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Pathways to Military Effectiveness:

Armies and Contemporary African States

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Abstract

How do weak states build and maintain strong militaries that do not pose a threat? A government that presides over an institutionally weak state might reasonably fear that an effective army would be tempted to engage in *coup d'état*. Yet several countries in Africa with low overall institutional capacity sustain armies with substantial material and organizational capabilities. Four countries meet these criteria and provide case studies for this research: Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.

This study identifies the mainsprings of a sustainable weak state – strong army outcome in a combination of appropriate political strategies on the parts of state leaders that includes a willingness to repurpose informal “customary” social practices and institutions to compensate for weak bureaucratic structures of control. Coalitions of leaders inside and outside the military also collaborate in the deployment of armies to tasks that are not conventionally associated with militaries. Those that are successful in executing strategies enable the creation of ‘military enclaves’ where informal institutions and practices commonly associated with ineffective militaries in fact contribute to military effectiveness of that military. These findings point to a need for a new conceptualization of professionalism based on what type of military has emerged in a given state. Beyond conventional categories of political and apolitical armies, the particular nature of African politics and warfare has led to the existence of personalist armies. Personalized militaries exhibit their own traits – to include their own contextually dependent ideas about professionalism and military effectiveness. I argue that we need a model of institutional military effectiveness to establish the sort of civil-military relations that result in five different types of military outcomes: Ineffective, Resourceful, Parochial, Hollow, and Effective.

The capacity of weak states to build effective militaries in Africa indicates an alternative pathway for African state-building in a regional context in which interstate warfare is rare, foreign patrons provide selective security benefits, and leaders face apparent domestic incentives to keep armies weak. My conclusions are drawn from interviews conducted at the Pentagon (Washington, D.C.) and U.S. Africa Command (Stuttgart, Germany), and fieldwork in Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia.

Acknowledgements

Having spent a decade in the U.S. Air Force as a cargo pilot, I came to Northwestern University to write a dissertation about the role of U.S. airpower in changing the organizational behavior of regime forces and rebels in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the Balkans. My advisor William Reno was enthusiastic to have me write about such a topic. There was one problem: Dr. Reno expected me to conduct serious field research. Unfortunately, my status as an active duty U.S. military member made this highly problematic. Like any other risk-adverse bureaucracy, they had little interest in seeing me visit warzones or failed states to conduct research and interviews. Even visiting such dangerous places “bubble wrapped” as Dr. Reno would jokingly suggest was not enough to convince my superiors in the U.S. Air Force.

During this period of uncertainty in determining which places would be tolerable to my chain of command for research my investigations into various African countries introduced me to new ideas of differences in state power and military strength. I tried to decipher how the political science literature determined some states to be institutionally “weak,” and yet my military experience and personal understanding of military capacity and effectiveness led me to believe otherwise. It made me question how a country could be deemed “weak” but still be militarily effective. Such questions drew me to Africa, a continent that had experienced tremendous numbers of internal wars since the end of World War Two, but had very few cases of conventional war between states.

In embarking on this counterintuitive adventure about militaries and the state, I was inspired by a hodgepodge of multidisciplinary literature while taking classes on political violence

and civil wars taught by Paul Staniland, William Reno, Ana Arjona and the anthropologist Bill Murphy. In these classes, my beliefs and understanding of political violence, rebel groups, and militaries was highly influenced by the writings of Stathis Kalyvas, Jeremy Weinstein, Roger D. Petersen, Herbert Howe, and Mary Kaldor. Regarding state-building literature, Charles Tilly, Otto Hintze, Joel Migdal, and Jeffrey Herbst, made me seriously reconsider the role of militaries in Africa. Moreover, ideas about administrative organization required reference to Herbert Simon, while my conceptions of institutions were heavily influenced by Douglas North. Finally, various intellectual strands within works on civil-military relations made me consider texts by Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Samuel Huntington, Peter Feaver, and Michael Desch. I even found myself intellectually inspired about African civil-military relations by the old African National Congress (ANC) rebel, Colonel Rocky Williams, who helped liberate South Africa from apartheid.

I was fortunate to attend numerous workshops and conferences where I connected with numerous accomplished scholar-practitioners. I had the good fortune of being accepted into the *Summer Seminar in History and Statecraft*, sponsored by the University of Texas at Austin, Clements Center for National Security. During this week in beautiful Beaver Creek, Colorado, I got the chance to personally interact (and have plenty of drinks) with William Inboden, Paul D. Miller, Steve Slick, Kori Schake, Steve and Tami Biddle, Hal Brands (and his dad H.W. Brands), Frank Gavin, Henry Nau, Colin Kahl, and Peter Feaver. Even a tangential discussion with Ted Bromund led to me learning that Adam Smith had written about civil-military relations in an obscure chapter in *The Wealth of Nations*. That week made me realize the role of history and

political choices by leaders in determining how some states develop a military that is reflective of strategic visions and outlays.

My two weeks in “Gorges” Ithaca, New York, attending the *Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy*, sponsored by Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, was a formative moment in my intellectual development. Day in and day out, myself and 23 junior security scholars challenged each other about our assumptions concerning war, strategy, military power and effectiveness, and even the importance of logistics in deciding battle outcomes! The daily mentoring by Dick Betts and Steve Biddle during that intellectually intensive time is something that I will always cherish; even helping me better understand my own military. Even a brief doctoral workshop at *School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)* in Montgomery, Alabama, introduced me to a group of military intellectuals, namely Rich Ganske, Mark Jacobsen, and Nathan Finney, that seemed determined to bring reform to the U.S. military through intelligent discourses on strategy and warfare.

I was also incredibly lucky to be selected to participate in the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Dissertation Proposal Development (DPD) Program, which supported a large portion of my research. The feedback from peers and professors during SSRC workshops enabled this manuscript to take its current form. I am especially thankful for the critiques and advice provided by Mary J. Weismantel, Durba Ghosh, and Ronald Kassimir. Moreover, the opportunity to present my dissertation findings about African militaries to a rowdy group of British military personnel, academics, and policy-makers at the 2018 *Sandhurst Trends in International Conflict Series Symposium on Fragile States: Challenges and Responses*, was an phenomenal experience I will never forget.

At Northwestern, I am indebted to the support, resources, and research assistance lent by the Buffett Institute for Global Studies through their Graduate Student Dissertation Research Travel Award, the Panofsky Award from the Program for African Studies (PAS), and the Minar Memorial Summer Award from the Political Science department (especially Sara Monoson, Courtney D. Syskowski, and John Mocek). In addition, my time as the program coordinator for the War & Society Working Group (formerly known as the Security Studies Working Group) gave me the opportunity to get face time with a wide array of visiting scholars, such as Vipin Narang, Rich Nielsen, Jon Caverley, Sarah Croco, Heidi Hardt, Peter Krause, Roland Marchal, Yuri Zhukov, Andreas Wimmer, and Caitlin Talmadge. They all facilitated my intellectual development in one way or another, even if they did not realize it in those fleeting moments making comments about my research.

I am also incredibly fortunate that my time at Northwestern was funded by a fellowship sponsored by the Military and Strategic Studies (MSS) department at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and that MSS Professor Mike Fowler provided a technical review of this dissertation. My grad school time in Evanston, Illinois, introduced me to the diverse and rich intellects of Jeff Winters, Rachel Beatty Riedl, Jeff Rice, Dan Krcmaric, Ian Hurd, Jason Seawright, Jordan Gans-Morse, and Hendrik Spruyt. Moreover, much of my fieldwork would have not been possible without the assistance and time lent by Joe Greenbaum, Moses Khisa, Wilson Thrale Vorndick, Nick Borman, Babacar, Abdeta, and many others that must remain unnamed. I also acknowledge the efforts of fellow grad students Buddhika (“Jman”) Jayamaha, Marco Bocchese, Beth Linn, Salih Nur, Eddine Bou, Dave Peyton, Dan Gamarnik, Sasha Klyachkina, Nate Allen and Paul Thissen, each one helped me with how I approached and conducted my research, especially

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Finally, in the spirit of saving the best for last... I could not have accomplished all that I have in the military and in graduate school had it not been for the tremendous support of my stunning wife and love Lara...my *habibti*. She tolerated my crazy hours, last-minute trips and deployments, and my 'dazed-and-confused' times. I am incredibly fortunate to have Lara and our wonderful daughter Madeline; this project and my life is dedicated to them and it would not have been possible without them being my biggest cheerleaders and supporters.

Preface

After presenting components of my research on African militaries to various audiences at the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) conference, the Post-Intervention Governance and Security in the African Sahel conference, the Africa Seminar (AFRISEM) forum at Northwestern University, Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Dissertation Proposal Development (DPD) workshops, and the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, I kept getting questions and feedback about ‘researcher positionality’ than the actual content of my presentation itself. Many were intrigued by the access I gained with militaries and the anecdotes, such as the Ethiopian General that admitted he had been a virgin for 8 years while fighting as a guerilla against the Derg Regime. Notwithstanding my own position as an officer in the U.S. military, much of my audience was fascinated with the type of information and stories I gleaned from American and non-American military personnel, telling me interesting stories and anecdotes about various security and organizational issues that I was researching.

I walked a fine line between “insider” and “outsider” with most people I interacted with for my research project. While I had over a decade of experience in the U.S. military, to include some time working with foreign militaries. For instance, I spent four years as an instructor pilot working with many NATO instructor pilots and students at the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) program in Wichita Falls, Texas, which is where I picked up the pilot call-sign nickname *Frankenstein* (later shortened to “FRANKY”) from fellow Dutch and German military aviators. In many ways I still felt like an outsider when interviewing most individuals during field research – even with American officials.

My research tapped into an aspect of security policy I had never dealt with in my military duties; hence I found myself asking foreign military personnel questions that juxtaposed with how I thought a traditional Westernized military should organize and fight. At the same time, I also had insider credibility with practically every person I interviewed because I could understand military jargon and could relate to similar organizational and security problems that I had faced while deployed in combat situations. Thus, I was incredibly fortunate to have found amicable and willing military personnel and government officials to be interviewed for this dissertation from the U.S., various NATO countries, South Korea, Australia, Ireland, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Senegal, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Ultimately, I found myself having to keep my American military bias in check constantly. I accomplished this primarily by joking with interviewees, such as making sarcastic comments “How impressed are you with the U.S. military winning every war by throwing a ton of money at the enemy?” This sort of banter always seemed to generate a smile and chuckle. Like in my own military experiences, humor and humility seemed to be an invaluable currency in winning over others that were suspicious of me and my questions. Such behavior on my part with many foreign military and government personnel seemed to be a relief to many that were used to interacting with American officials in a cold and harsh transactional manner. More importantly, based on how I cross-checked my interview data, I believe I came closer to the truth with the officials I interacted with since most of my semi-structured interviews were done in informal settings, occasionally with beer and wine to “loosen the lips.” Despite one person from an SSRC workshop telling me “the Senegalese military officials were just telling you what you wanted to hear,” I can confidently assert that based on the passion – one Colonel cried about the

bravery of his troops fighting off an ambush in the South Sudan – and genuine interest expressed by most respondents, most appeared to truly believe in what they were telling me. Many jokingly wanted to help educate the “big American” in their country, and that they too could have militarily effective organizations in their country, and that the “American Way of War” was not always possible or desirable in their political and social context.

While my nascent research on this dissertation began in 2015, I found myself interviewing – without too many problems – military and civilian members working for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agencies, and foreign military personnel living and working in Africa. The most difficult part of the project was trying to find networks of individuals willing to talk to me. Hence, I had to rely on the “snowballing” technique to gain entry into new groups of individuals to figure out who would be willing to be interviewed and who would also help me get access to another individual(s). In so many ways, I spent immense amounts of time building up trust with various individuals and organizations during my research process. This is vital for anyone dabbling in discussions about the security apparatus of a state, its foreign policy, and how its military organizes its relations with other states and institutions. Each can be precarious and sensitive topics, if not discussed delicately. Thus, the interviews and research conducted in this study were approved (STU00205105) by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Northwestern University.

Finally, one of the more surprising aspects of my research on militaries in Africa has been the lack of interest or concern by those within U.S. Africa Command, and other components of the DoD that deal with African security policy. In fact, many people that had a chance to see my research presented usually asked me “What do your military superiors think of

your research and conclusions?” To such questions I had to chuckle; not a single person within the DoD posed me any questions about my research. In fact, the only questions I received came from the department (Military & Strategic Studies) sponsoring my doctoral fellowship at the U.S. Air Force Academy, which was concerned about me completing my Ph.D. in time for me to teach in their department. Besides undergoing the DoD required public affairs review before publishing, I can proudly boast that this dissertation has not been redacted, censored, or altered in any way to fit a preferred American narrative or version of the “truth.”

In the end, there are dozens of interviewees that I wish I could personally thank and cite in this dissertation. Unfortunately, many scholars that conduct field research in conflict zones and less-than democratic states to do interviews with individuals involved with security institutions, such as Will Reno, Libby Wood, Ana Arjona, Romain Malejacq, Dipali Mukhopadhyay, and many others, would contend that there is tremendous risk to the interviewee and others tangentially involved when it comes to publishing the names, positions, and dates of individuals interviewed. Worse yet, some information learned in interviews is such compartmentalized data to a few that it would be easy to figure out who interacted with me. Thus, the only way I can repay those that decided to help me is by granting them anonymity and by being selective in which granular data (e.g. identifying dates, positions, identity, etc.) to present in this dissertation. Moreover, in accordance with IRB requirements I have left out information that I believed could be hurtful or damaging.

It is my hope that this dissertation about non-Western militaries developing military effectiveness and capacity will be beneficial to policymakers, practitioners of war, and those interested in conflict and state-building in Africa. Too many scholars and journalists find reasons

to have a dismal outlook on the African continent, and I can only hope to shape this narrative in a more positive fashion, or at a minimum, add some nuance. Undeniably, there is good reason to believe that some African states have discovered how to build strong militaries that keep the peace and do not threaten their own people or institutions, even if these are states seen as lacking a Western style of democracy. If we are truly looking to expand on the clichéd expression “African solutions for African problems,” then it is time we start looking at how Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, have developed and organized their militaries in a way that makes them effective in contemporary Africa.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Moreover, this study was conducted in strict adherence with IRB standards and rules set by Northwestern University.

Chapter 1 – Introduction: The Puzzle of Strong Militaries in Africa

*When the facts change, I change my mind.
What do you do, sir?*

John Maynard Keynes¹

Interview Question: What do you think makes some African militaries better than others?

The logic of their politics will show you the quality of their military.

*Senegalese Officer
Interview
August 14, 2017*

While hosting *Whose Line is It Anyway?* Drew Carey accidentally said, “Africa is a big country,” which resulted in humorous banter from contestants and audience.² American Vice President Joe Biden gave a speech to the U.S.-Africa Business Forum in 2014 stating, “There is no reason the *nation of Africa* cannot and should not join the ranks of the world’s most prosperous nations.”³ Worse yet, the U.S Secretary of Energy, Rick Perry, insinuated in 2017 that African countries need more fossil fuels to keep the lights on to prevent sexual assaults from occurring.⁴ More problematic is also when a sitting American president refers to all African nations as being “shitholes.”⁵ Gaffes and misinformed ideas aside, serious political commentators and journalists have made similar broad strokes about Africa, which perpetuate improper views of the continent.

¹ There is disputed evidence that the quote did not formally come into existence until the Nobel winning economist Paul Samuelson used a version of the expression in a television interview in 1970. For more explanation, refer to: <https://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/07/22/keynes-change-mind/>

² For partial transcript of episode 224 (1999) see: http://m.imdb.com/title/tt0748025/quotes?ref_=m_tt_trv_qu. For video clip see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GNT3BGvyePM>

³ Jessica Chasmer, “Joe Biden wants the nation of Africa to prosper.” *The Washington Times*, August 6, 2014, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/6/biden-wants-nation-africa-prosper/>

⁴ Dartunorro Clark, “Energy Secretary Rick Perry Says Fossil Fuels Can Prevent Sexual Assault,” *NBC News*, November 2, 2017, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/rick-perry-says-fossil-fuels-can-prevent-sexual-assault-n816896>

⁵ Ali Vitali, Kasie Hunt, and Frank Thorp, “Trump referred to Haiti and African nations as ‘shithole’ countries,” *NBC News*, January 12, 2018, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946>

Robert Kaplan's 1994 article titled "The Coming Anarchy" in *The Atlantic*, laid out a fatalistic case for Africa: it would be beholden to anarchy, violence, and disintegration for the foreseeable future.⁶ In 2016, Chigozie Obioma argued that "There Are No Successful Black Nations," for *Foreign Policy*, claiming that "no one will talk about the painful fact that most African and Caribbean nations have either failed or are about to collapse...[and] Nigeria, the most populous black nation on Earth, is on the brink of collapse."⁷ Each paints a world in which African states must suffer what they must, regardless of agential choices in their respective political systems.

Similarly, Michela Wrong penned "Why Are Africa's Militaries So Disappointingly Bad?" for *Foreign Policy*, contending that history, greed, ethnic favoritism, and nepotism are ruining African militaries. Such factors, she contends, leads these African security institutions to engage in inappropriate behaviors internally, such as becoming engrossed in domestic politics while letting their combat skills and organizational war-making abilities atrophy, making them less effective against security threats.⁸ There are also a host of other structural reasons as suggested in another article "Why is Africa so Screwed Up?" in *The Atlantic*, where the author satirically notes the enumerable issues facing the African continent.⁹

⁶ Kaplan's essay and argument would later be expanded and published into a book 8 years later. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic*, February 1994, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/>; Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the dreams of the post-Cold War*. New York: Vintage, 2002.

⁷ Chigozie Obioma, "There Are No Successful Black Nations," *Foreign Policy* August 9, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/09/there-are-no-successful-black-nations-africa-diginty-racism-pan-africanism/>

⁸ Michela Wrong, "Why Are Africa's Militaries So Disappointingly Bad?" *Foreign Policy*, June 6, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/06/why-are-africas-militaries-so-disappointingly-bad/>

⁹ Megan McArdle, "Why is Africa so Screwed Up?" *The Atlantic*, October 8, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2007/10/why-is-africa-so-screwed-up/2072/#article-comments>

Further complicating the analysis of African politics and their security forces is an enumerable list of terms and buzzwords that have emerged in their attempt to describe the ‘bad politics’ in many of these states. In fact, the creation of numerous axioms and exhortations make it almost as if it was a business enterprise, with scholars inventing a host of terms to describe similarly dismal states: “collapsed,”¹⁰ “failure,”¹¹ “fragile,”¹² “shadow,”¹³ “quasi,”¹⁴ and “weak.”¹⁵ Such narratives – while true of some countries – lead to a Western misunderstanding about the continent. Unfortunately, most coverage of African politics tends to overlook several countries that have managed to build relatively strong states with effective security institutions since their independence from European colonial overlords. Moreover, others dismiss rebels that are currently in power¹⁶ – despite them usually ousting a much more repressive regime – creating a new configuration of state and military power with a new identity and strategic outlook based on their nature of being “reform rebels.”¹⁷ This can be attributed to the fact that some rebel

¹⁰ Zartman, I. William, (ed.), *Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Marina Ottaway, "Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed state," *Development and change* 33, no. 5 (2002): 1001-1023.

¹¹ John Dunn, (ed.), *West African states: failure and promise: a study in comparative politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Robert I. Rotberg, "The new nature of nation-state failure," *Washington quarterly* 25, no. 3 (2002): 83-96.

¹² Christopher Clapham, "Rethinking African States," *African Security Studies* 10, no. 3 (2001): 6-16; Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat, (eds.), *Fragile states and insecure people? Violence, security, and statehood in the twenty-first century* (New York: Springer, 2007).

¹³ William Reno, *Warlord politics and African states* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

¹⁴ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Anthony G. Hopkins, "Quasi-states, weak states and the partition of Africa," *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 2 (2000): 311-320.

¹⁵ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's weak states persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood," *World politics* 35, no. 1 (1982): 1-24; William Reno, "African weak states and commercial alliances," *African Affairs* 96, no. 383 (1997): 165-186.

¹⁶ Kevin C. Dunn, "'Sons of the Soil' and Contemporary State Making: autochthony, uncertainty and political violence in Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (2009): 113-127.

¹⁷ William Reno, *Warfare in independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), especially Chapter 4.

groups are able to transform the state by creating a new state that addresses the grievances of the ‘old regime’, thereby making the ‘new regime’ more capable.¹⁸

After conducting over 80 interviews with personnel at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and at U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Germany, numerous officials would also joke that “Africa is a big country” while highlighting all the problems in Africa. These Western security personnel and policy officials worried that the inability of most African countries to effectively deal with internal and regional security problems would only breed more terrorism, criminal networks, refugee flows, instability, and other disruptions to allies and global markets. Even the movie *Blood Diamond* and its use of “TIA” (This is Africa) by Leonardo DiCapro echoes similar sentiments of the chaos and unpredictability perceived as permeating the entire continent.¹⁹ There is a reason why such narratives about Africa are damaging: they create incentives for policymakers and practitioners to partake in intellectual shortcuts that avoid the complicated politics of conflict ongoing in Africa. On the other side of the narrative spectrum, journalists such as Nick Turse write hyperbolic books and editorials that bloviate about the U.S. and other Western governments helping militarize the African continent, which he forcibly argues, supposedly enables these governments to be more repressive.²⁰ This journalistic narrative is not helpful, as it makes it more likely that the U.S. and other European powers will disengage from the continent. In addition, this contrarian narrative also misses the historical realities of successful

¹⁸ David Sobek and Cameron G. Thies, "Civil wars and contemporary state building: Rebellion, conflict duration, and lootable resources," *Civil wars* 17, no. 1 (2015): 51-69.

¹⁹ For a clip of it being used in scenes: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLd74Ukkbic>

²⁰ This is just a brief survey of things written by Nick Turse: *Tomorrow's Battlefield: US Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015); "The US Military Has Been ‘At War’ in Africa on the Sly for Years," *The Nation*, April 14, 2014; "The war you’ve never heard of," *VICE News*, May 18, 2017; and many more pieces written for *TomDispatch*.

state-building where repression, organizing the tools of violence, and the politics of centralizing coercion into a tenable position is a dangerous and violent process. Given that civil wars were prominent features of the African landscape after the Cold War, part of this can be attributed to disengagement by the West. Relaxing assistance and reducing commitments to African states that are undergoing the ‘growing pains’ of state-formation is not a tenable option either in the 21st century as these states attempt the difficult transition of modernizing their politics, economies, and militaries.²¹

Most Western officials I interviewed lamented that most African countries lacked the resources and bureaucratic capacity to put together effective militaries that are not a threat to their government or citizens. The prevalence of *coups d'états* in an independent Africa underlies this skepticism, because African regimes that do have resources (or willingness) that are truly interested in boosting the capabilities of military forces, have seen these capabilities used overthrow them. Evidence below shows that this skepticism is warranted. Even the few African militaries they believed were ‘capable enough’ – through their Western bias – attributed it to the U.S. and other European countries dedicating massive resources (i.e. funding, war matériel, etc.) and training programs to make them so. However, such assumptions about throwing resources at the problem of a weak military are just as problematic as there is a need to also understand the ‘absorption’ capacities of various states and their security institutions.

Just because a patron such as the U.S., China, or France dedicates numerous resources (e.g. arms, training, etc.) to a client state to improve the capacity and effectiveness of their

²¹ For an expanded discussion on the issues of modernization and transitioning the politics of the state (and the associated problems) requires us to reference the seminal work of Huntington. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political order in changing societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

security forces, does not automatically guarantee these outcomes. If such outcomes matched intent, then the \$103 billion in security assistance given to Iraq and Afghanistan by the U.S., and the 76,000 personnel trained in both countries by American troops would have made both militaries capable of easily defeating their respective insurgencies (Islamic State and Taliban); both of which lacked expensive weapons and proper training. However, the harsh fist of reality has shown that the blood, sweat, and tears of the U.S. and her allies trying to build the security institutions of Iraq and Afghanistan was literally a waste of time and money.²² Without the presence of American military advisors, the Islamic State and Taliban on numerous occasions easily overwhelmed Iraqi and Afghan armies in battles, despite the Iraqi and Afghan militaries having more troops and firepower – not to mention more training – in each combat situation. Such investments by the West in trying to create strong and technologically advanced security forces in underdeveloped societies (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, etc.), is nothing more than an exercise in building a “Fabergé Egg Military” in that they are costly, shiny, and easily broken.²³ Explanations that assume external assistance by a strong patron state will make partner country armed forces effective do not hold up upon closer examination. Could it be that resources matter less when it comes to creating an effective warfighting institution? Perhaps it has more to do with creating a cohesive political configuration of power in conjunction with a military institution with allegiance to the polity and the people, instead of an organization more focused on rents and other predatory pathologies? Moreover, it is probable that each state and its

²² Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: The Other Side of the COIN,” *Foreign Affairs* 92 (2013): 59-74.

²³ Jahara W. Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg Armies,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 34, no.3 (2018): forthcoming. We also need to consider the quality of training as well in that some military training may be too advanced for some host-nation militaries to absorb. This leads us to consider the need to assist and train such weak militaries in accomplishing the basics – the “ABCs” if you will – of what a military should be able to do and accomplish.

armed forces have their own definition of what it means to be ‘militarily effective’, much to the consternation of a stronger patron state.

Building effective armed forces are an incredibly important component of the state-building ‘soup’. It is reflective of state capacity in accomplishing something through use of resources and human capital, and is integral for defending the regime. A good military is able to defend the people and territory of the state, and if need be, be effective in offensive combat operations to defeat an adversarial force. Building the security forces of a state is not as easy as it sounds though. Warfare is a complicated process, requiring institutions, organizational abilities, training, resources, and enumerable other components, to be employed in an efficient fashion to maximize combat power. This requires extensive rationalization, coordination, and some coherence in the pursuit of national goals and priorities. In the case of many African countries, it is considered difficult to achieve due to the various social, economic, political, geographic, and other structural forces pushing and pulling on the regime at any given moment. Moreover, the nature of the international system usually subsidizes militarily weak states, meaning there is little incentive to spend resources and energy on an army if political leaders know that they can fallback (presumably) on international guarantees to protect their rule and sovereignty. Thus, if the structural forces of state-building are fatalistically stacked against African states, why do some elites in these states exhibit enough agency to overcome the numerous obstacles that supposedly inhibit the building of military institutions and capabilities?

Scholars and practitioners write off the capacity or willingness of most African states to build effective military forces because of their tumultuous histories. The intellectual ‘glossing over’ occurs because of civil wars, political and electoral violence, military coups (and attempts),

military juntas, warlord democracies, or other behavior that contributes to political instability and weak state institutions. And yet, we know that some states are able to balance threats and needs appropriately to ensure the creation of an effective military that is not threatening, but is not a drain on national resources, such as North Korea and Eritrea. In fact, in an interview with military officers from Botswana and Burkina Faso, they both lamented the difficulty of getting enough resources to accomplish their respective missions, because the public (and politicians) did not perceive threats the way they did; water scarcity and poaching for Botswana and regional Sahel terrorism for Burkina Faso. They believed that their civilian leadership did not understand the resources needed for their respective militaries to adequately respond to crises they were expected to respond to.²⁴

Some African states have managed to create durable regimes since coming into their contemporary configuration, and have done so precisely because they managed to strike the correct balance in civil-military relations. As noted by Barany:

*building armed forces that willingly acquiesce to state authority is always a critical issue of regime change – whether to democracy or some other form of government – though it is more difficult to accomplish in some contexts than others...[and] the political and socioeconomic contexts in which armies must be built are very different and thus pose dissimilar challenges and tasks to those crafting new armies and civil–military relations.*²⁵

Outside of Africa, building a military, and making it subservient to the political process, and not overwhelm it, has been a perennial problem when we take a *Long View of History*. State and institutional building has gone hand-in-hand with political elites negotiating and bargaining

²⁴ Interview, February 14, 2018.

²⁵ Zoltan Barany, "How Post-Colonial Armies Came About: Comparative Perspectives from Asia and Africa," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 49, no. 5 (2014): 597-616.

appropriate configurations of state and military power. Failing to do so has resulted in regime turnover *vis-à-vis* revolution, civil war, coup, and so forth. However, the international context has further complicated and muddled the process of state formation as territorial conquest went out of vogue after World War Two and states are expected to behave in a way that many successful Western states did not have to before the 20th century. Thus, given the various forces, what are the proper ingredients in the development of national militaries that lead to robust military effectiveness, which is amicable to the political leadership of the state? Moreover, what agency have some elites expressed in African states to avoid the structural traps that befell their neighbors?

My Puzzle

Deep-seated historical prejudices still color our view of Africa. The reality is that it is not any better or worse from most other least developed countries (LDCs). A striking observation, so obvious that very few notice, is that some countries in Africa have actually managed to build, strong, cohesive, and highly professional militaries that are subservient to the political processes (or at least interact in a benevolent fashion). This defies the conventional political logic of a strong army existing in a weak state. This is because an effective army in a weak state would just result in a *coup d'état*.²⁶ The political obstacle then, is for a weak state to create robust armed forces that do not pose a threat to the regime or society. Violence is a necessary process in state capture and/or state building. Nevertheless, the perennial puzzle is how do you separate and subsume organized capacity for violence, into the political process, instead of making the

²⁶ Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-military relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 211-241.

political process beholden to those with capacity for violence? Some countries have overcome this puzzle, so what explains these outliers?

If we go along with assumptions about state-building being correlated with military power and state power to provide public services, then one would expect similar development. However, when plotting military and state power for all 54 African countries (Figure 1-1), there are outliers that necessitate deeper inspection.




Figure 1-1. Four quadrants of variation of state and military power differences in an African relative context.

Quadrants “I” and “III” fit the typical idea of state-building resulting in similar development of military power and state capacity to provide public goods and other services. With quadrant “I” being states that fall into the category of low overall state and military power. Similarly, quadrant “III” shows the few African states that have developed high overall state and military

power. Quadrant “II” identifies the few African countries that have managed to create a high level of state power but with low military power. Finally, and the most important part of this dissertation, is understanding the outlier quadrant of “IV” where these states are considered to have low state power, but high military capacity. Quadrant “IV” requires deeper investigation because these are ‘outliers’ as low state power states should not be able to have strong militaries.²⁷

Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia – *in their current political configurations* – have been able to build strong military institutions in the 21st century with their own identities that also play a role in domestic development. They exhibit strong indicators of military effectiveness: ability to adapt, pursuing strong organizational practices (e.g. preference for merit, education, training, etc.), and can deploy their military (and sustain it). Their identities are each founded on the way in which each military came into being – ranging from colonial era structures to the reform rebels that overthrew the ‘old’ regime – and these armies do not explicitly intervene in domestic politics or engage in independent and predatory military actions. These ‘identities’ are much more different compared to traditional civil-military relation notions espoused by Samuel Huntington²⁸ and Morris Janowitz²⁹, because many African countries have militaries that exhibit a different form of professionalization.

Huntington and Janowitz looked at the problem of solving the threat of militaries to their governments through professionalism, by advocating for objective control of the military, where

²⁷ Chapter 4 goes into deeper detail to describe the methods behind creating this figure and its implications on the literature for states that are considered “weak,” but have managed to build strong militaries.

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).

²⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The professional soldier: A social and political portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

civilians reign supreme and the military has autonomy to make decisions by virtue of their professionalism in military matters (i.e. no political involvement.). Contrarily, subjective control translates into tight civilian control of all military affairs, because they are not trusted or professional enough, thus the military institutions and strategies (and other internal organizational aspects of the military) are dominated by the regime elites. Such theoretical conceptions of objective control and subjective control in many African countries is a tenuous proposition, because they have radically different societal conditions and political contexts. This leads to a different form of ‘military professionalization’ that is more negotiable. It also pushes back against these Western conceptions of what it means to be a ‘professional’ because there is a more nuanced role that African armies play in state formation and power sharing with political elites. African states that can create effective militaries, circumnavigate the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ divisionary lines, as military and civilian responsibilities share blurry roles in the state and in politics, in conjunction with patronage networks, which generally overlap. It enables the creation of shared forms of power that are interdependent, but that require internal politicking and dialogues to maintain harmonious relations between regime leadership and military elites. Huntington and Janowitz have had a tremendous impact on how many evaluate the organization of militaries, but their conceptions of what a military should do and look like does are too Western-centric and modernistic. Their ideas do not fit into contemporary African states, because many never modernized and their institutions generally require patronage to work. Thus, many African armies are contextually dependent on how politics are conducted within the state, and military effectiveness and professionalism is more flexible and negotiable.

Given the particular paths each state has taken, it is necessary to understand how institutional and political legacies inform current state practices, how the emergence of new political leaders have retained some aspects (if any) of the ‘old state’, and what has been reconfigured to make the state more durable and cohesive. It is with the political configurations between the political elites and their military institutions that we find the various ways in which informal institutions, organizations, ideology, leadership, and state structures interact to create a more capable military that endogenously makes the state stronger as well. Such dynamics also determine how (in)effectively foreign aid, such as security force assistance, are put to use in a regime. Understanding such processes in building professional armed forces that are subservient to the regime is an aspect that does not receive enough attention in the literature, as many scholars, such as Mathurin Hounnikpo, over concern themselves with normative conclusions that these African militaries should mirror the democratic institutions of the West.³⁰ Unfortunately, if such utopian propositions were implemented, it could be highly disruptive to the equilibria of the political-military configuration of the state, creating more problems than it solves.

In many ways, Senegal reflects the ‘ideal’ type of civil-military relations to be modeled in Africa. It seemed to strike the right balance at independence, managing to sustain a nonpartisan army that was built into an effective military that remains remarkably apolitical. Since 1960, the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) have been deployed extensively and utilized for domestic state-building projects, without it being a threat to the various elites that have governed.

³⁰ Mathurin Hounnikpo, *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010)

This appears to have been a product of agential choices by benevolent political and military elites, that despite neighboring countries having similar attributes, has permitted the creation of a bureaucratically competent SAF – capable of resisting politicization and personalization – that maintains harmonious relations with the polity and society.

While it is true that Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia experienced periods of military rule, suffered numerous coups, civil wars leading to government collapse; their prospects have changed considerably since coming into their contemporary political configurations. Each state has been able to build new security forces from their rebellious roots, creating professional armed forces with levels of capabilities that “defy the odds”³¹ despite each still having some vestiges of a political army. Each of these LDCs shares a similar experience of well-organized and politically cohesive rebel forces fighting their way to power in 1986 (Uganda), 1991 (Ethiopia), and 1994 (Rwanda), against state security forces that were materially stronger. Coming into these new political configurations, each state has overseen economic development and a more cohesive peace relative to the instability these countries suffered previously, outperforming many of their neighbors in terms of regime durability. They have avoided problems with their militaries (e.g. coups, etc.) that have continued to plague development and state-building elsewhere in Africa. It is a remarkable feat given that besides Senegal, since independence Botswana (1966), Cape Verde (1975), Djibouti (1977), Mauritius (1968), and Namibia (1990), are the only countries to have never suffered a military coup attempt in Africa.³²

³¹ Jahara W. Matisek, “The Rise of Strong Militaries in Africa: Defying the Odds?” Presentation at *Sandhurst Trends in International Conflict Symposium 2*, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK, February 7, 2018.

³² Arguments could also be made for Western Sahara and Somaliland not experiencing military coup attempts either, but due to their disputed recognition of Westphalian statehood, they are omitted.

These are notable countries in which Achille Mbembé's thoughts about the brutalization of Africans does not apply.³³

In defining *current political configuration*, I mean a new form of government that does not reflect the 'older state'. As noted in the opening paragraphs, scholars and practitioners generally make broad brushstrokes about the entire continent because they become too focused on longitudinally tabulating civil wars, coups, and disruptive events that have occurred in many of the 'old regimes' decades ago. They become so preoccupied with such quantitative analyses that they overlook that most African countries from the 1960s and 1970s have been politically and militarily reassembled in different ways, that many no longer reflect the regime that was begat at independence. This is because most African countries are configured in such a way that its social structure, political system, ideology, and civil-military relations, barely resemble the original state at independence, though Senegal appears to be an exception to this rule. In fact, changes in state identity, politics, flags, ideologies, etc., are generally reflective of new configurations of the state that reveal new institutional forms of power and orientation of the state. Hence, we need to refocus our efforts on evaluating and understanding a contemporary African state, and the last time the state was reorganized into a different configuration due to independence, civil war, or a coup.

This is not to say that each 'new regime' started with a clean state either, as the character and power relations of the 'old regime' has influenced particular politics of each 'new regime'. However, the fact that some states have managed to refashion a state with new forms of power

³³ Achille Mbembé, *On the Postcolony*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 14.

sharing and durability not seen in the vestiges of the *Ancien Régime* lends considerable weight to the argument that political and military elites in Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, have created militaries that have effectively fended off challengers to the new regime while simultaneously being involved in domestic state-building projects. Much of this can be grounded in that their ‘new regimes’ were defined more by civil-rebel relations, and that ideological legitimacy alongside strategic vision, carried more credibility than the authority of legal command, of which the ‘old regimes’ rested their laurels and saw their armies crumble against highly motivated and organized rebels.

Scope of Cases

Many scholars and practitioners frame the problem of military capacity the wrong way. By assuming, often implicitly, that all cases are roughly similar in underlying characteristics, they miss embedded processes of institution-building that are masked by trends observed in the larger dataset. To garner a better understanding of what ‘ingredients’ are required to make contemporary state formation effective in tandem with military capabilities means that we must be willing to delineate the difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ regime. It also means unpacking the ‘black box’ of military institutions to interpret how much agency each has in creating military power in relation to the polity. This means understanding what has caused some militaries to become cohesive and stronger, whereas other have been hollowed out and fragmented. Exploring this ‘black box’ allows us to escape the mental trappings of colonialism and obsessions with past atrocities committed by the old state, especially in cases where the current regime may barely correlate with the original form of the state, politics, and military institutions. Finally, Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, serve as excellent control cases for

the impact and role of colonialism; Senegal with a French background; Uganda with a British background; Rwanda with bouts of German and Belgian rule; and an Ethiopia primarily free of colonialism, except for the brief occupation by the Italian military (1936-1941).

Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, I am primarily concerned with state formation and the creation of strong military institutions in the most recent political configuration of the state. This can come in many forms. For instance, it may have remained static since independence, such as Botswana remaining relatively unchanged since 1966 or Mauritius in 1968 despite aesthetic changes to the regime with its transition to a republic in 1992.³⁴ Newer configurations of the state can come about due to rebels capturing the state such as when Séléka rebels captured the Central African Republic, leading to a new government in 2013. Other pathways to a newer configuration of a state can come about due to civil war cessation agreements, such as when Burundi negotiated a settlement with rebel groups to create a new constitution in 2005, creating new power-sharing with new actors not seen in the 'old' regime.³⁵

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Senegal has essentially maintained the same political configuration of the state to this day. Superficially, it exhibits patronage politics, relatively slow economic growth and other features that coup-prone countries exhibit, but somehow this country also sustains a remarkably high-capacity military. My argument will show how attention to the specific political context – the current political configuration – explains this positive outcome, despite similar structural forces in similar West African states. Senegal has

³⁴ Each of these countries have essentially maintained their original political configurations, and changes have been marginal at best, and there has been little to no disruption the way the state is ordered or how power is shared.

³⁵ Patricia Daley, "The Burundi peace negotiations: an African experience of peace-making," *Review of African Political Economy* 34, no. 112 (2007): 333-352.

had four presidents, in which there has been relatively smooth and peaceful transfers of power between each presidential administration; all without any civil-military strife.³⁶ Thus far, the SAF has retained its colonial roots and its astute belief in the *Armée-Nation* ideology, which has rested on keeping positive public relations with society through various types of developmental projects and peacekeeping operations.³⁷ It has also been remarkable in its ability to act as an apolitical army, and its ability to avoid partisan politics, with peacekeeping deployments serving as the primary mechanism in driving promotion.

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was the rebel leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and National Resistance Army (NRA) during the Ugandan Bush Wars, where he eventually seized the capital, becoming the President of Uganda in 1986. My argument will show how the state has remained firmly in Museveni hands without any credible coup attempts from the military, which was crafted through his ideational abilities in transforming the state. This has stood in contrast to the disastrous politics in neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. This can be attributed to how Museveni changed the alignment and orientation of the Ugandan state alongside him transitioning his political army (NRA) into an apolitical military in 1995 known as the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), though there still remain some political remnants of the UPDF.³⁸ At this point, most of

³⁶ In 1962, the Senegalese Prime Minister Mamadou Dia was accused of plotting a parliamentary coup against Senegalese President Léopold Sédar Senghor. Dia was forced to resign in what would be known as the December 1962 political crisis, and after the trial he was jailed for treason for life, though he was eventually released in 1974. The political fallout from this was that the Senegalese Chief of Defense, General Amadou Fall, had to resign because he had supported Dia, and was replaced by the more loyal General Jean Alfred Diallo.

³⁷ Biram Diop, "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal," in Dennis C., Blair, (ed.) *Military engagement: influencing armed forces worldwide to support democratic transitions* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 244-246.

³⁸ Admittedly there was an alleged coup plot against Museveni in 2016, however this cannot be considered an actual coup attempt, since it might have been a tactic to harass political rivals. At the same time, it could reflect Museveni's ability – especially in his military and intelligence agencies – to collect information domestically,

the UPDF generals are old “bush” fighters from the NRA, and many have remained professionally loyal to Museveni’s idea of fighting for pan-Africanism. Such ideas have been a formative part of the UPDF developing its own character as a professional military force involved in domestic development and regional peacekeeping. The UPDF attempts to distance itself from partisanship, despite Museveni trying to personalize the military in recent years.

Rwanda’s Paul Kagame (with experience serving with Museveni in Uganda’s NRM and NRA) led the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). He expelled the genocidal Interahamwe regime (Hutu paramilitary group) in 1994 that had ruled the regime ruthlessly. My argument is that Kagame created a new state, shedding most of its Belgian and French colonial identity³⁹ – a process distinct from Senegal’s but with a similar outcome – despite the “devastation” of 1994.⁴⁰ Kagame’s state-building actions stand in stark contrast with Burundi, which has been unable to overcome structural conditions that make it rife with societal divisions. He effectively transformed the society while maintaining the RPA as a political army that transitioned to an apolitical military in 2002, being renamed and reorganized as the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF); all without it ever attempting to threaten his rule. The 1994 genocide continues to serve as a strong mechanism for espousing a state ordained ideology, acting as a *sinew* for how the society and its military has been rebuilt, to include relying on the political indoctrination of *Ingando* to integrate Hutus into the RDF as a way of solving the problems

thereby preempting any collusion that could threaten his reign over Uganda. See this article for an explanation of the coup plot: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/uganda-coup-plot-160610151201612.html>

³⁹ Rwanda also shed its Germany, Belgian, and French colonial identity when it decided to join the British Commonwealth Network in 2009. Mozambique is the only other country to have ever joined this network without having been a former British colony. See here for more information: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8384930.stm>

⁴⁰ Patricia Crisafulli and Andrea Redmond. *Rwanda, Inc.: How a devastated nation became an economic model for the developing world* (New York: Macmillan, 2012).

associated with an ethnic minority (Tutsi) dominating political and military configuration of the state. The introduction of the Kigali Principles in 2015 by Kagame has further solidified the ideological commitment of the RDF as an astutely apolitical armed force, professionalized around peacekeeping and protection of civilians, though Kagame still relies heavily on “patriots” that served in the RPF/RPA.⁴¹ This is not to say that the RDF is not involved domestically, as Kagame regularly relies on RDF officers to oversee military investment firms involved in strategic development of the economy.⁴²

Finally, since the coalition of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew Mengistu's military administration known as the Derg Regime in 1991, the new Ethiopian government was led with a “guerilla” mindset by Meles Zenawi – the leader of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF).⁴³ My argument is that Meles, who ruled the country as Prime Minister until his death in 2012, without any military coup plots or attempts, was able to do so precisely because he ensured the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) retained its identity as a political army with a focus on political indoctrination and development centered on ethnic federalism. Meles (a Tigrayan) accomplished this feat, while neighboring Eritrea followed a much different development path, as their ruler Isaias Afwerki personalized his military, and put it to use for developing his economy in support of an oversized military budget. Meles was peacefully replaced in 2012 by Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe – a non-Tigrayan with no combat experience from the Ethiopian civil war – and managed to avoid any

⁴¹ For the “The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians” Conference Report (May 28-29, 2015) see: http://civilianprotection.rw/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/REPORT_PoC_conference_Long-version.pdf

⁴² P. Behuria, “Centralising rents and dispersing power while pursuing development? Exploring the strategic uses of military firms in Rwanda,” *Review of African Political Economy* 43, no. 150 (2016): 630-647.

⁴³ Jimmy Carter, *Beyond the White House: Waging peace, fighting disease, building hope* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 216-218.

overt civil-military conflict with the ENDF, despite resigning in February of 2018. Part of this might have been that Hailemariam was merely a figurehead for the “guerillas” (e.g. primarily the ENDF Chief of Defense (CHOD) Samora Yenus), with the ENDF ultimately calling the shots behind the scenes as they operated the machinery of the state. This appears more likely as Hailemariam’s resignation coincided with the promotion of dozens of high-ranking ENDF officers (mainly non-Tigrays), which possibly indicates the ENDF’s willingness to increase institutional power-sharing; something that neighboring countries have failed to achieve with their armies. This power sharing has been further reinforced by the induction of a new PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, that is an ethnic Oromo (the largest ethnic group), although he will likely continue the legacy of “guerilla” rule, since Abiy had joined the EPRDF when he was 15 years old, and served in the ENDF. Despite the political involvement of the ENDF, it has still contributed to certain amount of durability despite the numerous security within Ethiopia and its borders, to include its buffer zones.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the “guerilla” mindset, especially discipline, is still used as a form of indoctrination for each military member, which is reinforced at each rank. An emphasis on discipline and organization continues to inform the way in which the ENDF is involved in numerous military-industrial complex enterprises, of which it is considered very effective.⁴⁵

Considering alternative ideas on strong African militaries

⁴⁴ Seyoum Mesfin and Abdeta Dribssa Beyene, “The Practicalities of Living with Failed States,” *Dædalus* 147, no. 1 (2018): 128-140.

⁴⁵ Aaron Tesfaye, *Economic Policy and Performance. In: State and Economic Development in Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 93-128.

The rebel groups that emerged in the final civil wars of Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, helped transform their respective societies. The rebel leaders that took over each state displayed behavior that was much less predatory than predecessors, created stronger governance structures, leading to economic development and a more cohesive peace. While there are arguments about ‘resource-poor’ rebel groups being better than ‘resource-rich’ rebels because they are staffed by ‘activists’ not ‘opportunists’, as advocated by Weinstein, this cannot fully explain why some ‘resource-poor’ rebels were better than others when they captured the state and reconfigured the regime to fit the needs of the rebel organization.⁴⁶

The militaries of these countries, UPDF, RDF, and the ENDF, continue to feature some positive aspects of what it means to be a “*benign political army*,”⁴⁷ since they pursue objectives such as domestic development and peacekeeping, while generally avoiding indiscriminate domestic repression.⁴⁸ Based on interviews with government and military officials in Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, there is an institutional reluctance to use the military for domestic policing actions, and there are numerous coordination mechanisms in place to determine when it is appropriate to deploy the military internally. Too many outsiders and supposed Africanist ‘experts’ think many African militaries freely roam their own countryside in a predatory fashion, eliminating anyone perceived as opposed to the regime. This is not to say that repression is absent. The important distinction, however, is that these military forces can exercise internal discipline and political focus to the extent that they are more effective at

⁴⁶ Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

⁴⁷ Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (eds.), *Political armies: The military and nation building in the age of democracy*. (London: Zed Books, 2002).

⁴⁸ On domestic repression, refer to *Appendix A* where I describe the peculiarities of armies being use inappropriately and reports of their human rights abuses.

targeting specific regime opponents rather than indiscriminately attacking suspect communities and so forth, which generally undermine the cohesion of armies. This, I argue, is a component of military effectiveness, *as seen through the eyes of leaders* who otherwise might fear that an effective repressive force otherwise might turn on them.

An effective military – in an African context – also has more agency and organizational autonomy than many may assume, as military strength comes from being able to institutionally develop competence, promote good and qualified leaders based on some aspects of merit, and are trusted to deploy forces and conduct military operations without being micro-managed by politicians in the capital. These African armies have a blurring between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ control that shuck conventional standards and views on civilian control of the military. Many can negotiate with political authorities towards common objectives, instead of simply being subservient and following the vision and leadership imposed upon it. In essence, an effective military in the context of African politics, can exhibit bureaucratic (rational-legal) behaviors seen in the West despite being in a sea of patrimonialism. The phenomena of a high-performing subunit of the state outperforming other state organizations in a patrimonial regime is something McDonnell recently identified as a “interstitial bureaucracy,” in that some organizations in LDCs can develop and exhibit Weberian bureaucratic capabilities found in Western states.⁴⁹ Having a greater level of bureaucratic capacity is precisely what makes some African militaries more effective than others, but their alternative form of civil-military relations

⁴⁹ Erin Metz McDonnell, "Patchwork Leviathan: How Pockets of Bureaucratic Governance Flourish within Institutionally Diverse Developing States," *American Sociological Review* 82, no. 3 (2017): 476-510.

is contextually dependent on how military force is exercised and the role of an army in domestic state-building projects and ambitions.

Just because a rebel group comes to power and transforms the state and its military institutions, this does not automatically guarantee the safety and durability of the state or stable civil-military relations. Monica Duffy Toft suggested we should ‘give civil war a chance’, where she counterintuitively argued that civil wars should be played out – without international military interventions or forced peace accords from the UN and other states – to permit settling of scores by various factions, thereby preventing relapses of future violence.⁵⁰ Toft’s argument engenders a sort of Darwinian state-building argument in the sense that the side most capable of winning a civil war is likely the most proficient at reconstructing a stable postwar polity. My argument intends to build on Toft’s work, but by looking at the ways in which leaders reconfigure the state for future durability, whereas other rebel leaders fail in creating a cohesive state configuration of political and military elites.

Thus, Toft’s argument requires more nuance in an African context. For example, the *Séléka* coalition of rebels seized the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. One of the *Séléka* leaders, CAR President Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia, was unable to reconfigure the state and control the postwar violence, leading him to resign less than a year later under domestic and international pressure as new internal conflicts emerged, driven by ex-*Séléka* fighters fragmenting.⁵¹ Another illustration of Toft’s thesis lacking explanatory power in the long-term is the Chadian case. Idriss Déby was the rebel leader of the Patriotic Salvation

⁵⁰ Monica Duffy Toft, "Ending civil wars: A case for rebel victory?" *International Security* 34, no. 4 (2010): 7-36.

⁵¹ Ty McCormick, “‘One Day, We Will Start a Big War’,” *Foreign Policy*, October 28, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/28/one-day-we-will-start-a-big-war-central-african-republic-un-violence/>

Movement (*Mouvement Patriotique du Salut* [MPS]). He captured the capital in 1990, making himself president. Despite Déby remaining in power through the façade of “democratic elections” to this day.⁵² Unfortunately, he has been unable to build durable postwar order as he has endured numerous military coup attempts and rebellions.⁵³ The lack of regime durability in the CAR and Chad, appears to be less a product of structural forces, and seems more associated with respective rebel leaders not seeking the proper equilibria in power-sharing when they reconfigure the state.

Observers might point to the rebel victories in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Uganda as support for Toft’s argument. This is only partially correct, as it was not simply the victory that mattered, but instead how the rebels were organized, and how they carried this over into their state-building duties once they controlled their respective capitals. This outcome points to the centrality of the *current political configuration* of the regime and state, and their successes in departing from old path-dependent outcomes. It is also a testament to the cohesiveness and command structures of successful rebel organizations that carry-on in state governance.⁵⁴ Otherwise, Toft’s supposed savior rebels will reflect the political environment around them, as one finds more generally in cases like Chad and CAR. Moreover, one must wonder whether the predatory rebel leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor, was what Liberia really needed as a president to reconfigure the state when he ruled from 1998 to 2003.

⁵² Staffan I. Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), chapter 4.

⁵³ Ésaïe Toïngar, *Idriss Deby and the Darfur Conflict* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2014).

⁵⁴ Paul Staniland, *Networks of rebellion: Explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Another counterexample to Toft's argument, particularly the disdain for negotiated peace deals and military interventions by outsiders in Africa, is Sierra Leone. The postwar settlement has proven sustainable since international actors intervened. The robust military intervention by the British towards the end of the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) brought the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to its knees, leading the RUF to sign a peace treaty with minor concessions (e.g. amnesty, job opportunities, counseling, etc.) from Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.⁵⁵ This was a successful external intervention to broker the peace, and due to a considerable British and UN peacekeeping force that remains to this day, Sierra Leone has maintained stability in its postwar reconstruction period. Its political configuration under Kabbah, and smooth transition to an opposition party with Ernest Bai Koroma elected president in 2007 – without any rebellions or military coup attempts – indicates a durability with how Kabbah structured the new configuration of the state in 1998 with external guarantees slowly receding into the background now.⁵⁶

Thus, we must refine Toft's narrow argument for rebel victory that lacks the nuance to understand African cases (e.g. continued unrest in Liberia after being captured by the rebel Charles Taylor in 1997), especially since there are several African countries that have managed durable political configurations of the state since independence without rebels or the military coming to power. We need to investigate the "ingredients" that make certain polities and their military institutions work in certain configurable contexts following independence or cessation of civil war violence. Maintaining the stability of such societies has crucially required the

⁵⁵ Lansana Gberie, *A dirty war in West Africa: the RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).

⁵⁶ David H. Ucko, "Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain's Success Story in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 5-6 (2016): 847-877.

positive participation of their security forces in trying to maintain some semblance of a Weberian monopoly over violence, but does not indulge in excessive violence and repression domestically. This begs the question of how a country arrives at a point at which military and other security forces can do this, particularly when there have been numerous obstacles to this goal. The four case studies presented in this dissertation seek to illustrate how the armies of Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, came about as robust institutions in the 21st century through a long-term historical perspective. The common element among these four cases is the relative benevolence exhibited by political leadership and their armed forces since coming into their current political configurations.

The Argument

How have some African countries managed to develop well-disciplined and organized military institutions that are bureaucratically superior relative to the state? Moreover, how have these managed to create strong militaries that do not pose a threat? Despite lacking resources or state capacity, some militaries can effectively “punch above their weight,” whereas other states have an army that reflects just as poorly as other organizations of the state. The emergence of such a strong institution – especially one with all the guns – defies typical political logic on a continent where practically every country has cycled through military coup attempts or military led regimes.

In other cases, the perception of a strong military is merely a façade, as political elites stuff the military with loyalists, ethnic kin, use the budget for patronage, or create multiple security institutions to spy and compete with one another. In other cases, regime leaders have used the military as a praetorian guard – to be used specifically for the defense of the regime elite

and their narrow interests. Nonetheless, history has shown that since 1945 strong military institutions are typically incompatible with practically every type and form of regime, unless it is an institutionally robust democracy (“Full Democracy” score of +10).⁵⁷ At the same time, however, some authoritarian governments (“Autocracy” score of -6 to -10) such as China and Saudi Arabia, have also managed to build large – and ostensibly effective – military institutions that have not attempted a coup against the government.⁵⁸

Based on fieldwork in Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, I argue that each have built their own particularly effective configurations of civil-military relations that is an alternative to those observed in Western armies. This has resulted in strong military institutions – enclaves of military capacity – despite the various structural incentives that led other African countries to create politicized and fragmented armies. Agential choices by political elites and military leaders coming to certain power-sharing arrangements have been mutually beneficial and reinforcing to the durability of their respective regimes. Such accommodations between political authorities and military personnel in each of these countries have permitted the creation of strong military institutions that are not a threat to the regime, but are unlike the sort of civil-military relations one would expect based on conventional definitions. This is because ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ control mean something different in African politics and in the pursuit of regime strategies, where the army can play much more of a substantive role compared to modern militaries in the West. I make these claims based on the fact that Senegal (1960), Uganda (1986), Rwanda (1994), and Ethiopia (1991), have not had any significant military coup

⁵⁷ Since 1945, no country with a Polity IV score of +10 has experienced a military coup attempt.

⁵⁸ Monty G. Marshall and Ted R. Gurr, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013,” *Center for Systemic Peace*, June 5, 2014, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm>

attempts against their regimes since the current configurations of their respective governments began. Since 2000, these four countries are remarkable because they have exhibited considerable military capability and effectiveness by deploying a significant number of their armed forces for various purposes (e.g. UN peacekeeping missions, AU peacekeeping, invasions, occupations, etc.) at a level much higher than richer and more populous countries on the African continent. Indeed, if we measure ‘military effectiveness’ as the ability to project/deploy military force outside one’s own territory, the U.S. is clearly the number one country in the world with approximately 200,000 troops deployed around the world in 2017 alone.⁵⁹

In the case of Africa, as illustrated in Figure 1-2, Rwanda and Senegal rank first and third respectively for UN peacekeeper contributions when one controls for the population size of each country. Rwanda is remarkable in this regard because it did not start contributing RDF troops to UN missions until 2005.⁶⁰ In the case of Uganda and Ethiopia, Figure 1-3 shows that the two countries have deployed their soldiers for non-UN purposes more than any other country in Africa. Indeed, Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, are unique outliers cases given their propensity to deploy considerable military forces despite each having a similar GDP per capita that is substantially lower than the sub-Saharan African average (see Figure 1-4). It is also notable that these findings push back against arguments that suggest that the poorest countries

⁵⁹ One should also note that this figure would probably be much higher if the U.S. military did not use contractors. For example, at the height of the Cold War and Vietnam War, the U.S. had over 1.2 million troops deployed overseas. This requires tremendous institutional capacity and resources. For more data on U.S. troops, refer to: Kristen Bialik, “U.S. active-duty military presence overseas is at its smallest in decades,” *Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2017, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades/>

⁶⁰ Rwanda began contributing troops to AU peacekeeping missions in 2004.

contribute the most to UN and AU peacekeeping missions.⁶¹ For example, Malawi is one of the poorest LDCs in Africa with a GDP per capita of \$300 and a military force larger than Senegal,⁶² but ranks 21st overall in UN peacekeeping contributions, behind the much richer Tunisia in terms of contributing troops (per capita) to peacekeeping missions. While I do not deny the materialist gains (e.g. rewards such as side-payments, special pay, debt relief, etc.) for regimes and their armed forces *vis-à-vis* participation in peacekeeping missions,⁶³ I contend that participation fulfills ideological goals of the state and military, and contributes to the ethos of African state-building processes. Thus, rent-seeking behaviors cannot fully explain why Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, or Ethiopia, would dedicate resources to developing military effectiveness prior to deploying troops for peacekeeping (i.e. pre-deployment training, etc.), because each has their own rationale for participating.

⁶¹ Alex De Waal, "Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace," *International Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2009): 99-113.

⁶² The World Bank, [September 18, 2017], <https://data.worldbank.org/>

⁶³ Marina E. Henke, "Great powers and UN force generation: a case study of UNAMID," *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 3 (2016): 468-492.




Figure 1-2. Number of troops from African countries deployed on UN missions from 2000 to 2016, adjusted to account for population size of each country. Source: International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*, November 1, 2017, available at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org




Figure 1-3. Number of troops from African countries that deployed from 2000 to 2016 on a non-UN mission. See *Appendix C* for original dataset.




Figure 1-4. GDP per capita (current US\$) from 2000 to 2015 for Sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. Source: *The World Bank*, September 18, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/>

The militaries of Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, also engage in high levels of domestic development activities, such as infrastructure projects, state modernization, and/or managing state run corporations. While these four countries are generally considered to be patrimonial regimes, which means that patron-client networks and the personal discretion of leaders plays a big role in the exercise of domestic authority,⁶⁴ in theory they should not be able to create bureaucratically competent military forces. This assumption that they cannot develop capable militaries – at least by Western standards – that are effective in traditional and non-traditional military activities misses the unique character and nature of warfare on the African continent, and the niche role that armies play in society. Moreover, considering the role of their respective armies in state formation and development is a necessary process, as militaries have historically always played a role in shaping the politics of the state and society, before and after colonialism.⁶⁵

While there are numerous policy suggestions and narratives from the West on how the ‘fragile’ LDCs should strengthen their state and institutions, there is a tendency from a long-term perspective that a stronger military typically goes in conjunction with a stronger state. The problem is whether there is a cogent blending of politics with the art and tools of violence created by the state, which avoids an overly coercive state that is counterproductive in long-term

⁶⁴ Nic Cheeseman, *Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁶⁵ A. B. Assensoh and Yvette Alex-Assensoh, *African military history and politics: Coups and ideological incursions, 1900-present* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).

state formation.⁶⁶ While Senegal may appear to be a ‘model state’ for all other African countries to emulate in their civil-military relations, their particular colonial upbringing, cohesive society, and “luck” in the early years of independence, make it doubtful other countries will ever be able to emulate such an ‘ideal’ timing in historical contingencies with leaders displaying a high-degree of benevolence in political bargaining.

Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, appear to illustrate the role of agency in the process of creating a ‘new’ state through rebels with new ideological views of how to form a state, institutions, bureaucracy, and military. They provide models for how leaders in turbulent states can reconfigure the state, creating institutional enclaves of competence in wider authority structures. Such a strategy can help further institutionalize their states. However, we must be mindful that as much as these new political configurations ‘wiped the chalkboard clean’, like wiping any other chalkboard in life, there is always some residue and dust. Thus, we cannot wholly throw out the past either in each country. Culture, society, narratives, traditions, political norms, etc., are ‘sticky’ and can take several generations to transform. Ultimately, we cannot ignore the societal impact that military organizations have in shaping the state, especially with how ‘naked power’ is exercised.⁶⁷

Layout

In this introductory chapter, I have illuminated the haphazard ways in which Africa is portrayed and the existence of significant outlier cases in which initially weak regimes have been able to

⁶⁶ Antonio Giustozzi, *The Art of Coercion: The Primitive Accumulation and Management of Coercive Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

⁶⁷ Stanislav Andreski, *Military organization and society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

promote and sustain effective military forces. I make this claim on the basis political configurations of the state that work in tandem of promoting durability. I have contended that the fatalistic structural forces that make state-building supposedly improbable in Africa, is more the product of agential choices by political elites and military leadership. In tending amicable civil-military relations and avenues for power sharing, alongside the development of robust military institutional capabilities, it appears that Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, serve as important cases of study based on how much they utilize their militaries – especially allowing them to be bureaucratically capable – and in how stable their regimes have been in their current political configurations. While the primary focus of this text is how some states became militarily effective, I am aware of the inherent faults in an argument that essentially ‘selects on the dependent variable’. Thus, throughout the rest of the dissertation, I will evaluate other African countries that were unable to build effective ‘military enclaves’ to illustrate the different mechanisms at work in countries that escaped the ‘weak military trap’.

Chapter 2 introduces the numerous ways in which African militaries are important in state building and what causes them to be bad and ineffective and can contribute to state deformation. It surveys broad literatures on state-building, civil wars, and civil-military relations, in consideration of the tension that exists within a state between political authorities and those that wield the tools of violence. The chapter also considers the role of coups and purges in a historical context, and the various dynamics that influence each process. It contends that domestic and international context matters when it comes to militaries and that due to the particular challenges facing the average African country and their military, African militaries should be more engaged in domestic activities, which runs counter to most Western civil-military

dictums. Finally, the chapter acknowledges the various reasons why the average African country should not develop a military; let alone dedicate the resources for it because of the many ‘fail safes’ that protect and shield failing regimes in Africa.

Chapter 3 sketches how the particular environment of the African continent has shaped militaries, to include the international context distorting typical logic in creating certain types of militaries. It considers how military effectiveness is defined by various militaries in the world, to better understand the circumstances and context in which the typical African military operates. Moreover, it acknowledges the various problems with trying to assess the effectiveness of African militaries due to the numerous complexities of trying to measure them by Western standards. It considers how the literature has treated the role of instrumental variables, quantitative metrics, and qualitative considerations, when it comes to a military being able to generate military power when it matters most. Finally, it develops the concept of ‘military enclaves’ to illustrate how some regimes purposively allow some aspects of the state to be bureaucratically effective, despite it being a patrimonial state.

Chapter 4 presents the need to differentiate state and military power because they are the product of various domestic and international variables. Then I describe a process for decoupling military power from state power, by showing how military capacity (e.g. military firepower) and state capability (e.g. public goods and services) can be different. This results in four different quadrant types (as seen in Figure 1-1) of African state power configurations: Overall Low Military and State Capacity, (II) Low Military and High State Capacity, (III) High Military and Low State Capacity, (IV) and Overall High Military and State Capacity. This allows us to better identify outlier states that are weak by conventional standards and metrics, but have militaries

that appear much stronger. This forms the basis of understanding whether military power directly translates into military effectiveness, as leadership and organization are more determinative of this relationship, which supports the development of the model of institutional military effectiveness in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 builds on the quantitative military power aspect gleaned in Chapter 4. From this, the nature of African militaries is re-conceptualized to argue that there can be three different types of armies in Africa: apolitical, political, and personalist. Each ideal type can overlap with one another, and each has particular pathways towards generating military effectiveness. This contributes to my model of institutional military effectiveness, which considers material capability and civil-military relations in the generation of military power, as a heuristic to identify five different ideal types of militaries in Africa: Ineffective, Hollow, Parochial, Resourceful, and Effective. It provides an illustrative lens in which to view militaries within the context of resources, 'black box' institutional military behavior, and political and societal frameworks.

Chapters 6 through 9 provide in-depth case studies of Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia respectively. Each case study starts with historical influence and colonial aspects of each respective state based on primary and secondary sources, to include fieldwork, use of official government documents, and interviews in each country. This permits an understanding of how 'old' aspects of a state might still influence the 'new' political configuration of the state. In addition, each case study chapter analyzes the 'black box' of military institutions. This illustrates the important role of internal processes and mechanisms ongoing in each army that influences their institutional military effectiveness and the overall process of state formation. Chapter 6

(Senegal) is juxtaposed with neighboring West African states to show that agential choices by Senegalese presidents and the SAF, especially the domestic state-building ideology of *Armée Nation*, helped the state overcome the problems that similarly structured states seemed unwilling or unable to overcome. Chapter 7 (Uganda) shows how Museveni has managed to reorganize the state and his army around a pan-Africanist ideology that he developed while he and other fighters were in the “Bush.” Chapter 8 (Rwanda) illustrates the importance that Kagame has played in guiding the country out of the devastation of the 1994 genocide. It illustrates the role of civil war “patriots” in state development and how *Ingando*, a form of ideological indoctrination, is contributing to societal and military cohesion between Hutu and Tutsis. Chapter 9 (Ethiopia) highlights how much the “guerilla” ideology informs state politics and the behavior of the ENDF to this day. It shows how much the ENDF proudly plays a role as a political army, which views itself holding an important position in developing the state, society, and economy.

Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with considering the future of African militaries. It identifies why we need to reframe the nature of war and conflict in Africa, and explains how some militaries in ‘weak’ states end up strong whereas others have armies that match the bad politics of the state (or worse). This conclusory chapter reiterates the ways in which Senegal emerged with an effective military and as a stable state in the sea of chaos that has defined several generations of politics of West Africa. Senegal was able to retain much of its colonial structures and systems at independence, in contrast to neighboring countries, which succumbed to military coups and vicious civil wars. This is juxtaposed with how Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, each have come into their current political configurations as stable entities – despite their turbulent pasts – where each have emerged with significant military capabilities amidst a

similar chaos in East Africa. Finally, I make policy recommendations about the importance of understanding the political context of states in Africa, especially how each military perceives their role respective to the state and society, and the particular ways in which their institutions operate to generate military effectiveness. Understanding this allows one to “peek” inside the ‘black box’ of military institutions to understand how security assistance (e.g. training, advising, education, etc.) from strong patron states can be an effective form of aid that is efficiently put to use in further strengthening the military, to include contributing to state formation. Determining whether or not a military is a ‘enclave’ is vital in understanding whether a military can be effective or not, because anything less means that the military is likely beholden to personalist politics that prevent it from professionalizing.

Appendix A describes the methods of this research project, the certain nuance required in trying to study militaries, and the context in which militaries have behaved inappropriately (e.g. human rights abuses), to include the different standards contemporary militaries are expected to adhere relative to armies over a century ago. *Appendix B* provides a listing of the 20 interview questions – English and French version – that were utilized in semi-structured interviews with military personnel from African countries. *Appendix C* introduces a new dataset that shows how each African country has deployed its military for non-UN missions from 2000 to 2016, of which there were 299 recordable events coded from open-sources, with some missing data (e.g. troops deployed for Ethiopian invasion of Somalia) filled in through interviews with government officials. This dataset fills a missing gap in the literature as no one to date has coded each case of military force being deployed outside of one’s territory in Africa and it includes AU peacekeeping missions (such as AMISOM in Somalia) which are generally UN funded and

authorized. However, these troop deployments are not explicitly tracked by the UN and are excluded from UN peacekeeping datasets, meaning that much of the contemporary debate on peacekeeping is ignoring the role of countries such as Uganda, which contribute exponentially more forces to AU missions instead of to UN missions. *Appendix D* provides data for each African country from 2000 to 2014, which is the primary reference for metrics on military and state analysis made throughout the dissertation. Finally, *Appendix E* provides data, tables, and figures from the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4.

Chapter 2 – The Logic of Effective Militaries in Weak States

I've deployed to Mauritania and Niger multiple times to train their militaries. Before arriving in both countries, I was briefed on how poor they were and their dependence on foreign aid. At the same time, they briefed us that both countries had invested significantly in their military capabilities, and that on paper they both had military power comparable to each other. However, after traveling to both countries and training and working with their military personnel for several months, I realized that the military of Niger was much more competent and effective than the military of Mauritania. While in Mauritania, I observed a 'caste society' within their military that went beyond just typical officer-enlisted differences and that white moors held the most power and best jobs. You could tell that tribal connections and bloodlines guaranteed promotions better than actual job performance and competence, and this annoyed many of the black Mauritians I trained. I doubt their military could fight effectively if 'push came to shove'. Niger's military was a completely different story. Their personnel were very motivated and there appeared to be little internal division compared to Mauritania's military. The military personnel I encountered in Niger seemed to have a much more genuine interest in developing a professional military and their leadership appeared to reflect a preference for talent and abilities rather than 'who you knew'.

*Western Military Officer
Interview
February 17, 2016*

This vignette illustrates a paradox: Both countries are patrimonial states with weak formal institutional capacities, and yet, the military of Niger with a GDP per capita of \$362, operates a military with a significantly higher institutional competence and cohesion relative to Mauritania, which has a GDP per capita that is more than triple that of Niger.⁶⁸ These otherwise similar countries have a mismatch between military effectiveness and broader state capacities. This is true despite a general dearth of resources in both countries, relative to the resources available to build military capacities in much wealthier countries.⁶⁹ This observation leads to more general questions about the organizational logics of the militaries in other African states and their

⁶⁸ GDP per capita data from 2016, with Mauritania having a GDP per capita of \$1,078: <https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/mauritania/niger>

⁶⁹ The conventional argument is that GDP per capita is the best indicator for 'military strength', for more see: David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009): 570-597.

relative effectiveness and competence. It is particularly acute when compared to the relative ineffectiveness of most other state institutions that provide (or fail to provide) public services and goods to their citizenry. This variable relationship between formal institutional capacities of states and the effectiveness of military organizations suggests that other factors define military effectiveness in the African context. This chapter will identify and explain how these factors contribute to disparate outcomes.

Military effectiveness is not a monolithic concept. Despite the military of Niger appearing to display a more cohesive organization compared to Mauritania, for example, both armies share a penchant to intervene in domestic politics. Mauritania experienced successful military coups in 2005 and 2008, leading to the coup leader of both – General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz – winning a presidential vote in 2009.⁷⁰ In Niger, a military coup in 1999 resulted in the death of the incumbent leader (Ibrahim Bare Mainassara). In 2010, a mid-level officer (Army Captain Salou Djibo) staged a coup against Niger’s President Tandja Mamadou⁷¹ after the president attempted to unconstitutionally extend his term in office. Djibo “retired” and the coup leader stepped aside as Niger’s voters elected Mahamadou Issoufou as president, a man with no military experience. Two successful coups, but with two different outcomes in the political configurations of each state: Mauritania’s military remained a *de facto* power that ruled the state, while in Niger, the 1999 and 2010 coups aimed to stop democratic backsliding and cleared a path to open and competitive elections.⁷² In Mauritania, and as in Egypt in 2013 and elsewhere in

⁷⁰ Boubacar N’Diaye, *Mauritania’s Colonels: Political Leadership, Civil-Military Relations and Democratization* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

⁷¹ Mamadou was an officer that took part in the 1974 military coup and served in the Supreme Military Council

⁷² George Derpanopoulos, Erica Frantz, Barbara Geddes, and Joseph Wright, “Are coups good for democracy?” *Research & Politics* 3, no. 1 (2016): 1-7.

Africa, domestic military interventions in politics result in “democratic coups.”⁷³ Successful coup leaders then hold elections favorable to themselves after the coup so that they can demonstrate the ‘democratic process’ at work, which pleases international audiences that demanded some façade of democracy.

If one considers the internal security situation in Mauritania and Niger, it would be easy to assume that Niger’s military is ineffective relative to Mauritania’s because Niger’s army is locked in combat operations with non-state armed actors (i.e. al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, etc.) domestically and regionally on an almost weekly basis.⁷⁴ Mauritania ostensibly appears to have a stronger military because it is heavily involved in regional military operations to fight terrorism and Mauritania has not suffered any serious internal extremist violence since 2011.⁷⁵

Yet as the vignette shows, the military of Mauritania is ethnically divided, where the Halpulaar (the largest non-Moor group), Soninke, Wolof, and Haratines, are excluded from leadership positions, causing societal tensions and undermining bureaucratic effectiveness.⁷⁶ In reality, stability in Mauritania since 2011 has been a product of contingent political negotiations, and not a result of long-term state formation strategies. Based on fieldwork interviews, some

⁷³ Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, *Guarding the Guardians: civil-military relations and democratic governance in Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2016), vii.

⁷⁴ Lisa Mueller, “As Niger prepares for elections, it’s concerned about security. Should it be?” *The Washington Post*, January 28, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/28/heightened-concern-about-security-in-run-up-to-nigers-february-elections/?utm_term=.a8fdeb6f6faa; David Litt, “Why Is the United States in Niger, Anyway?” *Foreign Policy*, October 25, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/25/why-is-the-united-states-in-niger-anyway/>

⁷⁵ Anouar Boukhars, “Mauritania’s Precarious Stability and Islamist Undercurrent,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, February 11, 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/11/mauritania-s-precarious-stability-and-islamist-undercurrent-pub-62730>

⁷⁶ “Mauritania 2016 Human Rights Report,” U.S. State Department website, 2016, 25. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265490.pdf>

Mauritanian government and military officials apparently collude with armed groups in patronage and side-deals (i.e. smuggling, trafficking, etc.) in exchange for promises from these actors not to engage in rebellious activities within Mauritania. This is not a unique or surprising model of relations between state officials and non-state armed actors in a context in which formal state institutions are very weak.⁷⁷ In this formulation, weak state institutions are reflected in low levels of military effectiveness. Likewise, during the Iraq War and subsequent U.S. and Coalition occupation (2003 – 2011), the Assad regime in neighboring Syria allowed the creation of smuggling and trafficking networks to move Jihadist foreign fighters and war matériel into Iraq to wage a proxy war against the occupying Western military forces.⁷⁸ Much to the chagrin of an international audience, these networks were eventually used against Assad during the Syrian Civil War (2011 – present). Mauritania may also find that such accommodations are helpful in the short-term, but will likely expose it to the same ‘blowback’ that the Assad regime suffered.

Niger’s relative successes and the bad outcomes and risks in places like Mauritania (and Syria, for that matter) highlights the importance of understanding the logic of military effectiveness in settings in which other formal state institutions have very low capacities. Moreover, we need to explore why armed forces of a state are important and how they can be “bad” (i.e. coups, repression, etc.) to include the impact they have on the state. This discussion necessitates decoupling consideration of how various factors compel states to develop strong

⁷⁷ William Reno, "Patronage politics and the behavior of armed groups," *Civil Wars* 9, no. 4 (2007): 324-342; Christopher R. Day and William S. Reno, "In Harm's Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics," *Civil Wars* 16, no. 2 (2014): 105-126.

⁷⁸ Brian Fishman (ed.), *Bombers, Bank Accounts & Bleedout: al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008).

military capacities in some instances, and weaker ones in other cases. Related to this is the need to dissect the typical variables that are conventionally thought to cause internal tensions in militaries and their relations to the civil authorities, such as those illustrated in the epigraph.

Overall, it is surprising that any state in Africa builds strong militaries given the internationalized context of Africa since 1945, and more so since the end of the Cold War, as there seems to be little payoff in building or maintaining an effective military. First, a rational leader who rules a state with weak institutions might fear that a strong military would find little difficulty in overthrowing him. Second, interventions from external militaries, the UN, and the use of contractors/mercenaries seem to be more effective and safer ways of addressing domestic security threats. These structural conditions make it easier for regime leaders to refrain from creating robust military forces. In some cases, leaders opt to create a *loyal* military organization (e.g. presidential guard, elite special forces, etc.) to personally defend them from the broader military organization of the state. The loyal unit gets the majority of the resources, training, and education, which contributes to the fragmentation of military forces as the ruler cultivates rivalries between them that can be exploited to balance their interests while still benefiting from a reasonable level of personal protection. It is the epitome of divide-and-conquer, except regime allies and adversaries are ‘fluid’ in that power is constantly being balanced to prevent strong challengers to the state from emerging. However, such specialized loyal units can be problematic when that leader is no longer in power, such as the two military coup attempts made by the independent Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP) in Burkina Faso in 2015 and 2016.⁷⁹ The RSP was a personalized army created by Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré who had been in

⁷⁹ <http://www.africanews.com/2016/10/21/coup-attempt-foiled-in-burkina-faso-government-announces/>

power from 1987 until 2014, where he went into exile due to a public revolt stemming from his attempt to unconstitutionally extend his presidential term.⁸⁰ In both cases, the regular Burkinabé army intervened to protect the government against the RSP coup attempts.

Ultimately, the existence of effective military forces in this context points to a need not only to explain how such outcomes can happen, but also to a need to redefine ‘military effectiveness’ in Weberian terms. This needs to be done to explain how some African militaries can be strong organizationally – relative to the state – and perform non-traditional military duties (e.g. infrastructure projects, managing companies, etc.) while avoiding civil-military strife that has been a common feature of the African political landscape.

This chapter shows why militaries have been historically important and the dangers they have posed. Then the international context is evaluated in light of the particular conditions and politics of African states to understand the reasons about to develop (or not) competent militaries. I situate such discussions in three different literatures of state-building, civil wars, and civil-military relations, to advance more questions about African militaries. First, why are states considered ‘weak’ in Africa? Most scholarly assumptions are that weak overall institutions also equals weak military capacity. While there are some typical cases where they mirror one another, it is possible to have weak state institutions with military effectiveness because of various accommodations and agreements between political and military elites. Second, why is society important when analyzing the nature of military effectiveness? This emphasis on culture pays attention to context, and is open to the possibility that military effectiveness might be a mirror of

⁸⁰ Janette Yarwood, "The Power of Protest," *Journal of Democracy* 27, no. 3 (2016): 51-60.

the society instead of the state, which is generally overlooked in the literature. Context nested within different societies appears to be an overriding factor in explaining the unusual outcome of strong militaries emerging in states considered ‘fragile’ by the international community. Considering political configurations of the state and how it manages a semi-monopoly of violence, means we must look beyond the formal institutions of the state in Africa. In many cases, it might be that the real exercise of authority occurs through informal institutional channels. Thus, military effectiveness might be a reflection of this kind of authority, and can possibly help explain how militaries can be strong when formal state institutions are very weak.

The Importance of Militaries

It should go without saying that militaries are important to the defense of a nation and its territory and people. Even the perception of a credible military can deter adversaries that are calculating the costs and payoffs of invading another country. The utility of effective armed forces thus has been recognized since antiquity. The first known professional standing army was in 8th century BCE Assyria.⁸¹ Though present in Ancient Greece and the Kingdom of Macedon,⁸² professional standing armies were an uncommon occurrence for much of human history due to their costs and danger they posed to their political leaders. However, the Qin dynasty of Ancient China in the 3rd and 4th century BCE ruthlessly established a professional

⁸¹ Michael C. Howard, *Transnationalism in Ancient and Medieval Societies: The Role of Cross-Border Trade and Travel* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2012), 35-37.

⁸² Peter Hunt, “Military Forces,” In Philip Sabin, Hans Van Wees, and Michael Whitby (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

army in conjunction with a bureaucratically strong state in which the military was not a threat to the regime.⁸³

One obstacle to maintaining a standing army included the financial costs of fielding and caring for a large cadre of men. Conscripted men also led to societal disruption (i.e. revolts), while impeding the harvesting of crops and other labor requirements for their economies.⁸⁴ Yet paradoxically, the need to fund armies appears to have driven state centralization of power to create state bureaucracies capable of collecting revenue and supporting their military. Modern professional standing armies finally arose and became commonplace in Europe in a process that started with the emergence of the Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire in the 14th century⁸⁵ with the majority of countries finally creating similar armies by the end of the 19th century out of necessity to compete (and not be conquered).⁸⁶ This also was a time of great interstate warfare and territorial competition, which facilitated state-formation and expansion through the creation of colonial empires. Such traditional risks that had prevented the rise of such standing armies became less of a risk, and instead became seen as a tool for economic growth, helping secure new territories and preventing adversaries from capturing profitable land, populations, and

⁸³ Victoria Tin-bor Hui, *War and state formation in ancient China and early modern Europe*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 60-80.

⁸⁴ James C. Scott, *Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 29, 30, 36, 291, 300, 301, and 322.

⁸⁵ Godfrey Goodwin, *The Janissaries* (London: Saqi Books, 2006).

⁸⁶ European micro countries such as Andorra and Vatican City never had a modern standing army, and Liechtenstein abolished its standing army in 1868. Iceland has not had a standing army since 1869, and its military force is limited to a civil police role. The military of Monaco serves as a ceremonial army and for civil defense purposes, though some officers serve in active French military units. In all there is 23 countries in the world without formal militaries. See: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/countries-without-militaries/382606/>

resources. More importunately, military institutions appear to have been a necessary sinew for bonding the processes of state-building and nationalism.⁸⁷

State-Building

If we accept Charles Tilly's oft-cited aphorism "war made the state and the state made war"⁸⁸ then we need to consider how state-building (mirrored in the creation of effective military forces) through inter-state war holds up in Africa. Tilly argued that the ability and necessity to wage war required the development of bureaucratic state competence to finance and organize such complex operations. Ian Morris echoed a similar sentiment from a long view of history perspective, whereby warfare has helped modernize societies, counterintuitively improving human welfare by increasing security and wealth.⁸⁹ However, these war and strong state arguments are problematic when applied to independent African states since interstate warfare has been rare in comparison to Europe.⁹⁰ At the same time, internal conflict has increased, leading many to contend that this has contributed to state deformation.⁹¹ This has been illustrated in Latin America, where many countries since independence experienced limited internal wars, requiring limited amounts of state military response to deal with the threat. This meant there was little need to build elite

⁸⁷ Daniele Conversi, "We are all equals! 'Militarism, homogenization and egalitarianism' in nationalist state-building (1789–1945)," *Ethnic and racial studies* 31, no. 7 (2008): 1286-1314.

⁸⁸ Charles C. Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.

⁸⁹ Ian Morris, *War! What Is It Good For? Conflict and the Progress of Civilization from Primates to Robots* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014).

⁹⁰ Kalevi Holsti, "The Decline of Interstate War: Pondering Systemic Explanations," in: *Kalevi Holsti: Major Texts on War, the State, Peace, and International Order*. SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, vol 42. Springer, Cham (2016), 44.

⁹¹ Michael C. Desch, "War and strong states, peace and weak states?" *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (1996): 237-268.

coalitions as there was minimal mobilization of resources, which kept these states relatively weak despite waging war.⁹²

Returning to Tilly, his analysis looked at state formation in Europe from around the 15th century to the 20th century. Africa has contextually been different on so many different levels – from the domestic to the international. Structural conditions in Africa are radically dissimilar from the formative time (from end of Dark Ages to French Revolution) in which Tilly contended that war made European nations so strong. Jeffrey Herbst observed that Africa had missed this critical juncture in state formation, facing little incentive to create strong militaries, as treaties and international interventions from external militaries and the UN discouraged the creation of competent military forces. In addition, territorially large countries with low population densities made it expensive and difficult to administer services to people in peripheral areas of the typical African state.⁹³ Yet Paul Collier paradoxically suggested the “small country” trap, where African states do not have enough territory to have any modicum of power or governance,⁹⁴ which goes against the geographic determinism of African states being too big to govern as suggested by Herbst.

There are numerous multidisciplinary arguments that espouse similar structural fatalism with regards to Africa. Here is a brief survey: late African state entry into the international

⁹² Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and debt: War and the nation-state in Latin America* (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2002).

⁹³ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁹⁴ Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 64-78. In addition, Collier suggests other ‘traps’ such as conflict, natural resources, landlocked state, and/or missing the crucial juncture of modernizing the state during globalization.

system stemming development,⁹⁵ Jared Diamond's evolutionary ecological approach that writes off Africa,⁹⁶ Walter Rodney's Marxist analysis of how European capitalism made the colonial powers rich and strong at the expense of Africans,⁹⁷ Basil Davidson's argument that the European form of a 'nation-state' is alien to African societies,⁹⁸ and even a theory about how the Tsetse fly ruined state formation by preventing the consolidation of political authority in most tropical African countries.⁹⁹ Each of these arguments discards politics in favor of immovable structural constraints. One could even speculate what Africa might have looked like had European powers never colonized the continent, with educated guesses ranging from only 12 countries to over 130 states – depending on one's historical revisionism when it comes to their view of war and peace.¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, one needs to look beyond such structural arguments to consider the reality of effective militaries that develop through agential political choice. This political argument points to such factors as the exercise of control by political and military elites. It also considers that ideas of 'risk' should be given further consideration when considering how states and militaries emerge. This approach contributes to Azar Gat's suggestion that social and

⁹⁵ Douglas M. Gibler, "State Development, Parity, and International Conflict," *American Political Science Review*, 110 no. 4 (2016): 1-18.

⁹⁶ Jared M. Diamond, *Guns, germs, and steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1997).

⁹⁷ Walter Rodney, *How Europe underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1972).

⁹⁸ Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York: Random House, 1992).

⁹⁹ Marcella Alsan, "The effect of the tsetse fly on African development," *The American Economic Review* 105, no. 1 (2014): 382-410.

¹⁰⁰ Emmanuel-Francis Nwaolisa Ogamegbunam suggests that Africa would have 12 countries if there had never been colonialism in Africa, for more see: <https://www.quora.com/What-would-Africa-look-like-today-had-there-been-no-European-colonialism/answer/Emmanuel-Francis-Nwaolisa-Ogamegbunam>. For a pacifist view of Africa, an artist (Nikolaj Cyon) suggests that if colonialism had never happened and if war had been absent from 1300 - 1844 AD, there would be at least 130 countries in Africa today; for more see: <https://www.cyon.se/#/alkebulan-1260-ah/>.

political order in a society are related to effective military systems.¹⁰¹ Though they are interesting arguments that also suggest some elites prefer ruling through disorder.¹⁰²

Brian Downing's account of European state formation, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, engages a Tilly type argument, but contends that the military shapes political organization. Downing contends that most of Medieval Europe had representative assemblies, which were a foundational basis for liberalism. However, dangerous military situations and the particular way in which a polity responded saved or destroyed constitutionalism. Destruction of legislative mechanisms fostered the creation of authoritarian military-bureaucratic states – especially when the state relied on domestic revenues to sustain modern armies.¹⁰³ Thus, the 'military revolution' in Medieval Europe signaled a shift away from knight service (a decentralized process) and a movement towards efficient centralized state processes that could handle large standing armies that required more skills, training, funding, and organizational efficacy, due to technological advancements in warfare. States that managed the military revolution best, and maintained principles of participatory democracy, were ones that were already rich or had access to loans from external sources.

Overall, these approaches conclude that effective militaries are necessary components of the development of strong states and vice-versa. However, Downing is the most important in understanding African state formation, as the way a state builds its army, will also shape the way

¹⁰¹ Azar Gat, *War in human civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 298-303.

¹⁰² Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa works: Disorder as a political instrument* (Oxford, UK: James Currey, 1999); Crawford Young, "Deciphering disorder in Africa: Is identity the key?" *World Politics* 54, no. 4 (2002): 532-557.

¹⁰³ Brian M. Downing, *The military revolution and political change: Origins of democracy and autocracy in early modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

the state is built. The major difference of course is that Downing was writing about European armies and state-building, whereas African states have built their militaries and governments in novel ways that he could not have foreseen. This is because the weak state environment conditions how militaries are built. Leadership, foresight, and strategic planning mean much more in contemporary African state-building due to globalization and shortened time-horizons.

Much as Skocpol sought to ‘bring the state back in’,¹⁰⁴ I am trying to ‘bring the military back’ into the analysis of state-formation in Africa to explain the divergent outcome of institutionally weak states that are able to maintain effective militaries. This investigation also needs to take into consideration colonial-military models and rebel-military models that have influenced the transformation of the state in Africa. Thus, there is a need for unpacking the ‘black box’ of military institutions in the average African state where the various hierarches and dynamics of military institutions are endogenously influenced by their political system. At the same time, they are also exogenously adapting to an international system that has different expectations with how a military should be organized, behave, and act.

Building on Downing’s thesis about military institutions influencing society and government, David Ralston evinced that strong European military institutions caused a “military reform” of the state, transforming the state at the expense of conservative elites (and associated ideologies) that preferred the status quo of patron-client relations.¹⁰⁵ Could it be that the positive civil-military relations in Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, are helping with the

¹⁰⁴ Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Peter B. Evans, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the state back in* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

¹⁰⁵ David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions in the Extra-European World, 1600-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

transformations of their societies in much the way military institutions did between the Medieval period and the Renaissance period in Europe, but without interstate war? There is even the possibility that effective military institutions have acted as a bulwark against those in society that see no reason for an effective or bureaucratically strong state to exist. Perhaps Hendrik Spruyt is correct in asserting that “regardless of the particular feature of the state that one wishes to study, causal explanations will inevitably have to account for the specific dynamics of warfare, economic transformation wrought by trade and finance, and ideological aspects of state legitimization.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, bring particularly different backgrounds, ranging from colonial, geographic, level of internal violence, ethnic groups, and social relations, in which various different processes have led to similar outcomes: a military that can “punch above its weight” in the sense that they host militaries that are more effective than the underlying capabilities of their states would suggest.

State Deformation

State weakness in Africa has attracted considerable attention. For example, Jackson and Rosberg in their seminal article “Why Africa’s weak states persist” evaluate the need to decouple empirical statehood from juridical statehood.¹⁰⁷ While a state may legally exist due to international recognition, the typical measurable state competencies might not exist, to include many lacking a monopoly on violence or missing some semblance of a social contract between the ruler and citizenry. To explain such weakness in most African countries, Jackson and

¹⁰⁶ Hendrik Spruyt, “War, Trade, and State Formation,” *Oxford Handbooks Online*, December 5, 2016. <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-028>.

¹⁰⁷ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s weak states persist: The empirical and the juridical in statehood,” *World politics* 35, no. 01 (1982): 1-24.

Rosberg contend that the imposition of juridical statehood on Africa by the international community has frozen colonial institutions and “successfully outlawed force as a method of producing new states in Africa.”¹⁰⁸ This has resulted in African states where political authority is based on personalist rule, administrative and governmental power are underdeveloped, and there is a lack of human capital hurting economic prospects for growth.

Robert Jackson’s *Quasi-States* illuminates the issues of granting a Grotius notion of Westphalian recognition on states since 1945.¹⁰⁹ Earlier, Jackson identified these two state issues: ‘negative sovereignty’ as the “title to a successor” and positive sovereignty as the “means of self-government.”¹¹⁰ The international community normatively upholds ‘negative sovereignty’. Thus, political elites undermine their own states in the course of their personal pursuits of power because they know that they will still have access to international recognition and foreign aid.¹¹¹ Such states have little to no need for an army, because all they need is a presidential military guard to defend themselves and the regime from the population.

Overview

This survey of state-building and deformation shows that there is a strong argument for state formation to be paired with a states’ ability to produce ‘coercion’ and develop some modicum of

¹⁰⁸ Jackson and Rosberg (1982), 21

¹⁰⁹ Scholars of international law, such as Gross (1948) after 1945 saw the inherent problems bounded in the United Nations charter trying to establish world unity, especially in trying to enforce Westphalian statehood on nations, concluding “that rugged individualism of states ill accommodates itself to an international rule of law reinforced by necessary institutions” (p. 40). Leo Gross, "The peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," *The American Journal of International Law* 42, no. 1 (1948): 20-41.

¹¹⁰ Robert H. Jackson, "Negative sovereignty in sub-Saharan Africa," *Review of International Studies* 12, no. 04 (1986): 247-264, p. 255.

¹¹¹ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

military capability.¹¹² It appears that some African countries have pursued this course with a positive payoff. While the configurations of various African states have come in various shapes and forms since their independence, either through elections, a rebel group, or a coup (e.g. military, political, etc.), each presents a particular influence and separate pathway for each government and how the state is configured relative to its Weberian appreciation for a monopoly of violence in their specific context. This is because state capacity and military effectiveness are not properly understood. Neither require the threat of interstate war or critical concentrations of populations and revenues to sustain this process. Instead, it is a product of political calculation by political and military leadership and repurposing informal institutions that facilitate state strength and military power in ways that Western observers would deem inefficient or corrupt – but are still more effective and plausible relative to a formalized Western way.

The Danger of Militaries

It generally goes without saying that the people with the weapons and training to use them in a society are typically the biggest internal threat to the government. This issue is best described by Peter Feaver's 'Civil-Military Problematique', where there is a need "to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do."¹¹³ In places like Africa, there has been plenty of tension and friction between governments and security forces. For example, between 1952 and 2017, there were 90 successful military coups d'états in Africa alone.¹¹⁴ Civil authorities around

¹¹² Antonio Giustozzi, *The Art of Coercion: The Primitive Accumulation and Management of Coercive Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

¹¹³ Peter D. Feaver, "The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149-178.

¹¹⁴ "Coups d'état, 1946-2016" dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

the world have tried to reign in their militaries, as indicated by at least 416 occurrences of governments purging military personnel (191 of these purges involved high ranking officers) between 1969 and 2003.¹¹⁵ Decisions to purge should not be taken lightly as Samuel Finer noted that political rulers have typically chosen loyalty over military effectiveness when the achievement of military strength seemed out of reach or unneeded.¹¹⁶

Through history, the line between who governed and those with the weapons has blurred. Since Socrates spoke of Plato's Republic and his belief in having a strong military to defend it from threats, there was also concern about the threat these people posed. To address this critical issue meant instilling the proper amount of philosophical training to create a sense of devotion to the state they served.¹¹⁷ Such philosophical principles came to be known as professionalism, and to that end, Clausewitz is considered the modern-day father of Western Civil-Military Relations (CMR) thought.¹¹⁸ But such 'philosophical training' has never been a guarantee. The expression "Crossing the Rubicon" is derived from Julius Caesar's decision as a Roman General to refuse an order from the Roman Senate that he (and his army) not leave their province or cross the Rubicon River, which they eventually did, leading to a civil war. Caesar triumphed in this conflict, as he would victoriously emerge as the dictator of the Roman Republic in 49 BCE.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ Jessica Maves Braithwaite and Jun Koga Sudduth. "Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict," *Research & Politics* 3, no. 1 (January-March 2016): 1-6.

¹¹⁶ Samuel E Finer, "State and national-building in Europe: the role of the military," in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The formation of national states in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 94.

¹¹⁷ I. Lewis Libby, "American Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations and Democracy," *Heritage Foundation*, February 10, 1993, <http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/american-perspectives-civil-military-relations-and-democracy>

¹¹⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz and James John Graham. *On war*. Vol. 1. London, N. Trübner & Company, 1873. See Nielsen's (2001) work that further analyzes Clausewitz's understanding of civil-military relations: Suzanne C. Nielsen, *Political control over the use of force: a Clausewitzian perspective*. DIANE Publishing, 2001.

¹¹⁹ Robert B. Strassler and Kurt A. Raaflaub, *The Landmark Julius Caesar: The Complete Works: Gallic War, Civil War, Alexandrian War, African War, and Spanish War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2017).

History is replete with examples of military personnel such as Caesar that decided to violate an order from their higher political authorities; or believed that they were better suited (or equipped) for governing the state; or at least considered the current political state to not be democratic enough. The first known recorded incident of a military coup occurred in Israel in 885 BCE, where Israeli General Zimri killed King Elah and his family, so that he could make himself the new king of Israel.¹²⁰ Other military coups have enabled the transition to democracy, such as the Portuguese military coup in 1974 that ushered in the Carnation Revolution, leading Portugal to transition to a democracy in 1975, while ending its wars in Africa on the basis that the army no longer wanted to fight to retain Portuguese colonies.¹²¹ In 2013, the Egyptian military, led by the army chief, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, intervened against President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, because of Morsi's "democratic backsliding" in that he was trying to implement numerous Islamic policies that chafed his secular army.¹²² However, it seems the decision of Sisi to intervene was driven more by his desire to become president than to stymie Morsi's "Islamic fascism," as Morsi eventually became president a year later when he was elected to office in 2014 with about 96% of the vote due to the Muslim Brotherhood being prohibited from participating.¹²³ As illustrated by Edward Luttwak, there is a rhyme and reason why militaries engage in coups against their governments based on various conditions within the state, and his canonical book even suggests the certain things militaries should do if they want to be successful.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, it would require other minds to

¹²⁰ Edwin R. Thiele, *The mysterious numbers of the Hebrew kings* (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic, 1983), 88.

¹²¹ Phil Mailer, *Portugal: The Impossible Revolution?* (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012).

¹²² John Frank Clark, "The Decline of the African Military Coup," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007): 141-155.

¹²³ Abdel Monem Said Aly and Abdel Monem, "Deciphering Abdel Fattah el-Sisi: President of Egypt's Third Republic," *Crown Center for Middle East Studies* 82 (July 2014): 1-9.

¹²⁴ Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook* (London: Penguin Press, 1968); Edward Luttwak, "Why Turkey's Coup d'État Failed," *Foreign Policy*, July 16, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/16/why-turkeys->

investigate the phenomenon of how militaries posed a danger to government and society, as it is generally assumed that they have superior organization, high symbolic status, and typically a monopoly over the tools of violence.

Long before the writings of Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz in the 19th century pointing to the importance of militaries subordinating themselves to a higher political authority, there were others well before him outside of Europe that believed in militaries being subservient to the state. Such reasoning means the military should always concede to political authorities in directing how military operations should be conducted, to include strategy. Interestingly, a man in China laid out similarly essential thoughts on CMR concerning the need for military leaders to always submit to their political leadership over 2000 years prior.¹²⁵ While Clausewitz never read, or was aware of *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu (5th century BCE),¹²⁶ Tzu wrote “Generals are assistants of the nation. When their assistance is complete, the country is strong.”¹²⁷ Tzu implied that a military must only be interested in serving the state and its rulers, and nothing beyond that. Tzu asserted that when military leaders do not seek the best interests of the state, then their

coup-d'etat-failed-erdogan/. In fact, the 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey failed according to Luttwak because they did not follow the “rules” (e.g. secrecy, speed, intel, accuracy, and tactics) for success in his book (1968). While Turkey’s president Erdoga attributed the coup attempt to being orchestrated by the exiled cleric (Fethullah Gulen) in Pennsylvania, I would contend that (based on numerous interviews I have conducted with Turkish military officers and experts with insider knowledge) this military coup was ‘staged’ by Erdogan, so that he could purge the government and military of Europhiles in a legitimate fashion. This has allowed Erdogan to stuff the state with loyal Turks that espouse similar religious, political, and social values.

¹²⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, and James John Graham. *On war*. Vol. 1. London, N. Trübner & Company, 1873. See Nielsen’s (2001) work that further analyzes Clausewitz’s understanding of civil-military relations: Nielsen, Suzanne C. *Political control over the use of force: a Clausewitzian perspective*. DIANE Publishing, 2001.

¹²⁶ A reliable translation of Sun Tzu’s work did not emerge until the early 1900s, and there is no evidence indicating Clausewitz was aware of this Chinese theorist (assuming Sun Tzu was an actual person) when he published *On War* in 1832. See Handel’s (1991) book for a fuller explanation of this: Michael I. Handel, *Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991)

¹²⁷ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala, 2003), 80

“country is weak.”¹²⁸ Seeing how Clausewitz and Tzu both agreed to the code of military submission to political leadership, despite their spatial, cultural, and time differences, there may be a universal principle that should bind all militaries to a normative belief in professional military subservience to their political leadership when it comes to civil-military relations.

Much literature within the field of CMR contends with how civilian leaders interact with – and control – their military. Within this framework emerges discourses on what relationships and structures best serve the interests of political leadership, the state, and the military.¹²⁹ However, CMR literature becomes blurrier in the context of states run by militaries or with authoritarian regimes that purposively weaken and fragment their security forces,¹³⁰ or make the military overtly *political* (e.g. Soviet Union’s Red Army, Chinese People's Liberation Army, etc.). It also becomes more difficult to analyze CMR from a principal-agent perspective, at least, when state security forces pursue domestic strategies at odds with civilian directives without consequence because each are basically a ‘principal’.

Most literature on CMR is weighted towards Western style democracies, with an emphasis and preference for a dialectically ‘clean’ line dividing political and military leaders, with an assumption that politicians devise strategy and military personnel can wage war at the operational and tactical levels without political meddling and micromanaging. Much of the western canon on CMR implies that a military should only exist for the sole purposes of

¹²⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala, 2003), 80.

¹²⁹ Interestingly, Smith (1776) in Book V, Chapter 1, concludes that governments have to consider the policy implications of maintaining a large professional military, providing basic military training to its citizens, or should rely on maintaining militias. In addition, he acknowledges the threat that a standing army poses to its own government.

¹³⁰ Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

defending against external threats, with rare exceptions permitting internal interventions (i.e. insurgencies, humanitarian disaster relief, domestic development, etc.).¹³¹ Given this history of thinking, why did relations between militaries and their governments fundamentally change during the Cold War?

Cold War Era

At the beginning of the Cold War, two major CMR schools of Western thought emerged; the institutional approach from Samuel Huntington's seminal *The Soldier and the State* in 1957, and the sociological approach in 1960 from Morris Janowitz in *The Professional Soldier*. Both authors were concerned about militaries dictating strategies in war due to nuclear weapons posing a new problem in war: Atomic weapons could destroy the entire planet. Huntington viewed the military as holding conservative values, while civilians adhered to more liberal ideals. Since these conservative values were more militaristic than society, they posed a danger to government; hence, soldiers, the officer corps especially, had to develop "military professionalism... imbued with the ideal of service to the nation."¹³² This permitted the growth of a strong and capable military that would not threaten civilian governance.

Where Huntington saw a divergence between the civil and military spheres, Janowitz acknowledged its existence, but contended that a certain level of socialization exists in making the military adapt to civilian society and/or society becoming more militarized to mirror it. To ensure the military maintained the same values as society, Janowitz suggested conscription and

¹³¹ Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-military relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 211-241.

¹³² Samuel P. Huntington, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 35.

the implementation of more ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) programs at top universities,¹³³ which would ensure an overlap of attitudes in its citizenry and military personnel. In trying to understand the typical military officer, Janowitz explained two schools of thought in the military: (1) the “absolutists” who believing in apply maximum firepower to finish a war and win it, and (2) the “pragmatists” that understood the need for limited wars alongside limited budgets and objectives. Interestingly, Janowitz saw that the Cold War, in conjunction with nuclear weapons, had created a new paradigm of thinking among military ranks seeking limited wars. Thus, he envisioned the rise of a “constabulary” model for armed forces, engaging more in forms of policing instead of conventional warfare. To a certain extent Janowitz was right not only about the U.S. military, but about most militaries not waging conventional war as much after 1945, because the international system reduced the likelihood of conventional inter-state wars being waged as they had been in previous centuries.¹³⁴

In both landmark works, Huntington and Janowitz fail to mention the sort of civilian and military relationships existing in Africa, as both of their analyses were predicated on modernized and developed societies. While there has been minimal democratization on the African continent, the lack of nuclear weapons and interstate war (since 1945) has created structural conditions not as conducive to the sort of professionalization seen in the West; hence, military coups have been witnessed throughout Africa. It is only with recent African Union (AU) sanctions against military regimes in Africa has the practice decreased, showing that an international audience can

¹³³ Very few countries in the world have an ROTC program like the U.S., except for the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. The bulwark of the world generates their officer corps specifically from military academies.

¹³⁴ Ian Hurd, "The Permissive Power of the Ban on War," *European Journal of International Security* 2, no. 1 (2017): 1-18. In addition, see here for the OAU Charter of 1963: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-oau_charter_1963_0.pdf

normatively punish and deter military leaders seeking to displace their civilian governments.¹³⁵ Nonetheless, the institutional lens provided by Huntington illustrates the problem facing most of Africa, where it is difficult to develop Western-styled CMR institutions. Even more so, in cases where the military does become more professional, it finds the civilian government too corrupt, making the typical military in LDCs more likely to intervene domestically and overthrow political leaders they view as inept. Likewise, Janowitz's sociological approach highlights the other problem facing most weak states in Africa, which is that military service is a useful and honorable service to the nation. This is problematic in Africa, where societal cleavages along clan, tribal, ethnic lines, and other 'identities' make it difficult to develop a unitary sense of nationalist pride in states that emerged from European colonialism. Nonetheless, the suggestion of a military moving towards a constabulary model is interesting to note, as most militaries in Africa have engaged in military operations internally (i.e. putting down rebellions), and operating externally under the guise of peacekeeping operations, be it for the UN, AU, or a regional bloc.

Breaking with the Western canon, Samuel Finer wrote *The Man on Horseback* in 1962 seeking to better understand CMR in the developing world. In it, Finer considers underdeveloped states, and the amount of subordination a military should take in relation to the amount of necessary autonomy to keep its country safe, especially when such countries are administratively weak in conjunction with a fragmented society.¹³⁶ He observed that due to the weakness of the

¹³⁵ Jonathan Powell, Trace Lasley, and Rebecca Schiel, "Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950–2014," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (2016): 1-21.

¹³⁶ Samuel Edward Finer, *The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962).

state, regime leadership becomes dependent on its armed forces, courting them for “goodwill.”¹³⁷ Essentially, Finer finds that such societies do not have a separation between the political leaders and military leaders, because the armed forces are able to act as an independent political force.

Finer contends that most military leaders avoid establishing (and maintaining) military dictatorships and instead fabricate some quasi-civilian façade of government behind which they retire as fast as possible.¹³⁸ Why then, do militaries prefer a civilian run polity, despite supposedly having relatively superior organizational capabilities and the possession of advanced weaponry? Finer asserts that there are two political weaknesses inherent in most every military. First, most armed forces find it difficult to administer complicated communities and cities, being only sufficiently capable in governing primitive areas. Second, military leaders acknowledge the lack of internal and external legitimacy to rule; hence there is a normative constraint that attaches a moral taboo to a military being wholly in charge of a state. Finer asserts that only in low political cultures is the military able to overcome the second weakness, but in high political cultures, such as the UK or U.S., there exists a “moral barrier” due to the citizenry having an attachment to civilian institutions, thus discouraging and deterring such armed forces from intervening directly in the usurpation of the political system.¹³⁹ However, with most governments in Africa being perceived as either corrupt, inept, or ineffective, such moral barriers are removed, making the average military in Africa all the more likely to interject itself into domestic politics for reasons that undermine traditional notions of CMR.

¹³⁷ Finer, 1962, p. 3

¹³⁸ Finer, 4

¹³⁹ Finer, 22

While not falling into the traditional CMR spheres espoused by Huntington and Janowitz during the Cold War, Peter Feaver has taken CMR in a new direction by relying on principle-agent theory in conjunction with microeconomics. Feaver's rational choice model, known as "agency theory" was designed to explain daily relations between democratic governments and their militaries in terms of how a principal (i.e. civilian leader) orders an agent (i.e. military) to follow an order.¹⁴⁰ In such a setting, the agent can choose to follow the order or engage in "shirking" it (i.e. taking an action that is in the best interest of the military), of which, such decisions to obey or disobey are done by the agent on the basis and probability of being detected.¹⁴¹ This indicates the necessity of civilian leaders to impose some types of enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with all civilian orders and directives.

While Feaver's principle-agent work on CMR has primarily focused on Western democracies, centered on the normative assumption that armed forces are submissive to civilian authorities, Baker extends this analytical tool to dealings between civilian and military leaders in Africa.¹⁴² Baker contends that Feaver's agency theory on CMR is applicable even in coup prone countries that are young democracies in Africa, despite Feaver admitting his model would need to be modified to work in such a context. Thus, Baker argues that a coup is the ultimate form of

¹⁴⁰ Peter Feaver, *Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

¹⁴¹ Feaver (2009) identifies "shirking" as military behaviors that include slow implementation of policies (i.e. "foot-dragging" and leaks to the press, so as to shape American political discourse. The most recent example of an effective public leak to shape and tie the hands of a civilian administration, involved the leak of classified documents indicating how many American troops were needed in Afghanistan when President Obama was considering a drastic reduction in military personnel in Afghanistan. The leak led to President Obama to "surge" troops in Afghanistan closer to the preferences of the U.S. military. For more of an explanation refer to: Peter Baker, "For Obama, Steep Learning Curve as Chief in War," *New York Times*, August 28, 2010, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/world/29commander.html>

¹⁴² Deane-Peter Baker, "Agency theory: A new model of civil-military relations for Africa?" *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 7, no. 1 (2007): 113-135.

“shirking,” and that in such a strategic game, the decision by the agent (i.e. military leaders) to overthrow (and replace) the principal (i.e. civilian leadership) is a rational outcome, especially when one of them tries to assert dominance. The only check on this whole system derives from external sanctions placed on a state for allowing a coup to occur, of which international bodies, such as the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC), are able to punish the offending military through numerous forms of sanctions.¹⁴³

Focusing on how militaries become “bad,” more recent arguments have been leveled against security assistance programs to the militaries of less developed nations, primarily in the form of Western training and education that supposedly gives military members the necessary human capital to engage in military coups. Savage and Caverley make a dreadfully flawed argument that American education and training to foreign militaries increases the probability of a coup.¹⁴⁴ While they are correct that foreign training by the U.S. military (and other patron-states) increases the human capital potential of militaries, they fail to understand the sort of context that drives civil-military relations. In fact, most foreign military assistance and training is not done by patron states for altruistic reasons. Instead, it is provided by external states to ‘buy’ influence and access against the competitive West v. East backdrop of Russia, China, North Korea, and other anti-Western regimes vying for leverage. Had Savage and Caverley acquired transparent data from non-Western militaries concerning their engagement (e.g. training, education, etc.) with coup prone countries, it is likely their results would have been neutralized. In my interviews with

¹⁴³ Baker (2007, p. 133) mentions such measures as “ejection from prestigious regional military arrangements such as the AU standby battalions, withdrawal of training and other assistance, expulsion of officers of the offending military from military colleges in other countries, etc.”

¹⁴⁴ Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, “When human capital threatens the Capitol: Foreign aid in the form of military training and coups,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 54 no.4: 542-557.

military officers from various African states, many acknowledged that the officer corps of the many African militaries were developed by attending military academies in other African countries and in Western and Eastern countries. Besides some limited attendance at American and other Western academies, interviewees indicated that it was much more common for the average African military officer to attend initial and advanced officer training courses in Eastern and non-aligned countries, such as Russia, China, and India.

Understanding context and nuance in military training and education is why it is important to read up on CMR literature directly from African military officers. Answering this call, Rocky Williams¹⁴⁵ suggests that western CMR models are problematic in creating stable relations between political and military authorities in Africa, because there is a “combination of both objective and subjective mechanisms, each developed in relation to the political and cultural peculiarities of the country.”¹⁴⁶ Such context in each political configuration of the state matters and stable relations are dependent upon informal mechanisms that are derived from exigencies in the political landscape of the arrangement of that particular state.¹⁴⁷ Williams also suggests scrapping terms such as civilian-military relations, suggesting a more apt term: *civilian-security relations*. This concept reflects the diverse institutional nature of security in the average African state, to include even the incorporation of “non-institutional actors and mechanisms” to find cooperation between one another. Finally, Williams’ greatest contribution to African CMR is the

¹⁴⁵ Rocky Williams was a guerrilla commander in *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), during the South African liberation struggle. Williams became a Colonel in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), specializing in civil-military relations and security sector reform. For more details: <https://issafrica.org/acpst/publications/monographs/monograph-127-south-african-guerrilla-armies-the-impact-of-guerrilla-armies-on-the-creation-of-south-africas-armed-forces-rocky-wi>

¹⁴⁶ Rocky Williams, “Towards the creation of an African civil-military relations tradition,” *African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique* (1998): 20-41, p. 37.

¹⁴⁷ Williams, 38.

idea that there cannot be a “apolitical” soldier, encouraging the idea that African soldiers can still be professional while being involved in domestic politics, but on “issues critical to their national mandate.”¹⁴⁸

Ultimately, we need to revitalize the way we reassess how certain militaries appear ‘bad’ to the West and an international audience. Attempting to apply Western models to African militaries counterintuitively appears to cause more harm than good. This is because each African state has a unique relationship with their security forces (and non-state security actors), and the organization and effectiveness of their militaries reflects a path dependent socio-political reality within the configuration of the regime. Nonetheless, the international system has exerted some pressures on how certain African countries behave, leading to various externalities.

The Internationalized Context of Africa: The Many ‘Fail-Safes’

Following the Second World War, Africa was drawn into various proxy battles during the Cold War. Nationalism, ideology, and desire for political power served as the driving forces for movements that repelled colonial powers and minority led regimes. Simultaneously, the Cold War period resulted in varying strategies across the African continent as the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought different types of influence through aid (e.g. financial assistance, and military equipment and training, etc.) to the newly independent countries. At the same time, numerous African countries played both sides (and side switched), and many also claimed to be a part of

¹⁴⁸ Williams, 39.

non-aligned movements while engaging in multi-faceted rent-seeking behaviors with the generous Western and Eastern patron-donor states.¹⁴⁹

However, the international system that emerged after the Second World War has had a perverse influence – for at least seven reasons – on the typical mechanisms that created viable states before; leading to non-traditional forms of interstate competition. These ‘fail safes’ have generally stymied historical processes of state-building and the creation of bureaucratically effective militaries. First, the UN Charter in 1945 banned interstate war (except self-defense), which put in place various frameworks and mechanisms that decreased ambitious state expansion while checking overly bellicose behaviors.¹⁵⁰ Second, the OAU Charter in 1963 restricted interstate war, emphasizing the need to recognize original territorial boundaries that each colony inherited at independence.¹⁵¹ For a continent with over 50 countries, these two international agreements appear to have resulted in Africa experiencing low incidences of conventional interstate war (22 events) between 1946 and 2016 as displayed in Table 2-1. Each of these charters also made it more difficult for secessionist movements.

¹⁴⁹ Patricia G. Clark, “Cold War” in Richard M. Juang and Noelle Morrisette, (eds.), *Africa and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History* (New York: Abc-clio, 2008), 282-286.

¹⁵⁰ Hurd, 2016.

¹⁵¹ OAU Charter of 1963, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-oau_charter_1963_0.pdf

Date(s)	States Involved	Event
1958	Egypt and Sudan	Egypt occupied disputed territory of the Hala'ib Triangle in Sudan
1960, then in 1964, 1973, and 1987	Somalia and Ethiopia	Border wars over the Ogaden region
1963	Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco	"Sand War" dispute as Morocco occupied the Tindouf and Béchar provinces in Algeria
1964	Ghana and Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta)	Ghana occupied territory in Burkina Faso
1964	Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya	Rebels backed by Somalia sought unification with parts of Ethiopia and Kenya
1966-1989	Namibia* and South Africa	South Africa attempted to prevent Namibian independence (part of the Angolan Bush Wars)
1973-1987	Libya and Chad	Libya occupied Aouzou Strip in Chad
1975	Mali and Burkina Faso	Mali occupied territory in Burkina Faso
1966-1988	Angola and South Africa	South Africa occupied territory in Angola to prevent Namibian independence (part of the Angolan Bush Wars)
1975-1991	Morocco, Mauritania (1975-1979), and Western Sahara*	Morocco and Mauritania occupied the Spanish Sahara
1977	Libya and Egypt	Libya occupied the border town of Sallum
1978-1979	Uganda, Libya, and Tanzania	Uganda occupied the Kagera Salient
1983	Chad and Nigeria	Border clash in Lake Chad region over oil-rich territory
1985	Mali and Burkina Faso	Mali occupied territory in Burkina Faso (led to cross-border clashes)
1981, then in 1994 and 1996	Cameroon and Nigeria	Border clash over Bakassi Peninsula
1996-1998	DRC (formerly Zaire), Rwanda, and Uganda	Rwanda and Uganda occupation to oust the president of Zaire (First Congo War)
1998-2003	DRC, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda	"The Great African War" (Second Congo War); numerous countries involved to protect the Kabila government and other countries get involved to support rebels opposed to the Kabila regime
1998-2000	Eritrea and Ethiopia	Battle over control of the disputed Badme region
2006-2009	Ethiopia and Somalia†	Ethiopian invasion to remove the unofficial government of Somalia - the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) - and attempt to install the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu
2008	Eritrea and Djibouti	Eritrea occupied the Ras Doumeira area
2011-2012	Sudan and South Sudan	Border clashes over oil-rich territories
2016	Eritrea and Ethiopia	Battle over control of the disputed town of Tsorona

Table 2-1. Occurrences of traditional forms of interstate warfare between African states (1946-2016). Note: The “*” denotes territories and “†” denotes an unrecognized government. Sources: Mark W. Zacher, “The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force,” *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 215-250; David Chuter and Florence Gaub (eds.), “Understanding African Armies,” *Institute for Security Studies*, Report 27 (April 2016); Obasesam Okoi, “Why Nations Fight: The Causes of the Nigeria–Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Conflict,” *African Security* 9, no. 1 (2016): 42-65.

The incidences of warfare in Table 2-1 pale in comparison to the 177 conventional interstate wars fought by European states between 1648 and 1989.¹⁵² While Africa experienced more conventional interstate warfare between 1946 and 2016 than the Americas and Europe combined, it has been comparable to the similar amount (and severity) of interstate wars fought in Asia during the same time-period.¹⁵³ Given the scarcity of classic interstate war in Africa, it is surprising that even a small country with no threats – such as Equatorial Guinea – would even bother investing in their military capability.

Third, intervention by stronger non-African states with military and non-military resources in numerous intrastate and interstate conflicts has distorted Westphalian sovereignty and Weberian principles of statehood in Africa. External meddling in African politics, be it from the U.S. or the Soviet Union (and later Russia), to former colonial powers (e.g. UK, France, etc.) and even newcomers, such as Israel and China, significantly alters interstate and intrastate politics across Africa. Somalia is a case in point of the international community being unable to impose a central government, since Somali society has created various coping mechanisms (such as clan politics) to fill the void of a ‘traditional state’.¹⁵⁴ In addition, external peacekeepers from

¹⁵² Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

¹⁵³ Zacher, 2001, p. 225-228.

¹⁵⁴ Christopher J. Coyne, "Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the nirvana fallacy," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, no. 4 (2006): 343-360.

the UN have further distorted conflict resolution in many parts of Africa as shown in Table 2-2 with the 33 UN peacekeeping missions conducted in Africa since 1956. Of those 33 at the time of this writing, 8 missions are active. Some of these should be considered as having indefinite mandates, given that places such as the CAR, DRC, and South Sudan, appear to exhibit zero chance of building viable polities (or armies) for the foreseeable future.

Time Period	Name and Location
November 1956-June 1967	United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in Egypt
July 1960-June 1964	United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
October 1973-June 1979	United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) in Egypt
January 1989-June 1991	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)
April 1989-March 1990	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia
<i>April 1999-Present</i>	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
June 1991-February 1995	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)
April 1992-March 1993	United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)
December 1992-December 1994	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
March 1993-March 1995	United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)
June 1993-September 1994	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)
October 1993-March 1996	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
September 1993-June 1996	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
May 1994-June 1994	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) in Chad
February 1995-June 1997	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)
June 1997-May 1997	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)
April 1998-February 2000	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)
July 1998-October 1999	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)
October 1999-December 2005	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
November 1999-June 2010	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
July 2000-July 2008	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
May 2003-April 2004	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)
<i>September 2003-Present</i>	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
April 2004-June 2017	United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
June 2004-December 2006	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)
March 2005-July 2011	United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)
<i>July 2007-Present</i>	African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
September 2007-December 2010	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)
<i>July 2010-Present</i>	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
<i>June 2011-Present</i>	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in disputed territory between Sudan and South Sudan
<i>July 2011-Present</i>	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
<i>April 2013-Present</i>	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
<i>April 2014-Present</i>	Multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation (MINUSCA) in Central African Republic

Table 2-2. Armed UN Peacekeeper Missions (1946-2017). Source: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations>

UN missions, such as UNMIL in Liberia have created dependent governments that are essentially ‘trustees’; the polity can only exist with the presence of armed peacekeepers and their resources. Even the supposed ‘successful ending’ of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone in 2005, is an

illusion, given that the British military has maintained a significant garrison in Sierra Leone after the civil war ended in 2002, to include a recent increase in forces in 2017.¹⁵⁵ Further subsidizing weak state governance and post-war politics on the African continent is the presence of 17 different UN peace operations (referred to as Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements) operated by the UN's Department of Political Affairs. UN operations and external interventions by foreign military powers might be considered successful, but given the plethora of fragile states in Africa since the end of the Cold War, such interventions seem to be unable to recreate whole and capable states.¹⁵⁶

Fourth, and more problematic is the idea of African *de jure* sovereignty interactions inter alia the international community, despite lacking empirical statehood internally (i.e. lack of monopoly of violence, no social contract, etc.).¹⁵⁷ International economic development and trade *should* help most African states improve their economic outlook, but many of their economies have been stagnant or not kept pace with population growth.¹⁵⁸ Robert Bates was at the forefront of this debate noting how countless African regimes undermine their long-term economic growth

¹⁵⁵ Michael Dobbs, "British Intervention in War-torn Sierra Leone, 1997-2015," *West Africa Study Circle*, January 1, 2015. Accessed July 8, 2016. [http://www.wasc.org.uk/NewFiles/BritishForces in Sierra Leone 1997-2015.pdf](http://www.wasc.org.uk/NewFiles/BritishForces%20in%20Sierra%20Leone%201997-2015.pdf); Larisa Brown, "British troops have deployed to Sierra Leone in Africa mission to halt migrants coming to Europe," *The Daily Mail*, January 7, 2017, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4096628/British-troops-deployed-Sierra-Leone-Africa-mission-halt-migrants-coming-Europe.html>

¹⁵⁶ Norrie MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 94-140.

