the tree they came from: and yf at any time they growe out of kind, the fault is in the husbandman. And the lyke is in men, yf they bee trayned vp in good nourtour, moste commonlye they resēble them from whom thei come and often times passe thē, but yf they haue not one that can well trayn them vp, thei growe (as it were) wylde, and neuer come to their ripenesse. (Ciii)

Traits ("a certain force and propertie") persist across generations because nature has "deeply sowed that priuie sede" that makes everything resemble the seed it has sprung from.[33] Canossi expands the analogy between agriculture and breeding nobility when he asserts that if noble children do not grow up to resemble or surpass the parents, the fault lies with those who failed to "trayne" them up in "good nourtour." Just as trees may degenerate ("growe out of kind") if a husbandman does not care for them properly, so it is that men will "moste commonlye" mature to resemble their parents if they "bee trayned vp in good nourtour." Although Western writers have sometimes pointed to human culture as a point of human difference and exceptionalism, here Canossi considers humans to be like domesticated plants and animals in their need for culture to ensure proper development.[34]

[33]As we will see in Chapter 3, recognized exceptions to the rule that everything resembles its parent seed are certain plants, especially fruit trees, that produce variable seeds and therefore cannot be sown by seed. People propagated such plants by taking cuttings from good specimens and planting these "slips" in the earth or grafting them into stock plants. Castiglione refers to this practice when he mentions "trees, whose slippes and graftes alwayes for the moste parte are lyke vnto the stocke of the tree they came from."

[34]As Laurie Shannon has argued, the early modern discourse of humans' exceptional need for culture often took the form of writers lamenting the fact that humans, unlike self-sufficient animals, could not survive in the absence of culture; texts such as *King Lear* show a sense of human deficiency that refers to "our underprovisioned entrance into the world and corresponding need for education and extended nursing, in direct contrasts to notions of animal self-sufficiency, moderation, and innate knowledge that, at the turn of the seventeenth century, had long been in circulation" ("Poor, Bare, Forked," 170).

In a similar passage in Romei's *Courtier's Acadamie*, Varano claims that we can safely judge a gentleman by his "stocke" for the same reason we judge other creatures "by their races." A gentleman, having inherited the dispositions of his ancestors, tends to resemble them in their virtues:

> For if we esteeme the goodnesse of diuers creatures, by their races, how much more ought wee to prognosticate the vertue of men by his stocke, and progeny, considering that not onely secret vertue of seede, but also reason doth instigate man, to immitate the reuealed vertue of his progenitours. (196)

Rationality reinforces the blind reproductive process that causes an individual to resemble his breeding stock because a man's reason spurs him to imitate the "vertue of his progenitours" (similar to how Canossi saw the purpose of "trayning" as reinforcing a natural disposition toward virtue). This conception of human rationality is at odds with later arguments, such as those developed by Descartes in *Discours de la méthode* (1637) and other writings, that reason liberates humans from the bodily constraints that determine other creatures' behaviors.

In *Il Nennio* (Venice, 1542; trans. William Jones, 1595), Nenna comments on the similarity between the processes used to breed domestic animals and people. In this work, a "new" gentleman, Fabricio, debates with Possidonio, the scion of a long-established noble family, the question of whether a nobleman by birth or a gentleman by virtue is greater in nobility. (Their names befit their different conditions: "Fabricio" derives from the Latin *faber*, "craftsman," and refers to his position as a newly created gentleman of working-class origins; "Possidonio" derives from the Latin/Italian *possidere* ["to possess"] and *donum/dono* ["gift," "talent"] and refers to his wealth and natural gifts.) In his argument that blood and ancestral quality, rather than virtuous acts, better define nobility, Possidonio uses plant and animal

breeding to illustrate that nobility (defined as excellence) is "preserved" in "living creatures" through the principle of generational similitude:

> The force which nature giveth to this nobilitie is so great, that wee see it doth not only preserve the same in man, but likewise in other living creatures, not partakers of reason, yea, even in plants, as we may see in horses, dogs, trees, and in other things. For if I desire a faire horse, or a good dog, or if I intend to graft any excellent fruit,[35] I will first seeke out the most noble horse, the best hunting spaniell, and the most excellent tree of that sort which I can possibly finde, because it wil never faile to proove like unto that which hath engendred it … And everie kind (to which nature hath given vertue to bring forth fruite) produceth its like. (13-14)

Here the principle of generational similitude—"everie kind … produceth its like"—becomes a technique for breeding excellence, where a husbandman selects excellent individuals ("I will first seeke out the most noble …") and uses them as breeding stock. Although Possidonio grants that humans as "partakers of reason" differ from animals, rationality is not a faculty that exempts humans from the natural principles that make children resemble "that which hath engendred" them.

Similar thinking is expressed in Book VI of *The Faerie Queene*, where Spenser uses animal analogy to explain why virtuous gentlemen tend to beget virtuous children, and to respond directly to the humanist position that defined gentility in terms of virtuous behavior (which implied that a well-mannered commoner has as good a claim to gentility as a gentleman by birth). Spenser quotes Chaucer making the point that gentle deeds show a gentle mind: "True

[35] See n33 on grafting.

is, that whilome that good Poet sayd, / The gentle minde by gentle deeds is known" (6.3.1; 903).[36] Spenser then elaborates Chaucer's "democratic" line, twisting it to make it conform to his own position that gentle manners result from gentle breeding. Gentle manners indicate a gentle mind *because* nothing shows a man's "race" so well as his manners, which is why we seldom see trotting stallions beget ambling colts, or baseborn men showing courage or courtesy:

> For a man by nothing is so well bewrayd,
> As by his manners, in which plaine is showne
> Of what degree and what race he is growne.
> For seldome seene, a trotting Stalion get
> An ambling Colt, that is his proper owne:
> So seldome seene, that one in basenesse set
> Doth noble courage shew, with curteous manners met. (6.3.1)

Like the gentility writers, Spenser considers the patterns of resemblance between parent and progeny as evidence of the genealogical transmission of traits that explains why baseborn individuals seldom exhibit noble traits such as courage and courtesy and wellborn individuals usually do. Because ancestry determines the traits of all creatures, a person's manners show his ancestry in the same way that a colt's gait show his pedigree.

Gentility writers conceived of the gentry as a genealogically distinct, innately more virtuous group that had emerged after the classless pastoral societies of antiquity, as depicted in the Old Testament and classical histories, began to transition to modern agricultural states with

[36] In a 1932 article, "Spenser's Theory of Courtesy," Alexander Corbin Judson discusses Spenser's transmission of the "democratic theory that virtuous conduct rather than gentle blood makes a man noble," and makes the point that Spenser is "certainly twisting Chaucer's meaning to suit his purpose" (123). See also Geller, "Spenser's Theory of Nobility in Book VI of *The Faerie Queene*," 50.

complex economies and political hierarchies. The origins of the nobility, and the etymology of the term "noble," are discussed in *The Boke Named the Gouernour* (1531), Elyot's work concerning the education of members of the governing class. There, Elyot explains how, when states were first formed, societies distributed wealth and dignities to especially virtuous men as a reward for their beneficial labor and industry (2.4; 126). These "good men were ingendred good children" (fathered good children) who maintained the family's wealth and virtue, and passed both on to their own children (127).[37] The propagation of families that had won high status through their industriousness was, Elyot notes, termed "*Eugenia*" by the Greeks, meaning "good kinde or lignage," in reference to the "goodness" brought about by "suche generation."[38] As *nobilis* in classical Latin originally meant "generally known," these high-status families eventually came to be called the "nobility" because they were *known* for their virtue and excellence, and the term *nobilis* by extension came to denote the virtues—courage, industriousness, intelligence—that won the nobles their eminence (*ibid.*).

Writers stressed the antiquity of noble families because how long a family had been reproductively isolated from the commonality was thought to be a measure of the degree of the family's noble qualities and liability to base behaviors. In 1614, the jurist and scholar John Selden published *Titles of Honor*, an encyclopedic survey of the peerage systems of various nations from antiquity through the present. There, Selden argues that the genealogical diversity in the parents' seeds—the "potentially severall individuating Qualities"—vindicate the laws and

[37] A Biblical variant traced the two lineages of noble and ignoble all the way back to Adam's sons, Seth and Cain, in heraldry texts such as Juliana Berner's *The Book of St. Albans* (1496), Gerard Legh's *The Accedens of Armory* (1562), and John Ferne's *A Blazon of Gentrie* (1586) (Kelso 33-35; Shapin 54).

[38] The proto-eugenics language of "Eugenia" is common in these writings. In the preface to his second edition of *Titles of Honour* (1631), John Selden traces idea of the heritability of nobility back to a pseudo-Aristotelian fragment, "*περι Ευγενειας*," or "of Eugenia." In Hannibal Romei's *Courtiers Academie* (trans. John Kepers, 1598), a character defending natural nobility explains that the term "noble" corresponds with the ancient Greek usage of "Eugenia" to refer to "good birth" (186).

customs that derive nobility from ancestry. Because a child's "likeness is oft times to a remote Ancestor," there is a "speciall regard to bee had to the number of Discents in Gentrie" (8). That is, because children can inherit qualities from their remote ancestors as well as near ancestors, the peerage systems' requirement of multiple generations of nobility prevents a base atavism from ruining a lineage.

Other writers also stressed the importance of the ancient vintage of noble families. In the argument of William Cornwallis, noble families have blood and humors that are separate from those of the "crowde"bbecause "Time"—the length of time corresponding with multiple generations of noble marriages—has distilled, or purified, the noble content of their blood: "since Time hath distild our bloods and separated us from the crowde, I holde nobility bound not commit any action tasting of a degenerate humor" (qtd. C. B. Watson 80). William Petty defines a gentleman in terms of his "consanguinity or affinity by marriage to and with many other gentlemen, and for many yeares past" (qtd. Shapin 53). During the succession crisis in Sidney's *Arcadia*, Musidorus argues that the Arcadians ought to recognize Pamela, daughter of the seemingly deceased Duke Basilius, on the grounds that it would take many generations to establish another dynasty, "race," equal to Pamela's line: "Do you hope in a few years to set up such another race, which nothing but length of time can establish (378)"?

In an influential article on pastoral, Montrose contrasted the aristocratic ethos of courtly pastoral with the egalitarian impulses of "ploughman literature," which told the grievances of the common man through the suffering figure of the ploughman. The ploughman literature relied on "religious claims of common origins, shared fallenness, and spiritual equality among men" to challenge the legitimacy of the aristocracy (432). For Montrose, courtly pastoral and agrarian reform literature differed in their contrasting interpretations of the long-term impact of Adam

and Eve's banishment from Eden: gentlemen argued that, paradise being lost, the social order that divided gentleman from shepherd was the legitimate result of the "differential subjection to the penalty of fallen Adam" (430). Reformers countered that, in the existing social order, commoners were unjustly denied the rights they enjoyed as descendants from the first pair (432). Montrose implied that the disagreement between aristocrats and reformers was primarily phrased in a religious idiom.

However, in the view of the gentility writers, the scriptural account of the differential subjection to the penalty of Adam was corroborated by beliefs about the natural variation in quality within kinds of living things, and about the natural transmission of nobility and ignobility through family lineages. In *A Blazon of Gentrie* (1586), the lawyer John Ferne reads Genesis as evidence that since "the beginnings of the world" men maintained both "the bright estate of noblenesse, and also the obscure and servile condition of ignobility" (3). Ignobility began with Adam's son Cain, who, for the ungentle murder of his brother Abel, was penalized with a life of vagrancy and poverty ("condemned to leade a vagrant life, uncertaine of his dwelling, without alotment of patrimonie, or establishment of his family in any fixed, or permanent inheritaunce") (2). Adam's estate accordingly passed to his virtuous son, Seth, who begat "a most noble Genealogie" (*ibid.*). Nobility and ignobility continued in the respective lineages of Seth and Cain until the Flood brought an end to all ignoble people, leaving only the noble Noah and his family. But ignobility was renewed in the world through the delinquency of Noah's son, Ham, the founder of another lineage of "churls" (2-3). For Ferne, the existence of nobility and ignobility within mankind in consistence with similar variation in "worthiness" within kinds of birds, beasts, fishes, as well as plants and trees, for "nature, in the creation of all her creatures … hath

not distributed one equality of worthines … but that in them, so farre differing in shape and features, some one excelleth another, even in his owne kinde" (3-4).

For Ferne as for other heraldry writers, the universal tendency toward generational resemblance—for children to resemble their parents—is the basis both for the analogy between humans and nonhumans and for the assertion that the gentility are innately different than the baseborn. Defending the legal penalties against disparagement (the marriage of persons of unequal ranks), Ferne argues that such laws follow "natures law," by which he means the tendency for children to resemble their parents that requires that people take ancestry into account before approving a marriage:

> And althinges, how do they follow the qualities of their first cause? ... Are we carefull then, from what tree our plant is taken?[39] Of what kind our dogs do come? And of what race our horses are bred? And shall we hold it nothing to the purpose of what parents, a Gentleman is begotten? thus you see, how that the law-maker had instruction, even from natures lawe, to forbid such unegall copling. (12)

In the view of the gentility writers, social inequality reflected not—or not only—the disparate impact of Adam's fall, but more generally natural inequality, or variation, within all living kinds. And these inequalities were not randomly distributed but followed the pattern of generational resemblance where children tended to inherit the qualities of their parents. For Ferne, this pattern was discernible in the genealogies of the Old Testament as well as in the human families and plant and animal husbandry of the present day.

[39] See n33 on grafting.

The legitimacy of the hereditary aristocracy thus had both a scriptural and natural warrant because the genealogies of the Old Testament were believed to exemplify the transmission of nobility and ignobility through different lineages that continued into post-classical Europe. While reformers maintained that human equality was a fixed condition that had persisted since Eden, defenders of the prerogatives of the nobility replied that humans, like animals, were subject to the universal natural laws of variation and generational resemblance—that "everie kind (to which nature hath given vertue to bring forth fruite) produceth its like" (Nenna 14)—and that the gentry's innate worthiness gave them special dignities and rights. In the 1622 conduct book, *Compleat Gentleman*, the Cavalier writer Henry Peacham expresses incredulity that anyone would doubt the role of breeding in determining nobility, since everyone shows their appreciation for the "difference of linage" when they carefully choose their fruit cultivars, buy cuttings of flowers for propagation, choose their spouse, or even their servant (2).[40] "Surely," Peacham argues, "to believe that Nature (rather God in Nature) produceth not the same among our selves, is to question the rarest Worke-mistris of Ignorance or Partialitie, and to abase our selves beneath the Beast" (*ibid.*). In Peacham's conception, people who deny that God/Nature produces nobility in humans—in the same way everyone understands nature to work in non-human life—degrade humans to a level "beneath the Beast" by denying them the only real source of nobility. Humans' superiority to animals depends upon humans' acknowledging that God, working through Nature, uses "difference of linage" to breed differences in humans as in other creatures.

[40] Peacham defined nobility as the "Honour of blood in a Race or Linage, conferred formerly upon some one or more of that Family, either by the Prince, the Lawes, customes of that Land or Place, whereby either out of knowledge, culture of the mind, or by some glorious Action performed, they have been usefull and beneficiall to the Common-wealths and places where they live" (2).

In sum, by emphasizing the hereditary establishers of behavior and social identity, the discourse of breeding nobility in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century gentility writing denied the import of the species barrier and naturalized the class barrier between gentle and base. Although gentility writers agreed with the humanist tradition that associated nobility with virtue, they insisted that, because virtue was a heritable disposition of the embodied mind, it was normally found in noble lineages. This insistence of the materiality and heritability of mental traits would soon be challenged by new arguments that all humans differed from nonhuman life in their equal possession of a rational, disembodied soul. Descartes begins the *Discours de la méthode* (1637) by arguing that the *equal* reasonableness of all men is the necessary basis of humans' difference from other animals:

> Reason … is naturally equal in all men … the diversity of our opinions does not arise from the fact that some people are more reasonable than others, but solely from the fact that we lead our thoughts along different paths and do not take the same things into consideration; … inasmuch as [reason or sense] alone makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts, I prefer to believe that it exists whole and entire in each of us. (1-2)

Because humans are all born with rational minds, any variation in reasonableness is caused by post-natal environment—the "different paths" individuals take—rather than by the different genealogical paths that constituted an individual's natural inheritance, as the gentility writers believed. In arguing for the equal reasonableness of all humans (which formed the basis of modern human exceptionalism), Descartes departed from early modern writers who considered human mental traits to be inherited according to the principle that "like begets like," which also governed the persistence of traits in breeds and races of plants and animals. Assuming that

human and nonhuman life alike was shaped by processes of birth and generation, gentility writers insisted that the gentry and commonalty, like different races of horses, or breeds of dogs, or species of trees, had distinct genealogies that explained the nobility's greater disposition to virtue.

Breeding Nobility in the Pastoral Romances

As discussed at the outset of the chapter, the English pastoral romances grew out of a continental genre, initiated by Sannazaro and popularized by Montemayor, about ladies and gentlemen who abandon their native cities for the rural society of shepherds. In these continental romances, the subject of class difference between gentles and shepherds is marginal, especially in comparison to the Elizabethan and Jacobean romances, which bring class difference from the margins to the center of the genre. The English romance focus on the specifically hereditary nature of class difference may show the additional influence of the Greek romances that were popularized in new translations in the late 1500s. Heliodorus's *Aethiopian History* (trans. 1569) and Longus's pastoral romance *Daphnis and Chloé* (trans. 1587) both explore the concept of heredity in familiar "foundling" plots of abandoned wellborn children raised by foster parents in obscurity.[41] But, as discussed in the preceding section, there existed within heraldic mainstream culture a quasi-biological theory of the hereditary nature of class identity. This theory was supported by examples from plant and animal husbandry, and, as we will see, similar cross-species analogies in the pastoral romances show the influence of the gentility literature.

[41] Thomas Underdowne translated the *Aethiopica* in 1569, probably from the Latin translation of Warschewiczki published in 1551. The Greek text of *Daphnis and Chloe* was translated first into French by Jacques Amyot as *Les Amours pastourales de Daphnis et de Chloé* in 1559, and then, in a very free adaptation of Amyot's version, into English by Angel Daye in 1587.

The following three-part discussion examines the trope of breeding nobility in the pastoral romances to show that these texts present nobility and ignobility as innate qualities that are created by nature and that cannot be altered by a change of environment, dress, or title. By repeatedly linking the breeding of gentlemen and shepherds with the breeding of other kinds of plant and animal life, and by representing the futility of class transformation, pastoral writers reveal that the heraldic perspective was a "biocentric" one denying that humans were psychologically exceptional, and insisting that in humans as in other creatures, individual and class identities were determined by birth and descent.

Nature Passes Nurture in the Foundling Plots of Greene, Spenser, and Shakespeare

When the shepherdess Perdita is revealed to be the long-lost daughter of King Leontes and Queen Hermione, a gentleman attending the royal family observes that both Perdita's resemblance to her majestic mother and her noble affect indicating a nature (noble birth and ancestry) far above her breeding (fostering by common shepherds) are evidence that she is indeed Leontes's daughter: "the majesty of the creature, in resemblance of the mother; the affection of nobleness which nature shows above her breeding […] proclaim her with all certainty to be the king's daughter" (5.2.35-37). Without any suggestion of disrespect, the gentleman calls the princess a "creature" who, despite being bred, or raised, by poor shepherds, has a majestic and noble affect indicating her royal nature and filial relation to Leontes and Hermione. This assessment evinces the belief that nobility—the excellence in body and in behavior—was not acquired at court but rather inherited at birth from noble parents, in the same way that noble traits were transmitted from parent to child in all living things. In the pastoral romances, the discovery of the foundling's noble birth confirms not simply the correspondence

between birth and rank that was the basis of the political order, but, more precisely, the natural principle that *like begets like* from which that order derived its structure and legitimacy.

Recent scholars have read the pastoral romances' representation of natural nobility as a discourse in the service of the traditional social order that favored elite families. However, in reducing literary representations of nature to the social power structures that presumably motivate them, this analytical framework has examined "nature" only in human terms and has overlooked how the cross-species analogies and naturalistic references gestured beyond the social world to mediate the relationship between human and nonhuman life. In *The English Romance in Time,* Helen Cooper argues that the "meme" of the royal foundling registers early modern British societies' concerns with "the rightful passing on of land and power," and the succession disputes that required some way of recognizing the legitimate heir (324). The innate nobility of the foundling is an ideologically motivated "political fantasy" that functions to justify and naturalize the political status quo that transmitted titles and honors along blood lines (338). Cooper emphasizes the fictional status of a political ideology that imagined that a foundling's noble nature is recognizable in his body and behavior, even when his noble status is "occluded," or not marked by identifying clothing and courtly situation (*ibid.*). Similarly, in *The Origins of the English Novel*, McKeon reads the romance foundling convention as a response to the early modern socioeconomic problem of the "inflation of honors"—the increasing number of titles awarded to lowborn merchants who were buying their gentry status (151-153). In McKeon's view, the correspondence between "rank and virtue, birth and worth" in the romances is reducible to the romance's function of providing succor to the embattled aristocracy (133). The convention of discovered parentage "mediates the threat of noncorrespondence," writes McKeon, "by problematically isolating physical beauty and true nobility apart from inherited nobility, only

to reconfirm the wholeness of honor at the end of the story" (*ibid.*). In *The Reformation of Romance*, Christina Wald also sees the "essentialist view of class identity" in Robert Greene's foundling stories as soothing anxieties regarding "growing social mobility in Elizabethan England" (78). Linking the theme of the "inexpungeability of the nobility" in *Pandosto* and *Menaphon* to the conservative position that identity was not mutable in the post-Reformation Eucharist debates,[42] Wald argues that the foundling plots naturalize rank "by foreclosing the possibility of class 'transubstantiation,' and by demonstrating not only the persistence, but the readability of substantial nobility" (*ibid.*). While these are insightful arguments showing the relevant historical context underlying the representation of natural nobility and baseness in the pastoral romances, they tend to simplify the literary tradition's representation of nature's role in creating the social hierarchy. Romance writers grounded their political fantasy on biological inheritance—the belief that the natural processes of heredity that made "like beget like" in all creatures were the valid basis of the hereditary political order that concentrated power in noble families.

This strain of thought manifests in Greene's *Pandosto* (1588), which provided the foundling plot that Shakespeare adapted in *The Winter's Tale*. King Pandosto of Bohemia comes to believe his wife has cuckolded him with Egistus, the King of Sicilia, and commands his servants to cast the offending infant to sea in a rudderless boat.[43] Fawnia, the daughter, is shipwrecked on the coast of Sicilia and raised by poor shepherds. Despite her rustic upbringing,

[42]As Wald notes, in the sixteenth century, writers and theologians debated whether the essence of something might change even if its outward appearance did not (as in, for example, the Catholic claim that the wine and wafer used in the Eucharist actually became—were divinely transubstantiated into—the body and blood of Christ).

[43] In *The Winter's Tale*, Shakespeare assigns the kings to the opposite countries: Leontes, modeled on Pandosto, is from Sicilia, while Polixenes, modeled on Egistus, is from Bohemia.

Fawnia turns sixteen having "so increased with exquisite perfection both of body and mind" that her "natural disposition did bewray that she was born of some high parentage; but the people, thinking she was daughter to the shepherd Porrus, rested only amazed at her beauty and wit" (423). Fawnia's "natural disposition"—her beauty and wit—indicates that her parents were nobility, but her ostensible relation to poor shepherds leads people to conclude that she is a freak of nature, a case where an individual does "growe out of kind" (Castiglione Ciii) rather than follow the normal course of nature where "like begets like."[44] In naming Fawnia, Greene refers to the pastoral goddess Fauna, the sister (or sometimes wife or mother) of Faunus, the counterpart to Pan in Roman religion, who was worshiped by shepherds and associated with prophecy and nature.[45] The name "Fawnia" evokes both the exalted status of the shepherds' goddess, and also the goddess's association with nature and animate life.

The Sicilian prince Dorastus—whose name derives from the Italian *dorato*, "golden," and befits his position of recognized wealth and status—spies Fawnia one day and decides to speak with her to see if "nature had adorned her mind with any inward qualities as she had decked her body with outward shape" (425). Impressed by Fawnia's good wit, Dorastus is astonished that "so courtly behavior could be found in so simple a cottage" (*ibid.*).[46] His phrase

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[44] The trope of generational similitude—like begets like—is another instance of what Shannon has termed "Renaissance homonormativity" in reference to the idea that, in the normal course of nature, attraction or affiliation proceed on the basis of likeness and similarity. Although Shannon examines cases in which the preference for similitude is strong enough to normalize same-sex relations over those that "cross sexual difference," it is also the case that nature's bias toward resemblance normalizes generational relationships (between parent and child) as well as class endogamy above marriages that mix classes ("Nature's Bias," 187).

[45] In the eighteenth century, Linnaeus used the pastoral goddess's name in his coinage of a new term—*fauna*—to refer to the collective animal life of a particular region or epoch.

[46] Similarly, in Greene's second pastoral romance, *Menaphon*, the princess Sephistia meets her husband at a local country gathering, and although neither recognizes the other as spouse because they have both adopted shepherd disguises, they both read the marks of nobility in each other's looks and behavior. Sephistia wonders if such a noble-seeming man can really be a shepherd: "May this Melicertus be a shepherd? or can a country cottage afford such perfection? Does the coast bring forth such excellency? […] but his face is not inchaced with any rustic proportion, his brows contain the characters of nobility, and his looks in shepherd's weeds are lordly, his voice pleasing, his wit full of gentry" (32).

refers to the usual correlation between place and manners that allows court and country to metonymically represent the gentle and base people that are native to them. Dorastus is initially ashamed of his "base desires" (431)—here the baseness of the object degrades desire—but so great are Fawnia's charms that Dorastus succumbs to passion and woos her, until she agrees to elope with him. When a tempest blows their ship to a Bohemian harbor, Dorastus and Fawnia are taken into captivity by the King of Bohemia, Pandosto, leading to the discovery that Fawnia is Pandosto's long-lost daughter. Then it is revealed to the Bohemians and Sicilians what the reader has known from the beginning: that Fawnia is not an example of "growing out of kind" but actually proves the power of nature over nurture.

In the pastoral Book VI of *The Faerie Queene* (1596), Spenser uses the foundling device to show that courtesy is a virtue that people of gentle birth inherit from their parents—that "Gentle bloud will gentle manners breed" (6.3.2). Courtesy, in Spenser's view, is not undifferentiated kindness toward all: it is the skill of *differentiated* kindness—the ability to negotiate complex social hierarchies in a way that properly reflects the relative social positions of "all of each degree" (6.2.1).[47] In the book, Sir Calidore, a knight who embodies the virtue of courtesy, travels through Fairyland with the goal of subduing the Blatant Beast, which personifies calumny and injures gentle knights and lovely ladies by defaming them (6.12.28). In the woods and pastoral farmland, Calidore meets a series of obscure characters whose gentle looks and manners at first seem to challenge the blood-and-breeding definition of courtesy, until

[47]Spenser restates this definition of courtesy in the tenth canto, when the Three Graces allegorizing courtesy teach "how to each degree and kynde / We should our selues demeane, to low, to hie; / To friends, to foes; which skill men call Ciuility" (6.10.23). Judson writes that Spenser's definition of courtesy was common in courtesy books, and he cites several relevant titles, including *The Institucion of a Gentleman*, where the author writes: "It behoueth … a gentle man to haue in hym courtlye behauore, to knowe howe to treate and interteyne men of all degrees, and not to be ignoraunt howe he himselfe ought to be vsed by others" (qtd. 128).

the ineluctable discovery of their noble parentage reconfirms it. Early on in Book VI, a young woodsman, Tristram, valiantly slays a discourteous knight who first attacked him, and who had misused his lady (forcing her to walk alongside him as he rode, thumping her when she lagged with the butt of his spear). Although Tristram bears no arms or identifying garments, he is "tall and faire of face," and Calidore correctly guesses that the "gentle child" is "born of noble race" (6.2.5).

Later, Spenser presents an extreme case of cross fostering: the Savage Man, a gentleman by birth who, abandoned in infancy, was raised by wild beasts, without human language or society, and communicates only in murmurs and gestures. Yet he instinctively comes to the aid of the distressed knight Calepine and his lady Serena, who have been viciously attacked both by the Blatant Beast and the discourteous knight Sir Turpine.[48] The Savage Man's gentle deeds are, the narrator explains, illustrative of how gentle blood gives rise to virtuous behavior even in extraordinarily adverse environments:

> O what an easie thing is to descry
> The gentle bloud, how euer it be wrapt
> In sad misfortunes foule deformity,
> And wretched sorrowes, which haue often hapt?
> For howsoeuer it may grow mis-shapt,
> Like this wyld man, being vndisciplynd,
> That to all vertue it may seeme vnapt,
> Yet will it shew some sparkes of gentle mynd,

[48] Spenser links vices of the Blatant Beast and Sir Turpine to their base ancestry. The Blatant Beast is said to be the offspring of the three-headed "hound of Hades," Cerberus, and the fire-breathing hybrid monster, Chimera (6.1.8). Turpine's "discourteous deeds" are described as "discouering his base kind" (6.7.1).

And at the last breake forth in his owne proper kind. (6.5.1)

It is easy to discern gentle blood, even when its growth has been "mis-shapt" and deformed by misfortune, because, no matter how much an undisciplined upbringing may disincline someone to virtue, as in the case of the Savage Man, natural gentility will eventually "breake forth" and show its "proper kind." While Spenser represents nurture as secondary to nature in determining identity, he imagines that the absence of nurture can attenuate natural inheritance. Spenser's portrait of the Savage Man recalls the analogy between agriculture and breeding nobility that Castiglione offers in *The Courtyer*, where Count Canossi describes how the children of gentlemen may degenerate in the absence of "good nourtour," in the same way trees may degenerate ("growe out of kind") if a husbandman does not care for them properly (Ciii). Spenser, like Castiglione, represents that, ideally, nature and nurture complement each other in producing a gentleman: wellborn children inherit *aptitudes*, *inclinations*, and *dispositions* to virtue, but these may remain unrealized potentials in the absence of proper education.

Calidore pursues the Blatant Beast far into the countryside, where he falls in love with Pastorella, commonly believed to be the daughter of the old shepherd Meliboe, but later discovered to have royal parentage. Enchanted by the idyllic pastoral lifestyle and the beautiful shepherdess, Calidore abandons his pursuit of the Blatant Beast and decides to rest a while with the shepherds. He joins the shepherd Coridon in wooing Pastorella, whose "rare demeanure" strikes him as far exceeding "the meane of shepheards" (6.9.11), a phrase that puns on two senses of "mean": the mathematical average of a set of values, and the inferiority of rank or quality.[49] By "the meane of shepheards," Spenser refers to a norm of base behavior in shepherds.

[49] Spenser uses "meane" to refer to a class average later in Canto 10, when Colin describes Gloriana as "excelling much the meane of her degree" (stanza 27)

An attacking tiger gives Sir Calidore the opportunity to show that he is more deserving of Pastorella's love than Coridon. While Calidore slays the tiger, winning Pastorella's heart, Coridon runs away in fear and is rejected by Pastorella for his "cowherdize" (Spenser's variant spelling for "cowardice" that naturalizes Coridon's cowardice by implying that his born estate has predisposed him to that vice):

> From that day forth she gan him effect,
> And daily more her fauor to augment;
> But *Coridon* for cowherdize reiect,
> Fit to keep sheepe, unfit for loues content:
> The gentle heart scornes base disparagement. (6.10.37)

Pastorella seems to guess that she is of gentle birth and that she should reject an alliance with Coridon, who has shown himself to be a cowherd and coward, as "base disparagement."

The romance convention of the foundling shows that the correspondence between birth and rank is explained by the hereditary principle that makes children resemble their birth parents. The pastoral romances insist upon the animality, or creatureliness, of people whose aptitudes and dispositions are bred into families according to the same hereditary processes by which all-powerful Dame Nature generates other kinds of life. Denying that human nurture plays a decisive role in shaping the affects and manners of individuals and groups, the foundlings who mature to exhibit the virtues inherited from their birth parents cuts across the modern division between human and nonhuman while reinforcing the early modern division between gentle and base.

The Preposterous Rise of the Baseborn Shepherd in Sidney and Shakespeare

The royal foundling is inverted when a lowborn shepherd's base behaviors persist even after a sovereign elevates him to gentle standing. In Sidney's *Arcadia* and in Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*, the intractable baseness of the shepherd-cum-gentleman works to ridicule the view that gentlemen can be made rather than born, and to affirm the opposite position that nature, in the form of birth and breeding, endows the lower orders with dispositions to vice (ignorance, rudeness, weakness, etc.) that prevent them from behaving like gentlemen despite an elevation in status.

Sidney's *Arcadia* tells the story of the Arcadian Duke Basilius, who, having received an oracle that he will lose his daughters, his marriage, and his throne within the year, leaves the government of Arcadia in the hands a councilor, and retreats to the countryside with his family and his "principal herdsman," the shepherd Dametas.[50] In a key passage that describes the events leading to Basilius's promotion of the shepherd, Sidney uses agriculture as a controlling metaphor for representing both Basilius's presumptuousness in believing that he might play a creative role in nurturing virtues that would make Dametas a competent courtier, as well as the immutable natural factors that prevent Dametas from behaving like a born gentleman.

The narrator relates that Basilius, straying out of his way during a hunt (a literal straying that prefigures Basilius's moral error in favoring the shepherd), first meets Dametas and,

[50] I follow the common practice of referring to the earlier version of Sidney's *Arcadia*, which critics sometimes call the *Old Arcadia* to distinguish it from the later incomplete and textually complicated version, the *New Arcadia*. Although the dates of composition for the *Old Arcadia* are uncertain, Robertson argues that Sidney began a draft shortly after his return from Germany, in 1577, but wrote the bulk of the story while he was staying with his sister, the Countess of Pembroke, at Wilton and Ivy Church from March to August 1580 (xv- xvi).

impressed by his discussion of "husbandry matters," decides to bring the shepherd back to court, where he imagines that, in his presence, Dametas's vices will "grow" into virtues:

> The beginning of this Dametas's credit with Basilius was by the duke's straying out of his way one time a-hunting where, meeting this fellow, and asking him the way, and so falling into other questions, he found some of his answers touching husbandry matters (as a dog sure, if he could speak, had wit enough to describe his kennel) not unsensible; and all uttered with such rudeness, which the duke interpreted plainness (although there be great difference betwixt them), that the duke, conceiving a sudden delight in his entertainment, took him to court, with apparent show of his good opinion; where the flattering courtier had no sooner taken the prince's mind but that there were straight reasons to confirm the duke's doing, and shadows of virtues found for Dametas. His silence grew wit, his bluntness integrity, his beastly ignorance virtuous simplicity; and the duke (according to the nature of great persons, in love with that he had done himself) fancied that the weakness was in him, with his presence, would grow wisdom. And so, like a creature of his own making, he liked him more and more. (28)

The narrator blames Basilius for finding Dametas's knowledge of husbandry impressive: all creatures are expert in their designated domains, so a shepherd's ability to describe crop cultivation and animal breeding is no more remarkable than a dog having "wit enough to describe his kennel" (should the dog be able to speak). Imagining that in his presence Dametas's vices will "grow" into virtue, Basilius persists in favoring Dametas at court. The language of growth and cultivation evokes Basilius's creative pretensions in elevating the poor shepherd to courtier—as if Basilius sees his role as sovereign as cultivating noble virtues of wit, integrity,

and wisdom in a garden of men independently of their birth. The narrator takes a dimly critical view of Basilius's role as nurturer and implies that Basilius is improperly motivated by flattery and a Pygmalion-like love for a "creature of his own making," when the creature in fact comes to life only in his imagination.

Using more animal analogy, the narrator goes on to explain that Basilius has committed a "great error" in confusing his quality as sovereign, which is not "to make men," but to use each man as he would different kinds of animal domestics, "according to the force of his own nature":

> And thus gave he him first office of principal herdsman. And thus lastly did he put his life into his hands—although he grounded upon a great error; for his quality was not to make men, but to use men according as men were, no more than an ass will be taught to manage, a horse to hunt, or a hound to bear a saddle, but each to be used according to the force of his own nature. (28)

Teaching a shepherd to be a courtier is as futile as teaching an ass to manage (handle like a horse), or a horse to hunt, or a hound to bear a saddle. Using any creature other for the purpose for which it was bred ignores that the capacities of any individual, beast or human, is determined by "the force of his own nature," and therefore resistant to adaptation to new niches and applications. The rise of the baseborn shepherd does not simply contradict the traditional social order, but the belief that nature proceeds by generating particular kinds—classes, species, breeds—that circumscribe an individual's capacities at birth. The cross-species analogy shows how the biocentric view of social identity simultaneously denied the exceptionality of the human (since humans were lumped with other creatures as products of breeding) and affirmed the social division between gentle and base (since the division was ostensibly the product of nature rather than environment).

Making a similar point about the role of nature in generating gentle and base, Shakespeare returns to the scenario of a king who elevates two shepherds to the rank of gentleman at the end of his pastoral romance, *The Winter's Tale*. King Leontes knights the shepherds in recognition of their service in fostering his daughter, Perdita, after he abandoned her. The Shepherd and his son, the Clown, comically boast that their recent knighthood and new clothes have made them "gentlemen born," and in their rustic confusion of the political act of knighthood with the biological event of birth unto gentle parents, the shepherds are made to perform the unnatural or "preposterous" quality of their new gentle estate.

The Shepherd begins with the orthodox observation that, while he is too old to father more children who will inherit his gentle status at birth, the children of his son, the Clown, will be "gentlemen born" (5.2.124-125). He refers to the common understanding that gentle ancestry—being born to a gentleman—has more legitimacy than the mere title of gentleman that a king might grant in special recognition of virtue (or, in this case, circumstantial association with the royal family). As Guazzo put it in *Civile Conversation*, another Italian courtesy book that was published in English translation in 1581, "the world commonly reputeth gentry by byrth as legitimate, and gentry by vertue as bastardily, and farre inferiour to the other" (qtd. Shapin 53). Guazzo describes gentry by virtue as "bastardily," which is used here as an adjective meaning "illegitimate." Although sovereigns technically had the authority to make gentlemen, many writers represented such political fiats as bastardizations of the role that nature and breeding play in creating nobility. In this view, the elevation of a shepherd to gentleman perverts the proper sequence where social rank follows natural (born) identity.

The Clown then performs the natural untenability of his new condition by improperly insisting that his recent promotion has made him a "gentleman born." The Clown greets the

confidence man, Autolycus, who had used Prince Florizel's clothes to pass himself off as a gentleman at their expense in an earlier scene (his name in Greek translates to "the wolf himself," evoking the predatory thievery that Shakespeare's Autolycus shares with the Greek god of the same name), and dares Autolycus to deny that his robes now show him to be a "gentleman born":

> CLOWN [*To Autolycus*] You are well met, sir. You denied to fight with me this other day because I was no gentleman born. See you these clothes? Say you see them not, and think me still no gentleman born. You were best say these robes are not gentlemen born. Give me the lie, do, and try whether I am not now a gentleman born.
>
> AUTOLYCUS I Know you are now, sir, a gentleman born.
>
> CLOWN Ay, and have been so any time these four hours.
>
> SHEPHERD And so have I, boy. (5.2.126-135)

Shakespeare uses the Clown to ridicule the notion that clothing and title are constitutive, rather than expressive, of a social identity that is bred into an individual at birth.[51] The Clown of course means that the king has just performed a ceremonial act that has bestowed on the Clown the title of gentleman, but the Clown's persistent and improper use of the term "gentleman born" confuses a birth condition and political title. When the Shepherd declares that he too has been made a "gentleman born," the Clown continues his enactment of rustic simplicity by declaring that he was made a "gentleman born" before his father:

[51]This position, which is described in Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass's *Renaissance subjects, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory*, is frequently criticized in pastoral romance plots that show the *failure* of clothing to obscure born identity.

> CLOWN So you have; but I was a gentleman born before my father, for the king's son took me by the hand called me brother, and then the two kings called my father brother, and then the prince my brother and princess my sister called my father father, and so we wept; and there was the first gentleman-like tears that ever we shed. (5.2.136-143)

The Shepherd goes on to remark their "preposterous estate" (146), a malapropism for "prosperous estate" that captures the logical impossibility of the claim that the son becomes a gentleman born before his father. As Patricia Parker aptly observed in her famous chapter on Shakespeare's use of the word "preposterous" throughout his career, the word is derived from two Latin prepositions, *prae* and *poster*, literally "before" and "after," and "connotes a reversal of 'post' for 'pre,' behind for before, back for front, end or sequel for beginning" (21). Parker notes the "generational reversal" at play in the Clown's remark, "I was a gentleman born before my father," which evokes the "literally preposterous or 'unnatural' event of a son's coming before the father" (22).

