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Giving, Taking, and Sharing:
Reproducing Economic Moralities and Social Hierarchies in Transnational Senegal

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ABSTRACT

Giving, Taking, and Sharing:
Reproducing Economic Moralities and Social Hierarchies in Transnational Senegal

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This dissertation asks how deepening global inequalities reshape the ways families negotiate "economic moralities," normative expectations of material obligation and entitlement. It focuses on the families of middle class migrants: French-educated Senegalese urbanites whose diplomas no longer protect them from discrimination in Paris but who, among Africans, are still construed as high-status, potential patrons. Heightened tensions surrounding Islam and immigration have reconfigured the stakes of belonging in the French Republic. Faced with economic decline and escalating French xenophobia, educated Dakarois provide a striking example of the ways migrants reinforce transnational hierarchies as they cling to (post)colonial privilege. I examine the ways transnational families manage diverse moral priorities in their struggle to maintain status in multiple communities, each of which places demands on their limited resources.

Drawing on 18 months (2014-2015) of linguistic and ethnographic data from Senegalese households in Paris and Dakar, I analyze how talk about exchange serves to categorize and rank people and their rights to resources in kinship networks and state systems alike. This dissertation approaches the values that shape material exchange in a novel way: through examination of everyday acts of storytelling and food sharing. It foregrounds the role of children in negotiating economic moralities, attending to the moral stances family members voice in household talk. I theorize how people respond to multiple, sometimes contradictory

economic moralities in their daily lives, examining values as located in explicit pronouncements of virtue and tacitly communicated through talk evaluating and explaining acts of giving, taking, and sharing. I argue that economic moralities are inherently political, demonstrating how family discussions reproduce social distinction and selective solidarity, creating nested hierarchies of belonging in France and transnational kinship networks alike.

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.	end of intonation unit; falling intonation
,	end of intonation unit; fall-rise intonation
?	end of intonation unit; rising intonation
-	self interruption
:	sound immediately preceding has been noticeably lengthened
(.)	silences in seconds and tenths of seconds
[ ]	the beginning and end of talk that overlaps with that of another speaker
=	"latching" (no interval between the end of a prior turn and the start of the next piece of talk
(( ))	enclosed material is not part of the talk being transcribed, such as laughter
italics	emphatic stress

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

"*May ma, Awa. Et tata? Donne un peu à tata, mon bébé*[1]." In her apartment in Paris, Mouna Diallo[2] alternated between Wolof and French as she coaxed her daughter to share the pack of jellybeans the two-year old clutched. Awa eyed me suspiciously before she complied with her mother's urgings, handing me a piece of candy. Prodded until they share, children in families from Senegal and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa come to expect that when they are eating, others present should be offered their rightful part (Rabain 1979; Piot 1999; Riesman 1992; Ferguson 2015). Mouna stressed the importance of teaching Awa Senegalese values and the Wolof language at home, but reported speaking exclusively French in public. If identified as Senegalese, she explained, other Africans might ask her "to join their rotating-credit association."

In Paris, university educated Senegalese like Mouna carefully manage their social connections in an effort to demonstrate integration in France, while working to position themselves favorably in networks of reciprocity and exchange with transnational kin. As migrants and minorities, parents raised in Dakar strive to prepare their French-born children to distance themselves from immigrants thought to pose a threat to the secular French nation, but also to take part in transnational kinship relations. Parents urge children to show "solidarity" toward kin, verbally linking food sharing with moral virtues. But these same adults avoid

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[1] "Give me some, Awa. (Wolof). And auntie? Give a little to auntie, baby (French)."

[2] All names are pseudonyms used to protect research participants.

contexts in which other Senegalese may mobilize these values to request funds, acutely aware of the need for *selective* solidarity.

This dissertation focuses on the families of middle-class migrants in France: educated Senegalese urbanites whose diplomas no longer protect them from discrimination in Paris but who are nonetheless considered high-status, potential patrons among Africans. It asks how deepening global inequalities reshape the ways families negotiate normative expectations of material obligation and entitlement. Borrowing a term first proposed by Maurer (2009), I call these values, which animate resource redistribution at state and family levels, "economic moralities," a concept I locate at the intersection of scholarship on Maussian "gift" exchange and linguistic anthropologists' examinations of the "ordinary ethics" (Lambek 2010) that individuals embody in everyday interaction.

State institutions and transnational kin both show a vested interest in the ways the next generation perceives the moral stakes of resource allocation. Children, subject to caregivers' moral instruction, are uniquely situated to reveal how values are enacted in everyday discussions and acts of food sharing. Drawing on linguistic and ethnographic data from Senegalese households in Paris and Dakar, I show how social actors draw on economic moralities in unfolding interaction to carry out social work: creating similarity and difference, proximity and distance, between themselves and others. These moral stances are key to individuals' daily efforts to carry out selective solidarity in order to achieve and maintain status positions in nested hierarchies of belonging in French society and transnational kinship networks alike.

Faced with European economic decline and heightened tensions surrounding Islam and immigration, French-educated Senegalese provide a striking example of the ways migrants

reinforce transnational hierarchies as they cling to (post)colonial privilege. These middle-class Senegalese distance themselves from predominantly African neighborhoods in Paris, but host kin studying in France and remit at rates comparable to labor migrants (Chort et al. 2011). They mask behaviors that mark them as Muslims and migrants, while maintaining the "constant interconnections across international borders" characteristic of transnationalism (Glick-Schiller, et al. 1995: 48).

Since the colonial period, France has encouraged immigration among an educated, francophone minority through visas and scholarships, assuring that Senegalese leaders pass through Parisian universities (Wilder 2005). But as France attempts to extract itself from clientelist relations with former colonies, Senegalese benefitting from these relations must readjust their lives and livelihoods (Chafer 2003). Amidst European economic stagnation and escalating xenophobia, educated Senegalese in Paris feel increasing pressure to regulate their most banal behaviors to constantly communicate belonging in France. For many, the success of the extreme-right *Front National* represents a public measure of the discrimination they experience daily, as they are increasingly categorized alongside stigmatized migrants. As racial and religious minorities in France, for these Senegalese, integration must be constantly achieved, demonstrated anew, according to the ever-shifting demands of French secularism. In speaking, eating, and all forms of semiotic communication, educated Senegalese in Paris work to distance themselves from transnational Others deemed undeserving of the resources belonging affords.

In Paris, I carried out ethnographic and linguistic research in the households of French-educated[3] Dakarois and their school-aged children born in France. The families I worked with

[3] Individuals who received formal, francophone schooling to high school or university level in Senegal or France.

lived scattered throughout Paris and its nearby suburbs. All the parents possessed the legal documents to live and work in France, and most had dual citizenship, whereas many of their children held only French passports[4]. In Senegal, these adults' French language skills and formal schooling index their position among an educated, urban elite. In France, these same characteristics distinguish them from working class migrants, making it possible for them to take part in the French middle class as "integrated" immigrants.

Through fine-grained analysis of interactions in transnational Senegalese households, I examine families' efforts to demonstrate integration in France while strategically managing the circulation of people, gifts, and support that produce family relations between Africa and Europe. I approach material circulation and the speech acts that mediate it as integrated semiotic processes, using the idea of "language materiality" (Shankar and Cavanaugh 2012) to draw attention to the mutual imbrication of linguistic and material practices. Shankar and Cavanaugh define language materiality as a field of inquiry focused on "both the materiality of language as well as how the language and material may interact to create meaning and value" (Shankar and Cavanaugh 2012: 355). My intervention contributes to the study of language materiality by tracing links between families' exchanges of talk and food and normative ideologies that structure material circulation beyond the household.

This dissertation brings to light the material consequences, intended or otherwise, of shifting between economic moralities, revealing processes of exclusion that accompany individuals' attempts to morally manage the redistribution of their resources. I examine how values that organize material circulation are enacted in everyday exchanges of talk and food,

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[4] In 2014, many Senegalese in France made efforts to obtain Senegalese citizenship for their children prior to visiting Dakar, in order to avoid paying the 50€ fee associated with Senegal's short-lived "reciprocity visa." Between July 2013 and April 2015, Senegal required these entry visas from visitors from all countries, including France, that required Senegalese citizens to pay for tourist visas.

drawing theoretically on work in linguistic anthropology focused on the ways moral stances are asserted and contested in everyday interaction (Lambek 2010; Fassin 2012, 2014; Keane 2008, 2010; Das 2010, 2012; Mahmood 2005). Based on transcript analysis of acts of storytelling and food sharing, I argue that speakers draw on economic moralities to categorize and rank people and their rights to resources in kinship networks and state systems alike.

In Senegal, as in much of Africa, kinship ties are rooted in hierarchal relations that organize reciprocal obligations and rights to material support. In this system of patron-clientism, a successful migrant is construed as one who acts as a high-status benefactor to subsequent newcomers and those back home. In Dakar, these economic moralities of rank-based redistribution allow migrants to achieve status through the circulation of resources. But in France, expectations of rank-based redistribution can make middle-class Senegalese wary of the material expectations that social relations with other Africans might entail.

These anxieties are compounded by moral and legal expectations that immigrants integrate into French society, which demand that individuals carefully manage the people with whom they associate. Integration furthermore requires cultural and economic capital: legal migration requires linguistic and professional skills, visas have fees and require proof of economic stability. The material means required to integrate ranks immigrants in hierarchies of belonging, in which francophone, educated foreigners' linguistic and professional skills put them at a relative advantage.

Documenting the language families use to both share and *avoid* sharing, this dissertation illuminates the values speakers draw on to rationalize choices about resource redistribution, in ways that establish both group belonging and social distinction. I foreground the role of children in the reproduction of economic moralities, attending to the moral stances

family members voice in household talk. I theorize how people respond to multiple, sometimes contradictory economic moralities in their daily lives, examining values as located in explicit pronouncements of virtue and tacitly communicated through talk evaluating and explaining acts of giving, taking, and sharing.

Cultivating the skills to manage material resources according to diverse moral and economic priorities is a lifelong process, in which children's caregivers hold significant stakes. Both familial and institutional caregivers attempt to guide children's behavior, urging them to take up the social roles and exchange practices these adults value. Children are a locus of adult-world strategy, their perceived success or failure treated as an index of their upbringing. At best, successful children contribute to caregivers' social standing and provide material security in the future. At worst, they can tarnish parents' reputation, casting a shadow on all their caregivers have strived for (middle class status, carefully woven kinship networks, etc.). For adults, questions of what one can trust a child to do (or not do) are as key to saving face in unfolding interaction as they are to broader goals of maintaining class status intergenerationally.

Through examination of the economic moralities families enacted in their daily interactions, this dissertation bridges social scientists' investigations into the values that underpin systems of reciprocity, redistribution, and "gift exchange" with linguistic anthropologists' examinations of the micro-level interactions through which children embody culturally specific habits associated with morality. Studies of language socialization have demonstrated that children develop notions of generosity and greed through affective, embodied social interactions (Fader 2012). These scholars highlight acts of food sharing as key moments of moral development, in which children learn the language skills to share and

avoid sharing (Schieffelin 1990; Ochs et al. 1996). But these studies have yet to consider how, in participating in these practices, children shape the reproduction and transformation of morals in their everyday practice. This dissertation approaches children as active players in transnational processes, tracing links between exchanges of talk and food and the reproduction of "cultures of circulation" (Lee & LiPuma 2002). I call attention to the ways children recreate economic moralities as they embody the linguistic capital (Bourdieu 1977) and cultural repertoires (Coe 2013) necessary to navigate between them.

Social scientists' revisions of Mauss's (1925) insights into the ethics that drive exchange illustrate how normative ideologies underpin not only gift exchange but all economic systems (Brown & Milgram 2009; Bloch & Parry 1989). Even in liberal economies, moral discourses structure what can and cannot be sold, how, and by whom (Zelizer 1983; Coe 2013). Building on Africanist examinations of the interface between monetary circulation and other "value registers" (Guyer 1993; Piot 1999), I theorize how people respond to multiple, sometimes contradictory moral frameworks in their daily lives. Scholars note that social actors draw on "financial repertoires" (Buggenhagen 2012) to exploit "marginal gains" (Guyer 2004), but these studies overlook children's participation in multiple economic systems and have yet to explore how individuals shift between moral frameworks and exchange practices in unfolding context.

This dissertation analyzes how speakers separate ongoing interaction into recognizable acts of exchange, examining the "contextualization cues" (Gumperz 1982; see also Silverstein on metapragmatic calibration 1993) they provide regarding with whom and why one might share, or avoid sharing, material resources. I consider the ways family members characterize acts of exchange, linking them to relationships or "types" of people, to demonstrate how

speakers draw on ethics to position themselves in political-economic hierarchies. Speakers who *describe* acts of exchange simultaneously *prescribe* how material circulation ought to take place, offering explanations for their actions and evaluating others' behavior. As they align with or distance themselves from the individuals and acts they describe, speakers situate themselves relative to others. These language practices have material consequences, dividing and ranking individuals and their rights to resources. My dissertation examines the ethical stances speakers take up in ideologically mediated acts of naming and framing, revealing economic moralities to be fundamentally political. I argue that by drawing on economic moralities in interaction, social actors reproduce social distinction and selective solidarity, reinforcing the polarization of transnational populations.

Moralities in Times of "Crisis"

This dissertation documents a period of time that scholars and journalists described as characterized by a series of "crises" in France and throughout Europe, associated with economic decline, migration, and "homegrown terrorism." It sheds light on the particular impact these tensions had on the lives of racial and religious minorities in France, who watched with apprehension as growing fears surrounding Islam and immigration reconfigured the stakes for belonging in the French Republic.

In France, the European economic crisis resulted in record unemployment levels, sparking fears of the erosion of the social welfare system (Insee 2015; Le Point 2015). Like many European nations, the French economy was slow to recover from the global financial crisis of 2008. But this economic stagnation was only the most recent manifestation of patterns of economic decline and increasing inequality since the 1970s (Piketty 2013; Maurin

et al. 2015). French sociologists and economists contend that the stagnating job market, linked to the decreasing value of diplomas, has resulted in a general "backsliding" (*declassement*) of the French middle class (Beaud 2011, Marie Dubet and Duru-Bellat 2006; Crédoc 2009).

Intergenerational "*declassement*," in which children come to occupy a socioeconomic class status inferior to that of their parents, has become increasingly common (Peugny 2009). This is due in part to the "academic inflation" France has experienced over the past thirty years, as diplomas have been awarded to an increasingly large proportion of the population, causing their value on the job market to erode (Chauvel 2006; Duru-Bellat 2006). Chauvel (2012) explains that thirty years ago, a high school degree (*le baccalauréat*) assured a position in the French middle class, which was thought impervious to unemployment. But today, middle-class status is associated with growing uncertainty and young people whose qualifications would have assured full-time employment twenty years ago struggle to find internships (Duchemin 2015).

The growing gap between the rich and the poor has disproportionately impacted immigrants and their descendants (Chauvel 2009; Jones 2013; Hargreaves 2007; Minni and Okba 2014). Educated immigrants are 50% more likely to occupy a position below their qualifications than equally qualified French citizens (Picut 2014). Discrimination against visible minorities in hiring processes has been widely documented (Barou 2014; Beaud and Pialoux 2006; Simon 2008). Religion is also key vector of discrimination (Simon & Madoui 2011). Comparing the employment opportunities made available to equally qualified Muslim and Catholic Senegalese in France, Adida and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that Muslim candidates were 2.5 times less likely to be called back for an interview than were their Christian counterparts.

In France, like elsewhere in Europe and in the United States, immigrants and their children have often born the brunt of economic anxieties. In spite of scholarly evidence to the contrary, immigrants are often blamed for rising unemployment, wage stagnation, and the erosion of the social welfare system (Thomas 2013; Chojnicki and Ragot 2012; Chojnicki 2012). Far right political parties like France's *Front National* regularly scapegoat immigrants for economic decline (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014). Since the 1980s, these parties have garnered increasing support throughout Europe running on anti-immigrant platforms (Betz 1993; Mudde 2013). French support for the *Front National* has risen substantially since Marine Le Pen took over party leadership in 2011 (Thomas 2013). This is evidenced in their unprecedented success in regional and European elections in December 2015 and May 2014.

The rising success of far-right parties has furthermore encouraged mainstream politicians to take up increasingly harsh stances on immigration. Thomas (2013) traces, for example, parallels between Nicholas Sarkozy's political rhetoric and that of the *Front National.* The rise of anti-immigrant discourses has created an increasingly hostile environment for racial and religious minorities, even those whose families have lived in France for generations. The French Commission for the Fight Against Racism and Anti-Semitism (*Délégation interministérielle à la lutte contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme*, Dilcra) reported that in 2015, acts of anti-Muslim violence tripled in France.

Tensions surrounding Islam and immigration were compounded in 2015 by fears surrounding Europe's "migration crisis" and the rise of "home grown" terrorism. The mass migration of Syrian refugees into the European Union intensified immigration debates in France and throughout Europe, as politicians struggled to determine how many foreigners their country could (or, should be obliged to) support. Far right parties demanded protection of

national borders, calling into question the free movement between European nations assured by the Schengen accord (Antenore 2016). During this time, global acts of terrorism by Islamic fundamentalist groups like Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS became increasingly frequent. Muslims in France (like elsewhere the world) felt increasing pressure to distinguish themselves from fundamentalist groups (Aubenas 2016). "That's not Islam," became a common refrain among my Muslim research participants. For Parisians, the gravity of these acts became gruesomely apparent when terrorists carried out mass shootings in the French capital in January and November 2015.

These attacks signaled a new era of "homegrown" terrorism and heightened suspicions surrounding Islam and immigration. French nationals who claimed to be acting on behalf of Islamic terrorist groups carried out both attacks on the French capital in January and November 2015. The threat of "homegrown" terrorism has since been mobilized to justify increasingly severe security measures. Following January's attacks, France's Vigipirate security plan was raised to its highest alert level and armed forces were mobilized to protect "sensitive sites" like Paris's monuments and religious sites. After November's attacks, French President François Hollande called a state of emergency, initially intended to last only three months, but which has been repeatedly extended.

During the period of time this dissertation investigates, these political pressures critically shaped the ways that French residents understood themselves relative to other groups, informing individuals' and families' everyday practices. As scrutiny of Muslims and migrants has intensified, the social expectations of secularism have swelled and been written into government policy, placing pressure on minorities in France to ever more carefully regulate their behavior in order to constantly communicate integration. This task is more

feasible for the educated Senegalese urbanites I examine here than it is for many other immigrants, thanks to the French language and cultural skills they were able to develop in Dakar pre-migration and to the many social and political-economic connections between Dakar and Paris.

Life Between Two Capitals

The lives of the transnational families examined here are centered on two capitals, one African the other European. The adults I met from Dakar were quick to point out their urban origins, highlighting the cosmopolitanism of their pre-migration experience in the Senegalese metropolis. Dakarois often contrast the material conditions of their lives to those of villagers living isolated in the Senegalese "bush." Connections between the Dakar and Paris extend beyond bureaucratic remnants of the colonial period, continually reproduced by those individuals able to benefit from political and economic connections between the two countries.

Dakar is the current capital of Senegal and the colonial capital of French West Africa (*Afrique Occidentale Française, AOF*). It is the site of the headquarters of the Central Bank of West African States (*Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest,* BCEAO) and many international organizations. The city is also a transportation hub, the location of Senegal's international air and maritime ports, as well as the endpoint of a network of rail and highways that connect the city to the interior of the continent. Since the colonial period, Dakar has received disproportionate investments of both public and private funds, making it a locus of wealth and power in West Africa and a step toward horizons beyond the continent.

Dakar's status as a cosmopolitan, economic center is apparent in its built environment, particularly the highway, luxury hotels, and sumptuous villas built along the coast. Residents and visitors take part in global consumer culture in the city's restaurants, clubs, hotels, and international clothing chains. Smart phones are a common sight throughout Dakar, even in lower-class areas. While Senegalese consumer culture is inspired by trends in the U.S. and increasingly, places like Dubai, Dakar's cosmopolitanism also clearly bears the imprint of its colonial heritage. Middle- and upper-class Dakarois commonly subscribe to French television channels, wear French brands, and purchase food in French restaurants and supermarket chains.

In Senegal, French fluency is the mark of an urban, educated elite, for whom the language provides access to employment in the formal economic sector and facilitates migration abroad. Although Senegal is officially a francophone nation, scholars estimate that a mere 10 to 14% of Senegalese speak French (Cissé 2005). Wolof serves as a common language for the vast majority of Senegalese (Versluys 2010; Cissé 2005). Formal French schooling, like the language skills it teaches and necessitates, also indexes class. A francophone higher education indicates that one's family had the means to pay school fees and to live in an urban area with access to schools. For educated Senegalese, moving to France is often a logical, or even necessary, step in order to continue their studies. Certain academic specializations are not offered at the University of Dakar, and French diplomas hold particular status in Senegal. Educated Senegalese commonly spend some time living in France and many travel there regularly to visit kin.

Not all Senegalese have the means to take advantage of connections between the two capitals. Dakar is also a site of extreme inequalities, where families in impoverished

neighborhoods struggle to prepare one solid meal per day (Ndoye 2001). And yet, even those who struggle to get by speak about Dakar as more "modern" or "developed" than rural areas in West Africa. In Wolof, Dakarois often call immigrants from elsewhere in West Africa by the pejorative term "*ñak*," a designation that likens inhabitants of nearby African nations to country bumpkins.

In France, policies of immigrant integration have insulated educated Senegalese from much of the stigmatization to which other foreigners in France have been subject, in which race and religion are collapsed as "cultural differences" thought to impede integration into the secular French state (Fassin 2005; Fernando 2014). Integration demands cultural and economic capital, ranking immigrants in hierarchies of belonging, in which the linguistic and professional skills of educated Senegalese put them at a relative advantage.

Foreigners perceived to have successfully "integrated" are dissociated from the category of "immigrant." Those who appear to have adopted French cultural practices and values, on the one hand, are often explicitly referred to as "integrated" (i.e. *une africaine intégrée* an integrated African woman) or as "French of African origins," regardless of their legal status. The term immigrant, on the other hand, is reserved, in media and political discourses, for individuals thought to bear observable markers of (non-French) cultural or religious identities. French residents from the EU, the US, and other developed nations are rarely characterized as "immigrants." Whereas, visible minorities from France's former colonies – even those born in France – have difficulty separating themselves from the immigrant label. In France, Fernando observes, "some citizens are classified as foreigners" (2014: 64). Indeed, she points out that even scholars make reference to "third-generation

immigrants" an epithet she describes as a "downright oxymoron that reinscribes a certain population as immutably foreign" (Fernando 2014: 63).

Paul Silverstein (2005) contends that similarly distorted representations of "immigrants" are prevalent throughout Europe and the United States, arguing that they contribute to the racialization of migrants as "preternaturally transnational, with enduring cultural orientations to homelands elsewhere" (2005: 375). The racialization of the (im)migrant category in Europe, Silverstein contends, has resulted in the creation of a new "savage slot" (Trouillot 1991), emblemized by tropes of the "young European Muslim man, recruited to travel abroad in the duties of global *jihad*" (2005: 367). He further claims that scholars of transnationalism are complicit with these processes of racialization as transnational migrants have become "anthropology's increasingly preferred, exotic 'Others'" (2005: 365).

I seek to redress the racialization of the immigrant category by expanding the concept of "transnational migrant" to include those often overlooked in public discourses and scholarly analysis. The omission of middle-class, "integrated" foreigners from the category of "immigrant" facilitates the racialization of working-class minorities. By approaching French educated Dakarois as "transnational migrants," I draw attention to the diversity present in this category, complicating dichotomous representations of "immigrants" versus "integrated" foreigners.

Through "thick" ethnographic description (Geertz 1973), this study complicates understandings of the stigmatization of Muslims and migrants in Europe by tracing the ways shifting notions of "integration" divide and rank French residents, as they circulate between state discourses and familial conversations. Fine-grained analysis of discussions in

transnational Senegalese households shows how immigrants' efforts to demonstrate their own belonging reinforce distinctions between problematic "immigrants" and successfully "integrated" foreigners. This study demonstrates that belonging in France is contingent on one's willingness and capacity to locate oneself relative to – and thus often reproduce – tropes of immigrants who threaten national cohesion and security.

Fieldwork and Methods

This dissertation is based on eighteen months of ethnographic research in Senegalese households in Paris and Dakar. Between January 2014 and June 2015, I carried out participant observation with the families of French-educated Senegalese in Paris, accompanying family members on summer trips to Senegal. I additionally draw on a total of fifteen nonconsecutive months of fieldwork in Dakar and on four years (2006-2010) of experience living in France prior to the start of this ethnographic project. In Paris, my research centered on the families of Dakarois who had received formal, francophone schooling to a high school or university level, in Senegal and/or France.

I focused on five target households in which the adults grew up in Dakar and their children were born in France. Fine-grained transcripts of interactions recorded in these households form the main corpus of data upon which this dissertation is based. Although these five families in Paris form the focal group of my study, examination of their interactions with their broad networks of kin, friends, and acquaintences in both France and Senegal allowed me to observe more general attitudes toward the normative expectations that shape exchange. Participant observation with adults and children in these households routinely included members of extended families, neighbors, and guests. In Paris and Dakar I additionally met

and visited with the famlies of working-class labor migrants, which gave me a sense of the particularity of the position of these francophone, educated urbanites in Paris.

Traveling regularly between Paris and Dakar since 2005, I carried out participant observation with branches of transnational families in both countries, observing how individuals' practices and perspectives on material exchange shift with national context. On trips to Dakar, I examined gift exchange firsthand, transporting perfumes and palm oil between family members in France and Senegal. I also offered my own gifts, struggling to position myself in transnational families' thickly woven networks of exchange in ways that seemed to me both economically feasible and worthy responses to the care and aid they had offered. In preparation for trips to Senegal, I took careful note of the advice my research participants offered regarding what to give to whom, as well as when and how to avoid petitions for support. Through uncountable missteps and the precious guidance of Senegalese friends and teachers, I strove to manage requests for gifts and funds and to navigate my growing sense of responsibility to give back to those who had fed and cared for me.

In both Paris and Dakar, I audio-recorded naturally occurring conversations among family members and video-recorded meals and other acts of material exchange. Fine-grained transcripts illustrate how family members collectively construct and contest notions of morality in unfolding interaction. I worked closely with Senegalese transcription assistants and a professional Wolof language instructor in Dakar to develop transcripts of these recordings. These transcription sessions provided another layer of interpretation and discussion of the acts of exchange analyzed. I then annotated these transcripts to include the insights transcription activities had added (Schieffelin 1990; Kulick 1992).

Semi-structured interviews and child-focused methods compliment recordings of situated interaction. Videos of child-guided home and refrigerator tours (Paugh & Izquierdo, 2009) and their reality TV-inspired reflections on Senegalese social events[5] reveal children's perceptions of the social relations that organize exchange. Child-led tape recordings (Hunleth 2011), children's drawings of their "family trees," and audio-recordings of child-led "facebook tours" shed light on the ways children understand, enact, and describe their transnational kinship relations. These interactions furthermore sparked parent-child interactions regarding familial relations that provided critical insights into the ways that parents hoped that their children perceive their relations to kin near and far.

My ethnographic research also extended to French bureaucratic settings aimed at immigrant reception and integration and the analysis of instructional materials and legal documents used therein. Like many of my research participants, as a non-European spouse of a French national, I engaged in the process of obtaining a residence permit through familial connections[6]. The French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII, *Office Français d'Immigration et d'Integration*) thus treated me as having "engaged in the procedure to settle in France" (OFII letter to author, April 4, 2014). This permitted me to carry out participant observation at OFII-led "civic-training sessions" mandatory for immigrants since 2007, where I signed France's "Reception and Integration Contract" (*Contrat d'Acceuil et d'Intégration*[7]).

My investigation in the following chapters centers on discourses of material exchange broadly construed, considering household discussions of food sharing beside narratives that

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5 Following the format of the French television show "*4 mariages pour une lune de miel"* (4 Weddings for One Honeymoon), I asked children to describe and evaluate on a scale of 1 to 10 various elements of Senegalese celebrations and social gatherings, including "hospitality," "decorations," and "ambiance."

6 The parents, children, and spouses of French nationals or legal residents are eligible for "private life and familial" residence permits (*la carte de séjour vie privée et familiale).*

7 http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/cai.pdf

evaluate economic practices. I analyze these meta-level discussions alongside direct observations of linguistic and material exchange, relying methodologically on audio- and video-recordings and transcript-analysis of everyday negotiations of economic moralities.

From Family Homes in Dakar to Parisian Apartments: Locating Transnational Senegalese

My investigation began in Dakar, in the large family homes that housed the extended kin of the individuals I would ultimately work with in Paris. These multi-story houses were spacious, with ornate balconies that overlooked Dakar's dusty streets. Constructed gradually over time, their many bedrooms and living areas were testaments to the regular remittances invested by family members abroad. Elderly heads of households housed their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, nieces and nephews, friends and friends' children who had come to Dakar to study or work. But their own adult children were often absent, some living in France, while others were in the U.S., Spain, or Italy.

To locate participant families in France, I drew on connections I had established in Dakar during prelimary (2011, 2012) and Masters research (2008). My contacts in Dakar's middle and upper class neighborhoods, like Mermoz, Sacré Coeur, and the "SICAPs," put me in touch with their family members who had studied and subsequently settled in Paris. This enabled me to focus on Senegalese families scattered throughout the French capital, examining their selective connections with other Africans in Senegal and France. Much of the scholarship on Senegalese migration has focused on members of the Murid Islamic brotherhood, who are brought together in the diaspora, physically and ideologically, through their religious and economic practices[8]. My study, in contrast, examines migrants who work to

[8] Diouf claims that "the literature on this brotherhood is more extensive than that on other Senegalese brotherhoods and Islamic movements in black Africa" (2000: 681).

distance themselves from places and practices associated with African immigrants. It thus brings to light the ways transnational migrants judiciously choose the connections they enact within and beyond national borders, as well as the diverse moral stances they draw on to make sense of these socioeconomic choices.

My own experiences and interest in Senegal generated conversations in Paris focused on Senegalese practices, places, and people. I came to them via Dakar and situated myself relative to the adults through my familiarity with Senegal. Our introductions often began by comparing the neighborhoods in Dakar from which they hailed and the places I had stayed during field research. Although we rarely conversed in Wolof, my conversational language skills also drew attention to Senegal. In Paris, my research primarily took place in French, given that adults quickly realized it was the language in which I was more fluent and because the children often struggled to understand Wolof. However, when my visits coincided with those of their Senegalese kin and friends, my interlocutors enjoyed testing my vocabulary.

In their childrearing choices and economic practices, the families in my study regularly distinguished themselves from "traditional" Africans in Paris and from negative French stereotypes of immigrants. Indeed, "immigrant" was rarely a self-ascribed descriptor among the Senegalese I worked with. They sometimes used the term to joke that that one was temporarily acting like a stereotypical "immigrant." For example, a woman remarked that she "looked like an immigrant" when wearing the hood of her sweatshirt to hide her unbraided hair. Chapter four addresses these acts of self-positioning in detail. Here, I outline some of the characteristics that set the families in my study apart in both Paris and Dakar in order to provide a clearer idea of the five households on which this dissertation is focused.

In Dakar, kin and acquaintances of my research participants treated them as integral parts of extended families whose members spanned multiple nations. But in Paris, they lived in nuclear families in the city center or nearby suburbs. In the densely populated and expensive French capital, their apartments were cramped compared to their families' spacious lodging in Dakar. Even so, all of the children in my study had either their own bedroom or shared with one sibling. Unlike tropes of overcrowded immigrant households and "*famille nombreuse*" (families with many children) linked in French discourses with "tradition" (be it Muslim or Catholic), the households in my study aligned with modern goals of limiting family size.

The families I examined in detail each included two parents who migrated to France as adults and between one and three school-aged children who ranged in age from age three[9] to eighteen. Most attended public schools, but two sisters attended a private Catholic school in their neighborhood. All the children could walk to school, and those in middle school and older sometimes took the metro or city buses unaccompanied to after school activities or to spend time with friends. During my study, one household periodically hosted the father's nephew and daughter from a previous marriage, who were both in their twenties. The four other families housed only their nuclear family members. One household included divorced parents who lived a fifteen-minute walk from one another. My participant observation focused primarily on moments when their daughter was in her father's custody, but I also spent time with the mother and daughter, and occasionally with all three family members at once.

