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Explaining Female Suffrage Reform in Latin America:
Motivation Alignment, Cleavages, and Timing of Reform

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ABSTRACT

Explaining Female Suffrage Reform in Latin America:
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What explains the difference in the timing of female enfranchisement in Latin America? Despite constituting an essential process of inclusion for democratization, no comparative analysis of the region has sought to explain the differences observed in the timing of reform. Common explanations – developed for other regions – concerning the strength of women's movement, the type of political regime, the degree of electoral competition, and women's inclusion in modernizing economies do not account for the observed variation. This dissertation proposes a framework to explain the timing of reform that focuses on decision makers' motivations.

Strategic political calculations and normative beliefs constitute two central motivations of decision makers when facing the prospects of reform. Unlike the dominant strategic approach in political science, I show that both these motivations are necessary and need to align for reform to occur. The presence of only one motivation produces stalemate or the rejection of female suffrage reform. Before World War II, misalignment of motivations was the most common scenario. In this historical context, to explain the (mis)alignment of strategic calculations and normative beliefs in Latin America, I consider the region's historical oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage structure, which was rooted in an overlapping class and religious division. For most cases, a relative balance of power between oligarchic and anti-oligarchic actors blocked female suffrage reform in the region. In a few exceptional cases, reform was guided by normative

motivations when strategic considerations were unclear or unimportant. After the war, the democratic window that opened impacted normative motivations, making them favorable in most cases. In this new context, a realignment in the axes of political competition or an incumbent in electoral need provided the necessary strategic motivations. To test the argument, I provide detailed analyses of failed and successful reform attempts for the early and late periods in the cases of Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.

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To Laura

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

I. INTRODUCTION

"A particular [political] movement had to find women's suffrage both ideologically acceptable and politically advantageous" (Hammond 2011, 3)

In the Chilean cities of San Felipe, La Serena, and Casablanca, several women attempted to register to vote in 1875. These women based their claim in the fact that the constitution was ambiguous and did not explicitly excluded them, an argument that in some cases was accepted. They were nonetheless unable to cast their ballots as legal interpretations determined that female participation was against the "spirit" of the 1833 Constitution (Errázuriz Tagle 2005, 269-270). To prevent similar attempts in the future, male legislators included an explicit mention of sex as a requirement to vote in the 1884 electoral law. From 1917 on, multiple bills were introduced and there was a recurrent public debate on the issue. Chilean women, however, would not be allowed to vote for national elections until the 1949 reform. Similar events took place in other Latin American countries, evidencing women's suffrage was a hard-fought battle in which decades elapsed between the initiation of the public and (sometimes) legislative debate and final enfranchisement.

Universal suffrage constitutes a necessary key feature of any contemporary democracy and a reality in most countries in the world. Unlike contestation, formal inclusion is a feature of political regimes that since the twentieth century has been sticky, despite advances and setbacks in other dimensions of democracies/authoritarianisms. The road to the current consensus, however, was a long one marked by the systematic exclusion of different categories of people. This dissertation centers on how the political exclusion of women was (formally) ended in Latin

America, reform that represents – in most countries in the region – the single largest incorporation of voters into the polity. But formal suffrage rights are only part of the story. After female enfranchisement, participation remained a deeply gendered aspect of democracy. In some countries, the literacy requirement was left in place, disproportionally affecting women in rural areas. And differentiated turnout was also common feature of women's early electoral participation. Robert Dahl's participation dimension in polyarchies, then, must be analyzed in gendered terms.

Historical democratization studies have paid scarce attention to gendered dimensions of democratization. Despite calls to the contrary, both classic and recent works on the origins of democratic institutions maintain a focus on social class as key explanatory factor and on male democracy as an outcome. This bias persists despite works on women's suffrage showing that during the same period – the first wave of democratization – the fight for inclusion was being fought in many countries by feminists and suffragists. As such, resulting male democracies were so not because women's enfranchisement was a non-issue but as a consequence of recurring denials at expanding the franchise. At the same time, scholarship focusing on the third wave implicitly or explicitly sidetracks the question of the breadth of suffrage as a settled issue. Women's inclusion has then been left outside the main corpus of scholarship on democratization on the first and third waves of democracy where in fact, the prolonged process of women's enfranchisement bridges – and puts into question – this periodization.

A second important exclusion from the comparative democratization literature on the origins of contemporary regimes pertains to the geographical focus. By studying Latin America, my project incorporates the global South to a literature centered on Europe. The regional emphasis presents a fundamental contribution as it differs from regions like Africa or Southeast

Asia where liberal constitutions with universal suffrage were imposed or inherited upon decolonization. In Latin America, instead, the relatively early decolonization and consolidation of states allowed for long debates on inclusion. In this sense, the region presents a pattern similar to early industrializers where political inclusion followed a gradual path and endogenous factors were of central relevance. But different social, institutional, and political conditions make extant explanations partially or totally inapplicable to Latin America.

At present, we know very little about women's suffrage in Latin America; in fact, the dates at which all of the countries of the region achieved this milestone are often misreported. A comparative description and explanation of processes of enfranchisement – focusing on differences in the timing of reform and the paths that led to it – is thus far absent from the democratization literature. By filling these gaps, this dissertation makes both descriptive and explanatory contributions. In concrete, the research asks why was reform postponed for so long is most countries, to only take place after WWII? Why were some countries able to move away from the regional trend and enfranchise women relatively early? What are the different paths that led to women's suffrage? The next section presents a summary of the argument, sketching an answer to these questions.

1 Summary of argument

Suffrage reform, I argue, occurs when strategic and normative motivations of key decision-makers align. This is the motivation alignment argument, expressed by the quote in the epigraph. Strategic motivations refer to the calculated benefits (electoral and of legitimacy) of including new voters while normative ones are beliefs on relevant values such as democracy, inclusion, and women's rights. These two sets of motivations vary independently and can

therefore come into contradiction. In such cases, no reform will take place. I conceptualize motivation alignment as the mechanism that when activated explains reform.

Motivation alignment is a theoretical innovation as explanations of electoral reform tend to focus on strategic considerations only (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ahmed 2013; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 1999, 2003; Mares 2015; Przeworski 2009; D. Teele 2018). When considered, ideological or normative motivations tend to be mentioned as a residual factor. I claim, instead, they are both necessary and propose specific conditions under which motivations will align or misalign for the case of women's suffrage. Depending on the motivations of the key political parties, reform (or lack thereof) is guided by either normative or strategic considerations.

I contend that these two types of motivations vary according to the nature of party coalitions and the structure of political competition, which in turn are derived from the politicization of social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). To an important degree, the characteristics of women's political mobilization, both of suffragists as well as conservative women, also respond to social and political divisions. The axes of political competition – which determines electoral constituencies – and the nature of women's mobilization will be the basis for how strategic calculations are made as to women's future electoral behavior. These factors will also inform the normative commitments of different political actors.

Because structural conditions were similar across Latin American countries, examining cleavages and coalitions sheds light on whether motivations for suffrage reform aligned or not, and why early reform was rare in the region. This is the cleavage-path to reform. A second path to enfranchisement was the result of short-term political factors, when political leaders were in electoral need given the specific nature of their regimes – populist or electoral authoritarianisms.

The motivations and cleavages framework is applied to the specific conditions of early and late reform in Latin America – before or during/after World War II. The central historical argument can be summarized as follows. Early twentieth century Latin America featured class and religious cleavages that in most cases created contradictory normative and strategic motivations, making early reform rare. Before WWII, overlapping class and religion cleavages were the dominant configuration – what I label the *oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage*. The oligarchic side was composed of traditional landed and commercial elites who were often close to the Catholic Church. These actors tended to have traditional views on gender roles, seeing women's nature as confined to a limited public role and fearing that their participation in politics would be detrimental to family structure. Consequently, the oligarchic coalition had a negative normative motivation for reform. Their strategic calculations, on the other hand, were favorable: women's greater closeness to the Church led parties to anticipate a strong female conservative vote. Nonetheless, in most countries conservative parties did not support female enfranchisement in this early period and I argue this inaction was the result of this contradiction; the strategic argument – prevalent in the literature – is insufficient to explain reform.

In the anti-oligarchic camp were middle and working-class parties that were usually anticlerical. These parties had favorable normative views on women's political inclusion and often supported other women's rights. But strategically, they made the same calculation that the female vote would benefit conservative parties, and, because of that fact, they opposed reform. Based on these contradictory motivations, parties on either side of the cleavage did not support reform. This argument explains why early suffrage reform failed both in cases of conservative and progressive incumbents.

In the late period, the postwar democratic window and expanded social roles for women turned normative motivations mostly positive. In this scenario, a process of changing coalitions and political realignment or short-term political factors would provide the necessary strategic motivations.

This dissertation develops this argument in detail and provides detailed empirical tests in four countries – Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay – that vary in the timing of reform, in the causal path they followed, and in the combination of motivations of political parties that were the key decision-makers.

2 Timing and paths to suffrage reform in Latin America

Female enfranchisement in Latin America was achieved through varied causal pathways. While all countries eventually adopted the female franchise, they varied in the timing at which they did so, in the role of structural and leadership factors, and the predominance of normative or strategic motivations in political parties' decision-making process. These are the variations explored in this research, the first one a variation in the outcome and the other two variation in the causal factors.

The timing at which countries in Latin America recognized female suffrage reform varied dramatically; thirty-two years span between the first and last country to enfranchise women (Figure I.1). Most countries achieved female suffrage reform in the period after World War II, when a process of political realignment and democratic norms in the international system changed to favor this reform. However, a handful of early reform cases in Latin America exist, including Ecuador, Brazil, Cuba, and Uruguay. That reform came late in most countries is puzzling considering that women's enfranchisement was being discussed since the late

nineteenth century. This presents a puzzle core to Dahl's foundational route to democracy: when and why is democratic participation likely to expand?

Figure I.1. Dates of female enfranchisement in Latin America



Note: the dates of enfranchisement pertain to the year of the reform that recognized female suffrage for national elections, that became effective, and, except for Guatemala between 1945 and 1965, that had the same requirements as for men.

Early and late enfranchisement do not correlate with existing explanations for suffrage expansion or other aspects of democratization. There is no relationship between the timing of reform and the level of economic and social development, ethnic diversity, regime type, or strength of women's mobilization. The variation in timing, thus, presents an interesting puzzle. But is this variation specific to Latin America?

Figure I.2, which graphs the dates of enfranchisement by world region, reflects certain wave-like trends among and across regions. The most notorious trend is the global increase in the

number of countries that enfranchised women after WWII. This spike is observable in all the regions included in the graph. But the figure also suggests that there are regional trends. For example, in Western countries the highest concentration of cases occurred between 1915 and 1919, during World War I. And in Africa cases cluster in the after 1960 period, showing a link to decolonization processes. While some trends may be similar across regions, I suggest the reasons vary. For example, whereas in the Western hemisphere the postwar democratic wave played a significant role, in Asia the spread of socialism might be the dominant factor. Therefore, I claim that explanations of suffrage reform must be historically and geographically grounded, in line with the comparative-historical literature (Mahoney and Thelen 2015).

Figure I.2. Frequency of dates of female enfranchisement by world region



Note: Europe+ includes European countries and the Western offshoots (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States)
Source: Teele (2018)

Similar structural conditions are the reason why Latin America constitutes the scope for the argument presented. The class and religious configurations are historical conditions specific to the region and are particularly central for explaining early reform.[1] The international climate after WWII that initiated a democratic wave and led to a realignment of political forces in most countries, on the other hand, constitutes an external shock that had particular features in the region and it is central for understanding late reform. As such, both endogenous and exogenous elements give the region certain unique features that make it an important object of study.

Analyzing the timing of suffrage reform uncovers different causal paths to the outcome that vary within and across time periods. The explanation put forward in this dissertation highlights two central factors: motivation alignment and cleavage structure. The motivation alignment argument states that both strategic and normative motivations must align for reform to occur. As I discuss in detail in the next chapter, this means that no motivation can be negative, but a combination of positive and neutral motivations is possible. In some cases, uncovering normative beliefs will be the key to explain reform, as strategic motivations are either unchanged or neutral. In other instances, the opposite is true. My research finds that early enfranchisers were mostly led by normative concerns whereas in late adopters, strategic motivations are dominant. As such, a first central element indicating different pathways to reform refers to motivations.

The second element generating different paths are the causal factors explaining motivation alignment. My explanation highlights the nature of the class and religious cleavages in the party system as giving rise to alignment or misalignment of motivations. In some cases, however, the cleavage explanation is insufficient and the role of individual leaders in electoral

[1] Some countries in Southern Europe shared similar structural configurations during the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, my argument potentially applies to Catholic countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

need and feminist activists become central. The explanation of women's suffrage then identifies a cleavage-based and a short-term political factors path to reform, that are present in both early and late enfranchisers.

3 Women's suffrage and democratization

The origins and trajectories of democracy and authoritarianism are among the central and most analyzed issues in comparative politics. The literature covers all regions, methodological traditions, and theoretical approaches. Women, however, have not been incorporated into mainstream studies of democratization, particularly when focusing on the historical origins of regimes. By studying women's political inclusion, my research questions three gaps within the democratization literature: the male democracy bias, the class bias, and the European bias.

In his influential formulation of the three waves of democratization argument, Samuel Huntington (1991, 16) identified as features of the first wave that (1) 50% of adult males were eligible to vote and (2) a responsible executive. Close to three decades later, these criteria remain the standard in the field in both cross-national and comparative studies (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; R. B. Collier 1999; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). These works consider partial or universal *male* suffrage as sufficient indicator for participation. As Ruth Collier phrases it, "the final step in the historical processes of democratization is typically thought of in terms of enfranchisement of the working class itself" (1999, 13). Boix expresses a similar notion arguing that a first transition occurs from authoritarianism to limited democracy, and then from limited democracy to full suffrage (Boix 2003, 50–52), assuming that explaining the first suffices for the latter.

The assumption that the inclusion of the working was the final step of democratization is empirically inaccurate. As already mentioned, focusing on male suffrage ignores subsequent processes of enfranchisement of women but also illiterates, who in multiple countries in the region remained excluded for several more decades. Theoretically, the implication of male suffrage as final step in democratization would mean that successive episodes of inclusion are correlated with the former and explained by the same factors. In reality, there is no correlation between the timing of enfranchisement of a majority of men and women. For example, in Uruguay only thirteen years separate both, while in Chile seventy-four years elapsed between the inclusion of the working class and of women. Secondly, in several countries in Latin America, female enfranchisement did not occur under a limited democracy, meaning it was not the last step in democratization. In Bolivia, universal suffrage was implemented in a revolutionary context, at the same time as other democratic institutions were installed. Likewise, in Brazil it was a dictatorship that introduced reform. And in other cases of limited democracy, such as Ecuador, broadening suffrage did not move the country into a full democracy as competition remained restricted.

The exclusion of women from the classic democratization literature has been noted by authors such as Pamela Paxton (2000) and Teri Caraway (2004), highlighting the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical consequences of focusing on male democracy. Despite these calls of attention, recent works such as those by Ansell and Samuels (2014), and Ziblatt (2017) reproduce the same bias. For example, in an excellent book, Daniel Ziblatt (2017) considers two key institutional reforms toward democratization: parliamentarization and universal male suffrage. This decision seems to simply follow convention and to limit causal complexity, but conceptually there is no reason why breadth of suffrage is not the relevant outcome. In fact, of

the countries included in his analysis (Table 2.1, 27), Britain, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands extended suffrage to women within the period of study.

Women's inclusion is then relegated to later waves of democratization. Although the female franchise concentrated in the second wave period, the cases in fact span the three waves (see Figure I.2 above) and problematize Huntington's original classification of countries (Paxton 2000). More importantly, the exclusion of women during the first wave was not a natural process but the result of regular denials at their incorporation (Caraway 2004). As such, women's (often failed) enfranchisement constitutes an important component of first wave democratization. But female suffrage is also not the end of the story. First, formal literacy requirements persisted in some countries and affected women – who generally had lower access to education – to a larger degree. This restriction was in cases only lifted during third wave of transitions to democracy. Second, rates of participation also differed considerably among men and women and normally took decades to reach similar levels. As such, the gendered analysis of political inclusion questions the utility of the waves argument for analyzing political inclusion.

A second bias in the literature is the focus on social class. This bias is partly a consequence of analyzing male democracy as reaching universal (or extended) male suffrage required the lifting of education, income, property, and/or occupational requirements, thus incorporating lower classes. Class-based explanations vary considerably in terms of the focus they place on different actors. One strand claims that the working class was the key collective actor demanding their inclusion, empowered as a result of capitalist development (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992) or by presenting a revolutionary threat (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). A second strand claims that emerging economic but politically disenfranchised actors – the bourgeoise – were the democratizing force (Ansell and

Samuels 2014; Moore 1966). A third group places the focus on landowners and considers the protection of the interests of landed elites as necessary to advance toward democratization (Albertus 2017; Ziblatt 2017). Finally, some authors present a combined approach, highlighting cross-class alliances and identifying multiple paths to democratization (R. B. Collier 1999; Luebbert 1991).

Studying women's enfranchisement presents an opportunity for including non-class-based collective actors and identities. Looking both at women's mobilization and political parties, I demonstrate that while class remained a key factor to understand divisions within the women's movement and the organization of the party system, it falls shorts for understanding the discussions on suffrage extensions. Two forms of non-class identities are relevant to understand the decision-making behind women's enfranchisement: gender and religion. Gender marked the line between insiders and outsiders. Female outsiders were demanding their inclusion and male politicians were the gatekeepers deciding whether women should participate in politics and, more generally, expand their social roles. Religion also played a central role in the story, as a cleavage around which parties organized and women mobilized. In summary, the argument of this dissertation considers the roles of social forces in democratization moving beyond the existing class focus (Clarke 2017).

The final bias in the democratization literature concerns the regional focus. In comparative analyses, Europe remains the central area of attention, particularly in the historical analysis of democratization (Clarke 2017). The role of different social classes outlined above has been largely developed based on the pattern of capitalist modernization observed in Western Europe. Moreover, among the scholars that do include Latin America, there is a preference for Southern Cone countries – Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay – as those cases most easily fit the

modal European story and its relevant collective actors (e.g. R. B. Collier 1999; Madrid 2019a, 2019b). The literature on women's suffrage does not escape this trend (e.g. Banaszak 1996; Palm 2013; Przeworski 2009; D. Teele 2018).

Latin America plays a pivotal role in the comparative analysis of political regimes. Because of its early decolonization and nation-state consolidation, institutional development tended to occur in a gradual manner, as in Europe and other early industrializers. This gradual development contrasts with much of Africa and Asia, where many formal democratic institutions were adopted at once during independence. As such, Latin America can provide a better test of extant theories developed for Europe than other regions of the global South, where the different historical context present sharp distinctions that more easily allow ruling out certain explanations, particularly those based on class structure. At the same time, the region's historical development has important distinctions with much of Europe. The dominant Catholicism and high level of religiosity, on the one hand, and the social marginalization of (indigenous) rural societies, on the other, are two such differences that are relevant in my explanation of women's enfranchisement.

Recently, Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt proposed a new framework for the study of democratization moving away from the totalizing view of political regimes to examine specific institutions. This view starts from an understanding that each episode of institutional change often has its own set of causal factors and relevant actors (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). Additionally, the establishment and design of individual basic democratic institutions does not follow a linear development and can instead point in contradictory directions (Ahmed 2013). As such, to understand how democracy came about and the features it presents in different countries,

this strand of the literature focuses on specific episodes of democratization and the design of particular institutions such as constitutions, electoral systems, or the secret ballot.

The focus on episodes has the potential to overcome the biases mentioned above. Whereas considering male universal suffrage as an outcome or class as a key explanatory factor can be justified in some instances of reform, it does not mean they are sufficient to understand democracy at large. Despite this potential, the special issue where the framework was introduced was limited in its departure from existing literature. While participating scholars challenged class-based explanations, the issue did not include any analysis of gender and works on non-European cases. A later special issue following the framework that focused on the adoption of the secret ballot was likewise centered only on Europe and the US (Teorell, Ziblatt, and Lehoucq 2017).

This dissertation inserts itself in this research program by looking at one particular episode of institutional change but expanding it in its regional focus and through the inclusion of gender. My research analyzes one aspect of democracy – participation – and offers an explanation bounded to the reform that enfranchised women, in the particular historical context of the first half of the twentieth century, and in the Latin American region. In doing so, it builds and expands the democratization literature discussed in this section.

4 Research design and methods

This dissertation is the result of a multi-stage and multi-method research strategy. In regard to the former, a first stage can be described as theory-generating and the second as theory-testing. In terms of methods, the theory generation was based on process training. For theory testing, I use paired comparisons, process tracing, and statistical analysis.

Theory generating is process that combines inductive and deductive forms of reasoning and is iterative as it moves between both levels (Bennett and Checkel 2014; George and Bennett 2005). In addition to the literature on democratization and women's suffrage in other regions, I reviewed all the case studies I came across for the full set of Latin America. These are mostly works carried out by historians, and the number, breadth, and quality of the studies vary considerably from case to case.[2] After this preliminary sweeping, I developed an initial set of hypotheses that have been later refined and are presented in the theoretical chapter (chapter II).

The theory testing stage of the research design has two central components. First, I include a comparative chapter dedicated to the systematic evaluation of existing explanations for the entire set of Latin American countries using descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The main competing explanations considered are right wing parties as enfranchisers as they expect women will mostly support them (Przeworski 2009); heightened political competition that leads the incumbent to include new voters as necessary for enfranchisement (D. Teele 2018); the strategies of the women's movements (Banaszak 1996; D. Teele 2018), and modernization theory, particularly the entry of women into the paid workforce (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

An original dataset is the basis for this analysis. Here, cases or observations are defined by the year of the reform attempt, meaning there can be (and in most cases there are) multiple observations within one country. More specifically, I consider an attempt as instances where bills were actually debated in the legislative and executive powers; it excludes the mere introduction of a bill. This dataset constitutes an important empirical contribution as extant quantitative analyses do not code negative instances of reform. Likewise, the coding of women's

[2] Appendix 1 lists the secondary sources used for this stage.

mobilization – which I code from the same secondary literature in Appendix 1 – constitutes an important effort for comparative analysis.

With the results I can reject that there is any direct relationship between enfranchisement and these competing explanations; these are negative findings. I do not offer a complete test of my argument in the full set of Latin American cases as the complexity of my argument – including causal configurations and equifinality (George and Bennett 2005; Goertz and Mahoney 2012) – does not lend itself well for statistical analysis. In my argument there is one basic mechanism that explains reform – motivation alignment – achieved through multiple paths or sufficient combinations that are temporally bounded.

The rest of the theory testing component of the research uses paired comparisons and process tracing to conduct within-case analysis. I investigate six cases in four Latin American countries: Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. For the purposes of the early-late reform comparison, I consider the country-period (before or after WWII) as the unit of analysis. I pair the cases by their outcome, considering Ecuador and Uruguay as early reformers, while in Chile and Peru I study both the early and late periods. In these latter countries, the early cases constitute instances of failed reform, or negative cases, while the late period are positive cases. Including two cases in each of the chapters in this part of the dissertation, I use paired comparison (Slater and Ziblatt 2013) or structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005, chap. 3), meaning that I analyze the same questions in each of the cases. Specifically, I focus on the motivations of decision-makers and the causal factors that can best explain their alignment or misalignment.

With respect to the logic of case selection, I selected two pairs of cases from two different sub-regions within Latin America. Chile and Uruguay are cases from the Southern

Cone that share higher levels of economic, social, and political development within the Latin American context. They both also had strong women's movements. Ecuador and Peru, on the other hand, belong to the Andean region, with medium levels of development, weak institutions, frequent political instability, large indigenous populations, and low women's mobilization. The cases, nonetheless, vary on the main dependent variable of timing of reform. While Ecuador and Uruguay are early enfranchisers, Chile and Peru are among the late reformers.

The central aim of process tracing is "the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 7). Hypotheses are evaluated through diagnostic evidence and a case is built as to how well the evidence support the hypotheses, compared to the evidence supporting key rival explanations. In the case of the argument presented in this dissertation, the central rival hypothesis I evaluate through process tracing is that of a purely strategic account of suffrage reform. Some additional explanations that are evaluated concern the role of women's mobilization and pre-existing political regimes, when relevant.

As the four countries of the case studies were also included in the theory generation stage, it is crucial to incorporate additional evidence (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 18). The evidence presented in this research comes from two types of sources: primary and secondary sources. Historical sources include newspapers and other periodical publications, party and government documents, legislative debates, census data, electoral data, correspondence, among others. For some of the cases, these sources have been largely examined by existing scholarship while in others they remain understudied. The amount of primary data and its originality depends on two factors: the quality of the archives, largely determined by the historical bureaucratic

capacity of the state to produce and collect this information; and second, on the amount of existing research on the cases. For example, in Peru research concerning the process of women's enfranchisement is scant, therefore, multiple sources have yet to be analyzed. Primary sources are complemented by existing general and political historiography and country analyses of the process of female enfranchisement.

5 Contributions

Summarizing the discussion thus far, through the analysis of women's enfranchisement in Latin America, this dissertation makes several empirical and theoretical contributions to existing scholarship. First, on an empirical level, the dissertation offers a general overview of processes of enfranchisement in a region where the comparative work on the topic remains limited. While multiple country analyses exist, there have not been attempts to systematically compare basic features of processes of suffrage extension and many aspects of the debate remain under-analyzed. I present such an analysis. Based on an original dataset with all the successful and failed instances of suffrage reform in nineteen countries, I evaluate the relationship between reform and key variables such as women's suffragist mobilization, type of political regime, and ideological orientation of the government. In the country analyses, through the use of primary sources and detailed examination of the debates around suffrage extension, this research also contributes to countries' political historiography. The empirical contribution, then, encompasses both a comparative component as well as for individual countries.

As discussed above, this project moves the democratization literature beyond existing biases of male democracy, social class, and a regional focus in Europe. In particular, the attention of my argument on historical cleavages nicely complements the literature on early

democratization that centers on class conflict (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003; R. B. Collier 1999; Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992) by incorporating the religious cleavage. Religion and religious institutions remain uncommon in the democratization literature, and existing works focus mostly in Western Europe (Gould 1999; Kalyvas 1996). In studying a region with one dominant religion, my argument departs from old debates about democratization and religious denomination (particularly whether Protestantism is more favorable to democracy than Catholicism) (J. Anderson 2004) to concentrate on how a similar cleavage has different expressions in the political system and decision-making process. The religious argument also questions the distinction between doctrinal and not doctrinal policies that has been used in gender studies to explain outcomes across different areas of women's rights (Htun and Weldon 2010, 2018).

The research likewise contributes to scholarship on women's enfranchisement. The comparative and explanatory strand of this literature, like democratization studies more broadly, has concentrated on the West (Banaszak 1996; Palm 2013; Przeworski 2009; D. Teele 2018). The analysis of Latin America brings out two central contributions to this literature. First, unlike most advanced industrial nations, in many Latin American cases political competition was limited and of a different nature. As such, I investigate how processes of enfranchisement took place in authoritarian contexts, incorporating the logic of authoritarian politics into suffrage debates. Second, I analyze women's mobilization beyond suffragists. My claim is that politicians' calculations of women's behavior as future voters stemmed to a large degree from non-feminist female mobilization, particularly the mobilization of women in defense of the Catholic Church and traditional values. Extant literature focuses largely on the role and

characteristics of the suffragist movement.[3] Whether this type of mobilization is also relevant in other contexts, its incorporation into explanations of women's suffrage highlights the importance of expanding the regional scope and overcoming the early industrializing countries bias.

Finally, on a broader theoretical level, the framework presented to explain the timing of reform offers a novel mechanism by arguing that *alignment* of normative and strategic motivations is what explains reform. Strategic calculations are front and center in the literature of suffrage extensions as well as other electoral reforms (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ahmed 2013; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 1999, 2003; Mares 2015; Przeworski 2009; D. Teele 2018). The role of normative beliefs or ideology, on the other hand, is practically absent from this literature. By considering both as necessary, the framework brings together two explanations that are often seen as rivals. In doing so, and following Peter Hall's (2009) call for greater integration of approaches, the argument bridges the different strands of institutionalism – historical, sociological, and rational choice – that have been characterized as diverging in the focus they place on ideas or interests, and on using macro or micro approaches (Hall and Taylor 1996; Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate 2016). Initially depicted as having little communication, more recent works have found new areas of convergence among strands of institutionalism, as does my research. Concretely, in the argument presented in this dissertation, the strategic component falls within the rational-choice literature of actor's maximizing their utility based on specific interests. The normative component and the role of ideas has echo in both historical and sociological institutionalism. And while both motivations center on the micro-level, the cleavage part of the argument introduces a macro variable onto the analysis.

[3] Teele (2018) acknowledges the importance of non-suffragist mobilized women (e.g., the anti-suffragist movement in the United States). However, these groups do not enter into the case analysis in any of the empirical chapters.

6 Plan of the dissertation

This dissertation is organized in two parts. Part One, composed of chapters II and III, presents the theory and comparative data. Chapter II details the theoretical framework and then applies it to the two historical periods that form the early and late timing of female suffrage reform. It presents the actors and the different paths that led to early or late female enfranchisement.

Chapter III uses original and existing data to test how the dominant explanations for suffrage reform account for the Latin American cases. This is the most thorough cross-national examination of these explanation in the region. It also offers an improvement over existing statistical analyses by including all the instances of failed reform. This analysis shows that electoral competition, women's suffragist mobilization, political regimes, and modernization theory cannot account for the success of women's suffrage reform in Latin America. Although these variables cannot be completely discarded through this analysis and some of them are further evaluated in the case studies, this chapter considerably weakens the application of rival theories to the Latin American region.

Part Two is divided in three chapters that contain the case studies. Each case considers the dominant cleavage structure and general historical context, the nature of women's mobilization, and the motivations for reform of political parties, presidents, and legislators. Chapter IV focuses on Chile and Peru during the early reform period, as countries that failed to enfranchise women early. It claims that in both cases, the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage explains the misalignment of motivations, but that while in Chile it was the negative strategic motivations among key decision-makers which explains failed reform, in Peru it was a negative

normative motivation. In chapter V, I look at Ecuador and Uruguay, two cases of successful early reform. Both of these are cases of reform guided by positive normative motivations, in Uruguay by a progressive elite that imposed a certain normative consensus and in Ecuador by the predominance of liberalism after a successful revolution. Finally, chapter VI analyzes Chile and Peru again, this time as successful late reformers. This chapter states that in these two cases, reform was guided by strategic considerations of incumbents. In Chile, these considerations came from a political realignment along a communist/anticommunist cleavage whereas in Peru, short-term political factors led the positive calculations.

The conclusions summarize the argument and contributions of the dissertation and explore how the argument can be generalized beyond Latin America. Particularly, it focuses on Southern European countries that shared a similar religious cleavage and where we can observe analogous debates and outcomes as those present in Latin America. A second exploration of the generalizability of the argument explores how the motivation alignment mechanism – the central theoretical contribution on this dissertation – can be used to make sense of reforms in other policy domains beyond electoral reform. Finally, the dissertation ends by inquiring about the relationship between the process of enfranchisement and women's subsequent political participation.

VPART I: THEORY AND COMPARATIVE DATA

II. A THEORY OF MOTIVATION ALINGMENT

Why did Uruguay enfranchised women relatively early while neighboring Argentina, despite a stronger feminist movement and a similar early experience with democracy (among other similarities) failed to do so? Why did Cárdena's revolutionary Mexico tank an advanced attempt at legal reform for women's enfranchisement, only to take the final step in 1953 under a non-reformist government and a weakened women's movement? What factors put Ecuador at the forefront in the region in terms of women's suffrage? These examples indicate that timing of women's enfranchisement in Latin America is a puzzling outcome for two main reasons: first, some of the early enfranchisers are not "expected" based on factors such as previous experience with democracy, level of economic and social development, state strength, or suffragists' mobilizations. Second, since the late nineteenth century many countries debated on the convenience and consequences of including or excluding women from the franchise, but only in the 1950s was women's suffrage a reality in most countries.

Based on these puzzling developments, this dissertation asks about the timing of reform in the region, following a "causes of effects" approach (Holland 1986; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Three specific outcomes are explored: failed early reform, early reform, and late reform. I propose a framework to answer these questions that incorporates general theoretical propositions regarding motivations for electoral reform and the factors that explain them, and a set of historically specific elements for each of these periods – early (1920s-1939) and late reform (1940 and after).

The central proposition of the theory is that women's suffrage reform occurs when politicians' strategic motivations and normative beliefs align. If actors have contradictory

motivations, reform is either stalled or rejected. To explain dominant strategic calculations and normative beliefs, I turn to the key cleavages in a given polity and how these shape political coalitions, on the one hand, and to short-term political factors, on the other.

In what follows I first discuss the general logic of the argument and present the multiple components. Sections 2-4 discuss the three components of the framework – motivation alignment, cleavages, and short-term political factors – from a theoretical perspective. The following three sections put the framework at work in the specific Latin American historical conditions. Each of the three historical sections focuses on one outcome: failed early reform, early reform, and late reform.

1 Summary of the argument: a framework to explain women's suffrage

The framework I propose to explain women's suffrage reform has three central components: 1) cleavage structure, 2) short-term political factors, and 3) the alignment of normative and strategic motivations of decision-makers. The first two represents causal conditions, while the latter is conceptualized as a causal mechanism. Short-term political factors group two conditions (incumbents in electoral need and feminist individual action) that alone or in combination explain reform – via their effect on politician's motivations. I present them together for parsimony and to differentiate them from cleavages, which represents a structural condition. I argue that cleavages and political factors act as two paths to explain reform, as depicted in Figure II.1.

My explanation for the variation in the timing of reform has as focal point and central theoretical contribution an argument about politicians' strategic and normative motivations and their (mis)alignment. Only when both types of motivations are positive regarding suffrage

reform will enfranchisement occur. Motivation alignment constitutes the mechanism behind suffrage reform. Here, I understand mechanisms as "an unobserved entity that – when activated – generates an outcome of interest" (Mahoney 2001, 580). As motivations are not directly observable, they fit this definition. The mechanism, then, is not an intervening variable; they are portable concepts linking causes and outcomes (Falleti and Lynch 2009).

Figure II.1. Summary of Causal Argument



To understand when we observe motivation alignment or misalignment – and therefore reform or no reform –, there are two sets of conditions that complete the causal story. First are cleavages. Socio-historical cleavages give rise to different political parties, which in turn form political coalitions. From cleavages to coalitions there is a process of politicization of cleavages, so similar structural conditions can give rise to different political alignments. In addition to political coalitions, cleavages shed light on the nature of women's mobilization. Mobilization for the most part did not subvert dominant cleavages, but examining it is necessary for understanding politician's motivations.

Cleavages, then, are paramount to explain women's suffrage reform. However, their impact is not even across the three outcomes. In regard to the first outcome, I contend that

cleavages are almost sufficient to explain failed early reform. What I call the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic dominant cleavage in the early period (combining class and religious divisions) prevented the alignment of motivations, and suffrage bills were either stalled or rejected. For the positive outcomes, in both the early and late period, cleavages and coalitions explain some of the cases; in other words, they represent one causal path. In the early period, a cleavage structure that deviated from the general oligarchic/anti-oligarchic pattern explains reform. Or when the anti-oligarchic coalition reached power through a coup and were able to enact reform without participation of the other side of the cleavage. In the late period, some of the cases are explained by the change in cleavage alignment produced around WWII. While the underlaying cleavages (e.g. class, religion) did not fundamentally modify, their politicization changed. The central political cleavage was around class and was based on the communist/anti-communist polarization characteristic of the Cold War. In practice, the change meant that many middle-class political parties that had been part of the anti-oligarchic coalition now closed lines with their former political enemies to oppose communism. This change in political alignments unleashed sequences of events that led to the female franchise.

The rest of the cases of successful reform in both the early and late period are explained by what I call short-term political factors. In this category I include two conditions: electoral need and feminist individual action. The former refers to new incumbents that are in electoral need because their projects require supermajorities or are attempting to build a new electoral coalition against established parties. Feminist individual action – a different category than feminist mobilization – refers to the actions of feminist leaders and their capacity to directly reach decision-makers. I consider both of these political factors as short-term because they generally emerge from events such as a new election, changing political alliances, a successful

lobbying action. As such, these are conditions that are not directly related to cleavages and thus represent a second path to reform (see Figure II.1).

How does this framework to explain women's suffrage reform face in terms of the big theoretical debates regarding democratization and institutional change more broadly? A first longstanding debate in the democratization literature is whether democracy comes about through pressures from below or is engineered by elites to guard their interests.[4] Democratization from below is most often used to explain historical processes, where the central causal impulse is attributed to an excluded social class that through mobilization forces concessions from elites. Different versions of the argument place the locus of action in the bourgeoisie (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Moore 1966) or the working class (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Przeworski 2009; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In contrast, theories of democracy from above claim that splits within the ruling elite are the central cause of democratic reforms (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Madrid 2019a; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

Some works acknowledge that causality is usually more complex and identified different paths to democracy, where some cases fit the pressure from below argument, others are elite-led, and yet others present a combination of both (R. B. Collier 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 2016). My argument follows this line of reasoning, identifying various paths to women's suffrage reform. In most cases, my explanation comes close to the elite-led set of arguments. While mobilization from below was an input for the decision-making process, as I discuss below, this mobilization was usually not able to "force" reform. And many countries adopted women's votes without significant mobilization from suffragist groups. In some cases, I identify feminist action

[4] See Albertus and Menaldo (2018) for a recent review of this debate from a political economy perspective.

as a central cause, however, this is a more targeted form of influence than the collective action identified in the bottom-up explanations. Balance among political elites is then central in my explanation.

The class argument versus elite-led democratization have also been approached from the agency-structure debate. Bottom-up arguments are often conceived as structural as macro factors (usually economic development) are the cause behind the rise of the bourgeoise and working class. Some version of the elite-led argument, on the other hand, place the focus on the role of particular leaders, assigning the main causal role to human agency (Huntington 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).[5] Here I adopt what Mahoney and Snyder (1999) call in integrative approach that combines both agency and structure. Unlike the integrative models they identify – funnel, path dependency, and eclectic – my argument combines different types of causes in a single framework but through different paths, highlighting either structure or agency in the explanation of specific cases. Cleavages are structural, while short-term political factors are largely agential as they depend on the specific leader in power and their electoral needs. Feminist activists are also part of leadership-based arguments. As cleavages and political factors represent different causal paths to reform, this dissertation argues that democratization (or in this case a single reform) cannot be explained solely by structural or agential elements; in some cases it is the former that is causally dominant while others faced a more continent process of reform.

Finally, from the perspective of the different institutionalism, the integrative character of the argument signifies a contribution to this literature. Hall and Taylor's (1996) foundational article identifying three strands of institutionalism in political science – rational choice,

[5] The agency-structure debate does not perfectly map onto the bottom-up and top-down arguments; I link them for simplicity.

historical, and sociological – set the stage for subsequent debates regarding the nature of institutional change. These approaches have been characterized as diverging in the focus they place on ideas or interests, and on using macro or micro approaches (Hall and Taylor 1996; Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate 2016). Figure II.2 (left) graphically represents how the three institutionalisms are located on these two dimensions. Initially depicted as having little communication, more recent works have found new areas of convergence among strands of institutionalism. Following Peter Hall's (2009) call for greater integration of approaches, the argument in this dissertation bridges the different strands of institutionalism, as shown in the right panel in Figure II.2.

Figure II.2. The Three Institutionalisms and Causal Argument to Explain Women's Suffrage



Note: HI=Historical Institutionalism; RCI=Rational Choice Institutionalism; SI=Sociological Institutionalism.
Source: Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate (2016, 15).

Concretely, in the argument presented here, the motivation alignment mechanism combines interests and ideas. Strategic motivations fall within the rational-choice literature of

actor's maximizing their utility based on specific interests. The normative component and the role of ideas has echo in both historical and sociological institutionalism. In terms of the micro-macro dimension, both motivations center on the micro-level as individuals (presidents, legislators, party leaders) are the holders of these motivations for reform. The different causal conditions, on the other hand, are located on different places in the macro-micro continuum. Cleavages represent macro structural variables but because there is a required process of politicization of cleavages, it encompasses a considerable space within this axis. In terms of interests-ideas, cleavages are located in the middle, affecting both. Short-term political factors closer to the micro dimension as here particular leaders and parties are fundamental. However, their context is also relevant, so they are closer to the middle compared to strategic and normative motivations. Finally, short-term political factors also impact both types of motivations, but they usually have a greater impact on actor's strategic calculations.

In general terms, then, my explanation for women's enfranchisement and its different component push forward existing theoretical debates in the direction of integration. While in the bottom-up/top-down debate, my explanation falls more clearly on the latter, in terms of the agency-structure debate and the different institutionalisms there is integration of different theoretical traditions.

As mentioned, the causal mechanism alone combines interests and ideas, providing an important theoretical contribution. This mechanism of motivation alignment is present across all periods and outcomes – and at the heart of the analysis –, and I turn to its discussion next.

2 Motivations in political decision-making

In the most basic sense, to explain suffrage extensions we need to understand under what conditions members of the legislature and executive power will support them; we need to understand and explain their motivations. I contend that two main types of motivations guide reforms: strategic calculations regarding the potential electoral and political benefits, on the one hand, and normative commitments about the issue at hand, including ideas about democracy, inclusion, and gender roles, on the other. I refer to these as electoral calculations and normative beliefs.

These motivations correspond to two of the four types of action identified by Max Weber's in his theory of social action. Weber's four types are: a) instrumental action or according to pursued goals; b) value-rational, determined by the belief in an ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of value for its own sake; c) affectual, motivated by feelings; and d) traditional or ingrained habituation (Weber 1978, 24–25). For the type of decision-making process that I am studying, I consider the first two types to be the most relevant. While emotions certainly play a role, I argue that such emotions reinforce other motivations (particularly normative ones) rather than have an independent effect. With respect to traditional action, it may be relevant in politics to explain the status quo or lack of decision. The cases I am analyzing, however, are instances were suffrage reform was debated in the legislature; therefore, it is unlikely that approval or rejection was based on habit.

Strategic calculations concerning electoral benefits are estimations from political actors of how reform will impact their electoral support and ultimately the distribution of power. Starting from the broadly accepted premise that politicians want to remain in office and parties aim at increasing their representation, and in line with the literature, I propose that incumbents make strategic calculations regarding the merits of reform based on whether and how the

inclusion of a new constituency of voters will change the existing electoral balance. But I claim that in the Latin American context where electoral autocracies were common, elections often played a different role. Electoral autocracies often use elections to build supermajorities (Magaloni 2008). And using female voters for that purpose, also comprised a key strategic motivation. Finally, strategic considerations may not be electoral; at times a government, particularly an authoritarian one, may need legitimacy rather than voters. And certain reforms, such as the adoption of democratic institutions, aid in obtaining that legitimacy from both international observers and the domestic population. All of these are types of strategic motivations for reform.

The second set of motivations is in the realm of ideas. Both beliefs and ideology inform actor's motivations for reform. Following Sheri Berman (2013), I understand beliefs as "opinions held by political actors that are relatively limited in scope or relate to relatively circumscribed areas of politics" (223-224), while ideologies "are distinguished by their ability to create their own communities of believers, by their purposive nature, and by their ties to particular political programs and movements" (225). Political parties have core principles such as defending and deepening liberal democracy, human rights, increasing freedoms, achieving equality, protecting tradition and religious principles, among others. Some of these principles form part of ideologies while others are beliefs. But in both constitute motivations for reform as these principles have what Nina Tannenwald (1999) calls constitutive effects; they define what is acceptable. When facing reform, the ideas held by some actors will be compatible with and favorable to reform while others will not.

It must be noted that in practice, electoral calculations and normative beliefs are not fully independent; calculations are often dressed as other principles to appeal to the population. And

parties' ideas can be deployed strategically, as parties calculate how their position on a specific issue strengthens or weakens their brand. Nonetheless, we can analytically separate the two types of motivations and find evidence that demonstrates the presence of one or the other. A second caveat relates to the difficulty of identifying motivations, either because they are not explicitly stated or because actors are insincere in their justifications for a given decision. Methodological awareness and the use of multiple sources is the best strategy in this regard, with the goal of finding consistency of expressed motivations (E. Anderson 2013).

I hypothesize that alignment of strategic and normative motivations is generally necessary for successful reform; motivations are jointly necessary. Under normal circumstances, actors will not pursue a reform that they believe has negative political and/or electoral consequences for them; they will prefer the status-quo. Nor, under normal circumstances, will actors go against their normative commitments. As a consequence, I also hypothesize that, if motivations point in opposite directions, as it is often the case, decision-makers will opt to stall or reject reform. Table II.1 summarizes the *motivation alignment* hypothesis, showing how only the "yes/yes" cell has the outcome of reform.

Table II.1. Motivations and reform

		Ideas favorable	
		Yes	**No**
Strategic calculus favorable	**Yes**	Reform	No reform
	No	No reform	No reform

A dichotomous coding of motivations represents the simplest form of the argument. A third category – "neutral" motivations – can be introduced. For example, the electoral and

political implications of a reform at times are not clear, making strategic motivations neutral. Similarly, some actors or even political parties may not be committed to normative principles and ideologies on specific issues, or in general if they are non-programmatic. I hypothesize that one positive motivation combined with one neutral motivation will also lead to a positive outcome of reform. Likewise, a neutral motivation combined with a negative one will generate a negative orientation toward reform. Table II.2 summarizes this version of the argument with the trichotomous coding.

Table II.2. Trichotomous coding for motivations and reform

		Ideas favorable		
		Yes	**Neutral**	**No**
Strategic calculus favorable	**Yes**	Reform	Reform	No reform
	Neutral	Reform	No reform	No reform
	No	No reform	No reform	No reform

The central unit of analysis for the motivation alignment argument is the political party. Elections are organized around parties, so it is at this level where strategic calculations come into play. Likewise, ideologies are usually located at the party level. When considering individuals, for example presidents, it is in their role as leaders of a party or coalition. Even personalistic regimes in Latin America of the early and mid-twentieth century – like those headed by the Somozas in Nicaragua or Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic – used a political party as base of support. Although some parties have low ideological coherence and party discipline, expectations about behavior regarding electoral reform are still made at the party level.