The generational reversal is only half of the preposterous story here. The unnatural event of a son's coming before the father parallels the unnatural event of a political title coming before natural nobility. In imagining scenarios where sovereigns promote shepherds for misguided reasons, and not in recognition of "real" virtue," both Shakespeare and Sidney give voice to the belief that gentleness by virtue is a perversion or bastardization of the proper sequence where political title follows born identity. The shepherds-turned-gentlemen retain their ignorance and simplicity, thus showing that gentle status, ultimately a matter of birth unto gentle parents, is a force of nature rather than political fiat or distinctive attire.

The Aspiring Mind in Greene, Spenser, and Shakespeare

In the narratives that displace gentlemen from their birthplaces at court and shepherds from their birthplaces in the country, the pastoral romances create a mismatch between nature and nurture that highlights characters' attitudes toward their worldly condition. The royal foundling aspires to move into a courtly milieu that better suits her noble nature. The ambitious shepherd rejects his mean estate and desires to seek his fortune at court. The great knight, weary of the cares of court, seeks leisure and love in the country.

The pastoral romances submit all these desires to a moral calculus that judges aspiration to be good or bad according to whether it inclines an individual toward or away from the environment best suited to his nature. In this way, the pastoral convention of the aspiring mind is controlled by the Renaissance belief in natural determination—the idea that nature breeds individuals, human and nonhuman alike, for a particular kind of life in a specific environment. In the English pastoral romances, natural determination means the foundling characters rightly aspire to an environment that fits their noble nature, while ambitious shepherds and retiring knights improperly aspire to change the lives they inherit.

In reading the convention of the aspiring mind as an expression of the Renaissance ideal of natural determination, I am disagreeing with scholars who have understood the pastoral convention of the aspiring mind to mean undue courtly ambition, and have read pastoral's alleged rejection of the aspiring mind as part of an agrarian celebration of the values of the country and "nature" over those of the court and city.[52] These readings fail to account for contexts that clearly show that the rejection of the aspiring mind refers to an improper desire to

[52] For example, Hallett Smith, *Elizabethan Poetry*, Leo Marx, *Machine in the Garden*, Louis Monstrose, "'Eliza, Queene of Shepheardes' and the Pastoral of Power," Robert Watson, *Back to Nature*, Todd Borlik, *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature.*

change one's born condition—for a shepherd to foster courtly aspirations, or a knight to abandon the quest and retire in the country. In the English pastoral romance, harmony with nature means accepting or rediscovering one's native habitat in court or country and does not refer to an idyllic nonhuman environment "out there" at a distance from human activity in an urban setting.

In Robert Greene's *Pandosto*, the foundling character, Fawnia, falls in love with the Prince Dorastus and, after a long struggle against her "disordinate lusts" (443), finally abandons her country cottage with the intention of marrying the prince. As the embodiment of the force of nature, Fawnia/*fauna* initially rejects her love for Dorastus because she believes that her base birth disqualifies her for a life at court: "I am born to toil for the court, not in the court, my nature unfit for their nurture" (429). In asserting that her "nature" is unfit for the "nurture" of court, Fawnia draws on the nature/nurture rhetoric that writers typically used to argue that nature or nurture was the dominant influence on personal identity: "nature passes nurture" and its counter-proverb, "nurture passes nature" (Tilley 491, 509). In the variant put forth by Fawnia, nature's dominance over nurture places an obligation on an individual to limit one's ambitions according to one's kind, as determined by born identity.[53]

Cursing her "aspiring mind" that inclines her to Dorastus, Fawnia reminds herself, with an example drawn from the hierarchy of fowl, that going "against nature" by striving beyond her lot by birth will expose her to censure: "No bastard hawk must soar so high as the hobby, no fowl gaze against the sun but the eagle. Actions wrought against nature reap despite, and thoughts above Fortune, disdain" (427-428). In Fawnia's analogy, poor shepherdesses must not

[53] Fawnia applies the same logic, in reverse, when Dorastus comes to Fawnia dressed as a shepherd in the hopes that his "homely attires" (431) will lead Fawnia to accept him as an ostensible peer. Fawnia dismisses Dorastus with a lecture on birth as the true source of social identity: "Rich clothing make not princes, nor homely attire beggars. Shepherds are not called shepherds because they wear hooks and bags but that they are born poor and live to keep sheep; so this attire has not made Dorastus a shepherd, but to seem like a shepherd" (432).

aspire to consort with princes for the same reason that bastard hawks of obscure or inferior pedigrees must not fly as high as the hobby (a species of falcon used by gentlemen hunters) and only the king of birds, the eagle, can gaze at the sun: nature circumscribes the ambits and ambitions of all creatures. Later, Greene returns to animal analogy in depicting Pandosto's repudiation of Fawnia, whom Pandosto initially believes to be a poor shepherdess who has dared to match herself with a prince: "thou currish kite, assigned by the Destinies to base fortune and yet with an aspiring mind gazing after honour. How durst thou presume, being a beggar, to match with a prince?" (443) Accusing Fawnia of having an "aspiring mind," Pandosto calls her a "currish kite," compounding the predatory behavior of the bird of prey with the qualities of a cur, or lowbred dog. Importantly, the rejection of the "aspiring mind" refers to the "disordinate" (443) ambitions of a lowborn shepherdess—it is not the rejection of the aspiring mind or the court *per se*. In this way, *Pandosto* ties the rejection of the aspiring mind to the idea that nature destines individuals for specific environments, and thus imposes on individuals an obligation to match their "nurture" (environment or social milieu) to their "nature" (kind at birth).

However, critics have neglected this ideal of contentment with one's natural estate and have read the rejection of the aspiring mind as an attitude that disparages the greed and ambition associated with the court and extols the simplicity and contentedness of country life. In a seminal 1952 essay on Elizabethan pastoral, Hallett Smith argued that the "central meaning" of Renaissance pastoral was the "rejection of the aspiring mind"—the unbridled ambition typified by Christopher Marlowe's character Tamburlaine, who casts off his shepherd's clothes to embark on a career of conquest (10-11). Smith defined Renaissance pastoral by the contrasting ideal of contentment, as embodied by Edmund Spenser's character Meliboe, the old shepherd

who (in Smith's interpretation) maintains the superiority of the pastoral life that offers freedom (leisure, *otium*) from the cares and wants of the court.

More recently, ecocritics have found the alleged anti-courtly ethos of Renaissance pastoral amenable to green interpretation. In *Ecocriticism and Early Modern English Literature*, Borlik argues that writers used Renaissance pastoral as a didactic form that taught lessons of self-sufficiency and the ideal of the good life as a strategic retreat from the increasingly acquisitive lifestyle of the Elizabethan marketplace. Borlik finds in these lessons a "program for the good life" that focused on the simple pleasures of art and nature and constituted "a nascent environmental ethic in Early modern England" (46). In *Back to Nature*, Watson reads the quest for a simple life in terms of Western anxieties about whether our perceptions match reality, and the desire for unmediated knowledge that leads people "back to nature" in the hopes of finding epistemological certitude. In Watson's account, the pastoral rejection of the aspiring mind is a rejection of fallible perception and speaks to the question of "whether we can get the human mind out of the path between ourselves and the material world by retreating to some primal and simple version of that world" (67). All of these critics share an assumption that the idealization of "nature" in Renaissance pastoral expresses a desire for a simpler way of living (or thinking) and a corresponding rejection of human activity in a modern urban setting.

But this anti-courtly theme of "agrarian celebration" often competes with—and is often ironically controlled by—the awareness that nature destines individuals for particular modes of living in specific environmental niches. The "aspiring mind" in other pastoral romances is not a uniformly pejorative account of undue ambition, but also refers to what the texts present as the legitimate desires of wellborn children who, raised in a rustic environment, aspire to move in a courtly milieu that is a better fit for their noble nature.

In adapting *Pandosto* for the stage in *The Winter's Tale*, Shakespeare moves the source of the conflict from the conscience-ridden lovers to the adverse father who forbids their marriage. He introduces the lovers, Perdita and Florizel, at a point in their relationship where they are mutually committed and planning to marry. Fearing only that they will be found out by Florizel's father, Polixenes, Perdita is confident that her natural beauty and grace have fairly attracted a prince's love and welcomes the opportunity to leave the country and live in courtly society. In her courtly aspirations, Shakespeare's Perdita resembles Pastorella, the shepherdess foundling character in Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, who has a mind that does "ascend" to a better match than the one offered to her by the poor shepherd Coridon who woos her:

> But most of all the shepheard Coridon
> For her did languish, and his deare life spend;
> Yet neither she for him, nor other none
> Did care a whit, ne any liking lend:
> Though meane her lot, yet higher did her mind ascend. (6.9.10)

Although Pastorella is a poor shepherdess, her "gentle heart" leads her to scorn the "base disparagement" of a shepherd's love and accept instead the courtship of Sir Calidore (6.10.37). In Greene's second pastoral romance, *Menaphon* (1589), the royal infant Pleusidippus, kidnapped by pirates and raised in Thessaly ignorant of his parentage, deduces from his appetite for honorable deeds on the battlefield that his father was a gentleman: "[T]hough my parents and progeny are envied by obscurity, yet the sparks of renown … inciting me to more deeds of honour than stout Perseus effected with his falchion in the fields of Hesperia, ascertains my soul I was the son of no coward, but a gentleman" (53). The noble identity of his parents is "envied" (challenged) by obscurity, but Pleusidippus believes that his father was a gentleman because he

could not have inherited his noble aspirations from a baseborn coward. Royal foundlings such as Fawnia, Pleusidippus, Pastorella, and Perdita have "aspiring minds" that drive them away from the country and back to court. And their return to court is not a rejection of nature but is actually the realization of nature's dominance over nurture.

The integral role of nature in destining individuals for particular environments is succinctly shown in Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, in the dialogue between Sir Calidore and the shepherd Meliboe, the putative father of Pastorella, whom Calidore has fallen in love with. As a prideful young man, Meliboe rejected the lowly shepherd's life "amongst mine equall peares," and sought his fortunes at court (6.9.24). After ten years, he returned to his "natiue home," heaving "learn'd to loue more deare / This lowly quiet life, which I inherit here" (25). Meliboe says his courtly aspirations were misguided because they were motivated by the prideful rejection of his equal peers—i.e., the estate and society that he inherited it at birth and thus is natural to him. Spenser imagines Meliboe as a sage old shepherd who draws on the courtly aspirations of his youth and his eventual return to the country to preach a lesson of contentment with the life one does "inherit" in one's "native home."

But Calidore, enchanted with Pastorella and wishing to pursue her instead of the Blatant Beast, misconstrues Meliboe's story to mean its opposite: the superiority of country over court, and the possibility of finding happiness by choosing the good life of simple country pleasures. With his "hungry eye" bent on Meliboe's putative daughter, Calidore praises the country life, criticizes the court, and wishes that his "fortunes might transposed bee / From pitch of higher place, vnto this low degree" (6.9.28). Meliboe tries to correct him: Calidore is wrong in blaming the heavens for his fortune, since the heavens "know best, what is best for them" (6.9.29). The correct attitude, according to Meliboe, is finding satisfaction with one's assigned fortune: "But

fittest is, that all content rest / With that they hold: each hath his fortune in his brest" (*ibid*.) Meliboe explains that happiness and wretchedness refer to mental states, and do not exist external to the person who experiences them: "It is the mynd, that maketh good or ill, / That maketh wretch or happie, rich or poore" (6.9.30). But Calidore again twists Meliboe's words to suit his purpose of abandoning his pursuit of the Blatant Beast in order to woo Pastorella:

> Since then in each mans self (said Calidore)
> It is, to fashion his owne lyfes estate,
> Giue leaue awhile, good father, in this shore
> To rest my barke. (6.9.31)

Scholars have read Calidore's assertion that it is up to each man to "fashion his owne lyfes estate" as an unironic statement of the Renaissance ideal of self-determination. In *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, Stephen Greenblatt cites Calidore's line in support of his argument that the sixteenth century saw an increase in "self-consciousness about the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process" (2). This reading wrenches Calidore's statement on self-determination from the context in which Spenser represents Calidore not as autonomous individual who freely decides his own fate, but as a knight who, "entrapt of loue," abandons his quest to follow the Blatant Beast, and instead, "unmyndfull of his vow, and high beheast, / Which by the Faery Queene on him layd" (6.10.1), woos a shepherdess. In showing how Calidore misconstrues Meliboe's morality tale of the ideal of contentment with natural determination to mean its opposite (the ideal of self-determination), Spenser implies that the self-fashioning conceit is a means of justifying personal indulgence and neglect of an obligation to one's natural inheritance.

In their representation of the aspiring mind, the English pastoral romances show a preference for bringing one's social milieu into conformity with one's born estate—to make nurture fit nature. In the court-to-country narratives that displace gentlemen and shepherds, individuals find contentment in "nature" to the extent that they reconnect with the life that they "inherit" at birth. For this reason, the romances disapprove both the ambitious shepherd who abandons his "native home" and pursues his fortune at court and the rustic aspirations of the great knight, but they condone the courtly aspirations of the foundlings who legitimately desire to return to their native habitats. The aspiring mind in itself is not good or bad but is judged according to whether the ambition inclines one toward or away from the life that nature assigns individuals at birth.

Conclusion

While scholars have connected the representation of natural nobility and baseness in the English pastoral romances to anxiety, in the late 1500s and early 1600s, of increasing social mobility and the "inflation of honors," this historical situation is only part of the story. As we have seen in the pastoral romances and in the related gentility literature, the representation of natural nobility and baseness is also informed by the early modern tradition of hereditarianism, the theory that bodily and mental traits, including a disposition to a noble physique and manner, are transmitted from parent to child, in humans as in all living things.

Critical of the notion that humans are capable of self-determination and self-fashioning (that man can "fashion his owne lyfes estate" [Spenser 6.9.31]), the pastoral romances and gentility writings represent that the estates of gentle and base are distinct human lineages, with contrasting inclinations of the mind and body, within the kingdom of living things. The pastoral romance space is "materialist" in the sense that an individual's mind (and behavior) is not

incorporeal but develops, in conjunction with the body, from the germinal material of the parent ("the soul is born from semen and grows with the rest of the body" [Montaigne 124]). It is hereditarian in the sense that, except in the monstruous cases of "grow[ing] out of kinde," parents produce children in their likeness: "And everie kind (to which nature hath given vertue to bring forth fruite) produceth its like" (Nenna 13-14). Because nobles are born and not made, the multiple foundlings of the pastoral romances mature to exhibit the noble physiques and manners of their birth parents, while the shepherds and clowns brought to court cannot be taught to behave like "gentlemen born," no more than an "ass will be taught to manage, a horse to hunt, or a hound to bear a saddle" (Sidney 28). The pastoral romances and related works insist upon the creatureliness, or animality, of humans, whose bodies and manners did not register their difference from other species but, primarily, the genealogical differences *within* the human race, differences that reflected humans' *resemblance* to other creatures.

Chapter 2

Of Beasts, Gentlemen, and Shepherds:

Love and Reproduction in Renaissance Pastoral Drama

In the pagan Greek settings of Renaissance pastoral drama, young shepherds are torn between their spontaneous desires and human chastity laws—between the "law of Nature" to "Love if thou likest" and the "humane law" to "Love lawfully," as one shepherd puts it.[54] Analyzing three main exemplars of this popular early modern subgenre—Torquato Tasso's *Aminta* (1573), Battista Guarini's *Il Pastor Fido* (1589), and John Fletcher's *The Faithfull Shepherdess* (~1609)—this chapter examines how the resolution of the conflict between nature and the law suggests subtly different answers to the question of what sort of relationship exists between humans and animals, and between gentle and base humans, in regard to their desires and to the desirability of their reproduction.

Both the *Aminta* and *Il Pastor Fido* tell the stories of wellborn Arcadian shepherds who overcome obstacles to find love and happiness in lawful marriage. The dramas' celebration of aristocratic unions reflects their courtly origins: Tasso and Guarini were successive court poets at Ferrara, the northern Italian duchy on the Po, and the dramas' initial performances were connected with nuptials of the Italian nobility (Greg 178, 206). Although the Council of Trent had in 1563 declared "anathema" on anyone who maintained that marriage was preferable to celibacy (195), the *Aminta* and *Il Pastor Fido* indicate that the nobility were a special case where marriage was allowed to be preferable to celibacy. In both plays, wellborn virgins (Silvia in *Aminta* and Silvio in *Il Pastor Fido*) must abandon their preference for the solitary life and

[54] *Il Pastor Fido*, 4.5.45-48; 131. Unless otherwise noted, references to *Il Pastor Fido* follow the 1602 anonymous translation in the edition edited by Elizabeth Donno, and include act, scene, line and page number.

embrace instead the life of *chastity*, where sex is limited to lawful marriage. Drawing on newly revived classical sources, both plays represent that the religious veneration of virginity contradicts nature's procreative imperative, according to which nature compels all creatures, human and nonhuman alike, to procreate and perpetuate their kinds. While in the *Aminta* chaste marriage is the peculiar form that procreation takes among urban elites and thus signifies a point of analogy between human and animal life, in *Il Pastor Fido* chaste marriage expresses the application of human reason to govern beastly passions and thus signifies a point of difference, and not analogy, between human and beast. However, in Guarini's drama, only the nobility possess sufficient reason to behave chastely, and the human-beast rhetoric primarily reinforces not a species difference, but a social difference between the humane nobility and the beastly underclass.

In adapting the Italian pastoral drama for Protestant English playgoers, Fletcher creates a classless pastoral society where there is no difference between gentle and common shepherds and where there is a strong preference for virginity and chastity. Without heirs and heiresses to bring together in lawful marriage, *The Faithful Shepherdess* follows a lustfulness-to-temperance structure: the virgin heroine, Clorin, uses medicine and religious discipline to heal lusty shepherds, cooling their inflamed blood and restoring them to states of chastity and virginity, which are synonymous with bodily health. The application of humoral psychology allows Fletcher to take positions on the interaction of nature and society/culture as well as the man-beast relationship that are opposed to those of his Italian models. Because sexual behavior expresses a humoral condition that is plastic and sensitive to environmental inputs—rather than expressing hereditary and fixed inclinations to either lust or fidelity—society plays a positive, proto-Foucauldian role by deploying medicine and religion to cool lustful heats and produce a chaste

population. Virginity is represented as a healthful state of humoral balance that is beneficial to the social order and conformable to the natural order, and not a violation of nature's "law to love," as it appears in the Italian works. Eschewing the discourses of human rationality and moral preeminence, *The Faithful Shepherdess* shows that humans are uniquely vulnerable to lecherous and violent humors that, in the absence of religion and culture, lead them to disfunction and self-destruction.

While each of the three dramas presents contrasting perspectives on the relationship between humans and animals, and between the nobility and commonalty, with respect to sex and reproduction, none of them represents that humans collectively have access to a psychological dimension that makes their desires intrinsically different than those of animals. In these dehumanizing stories about desire, the belief that humans share procreative impulses with other animals is used, in the Italian dramas, to encourage marriage in the nobility and, in Fletcher's pastoral, to rationalize the use of religion and culture to discourage procreative sex in the population generally.

The Natural Argument against Virginity and for Marriage: Tasso's *Aminta*

In the prologue to Tasso's *Aminta*, Cupid explains to the audience that they are about to witness a triumph-of-love story, wherein he will transform the virgin huntress Silvia—"the most cruell Nymph, that ever yet / Hath bin a follower of *Dianas* traine" (47-48; 2)—into the lover of the shepherd Aminta.[55] The five acts of the pastoral tragicomedy follow the youths' path to love and matrimony, a path that is complicated by what is represented as Aminta's excessively

[55] First performed in 1573 for the Estense court of Ferrara, the northern Italian city state on the Po, Tasso's *Aminta* was first printed in Venice in 1590 and a year later (in Italian) in London in a duodecimo volume alongside Guarini's *Il Pastor Fido*. In 1628 was Aminta first "Englisht" by Henry Reynolds, and it is his translation that is used here unless otherwise noted.

modest style of wooing and, especially, by Silvia's apparent commitment, as a follower of Diana, to lifelong virginity. Convinced that Silvia's ostentatious chastity is a posture intended to conceal her love for Aminta, the confidantes Daphne and Thirsis urge Aminta to "ravish" her and conspire to create an opportunity for the bashful lover to force himself on the beloved (2.2.84; 22). When Aminta arrives at the appointed fountain where Silvia bathes, he finds that the Satyr has tied her to a tree and is preparing to deflower her. After Aminta repels the Satyr with his dart and liberates Silvia, the proud virgin rebukes Aminta for daring to touch her and runs away, leaving Aminta in a state of suicidal despair. At the play's climax, Aminta jumps off a cliff in response to what turns out to be a false report that wolves have devoured Silvia. Struck with remorse at the news of Aminta's suicide, Silvia rushes to his body, vowing to kill herself after she has buried him. But Aminta is only injured, and he revives in Silvia's embrace. In the play's conclusion, the shepherd Elpine hastens to find Silvia's father, Montano, to obtain his "consent" for her marriage to Aminta (5.1.51; 47).

In the eyes of Cupid and the Arcadians, Silvia's virginity is at odds with the order of nature, which commands all species, human and nonhuman alike, to pursue love as a pleasurable means of reproducing themselves. Because Silvia and Aminta are wellborn shepherds from wealthy families, the Arcadians blame their prudery on the restrictive sexual morality of the new urban gentry, which has lost touch with the "goulden lawes of Nature" stipulating that "[t]hat's lawfull which doth please" ("s'ei piace, ei lice" [1.681; 90])."[56] Borrowing liberally from classical sources, Tasso uses the rhetoric of biological determinism, human animality, and

[56] "*That's lawfull which doth please*" for "*s'ei piace, ei lice*" is Samuel Daniel's translation of the ode that appeared in his 1592 poetic miscellany *Delia* (257). In his 1628 translation, Henry Reynolds offers a more censorious translation that leaves out the idea that, in the golden age, pleasure alone stipulated right and wrong: "The goulden lawes of Nature, they / Found in their brests; and then they did obey" (25-26).

civilizational decline to expose the religious veneration of virginity as a deviation from natural procreative norms. This biocentric critique of virginity is made to affirm marriage for the elite, since Silvia and Aminta's union, which meets various nuptial criteria—including class parity, the consent of Silvia's father, and promise of legitimate heirs—shows dynastic and procreative marriage to be an extension of the reproductive order of nature. Through its configuration of humans as animals whose behavior is determined by a universal breeding instinct, the *Aminta* presents a "biocentric" worldview in which humans are essentially reproductive creatures, a worldview that challenges the religious idealization of perpetual virginity while providing a new naturalistic discourse for advancing aristocratic marriage.

Expanding the Critical Narrative on the Early Modern Downgrading of Virginity

While recent scholarship has linked the declining status of virginity in the sixteenth century to the rise of Protestantism and its promotion of chaste marriage for all, Tasso's *Aminta* shows that, within Roman Catholic culture, the status of virginity was also challenged through the revival of classical texts providing writers with a naturalistic framework for celebrating human animality and generation in contravention to religious orthodoxy. As we will see, Tasso draws liberally from recently rediscovered classical Latin texts expressing biological determinism and cross-species resemblance—the premises that all behavior has a material, biological explanation and that traits and behaviors seen in one species will also be seen in others, to varying degrees—to dispute the religious veneration of virginity and to promote the "naturalness" of procreative marriage for elite families. [57]

[57] In "What Posthumanism Isn't," Kenneth Gouwens argues that the Renaissance recovery of ancient texts facilitated renewed attention to classical writers, such as Plutarch and Lucretius, who challenged human presumptions to specialness and asserted fundamental resemblances between humans and beasts (50-51).

As Richard Halpern and Theodora Jankowski have shown, early modern culture is characterized by an (approximate) Catholic/Protestant division regarding the relative status of virginity and marriage. In their reading of the literature, pejorative representations of virgins in early modern Protestant culture show the replacement of the Catholic idealization of virginity with a new preference for chastity—monogamous marriage—as the preeminent state for all Christians. While post-Reformation Catholic culture continued to prioritize celibacy (in 1563 the Council of Trent anathematizes anyone who says "the married state excels the state of virginity or celibacy" [195]), Protestant culture came to regard the perpetual virgin as a threat to its preferred unit of social organization, the patriarchal family, which it considered an ideal vehicle for religious education and indoctrination (Jankowski 81). The declining status of the female virgin was also rooted in economic factors, since, as Jankowski puts it in *Pure Resistance*, the "necessity for the capitalist to be sure that all his children were fathered by him added economic impetus for female marital fidelity and led to the fetishization of chastity" (80). Reading Protestant English texts, such as Milton's *Comus*, Halpern similarly argues that such texts celebrate female figures who follow the virgin-to-chaste-wife trajectory but present lifelong virgins, such as the Amazons, the nymphs of Diana, and the Maenads (the female followers of Dionysus who dismember Orpheus), who withhold their sexuality from men, as dangerously independent (94). According to this narrative, in the new proto-capitalist economies of early modern Europe, the sexual division of labor combined with the sexual subjection of women in the formation of patriarchal families in which the chaste wife remained at home to bear legitimate heirs of her husband's accumulated wealth. In a period when economic and religious forces promoted patriarchal family formation, the former Catholic veneration for perpetual

virginity was replaced by a Protestant idealization of the young virgin who yields to chaste marriage.

However, the *Aminta* and *Il Pastor Fido* show that, within Roman Catholic culture, classical texts were mined for arguments that virginity violates the order of nature. Because these arguments are invariably aimed at urging wellborn heirs and heiresses to marry, they may express not the belief that marriage is generally preferable to virginity, but that marriage is preferable to virginity in the case of noble families wishing to improve their political and economic positions through alliances with other noble families. The limited explanatory power of the Catholic/Protestant division will be seen again later, in Fletcher's *The Faithful Shepherdess*, a Protestant drama that celebrates virginity as an expression of personal temperance and adopts an ambiguous and skeptical posture toward sex and procreation.

De-animalizing Virginity

Throughout the play, Silvia's virginity is represented as a violation of the natural order, according to which all creatures pursue love as a pleasurable means of reproducing themselves and their kind. The play begins with a dialogue between Silvia and her confidante, Daphne, in which Daphne argues that Silvia, in rejecting Aminta's love and committing herself to lifelong celibacy, rejects a future defined by becoming a mother. Is it possible, Daphne asks in the opening lines of Act I, that Silvia has resolved to waste her "flowring youth" (i.e., her fertility) and not leave a "part" of her, in the form of her child, to survive her death:

> Is't possible (Silvia) thou canst resolve
> To spend the faire houres of thy flowring youth
> With such contempt of *Venus*, and her Sonne;

> And hast no more desire to be a mother,
>
> And leave a part of thee (when thou art dead)
>
> Living behind thee? (1.1.1-6; 3)

These lines equate love with sexual reproduction, an equation that Daphne returns to in a long catalogue of plant and animal pairs that show how the "force of amorous flame" leads to the happy "coupling" of "[t]he beast, the fish, the fowle, women and men" (1.1.123; 6). In a world where all creatures seek love/reproduction, Silvia's vow of celibacy is "savadge": "Thou onely savadge more than savadge beasts," comments Daphne ironically (1.1.134; 6). The virgin is "savadge," or wild, because her rejection of love suggests a beast undomesticated in the ways of men and women, a suggestion which is ironic since, as Daphne emphasizes, even "savadge beasts" love.

In the 1628 English translation quoted above, Henry Reynolds adds to Daphne's opening argument the line that bearing children offers a form of immortality to the parent. In the original Italian, Tasso describes a mother surrounded by her small children playing and laughing joyously but does not say that the children perpetuate a part of her after her death ("né intorno ti vedrai vezzosamente / scherzar i figli pargoletti?" [1.1.5-6; 10]).[58] Reynolds's addition has some basis, however, in the classical passages, on which Tasso draws and which convey the idea that nature instills passion in all creatures as a means of guaranteeing the survival of species. Tasso modeled the dialogue between Daphne and Silvia on a scene from *Phaedra*, a Roman tragedy written in the first century AD by Seneca (revived in Italy in the late fifteenth century), in which the Nurse, exhorting the young misogynist Hippolytus to love, invites him to imagine the desolation of a

[58] Reynolds's addition implies a belief in physiological maternity and the "two-seed" model of generation, and it raises the question of whether Tasso assumed a "one-seed" model, where the mother provides only the material womb for nurturing the male seed, and consequently is not genetically related to her own children.

world without love/reproduction: Venus, as the goddess of love, "restocks and restores the losses of our race;" without her, the seas, skies and woods would be emptied of life; Hippolytus must "follow nature" and lovingly procreate in order to prevent the obliteration of the species.[59] Similarly, in Lucretius's first century BC poem, *De Rerum Natura* (made popular in humanist circles in the fifteenth century), the opening invocation of Venus credits love for bringing "eternal generations forth, / Kind after kind" (3). From the same period, in Book 3, on animal breeding, of the *Georgics*, Virgil presents love as the fire that attracts all kinds, human and nonhuman alike: "Nay, every race on earth of men, and beasts, / And ocean-folk, and flocks, and painted birds, / Rush to the raging fire: love sways them all" (3.242-244). This classical trope of love as a universal procreative passion, responsible for the perpetuation of species, was associated with the pastoral genre.[60] As Scaliger put it in his account of the origins of the love theme in pastoral poetry: "[T]hat the perpetuity of the species might not be endangered, passion was implanted in all animals at the creation."[61] Conflating passion and heterosexual

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[59] Come, just try to imagine human life without Venus,
Who restocks and restores the losses of our race:
The world would lie in squalor, its air rank,
The sea would soon be stagnant, empty, without fish,
The sky would have no birds, the woods no wild beasts;
[…] Imagine what will happen
If no young people have children: those you see now will be
Obliterated all at once, in a single generation.
Go on then, follow nature as your guide in life. (2.469-481; 16)

[60] Non-pastoral iterations of the argument that virginity is unnatural appear in Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, when Lucio complains that Angelo, a minister who has resumed prosecuting subjects found guilty of violating laws prohibiting fornication, is an "ungenitured agent" who will "unpeople the province with continency. Sparrows must build in house-eaves, because they are lecherous" (3.1.406-408), and in *All's Well That Ends Well*, where Paroles contends that it is "not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve virginity. Loss of virginity is rational increase, and there was never virgin got till virginity was first lost" (1.1.119-122).

[61] Scaliger traced the pastoral genre's thematic concern with love back to the ancient pastoral scenario where primitive shepherds, "inflamed by the example of the flocks" and motivated by the same animal passions, sang about their loves and desires:

> Pastoral poetry has many themes, but love seems to have been the earliest. There are many reasons why this should have been the case. In the first place, that the perpetuity of the species might not be endangered, passion was implanted in all animals at the creation. Then, both youths and maidens without distinction acted as shepherds, and were thus not only thrown much together, but

reproduction, this trope compares all species with one another (as all are alike in their instinct to mate and to procreate) at the same time it denormalizes virginity, which is represented as a deviant behavior that is broadly incompatible with pro-natalist nature.

Act 2, however, hints that Silvia's seeming preference for virginity is in fact an oblique mating strategy, a ploy to attract Aminta by feigning disdain for him; this interpretation of Silvia's prudery normalizes virginity by paradoxically redefining it as a reproductive modality. In a dialogue between the confidantes, Daphne complains that Silvia is ignorant of the pain she inflicts on Aminta by rejecting him, but Thirsis responds that Silvia wounds Aminta deliberately:

> Tush, there's no wench so simple but she knowes,
> Soone as shee leaves the cradle, how to seeme
> Spruce and delightfull; and what armes to use
> To hurte, or kill outright, and what to heale
> A wounded heart, and give it life withal. (2.2.12-16; 20)

All women know, from a very early age, how to manipulate a potential mate—the "heart" that can be hurt, killed, healed, or revived. The fact that Silvia does not "kill outright" Aminta's feelings leads Thirsis to conclude that she deploys her virginity to wound Aminta but intends eventually to yield. According to Thirsis, a maiden's modest posture is another expression of Nature's purposiveness, since Nature teaches women the "arts" (17) of manipulating men in the same way that Nature teaches the "Peacocke to display / His many-eye'ed-plumes beautie to the day" (20-21). Silvia's otherwise inexplicable rejection of a mate is explained as a natural art that is analogous to the peacock's artful use of his plumage to attract a mate. Daphne, agreeing with

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easily inflamed by the example of the flocks; as Theocritus most happily words it: "The goatherd, when he marks the young goats at their pastime, looks on with yearning eyes, and fain would be even as they." (*Poetices libri*, 22)

Thirsis, describes how she recently spied Silvia decking herself with flowers in a private grooming session at a reflecting pool in a manner suggesting that she is not the careless nymph she pretends to be. By cynically interpreting Silvia's ostentatious virginity in this way, the *Aminta* reinforces an ideology of universal procreativity, in which the virgin's renunciation of sex is intelligible only as a reproductive strategy.

While recent scholarship has linked the declining status of virginity in the sixteenth century to the rise of Protestantism and the Protestant promotion of chaste marriage for all, Tasso's *Aminta* shows that a classicized biocentric framework was also used—within Roman Catholic culture—to oppose the religious veneration of virginity and to promote the "naturalness" of procreative marriage, at least for elite families. Scholars, such as Halpern and Jankowski, have argued that pejorative literary representations of virgins in early modern Protestant culture show the replacement of the Catholic idealization of virginity with a new preference for chastity—monogamous marriage—as the preeminent state for all Christians. While post-Reformation Catholic culture continued to prioritize celibacy (in 1563 the Council of Trent anathematizes anyone who says "the married state excels the state of virginity or celibacy" [195]), Protestant culture came to regard the perpetual virgin as a threat to its preferred unit of social organization, the patriarchal family, which it considered an ideal vehicle for religious education and indoctrination (Jankowski 81). But before and apart from the Protestant authorities who saw virginity as a threat to the social order, poets writing for Roman Catholic courts, such as Tasso and (as we will see) Guarini, also degraded virginity for the nobility through their use of classical texts representing that virginity contradicts the order of nature.

The Ironic Defense of Rape and Critique of Chastity

Like Silvia, Aminta is faulted for excessively prudish manners that are presented as unnatural. We see Aminta's gentle wooing as abnormal and unnatural through his juxtaposition with the Satyr, here representing the violence of raw libido, as the humanoid goats often did in Italian drama (Jeffrey 147-158). Like Aminta, the Satyr has been rejected by Silvia. Unlike Aminta, who balks at the confidantes' recommendation that he simply force himself on her, the uninhibited Satyr attempts to rape Silvia. In his opening dialogue, the Satyr argues that rape is permitted because it is natural. Nature, the Satyr explains, has endowed all creatures with different "armes" and "powers," which they are licensed to use to satisfy their desires, so the Satyr may use his strength, just as the hart uses speed, the lion uses his paws, and woman uses her beauty (2.71-79; 19). The Satyr's rationalization of rape is implicitly endorsed by Daphne and Thirsis, who criticize Aminta's gentle wooing and council him to "ravish" Silvia (2.2.84; 22). Daphne observes that Aminta is "nicely respectfull beyond measure" and must learn to "leave that vice" of excessive respect (2.2.78, 80; 22): "If he will learne to love, he must be bould," Daphne councils Thirsis, "Let him a little filtch [take surreptitiously]; if that be vaine, / Then ravish" (2.2.81, 83-84; 22). Thirsis accordingly advises Aminta to take Silvia "against her will" to "quite thy paines and please her too" (2.3.68, 70; 27). Presumably, the Satyr and shepherds' arguments for rape contain a degree of irony. While Aminta's overly "respectfull" behavior is represented as ineffective and perhaps orthogonal or even opposed to his goal of winning Silvia's love, the more "natural" alternative—sexual assault—suffers through its association with the comparatively lowborn shepherds and the half-man, half-goat Satyr.

A similar irony underlies the Arcadians' complaint that Silvia and Aminta's sexual restraint shows that the morality of the present age, and its people, have declined from the

Golden Age, when creatures were permitted to follow love's law that pleasure alone stipulated right and wrong. This narrative of moral and social decline is the theme of the play's widely imitated passage, the Ode to a Golden Age, which the Chorus sings at the end of the Act 1.[62] As the Chorus explains it, the first age was considered the "Happy Age of Goulde" not for the natural abundance of the earth, not for the peace and leisure that men enjoyed in the absence of war and toil, not for the other familiar *mirabilia* of utopian mythology (1-13; 16), but for the absence, in a state of nature, of the "cruell lawes" that enforced a notional ideal of "*Honour*" on lovers:

> But therefore only happy Dayes,
> Because that vaine and ydle name,
> That couz'ning Idoll of unrest,
> (Whom the madd vulgar first did raize,
> And call'd it *Honour*, whence it came
> To tyrannize or'e ev'ry brest,)
> Was not then suffred to molest
> Poore lovers hearts with new debate;
> More happy they, by these his hard
> And cruell lawes, were not debar'd
> Their innate freedome; happy state;
> The goulden lawes of Nature, they

[62] Although it was not until 1628 that Reynolds issued a translation of the *Aminta* in its entirety, in 1592, the poet Samuel Daniel translated the Golden Age Chorus in his collection *Delia*. In *Il Pastor Fido*, Guarini responded to Tasso's Golden Age Chorus with a revised Chorus, discussed below, wherein Guarini reproduces the rhyme words and conceits of Tasso's Chorus but alters them according to his opposing vision of a Golden Age where rationality and chastity prevail over sensuality and pleasure.

Found in their brests; and then they did obey. (14-26; 16)

"Honor" is just a word, a "vain and ydle name," and has no significance, no reality, beyond the value assigned to it by an unreasonable linguistic community ("the madd vulgar"). Before society began to exalt ("raize") honor in what the Chorus says was a form of idolatry, the "goulden lawes of Nature" prevailed in a "happy state" of free love. As I discussed above, Tasso had, in the original Italian, specified that nature decrees that whatever is pleasurable is lawful: "*s'ei piace, ei lice*" (1.681; 90). Reynolds's censorious translation muffles Tasso's open nostalgia for an age when pleasure alone stipulated right and wrong, but it generally communicates the main idea that the human libido, as a natural phenomenon determined by the "goulden lawes of Nature," is incompatible with the "cruell lawes" requiring sexual restraint of lovers in the present age.

In 2.2., this sentiment is echoed by the confidantes, Daphne and Thirsis, who complain that Silvia and Aminta's excessive prudery typifies the *lapsed* sexual mores of the urban elite. Agreeing with Daphne that the lovers' behavior shows how the world grows "sadder" as it grows older ("*Il mondo invecchia, / ed invecchiando intristisce*" [2.2.72-73; 70]), Thirsis blames the decline in morality on the infiltration of citizens coming from the city into the pastures and mixing "blouds" with the "meaner people":

heretofore

Those of the Cittie were not wont so much

To haunt these woods as now adayes they do,

Nor meaner people in the village bred,

To come so much among the citizens;

Their blouds are now more mingled, and their customes. (2.2.67-72; 22)

With the Chorus and the confidantes blaming chastity on the rising influence of the urban aristocracy, the *Aminta* shows how the pastoral genre, which is based on a civilizational schema of successive ages (Gold, Silver, Bronze), allowed for the historicization of sexual morality. Chastity is not natural law, but a convention that was adopted by a new urban gentry, and thus has its own history and culture. From the "natural" perspective of the Arcadians, the aristocracy's obsession with sexual honor is an example of how the march of civilization has brought about cruel and perverse customs. But because the play attributes this critique of sexual honor to lowborn shepherds, and because the target is the higher-status Silvia and Aminta, the anti-chastity critique cannot be taken at face value and must be considered from the perspective of the Ferrara courtiers for whom it was written. As the final emphasis on bringing Silvia and Aminta's passion within the confines of lawful marriage suggests, the *Aminta* affirms sexual modesty as a sequential virtue leading to procreative monogamy.