¹⁵⁷ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg. "Why Africa's weak states persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood," *World politics* 35, no. 1 (1982): 1-24.

¹⁵⁸ Paul Collier, "Poverty reduction in Africa." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 104, no. 43 (2007): 16763-16768; Laurence Chandy, "Why is the number of poor people in Africa increasing when Africa's economies are growing?" *Brookings*, May 4, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/05/04/why-is-the-number-of-poor-people-in-africa-increasing-when-africas-economies-are-growing/>; Keith Palmer, "Why are Sub-Saharan African Economies not growing Sustainably," *Enterprise for Development*, Discussion Paper, July 2017, <http://www.enterprisefordevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Why-economies-in-SSA-are-not-growing-sustainably-final.pdf>.

by pursuing predatory strategies to stay in power through patronage.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, these types of personalist regimes throughout Africa, have a firm grip on the various levers of the government and economy, making it all too easy for them to prefer rent-seeking at the expense of institutions and state-building. The rise of such parasitic regimes has come in tandem with global markets, leading to the emergence of the “Shadow State” as coined by Will Reno, in which “informal commercially orientated networks” are created by personalist rulers that can access numerous markets through the veil of internationally guaranteed sovereignty, allowing them to collect rents to support their patronage networks.¹⁶⁰ Expanding on this phenomenon of the African state as a vehicle for organized criminal activity, Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou illustrated how ‘legitimately elected’ rulers and local strongmen rely on personal security forces – armies and/or militias – to maintain revenue streams by extracting resources to sell to international buyers.¹⁶¹ The veil of government legitimacy makes such a rapacious process easy, and essentially abuses the original purpose of sovereign statehood and the intent of diplomatic immunity.

Fifth, African states are not allowed to fail no matter the purposively incompetence of the regime leadership. This is a byproduct of inherited sovereignty and international recognition of sovereignty – even when the international community strives to impose the fallacy of a ‘state’ on a piece of ungovernable land. This is more problematic when also trying to facilitate the creation (or sustain) governments that not only lack credibility and authority, but also lack the political willpower and acumen to govern properly. Pierre Englebort notes that many Sub-Saharan

¹⁵⁹ Robert H. Bates, *When things fell apart* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

¹⁶⁰ William Reno, “Clandestine economies, violence and states in Africa,” *Journal of International Affairs* 53, no. 2., 434-435.

¹⁶¹ Jean-François Leguil-Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou, *The criminalization of the state in Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999).

African states are utter failures that do not provide rule of law, safety, or basic property rights. They survive because the international community wants these regimes to legally exist as representatives of their respective territories as there is “a lack of sanction for failure.”¹⁶² This creates the problem of *Legal Command* where many African regimes have the unconditional legal legitimacy for the “capacity to control, dominate, extract, or dictate through the law.”¹⁶³ The ‘legal command’ issue also makes it problematic for “rebel entrepreneurs” and other political actors to challenge corrupt and predatory regimes, because the international community is typically reluctant to support anti-regime forces and secessionist movements, especially in the 21st century.¹⁶⁴ This leads many local strongmen and other elites to pursue strategies of inclusion in regime patronage. This skews the sort of state formation Mancur Olson envisioned with roving bandits becoming stationary bandits to provide local governance so that they could protect their rents in the long-term against other bandits.¹⁶⁵ To Olson, this transition was crucial to creating effective governments that protected property rights; a necessary component of state development and growth.

Finally, the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States (and others in Western capitals thereafter), has made security cooperation more attractive to Western governments. Many of these African partner regimes engage in threat inflation (i.e. terrorism) for rent-seeking purposes (i.e. getting more resources from patron states). This in turn makes it easier for many of these authoritarian governments in Africa to label opposition groups as

¹⁶² Pierre Englebert, *Africa: unity, sovereignty, and sorrow* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 3.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁶⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Changing Character of Civil Wars, 1800-2009,” in Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (eds.), *The changing character of war* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 213.

¹⁶⁵ Mancur Olson, *Power and prosperity: Outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships: Outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships* (New York: Basic books, 2000).

terrorists through vague anti-terrorism laws, which further solidifies their own power, while simultaneously increasing the flow of aid and assistance. Such international aid and assistance also appears to create a perverse political economy for many neo-patrimonial African regimes, which undermine their economies for personal wealth accumulation so as to capture more rents to subsidize their flailing economies and institutions.¹⁶⁶ For instance, in an interview with a Western military officer, the official mentioned how an army intelligence officer in the Sierra Leone military attempted to fabricate a terrorist story about Al-Shabab planting a pipe bomb in the capital to curry favor with Western militaries.¹⁶⁷

The 21st century strategy of the international community brings in a foreign military presence that acts as a guarantor for regimes that are not able to protect themselves from their domestic rivals. It is a similar logic of assistance seen during the Cold War, except it enables political oppression instead of a ‘battle of ideas’ as seen during the Western and Eastern clashes of ideologies. More interestingly, in theory, as suggested by Handel, there is little to no incentive for small and poor states to create militaries when they face little to no internal or regional threats, since they can free ride on the expectation of the international system to rescue them.¹⁶⁸ However, the new ‘war on terror’ logic from the West has increasingly incentivized the benefit and payoff to building up military material capacity for many small African countries, due to the positive externalities (e.g. loans, trade agreements, investment, defense agreements, etc.) that are

¹⁶⁶ Nicolas Van de Walle, *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Todd J. Moss, Gunilla Pettersson Gelandar, and Nicolas Van de Walle, "An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa," *Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 74*, and *Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies Working Paper no. 11-05* (2006); Jonathan Glennie, *The trouble with aid: Why less could mean more for Africa* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2010).

¹⁶⁷ Interview, September 25, 2017.

¹⁶⁸ Michael I. Handel, *Weak states in the international system* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 76-90.

bundled in association with Western involvement in their country. This becomes apparent with the reality that between 2000 and 2016, the U.S. alone has given \$31 billion in security aid to African states (\$22 billion of which went just to Egypt), which has been coupled with over \$117 billion in economic aid as well to the continent (with Ethiopia taking the largest share of \$10 billion).¹⁶⁹

Conclusion

Ultimately, African states compete, but not through interstate war. Their mutual vulnerabilities, along with the international context noted above, have inhibited these wars. Instead, they compete through the sponsorship of proxy guerrilla forces in neighboring countries. This process has been deformed by an international system that skews state formation strategies, by subsidizing regimes and their inadequacies. Thus, the question remains: why would any country's leader risk the time, energy, or resources, on the creation of a military, let alone a strong one? With so many 'fail safes' for African countries, it is surprising some have even bothered to create organizationally robust military institutions, given the threat.

¹⁶⁹ Sources: <https://securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard>;
<https://securityassistance.org/content/economic-aid-dashboard>

Chapter 3 – Military Effectiveness: The African Alternative

Interview Question: How do you think your military is able to be effective compared to stronger militaries like the United States?

I think because of the difference in the size of our militaries we are forced to generate more generalist soldiers and officers and train more 'free thinking' soldiers. This potentially makes us more effective at adapting to uncertain environments and situations. The challenge for us, as a small military, is how we maintain a competitive advantage against national power which far exceeds our own. I think the key is focusing on developing the individual, regardless of rank.

*Australian Military Officer
October 16, 2017*

You Americans have it all. Ethiopians are very inspired by how American troops look physically (he pokes my chest), weapons, and discipline. We are nothing like your military. Your military is a machine; we are 'political animal'. Your way of fighting is too mechanical...you're too focused on killing people...the ENDF [Ethiopian National Defense Force] has few resources...we prefer fighting only when we have to...[we] would rather solve the reasons of why they are fighting us in the first place. If we copied your military [U.S. Armed Forces] it would be dangerous to Ethiopia.

*Ethiopian Military Officer
August 8, 2017*

What does it mean to be effective militarily? Australia and Ethiopia are fundamentally different when it comes to their systems of governance, their institutions, cultural and historical legacies, and their levels of economic development. Yet, given their specific contexts, each military officer saw the way their militaries coped with a common shortcoming (e.g. lack of resources) and described their own very different concepts of military effectiveness. Their different definitions, rooted as they are in their national and societal contexts, also are at odds with a conventional American definition of military effectiveness. When such a question was posed to a U.S. Army officer, he stated it was “accomplishing the objective with minimal guidance, resources, and effort but simultaneously utilizing joint interoperability ensuring optimal results” adding that it also means “see[ing] positive results with minimal guidance dependent on the situation.”¹⁷⁰ These three definitions all emphasize the centrality of ‘resources’, but each in

¹⁷⁰ Interview, November 29, 2017.

different ways. Ordinarily, this would not be problematic. The reality, however, is that the American definition of military effectiveness often is taken as a universal standard, and in many interviews, many military personnel considered the American military as the “standard,” but admitted that a lack of resources were generally an obstacle in emulating it. This has real world consequences when backed with U.S. military assistance and other security sector reform programs that are based upon this dominant definition of military effectiveness.

The most telling response of those interviewed, comes from the Ethiopian officer. He mentioned that it would be “dangerous” to his government if the ENDF copied the American military model. Why is this distinction between Western militaries and an African one important? It appears that military officers in Africa think more about their relationship to the polity when it comes to effectiveness whereas Western militaries think in more technical terms that automatically assume that the military is (and should be) apolitical and that the application of material resources and training for individuals will lead to “military effectiveness” that is defined in ways that do not consider alternative ways of conceptualizing a military’s relationship with its domestic political system. For example, a military officer from Burkina Faso lamented that his military is “involved somehow in politics” and because of this historical legacy, their military is tasked with “critical mission[s] with very limited resources.” They are forced to be “adaptive” and “flexible,” but due to their respective context they find it “difficult to find a room where we could be really better [sic].”¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Interview, February 15, 2018.

The impact of the supposed effective American way of war has especially chafed French military minds in the 21st century. Noting its numerous failings, retired French General Vincent Desportes highlights how overreliance on technology to fight battles and not strategically engaging with the nature of politics in conflicts is undermining the ability and effectiveness of the U.S. military (and allies that try to emulate the expensive American system).¹⁷² The American military model is simply unworkable in the African context mainly due to costs, but also because exerting control – an amalgamation of political, social, and security – over populations in a territory is more important than concocting war against adversaries that are too fluid and dynamic to pin down for a pivotal Clausewitzian styled battle. In this vein, French marine infantry Colonel Michel Goya notes that winning in wars is more dependent on human qualities and the ability of armies to rapidly adapt and evolve to varying threat environments; something technology cannot be solely relied on to overcome. Moreover, Goya finds that “scrappy” militaries – combat units lacking resources – can be surprisingly effective against stronger and better equipped adversaries if given full autonomy to operate on the battlefield.¹⁷³ Such conclusions by French military personnel illustrate that quantitative military superiority is no match unless such armed forces are permitted autonomy in their operations. Equally interesting is that Desportes and Goya believe that the French military (and others lacking resources) can be successful in their military operations in Africa only if they accept more risk and deploy more ground troops, which are needed to fill the vacuums of insecurity that plague the continent.¹⁷⁴ Their interpretations of effectiveness swim against the currents of most

¹⁷² Vincent Desportes, *La dernière bataille de France* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 2015).

¹⁷³ Michael Goya, *Res Militaris: De l'emploi des forces armées au xxi^e siècle* (Paris: Economica, 2010).

¹⁷⁴ Michael Shurkin, “Meet France’s War Philosophers,” *War on the Rocks*, January 5, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/meet-frances-war-philosophers/>

arguments about materialism and technology mattering more than just the presence of basic ground troops.

In this chapter, conventional (i.e., American) conceptions of military power and effectiveness are surveyed to highlight why African military effectiveness needs to be re-conceptualized to match the particular contexts of various African countries. We also consider how the literature treats the idea of military power from quantitative and qualitative perspectives. This reconceptualization means that institutions and their ability to operate in a rational-legal fashion remain an important facet of military effectiveness. However, this needs to be considered in relation to what state elites consider to be amicable configurations of relations with the domestic political system and how informal institutions inform the reality of their operation. Civil-military relations in each African country has led to the development of militaries that, to varying degrees, lead to decrepit patrimonial armies or the creation of bureaucratically effective ‘military enclaves’ that generate effectiveness in ways that are familiar to most Western observers, but through different processes that are unfamiliar. Much of this is also driven by the unique security environment in Africa, in that there is not much interstate warfare, and much of the combat that occurs on the continent happens during civil wars or during peacekeeping operations. Thus, most African armies need to worry more about fighting insurgents domestically or regionally, but not need to devote as much attention to trying to fight a conventional warfare style as seen in World War One and Two.

In practical terms, some militaries in Africa exhibit clear hierarchies of authority and allocate resources in a rational fashion that enables them to operate more effectively as an organization. This mastery of bureaucratic procedure leads these militaries to “punch above their

weight” relative to other state institutions. Such outcomes point to the puzzle noted in previous chapters: How does the leader of an otherwise institutionally weak state tolerate an effective military, defined in these terms? It also means understanding that armies have agency too when it comes to determining their ability in being militarily effective within certain constraints. This leads to the next component of the argument: The role of political context in which these militaries are embedded. This outcome, and the processes that make it possible, have come about through varying path dependencies with the histories in Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. Leaders in these countries define institutions, risk, and foreign aid (primarily security force assistance) in different ways, whereas less successful states on the continent have leaders that politicize or personalize their armies and fail to mobilize these various forces in an effective fashion. These perceptions and subsequent decisions have been defining factors of these states in how they are militarily effective.

Rethinking Military Power in an African Context

While interviewing numerous foreign officials responsible for implementing Western security policies in Africa, one quip by many was the desire to at least get some African militaries up to the standard of “Africa Good Enough.” Such a statement is indicative of the nature in which the West views the threats facing African continent, but also that these officials harbor very low expectations of the militaries with which they work. Despite such attitudes towards militaries in Africa, some scholars have taken more nuanced views about what “effective” means to African actors and how this status is achieved. Herbert Howe’s 2001 book *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, addressed ideas of military power by stating that “militaries often reflect national political values” and that “military capabilities are relative – that is, an African

military only needs to be mediocre by first world standards when facing manifestly incompetent opponents.”¹⁷⁵ My argument builds on Howe’s assessment, but we need a different lens in which to view most African militaries and what the risks are to each regime, and how various security institutions work into that equation. Indeed, there is good reason to redefine African military effectiveness based on context to include organizational attributes and institutions. African militaries face completely different domestic, regional, and international conditions relative to most Western and Eastern styled militaries.

Various strains of social science literatures assess ideas of military effectiveness, capability, and power, in various fashions. While there are structural arguments that contend that instrumental variables such as geography,¹⁷⁶ weather,¹⁷⁷ demographics,¹⁷⁸ disease,¹⁷⁹ and others,¹⁸⁰ can influence military effectiveness and capabilities, it is necessary to focus in on agential aspects of effectiveness that are more controllable and measurable. This is a necessary precondition as there is not enough battle data given the lack of interstate wars in Africa (refer back to Table 2-1) to consider which African states were consistently more effective in terms of actually fighting and protecting a state. Though, it is evident to say that from battle data and

¹⁷⁵ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 15 and 3.

¹⁷⁶ John M. Collins, *Military geography for professionals and the public* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 1998).

¹⁷⁷ Harold A. Winters and William J. Reynolds, *Battling the elements: weather and terrain in the conduct of war* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001).

¹⁷⁸ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1960). Morgenthau also mentioned the role of geography, to describe how the U.S. and the UK came to be formidable military powers.

¹⁷⁹ Erica M. Charters, "Disease, Wilderness Warfare, and Imperial Relations: The Battle for Quebec, 1759—1760." *War in History* 16, no. 1 (2009): 1-24.

¹⁸⁰ Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables," *International organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 185-205. Edward D. Mansfield, *Power, trade, and war* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

other indicators, Libya's military under Gaddafi consistently underperformed.¹⁸¹ That is to say, Libya's military was historically formidable in its region by Western material standards, but it consistently underperformed. This case highlights the importance of political context. In this example, a paranoid leader who wanted his military to perform in battle but feared that it could "perform" by overthrowing him, led Gaddafi to undermine his own military's effectiveness as it failed to achieve almost every foreign policy aim.

Evaluating African militaries is even more problematic when one considers the numerous regime changes that have happened in most African countries. These events typically lead to major reshuffling of security services and their institutions and personnel, where loyalty is typically preferred over competence. This is "good" in terms of a regime's concern to manage domestic risk, but "bad" in conventional (i.e. Western) conceptualizations of effectiveness. Even battlefield capability is hard to measure, such as in counting combat related deaths from the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM),¹⁸² to include the enumerable issues of trying to count conflicts and casualties in Africa in general.¹⁸³ Outside this framework exists the context of manageable variables where there is a binary split between material (i.e. quantitative) and non-material (i.e. qualitative) explanations for how some militaries become more effective.

Nevertheless, conventional material capabilities of states and societies dominate discussions about military effectiveness. Initially leading this debate, Paul Kennedy asserted that

¹⁸¹ Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Africa's thirty years war: Libya, Chad and Sudan* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt, "Coup-proofing and military effectiveness in interstate wars, 1967–99," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 331-350; Florence Gaub, "The Libyan armed forces between coup-proofing and repression," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 221-244.

¹⁸² Paul D. Williams, "Special Report: How Many Fatalities Has the African Union Mission in Somalia Suffered?" *IPI: Global Observatory*, September 10, 2015, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/>

¹⁸³ Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011), chapter 1.

national economic strength translates into military strategy, since economic productivity translates into efficient uses of resources during wartime.¹⁸⁴ Fearon and Laitin add that GDP is a proxy for military strength.¹⁸⁵ Beckley also argues that economic development is the best predictor for battlefield outcomes between 1898 and 1987, because more state resources allow for the creation of larger and more effective militaries. He concludes that democracies degrade the capability of militaries because voters are reluctant to allocate resources to militaries when this would result in economic pain at home.¹⁸⁶ Finally, Beckley asserts that “military effectiveness cannot be bought; it must be developed,” by which he contends that the effective systems that brought economic surplus and wealth also translate to the creation of military systems that are reflective of the economic power of the state.¹⁸⁷ This lends to credence to ideas that an effective military cannot be artificially created in a state unless there is a desire and political willpower to do so.

Nonetheless, there is merit to quantitative explanations for military strength because armies do not magically appear or fight for free, nor do they fight well without food, water, supplies, war matériel, etc. There is a reason why great French military minds – going back to the 17th century – would speak of “*Dieu est toujours pour les gros bataillons*” (God always favors the big battalions).¹⁸⁸ But as history has shown, the mass of one army (i.e. sheer numbers)

¹⁸⁴ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House 1987).

¹⁸⁵ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American political science review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.

¹⁸⁶ Michael Beckley, "Economic development and military effectiveness," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (2010): 43-79.

¹⁸⁷ Beckley, 74.

¹⁸⁸ Thomas Carlyle, *History of Friedrich II of Prussia, Called Frederick the Great* Vol. XI (Leipzig: Bernard Tauchnitz, 1865), 311; Ralph Keyes, *The quote verifier: Who said what, where, and when* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2007), 79. Most people believe Napoleon coined this expression. However, Voltaire was found to have used a similar expression in 1770, Frederick the Great wrote of big squadrons being favored by God in letters around

does not guarantee the defeat of a smaller military that is more capable. For example, Russia failed to militarily defeat the Finnish military during the Winter War (1939-1940), despite its much larger population and economy that allowed it to have a larger army with a lot more troops, tanks, and airplanes than its Finnish opponents could ever hope to mobilize.¹⁸⁹ While material capability is a good starting point in analyzing any sort of capacity in projecting force, we must understand how the material and masses are employed. This requires a wariness of structural realist arguments that contend two states will fight wars through optimal utilization of resources.¹⁹⁰ Many African countries have their own conception of what is 'optimal' in terms of waging war, which is generally overshadowed by their own perceptions of risk. The creation of optimal military force in Africa depends in large part on political context and choice, which is much more grounded in concerns about the military being a threat to their own regimes. This is generally an afterthought in creating powerful Westernized militaries, since they usually become institutionally embedded within the state and can operate autonomously because loyalty is no longer questioned.¹⁹¹

Regardless, there are a wide range of ideas that have been considered in attributing material factors to military effectiveness. In the West, the original intellectual debate over this issue started between the two great European military theorists of the 19th century – Baron

1759-1760, Roger de Rabutin of Comte de Bussy wrote of it in 1677, and the first documented evidence of the expression comes from Madame de Sévigné writing in 1673 about the French Marshall General, Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne of Vicomte de Turenne (1611-1675), who would commonly talk about the importance of having big battalions.

¹⁸⁹ Eloise Engle and Lauri Paananen. *The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland, 1939-1940* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2014).

¹⁹⁰ Charles L. Glaser and Chairn Kaufmann. "What is the offense-defense balance and how can we measure it?" *International security* 22, no. 4 (1998): 44-82.

¹⁹¹ Jahara W. Matisek, "American Civil-Military Relations since George Washington: Has Donald Trump Changed the Dynamic?" *Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law* 10, no. 3 (2017): 54-67.

Antoine-Henri de Jomini¹⁹² and Carl von Clausewitz¹⁹³ – where they considered the best ways of using the principle of ‘mass’ (i.e. the concentration of troop formations) in war (and its limits), to include analyzing how different variables could degrade or improve war fighting abilities. Much of their investigation centered on strategies, operations, and tactics, which took place in context of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). This was a period of intense military competition where Napoleon Bonaparte was defeating armies much larger than his own, flummoxing the advocates of orthodox forms of warfare in his era.¹⁹⁴ Unfortunately for Napoleon, his luck ran out at the Battle of Waterloo (1815), where a numerically superior anti-Bonaparte coalition defeated him.¹⁹⁵ So if the size of your military cannot guarantee military victory then that means one should consider the ways in which ‘mass’ is applied. This also means questioning the “Quantity has a quality of its own”¹⁹⁶ ideology attributed to the Soviet era doctrine of trying to overwhelm opponents on the battlefield through sheer numbers of troops, tanks, etc.

Outside of the Jomini v. Clausewitz debate, there are a host of other qualitative explanations that have been considered in the literature concerning military effectiveness and war outcomes.¹⁹⁷ These include but are not limited to: the type of strategy utilized to determine

¹⁹² Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, Translated by G.H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co, 1879), references to use of “mass” on 13, 33, 64, 70-76, 99-126, 139-141, 163-178, 194-251, 266-312, 319-360, and 385.

¹⁹³ Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Rosalie West. *Carl Von Clausewitz: On War*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), references to use of “mass” on 77, 95, 105, 153, 154, 184, 226, 236, 254, 258, 280, 290, 315, 323, 350, 362, 524, and 580.

¹⁹⁴ Napoleon was not an outlier who defied all odds in qualitative warfighting. For example, the Duke of Wellington (British Field Marshall Arthur Wellesley) established an excellent combat record for his superior defensive tactics that adapted (and defeated) armies much larger than his own. Paul K. Davis, *Masters of the Battlefield: Great Commanders from the Classical Age to the Napoleonic Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 471-530.

¹⁹⁵ Charles Esdaile, *Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803-1815* (New York: Penguin, 2009).

¹⁹⁶ This quote is generally attributed to Vladimir Lenin and/or Joseph Stalin of the USSR. However, there is no specific quote from either indicating that they said this, only that they inferred it, of which it seems likely to have been a theoretical proposition suggested by Karl Marx.

¹⁹⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

victory,¹⁹⁸ technology and military revolutions,¹⁹⁹ surprise,²⁰⁰ the attributes of the individual warrior (e.g. skill, age, discipline, training, recruitment, etc.),²⁰¹ combat motivation,²⁰² sea power,²⁰³ diplomacy (e.g. alliances, negotiations, etc.),²⁰⁴ ideology,²⁰⁵ type of political system,²⁰⁶ political willpower,²⁰⁷ domestic politics,²⁰⁸ civil-military relations,²⁰⁹ logistics,²¹⁰ doctrine,²¹¹ battlefield autonomy,²¹² and the warrior culture.²¹³ Moreover, technological and scientific advancements can also be considered as important variables, since they lead to new types of

¹⁹⁸ Russell Frank Weigley, *The American way of war: a history of United States military strategy and policy*. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977); Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

¹⁹⁹ Van Creveld, Martin. *Technology and war: From 2000 BC to the present*. Simon and Schuster, 2010; Knox, MacGregor, and Williamson Murray, eds. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

²⁰⁰ Handel, Michael I. "The Yom Kippur War and the inevitability of surprise." *International Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (1977): 461-502.

²⁰¹ Coker, Christopher. *Waging war without Warriors? The changing culture of military conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

²⁰² Ben-Shalom, Uzi, Zeev Lehrer, and Eyal Ben-Ari. "Cohesion during military operations: A field study on combat units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada." *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 1 (2005): 63-79; Siebold, Guy L. "The essence of military group cohesion." *Armed Forces & Society* 33, no. 2 (2007): 286-295.

²⁰³ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. 2ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1891); Bernard Law Montgomery, *Montgomery of Alamein (Viscount), A Concise History of Warfare* (London: Collins, 1972), Introduction chapter.

²⁰⁴ Cooper, Andrew F., ed. *Niche diplomacy: Middle powers after the Cold War*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

²⁰⁵ Sanín, Francisco Gutiérrez, and Elisabeth Jean Wood. "Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond." *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014): 213-226.

²⁰⁶ Reynal-Querol, Marta. "Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 1 (2002): 29-54. Reiter and Stam find that democracies fare better in combat primarily because they have better logistics, more initiative, and better leadership. Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. "Democracy and battlefield military effectiveness." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998): 259-277.

²⁰⁷ Jahara W. Matissek and Ian Bertram, "The Death of American Conventional Warfare: It's the Political Willpower, Stupid" *The Strategy Bridge*, November 5, 2017.

²⁰⁸ Levy, Jack S. "Domestic politics and war." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988): 653-673.

²⁰⁹ Jungdahl, Adam M., and Julia M. Macdonald. "Innovation inhibitors in war: Overcoming obstacles in the pursuit of military effectiveness." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 4 (2015): 467-499.

²¹⁰ Van Creveld, Martin. *Supplying war: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

²¹¹ Posen, Barry. *The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars*. Cornell University Press, 1986.

²¹² Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute destruction: Military culture and the practices of war in imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

²¹³ John Keegan, *A history of warfare* (New York: Random House, 2011).

weapons and tactics for war, which generally increases firepower.²¹⁴ For example, the Battle of Rorke's Drift (1879) in South Africa exemplified the 'quality over quantity' argument, where about 140 British troops with their Martini-Henry rifles (fast firing with longer range) repelled an attack of over 3,000 Zulu warriors – equipped primarily with spears and low-quality muskets – during the course of a two day battle in South Africa.²¹⁵ Similar gallantry was also displayed by Hendrik Witbooi – a chief of Namaqualand – that waged a lengthy guerilla war against the colonizing Germans in modern day Namibia until being killed in battle with German forces in 1906.²¹⁶ While there might be arguments for the power of ideas in making strong armies,²¹⁷ without the right tools (i.e. weapons) to close the 'fighting gap', technologically advanced militaries typically have an edge in war assuming they are provided the necessary conditions to be 'capable' and have the backing of their political counterparts so that they can follow through on objectives.

However, this 'quality only' argument is not universally applicable. The Afghans are notorious for being difficult to conquer and govern, based on their history of repelling invaders such as Alexander the Great (4th century BCE), the British during the three Anglo-Afghan Wars of the 19th and 20th century, and recent attempts by the Soviet Union and the U.S. to control the

²¹⁴ Bousquet, Antoine. *The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2009).

²¹⁵ Ron Lock and Peter Quantrell. *Zulu vanquished: the destruction of the Zulu kingdom*. (London: Greenhill Books, 2005). For a humorous play on a non-materialist example of how leadership and small unit tactics can facilitate military victory, refer to *The Defence of Duffer's Drift*, which was a fictional account of lessons learned from the Boer Wars written by a British Officer who fought in the Second Boer War (1899-1902). Ernest Dunlop, *The Defence of Duffer's Drift* (London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1904).

²¹⁶ Jan-Bart Gewald, *Herero heroes: a socio-political history of the Herero of Namibia, 1890-1923* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999).

²¹⁷ John A. Lynn, *Battle: a history of combat and culture* (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

country.²¹⁸ To the credit of Afghan fighters, they have relied on “terrain, climate and impregnable clan loyalties” for thousands of years to outfight and outsmart foreign invaders.²¹⁹ Foreign armies that operated in Afghan lands tended to believe that their superior firepower and technological prowess could overcome such Afghan societal structures and tactical adaptiveness. As we continue to see to this day, it seems that no amount of airpower and troop surges can disrupt this natural Afghan cultural equilibrium, which is a similar conundrum that faced American political and military leadership in the way they attempted to wage the war in Vietnam (1955-1975).²²⁰

From this long list, a common thread links these variables: agential political choice within the social structure. Returning to this theme of social and political context, the value of formal and informal institutions interacting in appreciable ways, influence the organizational capacity of militaries and their ability to employ combat power effectively, or at least provide the perception of credible military force. Stephen Peter Rosen contends that different cultures and types of societies generate different amounts of military power:

First, people in a political unit can identify themselves with social structures in ways that can create divisive loyalties within the political unit. This can create fissures in the unit that reduce the effective military power of the unit as a whole. Moreover, internal divisions can increase the amount of military power needed to maintain internal order, reducing the surplus of offensive military power that can be projected abroad. The fissures in the unit can create defensive vulnerabilities that can be exploited by invaders. Second, the social structures that create fissures in the unit at

²¹⁸ Peter Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan: messianic terrorism, tribal conflicts, and the failures of great powers* (New York: Perseus, 2013).

²¹⁹ Barry Neild, “Is Afghanistan really a 'graveyard of empires?’” *CNN*, December 7, 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/07/afghanistan.graveyard/>

²²⁰ Jahara W. Matisek, “Shades of Gray Deterrence: Issues of Fighting in the Gray Zone,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 10, no. 3 (2017): 1-26, p. 15.

*large may extend to the military organizations of that unit. Under circumstances that can be specified, those social structures can carry over into the society's military organizations in ways that reduce the amount of military power that can be generated from a given amount of material resources.*²²¹

Posen is on the right track, but the creation and execution of military power is not accomplished in a ‘black box’. Considering how military force is employed, Stephen Biddle provides a comprehensive theory based on the ability of militaries to adapt to increasingly lethal battlefields, dubbing it the “modern force employment system.” However, this style of warfighting is not easy to adopt as it is complex and poses political and organizational issues. It relies on giving up territory for counterattacks (i.e. defense in depth) and necessitates a decentralized military system that gives significant autonomy to lower ranking military personnel.²²² Ideas of this sort would be seen as unacceptably risky to regimes that exercise authority in different ways than the typically modern states that are at the center of Biddle’s analysis. It might also be institutionally repulsive, such as when an ENDF officer stated that he removed his troops from a training course conducted by the Kenyan military when they attempted to teach his unit how to retreat, which he and his men considered to be “shameful” behavior.²²³

If we accept the distinct configuration of the state and power relations in Africa, one finds that this environment also has significant impacts on how military capability is created and employed. These outcomes reflect efforts to actors to compensate for and work around obstacles,

²²¹ Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 5-31.

²²² Stephen Biddle, *Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 28-51.

²²³ Interview, August 2017.

just as a more lethal battlefield forces the U.S. military to consider possibilities that would have seemed strange to observers rooted in a different and earlier way of warfare. This is a problem for the contemporary military attaché or Special Forces trainer: Does that person consider African militaries for what they are and for how their leaders try to solve problems of military effectiveness? Or do they assume the universal application of an early 21st century form of U.S. and other Western experience? Indeed, Victor Davis Hanson's historical observation that war is culturally contextualized appears to be the best bet from a longitudinal perspective. Surveying nine pivotal battles fought over the last 2000 years, Hanson argues that Western countries that stress personal freedoms, citizen armies, and group discipline with individual initiative encouraged, will have effective militaries because they are able to develop distinct military cultures that are not bound to ritual, tradition, and religion.²²⁴ These combatants and citizen-supporters are conceptually attached to military organizations, and are (mostly) insulated from the realities of killing and suffering, at least in day-to-day operations. His most important finding, however, is that military organizations become the most institutionally effective when they develop ways of rationalizing warfare to the point that it overcomes traditional norms that generally interfere with combat operations.

In sum, this survey highlights the centrality of the weight of local context in shaping how leaders and members of military organizations define and pursue "military effectiveness." It also indicates that material and quantitative strengths are not the be all end all of military power. Understanding how the context in Africa is significantly different from most literatures and

²²⁴ Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power* (New York: Random House, 2007).

realities of governance in each state, is why we must now turn around our methods and units of analysis.

The Ubiquity of Making War in Africa

Relative military effectiveness is everything in Africa. If we look beyond the colonial wars of independence, non-African military action in Africa has been exceedingly rare. There have only been 12 sustained war events pitting African against non-African military forces (Table 3-1). All but two of these events were the result of Cold War proxy struggles in which the U.S. or Soviet Union (or their allies) aided one African army against another. This list excludes UN peacekeeping operations and foreign assistance to African armies to fight insurgents, as these do not involve confrontations between national armies.

Date	State Actor Belligerents	Event
1956	Egypt v. France, Israel, and UK	Suez Canal Crisis
1961	Tunisia v. France	Bizerte Crisis
1963-1964	Morocco v. Algeria, Cuba and Egypt	Sand War
1966-1990	South Africa and Portugal v. Cuba, Zambia, and Angola	South African Border War (Angolan Bush War)
1967	Egypt, USSR, Cuba, Jordan, and Syria v. Israel	Six-Day War
1967-1970	Egypt, USSR, Cuba, Jordan, and Syria v. Israel	War of Attrition
1973	Egypt, Cuba, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Syria v. Israel and U.S.	Yom Kippur War
1977-1978	Somalia v. Ethiopia, USSR, Cuba, and South Yemen	Ogaden War (Ethio-Somali War)
1978-1987	Libya v. Chad and France	Chadian-Libyan Conflict
1986	Libya v. U.S.	U.S. airstrikes against Libyan military targets in retaliation to 1986 West Berlin discotheque bombing.
1999-2003	Liberia v. U.S. and UK	Second Liberian Civil War (removal of Liberian President Charles Taylor)
2011	Libya v. France, U.S., UK, Italy, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Jordan, Qatar, UAE, and Sweden	Libyan Civil War (removal of Libyan Dictator Muammar Al-Gaddafi)

Table 3-1. Cases of non-African militaries employing conventional military force against the formal militaries of African states (1946-2017). Source: Cases coded from various open sources.

In fact, the majority of wars waged on the continent have been civil wars mixed in with proxy wars since 1946. Many post-Cold War conflicts can be linked to the colonial wars of

independence and their unsettled nature.²²⁵ Indeed, as noted by Dylan Craig, between 1950 and 2010 there were 27 ‘proxy war’ events in Africa that had rebel partnerships with African states, of which, there were a total of 101 non-state armed actors that were sponsored by one or more African states.²²⁶ Based on the history and nature of conflict in an African context, we need to understand how militaries in Africa have adapted (or not) to this environment.

A Special Form of African Warfare?

There are a number of different approaches to defining a particular African character of warfare. The controversial mercenary Eeben Barlow²²⁷ has argued that what he calls “Composite Warfare” has defined the nature and character of the African style of how African militaries fight. To Barlow, composite warfare is different from the more modernized and industrialized countries in the West and East; instead it is a mix of political and military operations, which is blended between bouts of conventional and unconventional warfare. Within this amalgamation, achieving government legitimacy is just as important (if not more) as winning tactical battles. His Africanist view of war is based on “determining the most efficient, realistic, sustainable, and viable manner by which to deploy forces, engage hostile forces, and meet national security objectives while securing, protecting, and defending the Pillars of State.”²²⁸ This line of reasoning is in tune with Mary Kaldor’s new wars vs. old wars argument. This is because in

²²⁵ James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American political science review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.

²²⁶ Dylan Craig, *Proxy war by African states, 1950–2010* (Washington, DC: American University, 2012).

²²⁷ Eeben Barlow became an expert on warfare fighting on behalf of apartheid South Africa, making the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the South African Defence Force. He set up the notorious private security company known as Executive Outcomes, and has worked as a security advisor and consultant to numerous African regimes. For more on Barlow and the controversy he created, refer to: Peter Warren Singer, *Corporate warriors: The rise of the privatized military industry*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), chapter 7.

²²⁸ Eeben Barlow, *Composite Warfare: The Conduct of Successful Ground Force Operations in Africa* (Pinetown, South Africa: 30°South Publishers, 2016), 8.

Kaldor's analysis, civilians are much more involved in warfare in Africa – and more important – than anywhere elsewhere in the world.²²⁹ This reality means that conventional military strategies and tactics are unworkable in the social and political context of African wars and politics.

The other ubiquity of conflict in Africa is the reliance on regional security organizations to militarily intervene. There have been many localized military interventions by African militaries through alliances, partly because of resource issues, but also to legitimize it to their domestic audiences and the international community. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for the purposes of jointly deploying military force to deal with African states that violated human rights, rule of law, and/or democratic principles.²³⁰ At the same time, civilians on the ground in Africa appear to prefer regional forces rather than interloping soldiers that are *Mzungu/Toubab/Ferengi* (foreign white people).

A Dominance of Ground Forces in Africa?

Since resources are typically considered an issue in waging war for many African countries this has a paradoxical effect on the state and society. A decade before World War One, Otto Hintze suggested from a sociological perspective that modernizing the tools of warfare (i.e. getting away from ground armies) would make the state more liberal and modern.²³¹ However, this is problematic in an African context, where ground troops are needed to fill the volume of territory

²²⁹ Mary Kaldor, *New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

²³⁰ Christof Hartmann and Kai Striebinger, "Writing the Script? ECOWAS' military intervention mechanism," in Tanja A. Börzel and Vera van Hüllen (eds.), *Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations: Patching Together a Global Script* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 68-83.

²³¹ Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," (1906): 178-215. Article reprinted in John Hall (ed.), *The state: Critical Concepts* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

to create ‘troop density’ instead of seeking pivotal battles against local ‘big men’ through high-tech weaponry. Many African countries cannot afford to purchase or maintain the type of military weaponry seen in the more industrialized world, and when they do increase their modernization of arms, it is usually pursued in defense of regime elites; not because of hostile neighbors.²³² Thus, it should not be a surprise that some African countries effectively become authoritarian police states because the army assumes a role as the primary power player in society. This is an important facet to understand since each military service – ground, naval, aerial, etc. – has their own agential cultural interests in how government and security policies work.²³³ But if the army receives the bulk of resources (in a limited African sense), then it generally becomes dominant in discourses with government over national security policies and strategies.

If we accept that most African states lack the resources to wage extensive industrial age warfare then this means that they cannot sustain extensive aerial operations, which are considered costly and resource intensive. Since there is a lack of resources in most African countries to purchase, support, and sustain expensive navies and air forces, to include typically a lack of domestic industrial capacity, most African countries become army-centric by default. This focus on cheap foot-soldier armies is a product of three conditions.

First, it is simply cheaper to have ground troops. They generally require little training and nothing more than hand held firearms and just enough weekly pay to subsist on their local

²³² Thomas Mandrup, "Modernization of African Armed Forces: Preparing for what future?" *Institute for Military History and War Theory*, November 10, 2015, [http://pure.fak.dk/portal/en/publications/modernization-of-african-armed-forces\(330a579e-fbdc-42d2-a20f-1bf32f2e094c\).html](http://pure.fak.dk/portal/en/publications/modernization-of-african-armed-forces(330a579e-fbdc-42d2-a20f-1bf32f2e094c).html)

²³³ Jeffrey W. Donnithorne, *Four Guardians: A Principled Agent View of American Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2018).

economy. Moreover, even without weekly pay, the average African soldier finds innovative ways of extracting pay from locals they guard to support themselves (and their families). This style of self-sustenance was best reified by Zairean dictator Mobutu comments to his army: “You have guns; you don't need a salary.”²³⁴ Second, because of the issues of geography (i.e. low population densities), more soldiers are needed to cover more ground. This type of situation results in the recruitment of many informal army troops, which are formally recognized as being a part of the national military of the state, but have not gone through all of training that urbanized recruits have gone through because most regimes cannot afford the costs associated with centralized training for every single recruit. This can result in uneven training in countries that do not make it a priority to integrate all ethnic/tribal (i.e. identity) groups and regions of the country into a unitary military training facility.

Finally, because most threats to a state emanate from non-state groups such as insurgents and criminal groups, such problems require more intelligence than firepower.²³⁵ As John A. Lynn noted: “navies and air forces make poor tools for internal control, coup d'état, or revolution, whereas armies are expert at all three.”²³⁶ We should consider how much this structural difference in African militaries compares relative to most militaries in modernized and developed states, which have military budgets big enough to field (and support) significant naval and aerial forces. This might also mean that a more balanced military, will likely experience less

²³⁴ Jason K. Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters* (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 116.

²³⁵ Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson. "Rage against the machines: Explaining outcomes in counterinsurgency wars," *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (2009): 67-106.

²³⁶ John A. Lynn, "The evolution of army style in the modern west, 800–2000," *The International History Review* 18, no. 3 (1996): 505-545.

coup d'état, because the army is unable to dominate domestic politics and interactions with regime elites.

Complications of African Military Operations

African warfare is an incredibly complicated and nuanced process that cannot be not solved through revolutions in military affairs.²³⁷ During the Cold War, stronger militaries from the West and East typically intervened and assisted African armies in wars.²³⁸ Following Cold War, the West (and to a much smaller extent the East) have continued to dabble in various conflicts throughout the continent. For example, Operation Turquoise was a French-led military operation in Rwanda in 1994 that attempted to stymie Tutsi rebels advances (despite the Tutsi attempt to stop the genocide against fellow Tutsis) under a United Nations (UN) mandate²³⁹; U.S. Marines landed in Liberia in 2003 to assist an African military force composed of Nigerian soldiers operating as UN peacekeepers²⁴⁰; British military intervention into Sierra Leone (Operation Palliser)²⁴¹ and other British ops in Africa²⁴²; French military operations in at least 9 countries in Africa²⁴³; German and Spanish military deployments to various parts of Africa.²⁴⁴ While there are too many modernized Western militaries involved in military operations in Africa to list here,

²³⁷ Ahmed S. Hashim, "The Revolution in Military Affairs Outside the West," *Journal of International Affairs* (1998): 431-445.

²³⁸ Odd Arne Westad, *The global Cold War: third world interventions and the making of our times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

²³⁹ Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and US Interests* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 156.

²⁴⁰ <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/15/world/200-us-marines-land-in-liberia-to-aid-african-force.html>

²⁴¹ <https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10877/2602/fulltext.pdf?sequence=1>

²⁴² <http://www.revolutionarycommunist.org/capitalist-crisis/4208-136bm151215>

²⁴³ <http://www.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1>

²⁴⁴ <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/19/mali-m19.html>; <http://thediplomatinspain.com/en/spains-military-presence-overseas-increased-by-more-than-60-last-year/>

the Turkish military has opened a military base in Somalia²⁴⁵ and Sudan²⁴⁶, and China recently established a naval base in Djibouti that is a 25 minute drive from the co-located military bases of Japan, France, and the U.S.²⁴⁷ Of course the major reason for such involvement from various outside militaries is because of the geopolitical fallout of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. global war on terror (later renamed overseas contingency operations). This has inadvertently increased the spread of religiously motivated terrorism across Africa to include giving ‘space’ to other violent non-state armed actors, which has brought back western militaries under the premise of maintaining stability.

However, as one senior official at AFRICOM admitted “these European countries are primarily motivated in creating states that will stop the flow of immigrants into Europe, which they see as a bigger threat than the actual problems and instability in these African countries.” He added “the more interesting aspect is that the Europeans somehow managed to convince the Americans to help them stop the flow of African refugees into Europe by helping create strong host nation security forces throughout Africa.” Indeed, the securitization of Africa has not been for altruistic purposes either. Europe has been suffering significant political instability caused by refugee flows caused by weak governance and civil wars in Africa over the last decade.²⁴⁸ This newly emergent problem has led to European governments to concern themselves with helping create effective security forces in many African countries, so that they can better control their boundaries, which by default, stems the flow of refugees into Europe.

²⁴⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH>

²⁴⁶ <http://gulfnnews.com/news/mena/sudan/turkish-base-in-sudan-a-problem-for-arab-powers-1.2148443>

²⁴⁷ <http://www.newsweek.com/chinese-military-china-and-us-military-base-africa-644890>

²⁴⁸ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886>

While many of these aspects and considerations point to structural features that affect choices about African militaries, one still finds a wide range of outcomes that show how decision-makers in Africa manage these challenges, and sometimes manipulate structural forces in their own favor at the expense of overall state formation in the long-term. The foreign observer would do well to keep this in mind, as the provision of resources and advice will work out in a variety of ways, depending on how African actors see their needs and adapt to conditions. This ability to adapt is similarly grounded in perceptions of political survival as well.

My Argument Expanded: Defining a new form of African Military Effectiveness

When Max Weber gave his “Politics as a Vocation” lecture at Munich University in 1918, there were only two independent countries in Africa – Ethiopia and Liberia – and he thought very little of the continent.²⁴⁹ In fact, a year prior, Weber – as a native German in the midst of the Great War – wrote an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, stating “The enemy armies are increasingly made up of barbarians. Today on the Western frontier there also stands a dross of African and Asiatic savages and all the world’s rabble of thieves and lumpens.”²⁵⁰ Regardless of Weber’s personal thoughts on non-Europeans, his view of the world was driven by what he saw as three types of governmental rule around the world. His vision begat the ideal Weberian concepts of political organization: rational-legal (i.e. bureaucratic), traditional (i.e. patrimonial), and

²⁴⁹ Weber’s (2009) briefly mentions Africa in his chapter on “The Sociology of Charismatic Authority” where he emphatically states: “The charismatic position (among primitives) is thus acquired without regard to position in the sibs or domestic communities and without any rule whatsoever. This dualism of charisma and everyday routine is very frequently found among the American Indians, for instance, among the Confederacy of the Iroquois, as well as in Africa and elsewhere” (p. 251). Max Weber, *From Max Weber: essays in sociology* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

²⁵⁰ Max Weber quoted in: Joachim Radkau, *Max Weber: a biography* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011), 439.

charismatic rule. Furthermore, statehood was conceptualized normatively on the basis of a community establishing authority to control its territory by instituting a monopoly on violence.²⁵¹

Most colonial powers imposed these Weberian ideals of statehood as ‘subsides’ on their African colonies, but much of it did not ‘stick’ after independence. Hence, no states in Africa emerged with the same type of capacity and capability (to include economic development or productivity) as the metropolises that colonized them. Civil wars and political violence after independence prevented most African states from transitioning to democracy and creating rational-legal states.²⁵² In place of Weber’s ‘legal-rational’ model, scholars, such as Paul Williams have suggested that there are five primary ‘ingredients’ (governance, resources, sovereignty, ethnicity, and religion) to explain armed conflict in a post-Cold War era and how states have pursued strategies of political survival at the expense of creating their Weberian societies, leading to state deformation.²⁵³ His argument further dissects the push-pull between state, society, and military, in structurally determining why some African states survived or thrived in the midst of rebellion.

As Joel Migdal notes, LDC regime survival strategies includes undermining and fragmenting their own institutions enough to prevent them from being strong enough to challenge the regime. According to Migdal, the three most common practices include the shuffling of competent technocrats, non-merit appointments (i.e. choosing loyalty and kin first), and dirty tricks (i.e., making rivals disappear). This is a balancing act (referred to “triangle of

²⁵¹ As Weber (2009) emphasized in his “Politics as a Vocation” chapter.

²⁵² Johan Ditttrich Hallberg, “RIO Conflict Site 1989–2008: A Geo-Referenced Dataset on Armed Conflict,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29 (2012): 219-232.

²⁵³ Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*,

accommodation”), because the regime cannot undermine their institutions too much, otherwise local big men would easily challenge the state.²⁵⁴ Migdal suggests a policy escape to this problem; there needs to be a ‘social dislocation experience’ to ‘create new power’ that allows for the creation of an ‘independent and skillful bureaucracy’ that is free of ‘existing bases of social control’. This leads us to the conclusion that some critical juncture events can – assuming elites are agential – develop new state competencies that escape the typical patrimonial traps that ensnared the ‘old regime’.

Military Enclaves with Bureaucratic Capacity

Some officials can choose – selectively – what aspects of their state to permit in essentially becoming bureaucratic organizations with Weberian rational-legal order. Take for example the poorly governed and corrupt Angola, which is the typical patrimonial African regime. Such patrimonial relations typically infect the entirety of the state, undermining capacity in favor of loyalty and patronage. However, Angola’s state-run oil company, *Sonangol*, founded in 1976 (two years after independence) was protected from the typical predatory logic of the regime. Angolan leadership permitted the growth of an “island of competence,” whereby bureaucratic management and technical capacity was encouraged in conjunction with Western assistance. This effectively made *Sonangol* a “bureaucratic enclave,” but only because the profits served Angolan elite interests in maintaining control of the state and society.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Joel S. Migdal, *State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

²⁵⁵ Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, "Business success, Angola-style: postcolonial politics and the rise and rise of Sonangol," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45 (2007): 595-619.

The idea of a ‘bureaucratic enclave’ should not be confused with an ‘authoritarian enclave’, which has been used to describe an authoritarian institution existing within a democratic state. In addition, the term ‘democratic enclave’ has been used to describe an institution within an authoritarian state that practices “democratic norms and practices.”²⁵⁶ A ‘bureaucratic enclave’ is a more appropriate term in attempting to describe the sort of organizational behaviors occurring in a military institution – if indeed it does – within a patrimonial regime. Nonetheless, scholarly literature has identified the existence of “bureaucratic enclaves” elsewhere in Africa, such as the tourism ministry in Mozambique,²⁵⁷ interactions between World Bank officials and finance ministries in most Sub-Saharan African countries,²⁵⁸ or even the inability to create such a competent organizational enclave when it came to the policy problem of water scarcity in Zimbabwe.²⁵⁹ Besides Africa, the “bureaucratic enclave” term has also been used to describe the institutional difference between Islamabad and the rest of Pakistan,²⁶⁰ and the competence of the Turkish military.²⁶¹ Notwithstanding such literature on bureaucratic enclaves, I contend that there is a certain context, institutional history and practices, and amicable civil-military framework, which permits the rise and growth of effective military ‘bureaucratic enclaves’ within patrimonial regimes that do not pose a threat to such a leadership.

²⁵⁶ Bruce Gilley, “Democratic enclaves in authoritarian regimes,” *Democratization*, 17:3 (2010): 389-415.

²⁵⁷ Diallo, Rozenn N. "Les paradoxes du régime de l'aide, entre injonctions internationales et logiques nationales. Le cas d'une enclave bureaucratique au Mozambique," *Mondes en développement* 1:165 (2014): 51-63.

²⁵⁸ David Williams, "Managing sovereignty: The World Bank and development in sub-Saharan Africa," *Mondes en développement* 3, no. 123 (2003): 5-21.

²⁵⁹ Zhou Gideon and Chilunjika Alouis. "A Peep into the Sources of Policy Implementation Inertia in Africa: The Case of the Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project (MZWP) in Zimbabwe," *Asian Journal of Empirical Research* 3, no. 4 (2013): 447-463.

²⁶⁰ Matthew Hull, *Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012)

²⁶¹ Christopher Houston, "Legislating virtue, or fear and loathing in Istanbul?" *Critique of Anthropology* 22, no. 4 (2002): 425-444.

Thus, this phenomenon of rational-legal militaries arising in a sea of patrimonial African states can best be described as *Military Enclaves*.

‘Military Enclaves’ are fundamentally different from prior literatures that considered the creation of strong militaries running the machinery of the state directly (or indirectly) led to scholars terming these societies as military regimes or as a *Praetorian State*. Nor are such military enclaves just an expression of how a military can be culturally and societally separated from the people they are derived from. For example, Genghis Kahn reorganized his Mongol army around the principle of removing tribal affiliations, helping rationalize his control, which increased the overall military effectiveness of his units.²⁶²

Max Lerner in 1939 was one of the first academics to note the rise of ‘praetorian states’ after World War One, but in the context of emerging totalitarian socialist and fascist governments that relied on armed force to sustain their regimes.²⁶³ Similarly, Harold Laswell warned of *The Garrison State* in 1941, where he argued that military professionals who had become specialists in violence due to the rapid technological advances in combat – air warfare especially – would dominate politics and management of states because of the requisite skills learned through technologically complicated war-making.²⁶⁴ However, what happens when states do not fully modernize their military because of the associated domestic risks and a lack of resources?

²⁶² Ryan Grauer, *Commanding Military Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 2

²⁶³ Max Lerner, *It is later than you think: the need for a militant democracy*. Transaction Publishers, 1939, 44 and 50

²⁶⁴ Harold D. Lasswell, "The garrison state," *American journal of sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941): 455-468.

Predating Charles Tilly's similar argument, Otto Hintze saw that variance in military buildups had an impact on classes and domestic politics. Hintze noted that "sea power is allied with progressive forces, whereas land forces are tied to conservative tendencies."²⁶⁵ While he wrote this statement before the advent of air forces, his logic could extend to the fact that an air force would be even more progressive than sea power, since it is more capital intensive and requires a higher degree of human capital. Thus, if we consider how wealthier states invest in technology to offset manpower costs, typically resulting in more liberalizing forces, then efforts by poor states to build strong militaries with minimal naval assets and aircraft may be linked to the presence of authoritarian rule. Given this predisposition in most African states, and the particular form of warfare in Africa (i.e. armed non-state actors, etc.), then these economic considerations may drive many of these states to prefer ground forces. At the same time, as Table 3-2 illustrates, there is a hodgepodge of African military sizes, and this is not a reliable metric for determining military effectiveness, ability to control the state, or representative of economic and political development.

²⁶⁵ Hintze, Otto. "Military Organization and the Organization of the State." (1906): 178-215. Article reprinted in John Hall (ed.), *The state: Critical Concepts*. (New York: Routledge, 1994), 202.

Countries	Average percent of military personnel to population
Eritrea	4.476%
South Sudan	2.016%
Djibouti	1.566%
Libya	1.095%
Egypt	1.033%
Mauritius	1.008%
Algeria	0.916%
Morocco	0.785%
Seychelles	0.754%
Namibia	0.688%
Burundi	0.627%
Angola	0.604%
Swaziland	0.558%
Botswana	0.535%
Rwanda	0.498%
Sudan	0.473%
Tunisia	0.461%
Gabon	0.459%
Zimbabwe	0.385%
Rep. Congo	0.320%
Chad	0.318%
Sao Tome	0.250%
Cape Verde	0.239%
Ethiopia	0.215%
Liberia	0.198%
Sierra Leone	0.194%
Equatorial Guinea	0.193%
DRC	0.188%
Uganda	0.162%
Togo	0.157%
Guinea	0.149%
Senegal	0.147%
Mali	0.147%
South Africa	0.142%
Zambia	0.136%
Cameroon	0.127%
Madagascar	0.112%
Nigeria	0.105%
Lesotho	0.101%
CAR	0.101%
Cote d'Ivoire	0.092%
Somalia	0.090%
Benin	0.090%
Guinea Bissau	0.084%
Burkina Faso	0.082%
Kenya	0.076%
Comoros	0.076%
Niger	0.069%
Tanzania	0.067%
Mauritania	0.062%
Gambia	0.053%
Ghana	0.050%
Malawi	0.047%
Mozambique	0.046%

Table 3-2. Percentage of military personnel per citizen in each African country (averaged 2000-2015).

With Eritrea and South Sudan mobilizing the largest proportions of their societies in Africa, their regime strategies and policies are reflective of elite perceptions of risk and their mindset towards war. Eritrea has been locked in a bitter border dispute with Ethiopia since 1998 and South Sudan is still dealing with a civil war and border disputes with Sudan that began in 2011 when it formally achieved independence. But high mobilization in these two countries mean different things. For South Sudan, the high percentage is a product of civil war and fragmentation, whereas Eritrea has relied on party-state mobilization under a strong personalist dictator.

It is important to understand that the number of citizens mobilized for military duty is not reflective of military effectiveness. In surveying 10 countries with ‘large’ militaries, Table 3-3 provides a perspective on how militarized (or not) the average African country is relative to other militarized states.

Countries	Average percent of military personnel to population
Brazil	0.161%
China	0.158%
France	0.303%
India	0.105%
North Korea	4.691%
Pakistan	0.338%
Russia	0.576%
South Korea	1.229%
UK	0.119%
USA	0.417%

Table 3-3. Percentage of military personnel per citizen in 10 different countries known for large militaries (2015).

Interestingly, North Korea and Eritrea appear to be very similar in terms of the number of citizens forced to serve in their respective militaries. This can explain why so many have referred to Eritrea as “Africa’s North Korea.”²⁶⁶ But what about reversing this sort of analysis to consider military size in relation to the size of the state? Could there be more to a ‘volume’ and ‘density’ argument of how many troops there are in a country relative to the actual territory?

If we recall Herbst’s argument in Chapter 2 about most African countries lacking the necessary personnel to control their large ungovernable lands, then there might be more behind the curtain when it comes to states having a larger share of troops based on the space within their sovereign territory.

²⁶⁶ Bartholomäus Grill, “A Visit to 'Africa's North Korea',” *Spiegel Online*, November 2, 2017, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eritrea-a-visit-to-africa-s-north-korea-a-1175664.html>

Countries	Troops per sq. miles
Burundi	5.126
Rwanda	4.760
Eritrea	4.364
Seychelles	3.689
Mauritius	2.657
Egypt	2.109
Djibouti	1.408
Sao Tome	1.054
Swaziland	0.964
Morocco	0.897
South Sudan	0.777
Tunisia	0.750
Cape Verde	0.741
Comoros	0.695
Uganda	0.537
Nigeria	0.442
Togo	0.429
Ethiopia	0.403
Sierra Leone	0.375
Zimbabwe	0.349
Algeria	0.348
Angola	0.247
Senegal	0.237
Sudan	0.221
Gambia	0.191
Liberia	0.189
Benin	0.183
Lesotho	0.171
Guinea	0.164
South Africa	0.148
Malawi	0.143
Cote d'Ivoire	0.143
Cameroon	0.135
Kenya	0.129
Congo (D. R.)	0.128
Ghana	0.125
Equatorial Guinea	0.121
Burkina Faso	0.113
Madagascar	0.098
Libya	0.095
Guinea Bissau	0.094
Congo (Republic)	0.092
Tanzania	0.079
Chad	0.071
Gabon	0.065
Zambia	0.061
Mauritania	0.052
Botswana	0.047
Namibia	0.046
Mozambique	0.034
Somalia	0.033
Mali	0.026
Niger	0.021
CAR	0.018

Table 3-4. Troop Density: Troops per square mile in each African country (2015).
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With Burundi, Rwanda, and Eritrea ranking highest for number of troops per square mile in Africa, there appears to be a uniquely different story for each. Burundi formally ended its civil war in 2005, and created a new military that integrated various rebels and militias into a new army. It created a new strategy of relying on deploying various factions of the army for peacekeeping missions as a way of keeping them financially satiated and also as a way of helping support the economically weak economy of Burundi.²⁶⁷ Rwanda has followed a similar model as Burundi, having retained a larger than average military after Paul Kagame's rebel group took over the country in 1994 and engaging his newly formed rebel army in numerous battles against neighboring militaries and rebel groups. Low troop densities do seem to correlate with a perennially fragile state as Somalia, Mali, Niger, and CAR, are the lowest on the list. Troop density should not be taken as a direct corollary of state strength or weakness, as there is an endogeneity problem of considering whether low troop density creates a weak state, or if a weak state begets low troop density. Finally, as mentioned previously, it should be no surprise that Eritrea is as 'troop dense' as it is since it is geographically smaller than Ethiopia but maintains a larger army. As seen below in Table 3-5, it appears that dyad states locked in bitter border disputes (e.g. Pakistan v. India, and North Korea v. South Korea) have significantly larger troop densities relative to other countries that are not currently on an active war footing over a

²⁶⁷ Jonathan D. Caverley and Jesse Dillon Savage, "Rent and Repression in Peacekeeper-Contributing Countries," draft presented at the War & Society Working Group, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, November 8, 2017; "Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Burundi," *Providing for Peacekeeping*, October 27, 2016, <http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/06/26/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-burundi/>

border. These larger than average numbers do reflect that ‘border wars’ translate into a conventional desire to control land; hence a larger than average army is needed to secure area along the disputed lands.

Countries	Troops per sq. mile
Brazil	0.10
China	0.59
France	0.97
India	1.13
North Korea	25.11
Pakistan	1.92
Russia	0.13
South Korea	16.43
UK	0.84
USA	0.35

Table 3-5. ‘Troop Density’ – Troops per square mile in 10 countries known for large militaries (2015).

When thinking about African militaries in a contemporary setting, Kenneth Waltz’s point is relevant:

To say that militarily strong states are feeble because they cannot easily bring order to minor states is like saying that a pneumatic hammer is weak because it is not suitable for drilling decayed teeth. It is to confuse the purpose of instruments and to confound the means of external power with the agencies of internal governance. Inability to exercise political control over others does not indicate military weakness. Strong states cannot do everything with their military forces, as Napoleon acutely realized; but they are able to do things that militarily weak states cannot do.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of Power,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1967), 227-228.