But not all parties are created equal. One important assumption of the argument is that strategic calculations are particularly important for larger parties, those who are actually

competing for power or a big share of seats. Small independent parties will place stronger emphasis on ideological motivations as the prospects of electoral success are scarce, with or without new voters. For this reason, I call the latter group principle parties.[6]

Strategic calculations arguments dominate the literature on electoral reform. When explaining the female franchise in the UK, the US, and France, Teele (2018) claims that the interaction between incumbent's strategic calculations and women's strategic mobilization explains early reform in limited democracies. If the incumbent is in electoral need and (as a results of women's mobilization) perceives women would cast their ballots mostly in their favor, they will enfranchise them. Analyzing the American case, McConnaughy (2015) presents a programmatic model, arguing that incumbents calculations relate not only what the new voters my offer, but what their existing constituencies demand regarding enfranchisement. In this sense, the coalitions suffragists are able to build with other groups such as farmers and labor unions are key to explain support for reform. Przeworski (2009) also argues strategic decisions are central, hypothesizing that the left will tend to be the enfranchiser of women in Protestant countries, whereas conservative parties will lead the process in Catholic nations. At least for Latin America, these strategic arguments are insufficient.

For male suffrage extensions in Chile and Uruguay, Madrid (2019a) claims these reforms were the result of splits within the incumbent party. Both the incumbent and opposition parties understood suffrage extension in a strategic light, specifically with status quo institutions benefiting the government party. When a faction of the incumbent party joined the opposition, reform took place. Political economist studying historical democratization and the inclusion of

[6] The "principle parties" label was often used by contemporaries in this same sense, to refer to small, ideological parties. One example is the Communist Party, which in most countries remained electorally weak.

lower classes focus less on the loss of office and more on the redistributive consequences of shifting electoral balances, also from a strategic perspective. Concretely, the new political landscape impacts redistributive outcomes through taxation and protection from expropriation as new voters have different preferences (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003). The evaluation the incumbent makes is strategic, assessing whether the benefits of extending the franchise outweigh its costs.

Electoral calculations arguments have also been advanced for other electoral institutions. For example, Boix (1999) argues that the entry of new actors in the twentieth century (mostly leftist parties) led ruling parties to evaluate changes to the electoral system. If the left was weak or the non-socialist camp maintained a dominant position, there was not a real threat and parties retained majoritarian systems. Conversely, a strong left would lead incumbents to adopt proportional representation to minimize their electoral loss. Ahmed (2013) likewise claims that the design of electoral systems in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe was a strategic choice made by pre-democratic elites to minimize the impact of suffrage expansion. Mares (2015) also focuses on incumbents' strategic use of existing electoral institutions when analyzing the adoption of the secret ballot and measures against voter intimidation in Germany.

Normative considerations, on the other hand, are almost absent from this literature on electoral reform. The topic comprises a considerable body literature in other areas such as international relations (with constructivism's attention to norms) and increasingly in research programs on social policy (e.g. Anderson 2013; Jacobs 2009; Orenstein 2013; Wincott 2010) and political economy (Blyth 2002, 2015; Hall 1989; Morrison 2016; Nelson 2017).[7] Ideational arguments, however, are marginal for explaining electoral reform.

[7] For an extended discussion of the literature on ideas and politics, see Beland and Cox (2010).

Lee Ann Banaszak (1996) is one scholar that considers beliefs and values in her comparison of the US and Swiss women's movements. The author argues that "beliefs and values determine which actions movements will evaluate as having utility and which will be considered counterproductive or useless" (33). Additionally, collective beliefs act as a lens though which information is filtered. These factors, however, are considered at the movement level. The argument does not consider beliefs of decision-makers, which is the focus of my analysis.

McCammon et al. (2001) consider how changes in gender relations caused decision-makers to altered their view on women's proper roles. This is what they call *gendered opportunities structure,* as opposed to *political opportunity structures,* which is closer to what I call strategic motivations. The argument, however, does not theorize on how the two interact, as changes in gender relations is one of a long list of independent variables considered in their statistical model.

Another cultural argument focuses specifically on religion and is based on the empirical correlation (in the Western hemisphere) between timing of female enfranchisement and dominant religion – with Protestant majority countries enfranchising women before Catholic ones. Bertocchi (2011) argues that the variation was due to values in both religions. Catholicism had supported a traditional breadwinner model and the idea the women's natural place was the home. On the contrary, Protestantism allowed more options for women and, since the Reformation, it incentivized girls' education. Suffragists in Catholic nations, therefore, faced much stronger resistance from male elites and society at large, which ultimately delayed their enfranchisement. The argument, while considering the effects of religious beliefs on normative motivations, compares across religions – Protestants versus Catholics – but is unable to explain

differences in the timing of reform within regions that are religiously homogenous, as Latin America.

In the literature on political regimes, *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America* by Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (2013) represents a rare case where normative concerns are central to their argument. In fact, because this type of argument is uncommon, and motivations are often seen as trivial, the authors spend a whole section refuting potential critiques to assigning normative preferences a key role in a theory about regime change (pp. 52-56). Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán consider two variables at the actor level: policy preferences (interests or strategic considerations) and normative views about dictatorship and democracy, which is the most proximate cause of regime change.[8]

My critique to Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán's theory is based, first, on the lack of clarity with respect to how the contradiction is solved when both motivations point in different directions. "An initial commitment to democracy may be cancelled by emerging radicalism among other actors, for example. Or potentially radical players may, by contrast, behave moderately if other actors are committed to competitive politics and they believe that competitive politics will serve their policy goals" (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 62) . While acknowledging that there is often a trade-off between policy and normative preferences, they do not offer a solution or a theorization of the circumstances under which one set of preferences will be dominant. Second, the authors claim that normative regime preferences are the more proximate cause and all the other variables have an effect on it (see figure in p. 47). From a methodological perspective this seems problematic as all the variables are assign the

[8] The third central variable in their argument are international influences, which have an effect on normative and policy preferences.

same ontological role (i.e. as variables). If normative views are always the crucial factors, then they might in fact be better understood as a mechanism that is activated, as in my framework.

Ideas also briefly appear in Ruth Collier's work. Collier (1999) identifies three paths to democratization for historical cases (with a definition of democracy that looks at broad male suffrage). In the first of those paths, called middle-sector democratization, the middle classes demanded their own inclusion based on a liberal project, a project that included full manhood suffrage. The working class was thus included as part of a liberal project – a normative commitment – driven by middle sectors. Motivations, however, are not the focus of Collier's analysis and the author does not expand on the issue. Madrid (2019a) likewise considers (liberal) ideology as a determinant of male suffrage extension in Chile, but as subordinated to strategic calculations. "Although ideology may have led some parties and legislators to support democratic reform, it has often proved less important than partisan interests in determining their votes" (171). And the role of ideology is not theorized in this argument.

This brief consideration of the literature on suffrage reform indicates how existing theories emphasize strategic decisions. Normative and ideological positions are usually not explicitly theorized. As the analysis of early women's suffrage reform will show, strategic considerations are insufficient to understand the timing of female enfranchisement in Latin America. In a number of countries, including Argentina, El Salvador, and Peru, incumbents had the strategic incentive – as well as the votes in the legislature – to incorporate female voters in the early period; it would benefit them, as per the perceptions of actors across the political spectrum. However, these incumbents failed to pass reform. Only when we take into consideration normative beliefs about women's political participation is that we can make sense of the outcome. More specifically, when both motivations align is that enfranchisement occurs.

3 Cleavages

In this section of the argument I discuss from a theoretical perspective the path that considers cleavages as central cause of women's suffrage reform. I start by reviewing the role of cleavages in forming of political parties and coalitions as the main effect cleavages play for the ultimate decision of enfranchising women. The existing literature on women's suffrage has not, in my view, adequately addressed the role of cleavages for suffrage reform. I then analyze the role of women's mobilization and how it relates to cleavages. My view of mobilization departs from the existing literature in a broad focus on women's activities, beyond the actions of suffragists, and in most cases directly deriving from cleavages and existing political divisions. A final issue I review in this section is the role of international factors. A long literature has analyzed the impact of international variables in democratization. I propose that for women's suffrage reform, the international climate had a crucial effect as an exogenous shock that changed the nature of the dominant cleavages and therefore of political coalitions.

3.1 Socio-historic cleavages and political coalitions

I argue that historical cleavages originating political and social coalitions are a fundamental causal factor to understand the motivations of the different actors. Cleavages act as a key condition to explain how political actors organize and compete for access to power. For the analysis in this dissertation, the central expression of cleavages is the party system and its representation in the legislative, as legislatures constitute the main decision-making arena for suffrage reform.

My understanding of cleavages aligns with the foundational work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) on party system formation in Western Europe, in which parties reflect deep social, cultural, economic, and territorial divisions. Scholars working on political parties have claimed that this classic cleavage argument does not translate well to Latin America, where many countries have had historically weak parties (Hagopian 2007). My argument shows that, even though party organization have not been long-lasting, cleavages are still fundamental to explain policy outcomes.

Divisions among parties often have a base in these social, cultural, economic, and territorial divisions. Structural conditions, however, do not automatically translate into a political cleavage; a process of cleavage politicization needs to occur (Kalyvas 1996; Laitin 1986). Additionally, there are cleavages based on divisions that are political and not structural, although both usually combined. In Latin America, the structural divisions were relatively similar across countries, but despite these similarities, structural divisions went through different processes of politicization, leading to different expressions of the cleavage in the political system.

Despite a similar starting point, I depart from Lipset and Rokkan in two respects. First, I understand cleavages as more dynamic than their path dependent framework highlights. For these authors, cleavages can be observable in the party system even after the initial cleavage (or its high degree of politicization) have waned. However, realignments leading to new coalitions can occur every couple of decades – due to endogenous or exogenous factors –, particularly in contexts of high institutional flux such as Latin America and Africa. I also depart from Lipset and Rokkan on their exclusive focus on political parties and electoral competition. Cleavages are equally reflected outside the party system. For instance, in an authoritarian regime with no legal

parties, cleavages dividing government and opposition can also be identified, which is, again, an insight that comes from analyzing countries with weak institutional settings.

Coalitions formed around sociopolitical cleavages are essential to understand actor's normative and strategic motivations. Regarding the former, cleavages shed light on parties' programmatic positions. In this sense, Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage argument is commonly understood as the basis for programmatic representation (Kitschelt 2000). For example, a religious cleavage translates into a normative commitment – and a programmatic platform – to secularizing policies, on one side, and measures protecting and/or advancing churches' areas of influence, on the other.

With respect to strategic motivations, cleavages affect political calculations by way of constituencies, as core and secondary constituencies emerge from social and political cleavages. In a class cleavage, for instance, parties on the right typically will have the upper class – landed and commercial elites – as their core constituency, while on the left, labor has historically taken this place (Gibson 1996). Other organized actors such as women's organizations, indigenous movements, and environmental groups are also important constituencies linked to one side of a sociopolitical cleavage. How reform impacts these actors and whether they attribute responsibility to incumbents is the basis for strategic calculations.

Actors' strategic motivation toward reform will partly depend on whether the reform in question creates a new constituency – whose behavior is at least partly unknown – or benefits an existing one. When a reform affects an established constituency linked to a specific party, that party's calculations are generally straightforward. By contrast, in suffrage expansions to women, particularly for early enfranchisers, it was unclear how the new voters would behave. This argument is about positions before reform takes place, regardless of whether or not those

calculations turn out to be correct. Ex ante estimations can fail to materialize as has often been the case of social policy in the United States (Galvin and Thurston 2017).

In summary, how parties and coalitions situate around one or more cleavages will inform their normative and strategic motivations. For instance, a single cleavage can generate contradictory motivations, and whether parties organize around overlapping or cross-cutting cleavages will also be informative of how coalitions shift. As I show below, historically relevant cleavages in the region – and central to my explanation – are the class and religious cleavage. All in all, cleavages form the basis of the analysis of the main political actors considered in this dissertation.

Because socio-historical cleavages are so central to the organization of parties, and to political and social coalitions, their presence in the literature on democratization and suffrage reform is widespread. In most cases, however, the notion of cleavage is implicit. For example, the literature concerned with democratization that analyzes the extension of the male franchise, centers their argument on the role of specific social classes, classes that are the product of cleavages (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003; R. B. Collier 1999; Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992).

Among studies of women's suffrage, two authors explicitly discuss cleavages. In the case of Teele, cleavages are explicitly discussed in her theory, mostly in the role they have on suffragists' capacity to overcome group cleavages and organize a broad or narrow movement (D. Teele 2018, 38–42). The role of cleavages in the party system, although graphically stated, is not discussed in detail. Empirically, the impact of cleavages is most evident in the case of France, where, in line with existing studies of the country, it was the religious cleavage which impeded the passing of women's voting rights in 1919. The cleavage acted by hampering suffragists

chances of forming a broad movement but more importantly, in the (negative) incentives it created for the dominant Radical party. This explanation is very much in line with the theory stated in this dissertation, although it is still framed as a strategic argument.[9]

In an article analyzing the timing of women's suffrage in Western Europe, Trineke Palm (2013) evaluates which conditions from Lipset and Rokkan's cleavages theory explaining early and late introduction. This is an example of a direct use of cleavages to explain women's enfranchisement. Using QCA, the author considers the religious, ethno-linguistic, class, and the sectoral cleavages (conflict between agrarians and industrialists). Her results produce two paths or combination of conditions for early reform and two for late reform. However, there is little theoretical elaboration as to the role of each condition and no further empirical analysis beyond the QCA results.

Overall, the role of socio-historic cleavages and their translation into the political arena represent a stepping stone in explanations of political development since Lipset and Rokkan's work in the 1960s. Their importance, however, is often implicit or undertheorized. How cleavages actually impact political institutions, which are more relevant at any given time, or how they change are all questions that require further analysis and are addressed by the argument presented in this dissertation.

3.2 Women's mobilization

[9] In the conclusion, I discuss the generalizability of the argument and address the cases of France and other Catholic Southern European countries that had similar cleavages to Latin America. I claim that my argument can also be applied to those cases, in line with the argument presented by Teele and the French historiography.

A second expression of cleavages – in addition to political coalitions –, fundamental to explain women's suffrage reform, is women's mobilization. Women's mobilization plays an important role in the literature on women's suffrage and it has been the main area of interest of feminist historians. Partly because the literature on the topic has been largely dominated by an analysis of the American and British cases[10] – outliers in terms of the strength and militant tactics of the suffragists –, and because of the focus of feminist historians in uncovering female organizational efforts, case studies assign an important causal role to mobilization. For example, referring to Chile, Margaret Power (2002, 54) writes "Their [women's organizations] determined efforts secured women's right to vote in national elections in 1949."

Here I claim that women's mobilization is central to understand politician's calculations, as it is based on this mobilization that they made calculations as to whether enfranchising women would hurt them or benefit them electorally. Different forms of mobilization, secondarily, likewise contributed to normative views on the role of women's participation in the political sphere. I contend, however, that the nature of mobilization is a consequence of the cleavage structure because mobilization was generally unable to subvert existing divisions, and as such I consider it part of this same causal condition. In more formal terms, I do not assign an *independent* causal role of women's mobilization but consider it one of the ways in which cleavages matter to understand political decisions, together with the forming of coalitions discussed above.

[10] A quick search on Google Scholar under "women's suffrage" reflects the focus on these two cases. Of the first sixty results, and excluding primary sources, eleven results refer to the US case, eighteen to the British one, fifteen to other Western countries, five are cross-national, and four analyze non-Western countries. More than half of the results engage only two cases. Results for April 2016.

Accounts of suffrage reform that have women's mobilization at the center can be grouped in three types of argument. The first type of argument is centered on the organization and influence of women's movements from an international perspective. Large-*N* statistical analyses (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006) as well as qualitative studies (Towns 2010a) have provided evidence for the claim that the institutionalization of the women's movement increased the pressure for countries to treat men and women as equal citizens, improving the chances of suffrage adoption. These studies show a correlation between the institutionalization of the international women's movement and the growing number of countries adopting women's suffrage. However, they do not provide much insight as to why some countries developed strong women's movements before this process of institutionalization, why places subject to similar external influences adopted suffrage at different times, or how transnational networks interacted with other actors in the political system.

The domestic strand of this argument is framed within the social movement literature. These authors argue that the political opportunities, resources, and strategies that women's movements had in different places can explain the variation in success in the adoption of women's suffrage (Banaszak 1996; McCammon et al. 2001). For example, Lee Ann Banaszak focuses on the leadership, alliances, tactics, and beliefs to explain the American suffragist movement success in 1920 and the failure of the Swiss movement, where women had to wait until 1971 for federal enfranchisement. This argument does not travel well to Latin America as strength of suffragist mobilization went from very weak to medium intensity. In terms of strategies, variation was also limited. No case comes close to American activism, and even the cases with more significant organization there is no correlation with the timing of enfranchisement.

A final set of arguments refer more explicitly to an interaction between political factors and women's movement actions. In this line, a more sophisticated account on the role of women's movements is that of Teele (2018), who argues that the alignment of strategic interests between politicians and suffragists explains reform. This alignment occurred when a party was facing strong competition and was thus in electoral need, and when mobilized women made strategic choices through which were able to overcome political cleavages to form broader movements. McConnaughy (2015) also argues that suffragists strategic decisions were a key signal to incumbents. She looks at the coalitions these mobilized women made with other constituencies, and how those coalitions influenced party's decisions of whether to enfranchise women. But again, these arguments are based largely on cases with strong movements.

The different strands of women's mobilization arguments, then, cannot account for variation in timing of reform in Latin America – as I show in chapter III –, a region where some early cases saw little mobilization while other with stronger movements only passed reform after WWII. Additionally, the focus on suffragists leaves other forms of female mobilization largely outside of the analysis, limiting the scope of party's strategic calculations. In turn, I claim that to understand the impact of mobilization in suffrage reform we need to look at the full range of women's mobilization.

In the first half of the twentieth century, women created feminist organizations to demand equal civil and political rights. If they included equal voting rights, I include them under the label of suffragist mobilization, even if their agenda was broader. This is the type of organization usually considered in the literature cited above. But in addition to this type of mobilization, women participated in other forms of political activity. The earliest causes that prompted women's mobilization – in the late nineteenth century – was usually the defense of the Catholic

Church's prerogatives and areas of influence and their participation in charitable activities. In the twentieth century working women also began organizing for their rights as female workers. And in some countries, such as Cuba in the 1920s or Venezuela in the 1940s, women also took part in revolutionary or democratizing processes.[11] All of these were instances when women mobilized as women, but only some constituted feminist mobilization.[12] In general terms, women mobilized following religious and class divisions, the same cleavages structured political parties and coalitions.

As I discuss in the historical sections below, many of these forms of women's organizations were relevant for politicians' motivations to support or reject suffrage reform. Most directly, they were central for strategic calculations, as the most numerous forms of mobilization signaled which women were keener to participate in the political sphere and had more organizational resources. On the other hand, the different forms of mobilization also impacted actors' normative beliefs, by reflecting certain ideals of women. For conservatives, for example, according to these ideals, women were defenders of tradition, with a superior sense of morality, and should thus remain in the family sphere, with charity work as an extension of that role. For liberals and leftist parties, women's mobilization often reflected they were equally prepared and interested in public affairs, and as such they should be allowed to vote and run for office.

Across the region there were multiple attempts at overcoming class and religious divides and form broad movements. The success of these initiatives, nonetheless, was limited; few

[11] Women's participation in democratizing projects has a correlate in the democratic transitions of the 1980s in Latin America (Alvarez 1990; Baldez 2002).
[12] On the conceptualization of women's movements, feminist, and non-feminist mobilization, see Beckwith (2005).

organizations managed to overcome social divisions (Asuncion Lavrin 1998; Ehrick 2005). As I show in the case studies, it was women's organizing along similar cleavages as political parties that provided decision-makers with central motivations to decide whether to support women's inclusion.

Following these considerations, the analysis of women's mobilization in the case studies makes three central contributions. First, it has an important descriptive value. In some cases, we know little about women's mobilization; sources remained to be uncovered and systematically analyzed. And what we do know tends to focus on feminist activists. Comparative research on Latin American women's movements and suffrage reform, on the other hand, remain scarce. We know little about what mobilization looked like in the region and the role it played.[13]

Second, and relatedly, by taking a broader view of women's mobilization beyond suffragists, this research provides a fuller picture of how female mobilization impacted the process of suffrage reform. And counterintuitively, it shows how often it was women organizing for non-suffrage related purposes that had the largest impact on the process of enfranchising women.

Finally, the causal role assigned to women's mobilization in my framework departs from existing works. While my claim about women's mobilization are in line with arguments that consider the interaction between women's movements and politicians (McConnaughy 2015; D. Teele 2018), it differs from this literature in that women's movements did not have as much leeway in their strategies so as to significantly affect the outcome of reform. I pose instead that both actors in this interaction (mobilized women and decision-makers) largely emerged from a

[13] Chapter 3 provides a region-wide analysis of the role of mobilization in a first effort to overcome this lack of comparative research.

single cause – cleavages – and that women's alternatives to organize were more limited than this literature acknowledges.

3.3 International factors and exogenous change

The literature on democratization has long paid attention to the role that international variables play in regime change and stability. Multiple mechanisms have been identified for such influence, from the more diffuse ones to direct intervention. And the literature on women's suffrage, in particular, has highlighted the transnational character of women's mobilization. In my argument, the international climate is an exogenous factor that explains the change in dominant cleavage-based political alliances. As I state below, the global realignment after the Allied victory and the onset of the Cold War, shifted coalitions from an oligarchic/anti-oligarchic scheme to the communist/anti-communist divide. In this section I first briefly review the endogenous/exogenous sources of change of cleavages. I then move onto how the existing literature has conceptualized international influences and how my understanding of international fits into that literature.

I start my explanation of the timing of women's reform by taking the cleavage structure in the early period as given. Political cleavages, as discussed above, emerge from the politicization of social divisions. The oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage that I identify as dominant in the early reform period emerged from changes in the social structure: the emergence of the middle and working classes and the growth of secularization. These were gradual changes that in time became politicized. Although the influence of European thinkers was vital, it was essentially an endogenous process.

To understand women's enfranchisement in the late period, however, it is necessary to look at the shift in cleavages between periods. The communist/anti-communist cleavage, on the other hand, emerged fundamentally from external forces. As Richard Saull (2005) has indicated, although most instances of social revolutionary struggles in the global South had their own local roots, during the Cold War they were reinterpreted as part of the global capitalist/communist conflict. I discuss this change in more detail below. Here suffices to say that the international context, then, is an important piece of the puzzle to understand why women's suffrage reform concentrated in the years following the end of WWII.

Students of regime change have paid a great deal of attention to the role of international factors in democratizing processes, particularly during the third wave. For example, among the causes of the third wave Huntington (1991) considers changes in the policies of international actors that actively promoted liberalization and democratization: the Vatican, the European Community, the US, and the USSR. These actors both favored and stopped blocking democracy as some of them had in previous decades. Lawrence Whitehead (1996) is another author that looked at the international dimensions of democratization focusing on the third wave, identifying three such dimensions: contagion (no explicit external interference), control (deliberate acts of imposition or intervention), and consent (incorporates relevant domestic groups in an interaction between domestic and international factors).

More recently, analyzing regime change in Latin America, Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán (2013, 45–46) list six mechanisms through which international influences affect regime outcomes: transnational diffusion of beliefs, demonstration effect, incentives and sanctions from foreign actors, international actors allocating resources or funding some activities (NGOs, technical assistance, funding media, etc.), some actors such as the Catholic Church are

international and domestic at the same time, and international actors directly overthrowing regimes. Except for the latter, these mechanisms work by impacting policy preferences and normative regime values, the authors' two other key variables.

In some of these works, the specific influences that international factors have on domestic actors are undertheorized. Kurt Weyland (2014) takes on this task and centering on diffusion, analyzes the speed and success in the diffusion of episodes of regime contention. Weyland proposes that diffusion works through a cognitive-psychological lens by which individuals evaluate what is occurring in other places. The success of this heuristic process, however, is mediated by the level of political organization – political parties – as this explains whether it is ordinary citizens who are filtering the information coming from an external contention processes or more informed and prepared political elites that take better consideration of existing conditions.

Another important work on regime change and stability that assigns a central causal role to the international structure is that of Levistky and Way (2010) on competitive authoritarian regimes. Focusing in the post-Cold War scenario, these authors claim that a number of global changes during this period led the international community to strongly promote democracy, but with an electoralist focus. This focus left important room for incumbents to maneuver, as they could hold competitive elections thus abiding by international norms, while at the same time having undemocratic features in other areas. Concrete changes in the late 1980s and 1990s include: a withdrawal of support for many superpower-sponsored dictatorships; the West, and the US in particular, emerged as the dominant economic and military power and with a lack of alternative, many countries wished to imitate; there was a general shift in Western foreign policy toward a defense of democracy through assistance, military and democratic pressure, and

unprecedented political conditionality. Additionally, there were efforts to create permanent international legal frameworks concerned with democracy (i.e. EU and OAS) and more generally the emergence of a transnational infrastructure, including IOs and INGOs, committed to the promotion of human rights (Levitsky and Way 2010, 17–19). In addition to this general post-Cold War context, variation in regime outcomes depended on the country's linkages to the West and Western leverage, which are also variables related to international system.

The post-Cold War context identified by Levistky and Way shares many similarities with the post-WWII scenario, the period of late women's suffrage reform. It is no coincidence that these two junctures correspond to Samuel Huntington's second and third waves of democratization. And a similar argument can be made regarding the adoption of certain democratic institutions while at the same time authoritarianism remained prevalent. For example, by including women, countries could claim to be part of the new democratic ethos without needing to actually give up on authoritarianism.

Women's suffrage has also been analyzed through international lenses, particularly in the last couple of decades (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Marino 2019; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Towns 2010a). The emergence of a transnational feminist movement and its role in the creation of international organizations and norms dedicated to promoting women's rights have been highlighted. In the struggle for women's suffrage, as opposed to other episodes of suffrage expansion and democratic reform, the transnational character of women's organizing is very clear. Networks were created among suffragists in Latin America and also with their American peers. While the efforts of these feminists were fundamental to maintain suffrage reform in the agenda and in time contributed to a change in

normative motivations toward a greater acceptance of women's political participation, the direct effects on domestic decision-making are weak at best.

I claim that international factors impact suffrage reform by changing the nature of political divisions and alliances. I argue that this change was produced through a combination of the mechanisms mentioned above, including diffusion, demonstration effect, the emergence of a set of international organizations that promoted a specific set of democratic institutions including women's suffrage, and the use of "sticks and carrots" by the United States. What is original in my argument, then, are not the mechanisms of international influence but the effect on domestic political actors. In other words, the impact of international influences on cleavages adds an intermediate variable that some of the cited works have not explicitly identified.

4 Short term political factors

Electoral need and feminist individual action constitute the two short term political factors that explain women's suffrage reform in the cases where cleavages are insufficient to understand the timing of women's enfranchisement. These may occur separately or combined.

4.1 Electoral need

The idea that incumbents will only extend suffrage (or carry out other electoral reforms) when they need to is pervasive in the literature on electoral reform. Although they do not need to initiate it, reform will be associated with the government in power, particularly in presidential systems. Therefore, the position toward reform of incumbents in the executive is of particular importance. The reasons that force them to act can be electoral, as when incumbents face strong competition and are thus in a weak position (e.g. Boix 1999; Madrid 2019; Negretto and Visconti

2018; Teele 2018), or because there is a revolutionary threat (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). The cases in my argument where electoral need is a key causal factor share with this line of argument the notion that incumbents will reform when in need. However, what "in need" means in the context of mid-twentieth century Latin America is quite different from the existing literature.

Unlike arguments that stress the importance of electoral competition, I argue that the central reason for incumbents to enfranchise women was not to simply win elections but to win supermajorities. In concrete, I identify two scenarios where supermajorities are a constitutive component of the regime.

First are populist regimes. Populism in Latin America – as opposed to Europe – has usually been inclusionary (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Traditionally marginalized sectors of society such as labor, peasants, or indigenous, have been materially, politically, and symbolically included at the hands of populists' projects. Part of the reason for this inclusion lies in their anti-establishment nature (Barr 2009; Mudde 2004; Roberts 2006). Because populist leaders usually emerge as outsiders and they must face the establishment that controls existing social and political institutions, popular social and electoral mobilization represents a central tool to build an alternative base of support (Barrenechea 2019).

Additionally, and for similar reasons relating to their anti-establishment character, populists in government tend to concentrate power and control all state institutions so they can uphold the challenge from traditional political actors. And this task of institutional redesign – which in Latin America has often translated in new constitutions – requires high quorums.

Therefore, populist have an electoral need to not only win elections, but to amass enough support to have the necessary quorums for institutional transformation.[14]

For these reasons, populists are likely to mobilize excluded sectors of the population and/or change formal rules, such as suffrage, to increase their political participation. Classic populist leaders of the first half of the twentieth century, then, were particularly likely to push for the political inclusion of women as their electoral participation had been demanded and discussed for decades.[15] Perhaps the clearest case is that of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina, but others include Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia or Manuel Odría in Peru, as I discuss in chapter VI.

But not only populists need to build supermajorities. Other forms of electoral authoritarian regimes are also likely to engage in efforts to build supermajorities. Beatriz Magaloni (2008, 15) argues that hegemonic-party autocracies "strive to sustain oversized governing coalitions rather than minimally winning ones because, first (…), they want to generate an image of invincibility in order to discourage party splits. A second reason (…) is to control institutional change to their advantage." Similarly to populist regimes, then, electoral autocracies will seek ways of building oversized coalitions, using strategies such as patronage, clientelism, repression, and appealing to particular groups of voters, including women.

The scenarios outlined constitute instances where incumbents are in electoral need; supermajorities are essential for the survival of these regimes. They differ from the cases of electoral need presented in the literature, however, as the latter are based on contexts of electoral competition where incumbents are in risk of losing office in a more straightforward way. In these

[14] The control of state institutions leads to a deterioration of democracy, which is why the literature sees populism as detrimental to democracy (see Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Weyland 2013).
[15] On the different waves of populism in Latin America, see Roberts (2007) and Weyland (1996).

cases, incumbent parties are also concerned about the electoral rules in case they move to the opposition. When populists or electoral autocracies lose office, on the other hand, they are often not part of the electoral game anymore.

4.2 Feminist individual action

The second short-term political factor I consider is what I label as feminist individual action. Here I include the actions of individual women or a small group – yet not a collective – that triggered a decision by politicians. The type of actions considered in this causal factor include direct lobbying and networking with important political authorities and challenging existing institutions, for example by attempting to register to vote. For instance, women registered to vote in Chile in 1875 and in Ecuador in 1924, in both cases prompting a decision by the authorities (negative in the first case, positive in the second).

Feminist individual action thus differs and is independent from social mobilization. Social mobilization centers on the collective. Leadership is certainly key for social movements and mobilization may include strategies such as lobbying or other forms of action that would fit my individual action category. In this sense, social movements work at two different levels: one that is about the social base, the number and persistence of those mobilized, and a second level where actions such as lobbying and networking are carried out by the movement's leaders. Feminist individual actions, as considered here, does not differentiate whether the relevant actions are being carried out independently or by representatives of a broader movement. As such, these actions may or may not be accompanied by social mobilization.

This type of political factors is usually not sufficient to bring about reform; other conditions must be present. However, in some cases feminist individual action is a necessary

condition to understand women's suffrage reform. It is one possible path, as I discuss below. Finally, feminist individual action is the most agential and idiosyncratic of all the factors considered in my theory of women's enfranchisement. It is difficult to predict when actions of this type will take place. In terms of the effects, as mentioned, this type of cause will usually trigger a reform attempt. The actual outcome of the attempt, though, is not also easily foreseeable.

5 The framework at work I: Explaining failed early women's suffrage reform

In this first historical section I focus on explaining why early women's suffrage reform was so rare in Latin America, with only four out of nineteen countries enfranchising women before 1940. To explain why, I evaluate the historical roots of normative and strategic motivations among political actors in the region. I find that an overlapping class and religious cleavages was a key generative force producing contradictory motivations. The prevalence of theses cleavages throughout the region explains why early suffrage reform was rare.

I first delve into the nature of this cleavage in the initial decades of the twentieth century, providing a general overview (greater detail can be found in the case studies). Then, I take a deeper look at the specific role of the Catholic Church and the Vatican in promoting traditional gender roles and its views on women's suffrage. Because religion is a much less analyzed cleavage than class in the early twentieth century, I devote more attention more attention to this actor to better understand where strategic and normative motivations of political parties came from.

5.1 Class, religion, and contradictory motivations in Latin America

I contend that early female suffrage reform in Latin America was relatively rare because the dominant political cleavages put political calculations and normative motivations at odds. During the first half of the twentieth century, two central cleavages structured politics in most Latin American countries: the class cleavage and a religious divide (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002; Dix 1989). These cleavages tended to reinforce each other. For simplification, therefore, I refer to this combination as a single *oligarchic /anti-oligarchic* cleavage.[16] As Table II.3 shows, actors on each side of the cleavage had contradictory strategic and normative motivations, generally leading to the outcome of no reform.

Table II.3. Oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage and motivations for reform

	Normative motivation	**Strategic motivation**	**Preferred outcome**
Anti-oligarchic coalition	Negative	Positive	No reform
Oligarchic coalition	Positive	Negative	No reform

The oligarchic side of the cleavage was composed of traditional landed and commercial elites who were generally close to the Catholic Church. In the anti-oligarchic camp were middle and working-class parties who were usually anticlerical. Both sets of actors believed that women, if enfranchised, would vote more conservatively than men. This belief was a rational political calculation, given the predominant role of women's organizations at the time. In the late

[16] In some countries, the dominant cleavage was still the liberal/conservative division. In these cases, the class divisions were intra-elites, and there was an important religious cleavage. The argument presented here also applies in these countries, with conservatives having similar motivations to oligarchic and liberals to anti-oligarchic actors.

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and before the emergence of women's suffragist organizations, upper-class women often participated in charity work run by the Catholic Church. They were leaders in efforts to defend the Church from secularizing policies, including attempts by the state to undermine the Church's autonomy and to introduce divorce (Ehrick 2005; Asuncion Lavrin 1998; Maza Valenzuela 1997). This mobilization was crucial in signaling future electoral behavior.[17] Thus, women's initial modes of political organization often worked more to defend the Church than to struggle for women's rights (Ehrick 2005).

With respect to normative motivations, anti-oligarchic actors tended to support women's suffrage. They themselves were excluded from the political arena not long ago, and their struggle for their inclusion led them to embrace more democratic norms. Democratization became part of the anti-oligarchic political brand and parties on the left were usually the ones that defended the expansion of suffrage to women and illiterates in their official political platforms. These parties were also close to nascent feminists and women's rights organizations, an additional factor that led them to publicly support the female franchise. However, when it came time to actually pass the reform, anti-oligarchic actors opposed female enfranchisement based on the strategic concern that women would vote conservative ((Maza Valenzuela 1997; S. Mitchell 2015)).

Oligarchic actors, on the other hand, and despite having a strategic motivation to reform, tended to hold traditional views as to women's participation in politics, perceiving it as a threat to the familial and social order. This normative belief, largely rooted in the Catholic Church's teachings, generally led them to reject extending the franchise.

[17] Although here I am interested in the ex-ante expectations, the claim of a more conservative female vote has some empirical support. In Chile (which until recently had separate polling stations for men and women), until the 1980s the gender gap benefited the political right ((López Varas and Gamboa Valenzuela 2015)). More generally on political gender gaps, see Shorrocks (2018).

Had either normative beliefs or strategic considerations dominated actors' decision-making, we would see more cases of early reform. In various moments there were parties, coalition, or authoritarian leaders on either side of the cleavage that had a majority to pass reform, including cases of parties facing heightened electoral competition (D. Teele 2018). However, with strategic and ideological motivations unaligned, neither oligarchic nor anti-oligarchic parties strongly pursued early suffrage reform in most cases. Only when motivations aligned – under the conditions discussed in the next section – did early reform occur.

Certainly not all parties in all countries fit into the overlapping cleavages perfectly. Two types of actors had crosscutting class and religion cleavages. First, liberals, as they emerged in the nineteenth century, were part of the upper class at the same time that anticlericalism was one of their defining characteristics. Second, during the 1930s, emergent social-Christian parties were less conservative in their views of gender roles, and in class terms could come either from the upper or middle class. For these actors, normative and strategic motivations for women's enfranchisement could align in support of reform. Both of these types of parties, however, were relatively small during the period of analysis.[18]

Incumbents generally will not enfranchise women if they believe it will hurt them electorally, as the literature has pointed out. This explanation, however, is insufficient. Based on this logic, we should see more cases of early enfranchisement by conservative actors – generally believed to be the beneficiaries of female votes – while instead we find numerous instances of their opposition based on normative arguments. Normative beliefs also help explain why left and some parties in Latin America exhibited contradictory behavior in face of reform before WWII. Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico reflects this contradiction. In the late 1930s, in the context of

[18] With the exception of countries where the liberal/conservative cleavage remained dominant.

increased corporatists forms of popular participation, the National Revolutionary Party (predecessor of the PRI), allowed "organized" women to vote in party elections. Cárdenas also named the first female ambassador and between 1937-1938, and repeatedly displayed support for women's national enfranchisement. These actions reflect sympathy toward women's rights and have been interpreted as a normative commitment (S. Mitchell 2015). However, Cárdenas failed to oversee the last step of enacting reform, even after it had been approved by both legislative chambers. The fear was women's conservative vote would lead the incumbent party to pursue unmanageable levels of electoral fraud to remain in office (S. Mitchell 2015, 439).

5.2 The Catholic Church and the woman question

A common view in Latin America is that the Catholic Church has been an obstacle for democracy. The Church "is hierarchical, authoritarian, and absolutist in both organization and dogma. The Church therefore conditions the individual more towards authoritarianism than toward democracy" wrote William S. Stokes in 1955 (cited in Posada-Carbó 2012, 35). For much of the twentieth century this was an argument used to explained why democracy was so elusive in the region. But while the relationship between the Church and different political actors across political regimes has been analyzed by a sizable literature, women have not been included in these analyses.[19]

On the issue of women's suffrage, the Church went from an initial opposition, to accepting it in mild terms, to full blown support and a call for women's electoral participation after WWII. This pattern observable in the Vatican was reproduced in Latin American by the

[19] For a complete bibliography on the Catholic Church in Latin America (and the absence of women in it), see Lynch (2012) and Schwaller (2011).

local clergy. There were certainly different expressions in the countries of the region. Despite the Church's hierarchical character, there is variation in the degree to which members of the clergy in different countries follow or deviate from official doctrine. While the local clergy rarely opposes the official doctrine, the emphases differ, and they can act by omission. Here, however, I describe this general pattern of the global Church – which will also be observable in the case studies – to support the claim that the religious cleavage is necessary to explain women's suffrage reform in Latin America and that the cleavage had a similar impact on across countries in the region.

In the early period, the Church's view of women and "the woman question" clearly fed normative views contrary to female political participation. Conservative views on gender roles were in no way exclusive to Catholics, but those who more closely followed the Vatican's positions, defended these views to a greater extent. Different Pope's encyclicals reflect the notion of women as subordinated to their husbands and the family as their natural sphere. "As Christ is the head of the Church, so is the man the head of the woman; and as the Church is subject to Christ, who embraces her with a most chaste and undying love, so also should wives be subject to their husbands" (Leo III 1878, 8). In the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, which addresses the issue of labor and working conditions, Pope Leo III wrote that "Women, again, are not suited for certain occupations; a woman is by nature fitted for home-work, and it is that which is best adapted at once to preserve her modesty and to promote the good bringing up of children and the well-being of the family" (Leo III 1891, 42). Forty years later, Pius XI presented a similar view in the encyclical *Casti Connubi,* on Christian marriage: "Again, this subjection of wife to husband in its degree and manner may vary according to the different conditions of persons, place and time… But the structure of the family and its fundamental law, established

and confirmed by God, must always and everywhere be maintained intact" (Pius XI 1930, 28). The issue of suffrage is not directly discussed in these documents. But as will be evident in the legislative debates presented in the case studies, these arguments about women's natural place were used when claiming that women participation in politics represented a threat to the family. And these are clearly normative arguments.

The view of women as subordinated to men did not stop the Church from understanding their crucial role in defending Catholicism. Particularly during the pontificate of Pius XI (1922-1939), the Church promoted the role of lays in the defense of Church values and advancement of its mission, mostly through the organization of Catholic Action. Under the umbrella of Catholic Action, many organizations were formed throughout the world, some general in characters while other expressly grouping only men, women, or youth. There were also international federations or unions bringing domestic organizations together. In addition to forming their organizations, women played key roles in the promotion and inspection of Catholic Actions across the world (Pollard 2012). Participating in these organizations and even having leadership roles was seen with positive eyes by the Church, indicating that when it came to the defense of Christian values, spending more type outside the home was appropriate for women.

In the issue of suffrage, in the 1900s Pius X expressed an explicit opposition to women's votes, claiming that politics by men was already chaotic enough (Hause and Kenney 1981, 23; Murphy 1997, 558). After WWI, in 1919, Benedict XV declared to be in favor of women's votes (De Beauvoir 1956, 144). However, in these early decades of the century there was not official Church position on the issue of women's suffrage and certainly no active promotion of the issue. These were opinions given by the Popes when asked, and even when they claimed to support

women's suffrage, it was a mild support at best. Only in the mid-1940s did the Church openly campaigned for women's political participation, as I discuss in the section on late reform.

This brief account presents an overview of what will later be replicated in the different case studies, with the relevant variations. The central argument is that the Catholic Church was against women's incursion in politics based on a normative view that their natural place was the home and the family, and that other activities posed a distraction to this higher role. At the same time, the Church could see the potential of women engaging in an active defense of the Church against secularizing forces, therefore having a strategic incentive for their participation in politics. The fact that conservative and religious actors did not strongly seek women's enfranchisement during the first decades of the century indicates that strategic motivations were insufficient to support female enfranchisement with determination.

6 The framework at work II: Explaining women's early suffrage reform

The previous section laid out a general historical argument as for why most countries did not adopt women's suffrage in the early period. There were, nonetheless, four early enfranchisers that followed two general paths: one explained by struggles between coalitional organized around sociopolitical cleavages (the cleavage path) and a second one by short-term factors. I discuss each in turn.

6.1 The cleavage path to women's suffrage

The argument for failed early reform is that the dominant class and religious cleavage translated into the most relevant political parties having contradictory normative and strategic motivations, failing to pass reform. This argument is based on two central assumptions: first, that

there is a relative balance between oligarchic and anti-oligarchic forces. Without this balance, strategic and normative motivations of the different actors will not be as clearly distinguishable. A second assumption is that the decision to enfranchise women took place in a legislature, requiring the favorable vote of multiple political forces. This assumption relates to the number of veto powers.

In terms of the first assumption, a cleavage structure that deviated from the general oligarchic/anti-oligarchic pattern explains reform. A balance of forces exists when both actors and views have a clearly observable presence in the public sphere and when a considerable ideological distance separates them. Less important is whether parties on both sides of the cleavage alternative in reaching power or representation in state institutions. For example, in the post-revolutionary period and until 2000, the Mexican PRI was a hegemonic party that perpetuated itself in power through vote-buying and other practices. One could assume that the other side of the cleavage had been suppressed, but it was precisely the existence of an opposition – mainly the PAN – that led to the deployment of such practices (Magaloni 2008).

To explain the fact that four countries did enfranchise women in this early period, I claim these were cases in which the assumptions or basic conditions were not met. The outcome of early enfranchisement occurred through two different paths: first, when oligarchic actors were weak relative to anti-oligarchic actors, and second, when the anti-oligarchic coalition reached power through a coup and where able to enact reform without participation of actors in the opposing side of the cleavage.

A weak cleavage has effects on strategic and normative motivations for reform. A weak cleavage means that the distance between the most important parties will be small and their constituencies may not be clearly differentiated on the class and religious cleavage. As a

consequence, strategic calculations as to which party women would majoritarily support will not be straightforward and they will tend to constitute a neutral motivation. In terms of normative beliefs, the short ideological distance will mean normative beliefs will be shared by a broad majority and the dominant side will usually impose its views. If the imbalance favors the oligarchic forces, reform will be closed off completely given unfavorable normative motivations. But if an anti-oligarchic/progressive consensus exists, normative preferences of both the incumbent and the opposition will be favorable to women's suffrage relatively early. Thus, the combination of positive normative beliefs and neutral strategic calculations will result in early reform. This is represented in the top branch of Figure II.3.

The second cleavage path to reform (the lower branch in Figure II.3) involves a successful anti-oligarchic coup or revolution. This path is related to the second assumption of a decision to reform being made by a legislative body representing different political forces. In this case, the assumption is not met as these new regimes legislated via decree. When anti-oligarchic actors were successful in reaching power through such non-electoral means, the possibility of reform opened up.

Figure II.3. Cleavage-dominated paths to women's suffrage



These actors usually had favorable normative motivations by their reformist/progressive nature, and since there was no competition, their strategic calculations focused on the legitimacy dividends over electoral concerns. This type of regime is more concerned with delivering to its base of support that with building a majority. In this sense, the link to women's suffragist organizations that most anti-oligarchic actors had, that might have only represented a minority of women (and thus not the best ally in the electoral arena), was important in this scenario.

To summarize, cases of early reform derived from the dominant cleavage occurred because of a weak cleavage with anti-oligarch dominance or an anti-oligarchic coup. Both of these scenarios were rare in early twentieth century Latin America. Oligarchic actors were still

dominant in most countries, meaning that they were able to counter the attempts by emerging anti-oligarchic sectors of reaching power.

6.2 The contingent path

The contingent path is not historically specific. In other words, the same factors applied for both early and late reformers. Populist leaders started emerging in Latin America in the 1930s, although they became more common in the 1940s and 1950s, all sharing the motivation discussed above of building as large an electoral coalition as possible to face the anti-establishment.

Similarly, feminist activists existed in both periods, and particularly when there was a regime in electoral need – populist or otherwise – they could have the most effect. Activists were often the reason behind the initial discussions of women's suffrage in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The success of reform, however, depended of the presence of the aforementioned short-term political factors.

7 The framework at work III: Explaining late enfranchisement

This dissertation claims that female enfranchisement in Latin America proliferated after WWII because the unfavorable cleavage discussed in the previous sections shifted. The communist/anticommunist polarization became dominant in the region, realignment that was largely due to the new postwar international scenario. This realignment changed strategic motivations for some actors. At the same time, the war and transformations in the economic and society lead to women increasingly entering the labor market, being more educated, and

generally occupying new roles in the public sphere. These structural changes translated in a decrease in ideological opposition to women's electoral participation.

In the remaining of this section I review the post WWII context and the communist/anticommunist cleavage. Here too I discuss the specific nature of the Catholic Church's anti-communist position during the period and the role of women in combating atheism. I end the explanation of late reform with an overview of the different paths to reform.