Although "middle class" was not a spontaneously self-ascribed category among my research participants, I characterize these families as such, relative to the parents' levels of

[9] In France, public school begins in preschool (*maternelle*), which children attend starting at age three.

formal schooling, their employment, and social practices in France. In their choices regarding the neighborhoods they inhabited and frequented, their children's schools, and the overall importance they placed on education, these families demonstrated an orientation toward practices associated with the French middle class. In Dakar, these same practices locate them in a relatively elite socioeconomic class and my adult research participants often emphasized the continuity they saw between their habits in Senegal and France.

The parents in my study voiced anxieties and ambitions typical of the middle class, which Barbara Ehrenreich (1989) has described as a "fear of falling." Ehrenreich suggests that the threat of downward mobility is inherent to middle class status, arguing that unlike upper and lower classes, which are more easily transmitted intergenerationally, parents cannot necessarily pass middle class status on to their children. Like middle class families elsewhere, the Senegalese parents I studied in Paris were particularly concerned with their children's academic achievements (Ortner 1992, Ehrenreich 1989; Ochs and Kremer-Sadlik 2013). The importance of education was perhaps even more critical in these middle-class immigrant families, in that, education is often treated as equivalent to "integration" in France (see chapters three and four). Immigrants who have received a higher education in France, for example, are exempt from OFII requirements to attend civic training sessions.

The parents in each of the families I studied had received formal, francophone schooling in Dakar and most had continued their studies in France. The adults with whom I worked had migrated to Paris sometime between the late 1970s and 2006. In all but one of these households, the father arrived in France a few years or even decades before his wife. Some of these men migrated before marrying in Senegal, while, in other families the wives

remained in Dakar for a period of time before joining their husbands in Paris. In all but one of my participant households at least one parent had a university diploma attained in France.

The language skills and diplomas with which these Dakarois arrived in Paris allowed them to find skilled employment that was, in most cases, commensurate with their qualifications. Two were high school teachers in French public schools. Others were salaried employees in accountancy firms or insurance companies. One father was a freelance consultant in marketing. Both parents worked full or part time in all but one of the households in my study, in which the mother did not work outside the home.

Not all of the parents, however, held positions that required post-secondary education. One mother was an assistant in a state-sponsored day care (*une crèche*). And in one household, both parents held jobs that required no higher education: the mother worked as a nanny and the father was a supervisor in a retirement home. This family was exceptional in my study, in that the parents had only some high school education and were employed in working class jobs commonly occupied by immigrants. Yet, their residence in a relatively wealthy area in Paris's 17th *arrondissement* and choice to send their children to private Catholic school gave them access to middle and upper-middle class social circles.

Each of the families in my study demonstrated an overall focus on formal education. Certain parents actively embodied the trope of African "intellectuals," a social type especially salient during the period surrounding Senegalese independence that was embraced in particular by the men in my study who migrated around that time. One father, for example, frequently referenced the multiple university degrees he had obtained in France, claiming that all his life people had called him an "*intello*." His intellectual persona was manifested

materially in the overflowing bookshelves that lined the walls of his living room and hallways.

Some parents contrasted the importance they placed on schooling with "traditional" African families, who would, they asserted, send their children to Koranic schools even in France. Others complained with frustration that their children's teachers categorized them alongside uneducated immigrants who struggle to speak French, assuming that they could not read the notes sent home with their children.

The family in which the parents were the least educated was particularly careful to ensure that their children attended a "well-reputed" (*bien coté*) school. Their mother explained that this was key to assureing that they stay "on the right path." These Catholic Senegalese parents chose to transfer their daughters to a private Catholic school when the oldest reached middle school. This choice resembles a common trend among non-immigrant French citizens, for whom middle school marks a moment when parents often choose to transfer their children private or better-reputed public schools (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2004: 93; Felouzis et al 2007; Beaud 2011). While private schools in Paris, are not necessarily better reputed than public institutions, this family's choice to send their children to a Catholic school oriented them geographically and ideologically toward the richly decorated buildings near the *Pereire* metro stop south of their apartment, away from the *périphérique* to the north and the higher concentrations of Muslims and immigrants who lived in that direction.

Theirs was the only Catholic family in my study. The majority of my research participants described themselves as Muslim, practicing and proclaiming their religion to various degrees. One father described himself as atheist and spoke highly of animism, describing it as Africans' original religion. The vast majority of Senegalese (94%) are Muslim

and 4% are Catholic. Analyzing everyday practices in both Muslim and Catholic families allowed me to examine the way religion influences notions of "integration" in France. Chapter four details how speakers communicate the social significance of religion among Senegalese in terms of economic moralities.

The location and type of housing inhabited by the five target households in my study also reflected their middle-class status. These families lived in the 14th, 17th, and 19th *arrondissements* and in the suburbs of Villejuif and Clamart. Among these, only the 19th *arrondissement* is commonly associated with large numbers of immigrants. Inhabitants of the neighborhoods occupied by my study's participants are, in general, somewhat better off the city's least prosperous and most ethnically diverse areas near the "*le périphérique,"* the circular highway marking Paris city limits. None of my research participants resided in Paris's stigmatized suburbs (*banlieues*), impoverished areas on the outskirts of French metropolitan areas. [10] The two families who lived outside Paris's city limits inhabited "*zones pavillonnaires*," residential areas that attract middle-class families who can afford larger homes there than in the city center. Unlike marginalized *banlieues* isolated from employers and public transit, these families lived in areas serviced by Parisian metro lines and busses.

All five of these families lived in "HLMs" (*habitation à loyer modéré*), state-subsidized public housing, but this does not necessarily index poverty in Paris. The maximum household revenue to live in an HLM is well above the poverty line: 54,109€ for a family of

[10] The word *la banlieue* does not refer exclusively to impoverished areas of ethnic segregation, but when used to refer to middle and upper class suburbs this is often qualified, i.e. "Paris's wealthy suburbs." Relatively well off suburbs are more often referred to by their specific city name (i.e. Neuilly-sur-Seine or Levallois), their inhabitants described as being from "*la région Parisien."* See Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2004 for discussion of the relative cultural and political-economic power of Paris's suburbs.

four and 72,443€ for a family of six[11]. The public housing complexes that most of my research participants occupied resembled private apartment buildings in many ways and were not immediately apparent from the outside. One family inhabited a visually marked "*barre HLM"* in Paris's 19th *arrondissement*: an austere, multi-story building constructed in the 1970s to accommodate rising numbers of immigrants from France's former colonies. The architecture of *barre HLM* is iconic of "*les cités"* high-rise housing complexes organized around a common courtyard that are prevalent in impoverished suburbs (*les banlieues*) outside of French metropolitan areas.

The families I worked with also verbally marked their status relative to other immigrants in geographic terms. Like many Parisians, they described the *banlieue* as being excessively far away and lacking people and places worth visiting. They similarly described the *Goutte d'or* neighborhood in Paris's 18th *arrondissement* as a hassle to visit. This area surrounding metros *Barbès* and *Chateau Rouge* is known for high concentrations of North and West African immigrants and stores where one might find African foods, cosmetics, and clothing that are difficult to obtain elsewhere in France. When I accompanied one mother and daughter to this neighborhood to buy hair extensions, the eleven-year old showed me how her mother had taught her to clutch her bag close to her chest to deter pickpockets. The African products sold and Wolof spoken on the streets near *Château Rouge* did not inspire confidence in this mother and daughter. They treated the neighborhood as a distant, dangerous space that required constant vigilance.

[11] On average, salaried employees in France earn 2,202 € per month (26,424 € annually) and minimum wage is1466.62 € per month (17,599.44€ annually). A dual-income, two-child household in which both adults earn the average wage would thus be eligible for housing in an HLM in Paris.

This dissertation is organized into eight chapters, which illuminate transnational families' struggles to maintain status in multiple hierarchal systems by strategically negotiating economic moralities. Chapter two begins by setting forth the theoretical framework of the dissertation, elaborating on the concepts of economic moralities, selective solidarity, and nested hierarchies that I have introduced here. Chapter three historically situates francophone, educated Senegalese in Paris by tracing the creation and disintegration of Franco-Senegalese (post)colonial ties. It shows how French "republican" policies during the colonial period established new hierarchies in Senegal, based on education, geography, and religion. It then illustrates how these forms of stratification facilitated the integration of educated Senegalese urbanites in France.

Chapter four demonstrates how French republican ideologies continue to rank Senegalese in contemporary France, via France's policy of immigrant integration. Exploring links between French state discourses and discussions in Senegalese households in Paris, it examines the ways educated Senegalese in Paris recursively reproduce axes of contrast that distinguish "immigrants" from "integrated" foreigners. It reveals the ways immigrants reproduce transnational hierarchies in their efforts to demonstrate their own belonging, laminating French hierarchies of belonging onto status hierarchies relevant in Senegal.

Chapter five analyzes household narratives of material exchange, illustrating the ways economic moralities emerge in storytelling, a moral act through which families construct normative expectations. I consider the ways that youth growing up in France become aware of and embody – or resist embodying – status positions in systems of rank-based redistribution in Senegal, through examination of French-born children's critical impressions of the

expectations of substantial gifts and material support their families encounter on return trips to Dakar. I examine the processes through which youth in France develop strategies of selective solidarity with kin back in Senegal as well as tactics to dodge frequent requests.

In Chapters six and seven, I analyze the ways children raised in France embody rank in transnational movement, considering how children growing up in France position themselves relative to their Senegal-based cousins during summer trips to Dakar. Chapter six considers the ways that children's rank in age-based hierarchies is shaped by migrant status. It demonstrates how children growing up in France manage to (both intentionally and inadvertently) take up positions of high rank relative to their age-mates in Dakar. It examines how economic moralities become meaningful to children in everyday of acts of sharing food, doing chores, and playing with other children, in which they position themselves in social hierarchies.

Chapter seven reveals a reversal of the usual flow of resources between transnational kin, illustrating the ways family members in Senegal work to establish transnational social relations with children growing up in France through gifts and material support. It examines an example of transnational "cross cousins," to illustrate how Senegalese strategically create and maintain *certain* kinship relations in ways that reproduce transnational hierarchies and post-colonial connections between francophone Senegalese across continents.

The conclusion argues that recourse to a repertoire of economic moralities allows individuals to navigate multiple systems of value and exploit marginal gains but requires increasingly selective solidarity, reinforcing transnational stratification. It argues that economic moralities are inherently political, showing how even children use them to position themselves in hierarchies of age, class, race, and religion. Children forge their own positions

in class-divided French society and in Senegalese hierarchies of gender and generation in which the social meanings of education and migration vary with context but are always intricately tied to obligation and entitlement.

SELECTIVE SOLIDARITY AND NESTED HIERARCHIES: THEORIZING THE MORALITIES OF DISTINCTION

"The policies of the Union … shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States."
– Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

"In Senegal, we have *teranga*. I'm not talking about friendship, I'm talking about *teranga* in the true sense of the word: welcome, mutual support, solidarity. You meet people and they will talk to you, help you … you go somewhere they'll invite you to eat."
– Aïda Leye, Paris February 22, 2014

"Solidarité" is a term that circulates in discourses on resource redistribution in French and European bureaucratic contexts as well as in household discussions among francophone Senegalese. A normative ideal, solidarity broadly refers to a supportive relationship between individuals who are linked through common interests and obligations. But the specific rights and responsibilities to which "solidarity" refers are contingent on context and scale. When kin petition for solidarity, the actions implied are different from those demanded by French immigration officers who emphasize solidarity as a fundamental French value. But at each of these levels, a call for solidarity represents an appeal to one's moral conscience aimed at directing the flow of material resources. These scales of solidarity correspond with multiple economic moralities to which individuals must respond in their daily lives. The tensions that arise between moral priorities, all of which place bids on families' limited resources, are at the heart of this dissertation.

Delivered during a gathering at the Sarr family's apartment in Paris, Aïda Leye's above comment sparked a conversation in which five adults who grew up in Dakar debated moral stances as the conversation shifted scales of solidarity. Abdoulaye Sarr and his wife N'deye were hosting Aïda and her husband Christophe, friends visiting from Dakar. Also

present that evening were Alioune, a friend from Dakar who, like Abdoulaye, had been living in Paris since the 1970s, the Sarr's eleven- and thirteen-year-old sons, my husband, and myself. After playfully testing my Wolof skills, Aïda asked if I knew of Senegalese *teranga*. When I offered the translation "*hospitalité,*" Aïda, unsatisfied, began to explain, comparing the Senegalese value to what she viewed as moral shortcomings in France. Her complaints that the French were unwilling to engage with and help others drew the attention of the other adults from Dakar, sparking a chain of anecdotes on the apathy and callousness they had encountered in Paris. The speakers aligned in their censure of Parisians who refused to stop to give directions or who, upon witnessing an accident or crime, continued walking, refusing to help the victim.

Aïda then lamented that in France no one trusts one another. She offered an example from earlier that day at the pharmacy, reporting that the pharmacist had refused to fill her prescription until the social security office had approved the quantity she requested. "What does social security have to do with anything?" she protested loudly. This time, however, her frustrations were met by silence, broken only when her husband exclaimed in exasperation, "They're the ones who pay!" Startled, the Sarr children looked up from their i-Pad and PlayStation Portable as the adults' voices overlapped, opposing Aïda's assessment and explaining the functioning of the French social security system to her. Alioune clarified that this procedure was necessary to circumvent those who would cheat the French system by taking large quantities of state subsidized medicine back to Africa to sell.

As Aïda's audience turned from collaborative support of her moral assessment to protest, speakers carefully navigated economic moralities, strategically creating similarity and difference between themselves and others in France and Africa. In celebrating *teranga* though

critique of selfish individualism, the five adults from Dakar rallied around values they viewed as characteristically Senegalese. But in their disagreement with Aïda's critique of the pharmacist's actions, the four other adults aligned with French priorities of solidarity at the national level, distancing themselves from Africans who would engage in illegal transnational exchange practices. At stake in these shifts in scale, were questions of group belonging. These adults voiced economic moralities that divided and ranked their social field, positioning themselves as moral members of multiple communities.

The three adults who lived in Paris and Christophe, Aïda's husband who had traveled with her from Dakar, framed themselves, first, as Senegalese, unified by economic moralities that are distinct (and superior) to the French. And then, they positioned themselves (in contrast to Aïda) in alignment with the French value of national solidarity, which underpins resource redistribution through the social security system. Distancing themselves from other Africans who might cheat the French state, these adults voiced *selective* solidarity with other Senegalese by alternating between the scales of group unity they highlighted as relevant.

Scales of Solidarity

The rights and responsibilities associated with "solidarity" are never extended indiscriminately but are always contingent on group membership. All solidarity is, in this sense, selective solidarity. With rights to resources at stake, the boundaries of belonging are constantly questioned, negotiations that intensify the context of economic decline. As individuals and entire nations struggle to manage increasingly limited resources, they carry out ever-more selective forms of solidarity. But it is not the moral commitment to solidarity itself that is put in question. Indeed, calls for "solidarity" often increase in the context of

escalating inequalities. Instead, the practices that index one's eligibility to benefit from relationships of "solidarity" are redefined or examined with a fine-toothed comb. In France, this may be seen in tightening immigration policies since the 1970s. In transnational kinship relations too, practices of resource redistribution that reinforce familial relations draw only *certain* kin closer together across geographic distances.

The European Union and the French state both characterize solidarity as a fundamental value and a guiding principle of their immigration policies. It is included among the six basic rights guaranteed by the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. French integration policy categorizes solidarity as a key French value, alongside the liberty, equality, and fraternity demanded by the French motto (ANAEM 2004). At the national level, solidarity is characterized as a relationship between citizens and assured by the government, associated with worker's rights and the health care and social security benefits granted by social welfare systems. Solidarity is also used to describe the relationship among EU member states. The "Solidarity Clause" in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) demands that EU countries "act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster" (Eur-Lex 2014). Article 80 of the TFEU on the "on the principle of solidarity" requires the "fair sharing of responsibility" between Member States, in questions of border checks, asylum, and immigration (European Parliament 2011).

During the period of escalating inequality that this dissertation documents, solidarity was debated, demanded, and denied at the levels of the EU, the French nation, and within the transnational families I studied. With rising political economic tensions, calls for solidarity accelerated. Mass migrations in 2015 put the EU's commitment to solidarity to the test

(European Commission 2015; Parkes 2015). The term solidarity circulated in European media and political documents as member states debated how to share the responsibility of receiving refugees (Patrick 2015; European Comission 2015).

In the context of French immigration policy, state discourses frame solidarity as integral to the government's contractual relationship with residents. In the civic-training sessions I attended, French immigration officers described solidarity as a fundamental French value that immigrants must uphold to demonstrate their will to integrate. The video, "Living Together in France," outlined solidarity under the rubric of fraternity. The film's narrator explained that by paying taxes, French residents participate in "national solidarity," which permits the functioning of state services like hospitals and schools. In a slideshow at a civic training I attended, solidarity and secularism supplanted fraternity entirely, listed alongside liberty and equality as the four fundamental principles of the French Republic.

The attention devoted to the notion of solidarity in official discourses aimed at immigrants speaks to fears in France that foreigners take unfair advantage of the benefits of an eroding French welfare system. Like tropes of "welfare queens" in the U.S. (see di Leonardo 1998), in France, stereotypes circulate of immigrants who have children for the express purpose of collecting welfare benefits or who misappropriate state funds by spending them in their home country (Chojnicki 2012).[12] In light of these images of immigrants who profit from French solidarity, immigration officials' emphasis on this value appears to be a moral reminder of the responsibilities that accompany the rights of French residents. Since the 1970s, economic downturn has fed anxieties that the state can no longer afford to offer

[12]These tropes may be seen, for example, in French rap lyrics like Doc Gynéco's 1996 hit "*Les Filles Du Moove*" (Girls of the Moove) or Youssoupha's 2007 song "*Les apparences nous mentent,*" (Appearances Lie to Us) which describe people who have children in order to spend state welfare funds on brand-name clothing or on vacation in their country of origin (*au bled*).

support to all the immigrant families arriving on French soil. Chapter three details how the requirements to migrate to France legally, which determine who can reap the benefits of national solidarity, have systematically increased since the 1970s. Rather than transform the economic moralities made explicit in government discourses and legal policies, the French state has managed burdens and benefits of solidarity through the contraction of the categories of eligibility.

Senegalese also treat solidarity as a fundamental social value. But African speakers often conceptualize this principle on a smaller scale, at an interpersonal level. Narratives like that voiced by Aïda Leye, cited at the start of this chapter, elaborate the notion of solidarity through the metaphor of food sharing. Alimentary idioms frame solidarity as a relationship realized through face-to-face exchange, unlike the solidarity of European welfare states, which is written into law and organized by government institutions.

Throughout Africa, a widespread symbolic association exists between food sharing and virtuous solidarity (Osseo-Asare 2005; Shipton 2007; Ferguson 2006; Buggenhagen 2012). Feeding others is said to demonstrate generosity and largesse, by taking up the moral comportment and material responsibility of a high ranked benefactor. Sharing food is a means of supporting dependents and investing in "wealth in people" (Guyer and Eno Belinga 1995; Bledsoe 1980), which connects individuals in networks of interdependency. Exchanges of food may provide the foundation for other forms of material exchange (monetary support, gifts, etc.) (Riesman 1992; Bledsoe 1990 Shipton 2007; Piot 1999; Ferguson 2015).

Beth Buggenhagen (2012) describes the ways women in Dakar strive to create relations of reciprocity by sharing meals and giving gifts. At feasts and family celebrations, she explains, individuals worked to extend "the rights and obligations of kin to non-kin and

thereby enlarged themselves in space and time" (2012: 154). Through language that categorizes and characterizes exchange and eating practices, speakers describe food sharing as a virtuous means of circulating wealth. This is particularly significant in African contexts in which the accumulation of capital is not an unequivocally valued, but might be construed as morally suspect, the result of malevolent acts.

Jane Guyer explains that among Africans, the store of wealth is often not an end in itself, but rather a "medium for relational life" (2004: 70). As such, individual accumulation can provoke negative reactions including "the alienations of social relationships, theft, witchcraft accusations, or magical attack" (Newell 2012: 4). Newell explains that in Côte d'Ivoire, "Any dramatic increase in wealth was evidence to people's friends and family members that they were not fulfilling their social obligations to share income" (ibid.). The notion that, in order to avoid money's corrupting qualities, wealth must "circulate visibly and constantly" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 172) is a theme throughout the Africanist ethnographic record (Geschiere 1997; Newell 2012; Buggenhagen 2012). The accumulation of wealth in the absence of circulation, or, in the alimentary metaphor, eating without sharing, is thus potentially sinister. James Ferguson points out that that in Africa, eating is widely associated "with both political domination and sorcery" (2006: 75). He explains that Bayart's concept of "*la politique du ventre* (the politics of the belly)," is particularly salient within this moral cosmology, according to which the corporeal accumulation of wealth can signify nefarious power obtained through witchcraft.

Senegalese describe eating alone as selfish and even dangerous. In parables and everyday discussions, the failure to share food due to inattentiveness, or worse, deliberate deception is treated as an example, par excellence, of greed (Diop 1966; Boucoum et al.1997).

Children are instructed to avoid eating in the street, so that they do not incite jealousy among those who have nothing to eat. Such a public act of consumption is said to expose them to harmful spirits (*jinne*) such that they might fall victim of the "evil eye" (*cat*) (Gamble 1957: 75). Moral and mystical interpretations of individualized forms of eating simultaneously encourage food sharing and establish parallels between acts of commensality and other forms of exchange, encouraging the creation and maintenance of interpersonal networks of solidarity through material redistribution and the constant circulation of wealth.

The French term *solidarité* may be glossed in Wolof as *dimbalante* (to help one another) or *jappalante* (lit. to "hold" or to "catch" one another). Both terms use the suffix "ante" to communicate reciprocity in the acts of helping or holding. *Jappalante,* like the notion of "lending a hand" in English, communicates the idea that a complicated task requires the combined effort of many. The term *jappalante* is commonly used to describe forms of solidarity expected in the context of life cycle events like funerals or weddings. In these cases, whether one gives or receives material support is a function of the event at hand rather than the relative status of giver and receiver. For example, guests at a wedding – even those substantially less well off than those celebrating the marriage – offer gifts. The sort of solidarity conveyed by the term *dimbalante*, meaning to help one another, in contrast, presumes and entails a hierarchal relationship between giver and receiver. While the help (*dimb*) offered in an act characterized as *dimbalante* may be reciprocal, it is not symmetrical. Instead, *dimbalante* draws attention to a hierarchal relation that exists between those giving and receiving aid, the flow of support organized by this asymmetrical complementarity. Solidarity in this case presumes and entails hierarchal relations, unlike the equalizing ideals of solidarity in welfare states.

In Senegal and throughout Africa, social life is explicitly organized according to multiple, mutually imbricated hierarchies of gender and generation, class and caste, etc. Of course, individuals' lives everywhere are organized according to overlapping hierarchies, as studies of intersectionality have repeatedly argued (Crenshaw 1991; Collins 2000, 2002; Carbado et. al 2013). But the hierarchal system associated with economic moralities of "rank-based redistribution" is distinct in the explicitness with which contrasts between individuals are emphasized, asymmetries expected and drawn on in unfolding interaction. In this cultural framework, linguistic and material exchanges presume and entail inequalities between interacting participants (Irvine 2001; Buggenhagen 2012). The normative expectations that organize exchanges between individuals of high and low status (elders and juniors, wealthy and poor, migrants and those left behind, men and women, etc.) function according to parallel logics, in which low ranking individuals work for their superiors and those of high rank must, in turn, support their dependents.

Economic Moralities

I use the term "economic moralities" to describe normative expectations related to material exchange, obligation, and entitlement. Bill Maurer proposed this inversion of the term "moral economy" in 2009, without specifying how the two concepts might diverge. In my usage of the term, the heuristic value of "economic moralities" is twofold: 1) it draws attention to the multiplicity of moral stances that concurrently organize material exchange 2) it transcends dichotomous portrayals of informal, "moral economies" and formal, market economies.

I approach economic moralities as ideologies that endow acts of material exchange with social meaning and ethical valence. Economic moralities represent a form of "semiotic ideology," what Webb Keane calls the "basic assumptions about what signs are and how they function in the world" (2003: 419). These ideologies are frameworks through which participants "interpret and rationalize" the "modes of signification at play within a particular historical and social formation" (Keane 2003: 410-11).

Founded on the assertion that all exchange systems are socially embedded (Keane 2008; Maurer 2006; Granovetter 1985), the term economic moralities applies equally to ideals of individualism and agency that underpin "modern" market economies and to values of reciprocity and the prioritization of social relations that scholars describe as central to "moral economies" (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976; Fassin 2012). Examining multiple economic moralities side-by-side reveals emic rankings of systems of exchange, shedding light on the ways stratification is reproduced and transformed as individuals draw on and respond to diverse moral stances. Like all values, economic moralities are necessarily associated with hierarchal ordering, as Dumont reminds us, "to adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy" (1969: 87).

The economic moralities of "modern" societies are premised on an implicit (favorable) comparison to the values and practices of "traditional" or otherwise "non-modern" groups. Modern economic moralities are founded on the expectation that economics is (or should ideally be) separate from the private beliefs and values of an individual or family. These modern values are underpinned by the evolutionary narrative, which claims that a "Great Transformation" (Polanyi 1944) took place as exchange developed "from socially embedded to disembedded and abstracted economic forms" (Maurer 2006: 15). This notion of the

economy as a space inhabited by "rational" economic actors is rooted in the Enlightenment project of filtering ethics out of economics to render the latter a "rational" science, fit for the public sphere. These discourses simultaneously distance the strategic calculations of "homo economicus" from morally charged relations of family, love, and care (Cole 2014; Coe 2014; Zelizer 2005).

Modern assumptions that a division exists between economic and ethical spheres are not neutral characterizations, but represent a particular *moral* stance, linked to hierarchal configurations. The supposition that market economies are not bound up with morality is a basic premise of the "moral narrative of modernity" (Keane 2013), which reproduces unequal power relations necessary to capitalism (Keane 2013, 2007; Asad 2003; Austen 1993; Maurer 2006). Bruno Latour argues that a separation between economics and morality requires the social work of "purification." He reminds us that if "the adjective 'modern' designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time" it simultaneously defines "by contrast, an archaic and stable past" (Latour 1993: 10). Echoing Latour, Keane argues that the modern narrative "involves winners and losers," in that it situates modernity "within a normative, and often desire-saturated, view of history" (2007: 83, 2013: 160).

According to modern economic moralities, the emancipated modern subject should not be indebted to far-flung kinship networks or obliged to engage in the ("irrational") rituals of exchange through which they are enacted. Instead, modern kinship is organized according to bourgeois individualism, with the nuclear family as its basic socio-economic unit, while polygyny and high fertility are associated with "traditional" familial arrangements. Modern marriage should ideally be a pact between two individuals, founded on romantic love, rather than a strategic decision made by extended families (Cole 2014). Children's value in a modern

family is not calculated in the economic terms of household labor or the eventual promise of filial piety, but in terms of affective, sentimental value (Zelizer 1985). Keane points out that the moral narrative of modernity produces a "largely tacit set of expectations about what a modern, progressive person, subject, and citizen, should be" (2013:160). The failure to embody these characteristics is treated as "an ethical failing" that poses a threat to individuals and entire societies, as in the "danger that headcovering seems to pose to the French" (Keane 2013: 2610).

This dissertation is driven by the analysis of social interactions in which modern morals of equality between citizens intersect with economic moralities of rank-based redistribution, examining how social actors compare and contrast or combine and collapse these moral frameworks in acts of exchange. Drawing these two moral logics together under the analytic of economic moralities sheds light on the ways that "modern" economic logic, which purports to be divested of moral subjectivity, naturalizes evolutionary ideologies that reinforce global hierarchies between Africans and Europeans, as well as between (potentially problematic) "immigrants" and successfully "integrated" foreigners. In spite of republican ideals of equality, the economic moralities of French state discourses paradoxically presuppose and entail *hierarchal* relations between "modern" French and "traditional" people, practices, and societies who have yet to evolve past unequal social and economic relations.

To shed light on the ways that both individuals and states draw on economic moralities to position themselves and others in political economic hierarchies, I use the term economic moralities to refer at once to visceral, "gut" feelings associated with giving, taking, and sharing and to the values that underpin the economic law and policy of nations and international accords. The concept of "economic moralities" draws together, on the one hand,

the moralities of everyday family life, studied by scholars of language socialization (Schieffelin 1990; Ochs and Taylor 1989; Kulick and Schieffelin 2004) and food studies (Fischler 1990, 2011; Ochs et al 1996; Ochs and Shohet 2006; Paugh and Izquierdo 2009; Aronsson and Gottzén 2011). And, on the other hand, it encompasses group values that organize material exchange examined by scholars of economic anthropology (Brown & Milgram, 2009; Gregory 1982, 1997; Bloch & Parry, 1989; Keane 2003; Maurer 2006) and sociology (Granovetter 1985; Zelizer 1985, 2005).

Scholarship examining families' everyday speaking and eating practices has provided rich insights into the processes through which families negotiate notions of morality (Baquedano-López 1997; Ochs and Kremer-Sadlik 2007, 2013; Fader 2012). Ochs and Izquierdo (2010) argue that moral instruction is necessarily affective and embodied, experienced and performed corporeally. These scholars have identified mealtime as a key site for socialization into moral ideologies (Pan et al. 1999; Blum-Kulka 1997; Wilk 2010).

As daily form of material exchange, food sharing provides a lens into the reproduction of economic moralities. Co-commensals negotiate self-interest and collective entitlement, autonomy and interdependence through mealtime interaction (Fischler and Masson 2008; Paugh and Izquierdo 2009; Anving and Sellerberg 2010; Wilk 2010; Karrebaek 2012). Schieffelin (1990) analyzed how children develop the linguistic skills to competently share and to refuse to share through repeated routines surrounding food sharing (direct instruction, teasing, shaming, etc.). Rabain (1979) demonstrated how rural Senegalese caregivers link individuals relationally through talk surrounding food, teaching children with whom they are to share and from whom they are entitled a portion.

Embodied through material exchange, economic moralities, like Bourdieu's habitus, are often "internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history" (1990: 56). Embedded in the presuppositions that underpin exchange, economic moralities justify and explain asymmetrical access to resources. Bourdieu revealed social actors' economic choices to be "the product of particular economic condition," arguing that notions of so-called "rational" economic behaviors obfuscate "the economic and cultural capital required in order to seize the 'potential opportunities' theoretically available to all" (1990: 64).

Bourdieu's practice theory is adept at revealing subtle ways that hierarchies are naturalized. But his emphasis on the reproduction of a dominant power structure falls prey to evolutionary logic, overlooking the potential benefits that "precapitalist habitus" acquired on, what he calls, an "economy of good faith," could provide in the context of a "universe within which, … 'business is business,'" (Bourdieu 1990:62; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:130, 97). Bourdieu's observation that Algerian peasants "forcibly thrown into a capitalist cosmos" as a result of colonialism were "ill-adjusted to the objective chances" of the market sheds light on the reproduction of colonial power hierarchies (Bourdieu & Wacquant1992: 130). But descriptions of habitus mismatched with the "field" does little to elucidate the ways individuals shift between diverse practices of exchange and cannot grapple with permeability and overlap of multiple value systems.

Drawing theoretically on linguistic anthropologists' examinations of language/semiotic ideologies (Kroskrity 2000; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity 1998; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994), my study sheds light on the ways individuals take part in multiple economic moralities to navigate the ever-shifting stakes of their everyday exchanges of food and funds. Unlike Bourdieu's subconscious dispositions, language ideologies are

located in the self-reflexive realm of metapragmatic discourse: talk that explicitly evaluates, remarks on, judges, or explains pragmatic acts and guides the interpretation of semiotic activities (Silverstein 1979, 2003; Keane 2008). Scholars of language ideologies do not, however, take informants' self-reflexive explanations at face value, but rather consider "the terms and presuppositions of metapragmatic discourse, not just its assertions," in order to analyze taken for granted assumptions (Irvine 2001: 25).