The faith that foreign donors conjure up about helping rebuild defunct bureaucracies in these patrimonial African states is a preoccupation that appears to rarely work.²⁶⁹ Instead, some leaders in Africa build these bureaucracies themselves – perhaps even in spite of external assistance – in ways that suit their circumstances and needs. Somaliland is a perfect example of this natural experiment, in which it had to rebuild its society after the 1991 Somali civil war with little to no external assistance.²⁷⁰ To this day, it has not been recognized as a state by the international community, despite its autonomy since 1991, but is considered a “rare success story.”²⁷¹ Somaliland’s leaders have managed to create a durable state with some aspects of state and military capacity, all without the sort of substantial foreign aid and assistance sent to failing countries in East Africa.²⁷²

This again reinforces the importance of political context, as the foreign observer has few other ways to know whether material assistance and advice will be used in ways intended. As identified by Biddle, MacDonald, and Baker, foreign security assistance appears to only work when there is an alignment of interests between the strong patron donor state and the weaker recipient client state.²⁷³ This can explain why the U.S. has been unable to convince the Afghan government to follow through on building and maintaining an Afghan army capable of repelling

²⁶⁹ Pierre Englebert, and Denis M. Tull, "Postconflict reconstruction in Africa: Flawed ideas about failed states," *International security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 106-139.

²⁷⁰ Ethiopia has been engaged in Somaliland’s development, but not for altruistic reasons, as Ethiopian officials admitted their desire for it to be a “buffer zone” with Mogadishu.

²⁷¹ Simon Allison, "Somaliland at the Crossroads Protecting a Fragile Stability," *Institute for Security Studies*, 5, (2015): 1-16.

²⁷² Nasir M. Ali, "Building State Capacity in a Post-Conflict Situation: The Case of Somaliland," *American International Journal of Contemporary Research* 4, no. 1 (2014): 157-170; Dominik Balthasar, "On the (In) Compatibility of Peace-Building and State-Making: Evidence from Somaliland," *The Journal of Development Studies* (2018): 1-16.

²⁷³ Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* (April 2017): 1-54.

the Taliban insurgency.²⁷⁴ It is likely that many other security assistance donors also struggle to convince the average government in Africa to utilize a military program, weapons, or training in the way originally intended.

Conclusion

Understanding military effectiveness within the political context and dynamics of a state is crucial to understanding how militaries think of their capabilities and role in society. Within the constraints of resources, there are a multitude of pathways and explanations for how certain militaries achieve combat power and effectiveness without having the materialist strength of an adversary. The particulars and ubiquity of conflicts and wars on the African continent indicate that the effectiveness of an African military should be based on such relative standards and not those of modernized Western states. Finally, this chapter introduced the concept of military enclaves as a way of describing the ability of a regime to create a bureaucratically effective military institution despite all other indicators making such an efficient organization improbable. This idea leads us to contend with the problem that a state having a pocket of bureaucratic efficiency (i.e. a ‘military enclave’) in an otherwise corrupt and predatory state is the product of agential choices by regime leadership; it is not the directly created via international assistance or strong patron donor states.

²⁷⁴ Karl W. Eikenberry, "The limits of counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan: The other side of the COIN," *Foreign Affairs* 92, (2013).

Chapter 4 – A Quantitative Look at Military and State Power in Africa

I hope that the African states will use existing or establish new regional machinery in order to avert an arms race in this area. In so doing they would help to spare their continent the ravages which the excesses of chauvinism have elsewhere inflicted in the past.

*Dwight E. Eisenhower
U.S. President
United Nations General Assembly
September 22, 1960²⁷⁵*

Poor Africa. No other continent has endured such an unspeakably bizarre combination of foreign thievery and foreign goodwill.

Barbara Kingsolver²⁷⁶

Military capability is typically correlated with state bureaucratic capacities. This may explain why so many scholars cite Charles Tilly's maxim that "war made the state and the state made war."²⁷⁷ Such logic equates that strong states have an equally strong military. Contrariwise, weak and fragile states ought to have military capabilities that are just as fragmented and incapable as their bureaucratic counterparts. This reasoning relies on the assumption that institutional and organizational capabilities of the state to provide goods (i.e. public services) to its citizenry are inherently reflective of its military capacity. Given this assumption, it is puzzling to explain how a state may possess military capacity that greatly exceeds the competency of the rest of the state, especially if domestic and external threats are minimal, and there is a risk that this military capacity will be used against the regime. Conversely, how do classic models explain regimes that have stronger public service institutions, compared to their military capabilities? Surely, such

²⁷⁵ John Asher Johnson, *Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 404.

²⁷⁶ Barbara Kingsolver, *The poisonwood bible* (London: Faber & Faber, 2008), 528.

²⁷⁷ Charles C. Tilly. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 42; Not all inclusive but this is a small survey of scholars employing Tilly's maxim: Herbst (1990), Fukuyama (2007), Taylor and Botea (2008), Jagers (1998), Snyder (1990) etc. In sum, there are currently at least 529 scholarly articles listed on Google Scholar that utilize Tilly's aphorism.

outliers have an explanatory reason or underlying causal mechanism that results in such a state having a ‘mismatch’ between two government functions: capability to project military force (domestically and abroad) and institutional capacity to provide public goods to their citizenry. Embedded within these processes are also elite perceptions of risk.

Risk can come from armed actors, the cost of having a military, not providing enough resources to the military, and/or provision (or lack thereof) of public goods to the citizenry. These regime activities all have costs and benefits, and unforeseen externalities. In many cases, under-or-over balancing one’s military is purposively executed in consideration of strategic risk and societal concerns. Research indicates that increasing public goods and services results in an increase democratic legitimacy and regime durability, providing long-term societal stability.²⁷⁸ Yet, some states consistently avoid doing this, and prefer patronage and investment in their security services. Investment in one’s armed forces is not a panacea either for protection or military effectiveness; politics and societal context exert substantial influence on whether a military is able to generate maximum combat power from resources allotted. As noted by Alesino and Spolaore, small states are in a predicament when it comes to making trade-offs on spending for their militaries and goods and services, especially when trying to establish some modicum of strength and position in the international system.²⁷⁹

These questions about mismatched bureaucratic administrative and military capacities are important for several reasons. First, weak state capacity ordinarily would be expected to be reflected in the military’s organizational structure. Barring extensive foreign assistance, strong

²⁷⁸ Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 9-10.

²⁷⁹ Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, *The size of nations* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

and capable military organizations need access to considerable revenues, which presupposes state capacities to promote the prosperity of citizens and then tax them. Even if a state with weak and fragmented administrative institutions managed to create a strong army, military leadership might be tempted to seize power for themselves because they might believe that they are better able to govern. This leads to questions of how governments can control an institution that is supposed to defend the country, but also has the capacity to threaten the regime (and willingness to follow through on such threats). This returns us to previous discussions of Peter Feaver's suggestion of the civil-military problematique, where political authorities struggle with having a strong military and controlling it at the same time.²⁸⁰

Africa is an ideal place to consider in search of these 'mismatch' cases. Africa has more states than any other continent, to include more porous and 'ungovernable' territory than any other place in the world.²⁸¹ This translates into the precarious situation in which rulers need to maintain some level of public support for their regime through provision of services, while simultaneously trying to provide for the safety of the regime (i.e. ruling elites) and territorial security of the state. There are also many political strategies for survival and informal means of maintaining regime control in peripheral and rural areas (i.e. patronage, accommodation, etc.).²⁸² In addition, Africa has experienced more interstate and intrastate conflict since 1945 compared to any other region in the world.²⁸³ Thus, as these states have contended with the political realities

²⁸⁰ Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (Winter 1996): 149-178.

²⁸¹ Kelechi A. Kalu and George Klay Kieh, *United States-Africa Security Relations: Terrorism, Regional Security and National Interests* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

²⁸² Catherine Boone, *Political topographies of the African state: Territorial authority and institutional choice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

²⁸³ Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no 4. (2015): 536-550.

of trying to govern, they have also dealt with various types of armed actors (e.g. militias, rebels, criminals, warlords, terrorists, neighboring militaries, etc.) that challenge their Weberian control over the monopoly of violence, violating their Westphalian sovereignty in some cases.

Globalization has also incrementally caused an “unbundling of state functions” leading to some fragile states to emerge with a “durable disorder.”²⁸⁴ Out of these problems have emerged different strategies: attempting to out-govern adversaries (i.e. winning “hearts and minds”), crushing opponents (i.e. military-centric approach), or co-opting them (i.e. integrating them into the state).²⁸⁵ While some of these armed anti-regime actors do try to ‘out-govern’ the state, or replace the state by taking the capitol, some are purely interested in financial gain and maintaining control over areas that suit their ideological and business interests.²⁸⁶ It is not surprising then that Africa is the least democratic of all regions in the world. Mauritius (a small island nation) is the only “full democracy” in Africa,²⁸⁷ and the continent hosts the world’s largest collection of corrupt governments.²⁸⁸

Understanding variation in military and state capacity can facilitate an understanding of how regimes prioritize resource allocation for their military and their citizenry, to then uncover how much autonomy is given to various state organizations. The logic within which this prioritization takes place might be expected to owe much to regime efforts to solve this

²⁸⁴ Philip G. Cerny, “Neomedievalism, civil war and the new security dilemma: Globalisation as durable disorder,” *Civil Wars* 1, no. 1 (1998): 36.

²⁸⁵ Christopher R. Day and William S. Reno “In Harm’s Way: African Counter-Insurgency and Patronage Politics,” *Civil Wars* 16, no. 2 (2014): 105–126.

²⁸⁶ William Reno, *Warfare in independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

²⁸⁷ Economic Intelligence Unit (2015): Mauritius is the only “full democracy” on the African continent. See here: <http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf>

²⁸⁸ African corruption levels are tied with Eastern Europe and Central Asia according to the *Corruption Perceptions Index 2014*.

contradiction between funding military organizations to provide greater security and the risk that a stronger military possibly pose as platforms for ambitious soldiers to overthrow the government that they are supposed to protect. The most likely outcome should be military capabilities that are evenly matched-to-slightly-below that of government overall administrative capabilities. Too much military capability would be too risky (i.e. *coup d'état*) and too little would expose a regime to unnecessary risk (i.e. adversaries seize the capital). Instances of poor and weak states sustaining cohesive and capable military forces are harder to explain.

In this chapter, I situate my argument on strong militaries in weak states in two different sections. In the first section, I survey numerous strains of literatures to understand how states can end up with militaries that result in different variations of capacity relative to the state. Each aspect illustrates the complicated nature of trying to create a robust army in the typical African state that is 'weak' by contemporary standards.

In the second section, I contend that despite GDP and other typically used material indicators, there are countries in Africa that do not fit neatly into such a mold of the military and state having the same power or capabilities. Relying on indexes on military power (i.e. material war fighting capacity) and state capacity (i.e. public services), I create a scatterplot to indicate where state (public service provision as a proxy) capacity and material military power of each African state (54 cases total) are relative to one another. From this, I create a 2x2 matrix to show that there are four different types of states in Africa in terms of state power and military capacity. Each African country is assigned to one of the cells depending on its quadrant location and where it lays along the scatterplot of public service provisions and military power. The four quadrant categories are: (I) Overall Low Military and State Capacity, (II) Low Military and High

State Capacity, (III) High Military and Low State Capacity, (IV) and Overall High Military and State Capacity. Dividing these states into four categories allows for a more systematic evaluation of each state to assess how each regime came to their respective strategies of public service provisions and military resources. It makes it easier to flesh out the relationship between the bureaucracy of the state and regime elites. In addition, it challenges traditional notions of a strong state translating into a strong military. However, these findings are not wholly definitive based on the empirical facts on the ground. Some states seem to be unable to build effective militaries, such as Nigeria (quadrant IV), despite having the resources (i.e. funding, troops, weapons, foreign aid, security assistance, etc.) to do so. This disconnect between material capability for war and military effectiveness means we must dig deeper into the ‘black box’ of military institutions, which will be later explained in Chapter 5. In many cases, as Eisenhower had warned, many states in Africa have pursued belligerence at the expense of their own development, stability, and livelihood. Thus, we must consider less measurable aspects when it comes to assessing military power and effectiveness.

Section One

Understanding Military Capacity in Relation to the State

The ability of a state to “Punch above its weight” or “Punch below its weight” militarily speaking, is a puzzle that few scholars have engaged. In fact, when state and military power is considered, they are generally lumped together as the same entity. The demigods Fearon and Laitin in their seminal 2003 article “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” contended that (*log*) *GDP per capita* is the best proxy for state capacities overall, as they believe state power and

military power are both monolithically a product of GDP.²⁸⁹ This is problematic for two reasons: first, it is one of the most cited articles on civil war in the 21st century, but secondly, and more importantly, state and military power should be considered separately because it would defy empirical reality. Because of politics (domestic and international) and history, there are plenty of countries, such as Canada, Germany, and Japan, that have very high ratings for public services provision (i.e. high state power), but have undersized militaries (i.e. low military power). Thus, this chapter contends that we need to delineate between varying institutional capacities nested within the state in Africa, where GDPs are considerably lower than the rest of the developed world.

The standard use of the term “Punch above its weight” in reference to military power is relegated to discussions on how countries (such as Britain, Australia, and Singapore) have strong militaries due to their strategies, policies, and/or a larger than average military budget.²⁹⁰ These states also rank very high on indices of bureaucratic administrative capacities with robust institutions, and should not expect to face the threat of a military coup that is generally associated with a strong military in an institutionally weak state. At the same time, they also commit a significant portion of resources to their militaries as well, and these militaries are generally not micro-managed by political elites in day-to-day operations. Other scholars focus on states that “Punch below their weight” in reference to very low budgeting for most militaries in

²⁸⁹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war,” *American political science review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.

²⁹⁰ See Tan (2011) for discussion on Singapore military strength as a function of its “expensive war-fighting institution” (p. 672) that has never fought a war, yet is a formidable military power in Southeast Asia.

Europe.²⁹¹ Some scholars point to gross domestic product (GDP)²⁹², foreign aid²⁹³, and/or international assistance (i.e. training)²⁹⁴ to explain the creation of militaries that are stronger than their government. Finally, scholars that align themselves along the Hedley Bull English School of thought conceptualize “Punching above their weight” as purely diplomatic, where small states manage to influence negotiations and treaties better than one would expect given a small population, low GDP, and other similar metrics that infer minimal state power in the international system.²⁹⁵ Accordingly, Vital’s study of small states in 1967 considered that “small states are militarily weak” because of their small population and economy.²⁹⁶

Many of the aforementioned structural arguments rely on the assumption that resources facilitate the creation of military institutions that are much more competent than the public service sector, without looking at the actual behavior and organizational tendencies of the military institutions. If such arguments were logically valid, donor-dependent states such as Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan – where vast sums have been spent by the international community to build their state and military – each would be strong enough by now. However, it has become increasingly obvious that these states remain perennially weak and their militaries

²⁹¹ See Thomas (2012); Gardner and Eizenstat (2010)

²⁹² Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Military expenditure in post-conflict societies," *Economics of Governance* 7, no. 1 (2006): 89-107; David J. Singer, "Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985," *International Interactions* 14, no. 2 (1988): 115-132.

²⁹³ Glenn Palmer, Scott B. Wohlander, and T. Clifton Morgan. "Give or take: foreign aid and foreign policy substitutability," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 1 (2002): 5-26; Daniel Yuichi Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola, "The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid Development Aid and Military Spending," *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 3 (2013): 615-629.

²⁹⁴ Benedikt Franke, "Enabling a continent to help itself: US military capacity building and Africa’s emerging security architecture," *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 1 (2007): 1-13.

²⁹⁵ Edis, Richard. "Punching above their weight: How small developing states operate in the contemporary diplomatic world." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 5, no. 2 (1991): 45-53.

²⁹⁶ Vital, David. *The inequality of states: a study of the small power in international relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 62, 117 and 164.

are hollow and easily ‘crack’ when facing insurgents without foreign assistance and western troops ‘babysitting’ them during combat operations.²⁹⁷ The inability of a regime (and/or its ‘leader’) to respond and adapt to internal and external threats is something Schweller once referred to as “underbalancing,” where regime elites are politically constrained in mobilizing resources and other forms of military power, because of incoherence or fragmentation.²⁹⁸ On the other hand, “overbalancing” has its own perils, as overinvesting in armaments and military capacity can be provocative to neighbors and domestic adversaries, and can also damage the economy and cause other societal disruptions.²⁹⁹

Others scholars have observed a negative relationship between military spending and economic growth, where military spending retards state development, undermining institutions that are needed to govern.³⁰⁰ On the flip side, others have argued that military budgets are an indicator of quality of governance, where least developed countries (LDCs) with high levels of state corruption are positively correlated with higher military spending (even as a function of GDP and total government spending).³⁰¹ Such research indicates that LDCs may have institutionalized corrupt networks of patrons and clients that derive their resources from political elites and devote loyalty *vis-à-vis* military strength towards such regime leaders.

²⁹⁷ William J. Astore, “Why American Efforts to Create Foreign Armies Fail,” *The Nation*, October 14, 2014, <https://www.thenation.com/article/why-american-efforts-create-foreign-armies-fail/>; Jahara W. Matisek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg Armies,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 34, no. 3 (2018): forthcoming

²⁹⁸ Schweller, Randall L. “Unanswered threats: A neoclassical realist theory of underbalancing.” *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): 159-201.

²⁹⁹ Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy: The soldier and the conduct of foreign relations* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956), 263-264.

³⁰⁰ Deger, Saadet, and Ron Smith. “Military expenditure and growth in less developed countries.” *Journal of conflict resolution* 27, no. 2 (1983): 335-353.

³⁰¹ Mauro, Paolo. “The effects of corruption on growth, investment, and government expenditure: a cross-country analysis.” *Corruption and the global economy* 83 (1997).

One reason for states to have militaries that *appear* stronger than the rest of the state may be due in part to a desire to keep young men and potential dissidents employed in armies instead of challenging state authority.³⁰² If this occurs, one should expect weak and fragmented states to use foreign assistance for this purpose. If they do not use assistance for this purpose when a threat exists, the logic driving the state capacity-military capacity relationship (or divide) must lie elsewhere. Similarly, if the creation of a large military is merely a ‘jobs program’, it is probable that such an army is likely ineffective and is nothing more than ‘cannon fodder’.

When it comes to conceptualizing military capability, Tilly’s take on “war and preparation for war” led to “extraction and struggle over the means of war created central organizational structure of states.”³⁰³ Such an inherent bias towards war should infer that with a ‘guns and butter’ mentality, the ‘guns’ will always come first, thus making states more likely to pursue security before trying to provide other forms of governance that fulfil social contracts. Rejecting Tilly’s conclusions (derived primarily from European state-making), Gongora contends that protracted conflicts, advances in weapon systems (i.e., Revolution in Military Affairs), and foreign aid (e.g., money, training, assistance, etc.) are undermining typical state formation schematics in LDCs, especially in Africa and the greater Middle East region.³⁰⁴ In essence, traditional institutions for war and state making that were organically created prior to modernization and globalization is now resulting in the creation of hollow military and state institutions. Such ‘hollowness’ translates into a façade of military and state strength, because the

³⁰² Berman, Eli, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Do working men rebel? Insurgency and unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 4 (2011): 496-528.

³⁰³ Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. P. 14-15

³⁰⁴ Gongora, Thierry. 1997. "War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East". *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (3): 323-40. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/164583>.

human capital and institutions have not been fully developed. However, some states might be avoiding the ‘hollowness’ problem by intentionally developing their human capital in the military because of the positive benefits it has on military effectiveness, that can be harnessed in contributing to overall state-building and economic development.

Continuing the argument for war-preparation strategies and relation to state and bureaucratic capabilities increasing, Barnett finds that conflicts increase military and state power in the short-term, but that prolonged conflicts ultimately result in state power losses that return to pre-war levels.³⁰⁵ Along similar lines, Mann states that “the power of the state to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure” is dependent upon similar institutional pathways created through ‘war-making.’³⁰⁶ Taking most of this literature into context facilitates Ayoob’s argument that LDCs are experiencing uneven state formation due to technology and a drastically different international environment than what most European states experienced in their formative years.³⁰⁷ Such an environment makes LDCs more dependent on external economic and military assistance, changing the domestic calculus of regime leaders to pursue short-term benefits that undermine the overall long-term stability of the polity. If short-term benefits are the primary goal, then security should always be the first pursuit, followed by other state concerns (i.e. providing goods and services to the citizenry). Similarly, if one applies Huntington’s understanding of order, it should make sense that states pursue military capabilities as a means of keeping the state secure firstly, to maintain order and

³⁰⁵ Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

³⁰⁶ Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in *States in History*, ed. J. A. Hall (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 114.

³⁰⁷ Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

stability, which eventually allows for ‘liberty’.³⁰⁸ However, such ‘ideal’ equilibriums and proper state models are incompatible in many patrimonial regimes in Africa, where predatory behavior, patronage, and rent-seeking are pursued as foremost goals as a means to an end for political survival, instead of state formation and institution-building.

The Inherent Tension with Creating a Durable State and Military Power

The pursuit of regime stability is no easy feat, especially in the face of contemporary global pressures.³⁰⁹ Regime durability requires a delicate balance between keeping up some modicum of military capabilities for regime protection, while also providing some degree of public goods and services to promote productivity and cultivate legitimacy. It also means balancing the risks associated with each because many LDCs lack the resources to fully fund their militaries for combat power or bureaucracies to provide adequate public amenities.

Most social science constructs concern the ability of a state to perform above or below expectations, generally rely on evaluations of a state and its performance in diplomatic, informational, and economic realms; all of which can be considered instruments of national power. Thus, the “punching above its weight” aphorism is used colloquially to vaguely describe countries that exceed expectations. However, just because a weak state has an oversized military with substantial resources that outsizes the rest of the state, does not mean we should haphazardly label such a state as having a military that ‘punches above its weight’. Such a large

³⁰⁸ Huntington, Samuel P. *Political order in changing societies*. Yale University Press, 2006.

³⁰⁹ Anthony G. McGrew and Paul Lewis, eds. *Global politics: Globalization and the nation-state*. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

military may serve many other purposes besides conventional notions of being capable to wage war against the military of another state.

An Overmilitarized State?

Lasswell in 1941, most eloquently identified the delicate balance between the state's monopoly of violence and ability to provide services, when he warned of the coming "Garrison State" in which the military would inevitably acquire the necessary management skills to autocratically rule and operate the state.³¹⁰ The only reason why most modernized Western countries did not succumb to the inevitable garrison state is due in part to open political systems – that had a liberalizing effect – and advances in weapon systems that reduced the need for large standing armies. Poorer countries, however, typically lack the necessary human capital and infrastructure to develop and operate advanced weapon systems themselves, leading some LDCs to build very large standing armies that can be a drain on resources.³¹¹ In other cases, some states that are distrustful of creating strong and independent security forces will rely on outsiders (e.g. mercenaries, private contractors, etc.) to fulfill numerous roles in their military, from combat positions to support roles.³¹²

Such concepts elucidate the idea that in a place such as Africa, garrison states should seem more likely based on the inability of many states to govern transparently. Paradoxically

³¹⁰ B. Lasswell, Harold, "The Garrison State," *The American Journal of Sociology* 46 (1941): 455-468.

³¹¹ D. Friedburg, Aaron, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" *International Security* 16 (4) (1992): 109-137.

³¹² Saudi Arabia relies on Pakistanis to serve in infantry positions. Oman relies on retired military personnel from the UK and Australia to operate their Air Force. In UAE, their military has relied on soldiers from the Colombian military to fight in the current civil war in Yemen (<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/middleeast/emirates-secretly-sends-colombian-mercenaries-to-fight-in-yemen.html>). Many African countries are known for contracting out to mercenaries to fulfill military duties and also relying on Western private military contractor companies to fulfill various military roles.

though, many of these militaries generally lack the technical and managerial skills needed to operate complex weapon systems and government agencies. This is partly a function of their militaries never fully transitioning to a modern force, due to a lack of capital. Even the notoriously under-modernized Russian military has taken on the task of rationalizing and investing in Western-like modern military capabilities in the 21st century as a way of adapting to the various internal and regional problems the Russian army faces.³¹³

The inability of many weak states to properly govern – in a rational-legal sense – gives some competent military “professionals”³¹⁴ an incentive to intervene domestically: negatively (i.e., *coup d'état*) or positively (e.g., involvement in public works, etc.). Such intervention is based upon the number of military ‘professionals’ that have the necessary human capital to manage and organize complicated institutions. Finally, this human capital capacity should translate into the possession of more complicated military systems (e.g. tanks, aircraft, etc.), because it greatly contributes to military power, but also requires advanced specialization and bureaucratic competence to maintain and operate. However, Western notions of human capital should not be overemphasized either. A military lacking resources and armaments might be incredibly resourceful in its ability to generate combat power and maximize its military effectiveness. Based on the political system and configuration of power within the state, an army in a patrimonial state could create its own professional identity – a ‘military enclave’ – that is

³¹³ Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, *The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016)

³¹⁴ The term “military professional” is highly debatable given Feaver’s (1996) critique of Huntington and Janowitz’s concept of a professional. Feaver’s argument is that a military cannot be “professional” if it has poor civil-military relations and tries to overthrow the government, and yet he asserts, many praise Latin American militaries for their “professionalism” despite the number of coups these militaries have initiated. I take the idea of a “professional” soldier to be contextually dependent within the politics and society in which one operates to maximize military effectiveness.

flexible and adaptable, and can cultivate non-standard forms of organization and networks to outwit and outfight materially stronger opponents.

Following this concept of professional militaries, Desch sees a structural relationship between the political leadership and military that is based on threat levels: internal (i.e. insurgents, etc.) and external (i.e. aggressive states, etc.). Writing in *Civilian Control of the Military*, he utilizes a 2x2 matrix to show that high external and internal threats results in poor civilian control of the military. Desch also contends that civil-military relations are the worst when internal threats are high, but external threats are low. The only time good civilian control of the military can exist is when there is a high level of external threats and low internal threats. Finally, when internal and external threats are both low, he finds civil-military relations to be a mixed bag.³¹⁵ Threat interpretation in this case drives political and military leaders to situate themselves accordingly in political interactions. Understanding such relationships in context of risks should drive deviations from expected military strength, which means it is dependent upon the types of threats each regime is facing. However, this cannot explain why some states might choose to build an effective military when they lack threats, or in deciding to utilize their armies in various peacekeeping operations and other military interventions.

Based on the aforementioned, it should be expected then that regimes face a complicated balancing act of addressing internal and external threats in conjunction with mobilizing resources for the military and security apparatus; all of which presents their own risks. Within this construct, military professionalism (or lack thereof) can drive certain path dependent outcomes

³¹⁵ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian control of the military: The changing security environment* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2001),14.

in civil-military relations. Regime leaders must also corral loyalty and support for their regime, while not providing too much power (or incentive) to varying factions within the state to pursue a coup. Finally, and most importantly, regime use of the military can have a significant impact on civil-military affairs, because the military is traditionally designed for fighting external threats and its employment domestically can vary from state to state depending on civil-military relations and the legal authorities afforded the government in using military forces domestically and/or their role in state-building. Most Westernized states, such as the U.S. have laws (such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878), which prevent the use of military forces domestically (except in times of declared emergencies), which is generally considered a core component of proper modern civil-military relations.³¹⁶ These issues all factor into regime durability and how relations are configured between the polity and those with the guns.

Coup Proofing

From 1946 to 2017, there were at least 851 *coup-events*: successful coups, attempted (failed) coups, plotted coups, and alleged coup plots from a host of domestic actors (e.g. politicians, military, police, etc.) around the world. More specific to Africa, there were at least 416 coup-events in 48 countries combined.³¹⁷ However large that figure may seem, datasets on coups appear inflated because many conflate a military coup attempt with a political coup and other types of coups enacted by non-military actors. In addition, these coup event datasets usually include ‘plotted coups’ and ‘alleged coup plots’. However, this is problematic in most African

³¹⁶ Jacobs, James B. *Socio-legal foundations of civil-military relations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1986), chapter 4; Head, Michael, and Scott Mann. *Domestic deployment of the armed forces: Military powers, law and human rights*. (New York: Routledge, 2016).

³¹⁷ “Coups d’état, 1946-2016” dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

countries, since many governments use the allegation of ‘coup plotting’ to justify repression of political rivals and those that might be engaging in activities that appear to challenge the regime. For example, Angola arrested over a dozen citizens in 2015 under the pretense of ‘coup plotting’ because these individuals were reading books about non-violently transforming dictatorships into democracies in the Luanda Book Club.³¹⁸ Many datasets code this as a coup event (i.e. coup plot), but in reality, it was just another case of domestic political repression.

If we eliminate spurious data points such as plotted coups and foiled coup planning, we arrive at the number of 254 coups in Africa. However, this number still includes political and non-military actors. When we cull the data down to successful military coups and actual military coup attempts (e.g. announced intent, acts of violence, etc.) the number of African coups since drops to 162 coup events, of which, militaries were successful 77 times (47.5% of the time). This ‘success rate’ is slightly higher than the world average of about 40%. Understanding the risky environment that the typical African regime operates in, adds further depth, clarity, and context, about survival and durability of the state. However, just because an autocratic regime coup-proofs their military, does not mean an effective military coup cannot take place, as Albrecht shows that coups usually succeed when there is a change in power or when the autocrat becomes a ‘lame duck’.³¹⁹

According to Roessler, the primary means of regime change in postcolonial Africa has been the *coup d’état*, which has forced many rulers to be defensive and implement “coup

³¹⁸ Simon Allison, “Reading the revolution: the book club that terrified the Angolan regime,” *The Guardian*, June 30, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/angola-book-club-dos-santos-arrests>

³¹⁹ Albrecht, Holger. "The myth of coup-proofing: Risk and instances of military coups d'état in the middle east and north africa, 1950–2013." *Armed Forces & Society* 41, no. 4 (2015): 659-687.

proofing” as a way of politically ‘surviving’.³²⁰ Moreover, he contends that the most common “coup proofing” strategy (and most effective) is the use of ethnic exclusion to prevent interloper groups from heralding the necessary resources and power to successfully threaten and overthrow the regime leader.³²¹ Quinlivan identifies typical “coup proofing” strategies to include: development of linkages to loyal groups, creation of military organizations that operate parallel from one another (i.e. no jointness), and the enlargement of agencies dedicated to internal security.³²² From the coup-initiator perspective, Finer finds that ethnicity, class, and corporate and national interests can drive coup motivations.³²³ In essence, “coup proofing” undermines overall military strength because it prevents the necessary institutional development of a combined fighting force due to fractionalizing within the force, causing various units to pursue their own interests at a loss of cohesion and professionalism. It might also reflect similar strategies taken within the rest of the bureaucracy, favoring certain groups over others. Within this construct, Talmadge identifies that militaries designed to deal with outside threats (typically conventional military forces) struggle to deal with domestic threats, and conversely the same is true; militaries designed for battle domestically, fare poorly in battles against other states.³²⁴ This indicates that there are different types of military effectiveness, in that internal conflicts usually require more intelligence gathering, whereas conventional warfare is more dependent upon the

³²⁰ Horowitz (1985) first coined “coup-proofing” and explains it in-depth in chapter 13. Philip Roessler, "The enemy within: Personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa." *World Politics* 63, no. 02 (2011): 300-346.

³²¹ Philip Roessler, *Ethnic politics and state power in Africa: the logic of the coup-civil war trap* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

³²² Quinlivan, James T. "Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East." *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131-165.

³²³ C. Finer, S. E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), especially chapter 13.

³²⁴ Talmadge, Caitlin. *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes*. Cornell University Press, 2015.

use of firepower. But these discussions avoid the non-standard role a military can play being effective domestically, in terms of providing public goods and services and/or involvement in building and maintaining infrastructure.

Based on such literature, countries that are ‘punching below their weight’ militarily should have fragmented and/or underfunded militaries due to regime leaders not trusting them. On the other hand, countries that ‘punch above their weight’ will likely have regime leaders that have strategically devised a way to foster the development of strong militaries in relation to the rest of the state without it being a threat to their future rule. In such cases, it might be possible that some regimes do not perceive the military as a threat, and are willing to allow it to become stronger than other aspects of the state.

Bureaucratic Enclaves for the Military

In its truest sense, a bureaucratic enclave is essentially an organization or institution that operates in the most effective Weberian rational-legal manner. The existence of such efficient enclaves is significant, especially in patrimonial states. This is an important because most regime bureaucracies in patrimonial states, and are corrupt and ineffective, but enclaves operate with a capability that far exceeds other institutions. To borrow from Croissant and Haynes, bureaucratic enclaves are “walled gardens” of expertise and competence.³²⁵ Goodhand and Sedra accord that such bureaucratic enclaves function better than the rest of government and work under highly efficient policies and priorities, which differentiates them from the rest of the regime.

³²⁵ Croissant, Aurel, and Jeffrey Haynes, (eds.), *Twenty Years of Studying Democratization: Vol 2: Democratization, Democracy and Authoritarian Continuity* (New York: Routledge, 2016). They originally used “walled gardens of democracy” (p. 101) in reference to “democratic enclaves” and their relationship to the idea of bureaucratic enclaves.

Interestingly, these authors also indicate that other components of the government resent these ‘technocrats’ due to their ability to run efficient organizations and attract foreign donors and international assistance, which typically affords bureaucratic enclave members higher wages, resulting in further ostracizing by elites in the public and private sector.³²⁶

Alternatively, Phares believes that security apparatuses with embedded bureaucratic enclaves can pose a threat to the state because of its ability to operate autonomously from the pressures of the state.³²⁷ Finally, and most importantly, this literature indicates that most bureaucratic enclaves are a product of foreign assistance and aid, and are not due to specific regime strategies. As argued in chapter 3, I contend that ‘military enclaves’ in Africa are sometimes enabled by some patron providing foreign security assistance, but that such enclaves are more agential; arising out of specific regime priorities and strategies. This is why countries such as Somalia, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR) seem doomed – for the foreseeable future – to build incapable military institutions despite extensive and prolonged external assistance from strong patron states and the international community.

The bureaucratic competency of the public services sector and military should correlate similarly, given the expectation that state formation, monopoly of violence, and provision of public services should be complementary. Based on the bureaucratic enclave literature, it suggests the possibility that countries with stronger than expected militaries, in comparison to their public service counterparts, should be highly developed organizations that operate with some autonomy, exemplify professionalism, and are not viewed as a threat by the regime. At the

³²⁶ Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra. "Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan," *Disasters* 34, no. s1 (2010): S78-S102.

³²⁷ Walid Phares, *The confrontation: winning the war against future jihad* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

same time, such ‘military enclaves’ are sometimes dependent on external actors providing assistance. Thus, countries with stronger militaries should be on the receiving end of foreign assistance, aid, and training. Conversely, weaker militaries in relation to the rest of the state might receive little to no assistance from outside actors. Though it is much more probable that regime leaders prevent such assistance from having its intended effect by diverting resources and moving personnel around to subsidize other ambitions.

Section Two

Separating State and Military Power

The Correlates of War (COW) is considered by many scholars as the best way of operationalizing military capacity, but will be omitted from the primary part of my analysis so as to utilize alternative measures.³²⁸ Hendrix suggests that the ability of the state to levy taxes provides the greatest measure of overall state capacity, based on most theoretical and empirical evidence.³²⁹ Unfortunately, there is limited data on tax collection in Africa for the 21st century, with *The World Bank* only reporting tax revenue collection (as a percentage of GDP) for a handful of African countries, making such an attempt to evaluate state capacity impractical.³³⁰ This is important to acknowledge since so much of the economy is illegible to the state in most African states, and informal markets carry significant resources and cash without global economists knowing.

³²⁸ See Wayman, Singer & Goertz, 1983; Diehl, 1983; Jones, Bremer & Singer, 1996.

³²⁹ Hendrix, Cullen S. "Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010): 273-285.

³³⁰ The World Bank (2016), Tax Revenue (% of GDP), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?end=2016&name_desc=false&start=2000

In assessing state-military relationships, I use 2015 data from the *Global Firepower* (GFP) *Index* to serve as a measure of material military capacity and the *Fragile States Index* (FSI) to measure state capacity through the proxy of public service provision. The GFP permits an assessment of quantitative military power by identifying how some African countries have militaries that are significantly different from the rest of the state.³³¹ The GFP Index allows for an assessment of conventional African military capabilities that incorporates a host of over 50 variables (with a few exceptions) to create scores on material military power, with it weighted more heavily on military weapons, personnel, and budgets.³³² The GFP Index in 2015 had 126 countries ranked, with 30 countries from Africa assessed. To overcome the shortcomings of the other 24 cases, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was utilized to impute GFP values, allowing for the creation of a full African dataset of GFP values compressed into a relative range of “0” (weakest military) to “1” (strongest military). The FSI on the other hand, assesses 178 countries every year using numerous validated methodological approaches. It provides the public service provision scores for each country. To maintain the idea of

³³¹ Africa technically has 54 states if Western Sahara is included, although the United Nations labels it a “Non-Self-Governing Territory,” despite Polisario Front trying to govern it in the face of *de facto* control exerted by Morocco and Algeria. In addition, the number of Africa states can be raised to 55 if Somaliland is included. Indexes such as *Freedom House* score Western Sahara as “Not Free” (7.0) and Somaliland as “Partly Free” (4.5) states.

³³² View GFP power indexes here: <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>. This non-academic source is maintained by Military Factory (www.militaryfactory.com). The GFP index has been cited 17 times on Google Scholar. The GFP index (coded as interval variable) considers only conventional military capabilities, thus nuclear capabilities are omitted. Per the GFP website, military ratings come from scoring total population, manpower available, fit-for-service, reaching military age annually, active military personnel, active military reserves, aircraft (all types), serviceable airports, tank strength, AFV strength, SPG strength, towed artillery, MLRS strength, merchant marine strength, major ports/terminals, fleet strength, external debt (USD), annual defense budget (USD), reserves (USD), purchasing power parity, labor force, oil production, oil consumption, proven oil resources, roadway coverage, railway coverage, waterway coverage, coastline coverage, shared borders, and square land area. Sources of such data are derived from the *CIA World Factbook* and open source government websites. While assigning a GFP index rating to countries based on some structural realities can be problematic (i.e. possibly ignores institutional and indigenous capabilities), this list and ranking was verified with members on the African policy section at the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Pentagon.

relativeness like the GFP, I compress the FSI values into a relative range of “0” (weakest state capacity) to “1” (strongest state capacity).

Case Selection

The continent of Africa serves as an optimal choice for evaluating military and public service capabilities in relation to the state due to the harsh reality that most of its countries have struggled with development and economic growth.³³³ Justification for looking at Africa specifically when it comes to military capabilities and state bureaucratic competence, derives from the need to better understand variation within weak states. Admittedly I am choosing on the dependent variable in terms of structural and conflict issues, but it is done so for the purposes of understanding nuanced differences in state and military power, which lends to an understanding of how regimes might have been shaped by various interests and risks, to include the various forces that lead to a divergence in state and military power. Nonetheless, the unique diversity in Africa, to include the varying types of colonial experiences, cultures and social norms drawing on relationships with tribes, clans, and kinship; all broaden the validity of my argument.

Military capacity should not be taken for granted; Napoleon managed to assemble and lead much smaller militaries – usually with great success – against larger adversaries in his day. The decision to evaluate military firepower (i.e. capacity) of states came about due to my belief in Weberian rational-legal orders needed to operate and maintain complex military systems and organizations. These processes should be rationalized to handle complicated deployments, which

³³³ Ake (2001) explores numerous African issues, such as colonial legacy, social pluralism and fragmentation, corrupt leaders, poor job discipline, mismanagement, limited investment, over-reliance on commodities, just to name, as root causes of African underdevelopment.

should have synergistic effects with other components of the military and the state.³³⁴ As most Africanists attest, most African regimes operate at least in part through patronage-based networks.³³⁵ However, with such arrangements, rulers may find necessary tools to exercise authority that also undermine the pursuit of wise investments and efficient management strategies in state militaries. For example, it is unwise to put loyalists in place of technocratic experts for tasks such as aircraft maintenance, because there is a high cost associated with the aircraft crashing due to poor maintenance. From a military capacity standpoint, it also is unwise to purchase expensive equipment with scarce resources, while from a patronage point of view such purchases may play important roles in gaining the support of key political and military actors, and can even act as a mechanism for creating the perception of ‘prestige’.

Due to the high costs involved and required human capital investment, there is little tolerance for ‘margins of error’ in certain parts of a military, and by this logic, certain organizations and job specialties need to operate as bureaucratic enclaves within patrimonial states. Based on perception of risk and consequences in certain parts of the state-bureaucracy (such as finance) and the military (such as aircraft), it is possible that regime leaders utilize technocratic experts in such fields due to the high costs associated with failure. Thus, ‘military enclaves’ can exist within the framework of patrimonial states by virtue of rational necessity

³³⁴ Saddam Hussein might have had the 5th largest military in 1991, but his inability to integrate advanced weaponry and attack aircraft in a joint Iraqi fighting force illustrated how quickly conventional forces could be crippled by an advanced nation. It is also indicative of the issues faced by ‘coup-proofing’ your military to the point that it is unable to act in unison against a threat. The United States showcased the importance of having good command and control (C2) and the pivotal nature of air supremacy in quickly routing an enemy as evidenced by the “Highway of Death” incident and the ability to secure victory within 100 hours of an American ground campaign. See: Talmadge (2015)

³³⁵ As relayed through correspondence with Professor Will Reno of Northwestern University and Roland Marchal (Research Fellow) of *Sciences Po*.

and/or strategic survival. This means, hypothetically speaking at least, that the military or certain state institutions should be able to bureaucratically outpace other parts of the government.

Independent Variable (Military Capability)

A *RAND* study on measuring national power in 2000 stated that:

*The ultimate yardstick of national power is military capability. Because countries subsist in an environment where internal and external threats to security are both common and ever-present, the effectiveness of their military becomes the ultimate measure of power.*³³⁶

African states while experiencing significant internal threat, do not face the sort of ‘external threat’ alluded to in this *RAND* study, as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter of 1963 has essentially made it normatively taboo for African countries to change boundaries, and as indicated in previous chapters, interstate war and foreign military interventions have been relatively uncommon on the continent compared to previous centuries. Because of numerous regional and international processes, military power has been unbounded from the traditional state-formation process in Africa (i.e. not designed to expand boundaries or defend state sovereignty from hostile neighbors). Thus, it is highly likely that the development of the military has been decoupled from the process of normal state-building. The GFP Index serves as the greatest way of measuring military power because its formula incorporates about 50 variables, which makes it an improved data source for military capacity relative to outdated COW data (most current version has 2011 data), which only utilizes 6 broad components in assessing military strength.

³³⁶ Tellis, Ashley J., Janice Bially, Christopher Layne and Melissa McPherson. *Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1110/MR1110.ch7.pdf

Dependent Variable (State Capacity)

In identifying a relationship between military capacity and state strength, public service provision from the *FSI* will be used as a proxy for traditional state capacity outside of military power. This allows for a decoupling of endogeneity issues that may exist between state power and military influence on other components of the state bureaucracy. The *FSI* identifies public services as being reflective of state capacity in these areas: policing, criminality, education provision, literacy, water and sanitation, infrastructure, healthcare quality, telephony, internet access, reliability of power, and roads.³³⁷

Validation

The use of corruption scores,³³⁸ GDP (Billions USD) and average GDP (2000-2015),³³⁹ GDP per capita,³⁴⁰ (log) GDP per capita,³⁴¹ various military measures such as military spending per capita³⁴² and (log) Military spending per capita,³⁴³ Phil Arena's "M" score (alternative military

³³⁷ Fragile States Index 2015, The Fund for Peace, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf>, 17.

³³⁸ Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 provided corruption index scores. See here for report: [http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-transparency-international-corruption-perceptions-index-2014/\\$FILE/EY-transparency-international-corruption-perceptions-index-2014.pdf](http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-transparency-international-corruption-perceptions-index-2014/$FILE/EY-transparency-international-corruption-perceptions-index-2014.pdf)

³³⁹ The CIA: The World provided GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) data (2014). See here for list: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>

³⁴⁰ International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, October 2014, last updated 3 September 2015. See here for listing of African countries by GDP per capita: <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/african-countries-by-gdp-per-capita.php>

³⁴¹ Fearon and Laitin (2003) contend that (log) GDP per capita can serve as a proxy for the capacity of the military, administration, and bureaucracy.

³⁴² The World Bank maintains data on military expenditure (% of GDP) in 5-year snapshot estimates. This dataset is incomplete due to them lacking military spending information on 7 countries in my African subset. See here for complete listing: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>

³⁴³ Henderson and Singer (2000) contend that corruption and (log) military spending per capita are both positively correlated with stronger militaries and conflict onset.

capability)³⁴⁴, and others³⁴⁵, number of troops deployed for UN and non-UN purposes (2000-2015), international development aid, and U.S. security force assistance (dollars contributed and number of troops trained), are presented as a way of validating the GFP data. Additionally, a Pearson's correlation (two-tailed) is utilized to check relationships (N=54) with prior research concerning these relationships, and also to identify other associations.

While part of the analysis is a 'snapshot' of African countries in 2015, Gibler has argued that overall state and military capabilities are generally static unless there is a major disruption to the state (i.e. radical regime change).³⁴⁶ Hence to account for a shortcoming in GFP data for 2000, I provide a table indicating how much African militaries have changed from 2000 to 2015 (i.e. changes to budget, personnel, weapons, etc.).³⁴⁷ I provide a chart indicating changes in supplementary security forces (e.g. gendarmerie, presidential guard, reserves, etc.) to illustrate how these have fluctuated. Additionally, descriptive statistics are included to illustrate certain patterns. Finally, a second correlation was run for African LDCs (N=43). More developed northern Africa countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) and South Africa were excluded because they might skew findings based on their level of development, and large economies and populations. Small island African nations were omitted because their economies are tiny and their militaries are essentially used for civil-defense and coast guard duties.

³⁴⁴ Philip Arena, *Measuring Military Capabilities*. University of Essex Working Paper, 2016; "Military Capabilities: A Revisionist Metric," August 6, 2012, <http://duckofminerva.com/2012/08/military-capabilities-revisionist-metric.html>

³⁴⁵ For an overview of different explanations of material military power, refer to: Bear F. Braumoeller, "Has the American military fallen behind?" *Monkey Cage*, May 4, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/04/has-the-american-military-fallen-behind/?utm_term=.5dfc407f0526

³⁴⁶ Douglas M. Gibler, "State Development, Parity, and International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 1 (2017): 21-38.

³⁴⁷ Since South Sudan was not a country in 2000 yet, I have modeled its "year 2000" economy and military based on data from 2008 and 2005 respectively.

Results




Figure 4-1. Military Power in Relation to State Power.

	Low Material Military Capacity	High Material Military Capacity
High State Capacity	Botswana Cape Verde Mauritius Sao Tome Seychelles	Algeria Egypt Morocco South Africa Tunisia
Low State Capacity	Benin Burkina Faso Burundi CAR Comoros Congo (Republic) Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Gabon Gambia Guinea Guinea Bissau Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mauritania Namibia Niger Sierra Leone Somalia Swaziland Togo	Angola Cameroon Chad Cote d'Ivoire DRC Eritrea Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Libya Mali Mozambique Nigeria Rwanda Senegal South Sudan Sudan Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

Table 4-1. Listing of Relative Military and State Capabilities, that is a textual representation of Figure 4-1.

Countries	Military Budget (US Millions)	Army Personnel	Tanks	Combat Vehicles	Artillery	Navy Personnel	Ships	Air Force Personnel	Aircraft
Sudan	\$2,375	127500	280	212	-205	-200	11	0	66
South Sudan	\$410	45000	-30	-12	114	0	0	0	9
Nigeria	\$1,390	38000	176	180	-318	1000	35	500	-30
Eritrea	-\$179	30000	170	12	-47	0	3	-450	10
DRC	\$417	24000	129	68	587	5800	4	1050	13
Cote d'Ivoire	\$625	16200	10	20	16	100	-6	700	-17
Somalia	\$45	14800	0	27	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	\$150	6500	0	46	3	1000	10	1000	-4
CAR	-\$17	4000	-1	-14	0	0	0	0	-9
Senegal	\$194	3900	0	177	2	350	-5	-50	1
Algeria	\$8,800	3000	173	38	32	-1000	50	4000	88
Sierra Leone	\$5	2300	0	-14	6	0	-1	0	-4
Benin	\$62	2000	-2	35	5	400	4	100	-2
Morocco	\$1,670	1500	-426	110	233	-2200	26	-500	-71
Mali	\$519	1100	-51	-46	-23	-50	-3	-400	-10
Cameroon	\$238	1000	0	96	32	200	-5	100	2
Burkina Faso	\$83	800	0	39	31	0	0	400	3
Botswana	\$252	0	-31	174	41	0	0	0	8
Chad	\$221	0	0	323	23	0	0	0	27
Djibouti	\$114	0	0	78	18	145	14	50	3
Equatorial Guinea	\$84	0	3	32	0	130	10	0	13
Gabon	\$78	0	0	61	0	0	21	0	-8
Guinea	\$204	0	0	13	0	0	2	0	-2
Kenya	\$985	0	0	135	8	200	-8	-500	0
Mad.	\$16	0	0	0	-13	0	2	0	-16
Mauritania	\$115	0	0	4	5	100	13	100	9
Mauritius	\$201	0	0	2	0	300	-18	0	6
Moz.	\$26	0	-320	91	-35	-400	1	0	-4
Namibia	\$317	0	5	9	38	700	6	0	13
Niger	\$32	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	15
Rep. Congo	\$492	0	-3	36	-15	0	4	0	-20
Seychelles	\$9	0	0	0	0	20	3	0	1
Swaziland	\$57	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Tanzania	\$376	0	25	-37	-110	0	5	0	-21
Tunisia	\$614	0	-6	32	4	300	15	500	2
Comoros	\$10	-20	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Lesotho	\$14	-110	1	8	0	0	0	110	-1
Malawi	\$3	-120	0	19	0	0	-6	120	-3
Gambia	-\$1	-230	0	0	0	230	5	0	3
Sao Tome	\$3	-700	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Cape Verde	\$3	-900	0	0	-24	0	2	0	3
Togo	\$52	-900	0	107	1	0	1	0	-9
South Africa	\$1,190	-1150	-136	-1647	-181	2650	-38	1400	-100
Guinea Bissau	\$16	-2800	0	0	-9	0	-1	0	-5
Zambia	\$216	-4900	0	25	-55	0	0	0	-49
Liberia	-\$2	-9500	0	0	0	50	0	0	-2
Egypt	\$2,930	-10000	-1150	541	485	-500	19	6000	-418
Zimbabwe	\$123	-10000	0	-264	-362	0	0	0	-11
Burundi	-\$1	-10050	0	1	0	0	-5	0	0
Uganda	\$349	-15000	99	62	45	-400	-10	0	1
Angola	\$2,238	-20000	-350	421	660	-1500	14	-2000	40
Rwanda	-\$37	-32000	22	39	-125	0	0	0	-13
Libya	\$1,800	-38000	-2208	-2382	-2475	-8000	-35	-23000	-829
Ethiopia	-\$6	-115000	161	230	160	0	0	500	-51

Table 4-2. Changes in Military Firepower Capabilities from 2000 to 2015. Source: *Appendix D*

Countries	Paramilitary	Gendarmerie	Prez/Republican/ Royal Guard	Central Staffs	Reserve
Egypt	72000	0	0	0	225000
Algeria	46000	-40000	0	0	150000
Morocco	20000	-18000	-1500	0	0
Burundi	20000	-5450	0	0	0
Sudan	13000	0	0	0	0
Mali	5000	0	-2000	0	-3000
Chad	5000	4500	0	0	0
CAR	1000	-1000	0	0	0
Rwanda	1000	-6000	0	0	-2000
Mauritius	650	0	0	0	0
South Sudan	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	120000
DRC	0	0	8000	14000	0
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	-800	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	0
Benin	0	0	0	0	0
Cameroon	0	0	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	0	0	0	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	0	0
Gabon	0	0	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0
Mad.	0	0	0	0	0
Moz.	0	0	0	0	0
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0
Niger	0	0	0	0	0
Swaziland	0	0	0	0	0
Tanzania	0	0	0	0	80000
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0
Comoros	0	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	0	0	0
Gambia	0	0	0	0	0
Sao Tome	0	0	0	0	0
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	0
Togo	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	0	0	0	0	-74139
Guinea Bissau	0	-2000	0	0	0
Zambia	0	0	0	0	3000
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	-5000
Libya	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0
Seychelles	-50	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	-500	800	0	0	0
Botswana	-1000	0	0	0	0
Mauritania	-1000	0	0	0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	-1500	-4400	-1100	0	0
Rep. Congo	-3000	0	0	0	0
Angola	-5000	0	0	0	0
Guinea	-7000	0	0	0	7000

Table 4-3. Changes in non-standard security forces from 2000 to 2015. Source: <i>Appendix D</i>

Analysis

Figure 4-1 and Table 4-1 partially corroborate Tilly's statement that regime pursuits of war making capabilities drive increases in state capacities. This process leads to the formation of new state institutions and increasing capacities of existing institutions, as seen in quadrants "I" and "III". Quadrant "IV" illustrates regime predisposition towards the pursuit of military power first and then the creation of administrative and bureaucratic capacity to provide public services. Quadrant "II" contains the four small island nations of Cape Verde, Mauritania, Sao Tome, and Seychelles, and peaceful Botswana. These states have very small militaries but high state capacity to provide public goods and services; an alternative to Tilly's classic formulation of war-making and state-making. Similarly, the more developed northern African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) along with South Africa have overall high military and state capacity. Libya would have likely been in this category if it were not for the civil war and fragmentation that has plagued the state since 2011; hence it has ended up in quadrant "IV."

In terms of longitudinal shifts in military firepower, Table 4-2 shows an interesting shift in military priorities from 2000 to 2015. Sudan has grown its army (and its number of tanks) more than any other African country, but this has been a product of the war with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Since independence, hostilities between Sudan and South Sudan drove the growth of Sudan's military, while the rapid growth of South Sudan's military reflected the integration of rebel forces into the new national army, largely funded by foreign donors. In addition, 18 countries did not change the size of their armies, whereas 17 grew their armies and 19 armies were shrunk. Algeria had the greatest increase in its military budget (about

\$8.8 billion), with much of this focused on its air force (i.e. 88 airplanes were added). On the other side of the spectrum, Ethiopia reduced the size of its army more than any other country in Africa, and yet their military budget has essentially remained the same. This reflects a shift towards modernization that requires less ground troops. Eritrea cut its military budget more than any other African country by about \$179 million, yet grew the size of its army by 30,000 personnel and added 170 tanks. Libya saw the greatest reduction in military power, which can be attributed to the downfall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011 and the subsequent civil war, with multiple armed actors and two different parliaments – one in Tobruk and the other in Tripoli.³⁴⁸

In terms of non-standard military forces, Table 4-3 indicates the changes in the size of these forces in African countries from 2000 to 2015. Egypt displays the greatest increase in paramilitary forces and reserve forces, adding 72,000 and 225,000 personnel respectively. The largest decrease in gendarmerie forces occurred in Algeria, where they cut 40,000 personnel. Chad had the biggest increase in gendarmerie forces, adding 4,500. The DRC is notable for being the only African country that grew its presidential guard – by almost 8,000 troops – something often associated with a weak formal security sector and bad governance.³⁴⁹ Guinea cut 7,000 paramilitary forces by converting them into reserve forces. The declines in presidential guards in Morocco, Mali, and Cote d'Ivoire signaled important transitions for each country as each aimed to avoid the problems associated with a conventional army resenting military units that are personally favored by the commander-in-chief. Overall, 20 African states did not have any non-standard security units and/or did not change the size of them during that 15-year timespan.

³⁴⁸ “Libya profile – Timeline,” *BBC*, January 24, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445>

³⁴⁹ James Barnett, “DR Congo in crisis: Can Kabila trust his own army?” *African Arguments*, September 20, 2016, <http://africanarguments.org/2016/09/20/dr-congo-in-crisis-can-kabila-trust-his-own-army/>

Due to the substantial number of significant correlations in analyzing the numerous variables involved with military and state power, *Appendix E* has the correlation data in Table E-1 (N=54) and Table E-3 (N=43). This also includes descriptive statistics for each, Table E-2 (N=54) and Table E-4 (N=43). In what follows, I broadly summarize significant correlations and identify possible explanations for each, and how inclusion (and exclusion) of the more developed African states and island nations changes these findings on relationships between the state and army.

Significant Correlation Overlaps between Table(s) E-1 and E-3 (see Appendix E)

Broadly speaking these significant correlations (noted in *Appendix E*) indicate that GFP is a good proxy with other indicators of state and military strength (e.g. COW, GDP, military spending and size, etc.). It also shows that higher GFP countries are more likely to deploy their troops for UN missions, while also receiving more international aid and having more of their troops trained by the U.S. military. This indicates that these countries benefit from at least the possibility of a foreign-assisted opportunity to create an enclave in which their military forces can develop expertise and professional standards. This development, however, is contingent on the political strategies of their regimes. Some regimes are more prone to see these deployments as opportunities for rent-seeking, and will fear the acquisition of skills and professional perspectives among their military officers. This points to the centrality of regime strategies and willingness to tolerate risks that Feaver and others associate with the weak state – strong military context. Finally, an interesting finding is that U.S. SFA appears to subsidize the cost of host-nation military personnel, as the number of host-nation troops trained goes up, African states spend less (per capita) on their militaries.

Significant Correlations that are Distinct for Table E-1 (see Appendix E)

The most definitive aspect of these particular correlations for N=54 is that American assistance appears to play a disproportionate role in driving many of the significant correlations. Egypt accounts for the greatest proportion of these correlations, as it is one of the largest recipients of American military and economic aid in the world. Between 2000 and 2017, Egypt had over 17,000 troops trained by the U.S and received over \$23 billion in SFA, which was second only to Israel that received over \$53 billion.³⁵⁰ Egypt during that period also received over \$7 billion in economic aid from the U.S.³⁵¹ However, because Egypt and other North African countries and South Africa have GDP and militaries (and budgets) substantially larger than the rest of the continent, this requires a more exclusive focus on the Sub-Saharan African states. Thus Table 4-6 analyzes these 43 LDCs, while omitting the small African island countries with minimal armed forces.

Significant Correlations that are Distinct in Table E-3 (see Appendix E)

The findings for N=43 illustrate how corruption plays a significant role in these 43 Sub-Saharan African countries (with South Africa excluded). The findings illustrate that these countries are more corrupt when they have bigger military budgets, more military personnel, and when they receive more American SFA (U.S. Dollars). This reinforces the finding that American military

³⁵⁰ “Security Aid,” *Security Assistance Monitor*, March 24, 2018, <https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Egypt/2000/2017/all/Middle%20East%20and%20North%20Africa/>,

<https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Israel/2000/2017/all/Middle%20East%20and%20North%20Africa/>

³⁵¹ “Economic Aid,” *Security Assistance Monitor*, March 24, 2018, <https://securityassistance.org/data/country/economic/country/2000/2017/all/Middle%20East%20and%20North%20Africa/>

assistance acts as a crutch in propping up corrupt regimes. Moreover, international aid to these countries indicates that it reduces military spending per capita, which shows how this might help subsidize militaries that these countries cannot support or afford without external help. Finally, the most interesting finding is that as military spending per troop increases, this results in a decrease in the number of troops per square mile. This suggests that modernization efforts reduce the size of African armies, but at the expense of reducing troop densities, which may be necessary in the long-term for controlling and holding domestic territory.

Descriptive Statistics for Table E-1 (N=54) and Table E-3 (N=43) (see Appendix E)

The mean for most of the variables in each of the correlations (N=54 and N=43) are relatively close with a few exceptions. When it comes to GDP, military budgets, military size, U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) received, Table E-2 is higher across the board in all these areas. It is interesting to note that the Sub-Saharan countries of Table E-4 are much more likely to deploy their soldiers for AU peacekeeping (and for other reasons, such as the invasion of DRC!) and average a substantially higher number of troops being trained by the U.S. This suggests that the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program run by the U.S. is having the intended effect with these countries, as they are more likely to deploy their forces on African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions.³⁵² But it also shows that these governments pursue other strategies that involve troop deployments, including ones that go against U.S. interests and policies.

³⁵² “ACOTA - Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance,” *United States Africa Command*, March 24, 2018, <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-cooperation/acota-africa-contingency-operations-training-and-assistance>

Conclusion

Overall, this analysis shows that material resources that are available to regimes in sub-Saharan Africa are correlated with their military firepower. But in some of these regimes, this military firepower considerably exceeds the capabilities of the rest of the state administration.

Ordinarily, this “excess” capability should pose serious risks to these regimes in that their militaries will develop capabilities, expertise, and perspectives, that would put the regime itself at risk. Yet these data also show that some regimes (i.e., those in Quadrant IV) *do sustain outsized military capabilities while demonstrating a capacity to manage this risk*. This development needs to be explained, and will be further dissected in the next chapter and will be the focus of the case studies (chapters 6-9). These cases provide an opportunity to explore the political strategies of these regimes.

In broad terms, political strategies to create and then manage outsized military capacities point to possible state-building strategies in contemporary Africa. These strategies, if successful, show that purposeful action on the part of leaders in very weak states may produce increases in overall state capabilities in geo-political conditions that differ from the conditions that Tilly and others identify as the drivers of historical military-building and state-building enterprises. These Quadrant IV outliers in Africa reverse the classic equation, as they must, in first building strong militaries, and then (possibly) building strong(er) states.