Naturalizing Marriage for the Nobility

The biocentric critique of virginity and the vindication of nature's reproductive imperative facilitates the play's advancement of marriage, which is made to appear an extension of the procreative order of nature. In the final scene of the play, 5.1, the shepherd Elpine tells the Chorus of Aminta's "fortunate and happy fall" (41; 47): how Aminta had attempted to kill himself by leaping from a steep precipice, but, surviving the fall, was joined by Silvia, who demonstrated her love for him with a sensuous kiss. Elpine has been tasked with finding Silvia's father, Montano, and bringing him to the lovers since "there wants nothing else but his consent / To both their boundlesse joys accomplishment" (51-52; 47). The Chorus predicts that Montano will surely favor Silvia and Aminta's union because their marriage meets the requirements of

age, social status (“bloud and birth”), and mutual consent (“mutuall loves”), and because Montano wants heirs:

> Their age, their bloud and birth, their mutuall loves,
> And all agree; and the good oulde Montano
> Will be glad doutblesse of posteritie,
> And to’arme his gray haires with so sweet a guard. (5.1.53-56; 47)

Elpine expects that Montano will bless the marriage because it will generate descendants (“posteritie”) who will “arme” him against his old age, figured by his “gray haires.” The offspring that result from the marriage of Silvia and Aminta will bear some part of Montano and thus offer him a form of protection against old age and death. Elpine’s allusion to the regenerative aspect of love brings the play back, full circle, to Daphne’s opening appeal to Silvia’s “desire to be a mother” and to “leave a part of thee (when thou art dead) / Living behind thee” (1.1.3-5; 3). Connecting the play’s concern with the procreative nature of love with legitimate marriage, this structure shows how the classical theme of natural procreativity was harmonized with early modern cultural preferences for aristocratic marriages that were legitimized by social parity, parental consent, and the expectation of childbearing.

An exacting attention to social class and rank modulates the play’s celebration of procreative marriage and suggests a differential emphasis on chastity for the elite. While lowborn shepherds and forest nymphs may indulge Golden Age freedoms, including the freedom to reject love and reproduction, the wellborn, whose virginity jeopardizes the survival of their lineage, bear the burden of reproduction. The play repeatedly cites Silvia and Aminta’s elite birth as an argument in favor of their union. In the opening dialogue, Daphne, imagining that Silvia might

think herself too highborn for Aminta, points out that they are equals because the blood of gods runs in both their veins:

> Nor canst thou thinke him to meane borne for thee;
>
> For (be thou daughter of Cidippe faire,
>
> Whose sire was god of this our noble floud)
>
> Yet is Aminta ould Silvanus heire,
>
> Of the high seed of Pan the Shepherds god. (1.1.78-82; 5)

Silvia could rightly reject Aminta's love if he were too "meane borne," but this ground for rejecting him is unavailable because they are of the same social rank. Aminta shows the same attention to parentage and status when he tells his confidante, Thirsis, of his passion for Silvia: "Thou know'st her mother hight Cidippe, no? / Montano the rich Goteheard is her father" (1.2.70-71; 10). Even the Satyr believes that Silvia spurns him not for his goatish shape, but for his low economic status: "No, no, my shape's not it thou hat'st mee for, / But 'tis my poverty thou dost abhorre" (2.1.51-52; 19). The value accorded elite marriages reflects the early modern ideal of preserving the nobility (as a distinct race or lineage) and their wealth by preventing marriages between the nobility and the "meane borne." Although Daphne strongly recommends childbearing and a "chast lover" to Silvia (1.1.195; 8), Daphne herself is apparently childless and perennially in and out of love. Thirsis, too, has resolved not to be a "lover" (2.2.117-126; 23), but his voluntary celibacy does not create a crisis, as Silvia's does. In this regard, the comparatively lowborn confidantes' roles resemble that of the poet speaker of Shakespeare's sonnets: a social subordinate whose recommendation of procreation to a wellborn youth shows the culture's bimodal attitudes toward reproductive morality.

The Animalization of Human Love

The *Aminta*'s love theme distracted its early twentieth-century critics, who faulted Tasso for reducing love to animal sex and failed to notice that the supposedly "hedonistic" play uses the rhetoric of human animality to advance a conservative ideology of patriarchal marriage.[63] W. W. Greg, author of the magisterial 1906 survey of the genre, *Pastoral Poetry and Pastoral Drama*, reads the *Aminta* as a dissipated play that glamorizes the animal passions while smearing modesty as a hypocritical religious convention. For Greg, Daphne's suggestion that "modesty is commonly but a veil for lust" expresses the "degeneration of sexual feeling" on display throughout the play, a moral decay that Greg attributes to the "rank soil of a petty Italian court infected with post-Tridentine morality" (190-191). Greg blamed the *Aminta* for reducing the early Renaissance ideal of human love to its "animal nature," the "mere gratification of the senses—a *luxuria* [lust] scarcely distinguishable from *gula* [appetite]" (*ibid.*). (It is ironic that Greg uses the language of sex and reproduction—"degeneration"—to describe the moral lapse of reducing love to sex and reproduction.) Domenico Vittorini, an Italian-American academic writing in the mid-twentieth century, was also struck by the final triumph of raw desire in the *Aminta*, a play he believed Tasso had first planned as a defense of Platonic love. In Vittorini's view, Tasso had originally wished to differentiate, in the characters of the Satyr and Aminta,

[63] Later twentieth-century criticism of the *Aminta* is sparse and has focused mainly on allegorical and historical performance readings. Richard Cody, in *The Landscape of the Mind*, defended *Aminta* against charges of gross sensuality by reading the play's celebration of physical love as a Neoplatonic allegory of the soul. Thus, when the injured Aminta is revived by Silvia's embrace, the episode is not to be read as a triumph of carnal pleasure, but a "rite of the Platonic theology by which a tragic union in death is controverted and the life of the soul in the natural world celebrated" (74). Later twentieth-century Italian-language criticism has focused on the *Aminta's* tragicomic structure—Aminta's "fortunate fall" that brings him on the verge of death in order to give him a new life—as an echo of Petrarch's redemptive itinerary from love to death to life (Varese, "Introduction"). Recent work on the historical performance of the play includes Maria Galli Stampino's *Staging the Pastoral* and Lisa Sampson's *Pastoral Drama in Early Modern Italy*.

between “brutal passion and Platonic love,” but in permitting Aminta to embrace Silvia in the play’s conclusion, ultimately “yielded” to the “hedonism” of the Ferrara court (124-125).

These readings rightly identify the play’s interest in love’s “animal nature” and “brutal passion” (where *brutal* describes something belonging to brutes, or beasts, as opposed to people). However, it is an oversimplification of the play’s attitudes toward sex to conclude that the conflation of human love and animal reproduction indicates the hedonism of the courtly milieu for which Tasso wrote. While the *Aminta* does reject the Roman Catholic idealization of perpetual virginity, it uses the rhetoric of biological determinism and cross-species resemblance to advance a conservative ideal of legitimate marriage as a means of reproducing the nobility and conserving their wealth.

A Nuptial Definition of Humanity: Guarini’s *Il Pastor Fido*

In 1579, Battista Guarini, seven years Tasso’s senior and his rival, became court poet at Ferrara. Seeking to “overgo” Tasso’s *Aminta*, Guarini composed his pastoral drama, *Il Pastor Fido*, between 1580 and 1585, circulated the manuscript upon its completion, and first published the pastoral drama in 1590 (Donno xix).

While *Il Pastor Fido* retells Tasso’s pro-nuptial story of young Arcadians who overcome obstacles to find love and happiness in lawful marriage, the two dramas have different attitudes regarding human psychology and the human-beast relationship. In the *Aminta*, Tasso took the position that behavior is determined by natural instincts that people share with other animals, and the discourse of biological determinism and cross-species resemblance normalized marriage as an extension of the universal procreativity of nature. By contrast, *Il Pastor Fido* is diffused with anthropological commentaries regarding the distinctiveness of human rationality, a faculty that *ideally* enables people to choose between natural pleasures and lawful love—between the “law

of Nature" to "Love if thou likest" and the "humane law" to "Love lawfully" (4.5.45-48; 131). Because marriage requires a rational soul capable of governing wayward desires and choosing "lawfull pleasure" (4.26; 143), marriage is a point of difference, not analogy, between human and animal identities.

In its premise that human identity is demonstrated by the display of reason/chastity, *Il Pastor Fido* defines humanness in such a way that few people are regarded as human. A person's human identity requires continual proof of fidelity and may be lost by indulging the "vilde frenzies of the body" that mark the descent into beastliness (5.9.40; 170). In this way, Guarini uses the discourse of reason and human-beast difference to ennoble monogamous marriage and to dehumanize the unfaithful, since human identity is granted to the chaste and denied to those whose "beastly will" prevails over their human reason (5.9.10; 169).

Guarini's Psychosexual Golden Age of Rationality and Chastity

Guarini uses the Golden Age Chorus to unpack his conception that human psychology, at least in its original and ideal form, was defined by the possession of a rational soul that enabled people to choose virtuous actions. At the end of Act 4, the Chorus laments the passing of the "sweete and golden Age" when people enjoyed the unimpaired faculty of "Reason" ("*ragion*" [1.1403; 229]) that caused them to "[d]esire to do well" (4.1; 1-24; 142-143). Here Guarini adapts to his particular ideas about the human mind and sexual behavior the classical myth of an *aurea aetas*, an original period of natural happiness that was, in depictions by Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, succeeded by periods of violence and decadence. Christian revisions assimilated the Golden Age to Eden, and in this synthesis the myth acquired the Christian themes of a paradise lost through human sin and the promise of redemption through faith. For Guarini, the paradise

lost was psychosexual perfection, according to which the faculty of reason liberated people from their corporeal desires and empowered them to be chaste.

His Chorus begins the Ode by contrasting the unimpaired faculty of reason in the Golden Age with the troubled mentality of the present and then attributes the chastity of original mankind to the rational soul's proper management of the desiring body. Comparing the human mind to a sky illuminated by reason, "our sunnes eternall light," the Chorus waxes nostalgic for the time when "troublous thoughts" did not cloud "our Wits skies" and dim "Reason" as they do now (4.7-11; 142-143). The Chorus explains that the clouding of reason has led to the modern disdain of "true Honor" (4.25) and the "unbridling" of "every secret vice" (4.45). The conceit of vice as an unbridled horse refers to the chariot allegory of the soul from the Platonic dialogue, the *Phaedrus* (sections 246a-254e), wherein Plato likens the human soul to a charioteer who drives a chariot drawn by two horses, one representing rational faculties and the other representing desire and appetite. The "Base present age," wherein people improperly give the reins to their appetitive horse, marks a decline or fall from the virtuous behavior of people in the Golden Age who gave the reins to the rational horse (Fanshawe 164). Blending classical psychology and myth of epochal decline, Guarini's Chorus represents the human mind as rational and virtuous in its ideal or original form, and the moral delinquency of the present age as resulting from the privileging of appetite over reason.

Imagining that, in a Golden Age of rationality, monogamous marriage was the universal condition, *Il Pastor Fido* gives life to the remarkable idea that chastity is rational and fully consonant with original human nature. With their corporeal passions reined in by the intellect, people in the Golden Age were free to pursue "lawfull pleasure" (4.1.26; 143) according to the decree, "piaccia se lice," which is literally translated as "let it please if it is lawful" (4.1419;

229).[64] Hymen, the god of marriage, presided over the pastures where swains and nymphs enjoy "lawfull Loves" (4.29; 143). Not only does Guarini place monogamy *in* the Edenic garden and thus show monogamy to be natural to prelapsarian mankind, but he also compares monogamy *to* a garden in that both are premised on the desirability of placing fences, or limits, on pleasure:

> To one alone
>
> The lively Roses of Delight were blown;
>
> The thievish Lover found them shut on Trial,
>
> And fenced with Prickles of Sharp Denial. (Fanshawe 178)

Although the language here (and in the original Italian) is gender neutral and implies that the marriage restrictions are equally applicable to husband and wife, the conceit of marriage as an enclosed garden suggests what Peter Stallybrass called the female enclosure of the body: the early modern confinement of women to the private sphere where they were categorized as male property ("Patriarchal Territories," 123-142). This patriarchal view is more explicit in the Chorus's observation that, in the Golden Age, "Husband and Lover signify'd one thing" (*ibid*.). The assertion that husband and lover were synonyms—that there were no lovers who were not husbands—presents a female perspective and implies that women were so universally faithful that the language lacked a word for extramarital lover. In the vision of a Golden Age populated by faithful wives, Guarini's Chorus ennobles patriarchal marriage by presenting it as a transcendent sexual arrangement that was natural to mankind in its original condition of perfect rationality.

Guarini's Golden Age of human rationality and chastity is a pointed revision of Tasso's ode to a Golden Age, which celebrates free love in a state of nature. In the *Aminta*, the Chorus

[64] Citations from the Italian text are taken from the edition of *Il Pastor Fido* edited by Elisabetta Selmi.

laments the passing of an age when people freely pursued pleasure according to the law of nature stipulating that "whatever is pleasurable is lawful" ("s'ei piace, ei lice" [1.681; 90]) and in the absence of "cruell lawes" requiring sexual restraint (1.23; 16). For Tasso, people resemble other animals in that their sexual behavior is determined by natural forces driving all creatures to reproduce. Guarini's Chorus, by contrast, describes a Golden Age when people, with their passions controlled by human reason, were content to restrict pleasure to marriage according to the decree "piaccia, se lice" ("let it please, if it is lawful"), a decree that is an explicit inversion of Tasso's verse (4.1419; 229). In the Tassian Golden Age, pleasure determined the law; in Guarinian Golden Age, the law determines pleasure. This is because, as Guarini's Chorus explains *et passim*, reason empowers people to manage their bodily passions and act morally—to choose "lawful pleasures."[65]

A Choice Between Pleasure and the Law

In *Il Pastor Fido*, Guarini manufactures plot conflicts that force the Arcadians to choose between their pleasure and their moral obligations, a choice that foregrounds human agency and human-beast difference. The main plot tells the story of the noble nymph, Amarillis, who loves the wrong shepherd, Mirtillo, instead of her fiancé, the huntsman Silvio. In the secondary plot, Silvio actively resists love, both the lawful love of his fiancé, Amarillis, and the desperate passion of the shepherdess Dorinda. The Arcadians have a special interest in the marriage between Amarillis and Silvio because, according to an oracle, it will end Diana's curse, which has plagued Arcadia since the end of the Golden Age, when the shepherdess Lucrina betrayed

[65] The Choruses concluding the second and third acts contrast rational love, where reason governs the corporeal desires, with lust, where reason is subordinate to the body.

her faithful shepherd with another man. Enraged, the goddess Diana punished Arcadia by mandating the yearly sacrifice of a maiden at Diana's altar, and by requiring the Arcadians to execute any woman found guilty of infidelity. An oracle, however, promises that these punishments will come to an end once two lovers descended from the gods are joined in faithful matrimony. After many generations, Arcadia finally has a male and female who meet the oracular criteria: Silvio, a descendant of the divine hero Hercules, and Amarillis, a descendant of the god Pan. The nuptials of Silvio and Amarillis are eagerly anticipated by everyone except the young betrotheds, who detest each other despite having been groomed for marriage since childhood. Under pressure, Silvio and Amarillis deliberate their courses of action and see their dilemmas as bearing on the difference between human and beast identities.

In the opening scene, Linco, an old servant of Silvio's father, Montano, seeks to persuade Silvio to love his fiancé Amarillis, as he is obligated to do by Arcadian law. The scene is modeled on the corresponding dialogue between Silvia and Daphne in Act 1 of Tasso's *Aminta* and begins with Linco cycling through stock arguments in the exhortation-to-love tradition.[66] In preferring the pleasures of the hunt to love, Silvio wastes nature's gift of youth and beauty (1.1.24-25; 57); overlooks the beauty and worthiness of his fiancé Amarillis (42-51); betrays his inexperience, which alone can explain his anti-love attitudes (61-66); and fails to recognize love as the necessary means by which all things in nature renew themselves (92-125).

In response to Linco's catalogue of regenerating plants and mating animals, Silvio first contemptuously asks Linco whether his youth had been committed to his charge in order for Linco to "nurse and traine" him in "these soft effeminate desires of wanton love?" (1.1.126-128;

[66] The classical source is the scene, in Seneca's *Phaedra*, where the nurse exhorts the young Hippolytus to abandon the woods and the hunter's life and to enjoy the pleasures of women and of love.

60) Then, referring to Linco's subordinate position as his tutor and his own semi-divine nature as a descendant of Hercules, Silvio asks whether Linco has forgotten what he is and what Silvio is: "Remembrest not what thou, and what I am?" (129) Linco responds:

> I am a man, and humane me esteeme,
> With thee a man, or rather shouldst be so.
> I speake of humane things, which if thou skornst,
> Take heed least in dishumaning thy selfe,
> A beast thou prove no sooner than a god. (1.1.130-134; 60)

So Linco has not forgotten his status as a tutor in the employ of Silvio's house, but is speaking as a man, and a "humane" one at that, and Silvio in turn is also a man, or at least should be one. And, rather than inculcating Silvio with "effeminate matters of wanton love," Linco speaks of "humane things" that Silvio scorns at the peril of dishumaning himself and showing himself to be a beast rather than the descendant of the divine hero Hercules.

The 1602 English translator captures the anthropological punning of the Italian original, and it is the polysemy of "humane" and "*umano*" that account for the rich ambiguity of this passage.[67] Derived from the classical Latin etymon *humanus*, "*umano*" and "humane" could refer to a biological identity (belonging to people, of the human race) and to a quality of behavior associated with people (benign, courteous, cultured, learned, etc.).[68] The modern semantic and

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[67] Uomo sono, e mi pregio
d'esser umano; e teco, che se' uomo,
o che più tosto esser dovresti, parlo
di cosa umana; e, se di cotal nome
forse ti sdegni, guarda
che nel disumanarti
non divenghi una fera, anzi che un dio. (1.1.202-209; 90)

[68] See the etymology note in the *OED* article for "human, adj. and n." and for "humane, adj." The two senses are also given in the entry for "umano" in the first edition of the dictionary of the Italian language, *Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca* (1612).

pronunciation distinction between "human" and "humane" not arising until the eighteenth century, "humane" was a variant spelling of "human."

If Linco uses "humane" in the sense "belonging to people," then the passage can be read as Linco asserting love and reproduction as defining qualities of being human. He speaks not just as a man, but a male human, and of "humane things"—things relating to the human race—which, in this context, likely refers to the biological reproduction of humankind, since he has just concluded his long speech on love as the procreative passion that ensures the regeneration of plants and animals. This sense is more explicit in the passage's classical source—a scene from Seneca's *Phaedra*—where the Nurse, exhorting the youth Hippolytus to love, invites him to imagine the death of the human race if all young people eschewed love as he does. But Guarini goes farther than Seneca in linking human identity to the performance of sexual reproduction that perpetuates the kind: if Silvio chooses not to love as all beasts do, he will, ironically, dishuman himself and show himself to be a beast.

However, if Linco uses "humane" in the sense of having the courtesy and benevolence characteristic of people, then he can be interpreted as distinguishing between being a man and being a humane man. As a "humane" man who speaks to Silvio of "humane things," Linco exhorts Silvio to a standard of courteous and benevolent behavior that differentiates humane men from beastly men. In saying that Silvio risks "dishumaning" himself by scorning the "humane things" Linco urges on him, he may refer specifically to Silvio's moral duty to honor his vow of faith to Amarillis. Silvio does not merely scorn love; he scorns his legal obligation to love and marry Amarillis and thereby end Diana's punishment of Arcadia. When Linco praises Amarillis for her beauty, he also notes that she "[r]eserves her selfe, ordained by heav'n and men" for Silvio (1.1.48; 58). He refers to her as a "Love so lawfull" (157) and reminds Silvio that he has

"solemnely receiv'd her faith" (163) and that the "heavens / Hereto do tye thee" (167-168). Thus, "humane things" may refer to normative love—monogamy—and Linco may be saying that men who do not abide by chastity laws risk dishumaning themselves and showing themselves to be beasts.

In response, Silvio argues that human identity is defined not by love but by freedom. When Silvio points out to Linco that Amarillis is not yet his spouse, Linco rejoins that Silvio has "solemnely receiv'd her faith" and cautions him against provoking the gods by violating his vow. Silvio argues that the gods have given freedom to people precisely so that they may resist all forms of force: "The gift of heaven is humane libertie, / May we not force repell that force received" (165-166). This "humane libertie" expresses the idea that people stand apart from beasts in their ability to choose a course of action according to their own will. While beasts have no choice in their action but to follow blindly their natural instincts, people are free to make their own fate. In resisting the law that compels him to marry Amarillis, Silvio shows the freedom of action that proves his humanity.

In this way, the opening scene of *Il Pastor Fido* reframes the "virginity problem" posed in the *Aminta* to replace Tasso's biological standard with an anthropological one. The *Aminta* represents Silvia's virginity as a problem because it violates the natural law mandating universal procreativity; as a virgin, Silvia does not jeopardize her status as human but as *beast*. Thus, Daphne ironically tells Silvia that she is more savage than savage beasts—"Thou onely savadge more than savadge beasts" (1.1.134; 6)—since even beasts love. Contra Tasso, Guarini shows people being judged according to their performance of a distinctive human identity rather than an animal one.

Through the character of Amarillis, Guarini explores the idea that people differ from beasts in that they are expected to behave morally, even in cases when there is a conflict between bodily desire and human law—between the "law of Nature" to "Love if thou likest" and the "humane law" to "Love lawfully" (4.5.45-48; 131). Although engaged to Silvio and legally obligated to marry him, Amarillis loves Mirtillo, a seeming stranger in Arcadia. However, she hides her feelings in view of the execution she faces if found guilty of a breach of faith to Silvio and reveals her love for Mirtillo only to Corisca, a former courtesan who also loves Mirtillo. Even in a play that stresses chastity for men as well as women and is titled for the exemplary faith of a male shepherd, *Il Pastor Fido*, Guarini creates a sex differential in infidelity penalties that reflects the sexual double standard of the early modern period, according to which female infidelity was punished to a greater degree (Traub 23, *et passim*). Plotting to eliminate her rival, Corisca devises a scheme whereby Amarillis is discovered alone in a cave with Mirtillo in an apparent betrayal of Silvio and is consequently sentenced to be sacrificed at the altar of Diana. In prison awaiting her execution, Amarillis protests her innocence to the Priest Nicander, who, imagining that she considers herself innocent under nature's law, explains that she has broken not the "law of Nature" to "Love if thou likest" but the "humane law" to "Love lawfully" (4.5.45-48; 131).

In her famous soliloquy in Act 3,[69] Amarillis envies the "happie savadge beasts" that are subject only to nature's law mandating love and laments "inhumane humane law" that punishes that love with death:

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[69] As Nicholas Perella describes in his article discussing the literary legacy of Guarini's *Il Pastor Fido*, Amarillis's dilemma expressed for later writers the injustice of the human chastity laws. For example, in his pastoral farce, John Gay has the shepherdess Dorcas, who is pregnant but unmarried, echo Amarillis in her complaint:

> Ah why does nature give us so much cause
> To make kind-hearted lasses break the laws?

> Oh happie savadge beasts whom nature gives
> No lawes in love, save verie love it selfe.
> Inhumane humane law, that punish'st
> This love with death, if't be so sweet to sin,
> And not to sin so necessary bee,
> Imperfect nature that repugneth law,
> Or law too hard that nature doth offend. (3.4.11-17; 107-108)

Amarillis refers to Arcadia's chastity code as an "[i]nhumane humane law," a pun that captures the contradiction posed by a "humane" law (a law applying to people rather than beasts) that is "inhumane" (cruel, unmerciful) in that it punishes people for satisfying their natural impulses to love. Amarillis finds that either nature is at fault in making love "so sweet," or the laws are "too hard" in criminalizing natural love. While Silvio represents the conflict between pleasure and the law as an opportunity to exercise his "humane libertie," Amarillis sees the discrepancy as some defect either in nature or in the law. Although Amarillis and Silvio have contrasting perspectives that reflect the sex difference in infidelity penalties under Arcadian law, both connect their dilemmas to the difference between human and beast. Amarillis envies the beasts' freedom to love according to one's pleasure, while Silvio wants to exercise his human freedom to break the law.

The tragicomic structure resolves the main conflicts between pleasure and the law by revealing them to be the result of a misunderstanding. Amarillis is spared death at the altar of Diana in accordance with the law when Mirtillo volunteers to die in her place. When Silvio's

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> Why should hard laws kind-hearted lasses bind,
> When too soft nature draws us after kind? (qtd. 355)

father, the high Priest Montanus, leads Mirtillo to the altar, the sacrifice is interrupted by the sudden appearance of Mirtillo's putative father, the shepherd Carino, who has arrived in Arcadia from abroad. Ensuing discussions between Carino and Montanus reveal that Mirtillo is actually Montanus's long-lost firstborn son, believed to have perished nineteen years prior in a great storm. This means that Mirtillo is Silvio's older brother and shares his divine genealogy. The Arcadians realize that they have misinterpreted the oracle, and now hail the union of Amarillis and Mirtillo—not of Amarillis and Silvio—as the long-awaited fulfillment of the oracle's prophecy and the law. Because the law obligates Amarillis and Mirtillo to love and marry, there is no longer any discrepancy between nature's law to "love if thou likest" and the "humane law" to "love lawfully." In the play's conclusion, a Chorus of Shepherds celebrates Amarillis and Mirtillo's marriage with a hymn to Hymen. The final Chorus congratulates the newlyweds on their virtuous achievement of true pleasure: "This is true joy, true pleasure, and true mirth, / T'which vertue got, in patience giveth birth" (5.9-10; 172). Their marriage is the second of the play's comic endings, for, in the midst of Amarillis's trial, Silvio accidentally wounds his admirer, Dorinda, with his arrow, and struck by pity and love, carries his victim back to his family's home to be healed and married.

In showing initially frustrated lovers ultimately achieving, through their virtue, happiness in lawful marriage, *Il Pastor Fido* is, like the *Aminta*, a pro-marriage play. But the final affirmation of marriage is represented not as a triumph of animal passions, as it was in the *Aminta*, but of the human rationality that frees people to choose "lawfull pleasure" (4.26; 143).

Guarini's Behavioral Definition of Human Identity

The discussions of reason and human-beast difference in *Il Pastor Fido* might lead one to conclude that Guarini commits himself to a strong human-exceptionalist position in a proto-Cartesian tradition, according to which humans differ from animals in their unique endowment of a rational soul that allows them real agency and autonomy and that legitimizes a moral hierarchy that subordinates animals to humans. However, because *Il Pastor Fido* defines human identity in terms of rational and chaste behavior that is rarely found in humans, it presents a standard of humanity where only the chaste and wellborn few are truly human. Thus, Guarini uses the discourse of reason and human-beast difference to ennoble monogamous marriage and to "dishuman" the unfaithful, since humanity is granted to the chaste and denied to those whose "beastly will" prevails over their human reason (5.9.10; 169).

The villainess, Corisca, is a figure for the beastliness that results from indulging the corporeal passions, which provoke in her the "amorous furious rage" for Mirtillo that drives her to plot Amarillis's death (1.3.53; 68). When in the final scenes Corisca learns that her scheme has failed, she is struck with remorse, and rues her "beastly will" and the "vilde frenzies of the body" that have made her the unwitting instrument of her own ruin and of Amarillis's marriage (5.9.10, 40; 169-170). Corisca claims to live by nature's law to love, which she says takes precedence over Diana's laws because it is instinctual and innate:

> Which is more auncient among us,
> *Dianaes* lawe or loves? This in our breasts
> Is bred and growes with us, Nature her selfe
> With her owne hands imprints in our hearts breasts:
> And where this law commands, both heav'n and earth obey. (3.5.25-29; 109)

Corisca's description of Nature imprinting her law in lovers' hearts refers to the controversial verse from Tasso's Golden Age Ode; in the first age envisioned by Tasso, lovers were free to obey the "lawes of Nature" commanding the pursuit of pleasure ("s'ei piace, ei lice" [1.681; 90]) that they "[f]ound in their breasts" (1.25-26; 16).[70] In the character of Corisca, Guarini critiques Tasso's Golden Age motto by suggesting that its application will lead to situations where pleasure's sovereignty justifies beastly violence.

In *Il Pastor Fido,* chastity, or the control and limitation of sexuality, is more natural to the gentle, and therefore chastity differentiates classes of people rather than human from animal. Implying that the wellborn are more likely to be chaste, the second Chorus calls fidelity the "ornament of every foole well borne" (10; 98). (Here the word "foole" is used in the now obsolete sense of "a term of endearment or pity," as when, in *The Winter's Tale*, Hermione calls her ladies "good fools" and tells them to stop weeping [2.1.120].) Similarly, Amarillis concludes her complaint against Arcadia's "inhumane humane law" by invoking chastity as the power of "soules well-born" that can restrain the appetite that would otherwise lead her to break faith with Silvio for the love of Mirtillo: "Deare chastitie, th'inviolable powre / Of soules well-borne, that hast my amorous will / Retein'd in chaines of holy rigour still" (3.4.20-23; 108). The notion that the wellborn are more likely to be chaste—that chastity is their signature virtue—registers the period belief that virtue is inherited at birth and that the nobility differ from the lower classes in that they are born with a greater aptitude for virtuous behavior, especially chastity. That is, the gentle are more likely to possess the innate capacity to bind their "amorous will" in "chains of holy rigor" and therefore realize the chastity that proves their humanity.

[70] The reference is clearer in the Italian original, where Tasso says that nature chiseled ("scolpì") nature's law onto the hearts of lovers, of which Guarini's image of nature imprinting her law on the hearts of lovers is clearly reminiscent: "ma negli umani cuori, / senza maestro, la natura stessa / di propria man l'imprime" (3.5.597-599; 166).

By making human identity contingent on the display of chastity/reason and by denying the humanity of people who behave lewdly/irrationally, *Il Pastor Fido* provides an example of what Erica Fudge calls "the beast in man" discourse in early modern culture. In her book, *Brutal Reasoning*, Erica Fudge—an early leader in the posthumanities—looks at early modern discussions of reason as key to understanding how human and animal identities were constructed in the period. Fudge opens her chapter, "Becoming Animal," with an excerpt from John Donne's 1610 poem, "To Sir Edward Herbert, at Juliers," where man, likened to a composite of all beasts, can either become a "fool" if he lets "his beasts" reign, or "happy" if he disciplines his beasts and makes reason sovereign. Commenting on the poem, Fudge notes that, alongside the notion of the human as one whose reason distinguishes him from the rest of creation, there exists another sense

> in which the human can cease to be human, can fail to assign due place "To his beasts." If a human is human because of the expression of reason—the display of the possession of the rational soul—there exists the prospect that what is expressed by a human may not after all be reasonable. …. There exists the risk that humans may cease to be human, may stop acting according to their education, and may revert back to their natural sensuality. The logical description of this absence of evidence of reason is a descent to the animal, is the revelation of the "beast in man." (59-60)

In Fudge's phrasing, the concept of the "human [who] can cease to be human" has a paradoxical quality because human identity is both asserted and denied. Fudge uses the word "human" both as the noun, referring to a member of the biological species, and as the adjective that refers to a characteristic of people as opposed to animals and gods. Early modern English writers rarely use

"human" as a noun; for example, "human" does not appear as a noun in Shakespeare's writings. As an adjective, "human" more often describes qualities or behaviors—being civilized, cultured, kindly, considerate, merciful, compassionate, etc.—that distinguish people as a group but are not characteristic of every individual. Thus, because early modern works represent that people who cease to be human (civilized, cultured, kindly, etc.) exhibit the natural sensuality that people share with beasts, the "beast in man" discourse is less paradoxical than Fudge suggests. While Guarini asserts that people differ from animals in their possession of a rational soul, he considers them "humane" only if they use reason to act morally. Often, early modern writers seem to default to the position that people are beasts, with only a gentle few rising to the level of human through reasonable action.

In *Il Pastor Fido*, the discourse of reason and of human-beast difference does not serve to elevate humans collectively above nonhuman species, but rather to elevate chaste marriage, which is understood to be an exclusive sexual arrangement available only to the rational and wellborn few.

Fletcher's *The Faithful Shepherdess*

In acclimating the Italian pastoral drama to the English stage, John Fletcher examines the tensions between procreative desires and chastity laws through humoralism, the medical theory holding that human behavior is determined by the flux of bodily humors, black and yellow bile, phlegm and blood. In the play, hot blood in particular impels a group of young shepherds to the cusp of fornication and murder, until they are rescued by Clorin, the eponymous faithful shepherdess, who uses prayer and anti-aphrodisiacal herbs literally to cool their blood and make them chaste. In a convergence of Protestantism and the medico-scientific discourse of

humoralism, Clorin and the Priest inculcate in the shepherds religious discipline—hard work, prayer, abstinence from alcohol—to cool the shepherds' blood and thereby heal their lust.

While *The Faithful Shepherdess* shares the view of its Italian models that "man sure is a kind of Beast" (5.2.33; 566), it presents a contrasting, humoral conception of psychology, which is connected, in the play, with a Protestant view of society's role in fostering chastity by creating a favorable humoral environment. In the play, sexual behavior is plastic and malleable (rather than fixed at birth and varying by social class), such that Thessaly's moral authorities can deploy a medico-religious technology of power to produce cool bloods and chaste shepherds. With its proto-Foucauldian model of society's role in managing the sexual behavior of its constituents, *The Faithful Shepherdess* resolves the Italian pastoral conflict between individual desires and chastity laws, since the role of priests and healers is not to punish unfaithful actions but to heal lustful shepherds so that they can live chastely.[71] Moreover, *The Faithful Shepherdess* denies, as we will see, the Italian pastoral argument that nature commands all creatures to reproduce their kinds. In the English pastoral drama, virginity and sexual restraint are fully consonant with nature, and the play rehabilitates the degraded status of virginity by showing that it not just a precursor to chaste marriage, but a powerful virtue that is recognized even by the woodland creatures and deities. Indeed, in Fletcher's Thessaly, the nonhuman personalities—the Satyre, the River God, and the wild beasts who will not harm a virgin—are represented as having more "humanitie" than the shepherds. Depicting that humans are dependent on religion and medicine to compensate for a unique susceptibility to lechery and violence, *The Faithful Shepherdess* is an

[71]Foucault, in his prison history, *Discipline and Punish* (1975), argued that power (control over people) in modern disciplinary societies differs from forms of juridical punishment in premodern societies in that, in the former, the goal of discipline is reforming delinquent individuals—bringing them in line with "normal" behavior, while in the latter punishment is used to right a wrong and give the wrongdoer his just deserts.

example of "human negative exceptionalism" in Jacobean culture (Shannon, "Poor, Bare, Forked").

Fletcher's Humoral Conception of Desire

The humoral theory of desire provides the *The Faithful Shepherdess* with its language of love as well as with the mechanism of its sickness-to-health plot, according to which the lustful shepherds, afflicted by hot humors located in their veins and livers, are ultimately cooled and healed of their disease by Clorin, the faithful shepherdess. In representing that desire is a condition of the blood, Fletcher follows the psychophysiological paradigm of humoralism that derived from ancient Greek medicine.[72] This theory held that the body contained four fluids or humors—black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and blood—each with a related quality (cold, hot, dry, wet) and corresponding temperament (melancholic, choleric, phlegmatic, sanguine). An individual's temperament depended on his humoral profile; for instance, a hot, moist man was temperamentally an amorous man. In *The Faithful Shepherdess*, the references to humoralism mainly involve the contrast between the hot and cold qualities of the blood that dispose one to wanton or chaste love.

Because lust has a physical location in the blood, the Priest of Pan and Clorin target the blood, livers, and veins of the shepherds they treat. Clorin, in her herbal practice that specializes in curing shepherds who have "through too much heat / Growne wilde or lunaticke" (1.1.36-37;

[72] In her influential study of early modern humoralism, *Humoring the Body,* Gail Kern Paster stresses that the humoral understanding of emotion was predicated on the conjunction of the physiological and the psychological—on emotions being embodied, or "psychological materialism"—and therefore different from the modern dualistic attitudes that posit that the mental and physical are separate domains (4-24). See also the discussion of humoralism in Renaissance literature that specifically refers to depiction of humors in *The Faithful Shepherdess* by Lawrence Babb, "The Physiological Conception of Love in the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Drama."

502), sets aside the herb Calamint "whose vertues do refine / The blood of Man, making if free and faire" (2.2.30-31; 520).[73] Throughout the play, the language of cleanliness and color—of staining, purity, fairness and whiteness—are used in conjunction with the thermal vocabulary to describe lust and chastity as they are materially manifested in the body. While the sanguine complexion was associated with an excess of hot blood and denoted a large sexual appetite, a white or fair complexion signaled temperance.[74]

During evening rites, the Priest of Pan sprinkles the shepherds with "holy water" (1.2.6; 504) and purges their veins and livers of the day's impurities:

> Shepheards thus I purge away,
>
> Whatsoever this great day,
>
> Or the past houres gave not good,
>
> To corrupt your maiden blood:
>
> From the high rebellious heat,
>
> Of the grapes and strength of meat,
>
> From the wanton quicke desires,
>
> They do kindle by their fires,
>
> I do wash you with this water,
>
> Be you pure and faire hereafter.

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[73] Clorin's use of Calamint recalls Glouce's use of the herb in a poultice to treat Britomart's passion in Book 3 of *The Faerie Queene* (3.2.49).

[74] Babb discusses early modern medical writings that see libido and complexion as expressions of the condition of the blood in the body. In the Introduction to *Race and Early Modern England,* Jonathan Burton and Ania Loomba show that dark skin color (in its association with class, religion, and race) was often associated with lechery or "abnormal" sexualities (esp. 17-20). For a contrasting perspective, see *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama*, in which Mary Floyd-Wilson argues that, contra the Hippocratic position that climate and humors are analogous (hot temperatures cause hot blood), many early modern writers were influenced by the counteractive relationship between climate and humor, according to which theory hot air makes cold blood and vice versa.

From your livers and your vaines,

Thus I take away the staines. (1.2.9-24; 505)

"[N]ot good" environmental inputs "corrupt" the shepherds' "maiden blood" and cause lustful desires, but the sprinkling of holy water purges the body of its contaminants and restores the shepherds to a state of purity. The shepherds' chastity is figured by their "maiden blood"—i.e., the blood of maidens ("maiden" could refer to the sexually inexperienced of either sex) and blood that is maiden, or pure ("Maiden"). Dietary triggers include wine ("grapes") and meat, which kindle "fires" in the blood and cause "wanton quicke desires."[75] The ritual ablutions cleanse the "staines" from the "livers" and "vaines," leaving the shepherds "pure and faire." Purity and fairness are not just figurative terms for the absence of sin but describe the uncontaminated and thus clear condition of chaste blood.

The motivations of the Thessalian shepherds are represented in thermal and sanguine terms as they seek either to love chastely (no fornicating) or to quench through sex the heats and fires that burn in their bloods. Having received his purgation, Perigot proposes to Amoret that they meet at night in a grove in order to "plight our trothes, / With interchange of mutuall chaste imbraces" (1.2.97-98; 507). However, Amoret worries that the "silent night" in conjunction with the "days heat" will "moove [Perigot's] blood," and she infers, from the "staine" she sees "sticking" to his "liver," that Perigot has not been "[w]ashd white enough" and must "goe and purge again" (1.2.87-92; 507). Amoret implies that high external temperatures—the "days heat"—have warmed Perigot's blood to the point of visible staining and that further purgation is necessary to restore him to a state of whiteness and chastity. Perigot reassures Amoret that they will meet at a fountain where herbs grow that "coole" the "flames" that the body's "sensuall

[75] Meat and wine were commonly regarded as inflammatory (Babb 1020-1035).

parts" create in the blood; these anti-aphrodisiacal herbs have the power to quench the "hidden sparks" that would otherwise provoke the "sence" to "open fires" (1.2.115-118; 508). Thus assured that their assignation will be chaste—and that there will be herbal remedies available to cool their heated blood—Amoret agrees to meet Perigot that night.