7.1 The postwar scenario: realignment, democratization, and women in the public sphere

The postwar context included several processes that occurred in parallel and are relevant to understand the strategic and normative motivations to enfranchise women of political actors in Latin America. I highlight three of those processes here.[20] First, is the increasing salience of the communist/anticommunist cleavage over the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic alignment. Second, the immediate postwar was a period of democratic revival, which promoted the adoption of democratic institutions, among them broad suffrage. Third, there was a growing incorporation of women into new professions and all levels of the educational system, leading to changing perceptions of gender roles.

Historians have devoted considerable attention to the analysis of anticommunism globally and in Latin America, problematizing the periodization, the multiple variations and expressions of anticommunism, and the relationship between local and global aspects of the phenomenon. From this literature, we know anticommunism is a combination between domestic and global phenomena that was not simply imported from the US. but often preceded the Cold War (Casals

[20] A fourth related process refers to the Catholic Church's postwar anticommunist activism which I discuss separately in the next section.

2016; Drinot 2012; Joseph 2007). But despite the long roots of anticommunism, with the onset of the global dispute known as the Cold War, the dichotomy communism/anticommunism became central and conflicts around the world were reconceptualize as falling on the social revolutionary camp championed by the Soviet Union or under the US-led the capitalist system (Saull 2005).

I identify the new dominant cleavage as communist/anticommunist for simplicity. A more accurate label for the former would be social revolutionary/reformist coalition, as it was a complex set of actors that transcended communism. While the specific complexities are discussed in detail in the country analyses, here it is important to make clear the broad use of the term. For example, in Chile, from the 1950s the "communist" coalition included the Communist, Socialist as well as smaller leftist parties but that were equally seen as Marxists (Casals 2010). In Peru, APRA was the main party of the left from the 1930s until the 1970s, and as Drinot (2012) has shown, it had from early on a particular brand of anticommunism.[21] From the oligarchy's perspective, however, both the APRA and the communist were seen as part of the same threat and were in fact outlawed together (in 1932-1945 and then 1948-1956). In Guatemala, what motivated the US sponsored coup of 1954 was overthrowing a non-communist reformist coalition that Americans considered as being under Soviet influence. The communist label, then, serves as a counterpart to the broadly used anticommunist term, which also exceeds the direct opposition to communism.

The communist/anticommunist cleavage differs from the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic essentially – but not exclusively – in the role played by middle-class parties. A broad Latin American pattern in terms of political inclusion was that exclusive oligarchic politics of the

[21] The distance between APRA and Peruvian communism was reflected in the polemic between their respective leaders, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre and José Carlos Mariátegui in the 1920s.

nineteenth century gave way to the inclusion of middle-class groups in the early twentieth century, and in a following step the lower classes were incorporated. As a consequence, in what I consider the early period for female enfranchisement, middle classes emerged in opposition to the privileges of the oligarchy and were thus generally anti-oligarchic. Oftentimes, these were also anticlerical parties. With time, however, many of these parties formed coalitions with the oligarchy to oppose radical parties on the left. Examples of this pattern are the Radical parties in both Argentina and Chile. Anticommunist, then, brought together parties that used to be on opposite sides in terms of class and religion.

The effect of this realignment in strategic motivations was that women's assumed greater conservatism could now be translated into support for anticommunism. So, if middle class parties were previously concerned that women would vote for their conservative electoral competitors, now they could more directly benefit from these new votes.

A second process of the postwar was the result of a brief democratic spring.[22] The global struggle against fascism translated into the promotion of democratic values at a discursive level and a set of institutions created after the end of the war. Among the later are the United Nations, the Humans Rights Declarations, and the organization of the Pan-American system. In addition to promoting democracy in general, the founding documents of these organizations included equal rights between the sexes and the Humans Rights Declaration explicitly reaffirmed the principle of universal suffrage.

This democratic window was reflected in Latin American political struggles, particularly with new coalitions incorporating labor (R. B. Collier 1993; Joseph 2007). Although the main expression of this democratization period was electoral competition and more inclusive social

[22] This period corresponds to Huntington's (1991)second wave of democratization.

coalitions, women's political inclusion also found a favorable climate amongst broader processes of reform.

The democratic window of the postwar climate – which was over by the late 1940s – impacted both normative and strategic motivations for female enfranchisement. In terms of strategic motivations, the perceived gains were not strictly electoral but related to legitimacy. The international promotion of democratic institutions turned female enfranchisement into a "standard of civilization" (Towns 2010b), increasing the reputational benefits of adopting such a reform and joining the club of civilized nations. The desire to follow processes occurring in industrialized countries as a sign of greater civilization is a common trend in Latin America, observable for example in labor politics in the early twentieth century (Drinot 2011). Normatively, and no matter how short the democratic spring, I argue that the antifascist struggle created, at least in some actors, a genuine appreciation for democratic institutions.

A final process that differentiates the late and early period relates to the status of women in society. By the 1940s and 1950s, when the majority of Latin American nations finally enfranchised women, women had become more educated and entered into new arenas. For example, women led and actively participated in the Pan-American peace efforts and the antifascist project (Marino 2019; Towns 2010a) and in 1945, a Latin American women received for the first (and only so far) time the Literature Nobel Price. These and many other visible forms of participation and recognition were often mentioned in debates around suffrage, having an impact in normative beliefs. Previous opponents to women's suffrage on normative grounds now faced a more difficult scenario. Although they might still not see women's political participation as their right, I argue that normative beliefs shifted to being neutral in face of women's growing public roles.

The three parallel processes of the postwar combined to produce favorable strategic and normative motivations among key political actors. For the anticommunist coalition, the cleavage realignment produced a favorable strategic motivation as women's electoral preferences were expected to benefit parties opposing radical change. There was an additional strategic calculation related to the reputational effects of joining the global democratic wave. In terms of normative beliefs, I expect a combination of positive and neutral stances in face of reform. Middle-class parties that were previously part of anti-oligarchic coalitions should maintain their positive views of women's political participation as well as links to women's rights organizations. For conservative parties, on the other hand I expect a neutral normative view based on changes in women's roles.

Table II.4. Communist/anticommunist cleavage and motivations for reform

	Normative motivation	**Strategic motivation**	**Preferred outcome**
Anticommunist coalition	Neutral/Positive	Positive	Reform
Communist coalition	Positive	Neutral	Reform

On the communist/revolutionary side, I anticipate positive normative beliefs. Since the writings of Friedrich Engel, Marxists saw the oppression of women as a result of the capitalist class system; as such, gender was often subordinated to class struggle, generating a complicated relationship between the radical left and feminism. However, even if it was seen as a secondary struggle, the oppression of women was clearly identified by these actors and often addressed through reforms. In fact, after the Russian revolution, communist states enfranchised women and became champions of women's political rights as a way to challenge "civilized states" (Towns 2010b). Among non-Marxist reformist actors, which were a majority in Latin America, the

enfranchisement of women was seen in a positive light as women were one more group among the excluded they were seeking to bring into national politics.

Strategically, I claim anticommunist actors had a neutral motivation. Again, they anticipated they were not to be the primary beneficiaries of women's votes. There was, however, an important strategic element in female suffrage for their reformist projects, as without it, transformative credentials would be incomplete. The combination of these strategic factors led to an overall neutral strategic motivation. Reform, then, for the anticommunist coalition, was guided by normative motives.

7.2 The Catholic Church and anti-communism

Since the origins of socialism and Marxism in particular, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Catholic Church exhibited a strong anticommunist stance. Marxism threatened the Church on two central fronts: in its promotion of secularism in society and in the battle for the hearts and minds of the working class. In fact, the Church's Social Doctrine largely emerged in response to the advances of socialism. In *Rerum Novarum* (1891), Leo XIII's encyclical that set the foundations for the Church's social program, there is a strong defense of private property and a rejection of class struggle. Forty years later, Pius XI repeated these ideas and clearly state that "Socialism (…) cannot be reconciled with the teachings of the Catholic Church because its concept of society itself is utterly foreign to Christian truth" (Pius XI 1931, 117).

During the 1930s, the Vatican strengthen its anticommunist stance and launched a campaign headed by a new Secretariat on Atheism based in Rome, imposing its anticommunism to the whole of Catholic nations (Chamedes 2016). Notwithstanding, until the end of WWII, the Church remained largely on the sidelines of electoral politics. In many Latin America countries,

the Church explicitly opposed the creation of a Catholic party (Schwaller 2011). And in Europe during the war years, the Vatican was concerned with remaining neutral. All of this changed, however, after the war. Alarmed by the postwar electoral success of the Italian Communist Party, the Vatican openly engaged with electoral politics in Italy, its most natural and direct sphere of interest with mundane affairs. Likewise, the emergence of Christian Democratic parties that emerged in many European and Latin American countries should be understood in this context.

If in the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* from 1937 – aimed at combating communism – the Pope Pius XI appealed to "two teachings of Our Lord which have a special bearing on the present condition of the human race: detachment from earthly goods and the precept of charity" (Pius XI 1937, 44), in the postwar context, electoral politics became an additional sphere of action. Concretely, in March 1946, Pius XII stated that the clergy should use all means, including the pulpit, to instruct the faithful (Carrillo 1991). And the Pope openly called on Catholics to vote for parties that defended religion. In fact, as Carrillo (1991) notes, at a time when the Christian Democratic Party had not yet developed an electoral machine, the Vatican, through lay organizations, headed the anticommunist campaign.

As discussed above, women occupied a central role in the defense of Church values in society. In this new context, it meant that women should also participate in electoral politics. In May 1946, speaking to a group of 40,000 Catholic Action women, the pope exhorted them to support parties that respected religion (Carrillo 1991, 62). The following year, with occasion of the meeting of the International Union of Catholic Women's League, the Pius XII pronounced a set of directives for contemporary women. While still emphasizing women's role in the family, grounded in natural law, this time there was an explicit reference female participation in politics:

> Your own role is, in general, to work toward making woman always more conscious of her sacred rights, of her duties, and of her power to help mold public opinion, through her daily contacts, and to influence legislation and administration by the proper use of her prerogatives as citizen. Such is your common role. It does not mean that you are all to have political careers as members of public assemblies. Most of you must continue to give the greater part of your time and of your loving attention to the care of your homes and families. We must not forget that the making of a home in which all feel at ease and happy, and the bringing up of children are very special contributions to the common welfare (…)
> Those among you who have more leisure and are suitably prepared, will take up the burden of public life and be, as it were, your delegated representatives. Give them your confidence, understand their difficulties, the hard work and sacrifices their devotion entails; give them your help and support (Pius XII 1947).

Politics is still seen as a burden, but a necessary evil. This extract also shows that the Church adopted a maternalist approach to women's political participation. Maternalism is defined by Michel and Koven (1990, 1079) as "ideologies that exalted women's capacity to mother and extended to society as a whole the values of care, nurturance, and morality (…) It extolled the private virtues of domesticity while simultaneously legitimating women's public relationships to politics and the state, to community, workplace, and marketplace" (p. 1079). Works on women's political participation in Latin America have argued that maternalism was deployed by women to justify their political participation (Chaney 1979; Franceschet, Piscopo, and Thomas 2016). The Church's approach to female political engagement, then, strongly resonated with women in Catholic nations.

This brief discussion indicates that, as in the early period, the Catholic Church had a positive strategic motivation to support women's enfranchisement. The motivation was based in the notion that women practiced their faith more intensely and had more leisure time to carry out the defense of the Church in the public arena. This time, however, the threat from the left seemed to be greater, which required action in the electoral arena, previously reserved for men. And

compared to the early period, normative motivations also shifted to become neutral. The Vatican still defended a traditional role for women and was not concerned with expanding women's public roles in equal conditions. But it accepted the exercise of voting rights – and occupying office in exceptional cases – as an extension of women's natural role as mothers and part of being a good Christian. Having a positive strategic motivation and a neutral normative belief, and following the position of the global Church, Latin American parties that were aligned with Catholic postulates had reasons to support women's enfranchisement and their electoral motivation in the postwar period.

7.3 Paths to late reform

The historical argument presented about how international factors rearranged domestic coalitions is the cleavage path to late suffrage reform. This argument is particularly relevant for the countries that enfranchised women in the 1940s, as in the following decade the democratic spring described as one of the important conditions of the postwar context closed off. The communist/anticommunist cleavage remained in place in the following decades and took on many forms – and women were also an important part of this process[23] –, but the enfranchisement effort occurred mostly as these coalitions were being formed.

The second path, dominant in the enfranchisers of the 1950s, was based on short-term political factors. Electoral authoritarianisms and populist projects that were in electoral need turned to women as a way of increasing their base of support. This process of reform was often in parallel or preceded by the incorporation of women into official parties, whether it was in

[23] Women were particularly targeted in the "terror campaign" of 1964 in Chile, a CIA-funded campaign to support the christian democrat Eduardo Frei against the communist threat represented by Salvador Allende (Power 2002).

feminine sections or new parties altogether. Behind the organization of women, which occurred in Argentina, Mexico, and Nicaragua, among others, there was an attempt to maximize electoral benefits. These regimes were generally on the anticommunist front, dealing with radical threats mostly through repression. Women's votes were not used to beat the communist enemy, but to legitimize the regime through supermajorities.

8 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the theory of motivation alignment to explain women's suffrage reform. It has been argued that for reform to occur, strategic and normative motivations need to align. The alignment of motivations is dependent on a number of factors, most centrally in the cleavages that structure political coalitions. In additional to the cleavage structural argument, some cases are better explained by short-term political factors, most centrally electoral authoritarian regimes that have an electoral need, and feminist lobbying.

The second part of the chapter presented the historical argument. Here I address the specific cleavages that were dominant in the region in the early and late suffrage reform periods. In the early period, the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage produced contradictory normative and strategic motivations in most cases. The shift to a communist/anticommunist cleavage in the postwar periods, as well as the short global democratic spring that emerged with the end of the war, presented favorable conditions for women's enfranchisement.

After a quantitative analysis of alternative hypotheses, the second part of the dissertation presents six case studies where this argument is explored in detail, analyzing cleavages, women's mobilization, and motivations for reform. The cases cover the three outcomes – failed early

reform, early reform, and late reform – and cover a range of the explanatory paths that have been laid out in this chapter.

III. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter presents comparative data for Latin America and explores the most relevant alternative explanations for women suffrage reform. Using existing as well as original data, I employ graphic descriptions as well as statistical hypothesis testing. Specifically, I focus on electoral competition and women's mobilization – which constitute what I consider as the most thoroughly explored explanations in the literature – and consider each separately. A third subsection presents a multivariate statistical analysis, where I include both of these variables as well as additional controls, particularly related to structural explanations.

Cross-national analyses of women's enfranchisement tend to only include a handful of Latin American cases in their datasets. The reason behind it usually relate to the availability of data. Disparities exist as to the most basic element of reform, that of the date of enfranchisement, and as good comparative data is non-existent for variables such as the case of women's movements. In this sense, the present study constitutes the most thorough examination of suffrage reform in Latin America. Moreover, by building a dataset that includes not only the dates of suffrage reform but also all the failed attempts at enfranchising women, it represents the only effort – to the best of my knowledge – of systematically analyzing factors associated with suffrage extensions in the historical democratization literature.

The central finding of this analysis shows that existing theories fall short at explaining women's enfranchisement in Latin America; there is not a direct relationship. As such, more nuanced ways of considering how electoral competition, women's mobilization, and structural conditions matter for reform need to be incorporated in theories of suffrage reform.

1 The competition hypothesis

As discussed in the previous chapter, competition represents a central explanation for the adoption of electoral reform. Electoral competition, or electoral threat, often constitutes the basis for parties' strategic calculations. Given that electoral reform introduces uncertainty, the argument goes, parties' will only support reform if they need to – if they face an electoral threat – and they estimate they might be better off under the new scenario (e.g. Ahmed 2013; Boix 1999; Teele 2018). In these arguments, competition is a key variable and strategic calculations is the mechanism. In logical terms, a high degree of competition is necessary for reform.

Evaluating the role of competition is an indirect way of testing the core competing hypothesis for my motivation alignment argument, i.e., that positive strategic calculations are sufficient to support reform. As motivations can never be tested directly, because they are placed inside actors' minds, the proxies we have are what actors do and say. Gathering this information is labor intensive and therefore, done only in a few cases, it is what is presented in the case studies. For other countries, in this chapter I concentrate on the variables without testing the mechanisms directly.

The competition hypothesis makes two related assumptions that most Latin American countries did not meet in the first half of the twentieth century. First, that there was continuous competition over time. A party's assessment of whether the introduction of new voters might be beneficial is based on other parties growing share of the vote or in the entry of new parties to the system. Thus, to determine if competition was increasing or decreasing, there need to be consecutive elections. A second assumption is that there was some degree of stability among competing actors from one election to the next. Both of these conditions were not present in most of Latin America as competition was generally limited, or when it existed it was quickly

interrupted. When some degree of competition returned, it was often with new actors. These assumptions can be understood as scope conditions for the argument, which therefore has limited applicability in the region.

Given the general absence of competition, a full test of the competition hypothesis presented is only possible in a handful of Latin American cases. Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay are the only countries generally considered as having competitive regimes (albeit with limited participation) in the first half of the century (Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 2005; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). These cases thus comply with the assumptions discussed above that there was continuous competition and that more or less the same political parties participated in the elections. As such, they constitute the most-likely cases for the competition hypothesis, meaning that failure to present the outcome is disconfirmatory for the theory (Gerring 2007).

Figure III.1 shows the degree of electoral competitiveness for the democratic periods of the first half of the century in the four cases: Argentina (1916-1930), Chile (1932-1953), Costa Rica (1928-1947), and Uruguay (1919-1932). To measure competition, I use the margin of victory – the difference in the share of seats in the lower chamber between the first and the second largest party.[24]

The competition hypothesis cannot be discarded in the case of Argentina and Costa Rica, and partially holds for Chile and Uruguay. In the latter cases, the competitive periods include the year when reform was passed; in Argentina and Costa Rica, women's suffrage was adopted in the first period after redemocratization and in the constitution drafted after the 1948 civil war, respectively.

[24] If votes are aggregated at the coalition level, I use this information.

Figure III.1. Electoral competition and women's suffrage reform in early competitive regimes



Note: Vertical dashed lines represent the year suffrage was extended.
Sources: Nahum (2007); Nohlen (2005); Urzúa Valenzuela (1992).

In Argentina, all throughout the 1916-1930 period, the Radical Civic Union party had a considerable advantage over its closest competitor (20 points or more), the conservatives. The radical incumbents, which had the necessary votes to pass reform, had no need to alter the electoral landscape. Competition can then partly explain why there was no reform in this early period of Argentine democracy. It cannot, however, account for the timing of actual reform, as it occurred one year after the re-inauguration of competition. In these elections, the Peronist coalition obtained a 42% advantage over the opposing coalition. Reform in this case is more a result of a populist attempt at building a supermajority and increasing control of state institutions

(Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Similarly, Costa Rica' s National Restauration Party had a majority all throughout the 1927-1947 period, with an advantage over its competitors that made challenges to the status quo limited (Lehoucq and Molina 2002).

In the cases of Chile and Uruguay, reform does follow a decrease in the distance between the two largest parties, or more competition. The competition hypothesis, however, fails to explain why women's suffrage was not adopted after previous episodes of heightened competition in the early 1930s and early 1920s, respectively. These two cases are discussed in detail in the following chapters.

Table III.1. Electoral competition and women's suffrage reform outcome

	No reform	**Reform**
Low competition	Argentina (1916-1922; 1926-1930) Costa Rica (1930-1940; 1944)	Argentina (1946) Costa Rica (1949)
High competition	Argentina (1914; 1924) Chile (1932-1945) Costa Rica (1926; 1942; 1946) Uruguay (1916-	Uruguay (1931) Chile (1949)

The evidence for the competition hypothesis, then, is mixed in the few Latin American cases where it can be tested. As table III.1 shows, when tabulating reform outcome and degree of competition,[25] it is clear that competition is not sufficient as there were many years of high competition when there was no reform. And while competition within parties in the system

[25] To classify between low and high competition, I use a 15% margin of victory as cutoff point or a drop of 15% in the margin from one election to the next, indicating the emergence of an important competitor. The elections that inaugurate a new period of competition with new actors are considered in the low competition category. The years next to each case represent election years.

might have played an important role in two of the cases, high competition it is also not a necessary condition.

2 Women's mobilization

Women's mobilization constitutes a second central variable explored in the literature on women's enfranchisement. Comparing suffragist mobilization across cases is an extremely difficult task. Comparative work on Latin America is practically non-existent, and to the best of my knowledge, there have been no efforts to systematize the characteristics of women's mobilization. In this sense, the original measure developed here constitutes an important contribution.

As discussed in chapter II, the way women's mobilization influenced the prospects of reform has been discussed: 1) with an emphasis on the institutionalization of the international women's movement (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Towns 2010a); 2) by looking at the political opportunities, resources, and strategies that women's movements had in different places (Banaszak 1996; McCammon et al. 2001); and 3) the interaction between politicians calculations and signaling from women's movement (McConnaughy 2015; D. Teele 2018). The second and third of these strands in the literature share an interest in how movement actions interact with the political system. They differ, however, in the focus placed on the movement, in the first case, and in the interaction with parties, in the latter.

The first of these arguments can be stated as the following hypotheses, relating to the success and timing of reform: *a) the stronger the movement, the higher the chances of suffrage reform*; and *b) countries with strong movements are more likely to adopt reform early*. The

rationale behind these hypotheses is that stronger movements can put pressure on the political system, questioning the legitimacy of a democratic regime that excludes women. Strong mobilization can also make the new constituency represented by these movements more attractive for incorporation.

The other two set of arguments – pertaining the characteristics of the social movement as well as those that focus on how politicians perceive women's organizations – have been developed for a small set of cases. Because of the detailed nature of the variables, they are more difficult to test in a medium group of cases. Some elements, however, seem less relevant for the Latin American context, where suffragist movements shared many similarities. Practically all had international connections and participated in Pan-American organizations, where they met both fellow Latin Americans as well as their American counterparts (Towns 2010a). In terms of tactics and discourse, another characteristic of Latin American suffragists was their comparatively moderate character. Feminist leaders explicitly rejected the more aggressive tactics of British and American suffragettes and what they saw as "masculinizing" tendencies (Hahner 1990; Hammond 2011; Asunción Lavrin 1998). The variation, then, is not as extreme as, for example, the cases of Switzerland and the United States (Banaszak 1996), and it partly discards difference in strategies and the movement beliefs as an explanation for reform success.

A way to capture differences in how movements were linked to the political system is through their relationship to political parties. It can be argued that movements closely allied to incumbents had a stronger impact on the incumbent's strategic calculations of the potential benefits of reform. From this I derive a second set of hypotheses: *a) Partisan movements are more likely to succeed in their demand for suffrage reform;* and *b) Countries with partisan movements are more likely to adopt reform early.*

To test these two hypotheses, I construct a measure of movement strength and partisanship, and I code the year when there was a reform attempt.[26] A country, then, can have several observations with different values on movement strength and partisanship. This allows for temporal variation in the characteristics of the suffragist movements.

For the first variable, I build a measure of movement strength with three levels – low, medium, high – based on existing case analyses. To classify cases, I focus on number of organizations, their duration, membership, range of activities (i.e., publications, petitions, demonstrations), diversity of leadership, and political connections. For partisan movements, I use a dichotomous coding. In most cases, women's organizations had a clear ideological orientation, which often meant they were formally or informally linked to political parties. In this sense, double militancy among feminists was common. These are not, however, the cases I code as partisan. Partisan movements differ in that women's activism is pushed from the party; it is the party the one that organizes mobilization or coopts existing organizations. In this case, partisan identity comes before feminist militancy, either for ideological or strategic reasons. Examples are Argentina in the 1940s, with Evita Perón leading the organization of women and demand for suffrage in opposition to the traditional feminist movement, or the women's movement in Trujillo's Dominican Republic.

By relying on secondary sources, the type of information included in the case studies varies widely in nature, detail, and quality – as a function of the primary sources available and the objectives of the studies. Likewise, the number of existing works to triangulate information differs considerably by country. Additionally, the coding has a less tangibly component in that to a considerable degree, the classification is a relative measure of how the movements compare to

[26] See below for a detailed discussion of how I determine what a reform attempt it.

each other, an assessment that comes from reading as many cases as possible. Considering these caveats, I offer a coding of movement strength and partisanship as a first attempt at building such variables. In Appendix 1 I list the sources used by country, following Kreuzer's (2010) call for transparency in the use of historical knowledge for quantitative analysis. Ideally, specialists that disagree with the classification can build on my coding.

Figure III.2. Movement strength

a) Movement strength and reform outcome



b) Movement strength and timing of reform



Figures III.2 shows the distribution of countries for women's movement strength and the two outcomes examined: reform outcome and timing of suffrage reform. Figure III.3 repeats for the partisanship variable. Reform outcome includes failed and successful instances or reform (the next section describes the coding in detail) and as such the number of cases is larger (N=62). For the timing of reform, I only include the dates of successful reform, therefore the number of cases is smaller (N=19).

Four patterns are observable in these figures. First, in Figure III.2 a) we can see that the grand majority of reform attempts were accompanied by weak suffragist mobilization, and that strong movements were more the exception than the norm. Second, in Figure III.2 b) there is no obvious relationship between movement strength and timing of reform. Three of the four early reformers, however, had medium or strong movements. Third, in terms of partisanship, Figure III.3 a) indicates that partisan movements were uncommon, and fourth, all of the partisan movements for successful reform were for late cases (Figure III.3 b)). In the two figures with timing as the outcome, however, the number of cases is very small, so these conclusions must be taken with caution.

Figure III.3. Movement partisanship

a) Movement partisanship and reform outcome



b) Movement partisanship and timing of reform



To evaluate whether the relationship between these variables is statically significant, table III.2 shows the results of two statistical tests, Pearson's $\chi 2$ and Fisher's exact. Fisher's exact probability works better with small sample sizes, as it is the case here, particularly in the

case of timing of reform. The null hypothesis for the tests is that there is not relationship between the variables. Using standard significance levels, we cannot assert there is a relationship between the women's movement strength and the outcome and timing of reform. Movement partisanship and reform outcomes are the only variables that present a statistically significant relationship (at the 95% confidence level).

Table III.2. Effect of suffragist movements on reform outcome and timing

	N	Pearson's χ^2	Fisher's exact *p*
Movement strength			
Reform outcome	62	4.2851 (p=0.117)	0.121
Timing of reform	19	2.5616 (p=0.278)	0.372
Movement partisanship			
Reform outcome	62	6.4275 (p=0.011)	0.019
Timing of reform	19	2.3385 (p=0.126)	0.255

The analysis in this section suggests that women's movement strength is not directly related to the success of suffrage reform or its timing. There were, indeed, more cases with medium or strong movements in the later period, which is what the literature has highlighted. But at the same time, there were many cases that adopted reform with weak movements.

Allying with a strong party, however, particularly incumbent parties, seems to have been an effective strategy. Exploring this relationship is beyond the scope of this dissertation. A tentative hypothesis is that this strategy was particularly likely in the case of authoritarian regimes.

3 Multivariate regression

In this section I present a multivariate regression analysis to further evaluate the mobilization hypothesis as well the effect of political regime. Specifically, I analyze a set of existing explanations on the outcome of reform – failure or success – for all the dates when there was a reform attempt.

3.1 Operationalizing reform attempt

For this analysis I use an original dataset with all the attempts at female enfranchisement in Latin America, both successful (the actual date of enfranchisement) and failed instances. Failed attempts instances are defined as cases where some decision was made either in the legislative or executive powers. This definition includes three specific instances: when a bill was rejected in one chamber of the legislature, when a bill received a positive vote in the legislature but failed in successive steps (either the second chamber or approval by the executive), or when an executive decree failed to enfranchised women after such possibility was debated. The operationalization of failed reform, then, excludes the mere introduction of a bill without debate, campaign promises, or discussions of the issue in public fora.

With this definition, I have been able to identify 62 instances of reform.[27] The number of observations by country varies from one (the Dominican Republic) to seven (Honduras and Nicaragua). In itself, this data constitutes an interesting source for exploration. For example, further research might shed light on the reasons behind the number of failed attempts, or in other words, why in some countries the issue was often debated and rejected while in others,

[27] The sources for the coding are the same as those used to code women's suffragist mobilization, listed in Appendix 1. The raw data for both reform attempts and women's mobilization is presented in Appendix 2.

politicians were reluctant to appear rejecting reform thus preferring not getting it to the decision stage.

This dataset represents, to the best of my knowledge, the first of its kind. Existing statistical analysis consider only positive cases, utilizing hazard models (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997) or comparing conditions associated to male suffrage extensions (Przeworski 2009). Hazard models consider how the probability of enfranchisement changes with the passing of time, and in the case of women's suffrage have identified a relationship with the institutionalization of the international women's movement and a changing international climate. However, because they lack negative cases, these models are not able to say what conditions favor success conditional on there being an attempt.

3.2 Independent variables

The variables included in the models target three main categories of explanations: social mobilization, political regimes, and modernization arguments. For social mobilization, I include the original two variables discussed in the previous section – suffragist movement strength and partisanship. Again, the hypotheses are that stronger movements and partisan movements should be positively associated to reform success.

In terms of political regimes factors, one hypothesis to be tested is Przeworski's (2009, 318) claim that authoritarian leaders played a central role in *granting* women the franchise. This argument has not been explored in detail in a theoretical or empirical level, but it is worth exploring as it is commonly mentioned in the literature (e.g. Navas 2012; Towns 2010a). The idea is that authoritarian regimes had an incentive to adopt a reform such as women's suffrage as it grants them a façade of democratic legitimacy and it provides a new stock of votes to be

mobilized. Following this logic, authoritarianism should be positively associated with reform success. To test the hypothesis, I use two different measures of political regimes: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018) and Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013).[28]

Table III.3. Summary of variables included in models

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	*N*	Source
Dependent variable						
Reform success	0.3	0.46	0	1	62	Original measure
Independent variables						
Suffragist mobilization strength	1.58	0.74	1	3	62	Original measure
Partisan suffragist mobilization	0.15	0.36	0	1	62	Original measure
Political regime (V-Dem)	0.61	0.53	0	2	57	Coppedge et al (2018)
Political regime (Boix et. al)	0.08	0.27	0	1	62	Boix et al. (2013)
Non-agricultural pop %	35.6	13.52	15	73.3	57	Mitchell (2013)
EAFP % *	12.8	7.29	4.84	38.9	41	Mitchell (2013)
GDP (USD, 2000 constant prices)	2,511	1,162	679	6,817	52	Haber & Menaldo (2011)
Literacy %	44.4	16.9	12.3	82.3	57	Vanhanen (2009)

* For the data for economically active female population I use the closest available year if less than a decade, otherwise consider it missing. I then calculate the percentages using data from the same source (Mitchell 2013) and with the same rule. The percentages are underestimated as they have been calculated over the entire female population of the country.

Third, I test structural explanations. Different versions of modernization theory claim that changes from "traditional" to "modern" in terms of social, cultural, economic, and political organization will bring about changes in gender relations (Jackson 1998; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Inglehart and Norris argue that industrialization brings women into the paid workforce, it increases their educational level, and produces a reduction in fertility rates. All of these changes would translate in increased rights, including voting rights. I test this hypothesis through the

[28] V-Dem's variable is "regimes of the world" and is built considering competitiveness of access to power and liberal principles. It is constituted by four categories: 0=Closed autocracies;1=Electoral autocracy; 2=Electoral democracy; 3= Liberal democracy. Boix et al. employ a dichotomous coding of democracy (1) and authoritarianism (0).

main mechanism of the argument, which is the entry to the labor market, using the percentage of economically active women (EAFP).[29]

Three other variables related to modernization are included as controls: the percentage of non-agricultural population as a measure of industrialization (from Mitchell 2013), the literacy rate (Vanhanen 2009), and GDP per capita. Table III.3 presents summary statistics of the variables included in the models.

Finally, I include time and regional effects. For the latter, I build dummies for three Latin American regions: the Andes, the Southern Cone, and Central America-Caribbean. Each of these regions shares characteristics such as similar historical patterns of institutional development, levels of social and economic development, and socio-demographic variables. I adopt this strategy to account for unobserved characteristics instead of country fixed effects because the number of observations by country is too small. For time effects I include a dummy variable with my distinction between early and late timing of reform, using 1939 as cut point.

3.3 Model results

I run a series of linear regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable – reform outcome – is dichotomous, nonetheless linear models should give unbiased significance tests and the coefficients are easier to interpret (Hellevik 2009), in this case as the probability of reform success. For each independent variable of interest, I first run a bivariate model, and in successive models add time effects, region effects, and then the controls. Because the timing of

[29] Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 18) also claim that in the case of women's enfranchisement their entry was central as it changed views on gender roles.

reform seems to be dragging much of the effects, I also include an interaction between the variable of interest and timing. Equations 1-5 formalize the models.

$$P(success) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

$$P(success) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 timing + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

$$P(success) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 timing + \beta_3 X * timing + \varepsilon \quad (3)$$

$$P(success) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 timing + \beta_3 region + \varepsilon \quad (4)$$

$$P(success) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 timing + \beta_3 region + \beta_4 controls + \varepsilon \quad (5)$$

Tables III.4 through III.8 report the results for each independent variable of interest. The first results are for movement strength. Movement strength is positively associated with reform success, and the size of the effect is an increase in the probability of reform of around 10 %. The relationship is not robust, being significant in only some of the model specifications. For this variable I include as an additional specification an interaction with movement partisanship (with and without controls). The negative coefficient for the interaction indicates that at higher levels of movement strength, the effect of partisan movements decreases, and actually becomes negative for strong movements.

Movement partisanship is only statistically significant in the bivariate model (Table III.5). The substantial effect is positive and larger than for movement strength, increasing the probability of reform between 10 and 40 % depending on the specification. Although not significant, the interaction with timing indicates that the effect of movement partisanship was most relevant for cases of late reform. In the early period, partisan movements actually decreased the probability of reform success by 0.9. Overall (considering the results mentioned above),

movements strongly associated to a political party or coopted by it were most successful in the late period and when they were not particularly strong. The different may depend on whether they were associated to an incumbent party or different organizations had partisan links across the spectrum, a distinction the variable does not pick up on. Given the small number of observations coded as partisan movements (nine out of the 62 cases), introduction this additional distinction would considerably reduce the power of the statistical analysis. It is thus a point to be explored qualitatively in future work.

Table III.4. Reform success and women's movement strength

Variables	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**
Strength	0.143*	0.115	0.126	0.132*	0.0979	0.142*	0.113
	(0.0816)	(0.0724)	(0.0859)	(0.0735)	(0.106)	(0.0847)	(0.104)
Timing		0.425***	0.483*	0.436***	0.441***	0.355***	0.396***
		(0.114)	(0.288)	(0.114)	(0.131)	(0.127)	(0.144)
Strength*Timing			-0.0358				
			(0.168)				
Partisan						0.790**	0.798*
						(0.339)	(0.401)
Strength*Partisanship						-0.312*	-0.348**
						(0.170)	(0.161)
Region effects				Yes	Yes		
Controls					Yes		Yes
Constant	0.0847	-0.0560	-0.0729	0.00667	-0.297	-0.0954	-0.346**
	(0.129)	(0.0955)	(0.107)	(0.139)	(0.224)	(0.107)	(0.152)
Observations	63	63	63	62	50	63	51
R-squared	0.052	0.259	0.259	0.289	0.341	0.300	0.360

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table III.5. Reform success and women's movement partisanship

Variables	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
Movement partisanship	0.423**	0.221	-0.0949	0.255	0.104
	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.408)	(0.170)	(0.194)
Timing		0.383***	0.357***	0.394***	0.419***
		(0.124)	(0.117)	(0.124)	(0.136)
Partisanship*Timing			0.372		
			(0.443)		
Region effects				Yes	Yes

Controls					Yes
Constant	0.246***	0.109*	0.247***	0.142	-0.295
	(0.0596)	(0.0558)	(0.0595)	(0.120)	(0.388)
Observations	63	63	63	62	50
R-squared	0.105	0.250	0.141	0.281	0.331

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With respect to political regimes, V-Dem is negatively associated to reform success, decreasing the probability of reform in around 0.1 (Table III.6). This negative coefficient is in line with Przeworski's (2009, 318) hypothesis that suffrage was often extended by authoritarian regimes to broaden their base of support. However, none of the specifications is statistically significant.

Table III.6. Reform success and political regime (V-Dem)

Variables	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
V-Dem	-0.173	-0.0797	0.00686	-0.0851	-0.0860
	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.192)	(0.137)	(0.152)
Timing		0.402***	0.515**	0.421***	0.430***
		(0.121)	(0.204)	(0.120)	(0.134)
V-Dem*Timing			-0.188		
			(0.274)		
Region effects				Yes	Yes
Controls					Yes
Constant	0.441***	0.194	0.130	0.221	-0.278
	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.154)	(0.180)	(0.261)
Observations	58	58	58	57	48
R-squared	0.036	0.207	0.217	0.235	0.322

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table III.7 shows the results for the regressions with the second measure of political regimes, Boix et al's. This variable is positively associated to reform success, meaning that democracies had a higher probability of passing reform. The substantial effect is quite large, increasing the chances or reform between 30 and 50 % depending on the specification. If we

consider the interaction with timing, for the early period (timing = 0), the increase in probability is around 90%. Although not an important argument in the literature, it could be explained by the fact suffrage extensions can normatively be seen as part of a process of further democratizations by regimes that are already. These results, nonetheless, are not robust as only some specifications have significant coefficients. Moreover, the independent variable is concentrated in one value, with only five cases coded as democracy in the entire dataset.

It is an interesting result that the two political regime indicators have opposite signs; while V-Dem has a negative coefficient, Boix et al.'s is positive. These results highlight how crucial is the conceptualizations and operationalizations of key variables and the effects it can have on statistical results. V-Dem's classification is more conservative and even though it has a high degree of overlap with Boix et al. (Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg 2018), it is precisely in the first half of the twentieth century were many of the discrepancies lie.

Table III.7. Reform success and political regime (Boix et al.)

Variables	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
Boix	0.539***	0.382	0.912***	0.348	0.313
	(0.190)	(0.229)	(0.0529)	(0.238)	(0.210)
Timing		0.396***	0.434***	0.414***	0.406***
		(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.116)	(0.126)
Boix*Timing			-0.684***		
			(0.255)		
Region effects				Yes	Yes
Controls					Yes
Constant	0.264***	0.104**	0.0883*	0.125	-0.290
	(0.0587)	(0.0502)	(0.0501)	(0.128)	(0.379)
Observations	63	63	63	62	50
R-squared	0.102	0.274	0.301	0.288	0.361

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, the economically active female population is positively associated to reform success as hypothesized in modernization theory explanations (Table III.8). The relationship, however, is not significant in any of the models and the substantive effect is very small, around 0.1 %. An initial conclusion is that EAFP is not a good measure of industrialization, as in some countries a considerable number of females were employed in agriculture. But since the controls that include the other structural variables are also not statistically significant in any of the models, it confirms that the modernization hypothesis does not hold for women's suffrage in Latin America.

Table III.8. Reform success and economically active female population

Variables	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
EAFP	0.00903	0.00288	-0.00624	0.00341	0.000839
	(0.0112)	(0.0107)	(0.00676)	(0.0136)	(0.0175)
Timing		0.433***	0.302	0.445***	0.426**
		(0.139)	(0.265)	(0.139)	(0.172)
EAFP*Timing			0.0114		
			(0.0156)		
Region effects				Yes	Yes
Controls					Yes
Constant	0.301*	0.106	0.205	0.269	-0.391
	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.270)	(0.817)
Observations	42	42	42	41	37
R-squared	0.018	0.189	0.193	0.219	0.279

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Overall, only timing is significantly related to the outcome of reform as has previously been established in the existing literature (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Towns 2010b). This literature points to changing global norms as a central explanation, but the specific mechanisms are not specified in detail. How exactly is timing relevant to understand women's enfranchisement is still largely unanswered by the literature and it is this dissertation's central questions.

4 Conclusions

The preceding analysis tested the central hypotheses in the existing literature on women's suffrage for the whole of Latin American countries – the competition hypothesis, the role of women's mobilization, and modernization explanations. This is the first systematic analysis for the region. For the purpose of evaluating rival explanations, I built an original dataset with all the successful and failed instances of female suffrage reform. The inclusion of failed instances makes it the first analysis of its kind, not only in Latin America, but generally. Similarly, the dataset includes an important effort to systematically compare women's suffragist mobilization.

In terms of results, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, the three arguments tested do not have empirical support in the Latin American cases. In one sense, this finding is unsurprising as these theories have been developed based on cases from the industrialized world. Nonetheless, these arguments have claim to have broader reach. Consequently, and particularly in the theories where competition and women's suffragist mobilization are central, scope conditions need to be better developed. The negative findings are also unsurprising for the hypothesis that have been stated but not systematically tested, such as that authoritarian regimes were often the enfranchisers. Even if this might be the case, the type of authoritarianism needs to be specified as during the time of women's enfranchisement there were fully closed autocracies as well as electoral authoritarianisms, each with different motivations for reform.

Second, the statistical analysis confirms that timing is central to understand reform success, but the mechanisms laid out in the literature are still very general. The theory presented in the preceding chapter identifies central differences in the historical periods classified as early and late reform – the changes in the socio-political cleavages and coalitions forming around them

–, explanations that constitutes an original contribution to the literature on democratization and women's suffrage.

The preceding analysis dismisses the notion that there is any simplistic relationship between electoral competition, women's mobilization, and suffrage reform, at least in Latin America. This does not, however, mean that these are irrelevant factors. First, different coding for the key variables and the inclusion of other explanatory factors could generate discording results. In this sense, the analysis presented in this chapter allows me to importantly question the role of these hypotheses but not fully dismiss them. Furthermore, although results show that in average there is no straight relationships between the analyzed variables and the success and timing of women's enfranchisement, some of these conditions may still be crucial for explaining reform in some cases.

The case studies of the subsequent chapters thus return to some of these alternative explanations. Electoral competition and women's mobilization are considered in all the case studies but they are particularly subject to scrutiny in the countries were both competition and mobilization were high – Chile and Uruguay – and therefore constitute a stronger rival explanation of reform success.

PART II: REFORMING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

IV. FAILED ATTEMPTS AT EARLY REFORM IN CHILE AND PERU

Case studies presented in this chapter (and the next two chapters) follow a similar structure. I first analyze the cleavage structure as the foundation of political competition and the main political parties. A second section analyzes the nature and characteristics of women's mobilization. This analysis of women's mobilization serves a dual purpose: first, it addresses the important rival explanation that strong mobilization is necessary for reform, and second, it provides politicians with expectations about what the behavior of female voters will be. I then proceed to study the debates regarding the extension of the franchise, focusing on the normative and strategic motivations of key political actors.

Chile and Peru provide an interesting comparison. They differed considerably in the nature and strength of political competition and of the women's movement, as well in level of economic and social development, but nonetheless had the same outcome of failing to enfranchise women early. These cases also differed in the political orientation of the incumbent. Whereas Chile had anticlerical governments throughout the early period, when reform was debated in Peru the majority and governing party was aligned with the traditional oligarchy, among which anticlericalism was weak. In Chile, these incumbents had a negative strategic motivation to enfranchise women and as such did not pursue it. In Peru, on the other hand, I show that strategic motivations were clearly positive for the incumbent Revolutionary Union Party, and still failed to pass reform. Strategic considerations, then, are insufficient and normative motivations must be considered to understand the behavior of political actors and the final outcome of failed early reform.

1 Strong parties, strong movement, and contradictory motivations in Chile's failed early reform

Unlike the case of Peru discussed in the second half of the chapter, before the suffrage bill of the late 1940s Chile did not have any votes in Congress; no suffrage bill was defeated in the twentieth century.[30] Despite a number of bills being presented, the main strategy of male elites was to stall the discussion. As such, the analysis of the Chilean case does not center on a specific moment but spans several decades. During this period there were two distinct party systems and a long period of instability between them, including the breakdown of political competition. The main political actors and characteristics of competition, however, remained in place and allowed explaining the lack of reform. Concretely, a fragmented party system – where no party held more than a quarter of seats – which was clearly organized around the religious and class cleavages, prevented the alignment of strategic and normative motivations. This is most clear in the case of the two largest parties, the Conservative and the Radical. The early organization of Catholic women presented the religious and upper-class Conservative Party with strategic motivation to pursue the franchise, and party of its legislators supported. However, because of traditional normative views, there were internal contradictions. The middle-class anticlerical Radical Party, on the other hand, also saw the potential advantage of conservatives if women were to vote, and as a consequence did not support reform. A strong women's movement failed to change this misalignment of motivations. The motivation alignment argument also explains why the municipal franchise was approved in 1934, given that these were conceived as

[30] The only time the issue was vote put to a vote was in 1883 was when women were first explicitly excluded from the franchise. See section on women's mobilization for an account of this episode.

low stakes elections and closer to social work. As such, contrary strategic motivations for the center-left and negative normative motivations for the right lessened in this context.

1.1 Class and religious cleavages and the consolidation of the party system

During the first half of the twentieth century, the party system in Chile was organized around a religious and a class cleavage (Scully 1992). As in the European cases for which the cleavage-based party system theory was developed by Lipset and Rokkan, the party system went through an evolution that at crucial moments – or critical junctures – led to the creation of new parties stacking up over existing ones, creating a system of layers of parties emerged around the religious and later the class cleavages.

Until 1924, the country was ruled by an oligarchic system, were the traditional parties coming from the nineteenth century dominated the scene. The main parties during this so called "parliamentarian republic" – when the executive was weakened and political parties in the legislature dominated – were the Conservative, Liberal, and Radical parties as well as their splinters. The Conservative was the traditionally catholic party, stemming from the post-independence struggles, that had the defense of religion at its core. A party publication in 1917 so stated it:

> Its existence [the Conservative Party] is necessary because, unfortunately, there are political parties in our country that are hostile to Catholicism, in a way more or less frank, and that constantly work so that the anti-Christian spirit dominates in the laws and in the Government. It is impossible to fight against these parties and avoid the social apostasy if Catholics do not organize as a political party (Partido Conservador 1917, 27).