Linguistic anthropologists' investigations of language ideologies have both built on and broken from Bourdieu's theory, providing a framework for the analysis of how reflexive evaluations of semiotic communication shape unconscious practice. For example, in her seminal work on Wolof language ideologies, Judith Irvine (1974, 1989, 2001) identified an axis of contrast that Senegalese villagers described as distinguishing the speaking styles of members of high- and low-ranking hereditary occupational orders (commonly glossed as castes). She notes that Senegalese represented "griot speech" (*waxu gewel*) as impulsive and hyperbolic, whereas they described "noble speech " (*waxu géér*) as a laconic, terse way of speaking. Irvine then revealed that Senegalese villagers regularly took up speaking styles reflexively associated with caste in order to mark subtler differences of rank (Irvine 1989, 2001). For instance, a noble might use "a 'griotlike' style of speaking when addressing a noble kinsman from whom he or she wants to ask a favor" (Irvine 1990:136). *Griot* and noble speech, Irvine argues, "invoke a kind of metaphor of high and low ranks" that can be used to "define (in this case) an act of petitioning and to make the petition persuasive" (Irvine 1990:136).

Like language ideologies, economic moralities encompass the conscious and unconscious, located in the dialectic relationship between values participants make explicit and the implicit assumptions on which their practices are based. Analyzing declarations of values alongside tacit expectations sheds light on social actors' efforts to harmonize their actions with the morals they proclaim and to reconcile their own position with those voiced by their children or parents, working to minimize, mask, or justify gaps between these moral stances.

In French state discourses and discussions in Senegalese households in Paris, social actors communicate economic moralities, which trace boundaries of belonging in French society and in Senegalese kinship networks alike, shaping the rights to resources belonging affords. Speakers draw on economic moralities in interaction to position themselves relative to others, drawing and redrawing lines of inclusion and exclusion. French republican ideologies provide a legal foundation for discussions in which Senegalese recursively categorize minority groups, creating nested hierarchies of belonging in France.

By "nested hierarchies," I mean asymmetrical relationships that recur in a repeating pattern as a single axis of contrast is applied at various scales. These embedded structures are the result of a semiotic process that Irvine and Gal refer to as "(fractal) recursivity," namely, "the projection of an opposition, salient at one level of relationship, onto some other level" (2000: 38). Irvine's example of a noble who speaks in a "griotlike" fashion in order to petition for material support illustrates the process of recursivity: the axis of contrast that Senegalese villagers associated with caste-based distinctions in verbal styles was reproduced among

members of the same caste to index (or establish) a difference in rank that could justify a request for support on the part of the noble who spoke like a low-status person.

Analysis of nested hierarchies that result from processes of recursivity draws attention to social work carried out at each iteration, or "nesting," of a dichotomy. By strategically drawing attention to a given level of contrast, individuals manage social meanings in ways that have political and economic consequences (Cohen and Comaroff 1976; Comaroff and Roberts 1977; Bledsoe and Murphy 1987; Newell 2012). Acts of exchange organized according to rank-based redistribution involve the constant reproduction of nested hierarchies: low-status beneficiaries in one context go on to take up the role of high-ranked benefactor in another. For example, children who receive gifts of food from adults may go on to act as high-ranking benefactor among children by redistributing the food they received. The following chapters examine how Senegalese in Dakar and Paris reproduce nested hierarchies by strategically drawing on economic moralities to manage their rights and responsibilities to resources in diverse social relations according to multiple normative frameworks.

FROM *ÉVOLUÉ TO INTEGRÉ:* REPUBLICANISM AND THE SHARED HISTORY OF PARIS AND DAKAR

Hierarchies of education, geography, and religion that divide contemporary Senegalese in Paris and Dakar are rooted in the colonial period, linked through the intergenerational transmission of social and economic capital as well as ideological continuity between France's colonial "*mission civilisatrice"* (civilizing mission) and its contemporary policy of immigrant "*intégration*." Examination of Republican discourses in Franco-Senegalese history reveals how colonial efforts to establish formal education and economic systems established new hierarchies in Senegal, favoring an educated, urban, francophone elite.

This chapter traces the movement of individuals and ideologies between Dakar and Paris relative to the historical development and transformation of cultural, political, and economic ties between the African and European capitals. It demonstrates how the maintenance of Franco-Senegalese post-Independence political-economic ties reinforced the privilege of educated Senegalese in both France and Senegal, a status position that continues to stratify Senegalese transnationally. I argue that tightening French immigration laws founded on a republican model of integration have produced two distinct migration trajectories: a shrinking legal path to France through education and employment on the formal economy and an expanding, illegal route through informal transnational connections.

The previous chapter introduced the argument that economic moralities underpinning "moral narratives of modernity" (Keane 2007) evaluate economic practices, ranking people in an evolutionary logic. Here, I demonstrate how the concepts of "civilization" and "modernity" shaped value-laden beliefs about material obligation and entitlement among Senegalese in

both France and Senegal, transforming extant hierarchies between individuals and groups. I first examine the colonial policies of France's Third Republic to historically situate the privilege of French-educated Senegalese urbanites. Second, I analyze Senegalese immigration to France during the period following Senegalese independence in 1960 to illustrate how the Franco-Senegalese official policy of "cooperation" reproduced the elite status of educated Senegalese. Finally, I consider how this group's status has shifted with global political-economic transformations toward neoliberal capitalism and tightening French immigration laws since the 1970s. I argue that the economic moralities used to justify and explain material inequalities between French citizens and colonial subjects during France's Third Republic (1870-1940) continue to legitimize hierarchies of belonging among Senegalese in France, reinforcing stratification among Senegalese populations transnationally.

The title of this chapter juxtaposes the French terms *évolué*, meaning literally "(one who is/has) evolved," and "*integré,*" "(one who is/has) integrated," to draw attention to the administrative heritage that links French republican policies during the colonial period and those applied in France's contemporary immigration policies. *Évolué* was a term used by French colonial administrators to refer to francophone Senegalese elites who supported colonial projects (Wilder 2005: 121). In colonial Senegal, higher education was restricted to *évolués* who served as "a vanguard of economic and social development who would function as intermediaries between administrators and indigenous populations" (Wilder 2005: 121). I use this term, rooted in the evolutionary logic of the French colonial administration, to highlight the imperial roots of French education as a strategy for economic and geographic mobility, which in French state discourses has long been directly linked to French citizenship through "assimilation" in colonial terms and "integration" in the language of current

immigration policy. This brief history of French colonial and immigration policy tacks back and forth between Senegal and France, building on the work of scholars who advocate for the analysis of France and its former colonies as a single unit (Balibar 2002; Wilder 2005; Bancel et al. 2005; Hale 2009, 2011; Thomas 2007; Fernando 2014). It does so by following those Senegalese who received a formal French education, in Senegal or France, to illuminate how Republican policies aimed at universal inclusion through education were also integral to processes of exclusion, distancing, and stratification, which have divided Senegalese populations in Africa and Europe since.

Republican Logic and Law in the French Colonial Civilizing Mission

Under France's Third Republic, Dakar became the capital of the colonial territory of French West Africa (AOF). Between 1895 and 1960, the city was the seat of much of the colonial government, including the territory's highest administrator, the governor general. Dakar was thus an important site for the production of republican discourses that structured colonial policy across West Africa. During the Third Republic, a key aspect of French republicanism emerged, which continues to underpin France's contemporary immigration policy: the state's contractual approach to citizenship based on individual merit and willingness to "assimilate" (in colonial language) or "integrate" (in contemporary terms).

In both continental France and its colonies, the return to republicanism in 1870 was characterized by a commitment to establishing: 1) state secularism, 2) mass public education, and 3) national linguistic unity. Following the fall of the Second French Empire, the Third Republic formally broke from the Napoleon-era Concordat system in which Catholicism held an official position as the majority church of France and Protestantism and Judaism were

considered state recognized religions. Under Napoleon III, Catholic congregations had controlled public education, and religion was taught in public schools. In continental France, the Third Republic saw a rise in tensions surrounding the political power of the Catholic Church. This anti-clerical movement culminated in the 1905 law of separation of the churches and state, now considered the cornerstone of France's policy of secularism (*laïcité*). This law ostensibly established state "neutrality" toward religion, relegating religious practices to the private sphere (Fernando 2014:10). The government of the Third Republic also passed laws making secular public education free and compulsory for residents of continental France.

The French government's pedagogical projects were part of its efforts at nation building through the spread of the French language via the formal educational system. Well into the nineteenth century, most citizens of continental France continued to speak regional dialects (*patois*) as their first language. In 1863, one fourth of the French population spoke no French at all (Weber 1976: 67). Prohibiting the use of regional dialects in public schools, the government attempted to "turn peasants into Frenchmen" through instruction of French (Weber 1976). In Senegal, French colonizers employed the same tactics as in the French provinces to promote French fluency: "marginalizing, inferiorizing, and infantilizing" native languages for the benefit of national unity (Cissé 2005: 109; see also Versluys 2010). In the words of Ngugi, "the night of the sword and the bullet was followed by the morning of the chalk and the blackboard" (1986:9). French colonial administrators pursued the colonial policy of assimilation through language socialization in the educational system (Versluys 2010: 93; Cissé 2005: 109).

In West Africa, France's Third Republic carried out colonial expansion and rationalization under the guise of the French "*mission civilisatrice*" (civilizing mission). While

many European powers at that time justified colonization in the name of "civilization," Conklin points out that only in France "was this claim elevated to the realm of official imperial doctrine" (1997:1). This terminology hinges on a presupposition of French cultural and economic superiority, which colonial administrators asserted entailed the moral obligation to "improve their subjects' standard of living" through the rational development of colonies' natural and human resources (Conklin 1997: 6).

The moral logic underlying the pact colonial administrators viewed themselves as enacting with African subjects was fundamentally economic. In their view, France's relative wealth and industrial success compelled a contractual relationship with colonial subjects, which called France to invest in the development of the colonies. This gesture was said to require, in turn, reciprocal efforts from colonial subjects. Colonial administrators asked African subjects to change the ways they earned, spent, and redistributed resources, to conform to the formal economic system colonizers worked to establish. Paying taxes to the colonial government was among the more contentious changes demanded (Conklin 1997: 8) But this was only part of a broader transformation the French attempted to initiate toward a modern class system, which included efforts to encourage wage labor, to secure the legal protection of private property, and to orient Africans toward the ideals of bourgeois individualism (Wilder 2005: 17).

Economic moralities expressed in colonial discourses explained and justified colonial inequalities by framing the relationship between colonizer and colonized as one of reciprocal moral obligation between unequal parties, often explained through the metaphor of a teacher—student relationship (Wilder 2005: 125). Indeed, French colonizers undertook their moral obligation toward their African subjects, quite literally, as teachers, by establishing

mass public education to ready Africans to take up positions in the modern economy. The morality colonial administrators attributed to colonial efforts to establish formal education and economic systems in Africa is clear in the titles of publications like "A Moral Conquest: Education in French West Africa"[13] by George Hardy, a pioneer of public education in Francophone Africa.

Colonial efforts to establish a mass education system were premised on the notion that public schooling and French language training could offer individual Africans the tools to access French civilization and the political and economic opportunities it provided. According to this logic, education would allow one to "evolve" and become "civilized," which, in colonial discourse, equated to the notion that education could make one *French*. This assertion was written into law in 1916, when francophone residents of Dakar and the three other coastal cities in Senegal called the "Four Communes" became eligible for full French citizenship (Wilder 2005: 129).

Until Senegalese independence in 1960, certain exceptional residents of the Four Communes were able obtain French nationality without ever having travelled to continental France. Among Senegalese urbanites, only "exemplary individuals" were granted French nationality (Wilder 2005: 109). Contenders for citizenship were required to demonstrate their devotion to France through their French reading and writing skills (Wilder 2005: 144). They also had to illustrate that they were sufficiently detached from African customs and traditions by pledging allegiance to the French civil code and forswearing the use of Muslim law, which was widely used in Senegal to settle civil affairs (Kopytoff 2015: 321). Granting citizenship on the basis of individual merit marked a change from the model of the Second Republic, in

[13] Hardy, Georges (1917), *Une conquête morale : L'enseignement en A.O.F*, Paris: Armand Colin

which the rights of citizenship were extended en masse to the inhabitants of certain colonies. In Senegal, during the Third Republic, citizenship rights were earned *individually*, contingent on one's language skills and education as well as one's willingness to align with French values (Conklin 1997: 104).

In both continental France and French West Africa, the state policies of the Third Republic treated education and French language training as transformative processes that could make French citizens out of colonial subjects in Africa and peasants in Europe. Despite the universalizing aims of mass education, French colonial policy was also founded on the assumption that only *particular* individuals – emblematized by the figure of the "*évolué*" – were capable of achieving the transformation promised by a French education.

While the purported goal of establishing a formal education system was to promote equality among residents of colonial France, education created its own hierarchies, dividing francophone, educated Senegalese from illiterate, non-francophones. While French schools in city centers enabled the advancement of Senegalese urbanites, the colonial administration deliberately limited villagers' opportunities for advancement through education. Rural schools taught pupils only the French language and basic mathematics, attempting to provide them "with practical skills appropriate for their rural lives" (Wilder 2005: 120). Wilder attributes this inconsistency to a fundamental double bind that characterized French republican policies of the colonial period: for colonial administrators, Senegalese "evolution" by way of education was at once a desirable ideal and an immediate danger, in that "educated Africans could also threaten the colonial order they had been formed to serve" (Wilder 2005: 125; see also Chafer 2003: 159).

In addition to introducing new hierarchies based on education and geography, colonial

interventions also divided Senegalese in terms of religion. Colonial officials in the Third Republic worked to establish new secular public schools alongside extant Catholic missionary-led ones (Conklin 1997: 75; Wilder 2005). The francophone education provided at each of these institutions operated in contrast to the Koranic schools to which Senegalese had sent their children for centuries (Ware 2009). The religious training in Arabic that children received at these Islamic institutions not only failed to provide opportunities through the formal economic system the colonizers established, this sort of devotion to Islam could impede efforts to demonstrate a commitment to French civic values in order to gain French citizenship.

Working within a republican framework that valued equality, French administrators legitimized their hierarchal relationship to African colonial subjects by drawing on economic moralities that posited the French and Senegalese to be economically tied in an asymmetrical but reciprocal relationship. This link was founded on an axis of contrast, presumed to divide French and Senegalese in terms of "civilization" as evidenced by France's material wealth. By transforming *certain* Senegalese into full French citizens, colonial administrators reproduced this axis of contrast in new contexts, projecting the relationship of colonizers and colonized peoples onto French citizens and colonial subjects in Africa, urbanites and villagers, and educated francophones and illiterate, non-francophone Senegalese.

In claiming the economic opportunities and political rights afforded by a formal, French education, francophone Senegalese took up the moral logic colonial administrators used to justify material inequalities between French colonizers and African subjects. In this example of the process Irvine and Gal call "recursivity" (2000: 38), educated Senegalese urbanites reapplied an axis of contrast the French used to distinguish Europeans from

Africans, at another level of relationship, in order to differentiate themselves from uneducated and rural Senegalese and legitimize their unequal access to the resources that circulated on the formal economy.

Hierarchal relations linked to formal French schooling did not, however, replace extant forms of stratification in Senegal. Instead, these emergent hierarchies were mapped onto notions of rank based on age, gender, kinship, and caste (Cole 2011). Cole argues that the introduction of schooling, and with it new economies and types of work, did not erase "older notions of what it meant to be an adult or how one was supposed to establish authority through participating in networks of exchange" but provided a new means to become "big," or achieve "a desirable social status and age" (2011: 78).

During the colonial period, French republican ideologies aimed at achieving universal equality and freedom, paradoxically contributed to the division of the Senegalese population according to education, geography, and religion. Wilder (2005) argues that these apparent contradictions are part and parcel of French republicanism. He argues that the racializing practices of the colonial government were able to coexist with its claims to respect Africans as equals through a mechanism of "temporal deferral," which allowed cultural racism to operate within the Republican framework. Africans in the AOF, he argues, were treated as perpetual political minors – eternal students – whose "political immaturity" prevented them from accessing full French citizenship.

By highlighting similarity between *certain* Senegalese and French colonizers, colonial interventions in French West Africa brought certain Africans closer to metropolitan France and French culture while establishing new distinctions among Senegalese. The following section shows how axes of contrast dividing francophone urbanites from uneducated and rural

Senegalese were reproduced during the period of decolonization and carried into new contexts through migration.

Independently Reproducing Francophone Privilege

Following Senegalese independence in 1960, hierarchies that emerged during the colonial period were reinforced through France and Senegal's official policy of political-economic "cooperation." During decolonization, paths toward economic mobility available to Senegalese shifted. While educated urbanites maintained their privileged access to salaried employment and legal migration trajectories, the post-colonial period ushered in economic downturn in rural Senegal.

After Senegalese independence, French fluency and schooling continued to be associated with status and economic stability. But rather than indexing "civilization" and "Frenchness," as colonial administrators had claimed, in independent Senegal, education became increasingly associated with *modernity*. Cole points out that throughout Africa, the period surrounding decolonization was characterized by a widespread belief in formal education as an agent of modernization (2011: 67). Immediately following independence, most Senegalese perceived success in the French school system to guarantee access to salaried employment, often as a civil servant in Senegal's socialist government (Kane 2011: 224).

The value of francophone education in independent Senegal was contingent on the country's continued orientation toward its former colonizer. This position was called into question at the time of independence by scholars and activists who advocated for Wolof to be chosen as Senegal's official language. French had been the language of government and

education during the colonial period, but only a small minority of Senegalese was francophone (Cissé 2005), while Wolof served as a common language for 80 to 90% of Senegalese (Versluys 2010: 97; O'Brien 1998: 30; Swigart 2001:96). At independence, Senegalese scholar and politician, Cheikh Anta Diop led a movement for Wolof literacy,[14] which advocated the use of Wolof in education, politics, and media (O'Brien 1998: 39; Cissé 2005: 109-110). But politicians like Léopold Senghor, who became the first president of independent Senegal, argued that the value of French as an international language justified its preservation as official language (Swigart 1992: 84; see also O'Brien 1998: 37-8). Senghor reasoned, "the best way to prove the value of black culture was to steal the colonizers' own weapons and be an even better student" (cited in Wilder 2005:151). Senegalese students, teachers, and parents also feared the loss of economic opportunities associated with French skills (Swigart 1992: 92; O'Brien 1998: 37-8). At independence, Senghor's francocentric approach prevailed and French was chosen as the sole official language of the Senegalese state.

While Wolof would have been a more democratic language choice, it was in the interest of educated elites to protect the official status of French (O'Brien 1998; Swigart 2001: 95). The privilege of francophone Senegalese depended on the notion that a French education had transformed them, making them modern. According to this logic, their French speaking skills, indexical of formal schooling, were construed as evidence of "modernity." This naturalization of the distinction of educated Senegalese, served to legitimize their political power and economic status. Using their French language skills to access modern jobs in state bureaucracy and French companies, educated Senegalese took up the French republican

[14] Irvine also notes the existence of "an early effort to institute Wolof literacy and Wolof medium education" (2000: 332) in Senegal during the early 19th century.

ideological framework and its associated economic moralities, which justified and explained their unequal access to these resources. Aligning themselves with "modern" France, Senegal's francophone elites inherited the double bind of colonial republicanism: while they advocated equality and advancement through education, their own position was contingent on *limiting* the number of Senegalese who could benefit from the resources a French education could provide.

During the period immediately following independence, Senegal maintained a particularly close relationship with France. This was clear in Franco-Senegalese bi-lateral accords, which assured preferential trade agreements as well as visas for Senegalese students in France (Wilder 2005: 151). This privileged relationship was part of France's official policy of "cooperation" with its former colonies in West Africa (Martin 1995: 6). Unlike the violent uprisings that characterized decolonization in North Africa, especially Algeria, transitions to independence in francophone West Africa were largely peaceful. Algeria had previously been the prototype of France's colonial policy of assimilation, but in the years leading up to the war of independence, even Algerian intellectuals broke from their assimilationist stance to join the revolutionary cause (Girard 2008: 54). In independent Senegal, in contrast, leaders described close political relations as a strategic and economic necessity (Martin 1995: 3; Chafer 2003).

West African and French leaders both "envisaged decolonization taking place through integration of the colonies into some kind of federation with France" (Chafer 2003: 158). To this end, French President Charles de Gaulle created the "Ministry of Cooperation," in 1959 (Martin 1995: 6). Scholars examining collaboration between French officials and West African leaders have highlighted France's vested interest in political-economic "cooperation" with its former colonies (Martin 1995; Verschave 1998; 2006). Using the term

"*Françafrique,"* to highlight corruption in the upper echelons of French and African governments, Verschave argues that the French government has clandestinely provided African leaders with funds in return for continued support in international affairs and privileged access to resources (Foutoyet 2009; Verschave 1998: 154). Much of French bilateral aid has been filtered through diplomatic relations organized under the guise of *Francophonie* (Hale 2011; O'Brien 2008: 10). The official "*Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*" (OIF), established in 1970, unites nations where French is spoken, ostensibly in order to spread and preserve the French language. Critics suggest, however, that the OIF masks privileged political-economic relations among francophone nations, allowing France to maintain its influence over its former colonies and to relocate its "colonial centrality in the era of decolonization" (Thomas 2007: 132; Hale 2009).

For Senegalese, the maintenance of close Franco-Senegalese political relations meant that speaking French could provide not only access to economic opportunities but also mobility in geographic terms. Schooling enabled francophone Senegalese to take up state sanctioned migration trajectories and find employment on the formal economic sector in France or Senegal. These paths were reinforced during postcolonial era. In the 1950s, with decolonization looming, the French government *increased* funding for Senegalese students in the metropole (Thomas 2007: 31). Africans who studied in France were key to Franco-Senegalese "cooperation," in that they maintained ideological continuity with the colonial system and established a sympathetic political elite (Thomas 2007: 31; Ndiaye 2008: 178-179).

Already during the colonial period, the population of Senegalese immigrants in France was diverse in terms of class, origin, and occupation. Immigrants from French colonies

became visible in Paris beginning in the 1930s, as France experienced the pan-European phenomenon of "the return of Empire on its soil" (Bancel, Blanchard, and Vergès 2003: 161). In France, Senegalese joined other immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (especially Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Madagascar) and North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia).

During and after the World Wars, France actively recruited labor migrants from its colonies to rebuild the metropole. A large portion of the African soldiers who fought for France in the World Wars (*tirailleurs sénégalais*) settled in the metropole following their demobilization (Tall 2002: 548, 551). At that time, a black intelligencia also thrived in Paris, including but not limited to members of the *Negritude* literary movement, like Senghor. Senegalese students in France occupied a privileged position relative to labor migrants, due to their elite status pre-migration as well as French government scholarships, which assured that African leaders pass through Parisian universities (Wilder 2005: 151). Senegalese studying in France often occupied student housing in central Paris, physically distanced from immigrant workers in crowded government housing complexes (Wilder 2005: 154; Metcalf 1996: 80).

Franco-Senegalese cooperation reflected the interests of urban elites, largely ignoring rural Senegal, where the post-Independence period ushered in severe economic decline. While France continued to provide scholarships for Senegalese students in the former metropole, at independence it stopped providing agricultural subsidies in rural Senegal. Then in 1966, France ended its exclusive relationship with Senegal in the peanut trade, the country's primary cash crop (Diouf 2000: 159; Oya 2006:208). At that time, the Senegalese government monopolized agricultural trade, a position that soon "gave way to corruption, unfavorable producer prices, and inequitable clientelism," impoverishing Senegalese villages (Perry 1997:32). Beginning in the late 1960s, an extended period of drought further weakened the

rural economy (1969-1985) (Fall 2007: 194). These combined ecological and economic forces resulted in the decline of villages' self-sufficiency and sparked a "rural exodus" toward Senegalese cities and abroad (Copans 1979: 87; Diop 2008: 63). Senegalese labor migration to France continued unabated following independence, dominated by *Soninké* and *Hal pulaar* villagers from the Senegalese River Valley (Tall 2002: 551).

Informal trade networks, notably those of the Murid Islamic brotherhood, gained prominence in this rural context of drought and economic decline (Perry 1997: 31). The majority of Senegalese Muslims affiliate with one of four Sufi brotherhoods (Villalón 2004). Although not the largest in number, the Murid brotherhood has gained substantial attention in the last thirty years, among Senegalese and scholars alike, for its fast growth and economic success (Buggenhagen 2012: 16; Babou 2007). The brotherhood originated in Senegal's groundnut basin, where it established extensive rural trade routes, quickly becoming the largest producer of peanuts in the region (Diouf 2000: 682). As the prices the Senegalese government offered for crops plunged, Murid trade networks began to illicitly export peanuts to Gambia (Perry 1997: 34). They simultaneously smuggled Asian goods back from Gambian ports, driving economic informalization in Senegal (Diouf 2000: 690).

From an administrative standpoint, trade on the burgeoning informal market was illegal. Political-economic cooperation between independent Senegal and France hinged on shared economic moralities, which forbade informal trade. Economic moralities set forth in national law and international accords legitimized unequal opportunities available to educated urbanites and uneducated, rural Senegalese, reinforcing the axis of contrast thought to distance "modern" francophone elites from "traditional" villagers.

By the mid 1970s, global economic decline sparked by the 1973 oil crisis brought an end to the period of labor mobility in Europe. As three decades of post-war economic prosperity (*les trente glorieuses*) drew to a close in France, immigration became an increasingly polemical subject. The presidency of Giscard d'Estaing marked the start of a series of increasingly restrictive immigration policies in France and unrelenting public debate regarding integration and secularism. Each wave of restrictions has brought with it new tropes of immigrants who threaten national cohesion and safety. French political discourses that associate immigration with insecurity have reinforced the belief that certain immigrants and their French-born descendants pose a continual threat to the nation.

During this time in Senegal, the economic push to emigrate intensified as legal channels for migration narrowed. By the mid 1970s, global economic decline pushed the Senegalese economy, already weakened by drought, into a period of severe and prolonged recession. Like countries throughout Africa, the Senegalese government was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for aid (Oya 2006: 211). Beginning in 1980, Senegal underwent three increasingly severe Structural Adjustment Programs, which consisted of sweeping trade liberalization and deregulation, combined with austerity measures that dismantled the Senegalese public sector. These neoliberal reforms culminated in the 1994 devaluation of the franc CFA by 50% (Daffé and Diop 2004). Senegalese in France saw their remittances double in value from one day to the next, while finances in Senegal were spread twice as thin.

Economic downturn in both Senegal and France severely limited the opportunities a French education could offer Senegalese (Kane 2011: 187; Riccio 2001a). Civil servants in

Dakar and other urban centers were laid off and unemployment increasingly affected university graduates, "undermin[ing] the faith in education among some sectors of the population" (Kane 2011: 224; see also Tall 2002: 552; Perry 1997:33). Cole describes this pan-African phenomenon as the "disintegration of the modern dream of education" as a viable path to economic stability (2011: 69). As French immigration policy tightened, Senegalese emigrants have increasingly set their sights on new migration destinations, especially Italy, Spain, and the United States (Carter 1997; Mary 2010).

Franco-Senegalese privileged relations have faded as France's approach to immigration has been increasingly shaped by pan-European policies. In 1974, the French government announced the end of labor migration from all sending countries outside the European Economic Commission (EEC) (Koikkalainen 2011; Freeman 1989: 166; Hargreaves 2007: 177). A predecessor to the European Union, the EEC's decision to move toward more restrictive migration practices marked the beginning of European influence on French immigration politics, constraining the favoritism France could offer Senegal and other members of *Francophonie*.

Despite tightening controls, immigration to France continued in the 1980s, both undocumented and documented, through: family reunification, salaried employment, student visas, and asylum. Rather than discouraging immigration, increasing restrictions encouraged Senegalese and other Africans to shift from circulatory labor migration toward more permanent family-based settlement in France (Tall 2002; de Haas 2014). The end of France's *laissez-faire* approach to immigration put a stop to the transient flow of workers between Africa and Europe that characterized the post-War period. Family members would often work sequentially in France, sending brothers and cousins abroad one at a time (Sargent and

Laranché-Kim 2006: 10). These laborers tended to work abroad for a few months or years before going back to Senegal, returning to France again when a particular need for funds arose. But legal restrictions that complicated entry and reentry into France prompted immigrants to settle more permanently, bringing or starting families there. Family reunification quickly came to account for the majority of immigration to France from outside of Europe (Hamilton et al. 2004).

By prohibiting migration trajectories that were once encouraged, or at least tacitly allowed, French immigration policy effectively created an underclass of undocumented immigrants heretofore classified as illegal. Quiminal and Timera (2002) demonstrate how frequent changes in French immigration law have contributed to the production of a "clandestine" population of "*sans papiers*" (lit. one without papers), an exclusionary process Sargent and Larchanché-Kim describe as the "state production of illegality" (2006: 15; see also Ferré 1997). Discursively constructed as the nation's abject, these immigrants amount to "impossible subjects of the Republic" (Raissiguier 2010).

During the 1980s and 1990s, Muslim families in France were increasingly stigmatized as a dangerous new class, associated with polygyny, arranged marriages, and dependency on state welfare benefits (Sargent and Laranché-Kim 2006). As wives and children joined men in large-scale public housing built for single male laborers (*foyers*), immigrant households became associated with overcrowding and insalubrious living conditions. In 1993, the Pasqua Laws, named after then Secretary of the Interior Charles Pasqua, targeted immigrant families by limiting family reunification, forbidding polygamous marriages, and terminating automatic citizenship rights for the children of immigrants born in France (Sargent and Laranché-Kim 2006; Hargreaves 2007: 161). Economic moralities were bound up with value-laden

assessments of family structure in tropes of immigrants purported to take unfair advantage of state support by having many children to collect more benefits. These stereotypes continue to circulate in French state discourses and pop culture, marking immigrants' kinship and economic practices as morally questionable: at odds with French values (Chojnicki 2012).

Prior to the 1980s, public debate on immigrant integration was virtually inexistent in France (Barou 2014: 647). But as immigrants settled in Paris's working-class neighborhoods and growing suburbs, fears that children raised in ethnic enclaves would not integrate into majority French society grew. Accusations of *communautarisme*, "the practice of enclosing oneself in one's community and privileging particular ethnic, racial, or religious affiliations over national ones," which had previously been aimed at Jewish communities in France, became increasingly directed at Muslims (Fernando 2014: 36, 111). Integration, in these discourses, is often measured in terms of secularism. Fernando explains, "to be an integrated, secular citizen means abstracting one's Muslimness and rendering it invisible in the pubic sphere" (2014: 36).

In 1989, the French government established the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration*[15] (High Council for Integration, HCI) to measure and promote immigrant integration. "Integration" thus became the explicit goal of French immigration policy, defined as an approach that acknowledges social differences "without exalting them, emphasizing resemblance and convergence" (HCI 2003: 12). Today, integration is a goal of immigration policy throughout Europe, made explicit in the European Union's "Common Agenda for Integration" in 2005 (European Commission 2005).

[15]The HCI is now defunct, its functions replaced by the *Observatoire de la laïcité* in 2012 (Devecchio 2016).

As French political discourses increasingly treated immigrants and their families as threats to national cohesion, educated Senegalese worked to separate themselves from unflattering stereotypes of the immigrant masses. Tightening immigration laws also encouraged Senegalese students to settle in France following their studies, often bringing spouses from Dakar and starting families in the metropole (Gueye 2002). Many Senegalese with French diplomas were able to find salaried employment in white-collar jobs in France, insulating them from much of the stigmatization to which working-class immigrants and their families were subject. Immigrant households with sufficient incomes settled in middle-class areas in Paris, spatially and economically distanced from marginalized immigrant neighborhoods in the suburbs and 18th, 19th, and 20th *arrondissements* (Barou 2002, 2014). In the 1980s, as certain French residents of North African descent began to claim the "right to difference" in what came to be known as the Beur movement (Fernando 2014: 37), the figure of the Senegalese intellectual as exemplar of integration in France persisted, evidenced by Léopold Senghor's election to the *Academie Française* in 1983.