The cool, chaste relationship of Perigot and Amoret is sabotaged by Amarillis, a shepherdess whose veins course with blood heated by visions of Perigot wrestling, running, and casting stones:

> what dull eie
> That never was acquainted with desire,
> Hath seene thee wrestle, run, or cast the stone,
> With nimble strength and faire delivery,
> And hath not sparkled fire, and speedily
> Sent heat to all the neighbouring vaines? (1.2.146-151; 509)

When Perigot rejects Amarillis and advises her to "[b]estowe those heates" on other men (162), Amarillis cuts a deal with the Sullen Shepherd, agreeing to have sex with him ("the quicke easing / Of thee and thy hot fires" [229-230; 511]) in exchange for his assistance in breaking the troth of Perigot and Amoret. By lowering Amarillis into a magic well, the Sullen Shepherd transforms her into an exact replica of Amoret. Disguised as Amoret, Amarillis attempts the seduction of Perigot, which drives him into a murderous frenzy ("Death is the best reward that is due to lust" [3.1.46; 542]) and causes him to wound the true Amoret while the imposter escapes. The Sullen Shepherd throws the dying Amoret into the well, but she is healed by the River God, only to be wounded a second time by a still furious Perigot. Amoret is then healed by Clorin, who reconciles her to Perigot, and the two exchange vows of faith (5.5.109-126; 579). Clorin

also heals Amarillis, commands her never to allow impurities into her blood ("let never spot, / Hencefoorth ceaze upon thy blood" [5.5.155-156; 580]) and to remain in "virgin state" (159).

A parallel hot-blood-versus-cold-blood plot centers on the lusty shepherdess Cloe, who goes into the forest with the hope of losing her virginity, and the male shepherds in her orbit. Sexually frustrated, Cloe blames her virginity on the "dull humor" of chastity, which has chilled the bloods of shepherds and made them unsuited to love. In the past, the younger shepherds were not so "frozen," as it was not then considered good for "lusty groomes" to mix their "quicker blood" with "cold and dull chastitie" (1.3.3-8; 512). In the woods, Cloe first meets the shepherd Thenot, who lives only "to admire a chastity," and repels her advances: "Farre from me are these / Hot flashes bred from wanton heat and ease" (1.3.43-44, 48; 513). She also abandons the "too cold" Daphnis (2.4.81; 530), who commands his veins to check their heats as he resolves to remain chaste: "I charge you all my vaines / Through which the blood and spirit take their way, / Locke up your disobedient heats" (2.4.16-18; 528). Finally, Alexis, who is consumed by a "burning lust" (2.4.35; 529) for Cloe, follows her to a private place to "injoy our stolne delight" (3.1.143; 535). Their coitus is prevented, however, by the Sullen Shepherd, who maims Alexis and prepares to force himself on Cloe—although, as Cloe reasons, it is "[i]mpossible" to "Ravish" her because she is "soe willing" (3.1.212-213; 538). However, the arrival of the Satyre, a servant of Clorin who patrols the forest for breaches of chastity, scatters Cloe and the Sullen Shepherd; he bears the wounded Alexis to Clorin's cabin for healing, where he also later brings the wounded Amoret, and Cloe and Daphnis, whom he has scented as "full of sinne" (5.2.58; 567).

In the final acts, blood continues to dominate the play's imagery as the lustful and bleeding shepherds are brought to Clorin for performance of herbal and religious cures. In the

case of Alexis, who harbors impure desires about Cloe in addition to bearing a serious wound given him by the Sullen Shepherd, the lustful thoughts that inflame his blood prevent his wound from healing. Clorin admonishes Alexis to lay aside the "heates, desiers" that provoke his thoughts and "stir upp lusty fiers" (4.2.109-110; 551). Alexis complies with her order to "Repent and pray," and his condition improves, but when he later sees Cloe enter the bower, his "wound again is burst" and gushes "streames of bloud" (5.2.103-106; 569). Wantonness, which indicates an inflamed condition of the blood, becomes a kind of anti-coagulant that prevents a knife wound from healing. After more herbs and prayer, Alexis exits the bower with Cloe, both radiating a cooler love that is "true and chast" (5.5.10,19; 575). Alexis and Cloe have exchanged their "vaine desires"—desires that are "vaine" in the sense of "futile" but also that afflict the veins—and "ill tempred fires" for a "newe fire," a "pleasant fume [steam given out by bodies when heated]" of "moderat heat." Thus, "[t]rue love" is still a fire, but it is a temperate and moderate one that does not need to be "quencht" in sex (5.5.13-18).

In the final scene, Clorin returns the shepherds to the Priest of Pan: "Now holy man, I offer up againe / These patients full of health, and free from paine" (5.5.166-167; 580). Her representation of the shepherds as "patients full of health" captures the central conceit of *The Faithful Shepherdess*, according to which the lusty shepherds are understood to be diseased, afflicted by overheated blood, but are healed (restored to a chaste condition) through the cooling treatment of Clorin.

Protestantism, Humoralism, and Property-Owning Shepherds

Fletcher's conception of desire as being largely determined by the flux of bodily humors corresponds, in the play, with a positive view of religion as a force that promotes humoral

balance, resulting in a chaste and orderly society. Clorin and the Priest, representing religious authority, help the shepherds by treating the hot humors in their blood and by inculcating personal habits—hard work, sobriety, and modesty—that promote humoral balance and chastity. Political power is thus represented positively, as a medico-religious technology to heal lustful humors, rather than negatively as the power to punish infidelity, as it was in the Italian pastoral dramas. Because sexual behavior is seen as expressing environmental influences on humors—rather than innate dispositions that track with social class, as it is in the Italian pastoral dramas—the relationship between society and the individual is a harmonious one. Society deploys religion and medicine to foster the individual self-control and chastity on which society in turn depends. Fletcher further departs from his Italian models in presenting chastity as an ideal condition for *everyone*. In egalitarian Thessaly, there is no social differentiation and no nobility to be urged to marry and procreate. In this way, Fletcher's Protestant pastoral anticipates Foucault's conception of *biopower*, where the power of the state is exercised positively to shape the lives of a population. In Fletcher's Thessaly, religious authorities lead the shepherds on a path to personal self-discipline and humoral temperance as a means of facilitating a chaste population.

Beyond purging and cleansing the shepherds' blood of contaminants that incite lust, the Priest and Clorin also help the shepherds to establish personal habits conducive to humoral balance. In the final scene, Clorin returns the shepherds to the care of the Priest, explains that they have been "brought againe / To virgin state," and lectures the Priest on what he must do to reduce recidivism among the young shepherds (5.5.158-159; 580). The Priest must be "ever neare / Unto their actions" to keep them from moral relapse (168-169). To "correct the bloud," Clorin recommends hard work and sobriety: "thrifty bitts of labour" and abstinence from "wanton clusters"—i.e., the wine made from clusters of grapes (172-3, 176). Labor, like sobriety,

was commonly depicted in medical writings as having an anti-inflammatory effect on the blood (Babb 1023). She urges the Priest not to "spare / Their faults through much remissnes," and to teach the young maidens to be especially strict so that the grooms may ever "feare to tempt their blowing youth" (180, 186). Although Clorin and the Priest exercise the power of exile when they banish the unreformable Sullen Shepherd from Thessaly, they mainly engage in positive discipline, inculcating a Protestant ethic defined by sobriety, hard work, and modesty as a means of "correct[ing] the blood."

In an article arguing that the dogmatic morality of *The Faithful Shepherdess* points to the young Fletcher's family affiliation with radical Protestantism, Philip J. Finkelpearl observes that Clorin advises the Priest "to scrutinize the private, personal conduct of his flock in a manner reminiscent of Calvin's Geneva" (288). While Finkelpearl compares Fletcher's "Golden World" to a "heavily policed Arcadia," power is wielded in Thessaly (not, in fact, Arcadia) to facilitate states of health and chastity, not to punish or effect compliance with the law. This distinguishes *The Faithful Shepherdess* from its main pastoral model, *Il Pastor Fido*. There, Guarini showed political authorities dealing with infidelity by punishing offenders. Thus, when Amarillis is found guilty of a breach of faith to Silvio, she is sentenced to die at the altar of Diana, per Arcadian law that demands chastity for women upon penalty of death. In having his characters question whether such penalties for infidelity are fair given nature's reproductive imperative, Guarini explores the conflict between "human law" to "love lawfully" and "Nature's law" to "[l]ove if thou likest" (4.5.45-48; 131). Tasso, too, voices the idea that society's legislation of sexual morality is "cruell" because it goes against people's nature, as beasts, to pursue mating as a means of pleasure and of reproducing the species (1.15-23; 16). Tasso and Guarini resolve this conflict in plots showing wellborn couples finding love and happiness in lawful marriage, consistent with the idea that the

nobility are naturally more chaste. Fletcher obviates the need for resolution because religious discipline and humoral balance free the shepherds of lust.

In *The Faithful Shepherdess*, the humoral conception of sexual disposition as generally plastic and sensitive to environmental inputs corresponds with a more liberal conception of society, where all individuals are capable of chaste, moral living, while this ability is limited to those of noble standing in the Italian pastoral dramas. Although Fletcher's shepherds vary in their humoral profiles and sexual dispositions—Amoret and Daphnis have cooler blood than Amarillis, Cloe, and Alexis—the variation is not attributed to class differences, and, with the exception of the Sullen Shepherd, the lustful shepherds are successfully treated by Clorin. Fletcher thus imagines Thessaly as a comparatively egalitarian society of property-owning shepherds, "the owners of flockes and not hyerlings," as he wrote in the prefatory letter to the print edition of the play (497).

With religious authorities as beneficent healers and spiritual guides who help the shepherds moderate their humors and achieve chastity, Fletcher imagines that a functional society requires chaste individuals. Thus, the play connects chastity and self-control to civic organization and social control. In the opening scene, the Satyre surprises Clorin when he worships her instead of raping her, and Clorin attributes the Satyre's restraint to her virginity, which she believes has a special power to bind unruly appetites:

> sure there is a power
> In that great name of virgin, that bindes fast
> All rude uncivill bloods, all appetites
> That breake their confines: then strong chastity,
> Be though my strongest guarde. (1.1.124-128; 504)

Her chastity is a force capable of binding bloods and "uncivill" appetites that preclude a civic organization requiring a population capable of subordinating desire to social norms. Later, when she is sorting her herbs, Clorin banishes from her collection "foule Standergrasse" with "lustfull Turpentine" because these herbs induce the hot humors that can overthrow reason and strengthen appetite:

> Intice the vaines, and stirre the heat
> To civill muteny, scaling the seate
> Our reason moves in, and deluding it
> With dreames and wanton fancies, till the fit
> Of burning lust be quencht by appetite. (2.2.35-41; 520)

"[C]ivill muteny" is a metaphor for the psychic rebellion that occurs when hot bodily humors elevate appetite above the faculty of reason. However, as James Yoch observed of this passage in his essay on temperance as a political virtue in Renaissance tragicomedy, Fletcher's suggestion of the "relationship of individual physical and spiritual health to the commonwealth" is reminiscent of Renaissance readings of Plato's *Republic* that attach the personal virtue of temperance to public wellbeing (133). While chastity has the effect of restraining "rude" appetites that threaten society, society in turn produces chastity in individuals by purging, through religion and medicine, the bodily heats that cause lustfulness.

In conceiving of chastity as a condition of humoral health that is both produced by society and necessary for society's flourishing, *The Faithful Shepherdess* adapts the aristocratic Italian chastity plays to a liberal and Protestant ideal of a society where prosperous property-owners achieve temperance through religious discipline and clean living. Fletcher abandons the Italian dramatization of an insoluble conflict between society's chastity laws and natural procreative

passions, and instead depicts the political authorities as targeting the shepherds' bodies—their humors—to cool their blood and restore them to a state of chastity and health.

"Humanitie" and Beasts in The Faithful Shepherdess

By linking chastity with humanity and unlawful sex with beastliness, Fletcher, like Guarini in *Il Pastor Fido*, uses the language of human-beast difference to reinforce a cultural preference for restricting sex to legitimate marriage. But this rhetoric of humane chasteness and beastly lustfulness is ironic in *The Faithful Shepherdess* since the Satyre and other nonhuman creatures honor virginity and generally show more "humanitie" than the violent and libidinous shepherds. The contrast between the humane manners of the Satyre and the beastly behavior of the shepherds constitutes a non-concordance between natural identity and behavior that shows how Fletcher stands apart from his Italian models. In the Italian dramas, natural identity, or birth, determines whether an individual is inclined to chastity or wantonness (per their respective natures, the satyrs are sexually aggressive, the low-born shepherds are promiscuous, and the noble shepherds are chaste), while in Fletcher's egalitarian society of property-owning shepherds, people are generally depraved except to the extent that their humors are chastened by religion, and virginity is so powerful that it disciplines even the rough heats of the savage Satyr. *The Faithful Shepherdess* further diverges from the Italian pastorals and the "pro-natalist" culture in that the order of nature is not violated by virginity, which is represented as a powerful and desirable condition that need not yield to procreative marriage. While the *Aminta* and *Il Pastor Fido* feature young virgins—Silvia and Silvio—whose preference for celibacy is criticized as a beastly denial of the nature's procreative imperative, Fletcher presents a pastoral world where nature herself approves virginity.

The non-concordance between natural identity and behavior is shown most prominently through the character of the Satyre, a "shaggy Man" (3.1.207; 538) who looks violent but acts humanely. In Italian pastoral, the stock character of the satyr embodies natural sexual aggression and is normally depicted as a rapist that harasses young nymphs and shepherdesses. Reassigning the role of sexual aggressor to a human character, the Sullen Shepherd, Fletcher's Satyre combines the characters of Puck, from Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and Sir Satyrane, from Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. Like Puck, the Satyre patrols the forest looking for wayward mortals and speaking in rhyming tetrameter couplets:

> Then must I watch if any be
> Forcing of a chastity,
> If I finde it, then in haste,
> Give my wreathed horne a blast,
> And the faieries all will run,
> Wildely dauncing by the moone,
> And will pinch him to the bone,
> Till his lustfull thought be gone. (3.1.180-191; 537)

And like Sir Satyrane, the half-satyr knight who in *The Faerie Queene* serves the virgin Una, Fletcher's Satyre is devoted to the virgin Clorin, "my Goddesse in the wood" (204).

The non-concordance between the Satyre's wild birth and gentle behavior is linked, in the play, to the transformative power of Clorin's virginity. In the opening scene, the Satyre encounters Clorin at the burial site of her deceased beloved and mildly kneels to "worship of thy [Clorin's] dietie" (1.1.68; 503). Clorin's "dietie" is her *deity*, her saintly chastity, but the word also recalls her material temper or humoral complexion, her vegetarian *diet* that has a cooling

effect on her blood ("My meat shall be what these wilde woods afford, / Berries, and Chestnuts, Plaintains" [1.1.41-42; 502]). She attributes the "submission" from this "rude man, and beast" to a "power" in the "great name of virgin," which "bindes fast / All rude uncivill bloods, all appetites / That break their confines" (104, 113, 124-126; 504). Why else, she wonders,

> should this rough thing, who never knew
> Manners, nor smooth humanitie, whose heates
> Are rougher then himself, and more misshapen,
> Thus mildely kneele to me? (111-116, 121-123)

Only the power of virginity can explain why she is now worshiped by the Satyre, with his rough body and rougher heats, ignorant of manners and of "smoothe humanitie." Here Clorin contrasts the shaggy body and correspondingly rough heats of the Satyre with the smoothness of humanitie—here "smoothe" refers both to the distinctive hairless exterior of human bodies and to the gentle manners associated with humankind. Clorin's pun on the two senses of "humanitie"—the collective noun, human beings, and the quality of being humane, links species and behavior in a way that the play goes on to question in situations that juxtapose the beastliness of the shepherds with the humane behavior of the Satyre and other wild creatures.

There was in early modern culture a myth that wild beasts will not harm virgins, and Fletcher invokes it in a subplot that revolves around the beastliness of the shepherd Perigot, who attacks Amoret when even the savage woodland creatures would not harm her due to her purity and innocence.[76] Deceived by Amarillis and the Sullen Shepherd, Perigot twice stabs the

[76] While the myth was widespread, Fletcher was likely influenced by the story of Una in Book I of Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, where Una's virginity protects her from a lion and from the "salvage nation"—a collection of wild woodgods, including the half-satyr, half-man knight, Sir Satyrane. In *Mamillia* (1583), Robert Greene writes, "Uirginitie alters the nature of wilde beastes: for the Lyons neuer hurt a pure Uirgin: and Pliny reporteth that the Unicorne will sleepe on a virgins lappe" (12). In *The Most Famous History of the Seauen*

innocent Amoret in the chest and leaves her to die. The first time she is healed by the God of the River. The second time, she is discovered by the Satyre, who brings her to Clorin and reassures Amoret that her fears of him are misplaced, since "[m]en are ruder farre then we" (5.2.22; 566). Addressing Amoret as "[f]ayrest Virgine," the Satyre asserts that Perigot is a "savadge man" for striking Amoret's breast, which is so "soft and white" that no wild beast would have touched it and "so sweet" that an adder, newt, or snake would have lain in it without stinging it:

> Some savadge man hath struck her brest
> So soft and white, that no wild beast,
> Durst a toucht asleepe or wake,
> So sweete that Adder, Neut, or Snake,
> Would have layne from arme to arme,
> On her Bossome to be warme,
> All a night and being hot,
> Gone away and stung her not.
> Quickly clap hearbs to her brest,
> A man sure is a kind of Beast. (5.2.19-33; 566)

Urging Clorin to treat her wound with medicinal herbs, the Satyre concludes that "man sure is a kind of Beast." This is ironic since he condemns as beastly the behavior that he has just described wild beasts as incapable of. In Fletcher's handling, the proverbial respect that beasts show for virginity serves mainly to intensify the savagery of man's neglect of it.

Champions of Christendome, Richard Jonson writes, "or it is the nature of euerie Lyon, be he neuer so furious, not to harme the vnspotted virgin, but humbly to lay his bried heade vppon a madens lappe" (117). Juan Vives alludes to the myth in *A Very frutefell and pleasant boke called the Instruction of Christen Woman* (English translation 1529): "Virginitie hath so moche marveylous honoure in hit, that wylde lyons regarde hit" (qtd. Jankowski 84).

The non-concordance between natural identity and behavior supports the humoral mechanism of Fletcher's plot, according to which individuals' behavior is shaped by the interaction of their humors and the environment, rather than by ancestral inclinations. Thus, Fletcher replaces the hereditarianism of the Italian dramas (wherein class or species identity determines sexual virtue or lack thereof) with a new environmentalism. While individual shepherds vary in their inclinations toward virtue or vice, the variation is not attributed to differences in social class (again, all of the shepherds are gentle in the sense that they are, as Fletcher spells out in the prefatory letter, the "owners of flockes and not hyerlings" [497]). Clorin implicitly critiques hereditary explanations for the distribution of virtuous behavior when she praises the Satyre for having manners as fair as someone who boasts to be the only "heyre, / To all Humanity":

> They wrong thee, that doe tearme thee rude:
> Though thou beest outward rough and tawny hued,
> Thy manners are as gentle and as fayre,
> As his who bragges himself, borne only heyre,
> To all Humanity (4.2.62-66; 550)

Clorin's phrasing again puns on the two senses of "humanitie." If "humanity" is taken as benevolence, kindness, the quality of being "humane," the only heir to all humanity has received all the kindness and benevolence associated with the human race, and the Satyre is as gentle and fayre as that person. But the phrase also suggests a contrast between the "rude man, and beast" of the Satyre with and the man who claims himself to be only heir to all humanity in the sense that he is a purebred human, and not a "shaggy man" like the Satyre. The Satyre's gentle manners show, implies Clorin, that mannerly behavior is not the exclusive inheritance of humanity. Since

the Satyre's conversion from savage man-beast to mild-mannered servant is attributed to the power of Clorin's virginity that "bindes fast / All rude uncivill bloods, all appetites / That break their confines" (1.1.104, 113, 124-126; 504), his case also suggests the play's position that behavior is plastic and determined by humoral inputs rather than inherited dispositions.

Fletcher dramatically diverges from his Italian models by representing the natural world as fundamentally compatible with chastity—both the total renunciation of sex in lifelong virginity and the restriction of sex to the "mariage bed" (5.3.96; 572). His adaptation of the myth of wild animals' respect for virginity to the pastoral setting, where the Satyr and other woodland creatures venerate virginity, shows virginity to be a real power that is recognized even beyond the human social world. Thus, in the first scene, Clorin reads the Satyre's submission as corroborating her mother's story that virginity will protect her against wild creatures inhabiting the woods:

> I have heard (my mother told it me)
> And now I doe believe it, if I keepe
> My virgin flower uncropt, pure, chaste, and faire,
> No Goblin, wood-god, Faiery, Elfe, or Fiend,
> Satyr or other power that haunts these groaves,
> Shall hurt my body (1.1.111-116; 504)

Similarly, Amoret must have the physical quality of virginity in order for the River God's treatment to heal her rather than kill her. After she is initially wounded by Perigot, she is flung into the well by the Sullen Shepherd (in thus ensuring her death, he sees himself as performing his promise to Amarillis to break the love troth between Amoret and Perigot) but is plucked up by the River God. He explains that a drop of water from his locks will cure her if she is a

"virgin" but that the drop is too pure for "unchaste flesh" to endure (3.1.381-385; 543). This kind of physical testing of virginity is repeated in the later scenes in Clorin's cabin, where she uses a magic taper that burns unchaste flesh but is repelled by chaste flesh. The proverbial notion that "[v]irginitie alters the nature of wilde beastes" (Greene 12) is not just a gloss on the desirability of virginity but is incorporated into the natural laws of Fletcher's pastoral world, where virginity refers to a real quality of the body that benefits virgins as they interact with the wild creatures and deities outside of human society.

In representing virginity as bodily condition with material benefits outside of the social world, Fletcher departs from the more ambivalent attitudes toward virginity and "natural desire" found in his Italian models. While both Tasso and Guarini ultimately affirm chastity—restricting sex to lawful marriage—in their stories of shepherds who are rewarded for their fidelity with happy marriages, their plays embed critiques of lifelong virginity with the characters of Silvia and Silvio, the young hunters who must overcome their savage preference for virginity over love and marriage. Perpetual virginity injures society and threatens its propagation, in contravention of the order of nature, where creatures freely seek out sexual pleasures in accordance with the innate procreative drives that people share with other species. As Tasso's Chorus puts it, sexual honor is a "vain and ydle name" and has no value outside of the "madd vulgar," the deluded linguistic community that implements "cruell lawes" forbidding the free indulgence of natural pleasures (1.15-23; 16). Fletcher, by contrast, makes his heroine, Clorin, a lifelong virgin and shows virginity to be a real virtue with material value, independent of the madding crowd, as it protects virgins against bodily injury by woodland creatures and allows Amoret to be healed by the River God.

Fletcher does not follow the virgin-to-chaste-spouse trajectory, as the aristocratic and Catholic Italian pastoral dramas do. For this reason, *The Faithful Shepherdess*, like the Italian dramas, complicates the critical narrative offered by Halpern and Jankowski, according to which the sixteenth century witnessed the replacement of the pre-Reformation/Catholic idealization of virginity with a Protestant preference for chastity—monogamous marriage—as the preeminent state for Christians. While Fletcher wrote *The Faithful Shepherdess* for a Protestant play-going public, he notably declined to follow his Italian models—and the supposedly pro-matrimonial culture—in characterizing virgins as savages who ultimately outgrow their unnatural preference for celibacy and learn to love. Likewise, his happy ending lacks nuptials. While the cooled and chastened pairs of lovers—Amoret and Perigot, Cloe and Alexis—hold hands, the play does not explicitly foreshadow or predict their marriages. The unmatched virgins—Clorin, Daphnis, and Amarillis—remain unmatched, and their virginity is presented as a desirable lifelong state, and not a sequential virtue on the road to monogamous marriage. Thus, Clorin, the eponymous shepherdess, embraces a virgin life—free "from all ensuing heates and fires / Of love" (1.1.6-7; 501)—after her beloved shepherd dies. And the play represents her virginity as the source of her power over the Satyre and of her moral authority generally. When Clorin restores Amarillis to "virgin state" and commands her to "so remaine / To thy last day, unlesse the faithfull love / Of some good sheepeheard force thee to remove" (5.5.159-161; 580), lifelong ("[t]o thy last day") virginity is held out as a preferable way of life, one that should be sacrificed only in the event that a good shepherd "force" Amarillis into "faithfull love." This, again, may reflect the culture's proto-eugenic attitudes toward reproductive morality, according to which nuptiality and fertility were encouraged for the gentry but less urgently recommended to the lower orders and even

discouraged in the case of the poor.[77] The privileged status of virginity in *The Faithful Shepherdess* does not necessarily challenge the Protestant institution of patriarchal marriage, but it does challenge the notion that marriage was urged on the general population as Jankowski and Halpern imply.

Finally, Fletcher not only erases from *The Faithful Shepherdess* the sympathetic arguments for natural desire and procreation that lace the Italian pastoral dramas but explicitly discredits the procreative argument for love by reassigning it to the Sullen Shepherd in his defense of rape. The Priest apprehends the Sullen Shepherd as he is about to assault Amarillis and accuses him of criminally indulging his lust. In defense, the Sullen Shepherd argues that his actions are consistent with the commandment of Mother Nature, who says that it is "good and just" that "every living creature" seek sex as a means of reproducing their kinds:

> Hath not our Mother *Nature* for her store,
> And great increase, sayd it is good and just,
> And willd that every living creature must,
> Beget his like. (5.3.44-147; 574)

While the notion that sex is justified by nature's procreative imperative appears unironically in the opening scenes of the *Aminta* and *Il Pastor Fido*, Fletcher changes the context of the argument, placing it in the mouth of the play's villain, the Sullen Shepherd, to excuse his attempted assault of Amarillis. Resemblances in language ("beget," "increase," "store") suggest

[77] Historians have documented the efforts by communities in the Tudor and Stuart period to block "beggar weddings" as a means of preventing the formation of families that would become a public burden. See David Cressy, *Birth, Marriage, and Death,* 312; John R. Gillis, *For Better, for Worse,* 86-89; Peter Laslett, *The World We Have Lost,* 137-143.

that Fletcher also had in mind Shakespeare's procreation sonnets, which first appeared in print in 1609, around the same time that *The Faithful Shepherdess* was first printed.[78]

In the Italian dramas and in the *Sonnets*, the procreation argument is made by a social subordinate who presses a wellborn youth to marry and become a parent; it is thus motivated by an aristocratic and proto-eugenic ideology that promoted the "increase" of the nobility by encouraging their nuptiality and childbearing. In reassigning the justification for natural desire to the delinquent rapist, Fletcher exposes the aristocratic premise of the procreative argument as it normally appears in the context of urging a wellborn youth to bear children. More generally, this reassignment challenges the notion that virginity and chastity are unnatural because nature commands "every living creature" to reproduce. The Priest, who functions along with Clorin as a mouthpiece for the prevailing morality of Fletcher's Thessaly, denounces the Sullen Shepherd's argument as "Blood and Letchery" and orders that this "beast" be brought to Clorin to receive his penance (5.3.148-150; 574).

Discussing this passage in an article on Fletcher, Finkelpearl complained that Fletcher, in idealizing chastity and stigmatizing promiscuity, was too "dogmatic" and lacked the ambivalence of Milton, who in his pro-chastity mask, *Comus*, at least allows the eponymous villain to make a compelling encomium on nature's bounty as a counterargument to chastity (287). Fletcher allows the Sullen Shepherd only a "feeble justification of natural desire," which is rejected by the Priest as "specious nonsense" (*ibid.*). But it is the feebleness of the Sullen Shepherd's appeal to the procreative justification of sex that is interesting because it is largely consistent with what may

[78] In the dedication to that edition, "TO. THE. ONLIE. BEGETTER. OF. THESE. INSVING. SONNETS.," Thorpe uses the generative language of the opening sonnets to describe the dedicatee, Mr. W. H., as the "begetter" of the sonnets. "From fairest creatures we desire *increase*" (Sonnet 1); "Let those whom nature hath not made for *store*, / Harsh, featureless, and rude, barrenly perish" (Sonnet 11).

be described as the play's "queer," or anti-natalist, humoralism. Unlike the aristocratic Italian plays, where chastity is assimilated to monogamy and celebrated as the only legitimate means of bearing children, *The Faithful Shepherdess* represents that chastity is a state of humoral temperance that is epitomized by lifelong virginity and integral to functioning society.

Fletcher uses the human-beast difference ironically in the play's juxtaposition of the beastliness of the human characters and the "humanitie" of the Satyr and wild beasts and woodland deities. The emphasis on the special depravity of man corresponds, in the play, with the idea that society and culture play a positive and beneficial role in inculcating the Protestant habits of sobriety, modesty, and hard work that foster chaste and virtuous living. The harmony between disciplinary society and individual results from Fletcher's humoral conception of desire, since an individual's sexual behavior is not determined by inherited disposition, but by bodily humors that can be chastened by religion and medicine.

Conclusion

In their exploration of the conflict between bodily desires and the human laws enshrining the value of virginity and chastity, the pastoral dramas by Tasso, Guarini, and Fletcher show that sex and reproduction was another early modern site where human animality and class differences were examined and, for the most part, affirmed. While the Italian pastoral dramas undermine the species barrier between humans and animals through their depiction of a common psychology, a universal procreative instinct, they reinforce the class barrier separating gentle and commoner through their differentiated reproductive morality. In the Italian dramas, nature's procreative imperative is actionable only in the context of pressing heirs and heiresses to enter dynastic marriages. In other contexts, the procreative urge is denounced as beastly and associated with a state of enslavement to bodily passions. According to the humoral psychology adopted by

Fletcher in *The Faithful Shepherdess*, the flux of humors in the blood motivates the desires of humans and animals alike. But because humans are uniquely susceptible to hot humors that cause violent and lecherous behavior, they require special cultural interventions—religious discipline and herbal medicine—to maintain personal temperance and civic order. In the peculiarly inhuman and illiberal love stories of Renaissance pastoral dramas, humans are generally considered to be beasts, or worse than beasts, when it comes to their desires and sexual behaviors, and the desire for procreation that humans share with beasts is condemned except in cases of noble marriage.

Chapter 3

Grafts Are Not Hybrids:

Historicizing Plant and Animal Generation in *The Winter's Tale*

In Act 4, scene 4 of William Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*, there appears an infamous debate about gardening, set within a pastoral context. In the scene, King Polixenes visits a sheep-shearing festival in the Bohemian countryside, where his son, Florizel, is rumored to dally with a shepherd's daughter, Perdita. Greeting the disguised king with rosemary and rue, Perdita tells Polixenes that she does not grow the fairest flowers of the season, carnations and streaked gillyflowers, which "some call Nature's bastards" (4.4.84).[79] She cares not to "get slips" of these flowers for her garden because she has heard that their streaked petals are not wholly natural but are the product of art ("there is an art which in their piedness shares / With great creating Nature" [85-88]). Polixenes counters that nature is improved by no "mean" that is not itself made by nature; and he illustrates this point with the example of grafting, where "we marry / A gentler scion to the wildest stock, / And make conceive a bark of baser kind, / By bud of nobler race" (94-95). Modern scholars have settled on the interpretation that Perdita condemns, and Polixenes defends, the art of crossbreeding plants (Hudson 89; Bevington 1508; Greenblatt 2932; Pitcher 264). On this reading, Polixenes's defense of plant grafting is rich with irony because he has come to the festival to stop Florizel's disparaging marriage with Perdita, a "hybrid" marriage that he should embrace for the same reasons he praises plant hybridization (Knight 105; Tayler 136; Kitch 60; Bushnell 149; Nardizzi 86; Estok 97).

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[79] All quotations and parenthetical citation of *The Winter's Tale* are drawn from the Arden 3rd series edition, ed. John Pitcher (2010). Quotations from other Shakespeare texts follow the *The Norton Shakespeare*, 2nd edition, Stephen Greenblatt, et. al., eds. (2008).

But this interpretation cannot be correct, as we will see, because early moderns understood grafting to be an art of asexual, or clonal, propagation, and because the modern technique of artificial hybridization was not discovered until over one hundred years after Shakespeare wrote *The Winter's Tale*. This chapter shows that the gardening passage must relate to the techniques of asexual propagation, employing slips and grafts, that were familiar to Renaissance gardeners and writers. And this properly historicized reading raises thorny questions about how and whether asexual plant propagation and human reproduction can be analogized, and in what respects they are incommensurable, given the early modern understanding of these phenomena.

Beginning with Perdita's statements on an "art" that is used to grow "Nature's bastards," the pied carnations and gillyflowers, the chapter first reviews the history of the consensus interpretation that Perdita objects to the artificial crossbreeding of plants before showing why this interpretation is impossible given the historical timeline of plant breeding in Europe. Under an early modern agricultural paradigm, the pejorative—"Nature's bastards"—likely alludes to the variable or "degenerative" nature of gillyflowers and carnations, which, when grown from seed, deviated from their parental type and thus appeared to be naturally occurring bastards. Through Perdita's stigma against "Nature's bastards," with its echoes of King Leontes's fears, in Acts 1-3, that his wife has cuckolded him and that his children are bastards, *The Winter's Tale* registers the early modern belief that an intrinsic risk of reproduction was degeneration, when children "growe out of kind" and do not resemble their parents. In the pastoral romances discussed in Chapter 1, nature surpasses "art" (nurture, culture, technique) in making "like beget like," so that even when princesses are raised in poverty or when shepherds are brought to court, they act, as all creatures do, in accordance with their parentage. While the "biology" of *The*

Winter's Tale still operates on the "green" premise that, in all creatures, nature makes children resemble their parents, it modulates the subgenre's formulaic handling of nature when it highlights the reproductive risks of degeneration and bastardy in human and nonhuman lineages.

The balance of the chapter is a deep dive into the question of how an early modern audience may have understood the analogy that Polixenes seems to make between grafting and human marriage. As the early modern agricultural and literary writings discussed in this chapter show, the twentieth-century interpretation of this passage is inconsistent with the period understanding that grafting was an art of asexual propagation, where gardeners use a stock plant, often a wild variety, as a substrate for regenerating the scion of a donor plant, and where the graft does not sexually fuse scion and stock to produce a hybrid but replicates the donor plant. To complicate the matter further, our parsing of the analogy between grafting and marriage depends not only on how grafting is understood, but also on whether the Aristotelian "one-seed" or the Hippocratic/Galenic "two-seed" model of animal generation is applied. While grafting resembles human marriage under a "one-seed" model of animal generation (since in both only the scion's kind is propagated), grafting appears to be incommensurable with the "two-seed" model in which the offspring is a blend of both parents. Getting plant breeding right in *The Winter's Tale*—that is, recognizing that grafting was understood to clone the scion without admixture from the stock—calls into relief a fundamental incommensurability between the grafting of plants and the "two-seed" model of animal generation, which Polixenes nonetheless appears to link in his analogy between grafting and marriage.

Accounting for these tensions between the historical understanding of grafting and the competing models of animal generation, this chapter explores the very different ironies an early modern audience may have seen in Polixenes's perspective, the potentially more "conservative"

view on marriage and reproduction that is suggested by his celebration of grafting, and, at the same time, the possibility that his views embed a "queer" critique of reproductive marriages, as they were understood in early modernity.

What Are "Nature's Bastards" and Why Does Perdita Refuse to Grow Them?

Many scholars have inferred from Perdita's refusal to grow gillyflowers, "Nature's bastards," in her garden that she objects to the art of crossbreeding flowers of different colors to create a hybrid with variegated petals. But this interpretation is implausible since the play predates plant hybridization by more than a century. If not artificially crossbred flowers, what are "Nature's bastards" and what is the art used to grow them?

We know that the art that Polixenes refers to is grafting because the terms ("scion," "stock") and general description match the common technique of regenerating a cultivar by grafting its scion onto a rootstock. But the art that Perdita refers to, the one used to grow carnations and gillyflowers, involves planting "slips," or cuttings, in the earth, where they will take root. She tells Polixenes that she "care[s] not / To get slips of them" (4.4.85; 264); later, after hearing Polixenes' defense of grafting, she repeats that she not put her "dibble in earth to set one slip of them" (4.4.100; 265), alluding to a gardener's tool for making holes to plant seeds and cuttings. As we will see, early moderns understood both the art of planting by slip, to which Perdita objects, as well as the practice of grafting, which Polixenes defends, to be *asexual* propagation techniques that differ from sexual reproduction because they do not cross two individuals to produce a hybrid, but rather clone a donor plant by regenerating a fragment of it.

Under the early modern horticultural paradigm, the phrase "Nature's bastards" likely denotes the variable or "degenerative" nature of gillyflowers and carnations, which were known to deviate from their parental type when grown from seed and thus appeared to be naturally

occurring bastards. In showing that Perdita rejects growing gillyflowers and carnations, this scene registers not a stigma against artificial hybridization, but a stigma against bastardy, in the sense of an individual's degeneration or variance from parental type.

150 Years of the Crossbreeding Interpretation

Since the 1800s, editors and critics have assumed that the "piedness" Perdita ascribes to gillyflowers refers to the variegation, or streaks of color, that arises from crossing two different-colored varieties. Glossing Perdita's denunciation of an art that produces streaked gillyflowers in his 1864 edition of *The Winter's Tale*, H. N. Hudson asserts that "variegated gilliflowers were produced by the crossbreeding of two or more varieties" (89). In the Yale edition of 1918, F. E. Pierce notes that the "variegated colors" of the gillyflowers "are partly the result of the gardener's art in cross-breeding, and not wholly produced by nature" (126).

In the early 1930s, a series of "Shakespeare and genetics" journal articles ran with the idea that Perdita's supposed objection to crossbreeding gillyflowers suggests that Shakespeare had anticipated plant hybrids over one hundred years before the technique was discovered.[80] Consistent with the new interest in genetics (and eugenics) of that time, the authors of these works were familiar with the European history of plant science and were therefore impressed that an allusion to plant crossing would appear in 1611, when everyone believed plants reproduced asexually. W. E. Praeger argued that the gardening debate indicates that some crossbreeding technique was practiced but was kept so secret that no other record was left besides Perdita's disapproving comments (161-162). F. C. Bradford writes that her aversion to carnations and

[80] Bradford, F. C. "Shakespeare and Bacon as Horticultural Prophets," *Modern Language Notes* 48.2 (1933): 108–110; Cook, R. C. "Bacon Predicted Triumphs of Plant Breeding," *Journal of Heredity* 23.4 (1932): 162–165; Praeger, W. E. "Did Shakespeare Know Plant Hybrids?" *Journal of Heredity* 23.4 (1932): 161–162.

gillyflowers seems to stem from something "mysterious, unnatural, almost perverted, almost unmentionable," which leads him to believe it "could be nothing else than sexually produced hybrids" (110). Interestingly, the pejoratives Bradford uses—"perverted" and "unnatural"—were characteristic of the early twentieth-century normative discourse of homosexuality and convey the perception that early seventeenth-century audiences must have regarded plant heterosexuality as transgressive as Bradford and his contemporaries regarded homosexuality.

Bradford and R. C. Cook went so far as to argue that the play's putative allusion to plant hybridization can be adduced to the evidence that Francis Bacon was the author of Shakespeare's plays. Assuming that Perdita refers to an art of crossbreeding gillyflowers (and that Polixenes's defense of grafting shows he has misunderstood her), Bradford compares it to a passage from the natural history, *Sylva Sylvarum*, in which Bacon writes idly about how we could make useful new plant kinds if we found how out to mix different varieties. It is no coincidence that Shakespeare and Bacon both predict plant hybridization a century before it was discovered because they must be, per Bradford, the same person (109). The article by Cook makes a striking leap from the hypothesis that Shakespeare/Bacon knew of plant hybrids to the "eugenist" (sic) position that it was genetically more probable that a person like Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays than an ordinary man from Stratford. After a short discussion of Bacon's interest in horticulture, Cook turns to the question "of no little interest to eugenists" of the authorship of Shakespeare's plays, and argues that if a "Stratford boy, abandoning his wife and children at twenty," was capable of the learning set forth in the plays, he would be "a unique phenomenon in the human race; more amazing than is generally considered," and that it is "much more biologically explicable" to attribute authorship of the plays to Bacon, the father of empiricism

and a man who produced original and significant works in both scientific and literary domains (162).

To their credit, Bradford, Cook, and Praeger recognized the anachronism issues presented by the consensus interpretation (that the play refers to plant hybridization), but their solution—that the author of Shakespeare's plays was a biological outlier who anticipated the discovery of plant sexuality and crossing by later scientists—overlooks the likelier explanation that, as we will see, the play alludes to what were then commonplace techniques of asexual propagation employing slips and grafts.

Most editors glossing the gardening debate have simply elided the anachronism issues presented by the historical timeline of plant breeding, following instead the practice of glossing the "art" that Perdita rejects as some form of sexual crossing. In the Longman edition of Shakespeare's *Complete Works*, David Bevington glosses Perdita's line, "*art* i.e., of crossbreeding" (1508). According to the second edition of the Norton Shakespeare, edited by Stephen Greenblatt, Perdita objects to streaked gillyflowers because they are crossbred: "[t]heir variations in color were thought to result from crossbreeding with other flowers" (2932). John Pitcher, in the most recent Arden edition, offers a variation of this gloss: Perdita's reference to "Nature's bastards" expressed the belief "that streaked gillyflowers, cross-bred without assistance, were natural hybrids" (264).