The Liberal Party (and later the Liberal Democratic and the Liberal Independent parties) was the other party tracing its origins to the beginnings of the republic. Liberals were characterized by its anticlerical position, which starting in the 1860s became the central political

conflict (Scully 1992). In the early twentieth century, however, liberal anticlericalism had moderated; its program focused on the separation of church and state and freedom of cult. It did not consider, for example, the establishment of divorce, a contentious issue at the time (Partido Liberal 1917). When the first two issues were included in the constitution of 1925, que religious question became secondary for liberals. Starting in the 1930s, liberals and conservatives became more and more the parties of the elites, and their collaboration indicated the religious conflict had faded among them.[31]

The third historical party was the Radical. It was formed by a group of disenchanted liberals in the early 1860s, more to the left. In the first party program of 1888 it is clear that it was anticlerical party, advocating for the separation of church and state and mandatory, free, and lay primary education. It also included improving of women's legal condition (Partido Radical 1889). The anticlerical character allowed the formation of a coalition with the liberals during the parliamentary period. But during the second administration of liberal Arturo Alessandri (1932-1938), the Radical Party turned to the left and formed the Popular Front with the Socialist and Communist Party, coalition that would take the party to power.

These three parties emerged in the nineteenth century and became organized around the religious cleavage. At the turn of the century, the class cleavage started having new protagonism. The oligarchic regime came to an end largely because the elite did not address the "social question," the poor working and living conditions of large sectors of the population (Correa Sutil et al. 2001). The inattention to social issues provoked a military intervention in 1924 and the start

[31] After experiencing an important electoral decline, both parties fused in 1966 and formed the National Party.

of eight years of political instability. In 1932 a new competitive regime emerged and consolidated that would last until 1973.

During this period of instability is when parties from the left – Socialist and Communist – emerged. The first party to emerge with a clear class-based purpose, that is concerned with the problems of the working class, was the Democratic Party. This party was created in the 1880s when a group of members from the Radical Party formed a different organization. Unlike parties created decades later, it had a reformist and not revolutionary character. In fact, although it maintained its original concern with the lower classes to some degree, it ended up forming coalitions with the Liberal and Radical parties and as such becoming part of the political establishment.

The first truly socialist, revolutionary, and working-class party came out, once again, from an existing party. Luis Emilio Recabarren founded the Workers Socialist Party in 1912. Recabarren was a lower-middle class politician who was active in the organization of workers, particularly in the northern mining towns. He was a member of the Democratic Party since 1894. In 1906 he was elected deputy but his election was disputed as irregular and he was voted out of the Chamber of Deputies a month after taking office. An interesting anecdote is that Recabarren refused to take the traditional oath, in which newly elected legislators swear to God, and an alternative procedure ended up being accepted. This event indicates that leftist parties also had a deep anticlericalism. In 1922, imbued by the revolutionary spirit after the success of the Russian revolution, the Socialist Workers Party changed its name to the Communist Party of Chile.

The final relevant party of the early period was the Socialist Party. Before the political tumult ended in 1932, that same year there was a short-lived socialist republic, declared after a coup in June 1932. In the twelve days this project lasted, the civil-military coalition that included

Eugenio Matte and Marmaduke Grove, carried out a number of reforms, including the creation of the ministries of Labor and of Health, the direct antecedent of a state-owned bank, and pardon for those sentenced for political and social crimes. Although short lived, this experience set the foundation for the creation of the Socialist Party in 1933.

During the early period of reform, then, there were different actors that emerged in scene as the debate took place. Table IV.1 summarized the location of each party on the class and religious cleavage, their normative and strategic motivations toward suffrage reform, and their expected position toward women's enfranchisement.

Table IV.1. Party positions regarding women's suffrage

	Class cleavage	**Religious cleavage**	**Normative motivation**	**Strategic motivation**	**Expected position**
Conservative	Upper	Religious	Negative/neutral	Positive	Mixed
Liberal	Upper	Anticlerical	Negative	Neutral	Reject
Radical	Middle	Anticlerical	Neutral	Negative	Reject
Democratic	Middle	Anticlerical	Neutral	Negative	Reject
Socialist	Middle-lower	Anticlerical	Positive	Negative	Reject
Communist	Lower	Anticlerical	Positive	Negative	Mixed

Normative motivations are hypothesized as negative or neutral for the right-wing and center. The two rightist parties had traditional conceptions on women's social roles and accepted only limited public action, mostly related to charity as I discuss in the next section. The main exception were members of the social-Christian current within the Conservative Party, who I consider as having neutral normative motivations. The Radical Party, on the other hand, included in its program the improvement of women's rights, but they focused on civil and excluded political rights. I classify this position as neutral because even if it represents a more favorable position than traditional liberals, it does not show a true commitment to equal rights.

Given their more progressive stand, I consider Socialist and Communist parties to be more concerned with women's rights in a wider set of issues. These parties should have a special interest in working women but extend their concern beyond that, despite the multiple and still lasting contradictions between the left and feminism. The leader of early communism, Recabarren, was probably also the figure that reflected the most on the relationship between socialism and feminism. Recabarren made a strong defense of issues such women's education and he blamed the Catholic Church for the subordinated condition women were in (Recabarren 1916).

Strategically, this same concern with the influence of religion should have led communists to have a negative motivation. I claim, however, that because this was a highly ideological and small party it was guided by convictions, although to varying degrees among party members, hence the mixed classification. Because of his early death by suicide in 1924, Recabarren did not take part in the most important debates to enfranchise women, so we do not know if he would have stood by his normative views despite negative strategic calculations, but I hypothesize a behavior guided my normative convictions.

For the rest of the anticlerical parties I anticipate a negative strategic motivation as laid out in the theoretical chapter. Given women's greater religiosity, it was expected their votes to go mostly to the Conservative Party. Therefore, for conservatives the strategic calculation is positive. Based on this configuration of motivations, there was a misalignment for most parties and no possibility of early reform. The no reform outcome was reinforced by the fact that this was a multiparty system, with no party holding more than a quarter of seats.

1.2 Class and religious cleavages in a strong women's movement

As in other countries in the region, the initial organization of women was to defend the Catholic Church from secularizing attacks. Starting in the 1910s, liberal and working-class women also started forming their own organizations; by the 1930s, there were women's organizations that spanned the political spectrum. These organization were also varied in their goals, including charity, labor demands, equal civil and political rights, and even a properly feminine political party. In most of these organizations, we can see that the same class and religious cleavages that form the basis of the party system are also behind women's organizing. All in all, in the Latin American context Chile can be classified as a case of a strong women's movement. Despite the relative strength of the movement, early suffrage reform did not occur. I claim that that the diversity of the movement reflected the multiparty nature of the Chilean early but also that the early organization of conservative women

A central episode in the clerical/anticlerical political debate occurred in 1856 with the so called "sacristan question." This was a conflict between religious and civilian authorities originated the firing of a priest. When the issue failed to be solved within religious institutions, the aggravated party recurred to civilian justice, which ruled in his favor, ruling that the Archbishop refused to accept. The dispute over whether civilian courts could intervene in Church affairs led to political parties taking sides and aligning with clerical or anticlerical position, giving their definitive form to nineteen century political parties described above (Scully 1992).

Elite women also intervened in the controversy, organizing to side with the Archbishop Valdivieso who was sentenced to exile for not obeying the Supreme Court's ruling. Well-connected women trying lobbying justices and even the president to overturn the sentence, to no success. According to Erika Maza (1995, 9), the action of these women was not simply because

of their religiosity but responded to Valdivieso's efforts to organize women to support the Church's social work, creating the Society of Women for Christian Charity in 1851.

During this period, women's charity work was also channeled through the Women's Beneficence Society. In 1865, they founded a weekly periodical to take part on debates regarding secularizing policies being discussed in Congress, the first one run by women. The periodical *Eco de las Señoras de Santiago* (The Echo of Santiago's Ladies) was printed in the same press as a newspaper of the Conservative Party (Maza Valenzuela 1995, 13), indicating the political links of these elite women. Educational and social work as well as the promotion of a Catholic view of life by elite women would continue throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. In 1912, the Chilean Ladies' League was founded with a similar purpose.

From these organizations to properly political ones it was an easy transition. In 1931, Adela Edwards de Salas, a prominent upper-class Catholic woman who had participated and led social and beneficence organizations, founded the Women's National Action of Chile (*Acción Nacional de Mujeres de Chile*). This organization acted as a political party in the municipal elections, closely allied with the Conservative Party. It defended women's full political rights as a mean to influence the legislation for the defense of the family, and the condition of woman and child (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986; Maza Valenzuela 1995).

Women, then, were active from early on in organizing to defend their interests. Another important episode related specifically to political rights came in 1875, when women attempted to register to vote in several different cities. The year before, a change in the electoral law had established literacy as the only requirement for *chilenos* to exercise the franchise. Some upper-class women that the generic Chileans was inclusive of both sexes, interpretation that was accepted by the Electoral Registry Board in several cities. According to Maza (1995, 20) these

women were acting as part of a conservative strategy to enhance their electoral base, as conservatives promoted the change in the electoral law after they broke their alliance with the government. The next electoral law approved in 1884 by an anticlerical Congress – after the conservatives abstained in the 1881 election – explicitly denied women the franchise.

Anticlerical women's organizations emerged later than Catholic ones, and reflecting the context of the early twentieth century, they were also divided by class. The visit of Spanish feminist and freethinker Belén de Sárraga in 1913, who dictated a number of conferences around the country, sparked the organization of organizations hostiles to the Catholic Church among working-class women (Correa Sutil et al. 2001, 85). Particularly in the northern mining towns de Sárraga toured, feminist organizations were created using the name of the Spanish activists. Teresa Flores, Recabarren's wife and a union leader herself, was a founder of one of those organizations (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986).

Working-class feminine and feminist organizations were divided between an anarchist and a socialist current, just as the broader labor movement (Correa Sutil et al. 2001, 85). This fact indicates how women's organizations followed the same cleavages and political divisions that the party system at large.

Other important non-Church related women's organizations were created in 1915: the Reading Circle (*Círculo de Lectura*) and the Ladies's Club (*Club de Señoras*). The former was a middle-class group headed by Amanda Labarca, an educator and writer who later served as diplomat and became one of the leaders of the Chilean women's movement. The Reading Club was not an explicitly feminist organization, but it set foundations for a group of its members to establish the National Council of Women in 1919, a strictly political feminist organization. The Ladies' Club, on the other hand, it was formed mostly by upper-class women. According to

Lavrin (1998, 287), these were "transitional institutions between the past and the future. They embodied a form of genteel feminism that promoted new roles for women but adhered to traditional female activities and pursued only limited changes" (p. 287).

Echoing the political debate on suffrage, anticlerical women often opposed women's enfranchisement. For example, Labarca, who was a member of the Radical Party, wrote in 1914 "I am not a militant feminist, nor am I a suffragist, for above all I am Chilean, and in Chile today the vote for women is out of the order" (cited in Pernet 2000, 667). Decades later, when the prospects of suffrage were near and Labarca was a strong promoter of women's rights, she mentions some of the arguments used as excuses not to support suffrage. "Some fear that female modesty might be uselessly tainted in the bitter crowds (*turbamulta*) of the political assemblies; others that her adherence to the dictates of the confessionary will mean a sort of return to the colonial period, and lastly, not few foretell that the hopes set on their civic intervention are in total disagreement with women's nature" (Labarca 1947, 138). This quote indicates that argument against women's inclusion spanned the strategic and normative.

Multiple organizations and publications by and for women followed in the 1920s and specially the 1930s.[32] The most significant in terms of duration and membership was the *Movimiento Pro-Emancipación de las Mujeres Chilenas* (Pro-Emancipation Movement of Chilean Women, MEMCh). MEMCh was created in 1935 by a group of prominent feminists who had already participated in other organizations. As such, MEMCh benefited from the political and organizational learning of the previous years. This organizational success was reflected in national reach of the MEMCh, the organization of three national congresses (in 1937, 1940, and 1944), the publication of a periodical called *La Mujer Nueva* (The New Woman) for

[32] For a longer discussion of these organizations, see Gaviola Artigas et. al (1986) and Lavrin (1996).

six consecutive years, and the variety of issues treated, including women's legal rights, working conditions, and the cost of living. MEMCh was led by professional middle-class women but it also included lower and some middle-upper-class women (Antezana-Pernet 1996). In this sense, it was the most successful organization in bridging class divides. Part of this success was related to the national political climate where starting in the 1936, the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties agreed to for a Broad Front. MEMCh membership, then, to an important degree mimicked the class composition of these political parties. It was also a non-religious organization.

Finally, during the 1930s, women's sections of political parties started to proliferate. The Democratic Party was the first to establish a feminine equivalent in 1924. It was followed by the Socialist Party in 1934 (only a year after the founding of the party), the Feminine Radical Assembly in 1935, the National Falange (a social-Christian splinter of the Conservative Party) in 1941, and finally the Liberal and Conservative parties in 1944 (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986, 94–95).[33]

Unlike some organizations of the previous decade, who adopted a cautious view of women's political engagement and tended to favor an evolutionary approach to women's political rights, starting with the municipal franchise (Asunción Lavrin 1998), by the mid-thirties there was a much stronger conviction regarding for full voting rights among women's organizations. One the one hand, the municipal franchise was approved in 1934, meaning that option was no longer on the table. Secondly, as suffrage started being approved in other countries in the region and beyond, the franchise lost its revolutionary character and it became a

[33] This last date is disputed as women participated in the 1941 Convention of the Conservative Party as a part of the Feminine Section, a new organization (Partido Conservador 1941).

must of women's rights for any civilized nation. In other words, a positive normative view on voting rights took hold among feminists, a process that would take longer to occur among men. As such, whereas in previous decades women's organizations focused on a broader range of issues, including education, civil rights, beneficence, among others, during the 1930s suffrage became the main demand of the women's movement.

The action of some of these women's groups and leaders are key to understand the timing of the introduction of some of the bills into Congress. The relationship of conservative deputies with the women of the Ladies' Club seems to have been a factor in the former introducing the first bill in 1917. In 1941, MEMCh leaders Elena Caffarena and Flor Heredia drafted the bill introduced by president Pedro Aguirre Cerda. MEMCh was informally affiliated with the Popular Front and it was very active in the campaign that led Aguirre Cerda to the presidency. The relationship between women's organizations and politicians, however, did not succeed in pushing the debate forward during this early period.

The overview of the women's movement in Chile during the early reform periods leads to several conclusions. First, particularly compared to Peru and Ecuador, it is clear that Chile had an important women's movement – that peaked in strength in the mid-1940s, as discussed in chapter VI – that even though it contributed to the approval of the municipal franchise, it nonetheless failed to have early reform. Second, I claim that the women's movement followed existing religious and class cleavages, and as such reinforced political divisions present at the party level. Because women's organizations and leaders had in most cases clear political allegiances that spanned the political spectrum, the existence of the women's movement did not tilt legislators' views on reform. Only among part of the Conservative Party did women's organization seem to influence support for the franchise among sectors of the party. In turn, this

same conservative mobilization created as a response a rejection of the women's votes by the Radical Party, which competed with conservatives for the first electoral majority.

1.3 Motivation alignment for the municipal franchise and misalignment for full political rights

This section reviews the central episodes when women's suffrage was discussed in Chile. The more important debates were around the municipal franchise; for full suffrage rights discussions evidence is more limited. I claim that voting rights for local elections were adopted because the stakes were perceived as low and the local sphere was conceived as non-political arena and an extension of the home. In that scenario, motivations aligned for the center-left parties as their negative strategic motivation receded given the low stakes. For the right, the non-political nature of municipal elections was more compatible with limited public roles for women. For the full franchise, however, motivations did not align. Focusing on the two largest parties, I argue that the Conservative Party had internal normative contradictions that prevented a unified action in carrying the debate forward, while for the Radical Party, negative strategic motivations made them contrary to women's political rights.

Both the constitutional debate of 1925 and the decree of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo's dictatorship in 1931 are considered as failed instances of reform in chapter III because given the nature of the decision-making process, the possibility of recognizing women's full political rights was theoretically on the table. In reality, however, the debate only considered municipal elections. Likewise, the only congressional debate we have pertains to the reform of the municipal law of 1934 that extended voting rights to women. The fact that women could vote in first municipal but not national election indicates that these two types of elections were strongly perceived as being of a different nature. While national elections were referred to as political,

municipalities were seen as an extension of the home and were social work was done, therefore better suited for women. These debates, nonetheless, serve to understand actor's motivations.

The constitutional debate of 1925 took place in a commission of fifteen people designated by president Arturo Alessandri instead of the originally announced elected constitutional assembly (Grez Toro 2009). Although there was some diversity in this commission, about half were members of the Liberal Party, with the rest of the parties having smaller representation. Regarding women's suffrage, the debate in this commission was whether the constitution should make explicit or not women's possible participation, specifically for municipal elections. The only mention of the political franchise was by liberal lawyer and academic José Guillermo Guerra, and to state he believed it was not convenient at the time to grant the political vote to women (Ministerio del Interior 1925, 390). Generally, liberal representatives (including president Alessandri and Justice Minister José Maza, who drafted the project of the new constitution) were of the position that the text should be neutral, not denying women's participation while also not explicitly mentioning it and leaving to electoral laws the specific regulations for the exercise of the franchise.[34] This was the position that was ultimately reflected in the 1925 constitution. The members that were for including an article stating that women could register in municipal electoral registries following the specification of the law were a conservative and the representative of the Democratic Party. The other representative of the working class expressed a favorable opinion for women's electability, asking to make explicit that women have the same rights as men to be elected for Congress (Ministerio del Interior 1925).

[34] Some years before, Maza had expressed his view contrary to women's enfranchisement in a book on suffrage (Maza Valenzuela 1997, 7).

Although these were brief mentions, they are consistent with the predictions of party positions presented in Table IV.1. The Liberal Party is expected to oppose women's participation as it had no positive motivations, and it followed suit by vetoing any explicit mention to women's political rights. Working-class parties, on the other hand, seemed to have a favorable normative view. The few representatives of the left were the most supportive of explicit mentions to women's participation in local election. Radicals did not intervene in this discussion.

A separate debate took place in the context of the Constitutional Assembly of Salaried and Intellectuals, instance that was pushed by the Communist Party and the Labor Federation of Chile. The Assembly was conceived as a deliberation space in preparation for the national assembly it had been announced. The Assembly was composed by 45% of proletariats, 20% employees, 20% teachers, 8% professionals and intellectuals, and 7% students (Grez Toro 2009). In the context of the assembly, which grouped center-left actors, some of the contradictions between normative and strategic motivations became evident. One the one hand, the inclusion of feminists organizations and representatives (the commission nominated by the President was all-male) indicates a positive view on women's political participation, and so does the inclusion in the final report of political and civil equality between both sexes (Grez Toro 2016). At the same time, while discussing this latter point, both a labor representative and feminist Amanda Labarca of the Radical Party indicated they were in favor in principle even if women were not yet "free spiritually" to exercise the franchise, probably a reference to women's religiosity. Labarca stated that "Even though currently women were not believed to be capable of acting free in equal conditions with men, the assembly ought to look into the future" (Grez Toro 2016, 29).[35]

[35] An important defender of women's rights within the left was Luis Emilio Recabarren, union leader, political activists, and founder of the Socialist Workers Party in 1912 (transformed into the Communist Party a decade later). Recabarren would write opinion pieces calling for women's emancipation and sign

Women's suffrage for municipal elections was first introduced into the legislation in 1931 via decree by the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. The regulation stated a plural vote system, through the creation of three registries: a general registry, a second one for property owners, and a third for tax contributors. Women over 25 years old (for men it was 21) could register in the second and third registries. Each person would have as many votes as registries they were in.[36] This legislation was never implemented.

What were Ibáñez's motivations to include women as voters? We do not have evidence that can give insight into his decision-making process. It was likely, however, guided by strategic concerns, although not electoral in nature. The decree was dictated just two months before the fall of Ibáñez, who was facing an important economic and social crisis as consequence of the Great Depression. It is possible that by enfranchising women he sought the support of women's organizations, some of which were active in the protests against his regime. And in fact, many women's organizations in the 1920s had adopted an evolutionary approach, settling for the municipal vote first (Asunción Lavrin 1998). Since enfranchisement was so restricted, it is unlikely electoral calculations played an important role. And in terms of normative motivations, Ibáñez had not shown interest in defending women's rights and again, the restricted nature of the franchise also indicate he was not committed to equal political rights.

The second instance where there was an important debate on women's suffrage was during the discussion of the new Law of Municipal Elections approved in 1934, after a decade of

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them under a feminine pseudonym (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986, 32). Interestingly, as discussed in Chapter 5, José Batlle and Ordóñez had similar views and undertook the same strategy of writing under a women's name. The first, however, was a radical figure within the Chilean political scenario while the second became a two-term president.

[36] DFL 320, "Sobre Organización del Registro Municipal de Electores," May 30, 1931. Available at https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1094691

mayors and councilmen being designated by the executive. This law stipulated women (as well as foreigners) could vote in local elections in the same terms as men. Full political rights were outside the purview of this bill, and as such the discussion centered on the franchise for local elections. I focus on the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, as it is in this chamber that the debate on women's suffrage took place. The original bill introduced by the government headed by liberal Arturo Alessandri did not consider women's suffrage; the issue was first introduced by the Committee on Interior Government. This Committee proposed that women over 25, with certain level of instruction and "that show interest" in the municipality affairs should be allowed to register (Cámara de Diputados de Chile 1933, 665). After the general debate, this same Committee agreed to remove any additional requirements for the female vote and set the same voting age as for men – 21 years old.

During this process, feminists had an important role with a campaign for full voting rights, headed by the National Committee Pro-Women's Rights. This organization was created that same year – 1933 – and among its leaders were Felisa Vergara, Amanda Labarca, and Elena Doll, a socialist, radical, and conservative respectively (López Varas and Gamboa Valenzuela 2015, 128; Maza Valenzuela 1997, 36).

There was no nominal vote for the municipal law. To analyze parties' motivations, I consider the legislators who intervened during the debate or presented amendments. This information is presented in Table IV.2, with each "x" representing one legislator. The table also includes the original bill and the members of the committee where female suffrage was introduced with restrictions. Throughout the debate a certain consensus was formed around full voting rights, so it is likely that some legislators altered their initial position.

Table IV.2. Positions on municipal female franchise, Chamber of Deputies (1933)

	Full rights	Restricted rights	Plural vote	No franchise
Conservative		xxx	x	
Liberal			xx	xx
Radical	xx	xxx		
Democratic	xxx			
Socialist/communist	xxx			
Others		x		x

The position defended by each party as well as the discourses pronounced during the debate are consistent with the motivation alignment argument. The argument holds, however, under the specific conditions in which the debate took place: the political vote was not a possibility, the alternatives ended up being full or limited rights, and that local elections were perceived as low stakes. Regarding this last point, the report of the Chamber Committee stated, "In the Municipality ideological questions will not be debated nor will laws be dictated, that can change the political or social face of a country; it will only administer municipal goods and perform a practical task of cleaning, hygiene, beautification, and vigilance in the sale of foodstuffs" (Cámara de Diputados de Chile 1933, 665).

The information in the table presents a clear division between right, center, and left-wing political parties. The two parties on the right, Conservative and Liberal, did not have favorable views on women's equal participation. The first sign is the fact that the issue was not considered in the original bill elaborated by the executive. The rest of the interventions by right wing legislators were to establish restrictions to the female franchise or propose a plural vote. In most versions of the plural vote, there were additional votes considered for the (male) head of family, widows with children, or based on how much they contributed to the municipality, because these categories of individuals had a "greater interest in a correct municipal administration." (Cámara

de Diputados de Chile 1933, 748). The plural vote, then, would also translate into unequal participation.

From a strategic point of view, limiting the franchise (for older, more educated women, professionals, property owners), made sense as participation would have been skewed to upper-class women, potentially benefiting the political right. This view was in fact pointed out in the debate by socialist Emilio Zapata (Cámara de Diputados de Chile 1933, 823). Normatively, there were no explicit rejections of women entering politics, but a more general philosophic view contrary to universal suffrage based on individuals' different capacities and preparation. In the case of women, this meant voting at a higher age, as "women before 25 years old have other concerns more befitting of their sex" (Cámara de Diputados de Chile 1933, 746). It can be claimed that the position against universal suffrage is simply strategic, as it justifies introducing additional class-based conditions. For the restriction on age, on the other hand, it is hard to see the strategic implications and I argue, it is sign of a normative view that saw women as not equally qualified. In fact, even when the final bill was being discussed, in 1947, a conservative deputy claimed it was a good thing women did not aspire in larger numbers to run for office and that her greatest contribution from the home to public life was through the vote and not through occupying public posts (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d., 182).

The first bill presented in Chile to enfranchise women was introduced in 1917 by conservative deputy Luis Undurraga, co-signed by eight legislators from the same party.[37] In 1920, another member of the party made a defense of women's political participation in the

[37] Some secondary sources (Chaney 1973, 337; Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986, 35) state that this bill was introduced by the Youth Section of the Conservative Party, given the close relationship it had with the Ladies' Club. None of the party members who signed the bill were below 35 years old (the age limit to be part of the youth section) though it is possible that the youth influenced more senior members to present the bill.

context of a meeting of the Ladies' Club and the Chilean Ladies' League (Salas Edwards 1920), while that same year, then liberal candidate Arturo Alessandri addressed the same crowd focusing on civil rights and dismissing the franchise (Maza Valenzuela 1997, 28–30).

Based on these antecedents, part of the literature has highlighted how the Conservative Party was the first one who appeared in favor of women's suffrage (Maza Valenzuela 1995). And while some party members did show and early commitment, the discussion from the municipal franchise indicates that Maza overstates the degree of unity the party had on the issue. Moreover, the support of the party's base to the issue seems even more feeble; when the 1917 bill for full suffrage rights was introduced, women who supported it were threatened with excommunication (Chaney 1973, 337).

As discussed above, my theoretical expectation is that the Conservative Party will show a mixed position toward suffrage, given the divisions that emerged in the first half of the century between social-Christians and traditionalists. While the strategic motivation is the same for both actors, social-Christians were characterized by a concern with social issues and were more open to the incorporation of women. Conservative women who organized for charity purposes, the origins of right-wing female organizing, were part of this same worldview (Maza Valenzuela 1995). Ricardo Salas Edwards, who in 1920 pronounced the speech favorable to women's suffrage in the Ladies' Circle was a social-Christian (Heise 1974, I:391). So were some of the deputies who signed the bill of 1917 (Brahm García 2016; Pereira 1994). Another prominent member of the social-Christian sector, Horacio Walker, introduced a bill into the Senate in 1937 and as party president, in the 1940s, advocated for women's rights (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d.; Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986).

Among leftist parties we can observe the opposite configuration of motivations in the debate of municipal suffrage. The left had a positive strategic motivation in equal voting rights, which was consistent with their normative motivation. Socialist and Democrats exhibited unanimous support for the unrestricted franchise, with the exception of one independent legislator, initially elected in a party of socialist tendency. The arguments presented were of a normative nature, stating they believed in equal rights for men and women. Socialist deputy Carlos Alberto Martínez went on to say that "these progressive forces cannot and must not refuse the fulfillment of their duty of giving satisfaction, without reservations, to a just aspiration, whether or not we will benefit with its satisfaction" (Cámara de Diputados de Chile 1933, 698). Strategically, full voting rights would mean the inclusion of lower and middle-class women left out by the restrictions.

Finally, the Radical Party representatives also expressed they favored equal political rights. However, the three members of the party that were in the Committee of Interior Government (of a total of six) failed to defend this position in this initial instance. And even though they were the largest party in the Chamber, only two representatives asked to intervene in the debate; the normative motivation seems to have been weaker than for parties on the left. With radical support for full rights, the correlation of forces favored center-left parties and they could reject the amendments introduced by the right.

For full suffrage rights the Radical Party seemed more reluctant. When the first bill was introduced in 1917, the radical press stated that women were doctrinairely behind and this bill was an attempt by conservative to bump their vote share, as women would be a great electoral market for clericalism (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986, 36). A couple of decades later, conservative senator Walker introduced a suffrage bill in 1935 that was rejected in the Committee of

Constitution, Legislation and Justice of the Senate by the Radical and Democratic parties. Walked also claims that in the Senate there were voices that accused the bill as "an initiative from the reaction" (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d., 63). There are no records of the debates within committees, so we cannot corroborate these words or the vote. Nonetheless, the rejection of the bill is consistent with radical's weariness of women's voting, particularly considering that March 1935 was the first time women voted in municipal elections, showing an overwhelming support for the Conservative Party.[38]

In January 1941 there were signs that motivations might aligned for the Radical Party. That year, president Pedro Aguirre Cerda introduce an equal suffrage bill, the only one introduced ever by the executive. This bill was drafted by feminists Flor Heredia and Elena Caffarena of MEMCh. Aguirre Cerda was the most socially progressive of the radical presidents, and a sympathizer of the feminist cause. His sympathies, however, proved timid as many of the feminists' demands were not carried through (Antezana-Pernet 1996). Similarly, although introducing the bill was an important step, this action took place after more than two years in office and was not followed by a debate in Congress despite the government majority. Ten months after the introduction of the bill, Aguirre Cerda died while still in office, and momentum was lost. The bill was not revived.

The debates surrounding early female suffrage in Chile showed parties contradictions between normative and strategic motivations, particularly among the two largest parties, Conservative and Radical. These contradictions emerged from the nature of party competition in a fragmented political system. During the municipal suffrage debate on whether to introduce

[38] 47.3% of women voted for the Conservative Party, compared to only 21.7% of men (Maza Valenzuela 1995, 34).

restrictions or not, the class cleavage was more prominent in the strategic calculations of politicians. For the full suffrage debate, which was more diffuse, religion was also part of the debate as the clerical/anticlerical cleavage, although secondary in policy debates, was still central in the logic of party competition. As such, failed early reform in Chile shows that the overlapping class and religious cleavages led to a misalignment of motivations.

2 Peru's 1931 failed reform

Female enfranchisement in Peru was debated in the legislature in one occasion during the period I consider for early reform. The debate took place in the context of a constitutional congress elected in 1931, so the analysis below focuses on this specific juncture. Full and restricted enfranchisement were analyzed as alternatives before settling on the adoption of the municipal vote. As the vote for national elections – the criteria for coding positive reform – was rejected, this is a failed instance of reform. I argue the failure was due to political disputes emerging from the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage. During this period, and for the first time, the cleavage had clear manifestations with emerging political forces in a juncture that inaugurated a new phase in Peruvian politics. APRA, UR, and the Decentralist Party were all reflections of the class and religious divisions as well as the particular characteristics of the 1931 elections. These parties had, for the most part, contradictory normative and strategic motivations, leading to a rejection of reform in congress. Peru, then, is a case that conforms well to the theory of motivation alignment presented in this dissertation, at the same time that shows that a purely strategic explanation falls short for explaining electoral institutions in the country.

2.1 Cleavage structure in Peru: oligarchic dominance

The nature of the oligarchic cleavage in Peru is, in many ways, the mirror image of Uruguay. Because of a strong colonial implantation, including the Catholic Church, and its many legacies on the social structure (Mahoney 2010), multiple observers interpret Peruvian history as characterized by an "oligarchic domination" until the revolutionary military regime initiated in 1968 (Cotler 2005; Pease 1977). The *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (American Revolutionary Popular Alliance, APRA), a leftist reformist party that mobilized middle and lower classes, led the efforts to tame oligarchic power but ultimately failed, spending long years proscribed (between 1933-1945 and again in 1948-1956). However, even outside formal politics the APRA was the main threat to traditional elites and it guided their political decisions and alliances. This party moderated its postulates in the postwar scenario, even though the perception that it represented a threat to the oligarchic order would not go away until the 21st century. It would take a military, Juan Velasco Alvarado, to carry out the structural reforms that were common in the region, including land reform and nationalizations.

After the eleven-year rule of Augusto Leguía (1919-1930), who governed with increasing authoritarian tendencies and displaced the traditional oligarchy in favor of new industrial sectors, there was a brief political opening that led to general elections of October 1931. José Miguel Sánchez Cerro led the highly welcomed military coup that ousted Leguía, becoming a popular figure. He was later forced to resign because of his attempts to remain in power through illegitimate means and a transitional government called for new elections. These elections have been characterized as the first modern elections in Peru because of the emergence of new social actors as well as new forms of political mobilization (Jansen 2017; Stein 1980). It was also an

important moment in the process of electoral modernization.[39] A new Electoral Statute was elaborated for these elections, establishing the secret ballot and minority representation, making voting mandatory, and establishing an autonomous electoral body (Basadre 2014).

The 1931 presidential elections centered around two central candidates: Sánchez Cerro, the military hero, and Raúl Haya de la Torre, founder and leader of the APRA. Robert Jansen (2017) highlights how, despite being ideologically opposed, both candidates shared modes of mobilization that were unknown in Peru (and most of Latin America) at the time: mass rallies, nation-wide tours of the country, and grassroots organizing efforts. They also shared being backed by new and – to varying degrees – highly personalistic parties. Sánchez Cerro would go on to win the presidential election with 50.7% of the vote. Haya de la Torre received 35% of the ballots.

A constitutional congress was elected in parallel. This assembly was in charge of drafting both regular legislation and a new constitution, which was published in 1933. The 1931 elections resulted in the representation of three main forces in the assembly: Sánchez Cerro's *Unión Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Union, UR) with a 43% of the seats, the APRA with 21%, and the *Partido Descentralista* (Decentralist Party) also with 21%. The other 15% came from independents and small parties.[40] The three parties were new organizations running for the first time, and except for APRA, did not survive long.

[39] The extent of popular mobilization was limited by existing suffrage restriction, specifically the literacy requirement. This requirement meant that only a 31.4% of the male population was eligible to vote, with great subnational variation (Jansen 2017, 115–16)

[40] The elections in the department of Cajamarca, in the northern highlands, were declared null and repeated in mid-1932. The APRA had a strong majority in this department, electing seven of the ten seats in the original election.

Up to this moment in Peruvian history, the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage had not clearly emerged in the political arena. The cleavage that dominated politics were the divisions within the oligarchy, between a traditional sector linked to agriculture, and a more liberal elite focused on commerce and industry. During the first third of the century, these actors had different political expressions, but were essentially two factions of the same class that shared an interest in maintaining the existing social order. At the same time, transformations to the social structure were starting to take place, with an important countryside-city migration, the emergence of labor as an actor, and a growing middle-class with access to all levels of education. Until the 1931 juncture, however, these structural changes had no real political expression.

The foundation of APRA and Raúl Haya de la Torre's presidential run clearly reflect the emergence and relative success of anti-oligarchic political actors. The party emerged as a non-Communist revolutionary party that was successful at capturing labor (Drinot 2012). Although differentiating themselves from communist with a more moderate discourse, they spoke in representation of workers and declared themselves anti-oligarchic (Partido Aprista Peruano 1931). But unlike socialist and communists – who would remain politically marginal –, APRA defended a coalition with sectors of the middle class and assigned a central role to electoral competition, differences in strategy that separated them from the traditional left (Drinot 2011; Jansen 2017).

Haya de la Torre became a prominent political figure as a student leader in 1923. He led the student protests against the government's attempt at consecrating Peru to the Sacred Heart, in a protest that brought students, young intellectuals, and workers together. After this episode, he was sent into exile by the Leguía regime, from where he started organizing what he envisioned as a continental political movement. The first branch of APRA was founded in Mexico in 1924

and others would follow in the continent, but with little medium-term success. Only when Haya de la Torre was preparing his return to Peru was the *Partido Aprista Peruano* (Peruvian Aprista Party, PAP) founded, in September 1930.[41]

One of the central principles of APRA was its anti-oligarchic character. The party and its leader placed the oligarchy at its central enemy, as the group that had governed through a system of exclusion. In the inaugural speech of the presidential campaign (pronounced on August 23, 1931), Haya de la Torre argued the state had been an instrument of the oligarchy and served its interests in an alliance with foreign interests. The three excluded classes the party claimed to represent – labor, peasants, and the middle class – constituted the real majority that would displace the oligarchy from the state (Partido Aprista Peruano 1931).

The elites, on their part, grew increasingly concerned with APRA as the party showed its capacity to organize and mobilized popular actors that had thus far remained excluded from political life (Jansen 2017; Stein 1980). The fear of a deep alteration of the social order led them to support Sánchez Cerro, a candidate from outside its ranks and not of the liking of many members of the elite. This support came to show the degree of rejection and fear of APRA, that would continue for decades. The anti-oligarchic character of APRA thus becomes apparent both from the own perspective of the party as well as for how its opponents perceived it.

Classification of actors on the other side of the cleavage is less straightforward. Sánchez Cerro was in no way a traditional representative of the oligarchy. He was a military from a middle-class family of the northern province of Piura. And he had indigenous blood, being

[41] The name of the party signals that the party was initially conceived as part of the americanist project. In practice, PAP and APRA became synonyms and I use both terms interchangeably. Another Latin American Party that emerged from the original americanist project was Democratic Action in Venezuela, as its founde Rómulo Betancourt was part of the same intellectual and political circle as Haya de la Torre and other aprista members.

characterized as the first *mestizo* president. His social origins, then, distanced him from the oligarchy. So did his style and the mobilization of popular support, a strategy that the elites were ideologically opposed to (Jansen 2017).

During the campaign it increasingly became clear that the election would center around Haya de la Torre and Sánchez Cerro, and faced with these options, the elites opted to support the UR candidate. Despite the differences, a strong opposition to the Leguía regime brought them together. And Sánchez Cerro's nationalists, paternalists, and authoritarian ideas were compatible with those of the oligarchy. More so, the fact that the UR party was created just months before the elections as a personalist vehicle for Sánchez Cerro (Molinari Morales 2006) and not as a programmatic party, provided a space for Sánchez Cerro and the oligarchy to converge. It served as umbrella to a diverse coalition that included different factions of the traditional elites and a popular base of support. UR, thus, essentially became an *anti-aprista* coalition (Klarén 2004).

Luis Antonio Eguiguren, the president of the assembly, reflects part of this diversity and the fact that UR was a collection of groups and individuals from different origins and political positions.[42] He had been a personal friend of Sánchez Cerro in their school days. He saw the coup with sympathy, given its democratic promises. In 1930, Eguiguren was designated mayor of Lima, where he pushed a number of policies for the popular sectors, including a particular concern with housing and unemployment. For the legislative elections, he run for UR and initially was a member of the government coalition. But he represented a moderate vision, getting support beyond UR to head the assembly. And as polarization increased in the initial

[42] Jorge Basadre, historian but also a relevant public intellectual at the time, states that Eguiguren founded the Social Democratic Party and that he supported Sánchez Cerro through this party. In 1936, Eguiguren would run as presidential candidate through the Social Democratic Party, winning the elections before they were declared null. The National Elections Jury (JNE) (2016), however, does not include this party among those represented in the assembly in 1931.

months of 1932, Eguiguren became progressively critical of Sánchez Cerro's administration, particularly after he dictated an Emergency Law that limited constitutional rights and allowed persecution of the APRA (Basadre 2014).

With respect to religion, the cleavage was relatively mild in Peru, with a weak anticlerical sector. To be sure, the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth saw the appearance of anticlerical actors, including liberals, Masons, anarchists, and socialists. The main anticlerical voices, however, tended to remain politically marginal. On the other hand, the most relevant political parties were not openly religious. Some attempts at forming Catholic parties took place in the provinces; but only in 1930, the with foundation of the Popular Union Party, albeit very briefly these attempts reached a national character (Klaiber 1992). This party only managed to elect two members to the assembly in the 1931 elections. The Decentralist Party also had a closer relationship to the Church, as discussed below.

APRA exhibited a considerable degree of anticlericalism during its early years. Some radical anticlerical members advocated for the separation of church and state, universal lay education, the expulsion of foreign clergy, and the nationalization of church property (Klaiber 1992, 208). During the campaign, however, and to appeal to broader sectors of a largely Catholic population, these proposals were mostly abandoned. The APRA's program only touched religion proposing the separation of church and state. And the party made explicit efforts to refute its depiction as an iconoclast party, claiming to be religiously neutral and that the Church had nothing to worry about.[43] After the election, and particularly once they were outlawed, the *apristas* abandoned their anticlericalism and appealed to popular religiosity to build a quasi-religious movement (Klaiber 1978).

[43] F. Cossio del Pomar. "La religión y el APRA". *APRA,* September 1, 1931, p. 10.

The somewhat heterogeneous composition of UR and its representatives is also observable in the religious aspect. While probably all Catholics (in the 1940 census, 98.5% of the population declared being Catholic), there were varying degrees of secularism within the coalition. In the first six months Sánchez Cerro was in power after the 1930 coup, he pushed the legislation to instate mandatory civil marriage and introduce divorce. In 1932, however, he would seek support of the bishop of Cuzco in his attempt to combat "Apro-Communism" (Klaiber 1992). Among legislators, debates reflect that the coalition combined liberal and conservative factions of the elite; while not anticlerical, some members of the party did show secularizing views. The secularizing commitment was nonetheless weak, exemplified in the fact that the 1933 constitution did not separate church and state. But the relative diversity translated into different positions regarding women's suffrage, as we will see below.

In addition to the two main parties contending for the presidency, a third important actor in the assembly were the decentralists, with the same number of representatives as APRA, 21%. The decentralists were based in the southern region of Arequipa; most the representatives were elected in the highlands provinces. The party was organized by a provincial middle-class and it also included a number of hacienda owners (Klaiber 1992; Klarén 2004). It did not have an important popular base, partly because it did not need it as the regions it represented had large indigenous populations, excluded from the franchise through the literacy requirement. In religious terms, these groups were traditional Catholics. Unlike Popular Union, formed in Lima and representing the social strand of Catholicism, in the highlands religion was associated with tradition against the modernizing forces in Lima. Regionalism and religion converged in a single force in the Decentralist Party, receiving open support of religious figures such as the bishop of Cuzco (Klaiber 1992).

2.2 Weak feminist mobilization and partisan activism

In this section I analyze the characteristics of women's mobilization during this period, an additional component to understand parties' calculations. In addition to the common Catholic, liberal, and working-class activists, Peru's female mobilization of the first part of the century had partisan variants, both linked to APRA and to UR. While in other countries women were affiliated to political parties, it is probably the weakness of the properly feminist organizations – which did not have an important social base – that makes these partisan variants so relevant, particularly in the case of UR, as I will argue in the next section.

As in other countries, the first signs of women mobilizing politically are related to a defense of the Catholic church. Basadre (2014, 4:254) indicates how in the liberal convention of 1855-56 to draft a new constitution, upper and lower class women constituted the majority of the audience and manifested against the (failed) attempt to introduce freedom of religion. Decades later, in 1886, women initiated a movement to defend Jesuits against expulsion. And the Catholic Union for Ladies, an organization created to defend Catholicism from growing anticlericalism, was much more active than the corresponding male association (Klaiber 1992). According to Klaiber, the Catholic Union for Ladies was the most prestigious organization for women of the middle and upper classes. The Union had chapters the most important cities, and its membership reached higher numbers than suffragists organizations would.[44]

On the liberal front, Peruvian feminists faced important obstacles in organizing to demand suffrage and other women's rights. The country had a small middle class, suffragists'

[44] As example, in the northern city of Trujillo, there were 86 members in 1912; in Chiclayo, the chapter was founded in 1916 with 135 members; and in the small city of Catacaos, it had 89 members in 1926 (Klaiber 1992, 81).

organizations main constituency; authoritarian regimes persecuted left-leaning feminists; and there was very little support from male figures and society more broadly. Under these conditions, Peruvian suffragist mobilization was highly dependent on a few isolated figures, with weak organizations, and unable to surpass their ideological differences to collaborate toward common goals.

The debate for women's civil and political rights was spearheaded by María Jesús Alvarado (1878-1971), the first woman to present a feminist project in Peru (Chaney 2014 [1979]; Rojas Benavente 2007). Alvarado was a self-educated schoolteacher; her readings led her to agitate in favor of women, children, and indigenous people in public forums and before Congress. In 1911, she gave a conference at the Geographic Society of Lima titled "Feminism." In addition to reviewing the role of women in different historical periods and cultures, the conference laid out the basics of feminism as a movement that claims equal capacity and rights for men and women. In order to achieve that equality, Alvarado argued, four sets of reforms were necessary: increased female access to education in equal conditions; access to public service and liberal professions; civil rights to end dependency of the husband; and political rights to intervene in national affairs (Alvarado Rivera 1912).

In 1914 she founded *Evolución Femenina* (Feminine Evolution, EF). Seventy-seven women were founding partners, but the organization never surpassed this level of membership (at its height it had 80 members (Chaney 1988)). The emergence of such an organization generated rejection from sectors of society that thought it would lead to a war between the sexes and to women abandoning the family, resulting in anarchy (Zegarra 2011). The members of the organization were even accused of being Protestant although most members were Catholic (Alvarado was an agnostic) (Chaney 1979). Alvarado's strong defense of women and labor led to

her imprisonment and later exile to Argentina by the Leguía regime in 1924. She would not return to Peru until 1936. During her absence, Feminine Evolution continued to formally exist but there are no records of activity.

Similarly, the efforts of a second important feminist of the period were equally unsustained beyond her personal actions. Zoila Aurora Cáceres (1877-1958) combines a middle and upper-class activism with a social concern that led her to get involved in organizing female workers. Daughter of former president Andrés Avelino Cáceres (1886-1890), Zoila was a writer, partly educated in Europe and that lived parts of her life in Argentina, France, and Italy. As Alvarado, in addition to suffrage, Cáceres advocated for the female education and female workers, helping organize the first seamstress union (Villavicencio 1990) and a telephone operators' strike (Basadre 2014).

Cáceres created *Feminismo Peruano* (Peruvian Feminism, FP) in 1924, getting official recognition in 1926. A year after the creation, the organization sent its first petition to the legislature, demanding the female vote for municipal elections (BPN[45]). The creation of this organization perfectly overlapped with Alvarado's exile and it seemed it would to take over the role of defense of women's rights. However, after founding and presiding the organization for one year, in 1925 Cáceres traveled to Europe and did not return until the fall of Leguía in 1930.

Angelina Arce took over the presidency during most of Cáceres absence, but the organization lost relevance. In 1928, it only had 61 active members. At the height of its activities, in 1931, membership would rise to roughly 360 members,[46] a considerable increase although still a very small number. Members of the organization acknowledged this weakness,

[45] Biblioteca Nacional del Perú (BNP), "Notebook of the Secretary of Communications of Peruvian Feminism," code 2000022498.
[46] Ibid.

stating in a letter to Cáceres "when you left our side, the society entered in a death silence, the multiple occupations of miss Edelmira del Pando [presumably the new president after Cáceres] prevented her (according to her answer) from dedicating her time to the institution."[47] Arce mentions that it was not possible to completely abide by the bylaws given the lack of staff.[48]

Under new leadership Peruvian Feminism also had a conservative turn. While Alvarado came in open confrontation with dictator Augusto Leguía, PF maintained a cordial relationship, even naming him an honorary member of the organization in 1928 and thanking him for incorporating women into public posts.[49] Moreover, in her final account, Arce presents quite a conservative view of women's political participation, claiming

> The woman is not yet prepared to act in public life and intervene in politics. She must first acquire personal rights, those that relate to her sex, those that will give her autonomy and will be the base of her dignity, and later, when this character is formed, when she has a true concept of her responsibilities in all sort of matters, she will be able to lay upon herself the terrible burden of politics in her country.[50]

Although the view that women first needed to be educated or secure their civil rights before entering politics was a common view at the time. But coming from the president of an organization that had women's enfranchisement as a central concern reflects how pervasive these more traditional positions were, and conversely, the exceptionality of feminists as Alvarado and Cáceres in the Peruvian context.