Chapter 5 – A Better Model for Conceptualizing Militaries and Effectiveness

in Africa

The essence of strategy is choosing what not to do...There's a fundamental distinction between strategy and operational effectiveness. Strategy is about making choices, trade-offs; it's about deliberately choosing to be different. Operational effectiveness is about things that you really shouldn't have to make choices on.

*Michael Porter
Professor of Business Administration³⁵³*

You cannot carry out fundamental change without a certain amount of madness. In this case, it comes from nonconformity, the courage to turn your back on the old formulas, the courage to invent the future.

*Captain Thomas Sankara
President of Burkina Faso (1983-1987)³⁵⁴*

Porter was addressing a business and management audience, but his words apply to strategic thinking about the type and form of militaries and whether they can develop institutions capable of sustaining an effective combat force. In the case of Burkina Faso's President Sankara, who came to power through *coup d'état* in 1983 (then assassinated in a *coup d'état* in 1987), had a revolutionary approach to politics, society, and his military. His rule caused significant disruption to Burkina Faso as his purges of bureaucrats and military officials – for the purposes of reducing institutional corruption – reduced the competency and effectiveness of the already recalcitrant institutions.³⁵⁵ This had tangible effects on how his military operated relative to neighboring states. For example, Sankara's army during the Agacher Strip War (1985) faced off against the Malian army, which was led by President Moussa Traoré (a former military officer

³⁵³ Michael E. Porter, "What is Strategy?" *Harvard Business Review* 74, no. 6 (1996): 61-78

³⁵⁴ Thomas Sankara, *Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983-1987*, translated by Samantha Anderson (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1988), 144.

³⁵⁵ <http://saharareporters.com/2013/10/15/thomas-sankara-and-assassination-africa%E2%80%99s-memory-chika-ezeanya>

that came to power through *coup d'état* in 1968). Sankara's military was ill-prepared and unable to hold the disputed land.

While the disputed Agacher Strip was not officially resolved by the 5-day "Christmas War," the Malian army expelled Sankara's troops. This engagement highlighted substantial differences in combat effectiveness between the two military regimes. Burkinabé forces suffered almost 400 casualties whereas Mali's lost under 100 troops.³⁵⁶ The battle showcased how much more effective the Malian military was, despite it being a personalist army built around Traoré's cohesive informal networks that lacked ideology, and still outperformed against Burkinabé ground troops that had been reorganized as a political army under Sankara's revolutionist ideology.³⁵⁷ In addition, the outcome of the battle rejects structural arguments about stronger economic productivity translating into a stronger military as Burkina Faso had a higher GDP per capita of \$201 in 1985, whereas Mali had \$178 GDP per capita and handily expelled Burkinabé troops.³⁵⁸

This outcome indicates leadership and institutions absent a strategy oriented towards military effectiveness will likely struggle against ill-equipped adversaries who make up for this deficiency in other ways. This is not to say that personalist armies with a supposed visionary are any better in Africa. Libya's Colonel Qaddafi (1969-2011), who came to power through *coup d'état*, created an army bound to him by bonds of personal loyalty and through the use of

³⁵⁶ Tom Cooper, "Burkina Faso and Mali, Agacher Strip War, 1985," *ACIG (Air Combat Information Group) Journal* (2004).

³⁵⁷ Jonathan van Eerd, *The Quality of Democracy in Africa: Opposition Competitiveness Rooted in Legacies of Cleavages* (New York: Springer, 2017), 193.

³⁵⁸ Up until 1991, Burkina Faso had a higher GDP per capita, at which point Mali has consistently had a higher GDP per capita. GDP per capita data in 1985 from The World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/>

patronage tied to the tremendous oil wealth of the nation. Over time Qaddafi tried to transform his personal authority into a political army beholden to the philosophy transcribed in his manifesto: *The Green Book*.³⁵⁹ The reality was that Qaddafi's philosophy found few true believers, and he had to rely on divide-and-conquer strategies to stay in power as he pitted various security services and armed factions against one another.³⁶⁰ It should be no surprise that when he deployed his military, they consistently underperformed, such as when his better armed force of about 2,000 Libyan troops (with tanks and bomber aircraft) fought alongside Idi Amin's personalized army during the Uganda–Tanzania War (1978-1979).³⁶¹ Libya's military (like Amin's troops) quickly crumbled and retreated when it faced off against over 30,000 motivated, but poorly equipped, Tanzanian troops.³⁶² Libya's army had been institutionally hollowed out by Qaddafi's logic of fragmented politics,³⁶³ and was unable to defend Ugandan territory against the army of a very poor country (Tanzania), which had converted its apolitical army into a political army in 1964.³⁶⁴

³⁵⁹ Muammar Al Qathafi, *The green book* (Tripoli, Libya: People's Committee, 1980 [1975]). For an overview of the history of the book and its implications refer to this review:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/books/review/what-did-qaddafis-green-book-really-say.html>

³⁶⁰ Geraint Hughes, "Militias in internal warfare: From the colonial era to the contemporary Middle East," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 2 (2016): 196-225.

³⁶¹ James Ciment, *Encyclopedia of conflicts since World War II* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 313; Robeson Bennazoo Otim Engur, *Survival: A Soldier's Story* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2013), 34-35.

³⁶² Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1982), 196; George Roberts, "The Uganda–Tanzania War, the fall of Idi Amin, and the failure of African diplomacy, 1978–1979," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 4 (2014): 692-709.

³⁶³ There was only one elite Qaddafi loyalist force, known as the 32nd Brigade. Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 359–60, 364; "Britain's Demanding Ally in Tripoli," *Africa Confidential* 50, no. 19, 25 September 2009.

³⁶⁴ After a military mutiny in 1964, Tanzania disbanded the King's African Rifles ("Tanganyika Rifles"), which was an apolitical military structure built by the British. In its place, an explicitly political army, Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF), was built centered on the political ideology of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), with recruits coming from the TANU youth wing. For more see: Abidallah H. Omari, "Civil-military relations in Tanzania," in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams (eds.), *Ourselves to Know* (Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 92-95.

These outcomes point to various ways of institutionally achieving military effectiveness that do not conform to Western notions of good organizational practices. Even in these few cases, there is considerable variation in how military effectiveness is achieved, the type of military created, and how such militaries generate combat power based on their given resources and political context (i.e. relations with society and government). This indicates that some African actors can build effective militaries, even though they defy (1) structural conditions, (2) Feaver's admonition (civil-military problematique), and (3) the advice of Western officials.

This chapter serves three purposes. First, it surveys the niche literature of military effectiveness, to illustrate how little is written about African armies. It also shows that the role of political context heavily influences how effective a military can be. It also demarcates African militaries as being heavily influenced by informal institutions. Second, I contend that African armies do not neatly fit into the Western binary logic of apolitical or political. Instead, I suggest that there are three different ideal types of militaries – apolitical, political, and personalist – that can fluidly exist (and overlap) due to the nature of African politics (e.g. patrimonialism), and that each has their particular pathways to generating military effectiveness. Finally, this chapter builds on the military power distinctions found in Chapter 4, where I develop a model of institutional military effectiveness that integrates quantitative material power in conjunction with the political context of civil-military relations. This serves as a heuristic tool in identifying five different ideal types of militaries in Africa: Ineffective, Hollow, Parochial, Resourceful, and Effective.

The Foundations of Military Effectiveness

There has been very little specific theorization on the concept of military effectiveness especially in political science. When such analyses have been done, African militaries generally are generally ignored. Most of the literature relies on the definition of military effectiveness that comes from the historians Millett, Murray, and Watman, where they state that “A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available,” adding that it must be capable of overcoming natural and political constraints.³⁶⁵ However, such a definition is intuitively set upon modern armies, formalized with industrialized institutions, since Millett and Murray published a three volume set on *Military Effectiveness* that considered the military performance (tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels) of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia/USSR, and the U.S., from World War One through World War Two.³⁶⁶ But as noted in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, the nature, conduct, and character of war is significantly different in an African context, requiring consideration of more variables.

Recently Risa Brooks argued that a “states’ military effectiveness often depends on the global environment and the particularities of their political cultures, social structures, and institutions...The creation of military power only partially depends on states’ material and human resources.”³⁶⁷ Her statement points to domestic and international forces that shape how a military is formed and maintained, along with particular relationships between political and

³⁶⁵ Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman. "The effectiveness of military organizations." *International Security* 11, no. 1 (1986): 37-71.

³⁶⁶ Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness: Volume I: The First World War, Military Effectiveness: Volume II: The Interwar Period, and Military Effectiveness: Volume III: The Second World War* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

³⁶⁷ Risa A. Brooks “Introduction: The impact of culture, society, institutions, and international forces on military effectiveness,” in Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley (eds.), *Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness*. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007), 1.

military elites grounded in historical path dependencies and context. The edited volume by Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley rely on the concepts of integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality, to describe how these attributes contribute to the generation of military power.³⁶⁸ Despite the tremendous breadth in their edited volume, they focus on large, modern militaries, basically skipping any analysis of militaries in Africa.³⁶⁹

Adding substantial theoretical contributions to the military effectiveness debate, Dan Reiter's edited volume *The Sword's Other Edge: Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness* digs deeper by focusing on political support, security threats, and war fighting, to encompass a more nuanced and refined concept of military effectiveness.³⁷⁰ Much like Brooks and Stanley's edited volume, it is devoid of African analysis,³⁷¹ because the unit of analysis is primarily directed at modern and industrialized militaries. Although one chapter is devoted to the Philippines and their development of a military with effective counterinsurgency (COIN) skills, the chapter notes that these specialized COIN troops learn skills that make them a threat to the government.³⁷²

One model that stands out for considering the type of (in)cohesive military formed and its ability to be (in)effective in a political context is Jasen Castillo's *Endurance and War*. Relying on a 2x2 chart of regime control and military organizational autonomy, Castillo creates a

³⁶⁸ Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley (eds.), *Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness*. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007).

³⁶⁹ One chapter is devoted to Egypt, and the only other mention of any African countries is South Africa in regard to the British military fighting the Boer War.

³⁷⁰ Dan Reiter (ed.), *The Sword's Other Edge: Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

³⁷¹ Egypt is mentioned in regard to battles with Israel.

³⁷² Joseph Felter, "Sources of military effectiveness in counterinsurgency: Evidence from the Philippines," in Dan Reiter (ed.), *The Sword's Other Edge: Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 126-160.

typology to describe four different types of militaries: *Authoritarian* (high control and low autonomy) such as the USSR (1941), *Messianic* (overall high control and autonomy) such as Nazi Germany and North Vietnam, *Apathetic* (overall low control and autonomy) such as France (1940), and *Professional* (low control and high autonomy) such as the U.S. and France (1914-1918).³⁷³ His important finding is that military cohesion is vital in creating an effective military and that politicization of the military can be a good thing but only if cohesion is encouraged, implemented, and maintained. This goes against traditional assumptions in CMR literature where political armies are supposed to underperform militarily.³⁷⁴

The only problem with Castillo's model is that is hard to apply to patrimonial African states that lack many elements of modernizations and do not fit neatly into democratic models of Western governance. Moreover, regime control and autonomy are contextually different, given the way in which politics and networks subvert these Western notions of state power in Africa. It is often stated that many of these African countries are 'fragile' and are unable to exert regime control over their respective militaries. Others will contend that these regimes supposedly exert too much control, personalize the army and/or coup-proof it into ineffective oblivion. Either way, the conclusion by many is that military effectiveness is an elusive pursuit in the typical African state.

There are different shades of authoritarianism in Africa, just as there are different shades of military autonomy. This is especially true in countries where former rebels are in charge of the government and military. This means that civil-military relations are actually a reflection of

³⁷³ Jasen J. Castillo, *Endurance and war: the national sources of military cohesion* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2014).

³⁷⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil-military relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).

civil-rebel-military interactions with legitimization of state authority resting in a different position relative to other states that retained their colonial identity. These blurs notions of principle-agent relations, as patron-client networks – more often than not – dictate how the typical African military operates and interacts within its respective political context. Moreover, each regime has a different use for their military. Typical authoritarian regime strategies can include the management of their militaries through counterbalancing (i.e. sowing divisions within the military),³⁷⁵ identity group stacking (i.e. staffing army with loyal ethnic/tribe groups),³⁷⁶ and economic coup-proofing (i.e. special pay and privileges).³⁷⁷

Nonetheless, regime preferences and societal identities still matter. Lyall argues that regimes relying on inclusive ‘identity’ politics are better able to legitimize their rule, creating a more cohesive military that performs better on the battlefield against militaries that come from societies where ‘identity’ is used by their regime for exclusionary and divisionary purposes.³⁷⁸ At the same time however, general coup-proofing practices undermine the average soldier, because it removes their “leadership qualities, initiative, and the ability to coordinate different military units,”³⁷⁹ which are traits essential to being effective in combat situations. Could there be more

³⁷⁵ Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Coup risk, counterbalancing, and international conflict," *Security Studies* 14, no. 1 (2005): 140-177.

³⁷⁶ Kristen A. Harkness, "The ethnic army and the state: explaining coup traps and the difficulties of democratization in Africa," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 4 (2016): 587-616.

³⁷⁷ Holger Albrecht, "Does coup-proofing work? Political–military relations in authoritarian regimes amid the Arab uprisings," *Mediterranean Politics* 20, no. 1 (2015): 36-54.

³⁷⁸ Jason Lyall, *Paths of Ruin: Explaining Battlefield Performance in Conventional War*, unpublished manuscript, December 2012, http://www.jasonlyall.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/PathsofRuin_Overview.pdf; Jason Lyall, "Why Armies Break: Explaining Mass Desertion in Conventional War," *Social Science Research Network*, November 14, 2016, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2524561>

³⁷⁹ Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt. "Coup-proofing and military effectiveness in interstate wars, 1967–99," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011), 331.

subtle ways of creating and maintaining an effective military through unconventional strategies (at least as seen from a western perspective) that can still perform?

Most analyses of military effectiveness ignore militaries in Africa and the realities concealed by the organizational charts and protocols. This ‘snub’ has not been maliciously intentional, though one historian’s book recently considered the military effectiveness of post-colonial states, which included a case study on the institutional problems the Nigerian military faced during the Biafra civil war (1967-1970).³⁸⁰ Coincidentally, it seems there are some parallels with the contemporary Nigerian military (i.e. poor civil-military dynamics, corruption, etc.) in its inability to effectively deal with Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.³⁸¹

As mentioned in previous chapters, transparency is a major problem with most militaries in Africa (as is gaining research access) and battle data is lacking or misreported (or hard to come by). Additionally, there just has not been enough conventional interstate warfare on the continent (thankfully) to truly work out the sorts of large-N analyses that scholars use to figure out what made certain militaries better than others in World War One and Two. These problems are not insurmountable. It just means our units of analysis need to change to what is observable to understand how some countries in Africa are able to create effective military organizations that are aligned with the interests of the state and political elites and do not contribute to economic decline or civil war. This is made difficult by the fact that the modern notions of a split between political and military elites are absent in many African countries. Understanding how these elites cooperate with one another and the particular way they generate militarily

³⁸⁰ Pradeep Barua, *The military effectiveness of post-colonial states* (Boston: Brill, 2013).

³⁸¹ Alice Hunt Friend, “Besting Boko Haram,” *War on the Rocks*, January 20, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/besting-boko-haram/>

effectiveness in their respective contexts is why we need to primarily rely on formal and informal institutions to understand how military effectiveness is achieved.

The evolution of a capable African military or one that is lacking capacity is generally driven more by informal institutions than any written rules. Additionally, organizational practices in some militaries might not reflect a structural coup-proofing, but instead can give tremendous agency to military elites in pursuing *purge-proofing* institutions. Such an organizational orientation might be developed to demonstrate commitment to political and societal elites, since military elites have just as much interest in not being purged from the military and do not like policies that subvert and undermine the effectiveness of their military. Moreover, many might seek informal ways of discouraging fellow military personnel from engaging in activities that might be perceived as coup-plotting, which can result in punishments *en masse* (e.g. purges, reassignments, etc.). Thus, we need a better model to conceptualize not only how political choices are made by regime elites in Africa, but also how militaries organize and operate in their own right. This model can show how they can become contextually strong and what politics and pathologies lead them to be weak.

Three 'Ideal' Types of Militaries

If we accept Castillo's propositions about cohesion theory as an important step in making an army effective – regardless of its political or apolitical orientation – then his model implies that we need to account for the various ways in which cohesive and effective armies are created in an African political context. The type and form of politics and the context of regime actors are a driving force of how institutions are regulated and maintained. Hence, since patronage is a common feature in African politics, armies in Africa can be more than just political or apolitical;

they can also be *personalized*. This is because many regimes are run by military men (current and former) or are run by the rebels that captured the state, bringing the sort of patron-client and cultural-familial relations that first helped them establish institutional control. Hence, we need to think beyond conventional binary notions of a military being political or apolitical.

This suggests that we need to understand that militaries can take the shape of three different ‘ideal’ types: *Apolitical*, *Political*, and *Personalist*. Such ideal typologies are similar in concept to Weber’s three ideal types of political leadership: rational-legal (bureaucratic), traditional (i.e. patrimonial), and charismatic (i.e. familial).³⁸² In this case, we need to understand how political elites of the regime exert control over their respective militaries and the pathways and mechanisms in which they interact and generate military effectiveness.

However, what most literature gets wrong – as indicated by the Agacher Strip War (1985) example – is that personalist armies can be militarily effective sometimes, given the right conditions (e.g. type of adversary, threat, etc.) and motivations (e.g. repelling an occupying force, greed, etc.). However, many scholars have considered such armies – built around personalist ties and networks – as being detrimental to the nation and overall state-building based on narrow loyalties and systemic organizational deficiencies.³⁸³ Nevertheless, I contend that personalizing an army can be an effective form of military control (in some cases) depending on the context and configuration of the state, and can be militarily effective when projecting abroad outside of its political context. For example, the Chadian military – a personalist army – fought

³⁸² Max Weber, “Politics as a vocation,” in H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948 [1918]), 77–128.

³⁸³ Petter Langseth, Damian Kato, Mohammed Kisubi, and Jeremy Pope, *Good governance in Africa: A case study from Uganda* (New York: The World Bank, 1997), 48; Lewis H. Diuguid, “Changing of the Guard in Venezuela,” *SAIS Review* 7, no. 4 (1963): 13-18; Stephen Randall and Graeme S. Mount, *The Caribbean Basin: an international history* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 62-63.

incredibly well alongside the French in Mali.³⁸⁴ This is because the Chadian troops had loyalties to their commanders and were not constrained by the typical coup-proofing strategies imposed by the Chadian president.

To conceptually understand military effectiveness and the similarly shared traits needed by each type of army, Figure 5-1 illustrates that there are overlapping traits of each type of ‘ideal’ military to show how each can achieve military effectiveness through their own particular institutions and context.




Figure 5-1. Three ‘Ideal’ Types of African Armies

Conceptualizing each military this way provides a better framework to interpret the behavior and organization of militaries. It helps bridge the various literatures that occasionally get caught up in

³⁸⁴ Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, "Operation ‘Serval’: A strategic analysis of the French intervention in Mali, 2013–2014," *Journal of strategic studies* 38, no. 6 (2015): 801-825.

the tautology of what the ‘perfect army’ looks *like when in fact we should be first looking at the political context of a state and evaluate the best type of army it is able to produce*. From such an understanding, we can consider what institutional characteristics it has that leads it to be militarily (in)effective. Table 5-1 provides an overview of the attributes and characteristics of each ‘ideal’ military type and what it means to be a “professional” in each type of army.

Type of Military	Attributes	Capability to Deploy Military Force
Apolitical Army	The typical “Western” model (e.g. US, UK, France, etc.). The military is expected to be oriented towards external threats and not focus on domestic problems and politics.	Ability to project military force is only limited by resources, domestic politics, and political resolve of civilian government. A “professional soldier” in this context is not required to ‘display political loyalty’ and is legally and normatively bound to follow orders from their government.
Political Army	The typical “Eastern” model (e.g. China, USSR, etc.). The military is usually focused on external threats, but is more engaged domestically because the ‘state’ and ‘army’ are the same. Thus, defense of political regime orientation is crucial.	The state and military interoperate with one another since the military is integrated into the political party of the regime. Thus, political and military elites are likely to bargain and negotiate over mobilization of resources and the deployment of military force. A “professional soldier” in this context is supposed to be a prominent representative of the state ideology, and is expected to act in accordance with the principles set forth by the political party.
Personalist Army	The typical ‘one-man’ model (e.g. North Korea, etc.). The ruler of the state may espouse some sort of ideology and create a political party, but it is merely done as a ‘smokescreen’. The ‘one-man’ ruler effectively controls all aspects of their military and society.	Least likely to develop the ability to project robust military force outside of capital since loyal troops are preferred over competent troops. A personalist ruler has trouble trusting their troops in the periphery. Thus, troops are primarily used to defend regime and are generally employed against the population. A “professional soldier” in this context has to be devoted to expressing loyalty to the ‘cult of personality’ that is the ‘one-man’ ruler. To maximize military effectiveness, lower level commanders must find ways of fostering troop loyalty.

Table 5-1. Attributes of each ‘ideal’ army type and how it can deploy its military.

Each of these military types have their own distinct political configuration of the state in relation to its army, and creating military effectiveness is contextually dependent on agential choices of political and military elites. Moreover, such contextual definitions of “professional” for each type of army are similarly in line with Forster, Edmunds, and Cottey’s definition of professionalism where soldiers “accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the state and are capable of undertaking military activities in an effective and

efficient way, and whose organization and internal structures reflect these assumptions.”³⁸⁵

Under such pretenses then it means that we cannot accept the narrow definitions of what it means to be “professional” in modernized militaries of the West (especially the American military), because every country has their own unique political context and configuration of political and military elites. Thus, we must be willing to accept that the average “professional” soldier operates within the framework of greed, grievance, and/or military effectiveness. Depending on how incentives are structured, as are military institutions, this can dictate how “professionalism” is defined and pursued.

If we consider the type of army created within the political configuration of a state and that resource availability is a component of military effectiveness, then that means that there can be institutional efficiencies that can make an army more effective relative to richer or bigger militaries. However, what usually undermines each of these military types is not overly ambitious behavior from personnel in the ranks. Instead, it is when the political elites attempt to politicize and over-personalize the military. As noted by one Senegalese General who had decades of experience working with almost every military in Africa, “promotions are like the stairs here in Senegal; it is not like an elevator like in many other African countries.”³⁸⁶ His comments are indicative of the problem facing many other African militaries in that promotions are handed out based on personalist networks or for political reasons (i.e. patronage). In either case, these types of promotions undermine any type of military effectiveness because it discourages others in the military organization from being good at their job, while also putting

³⁸⁵ Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey (eds.), *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 6.

³⁸⁶ Interview, Senegal, August 16, 2017.

someone in charge that is likely unqualified to be in that position generating various forms of resentment. In either case, it reduces military cohesion, which is a necessary component of having an effective military.

The Importance of Institutions in Making Militaries Work

Institutions matter, especially in a military. Based on ideas about Weberian effective 'military enclaves' helping generate military effectiveness and the three different types of militaries in Africa, we need to think more broadly about the various non-material factors that institutionally influence the organizational capability of apolitical, political, and personalist armies in Africa. Some militaries might have more agency in creating military power in context of the political

situation of the regime and its strategic outlook.




Figure 5-2: Model of Institutional Military Effectiveness

My *model of institutional military effectiveness* (Figure 5-2) serves as a heuristic device to organize thoughts on identifying different types of militaries. It also differs from other conceptualizations of military effectiveness because it is institutionally focused on political success in an African context; not a specific tactical, operational, or strategic outcome. Such a nuanced interpretation of military effectiveness is necessary because the greatest threat to

regimes in Africa is *coup d'état* and armed non-state actors (i.e. civil wars). When African armies are deployed outside of their territories, it is usually to provide stability, peacekeeping, and to achieve the foreign policy interest of the state deploying its military. In fact, there are very few instances of African militaries (e.g. Tanzania invading Uganda in 1979 to expel Idi Amin) deploying outside their lands to forcefully enact regime change or battle against the army of an adversarial state for territory (refer to Table 2-1). The ability to deploy an army outside of one's territory should not be taken as a given or easy task to accomplish as a developed or wealthy country. In fact, the deployment of military forces requires significant organizational capability, and those lacking it will struggle. For example, the rich Qatari state faced numerous difficulties in deploying its military to the Mediterranean in support of the 2011 Libyan No Fly Zone.³⁸⁷

Emphasis on the institutional aspect of military effectiveness is grounded in the reality that many African countries are more influenced by informal institutions than the formal structures of the state perceived by the West. However, few outsiders understand that the written rules of the state (formal institutions), typically do not reflect the actual practices (informal institutions). Based on the text *Afrique plurielle, Afrique actuelle*, and to roughly translate from the chapter on '*Le climatiseur et la veranda*', there is an "Africa of the veranda" (the real politics) and the "Africa of the air conditioner" (the politics for foreign consumption).³⁸⁸ In my interviews with Western military personnel that had spent time training and working with various militaries in Africa, they admitted that it was common for some of the heavily coup-

³⁸⁷ Jahara W. Matisek, "Dealing with the Arab Spring from the Combined Air Operations Center," *Small Wars Journal*, April 17, 2017, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/dealing-with-the-arab-spring-from-the-combined-air-operations-center-0>

³⁸⁸ Georges Balandier and Alfred Adler. *Afrique plurielle, Afrique actuelle: Hommage à Georges Balandier* (Paris: Karthala Editions, 1986), 37.

proofed militaries to ‘put on an act’, which confirms the problem first espoused by *Le climatiseur et la veranda*.

This phenomenon mirrors a similar institutional problem observed by a U.S. Army colonel working with the Jordanian Army. The Jordanians would put on a “dog-and-pony show” to display how well their military worked with one another in a combined arms military exercise, but the display of ‘effectiveness’ was a façade.³⁸⁹ In other cases, other parts of the state bureaucracy subvert the military. For example, a Western advisor that was working with the Nigerien armed forces found that, despite an eagerness to be professional and effective, the army of Niger was being undermined by the Ministry of Customs. This Nigerien bureaucracy was ‘detaining’ military equipment (e.g. ammo, weapons, spare parts, vehicles, etc.) from foreign donors by trying to extract ‘taxes’ (bribes) from the Nigerien army before they would release it.³⁹⁰ It is quite ironic when one assumes that an army with the capacity for violence, would be held hostage and ransomed by predatory customs officials, but sometimes that is the state of politics in many patrimonial states. Each of these examples are exactly why it is so important to investigate the institutional behaviors of militaries, because once they are unpacked, one can more easily decipher friction points and how such an army actually operates within the context of the state.

Some might consider institutions to be just another fancy expression for something that is essentially culture. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales contend that culture is defined as “customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from

³⁸⁹ Norvell B. De Atkine, "Why Arabs lose wars," *Middle East Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (1999).

³⁹⁰ Interview, June 12, 2017.

generation to generation.”³⁹¹ In practical terms the difference between institutions and culture could best be understood from the perspective of Germany and Korea being split into two different countries after World War Two. Liberal democratic institutions were used to govern West Germany (from the 1950s) and South Korea (from the 1990s), whereas authoritarian communist institutions stymied development in East Germany and North Korea. Thus, the completely different outcomes of each country were not a product of culture since they were the same people at the splitting of their countries, but instead the biggest change occurred with their institutions. Despite this distinction, some have made arguments about cultural modernity influencing military effectiveness.³⁹²

Helmke and Levitsky’s define institutions as “rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behavior.”³⁹³ This provides a jumping off point as to why militaries need to be ‘unpacked’ to understand how appearances can be misleading. There is more to this though as the late Douglas North has been pivotal to describing the role and importance of ‘institutions’, albeit from an economic perspective. To him, institutions are fundamentally important because they are “the rules of the game in a society.”³⁹⁴ North adds that formal institutions are represented by written rules, policies, and laws, whereas informal institutions are “codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions.”³⁹⁵ Through such an understanding of formal and informal institutions we can

³⁹¹ Charles C. Manz, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, "Does culture affect economic outcomes?" *The journal of economic perspectives* 20, no. 2 (2006), 23.

³⁹² Kumail Wasif, “Cultural Modernity and Military Effectiveness,” unpublished, October 27, 2014.

³⁹³ Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda," *Perspectives on politics* 2, no. 4 (2004), 727.

³⁹⁴ Douglas North, *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 36.

better interpret how African militaries organize themselves within the political context in which they operate. This also returns us to the idea of military enclaves, where some militaries can be effective from a Weberian perspective, by sometimes relying on informal mechanisms to achieve organizational and institutional efficiencies.

This is not to say that Western militaries do not have informal institutions either that contribute to their own military effectiveness. For example, German soldiers in World War One described how American troops were effective in battle because they “fought like wildmen,” were “good fighters with nerve and recklessness,” and yet, paradoxically believed them to be “better disciplined.”³⁹⁶ Moreover, during World War Two, one German officer lamented “The reason the American Army does so well in war is because war is chaos and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.”³⁹⁷ Similarly, the Soviets complained that “A serious problem in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine.”³⁹⁸ Unbeknownst to many, these apocryphal remarks about an effective military indicate the presence of informal institutions substituting formal processes and rules to generate military power from an organization.

Putting the Model into ‘Action’

Regarding the model (Figure 5-2), an important aspect of the *x-axis* (GFP; material capacity) is that it is representative of the military firepower of a given country and its quantifiable ability to

³⁹⁶ Intelligence Section (Unclassified), “Candid Comment on The American Soldier of 1917-1918 and Kindred Topics by The Germans: Soldiers, Priests, Women, Village Notables, Politicians, and Statesmen,” The General Staff at the General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, Chaumont, France (1919), <https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/wwi-soldiers.pdf>, 6, 8, and 13.

³⁹⁷ Jim Lacey, “Nothing Went According to Plan,” *TIME*, April 15, 2003, <http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,443808,00.html>

³⁹⁸ James R. Holmes, “Unorthodox and Chaotic: How America Should Fight Wars,” *The Diplomat*, September 27, 2013, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/unorthodox-and-chaotic-how-america-should-fight-wars/>

mobilize resources in support of that function. The *y-axis* (organizational capability) represents how much a military is able to be institutionally efficient in generating sustained military strength while not threatening the political elites of the regime. Overall this model (Figure 5-2) accepts the quantitative military firepower capabilities of African states presented back in Chapter 4 (specifically Figure 4-1), allowing us to create Figure 5-3.




Figure 5-3: Material power of militaries inset with the Model of Institutional Military Effectiveness.

Figure 5-3 shows how African militaries can only move ‘vertically’ in the model, which is based on their institutional competence. For instance, a country that has low military firepower can only move up into the resourceful military category or down into the ineffective military group. Likewise, a state that has high military firepower can only move up to the effective military category or down into the hollow military set. Militaries that fall somewhere in the middle between the typology traits are considered a parochial military, either because they are in transition or because they exhibit some traits from all the categories but still face the military coup problem. Other scope conditions of this model are the role of external actors. In many

cases, security force assistance can shift a military up into the resourceful or effective military category, but only if the internal politics are right and converge on mutually aligned interests with stronger patron state.

Ineffective Militaries

An ineffective military occupies the worst space in this model due to its institutional weakness. It is typified by rough partisan politics, an ineffectual military, organizational apathy, endemic corruption, and scarce resources. In addition, political and military elites are highly suspicious of one another, and the idea of a ‘principle-agent’ relationship exists in name only.³⁹⁹ Military elites have considerable autonomy, often struggling with other political elites to shape debates on policy and funding, since each actor hedges based on the perception of risk and fear that the other may come to dominate the political system and society. Such a Hobbesian relationship between civil and military authorities results in each operating in a fragmented fashion, with each pursuing their own selfish interests and engaging in predatory behaviors. In game theoretical terms, this is a constant iterative game of defection with each actor trying their best to signal the illusion of cooperation, while seeking rents that further consolidate their own power at the expense of the state and society.

At best, such an incompetent military might be able to field a small elite army unit, but it is likely beholden to a few select civil and military elites, and its existence is likely dependent on foreign backing (i.e. strong patron donor state provides resources and training). At its worst, such

³⁹⁹ The traditional ‘principal-agent’ relationship of civil-military relations suggests that the military (agent) should be subservient to the politicians (principal). However, in some African countries, this dichotomy may not exist at all since they might consider each other coequals because they were both rebels during a civil war, it is just that one decided to wear a uniform after the war and service in new army, whereas the other decided to put on a business suit and go into politics.

ineffective militaries are torn internally due to various tribal and ethnic identities vying for more control and power, creating units based on a certain identity, and doling out command positions as a form of patronage.

Somalia is the archetype example of the typical ineffective African military. Since 1991 it has suffered from numerous warlords vying for control of the country and even segments of Mogadishu. Numerous international attempts to stabilize the country, have failed to produce any desirable outcome. In its current political configuration, Somalia has had its military subsidized by foreign donors to little avail since clan politics continue to generate rifts within the Somali National Army (SNA).⁴⁰⁰ In addition, “ghost troops” threaten to undermine the SNA as there are supposed to be about 22,000 SNA troops on the payroll, but that figure is closer to 10,000, as various SNA commanders try to pocket the salaries of non-existent soldiers.⁴⁰¹ Since there is a lack of authority, command, and regular paychecks, SNA troops set up roadblocks to collect ‘fees’ as a way of dealing with not being paid by the government.⁴⁰²

The only competent military unit in Somalia is known as *Danab* (“The Lighting Force”), which is a 500-man unit that makes twice the pay of their regular SNA counterparts (i.e. about \$200 a month), but is housed in a compound by the American military and is kept separated from Somali politics and society.⁴⁰³ The attempt to separate it from the politics of the state is that it

⁴⁰⁰ William Reno, “Security Assistance to Failed States in Africa: Charades and Realities,” *African Affairs*, 2018 (forthcoming).

⁴⁰¹ United Nations Security Council, Report of the secretary-general on Somalia,” January 8, 2016.

⁴⁰² Drazen Jorgic, “Failure to pay soldiers threatens Somalia’s war on Islamists,” *Reuters*, 8 October 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-security-insight/failure-to-pay-soldiers-threatens-somalias-war-on-islamists-idUSKCN0S21GP20151008>

⁴⁰³ British Military Officer, Interview, October 30, 2015; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. foreign policy in Somalia,” remarks by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, June 3, 2014, <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/06/20140612301214.html#ixzz47M0V1HgZ>; Ty McCormick, “U.S. operates drones from secret bases in Somalia,” *Foreign Policy*, July 2, 2015,

draws members from all Somali clans, as a way of balancing power. As it currently stands, there are plans in place to grow the *Danab* to the size of five battalions (about 3,000-5,000 personnel), but this is unlikely given that the U.S. is supposed to bankroll it.⁴⁰⁴ However, the “clannism” is so bad in Somalia that it transcends politics and institutions, where the *Danab* is viewed as a threat by other Somali military and security organizations, leading it to regularly get into firefights with the SNA and other Somali regime actors.⁴⁰⁵

Resourceful Militaries

An important hallmark of a resourceful military is its ability to be operationally effective despite resource constraints. In addition, because political elites do not perceive their military as a threat, they permit such militaries to have considerable autonomy in how they organize and structure their activities. Thus, if a personalist regime can accommodate such a military, that regime will be able to combine this form of authority with military effectiveness. The trick for such a regime’s leaders is to use other techniques to overcome a lack of resources to achieve military effectiveness in primarily one arena. The lack of resources usually means that they lack the type of centralized command and control systems seen in more advanced and wealthier militaries. To overcome their resource deficiencies, informal institutions enable military power in ways that Western militaries likely would not teach or endorse, but it is contextually effective given socioeconomic conditions in such a society. This might include relying on kin ties to sustain

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/exclusive-u-s-operates-drones-from-secret-bases-in-somalia-special-operations-jsoc-black-hawk-down/>.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview, August 4, 2017.

⁴⁰⁵ Doyle Quiggle, “A Proposal for Security-Sector Program Development in Somalia: Weaponizing Moral Authority,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 2, 2018, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-proposal-for-security-sector-program-development-in-somalia-weaponizing-moral-authority>; Joseph Steigman, “Logistics at the Edge of the Empire: US Army Logistics Trainers in Somalia,” *Small Wars Journal*, February 7, 2018, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/logistics-at-the-edge-of-the-empire-us-army-logistics-trainers-in-somalia>

logistics for deployments into hostile areas and using *WhatsApp* as the primary form of informal communication between the ranks and leaders. The reliance on *WhatsApp* for informational and communicative purposes was something that I found in my interviews with dozens of African military personnel. Many African military officers admitted to relying on the texting application to be effective during combat operations, since many contended that their formally required communication process was slow, bulky, and inadequate, when it came to hostile environments where they needed to adapt and evolve to threats.

Botswana is a great example of a resourceful country that has never had any sort of coup-event since its independence, partly because it purposefully chose not to have a military when it gained independence from the UK in 1966. The only reason why it eventually created a military was because of troop incursions from South Africa and Rhodesia during the South African Border War (also known as Namibian War of Independence or Angolan Bush War). The Botswana Defense Force (BDF) that was created in 1977 was formed out of its Police Mobile Unit, being led by General Mompoti Merafhe (chief of the Botswana police) who was from the same tribe as Botswanan President Seretse Khama. To avoid the issues that plagued neighboring countries when it came to their insubordinate militaries, BDF leadership sought a “strong emphasis on high standards of professional behavior” and invested heavily in sending their officers to Western military schools, funding it generously (to avoid mutinies) and with an initial focus on stopping border intrusions and building infrastructure.⁴⁰⁶ The BDF also defies the logic of most arguments about the perils of foreign aid that contend that American military education,

⁴⁰⁶ Dan Henk, "The Botswana Defence Force and the War against Poachers in Southern Africa," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 16, no. 2 (2005): 170-191

training, and assistance, make a coup more likely. However, the U.S. has been credited as a major partner involved in the development of Botswana and its military since 1966.⁴⁰⁷

To Western observers, the BDF does not look like an effective military organization because its political and military elites have all hailed from the Bangwato tribe. On the surface it is an apolitical army, but is established and organized around personal networks stemming from the ruling Botswana Democratic Party. According to a Western military colonel that had spent four years living in Botswana and working with the BDF, “all the BDF cared about was fighting poachers internally” adding that “they had little interest in developing any capacity to be an effective military force outside the country.”⁴⁰⁸ Additionally, Botswana is the only African country to have created a separate part of its military institution that is responsible for infrastructure development that specifically models the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.⁴⁰⁹ The specialized Botswanan corps is specifically dedicated to infrastructure, and it is indicative of the sort of military Botswana has created, which is internally focused army. This is also exemplified by the BDF decision to be an inactive member of Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA).⁴¹⁰ Moreover, Botswana security forces have participated in UN peacekeeping, having only contributed 19,178 troops, 485 military observers, and 207 police, for peacekeeping missions between 1993 and 2009.⁴¹¹ Such participation is small in comparison to

⁴⁰⁷ Bureau of African Affairs, “U.S. Relations with Botswana,” U.S. Department of State, April 14, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm>

⁴⁰⁸ Interview, August 15, 2017.

⁴⁰⁹ Diane E. Chido, *Civilian Skills for African Military Officers to Resolve the Infrastructure, Economic Development, and Stability Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 25.

⁴¹⁰ Paul D. Williams, *Enhancing US Support for Peace Operations in Africa*. Council Special Report No. 73. Council on Foreign Relations, May 2015, 18.

⁴¹¹ International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*, [October 23, 2017], available at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org

the military of Niger, which has a military that is similar in size to that of the BDF (approximately 10,000 troops). Between 1994 and 2017, Niger has contributed 132,513 troops, 4,207 military observers, and 23,442 police, all towards UN peacekeeping missions.⁴¹² However, the military of Niger has a history of interjecting itself into domestic politics. Nevertheless, by many standards, the BDF is still an effective and professional military force,⁴¹³ it just happens to be that per Brigadier Mpho C. Mophuting, (Commandant of Training for BDF Ground Forces Command), “most the operations we do are assisting the Department of Wildlife in anti-poaching.”⁴¹⁴

Similarly, Djibouti was late to independence, gaining it finally in 1977. However, it has been a ‘fragile state,’ in the “High Warning” category.⁴¹⁵ Djibouti survived a post-Cold War civil war – Afar Insurgency (1991-1994) – because the French military remained after the Cold War ended and provided tremendous assistance and military resources to assist the small Djiboutian military. This enabled the Djibouti government to go on the offensive against the rebels, Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), leading to an end of hostilities in exchange for the FRUD being granted the right to be a political party.⁴¹⁶ Currently, the Djibouti Armed Forces (DJAF) which lacks material capacity, appears to be ‘combat effective’ in resourceful

⁴¹² International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*, [October 23, 2017], available at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org

⁴¹³ Dan Henk, *The Botswana Defense Force in the Struggle for an African Environment*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 77-79.

⁴¹⁴ General Mophuting quoted in Vince Crawley, "Botswana Troops Get Up Close and Personal with Wildlife before Anti-Poaching Missions," U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, November 9, 2011, <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/8697/botswana-troops-get-up-close-and-personal-with-wil>

⁴¹⁵ Djibouti’s fragility is ranked 41st out of 178 countries, with South Sudan being ranked 1st as the most fragile. J.J. Messner, Nate Haken, Hannah Blyth, Christina Murphy, Amanda Quinn, George Lehner, Daniel Ganz, “Fragile States Index 2017 – Annual Report,” *The Fund for Peace*, May 14, 2017, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/14/fragile-states-index-2017-annual-report/>

⁴¹⁶ Thomas, Caroline, and Peter Wilkin, eds. *Globalization, human security, and the African experience* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 129-132.

ways. It is filling a role in the region as a proxy army for the West, where the French and U.S. (as have other patron states) have invested considerable time and resources to subsidize the creation of the DJAF to deal with threats primarily emanating from Somalia. Since independence, loyalty of the DJAF to the state seems to be solid, given that it stopped a coup attempt by the police chief, General Yacin Yabeh Galab in 2000.⁴¹⁷ However, it still has some difficulties due to the structure and nature of its armed forces. For example, a source that had deployed as a UN observer to Juba observed that the DJAF camp “literally looked like a garbage pit.” The UN observer added that in his dealings with the DJAF they appeared eager “to be better” but found it problematic that they relied on uneducated “peasants to man their infantry...and their barracks regularly have cholera outbreaks.”⁴¹⁸

Parochial Militaries

A parochial military occupies the ‘gray space’ in this model. It represents a military that is in a transitional period that cannot fit neatly in any of the other four categories. This is because there is an imbalance in resources, risk, and relations between political and military elites. Hence, it is a military that has some modicum of effectiveness, but is still constrained by concerns of loyalty and the army exhibits some pathologies that degrade it to a certain extent. In addition, this ‘gray space’ encourages various informal institutional practices from civil authorities and military leadership to circumvent various problems facing one another, which is primarily driven by risk.

⁴¹⁷ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13232162>

⁴¹⁸ Interview, August 24, 2017.

Chad's military appears to be in a transitory phase from being ineffective and hollow to one that is effective. As one Senegalese General described the Chadian army:

*They're very good fighters, but they're warriors – not soldiers...they engage head on and do not maneuver or utilize other 'combined arms warfare' concepts...while they're not disciplined, they're very courageous.*⁴¹⁹

Another Western military officer – with experience advising and working with them – made similar comments about the Chadians as “good warriors, but bad soldiers.”⁴²⁰ These comments are reflective of a military that relies primarily on informal institutions with very little codified into their organizational practices. This problem partly stems from the fact that a large portion of the Chadian army – to include its officer corps – is illiterate. The other problem is that the military had been coup-proofed through ethnic stuffing of the military with Zaghawa (Déby's kinship) and Gorane ethnic groups, which socially and politically dominate Chad. While Chadian troops are considered “one of the most capable in the region,”⁴²¹ it has also been a threat to President Idriss Déby.

Ever since Déby seized the capital (N'Djamena) in 1990 as rebel leader⁴²² of the Patriotic Salvation Movement (*Mouvement Patriotique du Salut*) (MPS), there have been at least eight military coup attempts against him, with the first one in 1991, and the most recent coup event in 2013.⁴²³ Moreover, because he had coup-proofed his military so much, it lacked any cohesiveness or effectiveness, as rebels were able to seize N'Djamena once in 2006, and again in 2008; the only reason why his regime survived was because of a French military intervention and

⁴¹⁹ Interview, Senegal, August 16, 2017.

⁴²⁰ Interview, August 1, 2017.

⁴²¹ Alexander Thurston, “America Should Beware a Chadian Military Scorned,” *Foreign Policy*, October 18, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/america-should-beware-a-chadian-military-scorned-trump-travel-ban/>

⁴²² Prior to leading the MPS, he had been commander-in-chief of the army in Chad

⁴²³ “Coups d'état, 1946-2016” dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

Libyan support.⁴²⁴ In response to the ineffectiveness of his military, Déby started using oil revenues to buy military hardware and built a new 2,000 member unit known as the Special Antiterrorism Group (SATG), which has proven to be incredibly effective in combat since 2013.⁴²⁵ The only problem now with the SATG is that Déby is trying to get the international community to help him increase the size of the SATG to 5,000 troops, which is problematic given that this elite unit is increasingly acting and behaving like a *de facto* presidential guard. These are signs that the SATG is evolving into a more intensely personalist army.⁴²⁶

Cameroon also exhibits similar traits to the parochial army of Chad, especially in regard to the SATG. While Cameroonian President Paul Biya (a Christian from the south) did not come to power like Déby, he has governed in a similar fashion since coming to power in 1981 when President Ahmadou Ahidjo (a Muslim from the north) resigned due to health reasons. Within two years of coming to power, Biya purged anyone with connections or associations to Ahidjo, while experiencing coup events in 1983, 1984, 1993, 1994, and 2010.⁴²⁷ The most violent and significant of these occurred in 1984, where the presidential guard (still loyal to Ahidjo) had “perfect organization but lousy execution,”⁴²⁸ as Biya holed up in his fortress while various army units around the country mobilized and eventually turned the tide against the presidential guard troops.⁴²⁹ Since that time, Biya has pursued a strategy of mixing up the ethnic groups in his

⁴²⁴ Roland Marchal, "An Emerging Military Power in Central Africa? Chad under Idriss Déby," *Sociétés politiques comparées* 40 (2015).

⁴²⁵ Stephen F. Burgess, "UN and AU counterterrorism norm acceptance: Comparative security policies of Uganda and Chad," *Comparative Strategy* 35, no. 4 (2016): 315-325.

⁴²⁶ Interview, August 1, 2017.

⁴²⁷ "Coups d'état, 1946-2016" dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

⁴²⁸ Jonathan C. Randal, "Tales of Ex-Leader's Role in Revolt Stun Cameroon," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, April 15, 1984.

⁴²⁹ "Colonel Hans Anagho: A Loyal Soldier without a Fatherland," *The Fomunyoh Foundation*, June 12, 2014, <http://www.tffcam.org/press/2014/colonel-hans-anagho.html#sthash.r4ZBnRqh.SzaBB6cQ.dpbs>

security forces to prevent coordination against him, though he has shown a preference over the decades to give powerful positions in the state and army to those from his Beti ethnic group.⁴³⁰ Nonetheless, this strategy failed to maintain security in his state as unrest in northern Cameroon in 1998, caused by *coupeurs de route* (highway robbers), led Biya to create the Bataillon d'intervention rapide (BIR) (known as the "Rapid Response Brigade") in 2001.⁴³¹ Since creating the well-resourced BIR, it has been intermittently trained by the French and American military, but has been primarily built and trained by ex-Israeli commandos.⁴³² As of 2017, the BIR has grown to the size of 4,500 troops as a tactically effective special operations unit, but Biya has capped its growth and dispersed it throughout the country while keeping a special presidential guard stationed in the capital with over 4,000 troops.⁴³³

Hollow Militaries

A hollow military is nothing more than a Fabergé egg army; it is expensive, shiny, and brittle.⁴³⁴ Indeed, on the eve of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Turkish President Halil Turgut Özal described Saddam's Iraqi military as a "hollow army" and that it would not be able to fight despite it having the fifth largest military in the world.⁴³⁵ Meanwhile, numerous defense analysts expected American casualties of 3,344 upwards to 45,000.⁴³⁶ Özal was one hundred percent correct; the American coalition suffered only about 300 casualties (some of which were friendly

⁴³⁰ Interview, November 27, 2016.

⁴³¹ Mark Moritz and Paul Scholte, "Ethical predicaments: Advocating security for mobile pastoralists in weak states," *Anthropology Today* 27, no. 3 (2011): 12-17.

⁴³² Interview, August 2, 2017.

⁴³³ Interview, August 4, 2017.

⁴³⁴ Jahara W. Matisek, "The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg Armies," *Defense & Security Analysis* 34, no.3 (2018): forthcoming

⁴³⁵ James A. Baker, *The politics of diplomacy* (New York: Putnam, 1995), 284.

⁴³⁶ Jacob Weisberg, "Gulfballs: How the Experts Blew It, Big-Time," *New Republic* 204, no. 12, March 25, 1991, 17-18.

fire incidents).⁴³⁷ When the U.S. and allies finally launched its invasion against Iraqi military units, they crumbled and fled. The ‘hollow’ term should not be confused with other military literatures that contend that budget cuts lead to investments in weapons at the loss of experienced mid-level officers and enlisted personnel that are usually needed to operate such specialized weaponry.⁴³⁸

In hollow armies, political leadership attempts to over-control their military to include politicization, and generally relies on divide-and-conquer tactics to keep various divisions competing with one another. In addition, militaries display some agency in such a setting because there is a competitive game over displaying loyalty, and they will likely engage in *purge-proofing* tactics to personalize their own power within their fiefdom of the military structure. They will likely seek ways in which to ensure their military does not deviate from protocols, but rarely is there much focus on training for war because military leadership understands that such exercises make society uneasy and their political masters become anxious and nervous with such displays of military capability. Even though there are plenty of resources for the military, such resources are deployed for patronage purposes, and weapons and money are primarily doled out as a way of maintaining control and loyalty, instead of trying to create effective fighting units. Hence, such hollow militaries usually suffer from the “ghost soldier” phenomena, where commanders over-report the number of soldiers under their command, so that they can personally pocket the extra cash.

⁴³⁷ “Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991,” The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, November 23, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War>

⁴³⁸ Russell Rumbaugh, “The Myth Behind the Hollow Force,” Defense One, March 24, 2014, <http://www.defenseone.com/business/2014/03/myth-behind-hollow-force/81133/>

Nigeria is the archetype hollow military. Despite having the largest population and economy in Africa, and with a sizeable standing army with plenty of advanced military weapon systems,⁴³⁹ it is not trusted by the regime. Worse, it seems to lack any sort of sustained capability or effectiveness in its fight against Boko Haram. A 2016 report by the *International Crisis Group* looked inside the ‘black box’ of the Nigerian military by interviewing hundreds of their personnel. The findings called for massive reforms due to the “Long Decline” of the army, noting seven areas of distress: lack of leadership and civilian oversight, budget constraints, corruption and lack of accountability, lack of military equipment and logistical support, gaps in training and education, lackluster relations with political authorities, and destitute working conditions and late pay (to include “delayed” pensions).⁴⁴⁰ A Western officer that was deployed on observer duties to Sudan in 2008, noted that a company of Nigerian peacekeeper troops that was overrun by a small rebel platoon because of “corruption, laziness, indecisiveness...[adding] officers were the first to abandon their post leaving enlisted troops,” adding that many “Nigerian officers were [already] off post getting drunk” before the attack.⁴⁴¹ Nigerian peacekeeping efforts are equally as bad in the DRC, as one source living in the DRC complained that Nigerian peacekeepers are unreliable, and lamented that a Nigerian Colonel working as the UN Chief of Military Intelligence for the Beni territory was “clueless” and there for the “wrong reasons” as he could only speak English and was operating a prostitution ring on the side.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26913497>

⁴⁴⁰ International Crisis Group, “Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform,” Africa Report No. 237, June 6, 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5756664c4.pdf>

⁴⁴¹ Interview, August 15, 2017.

⁴⁴² Interview, August 20, 2017

Even though Nigeria has avoided military rule since 1999, it has not been able to escape its corrupt legacy. The Nigerian military still plays a major role politically, culturally, and institutionally in society.⁴⁴³ In fact, there is significant evidence to indicate that there was a serious coup plot against Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo – a retired General and Christian himself – in 2004 by a group of mainly Muslim and Hausa speaking officers.⁴⁴⁴ To those arrested⁴⁴⁵ though, it might have been a latent response to Obasanjo’s initial purge (i.e. forced retirement) of Nigerian military officials he saw as too “political” when he took office in 1999.⁴⁴⁶ The following President, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, followed a similar line of reasoning, except he essentially wanted to remove the institutional memory of coup plotting, so he forced the retirement of 40 military commanders that had exceeded 35 years of military service.⁴⁴⁷ The following President, Goodluck Jonathan, had to ‘sack’ all of his military chiefs in 2013 to alleviate domestic pressure and allegations that the Nigerian military was performing dismally against Boko Haram.⁴⁴⁸

While Libya was ruled by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011) he oversaw the creation of politicized and personalized army. Against the backdrop of military coup attempts against him in the 1970s, he pursued policies of de-professionalization of his army and ministries that oversaw military functions. It is paradoxical that Gaddafi would pursue expansionist military operations while heavily coup-proofing his military.⁴⁴⁹ Gaddafi created an institutionally

⁴⁴³ Kunle Amuwo, "The military factor in Nigerian politics," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 23, no. 1 (2001), 22.

⁴⁴⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/09/andrewmeldrum>

⁴⁴⁵ Notable Nigerian officers arrested for a credible coup plot: Maj. Hamza al-Mustapha; Lt-Col. Mohammed ibn Umar Adeka; Onwuchekwa Okorie; Navy Com. Yakubu Kudambo.

⁴⁴⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/366259.stm>

⁴⁴⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6924008.stm>

⁴⁴⁸ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25759755>

⁴⁴⁹ David S. Sorenson, "Civil-military relations in North Africa," *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 4 (2007): 99-114.

schizophrenic military, where training was kept to a minimum (as was the supply of ammunition) and used a 3,000-member Revolutionary Guard (loyal to Gaddafi) as a check on all security apparatuses of the state.⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, for a time, he recruited various Africans for a personalist army known as his Islamic Legion, and later specifically recruited ethnic Tuaregs to help him crush the initial Libyan uprising in 2011.⁴⁵¹ Within this construct, he also preyed on tribal and regional fissures, by creating friction between the groups, preventing them forming a coalition against the Libyan regime. Such disunity and inability to fight within the Libyan military was showcased during the Chad–Libya War in 1987 and during the 2011 Libyan Civil War and “No Fly Zone.”⁴⁵² The Chad–Libya War of 1987 was especially remarkable because Chad was such a poor state with an under-resourced army lacking any sort of comparable mechanized and armored units. The pivotal battles between the two became known as the “Toyota War” as Chadian forces relied on Toyota pickup trucks to mount rapid assaults and encirclements with troops, and mounted anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns onto the flatbeds – referred to as “Technicals” – where Libyan ground forces froze with inaction despite fielding “far more advanced and far more powerful weaponry [against the Chadian army] ... but were crushed nonetheless.”⁴⁵³ It was a spectacular *tour de force* of a hollowed out army fighting against the unconstrained Chadian National Armed Forces (CNAF), a personalist army loyal to President Hissène Habré’ primarily full of former Armed Forces of the North (FAN) rebels and

⁴⁵⁰ Florence Gaub, “The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 36 (2), 2013: 221-244

⁴⁵¹ Peter Gwin, “Former Qaddafi Mercenaries describe fighting in Libyan War,” *The Atlantic*, August 31, 2011, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/former-qaddafi-mercenaries-describe-fighting-in-libyan-war/244356/>

⁴⁵² Ulrich H. Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt, “Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 1-20

⁴⁵³ Kenneth Pollack, *Arabs at War, 1948-1991* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 417.

Codos guerillas.⁴⁵⁴ The CNAF fought in a resourceful fashion to overcome their material weakness, in which the CNAF destroyed and captured over \$1 billion worth of Libyan military equipment, killed over 7,000 Libyan troops, and only suffered about 1,000 casualties.⁴⁵⁵

Effective Militaries

An effective military is one that is able to protect their regime, while not posing a threat to it and its people (i.e. society). It is also capable of projecting some military force in an efficient manner, and their troops perform better than opponents in combat situations, to include peacekeeping and stability operations. Because regime leaders trust their military, the military has its own bureaucratic ‘military enclave’ in which it is able to operate without the inefficiencies of their patrimonial government, while also playing a domestic state-building role that may be explicitly or implicitly political. This means the military organization can learn and adapt, with a focus on being militarily effective through cohesive policies. While the country has significant resources for its military, political and military elites come to a mutual agreement on power sharing, appropriate levels of spending, and dictating the amount of domestic involvement by the army (e.g. using the military for state development purposes). Finally, some informal institutions still continue to dominate the way in which the military operates (especially former rebel armies). While informal institutions give the appearance of inefficiencies, they are function in a positive fashion that contributes to military effectiveness in the form of cohesion, command and control, and discipline.

⁴⁵⁴ Mirjam De Bruijn and Han van Dijk. "The multiple experiences of civil war in the Guéra region of Chad, 1965-1990," *Sociologus* (2007): 61-98.

⁴⁵⁵ Geoff Simons, *Libya and the West: from independence to Lockerbie* (London: IB Tauris, 2003), 58; Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 391-397.

Chapters 6 (Senegal), 7 (Uganda), 8 (Rwanda), and 9 (Ethiopia), will highlight the various ways in which these militaries have come to be effective in their own context. Special attention will be paid to the role of colonialism, informal institutions (networks of relations especially), Western security force assistance (and foreign aid)⁴⁵⁶, state-building, and civil-military relations. All of these are necessary to understand in unpacking the ‘black box’ of military institutions in each country. Moreover, considerations of neighboring militaries and differences between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ political configurations of the state will be illustrated to highlight varying processes that have contributed to military effectiveness. Finally, military effectiveness will be conceptualized from the perspective of military personnel in each country as a way of juxtaposing Western notions of what is needed to create a powerful army (see Figure 5-4).

⁴⁵⁶ China aid is left out of this analysis, though new data is coming to light:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/11/china-treats-its-foreign-aid-like-a-state-secret-new-research-aims-to-reveal-it/?utm_term=.e6ef790b909b




Figure 5-4: British Military Taxonomy of military effectiveness being created from three components: Physical, Moral, and Conceptual. Source: Jim Storr, *The human face of war* (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 8.

As mentioned in Chapter 1 (Introduction), Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, are notable for using their militaries practically more than any other country in Africa, which is surprising given their categorization as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). However, being a big contributor to peacekeeping is not a strong indicator of loyalty to their government or military effectiveness either as “Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Fiji, Ethiopia, Rwanda and the Philippines provided a staggering 39% of all U.N. forces” in 2014 and some of these countries have had problems with their respective militaries.⁴⁵⁷ Since coming into their respective political configurations, Ethiopia (1991) and Rwanda (1994), have managed to create tranquil state-military relations, avoiding coup problems, which had plagued their countries before. Similarly,

⁴⁵⁷ Adam McCauley, “Soldiers from Poor Countries Have Become the World’s Peacekeepers,” *TIME*, September 12, 2014, <http://time.com/3272718/un-undof-peacekeeping-golan-heights-terrorism/>

India has only had one coup attempt since its independence in 1947, and it was staged in 1968 by the secessionist Nagas in the northeast, led by Indian General Zeheto.⁴⁵⁸ The other countries appear more prone to military coups: Pakistan with 6 attempts since 1951 (last attempt in 1999 was successful), Bangladesh with 10 attempts (last successful in 2007), Fiji with 5 coup attempts since 1987 (last successful in 2006), and the Philippines with 12 attempts since 1948 (none successful thus far).⁴⁵⁹ Thus, it is problematic when scholars contend that deploying troops for peacekeeping and other military activities will liberalize them (i.e. bringing back democratic values to their country) into being subservient to their civilian authorities.⁴⁶⁰ Similarly, it is just as difficult to accept arguments from opposing scholars that contend that participation in peacekeeping abroad makes that military more likely to “subvert democracy” when back home.⁴⁶¹ In either case, some form of socialization occurs when engaged in peacekeeping abroad, but it is hard to ascertain whether such activities will have positive or negative impacts on the state and society when such troops return. This indicates that the way a military is structured and organized, and its relations with civilian authorities, probably has more influence on how international peacekeeping impacts individual troops views upon returning home.

In fact, in all my interviews with Western military officials and African government military personnel, they all complained about the militaries of Pakistan and India, being the worst peacekeepers because they “did not want to fight,” or as one Senegalese colonel put it,

⁴⁵⁸ Many datasets code this event as a military coup though it seems more as it was an attempt to become independent from India. Asoso Yonuo, *The rising Nagas: A historical and political study* (Delhi: Vivek Publishing House, 1974), 355, 387, 388, and 392.

⁴⁵⁹ “Coups d’état, 1946-2016” dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

⁴⁶⁰ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” In Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1-13.

⁴⁶¹ Philip Cunliffe, “From peacekeepers to praetorians—how participating in peacekeeping operations may subvert democracy,” *International Relations* (2017): online.