This reading goes back to Hudson, who hypothesized that Perdita referred to the natural cross-fertilization that can occur when different varieties, planted near each other, cross-pollinate with the assistance of the wind or bees. Attributing the piedness of gillyflowers to natural cross-fertilization has the advantage of consistency with the phrase, "Nature's bastards," which implies that the streaked flowers are the product of nature and not a deliberate art. However, there is no

evidence that early modern Europeans realized that natural cross-fertilization can happen in this way, much less that gardeners used natural cross-fertilization as "an art" to cultivate flowers (Scholl 176-178; Faircloth and Thomas 1-155). On the contrary, agricultural and horticultural writings from this and earlier periods indicate that the art gillyflowers share with creating Nature, and the "dibble" that must be placed in earth "to set one slip of them," refer to the technique of clonal propagation by planting slips.

"Never Trust to Seedlings": Plant Degeneration and Asexual Propagation in Early Modernity

In the early 1600s, English society lacked not only the art of plant crossbreeding, but the concept of plant sexuality that crossbreeding presupposes, making it unlikely that Shakespeare has Perdita objecting to the art of plant crossbreeding, or that original audiences would have understood that the phrase "Nature's bastards" refers to plant hybrids. Early moderns believed that plants *differed* from animals because plants reproduced asexually while animals, according to the "two-seed" model of generation, produced offspring through the sexual blending of both parents (Swann 141).[81] As Bacon puts it in *Sylva Sylvarum*, "[g]eneration by copulation certainly extendeth not to plants" (451).

Scientists did not work out plant reproduction—the pollination that occurs in a plant's flower, the location of its reproductive organs, resulting in seeds containing germinal material from both parents—until the end of the seventeenth century. Following speculative work on plant sexuality and reproduction by Marcello Malpighi (*Anatomia Plantarum* [1671]) and Nehemiah Grew (*The Anatomy of Plants* [1682]), a German botanist, Rudolf Jakob Camerarius

[81] See also *Flora Unveiled* by Lincoln Taiz, for a recent account of the historical European denial of the sexuality of plants and of the scientific investigations that led to the belated discovery of plant sex and reproduction.

finally laid the groundwork for plant hybridization through deliberate crossbreeding. This is set forth in his investigations into the sexual organs of plants, *De sexu plantarum epistola* (1694). Deliberately crossing plants to produce a new variety was not successfully performed until the early eighteenth century by a commercial florist, Thomas Fairchild. In 1720, when Fairchild presented the first hybrid flower (fittingly, involving a gillyflower) to the Royal Society, its novelty earned it the name "Fairchild's mule" in honor of the familiar animal cross between a horse and a donkey (Zirkle 108-114; Kingsbury 73-77; Bushnell 23, 159-160).

Lacking modern hybridization techniques, early moderns cultivated plants by selecting and preserving the best individuals for seeds or for slips (Kingsbury 4-8). The practice of *selecting* and *preserving*—rather than sexually crossing—had dominated agriculture since antiquity, when early farmers first domesticated grains and pulses (such as einkorn wheat, barley, lentils, chickpeas) by saving the seeds from the best plants. But seed propagation did not work for certain *highly variable* species, such as olive, grape, and apple, which produce seedlings that do not closely resemble the parent plant (Kingsbury 24-25; Mudge 438-439). (Biologists now understand this to be a consequence of their high heterozygosity.[82]) Since at least the late Neolithic era, such variable species have been cultivated clonally "by slip" rather than by sowing their seeds (*ibid*.). While farmers used grafting for species (especially fruit trees) that were not easily rooting, they propagated easily rooting species by taking cuttings from the best individuals and planting them in the earth, so that the resulting plant was a copy of the donor plant (Scholl

[82] Heterozygosity is a measure of genetic diversity; it is determined by the proportion of alleles (variant forms of genes) that are heterozygous in the average individual of a given population. In *The Botany of Desire*, Michael Pollan describes how grafting was used to overcome the high heterozygosity of the apple seed: "Every seed in that apple … contains the genetic instructions for a completely new and different apple tree, one that, if planted, would bear only a glancing resemblance to its parents. If not for grafting—the ancient technique of cloning trees—every apple in the world would be its own distinct variety, and it would be impossible to keep a good one from going beyond the lifespan of that particular tree. […] The botanical term for this variability is 'heterozygosity'" (10-11).

176-178; Faircloth and Thomas, 154).

"Degeneration" was the term that early modern writers used to refer to the natural variation that certain plants undergo across generations. In *Sylva Sylavrum,* in the chapter, "Of the degenerating of plants, and of their transmutation one into another," Bacon expresses the period understanding that clonal propagation techniques (both planting by slip and grafting) allowed people to cultivate plants that, not coming true to type from seed, tended to "degenerate" and return to their wild, uncultivated kind if planted by seed. "The rule is certain," writes Bacon, that "plants for want of culture degenerate to be baser in the same kind; sometimes so far as to change into another kind" (142). And he gives examples of fruits (grapes, figs, almonds) that are usually grafted or set by slip that, "if sown, make the fruits degenerate and become wild" (*ibid*.). In his 1935 history of crossbreeding plants, *The Beginnings of Plant Hybridization,* the American botanist and historian of science Conway Zirkle hypothesized that it was precisely the widespread belief in vegetable degeneration (where highly variable plants appear to transmute in kind, often returning to their wild varieties) that delayed the European discovery of plant hybrids. Zirkle speculated that, the belief in plant degeneration being so prevalent, Europeans erroneously attributed to natural degeneration the variation that was actually caused by spontaneous hybridization (64-65).

As for the carnations and gillyflowers neglected by Perdita, early modern gardening manuals indicate that these flowers, both species of the genus *Dianthus*, were not grown by seed but by planting "slips" in the earth. In a 1908 article contending that literary scholars wrongly assumed that Perdita refers to an art of plant crossbreeding, John Scholl argued that the art to which Perdita refers is clonal propagation through slips. His piece translates guidelines for cultivating gillyflowers written by Rembert Dodoens, a sixteenth-century Flemish physician and

botanist. In the 1583 Latin translation made from his 1554 Dutch original, Dodoens says gillyflowers "grown from seed return to a more rustic character, become smaller, less fragrant, and single," so gardeners wishing to preserve their streaks, size, and fragrance must winter the plants in greenhouses and "propagate them from cuttings, *and never trust to seedlings*" (qtd. 178). Similar accounts of growing gillyflowers by slip are found in English gardening manuals. In a 1629 manual, John Parkinson writes that gillyflowers are "nourished with us in Gardens, none of their naturall places being knowne" and that they "are usually encreased by slips" (314)—i.e., gillyflowers are not found in the wild ("naturall places") but are cultivated in gardens "by slips." Writing in 1664, the gardening author Stephen Blake gives instructions on how to propagate a flower variously known as "Hearts-ease," "Wall Flowers," and "yellow Gilliflowers," and notes with annoyance that he will not trouble himself to set down directions for planting it by seed since it "seldome beareth seed to perfection," and advises his readers how the plant "may be set of the slip" (44). As Scholl explains, gillyflowers are "a complex race like Darwin's pigeons, probably the product of special selection in certain directions to please a gardener's fancy, and run back to wild stock very soon if left to ordinary conditions" (178).

While most scholars (Scholl is the exception) going back to the mid-1800s have interpreted Perdita to refer to the art of plant crossbreeding, it is unlikely that Shakespeare has Perdita object to an art that was not discovered until the eighteenth century. Perdita's comments are consistent with the common early modern practice of propagating carnations and gillyflowers by planting their slips. Lacking the modern knowledge of plant sexuality and crossbreeding techniques, early moderns used the art of clonal propagation to replicate the beautiful individuals that, owing to the waywardness of their seedlings, would otherwise revert back to their wild or common form—"degenerate," in early modern parlance—and be lost.

Perdita's Stigma Against Bastardy, Not Art

If Scholl was correct in in his surmise that Perdita refers to the clonal propagation of gillyflowers, then her phrase "Nature's bastards" may allude to the "degenerative" nature of gillyflowers and carnations, which varied significantly when planted by seed. The specimens chosen for slips and cuttings would have been seen as beautiful freaks of nature, attractively streaked anomalies that did not resemble their parent plants with solidly colored petals. Not resembling their parent plant, carnations and gillyflowers seemed to be naturally occurring bastards, or "Nature's bastards." ("Bastard" in the sense of a spurious relation, "having the appearance of, somewhat resembling; an inferior or less proper kind.") On this interpretation, Perdita refuses to plant slips of the variable carnation and gillyflower *not* because she objects to the art of hybridization or to artificial hybrids, but because she disapproves of "bastard" plants that to do not grow true to type from seed and must be propagated artificially.

In banning "Nature's bastards" from her garden, Perdita shows an ironic family resemblance to her birth father, Leontes, who banishes Perdita in her infancy because he believes that she is not his child but the "bastard" of the visiting Polixenes (2.3.153, *et passim*). Both father and daughter appear to be afflicted by an extreme fear of bastardy—of the deviation, or corruption, in a lineage that is signaled when the offspring does not resemble its parent. And by foregrounding their resemblance in this respect, *The Winter's Tale* suggests that the suspicious disposition is a material one that is transmitted from parent to child. Perdita's inheritance of her father's suspiciousness is anticipated in Act 2, when Paulina tells Leontes that the infant Perdita bears physical resemblances to him proving he is her father, but worries that Perdita also inherits Leontes's "yellow," or suspicious, "ordering of the mind" (2.3.94-106). Showing that Leontes has transmitted to Perdita his yellow "ordering of the mind," which however takes the relatively

innocuous form of an irrational aversion to carnations and gillyflowers, *The Winter's Tale* confirms the natural relation between daughter and father. But it also implies that Leontes's tragic acts in the first half of the play—imprisoning his innocent wife and abandoning his legitimate child—are motivated by an innate disposition not wholly within his control.

A similar contemporary use of the phrase "nature's bastards" to refer to degeneration, or a deviation from kind, appears in *Doomes-Day* (a 1614 epic about the end of the world) by the Scottish courtier, William Alexander, the Earl of Stirling, who followed James I to England when he succeeded Elizabeth I to the English throne. In an account of the rise of the Ottoman Empire, Stirling uses the phrase "natures bastards" to describe how the Ottoman sultans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would, upon ascending the throne, slay their brothers:

> A savage troupe, the divels in order range,
> Which lavish of mens lives their ends to gaine,
> As natures bastards, quite from kinde to change,
> Had (for first act of state) their brethren slaine. (207)

The fratricidal sultans are "natures bastards, quite from kinde to change" in the sense that they deviated from their kind and did not behave toward their brothers in a way befitting their natural, kin relation. As a poet and courtier at the Jacobean court where *The Winter's Tale* was popular, Stirling may have seen the play at any of its several performances in the early 1610s, including a performance during the 1613 festivities to celebrate the marriage of the king's daughter, Princess Elizabeth, to Frederick V, Elector Palatine. If Stirling lifted "natures bastards" from an early performance of *The Winter's Tale*, the line "natures bastards, quite from kinde to change" can be read as a contemporary gloss on Perdita's line that shows that the phrase referred to the bastard

status that results when an individual deviates from its natural kind, and not because it is a hybrid.

Concerning Grafting and Its Relation to Marriage

Against Perdita's statement that gillyflowers are unworthy of her garden because they are "Nature's bastards," grown with "an art" that "shares / With great creating Nature" [4.4.85-88]), Polixenes argues that art improves nature and that Perdita ought to make her garden "rich in gillyvors" and "not call them bastards" (4.4.98-99). To illustrate his point that art improves nature, he gives the example of grafting, where

> we marry
>
> A gentler scion to the wildest stock,
>
> And make conceive a bark of baser kind
>
> By bud of nobler race. (92-95)

In the eyes of literary critics going back to at least the mid-twentieth century, Polixenes's defense of grafting is ironic because he disapproves of the prospective marriage between the noble Florizel and the base shepherdess Perdita, although presumably he should defend this marriage on the same grounds that move him to defend marrying a "gentler scion to the wildest stock." In the 1948 *The Crown of Life*, G. Wilson Knight notes there is a "certain irony" in "Polixenes' defense of exactly the type of love-mating which Florizel and Perdita are planning for themselves" (105).

However, as we will see, early modern audiences would have recognized that grafting a noble bud onto a bark of baser kind is not *exactly* the type of love-mating that Florizel and Perdita are planning for themselves because a graft asexually regenerates the scion while the marriage of a prince and shepherdess entails a sexual relationship resulting in blended offspring.

That is, because grafting a gentler scion onto the wildest stock is a means of propagating only the gentle lineage, Polixenes's defense of grafting is, in fact, consistent with his desire for "fair posterity" (4.4.414), or noble descendants, that leads him to intervene in the cross-class marriage between Florizel and Perdita, which would result in mixed or "unfair" posterity. While Polixenes ironically uses the language of human disparagement, which he abhors, to celebrate grafting, the irony may be less certain than Knight and many others have assumed because he analogizes asexual and sexual forms of generation. Aware of this difference between grafting and human marriage, an early modern audience may have understood that Polixenes ironically draws Perdita's attention precisely to those benefits of asexual generation that *do not extend* to the sexual type of relation that she and Florizel are planning.

The Hybridization Interpretation

At the center of recent interpretations of this passage lies the assumption that Perdita and Polixenes debate the merits of hybridizing plants and, by analogy, social hybridization. This strain of interpretation was initiated by Edward Tayler in influential 1964 discussion in *Nature and Art in Renaissance Literature*. There, Tayler argues that a "program of egalitarian eugenics" was implicit in the mixture of horticultural and social language of Polixenes's "shockingly unorthodox" argument (136). By celebrating the mixing of gentle and base in a grafting, Polixenes shows himself to be a progressive eugenicist who implicitly defends the position that social hybridization would eliminate injurious social differences, breed a homogenous population, or otherwise improve the human stock.

In the twenty-first century, critics have followed suit in understanding that Polixenes defends the art of hybridization. In a 2001 essay that reads the play's thematic handling of

bastards through its generic status as a tragicomedy, a "hybrid" of tragedy and comedy, Aaron Kitch argues that Polixenes represents the graft as a "positive model of hybridity" and that he becomes an "apologist for the mixing of categories by deconstructing the art/nature binary" (60). A 2008 introductory text to Renaissance literature includes an essay on *The Winter's Tale*, in which Siobhan Keenan explains that Shakespeare's version differs from his source (Robert Greene's *Pandosto*) in its "pointed concern with hybridity," which is foregrounded in Polixenes defense of "hybrid flowers" and the "merits of cross-breeding" (108-109). In a 2014 Broadview edition of the play, Hardin Aasand goes so far as to use *hybridize* in his paraphrase of Polixenes's description of grafting: "We hybridize plants by cultivating a 'gentler scion' to [*sic*] the 'wildest stock' to create a 'nobler' plant" (143).

Ecocritics have also accepted this interpretation. Simon Estok, in his ecocritical reading of *The Winter's Tale*, claims that the play challenges the "xenophobia toward mingling bloods more substantially than any other piece of early modern literature, culminating in the debate between Perdita and Polixenes on crossbreeding" (97). In *Green Desire*, Rebecca Bushnell examines how grafting in early modern texts figures the conjunction of disparate things, and argues that Polixenes disingenuously tests Perdita when he defends grafting in a way that sounds like he will tolerate an analogous union between Perdita and Florizel (149).Vin Nardizzi too sees that Polixenes defends grafting as a kind of mixing that is contradicted by his views on marriage: "the mixing of rank which grafting is said to effect undercuts Polixenes's ringing endorsement, for, despite the high regard he claims to have for grafting, this masquerading monarch would never consent to the application of its social logics to his realm" (86). Nardizzi thus sees Perdita and Polixenes's initial disagreement resolved in their ultimate acceptance of a "conservative stance" on grafting: "The shepherdess banishes nature's artifice from her garden (4.4.99-100),

and the monarch forcefully attempts to ward off the ruinous effect of a socially disadvantageous graft on his lineage" (*ibid*.).

But Perdita's refusal to put her dibble in the earth to plant one gillyflower slip has nothing to do with an art of crossbreeding when (as demonstrated in the previous section): [a] in the early 1600s plants were believed to reproduce asexually, [b] the play predates the discovery of plant crossbreeding by one hundred years, and [c] Perdita's neglect of the flowers is more plausibly related their variability or "degeneration," which explains why people call them "Nature's bastards" and propagate desirable cultivars clonally by slips rather than by seed. And for similar reasons, Polixenes's defense of grafting cannot be read as a defense of crossbreeding or hybridization. The passage must be reevaluated in light of period conceptions of grafting as a form of asexual propagation that allows for the conservation of a distinct kind or lineage.

Grafting as an Art of Clonal Propagation, from Virgil to Dryden

Around the beginning of the first millennium BCE, farmers discovered how to graft species that do not root easily from cuttings (such as apples, pears, and plums) by inserting a scion (the cut shoot of a donor plant) into an incision in a stock plant that has its own root system. Because grafting is a form of asexual, clonal propagation, a graft produces a plant that resembles the donor plant and not the stock plant. Today, horticulturalists refer to grafts as a "compound genetic system" because the two grafted plants retain their distinct genetic identity after the fusion, so that, for example, the "scion of a red-flowering rose grafted onto a white rose stock will continue to produce red roses rather than pink hybrid roses" (Mudge 440). Although scientists currently debate whether the transmission of RNA across the fusion means that grafting has "genetic consequences," and although grafting and hybridization are today linked in

the public imagination, grafts are not hybrids (Kingsbury 424; Mudge 482-485).

Classical and early modern agricultural writings show that grafting was once widely recognized to be a form of clonal propagation, where gardeners grafted a cutting, or scion, from a donor plant onto a stock plant, with the graft producing the kind of fruits or flowers of the donor plant, and without hybridizing stock and scion (Scholl 176-178; Faircloth 502; Kingsbury 24-25; Mudge 437-493). In the earliest accounts of grafting from Greece and Rome in the first centuries BCE, writers describe grafts as producing vegetation that resembled the scion rather than the stock. According to the fifth-century BCE Hippocratic treatise, *On the Nature of the Child*, some trees "grow from grafts implanted into other trees: they live independently of these, and the fruit which they bear is different from that of the tree on which they are grafted" (qtd. Mudge 454). In the second book of his agricultural poem, the *Georgics*, Virgil describes how gardeners insert a shoot or slip into an incision made into a knot, or deep into the grain of a tree, and imagines how the stock plant then wonders at its new boughs bearing leaves and fruits that are not its own (2.74-82). Although Virgil elsewhere describes fanciful, nonviable grafts (such as grafting a chestnut on an arbutus), his description of the stock plant's admiration for the strange fruits of the grafted scion indicates that he correctly understood that the stock and scion do not hybridize.

In a 1697 translation of the *Georgics*, John Dryden embellishes Virgil's grafting conceit in a way that both shows a similar understanding of the stock-scion relationships and draws attention to the oft-remarked similarity between grafting and human cuckoldry.[83] As discussed in

[83] While Virgil's description lightly anthropomorphizes the tree by depicting it as wondering ("*miratur*") at the strange fruit and leaves, he does not make any explicit comparisons between grafting and human generation. Some early English translators (Abraham Fleming in 1598 and Thomas May in 1628) followed Virgil in keeping the grafting language technical, without metaphorically comparing grafting to human generation.

more detail below, early modern writers sometimes used grafting to figure cuckoldry because the stock plant that is made to foster the fruits of another plant resembles the cuckolded husband who raises the child of the man who has impregnated his wife. Translating the Virgilian description of a tree that wonders at the strange fruits that have been grafted onto it, Dryden departs from his source and maternalizes the tree as the "Mother Plant" into whose "moist Womb" a gardener inserts a slip, or "Infant":

> The bat'ning Bastard shoots again and grows:
> And in short space the laden boughs arise,
> With happy fruit advancing to the Skies.
> The Mother Plant admires the leaves unknown,
> Of Alien trees, and Apples not her own. (2.107-117; 123)

The "bat'ning Bastard" is the grafted slip that thrives on the nourishment provided by its surrogate Mother Plant. Dryden puns on two senses of the word "bastard," which in early modern English could refer to an illegitimate child and, under the horticultural sense of the word, a "shoot or sucker springing of its own accord from the root of a tree, or where not wanted" ("Bastard"). Dryden's translation retains the idea that grafting does not hybridize scion and stock but propagates the leaves and apples of "Alien trees." And the specific image of a "Mother Plant" who battens the "Bastard" of other trees further suggests an analogy between grafting and female cuckoldry. Since cuckoldry has traditionally been understood as something that happens only to men, this is an unusual image. Owing to the mother's role in the gestation and live birth of children, there is an information asymmetry whereby the female can be certain of the child's maternity, while the father may have doubts about the paternity. Hence the geneticists' technical term for cuckoldry, "non-paternity event." But (in the absence of modern reproductive

technology) a "non-maternity event" is fanciful. Yet Dryden's fanciful grafting conceit retains the correct stock-scion relation, in which the stock plant is the surrogate parent of the scion, not a reproductive partner.

Another possibility is that Dryden's 1697 translation emphasizes the similarity in the roles that the cuckold, the stock plant, and the female play in generation, a similarity that would have been implicit in both the old Aristotelian "one-seed" model and the new theories of "animalculism" that denied physiological maternity.[84] In 1677, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek discovered spermatozoa and, theorizing that fetuses grow preformed from miniature animals ("animalcules") contained in the sperm, gave new life to the old idea that only men do the begetting while women provide only a "moist Womb." In other words, Dryden's grafting conceit may imply that *normal human generation* resembles female cuckoldry in that the mother, like the stock plant and the male cuckold, is made to nourish a child to which she is not formally related (the fetus growing from the preformed animalcule in the father's sperm).

While Dryden's translation raises the question of whether grafting is commensurable or incommensurable with human generation, both the translation and the original show that grafting had been recognized to be a technique of propagating a desirable cultivar without any admixture from the stock plant. Other Greek and Roman writers, such as the "father of botany," Theophrastus, Marcus Porcius Cato (in *De agri cultura*), and Marcus Terentius Varro, reiterated the view that the fusion of stock and scion produced fruits and flowers that resembled the donor plant, and not the stock (Mudge 452-458).

In early modern English agricultural writing, grafting is understood to be a means of

[84] See Joseph Needham's 1959 *History of Embryology*, especially "Ovism and Animalculism" (205-211); also Davidson's *Breeding* for a brief overview of early modern theories of generation (20-24).

using a stock plant, often a wild variety, as a hardy substrate for cloning a domesticated plant. Leonard Mascall, in his influential grafting manual of 1569, *A Booke of the Arte and maner how to Plant and Graffe all sorts of Trees*, tells his readers that, although the graft and the stock have contrary natures, the graft will not take on any of the "wild" nature of the stock: "although the stocke and the graffe be of contrarie natures: yet notwithstanding, neither the Graffe nor Scutchin [shield-shaped cutting], shall take any part of the nature of the wild stock so graffed" (19). "Scutchin" is a variant spelling of "escutcheon," which, in this horticultural context, refers to the "shield-shaped portion of a branch, containing a bud, cut for use as a graft" ("Escutcheon"). In heraldry, the escutcheon is the shield that displays an individual's coat of arms and denotes his family lineage. The graft or "Scutchin" has the shape of a shield, and the heraldic resonances of the term also suggest the resemblance between the grafted donor plant and the gentle scion of a noble family. Indeed, the general resemblance between Polixenes's description of grafting a "gentler scion" on the "wildest stock" and Mascall's description of grafting a "Scutchin" onto a "wild stock" raises the possibility that Shakespeare composed the defense of grafting in consultation with Mascall's grafting manual and its reminder that the graft will not "take any part of the nature of the wild stock."

In an agricultural manual, *An English Husbandman* (1613), Gervase Markham (whose *Booke of Honour* was cited in Chapter 1) instructs gardeners to select scions from "the best fruit trees" because the grafted scions "bring forthe the same fruit which the trees do from whence they are taken" (Chap. 3; 44). In *New Orchard and Garden* (1618), William Lawson writes that grafting concerns the "reforming of the fruite of one tree with the fruit of another, by an artificiall transplacing or transposing of a twigge, bud, or leafe" (Chap. 10; 33). The "trans" language here ("transplacing," "transposing") represents grafting as a moving over, a

transplacement or transposition, of a fruitful bud from one tree to another, and not a technique of crossing or sexual coupling. Like Polixenes, who describes grafting as an art that does "mend" Nature, Lawson characterizes grafting as an art of mending a defect, or "reforming," the stock plant by engrafting it with the scion of a better plant.

Giambattista Della Porta's "natural magic" book, *Magia Naturalis* (1558; translated as *Natural Magick* in London, 1658) is a notable exception to the rule that early modern writers equate grafting with clonal cultivation, yet his often fantastical and contradictory descriptions of grafting show that he was writing well outside of the horticultural mainstream (Mudge 461-462; Bushnell 140-160, 175).The third book, which purports to deliver "certain precepts of Husbandry; and sheweth how to intermingle sundry kinds of Plants, and how to produce new kinds" (58) represents grafting as sexual reproduction that produces new kinds by blending stock and scion. Della Porta compares it to animal copulation ("graffing is in plants the same that copulation is in living creatures" [63]) and declares that his purpose is to prescribe the rules by which "we may cause those divers plants which we would intermingle, to join more easily, and to agree better together, for the producing of new and compounded fruits" (*ibid*.). The use of the term "copulation" to describe grafting is unusual, and Bacon may have had Della Porta in mind when he writes, in *Sylva Sylvarum*, that "[g]eneration by copulation certainly extendeth not to plants" (451). As agricultural historians have noted, Della Porta's fanciful examples indicate a "propensity for exaggeration and embellishment" (Mudge 461). He gives directions for cultivating the "Almond-Peach," a fruit that looks like a peach but tastes like an almond; it is made "both of the Almond and the Peach compounded together" and it "partak[es] both of the shape, and also the qualities of either parent" (72). The "manner of engraffing" involves "clapping the bud of one upon the bud of another" and setting them on a stock (*ibid*.). Chapter

fifteen includes directions on how to change flowers' colors by grafting. A "white Gilliflower slip being engraffed into a red Carrot made hollow for the same purpose, and so buried in the earth, hath yeelded a Sea-coloured flower" (94), while a rose that is engraffed on a broomstalk will become yellow (*ibid*). As the gillyflower-on-carrot and rose-on-broomstalk "grafts" suggest, Della Porta uses a loose definition of grafting that includes a technique of making the exposed flower stalk absorb the color of the material into which it is inserted.

While Della Porta's examples are full of fantastical claims of grafting's ability to create new compound fruits and flowers through sexual crossing, his general statements about grafting also repeat the conventional understanding that plant generation was different than animal generation, and that grafting was a means of making a stock bear the fruit or flower of another plant without commixture. The Proem that opens Book 3 distinguishes plant and animal generation on the grounds that species identity limits the interfertility of animals, while the generative possibilities of plants are nearly infinite: "Copulation [in the case of the "living Creatures"] was but of one kind, here [in the case of plants] it is almost infinite; and not onely every Tree can be ingrafted into every Tree, but one Tree can be adulterated with them all" (58). And in the section on grafting, Della Porta claims that grafting is the "cause … of every adopted fruit which is not the natural child, as it were, of the Tree that bare it. … Virgil makes mention of such a matter, when he saith, that *Dido* admired certain Trees which she saw, that bare new kinds of leaves, and apples that naturally were not their own" (63). The comparison of the graft to an "adopted" child, different from the "natural child" of the parent tree, is consistent with the mainstream view that the graft produced a clone of the scion's kind and was not related naturally to the tree it was grafted on.

Grafting in Metaphors by Shakespeare and His Contemporaries

Poets, including Shakespeare, frequently used grafting metaphorically. Good grafts were used to figure the power of art to overcome decay, degeneration, and death. Bad grafts were used to figure cuckoldry and bastardy—but not hybrids.

In the couplet that ends Sonnet 15, the poet speaker, asserting his ability to immortalize the youth in his poetry, compares himself to a gardener who, seeking to counteract the degenerative force of time, uses grafting to regenerate the youth: "And all in war with time for love of you / As he takes from you, I engraft you new" (13-14). Because the word "graft" derives from the Latin word for stylus (*graphium*), which in turn derives from the Greek word for writing (*graphein*), the poet's claim to *engraft you new* may refer to his ability to rejuvenate the youth with the pen he uses to write the youth into his immortal verses, just as the grafter rejuvenates the desirable cultivar by grafting its scion into a stock plant. In the sonnet sequence (at least in their 1609 ordering), Sonnet 15 marks the point where the poet concludes the pro-natalist arguments developed in the first fourteen sonnets—that the youth should seek immortality through sexual reproduction and the generation of an heir that will resemble him—and begins a series of sonnets that reflect on an alternative form of immortality found in poetry.[85] If the youth is unwilling to "breed another thee" (6.7), then the poet speaker will play the part of grafter, so that the youth can live on, even after age and death have destroyed him, in the poet's verse.[86]

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[85] Literary critics have contested both the ordering of the sonnet sequence in the first 1609 edition put out by Thomas Thorpe, as well as the validity of the narrative structure and direction of addressee attributed to the sequence by the eighteenth-century editor, Edward Malone. However, Heather Dubrow, a leading challenger of the traditional sonnet sequence order and interpretation, concedes a basis for maintaining the procreation sonnets as a group of poems addressed to a young man (300).

[86] In "Shakespeare's Penknife," Nardizzi also notes the sonnet speaker's recourse to grafting as a form of seedless reproduction, and argues that "by disarticulating the imperative of genealogical succession from the 'seeded' generational act of human procreation, the gardener-poet of these sonnets also tends to the plant-like body

In this reading, grafting stands for the alternative form of reproduction offered by poetry, an asexual form that differs from the sexual reproduction first urged by the poet but rejected by the youth. However, the widespread misconception that grafting is a form of sexual crossing has led some commentators to put forth improbable interpretations of the metaphorical logistics of *I engraft you*. In his gloss to Sonnet 15, Stephen Booth claims that the poem compares the youth to a stock plant that is rejuvenated when the poet engrafts it with new boughs, i.e. the wife conducive to sexual procreation. This reading is based on the unsubstantiated claim that "the reader understand *I engraft you* as a metaphor from the practice of replacing the wasted limbs of old trees with slips that grow to be new boughs" (158). However, grafting was not a means of rejuvenating an old tree with new limbs, but rather a means of cloning a desirable cultivar by grafting its slips into a young and healthy rootstock. But this misconception of how grafting was practiced, together with the assumption that grafting resembles sexual intercourse, leads Booth to conclude:

> The reader's lack of foreknowledge of sonnet 16 [where the poet more explicitly calls attention to the regenerative power of his verse], the speaker's previous single-mindedness about urging procreation, and the similarities between grafting and sexual intercourse make it probable that a first reading of this line would suggest "As time withers you, I renew you by joining you to a wife." (*ibid*.)

This conclusion is the opposite of the one early modern audiences likely would have reached not only because of the pun on *engraft*/writing, but also the fact that grafting was recognized to be *different* from sexual intercourse in that it asexually regenerates the donor plant. More probably,

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of the beautiful young man queerly" (85)—i.e. the poet shows that regeneration can occur independently of biological reproduction, thus offering an alternative to heterosexual reproduction in the form of poetry.

the first reading of this line would suggest "As time withers you, I renew you by copying you into these verses."

In using grafting as a proxy for art's ability to protect against decay and death in Sonnet 15, Shakespeare echoes other period writers who promoted grafting's regenerative application. In the literary manual, *Poetica* (1536), the Italian critic Bernadino Daniello argues that art improves nature and provides the example of a gardener who grafts fruit trees in order to avoid the sour fruit produced by degenerated trees. Trees are "apt to degenerate and bring forth sour or insipid fruit if left to their own development," but they produce fruits that are sweet and savory if they are "diligently and artfully grafted with the proper scions of other fruit trees" (qtd. Wilson 116). In Daniello's conception, the art of grafting addresses the problem of natural degeneration—the change in kind that happens over time that was associated with fruit trees. In John Lyly's *Euphues* (1579), the title character uses the example of grafting in a statement on nature's dominance over art and education: "education can have no shewe, where the excellencye of Nature doth beare sway"; this is seen in the "the whelpe of a Mastife" that "wyll never be taught to retrive the Patridge" and in the crab tree (the wild apple), which "wyll never beare sweet Apple," no matter where you plant it, "unlesse you graft it by art, which nothing toucheth nature" (41). Although grafting shows the power of art to make a crab apple bear sweet fruit, Euphues, like Perdita, prefers plants that produce good vegetation by nature.

Following St. Augustine's famous passage from *Concupiscence and Marriage* (which claimed that God has providentially made some trees, such as the cultivated olive, prone to degeneration in order to illustrate how, owing to an innate or "original" propensity toward sin, saved individuals do not transmit biologically their redeeming beliefs to their children, who tend

to degenerate to a sinful default[87]), religious writers frequently used grafting's ability to remedy natural degeneration as a metaphor for the spiritual regeneration that comes with Christian salvation. For example, in his divine poem, "On Grapes," Francis Quarles, an English poet of the generation after Shakespeare, develops an extended metaphor that compares people to grape vines that, if propagated by seed, produce "degenerate Clusters" and grapes that are "degenerous and sower," but if grafted by God, bear "Delicious fruit" that can be pressed to make "sprightly *Wine*" (237-238). In eulogistic contexts, grafting was an art that mended a particular defect in nature: the degeneration—especially the degeneration in kind that happens across generations—over time.

When used pejoratively, Shakespeare's grafting metaphors figure reproduction that is illegitimate in that it creates cuckolds and bastards. In *The Rape of Lucrece*, Tarquin, the villainous son of the king of Rome, rapes Lucrece, the wife of his cousin Collatine. Contemplating suicide as a means of terminating the presumed pregnancy, Lucrece vows to her absent husband, Collatine, that Tarquin's "bastard graft shall never come to growth. / He shall not boast, who did thy stock pollute, / That thou art doting father of his fruit" (1062-1064). In Lucrece's assessment, Tarquin has wrongfully grafted his own scion onto Collatine's stock and therefore exposed Collatine to cuckoldry, the "non-paternity event" that makes a husband "dote" on the "fruit" of another man. Thus, the graft threatens Collatine not because it hybridizes Collatine's stock with Tarquin's, but because it "pollutes" Collatine's stock with the offspring of an enemy lineage.

[87] Just "as a wild olive grows out of the seed of a wild olive, and from the seed of a true olive springs also nothing but wild olive, notwithstanding the very great difference there is between the wild olive and the olive; so what is born in the flesh, either of a sinner or of a just man, is in both instances a sinner, notwithstanding the vast distinction which exists between sinner and the righteous man" (qtd. Zirkle 67-68).

Shakespeare uses a similar grafting metaphor for illegitimate birth in *Henry VI, Part 2*. The Duke of Suffolk insults the Earl of Warwick by alleging that he is a son of an "untutored churl" who impregnated Warwick's mother and, consequently, does not belong to "Nevilles' noble race," that of Warwick's father, Richard Neville (Earl of Salisbury). To illustrate his insult that Warwick is not the son of Neville because his mother betrayed Neville with another man, Suffolk describes Warwick as the fruit of a crab-tree slip that was illegitimately grafted on Neville's noble stock:

> If ever lady wronged her lord so much,
> Thy mother took into her blameful bed
> Some stern untutored churl, and noble stock
> Was graffed with crabtree slip, whose fruit thou art,
> And never of the Nevilles' noble race. (3.2.212-216)

Grafting the slip of the crab-tree (*malus sylvestris*, the wild European progenitor to the domesticated *malus*) onto noble stock figures the interruption in the noble lineage that occurs when a lady wrongs her lord by having the child of another man.

While in the above passages grafting clearly represents a deviation in lineage rather than hybridization, other, incommensurable components of the analogy raise the question of how specifically the comparison between grafting and human generation works in this period when human embryology and generation were variably understood. When Lucrece says to Collatine that Tarquin has polluted "thy stock," she may refer to herself as Collatine's stock plant that has been wrongfully engrafted with Tarquin's line. Or perhaps she abstractly compares Collatine's lineage and ancestry to a stock plant that has been wrongfully engrafted with, and supplanted by, the lineage of a rival plant. If *she* is the wrongfully engrafted stock plant, the conceit may

suggest an Aristotelian "one-seed" model of generation, where the female provides the "moist Womb" for gestating the father's scion but is not genetically related to the child. If Collatine's lineage is the wrongfully engrafted stock plant, the conceit leaves open the possibility that the fruit/child resulting from the graft/rape blends her and Tarquin's seeds, as the Hippocratic/Galenic model would have it.

Similarly, if Warwick's *mother* is the "noble stock" and the "crab-tree slip" is the germ of the "untutored churl," then the analogy could imply a "one-seed" model of generation where the male is the only begetter. If, however, the grafting of crab-tree slip on noble stock is a metaphor for the cuckolding of Neville and the degradation of his noble lineage that Warwick supposedly represents, the analogy is compatible with a "two-seed" model where Warwick is descended from both female and male lines.

In *Henry V*, after the English defeat the French at the battle of Harfleur, the French principals use grafting imagery to express their feeling that the attacking English have violated a filial obligation owed to the French as the genetic founders of the English people. In the conceit of the Dauphin, the Norman conquerors of 1066 ("our fathers") performed an act of self-grafting when they emptied their "luxury"— put their surplus "scions"—into the "wild and savage stock" of the native English, and these overgrown scions now "overlook their grafters" when they invade France:

> Shall a few sprays of us,
> The emptying of our fathers' luxury,
> Our scions, put in wild and savage stock,
> Spirt up so suddenly into the clouds
> And over-look their grafters? (3.5.5-9)

Agreeing with the Dauphin and continuing his garden imagery, the nobleman Bourbon curses the English by calling them "Normans, but bastard Normans, Norman bastards!" (3.5.10). Bourbon's phrase puns on two senses of *bastard*. The invading English are "Norman bastards" in the sense that they are the illegitimate children of the Normans, and in the horticultural sense of a "shoot or sucker springing of its own accord from the root of a tree, or where not wanted" ("Bastard"). In denouncing the English as a "few sprays of us" and "Norman bastards," the French do not denounce them primarily as Norman-English hybrids (although the mixed nature of the English is implied by the insertion of the French scions into the "wild and savage stock" of the natives) but as the rebellious creations and ungrateful descendants of the Normans.

Another pejorative grafting reference, in Robert Green's pastoral romance, *Menaphon*, is worth mentioning because its context and details make it a possible source for Polixenes's defense of grafting in *The Winter's Tale*. *Menaphon* was printed in 1589, a year after Greene's first pastoral romance, *Pandosto*, which was the primary source for *The Winter's Tale*. Both of Greene's romances, like Shakespeare's play, have similar courtly pastoral settings and cross-class romance conflicts. In *Menaphon*, the Arcadian princess Sephistia loses her standing at court and seeks refuge in the countryside, where she declines the love offered to her by the shepherd Menaphon. As she explains to the lovelorn shepherd, the love between individuals of different estates is discordant and unnatural: "Where the parties have no simpathie of Estates, there can no firme love be fixed; discord is reputed the mother of division, and in nature this is an unrefuted principle, that it falteth which faileth in uniformitie" (42). And to illustrate her point that uniform relations are preferable to disparate ones, she says that a gardener who grafts gillyflowers on nettles ruins the smell: "[h]e that grafteth Iillyflowers upon the Nettle marreth the smell" (*ibid*.). That is, the gillyflower-on-nettle graft is harmful because the nettle's malodor would overpower

the clove-scented gillyflowers' fragrance.[88] In *Menaphon*, Greene has Sephistia give the example of a *bad* graft to support her view that the unequal marriage between a shepherd and princess is undesirable. In *The Winter's Tale*, Polixenes gives the example of a good graft, where a competent gardener grafts a "gentler scion to the wildest stock" with the effect of making "conceive a bark of baser kind / By bud of nobler race" (4.4.92-94), raising the question, which we will return to below, of what analogy exists between a good graft and the marriage between a shepherdess and a prince.