As legal immigration to France became increasingly difficult, economic decline encouraged Senegalese to search for new means to get abroad. Informal trade networks have offered a path to (often undocumented) migration for growing numbers of Africans (Perry 1997: 235; Stoller 2002). Economic liberalization allowed the Murid brotherhood to scale and adapt informal trade networks that began in peanut commerce into transcontinental import/export businesses (Riccio 2001a: 587). By the late 1970s, Murid street vendors began to join Senegalese labor migrants in France (Salem 1981: 267). Hawking Eiffel Tower figurines in Paris and counterfeit purses in Italy and New York, Murid's connections to

members of the brotherhood in centers of wholesale commerce allowed them to purchase goods at prices their competitors could not match (Diouf 2000: 693).

French media and political discourses characterize informal street vending as "illegal," linking it to immigrants' other practices, economic or otherwise, thought to pose a threat to the secular French nation. For example, an episode of the M6 television show "Exclusive Report[16]" titled "The Murid Multinational of Street Vendors," that aired in 2009 criticized the brotherhood's economic and religious practices. Footage of Murid souvenir vendors running from policemen, juxtaposed with images of the brotherhood's religious gatherings and descriptions of the substantial funds they devote to their religious leaders, frame members of the brotherhood as not only engaging in illegal economic practices, but also of rejecting the values of the secular French state and refusing to integrate.

The emphasis on immigrant integration in French discourses works to divide France's foreign populations into desirable and undesirable (or illegal) groups. This division was made explicit in former President Nicolas Sarkozy's 2007 election promises to carry out a "selective immigration policy," by facilitating "*immigration choisie*" i.e. immigration that was "controlled, chosen, and selective" and preventing "*immigration subie,*" "endured or uncontrolled" immigration (Thomas 2013: 67). This language of "endured immigration" worked to essentialize migrant criminality, stigmatizing immigrant populations in moral and economic terms. Sarkozy's tenure as Minister of Interior (2002-2004, 2005-2007) and then President (2007-2012) marked a new wave of heightened immigration controls, characterized by a dramatic increase in forced deportations (La Documentation Française 2007).

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[16] Enquête Exclusive

Ever-increasing immigration controls are part of an overall trend toward heightened surveillance of minorities in France in the name of integration and a dispossession of immigrant rights, from which even educated Senegalese are not immune. Sarkozy's immigration reforms, for example, suppressed certain rights of Senegalese students. The "Circulaire Guéant,"[17] prevented many non-EU students in France – even those who had secured a salaried position – from obtaining professional visas following their studies (Beyer 2012). Educated Senegalese in France increasingly find themselves grouped alongside stigmatized migrants, as close Franco-Senegalese relations have deteriorated. Chafer describes forced expulsions of undocumented Senegalese in 2003 as symbolizing the end of the preferential treatment for Senegalese in France (Chafer 2003: 164). He suggests that this is part of broader efforts on the part of the French government to terminate France's special relationship with its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa (Foutoyet 2009; Chafer 2003:163).

Following François Hollande's election in 2012, Interior Minister Manuel Valls called for a move away from Sarkozy's immigration policies, which he described as "random and discriminatory" (Hamza 2012). But in the context of continued economic stagnation, the rising popularity of the far-right National Front party, and 2015's terrorist attacks in Paris, the leftist administration has found it difficult to escape the "protector" role Sarkozy took up against immigrants. Terrorism represents the most recent manifestation of recurrent anxieties that immigrants pose a threat to French security. French media and political discourses have mapped Islamic fundamentalism onto previous tropes of dangerous immigrants, explicitly linking 2015's attacks to the 2005 riots in French suburbs as evidence that the security threat posed by immigrants has only worsened in the past decade. Raids in the *banlieue* of St. Denis

[17] The "Circulaire Guéant" was subsequently repealed under President François Hollande in 2012.

– a space iconic of minorities – following the terrorist attacks on November 13, 2015 worked to reinforce the notion that French suburbs (*les banlieues*) are hotbeds of terrorism. Although Hollande's administration has abandoned the language of "chosen" vs. "endured" immigration, the introduction of new state programs focused on *laïcité*[18] reinforce the notion that there exist desirable and undesirable categories of foreigners in France and that the state must surveil and educate these latter, demanding secularism and integration, in order to protect the nation.

Conclusion

Although France and Senegal maintained close political-economic relations long after Senegalese independence, in recent years, these privileged ties have begun to break down. In Senegal, the prestige associated with the French language and a formal education has faded and the number of francophone Senegalese has dwindled since independence (O'Brien 1998; McLaughlin 1995). In France, educated Senegalese are no longer presumed to be exceptions to stereotypes of problematic immigrants as they often were during the decolonization period. Instead, they must constantly demonstrate their belonging in the secular French nation in order to maintain their position as integrated foreigners, a status francophone urbanites had previously taken for granted.

While heightened restrictions on immigration to France have encouraged many Senegalese to set their sights on other destinations in Europe and North America, France remains an attractive destination for many formally educated Senegalese whose language

[18] In 2013, Hollande's administration replaced the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* with the *Observatoire de la laïcité* and established the *Laïcité Charter* in French public schools. In 2015, after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, it additionally put in place *laïcité* workshops for parents and teachers.

skills and diplomas are primarily advantageous on francophone markets. But this state-sanctioned path to immigration has become increasingly narrow. The Senegalese able to benefit from education as a means of economic and geographic mobility – like those I analyze in subsequent chapters – have become increasingly rare. Senegalese migration trajectories that were already divided in terms of class, education, and immigrants' origin have thus become increasingly geographically distanced, French republican ideologies driving a global division of Senegalese populations. The axis of contrast that separated educated Senegalese urbanites from colonial subjects during the Third Republic has been carried across time and space through the reproduction of Republican ideologies of belonging based on individual merit.

The impact of heightened tensions surrounding Islam and immigration are not limited to the undocumented and new immigrants hoping to settle in France. Achille Mbembe reminds us that the "surge of legislative and repressive arrangements prevent entry into the country, of course, but each new law also renders ever more precarious the lives of foreigners who are already established in France" (2011: 92). State discourses surrounding immigration and Islam reproduce the belief that certain immigrants and their descendants (even those born in France) pose a *perpetual* threat to the nation. Like the mechanism of temporal deferral that Wilder argues allowed cultural racism to operate within the republican framework during the colonial period, immigrants in France today are "welcomed" according to a similar contradictory logic. Like Africans during the Third Republic who were treated as perpetual political minors and thus denied full belonging in the imperial nation state, racially marked minorities in France today are perpetually construed as potential threats, who, like their colonial predecessors are constantly obliged to demonstrate their detachment from any ethnic or religious affiliations. But in the tense political and economic climate of contemporary

France, the ways that one must go about demonstrating belonging in France are constantly shifting. The next chapter examines immigrants' escalating obligations associated with ever-shifting notions of integration and secularism.

RECURSIVE REPUBLICAN RACIALIZATION: THE LANGUAGE OF EXCLUSION IN FRENCH STATE DISCOURSES AND SENEGALESE HOUSEHOLDS

In the wake of 2015's terrorist attacks in France, stereotypes of Muslim migrants who pose a threat to the French nation loomed large. To demonstrate belonging, immigrants attempted to distance themselves from stereotypes of foreigners who menace the secular French nation. The previous chapter considered republican discourses in France and Senegal's colonial past, tracing the ways that France's "civilizing mission" established new hierarchies in West Africa based on education, geography, and religion. This chapter examines how republican ideologies continue to rank Senegalese in contemporary France. It contends that France's integration policy, predicated on an axis of contrast dividing "integrated" foreigners from potentially problematic "immigrants," provides the foundation for racializing discourses in state policy and everyday discussions in immigrant households. It then shows how Senegalese in Paris discursively populate categories of "immigrant" and "integrated" with person types salient in Africa, laminating French hierarchies of belonging onto status hierarchies relevant in Senegal.

I examine "integration" in France as both a legal category and a powerful metapragmatic framework that mediates indexicality in everyday interactions. Analysis of the language used in French state discourses, on the one hand, and in conversations in Senegalese households, on the other, reveals the ways educated migrants from Dakar adopt the language of the French state to demonstrate their own integration. In so doing, they take part in the continual redefinition of what is required to "sound" integrated, reproducing nested hierarchies of belonging among Senegalese in France. Educational and geographic

hierarchies, significant in Senegal premigration, are reinforced in France, whereas the significance of class and religion are transformed in the context of migration.

France's official approach to immigration is based on a contractual approach to citizenship founded in the "republican" tradition. French republican policies purport that anyone, regardless of skin color, religion, or ethnic origin, may "become French" by demonstrating the will to integrate into French society (Lamont 2004: 148; Raissiguier 2010). In everyday language, Senegalese who prove sufficiently "integrated" are not referred to as "immigrants," but, rather, as "French of Senegalese origins." The legal distinction between naturalized citizens and immigrants becomes, in turn, a division based on class, religion, and education that distinguishes "immigrants" from "integrated" foreign-born residents who have the means to manage their semiotic practices according to French expectations.

In what follows, I examine the ways French republican discourses that advocate equality and inclusion paradoxically reproduce exclusion and stratification among racially marked minorities. Scholars have highlighted the exclusionary outcomes of France's approach to integration, focusing primarily on the ways state institutions and the "unmarked" (white) majority attribute racial otherness to maintain positions of power (Chapman & Frader 2004; Fassin 2005; Silverstein, P. 2005; Hargreaves 2007; Ndiaye 2008; Raissiguier 2010). Analysis of the ways educated migrants from Dakar discursively position themselves relative to other Senegalese in France shows how immigrants draw on the language of French republicanism in their efforts to preserve their privileged position as "integrated" foreigners.

Following Hilary Dick and Kristina Wirtz, I define racializing discourses as "the actual language use (spoken and written) that sorts some people, things, and practices into social categories marked as inherently dangerous and Other" based on phenotypic differences

(2011: E2). This chapter traces interdiscursivity, or "culturally constructed, maintained, and interpreted connections among instances of language use (spoken or written)," between French government communications and talk in Senegalese households (Shankar and Cavanaugh 2012: 356). Like reported speech, which transports an utterance to a new time and place, transforming and reframing speakers' words, interdiscursivity is a process through which linguistic form and meaning are linked across contexts (Briggs and Bauman 1992; Silverstein & Urban 1996; Irvine 2005, 1996; Silverstein 2005). Examination of the ways educated Senegalese urbanites draw on French republican discourses reveals how immigrants reproduce and transform racializing discourses, mapping them onto hierarchies of education and geography salient in Senegal, while transforming the significance of class and religion in stratification among Senegalese in France.

The stigmatizing rhetoric of racializing discourses is often not explicit but couched in value-laden discussions of integration that draw multiple semiotic practices into relation with one another, mapping ways of speaking onto dress, eating, religious, and economic practices in ways that establish indexical chains between person types and diverse behaviors. This chapter examines "covert racializing discourses," which "racialize without being denotationally explicit about race," (Dick and Wirtz 2011: E2) specifically focusing on those that are located in moral stances regarding economic practice.

In French state discourses and discussions in Senegalese households in Paris, social actors communicate economic moralities that trace boundaries of inclusion in French society and in Senegalese kinship networks, shaping the rights to resources belonging affords. Speakers draw on economic moralities in interaction to position themselves relative to others, drawing and redrawing lines of inclusion and exclusion. Republican ideologies provide a legal

foundation for discussions in which Senegalese recursively categorize minority groups, creating nested hierarchies of belonging in France.

A Republican Pact: State Discourses of Integration

Immigrant "integration" is the explicit goal of France's official immigration policy, as expressed and carried out by the French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII). The OFII is the organization that grants long-stay visas and residence permits to foreigners from outside the European Union and manages the "reception and integration" of those eligible to permanently settle in France (OFII 2015). Founded in 2009, the OFII is the institutional descendent of the *Office National pour l'Intégration* established in 1945 to recruit foreign workers and introduce them to France. The OFII contends that its goal is to carry out an immigration policy "faithful to the tradition of reception and integration" of foreigners that promotes French Republican values (OFII 2015).

French republicanism is underpinned by Enlightenment ideals of universal inclusion, demanded by the revolutionaries of 1789 in the terms of "liberty, equality, and fraternity." The republican approach to immigration treats "integration" as foreign residents' civic duty, according to a social contract between French residents and the state. This republican logic implies that because the state provides immigrants with the pedagogical tools to integrate (language classes, civic trainings, employment counseling, etc.), the failure to integrate is the fault of those individual immigrants who choose to break their pact with the state. Framing belonging as a question of *willingness* places onus of integration on the individual and obfuscates the significance of class, race, and religion in shaping immigrants' capacity to integrate.

Foreigners formally employed in France or who are the spouse, parent, or child of a French citizen/resident have the right to settle in France on a long-term basis. To obtain their first residence permit, these foreigners have been required since 2007 to take part in a civic integration program. At an initial half-day reception session, they receive information on immigration and life in France. At an individual meeting with an OFII representative, these foreigners are required to sign a "Reception and Integration Contract" (*Contrat d'Acceuil et d'Intégration* see annex A) and are subject to an evaluation of their French language skills. When deemed necessary, the OFII representative can organize language lessons or professional training sessions to facilitate integration. This initial session is followed by a full-day civic training aimed at familiarizing immigrants with French law and their rights as residents.

The OFII draws explicitly on the language of French republicanism to describe the relationship between the state and individual immigrants. It obliges foreigners to enter, quite literally, into a social contract with the state. This "Republican Pact" purports to establish a relationship of "reciprocal obligation" between a foreigner and the French state. The contract clearly states, "To choose to live in France is to have the will to integrate into French society and to accept the fundamental values of the Republic." At civic training sessions, OFII representatives and a pedagogic video titled "Living Together, in France" explained that the French state welcomes foreigners by providing public education, healthcare, linguistic, and civic training (ANEM 2004). They declared that immigrants must, in turn, respect the fundamental values of the French Republic, obey common law, and strive to integrate into the secular French nation.

The OFII categorizes *laïcité* (secularism) alongside "liberty, equality, and fraternity," as a fourth fundamental French value by which all French residents must abide. At a civic training session I attended, an OFII representative specified that secularism was as important as the other three values, though it happened to have been "annexed later." She guided session attendees through an OFII PowerPoint on French history, which described secularism as a legal requirement in France since the 1905 law on the separation of church and state, asserting further that *laïcité* has been a French priority since King Henry IV signed the Edict of Nantes in 1598.

The single page (front and back) Reception and Integration Contract includes a section, titled in bold, "France, a Secular Nation," located between segments that characterize France as a country of "rights and responsibilities" and of "equality." The section on secularism proceeds to explain first, that in France, religion belongs in the private domain. Citizens and residents, it then specifies, have the right to their own religious beliefs, as long as they do not disturb the public order. Finally, the contract states that government is independent from religion but commits to ensuring the principles of tolerance and freedom.

Throughout Europe, secularism has gained heightened attention in recent years (Asad 2003). In France, debates over the requirements of *laïcité* flare up anew after each political event that draws public attention back to questions of Islam and immigration. Following the success of the far-right *Front National* party in municipal elections in March of 2014, for instance, party leader Marine Le Pen expressed support for mayors who eliminated the pork-less "substitution meal" in school cafeterias. Le Pen declared that her party will "accept no religious demands on school menus" (Laurent 2014). French aims of *laïcité* have increasingly become the burden of individual citizens (Fernando 2014). The OFII's civic training video

made explicit individuals' responsibility to assure secularism, explaining that residents are asked to limit religious expression to the private sphere and noting that it is forbidden to wear "conspicuous religious symbols" in French public schools and state institutions.

Terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 sparked new questions about how the state might safeguard secularism and minimize the risk of "homegrown terrorism." During this time, the state's commitment to ensuring the principles of tolerance and freedom entailed deploying soldiers equipped with assault rifles to secure access to religious spaces. A few months following the January attacks, a Muslim girl was sent home from middle school for wearing a black ankle-length skirt that her teachers deemed insufficiently secular (Le Monde 2015). This highly publicized event inspired debate over what constitutes a conspicuous sign of religion and what individual citizens (children included) should do to demonstrate secularism. The following autumn, the French Ministry of Education instated educational reforms that required teachers and parents to attend informational sessions on the expectations of secularism (Piquemal 2015).

As scrutiny of Muslims and migrants has intensified, the social expectations of secularism have swelled and been written into government policy, placing pressure on minorities in France to regulate their behavior ever more carefully in order to constantly communicate integration. "Secularism," and thus "integration" more generally, function as what Urciuoli (1996) calls "strategically deployable shifters," summarized by Dick and Wirtz as, "purposefully nebulous terms whose semantic ambiguity serves the pragmatic function of constructing particular social spaces and speaker alignments rather than specifying a fixed referent" (2011: E2). Regardless of their citizenship status, French residents from North and West Africa are racially marked as "foreign," outsiders until they demonstrate integration. For

these nonwhite French residents, "integration" must be constantly achieved, demonstrated anew, according to the ever-shifting demands of French secularism.

When OFII representatives enumerate the behaviors expected of French residents, they laminate – likening or fusing together – diverse practices (and people) construed as problematic to or unaligned with French goals of integration. In outlining the requirements of secularism, OFII representatives communicate the expectation that, in the public sphere, at least, minorities should detach themselves from their ethnic and religious backgrounds, avoiding speaking, dressing, or eating in ways associated with Islam in order to be treated as integrated, secular citizens.

French state discourses also define integration in educational and economic terms. The OFII frames education as an index of integration, a transformative process that both makes integration possible and provides evidence of belonging. French-educated foreigners[19] are treated as distinct to the immigrant masses to whom civic training sessions are addressed, exempted from civic trainings and from signing the Reception and Integration Contract. Uneducated immigrants, in contrast, must endure more extensive state intervention into their lives (e.g., professional and linguistic training) to demonstrate their willingness to integrate.

The OFII describes formal employment as part of immigrants' pact with the state, highlighting residents' legal obligation to pay taxes. They describe this responsibility as fundamental to France's system of economic "solidarity," according to which disadvantaged residents are entitled to welfare benefits and state subsidies. OFII representatives characterize employment as "an essential pillar" of integration in France and offer information on obtaining training from *Pôle Emploi*, the state employment center. French integration policy

[19] Individuals who have completed at least one year of higher education in France or three years of secondary schooling in a French establishment abroad may be exempted from civic trainings.

thus requires foreigners to align with the economic moralities of the French state, at minimum by avoiding the black market and refraining from excessive reliance on the welfare system and ideally as active participants in the formal economy who contribute to the public fund.

Republican ideologies that distinguish "integrated" foreigners from problematic "immigrants" simultaneously create indexical links among economic, educational, and religious practices. Value-laden integration guidelines draw diverse practices into relation, grouping them together under what Asif Agha (2007) calls "a metasemiotic typification." This typification – here the notion of "integration"– "motivates a likeness among objects within its semiotic range" (2007: 22). Bundling diverse practices as evidence of "integration" (or its absence), this semiotic process makes possible "slippage" (Fernando 2014:43) in state discourses of secularism, which liken Muslims in France (even naturalized or French-born citizens) to foreigners and delinquents.

The following section examines indiscursive links between state discourses and talk in Senegalese households to demonstrate how Senegalese in Paris reproduce republican axes of contrast in their efforts to demonstrate their own belonging in France. Fitting person "types" salient in Senegal into French categories of "immigrant" versus "integrated," they laminate hierarchies significant in Africa with those relevant in France, taking part in discourses that racialize France's foreign populations. Examination of the normative stances of Senegalese in Paris regarding other immigrants' economic practices sheds light on the ways educated Dakarois manage slippage between their own ethnic and religious backgrounds and racialized stereotypes of African immigrants.

French educated immigrants from Dakar arrive in France with a mastery of many skills necessary to demonstrate integration. The semiotic practices that index privilege in Senegal are often the same as those thought to point to "integration" in France. Fluency in French and formal French schooling mark members of an educated elite in Senegal.

Senegalese in Paris speak about education as if it marks a particular type of African abroad. They use the term "*intello*," an abbreviation of "intellectual," to refer to educated individuals who initially migrated on a student visa,[20] as opposed to working-class labor migrants or undocumented foreigners. Just as the OFII exempts French educated foreigners from civic trainings, Senegalese frame "*intellos*" as foreigners who can escape (in certain contexts) the marked designation of "immigrant."

A young woman who had arrived in France from Dakar five years prior described to me how her family members from rural Senegal came to recognize her as an "*intello*." When she first arrived, her cousins who had been living in Paris for many years used to tease her by calling her "*bledard*." Derived from the Arabic word *bled*, meaning village or homeland, in France the slang term *bledard* is used to refer to immigrants from North and West Africa who exhibit visible marks of the culture and customs of their country of origin. Associated with "tradition" and a lack of integration into French culture, the label has negative connotations similar to those associated with the term "FOB" (fresh off the boat) as used by the Desi teens Shankar describes (2008 a and b).

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[20] This usage may be seen, for example, in the title of Senegalese sociologist Abdoulaye Gueye's book, "African Intellectuals in France[20]" (2002), which analyzes the distinct migration trajectories of Senegalese students, many of whom stayed in France following the completion of their diploma.

When her cousins saw that she was serious about her studies, however, they began to call her "*intello*" instead, acknowledging that she was not the naïve *bledard* they had originally thought. In her story, education allowed her to transform in her cousins' eyes from a not-yet integrated *bledard* into an *intello*. These categories map onto republican dichotomies of "immigrant" versus "integrated" foreigners, illustrating the ways that Senegalese in France take up French republican ideologies of integration to distinguish themselves from other (Senegalese) immigrants.

Geographic hierarchies in Senegal are also crucial to the processes of distinction through which Dakarois in France highlight their own integration. Like Parisian ideologies that frame France as divided into Paris and "*la province,*" a disparaging term that groups all regions outside the capital, Dakarois speak of the Senegalese capital as distinct from (and superior to) the rest of the country, particularly the rural "bush" (*la brousse*). In a sense, the distance between Dakar and the Senegalese bush is perhaps even more exaggerated than that which separates Paris and French *provinces*. In Parisian narratives, the French countryside may also be described as escape from city life, a vacation site prized for regional food specialties, fresh air, and a slower pace of life. Travel from Dakar to the countryside is time consuming, difficult, and sometimes dangerous. Urbanites' trips into the interior of the country are most often visits to their (or their parents') native village, which entail substantial economic obligations. Villagers often expect significant gifts and monetary support from their presumably well-off family members visiting from the big city.

Socioeconomic relations between urbanites and villagers in Senegal (like elsewhere Africa, see Newell 2012) are predicated on presupposed inequalities of status and wealth. Economic moralities of rank-based redistribution link these two groups through moral

expectations of material rights and responsibilities. According to this moral framework, urbanites are expected to act as benefactors, providing rural beneficiaries with material support. Like education, geographic movements from "the bush" to the city (or from Africa to Europe) are framed as transformative processes, perceived as directly linked to wealth and status. Senegalese depict migration according to a nested hierarchy similar to that Sasha Newell (2012) described among urbanites in Côte d'Ivoire, in which villagers are thought to move up in status when they come to the capital and urbanites climb in this same hierarchy when they travel to Europe.

Three young women who had migrated from Dakar to continue their studies in Paris described to me one ethnic group whose behavior in France they found particularly problematic: Soninké villagers from the Senegal River Valley. The Soninké were among the first Senegalese to migrate *en masse* in the 1960s and 70s to work as laborers in France (Tall 2002: 551). The women's frustration was palpable as they explained that these villagers, who appear to be among the least "integrated," are actually full French citizens; they, meanwhile, were still obligated to wait in line at the *prefecture* each year to renew their residence permits. The women made clear that despite having legal citizenship, in their eyes, the Soninké remained "immigrants" in France: identifiable outsiders and thus problematic.

One of the woman complained that Soninké were "embarrassing," because they have been in France the longest but have "done nothing" to adapt. "You've seen them," she assured me, "They're the ones in the metro with a stroller full of groceries and their baby on their back!" This description – of a Soninké women who would *choose* to carry her baby on her back in the public space of the Parisian metro – frames these villagers as foreigners in France who have yet to sufficiently detach themselves from African cultural practices in order to

integrate. Focusing on the example of a mother with a young child, she highlighted Soninké villagers' reproductive (rather than economically productive) activities, alluding to French tropes of immigrant families with many children. These large families are often perceived to place an unfair burden on the welfare system by contributing little, while receiving substantial state support. The three women from Dakar voiced a critical portrayal of other Africans in France, aligning themselves with French state discourses that require residents to secure employment in order to pay taxes and support state institutions.

The problem with Soninké villagers in France, the three women explained, was that they had come directly "from the bush to the *banlieue,*" impoverished French suburbs often perceived to be ethnic enclaves. In the *banlieue*, they suggested, these Senegalese villagers were neither obligated nor motivated to integrate into majority French society. The three women framed their critique in terms that closely resembled French objections to *communautarisme,* the act of enclosing oneself in one's ethnic or religious community. French state discourses have long treated *communautarisme* as antithetical to "integration" and incompatible with French citizenship (Fernando 2014: 36). *Communautarisme* is often associated with immigrant populations in French *banlieues* notorious for illegal activities like drug trafficking, riots in 2005, and, increasingly, terrorism (Iteanu 2013; Jardin 2016).

One of the women argued that behaviors associated with immigrants in the *banlieue* would also be unacceptable in Senegal, saying, "They are '*ni ni*' neither Senegalese nor French."[21] Her critique suggested that one might achieve "both and" status by adapting one's behaviors to fit social expectations in each country. "Both and" here could refer not only to both Senegalese and French but moreover, both high class and "integrated." Indeed, in Dakar,

[21] See Fernando (2014: 59) for discussion of the term of "ni ni" as used among individuals of North African descent in France.

francophone Senegalese learn to "code switch" from a young age, alternating between French and Wolof languages and social practices associated with Europe and Africa. While French is required in public schools and international businesses in Dakar, Wolof demonstrates belonging in one's neighborhood, with family, and when haggling prices at the market. Educated elites learn to eat with silverware on plates at European-style restaurants in Dakar, but many also eat regularly with their hand around a communal platter at family meals. Mastery of these diverse skill sets, and demonstrating an awareness of the contexts in which each is appropriate, are critical to achieving the social position of educated Senegalese urbanite. The capacity to adapt one's semiotic practices distinguishes elite Dakarois from rural Soninké, in Senegal and France alike.

As Senegalese geographic hierarchies are carried into the French context, material inequalities so salient in Dakarois' relations with their rural kin are erased. Instead, Senegalese urbanites frame these distinctions as questions of one's willingness to integrate in France. Echoing republican discourses, the women highlighted their own belonging in France through critique of other Senegalese who, in their eyes, fail to demonstrate the will to integrate. In the context of migration, educational and geographic hierarchies that distinguish groups of people in Senegal are reinforced. Class, meanwhile, is erased, whereas religion – or rather secularism – becomes a key axis of contrast according to which Senegalese position themselves relative to others.

Recursive Religious Racialization

In Senegal, a majority Muslim country, piousness is valued, construed as a mark of high status (Buggenhagen 2012; Irvine 1974). In France however, public piety is suspect,

treated as evidence of immigrants' refusal of secularism and rejection of the separation between the public sphere of politics and the private sphere of religion (Scott 2007; Iteanu 2013). In Paris, religious expression takes on new meaning for Senegalese, aware of the marked status of religion, especially Islam. To demonstrate their own belonging, educated Senegalese in Paris distance themselves from immigrants who are more visibly religious or Muslim than they. Educated Dakarois often expressed a preference for "discreetly" practicing their religion. Certain families drew my attention to the fact that veiling is uncommon in Senegal.[22] Others described religiousness as a sign of "traditional" African immigrants. Religion was often implicated in normative discussions about economic practices. By voicing critique of others' practices in the form economic moralities, educated Senegalese positioned themselves relative to other immigrants in religious terms without explicitly criticizing piousness.

Marie Sene, a Catholic mother of two, voiced economic moralities that distanced her from the practices of Muslim Senegalese through implicit critique of Muslim women's ever-escalating gift exchanges. When I asked Marie about the ritual gifts Senegalese women offer their in-laws, she quickly gave up her attempts to explain how kinship relations organize these exchanges and told me she would call a Muslim friend of hers for clarification. Marie commented that her friend "always fulfills her duties (*devoirs*)," as she dialed the phone.

While their mother repeated aloud her Muslim friend's explanations of which members of her husband's female kin a woman is expected to offer food and gifts at which event, Marie's daughters Emilie and Rosalie rolled their eyes at the complex relations. "Couldn't they have just made it simple?" Emilie teased. After hanging up, Marie described

[22] Salafi women in Senegal are a notable exception.

how obligations toward one's in-laws escalate over time. "For them," she specified, "when you return the gift, you have to bring double the amount you received. That's just how it is." Marie specified that, "for Catholics it's not like that. I give when I want to give." Unlike Muslims, who are morally expected to manage escalating economic obligations to maintain far-flung kinship networks, Marie reported having the freedom to choose when and what she gives.

As Marie described Muslim women's compounding obligations, her daughters reacted incredulously. "That's how you end up with nothing at the end!" Emilie scoffed. Their mother confirmed that after fulfilling these economic obligations, participants are often left with little. In distancing herself from the obligations of Muslim women, Marie presented herself as successfully integrated into the modern, secular French nation. Unlike Muslims obligated to their extended family by rigid tradition, Marie framed herself as autonomous in economic terms. She ratified her daughters' dismissal of these practices, treating knowledge of these ritual gifts, already inconsequential for her as a Catholic, as completely irrelevant for the girls.

Muslim Senegalese also draw on religion as an axis of contrast to distinguish themselves from other Muslims in France who are more publicly religious than they. Aboulaye Diop, a Senegalese father of four who came to France in 1979 to study accounting, complained to me about Muslims who "talk about [their] religion all the time." He highlighted one group he found particularly obtrusive: members of Murid Islamic brotherhood. In France, Abdoulaye explained, Murids' bombastic pronouncements of faith were paired with illegal economic activities, aimed at generating funds for their religious leaders and the ongoing construction of the Murid mosque in Tuba, Senegal. Since the 1980s, Murids have developed

extensive transnational networks centered on vending souvenirs and counterfeit goods on the informal market (Ebin 1993; Diouf 2000; Riccio 2001).

Abdoulaye criticized the informal systems of international money transfer the brotherhood is said to use, complaining that Murids who had not studied international banking were unfairly encroaching on the business of those who had. Emphasizing the importance that those who practice a trade possess the proper degree, Malik aligned himself with French educational and bureaucratic systems, distancing himself from migrants who flout these legal requirements. He traced an axis of contrast between himself and members of the Islamic brotherhood based on their divergent religious and economic practices. Framing Murids in opposition to French law and values, Abdoulaye tacitly communicated his own alignment with French priorities of immigrant integration, positioning Murids as marked "immigrants" within a republican framework that demands that residents limit their religious expression to the private domain.

By voicing economic moralities, both Marie and Abdoulaye drew on religion as an axis of contrast to perform, without explicitly naming, their own belonging in French society. These examples illustrate republican categories of "immigrant" and "integrated" to be constantly shifting. The sorts of people, places, and practices described as indexing integration vary with one's interactional aims, as speakers strategically draw on this axis of contrast to demonstrate their own integration and to distance themselves from other "types" of immigrants in France.

Not everyone who immigrates is treated as an immigrant. This chapter has outlined some of the "types" of people and practices that circulate in discussions of integration in French state discourses and talk in Senegalese households. State discourses and Senegalese narratives both presuppose and reify an axis of contrast between marked "immigrants" and "integrated" foreigners. Interdiscursive links between republican discourses and Senegalese discussions show how these value-laden categories are reproduced and transformed, semiotically linked to types of people, practices, and places relevant in Senegal.

In Senegal, education and urban origins are construed as evidence of high rank, while in the French context, these same signs are treated as indexical of one's integration. Educational and geographic hierarchies salient in Senegal are reinforced in Paris through discourses that frame formal schooling and migration as transformative processes, whereas, hierarchies of class and religion transform substantially. On the one hand, economic inequalities that motivate Dakarois to support relatives in rural Senegal are downplayed in France. In the context of migration, willingness to integrate is highlighted as key, obfuscating the ways class differences unevenly shape one's capacity to index integration. Religion, in the other hand, takes on heightened significance in France. In narratives critical of others' exchange practices, Senegalese indirectly index their own secularism relative to others more publicly pious than they are. By carefully choosing the ways that they take up republican axes of contrast, which distinguish integrated foreigners from the immigrant masses, Senegalese in France strategically manage "slippage" between their own practices and those associated with potentially problematic "immigrants."