“these [Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshi] soldiers would regularly tell us that they were ‘here not to die’[sic].”⁴⁶² If a military lacks esprit de corps, ideology, morale, and/or discipline, then it is highly unlikely to be effective militarily. Thus, it should be no surprise that some of these disillusioned troops return home to a politically unstable environment and attempt to alter the state and their relationship to the government and society. This is also indicative of some research showing that military mutinies are also very likely in West and Central Africa after troops come home from UN peacekeeping mission, because they are internally rebelling against their military leadership for poor working conditions and low pay.⁴⁶³ Such behaviors are due in part because they are returning to a political context where their ‘professionalism’ is seen as a threat to the regime, especially in a military that is personalized by political leadership.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the importance of political context and processual relations between political authorities to establish how one military can be more effective and resourceful relative to the other. Literature on military effectiveness was surveyed to identify the gap in research that generally avoids analysis of African armies. From this I contend that militaries can be effective beyond the simple Western view that apolitical armies are best. Instead, I develop the precept that there are various traits and merits to the ideal type armies that can be apolitical, political, and personalist. Moreover, I note that professional soldiers can exist in each type of military. This contributes to the development of my model of institutional military effectiveness, where I illustrate that resources matter, but that it comes down to civil-military relations and political

⁴⁶² Interview, August 14, 2017.

⁴⁶³ Maggie Dwyer, "Borrowed scripts: Democratisation and military mutinies in West and Central Africa," *Conflict, Security & Development* 15, no. 2 (2015): 97-118.

context in how militaries achieve military power. This allows for the identification of five different ideal types of militaries: Ineffective, Hollow, Parochial, Resourceful, and Effective. From this I described each ideal type and gave empirical examples for each. The next four chapters will go in-depth to discover how Senegal (Chapter 6), Uganda (Chapter 7), Rwanda (Chapter 8), and Ethiopia (Chapter 9), have established effective militaries in their respective configurations of civil-military relations.

Chapter 6 – Senegal: The *Armée-Nation* ‘Rolls On’

*Où se trouvent donc les militants de votre parti?
(Where are the militants of your party?)*

*Jean Alfred Diallo
Senegalese General*

*Mon Général, prenez le pouvoir si vous le voulez...
Avec vous je sais que tout ira bien.
(General, take the power if you want it...
With you I know that everything will be fine.)*

*Léopold Sédar Senghor
Senegalese President
Friendly conversation at the High Council of Security in 1968⁴⁶⁴*

*The Senegalese military is not a separate caste of society...
too many African militaries create their own nobility.*

*Senegalese Military Officer
Interview
August 16, 2017*

During colonial rule, Dakar hosted a large French presence, with the Senegalese assimilating and being tasked with helping in the administration of French West Africa.⁴⁶⁵ Since independence in 1960, the Senegalese have created a stable state that is a durable semi-presidential republic. It is also remarkable state for having only suffered one minor internal conflict – a secessionist effort in the southern Casamance region since 1982⁴⁶⁶ – and no military coup attempts. This is exceptional in the West African context, as the region has had more violent conflicts and civil

⁴⁶⁴ Momar Coumba Diop and Mamadou Diouf, *Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf: état et société*. (Paris: Karthala Editions, 1990), 43; Pascal Bianchini, *Ecole et politique en Afrique noire: sociologie des crises et des réformes du système d'enseignement au Sénégal et au Burkina FASO (1960-2000)* (Paris: Karthala Editions, 2004), 77.

⁴⁶⁵ Francois Manchuelle, *Willing Migrants* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1998); David Robinson, *Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania* (Portsmouth, N. H.: Heinemann, 2001).

⁴⁶⁶ There are numerous dates before 1982 that are used to indicate the secessionist movement, however the rebellion formally began on December 26, 1982. For extensive background on the dynamics and grievances surrounding the Casamance Conflict refer to: Aïssatou Fall, “Understanding the Casamance Conflict: A Background,” *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)*, Monograph 7, December 2010.

strife than any other region.⁴⁶⁷ West Africa⁴⁶⁸ makes up 41% of the number of coup events that have occurred on the continent (1952-2018), experiencing the most successful coups as well, which stands at 44 with the most recent 2012 coup where Guinea-Bissau military officers set up a new government.⁴⁶⁹

Some may credit the good fortunes of Senegal to their cultural norm of *Téranga* (hospitality towards guests), but Mali has a similar norm known as *cousinage* (mutual understanding between ethnic groups) and *sanankuya* (familial joking relationships with outsiders). Besides a similar culture and religion, Mali shares similar familial ties, and demographic makeup, but it has had 10 coup events – beginning with the successful 1968 coup (led by Lt. Moussa Traoré) and most recently, another successful one in 2012 (led by Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo). Historically speaking, Senegal has been known for its spirit of dialogue and consensus to explain its success since independence,⁴⁷⁰ and yet it is ignored that Mali has a very similar societal tradition and equivalent mechanisms for dealing with disputes and reconciliation.⁴⁷¹ In fact, between the two, Mali was historically considered to have created one of the strongest and most famous standing armies in precolonial Africa.⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁷ Nancy Annan, *Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects*. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1 (2014): article 3.

⁴⁶⁸ For these purposes, West Africa is defined as Benin, Burkina Faso, the island nation of Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo.

⁴⁶⁹ “Coups d'état, 1946-2016” dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

⁴⁷⁰ Iba Der Thiam and Mbaye Guèye, *Atlas du Sénégal* (Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique, 2000).

⁴⁷¹ Scott Straus, *Making and unmaking nations: The origins and dynamics of genocide in contemporary Africa*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), chapter 6.

⁴⁷² Timothy J. Stapleton, *A Military History of Africa, The Precolonial Period: From Ancient Egypt to the Zulu Kingdom (Earliest time to ca. 1870)* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013), 73-74.

It may be that some scholars take these attributes as the cause of stability in Senegal, even though these same attributes are present in many other countries in Africa. How did Senegal manage to avoid the military coup trap in a region known for civil wars and poor civil-military relations, while simultaneously building a relatively effective military? In this case, Senegal stands in contrast to the other West African state, Cabo Verde, which has not had any military coup attempts, but has maintained a small military (about 1,000 personnel) that has been purposively been kept weak, un-professionalized, and given little capacity to project power.⁴⁷³

Numerous scholars and journalists have pointed out that “West Africa has a coup problem.”⁴⁷⁴ In fact, the absence of a military coup attempt in Senegal has led to 83% of its public trusting its military “a lot,” which is more than any other country in Africa.⁴⁷⁵ Such trust is not a guarantee for good military behavior either. In 2015, 67% Burundians trusted their army “a lot” in a 2015 *Afrobarometer* survey.⁴⁷⁶ And yet, months after that survey, Burundian General Godefroid Niyombare attempted a coup while President Pierre Nkurunziza was visiting Tanzania.⁴⁷⁷ The greatest difference between the army of Senegal, known as the *forces armées sénégalaises* (SAF), and that of Burundi is that the SAF has retained many legacies of French colonial administrative structures, particularly its apolitical character (at least in principle). Meanwhile, Burundi has had 17 military coups events since 1965, two major civil wars, and its

⁴⁷³ Gregory R. Copley, *Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook* (Washington, DC: Perth Corporation, 1999), 257; Nicolas Cook and Tomas F. Husted, “Cabo Verde: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, February 6, 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44756.pdf>

⁴⁷⁴ John Hudson, “Why Are There So Many Coups in West Africa?” *The Atlantic*, April 17, 2012, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/why-are-there-so-many-coups-west-africa/329209/>

⁴⁷⁵ Afrobarometer Survey (R5 2011/2013), <http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online>

⁴⁷⁶ Afrobarometer Survey (R6 2014/2015).

⁴⁷⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/15/burundi-army-dead-radio-station-battle-coup-leaders-arrested>

armed forces have had to deal with the problems of integrating various fighters from rebel groups since 2000.⁴⁷⁸

Sound civil-military relations since Senegal's independence and agential choices by political and military leaders appear to have crafted this outlier of stable civil-military relations in an otherwise tumultuous region. Such positive civil-military relations in Senegal have not been a given or predestined. It is not the product of a special culture, religion, French colonialism or other influences (e.g. foreign assistance). One might even assume that lackluster economic growth in Senegal would have undermined its state power,⁴⁷⁹ and yet it continues to carry on as a clientelist democracy.⁴⁸⁰ Coups in other francophone West African countries abound as does regional terrorism.⁴⁸¹ Instead, various institutional forces and path dependencies have permitted the growth of the SAF into an effective military that is not a threat to the Senegalese regime or society, while managing to protect the state from armed extremist groups in the region.

The Senegalese have done a lot to limit militarism in their society, which one could contend prevents military coups and other systemic issues related to a military dominating politics. At the same time, the Senegalese have had a very active foreign policy since independence, having consistently deployed its military in support of numerous missions on behalf of the UN, AU, and other regional organizations and alliances.⁴⁸² It has become such an

⁴⁷⁸ Cyrus Samii, "Military Integration in Burundi, 2000-2006," In Roy Licklider (ed.), *New Armies from Old: Merging competing military forces after civil wars* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 213.

⁴⁷⁹ Boone, Catherine. *Merchant capital and the roots of state power in Senegal: 1930-1985*. Cambridge university press, 2006.

⁴⁸⁰ Linda J. Beck, *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008).

⁴⁸¹ Seth J. Frantzman, "Senegal: The Linchpin of Security in West Africa," *The National Interest*, March 14, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/senegal-the-linchpin-security-west-africa-15485>

⁴⁸² Mays, Terry M. *Historical dictionary of multinational peacekeeping* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010).

institutionalized aspect of the SAF, that one cannot make the rank of Colonel (or higher) without having deployed on numerous peacekeeping missions. In fact, where some would assume that the best way to keep a military from militarizing society or engaging in *coup d'état* would be through keeping the military small and underfunded, Senegal has permitted the growth of a strong and effective military. Indeed, the size of the SAF is average – ranking 25th overall in Africa with about 18,000 troops – whereas the much richer Ghana has a smaller military of about 15,000. Moreover, Senegal has mobilized more of their population into their military – about 0.145% – while Ghana has mobilized only 0.05% of their population into military service but has experienced 15 coup events since 1961.⁴⁸³ Yet, despite the appearance of Senegal being more militarized than Ghana, Ghana still appears to be suffering from the after-effects of its numerous coups and juntas. This has led to successive civilian governments in Ghana to purposively weaken the army, leading one security expert on Ghana to comment that their military will remain lackluster due to their “inability to retain personnel” and that the army is “heavily dependent on external assistance.”⁴⁸⁴ Part of this problem is driven by politicians in Ghana that have been trying to politicize the apolitical army by bribing younger officers to their side.⁴⁸⁵

Some scholars have insinuated that the reason why Senegal turned out the way it did was because of its first president Léopold Sédar Senghor (1960-1980) was a Francophile that relied on Paris to act as a policeman to maintain the regime's hold on power.⁴⁸⁶ Such arguments fall short when one considers that Côte d'Ivoire had a similar type of Francophile leader, President

⁴⁸³ “Coups d'état, 1946-2016” dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

⁴⁸⁴ Interview, August 2, 2017.

⁴⁸⁵ Levine, Daniel H. "The Impact of Ghanaian Peacekeeping on Domestic Civil–Military Relations." *The Good Society* 25, no. 1 (2017): 81-104.

⁴⁸⁶ Schwab, Peter. *Designing West Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 65-83.

Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993), that shared a similarly positive relationship with France.⁴⁸⁷ Like Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny was a member of French Fourth Republic cabinets, a member of the Fifth Republic's constitutional drafting committee, and a French citizen. It is argued that such a “post-colonial historic bloc”⁴⁸⁸ in former French territories made it easier to operate patronage systems of control with help from a French security guarantee, while focusing on state institutions – to include centralization of administration – with some modicums of competency.⁴⁸⁹ Thus, despite the French having military bases in both countries, extensive French training and financial support in both, Senegal was able to keep its military focused on development and out of domestic politics, whereas the military of Côte d'Ivoire became politicized in the late 1990s. This politicization of Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces was an act of domestic choice by political elites after the death of Houphouët-Boigny, but only because the deceased leader did not explicitly identify his successor or normalize how the state would operate without him.⁴⁹⁰

Did Senegal get ‘lucky’ in purely situational terms, or was this outcome the consequence of a carefully crafted political strategy between civilians and military officials? In fact, I argue that the latter is central to this unusual but significant outcome.

A Brush-up in Senegalese Civil-Military Relations?

⁴⁸⁷ Joseph N. Weatherby, Craig Arceneaux, Emmit B. Evans Jr., Dianne Long, Ira Reed, Olga D. Novikova-Carter, *The other world: issues and politics in the developing world* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 191.

⁴⁸⁸ Jean-François Bayart, *L'État en Afrique: La Politique du Ventre* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 245-250.

⁴⁸⁹ William Reno “Protectors and predators: Why is there a difference among West African militias?” In Andersen, Louise, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat (eds.), *Fragile states and insecure people? Violence, security, and statehood in the twenty-first century*. Springer, 2007. 102-103.

⁴⁹⁰ Boubacar N'Diaye, *The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast, and Kenya in comparative perspective* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1997), 159-161.

After independence, Senghor created a presidential regime with multiparty democracy – three parties were allowed – and chose to peacefully resign in 1980, retiring himself to literature and poetry in France, allowing his Prime Minister (Abdou Diouf) to take over as president in 1981. Diouf continued political liberalization during his rule, and he was defeated in presidential elections 2000 by Abdoulaye Wade, which permitted a third peaceful transition to power. Wade stayed in power as president until losing an election to Macky Sall in 2012, leading to another peaceful democratic transition of power. Thus, Senegal had numerous political transitions without political violence or involvement from the SAF in political affairs. This is not to say that there were no major political struggles or attempts at trying to politicize or personalize the SAF, which could have turned Senegal sour.

In fact, the outcome of Senegal's first internal political struggle in 1962 between Senghor and his Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia, was a critical juncture in how Senegalese elites would handle future internal problems and how the SAF would behave and operate (with regards to their role as a non-partisan apolitical army). While many social scientists have coded the power struggle as a political coup attempt (or plot) by Dia, labeling it so is conceptually incorrect.⁴⁹¹ This supposed coup event by Dia was in fact a constitutional crisis that led to a misunderstanding between Senghor and Dia; both of whom were African socialist partisans.⁴⁹² The only difference was that Dia was trying to implement radical and autocratic socialist policies, which worried the French and most Senegalese elites, whereas Senghor preferred “armchair socialism.”⁴⁹³

⁴⁹¹ A report by the British Ministry of Defence incorrectly considers the 1962 December event as a military coup. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/ConflictTrendsAfrica2006MGMarshall.pdf>

⁴⁹² Elisabeth Fink, "The Radical Road Not Taken: Mamadou Dia, Léopold Sédar Senghor, and the Constitutional Crisis of December 1962," Unpublished Thesis, Colombia University, New York City, 2007.

⁴⁹³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/03/mamadou-dia-obituary-senegal>

The supposed coup ‘incident’ in December of 1962 was more a product of actors behind the scenes, where talk of ‘censuring’ Dia led to each part of their respective political power bases to view one another with suspicion, leading to confusion by both sides.⁴⁹⁴ In that moment, Dia’s supporters perceived an action by Senghor as in violation of the constitution.⁴⁹⁵ An American anthropologist account of the events leading up to the December incident and after – to include a trial for Dia and his associates – reaffirms interpretations that Dia and Senghor did not intend to remove the other from power.⁴⁹⁶ However, each had grown to distrust each other (as did their loyal associates), and they misinterpreted each other’s actions. Dia and Senghor were not personally trying to outmaneuver one another, but those loyal to each leader were taking actions that made it appear as if there was going to be a violent power grab. Thus, Dia incidentally ended up with the local police, gendarmerie, and the Senegalese Army Chief of Staff (General Amadou Fall), backing his side because Dia was still considered the Minister of Defence from their point of view. This led to Senghor to misinterpret Dia, leading him to call in a company of paratroopers stationed at Rufisque to defend the presidential palace.

Senghor’s decision to refrain from forcefully removing Dia and his colleagues with paratroopers from the administrative building they barricaded themselves in, permitted Senghor to retain legitimacy in the eyes of the public. In addition, his restraint of force deescalated the tense situation, putting Senegal on a positive path of non-violent political solutions. Avoiding the use of the paratroopers to engage in an offensive military operation is exactly what prevented

⁴⁹⁴ T. Diallo, “Quand l’affaire Mamadou Dia faillit brouiller les deux complices,” *Le Quotidien Sud*, July 14, 2008.

⁴⁹⁵ Roland Colin, *Sénégal notre pirogue, Au soleil de la liberté, Journal de bord 1955-1980*, preface by d’Elikia M’Bokolo (Paris: Présence Africaine, 2007), chapter 8.

⁴⁹⁶ Victor D. Du Bois, “The Trial of Mamadou Dia,” American Universities Field Staff Report Service, West Africa Series, VI, No. 6 (June 1963)

Senghor's regime from politicizing the army. It also prevented a loss of confidence in the army that would have likely ensued if they had been used to resolve a political dispute.

Few leaders in Africa have ever shown that much restraint when put into a similar type of situation, and the long-term outcome for those lacking restraint at these contingent junctures has led to state deformation. For instance, in the beginning of the Congo Crisis, President Joseph Kasa-Vubu went for a power grab by trying to dismiss his Prime Minister Patrice Émery Lumumba. When Lumumba refused his dismissal, Kasa-Vubu ordered the army – under the command of Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu – to arrest Lumumba, who was turned over to a rebel group and murdered.⁴⁹⁷ Such an action politicized and polarized the army, and it should be no surprise then that General Mobutu ultimately ended up engaging in a coup against Kasa-Vubu in 1965. Mobutu's rise to power – and his totalitarian rule until 1997 – was more the product of an army being politicized by the civilian government than a simplistic story of Mobutu's machinations, since he was just a sergeant in the colonial army before the independence of Congo. However, due to Congolese soldier mutinies (initially none of them could be officers), political concessions by the Congolese government to end the army rebellion resulted in many being promoted to high ranking officer jobs. This is how Mobutu was promoted to colonel, getting to serve as the first chief of staff of the army. This set him on a newly politicized path to intervene politically as he eventually did.⁴⁹⁸

Returning to the case of Senegal, Dia and his associates left the building, went home, and were eventually arrested by the police days later. They were put on trial for plotting a coup, with

⁴⁹⁷ Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

⁴⁹⁸ Kisangani Emizet, "Explaining the rise and fall of military regimes: Civil-military relations in the Congo," *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 2 (2000): 203-227.

long sentences that were eventually commuted and pardoned by Senghor a decade later. Because of the incident, General Fall – who had publicly backed Dia – was forced to resign, and the Colonel in charge of the paratroopers, Jean Alfred Diallo, was promoted to General and replaced Fall as the new Army Chief of Staff. The tranquil outcome of the Senghor-Dia constitutional dispute was an anomaly at a time when political scientists, such as Aristide Zolberg, observed in 1968 that “the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features.”⁴⁹⁹

A less known issue caused a different struggle in civil-military relations involved the election of Wade, who ushered in an era (2000-2012) of personalist governance and increased patrimonialism.⁵⁰⁰ Of every Senegalese military official interviewed, each mentioned how institutionally strong the SAF was in being able to resist Wade’s attempts at personalizing the military. The only aspect that Wade could slightly alter towards his personal preferences was the appointment of SAF flag officers (generals and admirals), which was a constitutional right. The Senegalese military has a rationalized process in which they submit to the president a list of all officers that are qualified to become a flag officer in certain positions that need filling. During Wade’s tenure, he created his own list of “qualified” flag officers and attempted to stuff the military with cronies that were known to be his personal friends. Each time, the SAF pushed back and struck out most of the names on Wade’s personalized flag officer list, because “many of them were simply unqualified or considered incompetent by many of us.”⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁹ Aristide R. Zolberg, "The structure of political conflict in the new states of tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review* 62, no. 1 (1968), 70.

⁵⁰⁰ Penda Mbow, "Senegal: The return of personalism," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (2008): 156-169.

⁵⁰¹ Interview with SAF Colonel and General, August 2017.

Eventually a mutual agreement came into being, where Wade was able to promote several of his ‘close friends’ to the rank of General and Admiral, which during his tenure, he tripled the rate of promotions to those ranks. However, the majority of Wade’s flag officers were primarily put into non-combatant positions (i.e. support jobs), and many others only served less than a year or two before being forced into compulsory retirement.⁵⁰² To the credit of the SAF, they wanted to prevent institutional damage to their apolitical army and adeptly handled Wade’s time in office. Of all SAF personnel interviewed, there was only one notable flag officer that was appointed by Wade that was considered a problematic crony, Vice Admiral Cheikh Cissokho, as he was given an important position. Many confided that he was ‘qualified on paper but lacked the leadership traits’ seen in most other flag officers. Apparently, Cissokho was an old roommate of Wade, and because of this personal connection, he became *Sous-Chef d’État-Major général des Armées* (CEMGA), making him the second in command of the SAF. Nevertheless, it appears that the SAF adapted to this predicament and took numerous actions to ensure Cissokho (and others) did not cause institutional damage to the organization of the SAF.

Besides trying to create a cadre of loyalist flag officers through patronage appointments, Wade also tried to make the SAF more political. Since its founding, Senegal has not allowed its military to vote, and the decision by General Fall to accept resignation without protesting or mobilizing troops loyal to him prevented the SAF from becoming politicized or personalized. However, in 2006, Wade helped pass legislation that permitted SAF personnel to vote. He coincidentally did this around the same time that he helped pass a spending bill that greatly increased the pay and benefits for Senegal’s military. However, most of the Senegalese officer

⁵⁰² All SAF personnel must retire by the age of 59, except for Generals who have to retire by the age of 60.

corps saw this as a cynical attempt to politicize the entire military, as it was perceived as *quid pro quo* legislation. Many admitted to not voting or voting for the other candidate at the time. Nonetheless, Wade won re-election in 2007 with 56% of the vote in the first-round.⁵⁰³ Eventually Wade would lose to Sall in 2012 elections, without incident, and many considered Sall to be a return to normalcy where he has not tried to politicize the SAF. Finally, the ability of the SAF to resist might also lay with its composition, as it was purposively built to be ethnically diverse, which one scholar argues makes such a military more likely to defend constitutional practices and prevent leaders from trying to personalize their power and extend their time in office.⁵⁰⁴

This example shows how institutionally robust and apolitical the SAF had become in that it was able to prevent intra-military fragmentation or a reduction in military effectiveness. The ability of the SAF to ‘flex’ against a personalist president indicates its high organizational capability, but also pragmatic skill in allowing itself to administratively ‘flex’ in allowing a president to stuff the military with some personal friends as a form of patronage payoffs. This equilibrium was vital in avoiding a disruption to tranquil civil-military relations, while the SAF maintained its institutional effectiveness against a personalist regime and still operate its organization as a bureaucratically efficient ‘military enclave’.

The Divergence of Côte d'Ivoire

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny kept his country stable and peaceful during his rule. Unlike Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny did not have a ‘game plan’ in place for who would rule

⁵⁰³ <https://libraries.indiana.edu/snapshot-2007-presidential-campaign-senegal>

⁵⁰⁴ Kristen A. Harkness, "Military loyalty and the failure of democratization in Africa: how ethnic armies shape the capacity of presidents to defy term limits." *Democratization* 24, no. 5 (2017): 801-818.

after him. This was because the president over relied on personal networks and his discretion over military appointments and promotions, eventually led to the intra-polarization of Côte d'Ivoire's armed forces. During this period, French assistance protected the Ivorian regime from the military, whereas the Senegalese regime had high 'absorptive capabilities' and was able to integrate the benefits of French military training that increased the level of human capital available for state-building projects.

When Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993, it led to a brief power struggle between the President of the National Assembly (Henri Konan Bédié) and the Prime Minister (Alassane Ouattara). Bédié declared himself the new president on state tv first without consulting other elites, and the Army Chief (General Robert Guéï) declared neutrality in the dispute between Bédié and Ouattara.⁵⁰⁵ In the years that followed, Bédié engaged in political repression, relying on loyal military units to put down protests, and created personalized networks of government corruption. Such events turn the military against him, eventually leading to a successful military coup by officers loyal to Guéï in 1999.⁵⁰⁶ During that time, Guéï had been dismissed by Bédié for a lack of loyalty in 1997, when he personally refused to deploy troops to put down Ivorian election protests, stating "The army does not intervene unless the republic is in danger."⁵⁰⁷ After this event, the country literally fell apart as the armed forces disintegrated along ethnic lines.⁵⁰⁸ Ethnic fragmentation split society and various military units, causing two major civil wars (2002-2007 and again in 2011). These events resulted in an ineffective Côte d'Ivoire

⁵⁰⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2002/sep/21/guardianobituaries1>

⁵⁰⁶ Jean-Pierre Dozon, "La Côte d'Ivoire au péril de l'ivoirité": genèse d'un coup d'État," *Afrique contemporaine* 193 (2000): 13-23.

⁵⁰⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2002/sep/21/guardianobituaries1>

⁵⁰⁸ "Cote D'Ivoire History Timeline," World Atlas, <https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/cotedivoire/citimeline.htm>

military as the government increasingly relied on co-ethnic loyalist military units while underfunding and debasing other parts of the military.⁵⁰⁹ Yet up until 1999, Côte d'Ivoire was considered a “model” by many experts because of its “long period of political stability.”⁵¹⁰ Unfortunately, it seems that institutional breakdowns became a norm in Côte d'Ivoire after Houphouët-Boigny died as he did not do enough to institutionalize power throughout the various components of his government.

Thus, what has been different about the way political and military elites have fostered the creation of a strong Senegalese military that is capable of deploying on a regular basis, while avoiding the creation of a police state or a military embedded into the politics of society?

Senegal and Mali: Twins with different Political Strategies at Birth

Some have attributed Senegal’s ability to retain its secular state and cohesive military to the role of the pragmatic form of Sufi Islam practiced in Senegal through the four primary Sufi brotherhood orders. One could presuppose that informal networks of relationships between the various Sufi orders, through their respective religious brotherhoods, could serve as mechanisms of coordination, cooperation, and control. However, upon closer inspection, it appears that Senegal is not exceptional for its particular religious pragmatism or Islam’s relationship with society and the state. Instead, one Africanist historian contends that such mechanisms and processes in Senegal are just as prevalent in coordinating activities and politics in the Malian

⁵⁰⁹ Michael Murphy, “A Deal with the Devil? Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Civil War Conflicts,” *Paterson Review of International Affairs* Vol. 15, 2015, 1-19.

⁵¹⁰ Akindès Francis *The roots of the military-political crises in Côte d'Ivoire* (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute, 2004), 5.

state (Sudanese Republic).⁵¹¹ This evidence then indicates that the particular Sufi Islam practiced in Senegal and Mali may not be as important for state-building, ‘good’ democratic politics,⁵¹² and/or in creating effective military institutions, as one may come to believe. This is interesting to note, as many Senegalese officers interviewed (and other experts on Senegal) believed that the strength of the SAF and durability of Senegalese society was due to the moderating force of Sufi Islam. Perhaps the failure of Mali’s cultural approach to integration was that its political leaders tried too hard to assert authority over northern Mali, despite its historical tendencies towards autonomy before (and during) French colonialism.

In many ways, Mali is a lot like Senegal. They each have a similar population size, Senegal with 15 million people and Mali with 17 million, and their economies are similar in scale; in 2015 each had a GDP of about \$12 billion.⁵¹³ In addition, each country is at least 90% Muslim and has a similarly dominant ethnic group; Wolof making up 38% of Senegal and the Bambara being about 34% of Mali.⁵¹⁴ This has led to the language of Wolof and Bambara being the predominant way in which each of their countries does business and politics, and yet ethnic rivalries have not been a feature of politics in Senegal or Mali.⁵¹⁵ In addition, each country shares a similar experience in military matters, having contributed troops to *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, a French colonial infantry unit composed of various ethnic groups and tribes throughout Francophone Africa, that saw combat in various wars from 1857 until being disbanded in

⁵¹¹ Andrew Francis Clark, "Imperialism, independence, and Islam in Senegal and Mali." *Africa Today* 46, no. 3 (1999): 149-167.

⁵¹² El Hadji Samba Diallo and Catherine Lena Kelly. "Sufi Turuq and the politics of democratization in Senegal." *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 2, no. 2 (2016): 193-211.

⁵¹³ The World Bank, 2018, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=MLI>

⁵¹⁴ <https://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/senegal.mali>

⁵¹⁵ <http://minorityrights.org/country/mali/>

1964.⁵¹⁶ If a ‘warrior culture’ existed or could influence military institutions then Senegal and Mali had developed a reputation for effectiveness as one German soldier in World War Two commented: “The French fought tenaciously; the blacks especially used every resource to the bitter end, defended every house. To break them, we had to use flame throwers, and, to overcome the last Senegalese [French West Africans], we had to kill them one by one.”⁵¹⁷

Yet, since independence, each country has taken dramatically different political and developmental paths. Senegal created an effective army that is mostly apolitical, engages in domestic state-building under the ideological auspices of *Armée-Nation*, stayed militarily aligned with France (and West), and has been a consistent and significant contributor to peacekeeping operations. Mali on the other hand has seen its society in turmoil since independence. The Malian army overthrew the government in 1968 due to their inability to address growing developmental problems.⁵¹⁸ Part of this was driven by the choices of homogenous Malian political elites that created an unstable political process.⁵¹⁹ Consequently, it has resulted in a tendency of a Malian military that is regularly involved in politics (i.e. coups and military regimes), intermittently (when stable) deploying peacekeepers, and a political system and military that has struggled with Tuareg separatists in the north. While some have attributed the contemporary Malian military ineffectiveness problem to being rooted in how it handled the first

⁵¹⁶Myron J. Echenberg, *Les tirailleurs sénégalais en Afrique occidentale française, 1857-1960* (Paris: Karthala, 2009).

⁵¹⁷ The Pommersche Zeitung of 28 July 1940 reported on the resistance of African troops serving in the French military at Conde-Folie, near Amiens, lower Somme; as quoted in ANSHA, 34N/1081, Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Polidori, 53rd RICMS, en captivité 3 July 1940, sur les opérations des 4-5-6 et 7 Juin 1940.

⁵¹⁸ Valerie Plave Bennett, "Military Government in Mali." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 13, no. 2 (1975): 249-66.

⁵¹⁹ William J. Foltz, *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), 189.

Tuareg rebellion, where the Malian army ruthlessly crushed these nomadic peoples through a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign of “massacres, poisoning of wells, and destruction of flocks,” which created tremendous intergenerational grievances.⁵²⁰ It has also continued to struggle with institutionally integrating ethnic Tuaregs into the army due to a 1992 treaty.⁵²¹ This stands in contrast to the SAF, which has consistently treated the Casamance Conflict as a policing action rather than as a firepower intensive COIN mission.⁵²² The Malian problem has more to do with poor institutional choices, leading to the intra-politicization of their army.

In numerous interviews with Senegalese military personnel that had decades of experience working with the Malian military (some mentioned familial ties) in training, education and exercises, they considered the Malians to be equally effective. However, in the early 2000s SAF personnel noticed a significant decrease in the professionalism of the Malian troops they worked with.⁵²³ They noted that ‘fraternization’ (e.g. inappropriate relations) became widespread in the barracks between the Malian officers and their enlisted troops. To the Senegalese, they viewed this as a serious breach of discipline that undermined organizational cohesiveness. They contended that it facilitated the downfall of the Malian military, leading to various politicized intra-military factions to develop. This was partially driven by Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré (nicknamed “ATT”) provoking the Tuareg, as ATT promoted the Imghad clan (El Hadj Ag Gamou as the leader) as a military force in the north to the

⁵²⁰ Dona J. Stewart, *What is next for Mali? The roots of conflict and challenges to stability* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 33.

⁵²¹ “Country Profile: Mali, January 2005,” *Library of Congress – Federal Research Division*, <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Mali-new.pdf>, 5

⁵²² Field Research, Pentagon, U.S. Africa Command, and Senegal, July-August 2017.

⁵²³ Interviews, Senegal, August 2017.

detriment of the historically dominant Ifoghas clan.⁵²⁴ These problems collided in roughshod in 2012 as corruption in the Malian government and a polarized military made them ineffectual in their response to the Tuareg Rebellion that began in January of 2012, as 1,600 Malian troops in northern Mali defected to the Tuareg's National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) with all their weapons and equipment.⁵²⁵ Moreover, the internal divisions within the Malian military, festered primarily between the well-funded elite 'Red Berets' (paratrooper Presidential Guard) and under-resourced 'Green Berets' (i.e. pro-coup infantry), made them unable to cooperate in effective military operations against Tuareg separatists.⁵²⁶ This was made even more problematic by the Green Berets being unable to project power nor operate in the desert region of northern Mali.⁵²⁷

These various problems eventually required the French military to intervene in 2013 to push back the Tuareg militants, but since that time, the Malian state and its military has essentially remained a 'trustee' of the international community. French and American military training and advising has been substantially increased in hopes that the government and military will not factionalize and disintegrate again. This may not be a viable long-term panacea, as the French and American military had already been engaged in Mali in limited advise and assist missions in the early 2000s trying to professionalize their armed forces before the Tuareg rebellion erupted.⁵²⁸ Of course one cannot ignore the forces that generated the rebellion as the

⁵²⁴ Interview, February 2018.

⁵²⁵ Adam Nossiter, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti, "French strikes in Mali supplant caution of the US," *The New York Times*, January 12, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/world/africa/french-jets-strike-deep-inside-islamist-held-mali.html?pagewanted=1>

⁵²⁶ Wing, Susanna D. "Mali: Politics of a crisis." *African Affairs* 112, no. 448 (2013): 476-485.

⁵²⁷ Interview, February 2018.

⁵²⁸ Austin Merrill, "Letter from Timbuktu," *Vanity Fair*, September 2007, <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2007/09/sahara200709>

historically dominant Ifoghas clan chafed against ATT's empowerment of the Imghad clan, which was supposed to be subservient. However, based on interviews with Western advisors, it seems that such training only provided tactical competence and proficiency, which was undermined by weak Malian military institutions and politicization that made it difficult to generate any modicum of military effectiveness.

While some have criticized the SAF as militarizing society due to its developmental role in Senegal,⁵²⁹ in fact the *Armée-Nation* ideology has been the cohesive glue in fostering the idea of an apolitical professional soldier. Even the troubles in the Casamance did not prevent most *casamançais* peoples from having positive working relations with the government and SAF.⁵³⁰ Whereas different iterations of the Malian military have lacked a similar ethos or ideology, without any specific dedication to integrating northern ethnic groups or engaging in the domestic mission building of infrastructure and development.⁵³¹ Ironically, the internalized SAF ideology has actually contributed to the demilitarization of Senegalese society. For example, many Senegalese military officials argued that when former SAF personnel went into politics they were rarely elected, as Senegalese society did not have any attachments or give any special consideration to politicians that had served in the military. Thus, even a retired SAF General, Joseph Louis Tavares de Souza, failed in his attempt to be elected mayor in a small town.

⁵²⁹ J'Kayode Fayemi, "The Future of Demilitarisation and Civil Military Relations in West Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Democratic Consolidation," *African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique* (1998): 82-103.

⁵³⁰ Vincent Foucher, "On the matter (and materiality) of the nation: Interpreting Casamance's unresolved separatist struggle," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (2011): 82-103.

⁵³¹ Michael Shurkin, John Gordon IV, Bryan Frederick, and Christopher G. Pernin. *Building Armies, Building Nations: Toward a New Approach to Security Force Assistance* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), Chapter 6. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1832.html

As noted by the *Partners for Democratic Change*, Senghor and General Jean Alfred Diallo (the second Chief of Defence) struck a deal in 1962 to increase educational investments (almost 30 percent of army budget) in the SAF so that they could put such new knowledge to use for domestic state-building projects.⁵³² This emphasis on coordination between civilian and military leadership created a sense of trust between both as the military developed a combat track that focused on peacekeeping missions and another track that focused on developing Senegal's "infrastructure, health, education, and environmental protections."⁵³³ This professionalized focus helped establish a 'military enclave', which has made it a strong component of Senegalese development and can be credited with maintaining the durability and stability of the state since independence.

The failure of Mali in 2012 (which also continues) was that during ATT's time in office (2002-2012), he tolerated and integrated too many extremist elements on both sides of the political spectrum, while Senegalese politicians and their networks have resisted extremist elements of society. In many ways ATT's strategy of co-optation increased corruption, because he essentially integrated all political opposition into patronage schemes.⁵³⁴ That and the lack of adherence to a coherent political alliance, alongside using criminal smuggling networks in northern Mali, led to fragmentation of political and military control.⁵³⁵ Thus, Malian politicians

⁵³² Partners for Democratic Change, *Senegal's Armée-Nation: Lessons Learned from an Indigenous Model for Building Peace, Stability and Effective Civil-Military Relations in West Africa* (Washington, DC: Partners for Democratic Change, 2010)

⁵³³ Alexandre Marc, Neelam Verjee, and Stephen Mogaka, *The challenge of stability and security in West Africa* (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2015), 134.

⁵³⁴ Alex Thurston, "Mali: The Disintegration of a Model African Democracy", *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (2013).

⁵³⁵ Wolfram Lacher, *Organized crime and conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).

have over-pursued strategies of patronage, at the expense of state formation, with the military acting as a cynical check on corrupt and unresponsive political elites. Mali can be illustrative of an ‘anti-Senegalese model’ of state deformation. It is thus fitting that one scholar’s aggrandized presentist article in 2007 contended that “An electoral system with proportional representation resulted in political instability in Niger, while a majoritarian system ensured a stable political majority in Mali,”⁵³⁶ was off the mark as neither regimes had the institutional buy-in from military elites as each president succumbed to army coups several years after that article was published.

The ‘Black Box’ of Military Institutions: What makes the SAF Effective?

According to a U.S. State Department report in 2011, “Senegal has well-trained and disciplined armed forces.”⁵³⁷ While interviewing numerous Western military officials, they all attributed such military effectiveness of the SAF to the fact that the French have been considerably involved in the affairs of the country since independence. However, as illustrated in the previous sections about other Francophone countries, Western diplomatic and military engagement alone, is not a sufficient explanation (or guarantee) for how the SAF was able to create a strong organization that is apolitical, and has not intervened in domestic politics like neighboring militaries have. Indeed, the presence of French and British militaries in former African colonies cannot explain why some states collapsed or fell prey to *coup d’état*.⁵³⁸ The development of states and

⁵³⁶ Sophia Moestrup, "The role of actors and institutions: The difficulties of democratic survival in Mali and Niger," *Democratization* 6, no. 2 (1999): 171-186.

⁵³⁷ “Background Notes: West Africa,” U.S. Department of State, June 2011

⁵³⁸ Alain Rouvez, Michael Coco, and Jean-Paul Paddock, *Disconsolate empires: French, British and Belgian military involvement in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994). For a current listing of all foreign military bases on the African continent: <https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2017/02/15/updated-rough-guide-foreign-military-bases-africa>

economies in independent Africa has not occurred without some involvement from their militaries. In the case of Senegal, the SAF has developed robust institutional capability – relative to other bureaucratic arms of the state – and has played a formative role in state development.

It seems that over time, the SAF has rationalized its institutions, becoming a strong organization – bureaucratically efficient ‘military enclave’ if you will – that learns and adapts to its conditions. For example, since so much of its officer corps has been trained and educated in various countries around the world (they do not ideologically discriminate, as they send officers for training in China, Russia, U.S., France, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ghana, etc.), the SAF has a ‘Captain’s Test’. This examination must be passed if someone wants to make the rank of Major and above. It forces SAF officers to “re-doctrinate,” by having to relearn their military rules and traditions, since such a large portion has spent time overseas for education and training.

Another aspect of rationalization and ‘re-doctrination’ is that all Senegalese personnel must do deployment rotations in the Casamance, of which this has been a formative internal war for three reasons. First, many SAF officers contended that it forced their organization to be more resourceful and efficient, which primed them for dealing with neighboring threats and improved their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations elsewhere. For example, before 2000, deployments were a haphazard affair, where troops were cobbled together for missions in the region, leading to discipline issues and reduced unit cohesion. However, after 2000, the SAF created regular battalion deployment rotations, where the unit spent 6 months in the Casamance, 6 months back home in garrison, 6 months on an international peacekeeping mission, and then 6 months of garrison. Secondly, it has served as a ‘proving ground’ for young officers, where SAF commanders figured out which of their troops had displayed the most competence. Finally, it

helped SAF troops develop a sense of national identity as they fought in the jungles of the Casamance against the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC). However, instead of seeing them as insurgents, many SAF troops perceived the MFDC as “criminals,” and SAF leadership did not feel it right to give out medals and awards to SAF personnel while serving in the region. To many, the SAF viewed the people in the Casamance as their own people, with many interviewees viewing the conflict as “sad” and “unfortunate.”⁵³⁹

These benefits to the SAF go against the commonly held belief in civil wars literature that internal conflicts – especially those centered around identity – lead to underdevelopment of the state.⁵⁴⁰ However, in the case of Senegal, it appears to have increased state capacity and made the SAF institutionally more competent and effective. For instance, SAF personnel have learned not to trust the UN when it comes to logistical support on deploying peacekeeping missions. Many SAF officers contended that the UN would tell them that the SAF only needed to send infantry and that the UN would provide in-country support. However, since their peacekeeper deployments to the DRC beginning in 2001, the SAF realized they could not count on the UN for logistics, medical, or administrative support while deployed. Hence, the SAF has always included functional support personnel on every peacekeeping deployment since that time, because UN promises had degraded their effectiveness in the field.

SAF institutional robustness has centered primarily on its ability to be an apolitical army under the ideological auspices of *Armée-Nation*. Moreover, despite the country being over 90 percent Muslim, the military is very secular, and does not allow any expression of religious

⁵³⁹ Interviews, August 7-11, 2017.

⁵⁴⁰ Murshed, S. Mansoob, "Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 4 (2002): 387-93.

affiliation and does not have any officers serving in the position of Chaplain or Imam.⁵⁴¹ In fact, one SAF Colonel that identified himself as an astute Muslim (i.e. no drinking or smoking, etc.) mentioned how he scolded a subordinate officer when the officer saluted him with prayer beads in his hand, which elicited “What the fuck are you doing [in Wolof].” The SAF Colonel threatened the subordinate officer with jailtime if he ever saw him in uniform with his prayer beads. As many interviews would indicate, informally there is an expectation up and down the ranks to keep religious faith and views private and discrete. Though SAF regulations do allow personnel to attend Mosque and Church in uniform, they are not allowed to go to religious celebrations or other political activities in public in uniform,

As previously mentioned, this ideological orientation of the SAF came about with the appointment of General Diallo in 1962 as Chief of Defence (CEMGA). Diallo was a transformative figure for the SAF, especially since he had the “instinct of a builder” since he had served in the French Army Corps of Engineers, thus he wanted to create a SAF that could help modernize its infrastructure. For example, Diallo advocated (successfully) for the creation of a military medical school in 1968 to train army doctors due to outbreaks of yellow fever and cholera, and in response to striking medical personnel.⁵⁴² In essence, the spirit of the *Armée-Nation* is that it “is meant to organize and facilitate collaboration between officials... The intent is to engage the armed forces in peaceful, concrete missions to assist in the country’s development.”⁵⁴³ This is reflected in recruitment practices, where the SAF regularly recruits

⁵⁴¹ The U.S. military, which is considered the most apolitical military in the world has officers that serve as spiritual leaders in practically every religious belief, to even include Wiccans (pagan witchcraft).

⁵⁴² Biram Diop, "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal," in Dennis Blair, (ed.), *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 236-256.

⁵⁴³ Diop, 239.

from all regions to ensure its organization, to avoid ethnic and tribal imbalances. The *Armée-Nation* spirit also has circumscribed how military force is used domestically, such as when the SAF set up a civil-military committee in 1999 “in support of development to bring together representatives from parliament, the military, government ministries, civil society and the private sector to collaborate on implementing public programs.”⁵⁴⁴

When there is a security problem or humanitarian issue, the SAF is not the first responder. In fact, there are three categories of response, of which the President must ultimately sign off on category two and three. First, regular police and *gendarmerie* are mobilized in response to any problem. The second category involves the activation and deployment of Intervention Forces, which can either be a territorial unit or mobile unit. Finally, deploying the SAF internally requires a regional/district authority to make a written request to the prefect governor, detailing the reason for using the SAF and their rules of engagement (ROE). From that, the prefect governor then requests military forces from the respective SAF zone commander who fulfils the request in conjunction with the presidential approval to do so. Ultimately, the civilian authorities that make the formal request for army assistance also end up with operational control of the SAF within the ROEs prescribed. The only mobilization of forces that the President can direct are the General Reserve Units – composed of commandos, paratroops, artillery, and tanks – of which the only known domestic activation to this day was Senghor’s use of paratroopers to guard his palace during the 1962 dispute with PM Dia.

⁵⁴⁴ Calestous Juma, “Building roads in Africa? Send in the troops,” *CNN*, May 23, 2013, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/05/23/opinion/africa-military-infrastructure-calestous-juma/index.html>

The other strength of the SAF has been the informal institution of *Djobot* (familial relations).⁵⁴⁵ Many of the Senegalese officers interviewed indicated a sort of ‘fatherhood’ and ‘brotherhood’ dynamic in their military duties, which was not circumscribed in their various regulations. Many of their actions in leadership positions was an expression of *Djobot*, in that they acted as a ‘father’ figure to their troops. It informed how they would do their jobs best in garrison, on a combat patrol in the Casamance, or while deployed elsewhere conducting a peacekeeping mission in a hostile area. For example, while conducting combat patrols, officers with high levels of *Djobot* would always go on patrols with their troops, while those with low *Djobot* would avoid such operations. Accordingly, *Djobot* is considered as the primary way of deciding who to promote. While *Djobot* on the surface might seem like any other form of patron-client relations in West Africa, it is not as parasitic or nefarious as the sort of patron-client relations seen in the armed forces of Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁵⁴⁶ It is also nothing like the systematic practice of *Godfatherism*⁵⁴⁷ in the Nigerian armed forces, which is an institutionally embedded form of corruption where a *godfather* is needed (and necessary) for promotion in their military. As several enlisted soldiers indicated from interviews, when they perceive high *Djobot* in certain commanding officers that “care about their needs,” many will name their children after

⁵⁴⁵ It can also be spelled *Ndiabot*. The best way to describe *Djobot* is that family relations in society are applied to the army. It becomes so engrained in effective military units to the point that you will see them naming the kids after each other or fulfilling family roles in their extended family. This sort of informal institution is beyond the typical ‘brother in arms’ you can observe in Western armies.

⁵⁴⁶ Murphy, William P. "Military patrimonialism and child soldier clientalism in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars." *African Studies Review* 46, no. 2 (2003): 61-87.

⁵⁴⁷ Albert, I. O. (2005). Explaining ‘godfatherism’ in Nigerian politics. *African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine De Sociologie*, 9(2), 79-105.

these officers.⁵⁴⁸ This implies that *Djobot* might be one of the most influential informal institutions in the SAF, that is beyond the sort of ‘brotherhoods’ seen in most Western armies.

In solidifying *Djobot*, the officers that end up reaching the highest ranks in the officer corps can engage in interpersonal level discussions with troops from each region of Senegal. For instance, it is very common for high ranking officers in the SAF to not only speak English and French, but also four different Senegalese tribal languages (e.g. Wolof, Pulaar, etc.). The ability to speak across various cultural and ethnic lines has tremendous value in the SAF, and contributes to its cohesiveness. In fact, from the dozens of interviews conducted with SAF they all seemed to infer a sort of ‘brotherhood’ bond with their superiors, peers, and subordinates. Enlisted troops in the SAF, mentioned how important it was for there to be mutual ‘personal respect’ with officers, and that the best officers were the ones that were ‘good listeners’. Moreover, it also serves as an informal mechanism of cohesion as one SAF sergeant stated, “I would rather die than go back with shame” when he told the tale of being ambushed by rebels on a peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This suggests the positive and cohesive effect *Djobot* in acting as an informal norm producing an effective fighting force.

As one Senegalese Colonel put it “We want to have our own military DNA.” Unfortunately, as many admitted, the SAF does not have its own doctrine for how it should operate and orient itself, which many contended was made worse by them not having their own war college for senior officers (required education for officers over the rank of Major). However,

⁵⁴⁸ Interviews, August 2017.

when asked what to make of the SAF military and how they think about military effectiveness, one SAF Colonel drew a picture (Figure 6-1) of what was needed to achieve it.⁵⁴⁹




Figure 6-1. SAF Officer illustration of the components needed for an effective military.

While this drawing of what it takes to make a strong military, may appear to be vague, it is *suggestive* of the way in which officers in the SAF informally think of their military, especially one lacking formalistic rules on what creates an effective army. In practice, this has meant adapting to problems while deployed. For instance, one SAF officer noted their interoperability issues with other militaries in peacekeeping operations in the early 1980s due to language issues, so they specifically began recruiting SAF personnel with English skills for deployments (and

⁵⁴⁹ Interview, August 14, 2017. Many other SAF personnel described the generation of military power in similar ways and drawings, Figure 6-1 just happened to be the best explanation of all the ones. More broadly, many Senegalese military officials stated that their effective military is a product of culture, education, and colonialism.

also increased military education training to improve English abilities). In fact, while deployed, SAF personnel insisted that their units operated like “blood” in that they ensured constant internal communication up and down the ranks, with priority given to constant feedback to improve their performance. This was further reinforced with many relying on *WhatsApp* to communicate on their mobile phone, further opening lines of dialogue with one another, which helped with discipline and morale.

Finally, the SAF, while reliant on Western security aid and assistance since independence, appear to have developed several mechanisms and efficient ways of absorbing such aid. Indeed, most SAF argued that education was one of the most important aspects of military life. For instance, while it is common for SAF personnel to attend training and education in various Western and non-Western countries, they admitted that the most sought out after education was attending an American war college, because they developed the best strategists in the SAF. However, they contended that the French war colleges (and British to a similar extent) produced their best operational commanders, because they were better at teaching resourcefulness and “practical” thinking in understanding the “constraints” of “realistic” combat conditions. They contended the biggest problem working with the American military in education and training aspects was that they “made too many assumptions...because they have too much money and technology.” One could suppose it is indicative of a reverse ‘resource-curse’ on U.S. military operational abilities, where an overabundance of resources has made the American military operationally lackadaisical.

These examples suggest an institutional adaptation and rationalization of filling organizational gaps. That is not to say that Senegal has not aggressively pursued such

international aid. For example, Senghor called out NATO and the Americans especially in 1978 after the conflict in Zaire, stating “They want Africa to resist the East’s offensive but will not help it do so. They want the end without the means. They refuse to supply us with modern weapons we need to defend ourselves.”⁵⁵⁰ The SAF and the state also has innovative ways of developing state capacity. The SAF regularly send personnel into the Greek Navy for several years to develop various trades and skills, such as learning radar operations, and after serving a tour, they are given government jobs, putting their skills and tradecraft to use in support of state functions, such as running airport operations at Léopold Sédar Senghor International Airport in Dakar. This shows how much of a state-building impact foreign security assistance has had, especially on the institutional development of an effective military enclave within the patrimonial waters of Senegal.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the various ways in which Senegal has bucked a regional trend in militaries being overly involved in politics. A fundamental component of this has been an aversion to politicizing the SAF, and putting it to work internally on projects related to development that has helped Senegal under the ideational auspices of *Armée-Nation*. The importance of this concept cannot be said enough in the engendering of a republican spirit as one SAF Colonel stated, “Many African military personnel see military as a way of wielding power, however, the Senegalese view the military as a form of responsibility [sic].”⁵⁵¹ An important aspect of this has been the institutional effectiveness of the SAF in focusing on the development

⁵⁵⁰ Coker, Christopher, and Helen Tyson. *NATO, the Warsaw pact and Africa* (Springer, 1985), 232.

⁵⁵¹ Interview, August 16, 2017.

of a 'military enclave' that has pushed back against politicization of the army, but has also focused on various ways of developing its military power in innovative ways. The 'military enclave' of the SAF is further supported by the informal institution of *Djobot*, which brings 'family-like' bonds and kinship to the military, but without the sort of predatory patron-client relations seen in other west African militaries (e.g. such as the corrupt *Godfatherism* practice in the Nigerian military). Finally, SAF focus on domestic issues of state-building contributes to how the SAF absorbs external military assistance, and attempts to put it towards state development in ways foreign donors might not have expected.

Chapter 7 – Uganda: “Bush” Fighters Running a State

*I am a freedom fighter. I would feel insulted if you called me a politician.
Politicians here in Africa do not have a good reputation.*

*Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
Ugandan President
Interview with Time Magazine
October 12, 1989⁵⁵²*

*I hear some people saying that I'm their servant. I'm not a servant of anybody.
I am a freedom fighter. I am fighting for myself and for my beliefs.*

*Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
Ugandan President
Speech to a Zambian audience
November 22, 2017⁵⁵³*

When independence came to Uganda in 1962, it was already famed for its military prowess.

Although, prior to British colonization, armies formed by indigenous groups and kingdoms that fought against British troops and her mercenaries were “sporadic and largely ineffective.”⁵⁵⁴ This made it easier for the British to capture Uganda in 1894, as the kingdom of Buganda – with the help of British weapons – conquered the smaller kingdoms. This set-in motion a divergent state-building path, as the British – fearful of making the southern ethnic groups of Buganda too powerful – balanced this military capacity through recruiting troops for colonial army service in the King's African Rifles (KAR) from the ethnic groups in the north (Nilotic speaking Acholi and Langi). This led to the creation of two classes in society: an ethnic warrior caste from the north that became known for military abilities (and looking like big “warriors”) serving in the KAR, and an educated ruling class from the south. Such a division of political and military

⁵⁵² <http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/Museveni-s-famous-quotes-since-1980/689844-2364984-a3r72xz/index.html>

⁵⁵³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/end-to-mugabe-rule-other-autocratic-leaders-may-fear-similar-fate>

⁵⁵⁴ Edgerton, Robert. *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy* (Boulder, CA: Westview Press, 2002), 37.

power along lines of identity was ripe for divisive politics at the outset of Ugandan independence.

Many, such as Gérard Prunier consider Uganda's colonial involvement in the KAR as the institutional cause of Uganda's 21st century military effectiveness. But such thinking ignores the fact that other British protectorates in East Africa had KAR battalions as well.⁵⁵⁵ It also overlooks the divergent reality of the rebel origin and organization of the contemporary military of Uganda – the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF). This military force is structured and organized in a completely different fashion relative to the KAR (i.e. a colonial styled army). Its origins are wholly different, and for a time it existed as a counterforce opposed to the Ugandan army that grew out of the KAR. In addition, if the KAR was such an influential institution on post-colonial militaries, and if its military culture had any real influence on the rebel armies that emerged in East Africa, then why has there been such uneven development, varying levels of military effectiveness, and capricious civil-military strife in the countries that had KAR battalions? This presents an obvious question: Why were some KAR influenced armies unable to militarily defeat rebel groups despite having a considerable institutional advantage in weaponry and training?

This question is important because it raises issues about the relationship of prior institutional experience, historical contingencies, and the character of regimes in considering the development of indigenous ideas of military effectiveness. While colonial experience is important, Uganda shows that Africans were developing their own ideas about military

⁵⁵⁵ Gérard Prunier, "The Armies of the Great Lakes Countries," *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 6, no. 4 (2016): 99-111.

effectiveness while fighting elements of an army styled on a colonial force. The rebel force that eventually became the UPDF, fought in a context in which their leaders aimed to overthrow a regime and transform a state—clearly a threat to the KAF legacy that many of these leaders implicated in the problems that in their analysis faced Uganda.⁵⁵⁶ Moreover, Yoweri Museveni, leader of the NRA/M (National Resistance Army/Movement), later known as the UPDF, and eventual president of Uganda, studied military tactics and strategy through direct experience with Mozambique’s liberation movement in the 1960s. He wrote about the impact that these experiences had on his efforts to form a guerrilla army in the 1980s that could overthrow Uganda’s armed forces.⁵⁵⁷

From 1902 until 1964, Uganda, Malawi (Nyasaland and Central African Regiment), Somaliland, Zambia (Rhodesia Regiment), Tanzania (Tanganyika), and Kenya, each had their own KAR units, fighting on behalf of the Crown in numerous British territories, World War One and Two.⁵⁵⁸ This armed force had extensive experience across the region and beyond, and included some units even deploying for the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and to Kenya to fight the *Mau Mau* Rebellion (1952-1960).⁵⁵⁹ Thus by Independence in 1961, many Ugandan officers had experience fighting outside of their own country with the benefit of British training. This experience would appear to portend a conventional sort of military effectiveness as Western armies conceptualize it. Yet due to political incompatibilities (e.g. mutinies, coups, etc.), by

⁵⁵⁶ Pecos Kutesa, *Uganda’s Revolution, 1979-1986: How I Saw It*, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2006).

⁵⁵⁷ Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for the Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*, (London: Macmillan, 1997), 89-90.

⁵⁵⁸ H. Moyse-Bartlett, *The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945* (Aldershot, UK: Gale & Polden, 1956)

⁵⁵⁹ Malcolm Page, *A history of the King’s African Rifles and East African forces* (London: Leo Cooper, 1997).

2018, colonial styled KAR units only existed in Kenya and Malawi, armies hardly renowned for their military effectiveness.⁵⁶⁰

A contrary analysis of the institutional impact of colonial experience paints a picture in which KAR military organization actually undermined future military effectiveness. Scholars, such as Timothy Parsons, have argued that the KAR subverted societal structures in each country creating new tensions that remain unresolved to this day. Parsons contends that the KAR created stereotypical identities of numerous tribes and ethnic groups as having certain “martial” or “non-martial” qualities. This made independent African states beholden to military involvement in politics (i.e. coups) by a ‘warrior’ class with KAR experience that were staffed by people mostly illiterate and unskilled.⁵⁶¹ This arrangement left the country’s most disadvantaged and underserved populations holding the guns to protect governments that were dedicated to serving better off communities: An ideal recipe for *coup d’états*. Parson’s argument helps to explain the seriousness of this threat, given the notoriety of one KAR ‘alumni’, Uganda’s dictator Idi Amin, who was uneducated, illiterate, and was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans.⁵⁶² But Parsons cannot explain the critical junctures of why KAR alumnae did not act in this way in many other countries that inherited elements of this armed force. A scholar who spent time embedded with the Ugandan army in 1985 argued that Uganda was fatalistically destined to have its politics dominated by military affairs. He linked these problems to the state

⁵⁶⁰ As one Colonel from a Western military noted while working UN duties, he observed that the Kenyan military had “poor tactical leadership... which is why they’ve been overrun numerous times in Somalia.” He contended this was made worse by the Kenyan Army Generals that were worried more about finding corrupt ways of getting side-deals so “that they can drive Jaguars and other luxury cars around Nairobi.” Field notes, August 2017.

⁵⁶¹ Timothy H. Parsons, *The African Rank and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann., 1999)

⁵⁶² Diane Law, *The Secret History of the Great Dictators: Idi Amin & Emperor Bokassa I* (London: Magpie Books, 2011).

structures and values during colonial times and its inheritance.⁵⁶³ It is ironic that less than a year later, a rebel group would defeat that military regime. This new group, led by Museveni, would alter power relations and re-configure the state, providing the ‘new’ military an ideological goal of pan-Africanism and other institutional practices, which entailed fighting regional threats politically and militarily.

These narratives about Uganda’s legacy in military matters identify the KAR’s pursuit of a conventional (i.e. Western) military effectiveness as both the source and the antidote to predatory, coup-prone military force. Meanwhile, how did the son of a cattle herder, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, manage to wage an effective rebellion in the first half of the 1980s against a Ugandan army that was supposed to be more capable (whether in a positive or negative sense) due to KAR influence? In addition, how was Museveni able to escape the problems of a militarized Ugandan society, which had caused so much civil-military strife before, and transform its military into an effective institution? Prunier has suggested that Museveni keeps his army, the UPDF, deployed on various military operations as a way of keeping them busy (and satisfied) so that they will stay out of domestic politics.⁵⁶⁴ Such reasoning, while appealing, ignores the experience of other states that deploy military forces outside their borders to occupy officers (e.g. financial incentives, combat experience helps with promotions, etc.) and keep them at arm’s length from domestic affairs.

For example, Burundi has operated its military with a similar ‘keep them busy’ logic since formally ending its civil war in 2003. Yet, even with extensive international oversight, it

⁵⁶³ Amii Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890–1985* (New York: Springer, 1987).

⁵⁶⁴ Gérard Prunier, “The Armies of the Great Lakes Countries,” *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 6, no. 4 (2016), 102.

has been unable to keep the military out of politics given the four coup events that occurred between 2006 and 2015.⁵⁶⁵ Worse, the 2015 coup attempt against Burundi President Pierre Nkurunziza came about because he ran for a third term (he was only supposed to serve two terms), which led to substantial unrest as political violence broke out. A rebel group, known as the Popular Forces of Burundi (FPB),⁵⁶⁶ formed shortly thereafter with the explicit intent of removing Nkurunziza from power. The FPB primarily formed out of individuals purged from the government and military in 2015, and those living in refugee camps in eastern Congo. Nkurunziza's policy purged anyone that had worked for the Burundian government during the civil war (1993-2006) and he altered the constitution to give himself more power (to include more presidential terms) and distorted power sharing heavily towards Hutus.⁵⁶⁷ Such actions present the risk of his actions growing into a greater civil war.