In sum, the grafting references from Shakespeare and his contemporaries reveal a recognition that grafting was a means of clonal propagation that produced a copy of the donor plant and did not hybridize stock and scion. In eulogistic contexts, such as the end of Sonnet 15 and Quarles's divine poem "On Grapes," grafting stood for the regenerative power of, respectively, art and faith. In pejorative contexts, the bad graft figured the deviation in lineage that creates cuckolds and bastards—but not hybrids.

The "One-Seed" Interpretation of Polixenes's Defense of Grafting

Properly historicized, Polixenes's defense of grafting in 4.4 would have suggested two possible interpretations for contemporary audiences. Insofar as the socially suggestive language of marrying gentle and base to produce a bud of "nobler race" seems to comment on the prospective union between Florizel and Perdita, the passage could allude to the "one-seed"

[88] The tendency of nettles to overpower the scent of nearby flowers was notorious. John Heywood, for instance, tells in *Epigrams* the story of a farmer who, finding a nettle growing next to his roses, asks the nettle why he has been so bold. The nettle replies that by growing next to the roses, he means to improve his smell. The farmer smells the nettle and concludes that the nettle has succeeded only in "perverting" the roses' smell: "Roses convert nettles? Nay they be too fell; Nettles will pervert roses rather, I smell" (129).

model of generation (Needham 43-46; Breuer 329; Laqueur 40-43).[89] On this view, grafting a gentle scion onto a wild stock is analogous to marrying a gentleman to a baseborn woman in that the resulting progeny will resemble only the man's noble "race," without any admixture from the female's baser kind. Polixenes's defense of grafting may have recalled to contemporary audiences the "old Aegyptian costume," as John Selden puts it, of regarding a "Kings issue by any Concubine, as good as one by the Noblest Queen" (8). Perhaps Polixenes sets a trap for Perdita in seeming to approve their union as some form of concubinage, consistent with his goal of preserving his noble lineage, by comparing Perdita to a stock plant that will incubate his "bud of nobler race."

As literary scholars have pointed out, Shakespeare throughout his plays uses metaphors that, contrasting the active and form-giving role of the male with the passive role of the female in generation, allude to the Aristotelian "one-seed" model. The metaphors comparing the child to the imprint of the father, for example, echo the Aristotelian theory that the mother provides the passive material that is transformed by the formal cause of the father (Parker 103-106). Thus, in *The Midsummer Night's Dream*, Hermia is "but as a form in wax, / [by her father] imprinted" (1.1.50). In an article discussing early modern theories of generation in Shakespeare, Horst

[89] The "one-seed" model of generation should not be confused with the "one-sex" model of reproductive biology described by Thomas Laqueur in his 1990 book*, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud*. Laqueur argues that, before the Enlightenment investigations that led to the modern "two-sex" model of biology (wherein male and female designate two opposed sexes with opposed reproductive functions), Europeans believed in a "one-sex" model, in which male and female genders represented different versions of the same underlying biology. On Lacquer's account, female genitals were thought to be the same as male genitals, only turned in and extending inward, and male genitals were the same as female organs, only "squeezed out" (25-26). In a 1991 review of Laqueur's book, Katherine Park and Robert Nye challenged Laqueur's thesis, arguing that there was "no single early Western model of sex and sexual difference" and that Laqueur's "one-sex" model was a "hybrid of individual and sometimes mutually contradictory features assembled from the two dominant and fundamentally incompatible traditions of early writing on the subject, the Aristotelian ("one-seed") and the Hippocratic/Galenic ("two-seed") (54).

Breuer concludes that "generally speaking" Shakespeare follows "the mainstream of Aristotelian and popular biomedical thought" (331).

Although other scholars have argued that, in fact, in the early seventeenth century the rival Hippocratic/Galenic "two-seed" theory dominated medical thought, it was still two centuries before experimental research on the fertilization of the female ovum by the male spermatozoa finally put to rest the "one-seed" theory and the millennia-old debates over whether children inherited traits from germinal material provided by their father, mother, or both (Park 53-57; Needham 31-36; Laqueur 38-40; Traub 85-87). In the mid-seventeenth century, William Harvey began to investigate animal reproduction and hypothesized that the reproductive cycle of all animals, including humans, involved eggs at some point (the motto for this position declared "*ex ovo omnia*," or "from the egg, all") and thereby paved the way for a female-centered model, "ovism." Still, through the nineteenth century, scientists debated whether the male spermatozoa (discovered by Leeuwenhoek in 1677) or female ovum (discovered by Karl Ernst von Baer in 1827) contained the embryo, and, relatedly, whether the male or female, or both, "genetically" influenced the offspring.

Thus, in a culture where the Aristotelian "one-seed model" still resonated, and where grafting was understood to be a form of clonal propagation that reproduces only the scion's kind, Polixenes's socially suggestive defense of grafting may have sounded like an argument in favor of marrying a prince to a shepherdess on the physiological grounds that the female, like the stock plant, does not influence progeny. Given his persistent objections to the match between Florizel and Perdita, such a defense of grafting/cross-class marriage would have been seen as ironic or inadvertent.

The "Two-Seed" Interpretation of Polixenes's Defense of Grafting

In another possible interpretation, an early modern audience would have understood that Polixenes simultaneously celebrates grafting and objects to cross-class marriage because he takes the "heraldic" view that it is beneficial to preserve noble kinds or strains. In this reading, Polixenes responds to Perdita, who refuses to use horticultural art to grow "Nature's bastards," by pointing out that such arts allow gardeners to propagate buds of a "nobler race" by marrying gentle scions to base stocks. Assuming the "two-seed" model of human generation, Polixenes's celebration of grafting and rejection of cross-class marriage are consistent because positions reflect a desire to propagate the best or noblest kinds. It is ironic that Polixenes uses the social language of marrying gentle and base to describe grafting; that comparison analogizes grafting to human marriage yet, in a "two-seed model," the modes are fundamentally dissimilar since the progeny resulting from a human marriage are a blend of the parents' two seeds, while the vegetation resulting from a graft replicates only the scion. An early modern audience might have understood that Polixenes, through this unsettled analogy and striking miscue, deliberately or inadvertently draws attention to the fact that, as an art of asexual reproduction, grafting differs from and is superior to human marriage because it enables the grafter to avoid sexual crossing altogether and to reproduce perfectly the "noblest race." His defense of grafting may thus embed a queer critique of sexual reproduction, which, under a two-seed model, is liable to degeneration when the gentler scion marries into the wildest stock. He seems to say that, in the case of asexual *grafting*, we can make a bark of baser kind "conceive" by bud of nobler race and thereby regenerate nobility without fear of base admixture, and in this way grafting is *unlike* the disparaging sexual union to which you, Perdita, aspire.

This interpretation would be consistent with similar discussions of the relationship between marriage and agriculture in heraldry writing from the period. As discussed in the first chapter, the pastoral romances generally share with heraldry writing the perspective that humans resemble other living things in that individuals act in accordance with their nature (birth or ancestry) and that their dispositions and traits had been bred into their lineage over many generations. Marriage and agriculture were analogous means of controlling breeding and therefore a presumed means of conserving nobility by, in the case of sexually reproducing animals, like humans, horses, and dogs, preventing the breeding of individuals of different ranks or breeds, and, in the case of asexual (as believed at the time) plants that tended to "degeneration," selecting cuttings from the best individuals for clonal propagation.

In 1586, the lawyer John Ferne had published *Blazon of Gentrie*, a heraldry book that takes the form of a dialogue about the nature of gentility and the bearing of arms, in which six interlocutors (a herald, a knight, a divine, a lawyer, an antiquary, and a plowman) agree that laws against disparagement are right and natural because they prevent the degeneration of the nobility through unequal marriages. The lawyer Bartholus maintains that barons who marry off a young ward to a base woman do a serious injury to the young gentleman and to his family, because the child that results from the marriage is "halfe noble, nay but halfe a man monstrous in kinde, and degenerated from the rest of his family," so that the family suffers a "lamentable dimunition and rebatement of her Noblenes" (9-10). Bartholus approvingly cites a provision from the Statute of Merton (the 1235 addendum to the Magna Carta) that penalizes barons who disparage their wards by marrying them to villains or burghers with the forfeiture of any profits from the wardship and marriage. However, the knight Torquatus complains that gentlemen frequently violate the law against "unegall matches" (10). Many impoverished gentlemen marry the

daughters of rich merchants because they believe that a "man is not ennobled by a woman's part"—presumably referring to the Aristotelian "one seed" theory of generation.

Using an extended analogy that compares the conservation of domesticated breeds of animals to the conservation of gentility in humans, the herald Paladinus inveighs against gentlemen who disparage themselves or their wards and explains why laws against disparagement are right and natural. In this argument, the same reasoning that leads gentlemen to conserve their best breeds of horses and dogs by preventing crossings between unlike kinds, and conserve their best trees by taking their cuttings, should commit them to eschew disparaging marriages:

> You your selfe seeme carefull, for the conservation of your hunting dogges in their kindes: and if you have a whelpe, begotten betweene a spaniell, and a mastiffe bitch, you will call it a mungrell, as a thing degenerated from his kinde, and thus it participateth in some, and peradventure all, the currish quallities of his damme. If you suffer your horse of warre, to leape a the Asse [*sic*], doe you receave, from his procreation, a steed fit for armed fielde, or a monstruous mule, destinated to the rusticall, and slavish labours, of the countrie peisant? A beast nothing at all following, heroicall parts, and fierce courage of his sier ... Do not fruits resemble the nature of their plants or seedes? And althinges, how do they follow the qualities of their first cause? ... Are we carefull then, from what tree our plant is taken? Of what kind our dogs do come? And of what race our horses are bred? And shall we hold it nothing to the purpose of what parents, a Gentleman is begotten? thus you see, how that the law-maker had instruction, even from natures lawe, to forbid such unegall copling. (11-12)

The fact that humans, like other animals, resemble their parents ("follow the qualities of their first cause") seems so obvious that Paladinus is incredulous that gentlemen who take great pains in breeding their horses and dogs would be so careless as to allow their sons to marry the daughters of base parents. A gentleman should take care to marry his children into gentle families for the same reason he is careful to breed his hunting dogs with similar dogs, and his steed with similar warhorses: a child will inherit the qualities of both male and female parents, and the child from a disparaging marriage will be, like a mongrel or mule, a thing "degenerated in its kind" because it "participates" in qualities from two different kinds. Contra the Aristotelian "one seed" model of generation, this invective against indiscriminate breeding assumes biparental influence on progeny in the case of sexual reproduction in animals, and also shows a familiarity with asexual plant cultivation. The rhetorical questions—"Do not fruits resemble the nature of their plants or seedes? … Are we carefull then, from what tree our plant is taken?"—allude to both common forms of plant propagation: planting by seed and regenerating by scion/slip, the form debated by Perdita and Polixenes. Paladinus's point is that in both cases we are "careful" in making sure that the generative vehicle—whether the seed or scion—is coming from a good plant or tree in a way that is analogous to limiting the breeding opportunities of children and livestock to like kinds.[90]

Just as Polixenes sees nature as subsuming human arts, Paladinus regards nature as

[90] Gentility literature often included passages where grafting, alongside animal husbandry and seed-based plant propagation, is used to support the argument that, because in all things "like begets like," nobility should be defined by noble ancestry rather than virtuous acts. In Baldassare Castiglione's *Courtyer* (trans. Thomas Hoby, 1561): "As we see by exaumple not onely in the race of horses and other beastes, but also in trees, whose slippes and graftes alwayes for the moste parte are lyke vnto the stocke of the tree they came from" (Ciii). Similarly, in Giovan Battista Nenna's *Il Nennio* (Venice, 1542; trans. William Jones, 1595): "For if I desire a faire horse, or a good dog, or if I intend to graft any excellent fruit, I will first seeke out the most noble horse, the best hunting spaniell, and the most excellent tree of that sort which I can possibly finde, because it wil never faile to proove like unto that which hath engendred it … And everie kind (to which nature hath given vertue to bring forth fruite) produceth its like" (13-14).

subsuming the anti-disparagement laws that aim to preserve nobility. The lawmaker who forbids "unegall copling" has his "instruction" from "natures law." Laws prohibiting disparagement follow the law of nature whereby children resemble their parents. For Paladinus, the conservation of the nobility as a distinct kind depends precisely on laws and customs that prevent the mixings and crossings that, producing hybrids, destroy the difference between kinds. For the diversity of kinds is threatened primarily by the power of sexual crossing to dilute all differences—to bring about the "confusion of al things," as Paladinus puts it (12).

In 1614, the jurist and scholar John Selden published *Titles of Honor*, an encyclopedic survey of the peerage systems of various nations from antiquity through the present; his arguments reveal a belief that the laws and customs that regulated the "descents" (generations of gentle members) necessary for gentle standing were a necessary means of conserving nobility. Selden's survey shows that princes throughout history, from Europe, Africa and Asia, had made the rank of nobility hereditary because they assumed the "likeness twixt Children and those which get them" (8). Their assumptions, Selden notes, were supported by Aristotle, who wrote in *On the Generation of Animals* that "one not like his Parents is, in some sort, a Monster, that is, not like him that got him" (*ibid*.).[91] But it is precisely the potential for producing a Monster—the child who does not resemble his parents—that interests Selden. What causes the "degenerating issue," the monstrosity of the delinquent child born of virtuous parents (9)? Selden rejects the second-century Greek physician Galen's humoralist argument that a person's behavior is

[91] In Book 4, Chapter 3 of *On the Generation of Animals*, Aristotle had developed a theory of monstrosity as the divergence from kind that can occur in the course of generation. Sometimes divergences are necessary, as when the embryo diverges from the father's male sex-kind and becomes female (hence the commonplace that femaleness is an imperfect development of the embryo). More rarely, an embryo may not resemble a human being and therefore be a case of divergence from the parents' humankind (768a13-768a20; 1188).

determined by bodily humors, that "the Minds inclination follows the bodies temperature" (8).[92] Although Selden, like Galen, believes that the mind is embodied and that behavior is materially determined, he believes that the germane material is in the parents' "Seed"—that children inherit their dispositions from their parents.

Affirming biparental influence on progeny, Selden argues that the genealogical diversity found in both parents' seed (where base traits from remote baseborn ancestors might lie dormant) is responsible for the monstrosity of the nobly born villain. Drawing on the 1593 *Opera Anatomica* of Montpellier anatomist André Laurens (a disciple of Vesalius), Selden explains that the child is an expression not only of his parents' "qualities," but of his ancestors in both "ascending or transverse [collateral] lines" (*ibid.*). "In the Seed," he writes, "are alwaies potentially severall individuating Qualities deriv'd from divers of the neere Ancestors, which by the formative power of the Parents may be exprest in the Children, with respective habitude to either Sex" (8). Thus, a child may not resemble his father because he may instead resemble his father's father or brother—or his mother's father or brother. Because *both* parents contribute "seeds," and because their seeds contain the "several individuating Qualities" of their ancestors, the maternal line matters just as much as the paternal. Selden therefore criticizes the Greeks for following the "old Aegyptian Custome" in believing that a "Kings issue by any Concubine, as good as one by the Noblest Queen," and insists that both sexes are "even equall to be regarded" (8). Similarly, heraldry literature in general seeks to warn young gentlemen against the hazards of marrying daughters of lowborn men, however

[92] It is inapt that Gail Kern Paster in *Humoring the Body* uses Selden's line—"the Minds inclination follows the bodies temperature"—as a refrain in her book on the influence of Galenic humoralism (13, 77, 85, 87, 114, 126, 134), since Selden in the passage containing that line argues against Galen's theory. Humoralism, as Kern Paster points out, is referred to as one of Galen's six "non-naturals" precisely because the passions were not seen as originating in the nature of the individual, but in the "fluctuations and variations of characteristic of phenomenal life in general" (27). By contrast, early modern hereditarianism, which may be regarded as a competing materialist theory of behavior in pre-Enlightenment Europe, understood behavior to be natural in the sense that an individual inherited behavioral traits and dispositions at birth from his ancestors.

beautiful and pleasing they may be, since they may bear children who favor their remote lowborn ancestors.[93]

Ultimately, Selden perceives the genealogical diversity in the parents' seeds—the "potentially severall individuating Qualities"—as justifying the laws and customs that derive nobility from degrees of pure noble ancestry. Because a child's "likeness is oft times to a remote Ancestor" there is a "speciall regard to bee had to the number of Discents in Gentrie" (*ibid*.). That is, because children can inherit qualities from their remote ancestors as well as near ancestors, the peerage systems' requirement of multiple generations of nobility prevents a base atavism from ruining a lineage and perpetuates a finely articulated social order with the nobles at the top.

In sum, the heraldry writers argued that laws and customs tying noble status to noble ancestry on paternal *and* maternal sides prevented the cross-class "hybrid" marriages that would otherwise dilute or destroy the virtue residing in noble lineages. This heraldic model of marriage culture had a cross-species analogue in agriculture, where husbandmen conserved their best animal breeds by preventing them from sexually mixing with members of other breeds, and conserved their best plants by planting their seeds or, in the case of variable species, taking their cuttings for clonal propagation. Thus, heraldry writers and early modern agriculturalists alike implicitly accepted the two-seed model of animal reproduction and the asexual, clonal model of plant cultivation through grafting. And King Polixenes's defense of grafting readily aligns with these early modern views. While there is undeniable irony in a king who comes to a festival to stop his noble son marrying a base shepherdess, and who then praises the art of "mak[ing] conceive by bark of baser kinder a bud of nobler race," the apparent contradiction between these positions is resolved when grafting is

[93] As Radin shows in "Legal History of the Morganatic Marriage," laws prohibiting disparagement were common from classical antiquity through the Middle Ages and the early modern period.

correctly understood to denote clonal propagation of the "bud of nobler race," without admixture from the bark of baser kind.

More broadly, Polixenes's endorsement of asexual techniques of propagation subtly echoes the "queer" reproductive morality manifested by the arc of the play's action, which foregrounds the conflicts and suffering that arise from sexual reproduction in animals. The critique of sexual reproduction starts in the beginning of the play, when King Leontes's doubts over Perdita's paternity lead him to imprison his wife, Hermione, and order his infant daughter, Perdita, to be abandoned in the wilderness. As suggested by the widespread imagery of cuckold's horns and cuckoo's eggs in writings by Shakespeare and his contemporaries, paternal uncertainty was regarded to be an intrinsic feature of sexual reproduction. Because conception takes place within the mother, the father cannot rule out the possibility of cuckoldry—that his ostensible children have been fathered by another man. In an effort to diffuse what she considers Leontes's irrational suspicion that Perdita is not his child, Paulina makes light of the information asymmetry in sexual reproduction that causes paternal uncertainty. Feigning concern that Perdita has inherited Leontes's suspicious disposition and will, when she is a mother, suspect "[h]er children not her husband's" (2.3.106), Paulina imagines a preposterous situation in which the mother does not know whether her own children were fathered by her husband or by someone else. Paulina's husband, Antigonus, also dismisses Leontes's fears that Hermione has cuckolded him, facetiously declaring that, if the queen is shown to be an adulteress, he intends to "geld," or make barren, his three daughters lest they also bring forth "false generation" (2.1.147-148). In the seventeenth century, "geld" referred to sterilization through the removal of either the testes or ovaries. Commonly used with horses and dogs, less commonly with people, the removal of the ovaries was an art or technique that controlled the risk that a female bear the offspring of the wrong male. Through its portrayal of a royal family

and court destroyed by a king's doubts over the paternity of his children, *The Winter's Tale* draws attention to the fact that, in a world where much depends upon perpetuating a specific paternal lineage, sexual reproduction has the significant drawback of being disproportionately in female hands, hoofs, and paws.

The critique of sexual reproduction also appears in Act 4 of *The Winter's Tale*, where the spontaneous attraction between Florizel and Perdita ostensibly threatens to bring an end to King Polixenes's noble line and violate his interest in "fair posterity," that is, to descendants resembling him. Under a two-seed model of animal reproduction, disparaging marriages produce mixed offspring—a "mungrell," as Ferne puts it, "a thing degenerated from his kinde" (11). Because animal reproduction requires the sexual crossing of two individuals, and thus two genealogies, there is always a risk of hybridization and thus, as early moderns viewed it, degeneration. In this respect, Polixenes's celebration of grafting may not reflect a general view that art improves nature, but, more urgently and personally, his view that grafters have, with their art of asexual generation that queerly replicates only the gentler scion, improved nature by obviating the threat of degeneration that imperils his lineage.

Conclusion

The payoff in properly historicizing grafting goes beyond correcting a horticultural detail in the glosses of lines 86-88 in Act 4, scene 4 of *The Winter's Tale.* Certainly, editors should address the anachronism lurking in these glosses, and, given the weight put on this passage in broader interpretations both of the play and its relation to pastoral literature, the lines suggest the necessity of editorial work informed more deeply in ecocritical approaches to Shakespeare and his contemporaries.

By recognizing that the play shows Perdita and Polixenes debating the legitimacy of the plants produced via clonal propagation (by slip and by graft), we can appreciate how their views about horticulture relate to the anxiety over bastardy and degeneration that, within the play and within Renaissance culture, were intrinsic risks of sexual reproduction. Carnations and gillyflowers are called "Nature's bastards" not because they are the products of artificial crossbreeding (which did not exist in the 1600s), but because they were a highly variable, or "degenerating," species that had to be propagated artificially, by regenerating slips of pied individuals. Perdita's prejudice against these flowers comically reprises the fear of bastardy, of "false generation," that spurs her father's tragic actions in the first half of the play. Similarly, Polixenes's celebration of grafting does not encode a defense of hybridity, but, to the contrary, a defense of the art of asexual propagation that allows the husbandman to conserve the "noblest race" of plant. Through Polixenes's celebration of the asexual replication of noble plants, the passage seems to imply a queer critique of what is, in the play, a deficiency of sexual reproduction and of human marriage: the degeneration of nobility that results when a gentle scion literally marries into base stock. More generally, the historically adjusted views on agriculture and marriage within *The Winter's Tale* are expressive of the "greener inhumanity" operating within the heraldic and hereditarian corner of Renaissance culture. For Shakespeare and his contemporaries, humans were essentially livestock, and the preservation of noble traits in human and nonhuman breeds required careful breeding techniques and protocols, including the prevention of disparaging marriages that could lead to the nobility's degeneration into a homogenous and common humanity.

Chapter 4

The Mobility of Sovereignty in Renaissance Pastoral:

Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale" and the Territory of Pastoral

The word "sovereignty," meaning the quality or condition of having authority over something or somebody, comes to English from the Anglo-Norman *sovereyneté* and, ultimately, from the popular Latin *superanus* (a combination of *super*, "above," and the suffix *-anus* denoting "of or pertaining to") ("Sovereignty, n."). In English and in Romance languages, speakers have commonly used "sovereignty" and "sovereign" as terms for the supreme political authority in a given domain; but the terms more broadly denote "anyone who has supremacy or rank above, or authority over, others" (*ibid.*). And scholars working within the environmental humanities and posthumanities have used phrases such as "ecological sovereignty," "ecological biopower," "human empire," and "human dominion" to refer to the power exercised by humans over nonhuman life and spaces (M. Smith; Clark 109; Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 27, 62). Sovereignty in these broader senses features prominently in Renaissance pastoral, whose various subgenres represent it as shifting from a shepherd's ownership of his flock, to a prince's dominion over a sentient physical environment, to a shepherd-*qua*-ruler's authority over his flock of men. These works are at or near the beginning of a modern genealogy of human sovereignty over nature, which they both help to establish, and, in the case of a neglected pastoral panegyric by Niccolò Machiavelli, also seem to critique.

This chapter analyzes pastoral representations of *who* exercises sovereignty and *what* sovereignty is exercised over, as they vary across three pastoral subgenres that were active in the long sixteenth century. All pastoral forms take inspiration from the shepherd's occupation of animal husbandry—the pasturing of sheep, goats, and cattle, breeding them, and extracting from

them milk, meat, wool, and skins. "Courtly" pastorals generally depict shepherds as they were imagined to have existed in the uniformly pastoral societies of antiquity, when shepherds were not necessarily poor laborers but, through their ownership of valuable ruminants producing food and materials, led happy lives characterized by economic self-sufficiency and aesthetic recreation.[94] (As Montrose showed in "Of Gentlemen and Shepherds," courtly pastoral assimilates shepherds to early modern gentlemen, contradicting the social and economic difference between shepherds and gentlemen in early modern society. The poverty of the early modern shepherd who cares for the flock on behalf of his master is captured in other Renaissance pastorals, such as the romances discussed in Chapter 1.[95]) By contrast, in the pastoral panegyrics, the context shifts from the private economic situation of the individual shepherd to a larger geopolitical situation involving a sovereign—a king, or prince—who controls a territory. In the pastoral panegyrics, the shepherd is no longer a figure for the economic independence that comes through owning animals, but a figure for the subject's dependence on a more powerful territorial sovereign, whose favor the shepherd seeks with his song.[96] These works foreground the prince's power over a territory by casting the prince as a godlike sovereign who is worshiped by the sentient physical environment that he controls.

In a group of pastorals that derive from the Biblical metaphor of the ruler as a shepherd

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[94] Examples of courtly pastoral are Richard Barnfield's collection, *The Affectionate Shepherd* (1594), Book VI of Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* (1596), as well as the pastoral dramas (discussed in Chapter 2), such as Tasso's *Aminta,* Guarini's *Il Pastor Fido*, and Fletcher's *The Faithful Shepherdess*. The term "courtly pastoral" comes from LMontrose's article, "Of Gentlemen and Shepherds," which argues that the depictions of prosperous and leisured shepherds in pastoral poetry reflected the aristocratic values of courtly culture.

[95] In *As You Like It*, a loosely pastoral romance, Shakespeare alludes to the difference between the ancient and modern shepherds when he represents Silvius in the style of the ancient shepherd who has the means to buy Corin's master's sheep cote and flock but is so besotted by his unrequited love for Phoebe that he "little cares for buying anything" (2.4.85). Corin, by contrast, represents the common shepherd precisely in his flockless status: "I am a shepherd to another man / And do not shear the fleeces that I graze" (2.4.73-74).

[96] All modeled on Virgil's first eclogue from the first century BC, Renaissance pastoral panegyrics include Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale" (~1515), Pierre Ronsard's *Bergerie* (1565), and Edmund Spenser's "Aprill" from *The Shepheardes Calendar* (1579).

of men, the sovereign exercises power over people rather than nature, but he exercises this power benevolently with the purpose of promoting the spiritual and physical wellbeing of his human flock.[97] As *bonus pastor*, the sovereign puts the welfare of his flock before his own interests, as Christ did in sacrificing himself for the salvation of mankind, and thereby inverts the role of the literal shepherd, who tends sheep not for their benefit, but for his own. In the representation of these works, power is legitimate if it is exercised benevolently and for the benefit of the subjects. While the subject over which sovereignty is exercised moves from animals and nature, in courtly and panegyrical pastorals, to people, in Biblical pastoral, all these strains of pastoral literature locate power in an *individual*—the flock-owning shepherd, the territorial sovereign, and the shepherd of men. These three subgenres thus stand in contrast to early modern agrarian reform literature, such as Digger-leader Gerrard Winstanley's *The New Law of Righteousnes* (1649), which argues that all humans, as the lineal descendants of Adam, enjoy a God-given right to dominion over the earth and animals.

The existence of any preexisting right to dominion, however, is contested in Machiavelli's pastoral panegyric, "Capitolo Pastorale," which presents a world in which the prince's sovereignty is justified by nothing other than his ability to conquer and maintain control over a territory. In the poem, a shepherd sings the praises of "Hyacinth," a beautiful young man who, despite wearing "citizen's clothes" (97; 100), is now adored by the sentient forests and lands that he has recently come to rule. The poem has been largely ignored by scholars, in part because its relation to Machiavelli's canon has not been understood. But the pastoral contains a subversive and "Machiavellian" element that disassociates power from any juridical or moral

[97] John 10:1-21. Biblical, or ecclesiastical, pastorals include the *Eclogues* of Mantuan (1498), the *Eclogues* of Alexander Barclay (1500), the *Eglogs* of Barnabe Googe (1563), *The Shepheardes Calender* by Edmund Spenser (1579), and John Milton's "Lycidas" (1637).

claim that could justify it; Hyacinth is not a hereditary prince, but a citizen who has used his personal magnetism and military *virtù* to seize territories formerly belonging to others.

An illustration in an original manuscript containing the poem captures the movement of sovereignty from a shepherd's power over his flock to a ruler's power over a territory (Fig. 1). At first glance, the pastoral scene appears "courtly" because the shepherd looks like the prosperous and leisured owner of a flock of sheep. The shepherd's prosperity is legible in his fine attire and handsome body; his tunic is made from billowing cloth that is stylishly fastened about the shoulders with ribbons, and the abundant material of the tunic has been pushed behind the shepherd, revealing muscular legs that signify the good nutrition and exercise to which pasturing animals was said, in period commentary, to conduce. But the flock—the source of the shepherd's



Fig. 1. Shepherd piping from: Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, MS Plut. 41.33, c. 7v.

wealth and ease in courtly pastoral—is sketched in faint lines and fades into the background. Bolder lines foreground the shepherd under a laurel tree. The laurel tree was the personal

emblem of Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, a Florentine citizen who acted as *de facto* ruler of Florence in the 1510s, and was the dedicatee of Machiavelli's *The Prince*. The contrast between the faded sheep and the bolded laurel tree suggests the displacement, in pastoral panegyric, of the shepherd's power over his flock with his dependency on a more powerful territorial sovereign, figured here allegorically by the laurel tree.

The chapter comprises two sections. The first traces representations of sovereignty as they vary across the courtly, panegyrical, and Biblical pastoral subgenres. And it contrasts these representations of individual sovereigns who exercise power over sheep, land, and men with the representation, in agrarian reform literature, of collective human dominion over the earth and animals. The second section is an in-depth treatment of the earliest manuscripts containing Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale." While editors have included "Capitolo Pastorale" among Machiavelli's *capitoli*, or long poems, since the eighteenth century, scholarship has focused on questions about when Machiavelli wrote the poem—and whether he wrote it at all.

This chapter, however, aims to bring "Capitolo Pastorale" from the margins to the center of Machiavelli's works, showing how the poem's conception of political sovereignty as power over nature connects with and elaborates on central themes in the *The Prince*. In the poem, Machiavelli pastoralizes the citizen Hyacinth's conquest of territories by depicting anthropomorphized forests, earth, grass, and air as celebrating their new sovereign. Through its representation of political power as the raw ability to control a territory, the poem underscores ideas set forth in *The Prince*, such as Machiavelli's argument that there is no moral or legal authority to rule a territory beyond an individual's ability to make others submit to his reign. And the poem's historical and manuscript contexts suggest that the poem is an allegory of Machiavelli's hope, also expressed in *The Prince*, that Lorenzo di Piero would lead armies to

conquer Italy and expel the French, German, and Spanish armies that had, since 1494, repeatedly invaded the peninsula. Read allegorically, "Capitolo Pastorale" asserts the idea that territorial sovereignty is an essential condition for the foundation of a nation state.

The mobility of sovereignty in pastoral demonstrates the form's capacity for expressing a range of power relationships that cross barriers of species and being, a range that has remained unremarked in modern criticism. Under a posthumanist analysis, these pastoral works and related texts give rise to a modern genealogy of ecological sovereignty, the series of historical forms configuring human dominion over nonhuman life and spaces. And the evolution of representations of ecological sovereigns—from shepherd to ruler to humans collectively—brings into relief the historicity of the assumption that humans enjoy a universal right of dominion over nature.

The Mobility of Sovereignty

The Shepherd Who Owns His Flocks in Courtly Pastoral

For the writers of courtly pastoral, the ancient shepherd's ownership of valuable animals defined the pastoral occupation and its association with economic independence and aesthetic recreation. Ancient shepherds, as imagined by these writers, were prosperous property owners who enjoyed self-sufficiency because they extracted the food (meat and dairy) and materials (wools, skins) they needed to survive from the sheep, goats, and cattle that they raised. (In this respect, ancient shepherds and their literary representations differed from the "hirelings" who tended the sheep of wealthy landowners in early modern England.[98]) Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* (1596) comments on the shepherd's economic independence when the old

[98]See n20.

shepherd Meliboeus explains that he has little need for "forreine helpes to lifes due nourishment" because "[t]he fields my food, my flocke my rayment breed" (VI.ix.20; 663). Meliboeus does not depend on others ("forreine helps") because his fields and flocks produce the food and clothing ("rayment") he requires. The flocks support the shepherd in perpetuity—and even allow him to accumulate wealth—since the shepherd can breed his sheep to increase annually the flock's number. Meliboeus boasts that he has only to watch as his lambs multiply and grow his wealth: "the litle that I haue, growes daily more / Without my care, but onely to attend it; / My lambes doe euery yeare increase their score" (6.9.21). And, relatedly, in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* (composed in the late 1590s), Shylock claims that Jacob, a shepherd in the Biblical book of Genesis, grows his material wealth when he makes his rams and ewes perform the "work of generation," that is, the physical act of reproduction that is capitalized by the shepherd (1.3.78). For the writers of courtly pastoral, the ancient shepherd was a model for the security and wealth that comes from owning animals. Usually glossing over or minimizing the violence involved in breeding, dairying, shearing, and slaughtering animals, the depictions of shepherding in these works highlight the economic benefits that accrue to the shepherd.

The benefits of animal husbandry, as courtly pastoral depicts them, extend beyond the economic domain to the artistic domain. Unlike farming, pasturing animals requires relatively little toil and thus affords the shepherd leisure for song and poetry. In an early-sixteenth-century work of literary criticism, *Poetices*, Julius Caesar Scaliger links the beginning of poetry to the pastoral stage of civilization, rather than the agricultural stage, because poetry requires leisure and "the farmer lives a life of toil, but shepherd of leisure" (21). In addition to enjoying leisure, the shepherds, according to Scaliger, had access to good nutrition and physical activity that made them amorous and inclined to express their desires in art and song. In antiquity, the "youths who

lived on milk and meat," who were "well-fed, with bodies which constant exercise served to make robust and vigorous," and with ample time for leisure (the "parent of luxury"), turned to poetry and song to express their amorous desires (22-23).

In another text linking the origins of poetry to the pastoral age, *The Art of English Poesy* (George Puttenham, 1588) maintains that the emergence of pasturage in antiquity marked the point at which human economic activity became *lawful* and consequently created the level of social trust necessary for the communal singing contests that were the first poetry. The "shepherd's life" is "the first example of honest fellowship, their trade the first art of lawful acquisition or purchase, for at those days robbery was a manner of purchase. [… B]efore there was a shepherd keeper of his own or of some other body's flock, there was none owner in the world" (127). Before the pastoral age, goods were acquired illegally, in acts of "robbery." When humans began to pasture animals, they discovered a means of "lawful acquisition," of extracting goods from animals lacking rights instead of violating the property rights of other people. By making animals property, pastoral societies created a lawful source of food and resources, and thus enabled the "honest fellowship" among people, and, consequently, the communal singing contests that led to song and poetry. Here, the shepherd's ownership of animals is represented as both the lawful source of his material prosperity and of the leisure and fellowship that enables him to create poetry.

A courtly pastoral poem by Richard Barnfield likens the shepherd's power over his flocks to a king's sovereignty over his people and thus captures the resemblance between animal husbandry and the more familiar political forms of sovereignty. In "The Shepheards Content, or the Happiness of a Harmless Life" (1594), the shepherd is like a "great King" because he "rules a little Land," his fields, where he establishes "Statutes" and "Lawes" for his "Subiects … his

Sheepe," beats them if they transgress these orders, and defends them against wolves and lions:

> Like a great King he rules a little Land,
> Still making Statutes, and ordayning Lawes;
> Which if they breake, he beates them with his Wand:
> He doth defend them from the greedy Iawes
> Of rau'ening Woolues, and Lyons bloudy Pawes.
>
> His Field, his Realme; his Subiects are his Sheepe;
> Which he doth still in due obedience keepe.

The shepherd-as-king metaphor identifies the shepherd's ownership of his flock as a kind of sovereign power. It inverts the Biblical pastoral metaphor, where the ruler (king or prelate) is made to seem more benevolent by comparing his power over people to the shepherd's care for his flock. Here, the shepherd's care for his flock (defending them from "the greedy Iawes / Of rau'ening Woolues, and Lyons bloudy Pawes") justifies his violence toward them ("beates them with his Wand"), just as the king's defense of his subjects justifies his punishment of them for breaking the laws and statues he has ordained. While the shepherd-as-king metaphor aggrandizes shepherding by making the occupation appear lordly and powerful, it also makes visible the power relationship inherent in the shepherd's ownership of his sheep.

Broadening the Analysis of Exploitative Structures in Pastoral Criticism

In a major strain of twentieth-century criticism of pastoral literature, scholars such as Empson and Montrose took a genre that is defined by its representation of livestock ownership and submitted it to a sociological analysis that argued that the function of pastoral was to represent the relation between rich and poor as beautiful and legitimate. With its focus on

pastoral's role in legitimizing a social order that benefited the aristocracy and immiserated the commonalty, their criticism does not consider how the genre's depictions of animal husbandry represent the humans' relationship with animals. Yet pastoral's defining representations of animal husbandry point to a deeper function and effect—that of celebrating human power over domesticated animals that are raised for food and clothing, and of laying the groundwork for a modern ideology that tacitly grants human societies a largely unfettered right to use animals to sustain themselves.

This strain of criticism begins with Empson's *Some Versions of Pastoral* (1935), which argues that pastoral served the ideological function of reconciling "some conflict between the parts of a society" (18). His attention to ideology and social class reflected contemporary interest with the culture of Soviet Russia and the question, which Empson poses in his introduction, of what good proletarian art looks like. That is, Empson had a theory about proletarian art (that it, like pastoral, mediates class differences) that brought him to the subject of pastoral: "My reason for dragging this old-fashioned form into the discussion is that I think good proletarian art is usually Covert Pastoral" (6). "Old Pastoral," the eclogues and lyrics written before the Restoration, exemplifies literature's ability to process social conflicts because it shows simple shepherds speaking about universal subjects in the learned style of the aristocracy, and by combining the best qualities of both poor and rich, it imparts to the reader a good feeling about both:

> The essential trick of the old pastoral, which was felt to imply a beautiful relation between rich and poor, was to make simple people express strong feelings (felt as the most universal subject, something fundamentally true about everybody) in learned and fashionable language (so that you wrote about the best subject in the

> best way). From seeing the two sorts of people combined like this you thought the better of both; the best parts of both were used. The effect was in some degree to combine in the reader or author the merits of the two sorts; he was made to mirror in himself more completely the effective elements of the society he lived in. (11-12)

As a critic interested in proletarian art, Empson understandably scrutinizes the class issues present in pastoral works. But this emphasis on asymmetrical power relations between classes of humans misses a key premise of courtly pastoral literature, which is that, in antiquity, shepherds were not poor, but rich (relatively speaking), because they owned their flocks and thus resembled the landed gentry both in their economic status and in their speech habits. As described above, Renaissance pastoral writers *reinforced* the class division between rich and poor in statements that their gentle shepherd characters were modeled on the property-owning swains of antiquity and had nothing to do with common "hirelings" of the present age. In pastoral works, the reader and author are made to cast their reflecting mirror beyond the "effective elements of the society he lived in" to the system of animal husbandry that allows the shepherds to lead prosperous and aesthetic lives on the backs of their herds. This exploitative relationship between shepherd and sheep is rendered idyllically in portraits of the caring shepherd who defends his flocks from predators, and whose breeding, dairying, and slaughter of the animals secures his economic independence and leisurely lifestyle, and entitles him to subsist on the milk, meat, and wool they produce. However the character of the gentle shepherd signified to early modern readers (whether he reconciled or reinforced the opposed interests of the classes), these pastorals present as fundamentally benign the relationship between the herdsman and the domestic ruminants that sustain and enrich him.