After the fall of Leguía, Cáceres returned to Peru in 1930 and quickly began lobbying the provisional government led by Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro to extend voting rights to women.

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[47] BNP, "Letters sent to miss Zoila Aurora Cáceres because of the campaign to obtain the female vote", code 2000020971, November 18, 1927.
[48] BNP, "Notebook…"
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid, May 20, 1929.

Cáceres first wrote to the commission that dictated the Electoral Statute for the elections of 1931 and after that instance failed, she addressed the political leaders of the forces represented in the constitutional congress from across the political spectrum. In addition to lobbying, the suffragist campaign also included a debate in the press communication with other women's associations to get their support and mobilize them for the cause. According to historian Roisida Aguilar (2003), these efforts led to the legislative to consider enfranchising women, ultimately extending women the vote for municipal elections only. There is not straightforward evidence that Cáceres' endeavors are the reason why the issue was considered in the constitutional congress, but it is possible that without her efforts, women's enfranchisement would have been more easily dismissed. What is clear is that the relevance of this campaign and whatever success it had mobilizing women, was due to Zoila Cáceres personally and not to the organization behind her.

The breadth of Cáceres movement was limited by the polarization that emerged during the elections. Since the inception of her political activity, Cáceres was active in organizing and defending female unions. In this sense, she was closer to the anti-oligarchic camp. However, despite this popular strand of her work, Apristas dismissed her organization as coming from the upper class and not concerned with workers. She also remained independent from the *sanchecerristas* (the president's movement), independence that led to a considerable degree of isolation.

Entering the from the partisan world, a third relevant figure is poet and political activist Magda Portal. Portal was a founding member of APRA and oversaw the Feminine Section of the party. APRA was the first party to have a feminine section, as part of its structure organized around functional units. In addition, the party had a territorial organization, with some women's associations affiliated to the local level structures. As head of the national feminine section,

Portal played an important role in recruiting other women to the party (García-Bryce 2014). Party women took part in the organizing efforts through activities such as literacy campaigns, founding rural schools, and providing free medical assistance, all part of the services the party performed to attract new members (Jansen 2017).

In this early state of the party's history, Portal was aligned with the party, including in the issue of suffrage. She actually pointed out the failure of Zoila Cáceres' movement, composed only of upper class women according to her, in obtaining the vote (Portal 1933). Portal also criticized these women for focusing only in obtaining the franchise, an issue that did not satisfy the demands of Peruvian women. She thus made the common arguments of anti-oligarchic actors. But during the next decade, as the next chapter shows, she would come to clash with Haya de la Torre precisely on the role of women's political participation both in the party and in the country.

A final relevant form of women's mobilization appeared during Sánchez Cerro's presidential campaign. Although they were not allowed to vote, women actively participated in the campaign, speaking at rallies and joining support clubs, as well as forming women only committees. Unlike the case of APRA, where grassroot associations were promoted from above, in the case of UR these organizations or clubs were either preexistent organizations from popular sectors or were formed spontaneously to show support for Sánchez Cerro, but without having an organic relationship to the party (Stein 1980). There are no clear records of how many of these clubs existed, or their membership. Stein (1980) estimates that in Lima there were about 20,000 working class people participating in them. If accurate, this number represents about two thirds of all the votes Sánchez Cerro received in Lima (Jansen 2017). That proportion, however, is probably lower as many women participated in these clubs without being able to cast a ballot.

At the level of the party's central structure, there was also participation of women. After being elected, the *Comité de damas de la Unión Revolucionaria* [Revolutionary Union Ladies' Committee] gave Sánchez Cerro a presidential band. The name of the committee as well as the family names of the members hint at this being an upper-class organization, which is consistent with the party structure where elites were at the top and popular support was not organically linked to the organization. In that occasion, the president of the Committee gave a speech where she highlighted their role in Sánchez Cerro's victory: "we want to let know, for the record, that the men that have given their votes in the polls, by an overwhelming majority, to the commander, have come out of our homes, where we have begged as daughters, instigated as wives, ordered as mothers, to achieve this unprecedented triumph" (*El Comercio,* December 4, 1931). She went on to mention the three areas of work of the Committee: a plan to establish a venue to conduct workshops, create cooperatives, and sales room to benefit women; a fundraising campaign to build a private residency for the president; and the elaboration of the presidential band that contained a number of patriotic symbols. A list of 48 women that participated in acquiring the presidential band is included in the article.

These women did not seem to have an agenda of their own in terms of promoting women's rights. Among the activities they mention as part of their agenda, there is a focus on women but with a somewhat assistance character. And even though they highlight their role in electing Sánchez Cerro, there is no explicit demand to obtain suffrage. There are also no records or mention of UR women as suffragists during the congressional debate to extend the franchise. Nonetheless, female participation in electing Sánchez Cerro probably played an important role in the decision of many UR representatives to support women's suffrage.

2.3 Misalignment of normative and strategic motivations

Failed early reform in Peru represents a clear case of motivation misalignment, misalignment that emerged from cleavages reflected in the 1931 electoral juncture, and the assembly it resulted from that election. In this sense, the case represents a good fit of the theory. This is particularly clear in the position APRA and the Decentralist Party defended during the debate to extend suffrage to women. Since both these parties had more easily identifiable ideological projects and social bases, it is easier to identify their position and understand their vote. Because UR was a non-programmatic and heterogenous party, the position of its representatives was likewise varied. I argue that the inconsistency in their position was due to this heterogeneity and reflected different motivations within the party itself.

Theoretical predictions from the argument above state that as an anti-oligarchic actor, the APRA should have been normatively favorable to women's suffrage and strategically against it, which I argue is the case (see Table IV.3 for a summary of expected positions). Universal suffrage was part of the party's program (Partido Aprista Peruano 1931), position that was frequently restated in publications and other instances. For example, in answering Zoila Cáceres' request to support reform, Haya de la Torre wrote "as you must be informed, the Peruvian aprista party, whose leadership I exercise, has been fighting for the recognition of women's political rights; in this sense, the campaign counts with the full support of this party."[51] In the debate, this position would be reinterpreted as meaning support for the restricted franchise; however, it is clear this was not the original meaning.

[51] Carmen Rosa Rivadeneira. "El Voto femenino." *APRA*, May 29, 1931, p. 6; "El Voto femenino", April 11, 1931, p. 6; BNP, "Letters…"

Table IV.3. Party positions regarding women's suffrage, 1931

Party	Class cleavage	Religious cleavage	Normative beliefs	Strategic motivation	Expected position
Full suffrage					
UR	Upper-lower	Mixed	Mixed	Favorable	Mixed
APRA	Middle-lower	Secular	Favorable	Negative	Reject
Decentralists	Upper-middle	Religious	Negative	Positive	Reject
Restricted suffrage					
UR	Upper-lower	Mixed	Mixed	Negative	Reject
APRA	Middle-lower	Secular	Favorable	Favorable	Support
Decentralists	Upper-middle	Religious	Negative	Positive	Reject

The inclusion of equal political rights came from the women's section of the party, led by Magda Portal. In addition to full political rights, the program included measures toward women's civil independence, labor rights, and equal salary. And during the legislative debate and unlike other parties, they recognized that women's juridical condition was unjust and not due to "natural" differences. In the words of Raúl Cáceres, "All our written laws have consecrated prerogatives for men and denied those same prerogatives for women" (República del Perú 1931, 413). These statements, the demands regarding women's rights, and including women in important positions (Portal was one of the founding members) and in the party structure are elements compatible with a strategic choice to have a broader base. Nonetheless, at a moment in its history where APRA was a highly ideological party, I interpret them as reflecting a normative concern with women's political participation. As we will see in the next chapter, this normative commitment was weak, at least from some of the party's members including Haya himself. In 1931, however, it is likely that these factors responded to the APRA being part of a certain Latin American and global leftist ethos that had inclusion at its core.

Despite what they had agreed in their programmatic congress, when women's enfranchisement was debated in the assembly in late 1931, the APRA representatives argued against full suffrage rights, advocating instead for qualified version of the franchise only for working and educated women (Aguilar Gil 2002). And very disciplined, they voted against full suffrage and for a restricted franchise (see Table IV.4). As representatives of the working class, the party defended this segment of society. The central argument of APRA was that while equal rights for men and women was the goal, the conditions were not yet adequate; for women to freely exercise the vote it was first necessary an expansion of education and full civil rights.

Behind their proposal was the belief that without education or economic independence women were subject to the Catholic Church's ideas and as such they would vote for conservative parties. Even though she had promoted the feminist agenda within the party, Portal defended the arguments of APRA in the constitutional congress, claiming, for example, that women were unduly influenced by religious beliefs. "The secret vote in the current moment, exercised by the woman not yet off the homely prejudices and the tutorship of the priest, would go to increase, we repeat, the banks of the reactionary conservatism."[52] Portal claimed that in the conception of democracy the APRA has, the **quality** of the vote is more important than the **quantity** (Portal 1933, 17, bold in the original). In the same 1933 publication she constantly mentions the negative influence of the Catholic Church and colonial structures in stopping women from having political awareness. All of these statements reflect how APRA saw in their political enemy a combination of class and religious factors and how their strategic calculations led them to reject women's suffrage, despite a normatively favorable vision of suffrage expansion. There was, thus, a misalignment of motivations.

[52] Magda Portal. "Rol de la mujer revolucionaria. El Voto femenino". *APRA,* April 2, 1931, p. 10.

Table IV.4. Constitutional assembly voting summary for broad female suffrage proposal

Party	In favor	Against	Abstention/absence
UR	31	13	12
APRA	0	27	1
Decentralists	4	21	3
Independents + small parties	10	8	1
Total	45	69	17

Sources: Constitutional Congress debates (República del Perú 1931) and Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (2016). Regarding the representatives of each party, there are certain disagreements among sources. I follow the publication of the National Elections since it has a full list, despite possible discrepancies.

In the case of Revolutionary Union, members split their votes for the majority proposal of unrestricted female suffrage. Thirty-one of the fifty-seven members supported the proposal, thirteen voted against it, and twelve abstained.[53] Had the UR voted in bloc, the bill would have passed. This vote, as well as the justifications presented in the debate, reflect the heterogeneity of the party that included both conservatives and liberals. As such, the mixed vote is consistent with theoretical expectations laid out in table IV.3.

Normatively, sanchecerrismo did not show interest in the issue of women's suffrage before the debate in the assembly. The program for the presidential campaign did not include any proposals regarding the conditions for suffrage – it only mentioned electoral freedom – or any other proposals directed at women (Sánchez Cerro 1931). As discussed in the previous section, women supported Sánchez Cerro during the elections forming "ladies' committees" who followed the leader's charismatic appeal (Molinari Morales 2006). But, this participation was non-programmatic in the sense that the ladies' committees did not make demands to include

[53] There are eighteen legislators with no registered vote. During the debate, it is mentioned that three are on sick leave, only one of which is named. Without being able to identify the other two, I consider all seventeen non-registered votes as abstentions.

women's rights in the program. When asked by a newspaper what his position was, Sánchez Cerro declared his support for the cause (*El Comercio,* December 30, 1931), however, there is no indication that this was due to normative commitment.

During the debate, only six UR representatives presented their views, all favorable to the female franchise. Given the small number of speeches, the set of arguments is limited, but at least one representative presented a liberal view. Elías Lozada Benavente[54] claimed that it was necessary to achieve juridical equality – current inequality being a result of only men enjoying political rights – and eliminate all ecclesiastic remnants from the legislation (República del Perú 1931, 570). A couple of other representatives favored secularization and further equal rights for men and women. The rest, however, despite supporting suffrage, held traditional views on gender. "I agree that, in fact, the intellect of the woman is not developed in the same way as that of men" (p. 597); "It may be that technical considerations or markedly scientific of a problem make it inconvenient for women to exercise government, because it requires conditions of culture, conditions of masculinity in the brain when it achieves its full development" (p. 587). The argument was that women had different qualities from men, such as being more sentimental or having a sixth sense. And they could bring their knowledge of the home to the state.

For this latter group of legislators, enfranchising women seems to have been a strategic choice. In their justifications, they did not show ideological commitment to advancing women's rights or greater gender equality; however, their willingness to support reform indicates a neutral normative motivation. The main strategic argument made by UR representatives was that women

[54] Lozada Benavente was the founder of the Social Nationalist Party in 1930, but he is listed as a member of UR in the JNE study. It is nonetheless clear him and his party supported Sánchez Cerro's government, first a cabinet member during the provisional government, then in the constitutional congress. As most of the small parties represented in the assembly, the Social Nationalist Party was short lived and there is not much information about it.

were already participating in politics. These comments were in reference to the ladies' committees mentioned above, indicating that this mobilization played a central role in actor's calculations. Women had mobilized most notably in support of Sánchez Cerro, particularly in Lima, so it seemed a logical conclusion that enfranchising them would benefit the UR. A further reason that points to a strategic decision is that fact that, after the unrestricted vote did not pass, the UR failed to support the minority proposal of a restricted vote. Normative commitment to women's suffrage would lead to support restricted suffrage as a second-best alternative and follow a gradual process of enfranchisement (only one *urrista* voted yes both times).

Sánchez Cerro also acknowledged the importance of women mobilizing during the presidential campaign: "I am a convinced and enthusiastic supporter of female suffrage (…) During the electoral campaign, she has been one of the more efficient factors of the triumph of Revolutionary Union, popular and nationalist party" (*El Comercio,* December 30, 1931).

For APRA, the reason why UR mostly supported enfranchising women was a strategic one. After the female franchise was rejected, the official party magazine claimed "the civilismo [old elite they claimed backed Sánchez Cerro] would have never dared to grant the *unrestricted vote* to women had it not been convinced of the conservatism that entails."[55] So both from the words of urristas themselves as well from their political rivals, the expected electoral effect of including women was seen as positive, leading to a favorable strategic motivation.

Nonetheless, as mentioned, a total of twenty-five UR representatives did not support the reform. There is no record of the motivations for those UR representatives who voted against the unrestricted franchise or abstained. But given the relative consensus on the favorable strategic

[55] Julian Petrovick, "El voto femenino, una nueva mascarada del Civilismo", *APRA,* January 7, 1932, p. 14.

calculations, it is possible to speculate that a considerable number of its member had negative normative views on women's political participation. Again, then, we see a case of motivation misalignment.

The final important group in the constitutional congress were the decentralists. Representing middle-upper provincial classes and having religion as an important identity element linked to tradition in the countryside, the argument predicts such a party would be normatively opposed to women's suffrage. This hypothesis is met in the debate and vote, as only four representatives voted[56] in favor of the unrestricted franchise while three abstained. For the restricted franchise, there were four supporters and four abstentions.

Manuel Bustamante de la Fuente claimed "The field of action of women is in the home. The function that nature has commended her is a strictly conservative function: conservation of the species, of the home, of the family and its traditions" (República del Perú 1931, 586). Another representative similarly claimed that women's goal was the family and the home. He went on to argue that if women voted differently than their husbands, there would be important consequences: "fights, tears, abandonment of small children, separation, divorce, etc. And that is why I am for the unscathed preservation of the rights of the home and the family" (596). These were the common type of argument made by conservatives in Peru and around the region more generally.

Strategically, the decentralist seemed to have no expectations of gains with the female vote. Here, the party deviates from the hypothesis presented in Table IV.3. To understand why there was no positive strategic motivation, the territorial distribution of the parties and the

[56] According to Basadre (2014) one of these four representatives, Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, was an independent.

literacy requirement for the franchise become important factors. The Decentralist Party had its best electoral performance in the departments of Apurimac, Puno, and Cusco, all in the Southern highlands. In these departments, based on literacy rates (a requirement to vote), women represented 22, 20, and 31% of potential voters, respectively (Census 1940). In Arequipa and Lima, the UR strongholds, women represented 43 and 45% of potential voters. And as discussed, the most visible demonstration of support from women were directed at sanchecerrismo, particularly in Lima. UR, then, had the most to gain from the unrestricted franchise. Without strategic incentives and holding traditional views common in the highlands, the decentralists had no motivation to support women's suffrage. Both strategic and normative motivations were negative.

After the proposals for full political rights was rejected, the minority proposal of restricted franchise was submitted to a vote. It only received thirty favorable votes, twenty-four of which came from APRA. Once both proposals were rejected, the option for the municipal vote was included as a conciliatory measure. In Peru, as in other countries at the time, local elections were seen as non-political and an extension of the home, so it was the natural space for the electoral participation of women. It was a symbolic compromise with no practical consequences. Up to 1963 the executive branch designated local authorities, even though there were provisions since the mid 19th century stating that these authorities should be elected.

Peru represents an important example of why a purely strategic argument does not suffice to explain women's early enfranchisement in Latin America. Revolutionary Union (together with some independents and small parties) had sufficient votes to include women's political rights in the new constitution. They also had the strategic incentive, as the most important form of women's mobilization during the election took place in support of Sánchez Cerro candidacy,

which gave them strong reason to believe they would benefit from the new female voters. Finally, the political context also provided an incentive to introduce reform. For many sectors of Peruvian society, the strong emergence of APRA, its level of organization and population support, represented a threat. Increasing the potential for future electoral victories would therefore be a strategic tool in the anti-aprismo fight. Nonetheless, a considerable number of UR representatives as well as the Decentralist Party did not support women's enfranchisement, I argue, because they had contrary normative positions on the issue. Sánchez Cerro would then opt for a non-electoral combat with APRA, through its persecution and outlawing.

3 Conclusions

Failed early reform was the outcome in both Chile and Peru, but as a result of quite different circumstances. In Chile, the extension of suffrage to women was constantly present throughout the period under analysis, as a result of women's mobilizations and some sympathetic politicians that brought the proposal into Congress. Political consensus, however, was only present for the approval of the municipal franchise, which was perceived as a low-stakes political arena. Despite the frequent present of the issue, however, given the lack of consensus it was never put to a vote. In Peru there was only one occasion where the issue gained public significance, but it the context of the discussion of a new constitution it was actually put to a vote. The contrast is interesting, and one could speculate that the fact that in Chile politicians avoided openly rejecting the franchise indicates the importance of women's mobilizations and that normative consensus was probably more extended. In Peru, on the other hand, as suffrage remained the concern of a small group of women, political parties saw no important cost in openly rejecting the proposal. The issue would only be raised again in 1938 in the contest of

Lima hosting the Eight Conference of the Interamerican Commission, but without repercussion in addition to some press articles.

In terms of the theoretical framework of the dissertation, both Chile and Peru can be characterized as cases of failed early reform driven by contrasting motivations. While in Chile, for the Radical Party, as the largest party and key actor in the center of the political spectrum, it was the negative strategic motivation that led to rejection, in the case of Peru it was the negative normative views of part of the incumbent Revolutionary Union party. In both cases, these contradictions stemmed from the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage and as such these are cases of cleavage-led failed reform.

V. NORMATIVE MOTIVATIONS AND PATHS TO SUCCESSFUL EARLY REFORM: URUGUAY AND ECUADOR

Ecuador and Uruguay, the two cases of early enfranchisement presented in this dissertation, differed in multiple social, economic, cultural, and political features in the first third of the twentieth century. It is therefore surprising that both have the same outcome in the timing of women's suffrage. In this chapter I argue that despite the many differences, these two cases share a process of reform guided by normative motivations. This means that strategic considerations were not central to the process of reform – they were neutral. The causes of neutral strategic motivations nonetheless varied. In Uruguay, a weak cleavage and relatively small differences in the constituencies of the Colorado and National parties translated into unclear projected political leaning of new voters. In Ecuador, on the other hand, the low politicization of reform and lack of feminist mobilization in a context of no competition made strategic considerations unimportant.

1 Weak cleavages and normative consensus in Uruguay

In 1932, the Uruguayan Congress extended political citizenship to women, becoming the first country to adopt fully universal suffrage in Latin America and the first to extend political rights in a competitive regime. I claim that two central elements made early reform possible. First, a weak class and religious cleavage coupled with internal factions made strategic considerations secondary for the two main political parties, as the electoral benefits of reform were not clear. Second, the early emergence of a progressive elite that from the top positions within the state advocated for women's rights, pushed the normative debate ahead as it did not

occur in other countries. While there were important opponents initially, the debate pushed by these key political figures, later joined by suffragists, led to a normative consensus on the need to reform among parties and the public opinion by the early 1930s.

1.1 Weak cleavages in Uruguay

Early twentieth century Uruguay is characterized by a comparatively weak oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage and a dominance of progressive (or anti-oligarchic) political elites. Women's enfranchisement occurred in the later part of what is known as the *batllista* era (1903-1933), named after its leader President José Batlle y Ordóñez (in office between 1903-1907 and 1911-1915). The batllistas were the dominant faction of the Colorado Party, one of the two traditional political parties. During this period, successive governments implemented a number of progressive reforms that included an expansion of the role of the state in the economy, political democracy, deep secularization, and the foundations of a welfare state.

A characteristic of this period, particularly during the first batllismo (up to the elections of 1916), is that the country's dominant economic interests – the oligarchy – were relatively weak and politically disorganized. The relative weakness of the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage was a legacy of the colonial period and the 19th century. As Carlos Real de Azúa puts it, the starting point of the battlista era was

> the undeniable weakness that the typical constellation of powers of the continent presented in the Uruguay of the nineteenth century. The social-economic hegemony of the agrocommercial businessmen and their interlacement with the Church and the armed forces as factors of consensus and coercive backing, respectively, did not take on the same consistency that they had in the rest of the Latin American area (Real de Azúa 1971, 37).

The landed elite was not a consolidated political actor. The recurrent civil wars of the nineteenth century led to a high land turnover. And there was a strong presence of foreign interests, with 36% of the land, 55% of the cattle, between 80 to 100% of banking and industry being foreign-owned in 1900 (Barrán and Nahum 1986). The industrial sector, moreover, emerged dependent on the state to a large degree, given the early intervention of the state in the economy. The political and economic spheres were separated. In the words of historians Barrán and Nahum, "the Uruguayan political system did not represent conservative classes, which does not mean it represented middle sectors, immigrants, or popular classes. The political system only represented itself" (Barrán and Nahum 1986, 215). In this sense, politicians were professionals and an independent class.

Another important actor part of the oligarchic constellation is the Catholic Church, which was materially poor and had weak links with the state. The reason was the late colonial implantation. Uruguayan territory was only incorporated to the Spanish Empire during the Bourbon period in the 18th century, period characterized by greater liberalism (Caetano and Rilla 2010; Mahoney 2010). The organizational weakness of the Church was reproduced at the social level. In the 1908 census only 70% of the population declared being Catholic (Dirección General de Estadística 1908). Although high, the figure pales compared to the more than 95% Catholic found in most countries of the region. A reflection of this weakness is that the Church was not able to counter the secularizing policies launched by the batllistas. These measures included the secularization of public health previously staffed by nuns (1904-1906), a divorce law (1907), the elimination of references to God in legislators' oaths (1907), and the end of religious instruction in public schools (1909). These anticlerical reforms culminated with the official separation of the

Church and the state (1917) and the secularization of religious holidays (1919). All of these policies made Uruguay the most secularized country in the region.

Traditional actors were not only weak in Uruguay but were also detached from political parties thus lacking clear representation in the political arena. Both the Colorado and the National (known as *blancos*) parties – the two parties of a bipartisan system – had similar liberal roots and their differences were not based on class or ideology, but emerged as disputes between independence leaders that became locked in and trickled down to society (Somma 2014). Competition between parties was then political more than ideological. Both were in fact multi-class parties and as such did not represent the class cleavage common in the region (Caetano and Rilla 2010). And both parties had internal factions acting as parties on their own (Morgenstern 2001). These factions often overlapped on a left-right spectrum, and as such, there were conservative groups in both parties. The ideological distance between the parties was moderate.

While the blancos had stronger presence of rural elites and Catholics, this relationship took time to consolidate. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the National party had not given up on insurgency as a mean to contest power, following multiple civil wars during the 19th century. As late as 1910 the blancos attempted a revolutionary approach. Conflict, concentrated in the rural areas, was highly detrimental to landowners, which is why they were reticent to align with the party (Barrán and Nahum 1986).

Catholics organized their own party to oppose secularization and Batlle's second term in office. The Catholic Union of Uruguay and later the Civic Union, however, never had more than a couple of representatives and acted within a very limited political space in a context of growing secularization and two strong party identities. As Barrán and Nahum (1986, V) point out, the fact that Catholic sectors felt the need to organize a party meant that they were not represented by the

two main parties. Catholics acknowledged that religion was not a criterion used to decide they vote; it was partisanship (Secco Illa 1946, 34). Thus, although the National Party is often characterized as the party closest to the Catholic Church, during the period of analysis the relationship was tenuous at most.

A 2016 document published by the National Party's Studies Center on the identity and history of the party presents an indication of how the party sees itself based on which components of the party's history they choose to highlight. In this document, they underscore the defense of liberties and electoral guarantees, of a limited government, of social justice, among others (Centro de Estudios del Partido Nacional 2016). There is no mention of religion or moral values associated with the Catholic Church.

In addition to the structural weakness of the oligarchy, the hegemony of the anti-oligarchic camp was further secured as the result of a majoritarian electoral system and the military defeat of a blanco insurrection in 1904. The Colorado Party controlled the national government since 1865 (and would do so until 1959). The frequent civil wars led to different co-participation arrangements, where the nationals had some minority representation. But some presidents, like Batlle, wanted a single party government to enact they program and limited co-participation. The blancos, on the other hand, were unhappy with the lack of proportional representations and several times abstained from participating in the elections, giving the government ample room to implement reforms and consolidate their decades-long monopoly over the state. This anti-oligarchic hegemony and progressive sectors in high positions allowed the early debate of women's suffrage, as I will discuss below.

In the 1916 elections for a constitutional assembly, the central political division emerged around Batlle's proposal to install a collegiate executive (with a design that would seem to

perpetuate the Colorados in power). A faction of the governing party opposed this measure, as did the National Party. Under universal male suffrage for the first time, the government suffered its first important and unexpected electoral defeat. But importantly, the election also served as a demand to moderate the reformist impulse (Arteaga 2000). In fact, Uruguayan historiography refers to this event and the years that followed as *el alto* or the halt of Viera, in reference to the politics of conciliation launched by the president Feliciano Viera. With this election, a more organized conservative reaction appeared for the first time. The year before, the Rural Federation had been formed and became an important interest group opposed to the batllistas (Vanger 1980). Simultaneously, large wholesalers founded the Commercial Defense League. Both interest groups had ties to the National Party, marking a somewhat stronger class cleavage.

The following decade was characterized by greater political balance that led to the need to compromise. The constitution itself was a result of these negotiations, with anti-batllistas accepting a form of collegiate government and the batllistas recognizing proportional representation. But even as the political participation of sectors of the oligarchy increased after 1916, the cleavage remained weak, particularly the religious cleavage that is central for my explanation of women's suffrage reform. Signs of the secularizing consensus is that no reversal of reforms took place. In fact, reforms continued. The Constitution of 1918 included secular measures such as the separation between church and state, and the secularization of religious holidays was approved the following year.[57] Another example of the deep secularization was the presence of some conservative actors with varying degrees of anticlericalism. For example, when the first bill to introduce female suffrage was presented in 1914, *El Siglo,* newspaper that

[57] Easter became the Week of Tourism, the day of the virgin is the Day of Beaches, and Christmas was rebaptized as the Day of the Family.

represented the conservative classes, showed its anticlerical leaning by claiming that "…our suffragists would abide first and foremost the Church's aspirations" (Barrán and Nahum 1986).

As I discuss below, the control of the state by the batllistas, the weak cleavages – particularly the religious one – and the small ideological distance between the two main parties derived described in this section were all key factors to understand early women's political incorporation. Specifically, the early emergence of favorable normative and the unclear strategic motivations led to a relatively early consensus on the need to include women.

1.2 Catholic, liberal, and working-class women mobilizing

In this section I explore the characteristics of women's mobilization along the two key dimensions of the cleavage that are relevant for the argument: class and religion. I look at the social and religious composition of women mobilized, the demands they made, and their relationship to political parties so as to assess – in the next section – the calculations made by political parties as to the potential electoral effects of including women as voters. The points of agreement between women and parties also shed light on the normative beliefs of political actors.

In Uruguay, as in the rest of the region, three central causes motivated women's mobilization: the defense of the Catholic Church, their rights as workers, and equal civil and political rights. The first of these fights was led by upper class Catholic women. Working class women were the ones that mostly mobilized for their rights as workers, at times with support from middle class sectors. As the movement was dominated by socialist, communists, and anarchist tendencies, they were mostly anticlericals. Finally, the suffragists were largely a middle

class group, with some elite women joining the cause, and the movement combined anticlericals and Catholics.

In the previous section, I argued that early twentieth century Uruguay was characterized by an important degree of secularization, intensified by Batlle's deep anticlericalism. It was still, however, a predominantly Catholic country, and more so among women. In the 1908 census, 82.15% of women declared Catholicism as their religion as opposed to 64.89% of men (Nahum 2007, 1:62). And not only were women the majority of the Church's faithful, but they were also the most active in its defense. Catholic women's mobilizations started in 1882 when 5,000 women petitioned to reinstate religious education in public schools (Osta 2014). Three years later they founded the *Asociación de Damas Cristianas* [Christian Ladies Association], dedicated to promulgating a Catholic way of life among lower class women.

These organizing efforts were incentivized by members of the Church, in particular Bishop Mariano Soler. In 1890, Soler wrote that "the Christian woman is a very efficacious helper in the order of truth. She exerts respect to Jesus Christ's ministry, a sort of spiritual maternity" (cited in Osta 2014, 60). Women, were thus often seen as the natural defenders of the Church against secularizing measures, and later on, the vote would become another tool in this defense.

During Batlle's government, a new organization emerged, the *Liga de Damas Católicas del Uruguay* [Catholic Ladies League of Uruguay]. In 1907, when the introduction of divorce into the legislation was being debated, the League managed to collect an impressive 93,000 signatures defending marriage (Osta 2008). Suffragists never came close to this number. The League was composed of upper class conservative women, many of them linked to prominent blanco figures as well as to the small Catholic party Civic Union (Ehrick 2005). They were

mostly women dedicated to charitable work, unlike the suffragist who concentrated female professional. Their activities were mostly opposing secularizing measures of the government, social action, and promoting "morality" in public spectacles, including theater and film.

The links between the League and the National Party became clearer after 1916, when there was a certain reorganization of Uruguayan politics and a strengthening of conservative political actors. According to historian Benjamin Nahum, the greater social conservatism of the blancos was more a political reaction to batllismo than an ideological conviction (Nahum 1975). In any case, there was a greater affinity with Catholic women's organizations.

Following the Church's ambiguity regarding women's suffrage, Catholic women did not actively seek their enfranchisement in the first decades of the century. However, in the 1920s the League supported reform. When an important campaign for suffrage was launched in 1929, the press was eager to know the opinion of Laura Carreras de Bastos, important leader of the League, indicating she had remained silent on the issue. Carreras expressed her belief in equal political rights (*Crónica,* November 27, 1929). When women's suffrage was sanctioned, the League strongly encouraged women to exercise their new right in defense of Catholic principles. They argued that they needed to counter batllistas, communists, and socialist who would go to the polls (Ehrick 2005). In political terms, members of the League were split in their alignment between the National Party and the small Catholic Civic Union party.

Later that Catholic organizations, liberal women also mobilized. There were some early efforts at the beginning of the century, but the women's suffrage movement really emerged in the mid 1910s. In September 1916, when a new constitution was being debated and universal suffrage first received the assembly's attention, the *Consejo Nacional de Mujeres* [National Council of Women] was created. Paulina Luisi, the first women to obtain a medical degree and

Uruguay's most important feminist of the period, was the founder of this organization as well as the *Alianza Uruguaya de Mujeres para al Sufragio Femenino* [Uruguayan Women's Alliance for Female Suffrage] in 1919. The National Council had a broad mission and added to internal differences, Luisi decided to create a separate organization dedicated to suffrage. Both organizations often collaborated in suffrage campaigns, particularly toward the late 1920s when they were most successful, gathering 4,000 signatures for their petition (Lavrin 1998).

Luisi had a broad agenda for advancing women's rights and child protection. Toward that end, she highlighted the importance of the franchise. "The vote, and only the vote, gives enough power to ask and be heard, to propose and be considered, to claim and be addressed (…) The woman who contributes in the same proportion as men to the public budged and the national progress, protests against this irritating exclusion" (Luisi 1919, 7). Luisi also spoke in defense of motherhood; the exercise of voting rights was not to keep her away from the home and family, but to defend that role. In line with her work as physician, she advocated for protective legislation for mothers, highlighting the social role of motherhood. In this sense, Luisi exhibited the maternalist feminism that was common in the region (Chaney 1979; Molyneux 2007). However, the defense of maternity and children did not stop her from making more confrontational statements, such as "They want us ignorant so they can keep us submissive" (Luisi 1919, 10).

Based on the work of Christine Ehrick (2005) and the biographical information this author collected on over 150 suffragists, we can know with some detail the class composition of women's organizations base. In the early years of the National Council of Women, its membership was composed of two groups: wealthy women associated with charitable work, and the first wave of female professionals. Few working-class women were incorporated into

feminist organizations. The Council attempted to include working women in their constituency, but those efforts proved of little success. This initial configuration changed in the 1920s as generational changes pushed elite, more conservative women away from mobilization and replaced them with professional, middle-class, and more progressive members. So even though suffragists leaders claimed their affiliates "constitute a great part of women in the country,"[58] they represented a particular sector of society.

Upon its foundation, the Council declared itself nonreligious and apolitical. Certainly, many of its members were Catholic. For example, Sofía Álvarez Vignoli, a suffragist and one of the first two senators elected in 1942 representing the Colorado Party, was a Catholic. But religion was here a private identity and not a reason to mobilize. More so, some suffragists actually perceived a danger in Catholic women organization, seen as competition: "Us with our arms folded while the Catholics organize under the leadership of the German priest...extending their tentacles into the Women's University...they have formed a students' league."[59]

In addition to some (initial) class diversity and its non-religious nature, the suffragist movement had, although limited, some ideological range. Paulina Luisi participated in the foundation of the Socialist Party in 1910. Suffragists organizations, however, did not have and organic link to the party; in fact, the same year the Council was founded, women affiliated with the Socialist Party formed the Socialist Women's Center. Other prominent members of the organization were from the Colorado Party, both batllistas (Isabel Pinto) and *riveristas* (Fanny

[58] Biblioteca Nacional de Uruguay (BN), Archivo Paulina Luisi (PL), folder 8, box 251. Letter from suffragist Sara Rey Álvarez to the president of the president of the lower chamber asking for the approval of women's suffrage, November 1929.
[59] BN-PL, folder 6, box 251. Letter from Fanny Carrió de Polleri to Paulina Luisi, June 10, 1919.

Carrió).[60] Again, these links were personal as organizations formally remained apolitical. But for Ehrick (2005), the differences crystallized in the division between a batllista Council on the one hand, and an anti-batllistas (including both socialists and other Colorado factions) Alliance, on the other.

Working class women were a final important group of women relevant for existing political projects. Both Catholic and liberal organizations attempted to reach working class women and incorporate them in their bases, with limited success. Suffragist included economic and labor-related claims in their program only secondarily, but they did successfully lobby Baltasar Brum in 1918 (then a cabinet member) to get the approval of a law to provide chairs so women could sit during their breaks. The Council also advocated for women's access to working positions that were banned to them, and successfully intervened on behalf of a group of telephone operators. These efforts in favor of working women, however, were an insufficient argument to get their support. The Communist Party criticized the Alliance and female suffrage as a tool that would be used by male bourgeois to get the vote from middle-class women without redeeming the working woman (Asuncion Lavrin 1998). Catholic women seemed to have had a greater success in reaching lower class women through their social action, but again, this support was limited.

Working class women organized within leftist parties – Socialist and Communist. There were also important anarchist groups among labor, but these did not advocate or believe in the franchise as the main tool to obtain rights, and therefore were not a crucial group available for electoral mobilization. Within the Socialist Party, women attempted some female organizations

[60] The riveristas emerged in 1913, opposed to Batlle's proposal of a collegiate government and the statism of the batllistas, claiming for a return to the party's liberal origins.

as the creation of the aforementioned Socialist Women's Center shows. Women's number and role were, nonetheless, limited by existing gendered structures within the party and their lack of available time due to their double work outside and inside the home (Ehrick 2005). Catholic and liberal women, on the other hand, commonly had domestic help that would release them from homely duties.

The Socialist Women's Center demanded suffrage, sending their own petition to the constitutional congress for the approval of the reform (Lavrin 1998). In the constitutional congress of 1917-1918, the two socialist representatives were the main proponents of the reform. Women were also called upon to support socialist candidates, even before they could vote. In a 1919 article in the socialist paper *Justicia*, there was a special call to working women to influence "their men" to vote for socialist candidates in the upcoming legislative election, as socialist representatives were the only ones defending their rights as workers (*Justicia,* October 27, 1919).

In 1920, the largest faction of the party changed its name to Communist Party and affiliated with the Third International. A new and short-lived women's group called Rosa Luxemburg Center emerged, later replaced by the *Agrupación de Mujeres Comunistas* [Communist Women Association]. In the 1920s, feminism within the party became increasingly under siege, as male leadership debated whether women could in fact be part of the proletariat. There was also a stronger critique of liberal women, whereas in the previous decade the relationship had been cordial. A final sign of the lack of commitment to women's issues from the party came in 1933, when Isabel Fernández, the main feminist within the party was expelled for failing to follow a party order (Ehrick 2005). When women's suffrage was seen as inevitable, the party both criticized the vote as a bourgeois tool while calling women to vote for Communists.

The party, however, had little to gain electorally as the two traditional parties dominated the scene. Communist and Socialist parties' electoral success remained small, receiving no more than 2% throughout the 1920s and a maximum of two seats (Nahum 2007), scenario unlike to change based of female support.

1.3 Normative beliefs as drivers of reform

Having established the nature of the class and religious cleavages expressed in the party system and the characteristics of women's mobilization, this section combines these components to delve into the strategic and normative motivations of the different political actors regarding the enfranchisement of women. The analysis centers on two moments: 1917 and the constitutional debate, where women's enfranchisement was debated but not approved; and the period from 1929 onward, when a consensus emerged that led to the final passing of the bill in 1932.

The central argument I present to explain the Uruguayan case is that reform was guided by normative beliefs and that strategic motivations were secondary. Because of the nature of the party system – two main parties with similar class composition, internal divisions, and none with tight links to the Catholic Church – potential electoral gains were unclear or neutral. The normative motivations needed then to be the driver. While this motivation was present early on in some actors, it did not reach a majority until the late 1920s, when reform became possible.

Tables V.1 and V.2 present the positions of the parties regarding women's suffrage for the two time periods. The tables follow the argument presented in chapter II. First, motivations are derived from the cleavages, and the expected position is positive or negative depending on normative and strategic motivations. If both motivations are positive or one positive and the

other unclear (or neutral), the expected position is to promote reform. If motivations are contradictory, I expect a rejection of reform. The exception to this pattern are the so called "principle parties" existing in Uruguay – Socialist and Civic Union. As discussed in chapter II, the central argument regarding conflicting motivations relies on the assumption that parties have something to gain or lose with the inclusion of new voters. But with parties that are electorally marginal, I argue principles – normative beliefs – outweigh strategic motivations. Their marginal position is unlikely to change with suffrage extensions, thus advocating for the fulfillment of their program is their priority.

The class and religious cleavage were already discussed above. I now turn to evidence regarding motivations. In none of the suffrage debates there were nominal votes in the legislature, thus we do not have evidence of how each congressman felt about the reform. The evidence I present refers mostly to those individuals who were particularly invested in the subject, as well as party leaders, party documents, and party-affiliated media from where the positions can be derived.

Table V.1. Predicted party position regarding women's suffrage, 1917

Party/faction	**Class cleavage**	**Religious cleavage**	**Normative beliefs**	**Strategic motivation**	**Expected position**
Colorado-batllismo	Middle	Anti-clerical	Favorable	Negative	Reject
Colorado-riverismo	Middle	Not strong platform	Negative	Unclear	Reject
National	Middle-upper	Not strong platform	Negative	Unclear	Reject
Socialist	Working	Anti-clerical	Favorable	Negative	Support
Civic Union	Upper	Catholic	Negative	Favorable	Reject

Two were the set of actors that early on defended women's enfranchisement: batllistas and socialists. In fact, all legislative measures presented between 1903 and 1920 concerning

women's civil and political rights came from the batllistas or the Socialist Party (Johnson 2001), and they both claimed the role of pioneers of the feminist cause (Giordano 2012). The initiatives that were successful included the introduction of divorce in 1907 (and modified to allow initiation by the sole will of the wife in 1913), advances regarding women's rights over their children, female access to certain professions such as notary, the capacity to act as witnesses, as well as efforts to expand female education at all levels (Giordano 2012; Rodriguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984).

Within the batllistas, José Batlle y Ordóñez and Baltasar Brum were two of the main feminist continuously advocating for women's rights. As early as 1912, Batlle started publishing editorials in *El Día,* the government newspaper, under the pseudonym Laura. In one of these early pieces, he discussed the issue of women's suffrage, arguing "Are they not, like men, conscious beings, with rights to exercise, duties to fulfill, interests to guard? Are they not as interested as men in the good progress of the political community they belong too? And are they not capable of casting a vote as illustrated as four fifths, at least, of the men who vote?" (*El Dia,* March 14, 1912).

Batlle promoted a form of state feminism labeled compensation feminism, that stemmed from the notion that women had a biological disadvantage and that the state needed to compensate such weakness through protective policies (Rodriguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). His critique to women's subordination was also closely linked to his deep anticlericalism. The 1913 reform to the divorce law can be better understood considering both factors. In addition to weakening an institution strongly defended by the Catholic Church, the introduction of divorce

by the sole will of the woman reflects the understanding that women needed to have particular tools for their protection.[61]

President Baltasar Brum's vision of feminism was more in line with gender equality instead of compensation. To this end, in 1921 he commended the study and drafting a bill for broad reform on women's civil and political rights, eliminating inequalities between men and women (Asuncion Lavrin 1998). In 1925, after leaving office, Brum published the book *Women's Rights* studying past legislation and proposing a comprehensive program of reform, again showing his interest and commitment to gender equality.

The first bill to extend the franchise to women was presented in 1914 also by a Colorado congressman, Héctor Miranda. This bill did not gain sufficient support and it was not moved to debate, but it started the discussion that would continue a couple of years later. Interestingly, this proposal was introduced before the emergence of an organized women's movement, showing a clear normative commitment on behalf of its promoter.

In the constitutional national convention elected in 1916, it was the two socialist representatives, Emilio Frugoni and Celestino Mibelli, who proposed and defended women's enfranchisement. At this time, the Socialist Party was the only party who had incorporated equal political rights into its platforms, doing so upon its foundation in 1910. In the debate, the two congressmen defended the proposal against some of the common arguments against the female franchise. Mibelli claimed that political differences come from economic and social differences, and not from sex. He specifically addressed the argument that women's vote would be an

[61] Batlle's interest in introducing divorce legislation also had a personal motivation. Batlle had a ten year "clandestine" relationship with Matilde Pacheco, his cousin's wife, who had been abandoned by her husband but remained legally married. Only after her husband's death, and already having three children with Batlle, were they able to legally marry. The lack of divorce legislation, then, had left Matilde as the object of frequent snubs.

instrument of the Church, claiming that this religiosity is not natural but a product of other aspects of life being banned for them ("Diario de Sesiones de La H. Convención Nacional Constituyente de La República Oriental Del Uruguay (1916–1917)." 1918, 378). Regarding the argument that women did not have the necessary preparation, Mibelli highlighted the growing number of women's secondary schools and the number of female teachers.

In this debate, the batllistas remained mostly silent. This can be partly explained because the constitution ended up being drafted by a small group of eight representatives, in what was a negotiated process. In the end, women were not enfranchised but a provision was included in the constitution stating it would take a two third majority on both chambers to enfranchise women, but no constitutional reform.[62] The lack of support from the batllistas indicates that the committed feminist, although in highly visible positions, remained a minority. Although the party supported many of Batlle's initiatives, limits to the party's progressive commitment became clear when it came to introducing a reform with unclear electoral consequences, particularly after anti-collegiate forces obtained a majority in the constitutional assembly in the first election with male universal suffrage. Their opposition was generally not open, but they refused to support the initiative, even though ballistas and socialists did not have a majority to introduce this reform without the support from other parties. Strategic considerations unfavorable to reform probably entered the scene in this context, as I discuss below.

Among the rest of political actors, normative commitment to women's enfranchisement was not present. The official newspaper of the church in 1914, when the first bill was introduced, openly opposed women's suffrage, specifically the right to be elected: "The destiny that women

[62] The quorum for constitutional reform was also two thirds, so it is unclear how this provision facilitated the future debate.

must fulfill, according to God's plan and nature, is contradictory, in our view, with the exercise of the broad political function" (*El Bien,* July 15, 1914). A similar view was expressed in the National Party affiliated newspaper, an outlet that had previously published editorials against feminism. A 1914 article claimed that laws had not put men in a superior position but that had happened naturally in all societies. "As weaker she will be defeated in the future, always, constantly, being destined to face the irremissible failure of any attempt to change the natural course of things or upset the permanent laws of nature (…) nature has imposed on her a mission too absorbing, a mission too transcendental, that fills most of her live (…) maternity" (*La Democracia,* July 11, 1914).

During the debate in the constitutional congress, two arguments contrary to reform were prominent. First, several representatives argued that there was no demand for suffrage, that women were not interested, and that the issue was too "advanced." The reform would thus not address a real concern; it should only be debated at that future time when the demand actually existed. And second, there were claims that women's natural place was the home and the family. Riveristas, blancos, and even some batllistas made these arguments, showing that there were not important ideological differences between the two main parties. The normative commitment mentioned above remained within a small minority ("Diario de Sesiones de La H. Convención Nacional Constituyente de La República Oriental Del Uruguay (1916–1917)." 1918).