In the following chapters I turn my attention to the ways that members of transnational households draw on economic moralities to position themselves relative to those in Senegal. The next chapter examines storytelling as a moral act through which children and parents negotiate moral stances toward people and practices of exchange they encounter on trips to Dakar.

"WHAT DID YOU BRING ME?": NAVIGATING AND EVADING MATERIAL EXPECTATIONS

Trips to Dakar are often extremely expensive for Senegalese visiting from Paris, far beyond the cost of a flight between the two capitals. Family members in Senegal await migrants' return with high expectations of financial support and "*sarica*," gifts brought back from abroad. In Senegalese households in France, few topics sparked animated discussion as consistently as did family and friends' expectations of gifts. Talk of return trips to Dakar (and explanations for the infrequency of these visits) often veered toward choruses of collaborative complaining among Senegalese adults. Speakers offered up personal stories aligning with one another in their complaints that the expectations they encounter in Senegal exceed their revenue in France, each trip back accelerating requests from kin and acquaintances.

Children growing up in France repeatedly overhear conversations in which adults characterize gift requests in Senegal, cite typical contexts in which expectations arise, and describe the diverse social relations that mediate them. To participate in these discussions, children must navigate a fraught moral terrain: The pertinence of any story they tell depends on their capacity to produce an example of an audacious request that others present will also find brazen. Determining which sorts of expectations one's audience might find exaggerated and which they could construe as appropriate, and thus unremarkable, is far from straightforward for children. This is particularly true for young people growing up in France, who are often less familiar with the economic moralities that mediate kinship relations in Senegal. Through analysis of storytelling events, this chapter examines the ways that youth

growing up in France become aware of and embody – or resist embodying – status positions in systems of rank-based redistribution in Senegal.

An analytical focus on storytelling sheds light on the ways that economic moralities are achieved in interaction. Linguistic anthropologists argue that narratives do not simply reflect a set of pre-established moral tenets, but are themselves the means through which groups establish and enact notions of morality. Ochs and Capps contend that everyday narration provides an "interactive means of building a moral philosophy of how one ought to live" (2001: 46). Following philosopher Anthony Appiah (2008), Webb Keane argues that the act of describing a situation, specifically the collaborative act of framing, is itself a moral task, indeed, it is "often *the* moral task" (Appiah 2008: 117 cited in Keane 2010: 67, 74).

This chapter argues that through storytelling events, children develop repertoires of moral stances regarding expectations of material exchange. I analyze two conversations concerning "*sarica*," gifts that Senegalese who live abroad commonly distribute while on vacation in Senegal. In each of these discussions, young people raised in France described their *involuntary* participation in acts of gift giving, evaluating expectations they encountered. The first example shows how, through narration, youth can align themselves with listeners present by voicing economic moralities that allow them to demonstrate their maturity and alignment with family members. The second storytelling event sheds light on the processes through which youth in France develop strategies of selective solidarity with kin back in Senegal and tactics to dodge frequent requests.

I first outline the ways hierarchal relations of kinship and patronage in Senegal organize the normative expectations of gifts and material support that migrants confront on visits back to Senegal. I contend that migrant status is one position of high rank, among

many, that can entail expectations of resource redistribution. Second, I examine a discussion I recorded in the apartment of the Diop[23] family in Paris, in which 18-year-old Badara shifted between moral stances, struggling to take up an age-appropriate moral position in front of his father and cousin from Dakar. Third, I analyze economic moralities voiced by Aminata, a young woman who grew up between Paris and Dakar, as she recounted strategies of avoidance she developed when faced with repeated requests for financial support on trips to Senegal. I show how the act of narrating gift-giving events that took place on trips to Senegal requires that the children of migrants grapple with multiple, sometimes conflicting economic moralities linked to contrasting conceptions of kinship, distinct perceptions of the role material support should play in demonstrating care, and divergent notions of what it means to "grow up."

Sarica *and Rank-Based Redistribution*

In Senegal, economic moralities of redistribution can permit migrants to achieve power, adulthood, and elder status through the circulation of resources. A successful migrant is perceived as one who has assumed the high ranked role of benefactor by providing for dependents back home. But these normative expectations can also leave migrants feeling saddled with insurmountable petitions for support from distant relatives and even strangers. The ethnographic record is replete with examples of African migrants who voice frustrations with the expectations of those back home, whether they live in another country or, as in the case of urban migrants, in their village of origin (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 1998; Riccio 2005;

[23] All names are pseudonyms used to protect research participants.

Newell 2012; Whitehouse 2012). But we know little about the ways children raised abroad confront, experience, and grapple with these same pressures to give.

The economic moralities that underpin systems of rank-based redistribution are often construed, by Africans and "Westerners" alike, in opposition to those common in Europe and North America, where "the economic underpinnings of emotional relationships tend to get downplayed or ignored" (Coe 2014: 60 see also Zelizer 1985, 2000). Cati Coe (2011, 2014) describes material exchanges that accompany kinship as "the materiality of care." She argues that in Ghana, the distribution of gifts and material support is carefully monitored, taken as a gauge of one's affection, whereas, in Europe and the U.S., the notion that love cannot or should not be "bought" prevails, encouraging individuals to downplay the distribution of material resources between family members. Narratives in which Senegalese in Paris describe giving gifts in Dakar are key sites of tension among multiple economic moralities. In recounting stories of gift giving in Senegal, children in France must navigate between contexts in which moral stances diverge regarding the role of material upkeep in affective relationships.

The oppositional portrayal of economic moralities in France and Senegal is clear in a conversation I recorded in the household of Aboulaye Diop, a Senegalese father of four who came to France in 1979 and has since worked and raised his children in Paris. At that point in 2014, Aboulaye was also housing his nephew, Ousmane, who had arrived from Dakar eight months prior to study engineering. While discussing healthcare and other forms of public aid available in France, Abdoulaye noted that in Senegal, those in need "can't expect anything from the state," but more often, "someone helps someone else." His nephew added that in Senegal, "solidarity" is "normal." Ousmane's accented French betrayed his recent

arrival from Dakar. He continued, “If Badou is my friend, he comes to the house ‘Boy, boy I’m hungry,’ I go to the kitchen and I get him something to eat. I see that he doesn’t have any clothes, I offer him a T-shirt, it’s natural.” “But here,” his uncle added, “it’s something imposed because people don’t do it naturally.”

The claim that in Senegal “solidarity” is “natural” and that in France this is not the case is a stereotyped opposition often found in discussions among Senegalese. The juxtaposition of Senegal and France or Africa and the West more broadly functions as a discursive tool, allowing people to understand (and valorize) themselves relative to others. In this sort of comparison, Westerners serve as a foil that highlights the “solidarity” of Africans. Speakers draw on examples like Ousmane’s with surprising regularity, highlighting the willingness of Senegalese to share their food or clothing to illustrate their virtuous “solidarity.”

Later, when the conversation turned to requests for gifts on return trips to Senegal, the word “solidarity” was conspicuously absent. Although he had left Dakar only months prior, Ousmane readily described the substantial expectations of family and friends at home. “For them,” he explained, “as soon as you’re here, you’re good. They don’t know that there are difficulties here too. So you necessarily have to bring something. They’ll look at you like, ‘What are you going to give me?’”

This phrase sparked a response from Badara, who had been listening in silence for more than five minutes. “What did you bring me?” he added, reformulating the request his cousin described with a look of frustration and contempt. Ousmane repeated Badara, “What did you bring me?” He nodded as if in agreement, but his casual tone diverged significantly from the negative affect his cousin displayed. Although the cousins uttered the same phrase

word for word, Ousmane's reaction contrasted sharply with that of his cousin from Paris. Badara, who had been to Dakar only three times in his eighteen years, appeared visibly bothered by these requests, speaking about them as if describing problematic or morally dubious behaviors he had observed among his Senegalese relatives. Badara's look of contempt hung in the air, as Ousmane rationalized these expectations of gifts, explaining that, in Senegal, living abroad is presumed to be linked to economic means.

In his French-Wolof dictionary, Diouf defines "*sarica*" as a "gift one brings back from a trip or a simple errand"[24] (Diouf 2003: 305). There is no general term in Wolof that corresponds with the word "gift" in English or "*cadeau"* in French. The word *sarica* refers specifically to a gift offered in the context of one's return. The example sentence the dictionary provides corresponds verbatim with the social expectation that Ousmane and Badara described: "*Loo ma indil sarica*" meaning "What did you bring me?"[25]

While Diouf provided this phrase as example, it is not always socially acceptable to request a gift in such a direct manner. In Wolof, like in English, one might teasingly ask a close friend or family member, "What did you bring me?" but in many contexts it would seem impolite to request *sarica* so explicitly. Senegalese describe this sort of request as indexing a lack of the virtue *kersa*, meaning self-control and reserve. Asking for *sarica*, like asking for money, is associated with *griots*, casted people who are among the only Senegalese (besides beggars) who directly ask others for money. Members of the bardic caste, *griots* carry out linguistic labor for their noble patrons, reciting their genealogy and singing their family's praises in exchange for money. Economic moralities that underpin

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[24] « Cadeau qu'on rapporte d'un voyage ou d'une simple course » (Diouf 2003: 305).
[25] « Que me rapportes-tu comme cadeau? » (Diouf 2003: 305).

complementary relations between *griots* and *géérs* (non-casted freeborn or "nobles") rationalize the two groups' asymmetrical social positions according to perceived differences in group members' ability to demonstrate restraint (*kersa*). According to this logic, *kersa,* which distinguishes *géers* from low-status, casted people, prevents them from directly requesting *sarica* gifts.

A Wolof instructor in Dakar explained to me that the term *sarica* has changed over time, suggesting that *sarica* initially described "little things we bring back for children" like candy or cookies, after a trip downtown. Now, she explained, in its most common usage, *sarica* describes more consequential gifts, like clothes or telephones, brought from abroad for adults and children alike. Even money may be offered in place of *sarica*. As a result, returning migrants often receive numerous visitors who come to see them with expectations of financial support or *sarica*.

The type of gift offered as *sarica* varies with the length and distance of a trip, as well as the social relations between travelers and potential beneficiaries. An outing downtown would not normally merit a gift of *sarica* among adults. The social status of a traveler relative to his or her potential beneficiary also determines whether the context merits a gift. Adja, a 25-year-old Senegalese woman who had lived in Paris for seven years, explained, for example, that if she goes to see her uncle, she would not give *sarica*, because, "children aren't expected to do this sort of thing." She then added that in this case she would be considered a child, since she is young and not yet married. "When you're married," she clarified, "people assume you're better off." After a moment of reflection, Adja added that now, coming back from France, her relatives' expectations have changed and more people expect *sarica*. She added, however, "*sarica* is a favor, but not an obligation," a distinction I

will examine in detail in the next section.

My interlocutor suggested first that she would not have to bring *sarica* to her uncle because she is a "child" relative to him. In this same context, however, she could potentially bring some candy for children in the house. This description illustrates that for her, being a "child" is not exclusively a question of age but rather, is a function of one's relational position in a given interaction. In Senegal, to get married is to take new positions in socioeconomic networks. Senegalese say that men have a moral obligation to provide for their wives. Husbands' position of authority is described as contingent on this material obligation. The act of marrying marks one's transformation toward adulthood, a status in which taking care of one's dependents is a moral obligation.

In Senegal, the status of adults and children, like that of *géér* and *griot*, or man and woman are perceived to be asymmetric and complementary. These relative positions organize gifts of *sarica* and material exchange more broadly. Irvine reminds us that while high status "implies prestige, respect, and political power, it also implies the obligation to contribute to the support of low-status persons. Thus, high rank means a financial burden, while low rank has its financial compensations" (1974: 175). She describes the way that nobles faced with incessant requests for financial aid used a "self-lowering strategy" to temporarily escape monetary requests. Irvine explains that in rural Senegal she was herself confronted with an overwhelming number of requests for financial aid. Analyzing linguistic roles in these verbal exchanges, she recognized that one could avoid a request for money if able to *initiate* the greeting and maintain the low-ranked role by *asking* questions rather than *responding*.

Irvine listed four criteria according to which individuals situate themselves in

unequal and complementary social relations: "age, sex, caste, and achieved prestige" (which may consist of wealth, or of an exceptional moral character)" (1974: 169). According to my interlocutors' descriptions of the gifts and financial aid expected of migrants, I suggest that the prestige associated with one's geographic position also represents a criterion that organizes rights and responsibilities in material exchange.

My argument here follows Newell's (2012) suggestion that migration functions as a process of transformation (see also Buggenhagen 2012). Even if migrants do not have much more money than before, when they return, they have gained social status and influence. The status associated with migration escalates requests for money and gifts. Newell explains that the distribution of gifts and money allows returning migrants to assume the role of benefactor and thus rise in the social hierarchy.

Migrant status represents one hierarchal position among many others, which individuals occupy simultaneously. Hierarchies of age, gender, caste, class, morality, and geography are mutually imbricated. In social interactions, individuals might draw on any or all of these criteria to determine their position relative to their interlocutor. It is not always clear who will take up which role in an interaction, particularly when interlocutors have conflicting rank criteria, such as when a young man interacts with an older woman. The rights and responsibilities of each person are thus negotiated and achieved in unfolding interaction. These relative statuses are always in flux and individuals alternate between taking up high and low ranking positions according to context. As such, to know when and to whom one should offer *sarica* represents a complex cultural calculation of one's status relative to potential beneficiaries in Senegal. In the next section, I return to the discussion of *sarica* with Abdoulaye, Ousmane, and Badara. Analysis of this conversation sheds light on

the ways that children growing up in France develop an understanding of the normative expectations they confront in Senegal.

Involuntary Sarica

After Ousmane and Badara described the stereotypical question, "What did you bring me?" that migrants encounter in Senegal, we discussed the pressures associated with questions of what and how much *sarica* to offer to whom. Ousmane described these decisions as "stressful," explaining that if his gifts are not on par with expectations, family members may think he was wasting his time in France. His uncle cut him off saying curtly, "It doesn't stress me out anymore." Abdoulaye's declaration seemed cavalier, framed in direct opposition with Ousmane's assertion. "For me, it's done, I've already given," he continued, "Now, I have other priorities." This comment seemed at first to resemble the aversion his son had shown toward the expectation of *sarica*. But instead of critiquing the requests he receives, Abdoulaye suggested that he had reached a stage in life in which he was no longer obliged to give like he did before.

Although it seemed that his uncle had contradicted him, Ousmane joined Abdoulaye's explanation saying, "He made it through." Together uncle and nephew described the obligation to distribute *sarica* as associated with a temporary life stage. The suggestion that Abdoulaye had fulfilled his duty to give *sarica* suggests that these gifts are not only linked to the status of adults relative to children, but also that they are also linked to an elder status for those who have passed a threshold liberating them from the arduous obligation. Abdoulaye's admission, which seemed at first intentionally provocative, transformed into a description of the conditions that structure gifts of *sarica*.

Abdoulaye continued his explanation, "It doesn't stress me out at all anymore when someone says, 'What did you bring me?' I say, 'What did you bring me when I was leaving?'" *Yombal* is a term in Wolof, which describes the sort of gifts one offers travelers before they leave on a voyage. Although Abdoulaye described *sarica* and *yombal* as a gift its return-gift, these two forms of gift do not necessarily function this way. The word *sarica* is more commonly used in Wolof than *yombal*. While *sarica* has evolved to include the products migrants bring back from abroad, in Wolof, *yombol* has a hackneyed ring. Senegalese explain that this term evokes images of the olden days, when one might have offered provisions to a person leaving on a long voyage on foot or horseback. If, in Senegal, *sarica* is on everyone's lips at the moment of a migrant's return, the disuse of the word *yombal* illustrates an inequality between these two forms of gift. This makes clear a disparity between the gifts we expect of migrants relative to those who have stayed, highlighting the asymmetry between these two social statuses.

Abdoulaye then responded to his own rhetorical question, "What did you bring me when I was leaving? *Nothing*? Well then, in that case, you – well, the people I owe something to don't ask for it." Explaining that those to whom he owes something do not ask, he illustrated the *kersa* and thus the high status of his family and friends. Ousmane specified, "Because you don't wait for them to ask," adding the precision that it is not that Abdoulaye's family no longer expects anything from him, but rather that his gifts precipitate their requests. "Yes" Abdoulaye confirmed, "but those who ask—" Abdoulaye again hesitated before declaring aloud that he would not give. His nephew finished his sentence, saying, "It's not obligatory." Abdoulaye confirmed, repeating, "It's not obligatory."

Abdoulaye then took a pedagogical tone saying, "We have obligations. The

obligation to be human." Anticipating my question, he added, "The obligation to be human, what does that mean? It means that you know that you are indebted (*redevable*) to certain people and you also know that there are people in need who, if we don't assist them, will never be able to make it without our help." While he had suggested previously that he gave only to those to whom he was personally indebted, here Abdoulaye clarified that there are those in need who require "our" support to survive. He explained that people must judge for themselves "what is possible for them and what isn't," keeping in mind that "you necessarily owe something to someone." He claimed that we must "go around" deciding to whom we owe something and to whom we do not. In the case of the latter, he declared, "If he asks me, I won't give." He then softened his stance, saying, "Well, if he asks, voilà, I'll try to make a little gesture."

Abdoulaye then justified the necessity that one *select* those to whom one gives:

> "When you go there [Senegal] … you find situations that are so catastrophic that you realize, … I would take all my credit to give to them. And when you come back, what are you going to you do? Are you going to restart from zero? Is that reasonable? Is that reasonable? No. I have a wife and children, it's not possible."

Abdoulaye thus described a hierarchy of needs that organize when and to whom he gives. He characterized his obligations toward his wife and children – those to whom he owes something – as more important than the requests of those in need. If it is adults' moral obligation to support their dependents, this requires them to limit the material aid they supply to others. Despite his categorical declaration that he "doesn't give anymore," Abdoulaye gradually made clear to whom he gives, in what circumstances, and why. In justifying why he does not give to *everyone* who asks, Abdoulaye implicitly communicated the value of giving to those in need.

I then asked 18-year-old Badara if he had also felt this pressure to give or if he had been "saved" from these requests in Dakar. Badara and his father both repeated the term I used saying "I think I've been saved" and "Yes, it's true you've been saved from all that." Ousmane intervened, saying, "It'll come!" He claimed that if his cousin had been saved from requests in Dakar, it is because, at 18 he is, "still little," but once he starts working, "people will learn that Badou has a job and then, 'Oh really?'" Abdoulaye took over, playing the role of this imaginary person who had just learned that Badara had started working, "You have a job? Help me, um, I'm your cousin from, I don't know—". Smiling, Badara showed that he understood by adding, "… and I've seen you maybe one time when I was—" His father interjected, "or even that you've never seen!" Ousmane repeated the phrase twice, "That you've never seen! That you've never seen." Ousmane and Abdoulaye repeated this phrase five times in total before Badara said, "For right now, I'm safe. Afterward, we'll see, but I heard what he said," directing his gaze at his father.

When I wondered whether people in Dakar would ask Badara for gifts if he returned to Senegal today, the three men answered with a resounding "yes." Badara added, "because I'm 18," showing that he understood these requests to accompany adulthood. But unlike Adja, who described herself as a child at 25 because she is unmarried, Badara characterized adulthood by age of legal majority in France. His cousin then said that before directly requesting *sarica*, people would ask Badara for "something [he] wore, that [he] leave it for them." Senegalese often admire articles of clothing or accessories that someone is wearing by asking, in a half-teasing tone, that the person leave it for them. One might say for example, "Your T-shirt is nice. I'm sure you were keeping it just for me."[26] Having often

[26] In Wolof, "*Sa t-shirt bi rafette na. Khanaa bii moom nga koy may*"

responded to this sort of appeal as a compliment more than an earnest request, I asked whether these were "serious" demands. As Ousmane began to respond, Badara cut him off, insisting that this sort of question is not a joke and urging us to listen to an anecdote he offered up as proof. I include the transcription of Badara's narrative below, to illustrate how, through storytelling, children growing up in Paris develop a sense of the moral expectations of their family members in both Senegal and France.

Transcript 1: Badara's Suitcase

1 Badara: C'est pour de vrai, moi j'ai une	Badara: They mean it, I have an
2 anec—j'ai une anecdote, écoute, écoute.	anec—I have an anecdote, listen, listen.
3 Quand, la dernière fois que je suis parti	When, the last time I went
4 Abdoulaye: Mm hm	Abdoulaye: Mm hm
5 Badara: On avait fait des bonnes courses,	Badara: We had done a lot of shopping,
6 ***moi*** je pensais que c'était les courses	***I*** thought that it was shopping
7 pour l'année, j'allais avoir euh	for the year, I was going to have uh
8 les nouveaux vêtements et tout.	new clothes and everything.
9 Et euh on est partis au Sénégal, et Papa	And uh we went to Senegal and Dad
10 Abdoulaye: Oui?	Abdoulaye: Yes?
11 Badara: Il a attendu qu'on aille à	Badara: He waited until we went to
12 à la plage, il a dit à euh à eux à	the beach, he said to uh, to
13 comment ils s'appellent ?	uh, what are their names?
14 Les trois-là	The three of them
15 Abdoulaye: Heh heh heh	Abdoulaye: Heh heh heh
16 Badara: À mes cousins	Badara: To my cousins
17 CYA: Oui?	CYA: Yeah?
18 Badara: D'aller se servir dans—	Badara: To go help themselves in—
19 CYA: Dans ta valise?	CYA: In your suitcase?
20 Badara: ((nods)) D'aller prendre, euh, il leur	Badara: ((nods)) To go take, uh, he gave
21 a donné quoi mais—	them like, but—

22 Abdoulaye: Et tu m'en as voulu?	Abdoulaye: And you were mad at me?
23 Badara: Non.	Badara: No.
24 Abdoulaye: Heh voilà.	Abdoulaye: Heh there you go.

Through storytelling, speakers both process past experiences and carry out interactional work in the present, narrating event. Storytellers attempt to maintain a coherent ethical position, as they take up stances relative to the actions of those they describe. According to Ochs and Capps, "Narratives situate narrators, protagonists, listeners/readers at the nexus of morally organized past, present, and possible experiences" (1996: 22). Webb Keane contends that in storytelling, speakers carry out moral work, arguing that the "presentation of self is a kind of ethical work on the self" (2010: 77). In describing a gift, speakers also prescribe how they think gifts *should* take place. Badara was thus obliged to anticipate the morals his father hoped that he would take from the event in order to tell his story.

Badara recounted an event that was memorable because the gift and the way it was given diverged from the economic moralities he understood at that stage in his life. Over the course of telling, the story, which began as an illustration of what those in Senegal expect of migrants, became an account of his father's behavior. He described his father waiting until he and his brothers had gone to the beach, a detail that gave the act an air of suspicion. Badara then said that his father had told his cousins, to go "help themselves" in his suitcase. With the knowledge that Badara was not conscious of the event taking place, this phrase evokes an image of the three cousins rummaging through Badara's new things as if at a

Badara cut himself off just before specifying *where* cousins were allowed to "help themselves." I supplied the word "suitcase." He said that his father had told them to "go help themselves in—" and "to go take— " hesitating twice at the point when his phrase required a possessive adjective, to indicate that they were helping themselves in "*his* suitcase" or taking "*his* things."

At the end of the narrative, Badara's opinion on the gift was not entirely clear. The punch line of his story was smothered by the fact that in telling, Badara was obliged to concede that it was *his father* who had encouraged his cousins to take his clothes. When Abdoulaye asked his son if this act had upset him, Badara reassured his father that it had not. Badara then specified that he had not been upset but had found it a "little odd." His use of the past tense in this phrase contrasted with his declaration later that he "thinks," in the present, that "it was good like that, because it could have made me sad." In this way, Badara communicated that now he was mature enough to understand his father's actions.

Abdoulaye then reminded Badara that upon returning to France, they had bought him new clothes. This comment highlighted the fact that Abdoulaye had only given away things that they could later replace, drawing attention to the reality that Badara could access European clothing more easily than his cousins. Abdoulaye then specified why he shared Badara's things with these cousins in particular, highlighting the similarity and the proximity between Badara and his cousins. They were "boys his age" Abdoulaye explained, with whom Badara "had spent the vacation." Then he said, "And we were going home." The act of returning to France draws attention to the fact that the boys live on different continents, a critical status asymmetry.

Badara and his cousins were equals in most ways, except in geographic hierarchies. The asymmetry between the children was materialized in the act of returning to France and it was at that moment that Abdoulaye offered Badara's clothes to his cousins. Mauss noted that: "The unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly when it has been accepted with no thought of returning it" (2002: 83) The timing of the gift, offered just before Badara left Senegal, prevented its reciprocation. The significance of this act, positioning Badara and his brothers as higher ranked than their Senegal-based cousins, would thus persist after their departure, defining the cousins' relationship from that point on.

In the story of Badara's begrudging gift of *sarica*, his father's actions – both in the past event depicted and in the present narrating event – made clear certain normative expectations concerning material obligation and entitlement. In giving away his son's things, Abdoulaye communicated the importance he attributed to the gesture of leaving possessions with kin in Senegal. His actions in the story demonstrated a sensitivity to notions of asymmetrical positions salient in Senegal, treating geographical hierarchies that divide migrants in Europe from those in Senegal as salient even among children, such that these inequalities might motivate certain forms of rank-based redistribution.

In recounting the story, Badara both expressed his past confusion at his fathers' actions and asserted that his present, narrating self could now see the merit of the act. Despite his verbalized alignment with the economic moralities his father displayed, the act of narrating the story appeared to disturb Badara's understanding of the rights of individuals and the sanctity of private property. His hesitation before announcing that they had taken *his* things, sheds light on Badara's struggle to understand the economic moralities at play as he grappled with divergent notions of possessions and the rights that family members might

Dodging Economic Moralities

Badara's example illustrated how telling stories in the presence of Senegalese family members can represent a complex verbal task, laden with moral pressures, in which children growing up in France must make sense of multiple economic moralities. Outside the earshot of kin, the children of Senegalese migrants in Paris sometimes voiced much sharper critique of the material expectations they encounter on trips to Dakar. Yet, even in storytelling events unmediated by the moral gaze of other Senegalese, youth wrestle with multiple moral stances in their attempts to describe the complex stakes of gifts in Dakar.

Aminata, a 22-year-old student who grew up between Paris and Dakar, spoke to me bluntly about her frustrations with requests for gifts and money she encounters in Dakar, claiming that she systematically refuses to give. She described what she viewed as audacious requests for monetary support and claimed that she had no moral qualms about refusing to give. Indeed, she claimed to have outlined this moral stance to her mother when she requested that Aminata accompany her on a trip to visit kin in her native village. "Other than my smile, I have nothing to give," she reported having firmly communicated before setting off on the voyage. Aminata explicitly framed her economic moralities in opposition to those she encountered in Senegal. She detailed interactions through which she developed the cultural awareness necessary to *avoid* requests for support. And yet, her stories also revealed moments when her firm stance yielded under moral pressure from kin.

In an interview in 2014, Aminata explained to me that she was born in Paris but speaks Wolof fluently, having lived with her parents and sisters in Dakar between the ages of

5 and 10, after which her family returned to Paris. Aminata described this period in Senegal as having affected her and her three sisters differently. She said that her sister who was in middle school at the time was the most marked by the experience. Aminata called this sister "the most Senegalese" of the four daughters, explaining that she had later married a man in Dakar and now lives in Senegal near his parents. Aminata explained with incredulity that her sister now dutifully fulfilled all her in in-laws' expectations for gifts, which have multiplied since her marriage. She characterized her own moral stance toward giving in Senegal in opposition to her sisters' and outlined three tactics she has employed to circumvent requests for support.

Aminata's efforts to avoid being solicited began with a set of stipulations she described having set forth clearly to her mother before their departure for Senegal. Aminata insisted that she had agreed to "just to go see them," but "would not spend one dime." When her mother responded dubiously, Aminata defended her position asking, "When I'm struggling in France, did these people pay my rent? Will these people help me? She told me, 'No'. And I said, 'Well, there you go.' From that point on, it's clear." Even before describing the requests that awaited them, Aminata explained why she refused to give.

She specified, however, that the act of giving itself did not bother her, but more the idea that distant cousins or aunts can "come out of nowhere" and "sing for you" (fig. sing your praises). "Sing like a *griot*?" I asked. "Well, yes, yes, yes," Aminata assured me, saying that these interactions are "so embarrassing." She then described a scene that had taken place during a trip to Senegal five years prior. In Dakar with her aunt and sister, she explained, "A lady came to sing our praises, our grandmothers, our grandfathers. And I just stood there." Aminata paused, staring blankly ahead to mime her confusion. "I didn't get that we were

supposed to give her something. And my aunt went like this," Aminata mimed elbowing someone, "You know, these big nudges." She explained that she and her sister had not understood that to escape the performance they should hand over some cash. It was not until her aunt took out some money herself and gave it to the woman that Aminata describes having realized that they were "supposed to give her money."

In this narrative Aminata recounted a moment of verbal and material exchange in Senegal through which she became aware of transactions in which one implicitly requests material support by taking up a low-ranked linguistic role like that of *griots* through the verbal act of lauding. In this story Aminata described the incomprehension and shame that she felt when faced with a woman who expected a response that she did not understand. At the center of attention, her ignorance was exposed by the praise that the woman sang loud and clear. Through this memorable event Aminata describes having developed sensitivity to certain tacit cultural cues that animate and organize practices of material exchange. But this consciousness does not indicate that she felt more swayed by the economic moralities she now saw in new light. Indeed, she described this moment as having helped her better understand how to avoid unwanted petitioning.

The second strategy of avoidance Aminata described involved direct confrontation within her immediate family when her moral stance conflicted with her mother's and sister's. Presenting "clearly" to her mother the rationale behind her principled refusal to give did nothing to dampen the expectations of material support from her family. And in the village, she found herself faced with resistance from her mother and sister when she tried to act according to the rules that she had put forth.

Aminata described an interaction at her uncle's home with her mother and the sister

she called the "most Senegalese," in which again dodged tacit requests for support. She described the visit ending with extended salutations in which each movement to leave was met with more talking. Goodbyes in Senegal, particularly when parting ways with someone one sees rarely, might include hosts' repeated blessings and thanks for the visit, sometimes even paying the visitor compliments on their character and moral standing. At this moment, certain visitors might discreetly offer their hosts a monetary token of their gratitude, particularly if they are richer or otherwise of a higher status than their host. Aminata described a context in which this tacit expectation to give appeared palpable, and in response, she stubbornly refused to give. Her sister, in turn, passed her a 2000 francs cfa (roughly $3.50) to give to their uncle, which Aminata did. But once outside her sister demanded that Aminata pay back the 2000 francs, as if the transaction had been a loan. "Excuse me!?" Aminata mimed her shock, "You toss me a bill and I'll give it," but, she explained, this should not entail repayment, given that her sister was the impetus of the gift.

Aminata laughed remembering her sister's frustration at her refusal to reimburse her. "I have no scruples about that!" she declared. "In fact," Aminata explained to me, "I'm not even touched. I have no obligation to fulfill, none. I don't see why I should give them something when they don't deserve it." The economic moralities in which Aminata felt implicated diverged substantially from those her mother and sister found significant relative to monetary gifts to their family in the village. The tension she felt when faced with the woman who had sung her praises transformed into a familial tension when her family members found themselves divided by the economic moralities they valued.

Before she depicted a third and final strategy of evasion she employed in Senegal, Aminata again softened her stance against giving. She explained to me that when people are

"nice and don't insist," she gives willingly. But otherwise, she hides behind her status as a student. She told me, "At some point, I'll work and I'll do it [give] because you have to." Though she added, "It will annoy me. Because I don't like being forced to give." She then described a final tactic of evasion she uses to avoid these tense moments and to dodge expectations of financial aid: "playing crazy." She elaborated, saying that although the first time the woman sang to her expecting money her innocence was sincere, now that she is conscious of these tacit requests, she can easily feign obliviousness. "The next time someone sings to me, expecting money, I'll just play the crazy person." She continued, explaining that her extended family in Senegal often treated her like a "*tubab*" (white person) "who doesn't understand anything." She specified, however, that her status as "the house *tubab,*" was "not so bad. Because that way, it lets me mind my own business." She confessed that in certain contexts in Senegal, she had even pretended that she did not understand Wolof. "I just looked at them with a really blank stare. I really played the idiot. You know, sometimes, you have to play, well, you have to pretend. Otherwise you can't get by."