Montrose applies the Empsonian rubric to early modern pastoral texts in his seminal essay, "Of Gentlemen and Shepherds: the Politics of Elizabethan Pastoral Form."[99] There, he argues that courtly pastoral operates by obfuscation, in a manner similar to Empson's "trick," to overcome a cultural contradiction between the rich and poor, so that "landed gentlemen and landless laborers, metaphorical shepherds and literal shepherds, could identify with each other because they shared a benevolent lordship over domesticated creatures that gave bountifully of themselves to the human community" (423). In noting that pastoral identified gentlemen and shepherds as lords of domesticated creatures, Montrose implicitly acknowledges the basic pastoral power relationship—human ownership of ruminant domestics—as part of his argument that pastoral beautifies a social order that benefited the landed gentry. Thus, when Barnfield compares the shepherd to a king in that both exercise power over a land and the creatures living on it, the common dominion over sheep forms the basis of a "pastoral fraternity" between masters and their men—between landed gentlemen and landless laborers. Sheep become a "hierarchy-transcending incarnation of property, a subject of human exploitation uniting or identifying the interests of groups that had profoundly differing proprietary relations to the land itself, to their own labor, and to each other" (423-424). While Montrose's analysis attends to pastoral's representation of the "human exploitation" of sheep, he considers this representation to be ideologically significant because it creates a common human identity—gentleman and shepherd are both human exploiters—that conceals their differing socioeconomic statuses. The pastoralized treatment of animal exploitation does conflate the contrasting claims of aristocratic

[99] Additional influential applications of Empson's thesis on pastoral, in the late twentieth century, were Leo Marx's *The Machine in the Garden* (1964) and Raymond Williams in *The Country and the City* (1973). Marx's and Williams' books are now regarded as proto-ecocritical texts because their analyses of modern pastoral (especially from the nineteenth century) made critiques of industrial capitalism that fed into the emerging environmental politics of the late twentieth century (Garrard 33-58).

privilege and spiritual equality in early modern culture; but it also pastoralizes animal exploitation itself by dignifying shepherds as benevolent lords who enjoy prosperity and happiness through their ownership of domesticated ruminants.

In sum, while Empson and Montrose directed their analysis of pastoral toward its function of masking a system that accorded privileges to the aristocracy and exploited laborers, the idyllic depictions of the shepherd's power over his sheep suggest an additional function of the genre in mystifying the opposed interests of domesticated animals and the people who benefit from their exploitation.

The Sovereign's Dominion over a Territory in Pastoral Panegyrics

The courtly pastorals contain representations of a world in which the shepherd acts as a sovereign over the flock that sustains him, but in pastoral panegyrics the shepherd's power over his flock is a contingent one that he enjoys only at the pleasure of a more powerful sovereign, a human ruler who is often depicted as godlike or semi-divine. Within the panegyrics themselves, sovereignty thus shifts from the shepherd's power over his flock, to the human ruler's absolute sovereignty over a territory and the people and creatures there. The early modern panegyrics are in the tradition of Virgil's Eclogues, wherein a shepherd speaker sings the praises of a powerful ruler whose favor he seeks. The idyllic and vaguely timeless setting of courtly pastoral is replaced, in the panegyrics, by an approximately historical setting where civil discord and the power of the state jeopardize the shepherd's livelihood. In a common version of pastoral panegyric, the sentient physical environment appears as the devoted subjects of the godlike ruler, and this beautiful relationship between anthropomorphized territory and the sovereign who controls it both sanctions the ruler's authority and reveals territory to be the primary subject of

the ruler's power.

In Virgil's first eclogue, the shepherd's sovereignty over his land and animals is shown to be false or spurious because it is contingent on the permission of a ruler in Rome who is a true sovereign because he enjoys supreme authority over the land and all that live there. Whereas courtly pastorals evoke the supposed tranquility of the stateless pastoral societies, the setting of the first eclogue is an Italian province within the territorial dominion of Rome, where recent "civil discord" has led to the reallocation of herdsmen's lands to veterans as a reward for their service (3).[100] In the case of a dispossessed shepherd, Meliboeus, the poem mockingly illustrates the limited and contingent nature of the shepherd's sovereignty, for Meliboeus fantasizes that he had been a "king" of his "lowly turf-roofed cot" and of his fallows "trimmed so fair," but is now exiled and destitute because these possessions have been seized by the "brutal soldier" and "alien master":

> Ah! Shall I ever in aftertime behold
> my native bounds—see many a harvest hence
> with ravished eyes the lowly turf-roofed cot where I was king? These fallows,
> trimmed so fair, some brutal soldier will possess these fields
> an alien master. Ah! To what a pass

[100] In *Pastoral and Ideology*, Annabel Patterson analyzes the ancient commentary tradition of the *Eclogues*, according to which Virgil uses the shepherd Tityrus to refer to his fate after the assassination of Julius Caesar (31-32). Caesar's heir, Octavian, together with the other members of the Second Triumvirate, Mark Antony and Lepidus, defeated the republican assassins, Brutus and Cassius, at the Battle of Philippi in 42 BC; later the Roman Senate made Octavian Princeps Civitatis ("First Citizen of the Roman State"), and granted him autocratic powers for life. To reward the veterans of the war, Octavian gave them land that had been expropriated from freeholders in northern Italy suspected of being republican partisans. Virgil is supposed to have lost his family estate in this confiscation but went to Rome and successfully petitioned Octavian, now Imperator Augustus, to restore his property. According to traditional commentaries, Virgil expresses, through the shepherd Tityrus, his gratitude and dedication to Augustus, the "young prince" and "god" in Rome, while also capturing the misfortune of the evicted freeholders in the person of Meliboeus.

has civil discord brought our hapless folk! (3)

The poem brings attention to the lack of perspective that enables the shepherd to regard himself as a king. Compared to the armies and vast tracts of territory controlled by the Roman authorities, the harvests that were so beautiful that they "ravished" the shepherd's eyes, the sod-roofed hut, the well-maintained fields and fallows are insignificant. Meliboeus is presented as a pathetic figure, still deluded in regarding his former humble possessions as kingly, and not comprehending the insignificance of his former life that has been destroyed by historical and political forces beyond his understanding and control.

The foil of Meliboeus, Tityrus, continues in his pastoral life, pasturing his cattle on lands that he owns, and enjoying economic security and leisure for aesthetic recreation, but like his dispossessed peer, he has no true sovereignty because he enjoys this position only because he petitioned the authorities in Rome for permission to remain on his lands. Tityrus went to Rome seeking his "freedom," and a "youth" granted his suit, directing him: "Feed, as before, your kine [cows], boys, rear your bulls" (2). Tityrus regards the powerful youth as a "god" because he suffered Tityrus to continue his comfortable life ("ease"), a sufferance that inspires Tityrus to honor his god by sacrificing a lamb on his altar:

O Meliboeus, 'twas a god vouchsafed
this ease [*otia*] to us, for him a god will I
deem ever, and from my folds a tender lamb
Oft with its life-blood shall his altar stain. (1)

In sacrificing a lamb to his new god, Tityrus exercises his sovereignty over the animals he owns, and simultaneously submits to the true sovereign, the prince at the head of the Roman state. The shepherd who offers his flock as a sign of devotion to the ruler also appears in Machiavelli's

pastoral, where the shepherd speaker concludes his praises of the new prince, "Hyacinth," by offering him his sheep: "yours is the flock you / see; even these poor sheep as well are yours" (116-117; 100). In the world of the panegyric, the shepherd's submission to the real sovereign limits the exercise of his sovereignty over his flock to an act of tribute.

The panegyrics' exposure of the shepherd's contingent sovereignty has its counterpart in the works' exaltation of the absolute and godlike power exercised by individual rulers who, in controlling the territory, are the true sovereigns. In metaphors that often appear in this subgenre, the human ruler is depicted as a god or as having semi-divine authority, and an anthropomorphized natural environment worships this ruler, or, in the case of elegies, mourns his passing. Pierre Ronsard's *Bergerie* (1565) promotes the Valois's claim to rule France using a sympathetic physical environment that mourns the death of Henry II and celebrates the new king, Charles IV.[101] Mourning Henry's death, the grasses wither and lose their verdure, and the roses and lilies take on a black hue.[102] The forests, plants, plains, flowers, and fountains witness the dead king's ascension into heaven and murmur that the good Henriot is now a God: "*le bon Henriot est maintenant un Dieu*" (22). Subsequently, the shepherd Guisin celebrates the regime of the new king, Charles IX, describing how rocks, pines, and sky become more beautiful to show their pleasure in his new reign. All things gladden at Charles's "*belle venue*"; the air is no longer sad, the sea laughs, and even the winds lose their blast.[103] The legitimacy of king's rule

[101]To celebrate a precarious peace between Huguenot and Catholic factions at the end of the first phase of the French Wars of Religion, Queen Catherine Medici of France commissioned Ronsard to write a set of eclogues to be performed in Fontainebleau at the 1564 Carnival festivities. In *Bergerie*, shepherd characters representing the children of the royal and noble French families recite monologues that comment on recent events including the civil conflict between Huguenots and Catholics, the death of King Henry II, Catherine's husband, and the ascension of their son, Charles IX (Scott and Sturm-Maddox 63-33).

[102] "*Les herbes par sa mort perdirent leur verdure, / Les roses et les lis prindrent noire teinture*" (21).

[103] *Les rochers et les pins, et le ciel, qui, plus beau,*
Se tourne pour complaire à ton regne nouveau.
Toute chose s'esgaye à ton belle venue,

manifests itself so powerfully that the sentient environment recognizes his sovereignty. And this conceit reveals the French territory to be the primary subject of the king's power.

In perhaps the most important pastoral work about Elizabeth I, Spenser's pastoral panegyric, "Aprill," the queen is both the "Queene of shepheardes" (34; 62) and a "goddesse plaine" (97; 63), adored by beings personifying aspects of the English territory. The speaker describes an assortment of nymphs and "Laydes of the lake" who hurry to honor Elisa (120; 64). Glossing "Laydes of the lake" in the commentary attached to the eclogue, E. K. presents a synthesis of indigenous folklore and Greek mythology, according to which the Arthurian legends about enchantresses inhabiting the lakes derive from the "Auncient Heathen" who believed that "of euery spring and fountaine was a goddesse the Soueraigne" (69). Chloris, who brings Elisa olive branches, is the "chiefest Nymph of al" (122; 64) because, when she married Zephyrus, she received as a "dowrie" the "chiefedom and soueraigntye of al flowres and greene herbes, growing on earth" (69). In the pastoral world of "Aprill," the nymphs attending Elisa are sovereigns over springs and fountains, flowers, and herbs. Their powers reside in their "soueraigntye" over the natural world, not over human subjects. Elisa, as a goddess and queen, is both honored by these territorial sovereigns, and her position as sovereign over a specifically English territory is suggested by the indigenous flowers ("Pincke and purple Cullambine, / With Gelliflowres," "Coronations, and Sops in wine," and "Daffadowndillies, / And Cowslips, and Kingcups, and loued Lilles" [136-141; 65]) that she receives from the shepherdesses.

L'air n'est plus attristé d'une fascheuse nui
La mer rit en ses flots, sans sougles est le vent. (26)

The Shepherd of Men in Biblical Pastoral

Within Renaissance pastoral literature there are eclogues and lyrics that metaphorically represent spiritual and temporal leaders—clergy and princes—as shepherds, and the human subjects under their authority as sheep. These pastorals take inspiration from the Parable of the Good Shepherd from the Gospel of John. There, Jesus, presenting himself as the son of God and the rightful leader of the Jews, compares himself to the good shepherd (who owns his sheep, calls them by name, and gives his life for them) and contrasts himself with the "hireling" (who does not own the sheep, flees when a wolf attacks, and does not care for the sheep).[104] The Gospel of John and associated Biblical pastorals change, radically, the genre's treatment of power by representing it as the authority that a ruler, figured as a shepherd, wields over a human population, figured as his flock. In shifting the subject of the sovereign's power from nature to people, the Biblical pastoral metaphor holds that power is justified by its kind and improving effects on the subjects. As Michel Foucault argues in his 1978 lecture, "*Omnes et Singulatim*," Biblical pastoral planted the seed of the modern belief that the role of government is not simply to exercise dominion over a territory and its resources, but to improve the lives of a human population. But while Biblical pastoral redirects attention to the power exercised over humans, it nevertheless participates in the modern genealogy of human dominion because these works perpetuate the association between animal agriculture and a power over life and death that is justified by its putatively benevolent purpose.

Biblical pastoral reconfigures sovereignty so that the collective of human subjects, and not the sovereign who rules them, are the primary beneficiaries of the relationship, thus inverting

[104] John 10: 1-21. The article "The Parable of the Good Shepherd, *De Contemptu Mundi*, and Lycidas" discusses the Biblical parable of the good shepherd and its influence on Renaissance pastoral (Coffman).

the morality of shepherding in courtly pastoral, where shepherding is desirable because of the benefits and prosperity it provides to the shepherd as the sovereign of his flock of sheep. Illustrating the moral inversion in the "Julye" eclogue from *The Shepheardes Calendar*, the shepherd Thomalin protests the "misusage" (Spenser 184) of the shepherds in Rome, whom he accuses of abusing their sheep to enrich themselves. In Rome, the shepherds behave like lords and masters ("shepeheardes […] there doen leade / as Lordes done other where"), keeping for themselves the bread and proper food ("chere") and giving their sheep only crusts and scraps ("chippes"), and profiting from the "fleece, eke the flesh" of the sheep (185-189). As shepherds who prosper on the backs of their flock, they stand in contrast to Christ, the "shepheard greate," who paid a large price for his flock ("bought his flocke so deare"); the flock is the primary beneficiary of this transaction since Christ the shepherd, shedding his blood and sweat, saves them from wolves ("them did saue with bloudy sweat / from Wolues, that would them teare" [53-56]). Similarly, in Milton's "Lycidas," St. Peter excoriates shepherds who, seeking only to nourish themselves, intrude into the sheepfold, and, enjoying the prosperity of their ill-gotten gain, neglect the proper pastoral care of their flocks. The shepherds "for their bellies' sake, / Creep and intrude and climb into the fold" (114-115). They are not motivated to learn the "faithful Herdman's art" because they have already prospered ("are sped") (121-122). That is, the shepherds are condemned for treating sheep primarily as a source of food and wealth, even though such treatment is constitutive of literal shepherding. Literal shepherding, as depicted in courtly pastoral, is celebrated as an ideal occupation because it allows the shepherd to prosper, with relatively little effort, by raising sheep for food and other materials. In Biblical pastoral, the condemnation of human exploitation of animals, and the celebration of shepherds who put animal welfare before their own interests, are intelligible only in the context of the metaphorical

identification of the shepherds as clergy and the sheep as people under their leadership.

Renaissance pastoral's differentiation between the various forms of political power—the sovereign's power over a territory and the spiritual or temporal leader's power over his flock of men—places early modern culture at the historical crossroads of what Foucault identifies as two different power techniques in the West. In "*Omnes et Singulatim*," Foucault contrasts modern power techniques that are oriented toward individuals and "intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way" (227) with Greek and Roman culture, where gods and rulers are represented as exercising power over the land, and, consequently, the people inhabiting it. The modern kind of power is the "pastorship," or "pastoral modality of power," because it follows the Biblical metaphor of the god or ruler as a shepherd who watches over his flock of men; thus, in the West, the relationship between power structures and individuals acquires a "pastoral" quality because the purpose of such power structures is "to constantly ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and every one" (235). Foucault traces the difference in the pastoral and territorial types of power to antiquity, and contrasts the Judeo-Christian traditions regarding the care that the leader-*qua*-shepherd provides his flock with Greek and Roman culture (183). While Foucault relies on Greek political texts (Isocrates's *Areopagiticus*, Plato's *The Statesman*) to support his argument that the Greeks rejected the "pastoral" management of men that characterized "Oriental" culture, a similar contrast can be found in the courtly, panegyrical, and Biblical traditions of pastoral literature. In representing power as a relationship between individual sovereigns and their animal or territorial property, courtly and panegyrical pastoral follow the classical conception that power is the authority over the land and whatever lives on it. Biblical pastoral, by contrast, figures the leader as a shepherd of men, a metaphor that reconfigures power as a benevolent and improving force that exists primarily to promote the welfare of the human population.

Nonetheless, Biblical pastorals euphemistically associate shepherding with the self-sacrificing and benevolent care of sheep, and this self-sacrificial benevolence justifies the shepherd's authority over the sheep. Abuse is differentiated from legitimate power when the bad shepherd, who profits from the fleece and flesh of his animals, is juxtaposed with the good shepherd, who watches over his animals, leads them to pastures, and sheds sweat and blood to defend them from wolves. This opposition of good and bad shepherding is incoherent in the absence of the metaphorical framework identifying the shepherds as political and spiritual leaders and the sheep as people. Nevertheless, it creates a positive feeling about shepherds and the pastoral economy. And it puts into play a paradigm that rationalizes total power over weaker dependents, even in matters of life and death, if that power has an improving or benevolent purpose.

The Democratic Expansion of Human Dominion in Reform Literature

While courtly and panegyrical pastorals imagine forms of ecological sovereignty in which the sovereign is an individual shepherd or prince, the agrarian reform literature written in England in the mid-seventeenth century puts forward a world in which the whole of humanity is a collective sovereign, and the subject over which its sovereignty is exercised is all of nature. Drawing on a radical political tradition with roots in *The Vision of Piers Plowman*, the authors of reform works, such as the leader of the Digger movement, Gerrard Winstanley, assert that all people, not just the gentry, enjoy rights to own land and animals and to use them to secure food, housing, and clothing, and that these rights were predicated on the notion that all men, as descendants of Adam, are beneficiaries of God's dispensation of the right to earthly dominion (Montrose, "Of Gentlemen and Shepherds"). And while Biblical pastoral conceives of power as

the benevolent and improving exercise of authority on behalf of sheep/people, agrarian reform literature brings the classical view of power—ownership of valuable resources—into modernity, but reconceives it as a power that is the birthright of all humans rather than of individual sovereigns.

In the pamphlet *The New Law of Righteousness* (1649), Gerrard Winstanley lays out a Biblical argument for abolishing the property laws that keep land and animals in the hands of the gentry while immiserating the poor.[105] In the state of affairs that Winstanley argues should exist, men and women collectively are the sovereign, and nature is the thing over which they exercise their sovereignty.[106] Genesis shows that God intended every person to be a "Lord" over the land and animals, and no one to be subservient to a member of his own human kind: "every one was made to be a Lord over the Creation of the Earth, Cattle, Fish, Fowl, Grasse, Trees, not any one to be a bond-slave and a beggar under the Creation of his own, kind" (34). The Biblical story of Creation leads Winstanley to the idea that property laws favoring the gentry violate the "*equall* freedom" that every man originally enjoyed to cultivate land and to "have dominion" over animals: "[i]n the first enterance into the Creation, every man had an equall freedom given him

[105] Winstanley wrote *The New Law of Righteousnes* during the short-lived Digger experiment in agrarian communism at St. George's Hill in Surrey in 1649, when Winstanley led a group of laborers in cultivating the common land. For discussions of *The New Law* in relation to the Digger movement and Interregnum radicalism, see Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down*; Loewenstein, "Digger Writing and Rural Dissent in the English Revolution"; Gurney, *Brave Community*.

[106] For a contrasting reading of the representation of sovereignty in *The New Law*, see Russ, "Michel Foucault and Digger Biopolitics." Engaging with the contrast between sovereignty (juridical right) and biopolitics (community-based relationships and subjectivities) as developed by Foucault and later elaborated by Antonio Negri, Russ argues that *The New Law* constitutes a communal vision of political relations, one that "has little truck with the languages of sovereignty and right, developing instead an inventive heterodox theology of community that produces new subjectivities and new arrangements of power" (187). Assuming, as Foucault and Negri do, that only humans can be subjects of sovereign power, Russ's reading of *The New Law* overlooks the fact that Winstanley's opposition to laws that harm the poor is based on his belief in the existence of a higher law, one that grants all people sovereignty over the earth and animals. Pace Russ, the languages of sovereignty and right pervade *The New Law*, but because Winstanley's new law represents sovereignty as human rights over nonhuman life, it cannot be recognized as belonging to the juridical discourse of sovereignty and right under the "modern constitution," where only humans can achieve subject status under the law.

of his Maker to till the earth, and to have dominion over the beasts of the field, the fowls of the heaven, and fish in the Seas" (37). Existing property laws should be discarded for a "new law of righteousness," which allows all people ("every man and woman") to cultivate the earth and raise livestock for their own needs:

> WHen this universall law of equity rises up in every man and woman, then none shall lay claim to any creature, and say, This is mine, and that is yours, This is my work, that is yours; but every one shall put to their hands to till the earth, and bring up cattle, and the blessing of the earth shall be common to all; when a man hath need of any corn or cattle, take from the next store-house he meets with. (39)

This vision of communal control of corn and cattle marks a radical departure from courtly pastoral, which idealizes animal husbandry in the form of the individual shepherd's ownership of his sheep. Indeed, in the Elizabethan pastoral writings discussed above, authors hold up the pastoral life as the first example of property ownership by individuals, and they regularly differentiate between ancient shepherd and common shepherd because the former owned his flocks while the latter tended the flocks of gentlemen. For Winstanley, such individual ownership of animals immorally allows a small set of rich landowners to control the property that rightfully belongs to all people. Animal husbandry and agriculture are idealized as forms of earthly dominion to which all humans have access, per God's ordering at the Creation.

Throughout the pamphlet Winstanley refers to the land and animals as a "Treasury," a metaphor that compares the natural world to the repository for money or valuables that a monarch or government keeps. The metaphor reinforces the main conceit of the pamphlet, according to which humans are collectively the sovereigns, or "Lords," over the earth and animals, which exist only to furnish people the materials for life. In this regard, his

characterization of human dominion differs from that found in panegyrical pastoral. Retaining animistic pagan ideas about nature as being infused with life and personality, the panegyrists represented the land as the sentient and affective *subjects* of the godlike ruler who claims dominion over them. Thus, in "Aprill" from Spenser's *The Shepheardes Calender*, in Ronsard's *Bergerie*, and in Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale," personifications of the natural world celebrate the reign of the sovereign (or usurper) or mourn the passing of the deceased ruler. Nature is imagined as a collection of beings who have feelings and preferences about the entity that rules over them. In *The New Law of Righteousnes*, by contrast, nature appears not as the feelings subjects of human rulers, but as a trove of valuable materials to be turned into food and clothing for all people. Winstanley looks forward to the day when "the earth becomes a *common treasury* as it was in the beginning," and every man shall again "have meat, and drinke, and clothes by his laboure in freedom, and what can be desired more in the earth" (7). His mission is to "open bags and barns that the earth may be a *common treasury* to preserve all without complaining; for the earth was not made for a few to live at ease upon" (52). Again, "the earth was made by the Lord, to be a *common Treasury* for all, and not a particular treasury for some" (57, emphases mine). The metaphor not only reduces the natural world to raw materials, but it exposes nature to large-scale exploitation, since rights to the natural treasury are not limited to "some" but are enjoyed by "all."

Juxtaposing pastoral and reform literature points to changing attitudes about who is entitled to dominion over nature, a point that is often overlooked by ecocritics who focus primarily on the historical shift in the representation of nature, from sentient being to material resource. In his classic article, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," Lynn White argues that pollution and other forms of environmental degradation are enabled by specific

Western beliefs, rooted in the Biblical Creation story, that the physical creation exists only to serve humans' purposes. According to his historical argument, such beliefs emerged as Christian culture replaced pagan animism, where beliefs that nature was ensouled protected nature from intense exploitation.[107] This mode of argument appears more recently in Todd Borlik's ecocritical reading of the use of the prosopopoeia in Sidney's *Arcadia*. Analyzing a passage in which Musidorus apologizes to the pine tree on which he carves poems, Borlik says that the "verses read like an apology for the pathetic fallacy, which to Sidney was no pathetic fallacy at all but a vital means of endowing nature with a dignity and honorary subjectivity that helps to justify its preservation" (94). That is, Musidorus expresses some contrition for "wounding" the tree, and his address to the tree as a sentient being suggests that his animistic beliefs inspire a conservationist attitude toward the tree—or, at least, some compunction over damaging it. In seeking to understand what changes in cultural attitudes led to modern ecological crises, scholars have focused on changing representations of nature.

It may also be working asking whether, in addition to the disenchantment of nature in modernity, the rise in democratic and human-rights ideologies have increased the scope of environmental and animal exploitation by increasing the number of people who claim dominion over nature—the right to use land and animals to satisfy the needs of all humans and not just some. The expansion of sovereignty from a limited number of landowners to the entire human

[107] White writes, "In Antiquity, every tree, every spring, ever stream, every hill had its own genius loci, its guardian spirit. These spirits were accessible to men, but were very unlike men; centaurs, fauns, and mermaids show their ambivalence. Before one cut a tree, mined a mountain, or dammed a brook, it was important to placate the spirit in charge of that particular situation, and to keep it placated. By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural objects" (1205). See also *Against Ecological Sovereignty*, where the environmental philosopher Mick Smith argues that ecological sovereignty might be understood as the unethical reduction of nature to raw material, a "standing reserve" in the Heideggerian sense of existing only as an instrumental means to human ends (104, 129-130). His analysis describes the reduction of nature as a reverse pathetic fallacy, where nature is understood as a "lifeless, that is, deanimated and nonautonomous 'matter,' systemically ordered according to a technological enframing (Gestell)" (102-103).

species may "matter" to nature because the rise of the democratic extractive regime has coincided with (and perhaps has facilitated through its promotion of new technologies to improve the welfare of the human population) an expansion of the total numbers of humans endowed with sovereignty over nature, from approximately 500 million in 1650 (not a huge increase over the 300 million estimated for AD 1) to over seven billion in 2021 (Haub). In arguing that the Bible reveals nature to be a treasury for *all* humans, Winstanley shows that the democratizing impulse of Christianity may also specifically shaped Western conceptions regarding the scope of human dominion over nature and, to the extent that such conceptions can be linked to them, our ecological crises.

Through the shifting representation of sovereignty in Renaissance pastoral, we see how different works adapt bucolic themes and settings to represent different forms of human dominion over nature as part of a lawful and rich ecology. In courtly pastoral, the shepherd's activity of owning animals and raising them for food and materials is an ideal economic arrangement because it allows the shepherd to enjoy, with relatively little toil or personal sacrifice, economic independence and leisure for singing and piping. In pastoral panegyric, the sovereign's dominion over a territory is glorified through its assimilation to a pagan deity's power over an enchanted world. And Biblical pastoral creates a new association between shepherding and a benevolent authority in its depiction of the self-sacrificing shepherd of men. While pastoral representations of power focus on the sovereignty of an individual, agrarian reform literature shows the democratic trend in Western culture of recognizing that dominion over nature is the birthright of all humans. The metamorphoses of sovereignty across these works spur us to examine not only the ideological function of cultural forms in reinforcing power dynamics within human society, but also power dynamics that cross species barriers.

Machiavellian Pastoral

While Machiavelli's "Capitolo Pastorale," like the pastoral panegyrics discussed above, represents sovereignty as the power that a ruler exercises over a territory, the poem departs from the panegyric norm because it identifies the ruler, "Hyacinth," as an ambitious young man who rules territories through conquest and charm rather than a legal or hereditary right.[108] In the poem, a shepherd sings the praises of Hyacinth, a beautiful and shrewd young man who is not only the "glory of every shepherd" (64) but is also beloved by the forests, earth, air, plants, and rocks within the domain he has recently come to rule.[109] Through its representation that Hyacinth, owing to his great physical beauty, personal magnetism, and military *virtù*, is able to seize dominion over a territory formerly belonging to others, the poem rejects the existence of a supreme legal or religious framework that recognizes a preexisting right to dominion. Rather, it expresses in pastoral form the pragmatic political philosophy Machiavelli puts forth in *The Prince* and suggests in the poem, that dominion does not rightfully belong to anyone, but is acquired and maintained only by those with sufficient virtue and fortune.

Although scholars debate this point, the poem is likely an allegory for Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici's ascent, in the 1510s, to power in Florence and for his ambition to expand Medici hegemony throughout the Italian peninsula.[110] Several textual, historical, and manuscript clues

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[108] The title was given to the poem in its first print edition, Gaetano Cambiagi's 1783 *Opere poetiche di Niccolò Machiavelli*. Since then, editors have included "Capitolo Pastorale" among Machiavelli's *capitoli*, or long poems, and most scholars agree that Machiavelli wrote the poem although they disagree on when he wrote it. The text of the poem is based on two manuscripts, a modest compilation of Italian poetry in the Vatican Barberini Latini collection (Barb. Lat. 3945), and the gorgeously illustrated and bound codex in the Laurentian Library in Florence (Plut. 41.33). In both, Machiavelli is identified as the author by the scribe, Biagio Buonaccorsi, a close friend and colleague of Machiavelli; Buonaccorsi also transcribed several manuscripts containing *The Prince*. However, for being "more insignificant and worse" than Machiavelli's other works, the pastoral is considered to be of "dubious authenticity" in the 1945 *Storia letteraria d'Italia* (Belloni 418), and its authorship is also questioned by Dionisotti on the grounds that the poem is too "abject and exaggerated" ("*abbietto e smaccatto*") ("Appunti," 57).

[109] The English-language citations are from Allan Gilbert's English translation of the poem, "A Pastoral: The Ideal Ruler." In some cases, I cite the Italian original with my own translation.

[110] In modern editions, glosses sometimes identify "Hyacinth" as Giuliano Medici (Gioda), and sometimes

indicate that Machiavelli figures in the poem his enthusiasm for Lorenzo di Piero's plans to conquer Italy, a conquest that Machiavelli regarded as necessary to end the foreign invasions and domestic conflicts that had since 1494 turned Italy into a theater of wars between the Hapsburg and Valois dynasties and their allies. As an allegory, the poem promotes territorial sovereignty as the foundation of new Italian state unified under a native ruling family. In this way, the poem also reveals territorial, or ecological, sovereignty to be not only power over any territory, but, more specifically, power over *oikos*—home, dwelling, or habitat—of an indigenous population.

The Territory That Loves "Hyacinth"

In the poem, the physical environment—the rocks, earth, plants, and air—rejoice in Hyacinth's presence and languish in his absence, and their sympathetic response to Hyacinth is presented as evidence of the godlike beauty and lordly manner that make him fit to rule. At the outset of the poem, the shepherd says he will sing the praises of Hyacinth, a "youth celestial and not earthly, of habits exalted, of / godlike qualities" (13-14; 98), whose famous deeds and "beauties great and godlike" (28) are a sign that the gods favor his "natural desire for gaining fame" (40). Hyacinth's beautiful locks ["*chioma*"] are "deserving every crown and diadem" (34-36). That is, his beautiful hair qualifies him to wear the crowns and diadems that are usually worn by princes as a symbol of royal dignity.[111] And his powerful effect on the natural world

Lorenzo di Piero (Tommasini; Gilbert). In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, scholars have favored the "juvenilia thesis," according to which Machiavelli, in the 1490s, wrote the poem for Giuliano when both were young men (Martelli, "Preistoria,"; Casadei; Black). However, in 2001, Martelli retracted the juvenilia thesis he had first proposed and argued that the historical evidence is stronger for the identification of Lorenzo di Piero as Hyacinth ("I Dettagli").

[111] In what appears to be a typo, Gilbert translates "*chioma*," an Italian word for hair or locks, as "looks": "Hence every light before this one grows dim, as soon as we behold those *looks* deserving every crown and diadem" (34-35). In the original Italian, it is Hyacinth's *chioma*, or locks, that are deserving of every crown and diadem (ln. 35; 60).

further demonstrates the godlike virtues that, in the absence of a hereditary claim, have led to his success. The sound of Hyacinth's "pleasing words" is enough to animate marble—to make a "marble-stone, a rock show life" (40). His footfall makes the earth smile, the air welcomes the sound of his voice, and his absence leaves the plants and air "in misery":

> 43 So that the earth smiles where you set foot, and the air grows
> happy wherever the welcome sounds of your voice are heard.
> 46 When you depart, the little plant that was flowering withers
> and is left in misery, and the air deprived of you shows grief. (98)

The enchanting effects of his presence and speech on the physical environment resemble the power attributed to other divine figures in Greek mythology, such as Orpheus, whose words tamed beasts and even the stones hurled at him by the Maenads.[112] In this initial representation of the relationship between the human ruler and the natural world, the poem shows a godlike youth who enchants the sentient physical environment, and this portrait of Hyacinth as enchanter of nature figures proleptically the poem's later representation of him as a conqueror of territories that worship him as a local deity.

For in the fiction of the poem, Hyacinth does not only charm the natural world with his beautiful hair and speech, but rules over the land as the new local deity who has recently replaced a set of old princes and gods. Addressing the forests, the shepherd exclaims that they no longer grieve the departure of Diana, Phoebus, Hecuba's son (there were many; possibly Hector or Paris is intended), Cephalus and Atlanta because they are "more happy, / more glad" with Hyacinth:

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[112] Orpheus's powers to enchant nature are described in many classical sources, including Book 11 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and *Iphigeneia at Aulis* and *The Bacchae* by Euripides.

67 No longer is it a grief to you, O forests! that Diana lives in
Heaven, nor do you long for Phoebus to return to tend
Admetus' herds,
70 nor do you any more call for Hecuba's son, nor Cephalus,
nor Atlanta, because with this youth you are more happy,
more glad. (99)[113]

The forests are so happy with Hyacinth because he "enrich[es] the forests like every god who inhabits them" (67). In this translation, Gilbert translates the Italian "*adorni*" (65; 161) as "enrich," so that the line suggests that the forests love Hyacinth because he improves them or makes them wealthier. But in Machiavelli's original, Hyacinth *adorns* the forests, suggesting that the forests love Hyacinth because he is, like other gods, an ornament that makes them more beautiful and attractive. Hyacinth has become a sovereign not because he is a good ruler who enriches the land, but because of his godlike qualities that inspire happiness even in the forest he now occupies.

While Hyacinth enchants and occupies the natural world, his name ("*Iacinto*") identifies him as part of the natural world, the flower hyacinth, and in this way the poem conflates the relationship between the natural world and the sovereign who exercises dominion over it. The name Iacinto/Hyacinth comes from Book 10 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, where Orpheus, having failed to rescue his deceased wife, Eurydice, from Hades, renounces women and retires to a forested hilltop to sing songs of "pretty boys / That were the darlings of gods" (157-158; 299). One of the boys is Hyacinthus, a beautiful Spartan youth, beloved by Apollo, who dies in a

[113] As discussed below, this passage is likely an allegory for a series of regime changes in Florence between 1492 and the mid-1510s, when Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici ("Hyacinth") emerged as the new de facto prince of Florence.

discus accident during a contest with the sun god and is subsequently immortalized as the fragrant Mediterranean flower. The hyacinth flower's clustered petals and red-and-purple hue are thought to have inspired the use of the word, "hyacinthine," as a rhetorical epithet for wavy or tawny hair (Homer refers to Odysseus's hyacinthine locks in Book 6 of the *Odyssey*). Like the Hyacinthus of Orpheus/Ovid, Machiavelli's Hyacinth is a "pretty boy," the darling of Apollo, and his beautiful hair further connects him to the flower. By presenting Hyacinth as part of the natural environment that he occupies, the poem creates an equivalency between the sovereign and subject. While this equivalency mystifies the relationship between sovereign and subject, it also clarifies and explains it, since Hyacinth's decorative and floral qualities (the luminous locks "deserving of every crown and diadem") move the natural world to adore him as a god.

The poem's anthropomorphizing of the forests makes the physical environment "subjects" in two respects. They have subjective first-person perspectives on both the old gods and princes, whose absence they lamented, and the new ruler, Hyacinth, whose arrival they celebrate. But it also makes the forests subjects by presenting them as beings who are under the authority or domination of the princes and deities who inhabit them. While they had been saddened by the absence and passing of the former rulers, they are now glad and happy with Hyacinth. The forests' happiness with Hyacinth signifies that they consent to his authority, and the conceit thus represents human dominion over nature in terms of a benevolent and consensual relationship between ruler and ruled. While other myths of human dominion reduce nonhuman life and spaces to a resource or a "treasury" that serve human purposes, the conceit of the natural environment as the devoted subjects of the prince validates his dominion over nature while still including nature as a subject—not an object—with interests and perspective.

Following John Ruskin in *Modern Painters*, modern readers often classify this species of

anthropomorphism as a "pathetic fallacy," where the speaker amplifies his human emotions by metaphorically attributing them to nonhuman life or matter (155, 159). In this "pathetic fallacy" interpretation, the world retains the modern division between human subjects, capable of emotion and subjectivity, and the inanimate objects of nature that can appear as subjects capable of emotion only through poetic fiction. This interpretation both limits the significance of the metaphor to its capacity for expressing the feelings of a human subject and denies the physical environment the possibility of appearing as a subject (since it posits a paradigm in which subjects have human feelings, and the environment does not actually have human feelings). But even if nature lacks the subjective emotional states that the shepherd imaginatively imputes to it through anthropomorphism, it is still present in the poem as *a subject of power*—an ecological entity over which Hyacinth exercises his sovereignty.

By identifying the territory as the subject of Hyacinth's powers, "Capitolo Pastorale" serves as a correlative to *The Prince*, where Machiavelli presents territorial power as the chief and essential objective of the prince. For Machiavelli, a state is not a particular form of political organization with characteristic governing institutions and bodies of law; it is a territory that can be walked across, studied, defended, and seized. In a chapter arguing that a prince must master the art of war in order to maintain his position, he writes that "[a] PRINCE, therefore, must not have any other object nor any other thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war" [50]. To prepare for war, a prince, in peacetime, must spend long hours outdoors, in order to "better understand how to defend" his country (51). Further, the prince must learn "the nature of terrains, and know how mountains rise, how valleys open, how plains lie, and understand the nature of rivers and swamps" (*ibid*.). Because territories tend to resemble each other, a prince who knows his own territory will be able to quickly understand the territories he hopes to seize.

"[T]he hills, valleys, plains, rivers, and swamps of Tuscany […] have certain similarities to those in other territories," and "by knowing the lie of the land in one territory, one can easily come to know it in others" (51). When princes lose territories in wars because they have spent more time on "delicate refinements than to military concerns," argues Machiavelli, "they have lost their state" (50).

Because Machiavelli presents the territorial state as separate from the human subjects that occupy it, he can distinguish between the prince's role in defending his state (territory) and governing his subjects. Ecclesiastical princes (the popes controlling the Papal States in central Italy) are outliers because "[t]hese princes alone have states and do not defend them; have subjects and do no govern them; and their states, though undefended, are never taken away from them; and their subjects, being ungoverned, show no concern" (40). In Machiavelli's analysis, a prince should govern well—earn the respect of the nobility and satisfy the people—in order to minimize the risk of conspiracies and rebellions that might cause him to lose his state (Chap. XIX). Good government of human subjects is not an end in itself, but a means to maintaining power over a territory.

In Foucault's lecture, "Governmentality," Machiavelli's *The Prince* stands for an older territorial model of sovereignty that contrasts with modern beliefs that governments exercise power in order to improve the lives of a human population. Machiavelli assumes that the

> objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen, and protect the principality, but with this last understood to mean not the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory but, rather, the prince's relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects. (232)

That is, the prince's goal is maintaining his power over, his sovereign relationship with, the

territory and subjects that make up his principality, rather than improving the condition of the territory and people that exist independently of a sovereign ("the objective ensemble of its subjects and the territory"). For this reason, territory is the "fundamental element in […] the Machiavellian principality" (235). Machiavelli's understanding of political power became scandalous, according to Foucault, only later in the sixteenth century, when a new generation of art-of-government theorists began to formulate more humanistic principles of good government that contrasted with Machiavelli's focus on a prince's ability to control a territory. Born out of the "archaic model … of Christian pastoral" (245), the new standard of "governmentality" urged political leaders to manage resources in a way that advanced "the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc." (241) *Pace* Machiavelli, sovereignty is more than power over a territory; it is primarily a power over a human population and is justified through the improvements it brings about in human subjects.

Foucault in this essay and elsewhere uses "pastoral" to characterize a power that is exercised over human individuals and populations with the benevolent intention of improving their lives ("*Omnes et Singulatim*," 180-201). Similarly, when other scholars analyze the political resonance of pastoral, they often focus on the representations of rulers as good shepherds over flocks of men, or read non-Biblical (mainly courtly) pastorals as resembling Biblical pastoral since they too have a social function of reconciling and mystifying exploitative power structures within human society (Empson; Montrose, "'Eliza, Queene of Shepheardes'," "Of Gentlemen and Shepherdes"). "Capitolo Pastorale," however, does not conform to the Biblical model of pastoral, since the ruler, Hyacinth, is not a *bonus pastor* who sacrifices himself for his flock, but a citizen general who has, through his many personal attractions and abilities, seized a sentient territory that now adores him as a god. In this regard, "Capitolo Pastorale" demonstrates the

heterogeneity of the pastoral tradition, which contains both the classical model of sovereignty (the prince's power over a territory) that Foucault associates with Machiavelli's *The Prince*, as well as the Christian model of the pastorate that Foucault sees giving birth, in the seventeenth century, to a style of government that is characterized by a "strange technology of power treating the vast majority of men as a flock with a few shepherds" ("*Omnes*," 184).