In terms of strategic motivations, in the small principle parties there is support for the claim that they were guided by normative concerns. During the constitutional debate, the only reference of potential electoral effects of enfranchising women came from socialist representative Mibelli. Mibelli mentioned the common argument that women might support the Catholic party but went on to argue that eve even if they did, it was not sufficient reason to deny

them the franchise. In the case of Catholic representatives, their lack of support for the initiative likewise indicates their decision was guided by normative beliefs given that they would likely increased their share of votes, as recognized by their peers and since Catholic women were the most organized female group at the time.

For blancos and colorados, as a consequence of the weak cleavage and small ideological differences, the electoral implications of reform – and thus the strategic motivations for politicians – were unclear. No group of mobilized women had strong links to any of the parties – suffragists were only beginning to organize. Although a few years after the convention, an article in *El Día* acknowledged the lack of clear electoral benefits. The author (who signed as "Colorado feminist") argued that the female electorate was not organized, meaning that their vote depended on the action of the parties; women had not predisposition to vote for a particular party or sector. He went to further argue that the colorados had an advantage as the wives, mothers, and daughters of public employees, soldiers, policemen, and those on social security would vote for the party (*El Día*, July 14, 1921). According to this vision, the Colorado Party had a potential advantage since it controlled the state, but not because of some characteristic of the cleavages in the party system.

The cleavage, hence, led to unclear strategic calculations. I argue, however, that there was one specific contextual reason that led the ballistas to a negative strategic position in 1917, which ultimately explains their lukewarm support for female enfranchisement despite having shown normative commitment to other women's rights and even suffrage.[63] As discussed earlier,

[63] Among the batllista representatives in the constitutional congress there were several figures that before and after had been outspoken in defending women's suffrage, starting by former president José Batlle y Ordóñez, and Juan Bueno, César Miranda, and Atilio Narancio who had backed the bill introduced in 1914.

the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1916 had resulted in a setback for the batllistas, against the original calculations of the government. Batlle envisioned the lifting of income requirements and the introduction of the secret ballot would lead to popular backing for his reforms. On the contrary, there was a backlash against them, and particularly to the collegiate executive. These reforms, as well as proportional representation, were introduced in the new constitution as it was an important demand of the opposition (Negretto and Visconti 2018; Zeballos 2015). Therefore, although not mentioned in the debate, it is likely that the batllistas did not want to introduce any more electoral uncertainty after this backlash. Piecemeal institutional changes have been common for this reason (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010).

In the 1920s, suffrage reform was often present in the public discussion. In 1921 Baltasar Brum presented a bill that did not reach debate in the legislature. In 1926 there was a proposal to introduce the female municipal vote. In both of these occasions feminist organizations requested the bill to be passed. They also organized events and a strong campaign starting in 1929 to influence public opinion and recruit new members to their organizations.

Around the time of this campaign, parties and newspapers started to show a growing normative consensus around women's enfranchisement; there were practically no contrary voices. Actors that had previously opposed reform or that had remained indifferent now came out in favor. And while future electoral benefits remained mostly unclear, as reform became imminent all political sectors started envisioning the possibility of using the female vote in a context of heightened competition and polarization. For example, the Catholic newspaper that years earlier had been against enfranchising women, when the reform was approved received the news positively and claimed women would be guided by the "purpose of restoring morale and good manners and to lay down solid foundations to the holy institution of the Family" (*El Bien,*

December 18, 1932). They could now see the potential of women as defenders of religious values. Another outlet, *El Pueblo,* close to the conservative sector of the Colorado Party (terristas), the day the bill was approved called on women to organize a Feminist Party, under the heading "Women of Uruguay, unite!" (Rodriguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). In this new context, reform passed without opposition (Asuncion Lavrin 1998).

The bill was approved without individualized votes in both chambers. In the Senate, because they were coming to the end of the legislative year and short on time, senator Pablo Minelli proposed to approve the bill without debate. "I believe the public opinion has been made in this respect, that the country's culture expects the sanction of this initiative and that in this body no contrary voice will be raised" (Cámara de Senadores del Uruguay 1932, 370). In the lower chamber, there was a similar debate, although some arguments were presented. Three congressmen from the National Party expressed a contrary opinion to women's enfranchisement (one of them still voted in favor following party discipline), with a final tally of 82 favorable votes out of 84. All three contrary opinions claimed they did not want to take women out of their natural environment. Juan Vicente Algorta said "it is too high and superior my concept on the social mission of women not to look with deep vacillation her intervention in politics" (135).

Table V.2. Predicted party position regarding women's suffrage, early 1930s

Party/faction	**Class cleavage**	**Religious cleavage**	**Normative beliefs**	**Strategic motivation**	**Expected position**
Colorado-batllismo	Middle	Anti-clerical	Favorable	Unclear	Support
Colorado-riverismo	Middle	Not strong platform	Favorable	Unclear	Support
Colorado-vierismo	Middle	Not strong platform	Favorable	Unclear	Support
National-herreristas	Middle-upper	Not strong platform	Favorable	Unclear	Support
National-Radical	Middle	Not strong platform	Favorable	Unclear	Support

Communist	Working	Anti-clerical	Favorable	Negative	Support
Socialist	Working	Anti-clerical	Favorable	Negative	Support
Civic Union	Middle-upper	Catholic	Favorable	Favorable	Support

From the debate, the main point worth noting is that the normative consensus expressed in Table V.2 became clear. It is likely that some sectors were not truly convinced normatively, but the fact that they still did so indicates how in the eyes of the public opinion it was no longer acceptable to oppose reform, signaling the consensus. Representatives of all parties showed their support for the bill, confirming changes that had been expressed in their party manifestos during the past decade. The Fructuoso Rivero Colorado Party or *riverismo,* a split of the Colorado Party, included equal women's political and civil rights in its platform in 1919.[64] The Nationalist Radical Party, a division from the National Party, did so in 1925, same year as the Colorado Party. Finally, the National Party included equal political rights in its platform in 1930 (socialists had done so in 1910) (Lavrin 1998). And as strategic motivations remained unclear for the main parties (and small principles parties based their decision on normative beliefs), this normative consensus acted as sufficient for the approval of reform.

To highlight their commitment, some parties explicitly denied any potential electoral benefits. Secco Illia, representative of the Civic Union, a social-Christian party, declared the "it is not a calculus that animates us (…) We, whatever the contingent that the female vote contributes to our rows or to the adversaries, we understand by supporting the bill, that before all we are consecrating an act of justice" (Cámara de Representantes del Uruguay 1932, 127). Alonso Montaño, of the National Party, also refused to discuss the electoral consequences of incorporating 450,000 new voters. "Some say that traditional parties are taking a leap into the

[64] BN-PL, folder 7, box 251. Letter from Paulina Luisi to Pedro Manini Ríos, president of the riveristas, October 25, 1919.

void with this. The majority of the National Party is not concerned with the consequences; it is, however, worried with the incorporation to civic life of this precious and appreciated element" (126). Montaño later claimed that he expected women to act moderately in politics.

Representatives also became involved in discussing what political sector had committed to women's suffrage first. The batllistas highlighted their two-decade long commitment: "for us [the batllistas] this matter has not been a problem for twenty years and we were, therefore, ready as soon as the conservatives made the smallest sign of joining us" (125). Secco Illia (Civic Union) called out on those parties who had had the votes to actually pass reform and that now defended it (in reference probably to the batllistas). Another batllista, Antonio Fusco felt the need to defend his party claiming that in 1914 when Miranda introduced the first bill, the conservative forces opposed to the reform were a majority (reason they also failed in passing other initiatives such as the eight-hour working day) (125).

A few months after the bill passed, President Terra, a batllista turned conservative, led a coup based on his opposition to the constitution. Only in 1938 would there be a partial return to democracy, when women were first able to vote. But these were not normal elections, as many political sectors abstained. 1942 were the first free and fair elections were women got to participate. And it was this year when the first female representatives were elected, two in the Senate (a batllista and a riverista) and two in the lower chamber (a communist and a batllista). These were all women who had participated in the suffragist movement and in the defense of women's working rights in the case of Julia Arévalo, the communist representative.

1.4 Democracy as rival explanation

Uruguay's early political democracy constitutes an important rival explanation that is particularly relevant for this case. The 1918 constitution, with the establishment of universal male suffrage, direct presidential elections, and proportional representation, inaugurated the country's (male) democracy, placing it next to Argentina as the exceptions in Latin America. In this context, women's enfranchisement can be thought of as simply the next step in this modernizing process. Democratic institutions developing one after the other in the same direction of deepening democratization is what has been labeled as the notion of trajectory in democratization studies (Barrenechea, Gibson, and Terrie 2016; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010), a common notion among classics such as Barrington Moore (1966), Gregory Luebbert (1991), and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992). Although the mechanisms behind a trajectory are not always specified, this argument can be summarized as "democracy brings more democracy."

In the specific case of Uruguay and the female franchise, two features of democracy could help explain early enfranchisement. First, a version of the argument relates to the specific role of competition. Dawn Teele has argued – in the same line as Boix (1999) – that an incumbent will support suffrage extensions only when it is weak, that is when, it faces a real threat in the next election (D. Teele 2018). Between 1919 and 1932, when women were enfranchised, competition was in fact tight. Although the Colorado Party would not lose control of the executive until 1958,[65] the National Party did at times control the collegiate or had similar number of seats in the legislature.[66] But as Teele argues, competition is insufficient on its own;

[65] The Colorados had control of the government for ninety straight years, from 1868 until 1958.
[66] In general elections, a third of the Senate, a third of the members of the National Council of Administration (the collegiate body), and the totality of the Chamber of Representatives were renewed. In 1928, for the first time the National Party had a majority of 61 seats in the lower chamber against 59 seats of the Colorado Party, considering all its factions (Nahum 2007), showing a very competitive party system.

there also needs to be a favorable calculation as to the future electoral behavior of the newly enfranchised. I have argued, this last component was unclear in the Uruguayan case.

Second, democracy facilitates the organization of a women's movement by respecting civil rights and liberties. And while Uruguay did have one of the earliest, most organized, and relatively numerous suffragist movements, as I have argued in previous chapter, this is neither a necessary not sufficient condition for early enfranchisement. Argentina had perhaps a stronger women's movement in the first third of the century, during a similar democratic period (1916-1930), but if failed to introduce women's suffrage. And as I have shown in this chapter, mobilization for women's political rights was the not only form of female activism during this period. Mobilization thus failed to signal parties where a majority of female votes would go.

Instead, I argue it is the weak religious and class cleavage present in the party system what explains why the strategic argument around democracy – regarding both competition and mobilization – provides an insufficient explanation. Because of the weak cleavage and the internal divisions within traditional parties, competition did not lead to any particular actor being the clear beneficiary of the new votes. In this scenario of neutral strategic motivations, it was normative beliefs that made a difference. I have also claimed that the early anti-oligarchic government and feminist politicians within the Colorado and Socialist parties spearheaded the debate on women's suffrage. And the emergence of these actors actually preceded the inauguration of democracy. The normative belief that initially only a small group had, in time became a consensus aided by the small difference between the parties and the push from women's organizations. In other countries, the normative consensus would only occur two decades later.

2 Liberalism, low politicization, and individual feminist action in Ecuador

The process of women's enfranchisement in Ecuador was cumbersome, making it difficult to set one date of reform. The process of suffrage reform has at least three key moments: 1897 with the liberal revolution that removed reference to sex from the constitution, 1924 and the determination by the Council of State that women could register as the generic *ciudadanos* established in the constitution included them, and 1929 with the final ratification. This latter date is usually considered for comparative analysis, however, after the 1924 decision some women did register and participate in the elections. Finally, Ecuador is the only case were a reversal of reform was debated.

Despite the intricate nature of the process, or perhaps because of it, Ecuador was the first country in Latin America to ratify female suffrage and as such it is important to understand the case. Theoretically it represents an outlier. During the entire period under consideration, Ecuador had a clear liberal/conservative cleavage where the religious division a central organizer of political competition. This cleavage should have prevented early enfranchisement. To solve this puzzle, I argue that women were enfranchised early, triggered by the actions of one woman, because the issue was not previously politicized; the most relevant debates took place a decade *after* women's right to vote had been ratified in the constitution. In a sense, the decision of the State Council that in 1924 acknowledged women could indeed vote took the system by surprise and as such did not incite much opposition as dominant normative beliefs based on liberalism stated that there should be equality under the law. Only after women exercised their right and conservatives regained strength was women's suffrage politicized along the religious lines of the cleavage and strategic considerations emerged. It was, however, too late to take a step back.

2.1 Liberal hegemony and conservative reorganization

The period that concentrated the debates on women's suffrage analyzed in the case of Ecuador covered four decades. This period was marked by the ascent of liberalism after the revolution led by Eloy Alfaro in 1895 and lasted until 1925. The next decade would see the attempts of different factions of liberalism holding on to power, but this time marked by multiple military interventions, internal divisions, and a growing threat from conservative sectors. Overall, it was a period where the liberal/conservative cleavage dominated.

During the nineteenth century, Ecuador was dominated by the traditional liberal/conservative division. While the first concentrated in the city of Guayaquil and the coast, conservatives had their economic base of power in the large landholdings of the highlands, using repressive forms of labor. They were also strong defenders of the Catholic Church. With the administration of Gabriel García Moreno (1860-1875), the role of the church in public affairs, particularly in the control of education, was strengthened. As a response, and also propelled by the development of a commercial and financial sector as a result of the cocoa export boom, a liberal anticlerical sector took form (Ayala Mora 1996).

Dominating the economy, the liberal bourgeoise went after political power, forming a broad coalition that included coastal landowners, middle sectors, and popular support from the *montoneros*,[67] that finally reached power in 1895 in a revolution led by Eloy Alfaro. The liberal coalition was initially multi-class and had a popular character that was lost in time. However, it was not the class composition which differentiated liberals from its conservative opponents. During the 1920s, and as liberalism grew increasingly oligarchic, conservatives developed a

[67] This was an irregular army composed of coastal peasants opposed to the violence of local landowners and republican authorities (Ayala Mora 2000).

relationship with the working-class, controlling the main labor organizations (Coronel 2012, 390). The first central workers organization, created in 1938, was the Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers. As such, the central cleavage differentiating conservatives and liberals was a religious division between clericals and anticlericals. And it was the religious cleavage, as discussed in previous cases, that was central in organization positions around women's suffrage.

With the liberal revolution's ascent to power, multiple secularizing measures were adopted: civil marriage, cemeteries, divorce, and perhaps most importantly, lay education. Additionally, the Church was stripped of much of its land and in 1906 the separation of Church and state was formalized. Traditional landowners of the highlands closed ranks behind the Church and the relationship between both sectors was strengthened and remained in place for decades to come (Ayala Mora 1996, 2012).

Anticlericalism was a feature that ran across other divisions among liberalism, a point of consensus. Liberals were divided among a more progressive sector, led by Alfaro, and the moderates who were in alliance with landowners, represented by Leonidas Plaza, against any activation of the popular sectors. Alfaro was assassinated in 1912, and from then until 1925 the moderate and increasingly plutocratic faction of liberalism was in power. There was halt in the reformist spirit although the growth of public secular education continued. The moderation of liberalism left a political space that would partly be occupied by the emergence of socialism. Perhaps the final breakpoint between this liberalism and progressive sectors came in 1922, when the government repressed a strike in Guayaquil, leaving a death toll of over a thousand.

In 1925, a sector of progressive militaries overthrew the increasingly oligarchic liberal regime, initiating what is known as the Julian Revolution. With this action, decades of political instability were inaugurated (no elected president would finish their term until Galo Plaza in

1948-1952). The Julian Revolution reflected the demands of middle sectors that had consolidated with the liberal secular state and were now seeking access to power. The military had an agenda of social and economic reform, although it soon left the former aside. This was essentially a period of modernization with the creation of the Central Bank and the General Comptroller. The military soon ceded power to civilians and Isidro Ayodra became the provisional president. Ayodra would call on a constitutional assembly in 1928, where female suffrage was made explicit.

Despite the political instability, it was in the second half of the 1920s when the different sectors constituted modern political parties, in what was essentially a three-party system: the Ecuadorian Conservative Party, the Liberal Radical Ecuadorian Party, and the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (in 1931 it suffered its first split that leading to the creation of the Communist Party). The roots of the Conservative and Liberal parties, however, remained essentially unmodified. Although middle sectors had now a larger ascendance within liberalism and that the emergence of the socialist left became an important actor, the structure of competition did not change.

What did start to change in the 1930s was the balance of power among liberals and conservatives. In 1931, conservative candidate Neptalí Bonifaz won the elections with 46% against 31% of the liberal candidate. However, he did not assume office because the National Congress, still controlled by liberals, declared him unfit after some correspondence emerged in which Bonifaz claimed being Peruvian.[68] Part of the military refused to accept Congress' decision and a civil conflict ensued for four days, leaving over a thousand deaths. This episode

[68] This supposed offence was doubly serious because Ecuador and Peru were immersed in a border conflict.

emboldened the conservatives who through the president of the Chamber of Deputies, José María Velasco Ibarra, went after the new liberal president who was removed by congress after less than a year in office. In a third presidential election in four years, Velasco Ibarra won his first presidency, in 1934. In the five different times he reached office in the following years, and as a populist, Velasco Ibarra went through multiple ideological turns. In this first presidential bid, however, he run as an independent backed by the Conservative Party. Once again, the conflict between conservatives and liberals expressed itself in a struggle between the president and the legislature, and Velasco Ibarra was finally deposed in 1935. When it became clear that conservatives would win a new election, power was handed to Federico Páez, a liberal dictator who ruled until 1937 and convened a new constitutional congress. Against this backdrop is that women's suffrage would return to the agenda in 1937-1938.

2.2 No suffragist mobilization and individual feminist action

Ecuador presents the weakest suffragist mobilization of all the cases included in this dissertation. The organizational weakness allowed individual feminist to acquire great salience, particularly the figure of Matilde Hidalgo, who triggered the explicit recognition of women's political rights. I attribute the lack of suffragist organizations to the early and at the same time ambiguous character of women's enfranchisement. That women were not explicitly excluded from the electoral legislation removed a target for mobilization, while no substitute emerged with the purpose of actually becoming voters. In the next section I claim that the lack of mobilization was one of the key reasons for the low politicization of women's suffrage up to the 1929 constitution.

Without important organizations, women's points of view were nonetheless present in the public sphere through mostly through their writing. Additionally, specific groups of women, such as Catholics and teachers, did organize to a greater degree. These public expressions quite clearly reflected the dominance of the liberal/conservative cleavage. While liberal women focused their efforts in extending education, conservatives defended religion and more traditional roles for women.

Catholic women's associations emerged in the nineteenth century and gained importance at the turn of the century. As it was usual at the time, these organizations were concerned with "restoring Catholic morality in society," using as main tools religious practice, education, and charity (Herrera 2010, 245). Catholic women's organizations were particularly visible during the liberal reform years, in the decade following Alfaro's 1895 revolution. The sudden and strong implantation of liberalism led to a catholic response, although this conservative movement also acted proactively.

Even before the revolution and the implementation of a number of secularizing policies, women sought to defend the church from the attacks of liberalism. A letter from 1877 signed by a group of women identified religion as a feminine sphere, stating "The language of men is the infinite camp of science, politics calculations, progress of the arts, of commerce, of war; but RELIGION is ours, and saving it is also our duty" (in Goetschel 2013, 40–41). In the collection of public letters presented by Ana María Goetschel (2013), other writings followed this same line, complaining about the attacks of the press on religion, particularly the press in Guayaquil, or protesting specific secularizing policies such as the law that established civil marriage, lay education, and religious freedom.

In 1909 took place the First Catholic Congress of Ladies, which was attended by upper-class women. One aim of this congress was to establish the National League of Catholic Women, which functioned throughout the country in close relationship to the church hierarchy. Part of its work was related to educating women, so they could engage in further religious and moral preparation and form a non-liberal and at times anti-liberal public sphere. At the same time, church authorities were concerned with women's excessive social exposition, and that they should only engage in social action once they had carried out their domestic obligations and if they had their husband's permission (Herrera 2010, 254). This concern indicates that even though the church promoted the organization of women, it was within the bounds of a traditional conception of appropriate gender roles, which initially, did not include voting.

In the following decades, as these organizations consolidated, they developed clear ties to the Conservative Party. According to Gioconda Herrera (2010, 257), these lay Catholic organizations were successful in attracting women because, unlike liberalism, they invested in defining a specific role for women in public life, a role associated to maternalism and as a moralizing factor. Liberalism, on the other hand, was very heterogenous and there were no efforts to build and equivalent feminine identity.

In the opposite front, the liberal revolution was a key juncture for women's participation in the public sphere. Partly as a counteract to secularizing reforms, that attacked traditional forms of socialization and roles, the liberal regime opened up new opportunities to women through education, vocational training, and employment (Clark 2015). New prospects developed for women with the professionalization of maternity wards as nurses and midwives, and as teachers with the expansion of public education. In this latter arena, women represented between 55-60% of teachers (Clark 2015, 90).

In the early decades of the twentieth century, a number of publications directed and written by women emerged, some with literary purposes while others more directly concerned with feminism (Campana Altuna 2002). Most of these women belonged to the middle class, reflecting the social, economic, and cultural changes produced during the liberal period. Political rights were not at the top of the agenda for most of these women exercising journalism and there was certainly no consensus among women. Nonetheless, female voices could be heard reacting to the central legislative debates. In 1910, 1928, and 1937, there were echoes in the press, and they became more numerous as time passed. However, both in the literature that has analyzed these debates as well as in my own revision of the press, there is not a single mention to an organization partly or completely devoted to promoting women's political participation (Estrada 2015; Londoño López 2010; Prieto and Goetschel 2008; Rodas Morales 2009).[69] Voices in defense of suffrage (as well as those against) acted mostly in isolation.

Given the lack of suffragists organizations, the action of individual women stands out all the more, most of them from the liberal camp. One of the key feminist figures is that Zoila Ugarte de Landívar, the first female journalist, editor of the first feminist magazine La Mujer (1905), and director of the National Library (1911-1920). Ugarte devoted much of her time to education, both as writer and as a teacher. She was also an early defender of the female franchise, claiming in 1910 that the constitution and electoral law already allowed the possibility of participation and that the issue should be not be discussed any further (Rodas Morales 2009,

[69] Some of the few organizations mentioned were the *Centro Feminista La Aurora* (Feminist Centre La Aurora) and the *Sociedad Feminista Luz de Pichincha* (Feminist Society Light of Pichincha), both devoted to providing education and training to lower class women (Campana Altuna 2002, 32; Goetschel 2007, 139).

106–7). She did not, however, try to exercise this right at this time. A couple of decades later, in the early 1930s, Ugarte formed part of the campaign to maintain suffrage.

A second figure, and whose actions set in motion the explicit recognition of equal voting rights in 1929, was Matilde Hidalgo de Procel. Hidalgo was a pioneer in education by becoming the first female physician in Ecuador, which required her to attend a traditional male-only school in the city of Loja. She attended the University of Cuenca, where she had to endure constant bullying for being a woman and a liberal in a conservative city (Estrada 2015). After finally obtaining her medical degree in Quito and marrying, she establishes herself in the southern city of Machala. Here she will go the electoral registry, after her lawyer husband confirms the interpretation that the 1906 constitution makes no distinction between the sexes as a requirement for suffrage. After this key moment, Hidalgo would continue expressing an interest in politics and public affairs, being elected to the local council (*Concejo Cantonal de Machala*) in 1936. In 1941 she ran for the legislature in the Liberal Party list, and although she received sufficient votes, party maneuvers left her an alternate deputy.

A final feminist worth mentioning is Hipatia Cárdenas de Bustamante. A well-respected liberal figure, in 1929 she received three votes to become a member of the State Council as one of the citizen members (*El Comercio*, April 5, 1929). And in 1937, she also came close to being elected in the Electoral Council (Quezada 2009, 157). She mounted a defense of women's suffrage in the press both in 1928 but particularly in 1937. When the suppression of female voting rights was being considered, in 1937, Cárdenas was a strong defender of the franchise and even met with dictator Páez to personally ask him to maintain the right (*El Día*, March 13, 1937). This personal meeting (and later in an interview referring to Páez by his first name) indicates that she was an insider of governing political circles. In her writings, Cárdenas defended women's

equal capacity – and equal rights as a consequence – to participate in politics. She also made a defense of politics more generally, as the corruption of the activity was a common argument to exclude women from it (see writings in Goetschel 2006).

The campaigns led by women in defense of suffrage gained relative strength in the 1930s, but overall women's interest in political participation and public affairs remained low. Evidence presented in the next section further substantiates this claim. Ecuador had the particularity that debates on suffrage took place before a substantial critical mass of women participating in different political spheres developed. In many other countries, the often decades-long debate on voting rights allowed and motivated the emergence of women's organization. Overall, Ecuador was a case where women's suffrage and women's political participation more broadly had a low degree of politicization.

2.3 Low politicization, normative motivations, and an intricate reform process

The previous section showed that no important suffragist mobilization took place in Ecuador. I claim this reality and an early "solution" of introducing a generic term (*ciudadanos*) in reference to qualifications for suffrage, translated into a low politicization of women's suffrage. Although Ecuador had a clear liberal/conservative cleavage based on a religious divide, this cleavage did not initially prompt strategic considerations. For liberals, then, who were a majority throughout the period, the low politicization of suffrage made strategic calculations neutral; women's political participation was not seen as a threat. And guided by normative beliefs founded on liberal principles, there was a consensus in allowing – yet not promoting – women's vote. It was only after enfranchisement that strategic motivations were negative for

liberals as predicted by the theory, and it this context the possibility of disenfranchisement was discussed.

The 1906 constitution included the generic term, *ciudadanos,* as it was the norm in the region. This was the second liberal constitution, based on the 1897 one. However, the 1906 constitution is particularly significant because it was in was in force in 1924 when it was used by Matilde de Hidalgo as an argument to register to vote. The constitution of 1884, previous to the liberal revolution, had explicitly excluded women by stating that the requirements for citizenship were literacy and being a male over 21 years old or married. At that time there was a debate as to the pertinence of including women, with the clear notion that using a generic noun would mean women were included, finally opting for specifying that only males could vote (Rodas Morales 2009, 78).

In the constitutional convention of 1896, however, no debate took place concerning this point. In this instance, a short debate focused on the voting age (lowering from 21 to 18 years old) and whether marriage should constitute an exception to the required age.[70] The initial proposal for the article regulating citizenship specified that being a male was a requirement; in the final drafting, this requirement was removed using only the term *ecuatorianos* (and the voting age was lowered to 18). Since the implications of using a generic term were clear for political parties, we could think this was a purposeful decision. Jenny Londoño (2010, 214) claims that liberal women joined and fought in the revolution and later pressed Alfaro to eliminate the word "male" from the constitution. And even though there were in fact women

[70] Archive of the Legislative Function (ALF), National Assembly, 1896-1897, ordinary session of October 26, 1896, pp. 176-179.

with military rank, the author presents no evidence that this was the reason behind the change, which occurred that same day.

The implications of the new wording were nonetheless clear for the members of the assembly. In June 1897, when the president called on the assembly to dictate laws to allow women access to university, academia, and the exercise of scientific professions, liberal deputy (and future president) Gonzalo Córdova argued that the chamber should not spend time on that and that the president should be reminded what they have done "since the first days the Convention met in Guayaquil, for improving women, going to the extreme of having granted her citizenship rights, and therefore leaving her in aptitude to occupy any public office."[71] This episode tells us two things: first, that president Alfaro had an interests in pushing women's rights forward and second, that there were differences among liberals as to how much to advance in this regard.

Less than decade later, in 1905, president Leonidas Plaza made an important speech in favor of women, mentioning she had no participation in political rights (Rodas Morales 2009, 87). According to his interpretation, then, the constitution was not sufficient, reflecting the ambiguity of how the issue had been resolved. In 1910, a discussion of the electoral law again brought the issue of women's suffrage to the fore in the national assembly. This debate was guided by normative arguments. For some, since they constitution already acknowledged equal rights, it was preferable to specify it in the electoral law and abide by the principles of liberalism. For others, it was unnecessary to bring women into a political arena that did not function well and take her out of the home (Rodas Morales 2009). This debate was left without resolution. It tells us, however, that although in some instances there was consensus as to the inclusiveness of

[71] ALF, National Assembly, June 3, 1897, pp. 287-288.

the constitution, at others it put into question. There were, nonetheless, no attempts during these years of explicitly excluding women, reflecting that despite a clear ambiguity, most legislators supported at least formal version of equality.

The normative belief that women should half equal rights that was often presented as a principle of the liberal revolution, had some basis in the policies implemented by these governments at the turn of the century. After first coming to power, Alfaro granted women access to public employment, in 1910 divorce by mutual consent was established,[72] and the economic emancipation of married women was introduced in 1911 (Rodas Morales 2009). A decade later, in the 1923 Liberal Party Program and Statutes there was no explicit mention to women's suffrage. The document did specified "The Liberal Party will impulse the cultural development of women to elevate her to equal conditions as men, in her legal status and in the unfolding of her political, economic, and social activities" (Partido Liberal Ecuatoriano 1923, 5).

In 1924 women's suffrage became a reality when Matilde Hidalgo registered in the city of Machala, in the south of the country. The president of the municipal council of the *cantón* (intermediate administrative unit) requested the opinion of the State Council, and the Council gave a favorable pronouncement. Matilde Hidalgo was able to vote in the legislative elections of that same year. In fact, although still far from extended, reports indicate other women voted in this election (Prieto and Goetschel 2008, 319).

The State Council was integrated by the president of the Supreme Court, the President of the Tribunal of Auditors, by cabinet members (who did not have a vote), two senators, two

[72] In 1902, divorce by fault of the woman's infidelity was introduced, and in 1904 also by man's and attempting against each other's lives.

deputies, and three citizens that met the requirement to be a senator, designated by congress.[73] Among the members in 1924, there was a majority of liberals (the list is in *El Comercio,* June 10, 1924). The annual account of the State Council to congress reported that the Council had determined political rights in fact extended to women.[74] The motives for the favorable ruling came from a report from councilmember Temístocles Terán, a liberal. The legal interpretation was that generic terms such *ciudadanos* and *ecuatorianos* were inclusive of women and that when the legislator had wanted to introduced restrictions, it had done so, citing the 1883 constitution.

Hidalgo's actions generated a reaction in the press, that mostly denote bewilderment. There was a consensus in terms of the legally of women's registration and exercise of the franchise; voiced were raised as to the "convenience" of its implementation. For example, an editorial stated "In this point, as in many others, our legislators have sinned by excess; they have given us laws that assume, by their finish, a social state more cultured and advanced." The article goes on to say that if some women of special character want to make use of their right, it cannot be reproached, but that such behavior should not be incentivized, particularly when feminism has not penetrated the country and there is not demand for it (*El Comercio,* June 11, 1924). Another article titled "Ecuador, paradise for women" makes a similar argument that despite not being organized, laws are very "generous" with women. One editorial makes the analogy with the entry of socialism in the country. Some intellectual began talking about socialism before the social ground was fertile, and as such it did not take hold. But as time passed and circumstances changed, socialist ideals took hold among sectors of the lower classes (*El Comercio,* June 14,

[73] Article 97, Constitution of 1906, retrieved from https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/constitucion_1906.pdf [June 8, 2019].
[74] AFL, p. 71ff. Report from the Council of State to National Congress of 1924.

1924). Other voices argued that women's superior moral sense would help clean politics (*El Día,* June 11, 1924), while some contrary arguments stated that women's participation would mean abandoning the home (*El Comercio,* June 11, 1924).

It is hard to answer why the actions of Matilde Hidalgo did not trigger an attempt by male elites to block women's participation, as it occurred in other countries. A similar process took place in Brazil only two years before. Like Ecuador, the Brazilian constitution did not specify sex, but when in 1922 women attempted to register judges rendered denials based on social custom and the "nature of women" (Hahner 1990, p. 151). And in both Chile and Peru, the constitutions of 1925 and 1933 respectively were also formulated in generic terms, but it was understood women could not vote. I argue that two main factors explain that the legal interpretation was imposed over political or social arguments in Ecuador. First was the lack of politicization of women's enfranchisement. As discussed above, before Matilde Hidalgo's registration and vote, there was no organized demand from women. In the constitutional conventions of 1895 and 1906, there had been little debate on the matter. And although the press reported on it, it was not a highly polemic subject. A second factor in the Council of State confirmation was what I have characterized as the positive normative consensus on the expansion of women's rights that, to some degree, had been imposed during the liberal era.

After some years of political instability, an assembly was elected to draft a new constitution. In the 1928 assembly, again there was no important debate on women's suffrage. The first draft of the constitution repeated the generic *ecuatorianos*, being 21 years old (raised from 18 in the 1906 constitution) and knowing how to read and right. During the debate, this last aspect came under discussion, as some legislators proposed requiring primary level education. Liberal deputy Abelardo Moncayo brought up the issue of sex, claiming that if the aim was to

include women, the current wording was ambiguous, and it could lend itself for conflict in the future. Says that women have not yet claimed for suffrage and proposes specifying that the law could grant women political rights.[75] After a brief discussion were all those who intervened agreed that women were citizens but showed different opinions as to whether it was necessary to specify in the article of the constitution that both men and women could vote or whether the generic term was sufficient, conservative deputy Remigio Romero y Cordero asked for the article to specifically include women.[76] The motion passed.

This time around there was certain debate in the press. An article in *El Día* by writer César Emilio Arroyo, defended the liberal principle of equality as guide for new constitution. He did not address the issue of women's suffrage in specific but did mention that women should have equal rights (*El Día,* October 9, 1928). Another author complained that, unlike what liberals usually claimed, Alfaro had not done much for women, particularly for furthering their education. Because of that,

> Female citizenship was implanted in Ecuador before woman realized she had a right to it: such was the civic delay she was in. Has this situation changed through the years? It is necessary to answer negatively, because never have women manifested the slightest interest, citizen in theory, of participating in an electoral function, not even with the purpose of defense of her religious doctrines or of the realization of her vague wishes for social reform (*El Día,* October 24, 1928).

The mention of religion as a cause women might wish to defend indicates that there was indeed a notion that women were more religious than men, as in the rest of the region. In another piece, the same author mentioned an anecdote where a leftist politician within official liberalism had claimed that the female vote was dangerous in Ecuador, given their submissiveness to the

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[75] ALF, December 14, 1928, p. 251.
[76] Ibid., p. 252.

Church, and that their participation should not be encouraged. The author argued that suffrage should nonetheless be recognized and if it was the case that women were subject to influence of religious authorities, it was men's fault for not organizing schools where they could be freed from such prejudices (*El Día,* December 7, 1928). The fact that liberals quickly dismissed contrary strategic arguments as well as the repeated claim that the franchise had come as a surprise to women, indicate the low polarization of the issue.

Voices against women's suffrage were also present. After the constitution was promulgated, *El Comercio* published an editorial arguing that true feminism should be based on women's education and the protection of childhood. Regarding suffrage, it contended that "removing woman for the sacred functions of the home, turn her politician and public employee, is not forging the happiness of nations" (*El Comercio,* April 10, 2019). Another commentary in this same media argued that the article defining access to citizenship was too broad as women would be qualified to be president of the republic, deputy, and state minister, which by the tone were clearly not acceptable (*El Comercio,* December 10, 1928).

An influential interpretation of women's explicit enfranchisement in the 1929 constitution is that of sociologist Rafael Quintero (1980, 239–45), who claims that it was the conservatives who, in the absence of a suffragist movement, pushed for reform in the 1928-1929 assembly hoping to benefit given the Catholic Church's influence over women. Quintero bases his claim in the fact that a conservative representative proposed the explicit inclusion of women in the constitutional debate and that the assembly had a conservative majority. The evidence supporting this argument is nonetheless limited.

First, the assembly that approved the motion was dominated by liberals (Prieto and Goetschel 2008, 310). Second, even though it was a conservative deputy that proposed the

change, no liberals opposed. Third, another figure that intervened in favor of being as explicit as possible in the drafting of the article was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As part of Isidro Ayora's provisional government, which did not rule supported by parties but had progressive tendencies closer to liberalism than conservatives, it is hard to sustain it was an issue resisted by liberalism. Finally, as additional evidence Quintero cites a thesis claiming that in the years leading to the new constitution there had been "long and fiery legislative campaigns in which the names of Rafael Arízaga and Remigio Crespo Toral (both conservatives) stand out" (Quintero 1980, 244). By the dates in which these two figures were representatives, the quoted thesis seems to be referring to the debates in 1883,[77] when the issue of women's rights was in fact debated, while at the same time stating that liberals were in power and as such they would not be favored by a change in suffrage rules. Since liberals did not reach power before 1895, the author referenced by Quintana seems to be extrapolating the positions of liberals and conservatives from a 50-year-old discussion. Overall, then, the evidence that conservatives pushed for reform is weak, which does not mean that conservatives did not benefit from women's votes. I argue, however, that the electoral advantage based on religious beliefs was an argument prominent *after* reform.

Electoral data previous to the creation of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in 1947 is not systematic. For 1930-1933 we have the registration data provided by Quintero (1980), reproduced in Table V.3.[78] According to this data, the first two years after the new constitution

[77] Biographical information from Rodolfo Pérez Pimentel. Archivo biográfico Ecuador. Retrieved from http://www.archivobiograficoecuador.com/tomos/tomo1/Crespo-Toral-Remigio.htm [June 8, 2019].
[78] The 1929 Electoral Law stated that voters had to re-register for every new election, and could do so only in September 20-30 each year (Quintero 1980, 231). As men only had to register, this stipulation facilitates the comparison between the number of men and women. The newspaper *El Día* (June 7, 1937) published slightly different numbers 1932, but that do not alter the percentages

came into effect women represented the 9.5% of all registrations, percentage that went up to 12% the following two years.[79] As a comparison, in Chile (where we have data), 16% of those registered were women in 1935, the first year women could vote in municipal elections. During the following decade, women represented up to 20% of total registrations (Maza Valenzuela 1995, 32). Considering that in Ecuador women could vote in national elections (which took place in 1931, 1932, and 1933), which should presumably wake up greater interests, women's registration during these years is low (in Chile women's registration surged to 30% for the first presidential election with female suffrage).

Table V.3. Electoral registration by sex, 1929-1933

Year	Total	Women	% women
1930	127,202	12,055	9.5
1931	155,186	14,707	9.5
1932	207,521	24,610	12
1933	243,633	29,679	12

Source: Quintero (1980, 245).

The relatively low percentage of women could in part be due to the literacy requirement. Continuing with the comparison, according to the 1940 census in Chile only 32% of the population was illiterate and the distribution among sexes was almost equal. In Ecuador, an estimated 65% of the population over 21 years old was illiterate in 1931 (Quintero 1980, 227). And although not disaggregated by sex, illiteracy among women is higher than men to this day, and in the 1930s female education had lower coverage, presumably leading to lower literacy (Goetschel 1999). A second reason for the low political participation of women is likely related

[79] Abstention among those registered was very high: 61.4% in 1931 and 58.1% in 1932 (*El Día,* June 7, 1937).

to the lack of organization and mobilization before enfranchisement. In this sense, the data on registration lends support to observations of contemporaries that there was very little demand for participation among women. The numbers on Table V.3 can then be understood as a consequence of low politicization of the issue. Additionally, the first women elected to congress – communist Nela Martínez – reached office only in 1945, that is twenty years after women started voting. Matilde Hidalgo had been elected in 1941 as substitute (in this election she was also the first female candidate to run) and in 1930 for the municipal council.

In the second half of the 1930s, que issue of women's suffrage reemerged with greater strength than before, as per the intensity of the debate reflected in the press. The dictatorship of Federico Páez (1935-1937) decreed that the 1929 constitution was no longer in effect, defaulting to the 1906 document (Gómez López 2012), which as discussed had the generic *ecuatorianos* in reference to suffrage. This regime also dictated a new electoral law, which prompted the debate as to whether women were included. When asked about the issue, the solicitor general considered she was not included as voter as unlike in the 1929 constitution, there was no explicit mention of women (*El Día,* May 6, 1937). Other legal experts believed otherwise (*El Día,* May 7, 1937).

In this juncture, the debate more clearly followed the lines of the liberal/conservative cleavage and strategic arguments gained importance. When it was being debated whether the new electoral law by the Páez dictatorship would disenfranchise women or introduce an education requirement, and editorial in the liberal newspaper *El Día* stated "we already know that women, in their immense majority, followed the routes imposed by their sentimental and mystical determinations: as such they constituted electorally a decisive force in favor of traditionalist politics." The author then goes on to specify why that is so: "the shackles that today

and forever has restricted women's freedom: that of eternal religious submission" (*El Día,* March 12, 1937). This type of opinion did not come only from men. An article signed by María Luisa Calle argued that the education that women received did not make her a valuable input in political life (*El Día,* January 4, 1937). *El Comercio* showed a more favorable position, countering the argument of lack of preparation by asserting that women were no longer only consecrated to motherhood but that they could be found in all careers (*El Comercio,* May 12, 1937).

In 1938 this debate translated to the commission in charge of drafting yet another constitution (one that would never come into effect). In a set of letters that reported on the political debate taking place in the country to prominent conservative leader and ideologue Jacinto Jijón y Caamaño – exiled by the Páez dictatorship –, an informant claimed that the left was demanding the commission to eliminate women's suffrage. The reason given by the left was "woman not being prepared and being influenced by the clergy".[80] The informant also claimed liberals were proposing the restriction of the franchise by instruction.[81]

The first half of the 1930s, when women began exercising the franchise, coincided with the end of the liberal hegemony and the first electoral triumph of conservatives (first with Neftalí Bonifaz, and later José María Velasco Ibarra, a populist allied with the Catholic Church) (Ayala Mora 2012). The claims of liberals and the left that women supported conservatives can have some basis if we consider registrations in different provinces (Table V.4). As mentioned above, women represented 9.5% of registered voters nationwide, but there were considerable differences among provinces. In the province of Guayas, where the city of Guayaquil is located,

[80] Historical Archive of Ecuador (HAC). Letter to Jacinto Jijón y Caamaño, n.d
[81] HAC. Letter to Jacinto Jijón y Caamaño, March 18, 1938.

women represented only 4% of registered voters. Guayaquil has traditionally been home to the financial and export elites – the local bourgeoisie – and it is where the liberal revolution of 1895 started. In the northern highlands, on the other hand, women represented a higher percentage. The provinces of Chimborazo, Imbabura, and Pichincha (where the capital Quinto is located), strongholds of conservatives and Catholicism (Espinosa Fernández de Córdoba and Aljóvin de Losada 2015, 187), had 13, 17, and 16% of women respectively, well beyond the average. This could indicate that conservatives were more successful at mobilizing women, concordantly with claims found in the literature (Quezada 2009, 149; Quintero 1980, 292–99).

Table V.4. Registration by province, 1931

Province	Region	Total	Women	% women
Azuay	Highlands	12,941	304	2.3
Bolívar	Highlands	4,747	780	16.4
Cañar	Highlands	4,748	197	4.1
Carchi	Highlands	5,573	1,160	20.8
Chimborazo	Highlands	11,244	1,449	12.9
El Oro	Coast	5,073	464	9.1
Esmeraldas	Coast	3,115	261	8.4
Guayas	Coast	21,788	769	3.5
Imbabura	Highlands	7,934	1,337	16.9
León	Highlands	7,022	758	10.8
Loja	Highlands	8,697	543	6.2
Los Ríos	Coast	9,427	220	2.3
Manabí	Coast	14,265	1,087	7.6
Pichincha	Highlands	27,862	4,367	15.7
Tungurahua	Highlands	10,148	847	8.3
National		155,186	14,707	9.5

Source: *El Día,* June 7, 1937.

Women's suffrage ended up not being revoked.[82] Given the nature of the debate and existing political balances, one could imagine that the franchise would not have been extended in a scenario of previous restriction, as it occurred in most of the region. However, taking away a right that has already been exercised is harder politically; there is a path dependent nature to many political institutions. The debate in the 1930s shows that it was not the absence of a clear cleavage around which parties were organized which led to early enfranchisement, but that it was the low politicization of the issue which prevented parties from developing strategic considerations. Once women's suffrage became a reality, those strategic considerations were clearly developed.

3 Conclusions

Early reform in Uruguay and Ecuador was guided by normative beliefs of incumbents, as strategic calculations were neutral. This represents a surprising finding for two cases that share very little otherwise. In Uruguay, normative consensus emerged after a progressive faction of the governing Colorado Party reached power and from there pushed an agenda of deep social, economic, and political reform. Although progressive views were initially confined to a minority (as seen in the 1916 constitutional debate), in time, all parties came to see women's suffrage in a positive light. Strategic considerations, on the other hand, were not clearly beneficial for any specific party, as the cleavage separating them was weak and internal divisions often translated into cross-party alliances.

[82] Another issue discussed was whether the vote should be mandatory or not. All parties seemed to agree on this point, and in fact it was so established but for men only. The vote remained voluntary for women until 1947.

In Ecuador, I have claimed the process was equally guided by normative beliefs, in concrete those held by winning liberals of the 1895 revolution. Because women's suffrage was not a highly politicized issue and probably expecting women would not make use of the right (as it was the case for three decades), the 1897 constitution eliminated the exclusion of women without much debate, guided by liberal principles of equality under the law. That women were in fact enfranchised was ratified in 1924 and in a new constitution in 1929. In all of these occasions, strategic considerations did not figure prominently as low women's mobilization and politicization of reform likely led liberals to think the impact of women's votes would be limited. Only in 1938, where liberal forces started losing their hold on power, did strategic considerations gained force.

Another conclusion from the case of Ecuador in contrast to Uruguay is the importance of women's mobilization in politicizing women's suffrage. This duality was also present in the cases of Chile and Peru analyzed in the previous chapter, where a stronger mobilization in Chile kept the issue on the agenda as opposed to Peru, where suffrage was discussed in a single occasion. Taken together, then, the analysis of all four cases indicates the important role of mobilization for agenda setting, in line with previous works (Kenney 2003).

VI. STRATEGIC MOTIVATIONS AND LATE REFORM IN CHILE AND PERU

Chile of the postwar had one of Latin America's strongest and most competitive party systems – despite a small electorate – and a diverse, highly organized, and relatively numerous women's movement that managed to keep women's political rights in the agenda. Peru, on the other hand, lacked all of these conditions, with chronically weak political parties and an even feebler women's movement. Both countries, however, represent late instances of suffrage reform. I claim it was precisely the strong competition and mobilization that created contradictory motivation in Chile and delayed reform, while in Peru, it was the general disinterest of male elites and APRA's negative strategic and normative motivations that postpone reform when the context seemed propitious.