Aminata's belief that it would be impossible to give every time solicited in Senegal is not particular to her upbringing in France. Abdoulaye, who was raised in Dakar, expressed similar sentiments in describing the need for selective solidarity. However, in contexts in which the *géérs* Irvine studied would use self-lowering strategies and Abdoulaye would make a "small gesture" in lieu of a direct refusal, Aminata lacked socially acceptable strategies for avoiding or delaying requests. Making reference to her status as a student is a strategy of selective solidarity that corresponds with normative expectations of rank-based redistribution in Senegal. *Sarica* is especially expected of adults, who are married or employed. Whereas, her strategy of "playing the crazy person" or "playing the *tubab*"

represents a refusal to take part in the economic moralities that organize rank based redistribution.

Robbins (2009) pointed out that Mauss's notion of reciprocity and Hegel's concept of recognition have a similar "three part rhythm: in both, something (the gift/recognition) must be given to the other, must be received by the other (who thereby acknowledges his/her worthiness as a subject), and must be matched by a return from the other (who thereby recognizes the worthiness of the giver as a subject" (2009: 46). In "playing crazy," Aminata refused to acknowledge the recognition of the other, masking her own worthiness as a participant in either verbal or material exchange, and thereby denying the worthiness of her thwarted interlocutor as a subject.

In a sort of reversal of Guyer's (2004) notion of marginal gains, Aminata's tactic expands the cultural gap between her and those Senegalese whose requests she hoped to avoid by feigning ignorance of Wolof and Senegalese cultural cues. Rather than taking advantage of multiple, overlapping scales of value to make marginal gains through material exchange, Aminata exploited the obscurity of the margin between two economic moralities and cultural repertoires. Her refusal to recognize her interlocutor thus precluded any subsequent invitation to material exchange. This strategy functions because she is no longer categorized as a functioning member of Senegalese society. Instead of lowering her status to avoid demands, Aminita erases herself completely through her own refusal to recognize her potential interlocutor, in her attempt to evade the economic moralities they perceive to be at play.

Despite her brazen rejection of the high expectations of gifts, Aminata demonstrated awareness that the obligation to give is linked to adulthood and the economic stability that

allows one to support dependents. Ultimately, she conceded that "one day" she too would have to give. Her frequent justifications of her behavior illustrated an understanding of the moral expectations that she do so and an awareness of the moral significance that her proclamations might have for a Senegalese audience. However, she purportedly did not understand the logic behind these obligations and did not feel implicated by the economic moralities that motivated her mother and sister to distribute funds. For the moment "playing the crazy person" was a weapon she needed in these situations to dodge the demands that would otherwise become unmanageable.

Conclusion

Tensions between economic moralities in these narratives are more complex than questions of whether one's actions are motivated by "solidarity" or "individualism." In these examples, young people raised in France described situations in which they did not know how to or did not want to give *sarica* according to the normative expectations of their families. These storytelling events reveal the ways their family members attempted to oblige them to give against their will or without their consent. Badara's father and Aminata's aunt and sister provided a social scaffolding that implicated Badara and Aminata in relations of material exchange with kin in Senegal in ways that did not require the youth's accord with the values or cultural logic that underpinned the gift they were viewed as giving.

Requests for financial aid that migrants encounter in Senegal can be overwhelming. It is often impossible for migrants (or others perceived as high-status) to give each time they are asked. But deciding when, to whom, and how to give represent a complex cultural calculation that implicates questions like: Who has the right to ask for support? How well

should one know one's potential benefactor before asking? Through what strategies might one avoid giving? In everyday life, these questions are negotiated under the pressure of unfolding social interaction, in which social actors have little time to compare different possibilities or measure one's status relative to one's interlocutor according to multiple imbricated hierarchies.

SKIPPING AN AGE GRADE: GROWING UP IN MOVEMENT

This chapter is concerned with the ways that children growing up in France position themselves in intertwined geographic and age-based hierarchies relative to their Senegal-based cousins during summer trips to Dakar. It considers the role of age and intergenerational relations in systems of rank-based redistribution, to examine how economic moralities become meaningful to children in the everyday acts through which they negotiate and position themselves in social hierarchies. I focus, first, on a meal that took place Adja and Karim Bâ's living room in Dakar, examining the ways that adults guided nine-year-old Awa in taking up an age-appropriate position of deference when she "skipped an age grade," positioning herself above her cousins who lived full-time in Dakar. I then examine a subsequent interaction between Awa and her seven-year-old cousin Youssouf Bâ in which the two children vied for authority, demonstrating a diversity of skills and practices valued among transnational Senegalese families.

These examples show how children who are similar in age but live far from one another position themselves in hierarchies in which age is bound up with class, education, and geography. I argue that children growing up in France both intentionally and inadvertently take up hierarchal positions relative to Senegal-based kin that, when construed relative to moral frameworks of rank-based redistribution, convey high status and thus material obligation. As such, social distance between children raised in Senegal and abroad does not necessarily call into question migrants' belonging in transnational families, but reinforces the notion that they occupy positions of high rank that entail material

responsibility. I demonstrate how interactions between children from France and Senegal make geographic hierarchies palpable, confirming for those in Dakar that migration and formal education are means of becoming "big" and of escaping the labor demanded of children and others of junior status.

Examination of the embodied practices of migrants' children on trips to Dakar relative to the normative expectations of children in Senegal reveals a diversity of behaviors accepted and valued by members of transnational families. Children growing up in France may not be aware of the diverse means of marking deference that their Senegal-based kin employ, but their failure to master the tacit semiotics of social hierarchies in Dakar is not necessarily treated as aberrant or disrespectful. Indeed, transnational families in Dakar value even behaviors learned in France that fail to conform to the normative expectations of children in Senegal. I suggest that this expansive understanding of the moral ways children can engage with kin is tied to strategies for grappling with economic volatility, allowing transnational Senegalese families to cultivate a diverse ensemble of kin, equipped to follow distinct, but complementary economic, educational, and migratory trajectories.

Shifting Ages: Negotiating Status Throughout Life's Course

This chapter builds on scholarship that approaches age as a relational position achieved in interaction (Bledsoe and Banja 2002; Durham 2004; Goodwin and Kyratzis 2007 2012), in an effort to demonstrate how, even in childhood, members of transnational families actively negotiate hierarchies that mediate economic moralities. Contrary to Euro-American common sense models that treat age as fixed from birth and categories like "child" and "adult" as stages that mark time's passing, scholarship on childhood and intergenerational

relations has demonstrated age categories to be fluid and shifting, actively achieved. These scholars take as a point of departure studies that demonstrate childhood to be historically and culturally contingent (Ariès 1960; Levi and Schmitt 1997; Mead 1928), illustrating how experiences of age even vary with class and gender (Goody 1973; Kett 1977; Cole 2004).

In Western industrialized societies, life stages are measured by and contingent on chronological age. Documentation of one's birth is legally required, in France, within the first three days of life. This birth date distinguishes an individual for life, making one legible to state bureaucracy and society as a whole. The assumption that movement from infancy into childhood and adolescence, then adulthood and old age is the result of the natural progression of time underpins psychological studies of human development. In Europe and the U.S., the state formalizes this developmental framework through laws that distinguish the rights and responsibilities of children and adults according to age.

But in sub-Saharan Africa, chronological age often holds less significance than generational and age-based hierarchies, which are key to organizing social and material relations throughout the continent (Bledsoe and Banja 2002; Irvine 1989; Durham 1995; Ferguson 2006; Cole 2011). Africanist ethnographies have repeatedly demonstrated age to be a *relational category*, rather than a marker of the time that has passed since one's birth. This is made clear in many African contexts by a wide disjuncture between chronological and generational age, according to which a very young person may be considered senior to an elderly person according to the generational logic of lineal descent (Meyer Fortes 1984; Schloss 1988). Evans-Prichard (1940) described the "age-grades" into which young Nuer men were initiated to illustrate that the relational significance of all social groups. Rights, authority, and obligations in Africa depend on whether one is considered elder or junior,

status positions that shift constantly, as a person who is a junior in one setting is positioned as elder in another.

Africanist scholars have further illustrated age to be "contingent" on life's events and the ways one manages kinship relations and material resources (Bledsoe and Banja 2002; Johnson-Hanks 2006; Durham 2004). Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, social adulthood is framed as dependent upon intertwined economic and kinship practices, such that age "emerges from one's position in relations of exchange" (Cole 2011: 74 see also Bledsoe 1990, Durham 2000, 2004). To be an adult in Africa depends less on one's chronological age than having the material means to marry, take care of children, and otherwise support dependents. Adulthood requires that one assume the role of benefactor and the status of child represents, in turn, a position of dependence. Material wealth can thus allow a person to "grow up," as evidenced in Denot's observation from Côte d'Ivoire that affluent individuals may be "called *grandfrère* or *tonton* [big brother or uncle], even by people who are older" (1990: 42, cited in Newell 2005: 180).

Borrowing terminology from linguistic anthropology, Deborah Durham (2000, 2004) advocates approaching age categories as "social shifters." She contends that, like deictic terms in linguistics, age-categories "establish a spatial relationship between speaker and object, or a temporal relationship between parts of an utterance" (Durham 2004: 592). She points out that concepts like "child," "youth," and "elder" do not refer to a fixed group, instead, age categories connect speakers to a relational context. Durham argues that thinking of age as a social shifter draws attention to the political import of the act of claiming or assigning a person to a given life stage. Age categories, and the linguistic and social practices that index them, locate individuals relative to one another in terms of "a social

landscape of power, rights, expectations, and relationship—indexing both themselves and the topology of that social landscape" (Durham 2000: 116). Age status is claimed and contested in everyday interactions, like asking for money, for example, which involve the continual testing and renegotiating of relations (Durham 2004, 1995; Irvine 1989).

Linguistic anthropologists who have examined children's negotiations of hierarchy point out that in any context where age is associated with power, individuals' age is effectively at stake in negotiations of status (Berman 2014; Ochs 1988; Goodwin 1990, 2008; Howard 2007, 2012). Transcript analysis reveals how individuals provide the "contextualization cues" (Gumperz 1982; Hymes 1972) that guide interaction, drawing attention to which social roles they assert are significant among the many that age categories may index. In selecting among diverse hierarchies potentially at play, speakers negotiate age in unfolding interaction, such that age (like hierarchy more broadly) is "emergent and interactionally achieved" (Goodwin and Kyratzis 2012:382; Ochs 1988; Duranti 1992).

Age in Senegal: Embodying Deference

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa[27] (Rabain 1979; Cole 2011, 2014; Bledsoe 1989, 1992; Durham 2000), everyday tasks are organized according to reciprocal but asymmetrical claims that younger and older people make on one another based on age. Like other rank-based relations, interactions between elders and juniors are organized by a logic of inequality and complementarity according to which adults should provide for children's material needs and children are, in turn, expected to serve adults. Adult status requires that one protect, feed, and take care of dependents, whose labor these caregivers gain the right to command.

[27] Similar rank-based relations of care may be found in many stratified societies, beyond the African context, see Ochs 1992 for an example from Samoa and Howard 2007 for a discussion from Thailand.

Senegalese associate movement, be it running errands, traveling to visit or to greet someone, or even dancing, with youth and low status more broadly (Irvine 1974, 2001; Neveu Kringelbach 2013). High-ranking elders have earned the right to be sedentary and exert influence over the labor and the movement of younger kinsmen. For example, men and older women relegate the laborious task of cooking to younger women in their household, their daughters or preferably daughters-in-law. Household tasks like cleaning up after a meal or fetching missing ingredients are children's domain, organized relative to rank and capacity to fulfill the task at hand. As they grow, children gradually take on greater role in household responsibilities, beginning with simple tasks and soon taking on more consequential jobs, like care for younger siblings.

Senegalese describe children's chores as crucial to their "education," or moral upbringing. Mastery of these basic tasks is construed as an indicator of a child's maturity and movement through life's stages. For instance, when Dakarois scoff at the idea that a woman marry without having mastered basic cooking skills, it is not necessarily, or exclusively, because these skills will be critical in her new role as a wife, but also because cooking is often treated as a basic indicator of a girl's maturity. Indeed, in middle and upper class households in Dakar, maids often do more of the cooking than the married women who employ them. Yet, culinary skills remain an important gauge of female adulthood.

Senegalese describe careful oversight of children's development of skills in household tasks as key to raising a child who is respectful (*yaru* in Wolof) and well brought up (*bien eduqué* in French), characteristics deemed critical to one's success later in life. As such, children's labor is often perceived to be an index of adults' love and care for them. This sentiment underpins the expectations of children in much of Africa, described by Lancy

(2012) as the "chore curriculum," and documented by Bledsoe (1990) in Sierra Leone, as epitomized in the saying, "No success without struggle."

In households in Africa, age-rank organizes an intergenerational flow of care and material support. Adults and children both describe love as being deeply imbricated with these mutual obligations and responsibilities between children and caregivers, materialized in adults' gifts and their willingness to provide for children's material needs (Durham 2004; Coe 2014). Adults (and older children), in turn, expect children to be attentive to the needs of others and to take a growing responsibility for the welfare of the family as a whole.

Wolof kinship terms that encode relative age regularly draw children's attention to their position in age-based hierarchies. The terms "elder sibling" (*mag*) and "younger sibling" (*rakk*) are used to refer to and address one's (full or half) siblings and cousins[28] alike. Even neighbors and friends are often called *mag* or *rakk*, a trope on the sibling relation, which indexes a close (hierarchal) relationship between non-kin. The terms *mag* and *rakk* are also used in a broader sense to mean elder and junior respectively. The notion of *mag* is particularly polyvalent, used to refer to adults, as opposed to children (*xale*), and to describe the state of being an "elder" or otherwise being "big," i.e., having achieved a desirable age and status. Growing up in Senegal is thus a linguistically marked movement, in which one gradually earns the rank of *mag* relative to an increasingly wide range of people, in more diverse contexts.

Age organizes children's rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis adults and other children. Adults expect older children to guide and take care of younger siblings and

[28] The kinship terms *mag* and *rakk* are used exclusively to refer to "parallel" cousins, that is the children of one's father's brother or mother's sister. The relationship and kinship terminology used for "cross cousins" is explored in detail in chapter seven.

playmates. Boys are specifically encouraged to protect their sisters. Ideally, younger children should, in turn, obey and work for their seniors. Even in play, children reserve the least pleasant and most laborious tasks for the youngest members of the group, while the oldest claim the right to command their playmates and control the activity at hand. Ranked social relations also organize material redistribution among children, shaping the ways children share snacks (Yount-André 2016).

To demonstrate respect and deference toward elders, Senegalese draw on diverse semiotic resources to illustrate their recognition of relative rank. Speech registers that mark low rank (like the *griot* speech register identified by Irvine 1990) and kinship terms that signal relative age are construed as indexes of deferential respect. By register, I am referring to a way of speaking or variety of a given language, "a coherent complex of linguistic features linked to a situation of use" (Irvine 1990: 127). Embodied comportment is also key to displaying one's orientation to age-hierarchy. Beyond greater degrees of physical movement and willingness and capacity to labor, children often mark deference through discreet gestures like lowering their eyes when interacting with people of higher rank[29]. Claims to occupy certain spaces, like taking part in the "men's circle" at a wedding (Durham 2004), for example, require individuals to demonstrate an awareness of their literal and physical "place" in age-hierarchies.

Through everyday interactions with adults and peers, children growing up in Dakar develop an intuitive awareness of the value-laden expectations associated with age-rank. Their embodied skills distinguish them from their cousins visiting from abroad, who fail to

[29] If and in what circumstances children should lower their eyes is, however, a topic of debate in Dakar. Some Senegalese describe this practice as "traditional" and associate this expectation with elderly people and villagers, whereas others find it disrespectful when children look adults (particularly elders) directly in the eye.

master all the nuanced practices through which individuals in Senegal position themselves in social hierarchies. The children of migrants often do not speak or understand Wolof, let alone the subtle differences of register that mark respect. Their lack of experience carrying out tasks that make up daily chores for their Senegal-based age-mates prevents them from acting out many of the practices that illustrate age in Dakar. This can hamper their autonomy and ability to demonstrate maturity, such as when adult caregivers do not trust them to go alone to the market or the corner shop.

Migrants' children's lack of experience in Dakar can also impede their capacity to show deference through household chores associated with children their age, unable to maneuver heavy loads on their hip or head, to clean a fish, or to chop an onion without a cutting board. Indeed, the children of migrants might be oblivious to the sorts of tasks that need to be carried out or the ways that these practices (or their failure to complete them) may be interpreted through moral frameworks salient in Senegal. Adults' expectations of children raised abroad diverge substantially from the demands placed on those growing up in Senegal. Not only are migrants' children unskilled in and unaware of chores, but additionally, in Dakar, they occupy the status of "guest." As both guests and kin, the children growing up abroad occupy a tricky social position in Senegal. While they are low-ranking children lacking skills to demonstrate maturity, their status as guests can sometimes allow them to make claims on rights inaccessible to others their age.

Jumping Rank: Deference and Disjuncture

While the behaviors of children raised abroad often diverge from those expected of children growing up in Senegal, their relatives in Dakar do not necessarily critique their

practices or construe them as disrespectful. Examination of the ways Awa – a nine-year-old growing up in France – took part in a meal of *ndogu* (*iftar*) at her cousin's home in Dakar illustrates a diversity of ways to be a moral child in transnational Senegalese families. Her embodied practices and the spaces she occupied diverged from those of her Dakar-based age-mates present that evening in the Bâ family's home. During the meal, her adult cousin, Khady regulated Awa's actions and guided her in taking up tasks that allowed her to embody her position as a child.

Adja and Karim Bâ lived in Dakar's Medina neighborhood with their three children, Penda, Youssouf, and Kader along with Adja's sister Khady. Karim was a professor at the University of Dakar who had recently ventured into local politics. Adja and Khady both worked at the Dakar branch of an international telephone company. Given that all three adults received regular salaries from full-time jobs on the formal economy, the household revenue likely surpassed most in Dakar. Ten years prior, Adja and Karim had left the apartment they rented in an upper-class neighborhood for the home they constructed above Karim's elderly mother's apartment in the working-class neighborhood of Medina. While their apartment was smaller than middle-class houses located farther from downtown, their living room's the flat-screened T.V. and leather couches, imported from Europe indexed their class status.

The Bâ family steadily hosted guests, some for a meal and others for many days, accommodating particularly large groups on weekends. Adja and Karim regularly provided lodging for their cousins, brothers, and sisters, sometimes for periods of months or even years. Their living room was a space through which guests of all ages and social relations passed, in which family members enacted the hospitality (*teranga*) that Senegalese

characterize as a national trait. The level of formality of the living room and the people allowed in it varied according to the event. Sometimes a space where children and adults relaxed barefoot on the sofa, at other moments, the living room became a formal and male-oriented reception space. When Karim welcomed political supporters, for example, his wife, sister-in-law, and daughter entered only briefly, often to serve food and drinks.

During the month of Ramadan, *ndogu* is the meal eaten at sundown to break the fast. Senegalese consume foods that resemble those eaten at breakfast in Dakar. Hot chocolate, tea, and soluble coffee are consumed with baguettes smeared with butter or chocolate spread and sometimes croissants or other French-style pastries. The quantity, quality, and variety of foods consumed mark *ndogu* as a special meal, which celebrates the end of a day of fasting. Even in impoverished neighborhoods in Dakar, mothers claim to spend more money on food than usual during the month of Ramadan. As resources permit, family members add extra sugar to their coffee and individuals who abstain from breakfast for economic reasons generally eat at the *ndougu* meal.

The Sunday in July when I took part in *ndougu*, there were many guests present in the Bâ's home. I recognized Oumoul, Abdou, and Ismaila, Adja and Khady's younger siblings, as well as Karim's brother, and some of their cousins. The living room, however, was nearly deserted only 20 minutes before it was time to break the day's fast. Guests sat on the sofas in the entryway, on the bed in Khady's room, and on the open-air rooftop deck. Eleven-year-old Penda gradually carried glasses, coffee cups, a bowl of ice cubes, and bottles of hibiscus tea (*bissap*), Sprite, and Coca-Cola into the living room. She placed a stack of baguettes and a basket of pastries on the coffee table. She then brought in sugar, powdered milk, soluble coffee, Lipton tea bags, butter, and Chocoleca brand chocolate-

peanut butter spread. There was a mat spread out on the floor in the living room to accommodate the guests who would not fit on the three long couches that lined the walls.

As we waited for the meal, Adja introduced me to Awa, her uncle's daughter who lived in France and was spending her summer vacation in Dakar. Awa's parents, who had accompanied her to Senegal, were not present at the Bâ home that evening, having left her to spend the evening with her cousins Youssouf (7) and Penda (11) who were close to her age. Following Adja's introduction, Awa sat down next to me on the couch in the living room. She explained that she was very much looking forward to the meal, having fasted all day. "There is so much delicious food!" she exclaimed, gesturing toward the array of food and drink Penda had arranged on the coffee table. Youssouf, Adja's son, hung back, observing us from the doorway as he waited for Awa to return to the hall where they had been playing.

When Adja and Khady began distributing dates, indicating that time had come to break the fast, most of their guests were still not seated in the living room where the table was set. Adja and Khady's younger brothers slipped into the room to quickly make themselves a sandwich and some coffee, which they took back to the open-air deck where they had been talking. Finally, guests gradually began filtering into the living room filling the couches and then the mat on the floor. I sat on a couch next to Karim's older brother and Adja's cousin who held her two-year-old daughter on her lap. Awa sat down on the floor between the coffee table and the mat.

My attention was drawn to Awa's presence in the living room during the meal as Khady began to repeatedly ask her to pass condiments, foods, and beverages, according to the needs of those sitting on the ground. Seated close to coffee table where the food had been laid out, Awa obediently handed her adult cousin (and host for the evening) the requested

items. Over the course of the meal, Khady continually communicated requests to Awa in a curt, direct tone. These commands, "Awa, pass the salt" and "put that over there" drew my attention to the fact that, other than a baby and toddler, Awa was the only child in the living room. Every task seemed to fall on her shoulders. During the meal, Adja and Karim's children, Youssouf and Penda, were out of sight. I had, however, often eaten in the Bâ's living room with the two children. Indeed, on past occasions if the children ate outside on the deck or in another room, I had generally eaten with them, rather than accompanying Karim (and sometimes Adja) and his (often adult male) visitors in the living room.

That evening, I did not overhear any discussion or debate regarding who would eat where. Instead, these questions appeared to be tacitly settled as guests and family members gradually filtered into the living room. In the moments before breaking the fast, and even after the dates were served, many in the household seemed unsure of where their mealtime position should be. When Adja and Khady's younger brothers took food out of the living room to consume on the deck, they established a second commensal space. Eating among young people, without a table, in the dim light of open-air rooftop, their meal was markedly less formal than the large congregation in the living room. For Penda and Youssouf the freedom to eat on the deck and move from room to room during the meal might well have seemed more attractive than eating in the living room that was rapidly filling with adults, where they would likely be closely watched and obligated to help host.

At mealtime, Awa did not follow the other children to find her place, but positioned herself in the living room where the food was located. Although Awa was a visitor in the Bâ household, Khady's repeated directives made clear that, during the meal, her position as a child among adults trumped her guest status. As her father's brother's child, Awa was

technically Khady's cousin. In generational terms, the two were thus closer in rank than they were in an age-based hierarchy, given that Khady was well into her 30s, married to an emigrant in France and had held a steady job for over a decade.

Khady repeatedly directed Awa's behavior using an unmitigated, imperative form. Like all directives, Khady's commands were designed to get Awa to do something. Directives furthermore provide a gauge of the relative power between speaker and addressee (Ervin-Tripp 1976; Goodwin 1990). Beyond the "perlocutionary effect" (Austin 1962) of each individual command, the collective impact of these repeated directives functioned to position Khady and Awa relative to one another and to other co-commensals present. Through the syntactic shape of her utterances, Khady assumed the right to control Awa's behavior, asserting her hierarchal position in terms of age. Khady's commands, delivered with persistence and authority, guided Awa in taking up the responsibilities associated with her role as a child. Eating in the living room positioned Awa as a child among the adults, a role she was able to fulfill under Khady's direction.

In assigning Awa with these menial tasks, Khady accepted the girl's presence at in the adults' commensal space, in demanding that she embody the position of a child poised to work on her elders' behalf. At the same time, Khady was able to illustrate to her guests that she was taking care of, disciplining, and instructing her uncle's child, by performing her care for and authority over the girl who was growing up in France. Recruiting Awa to aid her in hosting, assuring that their guests were well fed, Khady also highlighted the child's status as family member, rather than honored (but relationally distant) guest.

At mealtime, Penda and Youssouf positioned themselves as children in a manner that contrasted with Awa's. Avoiding the living room during the meal, they participated in a

spatial division between children (and youth) and the adults (and babies), who were eating separately that evening due to the large number of people present at the meal. This act put Awa in a hierarchal position relative to them. Even if she had willingly taken up the child-role Khady assigned her to during the meal, eating in the living room had separated Awa from the other children her age.

This was one act among many that distinguished her from her cousins who lived in Dakar full-time. Before the meal, Awa had distanced herself from the other children as she chatted with me. She looked me in the eye and sat next to me on the sofa as we talked. These acts could have indexed a level of familiarity with an adult that certain Senegalese might find offensive. Even if Awa was at Khady's service *during* the meal, she escaped the preparation work before the meal, and the clearing and cleaning of dishes afterward, which fell to Penda. These acts highlight Awa's status as a foreigner and guest, in her relatives' household and in Senegal. Whether consciously or not, Awa claimed privileges that the children from Dakar did not have.

Awa's mealtime behaviors shed light on the ways children experience migrant status as imbricated with age-based hierarchies, through the organization of rights and responsibilities in everyday interactions in Senegal. While Youssouf and his sister had given up their usual mealtime spot in the living room, Awa ate in the adult space. She did not, however, break a rule, per se, in that the adults permitted her to stay without criticizing her actions. During the meal, Awa thus successfully took up a higher social status than her cousins in Dakar. She had "skipped an age grade." Traveling to Dakar provided her with the rights of an older person, she had grown up in movement.

In the next section, I examine an interaction that took place between Youssouf and Awa immediately following the meal, during which the children competed for positions of authority. This interaction illustrates how children growing up in France in Senegal draw on geographic and linguistic hierarchies, salient in Dakar and beyond, in their efforts to negotiate their positions in overlapping status hierarchies.

Play and Prestige: Children's Negotiation of Hierarchies Between France and Senegal

After the meal, I handed seven-year-old Youssouf my audio-recorder, proposing that he record something with his friends. Youssouf brought the device into the entryway where he had been playing with Awa and a friend from the neighborhood. Taking up the "voice" (Bakhtin 1984) of a talk show host, he proceeded to "interview" Awa. He spoke loudly, dramatically drawing out his words, as if to arouse excitement and project to a studio audience. He physically marked his own and Awa's turns to talk with the recorder, first speaking directly into it then holding the "microphone" out to Awa to indicate that she had the floor.

In this instance of pretend play, an activity often presumed to be "carefree" and separate from adult concerns (Schwartzman 1976, 2012), the children engaged with hierarchies salient in the adult world at local and global levels, drawing on language ideologies that rank places and people. The interaction represented in Transcript 2 (below) shows how the children showcased their linguistic skills for the imagined audience symbolized by the audio-recorder. They alternately proposed frameworks of evaluation, each attempting to shift their "footing" (Goffman 1979) relative to one another. From the start of the "interview" depicted here, Youssouf playfully ridiculed Awa, establishing a competitive

tone to the interaction. In the transcript, Wolof is indicated in bold and French in italics. English appears in lines 10-11, but is not indicated graphically.

Transcript 2: "Speak Wolof!"

1 Youssouf: *Est-ce que* **mën nga lakk** 2 **wolof? 'Naa nga def? Maa ngi fii rekk.'** 3 **Loolu nga mën na wax. Ak 'Bayi ma.'** 4 **Waxal wolof. Waxal.** (2.4) **Dara, ho dara.** 5 **mënu ci dara waxal** 6 **wolof.** (3.0) **Oh::: dara wolof.**	Youssouf: *Can* **you speak wolof?** '**How are you? I'm fine.' That's all you can say. And 'Leave me alone.' Speak Wolof. Speak.** (2.4) **Nothing, oh nothing. You can say nothing in Wolof.** (3.0) **Oh::: nothing in Wolof.**
7 Awa: *Oui normalement moi je parle* 8 *anglais un peu*	Awa: *Yes I should be able to speak English a little*
9 Youssouf: *Ok donc parles anglais*	Youssouf: *Ok then speak in English*
10 Awa: Hello my name is Awa. (2.4) 11 Today my is euh hap—	Awa: Hello my name is Awa. (2.4) Today my is euh hap—
12 Youssouf: *Parles Pays-Bas.*	Youssouf: *Speak Netherlands*
13 Awa: *Je parle pas cette la:::ngue!*	Awa: *I don't speak that la:::nguage !*
14 Youssouf: *Mais tu étais partie au* 15 *Pays Bas?*	Youssouf: *But you were in the Netherlands?*
16 Awa: *Si mais ça c'était quand j'étais toute* 17 *petite* ((rising pitch))	Awa: *Yes but it was when I was tiny* ((rising pitch))
18 Cheikh:((enters)) *Bon soir.*	Cheikh:((enters)) *Good evening.*
19 Youssouf: *Tu parlais français? Ou arab,* 20 *ou* **naar**. *Cheikh Seck est tro:::::p nul*.	Youssouf:*You spoke French? Or Arabic or* **Naar**. *Cheikh Seck is so::::::: lame.*
21 Oumoul: Awa	Oumoul: Awa
22 Awa: *Oui*?	Awa: *Yes*?
23 Oumoul: *Cedez la place, eh Awa,* 24 *Youssouf?*	Oumoul: *Give up your spot, uh Awa, Youssouf?*
25 Youssouf: Mm?	Youssouf: Mm?
26 Oumoul: **May leen nu toog**	Oumoul: **Let them sit down**

27 Cheikh: *Mais c'est pas grave*	Cheikh: *But it's not a big deal*
28 Oumoul: *Non non non non* **toogal**	Oumoul: *No no no no* **sit**

In this interaction, Youssouf and Awa situated themselves relative to one another by drawing on evaluations of languages linked to hierarchies relevant in the adult world. Bourdieu's (1977) notion of a "linguistic market," and studies of "language ideologies" (Kroskrity 2000; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity 1998; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994) are premised on the notion that different languages and ways of speaking carry distinct social values, or linguistic capital. Since the 1990s, linguistic anthropologists have paid particular attention to local beliefs and presuppositions about language practices that link linguistic behaviors to speakers' social positions. Examinations of language ideologies demonstrate that these seemingly anodyne sets of beliefs are "suffused with the political and moral issues pervading the particular sociolinguistic field and are subject to the interests of their bearers' social position" (Irvine and Gal 2000: 35).

Youssouf, his sister, parents, aunts, and uncles all spoke French fluently, a testament to the family's socioeconomic status and education. The Wolof spoken most commonly in the Senegalese capital includes substantial French borrowings. Linguists have dubbed this variety "urban Wolof," arguing that Senegalese urbanites intertwine French and Wolof to an extent that goes beyond code-switching to constitute a code in itself (McLaughlin 2001, 2008; Swigart 1994). Indeed, speaking either language without borrowing from the other proves difficult for many Dakarois. In Dakar, urban Wolof functions as an unmarked register, whereas "pure" Wolof is associated with rural speakers from ethnically Wolof

villages and French indexes formality or foreignness (McLaughlin 2001, 2008). Senegalese often expect other Africans to speak (or learn) Wolof, but (those who are able) are likely to use French when addressing European and American visitors to their country.