To understand how Museveni accomplished this feat (despite extending his presidential terms as well) of balancing the military in the context of past societal cleavages embedded in society—military relations, requires an evaluation of the Ugandan government and civil-military relations in the 'old' regime. Museveni's rebel background has influenced the path of the Ugandan state and the way in which the military operates because he has articulated a vision and ideology for the state, albeit not always evenly executed. Moreover, in the 'new' state, Museveni took his rebel army based on personalist connections and political ideology from the "Bush," and

⁵⁶⁵ "Coups d'état, 1946-2016" dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>

⁵⁶⁶ The original name of FPB was the Republican Forces of Burundi ("Forebu"). The name-change to FPB occurred in 2017 as part of a broader re-organization of the rebel group. "Burundi: les rebelles du Forebu changent de nom et d'organigramme," *RFI: Afrique*, August 30, 2017, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170828-burundi-rebelles-forebu-changent-noms-organigramme?ref=tw_i

⁵⁶⁷ Jordan Anderson, "Burundi's newest, biggest rebel group," *African Arguments*, October 3, 2017, <http://africanarguments.org/2017/10/03/burundi-newest-biggest-rebel-group/>

then transitioned it into a professionalized army that appears apolitical on the surface, but has proven itself to be effective and resilient.⁵⁶⁸

The caveat of such professionalization is that it has taken place in context of an Ugandan military (NRA/UPDF) constantly at war. Since 1986, the NRA/UPDF has been battling insurgents – off and on – in the periphery, where “operational expedience tends to take precedence over administrative processes thereby infringing on regulatory mechanisms,” as relayed by a retired UPDF officer.⁵⁶⁹ This conception of particular professionalism intertwined with UPDF military effectiveness, elevates political behavior and involvement to the center of its definition, identifying political involvement as the antidote to the predatory and socially destructive behavior of the old KAR-influenced army. How does this conception of military effectiveness translate into UPDF discipline? What comes after Museveni steps down from power (or dies) and will the UPDF stay in the barracks?

Museveni’s use of political engagement as a condition of military effectiveness can appear to be contradictory. On the one hand, a disciplined political program appears to be the guard against misbehavior and mistreatment of the population. On the other hand, politicizing the military can become a way of turning it into a tool of political domination. For example, Museveni (as of the 2010s) appears to be re-politicizing the army in an attempt to shore up his personalist control and dictate succession. As it stands in 2018, it appears he may to try pass

⁵⁶⁸ Interview, UPDF Official, January 27, 2018.

⁵⁶⁹ Retired UPDF officer quoted in: Asuman Bisiika, “Uganda: It’s tough to make the UPDF professional,” *The Monitor*, October 26, 2005, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200510260016.html>

control of the presidency to his wife Janet, who is an experienced politician, or to his son in the UPDF, Major General Muhoozi Kainerugaba.

These political moves create tension within the UPDF, as some members may have a clear idea about the political role of an army that is independent of the personal fortunes of the country's leader. This might be a disruption in context of the professionalization of a Ugandan army over the last decade and the original ideological design of Uganda under Museveni, a sort of “good politicization”, which he codified in 1986 through his party’s *The Ten-Point Programme*.⁵⁷⁰ Given the recent ousting of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, a revolutionary figure similar to Museveni, his removal from power in late 2017 by a military coup initiated by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) suggests Museveni may have to recalculate his exit plan, particularly if it involves inserting unpopular family members in his place. This is vital for the future of Ugandan state durability, as Mugabe appeared to be planning on handing power to his much younger wife Grace, which chafed much of the ZDF leadership.⁵⁷¹

Nevertheless, as one Egyptian diplomatic source relayed, “Museveni is smarter and more strategic than any of us give him credit for... a post-Museveni Uganda will maintain stability and his army will stay out of it.”⁵⁷² As I will argue, Museveni appears to have escaped many of the patronage-traps and divisionary problems seen in the ‘old’ regime. He seems to have routinized personal connections within (and between) the political and military elites, permitting the growth

⁵⁷⁰ Yoweri K. Museveni, *Ten-point Programme of NRM* (Kampala: NRM Publications, 1986).

⁵⁷¹ The dismissal of Vice President Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa supposedly prompted the army intervention as well, leading to Mnangagwa being installed as the new president to replace Mugabe. Brian Latham, “Zimbabwe Power Brokers: Key Figures in Battle to Succeed Mugabe,” *Bloomberg*, November 15, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-15/zimbabwe-power-brokers-key-figures-in-battle-to-succeed-mugabe>

⁵⁷² Interview, February 7, 2018.

of a UPDF ‘military enclave’ that is supposed to be apolitical but serves an important domestic function through its own ‘political awareness’. Overall, this record shows that “professional” and “political” can be compatible, provided that the political engagement of the army serves the general interests of society—at least in ways seen as broadly legitimate by the population—rather than the personal interests of a grasping or violent leader. This is a very different concept of professional or effective military force from a conventional Western perspective. But from a Ugandan perspective, it addresses some of the key problems of the country’s political development in which an “effective” military ran amok in a context of very weak state institutions and serious social divisions in ‘old’ regimes. The broader question to ponder is how Museveni will transition the government and army out of the hands of Bush War veterans to up-and-coming youthful cadres that are ambitiously seeking the benefits of patronage.⁵⁷³

The ‘Old’ Uganda

As told by Museveni in his autobiography, an independent Uganda was a part of the broader 1960s problem in Africa, epitomized by “the political bankruptcy of the independence generation of African leaders...from 1962 to 1966, I call the era of confusion and ideological bankruptcy.”⁵⁷⁴ The first Ugandan Prime Minister, Apollo Milton Obote, was a professional politician, but hailed from the “warrior class” ethnic group in the north. Within two years, the Ugandan army mutinied due to low pay and poor working conditions, requiring Obote to request British military assistance in putting it down. Eventually Obote’s government capitulated to the

⁵⁷³ International Crisis Group, “Uganda’s Slow Slide into Crisis,” Africa Report No. 256, November 21, 2017, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/256-ugandas-slow-slide-into-crisis.pdf>

⁵⁷⁴ Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 45 and 200.

demands of the army: higher pay and faster promotion. This event accelerated political decay, as Obote did not punish any rebellious troops – whereas neighboring leaders did, such as Julius Nyerere who dissolved the entire Tanzanian military (including all KAR units) and built a new political army that he also defined as an explicitly political tool to build a particular kind of state.⁵⁷⁵ In the case of Obote, the request for assistance and the improvement of conditions of military service (elements of conventional Western approaches to boosting military effectiveness) turned the mutiny into an opportunity to personalize his apolitical military.

Later in 1966, it came to light that Obote was smuggling gold and ivory in support of rebels in the Congo, which was being accomplished by a rising star in the army: Colonel Idi Amin (a fellow northerner). After accusations from government ministers, Obote dissolved the government, declared himself President, and appointed Amin to be in charge of the army. Obote then ordered Amin to forcibly remove the Kabaka of Buganda in the south, ceremonial President Mutesa II (“King Freddie”), in an assault on the palace known as the Battle of Mengo Hill. Mutesa II barely escaped to Burundi, and later found exile in the UK, where in 1969 he suspiciously died of alcohol poisoning.⁵⁷⁶ Ironically, Idi Amin presided over the dead Kabaka’s return and state funeral in Uganda in 1971, five years after he led the assault on the royal palace.

Until being overthrown by General Amin in 1971, Obote increasingly began to rely on “classic "divide and rule" tactics...encouraged personal infighting between his main military

⁵⁷⁵ “Obote, (Apollo) Milton,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, March 7, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/96666>

⁵⁷⁶ Michael W. Tuck and John A. Rowe. "Phoenix from the Ashes: Rediscovery of the Lost Lukiiko Archives." *History in Africa* 32 (2005): 403-414.

protégés" ...and removed...officers who appeared unreliable or too authoritative."⁵⁷⁷ Such behavior would serve as a politicization device within the Ugandan armed forces. It would set a precedent, and would lead his successor to escalate the fragmentation of personalist loyalties based on tribal identities and affiliations.

Upon Amin's initial takeover of Uganda, he appeared benign domestically and internationally. After the initial massacre of over 5,000 military and police personnel – Langi and Acholi troops (and other tribes) seen as ethnically loyal to Obote – Amin's rule rapidly dissolved into 8 years of killing. He targeted real and imaginary opponents, and expelled Ugandans of Asian descent.⁵⁷⁸ Because Amin was increasingly polarizing each aspect of society and his military, Amin had to personalize his military by filling it with Nubian 'outsiders' (i.e. foreign fighters from Egypt and Sudan) as a more trustworthy ethnic (and class) group to carry out his pogroms.⁵⁷⁹ As a diversionary tactic in 1978, Amin ordered his army to invade the Kagera Salient in Tanzania, which resulted in a strong Tanzanian military response. Exiled Ugandans in a rebel group known as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA)⁵⁸⁰ joined with the Tanzanian military in a counterassault and quickly crushed Amin's military, capturing the capital, as Amin exiled himself to Saudi Arabia.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁷ Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: studies in military style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 205.

⁵⁷⁸ Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey. 1982. *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport, CT: L. Hill), 31; Marc Lacry, "Once Outcasts, Asians Again Drive Uganda's Economy," *The New York Times*, August 17, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/17/world/once-outcasts-asians-again-drive-uganda-s-economy.html>. The decision to expel Asians – primarily those of Indian heritage – destroyed the Ugandan economy, and its effects are still felt into the 21st century.

⁵⁷⁹ Nelson Kasfir, "Explaining ethnic political participation," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 365-388.

⁵⁸⁰ Museveni's Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) formed in 1972 was a part of the UNLF coalition of rebels.

⁵⁸¹ Susanne Streleau, "Uganda: Half Way to Democracy," In Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio, (eds.), *Through fire with water: the roots of division and the potential for reconciliation in Africa* (Claremont, South

While one may have thought the rebel capture of Kampala would have ended the turmoil, it did not. Instead it ushered in a period of increasing turmoil. The first interim president, Yusuf Lule, was appointed by the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), but only served two months. Then, the UNLF appointed Godfrey Binaisa as the next interim president, but he was also removed after 11 months when he tried firing the Army Chief, Oyite Ojok. Ojok was an ethnic northerner that was coordinating activities – politically and militarily – to facilitate a return of Obote to power. When elections were held at the end of 1980, they were rigged by Obote’s political supporters, helping him win the presidency.⁵⁸²

By this time, military force in Ugandan politics was at the service of political strongmen or military commanders in their own right. This experience marked Ugandan society. Average Ugandans came to see military force as a threat. Museveni and others who presented alternative programs thus recognized that promises to protect Ugandan people would have to be at the core of any legitimate alternative. This experience of turmoil shows how “political” comes to be *an element of military effectiveness* in this context. This is not so much a case of political versus a-political, as it is a case of “good” politics against “bad” politics. Good politics in this case dissociates the military from the personal ambitions of any one politician and puts political engagement at the service of protecting the population and upholding programs (i.e. state-building) towards a legitimate regime.

Africa: New Africa Books, 2003), 249-250; “Amin, Idi,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, January 6, 2011, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/92669>

⁵⁸² Baganchwera B. N. Barungi, *Parliamentary Democracy in Uganda: The Experiment that Failed* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011), 161-176.

This led Museveni to begin the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), with a guerilla war beginning in the “bush” in 1981 with an attack against a Ugandan army base.⁵⁸³ Museveni then eventually merged with the Uganda Freedom Forces (UFF) to create the NRA/M (National Resistance Army/Movement). These first steps followed a classic notion of “people’s war” that Museveni admired and wrote about as he observed the anti-colonial liberation struggles of other countries. To his credit, discipline was the most important aspect to be followed in his rebel army, and as one UPDF officer admitted “harsh discipline was required to keep discipline...one rebel in my unit stole a banana...he got the firing squad.”⁵⁸⁴

Meanwhile, in 1985 Obote tried to reaffirm personalist control of his army as he fought Museveni, when he appointed General Smith Opon Acak (a clan relative) as chief of the army.⁵⁸⁵ In response to an under qualified crony appointment, a military junta led by General Tito Okello Lutwa (with General Bazilio Olara-Okello) removed Obote from office, though most of these civil-military tensions stemmed from the Acholi becoming increasingly insubordinate.⁵⁸⁶ Shortly thereafter, Museveni entertained the idea of being incorporated into the new junta government which made a peace offering. However, he decided to capture Kampala and expel the junta because Museveni did not believe his joining of the government would solve the structural problems he was fighting against (and had fought so long for). Museveni wanted to solve the

⁵⁸³ Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Obote to Museveni: Political Transformation in Uganda Since Independence* (Claremont, South Africa: New Africa Press, 2012).

⁵⁸⁴ Interview, August 11, 2017.

⁵⁸⁵ “Uganda: UPDF Kills Opon Acak,” *All Africa*, July 19, 1999, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199907190139.html>

⁵⁸⁶ Sabiiti Mutengesa, “From Pearl to Pariah: The Origin, Unfolding and Termination of State-Inspired Genocidal Persecution in Uganda, 1980-85,” *How Genocides End*, December 21, 2006, <http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/Mutengesa/>

tribal identity politics between the north and south, which had been the source of so much instability.⁵⁸⁷

Museveni wanted to capture the state and rebuild it through the NRA/M victory and through the promise of liberating Uganda's people. As developments below show, Museveni was not always true to this process. Yet it is still important that he broke with the old institutional path of the KAR and the politics of dragging armed forces into the personal battles of contending politicians. This ideal was inculcated into the UPDF's command and to some extent among Ugandans more generally. These ideas of an army that protects Ugandans and that is defined by the contrasts of its behavior compared to its predecessor remains a foundation of how the UPDF defines military professionalism and its capacity to exercise armed force effectively.

The 'New' Uganda

Museveni's state-building strategy for Uganda, as relayed in his autobiography, was that "Uganda's leaders had not been able to handle correctly the relatively simple problem of building national unity."⁵⁸⁸ Indeed, various Ugandan regimes since independence had brutalized citizens to gain their support, whereas Museveni's "guerilla fighters depended on the goodwill of the people to survive and therefore could not afford to antagonize them the way government forces did."⁵⁸⁹ Such penchant for obtaining support primarily through non-violent mechanisms of co-optation would remain a part of his strategic culture, creating a 'new' Ugandan government and

⁵⁸⁷ Phares Mukasa Mutibwa, *Uganda since independence: A story of unfulfilled hopes* (Claremont, South Africa: Africa World Press, 1992), 168-177; Nyeko, Balam, and Okello Lucima. "Profiles of the parties to the conflict." *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives* 11 (2002).

⁵⁸⁸ Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda* (London: Macmillan, 1997).

⁵⁸⁹ A. B. K. Kasozi, Nakanyike Musisi, and James Mukooza Sejjengo, *Social origins of violence in Uganda, 1964-1985* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 181.

military after seizing Kampala on January 25, 1986. For which, many have described this as a “Patronage Empire,” that has incidentally enabled political stability and economic development.⁵⁹⁰

While Museveni’s military (NRA) conducted ‘clean-up’ operations – with help from Libya, Sweden, and Tanzania – against minor insurgencies in the north and east, he declared an interim presidency until 1989. However, 1989 came and went as he introduced the Movement (“no-party”) System, where all Ugandans became a member of the NRA/M system, effectively establishing one-party rule in Uganda.⁵⁹¹ Cementing his control, Museveni returned lands to their supposedly rightful owners, which had been seized by Obote and/or Amin, though some of this was a way of reallocating patronage to loyal cronies.⁵⁹² Nonetheless, a *Human Rights Watch* report in 1999 admitted that despite some human rights issues and corruption, many of Museveni’s political reforms – to include decentralization and inclusion of opponents in parliament – had given Uganda more stability than it had ever been seen before and greatly reduced sectarianism. However, the report did acknowledge that Museveni was unlikely to cede control for the foreseeable future.⁵⁹³ This sentiment was echoed in an interview with a UPDF General who noted that “we want democracy, but this is only possible once they [Uganda] have stability internally and regionally.”⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹⁰ Andrew Mwenda, “Personalizing Power in Uganda,” In Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner (eds.) *Democratization in Africa: Progress and retreat* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 2010), 239-241.

⁵⁹¹ Sabiti Makara, “The Challenge of Building Strong Political Parties for Democratic Governance in Uganda: Does multiparty politics have a future?” *Les Cahiers d’Afrique De L’Est* 41 (2009): 43-80.

⁵⁹² Onok C. Adyanga, *Modes of British imperial control of Africa: A case study of Uganda, C. 1890-1990*. (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 195-197.

⁵⁹³ Peter Bouckaert, *Hostile to democracy: The movement system and political repression in Uganda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 42-102.

⁵⁹⁴ Interview, August 11, 2017.

Nevertheless, Museveni's pragmatic rule in the 1980s and 1990's brought substantial economic and developmental reforms – as he had promised in his 1986 *Ten Point Programme* – that was lauded by the West, albeit his unorthodox relations with Libya and North Korea irked many as well.⁵⁹⁵ International relations became more complicated in 1990, as some serving Ugandan NRA troops with ethnic Tutsi ties to Rwanda, formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)⁵⁹⁶, and invaded Rwanda with the intent of removing the militant Hutu regime. When the RPF eventually succeeded in 1994, this led to a coalition between the leaders of Uganda and Rwanda.⁵⁹⁷ The fervent ideological beliefs held by political and military elites in Uganda and Rwanda concerning Mobutu Sésé Seko brutal totalitarian rule in Zaire was a strong motivational factor among others (such as Mobutu giving rear bases to rebels that attacked their respective states) to militarily intervene with a regime change.⁵⁹⁸ This led various neighboring states – each with their own reasons to dislike Mobutu – to invade militarily in 1996, providing support to the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDLC) led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. It would become known as the First Congo War, and Kabila's AFDLC quickly toppled Mobutu's regime in 1997, whose army put up little resistance, changing the name from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). However, Kabila did not turn out to be the useful puppet that Uganda and Rwanda had hoped. He immediately began governing like Mobutu and against the interests of various actors that had initially supported his rebellion.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹⁵ Ruth Nora Cyr, *Twentieth Century Africa* (New York: Writers Club Press, 2001), 543.

⁵⁹⁶ Also known as Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)

⁵⁹⁷ Gérard Prunier, "Uganda, Nearly a Miracle," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 1998, <https://mondediplo.com/1998/02/10uganda>

⁵⁹⁸ Yoweri K. Museveni, *What is Africa's problem?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

⁵⁹⁹ Kevin Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: The international relations of identity* (Springer, 2003), 152-161.

Following Kabila's decision to expel Ugandan and Rwandan armies in 1998, and amid worsening governance, Congolese army units broke off and formed their own rebel groups, of which, Uganda and Rwanda fractured their alliance by backing different groups.⁶⁰⁰ This started the Second Congo War, where 9 countries formally got involved and 20 different armed groups emerged in the fragmented war that led to Laurent-Désiré Kabila being assassinated by a bodyguard in 2001. His son, Joseph Kabila, took over as president, and pragmatically negotiated political settlements with rebel groups and neighboring militaries to bring an end to the hostilities in 2003.⁶⁰¹

Despite influencing affairs in neighboring states, Museveni's rule and reconfiguration of the state has not been fully achieved or realized. For example, while minor insurgencies have existed since 1986, these have been peripheral problems – primarily in the north – caused by rebel groups with leaders hailing from the Kakwa and Lugbara groups. Many of these tribes had been a part of Amin's coalition, and viewed rule by a Bantu speaking southerner, Museveni, as a threat to their existence. Thus, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), West Nile Bank Front, and the Uganda National Salvation Front (and many others) sprang up over time (22 insurgent groups total), though Ugandan military actions and diplomatic negotiations with most of these groups led each to eventually give up and integrate into the government and military. The only exception has been the LRA's Joseph Kony, who continues to persist to this day due to his

⁶⁰⁰ Erik Kennes, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: structures of greed, networks of need," In Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman (eds.), *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005), 140-177.

⁶⁰¹ Enrico Carsich, "The Unusual Suspects: Africa Parapolitics and the National Security State Complex," In Eric Wilson (ed.) *The dual state: Parapolitics, Carl Schmitt and the national security complex* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 117-152.

resilience and ability at “reading the political terrain.”⁶⁰² In addition, insurgents in western Uganda, such as the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), continue to thrive partly out of material support from various regional governments permitting rear bases and also because some UPDF commanders in the region do not perceive them as a significant threat. Many rebels exhibit marginal control over peripheral areas; hence, some UPDF officer have been known to misappropriate war funding for themselves.⁶⁰³ However, Museveni put an end to UPDF commanders pocketing salaries of “ghost troops” in 2005, through the computerization of pay, which was a reform that reduced opportunities for corruption, making the UPDF more effective.⁶⁰⁴

Some believe that the inability of Museveni and the UPDF to eliminate all insurgencies – the LRA especially – has been the cause of what some foreign observers identify as UPDF unprofessionalism and Museveni personalizing the army at the expense of military effectiveness.⁶⁰⁵ However, such arguments miss the point that Museveni prefers not to militarily defeat insurgencies, as he has traditionally had a preference for political socialization, and co-opting the opposition and other rebels.⁶⁰⁶ Besides the resilience of Kony’s LRA, the inability of the UPDF to “defeat” Kony is that he resisted political inclusion and co-optation by Museveni. Unfortunately, by the time Kony’s LRA offered an “olive branch” in 2006 to end hostilities, the International Criminal Court (ICC) pressed Museveni to reject his offer of immunity. Western

⁶⁰² Christopher R. Day, ““Survival Mode”: Rebel Resilience and the Lord’s Resistance Army,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2017): 1-21.

⁶⁰³ Prunier, 1998.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview, August 24, 2017

⁶⁰⁵ Rune Hjalmar Espeland, and Stina Petersen. "The Ugandan army and its war in the north." In *Forum for Development Studies*, vol. 37, no. 2 (2010): 193-215.

⁶⁰⁶ Christopher R. Day and William S. Reno. "In harm's way: African counter-insurgency and patronage politics." *Civil Wars* 16, no. 2 (2014): 105-126.

audiences (and most of the international community) viewed the LRA as a terrorist group, and that any truce without consequences for those indicted, was no longer a plausible outcome.⁶⁰⁷

Finally, the end of the Second Congo War (referred to some as the Great African War⁶⁰⁸) was a transitional moment for Museveni's military. This intervention presented the possibility that Museveni would turn the "good" political engagement of the UPDF as a protector of the people into the "bad" political engagement of a military that serves the interest of politicians and to become a vehicle for providing patronage to targeted communities. Many militaries – to include the UPDF – engaged in a practice of "military mercantilism" (i.e. stealing minerals) during the Congo Wars.⁶⁰⁹ The difficulties of the UPDF, and their less than stellar military performance, forced Museveni to enact several reforms, such as no longer permitting UPDF troops to be above the law. This included bringing back the "Court Martial System" to deal with UPDF troop transgressions.⁶¹⁰ It also led to Museveni to look westward in 2008 for military assistance and training to deal with the LRA, which was partly a consequence of his 2007 decision to conduct regional peacekeeping in Mogadishu under the UN authorized African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁶¹¹ But this is not to say that Museveni's personalist control over certain army units was bad either. For example, a researcher conducting interviews

⁶⁰⁷ "Museveni accepts Kony's olive branch. But ICC won't have it," Human Rights House Foundation, May 18, 2006, <http://humanrightshouse.org/noop/page.php?p=Articles/7336.html&print=1&d=1>

⁶⁰⁸ Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁶⁰⁹ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous order: Military forces in African states* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 92-103

⁶¹⁰ After 2000, interviewees stated that the UPDF no longer tolerated improper behaviors by UPDF troops and began prosecuting bad conduct. Those found guilty usually faced a firing squad. Field Research, August 2017.

⁶¹¹ Matt Freear and Cedric De Coning, "Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 2 (2013); Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army: The US Response," *Current Politics and Economics of Africa* 7, no. 2 (2014): 173.

with Ugandan citizens and army personnel found that when Museveni exerted personal control over UPDF units in the 1990s, they were “dramatically more vigorous and certain types of corrupt practices decrease.”⁶¹²

The ‘Black Box’ of Military Institutions: What makes the UPDF Effective?

The cohesive ideology of the UPDF appears situated around its “Bush Fighter” mentality and pan-Africanism. Many UPDF personnel that served in the National Resistance Army (NRA) during the Ugandan Bush War (1981-1986) still considered their contemporary army as being informed by the ‘Bush’ mentality embedded with desire to help other Africans. In fact, the NRA’s *Code of Conduct* – that was developed by Museveni while fighting in the “bush” – is still the basis for political indoctrination of all UPDF recruits.⁶¹³ Moreover, one UPDF General that had joined the NRA in 1981 (he was a university student in Tanzania before joining) still referred to himself as a “Bush Fighter” and mentioned how important “pan-Africanism was as an ideology... [it] was the primary weapon because they [NRA] didn’t have enough guns for every guerilla.” The UPDF General even admitted how fond he was of those days in the “Bush” where he and his friends would sing songs about their “movement” in the evening to reinforce the importance of this pan-Africanist ideology so that they could “win the population and the mind of the people [sic].” It was this singing, he explained, that was vital for ideological indoctrination

⁶¹² Robert Gersony, *The Anguish of Northern Uganda* (Kampala: U.S. Embassy and USAID, 1997), 37, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacc245.pdf.

⁶¹³ The NRA/M Code of Conduct was important for improving guerilla relations with local populations. As a document, it helped formalize structured relations within the rebel movement. Interview, August 24, 2017; Ondoga Ori Amaza, *Museveni's long march from guerrilla to statesman* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998), 42 and 246; Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 143-144.

and keeping “guerilla minds active” since they were surviving on very little (e.g. “picking beans”) in the “Bush” for months at a time.

Indeed, the government of Uganda acknowledged the importance of such music, when they mourned the passing of Sergeant Kifulugunyu, who was their most instrumental liberation song composer. The UPDF released an official statement about Kifulugunyu, stating “He remains specifically remembered for boosting the morale of the fighters through his patriotic music. UPDF and the entire country had continued to enjoy his patriotic songs to motivate soldiers.”⁶¹⁴ The experience of actually ruling captured “liberated zones” inside Uganda marked the NRA/UPDF too. This gave soldiers the experience of participating in a political program defined by their opposition to Uganda’s ‘old’ politics to that point. It also gave them connections to the people in ways that these songs and other propaganda could help members to interpret this experience.

In the areas liberated and controlled by Museveni’s NRA/UPDF soldiers, they taught *mchaka-mchaka* (basic military skills) to the peasants. This helped give the NRM legitimacy under the overarching aim of preventing government tyranny that occurred under the rule of Obote and Amin.⁶¹⁵ While the *mchaka-mchaka* is formally an NRM institutional class for teaching self-defense skills and how to use an AK-47, it also serves as a form of political indoctrination as the course teaches Ugandan history with a narrative favorable to Museveni’s NRM, with an emphasis on the special role the NRA/UPDF plays in society.⁶¹⁶ *Mchaka-mchaka*,

⁶¹⁴ Sarah Kagingo, “UPDF Mourn Bush War Songs Composer Sgt Kifulugunyu,” *Soft Power News*, November 15, 2017, <https://www.softpower.ug/updf-mourn-bush-war-songs-composer-sgt-kifulugunyu/>

⁶¹⁵ Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Uganda: A Nation in Transition: Post-colonial Analysis* (Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2013), 226-227.

⁶¹⁶ Chris Dolan, *Social torture: the case of northern Uganda, 1986-2006* (Berghahn Books, 2013), 115-116.

which can be crudely construed as a form of NRM propaganda, continues to be taught (as of 2018) by the NRM throughout the country as a way of reinforcing Museveni's rule, and engendering societal cohesion for citizens and those in the UPDF.⁶¹⁷ It can also serve as an informal mechanism for cohesion within the UPDF, as its institutional politicization aspect attempts to reduce tensions centered on perceptions of identity. Nonetheless, the decades in which *Mchaka-mchaka* has been practiced and implemented by the NRM, it has helped numerous communities be resilient against insurgent attacks and can be credited as a foundation for basic military effectiveness in the UPDF.⁶¹⁸

Museveni honed his "Bush" abilities of "basic fighting and survival" to the time he spent in RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance).⁶¹⁹ Despite his experience in RENAMO, it appears Museveni was willing to create a rebel army that was structured and organized in a different fashion. Where RENAMO had a centralized military structure and command tightly under the control of their leader Afonso Dhlakama, Museveni's "NRA invested power and authority in local commanders and rank-and-file combatants."⁶²⁰ In many ways, Museveni was organizationally more efficient in his fight against the Ugandan government and military between 1981 and 1986, with an emphasis on liberating Ugandans.⁶²¹ For instance, a former government soldier that had fought against Museveni in the jungles described his experience of

⁶¹⁷ Joseph Kiggundu, "Museveni makes case for mchaka – mchaka," Daily Monitor, June 25, 2015, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-makes-case-for-mchaka---mchaka/688334-2764174-kbgmk0z/index.html>

⁶¹⁸ Tom Ogwang, "Private Security Organizations in Uganda: At home and away," In Kennedy Agade Mkutu (ed.), *Security Governance in East Africa: Pictures of Policing from the Ground* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), 152-153.

⁶¹⁹ *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*

⁶²⁰ Weinstein, *Inside rebellion*, 145.

⁶²¹ Margaret A. Novicki, and Martine Dennis. "Interview with President Yoweri Museveni." *Africa Report* 33, no. 1 (1988): 18-21.

being captured by NRA rebels, where singing and political indoctrination were used to ‘convert’ him and other captured government troops into fighters for the struggle against Obote (and later the Tito Okello military junta). He also described the 26 circles of trust with Museveni – new recruits were always in the 26th circle – in which one had to earn their way towards the inner rings. Interestingly, this soldier-turned-rebel fled back to his hometown after Museveni announced control of Uganda out of fear that he would turn on Ugandans like Amin, but Museveni did not wage any pogroms.⁶²² RENAMO leadership on the other hand, did not see a path to victory through winning the population, and chose to demonstrate their “power to hurt” as a way of seeking concessions from the government.⁶²³

After seizing the capital of Uganda, the NRA retained its name, organization, and principles until 1995, when the Constitution was amended to rename it the UPDF. While the reorganization and renaming did change the ‘character’ of the Ugandan military, the ‘nature’ of its involvement in domestic matters continued.⁶²⁴ In effect, the UPDF was part of the importation of “Bush” institutions and style of politics into the state that the successful rebel army now controlled.

The transition from rebel army to nationalistic Ugandan military has not occurred without holding onto one peculiar institution from the ‘old’ regime. During Obote’s second reign (1981-1985), he instituted the policy of having 10 senior military officers represented as members in

⁶²² Andiema Chesibay quoted in Joyce Chemitai, “War against Museveni: UNLA soldiers kill each other,” *Daily Monitor*, February 6, 2017, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/PeoplePower/War-against-Museveni--UNLA-soldiers-kill-each-other/689844-3799564-12uyk4bz/index.html>

⁶²³ Otto Roesch, "Renamo and the peasantry in Southern Mozambique: a view from Gaza Province," *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines* 26, no. 3 (1992): 462-484.

⁶²⁴ Nelson Kasfir, ““No □ Party Democracy” in Uganda,” *Journal of Democracy*, 9, no. 2 (1998): 49–63.

parliament (MP) as a way of improving loyalty.⁶²⁵ This policy remained intact after Museveni came to power, and while the 10 military MPs are non-partisan, they generally favor government policies and try to curb opposition.⁶²⁶ In addition, when it came to rebuilding a ‘new’ regime, Museveni eventually absorbed ‘old’ regime personnel that had served in previous governments and armies through a “screening team.” This imposed political indoctrination through an “Orientation Course” (about 6 months), ensuring they would share Museveni’s vision for a ‘new’ Uganda and “bring fundamental changes to the old regime thinking.”⁶²⁷

The transition from Museveni’s personalist army (NRA) to a “good” apolitical military (UPDF) appears to be in tension with one another, as Museveni has continued to micro-manage promotion lists for anyone wanting to make the rank of Major or higher. In addition, he is fearful of his “Bush” fighter Generals entering politics. For instance, Museveni recently put one of his top officers, General David Sejusa (Tinyefuza) under ‘house-arrest’ in 2014 because of supposed coup-plotting. However, after conducting numerous interviews, it turns out Museveni will not let him retire because he views him as a political threat, since Sejusa was planning on running for President against Museveni.⁶²⁸ The cadre of Ugandan Generals that want to retire is growing. As one UPDF General admitted: “I am an old Bush fighter now...I want to retire and make room for the younger generation of officers that did not fight in the Bush Wars...there is a tension in the lower ranks because there’s no room for them to be promoted.”⁶²⁹ Yet part of this problem is also

⁶²⁵ Amii Omara-Otunnu, *Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890–1985*, (London: Macmillan, 1987), 159.

⁶²⁶ Nelson Kasfir and Steven Hippo Twebaze, “The limits of institutionalisation of legislature without parties: The Ugandan parliament,” *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Washington, DC, September 2, 2005, <https://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/uganda/doc/KasfirTwebaze%20%20APSA%202005.pdf>.

⁶²⁷ Interviews, August 2017

⁶²⁸ Field notes, Uganda, August 2017

⁶²⁹ At the time of the interview there are only 6 out of 56 UPDF Generals that do not have experience from the Bush Wars. Interview, August 11, 2017. For more information on UPDF leadership and their pay, refer to:

budgetary as the UPDF budget cannot afford many of the generous retirement pensions, although Museveni did promise a pay raise for UPDF soldiers a week after the ZDF overthrew Mugabe.⁶³⁰

It seems that Museveni is trying to maintain personalist control, even though he had begun the transformation of the UPDF into a more professional warfighting apolitical army in 1995. In maintaining a personalist army, Museveni ostensibly appears to be grooming his son, Major General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, as a line of succession. To improve the credibility and legitimacy of General Kainerugaba, Museveni has sent him overseas for education and numerous training courses, to include attending Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in the UK. The management of the military has meant that Museveni has had to increasingly rely on patronage to keep high-ranking officers loyal when he lets them retire, by appointing many of them to high paying government posts.⁶³¹ One would expect this trend to produce tensions in the UPDF, as many members believe that the UPDF should engage in politics independently of the personal interests of the leader. Therefore, some will be resentful of this turn in Museveni's behavior. However, as one UPDF source admitted "Museveni is careful about firing generals and colonels with lineage from the eastern region because it will cause riots."⁶³² This suggests that, while it may appear that the UPDF might be undermined by personalist control of their upper ranks, it also suggests a strategic choice of preventing the creation (and perception) of an army that favors any other region or ethnic/tribal group at the expense of the other. As another source relayed

<http://www.monitor.co.ug/artsculture/Reviews/Who-is-who--List-of-UPDF-top-brass-and-what-they-do/691232-2536060-d2qq7g/index.html>

⁶³⁰ "Museveni promises pay rise for soldiers after bloodless coup in Zimbabwe," *Kenyan News*, November 22, 2017, <https://kenyannews.co.ke/tuko-news/museveni-promises-pay-rise-for-soldiers-after-bloodless-coup-in-zimbabwe/>

⁶³¹ "Uganda: Kith, kin and cosh," *Africa Confidential*, February 3, 2017, https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11900/Kith%2c_kin_and_cosh

⁶³² Interview, August 25, 2017

about Museveni struggling to incorporate the eastern areas of Uganda, “he [Museveni] has had to be conscious of making them [eastern tribes] represented in the UPDF and government.”⁶³³

Thus, while it may appear to outsiders that Museveni is overly exerting personal control to stay in power, such actions might also indicate a desire to prevent group grievances and security dilemmas arising from over-favoring one identity over the other. This is more in line with Petersen and Staniland’s reasoning “that the international community must be more attuned to the resentments and fears not only in society, but within the military.”⁶³⁴ Finally, it also suggests Museveni's ability to personally control army units, which typifies the "civil-rebel relations" that continue to persist despite numerous reforms and constitutional changes that are supposed to have removed legacy NRA institutions.

According to Uganda’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), they oversee the UPDF “to ensure that a professional Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force which is accountable to the people while focusing on protecting its citizens, defending its sovereignty and contributing to regional stability.”⁶³⁵ The UPDF website highlights a similar vision for a professionalized UPDF, “that is well trained, well equipped and which will sustain conditions in the country that enable economic growth, stability, democracy and national unity.”⁶³⁶ These organizational visions echo similar MoD sentiments in that the UPDF will “preserve, defend and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda, guarantee the non-violability of the people's rights, contributing to

⁶³³ Interview, August 25, 2017

⁶³⁴ Roger Petersen and Paul Staniland, “Resentment, fear, and the structure of the military in multiethnic states,” In Stephen M. Saideman and Marie-Joelle J. Zahar (eds.), *Intra-State Conflict, Governments and Security: Dilemmas and Deterrence and Assurance* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 117.

⁶³⁵ “Ministry of Defence,” Government of Uganda, 2018, <http://www.gou.go.ug/ministry/ministry-defence>

⁶³⁶ “Vision,” Ministry of Defence, Government of Uganda, February 1, 2014, www.defence.go.ug/&num=1&hl=en&gl=us&strip=1&vwsr=0

regional stability and supporting international peace initiatives, and ensuring the rule of law and good governance.”⁶³⁷ Such official statements suggest the nuanced ways in which Ugandan civil-military relations are codified through official channels and an attempt by political and military authorities to express and define roles in the 21st century.

In making this 2001 transition for the UPDF, the MoD sought “to further the consolidation and transformation of the UPDF from a guerrilla army into a modern, accountable, efficient and professional Defence Force.”⁶³⁸ However, this has effectively just been the transition from a personalist army to an aesthetically apolitical army that is still tightly controlled by Museveni, but permits the creation of professional UPDF soldiers. This is not to say that it was not a successful attempt at increasing the durability and stability of the state and military. For example, to improve the quality of the UPDF officer corps, Museveni began the practice of recruiting top graduates (men and women) from Ugandan universities in 2000, and sent them to a military academy in Russia. Moreover, Museveni implemented the “Quarter System” in 2008 to ensure equal recruitment in all districts to improve ethnic balances and relations within the UPDF.⁶³⁹ Moreover, one must also consider the different nature of threats to Uganda. For example, one of Museveni’s presidential advisors astutely noted that “the definition of security has changed from the conventional knowledge of security to include things like genocide, food

⁶³⁷ “Mission,” Ministry of Defence, Government of Uganda, February 1, 2014, www.defence.go.ug/&num=1&hl=en&gl=us&strip=1&vwsr=0

⁶³⁸ “UPDF Doctrine,” Ministry of Defence, Government of Uganda, May 18, 2015, http://portal.defence.go.ug:10039/wps/portal/mod-home/Doctrine/projects-and-programs/doctrine!/ut/p/a0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOIt_Q0sDL0NjLzcLQJdDByDg02MvD2MjPx9TPQLsh0VAfr1gS0!/

⁶³⁹ Interview, August 24, 2017

insecurity, disasters, governance, greed and grievances.”⁶⁴⁰ His comments suggest the need to rethink how the UPDF is effective militarily. Hence, the presidential advisor goes on to contend that such security problems have “forced the UPDF to re-adjust strategically in order to integrate within these challenges...while doing their oversight roles of corporate social responsibility.”⁶⁴¹ This reinforces the fact the UPDF can be a professional army in their own political context of how security is viewed and managed, but it also suggests a UPDF that is engaged domestically.

When it comes to deploying the military internally, there is a formalized process that may surprise some that believe Museveni over relies on his army to put down protests and repress dissidents. In fact, the UPDF does not have autonomy to conduct domestic military operations without explicit approval. UPDF personnel interviewed consistently argued that anti-riot duties were incredibly rare and that they tried to avoid them because it distracted from their primary military duties since it was bad for morale and unit cohesion.⁶⁴² While a critic might contend that these are ‘talking points’, numerous Ugandan civilians interviewed stated how much they respected the UPDF, especially because they said it was rare to see them used for ‘policing activities’ (e.g. riot control), with many contending that they did not like the various forms of police units because they generally used too much force. The process for deploying UPDF troops in a district in Uganda (there are 122 districts and each one has a UPDF commander), requires the district police commander to send a formal request (i.e. must justify the reason) to the UPDF division commander, who then notifies the operational UPDF Chief of Defense (CHOD) who then requires a signature of authorization from the civilian in charge of the MoD. Once that

⁶⁴⁰ Richard Todwong, “The UPDF is a highly professional army,” *New Vision*, December 22, 2009, https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1230245/updf-highly-professional-army

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴² Field Research, August 2017

process has been completed, then the district police commander is given the tactical authority to command the division of UPDF troops in his district for whatever reason he might need. Those that may believe Museveni deploys his troops regularly for domestic repression miss the fact that UPDF assistance must be requested in writing by civilian authorities. Understanding the process of domestic military deployments is vital to understanding the level of professionalism dedicated to keeping a military focused on external problems.

The desire to be a professional army that is combat effective and politically involved, appears to be the *modus operandi* of the UPDF. For example, UPDF Colonel Shaban Bantariza penned an editorial titled “Military, politics are bedfellows,” in which he decried the dangers of having a truly apolitical army in Africa. Giving examples of disconnects that occur between apolitical militaries and civilian authorities in an African context, he concluded “So, with hindsight, we must shield the military from national partisan politics, but to shut it out of politics completely, we can only do that at our own cost and peril.”⁶⁴³ Bantariza further adds “but a military officer who is subordinate to civil authority out of political consciousness and mutual respect, is more dependable, reliable and deployable for national defence.”⁶⁴⁴ The Colonel’s remarks suggest that despite the UPDF being constitutionally slated as an apolitical army, it must maintain a degree of ‘political awareness’, otherwise it might fall prey to the traps of other apolitical armies. It suggests that the nature of politics and security are different in an African context and that militaries can play a positive role in state-building and development. Otherwise, militaries that lack a personal political connection to their government are more likely to

⁶⁴³ Shaban Bantariza, “Military, politics are bedfellows,” *The Observer*, October 6, 2013, <http://observer.ug/viewpoint/guest-writers/27865-military-politics-are-bedfellows>

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid.

overthrow their regimes or fight poorly (and lose) because they are deficient in political and ideological commitment to the government and/or society.

In sum, “political” is an element of professionalism in a weakly institutionalized state environment. The military has to take a stand in favor of a state-building program, and have a clear vision of politics to guard against the reappearance of the predations of the past. This idea of professionalism and effectiveness also is susceptible to co-optation if a leader is able to manipulate the articulation of the political program. Interested observers also might wonder whether a vision of “good politics” can be transformed into a more truly apolitical army, or whether engagement with politics is inevitable (and beneficial) in a context in which other state institutions are weak and serious societal divisions remain.

According to a UPDF officer, when asked about military effectiveness, he contended that “we have developed confidence in ourselves” and that pan-Africanism is “the culture,” adding “why should we wait for outsiders to help us [black Africans].”⁶⁴⁵ Such comments indicate how much the idea of taking care of fellow Africans informs the way the UPDF conducts peacekeeping operations. It is indicative of why Uganda only contributes a handful of troops annually to UN operations, but annually deploys thousands of troops in support of African Union missions to protect Africans. Interestingly, since few UPDF officials could give cohesive answers specifically about UPDF effectiveness, I have generated a drawing (Figure 7-1) based on a consensus of numerous answers given by UPDF personnel about what they believed made

⁶⁴⁵ Interview, August 11, 2017

their army effective.⁶⁴⁶ It also suggests the pragmatic approach to developing effective military institutions with the strategic vision of Museveni and the NRM.




Figure 7-1. Compilation of answers from UPDF personnel about making an effective military.

The lack of specificity should not be seen as a particularly bad aspect either, as UPDF effectiveness seems to be informed by several informal practices. The importance of Figure 7-1 is that it explicitly shows what UPDF officials believe to be of importance to their institutional competency. It also serves as a way of conceptualizing how the embedded ‘military enclave’ of effectiveness is perceived in a UPDF context. Other militaries (especially Westernized apolitical militaries) might implicitly assume that things like education, training, and human rights are a

⁶⁴⁶ Field Work, August 2017

given, and would not bother mentioning them as a part of conventional military effectiveness.⁶⁴⁷

Nonetheless, a *White Paper on Defence Transformation* published in 2004 by the Ugandan government identified what would be needed to improve the technical capabilities of the army based on financial costs and risk (see Figure 7-2).⁶⁴⁸



Fighting Power – Finding the Right Balance




Figure 7-2. This is the only “Figure” (page 33) in the 2004 *White Paper on Defence Transformation* that attempts to describe UPDF military effectiveness.

The *White Paper on Defence Transformation* serves as an interesting case of rare military transparency on the African continent. It is also an illustration of self-reflection in that “the operational structures and practices which supported the NRA to wage a successful bush war

⁶⁴⁷ In dozens of interviews with personnel and officials from modernized apolitical militaries (U.S., European, Australian, etc.) almost never mentioned education, training, or human rights, because to them, it is likely taken as so fundamentally embedded to military effectiveness, that to identify it would be like pointing out grains of sand at a beach. Interviews, 2015-2018.

⁶⁴⁸ Government of Uganda, *White Paper on Defence Transformation* (Kampala: Ministry of Defence, 2004).

then, did not of necessity conform to the requirements of an army serving a democratic modern state [sic].”⁶⁴⁹ Whether or not their belief in such an observation is true – let alone a proper solution to this – indicates that there was some acknowledgement that UPDF operations were unsustainable for a modern army.⁶⁵⁰ This is not to say this reform document has been followed by Museveni, as one UN observer noted that Museveni has acquired tanks and fighter aircraft “purely for prestige,” as they provide little competitive edge in counterinsurgency.⁶⁵¹

As identified throughout most of Museveni’s rule, he does not appear to overly dictate how the UPDF becomes effective – besides trying to maintain loyalty. His belief in pan-Africanism, NRA/M indoctrination, and tribal/ethnic balancing within the ranks (to prevent the appearance of tribal favoritism) situate the informal ways in which UPDF pursues its role in politics and military affairs. From this, education and training through military assistance and training from various patron states has been used to support Museveni’s vision. Due to the LRA (and other neighboring rebel/terrorist organizations) and the growing use of the UPDF for regional AU peacekeeping, the UPDF has received substantial training and education from many Western and Eastern states, to include assistance from the Israeli military and North Korea.⁶⁵²

In domestic affairs, the UPDF see themselves as being “aware” in that they are involved in several activities of development. Firstly, while UPDF personnel deny that they are involved

⁶⁴⁹ *White Paper on Defence Transformation*, 12.

⁶⁵⁰ The *White Paper on Defence Transformation* also identifies the apolitical role of the UPDF: “Article 208 of the Constitution affirms that UPDF shall only recruit Ugandan citizens of good character and prescribes the character and nature of the defence forces as non-partisan, patriotic, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civil authority.” (43).

⁶⁵¹ Paul Pryce, “Uganda’s Defence Reforms in Review,” *NATO Association of Canada / Association Canadienne Pour l’OTAN*, July 9, 2015, <http://natoassociation.ca/ugandas-defence-reforms-in-review/>; Interview, August 24, 2017.

⁶⁵² Field notes, July-August 2017.

in the training of Ugandan police officers, many Uganda police officers (local and federal) readily admit that most of their training was conducted by the UPDF – not by the police units that hired them.⁶⁵³ This might indicate a strategy by the UPDF of trying to develop a different component of Ugandan security apparatus that is more loyal to the state and more professional, as many Ugandan citizens interviewed complained of police corruption, which many attributed to their very low pay.⁶⁵⁴ Secondly, it also suggests that such involvement is a way of developing networks of loyalty between the UPDF and police forces in patron-client terms, but also as a way of potentially stymieing a future threat to Ugandan government. In Africa, there have been instances of police forces attempting a coup against a government (such as the one in Djibouti in 2000), thus UPDF involvement with police structures and institutions might serve as a way of bringing NRA/M practices to this defunct organization.⁶⁵⁵ Finally, the UPDF has been holding an annual “Army Week” since 2007, where soldiers engage in “community activities, such as slashing road sides, cleaning health centres and digging pit latrines in IDP [internally displaced person] camps.” While symbolic in nature, it does illustrate the way in which the UPDF attempts to engage in positive socialization relations with the public, which reinforces internal UPDF processes meant on fostering national unity towards society and state. It is also a part of the broader civil-military operational strategy as the UPDF deployed a sizeable presence to northern

⁶⁵³ Interviewees indicate that UPDF officials do not want to be seen as having a formal link with the police.

⁶⁵⁴ In interviews, it was discovered that Ugandan police start out making 360,000 Shilling annually (about \$97 USD total a year), whereas a new UPDF troop makes 350,000 Shilling per month (about \$1,100 USD a year). The massive disconnect between police and military payroll is suggestive of why Ugandan citizens regularly spoke of police intimidating for bribes, to include food and water. One individual was intimidated into buying beverages for several police officers when they repeatedly told him “how thirsty they were.”

⁶⁵⁵ Carlson Anyangwe, *Revolutionary overthrow of constitutional orders in Africa* (Bamenda, Cameroon: African Books Collective, 2012).

Uganda to keep the LRA out, beginning in 2006, with an emphasis on reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.⁶⁵⁶

Domestic involvement by the UPDF in state-building projects is especially important. At the national level, sources close to Museveni stated that he has increasingly relied on UPDF officers to run and operate state funded projects (e.g. development, construction, agricultural, etc.) because he trusts them the most. This is because Museveni considers the UPDF the least corrupt of all Ugandan institutions. This is not to say that there is not some patronage involved with the UPDF as they have a “commercial wing” that runs all sorts of economic projects from farms to industry.⁶⁵⁷ For example, Museveni allows UPDF officers to “keep leftovers” from a project/program if they finish on-time and under-budget.⁶⁵⁸ While this is perceived as “corruption” to the average Western observer, to UPDF personnel this is a reward for doing the best job given the conditions and political context. In fact, Museveni trusts his UPDF officers so much that he even “deployed” the army in 2017 to the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) for the explicit purpose of fighting corruption (including a “Anti-Corruption Hotline” where citizens could phone UPDF troops to report cases of corruption). This move was meant to attract foreign investors, who were losing confidence in the UIA due to graft.⁶⁵⁹

When it comes to employing the UPDF, Museveni has an “offensive mindset...[and] does not like defensive operations” for his military, which is informally inculcated within the

⁶⁵⁶ Laura J. Perazzola, “Civil-military operations in the post conflict environment: Northern Uganda case study,” Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.

⁶⁵⁷ Luwero Industries is run by UPDF officers and makes bullets, guns, and armored vehicles.

⁶⁵⁸ In interviews, sources indicated that Museveni sees the UPDF as “professional” in that they are “disciplined” and “selfless.”

⁶⁵⁹ Yasiin Mugerwa, “Museveni deploys army to fight graft at UIA,” *Daily Monitor*, May 10, 2017, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-deploys-army-to-fight-graft-at-UIA/688334-3920460-f5irl4/index.html>

ranks.⁶⁶⁰ When we consider that a U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) report indicated that UPDF troops are “really good when on ‘offense’ and when not relying on U.S. training tactics.” The 2017 report then admits that since 2012, the “U.S. Army has been trying to train them to fight under the U.S. Army model and these [UPDF] units struggle/fail in combat” in Somalia.⁶⁶¹ This suggests that armies, such as the UPDF, cannot be forced to create Western-centric type militaries and tactics, especially devoid of political context. Instead, it suggests that their own *esprit de corps* and “bush” mindset to fighting may be contextually best for how they generate military power. Hence, the UPDF underperformed somewhat during its initial AMISOM occupation of Mogadishu from 2007 until 2011 because it was required to operate under restrictive defensive rules of engagement. However, the UPDF preemptively decided to wage an offensive counterinsurgency (despite lacking UN/AMISOM authority)⁶⁶² in February of 2011 – out of frustration with al-Shabaab attacks – and played a pivotal role in expelling insurgents and securing the city of Mogadishu by October of 2011.⁶⁶³ This is where the UPDF proved to be a

⁶⁶⁰ Interview, August 11, 2017

⁶⁶¹ Unclassified report on AFRICOM security force assistance to Uganda, August 2, 2017

⁶⁶² When the Ugandan troops began offensive military operations against al-Shabaab in February 2011, they technically were operating outside the defensive peacekeeping mandate outlined for using military force in UN Resolution 1772 (2007). To accommodate the reality on the ground, in that AMISOM forces were conducting operations outside their legal mandate, a special 2012 report on Somalia by the UN Security Council identified the need for AMISOM to “support major offensive operations on multiple fronts, which then led to UN Resolution 2036 (2012) to explicitly call for offensive military operations “to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia.” Refer to these source documents for more: “UN Resolution 1772 (2007)”, UN Security Council, S/RES/1772, August 20, 2007, <http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Resolution%201772%20%282007%29.pdf>; “UN Resolution 2036 (2012)”, UN Security Council, S/RES/2036, February 22, 2012, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/604/21/PDF/N1160421.pdf?OpenElement>; “Special report of the Secretary-General on Somalia,” UN Security Council, S/2012/74, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/74

⁶⁶³ Kasaija Philip Apuuli, “Uganda in Regional and International Peacekeeping Operations,” *The Round Table* 106, no. 5 (2017): 505-515,

militarily effective force, especially compared to Burundian and Kenyan troops that struggled in their military operations.⁶⁶⁴

Finally, it seems that Museveni has escaped the coup-trap by permitting the creation of a UPDF ‘military enclave’ that is more effective than neighboring states that are larger and richer. Indeed, if one accepts the numerous ways in which Museveni actively or indirectly coup-proofs his military, he seems to have found innovative ways in which to foster some meritocracy centered around pan-Africanist ideology and the political context of ‘old’ regimes that had various pathologies in their dealings with the army.⁶⁶⁵ This process did take time, and seemed to happen in the mid-2000’s, as one UPDF officer noting that “peacekeeping experiences has made the UPDF a very effective military.”⁶⁶⁶ Moreover, while some scholars might criticize Museveni’s “effective coup-proofing”⁶⁶⁷ it diminishes the fact that several UPDF officers interviewed admitted that they were content with ethnic/tribal balancing because of Uganda’s tragic military history, and identified the political necessity of such balancing in UPDF promotions and recruitment to prevent misperceptions.⁶⁶⁸ This suggests that UPDF personnel might subconsciously view such actions as a way of “purge-proofing” the UPDF in that it reduces the future chance of counter-purges from occurring within the ranks, which was a systemic problem during Amin’s and Obote’s rule. Thus, reducing the risks of being seen as

⁶⁶⁴ Paul D. Williams, "AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia," *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper* 13 (2013): 1-7; Field notes, July-August 2017.

⁶⁶⁵ Michael Murphy, "A Deal with the Devil? Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Civil War Conflicts," *Norman Paterson School of International Affairs* 15, no. (2016): 1-19.

⁶⁶⁶ Interview, August 11, 2017

⁶⁶⁷ Sabastiano Rwengabo, "Regime stability in post-1986 Uganda: counting the benefits of coup-proofing," *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (2013): 531-559.

⁶⁶⁸ Field Work, August 2017.

disloyal to Museveni and other identity groups within the UPDF suggests that cohesion can be retained in the pursuit of UPDF military effectiveness.

Conclusion

As shown, the colonial institutions such as the KAR had an impact on Uganda after Independence in terms of creating intra-tribal competition, but did not directly lead to an institutionally effective NRA/UPDF. Instead, it was the agency of Museveni creating a system of ‘good’ politics ideologically centered on pan-Africanism alongside patronage strategies for Uganda after he seized Kampala in 1986. While Museveni was able to create a ‘new’ regime, based on his internalized way of doing politics and civil-military relations – which is an institutionalized form of civil-rebel relations – some components of the ‘old’ regime did carry-on into his own, as did tribal grievances and strife. Regardless, Museveni has managed to create a durable state and effective military. Moreover, the NRA/UPDF has played a pivotal role in politics and society, even after formally being restructured as an apolitical army. The legacy of “Bush fighter” institutions permeate deep within the state and military. While some may see this as outright corruption, patron-client relations seem to have been institutionalized to the point of equilibria, whereby the UPDF has been able to create its own ‘military enclave’ within the political context of Museveni.

The scaled-up wars against the LRA and participation in AMISOM has facilitated this process due to mission focus, and external assistance towards such objectives. Finally, while Museveni has not fulfilled the entirety of his vision as set out in his *The Ten-Point Programme*, he (and many of his fellow Bush War veterans) should be given credit for having escaped many of the traps and problems seen in the ‘old’ regimes. The only danger that remains is how much

Museveni will re-personalize the UPDF. It also remains to be seen whether or not the UPDF maintains its institutional effectiveness, and decides to behave in a positively benign political fashion that stays out of divisive and partisan issues as Uganda. This will be vital for the future of Uganda, as at some point, Museveni and his original cadre of NRA/M fighters will have to pass the reins of government onto a younger generation of political and military leaders that may not fully comprehend “Bush style” institutions.

Chapter 8 – Rwanda: “Patriots” Building a New State

Interview Question: What do you think makes Rwanda a country that “punches above its weight”?

Rwanda is organized like Germany...

Rwanda is clean like the Swiss...

Rwanda maintains security forces like Israel...

Rwanda is a police-state like Singapore...

Rwanda doesn't have African corruption; it's more like the corruption you see in the West...

*Comments from a room full of Western security officials
Kigali, Rwanda
August 2017*

Throughout its history, the RDF never invested primarily in numbers, armament, equipment and technology. While armament, technology and equipment have been important to the RDF, what has made a difference for us has been an emphasis on training that engenders personal and collective values of clarity of purpose, competence, integrity, a sense of identity, and ethical conduct. These are the same values that have led the RDF's success and have earned them respect when they go on international peace keeping missions.

*Paul Kagame
Inauguration Ceremony
Rwandan Senior Command and Staff College and Course
July 23, 2012⁶⁶⁹*

Just mentioning Rwanda stirs up tremendous emotion and passion. The scale and ferocity of the genocide perpetrated by the Hutu militant regime (*Interahamwe*) in 1994 took place over 100 days, slaughtered over a million Tutsis (and some moderate Hutus), and displaced hundreds of thousands of people.⁶⁷⁰ The events that transpired around the genocide capped the end of the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), as Paul Kagame led his rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic

⁶⁶⁹ Paul Kagame, “Speech by H.E. Paul KAGAME, President of the Republic of Rwanda, at the inauguration of the Senior Command and Staff College and Course, Nyakinama, 23rd July, 2012,” Rwanda Defence Force Command and Staff College, June 3, 2013, <http://www.rdfsc.mil.gov.rw/podcasts/speech-by-h-e-paul-kagame-president-of-the-38.html>

⁶⁷⁰ Rwanda 1994 Genocide estimates are as low as 800,000 deaths and some have estimated up to 2 million deaths. “Numbers,” Human Rights Watch, July 19, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-04.htm>; Edwin Musoni, “Rwanda: Report Claims 2 Million Killed in 1994 Genocide,” *The New Times*, October 4, 2008, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200810040044.html>

Front (RPF)⁶⁷¹, against the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)⁶⁷², seizing Kigali on the 4th of July. He expelled remnants of the old regime, established full control over the countryside by the 18th of July, and created an armed wing of the RPF known as the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Those that fought for the RPF during the war would later be known as “patriots.”

Since 1994, Paul Kagame has effectively controlled and led the new Rwanda. First as Vice President and Minister of Defence at the same time from 1994 to 2000 (he was the *de facto* ruler from behind the scenes)⁶⁷³, and then as President since 2000, with the foreseeable expectation that Kagame will serve in that position until 2034. Nonetheless, Kagame has been responsible for transforming Rwanda from its colonial Belgian roots and post-independence societal turbulence to a newly configured modern African state that is considered one of the safest countries in the world.⁶⁷⁴ This transformation has included a shift away from French and Belgian influence and institutional structures. This change has been extensive enough to include outlawing the colonially created ethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi in its amended 2003 constitution.⁶⁷⁵ Moreover, Rwanda has reoriented itself towards Anglophone countries. English became the primary language in 2008, a rare instance of a government decreeing and actually overseeing a change in the population’s use of language, and it joined the British Commonwealth as its 54th member in 2009.⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷¹ *Front Patriotique Rwandais* (FPR)

⁶⁷² *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR)

⁶⁷³ Colin Waugh, *Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004), 120-121.

⁶⁷⁴ Collins Mwai, “Rwanda among safest countries globally – new Gallup report,” *The New Times*, January 27, 2018, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/217359/>

⁶⁷⁵ Marc Lacey, "A Decade after Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity," *New York Times*, April 9, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html>

⁶⁷⁶ Commonwealth Secretariat, “Rwanda,” *The Commonwealth*, 2018, <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/rwanda>

When Mobutu Sese Seko, tried a similar reorientation of Zaire/DRC, the outcome was very different. Coming to power via military coup in 1965, Mobutu tried to eliminate Belgian control and influence on his country and institutions. His efforts at centralizing power and policy disconnects, only caused *pagaille* (mess/shambles) in Zaire.⁶⁷⁷ Whereas Kagame had to create a specific political program to rebuild Rwanda, Mobutu navigated complicated political situations first seeking power as an end, rather than as a means. This “Africanization campaign” eventually required Mobutu to develop an ideology centered on a cult of personalist surrounding himself to justify his kleptocratic rule, which was really just “Mobutuism” disguised in old Belgian ways.⁶⁷⁸ In sum, Kagame’s transition in Rwanda produced considerable increases in formal state capacity, while Mobutu’s transformation greatly weakened state capacity.