Being both late enfranchisers, the paths to reform differed. The late adoption of women's suffrage in Chile was a result of the changes in cleavages and political realignments. These changes introduced new strategic reasons to pass reform, particularly related to regime legitimacy. As such, I consider late reform in Chile as cleavage-led. In terms of the theorized mechanisms, it is also a case where reform was guided by strategic concerns as normative motivations were already neutral or positive for most actors. Peru's reform was likewise guided by a change in strategic motivations but created by short-term political factors. Concretely, after his political ambitions led to breaking with sectors of the oligarchy, dictator Manuel Odría needed to build an independent base of political, and eventually, electoral support. For this purpose, he used clientelistic strategies, engaged in party building efforts, and pushed women's enfranchisement to take the lead in the mobilization of female voters and appear popular among women by taking full credit for reform.

1 Democratic deficit and anticommunism in Chile's late reform

In a multiparty system like Chile of the 1940s, where no single party had more than 30% of seats and no coalition had an absolute majority, it is essential to understand parties in the center that had a pivotal role (Scully 1992). In Chile during the period of late reform, this role was played by the Radical Party (PR) – which was also the government party – a traditional anticlerical and middle-class party. For this reason, in this chapter I place and important focus in the PR. In brief, the central claim regarding this case is that the break of the government headed by Gabriel González Videla with the Communist party – his previous coalition partner – and his alignment with global anti-communism ultimately led to the enfranchisement of women. Before the anticommunist turn, and despite a very strong women's movement, the government did not act to support the franchise. The intermediate step between both events was the passing of the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy, which banned the Communist Party. My claim is that this move, result of the new cleavage and political realignments, created a democratic deficit and questioned the regime's legitimacy. To counteract the deficit, the government turned to women's enfranchisement, which had been on the table for years. With government support, the bill was almost unanimously approved. The analysis also shows that only when the franchise was in the horizon did the government pursue the organization of sympathizing women; it was not women's mobilizing that achieved reform.

1.1 The anticommunist turn in the early Cold War

Chile has often been characterized having the party system closest to the European model (Dix 1989; Scully 1992). In this relative synchronicity with international phenomena

(Fermandois 2004), it is no surprise that the Cold War conflict had an early expression in Chile. Already in 1947, the government headed by Gabriel González Videla broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet sphere and the following year passed the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy, which outlawed the Communist Party (PC for its initials in Spanish). I claim that this anticommunist turn – as culmination of a process that have been gestating for some years – explains women's enfranchisement, when after decades of debates and years of a bill sitting in Congress, the executive finally supported the reform, resulting in its approval in 1949. Chile, then, followed the cleavage path to late suffrage reform.

Anticommunism had a long history in the country. The Communist Party had been excluded from the system in the period of de facto governments (1924-1932), and an interpretation of the electoral law had forced them to register under different names, but there was no explicitly anticommunist legislation. The first illegalization attempt came in 1940-1941, initiated by a conservative deputy and approved in both chambers of congress by a right-wing majority. Only a presidential veto stopped it from becoming law (Casals 2016). This illegalization attempt is a reflection that during the war years, as Casals shows (2016, 146–48), anticommunism became the core inspiration of the Chilean right.

The period between 1938-1952 was led by three consecutive coalitions governments headed by the PR. This party, created in the mid-nineteenth century, was characterized by a strong anticlericalism from its founding days, combined with an increasing mesocratic, reformist, and anti-oligarchic character. In 1936, aligning with the Comintern's Popular Front policy, a local version was formed, bringing together radicals, socialists, communists, and the small Democratic Party. Albeit some changes, the core of the coalition remained in place for the successive elections. Their main opponents were the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties.

In their origins, these parties were separated by the clerical question. However, the Liberal's anticlericalism had moderated, and particularly after the official separation of church and state in the constitution of 1925, the differences between the parties were further diluted. As Scully (1992) claims, from the 1930s onward, Conservative and Liberals were practically indistinguishable as the parties representing the elites and controlling the countryside. Until 1947, then, the dominant cleavage and axis of competition is what I have called the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage, as discussed in chapter IV.

Of the three radical presidents, González Videla had been the most sympathetic to joining efforts with the communists. Throughout the three radical presidencies, he defended an alliance with the left – first the Popular Front, then a coalition called Democratic Alliance – over governments of national unity that included the right (González Videla 1975, 468). Once he was nominated candidate in 1946, it was only the PC that joined his electoral coalition as the socialists opted for supporting their own presidential candidate. As sign of the PC support, his chief of propaganda during the campaign was Pablo Neruda, poet and communist senator.

Despite being part of the electoral and governing coalition since the origins of the Popular Front, the two previous presidents had opted for maintaining a more distant relationship with the PC. It was not until González Videla's term that the communists entered the cabinet, in November 1946. After difficult negotiations, communist occupied the ministries of Land and Colonization, Public Works, and Agriculture. Two of the ministries were particularly strategic, associated to the key issues of peasant unionization and land reform, which had been included in the government program by the pressure of the communists (Rojas Flores 2018). There were also communists designated as *intendentes* (the regional executive) and in other administrative posts. These designations did not last long and some evidence points to this short stint in the

government being part of a strategy to discredit them to their bases, neutralize workers' protests, and have an excuse to break the coalition (Huneeus 2009, 95–96).

The government's anticommunist stance unfolded over several months. In April 1947, communists volunteered their resignations to the cabinet after increased polarization. In June, after a strike of public transportation workers, the president publicly accused the PC of being responsible for the unrest and declared an emergency zone in Santiago. In August, after a strike of coal miners, the president introduced the first of several laws that granted the government extraordinary powers to reinstate order, which translated into persecution of communists. In October, the government expelled Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak diplomats, to later that same month break relations with those countries. The charge was that the diplomats were collaborating with the local communists in their subversive efforts. At the end of 1947, communist senator Pablo Neruda was stripped of his parliamentary immunity for publishing an article criticizing the president, spending several months underground before leaving the country. In April 1948, the government introduced the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy, which was approved in September that same year. This legislation outlawed the PC, decree the expulsion of party activists from the public administration and unions, and disenfranchised party members or sympathizers. Until 1950, using extraordinary constitutional powers and the new law, political repression was at its highest.

The anticommunist policy also translated in a shift in governing alliances. As a minority president, González Videla needed the support from other parties. Once the communists and liberal exited the first cabinet, González Videla incorporated independents and military.[83] In

[83] The liberals had entered the government in negotiations after the presidential election. The 1925 constitution stated that if no candidate received an absolute majority, Congress in full had to select between the first two relative majorities. González Videla received 40% of the vote in the presidential

1948, the traditionalist sector of the Conservative Party (but not the social-Christian minority) and the Liberal Party joined the new cabinet. Although this new cabinet proved unstable and new alliances were formed in 1950, it marked the first time after ten years in power and multiple political alliances that the radicals governed together with the conservatives. After the split with communists, the Radical Party would no longer form electoral or governing coalitions with the left.[84]

Multiple factors combined leading to the anticommunist policy, which can largely be summed as political, economic, and international. In the political front, once in the government, the communists adopted what Carlos Huneeus (2009) calls a dual strategy: using the institutional resources at their disposition as part of the government, and the mobilization of the social bases through unions and social organizations. After a relative moderation in their labor-led demands during the war years, in the postwar communists adopted a more confrontational strategy that increased social conflict. Communists controlled most of the unions from the mining industry – their greatest electoral support came from mining towns – in a labor activity criticized a sectarian particularly by the socialists (Casals 2016). They also focused on organizing peasants as part of the long overdue modernization of the countryside they had managed to include in the government platform. In fact, rural protests increased by 24% in 1946 and 31% in 1947 (Loveman 1976, 130). Through these actions they challenged the *estado de compromise,* the political arrangement by which the right accepted state-led industrialization, extension of social

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election and congress was controlled by the right. This scenario prompted him to negotiate support of the Liberal Party in exchange for cabinet positions and the compromise not to pursue peasant unionization.

[84] A partial exception was the 1970-1973 period, when part of the Radical Party joined the Popular Unity coalition. This generated a split within the radicals.

rights, and the political organization of the left in exchange for maintaining social and political control in the countryside (Moulián 1982).

Social unrest alarmed right wing parties and the radicals. The fears increased after the April 1947 local elections. In these elections, the PC, running in the same list with the Radical Party, was the third most voted after conservatives and radicals, reaching 16.5% and increasing in more than 10% its vote in the previous municipal election, and 6% from the last legislative election. Based on these electoral results, projections for the 1949 legislative elections estimated the communists would become the largest party in the lower chamber (Huneeus 2009, 112).

In the economic front, the first year of the González Videla administration saw a considerable increase in inflation, affecting in particular the price of basic foodstuff such as flour. Wages also suffered in a context of economic difficulties and living conditions were extremely harsh in many towns, particularly in the coal industry in the south. This economic situation provided the perfect context for the labor mobilization pushed by the communists as well as their electoral growth.

Finally, the international context was key. After a strike in the American-owned Sewell copper mine, the US government imposed an embargo on credits to Chile and pressured other banks to follow suit. The embargo lasted until October 1947, when González Videla had started the persecution of communists. When the government introduced the bill to outlaw the PC, one of the arguments was that the world was facing a war between democracy and totalitarianism started in 1946 after the break between Truman and Stalin, a war Chile was a part of. The revolutionary tactics of the communists were being orchestrated from overseas as part of the Soviet strategy to expand its area of influence (González Videla, 1975). The process of realignment, then, was accompanied by changes occurring in the international sphere.

Support and discussion around the Damned Law – as was labeled by the communists – serves to place actors in the communist/anticommunist cleavage. In addition to communists, the anticommunist camp was divided in two stances: those who believed the threat posed by communism demanded suppressing them and thus supported the bill, and those that while anticommunist, felt that the party should be fought by changing the social conditions that made it strive, and that outlawing a party was unconstitutional, against democratic liberties, and even a bad tactic as acting underground would strengthen their identity and actions (Casals 2016). The difference between these two positions generated splits within most parties. Among supporters of the project was the Liberal Party, a majority of the Conservative Party (labelled the traditionalist sector), a majority of the Radical Party, and a minority of socialists. Against the outlawing were the social-Christians (a minority within the Conservative Party and the small party Falange National, predecessor of the Christian Democratic Party), a minority of radicals, and most socialists.[85]

The argument about 1947-1948 presenting a critical juncture for political realignment departs from other analyses of Chilean historical cleavages and party system. One relevant work in this area is that of Timothy Scully, who in *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Chile* (1992) argues that three distinct critical junctures crystallized the three relevant cleavage that shaped the pre-1973 party system: the religious (1850s-1920s), the urban class (1920-1950s), and the rural class conflicts (1950s-1973). According to this analysis, the change in cleavage came in the late 1950s, with the changes in the electoral law that reduced

[85] The Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy was approved in the lower chamber by 93 favorable votes and 20 against, and in the Senate by 31 in favor and 8 against (González Videla 1975, 712).

oligarchic control over peasants. The 1947-1948 turn of the governing coalition was, in Scully's view, a change in alliances and not a fundamental new political arrangement.

In this sense, my argument better aligns with Casals' (2016), who claims the although anticommunism had been present for decades in Chilean political parties, the outlawing of the Communist Party in 1948 had profound and long term consequences in terms of the centrality of anticommunism. This centrality was observed in the 1964 election, during the Popular Unity's government (1970-1973) and the coup the overthrew president Salvador Allende in 1973, and as the central discourse of the military dictatorship (1973-1990). Likewise, Huneeus (2009) argues that is was this juncture that explains the weakening of political parties and later breakdown of democracy.

The next section analyzes the characteristics of the women's movement during the 1940s and claims that despite the strength that the movement reached in the mid-1940s, it was the government's anticommunist turn what explains that the full enfranchising of Chilean women occurred in 1949 and not earlier.

1.2 Unity and polarization in the women's movement

In the second half of 1940s, the period considered in this chapter, the Chilean women's movement lived its heyday, with an organizational structure that spread throughout the country, great mobilizational capacity, and unity behind the suffrage cause. The strength of the movement peaked not only in relation to previous decades, but also in comparison to future waves of feminist activism (Ríos Tobar 2009). After some initial success in getting a bill introduced and approved in the Senate, following the political climate of the country, the movement split along political lines, marking the beginning of its decline. This section describes this process of

successful organization and decay to show, first, that the movement spanned the political spectrum, thus not providing a hypothesized advantage to any single party. Second, despite the movement's strength, I argue that the final passing of the women's suffrage bill was not a direct consequence of women's mobilization.

The emergence of the Chilean Federation of Feminine Institutions (FECHIF for its Spanish acronym) in 1944, an umbrella organization that grouped existing women's organizations, represented the height of unity of the women's movement. FECHIF brought together autonomous women's organizations but also the feminine sections of political parties. At least since the mid-1930s, when women started participating in local elections, all major parties had sections dedicated to organizing and mobilizing women. What was known as "double militancy" between a political party and feminist organizations was common at the time and it meant that despite moments of unity, relationships among organizations and leaders were fraught with conflict. As we will see, this was particularly the case among center and leftist organizations and parties. Within conservative sectors, there was greater alignment between the parties and women's organizations in terms of what should be women's social and political roles, and as such the Conservative and Liberal parties had less trouble mobilizing women and aligning them behind their agenda (Asunción Lavrin 1998).

FECHIF emerged from the First Nacional Congress of Women, organized in October-November 1944; it brought together organizations representing women of diverse social background and political inclination. The organizations had differences in their agendas, but large part of the success of FECHIF was that it was able to align women behind the issue of political rights and the high cost of living. The first president of this organization was Amanda Labarca, one of the most important feminists of the period, and a member of the PR.

FECHIF was able to introduce a bill into the Senate in 1945, signed by Senators from parties across the spectrum – a liberal, a conservative, a radical, a socialist, and a communist. That senators from all major parties backed the bill reflects the broad political reach of FECHIF. During its discussion, the Federation campaigned on the issue, through the press, public fora, radio messages, and demonstrations outside congress, which for the first time reached the title pages of the mainstream media (Antezana-Pernet 1996, 349; Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986, 46). FECHIF also recruited the first lady Rosa Markmann as an ally, who helped keep the issue in the agenda (González Videla 1975).

After the bill was approved in the Senate in December 1946, it lay dormant in the Chamber of Deputies for months. It was only in September 1948 when the issue was discussed again, in a different political context. When the bill was debated and later approved in the Chamber, the Law of Permanence Defense had already been approved and the persecution of communist was in full deployment.

The political polarization in the country also reached the women's movement and led to its division, particularly critical when MEMCh left the Federation. Since its founding in 1935, the Movement Pro-Emancipation of Women in Chile (*Movimiento Pro-Emancipación de las Mujeres en Chile, MEMCh*) had become the most important feminist organization in Chile. It was the only truly national organization, with local committees throughout the territory. Local committees could be formed with a minimum of ten members, who should meet at least once every two weeks and pay a monthly due. In 1947, there were around fifty local committees, with membership ranging from a couple of dozens to over 500 (Antezana-Pernet 1995, 297). The MEMCh was also of great relevance because unlike most organizations of the period, it was successful in broadening the social base of the organization, including not only professionals and

middle-class women, but also women from the working class (Eltit 1994, 55; Poblete de Espinosa 1993, 42–43). MEMCh turned the women's movement into a mass movement (Baldez 2002; Ríos Tobar 2009). As such, the participation of MEMCh in the FECHIF resulted of great importance, providing "soldiers" for the demonstrations while the latter organization concentrated in direct lobbying of politicians.

MEMCh remained formally a non-political organization, but it had a clear political alignment with the Popular Front parties, that is Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties. Communists and sympathizers dominated the MEMCh. According to one of MEMCh's main leaders and founding member, Elena Caffarena, about half of MEMCh members had Communist ties (cited in Antezana-Pernet, 1996, p. 327). Although Caffarena and other MEMCh leaders worked to preserve the independent character of the organization, it was often perceived as communist leaning.[86]

As Antezana-Pernet (1996) recounts, there was an important internal debate as to the role MEMCh should have in relation to communism and class struggle. While figures such as Caffarena and Marta Vergara fought to maintain the organization's autonomy and a broad agenda, others such as Micaela Troncoso suggested the organization should be led by working class women (displacing professionals such as Caffarena), and put the defense of workers front and center, while also having close ties to the Communist Party. In MEMCh's second national congress in 1941, the latter were successful in introducing a number of changes to the organizational structure to likened it to the PC. Caffarena managed to be reelected as secretary general, however, given the turn taken by the organization, she did not assume the post and

[86] Caffarena herself was often associated to the Communist Party, partly for her marriage to a well-known and respected communist lawyer.

resigned from MEMCh. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Communist Party adopted a more collaborationist policy and in 1944 many of the old members returned to MEMCh, including Caffarena as secretary general. It was in this stage that MEMCh joined the FECHIF.

The Second National Congress of Women took place in October 1947, amidst tensions between the government and the Communist Party, and ended up breaking the movement. Most of FECHIF's leadership was sympathetic to the government's offensive against communists, and in fact invited the president to address women in the congress. González Videla's remarks justifying the exceptional security measures as necessary to protect democracy in the country motivated Caffarena to leave the auditorium in protest. In January 1948, FECHIF expelled all member institutions affiliated with the Communist Party, provoking the marginalization of MEMCh (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986).

When the female suffrage bill was finally approved, no MEMCh members were invited to the ceremony and FECHIF credited itself for the accomplishment. Cafferena remembered: "Many women [were there] whom I had never, ever, seen fighting for the right to vote, never, and some of them even talked at this celebration… and I was at home, listening on the radio to the event at the Municipal theater. They had not invited me" (cited in Antezana-Pernet, 1996, p. 365). Furthermore, many members of MEMCh, particularly outside Santiago, were stricken from the electoral records and face state repression.

Women's suffrage received the support of the government and was approved when the women's movement had already suffered an important division and had weakened as consequence. Although the movement can be credited with the introduction and initial approval of the bill, after it left the Senate reform lost momentum. During this period, there was no open

opposition to reform and all sectors claimed to support it. However, mobilization was not able to bring the discussion back on the table and most importantly, to have the government accelerate the debate. It was not, then, the unity and strength of the movement what led to reform success, despite being a common argument among scholars of the Chilean women's movement (Chaney 1973; Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986; Power 2002).

Regarding the argument that women's mobilization served to alter politicians' calculations as to the potential behavior of female voters, the evidence likewise does not support it. Unlike Teele (2018, 447–48), who for lack of detailed information on the expected partisan preferences of women's organizations in a large-*N* analysis, simply uses movement strength as proxy for mobilization capacity, the (quasi)partisan nature of most women's organizations in Chile allows me to make more specific predictions. Although we do not have comparable numbers for each party-affiliated organization and others formally autonomous but with clear political leaning, the experience with municipal elections (discussed in detail in the next section) provided parties with concrete evidence. Results indicated that women favored the Conservative Party in a considerably largely proportion than men, with the Liberal and Radical parties also faring relatively well.

Conservative women had a longer and more successful tradition of mobilizing women, which lasted until women could vote in national elections, starting in the 1950s (Maza Valenzuela 1995; Power 2002). For example, the Women's Nacional Action of Chile (*Acción Nacional de Mujeres de Chile*) founded by Adela Edwards de Salas, was an organization of upper-class women that bridged charity world with political action and that was successful at mobilizing voters and getting its female candidates for local council elected. It was closely associated with the Conservative Party. And while by the mid-1940s, women's organizations

sparked the political spectrum, it is not possible to claim that the organizations that supported the government of González Videla had grown considerably more than those linked to other parties. For this reason, the nature of mobilization in Chile is not sufficient to turn strategic motivations positive.

In fact, the government made important efforts to organize popular sector women *after* it had started its anticommunist turn – the factor I claim ultimately explains the timing of reform. After the break with the communists, the government attempted to organize popular women through the creation of the Housewives' Association (*Asociación de Dueñas de Casa*), founded in August 1947 and formally presided by the first lady Rosa Markmann. The organization aimed at better preparing them to carry out their housework and as consumers; and initiated them in political and labor participation (Valdés et al. 1989, 9). Two-hundred housewives groups had been formed within a year, under the auspices of the government, who provided logistical resources for the organization (Antezana-Pernet 1996, 363).[87]

It was the persecution of communists that opened up the space for the government to strongly pursue the organization of women and once it had advanced in this task, it more strongly supported the franchise. In 1947-1948, having already been approved in the Senate, it was also clear that suffrage reform would be passed in the near future. The common causal story claims that existing women's organization achieved backing from the government to support the franchise. But in the case of the González Videla's government, the relationship goes partly the other way, with the government promoting the organization of women before giving the final push to the required institutional reform. The next section complements this argument as to the

[87] These organizations form an important antecedent of the Mother's Centers (*Centros de Madres),* one of the key institutions in the organizations of women during the Frei Montalva administration (1964-1970), and later in the Pinochet dictatorship (Pieper Mooney 2009; Power 2002; Valdés et al. 1989).

importance of the anticommunist turn in explaining the timing of women's enfranchisement in Chile.

1.3 The Radical Party and the shift in strategic motivations

Chile's extension of the franchise was guided by strategic concerns. As discussed in chapter IV, the Radical Party's distrust of women's electoral preferences – a negative strategic motivation – turned this party into a key gatekeeper of the status quo in terms of political inclusion. As the government party in a strong presidential system, the executive support was essential to accelerate the approval of the bill.[88] Radicals also had the largest representation in both chambers. Additionally, being located at the center of the political spectrum, the PR had pivotal position for the passing of legislation. In the discussion that follows, I focus on the changing motivations of the Radical Party, explaining how strategic motivations turned positive. I claim that the anticommunist turn of the government is the key element that explains this shift.

Table VI.1. Political parties and motivations for reform before and after realignment

	Before realignment			**After realignment**		
Party	**Normative motivation**	**Strategic motivation**	**Expected position**	**Normative motivation**	**Strategic motivation**	**Expected position**
Conservative	Negative/ neutral	Positive	Mixed	*Neutral*	Positive	Support
Liberal	Neutral	Neutral	Reject	Neutral	*Positive*	Support
Radical	Neutral	Negative	Reject	Neutral	*Positive*	Support
Democratic	Positive	Negative	Mixed	Positive	*Neutral*	Support
Socialist	Positive	Negative	Mixed	Positive	*Neutral*	Support
Communist	Positive	Negative	Mixed	Positive	*Neutral*	Support

[88] The executive had the capacity to put an "urgency" to a particular bill, giving Congress 30 days to debate it. Urgencies, however, are not binding but a tool to set the agenda. Additionally, the 1925 Constitution stated that ordinary sessions would run between May and September each year, and that extraordinary sessions could be called one by the president could call the to discuss only those issues the executive determined.

Table VI.1 presents the main political party's hypothesized motivations and expected positions toward reform before and after the communist/anticommunist realignment. The before realignment columns correspond to the positions discussed for the early reform period in chapter IV. The after realignment columns show the changes between periods, highlighting in italics where there was variation. I argue that the changing status of women as a result of entering new social, economic, and political arenas, turned neutral/negative motivations into positive/neutral ones. And that all parties had neutral or positive strategic motivations for reform.

With respect to normative motivations, I claim there was not a substantial change between the early and late periods and that the González Videla administration was not particularly favorable to women's rights. I therefore classify normative motivations as neutral.

While the government included women's suffrage in the government program., it apparently did so under the insistence of communists and feminists, since the presidential candidate initially resist it (Rojas Flores 2018, 131). At the same time, the successive radical administrations designated women in a number of posts. Pedro Aguirre Cerda designated socialist Graciela Contreras de Schnake as the first mayor of Santiago and Olga Boettcher as the first governor. Radical Amanda Labarca was ambassador to the United Nations in 1946. González Videla named the first *intendenta* and female first minister (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986).[89] This type of measure can be considered at once strategic and normative. It is strategic as it constituted a reward for feminist that supported the government (Rosemblatt 2000). But at the same time, it shows that the government was at least sympathetic to women exercising important

[89] Intendentes in Chile are the executive head of regions, the largest subnational political units, while governors are heads of provinces (intermediate unit) and majors govern municipalities (the smallest units).

public roles. Importantly, Contreras was designated major of a key municipality and Adriana Olguín, the first cabinet member was named in position generally seen as neutral and of medium prestige, and not in a stereotypically feminine ministry, such as education or culture (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009)

In addition to these posts, women were strongly incorporated into the state bureaucracy during the Popular Front governments was as welfare workers. As Karin Rosemblatt (2000) has investigated, these workers were part of a deeply gendered project that as part of a development ideal promoted a traditional view of the family. This parternalist and assistentialist project was supported by feminists the author refers to as moderate (those political aligned with the government), as opposed to more progressive groups (including Elena Caffarena and others) that envisioned state intervention as providing greater autonomy to women. This later group were the feminists, however, that with the anticommunist turn were marginalized from the mainstream movement and lost connections to the state. Here, again, we see a neutral normative motivation, with the commitment to include women in the development project not only through charity but as professionals at the same time they were promoting deeply traditional gender roles.

The bill that later translated into Law 9.292 that extended women their full voting rights was sponsored by a group of senators from across the political spectrum, including a liberal, a conservative, a radical, a socialist, and a communist. This bill was introduced at the impulse of FECHIF in 1945 and first approved in the Senate in December 1946. It took almost two years to be debated and voted in the Chamber of Deputies, being approved in September 1948. Changes were ratified by the Senate in December and in January 1949 it was finally published and came into effect.

Voting in both chambers reflected broad support for the initiative (almost unanimous).[90] In the debate, all parties claimed to have long supported the franchise extension and lauded women's capacities and preparation to participate in politics. In this scenario of no open opposition to reform, the main question is why the approval process took almost four years to be completed. During the debate, the point was brought up by congressmen Julio Durán, a splintered radical opposed to the government, and socialist Astolfo Tapia, both of whom argued that it was the government's prerogative to have accelerated the debate and that the government parties had a majority (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d., 189, 213–14). In fact, the bill only received two urgencies, the first in June 1946, when the government was headed by Interior Minister Alfredo Duhalde,[91] and the second in late 1948, when the bill was finally approved.

I contend three factors impacted the change of the government party to a positive strategic calculation to support women's suffrage. First, the electoral projections based on women's participation in local elections. Second, the creation and consolidation of favorable women's organizations. These two factors shifted strategic motivations from negative in the 1930s and early 1940s, to neutral. But what finally made strategic motivations positive was the third, and most important factor: the anticommunist turn and the political realignment that occurred as consequence.

Regarding the first of these elements, the expectations on women's electoral behavior ceased to be as negative as in the previous decade for the PR. Chile constitutes a particular case

[90] In the Chamber of Deputies there was a single negative vote, of liberal José Miguel Huerta, who claim he would vote against the idea of cutting the debate short and submitting the vote to a vote (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d., 228).
[91] President Juan Antonio Ríos, elected in 1942, fell gravely ill and died in office in late June, 1946.

in which women's expected behavior had empirical referents. Women had been participating in municipal elections since 1935 and doing it with separate electoral registries and polling stations, providing precise information as to which parties women tended to favor. Tables VI.2 and VI.3 show women and men's support to each party and the percentage each gender contributed to their overall results.

Table VI.2. Results of municipal elections by gender, 1935-1941

	1935				1938				1941			
Party	% of W vote	% of M vote	% of party (W)	% of party (M)	% of W vote	% of M vote	% of party (W)	% of party (M)	% of W vote	% of M vote	% of party (W)	% of party (M)
Right												
Conservative	47.3	11.7	34.3	65.7	39.0	19.0	27.2	72.8	25.9	14.4	26.2	73.8
Liberal	18.6	21.1	17.4	83.6	17.2	19.0	14.2	85.8	22.8	18.4	19.7	80.3
Center												
Agrarian	0.7	1.5	10.5	89.5	1.0	2.1	8.0	92.0	0.9	1.2	12.0	88.0
Democrat	3.8	1.5	8.4	91.6	2.8	4.1	11.0	89.0	0.4	0.6	12.4	87.6
Democratic	2.5	6.9	7.9	92.1	1.1	2.7	7.0	93.0	3.1	5.8	9.7	90.3
Radical	12.5	19.9	13.0	87.0	13.8	21.5	10.5	89.5	4.4	31.1	13.4	86.6
Left												
Socialist	0.1	0.2	13.3	86.7	5.1	11.1	7.6	92.4	10.6	15.2	12.2	87.8
Communist	n.d	n.d	n.d	n.d	2.5	6.6	6.5	93.5	n.d	n.d	n.d	n.d
Independent*	13.1	17.2	14.4	84.6	14.9	12.4	17.9	82.1	11.9	13.3	14.9	85.1

* For 1935 and 1941, it includes communists
Source: Maza (1995)

The electoral data indicates that the projections that women would mostly support the Conservative Party proved true as between 1935 and 1947 it was the most voted party among female voters (among men it oscillated between first and fourth). In several elections women's support for the conservatives doubled that of men. And if not necessarily showing the preferences of all women, as participation was low, it indicated that the conservatives had a higher capacity to mobilize women. In the 1940s, women also supported the National Falange

(predecessor of the Christian Democrat Party) in a greater proportion that men, indicating a clear overall preference for Catholic parties. Anticlerical concerns, then, proved true.

Table VI.3. Results of municipal elections by gender, 1944-1947

	1944				1947			
Party	% of W vote	% of M vote	% of party (W)	% of party (M)	% of W vote	% of M vote	% of party (W)	% of party (M)
Right								
Conservative	30.4	18.9	25.7	74.3	30.0	17.8	29.4	70.6
Liberal	16.2	14.0	19.8	80.2	14.0	13.1	20.9	79.1
Center								
Agrarian	0.8	1.2	12.1	87.9	3.9	4.6	17.4	82.6
Democrat	0.4	0.9	8.5	91.5	n.d	n.d	n.d	n.d
Democratic	6.6	9.7	12.7	87.3	3.5	4.8	15.0	85.0
National Falange	4.3	2.9	24.5	75.5	3.5	3.3	20.6	79.4
Radical	20.6	25.6	14.7	85.2	17.0	20.8	16.8	83.2
Left								
Socialist	6.2	9.0	12.9	87.1	8.3	8.8	18.9	81.1
Communist	n.d	n.d	n.d	n.d	11.8	17.7	14.1	85.9
Independent	8.7	8.5	18.0	82.0	3.8	3.5	20.7	79.3

Source: Maza (1995)

The third and fourth columns for each election indicate that women's votes represented a generally small percentage of the overall votes received by a party. For the Conservative Party, female voters led to an increase in their overall vote share, but for the rest of the parties the influence was small and mostly negative. The reason is that female participation was low. Before full enfranchisement in 1949, the largest percentage of registered women among potential voters (literate women over 21) was 14.3% in 1944. In addition, abstention ranged between 15 and 40%. At most, women represented 20% of actual voters (in 1947), which increased to 30% in 1952, the first presidential election women participated in (Maza Valenzuela 1995, 32).

After the initial 1935 municipal election, while still supporting the Conservative Party first, women's votes started to become more similar to men's preferences. For the incumbent Radical Party, I claim this translated into a neutral strategic consideration in the specific issue of future electoral impact of reform. I consider motivation as neutral because even though electoral support for radicals in the 1947 election increased and put them second place among female voters, it was still not positive. In fact, another clue that the PR was still reticent to women's electoral participation is that the government made no effort to accelerate the discussion of the bill and as a consequence, women were not able to participate in the 1949 mid-term legislative elections.[92] So although, the radicals did not have positive calculations as to women's electoral participation, women's voting seized being an important threat, particularly considering their lower rates of registration and turnout. For political scientists López Varas and Gamboa Valenzuela (2015, 130), the "normalization" of women's electoral behavior was the reason women's full enfranchisement came in 1949. Although I agree this is an important factor in the radicals' calculations, it does not explain why the government decided to support the bill in 1948 and not before (or after), as their argument is based on an electoral trend and not the results of a particular election. The democratic deficit argument does allow to explain the specific timing of reform.

The second relevant component of the strategic motivation shift relates to women's organizing described in the previous section. Women's mobilization is the counterpart to the growing electoral support of center and left parties presented in Tables VI.2 and VI.3. In other words, the increasing diversification of women's electoral preferences at the municipal level

[92] The law stated that it would come into effect 120 days after its publication date, which was January 14, 1949. The elections took place on March 6 that same year.

were to a large degree a consequence of the organization of center and leftist women (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986, 48). Radical women in particular had an important role in FECHIF, in addition to the Housewives' Association and the properly partisan organization Radical Women's Assembly. These organizations provided an important counterpart to the political and charitable organizations associated to the right, and in the age of female suffrage they could lead to an increased female electoral participation.[93] But again, this would only make strategic motivations neutral as conservative women continued to be organized and the upper-class bias among voters persisted.

The third, and I argue most central aspect leading to positive strategic motivations, was the anticommunist turn and political realignment led by the government of Gabriel González Videla. This process had two central effects: first, it created a democratic deficit which women's enfranchisement could partly offset, and second, it made women a potential ally in the struggle against communism. Historians Erika Maza and Javiera Errázuriz coincide with my explanation that the specific juncture produced by the Damned Law and the political realignment explain why reform came in 1949. While Errázuriz (2005, 283) highlights the democratic deficit created by the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy, Maza points to the second factor.

As the literature has pointed out, the anticommunist policy and particularly the passing of the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy had as central consequence the weakening of democracy in the country (Huneeus 2009). This law impacted the two dimensions of the Dahlian conception of democracy: it restricted competition by outlawing a political party and it reduced

[93] It was only in 1989 when women first represented a similar percentage of the electorate as they are of the population, slightly over half (López Varas and Gamboa Valenzuela 2015, 125)

the participation component by striking communist from electoral records, denying them their political citizenship.

In the legislative debate on women's suffrage, unsurprisingly, communists were the ones to point out the contradiction between claiming to broaden and strengthen democracy with women's inclusion and the recent outlawing of the communist party.[94] Deputy Cipriano Pontigo stated:

> By sending this bill, the Executive pretends to demonstrate that it wishes to broaden the democratic base of the nation allowing women to participate in popular elections; but in the international context it is known that here freedom has been taken from the people through repressive laws like the Extraordinary Faculties to intervene in the next electoral act in March, that, with a liberticide law, badly called Permanent Defense of Democracy, it aims to perpetuate a regime of oppression and violence, abuses and trampling of rights (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile n.d., 219–20).

When the Law of Permanent Defense was discussed, the issue of it creating a problem for democracy was a point raised not only by communist but by other opponents of the bill, including the Falange, socialists, and social-Christian conservatives (Huneeus 2009). It was therefore clear for the government that it had an open wound in terms of regime legitimacy.

In his speech when the law was promulgated, González Videla placed important emphasis in the aspects related to the construction of a democratic order in Chile and internationally. The president highlighted the role the Chilean delegation (him included) had in the San Francisco conference to include in the UN Charter the explicit mention to equal rights between men and women.[95] In his speech he went on to claim: "We are living hours of

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[94] According to the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy, elected communist representatives could finish their current term.

[95] Speech pronounced during the promulgation ceremony for the political vote of women, Municipal Theatre in Santiago, January 8, 1949. Available at https://www.museohistoricolaserena.gob.cl/633/articles-56777_archivo_01.pdf. Inter-American feminists in fact pushed for this inclusion, against the objection of US and British women (Marino 2019, 6).

uneasiness and anguish for the future of the world and the only way to free ourselves from them is the tireless, abnegated, and of limitless sacrifices action for the improvement of the democratic system".[96] The inclusion of women could contribute to partly overcome the democratic deficit in most straightforward sense of the institutional reform. There was also, however, a more symbolic effect of women as new, pure, and uncontaminated force that would help clean the political debate (Gaviola Artigas et al. 1986).

The second related effect of the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy was the specific threat to democracy that communism posed. The constant reference to democracy had to do not only with a deficit but the attack it was facing from domestic and international communist. In the same speech for the promulgation of the women's suffrage law, González Videla acknowledged that democracies around the globe are not living happy days. And it was up to women to help defend the regime: "going forward, of your performance will depend, to a large degree, the happiness of our people and the preservation and perfecting of our Democracy" (p. 18).

In the words of historian Erika Maza (1995, 46), "in the new political context, the clerical/anticlerical division seemed much less important, and the greater propensity of the women to vote for the Right became an asset to the parties that focused on the Communist threat." In his memoir, González Videla retrospectively attributed women an important role in Allende's fall: "Communism was defeated, deep down, by the war women declared on it, watching over the democratic rights and the future of their children" (González Videla 1975, 1104–5). Probably referring to the anti-Allende protests led by women (Power 2002), González Videla assigns women a predominant role in the anticommunist struggle. And in fact, in the

[96] Ibid, p. 10.

decades that followed their full enfranchisement, women were often targeted as protectors of the nation against the communist threat, discourse that peaked in the 1964 "terror campaign" (Casals 2016; Power 2002).

Summing up, the case of late reform in Chile is one where cleavage realignment constitutes the main explanatory factor. In terms of mechanisms, as a country governed by the center-left that had neutral/positive motivations, strategic considerations are the key aspect to evaluate. In concrete, I have argued that the anticommunist turn of the government led by radical Gabriel González Videla – giving origin to a new political cleavage – led to strategic considerations becoming positive for the incumbent. Unlike existing explanations focused on the strength of the women's movement and this argument allows to explain the precise timing of reform. The repression of communists started in 1947 and was consolidated in late 1948 with the dictation of the Law of Permanent Defense. Only in this context, given the democratic deficit generated by the Damned Law and the need to secure allies in the fight against communist, does the approval of women's suffrage in December 1948 make full sense. This argument also allows to adjudicate between competing explanations posed by existing work on Chile, which unlike other cases included in this dissertation, has a more abundant and elaborated secondary literature.

2 Electoral coalition building and Peru's late suffrage reform

Women's enfranchisement in Peru took place in 1955, toward the end of the dictatorial government of Manuel Odría's, and it was implemented for the first time in the 1956 general elections. This date of reform made Peru the second to last country in Latin America to allow women the right to vote, with Paraguay being the last (Honduras and Nicaragua passed the reform earlier in 1955). Despite of being at the backend of the issue in the region, women's

suffrage did not figure prominently in the public agenda: Odria had not expressed any concern or interest in the issue in his speeches nor was there a visible demand from women's organizations, which had weakened with respect to the debate of 1931.

Peru's party system remained weak throughout the period, with the only most important organization being APRA. Without important parties on the right and center of the political spectrum, we cannot talk about a clear political realignment similar to what occurred in Chile. Without changes resulting from political cleavages, the cause of women's enfranchisement lies elsewhere. I claim that women's enfranchisement was used by Odría to include women in a new coalition when planning his reelection. The need for new voters emerged when Odría's political ambition challenged the sectors of the oligarchy that had initially supported him and led to their break. Women's enfranchise, then followed the contingent path followed to reform, based on the incumbent's electoral need.

2.1 Lack of political realignment

Peru did not go through a cleavage-based realignment during the period under analysis. From 1945 until suffrage reform, the late reform period, there were two different governments in Peru: the administration led by moderate independent José Luis Bustamante y Rivero (1945-1948), who was elected with support from and initially governed with APRA, and the dictatorship of Manuel Odría (1948-1956) that was a response to APRA's social mobilization and an insurrection attempt in 1948. What occurred during 1945-1956 period was the alternation between two coalitions that could still be defined as part of the oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage.

Unlike the case of Chile, where the shift in middle-class parties from a predominant anti-oligarchic position to an anti-communist one, no such reformist party existed in Peru before the 1960s. Bustamante was a reformist, but he did not have a political party; he was an independent with no significant political experience. Once his National Democratic Front coalition broke down, that space he occupied in the political center was left empty. On the other hand, the radical option of social transformation associated to the communist/anti-communist cleavage did not take hold during this period in Peru. The Peruvian Communist Party was never strong politically and lost the capacity to conduct labor to APRA (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002). And while APRA had represented the revolutionary path in its origins, it also included a moderate middle-class sector, more so during the 1940s and 1950s when it went through an ideological shift, moderating its combative nature. This shift was largely a pragmatic strategy to avoid being put outside the law again (Cotler 2005) and it culminated in 1963 when APRA allied with Odría's party, even after Odría's regime had made of persecuting *aprismo* a key objective.

APRA's moderation was expressed in Haya's discourse and alliances, but most importantly during the Bustamante years, when the had an important participation in the state, both in the executive and in congress, where they became the largest party with 45% of seats in the lower chamber (the National Democratic Front, coalition behind Bustamante's election, had 55% of seats in total). From this position they did not pursue any policies that would threaten the elites or foreign interests, avoiding nationalizations, land reform, and keeping existing fiscal and monetary policies (Klarén 2004, 356).

This moderation at the policy level was accompanied, however, by social mobilization and at times an insurrectional strategy. This insurrectional component – which after a failed coup in October 1948 led to APRA being put outside the law again and three weeks later prompted

Odría's military intervention – could be considered a sign that APRA was still mostly a revolutionary party. However, because the party leadership and specifically Haya de la Torre were not committed to this strategy, it was a path that did not have the possibility of success. Haya de la Torre had an ambiguous position toward an armed insurrection, at times instigating it knowing that the confrontational aspect that it was an important identity component for large sectors of the party's bases, but later withdrawing his support (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002; Manrique 2009). 1948 was the last important insurrection attempt from APRA.

The coup led by Odría was supported by the opposition to APRA, led by exporting interests within the traditional oligarchy. Through repression, this coalition sought to disarticulate social mobilization promoted by APRA and implement a new phase of capitalist development privileging foreign interests. Repression also targeted communists and in the context of the cold war anticommunism was an important rhetoric in Odría's discourse as part of a strategy to align with the US (Romero Sommer 2013). This anticommunist element would also come up in the debate on women's enfranchisement. However, for the two key reason's mentioned – first, that APRA was the main threat and party moderation made it so that it could not longed be placed in the social revolutionary camp, and second, the were not reformist middle-class parties that joined anticommunist – I do not consider Odría's regime to represent a political realignment.

I have claimed that there was no important change in political coalitions during the late period reform to set the stage to the contingent path to reform. Next section looks at women's organization where I show that weak women's organizing led to very limited influence in the process of reform and in altering political actors' strategic calculations.

2.2 Weaker women's mobilization

In the almost two and a half decades spanning from the 1931 failed attempt at reform discussed in the previous chapter and the final reform of 1955, women's mobilization and organizing maintained similar characteristics. In most of Latin America, the 1940s was the decade were the women's movement peaked in strength. In Peru, the characteristics of suffragist mobilization – small, divided, and highly dependent on individual figures – remained in place. And no other significant forms of female mobilization came to replace this deficit.

A couple of new suffragist organizations did emerge in this period. One was the National Committee for Women's Civil and Political Rights, which although founded in 1934, only gained some notoriety in the decade after. The organization attempted to revitalize the suffrage debate in 1941, when they managed to introduce a bill through congressman Dante Castagnola. The bill did not have the necessary votes to move on to debate (Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social 2009). In 1954, the Committee introduced a new petition to congress to debate the issue of women's suffrage, petition that was signed by 305 women (Poulsen 2014), a small group in absolute terms and compared to the initiative of similar organizations in other countries in the region.

A second new organization was founded in 1953. Called *Asociación de Abogadas Trujillanas* [Trujillo's Female Lawyers Association], they too presented a memo to Congress, arguing that in a democracy there can be no distinctions based on sex or race and that as a member of the United Nations, Peru needed to abide by the recommendation of recognizing equal rights to women (Poulsen 2014).

Both of these organizations were characterized by their small number of adherents. At the same time, they reflected some changes in the status of women as the members of the

organizations were largely professional women. This is obvious in the case of the Female Lawyer's Association, but it is also the case of the Committee. In the aforementioned petition to Congress, many of the signers wrote their name next to their professional degree (Poulsen 2014). This represents a difference with respect to the membership of the organizations of the 1920s and 1930s where upper-class women had a higher participation and those from the middle class were mostly teachers. The change is a reflection of the increasing access of women to higher education. However, these organizations were still small, as was female access to professional degrees;[97] they also failed at making important male allies. While some congressmen supported enfranchisement women and sometimes introduced bills in this direction, these were isolated cases. There were no formal or informal alliances with any of the presidents or with party leaders of the period.

Furthermore, female activists acknowledged the lack of mobilization. When asked what effect the suffrage reform had on women, Teolinda Camuso, a leader within APRA, claimed "At the beginning it has been a surprise, because it did not come from a struggle" (Martin 1956, 76). Nina Flores, who participated in several women's organizations and that in 1945 campaigned for Bustamante (*El Regional de Piura,* September 8, 2015), gave credit to Odría for the reform: "Worthier and more humane General Odría's gesture, because (…) he averts our women from being made instrument of the professional agitators, dragging them to the streets to solicitate a right" (*La Nación,* November 3, 1954).

After suffrage reform was approved in congress, a Civic Feminine Movement was formed with the purpose of educating women to exercise their voting rights (*El Comercio,*

[97] As point of reference, in 1940 the number of women with university education, albeit small in both countries, was three times larger in Chile than in Peru (15,045 and 5,517 respectively), even though Chile's total population was smaller).

September 5 and 8, 1955). One of its members, an educator, mentioned that she did not have time to participate in the debates and campaigns for equal political rights, but when the president sent the bill, understood its importance. She also mentioned that taking care of the home was women's primary mission, and part of this mission is expressing her political opinion (*La Prensa,* September 5, 1955). The conservative character of the organization again indicates some of the limits of Peruvian feminism.

The main feminists discussed in the previous chapter were still in the scene in the following decades. After the campaign she conducted to get the constitutional congress to include women's suffrage in the new constitution, in late 1932 Zoila Cáceres, the main suffragist of the time, moved to Europe. In the four years she was out of the country, her organization, Peruvian Feminism, was dormant. In the context of the 1938 Conference of the Pan-American Union (PAU), carried out in Lima, Cáceres reactivated the struggle for suffrage. Cáceres was the Peruvian delegate to the Inter-American Commission of Women,[98] and used the context of the Conference to petition both the Peruvian delegation and the PAU to grant women suffrage (Towns 2010a). This time, Peruvian Feminism managed to gather 5,000 signatures to press the delegates (Cáceres 1946). This number of signers represents an unprecedented quantity in the Peruvian context. However, only a handful were activists and actually involved in the campaign. Again, they did not succeed in their goal. This was Cáceres last major involvement in suffrage campaigns.

The other important feminist of the early twentieth century, María Jesús Alvarado, also maintained some sporadic activity. After she was sent into exile in 1923, her organization

[98] The Inter-American Commission of Women, created in 1928, was the first international organization mandated to advocate for women's rights. It is part of the Inter-American system of states, at the time the Pan-American Union, now the Organization of American States (OAS) (Towns 2010a).