Ecological Sovereignty as an Expression of Violence and Beauty, Not Right

With echoes of Machiavelli's admiration of Cesare Borgia, his model of a "new prince" in *The Prince*, the shepherd praises Hyacinth as a citizen who, through his physical magnetism and military acumen, wins dominion over territories to which he has no hereditary or legal claim. Through this portrait of a charming and warlike citizen-conqueror, "Capitolo Pastorale" links ecological sovereignty—the prince's power over a territory—to an individual's charisma and aptitude for military violence rather than to right.

In the creation story of Hyacinth's origins that constitutes the second main section of the poem, the shepherd attributes the citizen's good fortunes to the virtues that were given him by the Roman deities and that signal that the heavens favor his rise to power. Hyacinth's extraordinary beauty and vivacious spirit were the special behest of Jove, who enlisted Vulcan and Minerva to make Hyacinth so fair, lively, and joyous that Ganymede, the usual favorite of Jove, feels insecure about his position. Venus surrounded his head with her immortal graces and announced that he would always be "pleasant and gracious" to the shepherds (85-87). Besides good looks and personality, the gods have also disposed Hyacinth to conquer and rule territories: "Fierce Mars" enclosed a heart "like that of Caesar the general, like / those of all the generals" within Hyacinth's chest (91). Mercury instilled "shrewd discernment" (94). And Juno put a "soul

fit to rule empire and / kingdoms" under Hyacinth's "citizen's clothes" (97). The "citizens' clothes" ("*privati panni*" [97; 162]) that Hyacinth wears identify him as a private person—an individual lacking a public office or hereditary title—who does not have a right to rule, but nevertheless rules because he *can*.[114] In this might-makes-right world, any prince or government whose territory is seized by Hyacinth is *ipso facto* unqualified to rule, since that prince or government lacks the ability to defend the territory.

Hyacinth's manly virtues and private attire, and his rivalry with Ganymede, place him in a homosocial, and possibly homoerotic, context of males whose good fortunes result from their individual virtues, rather than from the heteronormative lineage that usually forms the basis of a prince or people's claim to sovereignty. In Greek mythology, Ganymede was, along with other mythic "pretty boy" archetypes—Hyacinthus, Adonis, and Hippolytus—an exemplar of youthful male beauty. Ganymede for his physical excellence was beloved by Jove, as Hyacinth was by Apollo. Apollo's love for Hyacinth actually shapes the poem's beginning. Alluding to this myth, the shepherd says he sees the face of Apollo shining (i.e., the sun; he has driven his flock to pasture in the morning light), and, addressing Apollo, asks the sun god for special powers to honor the "beauties great and godlike" and notable "deeds" of "your Hyacinth" (22-28; 98). By representing that Hyacinth does not heterosexually *inherit* his right to dominion, but wins it through the manly virtues that make him beloved by Apollo himself, Machiavelli's pastoral of power differs from Renaissance pastoral panegyrics that tie a sovereign's dominion to his or her

[114] Gilbert's translation of *privati panni* as "citizen's clothes" is questionable because *privati panni* refers to the clothing worn by a private individual—by someone who does not hold public office—and not necessarily the clothing worn by a citizen, which implies legal standing in a republic. Presumably, Gilbert assumed that Machiavelli was referring to Lorenzo di Piero, who was a Florentine citizen who did not hold public office, and he may even had had in mind Machiavelli's discussion, in Book 9 of *Il Principe*, of the "*privato cittadino*" and "*cittadino privato*," who becomes the prince of his "*patria*," turning it into a "*principato civile*," or "civic principality."

ancestry. In Spenser's "Aprill," for instance, the shepherd speaker establishes Elisa's "heauenly race" through a mythological genealogy according to which she is the daughter of the nymph Syrinx and "*Pan* the shepheards God" (50-54; 62) (a euphemism for the troubled marriage between Elizabeth I's parents, Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn). In Ronsard's *Bergerie*, the members of the French royal family appear as shepherds of "high family and of ancestral race" ("Mais haute famille et de race d'ayeux" [6]); the heavens regard King Carlin (Charles IV) as belonging to their own heavenly "race" (8-9); and Carlin is prompted to survey the "fertile heritage," the fields and bulls that he inherits from Henri II: "Haste-toi d'aller voir ton fertile heritage, / Environne tes champs at compte tes taureaux" (26). Machiavelli's understanding that dominion exists only in effect is also contradicted by the seventeenth-century radicals, such as Winstanley, who, as we saw earlier, extended the genealogical rationale of territorial sovereignty to the entire species when he claimed that all humans as descendants of Adam are the rightful heirs to dominion over the earth and animals. In contrast to those who derive their rights over territories and its inhabitants from ancestral race or species, Machiavelli in his pastoral represents that such dominion acquired only through the violent enactment of individual virtue.

In stating that Mars enclosed within Hyacinth's chest a heart similar to that of *Cesar duca*, the poem suggests a comparison to Cesare Borgia, *Duca Valentino*, the famous *condottiero* who became a textbook example of a "new prince," a private individual who establishes new principalities through conquest. Around the turn of the *cinquecento*, Borgia leveraged the fortune of his father, Pope Alexander VI, to acquire the duchy of Valentinois, and, as *Duca Valentino*, led papal armies to seize various states in central and northern Italy. In the original Italian, the shepherd says that Mars gave Hyacinth a heart "simile a Cesar duca, agli altri duci" [93]. The Italian word *duca* can refer to the sovereign of a duchy, but it is also a generic term for

condottiere, with which it shares a common Latin root—*dux, ducis*—meaning "leader." In their English translations of the poem, Gilbert and Joseph Tusiani use the Latin spelling, *Caesar*, rather than the Italian *Cesar* (the spelling used in the manuscripts and the modern Italian editions containing the poem), creating the impression that Machiavelli alludes to Julius Caesar, who in the first century BC commanded Rome's armies before becoming Consul and, briefly, Dictator of Rome. However, *Cesar duca* may point to Cesare Borgia, *Duca Valentino*, as a more recent precedent for an ambitious individual who conquered territories belonging to others. Additionally, *Cesar duca* could be both Julius Caesar (*Giulio Cesare*) and Cesare Borgia, since *Caesar* in Italian is *Cesare*, and the difference of identity, between *Caesar* and *Cesare*, appears only in English.

In identifying Hyacinth as a private individual who, like Cesare Borgia, rules territories through ability and not right, "Capitolo Pastorale" parallels Machiavelli's analysis of legitimacy, the phenomenon of the "new prince," and Borgia in *The Prince.* There, Machiavelli denies the existence of any moral or legal right to dominion, and argues that a prince does not need a preexisting authority to assert his sovereignty because people will honor and praise an effective prince regardless of the means by which he conquered and acquired his state:

> In the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no tribunal to which to appeal, one must consider the final result. Therefore, let a prince conquer and maintain a state, and his methods will be judged honourable and be praised by all. (62)

"Capitolo Pastorale" enacts this proposition by showing how Hyacinth, a citizen who has conquered and maintains a state, is praised and honored as a god by the sentient territory he occupies. Both *The Prince* and "Capitolo Pastorale" depict a world where no prince or people is

the legitimate sovereign of a territory, but where the violent act of territorial dominion produces its own legitimacy.

The poem's portrait of Hyacinth as a young man whose virtues enable him to conquer states echoes Machiavelli's argument, in *The Prince*, that a new prince must have virtue in order to overcome the difficulties of establishing a new principality. In Chapters III-VII, Machiavelli discusses the cases of new principalities—where a new prince seizes a state formerly belonging to another prince or to a republic. Because establishing a new principality is exceedingly dangerous and difficult, only people with extraordinary virtue or fortune ever become princes, and their success in maintaining their new principality largely depends on how much virtue they have:

> I say, therefore, that in completely new principalities, where there is a new prince, greater or lesser difficulty in maintaining them exists according to the greater or lesser virtue of the person who acquires them. Because for a private citizen to become a prince presupposes virtue or Fortune, it appears that either the one or the other of these two things should partially mitigate many of the problems. Nevertheless, he who relies less on Fortune has maintained his position best. (Chap. VI; 21)

The creation myth of the poem legitimizes the phenomenon of the private individual who becomes a "new prince" by telling a beautiful story about the origins of the abilities ("*virtù*") by which the individual conquers and rules new territories to which he has no hereditary claim. In imagining the gods joyously working to endow Hyacinth with the traits that will enable his rise to power, the myth glamorizes innate ability that is uncoupled from family lineage or constitutional authority.

The pastoral's apparent allusion to Cesare Borgia similarly echoes Machiavelli's identification of Borgia as a model for a "new prince" who conquers territories through virtue. In Chapter VII, Machiavelli analyzes Borgia's bold yet short-lived military career. Borgia initially acquired his states through "Fortune": his father, Pope Alexander VI, gave him armies and the support of the papacy that allowed him to seize a vast tract of territory in central and northern Italy (24). When his father died, Borgia was weakened by the same illness and subsequently defeated by his enemies. However, while Borgia lost his territories, he did so "despite the fact that he did everything and used every method that a prudent and virtuous man ought to employ in order to root himself securely in those states that the arms [military] and Fortune of others had granted him" (24). Machiavelli holds up Borgia as the best model for a new prince: "I would not know of any better precepts to give to a new prince than the example of his [Borgia's] deeds" (25). Borgia's downfall is attributed to his and his father's illnesses and premature deaths, not to any lack of virtue: "his plans were frustrated solely by the brevity of Alexander's life and his own illness" (29). Borgia thus exemplified a new prince who had every virtue necessary to conquer territories—except the virtue of longevity. The creation myth of the poem appears to allude to Borgia when "Fierce Mars" encloses within Hyacinth's breast a "heart like that of *Cesar duca*," while Saturn gives him the "years of Nestor"—or longevity (ln. 99).

The correspondences between "Capitolo Pastorale" and *The Prince* are likely not a coincidence but arise from the probability that Machiavelli dedicated, in the mid 1510's, both the poem and the book on principalities to Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, the new *de facto* prince of Florence who planned to expand his family's rule throughout the Italian peninsula.

In the years following the fall of the Florentine republic in 1512 to the resurgent Medici, Machiavelli hoped that the Medici would go on to conquer the entire jumble of city states and regional governments composing the Italian territory, thus liberating it from the French, Spanish, and German-speaking forces that had, since 1494, fought with Italians and each other in the "Italian Wars" over control of the peninsula.[115] Taken as allegory, "Capitolo Pastorale," is a pastoral panegyric that praises the Medici's conquest of Florence and encourages their broader ambitions to seize all of Italy, and thus promotes ecological sovereignty as a precondition for the restoration of an Italian state united under indigenous leadership.

By representing that Hyacinth succeeds a set of former princes and gods as ruler of the forests, the poem mirrors Lorenzo di Piero's ascendance, in the 1510s, as effective ruler of Florence. The discrepancy between Hyacinth's citizen status and his imperial ambitions parallels the 1515 controversy over Lorenzo's election as Captain of the Florentine militia. The comparison of Hyacinth and "*Cesar duca*" has its analogue in Lorenzo's designs on the Duchy of Urbino, and in Machiavelli's identification, in *The Prince*, of Cesare Borgia as an example of a new prince that would be instructive for Lorenzo di Piero as he undertook a course similar to

[115] He expresses this hope in Chapter 26, "An Exhortation to Seize Italy and Save Her from the Barbarians." Summarizing the effect that the Italian Wars had on Machiavelli and other Florentine political writers, Mikael Hornqvist writes: "It is against this background [the Italian Wars] that the extraordinary development that political thought underwent in Florence during the first decades of the Cinquecento must be understood. For all the protagonists of the intellectual revolution we are inquiring into here—Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, Francesco Vettori—the striking contrasts between the realities of contemporary warfare and Christian idealism serves as an important point of departure. The fact that war plays such an important role in their thought can be explained by their professional status, for besides being public servants, diplomats, political theorists, and historians, they were also military men as well" (80). Frances Yates links the "recrudescence of the imperial theme" in sixteenth-century Italy to the resentment over the foreign invasion, but also to the new and distinctly humanist resentment of the barbarity of the northern civilizations, which they did not consider continuations of the classical civilization that was being rediscovered and reborn in Renaissance Italy (16-18). See also Maurizio Viroli, ("Introduction" to *The Prince*, especially xviii; *Niccolò's Smile: A Biography of Machiavelli,* especially pages 113-114, 159-170); Ardito, *Machiavelli in the Modern State*.

Borgia. Hyacinth's presentation as an ecological sovereign who brings peace and happiness to the forests by occupying them parallels the portrait of Lorenzo di Piero, which Machiavelli sketches in *The Prince*, as the prince who would redeem Italy by conquering it. In the earliest manuscript containing the poem, the prominent use of the laurel tree and Golden Age imagery echo the pastoral imagery that, in the 1510s, Lorenzo di Piero used in public campaigns to promote his controversial regime. And last, the poem suggestively evokes Machiavelli's efforts, in the 1510s, toward reconciliation with the new Medici rulers and gaining employment in their regime. All these echoes and correspondences cast Hyacinth as an allegory of Lorenzo di Piero in his capacity as a new ruler whose territorial dominion brings about a new Golden Age.

On this allegorical reading, "Capitolo Pastorale" identifies and validates sovereignty—the prince's effective control of his territories—as the necessary condition for peace and prosperity. Without a strong prince asserting his sovereignty over a territory, foreign powers will wage war to possess it for themselves. While the poem represents territorial dominion as the overarching goal of a prince, it also challenges the notion that moral or legal grounds for such dominion exist. As a conqueror who wears "citizen's clothes," Hyacinth/Lorenzo di Piero conquers territories because he can, and not because he or anyone has a God-given or legal right to earthly dominion.

Historical and Textual Evidence Linking Hyacinth to Lorenzo di Piero

In the poem, Hyacinth, a godlike young man, has succeeded a set of former gods as ruler of the forests, a scenario mirroring the circumstances in which Lorenzo di Piero emerged as *de facto* prince of Florence after the Medici restoration. As noted above, the forests no longer grieve the loss of the former gods because they are so happy with Hyacinth, who has taken their place. A similar succession had occurred in Florence around the time of the likely composition of

"Capitolo Pastorale." In late summer of 1512, the Medici overthrew the republican government of Florence and reinstalled themselves as effective rulers of the city. Giovanni Medici, the eldest son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, initially controlled the state, but in 1513 he was elected Pope Leo X and went to Rome, leaving the management of Florence to his younger brother, Giuliano, and his nephew, Lorenzo di Piero. In 1515, Giuliano withdrew from politics owing to an illness and, in 1516, died (Ridolfi 163-164). In this way, Lorenzo became ruler of Florence after a series of regime changes and power struggles, and the shepherd appears to allude to this history when he comments that the forests are so happy with Hyacinth that they no longer call for the former deities and princes (67-73; 99). The shepherd refers to Phoebus's role as temporary shepherd to Admetus, king of the Thessalian city state of Pherae; the sun god's stint as a shepherd points to Lorenzo's uncle, Giovanni Medici. As Pope Leo X, Giovanni was the supreme pastor, or shepherd, of Christendom. In saying that the forests no longer call for Phoebus to return to tend the flocks of Admetus because they are happy under Hyacinth's rule, the shepherd may compliment Lorenzo on replacing Giovanni as ruler of Florence. The identification of Phoebus with Giovanni is also supported by the poem's opening, where the shepherd addresses the sun god, whom he sees blazing above, and announces his intention to sing the praises of "your Hyacinth" (22; 98). As pope and head of the family, Giovanni outranked Lorenzo as Phoebus does Hyacinth. But, as Hyacinth was a favorite of Phoebus, so Lorenzo was a favorite of Giovanni, who supported Lorenzo's territorial ambitions and facilitated his conquest of the Duchy of Urbino in 1516 (Ridolfi 163-164). "Hecuba's son," for whom the forests no longer call, may refer to Lorenzo's uncle, Giuliano, the son of Clarice Orsini. Orsini was like Hecuba—the queen of Priam, king of Troy—in that she bore many sons, scions of a ruling family, who lost their city to their foes. Giuliano died in March 1516 but had been absent from public life in

Florence since the summer of 1515, when he became seriously ill with the pulmonary tuberculosis from which he did not recover (*ibid*.). The forests may have called for Hecuba's son, Giuliano, during his absence, but no longer call for him because they are satisfied with Hyacinth/Lorenzo. Whoever is intended by the mythological figures, they are figures for people whose power over the forests has been eclipsed by the power that Hyacinth now has. And this was Lorenzo di Piero's position circa 1515—a young man who, backed by his powerful uncle in Rome, effectively ruled Florence.

According to the shepherd's creation myth, Juno placed a "soul for dominating empires and kingdoms" under Hyacinth's "citizen's clothes" (lines 97-98), and the discrepancy between Hyacinth's imperial ambitions and his citizen status parallels a 1515 controversy over Lorenzo di Piero's election as Captain General of the city militia. That spring, Lorenzo and his supporters arranged for the city government to elect him Captain General of the city militia. The Florentine office-holding class opposed this because Lorenzo was technically only a citizen, and Florentine tradition prohibited citizens from heading the military.[116] By presenting Hyacinth as a citizen who was nevertheless born with a "soul for dominating empires and kingdoms" (lines 97-98), Machiavelli signals his approval of Lorenzo's controversial election to Captain General since a position of military leadership suits his ostensible aptitude for dominion. The controversy over Lorenzo's election may also explain why Machiavelli concludes the poem with the shepherd speaker saying he "shall keep concealed the love I cherish" (121; 100). If Machiavelli presented this poem to commemorate Lorenzo's investiture as Captain General (1515), he would have had reason to conceal his love given the outcry of the republicans (among whom Machiavelli counted

[116] This was controversial among the office-holding class because, as Nicholas Scott Baker writes, "the election of a Florentine citizen as military leader broke with tradition and shattered a taboo that, looking back to the example of Julius Caesar, viewed such an election as paving the way toward a dictatorship" (79).

many friends and former colleagues) who objected to the Medici's disregard for Florence's civic traditions and their ambitions (realized in 1532) to become hereditary princes of Florence.

Another bequest by Mars—a heart "similar to that of *Cesar duca* and of other *duci*"[117]—points both to Lorenzo's designs on the Duchy of Urbino and to Cesare Borgia, another citizen-turned-*duca* who Machiavelli holds out, in *The Prince*, as a model for Lorenzo di Piero. After becoming Captain General of the Florentines in 1515, Lorenzo went on, at the direction of his uncle Pope Leo X, to conquer Urbino in the summer of 1516 and to acquire the title of *duca*. At the time, commentators compared Lorenzo to Cesare Borgia, a *condottiero* who, in the early 1500s, had led Italian armies and Swiss mercenaries to seize a number of states in northern Italy.[118] Borgia was the illegitimate son of Pope Alexander VI, and, like Lorenzo di Piero, wore "citizen's clothes" by birth but acquired a duchy, that of Valentinois, and became in 1498 *Duca Valentino.* The endowment of a heart similar to that of "*Cesar duca* and of other *duci*" is an apparent allusion to Lorenzo's conquest (or anticipated conquest) of the Duchy of Urbino and elevation to *duca di Urbino*. The favorable allusion to Borgia echoes Chapter 7 of *The Prince*, where Machiavelli offers Borgia as an example for a "new prince" (29-30)—a prince, like Lorenzo di Piero, who lacked legal authority to rule.

The poem's representation of Hyacinth as an ecological sovereign who brings happiness and tranquility to forests and the natural world by occupying it parallels the portrait that Machiavelli sketches of Lorenzo di Piero in *The Prince*. In the book's concluding chapter, Machiavelli calls on Lorenzo to lead armies to conquer Italy in order to save it from foreign occupation—to "seize Italy and save her from the barbarians," as Machiavelli puts it in the

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[117] "Simile a Cesar duca, agli altri duci" (93; 162)

[118] "At Urbino," Ridolfi notes, Lorenzo "had followed in the footsteps of the usurping Borgia, and now yet further conquests were expected of him" (164).

chapter title (27). The time is ripe for the unification of Italy, and Lorenzo will win the love and gratitude of the Italian people by redeeming the country from foreign forces:

> This opportunity, therefore, must not be allowed to pass by, so that Italy may behold her redeemer after so long a time. Nor can I express with what love he will be received in all those territories that have suffered these foreign floods ... This barbarian dominion stinks in everyone's nostrils! Therefore, may Your Illustrious House take up this task ... so that under your banner this country may be ennobled. (90)

Machiavelli presents Lorenzo's anticipated conquest of Italian territories as an ecological power arrangement that restores power over the land to indigenous rulers, thus solving the environmental crises resulting from foreign occupation. "Foreign floods" have inundated Italian territories, and the land, rotting beneath the standing water, has become a "barbarian dominion" that "stinks in everyone's nostrils." These metaphors comparing foreign occupation to a flooded and putrefying land represent Italy's lack of an indigenous sovereign as a natural disaster. And for exhibiting a strong preference for the territorial reunification of Italy under Italian leadership, the passage has for ages been at the center of debates over whether Machiavelli ought to be understood as a detached pragmatist or an ardent nationalist *avant la lettre* (F. Gilbert 38-49). But the passage also reveals how the nationalist cause—the promise of peace and redemption through native leadership—is predicated on ecological sovereignty, since the preference for indigenous rulers over foreign rulers presupposes those rulers' ability to acquire and maintain control over an oikos, the dwelling or home native to a population. Machiavelli does not tell Lorenzo to govern Italian people or to reform the state institutions, but to seize Italy, and by that he means asserting sovereignty over a territory and the life it supports. And this depiction of

Lorenzo as a messianic ruler who redeems a land by seizing it evokes, in a different style, the pastoral poem's vision of Hyacinth as a godlike ruler who has brought happiness and peace to his domain through violent conquest.

Echoes of Medicean Iconography in "Capitolo Pastorale" and the Manuscripts

As noted at the outset of the chapter, a key manuscript containing the poem is prominently illustrated with a laurel tree, and the poem's shepherd rests under a laurel as he sings his praise of Hyacinth. These elements echo the pastoral iconography of both Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici and his grandfather, Lorenzo "*il Magnifico*." In the 1510s, Lorenzo di Piero used the laurel tree and Golden Age imagery to promote his regime as a rebirth of the Golden Age of his grandfather, Lorenzo "*il Magnifico*," who himself had used the laurel tree as a personal emblem. The Medicean iconography not only connects "Hyacinth," the sovereign in the poem, with Lorenzo di Piero, but also it pastoralizes territorial dominion through the representation of the sovereign as the laurel tree whose regeneration signals the returning Golden Age.

In 1512, after almost twenty years of exile, the Medici returned to Florence, ousted the senior officials of the Republican government (including the Secretary of War, Machiavelli), and reinstalled themselves as *de facto* princes of the nominal republic.[119] In public displays, Lorenzo

[119] After Lorenzo the Magnificent's death in 1492, populist factions within Florence expelled his sons and other Medici from the city, including his firstborn son, Piero, the father of Lorenzo di Piero. With the Medici gone, the Dominican priest Girolamo Savonarola led Florence, but soon antagonized rival Florentine preachers and Pope Alexander VI, who excommunicated him. In early 1498, Florentines burned Savonarola to death. In the new Florentine government that emerged from the ashes of the Savonarolan moment, a young Machiavelli began his political career in various administrative and diplomatic roles. From 1498 until 1512, he served the Florentine government, often assisted by his close friend, Biagio Buonaccorsi, a scribe who copied many manuscripts containing Machiavelli's works. The republic lasted until August 1512, when the Medici reentered the city, with the help of Spanish troops, and overthrew the republican government.

di Piero de' Medici identified himself as the *broncone*, the cut laurel branch that bears new leaves and regenerates the old tree, to show that his grandfather, Lorenzo "*il Magnifico*," and the Golden Age associated with his reign, was renewed in him.[120] The company of aristocratic youths who accompanied Lorenzo di Piero was called the *broncone*, while the company accompanying Lorenzo's uncle and rival for control of Florence, Giuliano (a younger son of Lorenzo the Magnificent), was the *diamante,* or diamond (Vasari 342-344; Baker 59-60). Around 1515, the printer Filippo Giunta put out an anthology, *Lauretum*, of Latin panegyrics for Lorenzo di Piero with a

Fig. 2. Violist with muses from: *Lauretum* (1514).

[120] Lorenzo the Magnificent (1469-1492) had used the pastoral imagery of the Golden Age and the laurel tree to characterize his power over Florence as the source of its peace and prosperity. Pastoral lyrics written by Lorenzo in the late *quattrocento* represented his rule as a an "*età d'oro*" and "*secol felice*," a felicitous and golden period of peace and plenty that, in accordance with ancient myth, followed an Iron Age of war and poverty. The very name "Lorenzo" derives from *Laurus*, the Latin word for laurel, and Lorenzo adopted the laurel as a personal emblem. In *Stanze per la Giostra*, the poet Poliziano refers to the laurel at the root of "Lorenzo," invoking his patron as the "well-born Laurel, under whose happy shelter Florence rests in peace" (3). The laurel tree thus stood for the peace that resulted from Medicean hegemony in the mid-fifteenth century, and was particularly associated with Lorenzo the Magnificent, who was said to preside over a Golden Age in Florence until his death in 1492 (Gombrich 306-309).

frontispiece that foregrounds Lorenzo's preferred symbol of the laurel.[121]Within a border design of cut laurel branches and the Medici heraldic device of five balls, a young man wearing a crown of laurels, presumably Lorenzo, stands beneath a laurel tree and plays an early violin, a *lira da braccio*, flanked by the nine muses (Fig. 2). Another symbol of rebirth, the phoenix spreads its wings as it rises from a burning nest in the tree. The laurel device and the phoenix echo the lines that the poet Iacopo Nardi composed for a 1513 pageant commissioned by Lorenzo: "*Torna il secol felice; / E come la Fenice / Rinasce dal broncon del vecchio alloro, / Così nasce dal ferro un secol d'oro*" (38).[122] In this conceit, the years of republican government were an iron age of conflict and unhappiness, but with the return of the Medici, and with the ascendance of Lorenzo di Piero in particular, a happy age returns to Florence, a phoenix rises, and the laurel branch bears new leaves.

The installations of the 1513 pageant provide an important example of Lorenzo di Piero's appropriation of the laurel tree as a personal emblem, and, more broadly, of the Medicean use of pastoral imagery to constitute their dominion as restoring peace and prosperity to the city. Lorenzo's pageant was sponsored by his *broncone* company and took place on February 6, 1513, about two weeks before Machiavelli was arrested and accused of conspiring against the Medici.[123] The pageant installations, commissioned by Lorenzo, and designed and produced by the poet Nardi and the painter Jacopo Pontormo, are described in the "Life" of Pontormo in Giorgio Vasari's *Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects* (1550). On the

[121] The undated *Lauretum* is estimated to have been printed between 1514 and 1516 (Ridolfi 299). The Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze dates their edition to 1514.

[122] "The happy age returns / And like the phoenix / the *broncon* is born again from the old laurel / So a golden age is born from iron."

[123] Machiavelli's imprisonment, release, and failed attempts to gain employment with the Medici are described by Ridolfi (134-144).

first chariot, the god Saturn, accompanied by a dozen semi-nude shepherds, represented the first Golden Age, when all men lived as shepherds under the benevolent jurisdiction of Saturn. The second through sixth chariots depicted Roman rulers who had presided over subsequent periods of Roman "golden ages": Numa Pompilius, second king of the Romans; the Consul, Titus Manlius Torquatus; the "Lord of the Universe," Caesar Augustus; and the Emperor Trajan (153-154). The Roman kings, consuls, and emperors bestriding the procession's floats constituted a revisionist history that applied the Golden Age designation not only to the mythological first age, but also to periods where Rome existed as a state—kingdom, republic, and empire—united under a strong leader. For Lorenzo, and for other sixteenth-century princes who glorified their regimes with the myth of the returning Golden Age, the period was synonymous with empire and with the political ideal—so attractive during the widespread territorial conflicts of the sixteenth century—of a prince capable of crushing factionalism and defending a territory from invading foreign powers (Gombrich 306-309; Yates 33-38).

On the final chariot was a *broncone*, a laurel tree putting out new leaves, which was, as Vasari notes, an allusion to Lorenzo di Piero that "signified that he was reviving and restoring the name of his grandfather" (152). Also on the final chariot was a great globe, with a warrior lying prostrate, as if dead, his face in the earth. Out of his rusted armor emerged a naked child who had been painted gold. As Vasari explained, the corpse represented the end of the Iron Age, and the gilt child represented the returning Golden Age. Lorenzo paid ten scudi for the use of a baker's child, whom he painted gold and set naked, in early February, on top of a float representing the returning Golden Age. The child died in the event (the cause of death is not given). If Vasari, whom E. H. Gombrich describes as a propagandist for the Medici, was aware of any irony in a dead child representing the rebirth of the Medicean Golden Age, he did not say

so (307-308). Perhaps he did not consider negligent infanticide to be incongruous with the pastoral program aimed at solidifying Lorenzo's authority over Florence.

The laurel tree figured prominently in both Lorenzo's parade, and in what is believed to be the earliest manuscript containing the poem (Martelli, "Preistoria," 377). In the ms. Plut. 41.33 of the Laurentian Library in Florence (Fig. 1), an illustration of a laurel, easily identified by the iconic bay leaves, occupies a large space in the right margin. At the base of the trunk of the mature tree, a young shoot or scion rises, in an apparent allusion to Lorenzo di Piero's iconographic self-representation as the new laurel branch, the *broncone*, that regenerates from the old. Below the tree, a shepherd plays a flute, accompanied by his dog, while his sheep graze. This conventional pastoral scene corresponds with the poem's opening lines, which give emphasis to the laurel, "alloro," by placing it as the final rhyme word of the first line: "Poscia che all'ombra, sotto questo alloro, / Veggo pascere intorno il mio armento, / Vuo' dar principio a più alto lavoro" (1-3; 159); "Now that in the shade under this laurel I see my flock grazing around me, I am resolved to begin loftier work" (1-3; 97). The shepherd's position under the laurel suggests both the subject of his praise—Lorenzo whose name found its roots in the Latin word for laurel—and also his abject and supplicating position in relation to the laurel/Lorenzo.

By identifying Lorenzo as the laurel tree, the poem imagines the sovereign as part of the natural environment, and thus creates an equivalency between the sovereign (Lorenzo/laurel) and the environment over which he exercises his sovereignty—an equivalency also embedded in the floral name of the sovereign in the poem, "Hyacinth," as noted above. These names mystify Hyacinth/Lorenzo's dominion over the territory by depicting that the sovereign is an indigenous plant with roots in the very soils he has seized, or perhaps that his dominion is so totalizing and complete that he has become the territory itself. Ironically, in the poem and in the history

allegorically figured in the poem, Hyacinth/Lorenzo has acquired the principality by conquest, and thus his relationship with the territory is purely synthetic. And yet the poem opposes and obscures the violent origins of Hyacinth/Lorenzo's power, by figuring him organically, as a native flower and laurel tree that is rooted in and part of his new territory.

The Golden Age and Medicean character of the Laurentian manuscript connects the creation of the volume to Lorenzo's campaign that presented his regime as a rebirth or recycling of the golden age of his grandfather, Lorenzo "il Magnifico." Of the fourteen poems in the core *codicetto* of the ms. Plut. 41.33, ten are by Lorenzo the Magnificent (d. 1492), one canzone is by Poliziano (d. 1494), and another is by Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de' Medici (d. 1503).[124] The remaining two are by Machiavelli: the pastoral panegyric and a canzone, "*Se avessi l'arco e le ali*."[125] Some scholars point to the fact that the other poems in the compilation were written by an older generation of Medici, and argue that the manuscript and therefore Machiavelli's poems must date to the same period, the late 1400s, as the rest of the compilation.[126] In their reading, a young twenty-something Machiavelli wrote the poem as a token of his love for an adolescent Giuliano, figured as "Hyacinth."

But the identity of the scribe of the manuscript, a friend of Machiavelli, Biagio Buonaccorsi, with ties to Lorenzo di Piero, points to another possibility: that the poem and the manuscript were created to resonate with Lorenzo di Piero's presentation of his regime as return

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[124] Machiavelli's pastoral appears in a section believed to have been originally a separate codex that was later bound with other sections (Martelli, "Preistoria," 385-386). Although all the sections share the same scribe (Biagio Buonaccorsi, Machiavelli's friend and former colleague) and generic style (mostly amorous lyric), the first codicetto is set off from the rest of the manuscript by designs and illustrations, a more formal hand, and a generally more elegant layout.

[125] Scholars agree that the "giovanetto Giulio" of the canzone refers to Giuliano Medici, but they disagree when Machiavelli wrote the poem for him (Martelli, "Preistoria"; Black 61-67) In the Vatican manuscript (also copied by Buonaccorsi) the subject of the poem is a woman, "Giulia."

[126] Martelli, "Preistoria"; Black (61-67).

to the Golden Age of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Buonaccorsi was a friend and colleague of Machiavelli in the Florentine Chancery. He also transcribed a second manuscript containing "Capitolo Pastorale," the ms. Barb. Lat. 3945 of the Vatican Library in Rome, as well as several copies of The Prince. After the downfall of the republican government in which he and Machiavelli worked together, Buonaccorsi became attached to the banker Filippo Strozzi, the right-hand man of Lorenzo di Piero and a chief architect of the neo-Laurentian state. Mario Martelli, an Italian philologist who worked extensively on Machiavelli's works, speculated that Strozzi may have commissioned Buonaccorsi to produce the manuscript Plut. 41.33 around 1515-1516, when Lorenzo di Piero was elected Captain General of the Florentine militia and went on to gain, by military conquest, the duchy of Urbino. In this scenario, Buonaccorsi sought to help his friend, Machiavelli, reconcile with the Medici by anthologizing "Capitolo Pastorale" in a compilation of lyrics by Lorenzo "the Magnificent" and others in his circle. "Capitolo Pastorale," would have been read as praise for Lorenzo's military successes that also honored Lorenzo's identification with his grandfather by placing the poem among recycled lyrics by his grandfather.

This interpretation also explains why Machiavelli's pastoral, while sharing the bucolic style of the compilation, stands apart from the group as the only panegyric with military and political allusions. Lorenzo the Magnificent's poems are amorous lyrics inspired by Golden Age mythology and are not, as "Capitolo Pastorale" is, political allegory.[127] While Machiavelli's

[127] For example, "È un monte in Tessaglia detto Pindo" opens with a description of Tempe, the valley in Thessaly through which the river Peneus flows into the Aegean, where spring is eternal ["eterna primavera"] and the land is full of sylvan creatures "not hostile to our nature" ["piena di silvestre fere, / Non inimiche alla nostra natura"]. Apollo, disguised as a shepherd, sits down beneath the laurel tree that was once the nymph, Daphne, and sings a love song to her. And in "Corinto," the eponymous shepherd woos the nymph Galatea, urging her to gather roses now that there's fine weather: "Cogli la rosa, O Ninfa, or che è bel tempo."

pastoral echoes the mythological characters and pastoral setting of the older Lorenzo's lyrics, its references to a recent regime change, to Hyacinth's political and military aspirations, and to Hyacinth's resemblance to "Cesar duca" (presumably Cesare Borgia) match the historical circumstances of Lorenzo di Piero in the 1510s. The allegorical and political character of "Capitolo Pastorale" support a scenario in which Machiavelli, assisted by his friend and the manuscript scribe Buonaccorsi, took his cues from Lorenzo di Piero, and redeployed the bucolic style of the older generation of Medici to pastoralize Lorenzo's controversial regime through the poem's characterization of Lorenzo as a beautiful citizen who is adored as the godlike ruler of the territories that he has seized.

Thus, the manuscripts containing "Capitolo Pastorale" connect the poem to Lorenzo di Piero, and, in particular, to Machiavelli's efforts both to gain employment in Lorenzo's regime and to encourage Lorenzo's plans of expanding Medici rule throughout Italy. The Golden Age and laurel tree imagery in the manuscripts and in the text of the poem indicates that Machiavelli took inspiration from Lorenzo di Piero's identification with the laurel tree and general promotion of his regime as a restoration of the Golden Age of past empires and the happy age of his grandfather, Lorenzo the Magnificent. In its presentation of Hyacinth as a talented young man who becomes a local deity and brings an end to a period of mourning for the loss of the old gods, the poem suggests Lorenzo di Piero's return to Florence after eighteen years of Medicean exile, his election to the rank of Captain of the Florentine militia, and his effective lordship over the city. And the shepherd's praise for Hyacinth's military genius and desire to conquer empires and kingdoms parallels Machiavelli's hope—set forth in *The Prince*—that Lorenzo di Piero would save Italy from foreign dominion by conquering it for the Medici.

Ecocritical Implications of the Allegorical Reading

As an allegory for Machiavelli's hope that Lorenzo di Piero would restore a Golden Age to Italy by turning the peninsula into a Medicean principality, "Capitolo Pastorale" represents that ecological sovereignty—a native prince's possession of a territory—is essential for peace and freedom from foreign interference. In the poem, the ideal of human dominion converges with a proto-nationalist ideology holding that peace and stability exist only when the sovereign is indigenous to the territory he rules. However, the nationalism that is allegorically suggested by the poem is free of the extractive and appropriative relation to nature that is present in the more overtly democratic agrarian reform literature discussed earlier. In Winstanley's *The New Law*, the ideal of human dominion converges with social justice: the earth and animals are a "common treasury" that exists for the benefit of all, not some. By contrast, in Machiavelli's panegyric, the various natural entities are not represented as property or resources, but beings with voices and perspectives, capable of being enchanted by the charismatic native-born Hyacinth who has recently come to rule the territory. That is, in idealizing human dominion over nature, Machiavelli idealizes specifically the indigenous man's ability to control an ecological space, his *oikos* does not exist as a fungible resource for human occupants, but is the home, the oikos, of a collection of human and nonhuman entities that, in Machiavelli's conceit, find contentment in the shade of the laurel tree, figuring the native-born ruler, Lorenzo.

Even as the allegory idealizes the ecological sovereignty of the indigenous laurel/Lorenzo, it subversively contests that moral or legal grounds for such sovereignty exist. Lorenzo di Piero is an illegitimate prince with no authority to rule Florence, the Duchy of Urbino, or Italy, beyond his own ability to force others to recognize, or charm or cajole them into accepting, his sovereignty over those territories. There is no moral or hereditary right to

dominion; there is only Hyacinth's "accomplished and lordly genius" (58), "soul fit to rule empire and / kingdoms" (97-100), and his heart "like that of Caesar the general" (91)—that is, only the individual's ability to acquire and maintain power. The shepherd speaker says that conquest is a worthy endeavor, both because it will satisfy Hyacinth's "natural desire for gaining fame that will make you glory evident" (50-51), and because his dominion is welcomed by territorial subjects who are "more happy, more glad" under his reign (72; 99). And, read allegorically, the territory's happiness with Hyacinth's dominion figures the "love" that *The Prince* says Lorenzo di Piero will find when he liberates Italian territories from "barbarian dominion" (90). But by identifying territorial dominion as an act of conquest, and by denying the existence of a theological or juridical right to enact such violence, Machiavelli's pastoral anticipates radical ecologists' arguments against the "modern constitution" that "presumes human dominion and assumes that the natural world is already … fundamentally a human resource" (Smith x-xii).

Conclusion

As Empson and Montrose show, pastoral representations of power raise the question of what dominant social factions have benefited from the cultural forms that mask or beautify systems in which one human group exploits another. But even more salient in pastoral works are representations of human exploitation and dominion of animals and the physical environment; the works thus illuminate power structures operating not only within human society, but also between human society and nonhuman life and spaces. In the different subgenres of Renaissance pastoral and adjacent writings, sovereignty shifts and metamorphosizes from the shepherd's power over his sheep, to the individual ruler's power over his territory or his subjects, to humans' collective power over nature. While human dominion over animals and ecologies is

harmonious, consensual, and mutually beneficial in early modern pastoral, in the modern world this dominion has resulted in industrial-scale mistreatment of animals as production inputs, carbon emissions that threaten the stability of the earth's climate, and mass destruction of wilderness and open spaces. Renaissance pastorals and related works anticipate the modern paradigm in which sovereignty over animals and the environment does not belong to an individual, but to all humans. A lone dissident voice within these works, Machiavelli's pastoral reveals that human sovereignty over nature is founded on nothing more than brute force and conquest.

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