Although he was aware that, coming from France, Awa understood little Wolof, this was the language in which Youssouf chose to "interview" her. He began by asking, "Can you speak Wolof?" in urban Wolof, starting in French with "*Est-ce que*" (Can), then immediately shifting to Wolof to finish the question. In the next six lines of the transcript, he spoke Wolof insistently, French borrowings conspicuously absent. Youssouf's questioning then took a confrontational tone as he imitated Awa, reciting a few, simple Wolof phrases that, he claimed, were all she mastered "*Naa nga def? Maa ngi fii rekk*" ("How are you? I'm fine"). Youssouf's tone of annoyance made clear his critical evaluation of Awa's lack of Wolof skills. "That's all you can say," he continued in Wolof, "and '*Bayyi ma*'" ('Leave me alone'). Through this act of reported speech, Youssouf communicated his opinion that Awa *should* speak Wolof, framing her incompetence as a lack, a moral stance that would have been unlikely had she been a French child from a non-Senegalese family.

Youssouf then asked Awa (still in Wolof) to speak Wolof (L4), presumably to demonstrate her lack of proficiency in this language that unites Senegalese. A long silence followed as he awaited her response, holding the recorder under her chin. Then, using a register similar to that which Ferguson (1983) has called "Sports announcer talk," he exclaimed, "Nothing! Oh Nothing! You can say nothing in Wolof" (L4-5). He paused again, as if to give Awa a chance to redeem herself. When she was again silent, he repeated, "Oh::: nothing in Wolof." Like a commentator on a soccer match yelling "Goal," he drew out the word "Oh," as if to highlight her defeat.

Youssouf shifted to sports announcer talk as his teasing gained force. Treating the linguistic demonstration he had demanded as a game, this change in register functioned as a metapragmatic cue that, rather than a direct attack on Awa, his comments should be construed as a dramatic performance for an imaginary "show." Hoyle (1993) has described children who drew on this sports announcer register to comment on their ping-pong game in real time, taking up imaginary identities of sports announcers and professional athletes at the same time (see Agha 2007: 164-5). Youssouf similarly used this register to take up an imaginary role that allowed him to distance himself from the emphatic critique of Awa's lack of Wolof proficiency that he delivered through the voice of an imaginary sports announcer.

To grasp Youssouf's mockery paradoxically required Awa to make use of the Wolof skills she did have. Her response in line 7 illustrates that she had indeed understood enough to recognize that her language skills were in question. She responded saying that she spoke English a little, highlighting her linguistic capital in a language valued internationally. Youssouf commanded her to demonstrate her skills, but interrupted her midway through her second sentence, ordering her to speak Dutch. Awa replied with frustration that she did not speak that language, having lived in Holland only for a brief period as an infant. Youssouf responded, first, in what appears to be an earnest attempt to ascertain what language she and her family had spoken during this period (L19), asking "You spoke French?" He then quickly reverted back to his game of disparaging her language skills, suggesting that they spoke Arabic or "*Naar*." *Naar* is a pejorative, colloquial term used in Senegal for people from Mauritania.[30] Youssouf's "interview" then ended abruptly when his Aunt Oumoul

[30] Although the term *Naar* it is not usually used to describe the language spoken by Mauritanians, this is how Youssouf used the term in line 20.

directed the children to "give up their spot" (*ceder la place*) to two young men who had just arrived.

In this interaction, Youssouf and Awa competed for authority by comparing their linguistic capital. First, Youssouf spoke in Wolof, a performance at Awa's expense, as he explicitly commented on her lack of proficiency in the language. He claimed authority over his cousin from France by demanding that she do a demonstration of the language and mocking her when she was unable. Awa then attempted to renegotiate her position relative to Youssouf by drawing attention to her English skills. A language associated with migration and the global economy, Awa highlighted the value of her skills beyond Senegal's borders. Youssouf's subsequent turns worked to diminish the authority Awa claimed through English, by interrupting her demonstration, drawing attention to another language she did not speak, and finally by suggesting that she spoke "*Naar,*" associating her with stigmatized Mauritanian migrants in Senegal.

As the two children vied for a hierarchal position, their struggle drew significance from both the local context of Dakar and from global political-economic hierarchies that structure the perceived value of each language. In Dakar, Wolof had an immediate and obvious value as the *lingua franca* among Senegalese. Youssouf, on the one hand, drew attention to his own mastery of local practices, taking up a position of authority throughout the interaction in his repeated use of aggressive, unmitigated directives. His claim to this powerful position was rooted in his "home court advantage," illustrated by his knowledge of Wolof and familiarity with the many guests present in his home, including me. While I had met Awa only that evening, I had known Youssouf and his family since he was four years old, visiting them frequently on four separate trips to Dakar since 2008. In this episode of

power-wielding between the two children, Youssouf's control over the recording equipment functioned simultaneously an index of his connections at home and abroad.

Awa, on the other hand, highlighted the international value of English to demonstrate her status as a traveler and guest visiting from Europe. In Senegal, the linguistic capital associated with English is communicated even to very young children. In the image below of a bilingual school, for example, the language is associated with cartoon animals and a

Figure 1: A bilingual French/English pre-school in Dakar's Baobab neighborhood

computer, symbolizing modern technology and foreign products. Adults and youth in Dakar frequently borrow words and phrases from English. This provides cultural cache among Senegalese youth who draw on the linguistic styles of international hip-hop culture as well as among educated Senegalese elites, only the wealthiest of whom can afford tuition costs at bilingual schools in Dakar, let alone American universities.

As Youssouf and Awa vied for a position of authority, they negotiated these multiple geographic and linguistic hierarchies, squabbling over status positions that, in Senegal are intimately tied to one's age-rank. In this interaction, Youssouf was able to minimize Awa's two years of seniority by drawing on his secure position of belonging in Senegal and in his own home, implicitly questioning Awa's inclusion in these arenas.

He did not, however, question outright her place in Dakar or their family. Instead, he addressed her as Senegalese, chiding her for her lack of Wolof skills. Furthermore, the fact that he did so in Wolof required Awa to demonstrate a certain measure of belonging simply to respond to her cousin's critique, which questioned her position in their transnational Senegalese family. Although she proved unable, at that moment, to produce a phrase Wolof, Awa responded to Youssouf's challenge by demonstrating comprehension that her language skills were at stake. In a clever riposte that served to somewhat level the playing field, Awa drew attention to her knowledge of English, expanding the terms of play to language skills rather than just Wolof skills. Youssouf then conceded the value of English by commanding a demonstration of her skills.

For children in transnational families, whether based in Senegal or abroad, the value of skills and practices useful in Dakar and on an international scale is clear. The economic capital associated with these diverse skills is bound up with a multiplicity of possible moral stances, multiple frameworks through which children's and adults' behaviors might be evaluated.

Even among children, status distinctions like age-rank are bound up with political economic hierarchies between geographic locations. Geographic hierarchies perceived to exist between Senegal and France like those between urban and rural areas in Senegal structure the status of individuals who travel relative to those who stay put. Social distinctions that mark one as a migrant can establish a relationship of inequality, and thus complementarity, which structures expectations of rights and responsibilities among migrants and non-migrants. Even without ever leaving Senegal, children, like adults, are aware of these geographic hierarchies, manifest in the value associated with foreign products and languages, and in the money migrants spend when they return to Senegal on vacation.

The role of a migrant, like that of a patron, a parent, or an adult more generally, is thus linked to one's capacity to support dependents. And on return trips migrants never lack potential beneficiaries. Friends and family members rush to make their financial struggles known before they exhaust their funds, in a process Moya (2011) described as a financial "bombardment." Cole (2011) suggests that the social ascension associated with migration also influences one's position in age-based hierarchies, such that migration allows one to "grow up."

At the end of the "interview" that Youssouf recorded, the two children, having squabbled for positions of authority, were both put in their place by Oumoul's command. When she demanded that the children "give up their spot" to the adults, Oumoul made explicit the responsibility that children in Senegal are presumed to have to recognize their place and cede privileged positions to adults. In the first scene examined in this chapter, it

was Youssouf and Awa's divergent orientation toward this responsibility that divided the cousins.

In Senegal, the distance that "Western" practices may be perceived to create between children growing up geographically distant from one another does not necessarily result in the exclusion or negative sanctioning of children raised abroad. Awa was not scolded for her failure to give up her spot in the adult space. And even Youssouf recognized the value of her English skills in his pretend interview. This distance may instead be construed as evidence of the high status of migrants and their children, confirming the perception among those in Dakar that they have a responsibility to support kin in Senegal.

This chapter has again illustrated the multiplicity of moralities upon which members of transnational families draw in their everyday interactions, demonstrating that there is no one way to be a moral child any more than there is a single means of morally bringing up children. While this may be true in any social context, the multiplicity of moral means of engaging with kin and taking up or avoiding ranked positions in linguistic and material exchanges is intimately tied to transnational Senegalese families' strategies of grappling with economic volatility in the neoliberal global economy.

I suggest that this multiplicity of economic moralities is not simply a condition of their "betwixt and between" status, instead it is an agentive choice that creates the social space necessary for children raised abroad to nonetheless be part of families in Senegal. West African families have long invested in what scholars have called "wealth in people" (Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Guyer 1993; Guyer and Eno Belinga 1995; Bledsoe 1980). Rather than focusing primarily on attaining "wealth in things," these scholars point out that throughout Africa, individuals seek to "transform material wealth into loyal subjects" who

are "considered both means to the (re)production of power and power's ultimate end" (West 2010: 651).

An expansive understanding of belonging benefits transnational kinship networks: it is key to diversifying the paths they invest in through the education of children. Acceptance of diverse moral means of interacting with kin permits members of transnational families to "invest" in a wide variety of individuals, cultivating a network of diverse kin. Rather than treat values learned abroad in opposition to Senegalese virtues, transnational Senegalese accommodate multiple moral frameworks for understanding individuals' behaviors.

TRANSNATIONAL CROSS COUSINS: KINSHIP AND THE MATERIALITY OF CARE

Scholarship on transnational families has examined the resources and gifts that parents abroad send their children living in their country of origin (Coe 2011; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997, Schmalzbauer 2001; Parrenas 2001). The example I describe in this chapter illuminates another permutation of this process: family members in Senegal who work to create and reinforce transnational relations with and through children growing up in France through gifts and money. This chapter analyzes the evolving relationship between 11-year-old Aminata, who was born and is growing up in France, and Serigne, her 35-year-old cousin in Dakar, who devoted substantial effort and resources to establishing close ties with his younger cousin in France.

I argue that the notion of "cross-cousin" relations (a *jamm/sang* relationship in Wolof), opened up the possibility for a particular closeness between Aminata and Serigne, despite the fact that their relationship diverged significantly from that which Senegalese traditionally describe as characteristic of cross cousins. Through examination of this kinship relation, this chapter sheds light on everyday kinship-making processes that shape and are shaped by resource redistribution on a transnational scale. It illustrates the continued salience of kinship strategies and economic repertoires that have long organized socioeconomic relations in West Africa, facilitating migration and allowing Africans to weather economic volatility.

I first examine the ways family members interpreted and evaluated Aminata and Serigne's kinship relation, relative to the cousins' acts of exchange. I then examine their

status as "cross cousins," in light of the rich anthropological literature on this subject. Finally, I analyze the "materiality of care" (Coe 2011, 2014) that underpinned the cousins' transnational connection, to shed light on why Serigne appeared so interested in this particular bond with his young cousin from Paris. Through examination of everyday processes of kinship-making that both shape and are shaped by economic moralities, I illustrate the ways individuals reinforce and transform socioeconomic relations that link Senegalese across continents, reproducing households in Africa in ways that are imbricated with former European metropoles and new frontiers.

Kinterms and Airplane Tickets: Practical Kinship on a Transnational Scale

Aminata's father and Serigne's mother were brother and sister (same mother and father) in a family of eleven children who grew up together in Dakar. As adults, nearly all eleven siblings went abroad and some have later returned to Senegal. Aminata and Serigne's lives were divided not only by the continents they live on but also by their ages, Serigne being more than 20 years Aminata's senior. In such a large, transnational family, one might imagine that Aminata and Serigne would not know each other very well. But these two cousins share a special bond founded on regular exchanges of news and gifts.

In English, we would call Serigne and Aminata "first cousins" in French, "*les cousins germains."* But in Senegal, like most of Africa, there are distinct kinship terms for "parallel" and "cross" cousins. In this type of kinship terminology, "first cousins are divided into two types – *cross cousins*, and *parallel-cousins*: cross cousins are the children of siblings of opposite sex, parallel-cousins are the children of siblings of the same sex" (Fox 1967: 185). In other words, a person's "father's sister's children, and his mother's brother's children are

his cross cousins; his father's brother's children and his mother's sister's children are his parallel-cousins" (ibid.). In Wolof, the same kinship term is used for parallel cousins as is used for one's full and half brothers and sisters (*mag* and *rakk*; see chapter six for discussion of these kinterms). The terms "*sang*" and "*jamm*" index a distinct relationship between cross cousins. The kinship term "*sang*," which literally means "master" in Wolof, suggests that matrilateral cross cousins are the "masters" in their relationship with their patrilateral cross cousins, who are, in tern their "slaves" (*jamm*[31]).

In Wolof society, (like many in which a particular term distinguishes cross cousins) this represents the preferential conjugal unit. As such, women – ranked lower than their husbands in gender hierarchies – ideally marry men who are their "slaves" in kinship terms (Diop 1985: 60-65; Moya 2011). These overlapping hierarchies counterbalance each other to establish a union that is, symbolically at least, egalitarian (Diop 1985: 65). Beyond the preferential marriage union, in Senegal, the relationship between *jamm* and *sang* cross cousins is perceived as characteristically playful, founded on systematic teasing and jokes, and associated with certain rights and responsibilities. For example, on the days of religious celebrations, *jamm* might theatrically wash his or her cross-cousin's feet (an action conventionally associated with acting out the slave in this context, but which true slaves do not actually do) or carry out other acts stereotypically associated with slaves (Moya 2011:93; Diop 1985: 60).

From the start of the discipline through the 1970s, the comparative examination of kinship constituted one of the central topics of anthropological investigation. Ethnographers'

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[31] The terms "*jamm-waan*," meaning 'real slave' [lit. kitchen slave] and *jamm-lenqe* [family-slave] may be used to distinguish between cross cousins and those who occupy the status of slave within the Wolof caste system (Diop 1985: 60).

focus on the comparative study of kinship systems revealed cross-cultural significance attributed to cross-cousin relations throughout Africa and elsewhere in the world. In many societies, this is described to be the preferred marriage union. Scholars have explained this preference saying that this is the closest relation that nonetheless meets the requirements of exogamy. This union thus allows individuals to remain close to their birth families while achieving the genealogical distance necessary to avoid incest (Diop 1985:61-2). In 1969, Meyer Fortes explained that on a pragmatic level, "such a marriage reconciles the care and expense a man has devoted to preparing his son for life with the obligation to provide also for … his sisters' and sisters' daughters' children" (Fortes 1969: 214). A man's sister's son is already invested in social and economic relationships with his potential future affines, brought up in the cultural repertoires and moral frameworks of their group.

Aminata is Serigne's mother's brother's daughter. In Wolof kinship terminology, she is thus his "*sang*" or master. Despite this genealogical relationship, during my fieldwork, Aminata and Serigne did not engage in the behaviors that Senegalese and anthropologists alike associate with cross cousins. Serigne was already married and Aminata only 11 years old. Marriage between the two was never an explicit topic of discussion or even the subject of good-natured teasing. Furthermore, Aminata knew only a few phrases in Wolof and was unfamiliar with the kinship terms *jamm* and *sang*. But even if she never called Serigne her "*jamm*," their close relationship suggests this notion of kinship offered a logical foundation for a particular closeness between the cousins this transnational context.

In this section, I focus on the linguistic and material exchanges that made up Aminata and Serigne's relationship, through analysis of "practical kinship" (Bourdieu 1990; Weber 2005). Founded on the notion that kinship relations are not given, but must be created

through everyday practices of "doing family" (Morgan 1996; see also Carsten 2000; Agha 2007), "practical kinship" focuses on the everyday management of domestic economies and the social practices through which notions of relatedness are enacted (Weber 2005: 20; Ténédos 2006: 24). Although Aminata may not have been aware of the kinterms *jamm* and *sang,* the shadow of their cross-cousin relationship appeared to exert a tacit influence on the exchanges that reproduced their relationship.

My attention was first drawn to the special relationship between Aminata and Serigne when Aminata's father told me that one of her cousins had promised to buy her an airplane ticket to Dakar during her school vacation. Even if Serigne's promise to purchase the ticket never materialized, the offer itself indicated a particular link between the cousins. A testament to Serigne's desire to cultivate a close relationship with his cousin, the offer was a proposition to invest in her upbringing, by funding her return to Senegal. This gesture would facilitate Aminata's familiarity with Dakar potentially reinforcing her relationships with kin there, including, but not limited to Serigne.

Later, when I inquired about the possible vacation to Senegal, Aminata expressed doubts that the promise would materialize. Her father responded with surprise, bordering on indignation. Aminata justified herself saying that sometimes people "just say things like that," but her father reassured her that Serigne was reliable and if he had offered her a trip to Dakar, he would make good on his promise. Later when I asked him whether he thought that Serigne would buy the ticket, Abdou assured me that it did not matter whether Serigne bought it or he (Abdou) did, Serigne could pay him back once in Senegal. Regardless of whether, in the end, it was Serigne or her father who financed the ticket, for Aminata, her trip had been a gift from her cousin.

Aminata made her close relationship with Serigne clear to me when, at my request, she drew a picture of her "family tree" and gave me on a guided "Facebook tour." On Aminata's Facebook page, Serigne was the first "friend" she showed me, her attention drawn to his Facebook page by a recent message he had sent her. Aminata pointed toward a tension she felt between Serigne's status as her cousin and as a financially independent adult when she added his name to her kinship diagram. She hesitated before adding Serigne's name to her list of cousins, saying, "And who else, ah Serigne. But him, actually, he's a journalist. But he's still my cousin." As if anticipating the age one might presume the 11-year-old's cousin to be, Aminata added the qualification that he was a journalist. In Dakar, this job on the formal sector marked Serigne as part of a francophone elite, one of a minority of Senegalese who could depend on a regular salary each month. For Aminata, Serigne's occupation indexed his age relative to her. And yet, she emphasized, he was still her *cousin*, a position similar to her in generational hierarchies.

The following July (2014), Aminata and her father traveled to Senegal, during the time that I was carrying out the Dakar-based leg of my fieldwork. This allowed me to meet Serigne and observe first-hand his interactions with his cousin and uncle from France. As we sat exchanging news in the living room of Abdou's mother's (Aminata and Serigne's grandmother's) home, Abdou chuckled playfully as he described to me their preparation for the trip, saying that Aminata had insisted on buying a special gift for Serigne. Although his daughter was out of earshot, Abdou's tone had an air of teasing, as he described how she "*loved* her cousin *so much* that she wanted to spend 150 euros on a shirt for him." She selected this gift because, Abdou reported, she knew that he always wears very "classy" button down shirts.

Serigne's collared shirts visibly distinguished him among their relatives in Dakar, who generally wore t-shirts or ample ensembles made of wax-print fabrics. In the heat of Dakar's summer, Serigne's long sleeved, button-down shirts, like his close-toed shoes, indexed his socioeconomic and professional status. Among Abdou's nephews in Dakar, he was the only one who held a salaried position on Dakar's formal sector.

I met Serigne at the home of his maternal- and Aminata's paternal-grandmother. The large family home in Dakar's Castor neighborhood had many bedrooms, financed by remittances that Aminata's father, Serigne's mother, and their siblings had been sending from Europe since the 1970s. After introducing myself to Serigne, I told him that Aminata had often spoken about him back in Paris. I mistakenly referred to him as her "uncle" and Serigne kindly corrected me saying that even if she sometimes calls him her uncle, he is actually her cousin. Having overheard my error, Aminata rushed toward us insisting that she does *not* mistake him for her uncle, she knows very well that he is her cousin! Aminata and her father then joined our conversation, her father teasing her for the attention she pays her cousin and telling Serigne that Aminata found him very classy.

Regular exchanges of news and gifts between Aminata and Serigne marked a particular closeness between these two cousins, who were otherwise divided by a substantial difference in age and by the geographical distance between the countries they inhabited. From Aminata's perspective, despite their distance in age, it was important to emphasize that their kinship relation was one of *cousins*. Upon returning to Paris, I learned that Serigne had given Aminata 200 euros just before she left Senegal to return to France. Serigne's timing, offering the money just before their interactions were again stretched across a transnational expanse, caused the gift to appear to be an effort to encourage Aminata to remain in contact

and to assure that their newly reinforced bond stretch forward across time and space. Indeed, back in Paris, Aminata spent most of the money on a new smart phone, which would facilitate her ability to remain in contact with family abroad through Facebook and Viber.

Cross Cousins: A Moral Foundation for Emergent Relations

Early structuralist and functionalist schools treated kinship systems as sets of rules that established moral and material obligations between individuals and groups. But later, scholars inspired by practice theory approached kinship as the "product of strategies oriented toward the satisfaction of material and symbolic interests and organized by reference to a particular type of economic and social conditions" (Bourdieu 1990: 167). Bourdieu emphasized the fact that kin relations can always be characterized in multiple ways (traced through paternal or maternal lines, for example) such that "one can always bring a remote relative closer … by emphasizing what unites," or "distance the closest relative by emphasizing what separates" (1990: 172). John and Jean Comaroff's (1981) investigations into the management of meaning in kin relations and Florence Weber's (2005) notion of practical kinship have built on this practice-based approach to kinship.

The Comaroffs point out that cousin marriage blurs boundaries between agnates, matrilateral kin, and affines. They explain that in these circumstances in which "ties overlap and rank, status, and relationships are constantly being manipulated," the act of labeling a union in terms of a particular type of cousinship is, "primarily a cognitive device" that through which individuals might "articulate normative expectation with actual political relations" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1981: 41). As individuals manage and manipulate the meanings and practices of kinship for personal and collective aims, Bourdieu reminds us that

what is at stake, "is nothing other than the definition of the practical limits of the group," (1990: 172). The identification and redefinition of the terms of a cross-cousin relationship, key to individuals' positions in political-economic networks, simultaneously mark boundaries of belonging between differently positioned groups of kin.

Finally, anthropologists have illustrated that the relationship between cross cousins is one in which individuals can "play with" symmetry and asymmetry in their relative social roles. I mean this, first, in the sense that this relationship affords individuals a particular capacity to renegotiate their relative positions. Second, rank-relations among cross cousins are often, quite literally, the topic of light-hearted, mischievous, and even profane play. Indeed, cross cousins are known in anthropological literature for their joking relationships (Radcliffe-Brown 1940; Mauss 1928; Lévi-Strauss 1945; Harris 1968: 527-30; Launay 1977, 2006). In Senegal, they might tease one another for gluttony or even make vulgar accusations that, in any other context, would be cause for offense (Diop 1985: 60). Diop contends that these jokes create playful, mischievous, and flirtatious relationships between cross cousins, explaining that these teasing events are so systematic among cross cousins that one's failure to tease might be interpreted as a sign of reservation or even hostility (1985: 61).

In many ways, Aminata and Serigne's relationship diverges significantly from these accounts of cross cousins. Aminata appeared unaware of the stereotypical forms of teasing that cross cousins engage in. Nor did Serigne attempt to recruit her to the role of joking partner, introducing her to this mode of play. None of their family members treated Serigne as a potential marriage partner for Aminata. He was already married to a woman his age who was living in Quebec and who Serigne planned to join in Canada the following fall.

Although polygamy is lawful in Senegal, it is relatively rare among French educated Dakarois. This, the cousins' age difference and Aminata's French background combined to make marriage in this case improbable.

Furthermore, for educated Senegalese urbanites like Serigne or Aminata's father Abdou, this style of arranged marriage would likely seem excessively "traditional" in either France or Senegal. Abdou prided himself on his status as a "modern" Senegalese intellectual in Paris, fully integrated into French society, a position that would be put in question by the act of arranging marriage between his daughter and nephew. I have often heard Senegalese in Paris refer critically to Africans in France who engage in this sort of family-arranged marriage between cousins or a partner from their parents' village. Jennifer Cole reminds us that European folk ideas about love and marriage are closely tied to value-laden notions of modernity, explaining that, "romantic love, companionate marriage, and the nuclear family all emerged with – and signify – modernity, while the pragmatic demands of extended families, custom and material concerns are said to characterize more traditional societies" (Cole 2016: 202; see also Radcliffe-Brown et al. 1950: 44-45). If cross cousins make up a traditionally preferred conjugal union in Senegal and much of Africa, in certain contexts (in Africa and beyond), this type of marriage marks couples and entire families as "backward," insufficiently "modern" or, in France, unsuccessfully "integrated."

The particularity of Serigne and Aminata's relationship is further illustrated through comparison with Serigne's relationship with one of his parallel cousins in Dakar, Koumba, who was two years younger than Aminata. Koumba was born in France, but when her parents divorced, her mother sent her to live with her grandmother Dakar. As his parallel cousin, Koumba was Serigne's *rakk bu jigeen* or younger sister. Serigne took up this role of

an older sibling by directing her to fulfill household tasks. She received none of the special attention and gifts that Aminata did coming from France. Aminata's status as a cross cousin and visitor from Paris allowed Serigne and Aminata to play with their relative status positions, rendering the age gap that divided them relatively less important to defining their kinship relations.

While Aminata and Serigne's relationship diverged substantially from that which scholars and Senegalese describe as characteristic of cross-cousin relationships, both Aminata and Serigne were quick to emphasize their status as *cousins* not uncle and niece. For Aminata, this meant that Serigne was not a person of her father's generation who had the right to order her around. The final section of this chapter further examines the significance of the cousins' exchanges from Serigne's perspective. It suggests that, in this context of transnational kinship, material exchange provided Serigne with the means of creating a close relationship with both Aminata and her father.

The Materiality of Care: Constructing New Forms of Kinship

Examination of the cousins' relationship from Serigne's perspective draws attention to the ways the gifts he offered established a close relationship, not only with Aminata but also with her father Abdou. This further illustrates the ways the cross-cousin relationship organizes the social meaning of their exchanges according to an economic morality that treats care as ideally materialized through gifts and support, which Cati Coe refers to as the "materiality of care" (Coe 2011, 2014). I suggest that these transnational kin drew on longstanding kinship categories to create new forms of relatedness, linking themselves across the Senegalese diaspora.

Scholars of kinship have argued that kin strategically use marriage between cross cousins to cement socioeconomic relations between a nephew and his mother's brother. In Wolof society, men are said to have a material obligation to provide not only for their own children, but also for their sister's children (Diop 1985: 60). John and Jean Comaroff (1981) point out that mothers transmit to their children a particular relationship with her brother, which is accompanied by "ritualized reciprocal exchanges, solidarity against agnatic rivals and, sometimes, substantial material support" (1981:37). The characteristics associated with the ideal-type of mother's-brother/sister's-son relationship render this link particularly advantageous if the mother's brother becomes the father-in-law of his sister's son.

Examination of efforts Serigne and Abdou invested in the creation and maintenance of Serigne and Aminata's relationship, shows how the cross-cousin model provided a foundation not only for a close relationship between Serigne and Aminata but also between Serigne and Abdou. Serigne's mother had four other living brothers, but he did not, to my knowledge, offer any of their daughters gifts as substantial and frequent as those he provided Aminata. The Comaroffs show that although a man's mother is likely to have multiple brothers, he will "generally emphasize his close matrilateral link with only one or two of them," carving out his own kinship universe by "selectively activating a number of linkages" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1981: 33). Kinship relations are always negotiable, produced through individuals' efforts to position themselves within political-economic networks of kin. The significance of Serigne's relationship with Aminata was the result of her role as her father's daughter, his uncle. In cross-cousin relations she held the high status of *sang* thanks to this relation, essentially representing and yielding the authority of his uncle.

I suggest that Serigne focused particular effort on reproducing a close relationship with Aminata and Abdou to create and reinforce socioeconomic bonds with this French-educated, middle-class branch of their transnational family. Like his uncle, Serigne's formal education in Dakar had provided him access to salaried employment on the formal economic sector. His plans to emigrate to Quebec would reinforce parallels between the two men's lives and statuses in their family, as educated migrants to francophone destinations who had the means to migrate legally and seek skilled jobs abroad. Serigne and Abdou's education and class status distinguished them from their relatives who migrated to work on the informal economic sector in Spain and Italy as well as those who were unemployed in Dakar.

Tightening immigration laws and economic stagnation have contributed to shift in the social meanings associated with migration to France and other European countries. While France was formerly the most common destination for Senegalese emigrants by far, since the 1980s, increasing numbers of Senegalese have migrated to Italy, Spain, and the United States (Carter 1997; Mary 2010; Stoller 2002). As destinations have diversified, however, legal migration channels to Europe and the U.S. have become increasingly limited. As a result, a growing number of Senegalese have emigrated through informal trajectories (undocumented or with a falsified passport/visa). These migrants struggle to gain their livelihoods abroad on European and American informal markets, like the members of Murid transnational trade networks who work as street vendors abroad (Ebin 1996; Riccio 2001; Diouf 2000). Stricter immigration laws have produced hierarchal migration trajectories for Senegalese: shrinking legal paths abroad through education and employment and expanding, illegal routes through informal transnational connections. These distinct channels have

contributed, in turn, to the stratification of Senegalese populations at home and abroad, relative to their own and their relatives' migration destinations.

Many Africans now view the prestige of migrating to North America as having surpassed that of relocating to Europe (see Newell 2012: 71). In recent years, Quebec has gained in popularity and prestige as a site of immigration among French and francophone Africans alike (Hirtzmann 2013; Pâris 2014). In France, many perceive North American economies to have recovered more quickly than European markets following the 2008 financial crisis. There has been an upsurge in requests by young French citizens for visas to live and work in Quebec (Daudens 2012; Shingler 2014). Serigne's migration destination thus offered economic promise and prestige similar to that which was associated with studying and working in France in the 1970s when his uncle first left Senegal. Serigne's choice to cultivate a close socioeconomic relationship with Aminata and her father Abdou both flows from and reinforces divisions in the Senegalese diaspora that may be observed within their own transnational family.

For his part, Abdou played a strategic role in reinforcing, broadcasting, and supporting the kinship behaviors that linked his daughter and nephew. He verbally highlighted the material support that Serigne provided Aminata, as well as the affection she displayed for Serigne. Abdou's approval of these gifts was clear in the playful tone he used to frequently describe these exchanges. Repeatedly drawing attention to Serigne's gifts, Abdou circulated an image of closeness between the two cousins, reminding his daughter and other family members that she and Serigne share a special bond. Her father paid for the gift that she offered Serigne, treating Aminata as the gift's impetus and true giver, moved by her *love* for her cousin. He also demonstrated a willingness to finance the plane ticket that

Serigne had promised his daughter, transforming a verbal proposition from Serigne to Aminata into a material debt between his nephew and himself. He defended Serigne's honor to Aminata, assuring her that her cousin would make good on his promise to buy her a ticket to Dakar. In facilitating the acts of exchange that linked the two cousins, Abdou actively worked to reproduce Serigne and Aminata's close relationship.

In this transnational context, the physical distance between Serigne and Aminata, paired with Aminata's unfamiliarity with *jamm* and *sang* kinship relations limited the effectiveness of the kinship practices Senegalese generally associate with cross cousins in establishing a close kinship relation. Instead, it was through material gifts, that Serigne forged a close bond with Aminata and Abdou. Cati Coe (2011, 2014) asserts that in West Africa there exists a notion of the "materiality of care" is explicitly discussed as a gauge of "emotional depth and closeness" (2011: 15), such that "a person's distribution of his or her resources is taken as his or her level of affection for others" (2014: 28). Drawing from her work in Ghana, and its diaspora, Coe points out that this unambiguous attention Ghanaians pay to the material exchanges that underpin intimate relations represents an approach ideologically distinct from that common in the United States and Europe, where "the distribution of material resources between family members is downplayed" (2014: 28).

Coe suggests that this approach to material exchange represents an adaptation of "repertoires" of family life that have long existed in Ghana and throughout West Africa, arguing that the materiality of care in transnational families represents a continuation of previous "debt-care exchanges between kin" (2014: 42) like child fostering. Coe argues that children "left behind" in Ghana by their migrant parents "understand material care as a sign of love and tend to praise or criticize a relationship on the basis of economic exchanges"

(2011: 15; see also Bledsoe and Sow 2011). I suggest that this materiality of care similarly allowed Serigne to forge a close relationship with Aminata and Abdou, reconfiguring the *jamm/sang* kinship relations in the transnational context.