Feminine Evolution (EF) was mostly under the radar. It is only in the mid 1940s when there is evidence of Alvarado lobbying Congress when the compulsory character of the female municipal vote was being debated and when a new bill for full suffrage rights was introduced. In September 1945, Alvarado's organization made an attempt to revive the debate on suffrage after senators José Antonio Encinas (married to a member of Peruvian Feminism, Edelmira Del Pando) and Emilio Romero introduced a bill with that purpose.[99] To this end, they met with the Senate's Constitution Committee (*El Comercio,* September 7, 1945). The bill, however, remained stagnant (Poulsen 2014).

Finally, the case of Magda Portal is a case where the activism took place mostly within a party. After having supported the official position of APRA in the 1931 debate – enfranchisement only for working women – Portal had the expectation that the party would come to support women's enfranchisement. After returning from her exile in Chile in 1945, where she was linked to the Socialist Party and collaborated with women's groups, she took the position of general secretary for feminine training within APRA. In this role, she travelled all over the country, making propaganda for the party (Reedy 2000). And she openly defended women's participation in all aspects of national life (*La Tribuna,* May 26, 1945).

Her defense of women's political participation would take her into open confrontation with Haya de la Torre, who controlled the party. In the 1945 First National Congress of Aprista Women, presided by Portal, Haya de la Torre gave a speech referring to women's primary role as being in the home (García-Bryce 2014). Three years later, in the Second Aprista Party Congress, Haya de la Torre refused to support Portal's request that women be allowed to vote within the

[99] A bill to enfranchise women was introduced in 1945 by senators José Antonio Encinas, a left-leaning independent, and Emilio Romero, also independent. In the constitutional congress of 1931, Romero, as part of the Decentralist Party, was opposed to women's enfranchisement (Aguilar Gil 2002).

party. The APRA leader argued that women could not vote in national elections and as such could not be true members of the party, only sympathizers. The revised party manifesto that emerged from this Congress was discussed among ideological divisions between revolutionaries (Portal among them) and more moderate currents (represented by Haya de la Torre). The manifesto included the female franchise only for women over twenty-five years old, when as for men the age was eighteen. Portal protested what she considered the betrayal of the APRA's original principles, which led her to finally leaving the party and politics more generally.

The case of Portal reflects some of the difficulties of working within a political party. And as APRA was the only real party organization at the time, the partisan route to influence legislators it seemed largely closed off.

In a similar vein to Sánchez Cerro, a final form of female mobilization came from popular sectors. Sánchez Cerro and Odría shared a number of characteristics in this sense: both were military, and although (initially) supported by sectors of the oligarchy, they sought to build a base of support among the urban poor, particularly in Lima, to counteract APRA's strong appeal. Odría's wife, María Delgado, played an important role in these pro-poor initiatives, in an attempt to emulate the role played by Evita Perón in Argentina (D. Collier 1976). Another similarity with Sánchez Cerro was that the relationship with the urban poor was of a paternalistic and informal nature, and that the creation of a political party served mainly as a vehicle for the leader.

The assistentialist actions of Odría's wife likely had the particular goal of appealing to women, showing the feminine face of the regime (Poulsen 2014, 123). The topic, however, has been scarcely studied and there is not much direct evidence of a specific gendered approach to

social assistance. The incorporation of the urban sector focused on the new migrants form the countryside and had a territorial nature more than any other character.

The nascent Restauration Party launched by Odría made multiple appeals to women in its publications and had a feminine section. These efforts, however, concentrated in late 1955 and 1956, after the female franchise was approved in the legislature. In other words, there is evidence the regime attempted to organize women and obtain electoral profits from their political participation. There is no evidence, however, that women mobilized significantly *before* reform and that such mobilization pushed the regime to expand voting rights to women. As such, Odría's potential gains from including new voters came from his incumbent character and the mobilization organized from above and not in response to organizing from below.

In sum, independent women's organization did not have an important role in the process of their enfranchisement. The weakness of mobilization did not provoke an important debate and the question of women's suffrage remained a secondary political issue. On the other hand, the lack of mobilization did not provide political actors with incentives to enfranchise women as it meant there were no shortcuts to mobilizing these new voters and their organization would have to be carried out by parties. This is precisely what Odría would attempt.

2.3 Coalition building under an authoritarian regime

The lack of a cleavage-based political realignment after the immediate postwar explains why women's enfranchisement did not take place in the reformist period of the Bustamante-led government, as strategic and normative motivations remained unaligned for APRA. This section first analyzes the 1945-1948 period and then focuses on reform under Odría, placing attention in his efforts to build his own base of political support after breaking with the commercial elite that

had supported the coup that led him to power. In this sense, Odría's support for reform was guided by strategic motivations stemming from short-term political factors.

The Bustamante administration seemed a propitious time for suffrage reform. APRA had recently been legalized meaning that the 1945 elections were the first democratic ones since 1931, in a "climate of freedom absolutely unprecedented in Peruvian history" (Cotler 2005, 238). Also for the first time the winner was a coalition – the National Democratic Front of APRA and Bustamante – that promised deep social and economic reform as well as democratization of the country. Moreover, the coalition won a majority of 55% in congress, with APRA being the largest party with 45% of seats. Finally, this domestic democratic spirit concurred with the global democratic spring of the end of the WWII.

Auspicious days, however, were short. Conflict between APRA and Bustamente soon arose with more experienced politician Haya de la Torre winning the upper hand, blocking Bustamante's proposals and introducing his own legislative program. According to Peter Klarén, despite these conditions, APRA maintained a moderate policy course and Peru lost a crucial opportunity of implementing deeper reforms. Importantly, there was no effort to broaden the electorate by including women and/or illiterates (Klarén 2004, 356).

As discussed in chapter IV, APRA exhibited contradictory motivations toward women's enfranchisement. Women were included early in the party in a feminine section and they were influential in the crafting of the first party program, showing a normative commitment with women's political participation. When it came to vote in the 1931 debate, however, APRA supported a restricted franchise for working and educated women, fearing that full voting rights would lead to support for the oligarchy. A decade and a half later, the prospects of APRA supporting suffrage reform looked even gloomier.

I claim that normative motivations of APRA changed from positive to neutral. The central reason for this shift lays in the evolution of the party. While the 1931 debate took place near its founding, when the party had a strong revolutionary character, by 1945 APRA and Haya de la Torre in particular had taken an ideological turn and moderated some key components of its platform, such as its anti-imperialism (Manrique 2009). As the moderate faction within the party took hold, its leaders were open to disregard some of the more progressive components of the party platform. Women's suffrage was one of those issues.

As discussed in the previous section, Haya de la Torre and the party leadership refused to support women's suffrage. First, during the National Convention of Aprista Women in 1945 by highlighting women's traditional roles and not mentioning her rights, and then during the Second National Congress of the party in 1948, when the party platform only included suffrage for women over 25 years old (Reedy 2000). Thus, between the first and second national congresses, APRA recoiled in its support for women's suffrage, which ultimately led to Magda Portal's departure of the party. I consider this shift in normative commitments a result of the increased personalization. Haya de la Torre was never personally a supporter of women's rights, but while in 1931 accepted a collective building of the APRA project, in 1945 this collaboration had drastically reduced.

Since there was no debate on women's enfranchisement during this period – only one bill introduced in Congress in 1945 by two independent senators, which did not reach the debate stage – it is harder to know the calculations made by the Bustamante/APRA government. APRA had two non-exclusive strategies available to secure a political base: cultivate support from its existing working- and middle-classes voters through state policies, and mobilize and incorporate disenfranchised groups. APRA opted for the first. For labor, there was an increase in collective

bargaining, better working conditions, union recognition, and control of cost of living while for the middle-class there were generous salary increments for public employees and the penetration of the state bureaucracy to distribute patronage and create *aprista* cells (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002, 322–23; Klarén 2004, 356–57). According to Ruth and David Collier, these efforts were aimed at winning the partisan competition with the Communist Party to control labor.

APRA did not substantially mobilize peasants, one important disenfranchised group (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002). With respect to women, Bustamente claimed that APRA's mobilization efforts during these years did include young girls in school age and in the neighborhoods. For Bustamante, this mobilization was in sight of the exercise of the municipal franchise, which ended up not taking place (Bustamante y Rivero 1949, 58).[100] It is unclear, however, why the mobilization of young women would be a good target for municipal elections if voting age was 21 and less clear why the party proposed 25 as age for full enfranchisement. Although strategic calculations are unclear given the lack of discussion and of women's mobilization, it is likely than APRA felt it would take the party larger efforts to mobilize women as compared to candidates from the oligarchy.

Odría, on the other hand, would combine strategies of providing policy benefits to existing voters and enfranchising new ones to build his electoral coalition. General Manuel Odría first came to power through a coup in 1948, as a response to a political and economic crisis; his main tasks – for which he had support of the oligarchy – were stabilizing the economy and imposing order. The latter translated into widespread repression through a *Ley de Seguridad*

[100] During the administration there was a discussion about dictating a new law of municipal elections, which would have meant implementing the female franchise established in the constitution of 1933. According to the constitution, women over 21 years old or married and mothers before that age could vote in local elections. But the law that would regulate these elections was not dictated until 1963, meaning women's suffrage remained a dead letter.

Interior (Internal Security Law), with suspension of constitutional guarantees. The APRA was the main target of these actions, seeing its members imprisoned or exiled, and together with the Communist Party, was once again declared illegal. On the economic front, the regime promoted foreign investments through a new Mining Code, and new regulation in oil production and electricity (Cotler 2005). Odría also benefited from favorable international conditions, which aided in the economic recovery. Having achieved the goals that led him to power early on, elections were called in 1950 to return to a constitutional regime.

In the 1950 elections, Odría ended up competing as an only candidate for the presidency after denying the inscription of other potential candidates and imprisoning his only opponent. For Congress some independent lists managed to register, forming a small opposition, but Odría controlled both chambers, managing to pass all of his proposed legislation. As such, the legislature acted as an additional branch of the executive (Letts Benavides 2015).

Odría's intentions to remain in power, first by participating in the 1950 election and later by showing intentions of repeating in 1956, translated into a growing opposition from the actors that had supported the 1948 coup. The first sector to defect from his coalition in 1950 was the commercial oligarchy led by Pedro Beltrán, who himself had the intention to run for president in 1950 (Letts Benavides 2015). Middle class professionals and part of the provincial elites also became part of the opposition, and particularly as the 1956 elections approached, joined around a democratic agenda. Overall, Odría gained a degree of autonomy from the oligarchy that he did not have after the coup (Cotler, 2005), but that also meant a relative weakness as he could no longer rely on those votes in a competitive election.

Odría did not explicitly state his intentions of running for re-election political observers of the time estimated he would pursue a reform of the constitution to be able to legally run, as the

constitution did not allow reelection.[101] Nonetheless, a number of actions pointed in the direction of a reelection bid. First, he made efforts to communicate to the oligarchy the regime's economic success and the importance of political continuity. Second, social policy was used to organize supporters, adopting a paternalistic approach and in cases conditioning benefits to political support. And third, in 1955 he started the process of founding his political party, *Partido Restaurador* (Restorer Party), using the state apparatus for collecting signatures (Letts Benavides 2015). Even though the political circumstances and the pressure for democratization led Odría to not run for reelection and giving up power after the 1956 election, it was in this context that the bill to enfranchise women was introduced.

The paternalistic approach to social policy from Odría's government, although still largely understudied, is a better-known component of his political strategy. As David Collier analyzed, one important mechanism was urban settlement policy, particularly by an informal incorporation strategy of allowing and even promoting squatter settlements in Lima by the growing internal migrant population (D. Collier 1976). By not legalizing the occupation of the land, Odría maintained the dependency linkages with the urban poor, an actor that had no previous political linkages, unlike labor, who was largely dominated by the APRA (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002). Odría'a lenient policy toward settlements was in exchange for political support in demonstrations and later there was an explicit requirement of joining his party (Collier 1976).

Another paternalistic tool was his labor policy and the use of charity to help the poor. Odría's wife, María Delgado, played a key role in latter area, attempting to emulate Evita Perón

[101] This common view has even made it into fiction in Mario Vargas Llosa's famous novel *Conversation in the Cathedral* (p. 430), that is set during the Odría dictatorship.

in Argentina. Highlighting her humble social origins, charity was channeled through the María Delgado de Odría Center for Social Assistance established in 1951, showing how the efforts were highly personalized. The regime made important efforts to highlight these actions through the press and with special publications (D. Collier 1976; Guerra 1995).

Party building efforts also point to an interest in including women among the *odriísta* constituency. The party had a Feminine Section, whose national secretary, Irene Silva de Santolalla, would go on to be the first women elected to the Senate in 1956 (*En Marcha,* February 29, 1956). The party also had a publication, On March (*En Marcha*), which included in every number a section dedicated to the Peruvian woman and politics.[102] In the section dedicated to women there were speeches published, news on the upcoming elections, calls for women to register in the party, and general references to the party's program including protection to the family, defense of Catholic faith and democracy. Importantly, there were multiple references to Odría as the one who had granted women the franchise: "The Restorer Party of Peru has incorporated you to your homeland's political life giving you citizenship rights and dignifying you as mother, wife, professional, and worker. Do not forget it" (*En Marcha,* February 24, 1956). This appeal to enfranchisement as an accomplishment of the regime is in line with what likely was Odría's strategic calculation.

Based on this evidence, women's suffrage can be understood as an additional tool in the incumbent's process of building electoral support and it has been interpreted in such way (Aguilar Gil 2003; Letts Benavides 2015).[103] A competing explanation states that women's

[102] Archive of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru, Manuel A. Odría Collection (PUCP-Odría), code O 36.0022ff.

[103] A similar strategy of incorporating previously disenfranchised groups seems to have been in mind when Odría ran for the presidency in 1962 and included voting rights for illiterates in his platform. PUCP-Odría, code R 44.0088

enfranchisement must be understood as part of Odría's efforts to build a reputation as democratizer (Poulsen 2014). Although not incompatible, the timing of reform, so close to the 1956 elections, lends greater support to the first explanation. Opponents of the government likewise saw in the upcoming election the reason to push for reform as an opportunistic measure.[104] When we consider the lack of normative commitment previously shown by the regime, suffrage reform seems more clearly guided by short-term political factors.

Until 1954, Odria had not expressed a concern for women's political exclusion. The issue was never mentioned in any of his speeches when he assumed power or later, nor in his 1950 presidential campaign.[105] In 1950, when he was head of the military government that organized the elections, a new electoral statute was dictated in which women remained excluded. And when in 1953 two different bills were introduced by deputies Francisco Pastor and Luis Osores Villacorta, the government did not support their debate. But in late 1954, in the yearly speech that commemorated the revolution that had brought him to power (October 27), Odría declared that there was no reason to maintain the exclusion of women, announcing the introduction of a bill to reform the constitution and recognized women equal political rights. Women's rights were absent from his platform, nonetheless, unlike APRA there is no evidence of a negative view on women's participation. As such, I consider normative motivations to be neutral, and when combined with a positive strategic motivation coming from the need to build a base of political support independent from the oligarchy, the conditions were propitious for women's enfranchisement.

[104] Socialist deputy Cáceres Cherres (Congreso de la República, n.d., 85)
[105] PUCP-Odría.

In the legislative discussion of 1954-1955 there was a strong consensus in favor of the reform, and most concerns, at least those openly expressed, had to do with the procedure for implementing the reform and including a big group of new voters. Peru was one the few countries in the region that had yet to enfranchise women and at a time when women had conquered new roles in the public sphere, congressmen and the press showed a favorable position toward the female vote. "Today, mister President, it is very easy to treat this problem, because nobody is against it. It has imposed itself" (Congreso de la República, n.d., 62). Some legislators even dismissed the debate saying "we did not discuss the convenience of giving women the vote; to us the problem was this: whether it was timely, whether it was convenient in this moment to grant the vote" (Congreso de la República, n.d., 62). Reasons to support reform that were mentioned by Odría's coalition often referenced international agreements and recommendations, as well as this being a sign of the democratizing character of the government and its revolution. Only a small opposition of socialist representatives questioned the motivations of the executive, stating that unlike them, who were acting on principle having included equal political rights in their platform since 1930, Odría had not shown any concern with the issue (Congreso de la República, n.d., 85).

Processing of the bill was quick, contrasting with the case of Chile. The executive introduced the project in October 1954, being approved by both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in November that same year. Given that this was a constitutional reform, it required the approval in two consecutive legislative years. As such, it was voted and approved again in the Chamber and Senate in August and September 1955, respectively. The necessary decrees specifying the documents women would need to present were also dictated promptly, so women began registering in September 1955, the same month the law was published (*La Nación*,

September 21, 1955). The celerity can be attributed to government action as some actors were reticent to implement the female franchise so quickly, as expressed by the newspaper *El Comercio* which represented traditional elites (*El Comercio,* September 4, 1955).

All existing parties attempted to organize and attract female voters. For example, in December 1955, the Pradista Democratic Movement was formed by women to support the candidacy of Manuel Prado, who would go on to win the 1956 elections.[106] As discussed, Odria's Restorer Party seems to have been particularly active on this front, despite not having a strong successor presidential candidate. The party made calls for women to participate in the elections and in the party, using a conservative platform. One common strategy was the reference to Odria as the one who had accomplished women's political incorporation.

Table VI.4. 1962 presidential election results

Department	Haya	Belaunde	Odría	Registered voters	Female literacy
Amazonas	48.51	16.66	32.19	26,045	0.43
Ancash	44.38	32.34	17.72	100,042	0.34
Apurimarac	45.73	40.12	11.16	21,740	0.11
Arequipa	14.53	41.31	31.46	115,384	0.64
Ayacucho	33.04	39.92	22.68	42,262	0.15
Cajamarca	56.72	15.53	22.99	112,087	0.28
Callao	24.98	26.76	43.52	80,887	0.90
Cusco	20.83	54.14	15.46	66,049	0.20
Huancavelica	30.58	41.77	22.40	34,816	0.16
Huanuco	41.45	25.23	26.71	47,377	0.29
Ica	47.69	31.89	15.32	78,082	0.79
Junin	23.34	42.09	23.97	121,122	0.44
La Libertad	74.33	14.10	9.18	131,510	0.51
Lambayeque	63.49	20.55	13.14	74,208	0.63
Lima	25.52	32.32	36.46	791,663	0.85
Loreto	27.29	44.55	24.26	62,751	0.58
Madre de Dios	35.15	45.91	16.24	4,496	0.57
Moquegua	18.31	52.11	26.41	16,030	0.48
Pasco	57.44	28.45	13.14	23,844	0.32

[106] PUCP-Odría, code O 36.0012.

Piura	22.31	21.51	40.55	127,926	0.47
Puno	11.67	65.88	15.12	69,189	0.17
San Martin	48.33	32.37	18.08	39,477	0.62
Tacna	11.39	29.42	57.07	20,041	0.63
Tumbes	29.29	28.02	27.33	15,898	0.74
National	32.98	31.13	28.44	2,222,926	0.48

Sources: Electoral results from Tuesta (2011), registered voters from Roncagliolo (1980), and female literacy, own calculation based on 1961 census data (República del Perú 1966).

Odría did not run in 1956 but he did so in the next election in 1962, which we can used to evaluate the success of his strategy of building a coalition from the government and receiving the support of women. The results are displayed in Table VI.4. Registration and electoral results are not disaggregated by sex, so I use female literacy rate as proxy, as this remained a requirement for suffrage. The general presidential election results were very close, with Haya de la Torre receiving 32.98% of the vote, reformist candidate Fernando Belaúnde Terry 32.13%, and Odría coming in third with 28.44 (Klarén 2004, 389).[107]

Odría was the first majority in only four of the 24 departments – Callao, Lima, Piura, and Tacna – but those four departments grouped 46% of registered voters and included the capital. More significantly, Odría won in the two departments with the highest female literacy (Callao with 90% and Lima with 85% when the national average was 48%). From this data we can presume that Callao and particularly Lima had a larger proportion of female voters who may have contributed to Odría's electoral success. The victory in Lima, where informal settlements were concentrated, also indicates that his approach to the urban poor proved successful.

[107] The constitution required the president to be elected with 33% of preferences; otherwise it was up to congress to elected between the main candidates. APRA, who had the first majority in congress, made an agreement with Odría to get the latter elected with an aprista vice-president. This agreement prompted a military intervention and the annulment of elections, which were repeated in 1963. This time around, Belaúnde was elected, defeating Haya de la Torre and Odría.

If we consider all departments in the analysis, there is fact a correlation of 0.42 between female literacy and Odría's vote share (statistically significant at the 0.05 level), indicating that higher female literacy (and more female voters) is correlated with a higher vote share. This relationship is graphically represented in Figure VI.1. While literacy can also be a proxy for social class, however, I believe it can be a good indicator of women's electoral participation for two reasons: first, literacy was a stronger predictor of the urban-rural divide than of class, and second, the class base of each candidate was unclear. Although Odría represented the political right, his called himself a "right-wing socialist," it was in fact Haya de la Torre who was backed by important figures of the oligarchy such as Pedro Beltrán and outgoing president Manuel Prado.

Figure VI.1. Relationship between female literacy and Odría's vote share in 1962, by province



Peru's late women enfranchisement occurred in a context when the incumbent, dictator Manuel Odría, was in electoral need. The coalition that had initially supported his authoritarian regime broke down and Odría lost the support of the elite. To have his own political based, the regime used the state apparatus to build loyalty by way of clientelistic relations with the urban poor, to build a party, and to incorporate women as voters. Added to the lack of a significant political realignment during the period, I consider this to be a case where reform took place based on contingent factors that altered strategic motivations.

3 Conclusions

Late reform in Chile and Peru was guided by strategic motivations of incumbents. In Chile, a positive strategic calculation emerged after the government of Gabriel González Videla began persecuting the Communist Party, leading to a rearrangement of political alliances stemming from existing cleavages. After this turn, lacking in democratic credentials and after organizing women in base organizations using the state apparatus, the government supported reform. In Peru, there was no significant political realignment. Reform took place as a tool used by dictator Manuel Odría to secure a base of support, after losing the backing from the oligarchy. Similar to Chile, Odría also used the state apparatus to organize his supporters. In the end, reform was led by short-term political factors.

Much of the literature states that the global wave of enfranchisement after the end of WWII was a result of changing norms and a contagion effect with the tacit implication that further theorizing is unnecessary (Towns 2010b; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997). Following this logic, late reform should be guided by normative views and the strategic motivation to be part of the group of "civilized nations." Interestingly, the cases of Chile and

Peru indicate otherwise. Although decreased normative opposition was a necessary requirement for reform to occur, enfranchisement only took place when domestic political conditions created the incentives for incumbents to pushed for reform.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This concluding chapter begins by summarizing the main arguments and findings of the dissertation and how they contribute to existing research. It then discusses the generalizability of the argument by exploring women's suffrage beyond Latin America and reform in other policy issues. A final section of the chapter considers implications of the argument on the timing of women's suffrage for female political participation as a future area of research.

1 Summarizing the findings

This dissertation proposes a theory to explain the timing of women's suffrage in Latin America and a test for the cases of Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. The theory states that to understand reform, we must analyze strategic and normative motivations of decision-makers. Only when these two types of motivations align will reform take place. The motivation alignment argument theorizes on a notion – that both ideology and strategy matter – common in historiographical case studies, but practically absent from political science explanations of electoral reform.

The second central component of the theory is that to understand motivations we must consider how cleavages are politicized and reflected in the party system and political coalitions. Specific historical configurations of political competition explain when motivations align or misalign. In some cases, however, short-term political factors more directly explain strategic motivations, introducing a contingent path to suffrage reform.

Case studies presented in previous chapters confirm the centrality of the motivation alignment argument. Table VII.1 locates the cases of failed and successful reform in the four

countries, according to guiding actors' motivations (based on Table II.2). For locating the cases I consider the incumbent/majority party, or the party that was key to reform success in a multiparty system. As the table indicates, and contrary to dominating strategic arguments, normative motivations are central to explaining a majority of cases. Positive beliefs on women's suffrage account for early reform in Uruguay and Ecuador as well as the municipal franchise in Chile. Negative beliefs, on the other hand, are key to explain failed reform in Peru. Late reform in Chile and Peru, as well as failed early reform in Chile and the post-enfranchisement debate in Ecuador are explained by strategic concerns, more in line with the literature.

Table VII.1. Cases studies and motivations

		Ideas favorable		
		Yes	**Neutral**	**No**
Strategic calculus favorable	**Yes**	Yes (Chile 1949)	Yes (Peru 1955)	No (Peru 1931)
	Neutral	Yes (Uruguay 1932/Ecuador 1896, 1929/Chile muni)	No	No (Uruguay 1916)
	No	No (Early Chile/Ecuador 1938)	No	No

Focusing on the timing of reform, as mentioned in chapter VI, that early reform was guided by normative beliefs while late reform by strategic ones is an intriguing finding in light of extant research. The fact that women's enfranchisement concentrated in the postwar era has been seen as the result of changing norms and influence of international actors (Paxton, Hughes, and

Green 2006; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Towns 2010b). The cases of Chile and Peru, on the other hand, point to domestic causes of enfranchisement. And while changing global norms were important to reduce normative opposition to women's suffrage, the ultimate driver of reform were strategic concerns.

In terms of causes of motivations, five of the six cases were propelled by the cleavage structure. In the early period, the two failed cases had a clear oligarchic/anti-oligarchic cleavage along which political competition was organized. Each side of the cleavage had defined positions on suffrage, usually marked by internal contradictions as predicted by the misalignment argument. In the cases of early reform, the cleavage is also central to understand reform. In Uruguay, it was the weak cleavage and small distance between the two dominant parties which produced no clear strategic calculations. In Ecuador, it was the low politicization of suffrage reform that initially put strategic calculations in a secondary place. As women began participating and the issue was politicized, positions on suffrage along cleavage lines became clear. Finally, among late enfranchisers, Chile's reform is explained by the change in how the cleavage translated into political coalitions. The Radical Party shifted from an anti-oligarchic position to an anticommunist one, change that provided the incentives to support enfranchisement.

Peru is the only case of reform guided by short-term political factors. In specific, it was the need of the authoritarian leader Odría to build a support coalition for the upcoming elections, as he had reached power through a coup. For that purpose, he used clientelism and women's suffrage to engage the urban poor and women to back him. Ecuador is also a case where a short-term factor as the actions of a single feminist triggered the ratification of women's political rights. However, this action on its own does not explain reform, as the previous 1896 decision to

remove women's explicit exclusion was a necessary previous step. The actions of feminist activists, then can be an important trigger but insufficient on their own.

The above links to an additional finding from the case studies related to women's mobilization. This research has claimed that all forms of women's mobilization must be considered in attending how politicians form their strategic calculations. Moreover, women's organization in defense of the Catholic Church and support for right-wing candidates played a central role in explaining anticlerical opposition to suffrage. As such, this dissertation moves beyond the focus on suffragist mobilization. Nonetheless, the case studies do find that suffragist mobilization was fundamental for the politicization of the issue and its continued presence in the political and legislative agenda. The cases of Chile and Uruguay, with strong movements, were ones that saw multiple initiatives presented before the legislature and debates outside of it. Ecuador and Peru, countries with very weak suffragist mobilization were also cases where suffrage reform remained a low priority political issue and outside the interest of male elites.

Overall, the theory developed in this dissertation and the case studies provide important evidence against dominant explanations that electoral reforms are guided by strategic considerations. Ideas about inclusion, equality, and gender roles are not a residual causal factor but central to understanding the timing of reform, as Table VII.1 shows. As such, this dissertation makes a significant contribution to the literature on suffrage reform.

It is worth spending a few lines discussing how the theory in this dissertation differs from Teele's (2018) work, a recent book that represents a central contribution to the comparative analysis of women's suffrage and historical democratization. Teele and my work share a number of similarities that have been discussed throughout the dissertation (mostly in chapters I-III). Importantly, we both aim at overcoming the male and class bias present in the democratization

literature. Her work maintains, however, the third bias I described in the introductory chapter: a focus in Europe and the US. Based on this fundamental difference, I note four central points of why Teele's argument is insufficient to understand women's suffrage in Latin America.

First, normative beliefs do not play an important role in her argument, which as is a purely strategic one. As I have shown, without being attentive to actor's beliefs, it is not possible to get a full understanding of suffrage reform.

Second, cleavages are mentioned as relevant in the theoretical chapter, but they are not sufficiently theorized and do not always figure in the empirical chapters. Particularly in the case of Great Britain, it is not discussed how cleavages impacted women's mobilization or political parties. Socio-historical cleavages, on the other hand, are central to my explanation and discussed in depth in both the theoretical and empirical chapters.

Third, the author is imprecise with respect to scope conditions. It is argued the argument applies best to "limited democracies" (p. 7), however, the conceptualization of this regime type is unprecise in certain respects. For example, it is unclear if a case like Peru in 1931 – as analyzed in chapter IV – would meet the definition. Historians generally agree that the parliament elected in 1931 that made the (negative) decision on women's suffrage was elected in a mostly competitive election. However, it was not preceded or followed by similar elections. Does it make the cut? Moreover, I show that electoral and political calculations were important even in cases that were not limited democracies. More generally, to overcome this problem, my argument is temporally bounded and geographically grounded, making precise claims as its the scope (further discussed below).

Finally, I amply consider the theoretical and empirical importance of women's mobilization beyond how and when suffragists organized to claim for voting rights. Teele

recognizes the relevance of non-suffragists women's mobilization (particularly anti-suffragists, p. 39). In the empirical chapters, however, these women practically do not make an appearance and along with existing research, suffragist constitute the mobilized group of women that are the focus of analysis.

Research presented in these pages, then, builds on existing works and moves beyond theoretically as well as empirically by considering an under analyzed region from a comparative perspective. Whether the argument presented can shed light on processes of reform beyond those considered in the dissertation is an issue I address next.

2 Generalizability: suffrage reform and beyond

I have claimed throughout this dissertation that the argument for explaining the timing of women's suffrage reform is applicable to Latin American countries as they share the central class and religion cleavages stemming from a common colonial past. The countries in the region were also the source for the initial inductive theory-building phase. Detailed case analyses are necessary to confirm that the argument applies to other Latin American cases not studied in detail in the present research.

Beyond Latin America, the theoretical prediction is that the argument should also apply to countries with similar cleavages in other regions, such as those of Catholic Europe. In fact, existing analyses of the French case in particular point to the religious cleavage being a central factor in the opposition of the Radical party to the ultimately failed franchise extension in 1919 (Hause and Kenney 1984; D. Teele 2018 ch. 5). France would not enfranchise women until 1944. Italy also extended the franchise at the end of WWII, in 1945. Here, too, the contradictions between Catholic traditional values and the potential strategic use of women's vote precisely to

defend those traditions – motivation misalignment in my framework – have been pointed out (Dawes 2014).

Spain, on the other hand, is an early enfranchiser and a more puzzling case. The franchise was extended in 1931, during the Second Republic headed by a republican-socialist government. The three women of the center-left present in the constitutional debate represent the tension between normative and strategic motivations.[108] While radical Clara Campoamor made a consistent and often lonely defense of suffrage women's equality as basic democratic principle, radical-socialist Victoria Kent and socialist Margarita Nelken argued it was better to wait as female votes would go to conservatives and the future of the Republic should be above other considerations (Aguado 2005, 115–17). The female enfranchisement proposition was finally approved with the votes of socialists, the right, and other small groups (161 yeas) and the opposition from the center-left, republicans and radicals (121 nays). There were also 188 abstentions from mostly absent deputies. I would suggest suffrage passed given the very particular juncture of 1931-1933 where principle parties – particular the socialists (PSOE) – had strong support in a deep reformist climate, which included other policies related to gender equality (Aguado 2005). Since suffragist mobilization was relatively weak and ideologically diverse (Franco Rubio 2004), there was not clear electoral payoff to enfranchisement. In this particular juncture, then, an ideas-guided party was fundamental in overcoming the strategic opposition from the rest of the center-left.

In addition to electoral reform, the motivation alignment argument can potentially serve as a tool for analyzing other areas of reform. Here I consider the case of social policy as an area

[108] In the call for the elections of the Constituent Courts (assembly), a decree was issue making women over 23 eligible, still without voting rights. Two women for 470 seats were elected, while a third one entered by substitution (Monteverde García 2010, 267).

where both normative and strategic considerations can be identified. Strategically, political actors expect beneficiaries from policies to support them, particularly parties on the left that have as core constituencies the lower and middle sectors that mostly receive the benefits from social policy. For example, Galvin and Thurston (2017) pose that president Obama trusted electoral benefits would come as a result of policy success in areas such as health reform. Normatively, the left should be more favorable to social policy expansion; left-wing parties have been conceptualize as those that place a focus in addressing inequality through redistribution (Levitsky and Roberts 2011). As such, motivations align for the left. The right, on the other hand, tends to believe inequalities are natural and outside the purview of the state (Luna and Kaltwasser 2014). And strategically, any social reform must consider the interests of business and the upper strata, which constitutes its core constituency (Gibson 1996). As such, motivations normally align in the direction of retrenchment for the right.

The literature on social policy in Latin America has highlighted the role of the left in creating and extending policy benefits (Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2014), meeting the expectations of the motivation alignment argument. At the same time, the literature emphasizes the role of electoral competition (Fairfield and Garay 2017; Garay 2016; Pribble 2014), which provides the strategic incentives for pursuing new constituencies and securing existing ones. But motivation alignment can also shed light on the more puzzling question of why certain right-wing administrations including those of Piñera in Chile and Macri in Argentina have not cut back on social spending and even pursued social policy expansion. Electoral competition also applies as a strategic motivation for the right. The question then is why would these administrations go against some of the sectors' core beliefs, such as limiting public spending. Recent research indicates that after the left turn, when there was a general expansion in social

policy, there have been policy legacies left in place, which constrain the decision-making of new governments (Niedzwiecki and Pribble 2017). Part of the legacies affect strategic decision by making retrenchment socially costly. But additionally, I would argue, the consensus around redistribution has partly shifted to the left. The positive or neutral beliefs of the right, aligned with strategic consideration, would then explain recent social policy initiatives in part of the region.

Future research should theorize more carefully under what conditions will motivations align for a right-wing government to extend social policy benefits. Through the example, I suggest that considering normative and strategic considerations can be a useful tool in that endeavor.

3 Consequences for women's political participation

What were the consequences of the timing and path of suffrage reform for women's political participation and representation? Did a reform guided by strategic concern have different effects that one motivated by normative beliefs? Did women's mobilization have clear legacies? This last section considers some of these questions as an agenda for future research. It thus returns to the point made in the introduction that the gender dimension of inclusion exceeds suffrage reform.

One can speculate that the process of enfranchisement is linked to political participation of women in the aftermath of reform. For example, cases where women's suffrage was a highly politicized issue with strong suffragist movements would see higher rates of participation as voters and also running for elections. The reason behind these expectations is that politicization of the issue should trickle down and create interest among potential voters whereas mobilization

should act as a shortcut to increase turnout. In terms of timing, later enfranchisers should see higher levels of turnout as women's social, economic, and political participation is increasingly normalized globally and domestically. Finally, enfranchisement processes led by strategic motivations should lead to higher mobilization by incumbents and thus higher participation.

Electoral and registration data disaggregated by sex is very scarce for the period following enfranchisement (with the exception of Chile). To explore these hypotheses Table VII.2 presents information on the percentage of women registered in relation to total registration and the percentage of women in the legislature (both chambers combined) for the four first legislative elections after enfranchisement. Some caveats are necessary in relation to this data. In Peru, for example, between the second and third elections there were fifteen years of dictatorship. In Ecuador, legislative elections were every two years whereas in Chile and Uruguay they were every four. As such, the information is not strictly comparable, but it provides a basic overview.

Table VII.2. Participation and representation of women in legislative elections following enfranchisement

	1st election		**2nd election**		**3rd election**		**4th election**	
	% women regist.	Women elected	% women regist.	Women elected	% women regist.	Women elected	% women regist.	Women elected
Chile[a]	30.1	1%	35.2	2%	35.2	3%	47.7	7%
Ecuador	9.5	0%	11.9	0%	n.d	0%	n.d	0%
Peru[b]	33.7	4%	n.d	1%	n.d	2%	n.d	6%
Uruguay	n.d	0%	n.d	3%	n.d	2%	n.d	2%

[a] The data for Chile is of actual turnout and for the closest presidential election
[b] The third elections were in 1978 for the constituent assembly, after 15 years of military dictatorshipSources: Ecuador (Quintero 1980); Peru (Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social 2009); Uruguay (Pérez 2015).

The lack of registration data in Uruguay limits the comparison, but from the other cases we can see that later enfranchisers had higher female participation in the first election after women's suffrage was adopted. Interestingly, participation/registration was similar in Chile and Peru, despite de fact that Chile had very strong women's mobilization against weak and few organizations in Peru. The lack of social mobilization may have been supplemented by mobilization from above by Odría's dictatorship. The high increase of women's participation in the fourth election after enfranchisement in Chile may also point to the important of particular leaders and parties in the mobilization of women. This election coincides with the peak of popularity and support of the Christian Democratic Party, a party that devoted much energy to organizing women (Pieper Mooney 2009; Power 2002). In Ecuador, as discussed in chapter V, female registration in the first few elections (and for when there is data) was limited in line with the low politicization of women's suffrage.

In terms of descriptive representation, in all countries the number of women elected to the legislature was low. Ecuador stands out in that the election of the first women to the lower chamber took place 16 years after enfranchisement. The case of Uruguay is also interesting, as the representation of women is lower than expected given important women's mobilization. The low numbers are not only a matter of the first few elections, but an issue that has remained a deficit of Uruguayan democracy (Pérez 2015). In fact, Uruguay was the last country in the region to pass gender quota legislation, doing it so only in 2017. As such, there does not seem to be a relationship between timing and process of enfranchisement and women's representation.

This analysis is meant to simply illustrate possible avenues for future research. In addition to participation and representation, the electoral preferences of women, subnational variations in behavior, and the policy outcomes after enfranchisement are still largely unexplored

issues. While a considerable literature has studied women's descriptive and substantive representation in the last couple of decades, and particularly the adoption of gender quotas in the region, to the best of my knowledge the political participation of women in the decades following enfranchisement has not been investigated. Given the problems with data availability, Chile can perhaps more easily answer many of these questions. Still, other inferential techniques may be able to partly overcome problems of data availability to analyze the period after women's enfranchisement, as an emerging literature is doing in other regions (e.g. Morgan-Collins Forthcoming).

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: List of sources used for the theory development stage. The same sources were also used for coding reform attempts and women's mobilization for the quantitative analysis in chapter III.

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Appendix 2: Coding of reform attempts and women's mobilization (Chapter III)

Country	Date	Timing	Outcome	Independent women's movement	Partisan women's movement
Argentina	1932	Early	Failure	High	No
Argentina	1947	Late	Success	High	Yes
Bolivia	1938	Early	Failure	Low	No
Bolivia	1945	Late	Failure	Low	No
Bolivia	1952	Late	Success	Low	Yes
Brazil	1891	Early	Failure	Low	No
Brazil	1921	Early	Failure	Low	No
Brazil	1927	Early	Failure	Medium	No
Brazil	1932	Early	Success	Medium	No
Chile	1884	Early	Failure	Low	No
Chile	1925	Early	Failure	Low	No
Chile	1931	Early	Failure	Low	No
Chile	1949	Late	Success	High	No
Colombia	1933	Early	Failure	Low	No
Colombia	1936	Early	Failure	Low	No
Colombia	1944	Late	Failure	Low	No
Colombia	1954	Late	Success	Medium	No
Costa Rica	1917	Early	Failure	Low	No
Costa Rica	1925	Early	Failure	Medium	No
Costa Rica	1943	Late	Failure	Medium	No
Costa Rica	1949	Late	Success	Medium	No
Cuba	1927	Early	Failure	High	No
Cuba	1932	Early	Failure	High	No
Cuba	1934	Early	Success	High	No
Dominican R.	1942	Late	Success	Low	Yes
Ecuador	1884	Early	Failure	Low	No
Ecuador	1897	Early	Failure	Low	No
Ecuador	1929	Early	Success	Low	No
El Salvador	1938	Early	Failure	Low	No
El Salvador	1950	Late	Success	Low	No
Guatemala	1921	Early	Failure	Low	No
Guatemala	1945	Late	Success	Low	No
Honduras	1894	Early	Failure	Low	No
Honduras	1924	Early	Failure	Low	No
Honduras	1934	Early	Failure	Low	No

Honduras	1949	Late	Failure	Low	No
Honduras	1952	Late	Failure	Medium	No
Honduras	1953	Late	Failure	Medium	No
Honduras	1955	Late	Success	Medium	No
Mexico	1917	Early	Failure	Low	No
Mexico	1932	Early	Failure	High	Yes
Mexico	1938	Early	Failure	High	No
Mexico	1947	Late	Failure	Medium	Yes
Mexico	1953	Late	Success	Medium	Yes
Nicaragua	1930	Early	Failure	Low	No
Nicaragua	1932	Early	Failure	Low	No
Nicaragua	1933	Early	Failure	Low	No
Nicaragua	1939	Early	Failure	Low	No
Nicaragua	1944	Late	Failure	Low	No
Nicaragua	1953	Late	Failure	Medium	Yes
Nicaragua	1955	Late	Success	Medium	Yes
Panama	1936	Early	Failure	Medium	No
Panama	1941	Late	Failure	Medium	No
Panama	1945	Late	Success	Medium	Yes
Paraguay	1940	Late	Failure	Low	No
Paraguay	1961	Late	Success	Low	No
Peru	1931	Early	Failure	Low	No
Peru	1955	Late	Success	Low	No
Uruguay	1917	Early	Failure	Low	No
Uruguay	1932	Early	Success	High	No
Venezuela	1944	Late	Failure	Medium	No
Venezuela	1946	Late	Success	Medium	No

Appendix 3: Glossary

Alignment (of motivations): When both strategic and normative motivations are present at the same time, for a single actor. This alignment leads to the positive outcome of reform; its absence produces no reform.

Anticlericalism: Political position that advocated for a reduced role of the Catholic Church in social and political affairs, promoting the separation of Church and state and the provision of secular public services (education, health, marriage, etc.).

Anticommunist coalition: Coalition that grouped middle- and upper-class parties during the Cold War, united by their opposition to communism and social revolutionary change. It downplayed the religious cleavage.

Anti-oligarchic coalition: Common in the first half of the twentieth century, composed of anticlerical middle and emerging lower-class parties.

Cleavages: Deep social, cultural, economic, and territorial divisions that when politicized, give rise to political coalitions.

Competitive political regimes: Political regimes where there are free and fair elections, with general respect for political and civil rights.

Conservative coalition: Traditional landed elites closely tied to the Catholic Church.

Constituencies: A group of people who support or are likely to support a particular party or politician

Democratization: Process of institutional building and change in the direction of democracy, the latter understood as possessing universal suffrage, free and fair elections, respect for civil and political rights and liberties, separation of powers, civilian supremacy over the military, national sovereignty (Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 2005; R. B. Collier 1999; Levitsky and Way 2002).

Electoral authoritarianism: Non-competitive regimes where elections are nonetheless meaningful and central to signal strength to the opposition and within the governing coalition.

Electoral need: Refers to an incumbent's necessity to broaden their existing base of electoral support to new groups. It can occur after the loss of support from an existing coalition, or in cases of populist and electoral authoritarian regimes, both of which have supermajoritarian tendencies.

Exogenous change: A shock or process external to the polity that gives origin to structural and political transformations. It allows explaining similar processes in different countries.

Female enfranchisement: reform that recognized female suffrage for national elections, that became effective, and, except for Guatemala between 1945 and 1956, that had the same requirements to exercise the franchise as for men.

Feminist individual action: Actions of individual feminist activists or leaders that have broad consequences for suffrage reform.

International context: Dominant global climate, with relevance to the predominance and promotion of democratic values or their retrenchment.

Liberal coalition: An alternative to the anti-oligarchic coalition, before the emergence of important middle-class parties. Composed of export and financial elites with strong anticlerical beliefs and (to varying degrees) support for individual rights.

Mechanism (causal): An unobserved, underlying process connecting inputs and outputs, that when activated produces the outcome of interest (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1161; Mahoney 2001, 580). In this dissertation, it is the strategic and normative motivation alignment for decision-makers.

Motivations: Reasons upon which political actors decide whether to pursue a particular reform. For the purposes of this research, normative and strategic constitute the two central types of motivations.

Normative motivations: Ideational commitments of politicians for a given issue, informed by beliefs and ideologies.

Oligarchic coalition: Similar to the conservative coalition, it also includes liberal economic elites.

Populist regimes: Characterized by strong anti-establishment appeals, are figures that rely on popular support. Once in office, they tend to concentrate power and attack other state institutions.

Paths (causal): A combination of causal conditions that produce an outcome. In this dissertation I consider two general paths to reform, cleavage-led or short-term political factors.

Principle parties: Electorally small parties guided by ideological motivations.

Process tracing: It is a methodological tool for the development and testing of hypotheses in particular cases, where diagnostic evidence is selected and analyzed in light of research questions.

Realignment: Rearrangement of political coalitions or emergence of new ones based on a new cleavage or the (re)politicization of old ones.

Reform attempt: Failed attempts are instances are defined as cases where a decision was made either in the legislative or executive powers. This definition includes three specific instances: when a bill was rejected in one chamber of the legislature, when a bill received a positive vote in the legislature but failed in successive instances (either the second chamber or approval by the executive, or when an executive decree failed to enfranchised women after such possibility was debated. The operationalization of failed reform, then, excludes the mere introduction of a bill without debate, campaign promises, or discussions of the issue in public fora.

Short-term political factors: Causal factors not directly derived from the cleavage structure and the nature of competition but related to the political circumstances faced by incumbents. They mostly affect strategic calculations.

Strategic motivations: Electoral and political calculation by a political actor of how a given reform will impact their electoral support and ultimately the distribution of power.

Suffrage: Voting rights. Unless specified, it refers to full voting rights, for all election types.

Suffragist mobilization: A subtype of women's mobilization. It is present when women's organizations are partly or totally dedicated to obtaining of suffrage.

Timing of reform: Relative moment of female enfranchisement in Latin America. Based on the year enfranchisement, early reform encompasses the period 1920s-1944, and late reform after 1945.

Women's mobilization: Collective action lead and carried out by women, often through the establishment of organizational structures, for the purpose of supporting candidates, demanding women's rights, carrying beneficence or educational activities, defense of religion, among other goals.