Serigne's gifts to Aminata thus provided a means by which he could carve his own political-economic position in their transnational family. These repeated material exchanges created socioeconomic links between Serigne, Abdou, and Aminata beyond those they shared with other relatives. Among transnational kin, individuals who work to favorably position themselves in these socioeconomic networks actively weave particularly dense webs linking themselves to *certain* branches of kin. Drawing on these notions of the materiality of care, Serigne, Abdou, and Aminata carved out new forms of kinship in the Senegalese diaspora through reference to and transformation of kinship norms readily recognizable in Dakar.

Aminata's obliviousness to the workings of cross-cousin relationships in Senegal was inconsequential, given that the two men, both raised in Dakar, actively facilitated gift exchanges between the two cousins. Her father and cousin's acquaintance with the cross-cousin relation made "possible effective forms of tropic improvisation" (Agha 2007: 340), which organized and provided moral justification for the flow of material resources in their arrangement. As the recipient of Serigne's material care, Aminata was the site of her father's and cousin's efforts at making and reinforcing their transnational connections. The two men thus established a sort of cultural scaffolding surrounding her, aimed at creating a particular closeness between these two geographically distant branches of their transnational family.

Through the lens of a cross-cousin relationship, Aminata was, symbolically at least, Serigne's master (*sang*). In these terms, she carried the high status associated with her father's position relative to Serigne's mother. Unlike the "younger sister" status his parallel cousins occupied, Aminata mediated Abdou and Serigne's relationship, yielding influence as Serigne's "uncle," or at least his proxy. To enact this relationship in the transnational context, Serigne relied on material offerings, according to economic moralities that construe care as gauged by material support.

Serigne was a financially independent adult, who, although not yet a migrant, likely occupied a socioeconomic status similar to that of his uncle. As such, he established a close kinship relation with Aminata through material investment in their relationship. If "one can always bring a remote relative closer" (Bourdieu 1990: 172) through careful management of the meaning of kinship behaviors, in transnational families, this can entail the compression of great distances through exchanges of gifts and news. But alongside the processes of alignment achieved through kinship behaviors, processes of exclusion and distancing are simultaneously carried out. Serigne's attempts to create a particular closeness with his French-educated family members in Paris reinforced a distance between him and family members with less economic and educational capital.

Examination of the processes through which Serigne, Aminata, and Abdou constructed emergent kinship relations, drewing them together in the Senegalese diaspora, sheds light on the ways economic moralities that have long underpinned kinship behaviors in Senegal are reproduced, combined, and transformed through individuals' efforts to carve their own positions in transnational kinship networks. Kinship behaviors that once

established socioeconomic bonds between certain groups through “wife exchange,” are today being troped upon by transnational kin who strategically draw on and adapt similar practices of alignment and distancing on a global scale in their attempts to favorably position themselves in the Senegalese diaspora. These kinship practices are crucial to the ways that many households in Africa, reliant on remittances, reproduce themselves. Their relationships, linking Dakar, Paris, and Montreal, reflect the continued salience of francophone connections, revealing the remnants of empire the age of global capitalism. It further illustrates the role the French language continues to play in the stratification of Senegalese populations. Through these kinship practices, hierarchies of class, education, and geography become imbricated with ranked roles that underpin kinship behaviors. At stake in these everyday strategies of managing the meaning of kinship relations are the boundaries of the group itself.

MANAGING MULTIPLE MORALITIES

This ethnography, driven by the examination of normative expectations that mediate material rights and responsibilities, has revealed how social actors strategically draw on economic moralities to manage similarity and difference, proximity and distance between themselves and others in their everyday lives. Members of transnational Senegalese families navigate economic moralities to position themselves as successfully integrated in France and to weave transnational kinship networks that draw certain kin closer across geographical distance. These chapters have demonstrated how people work to achieve and maintain favorable status positions in multiple communities through the strategic negotiation of moral positions, carrying out the social work of selective solidarity. Focusing on transnational Senegalese families has shed light on the ways people negotiate between multiple, sometime contradicting, moral frameworks. The multiplicity of normative expectations is particularly apparent in the case of transnational families, but is by no means limited to the context of immigration. Indeed, moral priorities impinge in the everyday lives of all social actors.

In this final chapter, I draw together key themes revealed through the study of moralities that emerge in everyday interactions in transnational households. First, ethnographic analysis has shown how economic moralities, as values that rank people and practices, necessarily entail political-economic hierarchies. Examination of the values that underpin state discourses under the same analytic as those voiced in families' discussions of food sharing and gift giving has revealed the processes of ranking social actors carry out in voicing modern narratives of equality. My analysis contributes to the field of language

materiality by drawing attention to the interactional work speakers carry out by drawing on economic moralities, demonstrating acts of material circulation to be linked to efforts to position oneself in the context at hand as well as in broader political-economic hierarchies.

Second, a focus on values enacted in everyday interactions has demonstrated how social actors negotiate economic moralities by strategically managing the meaning of social categories. Age, kinship relations, and "integration" are not fixed status positions but must be achieved in each new social interaction. Social actors negotiate rights to material resources by managing these categories, while working to create a semblance of continuity in the values that explain and justify asymmetrical access to resources.

Morally Reproducing Inequality

Economic moralities organize the flow of resources, connecting individuals in value-laden forms of exchange. In Senegal, and throughout Africa, social and economic relations are explicitly organized according to multiple, mutually imbricated hierarchies. I have referred to this as an economic morality of rank-based redistribution. Irvine identified age, sex, caste, and achieved prestige linked to wealth, or moral character among the criteria according to which individuals in Senegal situate themselves in unequal and complementary social relations (1974: 169). I have shown education and migration to be two other means by which individuals achieve status positions, which organize asymmetrical, but complementary social and economic relations.

Linguistic and material exchanges organized according to rank-based redistribution presume and entail inequalities between interacting participants (Irvine 2001; Buggenhagen 2012). The normative expectations that organize exchanges between individuals of high and

low status, such as elders and juniors, wealthy and poor, migrants and those left behind, men and women, function according to parallel logics, in which low ranking individuals should ideally labor for their superiors and those of high rank, in turn, support these dependents.

Moral narratives of modernity, which provide the foundation for French state discourses and legal policy, present equality between citizens as a moral ideal, whereas in systems of rank-based redistribution, virtuous exchange springs from, produces, and maintains hierarchal social relations. This represents a key point of divergence in the economic moralities encountered by members of transnational Senegalese households: in African contexts, resource redistribution hinges upon asymmetrical relations, whereas French state discourses claim that the virtuous redistribution of resources (though the national system of "solidarity" for example) should ideally redress hierarchies characterized as inherently problematic.

In the French context, equality is treated as a mark of modernity and superiority. Within the moral narrative of modernity, hierarchies that might seem obvious, necessary, and anodyne in Senegal, are perceived as unethical or backward in "modern" Europe. Drawing these two moral logics together under the analytic of economic moralities, this dissertation has shed light on the ways that Euro-American economic logic, which purports to be divested of moral subjectivity, acts as a mechanism for the naturalization of evolutionary ideologies that reinforce global hierarchies between Africans and Europeans and between problematic "immigrants" and successfully "integrated" foreigners.

Educated Senegalese in Paris navigate multiple moral frameworks. Aligning their moral stances with French republican values, they distinguish themselves from stigmatized immigrants in France in their efforts to demonstrate their own integration and claim rights to

the resources belonging affords. These individuals simultaneously use economic moralities to name and frame acts of exchange between family members in ways that bring *certain* kin closer through material circulation. They facilitate exchanges of gifts and funds that link family members across continents, but also voice normative stances that create distance and obstruct kinship making practices.

Members of transnational families carry out selective solidarity in everyday interactions by moving between scales of group-belonging and the moral frameworks that support them, strategically navigating multiple moralities in everyday discussions. Through reflexive commentary on exchange practices, speakers locate themselves relative to others. As speakers describe acts of exchange, they position themselves relative to these economic practices and the types of people they believe carry them out. In voicing economic moralities, social actors draw axes of contrast between themselves and others, dividing their social world into ranked categories.

Arriving in France with French language skills, formal schooling, and cultural capital that facilitate their integration into French society, educated Senegalese in Paris gain privileged access to skilled employment, working papers, and France's social welfare programs. Their integration does not, however, indicate a detachment from Senegalese economic moralities of asymmetrical but complementary relationships. Quite the contrary, integration in France provides them with material wealth necessary to support growing networks of dependents, establishing themselves as adults and successful migrants in terms that are distinctly African. The mutual imbrication of these moral and economic systems serves to reinforce hierarchies that divided Senegalese pre-migration in the diasporic context.

This may be seen in the ways that French state discourses and transnational Senegalese families both frame education and migration as transformative processes, which (should ideally) change individuals' social status. Chapters three and four highlighted French republican discourses that have long framed education as capable of transforming individuals: from colonial subjects into French citizens during the Third Republic and from problematic "immigrants" into successfully "integrated" foreigners in contemporary France. In France's colonial policy of assimilation and current approach of immigrant integration, these "transformed" individuals are seen as those who demonstrate themselves to be sufficiently detached from ethnic and religious practices that could impede belonging.

Senegalese similarly describe education and migration as processes that facilitate social ascension, intertwined paths to economic opportunity. But in Senegalese families, individuals often interpret the status afforded by these transformative processes according to hierarchal relations and moralities that diverge from French state discourses. Among Senegalese, educated migrants are thought to occupy a position of high rank that should ideally be materialized through the redistribution of resources.

Managing Meaning and Shifting Solidarity

Strategic navigation of economic moralities takes place most often, not in direct debate and confrontation, but in more subtle forms. Questions of who "counts" as a child or an adult, as kin or non-kin, and as an immigrant or an integrated foreigner are integral to the sorts of material rights and responsibilities one might claim. Slight adjustments of stance, nearly imperceptible in ongoing interaction, alter the economic moralities at play and the scales of group membership treated as significant. In Africa, one who is addressed as "big

brother" may well receive a request for material support. In France, those foreigners who can demonstrate French language skills and document their francophone higher education are treated as integrated and exempt from civic trainings. Amending the word used to describe an interaction or kinship term used to characterize a relative can imply a shift in the interactional framework and modify the expectations of rights and responsibilities of social actors involved.

Social actors draw and redraw value-laden axes of contrast according to the stakes at hand in a given interaction. This is how, in chapter two, the same Senegalese who critiqued the French for their selfishness, moments later aligned with French values to distinguish themselves from Africans who would cheat the French social security system or engage in illegal transnational trade practices. These two moral stances communicated selective solidarity with other Senegalese, but not moral inconsistencies, in that speakers framed different scales of group membership as salient according to context.

In order to align with the diverse moral stances necessary to demonstrate belonging in multiple groups, family members carry out selective solidarity through subtle acts of "managing meaning" (see Comaroff and Roberts 1977). Cohen and Comaroff explain, "a crucial variable in the construction of reality lies in the *management* of meaning: actors compete to contrive and propagate interpretations of social behavior and relationships" (1976: 102). Kinship relations, immigrant status, and even age are continually recreated, contested, and reconfigured in interaction. Negotiations of relative status and efforts to define social relations, simultaneously determine the boundaries of group membership and rights to resources.

I have argued that economic moralities are reproduced and reconfigured through everyday acts of speaking, sharing food, and giving gifts, illustrating the active roles children play in practices that reproduce and transform these normative stances. Placing children at the center of my analysis has revealed the value-laden positions that shape resource redistribution to be the stuff of "face work" (Goffman 1967), fundamentally shaped by efforts of self-presentation and subject to social actors' efforts to exert influence over one another. Fine-grained analysis of household interactions has provided glimpses into families' everyday lives at a specific moment in children's education and adults' careers. Children's cultural competencies evolve quickly, but not reliably in the ways their caregivers would prefer: their aims sometimes diverge from those of adults, especially as children develop desires to resist and rebel.

The ways one – or one's child – attempts to navigate multiple economic moralities is critical to the management of social relations and the material resources that flow through them. When accomplished with diplomacy it can allow one to take advantage of marginal gains while masking potential moral inconsistencies. But when botched, attempts to carry out selective solidarity lay bare unflattering attempts to hedge one's bets. Selective solidarity is strategy key to managing social relations. Caregivers constantly struggle to provide children with the skills to necessary to accomplish it. Children meanwhile, enact and reconfigure economic moralities in their own ways, sometimes aligning with adults' values and strategies and others resisting them or proposing their own alternative moral stances.

In the household interactions examined here, values were made explicit only in certain contexts. Distinctions between economic moralities were not cleanly organized along national lines, distinguishing French from Senegalese. Nor did these distinctions necessarily

map onto generational cohorts, separating immigrant parents from their children born in France. Instead, social actors draw on economic moralities to establish axes of contrast in unfolding interaction, aligning with certain people and practices while distancing themselves from others. Emic distinctions between economic moralities carry out interactional work, allowing speakers to situate themselves in hierarchal relation to those they reference.

Interactions in the transnational Senegalese families examined here have shed light on ways children actively participate in everyday negotiations of economic moralities and how caregivers attempt to guide children's interpretations of material exchange practices: providing cultural scaffolding, in voicing their own moral stances, and by acting as audience members during children's acts of storytelling. Borrowing from cognitive psychologists' work on language acquisition (Bruner 1978), linguistic anthropologists use the term "scaffolding" to refer to mediating activities social actors carry out to support "authorized knowledge, or that information which is deemed by the community and the institution to be legitimate" (Bruna and Gomez 2009: 157). Adults may construct cultural scaffolding around children by carrying out a given social practice and strategically engaging a child's participation, such that the act may be attributed to the child. Ochs and Scheiffelin (1984) point out that through the work of scaffolding, caregivers portray children to be more culturally competent than their behaviors would otherwise indicate.

Chapters five and seven provided examples of scaffolding work carried out by Senegalese caregivers who orchestrated material exchanges between children raised in Paris and their kin in Senegal. These adults worked to shape both children's behavior and the interpretation of children's actions among relatives in Dakar. Caregivers financed children's gift giving, carried out acts of exchange on behalf of children, and even coerced children to

give against their will or without their knowledge. In so doing, these adults portrayed children as capable exchange partners, aware of their responsibilities to give according to economic moralities of rank-based redistribution.

For the children themselves, cultural scaffolding was only sometimes obvious. In chapter seven, Aminata did not appear to notice the role her father played in cultivating her close relationship with her cousin Sereigne, whereas in chapter five, Badara was well aware that his father had redistributed the clothes in his suitcase without his consent. Yet, even when the work of scaffolding was obvious to a child, it did not necessarily counteract adults' efforts to shape children's moral stances. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight and maturity, Badara claimed to have understood the value of his father's act, at least when he recounted the anecdote in his parents' presence.

Caregivers also try to shape children's behaviors and moral stances by communicating their own economic moralities. Through value-laden descriptions of Senegalese street vendors' illegal exchange practices or of women in Senegal's "irrational" dedication to exchanges that maintain far-flung kinship networks, parents populate their children's social world with moral representations of different types of people and economic practices. Parents not only explicitly highlight practices they value or condemn; they also tacitly communicate which sorts of behaviors children might disregard. This was the case in chapter four's example of a Catholic mother who critically described the escalating expenditures on gifts for in-laws that are expected of women in Senegal. Her dismissive portrayal of material exchange at Muslim ceremonies communicated to her daughters that, as French-born Catholics, they would never need to take part in these exchange practices or even learn the Wolof terms for the kinship relations that mediate them. Adults'

representations thus shape not only the social meaning their children attribute to acts of material exchange but furthermore constrain the types of behaviors and social relations to which children have access.

Adults also work to shape the moral stances children voice as audience members during children's acts of storytelling. The most quotidian narrative acts represent repetitive exercises in portraying one's moral position toward acts of food sharing and gift giving which require nuanced understandings of economic moralities. Successful storytelling requires speakers to anticipate their audience's moral stances. When children take part in everyday narrative acts with their families, they must position themselves relative to their parents and other audience members. For a story to make sense, a punch line to be pulled off, child storytellers must demonstrate an awareness of their audience's expectations, normative and otherwise. Through these exercises children develop the skills to navigate the diverse economic moralities they encounter in their daily lives.

These chapters have also illustrated how children take an active role in the reproduction and reconfiguration of economic moralities, forging their own social relations and moral stances and embedding themselves in hierarchal relations with transnational kin. Children act as the dependents of transnational caregivers by accepting gifts and money. They also take up high-status positions relative to other children in Senegal, by flaunting their cultural capital linked to residence in Europe and in their failure to take up practices expected of children, like laboring for adults or making room for their elders, as described in chapter six. In so doing, they contribute to the adaptation of moral expectations of children, shaping the ways migration reconfigures age hierarchies. The children of transnational migrants contribute to the expansion of notions of what constitutes a moral Senegalese child

and the reconfiguration of the ways kinship relations (like those between cross cousins explored in chapter seven) may be enacted. By taking an expansive view of acceptable behaviors of children raised abroad, families in Senegal work to draw these children closer to Senegal, treating them as moral family members rather than demanding that they perform the practices expected of their age-mates in Senegal.

As children get older and encounter requests for material support on visits to Dakar, they also develop tactics for evading obligations and sometimes voice outright resistance to normative expectations they view as incongruent the moral systems most salient to them. Some of the strategies children adopt fit into models common in Senegal, such as delaying requests for support from family, friends, and even strangers in Dakar by emphasizing their status as a student. In other cases, children raised in France circumvent economic moralities of rank-based redistribution entirely, "playing crazy" or acting like a *tubab* (white person), unaware of the social expectation to give.

In voicing economic moralities, social actors work to establish proximity and distance between themselves and others in the transnational social field. These moral discourses shape material realities, structuring the ways that resources circulate on state and family levels. Members of transnational families draw on economic moralities to explain and justify unequal access to resources and to carry out selective solidarity with others in Europe and Africa. This strategic social work is not limited to acts through which educated Senegalese urbanites distinguish themselves from other immigrants in Paris. Individuals also carefully select their social relations and economic commitments within their own families, actively working to create closeness with *certain* kin.

These strategic kinship-making practices shed light on the ways that transnational Senegalese families contribute to global stratification in navigating between economic moralities. The wealth and status associated with the French language and schooling in Senegal facilitate educated urbanites' "integration" in France. These francophone connections are not limited to links between Senegal and France, but increasingly extend to Quebec, a new prized emigration destination for French and Senegalese alike. Bilateral agreements among francophone nations facilitate these migration paths for those Senegalese who possess the cultural and economic capital necessary to take part in state-sanctioned forms of migration. The political projects and bilateral accords of francophone nations, overlapping in the remnants of empire, structure the creation and disintegration of individual pathways to social mobility.

In managing their economic moralities, members of transnational families negotiate group boundaries and reconfigure social and economic hierarchies. Through the strategic management of their moral stances, transnational families work to demonstrate belonging in diverse social groups, an act that becomes more complex as resources are increasingly limited in the context of increasing global inequalities.

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Annex A: Reception and Integration Contract

Liberté • Égalité • Fraternité
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

Bienvenue en France

Vous avez été admis à résider sur le territoire de la République française, Etat membre de l'Union européenne.

Chaque année, plus de 100 000 étrangers s'installent en France venant de pays, de cultures différents. Comme vous, depuis plus de cent ans, d'autres y sont venus et y ont construit leur vie.

Ils ont participé à son développement et à sa modernisation. Certains, parfois au prix de leur liberté ou de leur vie, ont défendu son sol par les armes.

La France et les Français sont attachés à une histoire, à une culture et à certaines valeurs fondamentales. Pour vivre ensemble, il est nécessaire de les connaître et de les respecter. C'est pourquoi, dans le cadre d'un contrat d'accueil et d'intégration, nous vous demandons de suivre une journée de formation civique pour mieux comprendre le pays dans lequel vous allez vivre.

La France, une démocratie

La France est une république indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale.

Le pouvoir repose sur la souveraineté du peuple, exprimée par le suffrage universel ouvert à tous les citoyens français âgés de plus de 18 ans.

Sur de nombreux bâtiments publics, vous verrez gravée l'inscription «Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité». Cette devise est celle de la République française.

La France, un pays de droits et de devoirs

La Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 proclame que tous les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits, quelles que soient leur origine, leur condition et leur fortune.

La France garantit le respect des droits fondamentaux, qui sont notamment :

• la liberté, qui s'exprime sous plusieurs formes : liberté d'opinion, liberté d'expression, liberté de réunion, liberté de circulation... ,

• la sûreté, qui garantit la protection par les pouvoirs publics des personnes et des biens,

• le droit personnel à la propriété.

Les étrangers en situation régulière ont les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs que les Français, sauf le droit de vote qui reste attaché à la nationalité, et doivent respecter les lois et principes de la République française.

Qu'elle sanctionne ou qu'elle protège, la loi est la même pour tous, sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion.

La France, un pays laïque

En France, la religion relève du domaine privé.

Chacun peut avoir les croyances religieuses de son choix ou ne pas en avoir. Tant qu'elles ne troublent pas l'ordre public, l'État respecte toutes les croyances et la liberté de culte.

L'État est indépendant des religions et veille à l'application des principes de tolérance et de liberté.

La France, un pays d'égalité

L'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes est un principe fondamental de la société française. Les femmes ont les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs que les hommes. Les parents sont conjointement responsables de leurs enfants. Ce principe s'applique à tous, Français et étrangers. Les femmes ne sont soumises ni à l'autorité du mari, ni à celle du père ou du frère pour, par exemple, travailler, sortir ou ouvrir un compte bancaire. Les mariages forcés et la polygamie sont interdits, tandis que l'intégrité du corps est protégée par la loi.

Connaître le français, une nécessité

La langue française est un des fondements de l'unité nationale. La connaissance du français est donc indispensable à votre intégration et favorisera le contact avec l'ensemble de la population.

C'est pourquoi vous devez avoir un niveau de connaissance de la langue française qui vous permette, par exemple, d'entreprendre des démarches administratives, d'inscrire vos enfants à l'école, de trouver un travail et de participer à part entière à la vie de la cité. Si vous n'avez pas ce niveau à votre arrivée en France, vous devez l'acquérir en suivant une formation sanctionnée par un diplôme reconnu par l'Etat. L'inscription à cette formation gratuite est faite par l'Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration.

L'école est la base de la réussite professionnelle de vos enfants. En France, l'école publique est gratuite. La scolarité est obligatoire de 6 à 16 ans. Garçons et filles étudient ensemble dans toutes les classes.

C.A.I. 01/2011 - SIB imprimerie

Contrat d'accueil et d'intégration

LIBERTÉ - ÉGALITÉ - FRATERNITÉ

Préambule

L'intégration de populations différentes exige une tolérance mutuelle et le respect par tous, Français comme étrangers, des règles, des lois et des usages.

Choisir de vivre en France, c'est avoir la volonté de s'intégrer à la société française et d'accepter les valeurs fondamentales de la République.

C'est pourquoi vous devez préparer votre intégration républicaine dans la société française en signant, à cette fin, le contrat d'accueil et d'intégration prévu par l'article L-311-9 du code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile.

Le présent contrat est conclu entre l'Etat, représenté par le préfet du département

et Madame - ~~Mademoiselle~~ - ~~Monsieur~~ .....
...

Article 1 : Engagements de l'Etat

L'Etat assure l'ensemble des prestations suivantes :
- une réunion d'accueil collectif ;
- une visite médicale permettant la délivrance du titre de séjour ;
- un entretien individuel permettant notamment d'apprécier le niveau de connaissance en français du signataire du contrat ;
- en tant que de besoin :
  - un bilan linguistique ;
  - un entretien avec un travailleur social, donnant lieu, si nécessaire, à l'établissement d'un diagnostic social et à la mise en œuvre d'un appui social individualisé ;
- une journée de formation civique présentant les droits fondamentaux et les grands principes et valeurs de la République, ainsi que les institutions de la France ;
- si nécessaire, une formation linguistique dont la durée est fixée en fonction des besoins et capacités d'apprentissage de la personne. Cette formation est destinée à permettre d'atteindre un niveau de langue correspondant à celui exigé pour le diplôme initial de langue française (DILF) ;
- une session d'information sur la vie en France qui a pour objet de faciliter la compréhension de la société française et l'accès aux services publics ;
- un bilan de compétences professionnelles, sur une demi-journée, permettant de faire un point sur les compétences professionnelles et le projet professionnel des signataires et de les orienter en conséquence. Ce bilan vise à encourager les signataires du CAI à trouver un emploi.

Article 2 : Engagements du signataire du contrat

~~M./~~ Mme / ~~Melle~~ .....
dont le niveau de co[illegible]
[illegible] mention inutile) s'engage :

- à participer à la journée de formation civique, à la session d'information sur la vie en France s'il a souhaité en bénéficier, et au bilan de compétences professionnelles ;
- à suivre avec assiduité, lorsqu'elle lui a été prescrite, la formation linguistique destinée à lui permettre d'atteindre un niveau satisfaisant en français, ainsi qu'à se présenter à l'examen organisé à l'issue de la formation pour l'obtention du diplôme initial de langue française (DILF) ;
- à se rendre aux entretiens fixés pour le suivi du contrat.

L'assiduité de l'étranger à chacune des formations prescrites est sanctionnée par une attestation nominative remise par l'OFII.

Article 3 : Durée du contrat

Le présent contrat est conclu pour une durée d'un an. Il peut exceptionnellement être prolongé par le préfet dans la limite d'une année supplémentaire, pour engager ou terminer une formation prescrite. Dans ce cas, la clôture du contrat intervient à l'échéance de cette formation, dans des conditions précisées au signataire par l'OFII.

Article 4 : Suivi du contrat

La réalisation du contrat fait l'objet d'un suivi administratif et d'une évaluation par l'OFII. Au terme du contrat, l'Office vérifie que les actions de formation ou d'information inscrites au contrat ont été effectivement suivies et délivre au signataire une attestation nominative récapitulative qui précise les modalités de leur validation. Cette attestation est transmise au préfet qui peut tenir compte, lors du premier renouvellement de la carte de séjour, du non respect des engagements pris dans le cadre du contrat.

Article 5 : Respect du contrat

Le signataire est informé que le préfet :
- peut résilier le contrat en cas de non participation à une formation prescrite ou en cas d'abandon en cours de formation, sans motif légitime ;
- tient compte de la signature du contrat et de son respect pour l'appréciation de la condition d'intégration républicaine de l'étranger dans la société française prévue pour la délivrance de la carte de résident.

N° de contrat : [illegible]
Fait à PARIS
Le préfet du département

N° AGDREF : [illegible]
Le 07/05/2014
Madame, Mademoiselle, Monsieur

Pour les mineurs, le représentant légal

Ministère de l'intérieur

La loi n°78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés s'applique à ce contrat. Elle garantit un droit d'accès et de rectification pour les données vous concernant auprès de l'Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration

Welcome to France

You have been admitted to reside in the territory of the French Republic, member state of the European Union.

Each year, more than 100,000 foreigners from different countries and cultures settle in France. For more than 100 years, others, like you, have been coming here to build their lives.

They participated in France's development and modernization. Some have defended this land in its armed forces, sometimes at the cost of their freedom or their lives.

France and the French are attached to a history, a culture, and certain fundamental values. To live together, it is necessary to know and respect them. This is why, in the framework of a reception and integration contract, we ask that you attend a day of civic training to better understand the country in which you are going to live.

France, a democracy

France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social republic.

The power lies in the sovereignty of the people, expressed in universal suffrage open to all French citizens over age 18.

On many public buildings, you will see engraved the inscription, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." This is the motto of the French Republic.

France, a country of rights and duties

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 proclaims that all men are born and live free and equal in rights, whatever their origin, condition, or wealth.

France guarantees the respect of these fundamental rights, which include:

- freedom, expressed in many forms: freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement… ,
- security, which guarantees protection of persons and property by public powers,
- the right to personal property.

Documented foreigners have the same rights and duties as the French, except for the right to vote which remains attached to citizenship, and should respect the laws and principles of the French Republic.

Whether it sanctions or protects, the law is the same for all, regardless of origin, race, or religion.

France, a secular nation

In France, religion belongs to the private domain.

Everyone may have the religious beliefs of their choice or may not have any. As long as they do not disturb public order, the State respects all beliefs and freedom of religion.

The State is independent of religions and ensures the application of the principles of tolerance and freedom.

France, a nation of equality

Equality between men and women is a fundamental principle of French society. Women have the same rights and duties as men. Parents are jointly responsible for their children. This principle applies to everyone, French and foreigners. Women are neither subject to [soumise] the authority of their husbands, nor that of their father or brother to, for example, work, go out, or open a bank account. Forced marriages and polygamy are prohibited, given that the integrity of the body is protected by the law.

Knowing French, a necessity

The French language is part of the foundation of national unity. Knowledge of French is therefore indispensable to your integration and will foster contact with the whole of the population.

This is why you must have a knowledge of the French language that permits you, for example, to manage administrative processes, to register your children at school, to find a job, and fully participate in public life. If you do not have this level upon arriving in France, you should acquire it by following training in order to receive a diploma recognized by the State. Registration in this training is free of cost and carried out by the French Office of Immigration and Integration.

School is the foundation of your children's professional success. In France, public school is free of charge. Schooling is required from 6 to 16 years of age. Boys and girls study together in all grades.

Preface

Integration of different populations requires a mutual tolerance and respect for rules, laws, and functions, by all, French and foreigners alike.

To choose to live in France is to have the will to integrate into French society and to accept the fundamental values of the Republic.

This is why you must prepare your Republican integration in French society by signing, to this end, the reception and integration contract under the article L-311-9 of the code of entry and stay of foreigners and refugees.

The present contract is concluded between the State, represented by the Prefect of the department

and Mrs. – Miss – Mister ……
……

Article 1: Commitments of the State

The State assures all of the following services:

- a group reception meeting
- a medical visit that permits the presentation of the residence permit;
- an individual interview which notably allows for the evaluation of the level of knowledge in French of the signatory of the contract;
- when necessary:
  - a linguistic assessment;
  - an interview with a social worker, giving rise, if necessary, to the establishment of a social diagnostic in order to establish an individualized social program;
- a civic training day presenting the fundamental rights and the major principles and values of the Republic, as well as the institutions of France;
- if necessary, a linguistic training, the duration of which corresponds with the needs and learning skills of the person. This training is intended to allow one to reach a level in the language that corresponds with that required by the initial diploma of the French language (DILF);
- an information session on life in France, which has the objective of facilitating understanding of French society and access to public services;
- a half-day assessment of professional skills, to determine signatories' professional skills and professional plans of and to orient them accordingly. This assessment is intended to encourage signatories of the CAI (Reception and Integration Contract) to find employment.

Article 2: Commitments of Signatory of the Contract

Mr./Mrs./Miss ……
Whose level of knowledge of French is judged satisfactory / non satisfactory (cross out the unnecessary point) is committed to:

- to participate in the civic training day, in the information session on life in France if he hopes to benefit from it, and in the evaluation of professional skills;
- to assiduously follow, if prescribed, the linguistic training intended to allow him to reach a satisfactory level of French, as well as to take the test organized at the end of the training to obtain the initial diploma of the French language (DILF);
- to take part in the interview established for the signing of the contract.

The foreigner's assiduousness at each of these prescribed trainings is sanctioned by a certification provided by the OFII.

Article 3: Duration of the contract

The present contract is fixed for the duration of one year. It can exceptionally be extended by the Prefect for one additional year, to begin or finish the prescribed training, according to the conditions specified to the signatory by the OFII.

Article 4: Monitoring the contract

The realization of the contract is the object of administrative monitoring and evaluation by the OFII. At the end of the contract, the Office verifies that the training actions or information registered in the contract have effectively been followed and delivers the signatory a recapitulative certificate which specifies the mode of their validation. This certificate is transmitted to the Prefect who may take into account, at the first renewal of residence permit, any failure to respect the engagements of the contract.

Article 5: Respect of the contract

The signatory is informed that the Prefect:

- can terminate the contract in the case of the failure to participate in a prescribed training or in the case of abandonment of training courses, without legitimate motive;
- takes into account the signing of the contract and the respect for the conditions of republican integration of the foreigner into French society anticipated for the delivery of the residence permit.