The transformation of the Rwandan state and the emergence of a highly effective military could be attributed to the supposed preexisting “culture of obedience” to authority.⁶⁷⁹ However, it is problematic to treat “obedience as a fixed property of Rwandan culture, if not Rwandans’ psychological predispositions.”⁶⁸⁰ Paradoxically, many use the supposed ‘obedience’ of Rwandan culture to explain why the 1994 genocide was carried out in such an efficient manner⁶⁸¹, while others rely on it to explain Kagame’s ability to rebuild and transform the state

⁶⁷⁷ Crawford Young and Thomas Edwin Turner, *The rise and decline of the Zairian state* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 42-44.

⁶⁷⁸ Karl Cordell, and Stefan Wolff. *Ethnic conflict: causes, consequences, and responses* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009), 105-106; Young and Turner, 1985, 44.

⁶⁷⁹ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 57 and 245; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, “The Prosecutor Versus Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T: Judgement,” paragraph 151; Christian P. Scherrer, *Genocide and crisis in Central Africa: conflict roots, mass violence, and regional war* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 113; Shahryar M. Khan, *The Shallow Graves of Rwanda* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 67; Regine Andersen, “How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda,” *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (2000): 441–56.

⁶⁸⁰ Peter Uvin, “Reading the Rwandan Genocide,” *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001), 84

⁶⁸¹ Christopher Charles Taylor, *Sacrifice as terror: The Rwandan genocide of 1994* (Oxford, UK: Berg Publishers, 1999), 101.

into its new political configuration.⁶⁸² Even the current Rwanda government has affirmed that the culture and values of Rwanda embody hierarchy, obedience, and respect for authority.⁶⁸³ But it is hard to tell if this “obedience” is a consequence of state-building efforts or the cause of it.

Regardless of such fixations on ‘culture’ to explain Rwandan behavior, Kagame (better or for worse) has managed to reorient society with his strategic vision for the state, fashioning it as one of the most peaceful and stable countries on the African continent in the 21st century. The extent and rapidity of this change remains to be explained. The focus here on military effectiveness provides insights that are critical to understanding how this transformation was accomplished.

A brief consideration of neighboring Burundi sheds light on the relationship between culture (or disposition) and considered political strategies in building states (and boosting military effectiveness). Burundi shares other features that are similar to Rwanda, such as social composition, historical political institutions, colonial legacies, ethnic cleavages, and economic conditions, etc.),⁶⁸⁴ then we need to consider what went wrong with Burundi in terms of declining capacity and what went right with Rwanda in terms of increasing capacity. Many consider these two countries as “false twins,” because each state has taken divergent paths since independence.⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁸² Catherine A. Honeyman, *The orderly entrepreneur: youth, education, and governance in Rwanda* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2016), 13.

⁶⁸³ Ministry of Administration, Information and Social Affairs, *Ubudehe in Rwanda: Community Collective Action* (Kigali, Rwanda: Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC), 2001); Ministry of Administration, Information and Social Affairs, *Rwanda Five-year Decentralization Implementation Program* (Kigali, Rwanda: Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC), 2004)

⁶⁸⁴ René Lemarchand, *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 49-78.

⁶⁸⁵ René Lemarchand, "Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *African Affairs* 106, no. 422 (2006): 1-20.

In Burundi, Tutsis continued to dominate the postcolonial state in terms of politics and military affairs until the civil war (1993-2003) resulted in a negotiated settlement that gave Hutu rebels power in the government and army. Alternatively, Rwanda saw majority Hutus dominating the postcolonial state until the civil war (1990-1994), which resulted in Tutsi rebels taking over the state with minimal Hutu involvement. Such divergence is apparent in the 21st century where Burundi has politically struggled to keep the peace and maintain stability since the cessation of hostilities in 2003, which led to the *Conseil national pour la démocratie/Forces pour la défense de la démocratie* (CNDD-FDD), a former Hutu rebel group, coming to power through democratic elections in 2005. Severe political unrest began in 2015 that happened in conjunction with an attempted military coup by General Godefroid Niyombare and subsequent purge by the president. Such activities have produced a new rebel group with the intent of removing the Burundian president.⁶⁸⁶ Thus, Burundi appears to be trapped in cycles of political instability in which state institutions are ineffective and its military force is fragmented and an agent of instability, whereas Rwanda continues the process of state-building through economic growth and the development of state institutions. This divergence also can be attributed to the ‘bad’ politics of Burundi since 1993, where the privatization and personalization of “key institutions such as the military, the judiciary, and the education system by ethnic and regional entities, has resulted in a divorce between state institutions and the population.”⁶⁸⁷

Even as Zoltan Barany suggested that giving an army a constructive mission, such as peacekeeping, helps make militaries prideful and professional and facilitates democratic

⁶⁸⁶ “Burundi: Events of 2016,” Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/burundi>

⁶⁸⁷ Léonce Ndikumana, "Institutional failure and ethnic conflicts in Burundi," *African Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (1998): 29-47.

transitions, the divergence between Burundi and Rwanda is stunning.⁶⁸⁸ For instance, in a 2004 meeting with an American Colonel, Kagame was persuaded that contributing troops to peacekeeping operations – something Rwanda had never done before – would be a way of rehabilitating Rwanda’s image after their military involvement in the Congo Wars (1996-2003).⁶⁸⁹ On the advice and consent of the U.S., Kagame first sent troops in support of the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan at the end of 2004 and began contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions in May of 2005.⁶⁹⁰ Between 2005 and 2016, Rwanda had contributed over 156,000 troops for UN missions and over 27,000 troops towards AU missions.⁶⁹¹ Burundi also is a major troop contributor to peacekeeping operations, having contributed over 40,000 troops for AU peacekeeping missions since beginning in 2005 and over 14,000 troops for UN peacekeeping since 2007.⁶⁹²

These commitments suggest that each country has developed the ability to project military power outside their territory and that their leaders see value in participating. Yet, articles are written in 2017 about Burundi keeping its troops involved in peacekeeping operations “to keep its troops paid and happy.”⁶⁹³ Such suggestions point to the reality of the relationship between Burundi’s military and the country’s political system. Deployments in peacekeeping

⁶⁸⁸ Zoltan D. Barany, *The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 167-169.

⁶⁸⁹ Interview, Kigali, August 21, 2017.

⁶⁹⁰ “UN Peacekeeping,” *Rwanda Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations*, 2018, <http://rwandaun.org/site/un-peacekeeping/>

⁶⁹¹ UN troop contributions are tabulated based on monthly contributions and AU peacekeeper data is from Appendix C. International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*, November 1, 2017, available at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org

⁶⁹² UN troop contributions are tabulated based on monthly contributions and AU peacekeeper data is from Appendix C. International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*, 2017

⁶⁹³ Richard Moncrieff and Thierry Vircoulon, “The Burundian army’s dangerous over-reliance on peacekeeping,” *African Arguments*, September 1, 2017, <http://africanarguments.org/2017/09/01/the-burundian-armys-dangerous-over-reliance-on-peacekeeping/>

operations are organized around the leader's need to distribute patronage rewards as a condition for disciplining own military command. The record of military interventions in politics noted above, particularly its role in continuing political instability, shows that these efforts are not entirely effective. Problems in Burundi continue to persist, and indicate that peacekeeping operations for a poor country with deployed Burundi troops making between \$500 to \$1,000 a month⁶⁹⁴, is still not enough to keep the stability and loyalty of the armed forces, given the force coup-events in the 21st century. Keeping troops busy abroad is not a necessary condition for keeping armed forces loyal or professionalized and pushes back against findings by Magnus Lundgren that suggested high peacekeeper participation rates reduce coup events.⁶⁹⁵ As the analysis in this work shows, the real driver of military effectiveness is found in the military's relationship to its own political context, and the roles and norms of "professionalism" (locally defined) that this context facilitates.

Burundi's struggles with state-building and the creation of a loyal and capable National Defense Forces (FDN)⁶⁹⁶ stems mainly from its problem of integrating former rebels that began in 2003. The power sharing began with the armed wing of the Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD) contributing 37,000 fighters (mainly Hutu) to the Tutsi dominated FDN.⁶⁹⁷ However, the integration chafed Tutsi hardliners in Burundi's government, and many of the newly integrated rebel leaders jockeyed for more power than agreements had allocated to them, leading to

⁶⁹⁴ This depends on how much the government "taxes" their peacekeeper troops. In the case of Burundi, the government typically takes \$200 a month. Paul Williams, "Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU's Largest Peace Operation?" IPI: Global Observatory, January 11, 2017, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/>

⁶⁹⁵ Magnus Lundgren, "Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?" *Journal of Peace Research* (2018), <https://doi.org/10.11177/0022343317747668>

⁶⁹⁶ *Forces de Défense Nationale*

⁶⁹⁷ "First rebel joins Burundi's army," *BBC*, December 16, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3324009.stm>

fractionalization and politicization of the FDN.⁶⁹⁸ In the case of Hutu integration with the RPA/RDF, this came about out of necessity for perceived legitimacy in that Kagame needed personnel for his new national Rwandan military. Moreover, the Congo Wars required a larger number of ground troops to support Kagame's ambitious foreign policy, and many Hutus saw (and discovered) how far they could advance in the RPA/RDF, assuming they followed the various political and ideological protocols.⁶⁹⁹ These political strictures were real, and play a decisive role in shaping how individuals integrated into the RPF and in how they define professional careers. This in turn defines "military effectiveness" in the Rwandan setting, which contributes to an explanation of why peacekeepers from Burundi and Rwanda end up behaving so differently. The disjuncture between the countries illustrates that a robust rebel victory is important, but so is a strategic vision for why the army can serve as a tool of socialization in overcoming supposed primordial issues over identity.

Interestingly, the 1994 genocide serves as a jumping off point in how Kagame has reorganized the structure and society of the Rwandan government. Moreover, in what began as a personalist rebel army, Kagame rapidly transformed the RPF/A into the most Western looking and structured apolitical army (known as the RDF after 2002) on the African continent, but with a very different mission set and origins. The RPA/RDF is ideologically and politically oriented towards protecting civilians in conflict-ridden areas, and "patriots" exert substantial amounts of influence and control over the organization and its objectives. Members of this military thus

⁶⁹⁸ Kristen A. Harkness, "Military Integration and Endemic Conflict: Lessons for Peace Building from Rwanda and Burundi," APSA Annual Conference: Seattle Panel 12-22 Post-Conflict Development, August 30, 2011, https://web.princeton.edu/sites/Kharknes/Working%20Papers_files/RwandaBurundi.pdf

⁶⁹⁹ In an unclassified AWG 2017 document, the author's stated that the RDF's management and career model had "similarities between how the US Army / Marine Corps and RDF organize, train, and deploy forces." (page 6)

define military effectiveness in these explicitly political terms. Rwanda's population, to the extent that they accept Kagame's regime, also see their own military as effective in these same terms.

This chapter is concerned with how Kagame was able to solve a problem of societal cohesion that previous regimes (and neighboring countries) seemed unable to overcome through simultaneously creating a distinctly Rwandan concept of military effectiveness. This creation of an effective military played a central role in solving these difficult political problems. From that perspective, it makes sense that the military would be both political and effective.

I argue that despite the immense hurdles and challenges posed by the destruction of Rwanda in 1994, Kagame's strategic vision for the country, and the non-conventional role of the RPA/RDF in domestic affairs while maintaining incredibly high military effectiveness when deploying outside the country are indicative of a distinctive leadership and discipline throughout the Rwandan government and military. Given the path Kagame has set, the question remaining concerning the relationship between Kagame's personal discretion and power, and the autonomous operation of Rwanda's military institutions. One finds a robust 'military enclave' that appears non-partisan and institutionally committed to the regime, regardless of who comes after Kagame. At the same time, Kagame's personal legacy and his decision-making role lead to the possibility of creating a military on the basis of personal loyalties. Yet this investigation of the RDF illustrates its paradoxical position as a highly professional and disciplined army that also plays a substantial role in domestic affairs. For all intents and purposes, the RDF is apolitical, and yet it is controlled within by personalist networks established by Kagame, while

simultaneously allowing it to be a ‘military enclave’ within the political context and bounds set by “patriots.”

The ‘Old’ Rwanda

Before the arrival of the German colonial expeditions in 1893-1894, Rwanda already was unified as a sovereign nation by the Nyiginya Kingdom, the dominant royal clan. By 1700 the kingdom had exhibited high degrees of centralization and had established a standing army. Nevertheless, the Nilotic people (i.e. Tutsis) were in essence already the dominant political class relative to the Bantu people (i.e. Hutus) and the hunter-gathers (i.e. forest dwellers known as *Twa*) in their respective society.⁷⁰⁰ However, there was no primordial violence between the groups because societal politics were centered around the competition of 15-18 clans that were indistinguishable in terms of ethnic identities.⁷⁰¹

Once Rwanda came under German rule, Tutsis were further accentuated as superior by German prejudices that saw them as more “European” than Hutu counterparts, leading to them gaining even more favorable status under colonial rule, despite the fact that the two groups being substantially intermingled.⁷⁰² When Germany was forced to transfer control of Rwanda to Belgium after World War One, Belgium solidified Rwandan identities by issuing identification cards in 1933, on the basis of economic status, where Rwandans were labeled a Tutsi if they had

⁷⁰⁰ Stapleton, Timothy J. *A History of Genocide in Africa* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2017), 26-28.

⁷⁰¹ Sarah Freedman, Harvey Weinstein, and Timothy Longman, *The Teaching of History of Rwanda: A Participatory Approach* (Berkeley: Human Rights Center at the University of California, 2006), 6-11; Republic of Rwanda, *The Unity of Rwandans – before the Colonial Period and under Colonial Rule – under the First Republic* (Kigali: Office of the President of the Republic, 1999), 6-9.

⁷⁰² James Ciment, *Encyclopedia of conflicts since World War II* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 341.

more than 10 cows, a Hutu if less than 10 cows, and a *Twa* (pygmy) if no wealth at all (only about 1% of the population were classified as this).⁷⁰³

From this new system, Belgium effectively created a new structure, as they heavily favored Tutsis in education and also gave them preference in government jobs.⁷⁰⁴ The problem with this – besides its discriminatory nature – was that the Tutsi's only represented about 10-15% of the Rwandan population; hence, it created an imbalance in societal power that led to tremendous Hutu grievances once independence appeared on the horizon and Rwandans were allowed to organize politically. This was further engrained by the Catholic schools in Rwanda, which reinforced stereotypes about Tutsis being destined and ordained to govern by God, implying that Hutus role was to remain subservient to Tutsis.⁷⁰⁵

Prior to formal independence in 1962, the 1959 “Rwandan Revolution” culminated with Belgian complicity with what they realized would be the dominant Hutu political parties as the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown. This led to tens of thousands of Tutsis being killed or escaping as refugees to neighboring countries, such as Paul Kagame ending up in Uganda at the age of two. Independence in 1962 was followed by significant pogroms by Hutus and Tutsis against one another, with the Tutsi minority practically holding little to no power in the new government or military as President Grégoire Kayibanda's firmly established one-party control for Hutus.⁷⁰⁶ During this period of instability, the Belgians helped set up a new “Africanized” Rwandan

⁷⁰³ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan genocide* (New York: Verso, 2006), 5; Field notes, Rwanda, August 2017.

⁷⁰⁴ Paul J. Magnarella, *Justice in Africa: Rwanda's genocide, its courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Pub Limited, 2000), chapter 1.

⁷⁰⁵ Linda Melvern, *A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2014); Field notes, Rwanda, August 2017.

⁷⁰⁶ Catharine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda.” *Africa Today* 45, no.1 (1998): 7-24.

military, but specifically chose to make it primarily Hutu.⁷⁰⁷ This created tremendous grievances, and numerous exiled Tutsis formed rebel groups and launched cross border attacks, which created further societal tensions.⁷⁰⁸

In 1966, neighboring Burundi saw a Tutsi General come to power through a coup, which led to Hutu repression in that country, leading to an influx of Hutu refugees into Rwanda. Kayibanda responded by escalating persecution of Tutsis in Rwanda, and by 1973 the political violence had spiraled out of control. The tremendous violence led General Juvenal Habyarimana (a Hutu himself) to stage a coup and oust Kayibanda as a way of trying to reduce strife between the Hutu and Tutsi.⁷⁰⁹ Initially, his rise to power did reduce societal tensions, however, President Habyarimana exerted personalist control over the government and army through a network of family and friends, and over time he increasingly excluded and persecuted Tutsis much like Kayibanda did, resulting in many fleeing into Uganda.⁷¹⁰

While Habyarimana increasingly relied on his army and an army-trained Hutu extremist militia – the *Interahamwe* to maintain his personal hold on power– a drought ruined cash crops and the economy began to fall apart. This gave the RPF a belief in 1990 that their rebel invasion had a chance, however France, Germany, and Zaire/DRC, aided Habyarimana’s embattled government and army, which helped repel the RPF.⁷¹¹ In the run up to the 1990 hostilities, Rwandan exiles – many that had served in Museveni’s rebel force during the Bush Wars and in

⁷⁰⁷ Lefèvre, Patrick, and Jean-Noël Lefèvre, *Les militaires belges et le Rwanda: 1916-2006* (Brussels: Racine, 2006), 11-12; British National Archives, Colonial Office (CO) 822/2064, document 11, 2.

⁷⁰⁸ Plaut, Martin. 1994. "Rwanda—Looking Beyond the Slaughter." *The World Today* 50, no.8/9 (1994): 149-153.

⁷⁰⁹ Wm. Cyrus Reed, "Exile, reform, and the rise of the Rwandan patriotic front." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 3 (1996): 479-501.

⁷¹⁰ Charles Villa-Vicencio, Paul Nantulya, and Tyrone Savage, *Building nations: transitional justice in the African Great Lakes Region* (Cape Town, South Africa: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2005), 74-76.

⁷¹¹ David C. King, *Rwanda: Cultures of the world* (2007), 26-28.

the Ugandan military after 1986 – founded the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1988, “with the stated aims of securing repatriation of Rwandans in exile and reforming of the Rwandan government, including political power sharing.”⁷¹² Later in 1990, the RPF began attacking the Hutu militant regime with about 7,000 troops. Incidentally, this fueled anti-Tutsi sentiment in the country as the media began to label all Tutsi Rwandans as “traitors,” which led to escalating political violence.⁷¹³ On the second day of the invasion, RPF founder and leader, Fred Rwigyema (who had been serving in Museveni’s Ugandan army), was killed. This halted the initial invasion, and required Ugandan Army Major Paul Kagame to leave his studies halfway at the U.S Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, returning to Uganda to reorganize the flailing RPF. This was a critical shift in the RPF, as Kagame was a battle-hardened guerilla fighter like Rwigyema, but Kagame “was reputedly a military tactician of enormous talent, discipline and strategy” that was recognized by U.S. Army faculty during his training courses in Kansas.⁷¹⁴

Regardless, the civil war continued to be waged until 1993, where the Arusha Accords ended hostilities and initiated the process of power sharing between Hutus and Tutsis, to include integrating RPF fighters into the Rwandan army. The agreement led to a new United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with armed peacekeepers to monitor and oversee the ceasefire and integration of Tutsis back into government and society.⁷¹⁵ Tensions arose in

⁷¹² “Rwanda: A brief history of the Country,” Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, accessed March 3, 2018, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml>

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan genocide* (New York: Verso, 2004), 16-17.

⁷¹⁵ “Resolution 872 (1993),” UN Security Council, S/RES/872, October 5, 1993, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement>; “Resolution 891 (1993),” UN Security Council, S/RES/891, December 20, 1993, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/719/88/PDF/N9371988.pdf?OpenElement>

Rwanda around the same time as the Arusha Accords due to events in Burundi. The first democratically elected and first Hutu president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated in a botched military coup attempt. This reignited Hutu-Tutsi tensions and intercommunal violence in Burundi and Rwanda, polarizing extremists on both sides of the political spectrum. Such societal strains, now in hindsight, was a tinderbox waiting for a match.

Ignition came on April 6, 1994, when the airplane carrying Habyarimana and the Hutu president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down by extremists⁷¹⁶ as it was on approach to land in Kigali. Hours after the crash, presidential military units in conjunction with elite army units went on a killing spree against regime opponents – primarily Tutsis, but moderate Hutus as well – that within several days became a monumentally instrumental killing spree to eliminate the entire “Tutsi threat” in Rwanda.⁷¹⁷ Within two days, the RPF led by Kagame began a massive ground assault with the intent of capturing Kigali.

Over the next hundred days, almost a million people were killed, and many more displaced. Scott Straus’ work on the genocide is a critical rejoinder in understanding the variation in violence that ensued throughout the country,⁷¹⁸ while the UN peacekeeping commander on the ground, General Roméo Antonius Dallaire, believes that Kagame’s pretext for an RPF invasion to protect civilians was an obtuse reason, and does not militarily explain why

⁷¹⁶ Various claims back and forth speculate Hutu extremists shot it down because Habyarimana was being too moderate with the Tutsis, and others contend it was an RPF unit that was looking for a reason to initiate an invasion of the country. Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda’s Untold Story. A reply to “38 scholars, scientists, researchers, journalists and historians”,” African Arguments, October 21, 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/10/21/rwandas-untold-story-a-reply-to-38-scholars-scientists-researchers-journalists-and-historians-by-filip-reyntjens/>

⁷¹⁷ Timothy Longman, “Obstacles to peacebuilding in Rwanda,” In Taisier Ali, Mohamed Ahmed, and Robert O. Matthews (eds.), *Durable peace: challenges for peacebuilding in Africa* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 67-68.

⁷¹⁸ Scott Straus, *The order of genocide: Race, power, and war in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).

the RPF seemed more intent on capturing Kigali than protecting citizens being brutalized in the periphery.⁷¹⁹ For an in-depth bibliographic review and personal account of the Rwandan Genocide and aftermath, one should refer to the writings of retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, who was a U.S. Defense Attaché in Zaire from 1993 until 1994, and then became the acting U.S. Defense Attaché in Kigali, Rwanda, from 1994 until 1996.⁷²⁰

The RPF under Kagame's command was able to capture Kigali by mid-June 1994. The Rwandan army was not effective at battling this rebel force, even though the army benefitted from French assistance. Up to this point, Rwanda's army resembled the army of Burundi, noted above, in its reflection of factional politics and personal loyalties that characterized the incumbent regime. "Effectiveness" in that context constituted an ability to protect the regime (on which score the army ultimately failed) while being divided enough to not pose a threat of a coup d'état.

The 'New' Rwanda

Since coming to power, Kagame has been responsible for the reconstruction of the Rwandan state that in some ways mirrors the Tillyian pursuit of war and state formation. As one scholar has described the rise of a strong Rwanda, it is somewhere "Between Pyongyang and Singapore"; it is one of the most functional states in Africa, but the elites (e.g. Kagame) that run it, have a precarious hold on power, requiring more Hutu inclusion instead of the exclusion that

⁷¹⁹ Romeo Dallaire, *Shake hands with the devil: The failure of humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 2004).

⁷²⁰ Thomas P. Odom, "Politics, War, and Genocide in Rwanda 10 Years Later," *Small Wars Journal*, 2006, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v6/odom-10yrslater.pdf>; Thomas P. Odom, *Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda* with a foreword by General (ret) Dennis J. Reimer (College Station, Texas: TAMU Press, 2005).

defined the formative years of Kagame coming to power.⁷²¹ Kagame has been forced to be inclusionary in social terms, particularly given that his own and many of the top RPF rebel commanders' Tutsi ethnic group is a minority in Rwanda. At the same time, this initial force faced political risks from a potentially hostile majority of the population and the danger that officers from the former regime would oppose Kagame's regime.

In creating a 'new' state, literally out of the ashes of the 'old' regime, Kagame chose to stress the appearance of a legitimate government centered on the perception of unity. However, the "Government of National Unity" was hardly unified or equal in its proportional power sharing, being dominated by the Tutsi-RPA/F. This made sense as hundreds of thousands of Hutus fled the country in the beginning years, over 100,000 Hutus ended up in jail under suspicion for participating in the 1994 genocide.⁷²² Moreover, Kagame allowed his armies to roam freely across the country and into neighboring countries – Zaire/DRC especially – in pursuit of *génocidaires*. However, Kagame recognized that it was unsustainable to return to the same errors of other regimes that explicitly tried to exclude one group from all components of the state. He could have done as Mobutu did on Zaire in 1965 in using personal ties and ethnic loyalties to create a core palace guard while buying support from as many others who could be coopted to the new regime. But the Tutsi minority status, coupled with the severity of the security threats it faced (from a sullen population, the old regime's rebel force across the border

⁷²¹ Will Jones, "Between Pyongyang and Singapore: the Rwandan State, Its Rulers, and the Military," in Maddalena Campioni and Patrick Noack (eds), *Rwanda Fast Forward: Social, Economic, Military and Reconciliation Prospects* (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012), 228-248.

⁷²² Borton, John, and John Eriksson. *Lessons from Rwanda: Lessons for Today; Assessment of the Impact and Influence of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda* (Aarus, Denmark: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), 25-26.

in DRC, and the scarcity of resources that could be used to purchase loyalty), forced Kagame to experiment with other concepts of military effectiveness.

To solve the problem of a small ethnic minority – the Tutsi, which made up approximately 10-15% of Rwandan society – required a political and ideological narrative to counter decades of grievances. *Ingando* emerged as a way of reeducating the public and reintegrating Hutus into government and military service. It also helped ex-FAR troops and ‘old’ regime bureaucrats and politicians towards the purposes of rebuilding Rwanda around a new form of nationalism, which was a necessary step for Kagame to take in legitimizing the new state.⁷²³ In a clever move that solidified his rule, Kagame allowed over 10,000 ex-FAR troops and militias (those with clean backgrounds) to join the RPA between 1995 and 1997, partly because he needed their technical skills, but also to give jobs to militarily capable Hutus who could potentially become insurgents. Thus, even as early as January 1995, Kagame held a ceremony integrating 5 prominent ex-FAR officers, giving them high positions as Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels.⁷²⁴

Despite such olive branches to integrate ex-FAR soldiers with clean records, many began insurgencies in eastern Zaire/DRC, disrupting the Rwandan countryside in the northwest. This rising threat required an effective tactical response and a larger army, which drove the need to

⁷²³ Stephen Burgess “From failed power sharing in Rwanda to successful top-down military integration,” In Roy Licklider, (ed.), *New Armies from Old: Merging competing military forces after civil wars* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 93-100.

⁷²⁴ Colonel Deogratias Ndiwami became Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi became the RPA Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Balthazar Ndengeyinka became the 305th Brigade commander, Lt. Colonel Laurent Munyakazi became the 99th Battalion commander, and Lt. Colonel Emmanuel Habyarimana became an RPA member of parliament and director of training for the Ministry of Defense. Rick Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12, no. 1 (2001): 76-109.

recruit capable Hutus into the RPA. As Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko permitted various militant Hutu insurgents to roam in eastern territories, this required Kagame to hatch a plan to remove the most authoritarian (and longest ruling) dictator on the African continent. Luckily, Kagame found a leader for an anti-Mobutu rebel force; the battle-hardened Marxist Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who had been trained by the famed revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara in 1965.⁷²⁵

Working with Kabila’s rebel group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL), was RDF General James Kabarebe who was a famed RPF commander during the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994).⁷²⁶ As Mobutu’s factionalized army collapsed, he attempted to rely on foreign fighters to stop the alliance of anti-Mobutu forces, to include creating the *Legion Blanc*, which was primarily composed of French, Belgian, Serbian, and Ukrainian mercenaries (to include at least one American pilot named Roland). However, they proved unreliable as they tended to drink more than actually fight.⁷²⁷ The weakness of Mobutu’s army began in the 1970s, whereby prior coup attempts led him to create a personalist army, with co-ethnics given important posts as patronage, while providing practically no pay to the mid-level officers and lower ranks, leading them to engage in predatory behavior with the citizenry just to

⁷²⁵ “Che” was not impressed by Kabila’s organization or soldiering skills, but at least thought he was good at motivating his soldiers through speeches. Ernesto “Che” Guevara, *The African dream: The diaries of the revolutionary war in the Congo* (New York: Random House, 2001). 50-92.

⁷²⁶ For detailed information on Kabarebe who has been the Rwandan Minister of Defence since 2010, visit his personal website: <http://jameskabarebe.com/>

⁷²⁷ According to Cooper (2013) the only benefit of European mercenaries was that they provided some airpower (e.g. transport, attack, etc.). Al J. Venter, *War Dog: Fighting Other People's Wars-The Modern Mercenary in Combat* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2006), 262; Tom Cooper, *Great Lakes Holocaust: First Congo War, 1996 1997* (Solihull, UK: Helion and Company, 2013), 45-51.

survive.⁷²⁸ In many ways, the West complicity allowed this behavior, and subsidized such state deformation strategies because Mobutu was robustly anti-communist.⁷²⁹

After clearing eastern Zaire of *Interahamwe* and other militant Hutu groups, Kabarebe would be the disciplined mastermind behind the infamous 1997 military march on Kinshasa, through dense Congolese jungles, rugged terrain, and areas lacking any sort of infrastructure to support the RPA and Kabila's troops.⁷³⁰ Kabarebe's 900-mile trek on foot with a mixed force was amazing military feat given the conditions and lack of modern weaponry and logistics, which led one U.S. ambassador to admit "He's smart. He's able. And heaven knows he knows the territory."⁷³¹ Not to discount Kabarebe, but many of Mobutu's officers chose to flee and not fight, and other Zairean generals immediately switched loyalty to Kabila's rebel fighters and new government as DRC/Zaire "military elites have historically viewed the state as a primary source of power and wealth."⁷³² To reward his Rwandan allies, Kabila appointed Kabarebe as the DRC Chief of Staff, and selected many other RPA officers to command and train newly created DRC military units.⁷³³ Unfortunately, a falling out between allies led to the Second Congo War, as neighboring countries jockeyed to decide the fate of Kabila in choosing the next rebel

⁷²⁸ Zoë Marriage, *Formal Peace and Informal War: security and development in Congo* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 90;

⁷²⁹ Frederic Belle Torimoro, "Zaire," In Constantine Panos Danopoulos and Cynthia Ann Watson (eds.), *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 449-451.

⁷³⁰ Cooper, *Great Lakes Holocaust*, 54-59.

⁷³¹ Reuters Staff, "NEWSMAKER: Kabarebe, Rwanda and Congo's killing fields," *Reuters*, October 19, 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/congodemocratic-rwanda-kabarebe/newsmaker-kabarebe-rwanda-and-congos-killing-fields-idUSL5E8LJQB320121019>

⁷³² Osita G. Afoaku "Between dictatorship and Democracy: A critical evaluation of Kabila's "Revolution" in the Democratic Republic of Congo," In Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere and John Mukum Mbaku (eds.), *Political liberalization and democratization in Africa: lessons from country experiences* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 218-219.

⁷³³ William G. Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 19, no. 2 (1999).

leader/group to replace him, while trying to simultaneously profit from minerals and natural resources in the vast uncontrolled sectors of eastern DRC.⁷³⁴

The anti-Tutsi tendencies of Kabila and his penchant to follow the style of the ‘old’ regime (i.e. re-integrated old Mobutu regime personnel into new regime with “re-education”), resulted in him forcing Kabarebe and other Rwandans and Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) out of military and government.⁷³⁵ These events would precipitate in the most daring military maneuver since the Cold War. Kaberebe developed an audacious plan, known as the Kitona Operation, to foment a mutiny in Kabila’s military while flying thousands of RPA, UPDF, and Congolese troops into Kitona airbase way behind enemy lines. The airfield was about a 300-mile hike west of their main objective: capturing Kinshasha to expel Kabila. The operation began in early August of 1998, showing great initial success, catching the entirety of Kabila’s army off-guard. By the end of August, Kaberebe entourage of soldiers and rebels were within 20 miles of the capital, which led to Kabila taking desperate measures.⁷³⁶ Kabila convinced the neighboring countries of Angola and Zimbabwe to provide military support and assistance in exchange for access to natural resources in the DRC – this was something Kabarebe had hoped would not happen.⁷³⁷

⁷³⁴ Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous order: military forces in African states* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 98-99.

⁷³⁵ “How Kabila lost his way: The performance of Laurent Désiré Kabila’s government,” International Crisis Group, Report No. 3, May 21, 1999, 8-9, http://old.crisisgroup.org/_/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/How%20Kabila%20Lost%20His%20Way%20The%20Performance%20of%20Laurent%20Desire%20Kabilas%20Government.pdf

⁷³⁶ Charles Onyango-Obbo, “Daring RPA Raid in Congo, Angola; and a Heroic UPDF Unit,” *The Sunday Monitor*, April 16, 2000, <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/mediascongolais/conversations/topics/20838>

⁷³⁷ Philip Roessler, *Ethnic politics and state power in Africa: the logic of the coup-civil war trap* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 250-265.

Undeterred, Kabarebe attempted to push into Kinshasha despite foreign troops deployed into the capital to defend Kabila, though it became readily apparent Kabarebe and his forces would not be able to overcome the new defenses that had reinforced Kabila's lackluster troops. This required an exfiltration plan, that was equally as daring as the original invasion. Kabarebe marched his contingent into Angola in September, seizing the airport of Maquela do Zombo despite it being defended by about 400 Angolan troops.⁷³⁸ Kabarebe then had to upgrade the airport to facilitate the movement of larger cargo aircraft, which took him several months alongside defending his position from numerous Angolan assaults. Nonetheless, his gambit paid off, as Kabarebe was able to evacuate his entire contingent of forces out of the airfield by the end of December 1998 with minimal losses.⁷³⁹

Later in the Second Congo War, splitting interests would lead the RPA and Ugandan Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) getting into fights against one another known as the Kisangani Clashes (1999-2000). Multiple sources indicate that the RPA handily won each engagement.⁷⁴⁰ During the final clash, known as the Six-Day War, the RPA inflicted over 2,000 casualties on the UPDF, to include an ambush at the Chope (Tshopo) Bridge river crossing, that destroyed a large Ugandan convoy and numerous tanks, with many UPDF troops drowning in the river below.⁷⁴¹ Again, economic explanations fail to explain the military effectiveness and outcomes of these

⁷³⁸ Comer Plummer, "The Kitona Operation: Rwanda's African Odyssey," *Military History Online*, May 26, 2007, <http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/kitona.aspx#>

⁷³⁹ James Stejskal, "The Kitona operation: Rwanda's gamble to capture Kinshasa and the misreading of an ally," *Joint Force Quarterly* 68 (2013): 99-104.

⁷⁴⁰ Interviews, Pentagon and U.S. Africa Command, July 26 – August 5, 2017.

⁷⁴¹ The Associated Press, "The Forces of Rwanda And Uganda Fight in Congo," *The New York Times*, June 11, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/11/world/the-forces-of-rwanda-and-uganda-fight-in-congo.html>; Dennis Otim, "Revealed: 2,000 UPDF troops died in Kisangani," *Uganda Correspondent*, September 6, 2010, <http://www.ugandacorrespondent.com/articles/2010/09/revealed-2000-updf-troops-died-in-kisangani/>; Interviews, July-August 2017

skirmishes as Uganda had a GDP per capita of \$257, while Rwanda had a GDP per capita of \$217.⁷⁴²

Towards the end of the Congo Wars, the RPA formally transitioned into the RDF in 2002, as a way of reorganizing the structure of the original rebel army. This was an important step in civil-military relations, as the Congo Wars had resulted in the RPA growing to the size of 85,000 soldiers by 2002, which was partly driven by absorbing ex-FAR troops.⁷⁴³ As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the end of the Congo Wars meant Rwanda had to repair its image. Thus, American recommendations to put their highly capable RDF troops to good use in peacekeeping in exchange for favorable diplomatic relations took off with their first AU operation in late 2004, followed by UN operations later in 2005. Contributions to peacekeeping then allowed RDF troops to participate in Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) in 2006; a U.S. program meant to develop the capabilities of African militaries to deploy for peacekeeping operations.⁷⁴⁴ Many RDF personnel interviewed considered ACOTA involvement to have substantially contributed to RDF institutional effectiveness, though when asked why it had not made the Nigerian military better, many would claim that the Nigerian army was too corrupt to make any good use of it.⁷⁴⁵

As the RDF has established its position and role in society, Kagame in 2015 decided to push a new ideological frame for the RDF and the international community. He brought about

⁷⁴² The World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/>

⁷⁴³ Nina Wilén, "A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed SSR–DDR in Rwanda?" *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 7 (2012): 1323-1336, p. 1328-1329.

⁷⁴⁴ Scott Firsing, "Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 21, no. 1 (2014): 45-67.

⁷⁴⁵ Fieldwork, August 2017.

the Kigali Principles, which has 18 recommended ideas on how to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. It is meant as an ideological force to help the transition towards an RDF that is no longer defined by liberating Rwanda in 1994, to one that is symbolically defined as an societally engaged military that can be militarily effective and that is poised to militarily protect civilians through offensive measures.⁷⁴⁶ An important aspect of the Kigali Principles is that Kagame is pushing the UN to adopt them as a way of eliminating Chapter 6 peacekeeping (monitoring only).⁷⁴⁷ The Kigali Principles advocate for broadening the scope and effectiveness of Chapter 7 peacekeeping (enforcement and making peace) through various forms of counterinsurgency operations and tactics.⁷⁴⁸ These indicate efforts to ‘export’ RDF values to other militaries. If successful, the RDF will likely be the framers of future UN peacekeeping operations and structures, which will further redefine what it means for the RDF to be militarily effective, thus giving it purpose.

Finally, the tremendous military genius of Kaberebe in the civil war and in both Congo Wars, makes him revered in the RDF. This is especially so despite the failed operation in the Second Congo War. It is because he showed immense bravery and flexibility in managing to evacuate all UPDF and RDF troops against all odds. This is indicative of why Kaberebe was made Chief of Defence (2002-2010) and then appointed as Minister of Defence (2010-present).

⁷⁴⁶ “The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians,” International Conference on the Protection of Civilians, May 28-29, 2015, http://civilianprotection.rw/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/REPORT_PoC_conference_Long-version.pdf

⁷⁴⁷ “Chapter VI: Pacific settlement of disputes,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vi/index.html>

⁷⁴⁸ Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/>

Such guidance continues to inform RDF practices, and also ensures unity of effort in civil-military relations.

The ‘Black Box’ of Military Institutions: What makes the RDF Effective?

In a 2016 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) report, it identified the RDF as “a unique partner in Africa due to their unparalleled professionalism and organization...and their commitment has contributed to the production of a highly proficient and professional force in Africa.”⁷⁴⁹ Despite this glowing assessment, the RDF has built a robust military enclave because of the organization legacy and legitimacy of the RPA. Western engagement has played a role in the RDF development to a certain extent, but the RDF has been given substantial autonomy by Kagame to focus on military effectiveness and other pursuits that make it appear non-conventional by Western/NATO standards. Regardless, the RDF’s ability to be “heroes at home and abroad” is a self-legitimizing and endogenous cohesion mechanism, as it gives the RDF an important idealized identity, while also giving domestic and international audiences a positive narrative about Rwanda.⁷⁵⁰

In numerous interviews with Rwandan military personnel, they consistently referred to themselves (and others) as “patriots” who had fought in the Rwandan Civil War. These “patriots” play an important role in narratives and specific types nationalism, as they liberated the state from the previous ‘old’ regimes that were murderous and corrupt. Indeed, this ‘patriot’ ideology appears to present a cohesive way of bringing in an “imagined community” of RDF

⁷⁴⁹ “CONOP 16-314: Rwanda,” U.S. Army AWG Assessment, March 2016.

⁷⁵⁰ Josefine Kuehnel and Nina Wilén, “Rwanda’s military as a people’s army: heroes at home and abroad,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 12, no. 1 (2018): 154-171.

unity and resolve through stressing the military's task of protecting the people.⁷⁵¹ This is especially needed as the RDF makes the transition from a Tutsi dominated military towards a more inclusive armed forces, that allows Hutus to rise in the ranks and hold important positions of power, which appears to be occurring.⁷⁵² As noted by a researcher with extensive field work in Rwanda, the "smooth integration of former combatants and extensive training programmes by external donors has resulted in a disciplined army and a popular peacekeeper."⁷⁵³ This inclusion and the stress on protecting people, both in Rwanda and abroad in peacekeeping operations, plays an important role in the regimes overall legitimation. Thus, military effectiveness in the battlefield is linked to an explicitly political role for the military in a narrative that depicts the RPF/A and RDF as saviors of the country and promoters of national unity.

When the RPF seized control of the capital in 1994, the RPF became the political wing, and the RPA was created as the armed wing. The RPA lasted until 2002, when it was renamed the RDF to reflect its transition away from a liberation force to one that is supposedly apolitical,⁷⁵⁴ at least in the relinquishing an explicit role in mobilizing people in a civil war. As a means of facilitating this rebranding and movement towards a military organized institutionally in a Western fashion, it continued to rely on *Ingando*. This is still an explicitly political role as an agent of unity in building a new political system. It has been considered effective partly because so many Hutus were recruited into the RPA to fight in the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-

⁷⁵¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (New York: Verso Books, 2006).

⁷⁵² Up until 2009, there was at least two RDF Generals that are Hutu and considered allies of Kagame. Field notes, Rwanda, August 2017. Orth, 2001.

⁷⁵³ Wilén, Nina. "From Foe to Friend? army integration after war in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo." *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 1 (2016): 79-106. (page 82)

⁷⁵⁴ "Rwanda Defence Force," Ministry of Defence, Government of Rwanda, 2018, <https://mod.gov.rw/about-the-rdf/rwanda-defence-force/#.Wm0Wu2inGuk>

2003) Congo Wars. *Ingando* was also effective because Hutu recruitment and advancement in the RPA/RDF provided the only avenue of ‘social status’, since Hutus were unable to achieve prominent posts in the Tutsi-dominated government.⁷⁵⁵

A symbolic sign of the RDF becoming a professional apolitical military was embodied with the construction of their Ministry of Defence building that is similarly shaped like the U.S. Pentagon structure in Washington, D.C. In addition, it is the only African military to have emulated the American Joint Staff system of military control and administration.⁷⁵⁶ Moreover, the RDF’s mission statement is engrained into their 2003 constitution:

- to defend the territorial integrity and the national sovereignty of the Republic;
- to collaborate with other security organs in safe-guarding public order and enforcement of law;
- to participate in humanitarian activities in case of disasters;
- to contribute to the development of the country;
- to participate in international peace-keeping missions, humanitarian assistance and training.⁷⁵⁷

The explicit admission that the RDF will “contribute to the development of the country” is a notable nod to the military being engaged in domestic issues for the purposes of nation-and-state building. For example, similar to Uganda, the RDF has been holding an annual “Army Week” since 2009,⁷⁵⁸ where the RDF engages in community engagement projects, such as “outreach services and free surgeries offered by military doctors,” leading one commentator to remark “it is

⁷⁵⁵ Chi Mgbako, “*Ingando* Solidarity camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18 (2005), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/377; Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Susan Thomson, “Rhetorical Legacies of Leadership: Projections of ‘Benevolent Leadership’ in Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49, no. 3 (2011), 429–53.

⁷⁵⁶ “Official Gazette n°39 Of 24/09/2012,” Ministry of Defence, Government of Rwanda, https://mod.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_Documents/official_gazette_no_39_of_24.09.2012.pdf, 35; Field notes, Rwanda and Germany, August 2017.

⁷⁵⁷ “Rwanda Defence Force,” Ministry of Defence, Government of Rwanda, 2018, <http://gov.rw/about-the-government/security-peacebuilding/>

⁷⁵⁸ Jon E. McMillan, “CJTF-HOA Photo,” Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, August 13, 2009, <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/image/4246/cjtf-hoa-photo>

not often that we see the army contribute effectively to national development in many [African] countries.”⁷⁵⁹ The RDF also engages in “quick impact projects” when resources are available, whereby they build infrastructure to support victimized individuals in Rwanda.⁷⁶⁰ Such military socialization suggests an endogenous process of positive actions reinforcing societal views of the RDF, while also leading the RDF to believe it has a professional obligation to take care of their society. It is also a part of the broader involvement by the RDF in society.

Such involvement by the RDF in society, also flows into engagement with commercial enterprises. This is reflective of a Rwandan strategy to permit RDF personnel to be engaged in the development of the state and economy. For instance, the Rwandan government encourages its military to be engaged in the formal economy either through Rwandan government owned corporations, or through their own personal side-businesses.⁷⁶¹ Moreover, Kagame purposefully gives current and retired RDF personnel jobs at Tri-Star Investments, Crystal Ventures Ltd. (CVL), Horizon, and others, partly as a form of reward and patronage. These companies engage in various economic activities and focused on areas of underdevelopment in concentrated investment strategies.⁷⁶² While using RDF personnel (current and former) to operate state-owned businesses appears to be corrupt to Western observers, there is also an important developmental logic. Kagame needs loyal and highly capable individuals to be involved in state-run economic activities. Many RDF personnel have proven their reliability, and management and organization

⁷⁵⁹ Herbert Lugaba, “There is a lot to learn from RDF's philosophy,” *The New Times*, February 27, 2018, <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/230305/>

⁷⁶⁰ Interviews, August 22, 2017

⁷⁶¹ Nina Wilén, “From Foe to Friend? army integration after war in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo,” *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 1 (2016): 79-106, p. 88.

⁷⁶² David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, “Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda,” *African Affairs* 111, no. 444 (2012): 379-403.

skills from their education, training, and service in the military.⁷⁶³ To Kagame, it is only logical to expect RDF personnel to be put into positions that contribute to Rwanda's economic development, but the logic of involvement also makes sense to the RDF because it is their way own particular way of being patriotic.

When it comes to deploying military force domestically, there is a formalized process that begins with a police chief. There are 30 districts in Rwanda each with their own Joint Operations Center (JOC), and there is a national JOC in Kigali. The JOC is collaborative unit where military officials, police officers, and civilian authorities oversee daily events in their respective districts, and send daily reports to the national JOC. When an issue arises requiring the deployment of RDF troops, the police chief coordinates through their respective district JOC the need for the RDF to provide assistance. The JOC takes the formal request and send it to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Then the MoJ sends the request to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) who forwards it to the Chief of Defence (CHOD) who is the final approval. At that point, the CHOD then determines which military unit in that region would be most appropriate to deploy to that district and they are put under control of the original police chief that requested the assistance. According to the RDF officer, the RDF is rarely deployed domestically except for anti-terrorism purposes.⁷⁶⁴ Domestic use matters so much to the integrity and perception of the RDF, that unlike most African militaries, the rule of law matters. In fact, two RDF troops were

⁷⁶³ Fieldwork, August 2017.

⁷⁶⁴ Interview, February 28, 2018.

sentenced to life in prison after they got drunk at a bar and shot a local Rwandan civilian to death.⁷⁶⁵

When it comes to projecting military power outside their boundaries, RDF personnel emphasize how much they must “economize our resources.”⁷⁶⁶ In addition, RDF officers appear to believe that their own personal experiences with the 1994 genocide helps them bring “intimacy with the people” when they deploy to places such as Darfur and South Sudan, because they contend it helps them “feel committed...and that makes a difference.”⁷⁶⁷ The ability of the RDF to adapt to difficult deployment scenarios came about during their deployments to Darfur. RDF officers noted that sustainment, lack of logistics, inability to rapidly move forces, and lack of assets (e.g. airlift) were major impediments to being militarily effective in an ideal world. However, RDF personnel contended that they have a spirit of innovation to overcome obstacles – much as General Kaberebe did – and that they did not let these issues stop them from accomplishing their objectives. Whereas the Nigerians, Indians, Pakistanis, and many other richer countries, opted to avoid missions by relying on their memorandum of understanding (MOU). Many RDF personally explained how “shameful” they thought it was for these supposedly more powerful militaries to hide behind their MOUs if conditions and were resources were not optimal.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶⁵ “Two soldiers get life imprisonment for shooting to death a civilian in Gikondo,” *Rwanda: Ministry of Defence*, October 6, 2017, https://mod.gov.rw/news-detail/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3599&cHash=2430269a3558f2f750e7612e60f87921#.WqgdAejwaCi

⁷⁶⁶ Interviews, August 22, 2017.

⁷⁶⁷ Interviews, August 22, 2017.

⁷⁶⁸ Fieldwork, August 2018.

In terms of reflecting on military effectiveness in the RDF, there appears to be two institutional camps of thought, after having interviewed several RDF officers: those that served in the RPF (1990-1994) and those that joined after 1994. The first camp is composed of “patriots,” who think about RDF military effectiveness primarily in terms that defined their political successes as RPF/RPA fighters. Figure 8-1 illustrates how “patriots” answered questions about the traits that made (and continue to make) the Rwandan military so effective, disciplined, professional.




Figure 8-1. Answers from “patriots” (RPF) on what it takes to make an effective RDF.

Because many of the “patriots” had served in Museveni’s rebel army and eventually the Ugandan military after 1986, their conceptions of military power were defined by the particular institutional upbringing. The only difference is that where Museveni had to be more inclusionary through patronage tactics following 1986, as ethnic/tribal cleavages were not as great as in

Rwanda's case. Kagame had to overcome the substantial human capital loss whilst relying on his "patriots" to nation-build through politicization programs in the short-term to facilitate the risky project of long-term state-building. Ideas of honor, values, training, and professionalization, represents the core of "patriot" thinking when it comes to producing military power given their background and understanding of the political context.

In the second camp are the 'new' RDF personnel, and the interpretative divide between the two camps becomes apparent with interviewees who joined after 1994. Many 'new' RDF personnel admitted that they joined due to a lack of personal insecurity, in that the RPA offered an opportunity to protect themselves and their families. Many appeared to not show much of an inclination for specific political aims for the RDF, but believed the political education was necessary in the contribution of military effectiveness. This suggests the explicit connection between *Ingando* and what has kept the RPA/RDF cohesive and coherent in an army where most leadership positions have been dominated by the Tutsi minority. In comparing the answers from "patriots" in Figure 8-1 and post-1994 RPA/RDF officers in Figure 8-2, it appears that *Ingando* has contributed towards the sort of Rwandan nationalism intended.




Figure 8-2. Answers from ‘new’ RDF officers (joined after 1994) on achieving an effective military.

More telling is that these ‘new’ RDF officers have been socialized to a ‘new’ regime with civil-military configurations much different from the ‘old’ regime, to include a different form of politics. More interesting is that the ‘new’ RDF personnel saw the “patriots” as a fundamental base for their military effectiveness. Many suggested that the experience of “patriots” and their tremendous leadership made them fit to lead and command because, as one RDF officer suggested “hardships and suffering made them good leaders.”⁷⁶⁹ This implies that ‘new’ RDF officers see themselves as subservient to the “patriots.” In fact, one ‘new’ RDF Lieutenant Colonel off-handedly remarked that the “patriots...carry a lot of informal power and weight because of their background,” adding “they’re respected regardless of education and training

⁷⁶⁹ Interview, February 28, 2018

because of their military achievements.” Moreover, this RDF officer even suggested that they will likely remain in charge for the foreseeable future because “patriots have no civilian abilities...they cannot get a job in the civilian world.” Such comments from ‘new’ officers mean that “patriots” are perceived in an honorary but tragic fashion: brave fighters that cannot return to the normalcy of civilian life.

According to a UN military observer, Kagame has been very strategic and selective with whom he does business with and what countries he accepts military training, advising, and assistance from.⁷⁷⁰ For instance, Kagame has primarily sought relations with the U.S. and British for military training and education. Similarly, the U.S. military regularly provides civil-military operational education and training to improve RDF training and organizational practices.⁷⁷¹ Indeed, in one unclassified report, the U.S. Department of the Air Force found the RDF to be a “professional and disciplined force that should be able to effectively operate” C-130s, of which, only a few countries in Africa (i.e. rich and developed countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, etc.) have been assessed as being competent enough to do so. The author of the report concluded that the RDF saw the need for a C-130 as a way of improving their peacekeeping capabilities to self-deploy and not have to rely on foreign donors to provide airlift. Finally, the author was impressed that the RDF had built hangars for the C-130s and had four military pilots staying current in flying duties by flying for *RwandAir* (Rwanda’s civil airline), but the Rwandans experienced ‘sticker shock’ when they discovered that purchasing a C-130 and maintaining it would consume a substantial amount of the RDF budget. The author recommended a

⁷⁷⁰ Interview, August 24, 2017

⁷⁷¹ Peter Thompson, “U.S., Rwanda Build Civil-Military Capacity,” *United States Africa Command*, February 17, 2016, <http://www.aficom.mil/media-room/article/27974/u-s-rwanda-build-civil-military-capacity>

smaller/cheaper alternative, a Cessna C-208, to provide the RDF airlift capability to deploy more readily.⁷⁷² This report is indicative of how institutionally focused the RDF is on creating military effectiveness that they had done everything within the constraints of limited resources to show that they could operate an advanced military cargo plane, but understood the long-term consequences of owning/operating a weapon system that was not financially feasible. Such efforts paid off as the U.S. State Department provided two C-208 aircraft in 2017.⁷⁷³

Beyond displaying capabilities to build and maintain an effective Rwandan Air Force, a 2017 U.S. Army AWG report detailed that:

Senior RDF leadership stated that current SFA [American Security Force Assistance] training efforts are ineffective as they have not evolved with the capability of the RDF and reiterated the need for SFA efforts focused on their specific challenges... The RDF's ability to organize and generate forces coupled with their willingness to make contributions to achieve regional security objectives makes them one of the most viable partners to AFRICOM.⁷⁷⁴

Such findings from the AWG illustrate how capable the RDF has become militarily that it views American SFA is beneath their own standards now. The AWG also observed, “The RDF demonstrates a strong willingness to invest in their own infrastructure and force modernization to enhance their defense institutional capacity,” and viewed “the RDF’s ability to project organic forces in response to emerging crises” as a capability rarely seen in Africa.⁷⁷⁵ These statements from the AWG lends further weight to the argument that Rwanda has one of the most institutionally effective ‘military enclaves’ on the African continent. Not to be outdone, the

⁷⁷² Jean-Andre J. Parmiter, “After Action Report Rwanda 21-28 March 2015,” U.S. Department of the Air Force, 818th Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (AMC), March 30, 2015; Interview, June 1, 2017.

⁷⁷³ “Fact Sheet: U.S. Peacekeeping Capacity Building Assistance,” U.S. Department of State, January 25, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267567.pdf>

⁷⁷⁴ Paul M. Gahl and Stephen C. McCoy, “Asymmetric Warfare Group: CONOP 17-200.10,” U.S. Army WG, 11-26 March 2017, 1.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid, 2 and 6.

British also played a strong role in RDF development. For example, in 2012 a team of military experts from the UK visited Rwanda to help the RDF validate its new Senior Command and Staff College curriculum.⁷⁷⁶

Finally, Kagame's ability to permit the growth of an RDF 'military enclave' is illustrative of the role he believes it should play – besides defense of the regime – in economic growth and societal development. Despite being a poor country like many of its neighbors, the RDF has managed to overcome such resource constraints, and other pathologies that infect military institutions, such as those found in Burundi and the DRC. Instead of espousing a sort of pan-Africanist attitude as seen in many other African states and military, the RDF has pursued a generalist attitude of protecting all civilians, which is constitutionally embedded into formal and informal institutions. Formal acts of 'coup-proofing' by Kagame seem non-existent, which indicates that Kagame had developed robust formal and informal controls and mechanisms for the RDF to be professionally devoted to activities that are non-partisan. It also indicates that the RDF might also be engaged in 'purge-proofing' of their institutions, ensuring that their members are wholly indoctrinated to the cause of the state, and by ensuring proper control over RDF personnel in what is acceptable behavior. Ultimately, RDF participation in numerous peacekeeping operations appears to be a substantial outlet towards fostering a culture of military effectiveness, and many Western and non-Western military officials interviewed were impressed by how much effort the RDF put into the processes of developing deployable peacekeeper units,

⁷⁷⁶ "Uk Defence Academy & Kings College London Validate RDF Senior Command and Staff College Curriculum," Rwanda Defence Force Command and Staff College, May 29, 2013, <http://rdfcsc.mil.gov.rw/news/uk-defence-academy-kings-college-london-validate.html>

which illustrates that their preparation is motivated by more than just material gains (i.e. extra peacekeeping pay, etc.).

Conclusion

With the destruction of the Rwandan state in 1994, Kagame had to rebuild a new Rwanda, based on his vision, ideology, and institutional experiences serving in an Ugandan rebel group – and later the Ugandan army. Kagame in many ways was fortunate with this sort of devastation, because it allowed him to be more strategic and selective in decisions related to how society, politics, and the military would play a role, without the institutional contamination of ‘old’ regimes. This has permitted Rwanda to form what is their own contextual form of ‘good’ politics, that contributes to stability in the political system. It also shows how the rebel group (RPF/A) went from a military centered specifically on political ideology of liberation and personalist relations, and later transitioned into an apolitical army that is very much a ‘military enclave’ but is also politically engaged as it participates in society for state-building purposes.

Chapter 9 – Ethiopia: Moving the State beyond the “Guerilla” Mindset

The Ethiopian [troops] scare the hell out of everybody...because they deliver.

Alexander Rondos

May 14, 2014

European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa⁷⁷⁷

The Ethiopians are patriots defending themselves in a bad neighborhood.

British Military Officer

Interview

August 8, 2017

The Ethiopian military system is a political animal and is the most democratic institution in Ethiopia because there is immense dialogue among all the ranks, to include significant discussions within the military before going to war...dissent and criticism is encouraged with new military policies...we [ENDF] struggled in our border war [1998-2000] with Eritrea because we were stuck in a “Guerilla Mindset.”

Ethiopian Diplomat

Retired ENDF Officer

Interview

August 8, 2017

Ethiopia is the oldest independent nation in Africa dating back to the *D'mt* Kingdom in 980 BC

(known as Axumite/Aksum, and then Abyssinia).⁷⁷⁸ Ethiopia was the only African nation not

colonized, as it had resisted (for centuries) numerous foreign military campaigns and political

attempts to conquer it. The ancient Kingdoms that dominated the territories of Ethiopia shifted

their areas of control over the centuries and exercised varying levels of control. But throughout,

Ethiopia was known in the region and beyond as a militarily powerful kingdom that was

prosperous due to its vital Red Sea port and its control of trade within the Nile river region.⁷⁷⁹

This early evidence of capacity, including military might, led a Persian religious leader in the 3rd

century AD to comment about Aksum (Ethiopia) being one of the five most powerful kingdoms

⁷⁷⁷ Abel Abate, “Ethiopian Defense Forces: Efficiency for less,” *Horn Affairs*, March 5, 2015,

<https://hornaffairs.com/2015/03/05/ethiopian-defense-forces-efficiency-for-less/>

⁷⁷⁸ Charles Henry Rowell, ““Older than the Flow of Human Blood in Human Veins”: The Editor's Notes,” *Callaloo* 33, no. 1 (2010): 1-7.

⁷⁷⁹ Rackham, H. “Pliny: natural history (English trans.), Loeb Classical series” (1952); Stuart Munro-Hay, “The British Museum excavations at Adulis, 1868.” *The Antiquaries Journal* 69, no. 01 (1989): 43-52.

in the world because it was minting gold coins.⁷⁸⁰ Much of this Ethiopian heritage still informs many attitudes and beliefs about the country's accomplishments, and this legacy informs institutional practices.

The Battle of Adwa in 1896 is considered a formative moment in more recent Ethiopian state-building and military prowess.⁷⁸¹ Emperor Menelik II had a force of about 100,000 barefoot fighters (many in decorative battle costumes) equipped with some modern weapons that faced off against Italian General Oreste Baratieri's army (composed of 10,596 Italian soldiers and 7,104 Eritrean troops). Menelik deceptively lured the Italian force out of their fortified encampment under the assumption that his army was dispersing due to starvation.⁷⁸² In what has been described as the "most incredible and absurd battle that has ever taken place in modern history,"⁷⁸³ the Italians "suffered a great disaster...greater than has ever occurred in modern times to White men in Africa...[it was] the bloodiest of all colonial battles, leaving 11,000 dead from both sides."⁷⁸⁴ It would be a major setback to Italian attempts to militarily expand control over East Africa, but it also reified Ethiopian exceptionalism. Beyond its implications for anti-colonial ideas of *pan-Africanism* and *pan-Ethiopianism*, this event is a holiday that is still

⁷⁸⁰ H. J. Polotsky, "Manichäische Handschriften der Staatlichen Museen Berlin," vol. 1, Kephalaia, 1. Hälfte (Lieferung 1–10), edited by HJ Polotsky (pp. 3–102) & A. Böhlig (pp. 103–244), with H. Ibscher, W. (1940).

⁷⁸¹ Christopher Clapham, "War and state formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea," Failed States Conference, Florence, Italy, April 10-14, 2001, http://www.comm.ucsb.edu/faculty/mstohl/failed_states/2001/papers/CLAPHAM1.pdf.

⁷⁸² Robert B. Edgerton, *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy, A history from 1791 to the present* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 45-46; David Levering Lewis, *Race to Fashoda: Colonialism and African resistance* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 117.

⁷⁸³ Sven Rubenson, "Adwa 1896: The Resounding Protest," in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (eds.), *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 121.

⁷⁸⁴ Chris Prouty, *Empress Taytu and Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1883-1910* (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1986), 155-157.

celebrated in Ethiopia, shaping narratives and symbolism of Ethiopian heritage and strength.⁷⁸⁵

This history is important for understanding how Ethiopian officials and military officers think about their armed forces, particularly in terms of its relationship to the state as a protector of its independence and a key player in asserting a distinct national identity as a powerful African country.

Despite the outcome at Adwa, eventually Italy got its way – but only temporarily – decades later. In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia, under the pretense of abolishing slavery, and had to use chemical weapons to defeat Emperor Haile Selassie’s army.⁷⁸⁶ Italy would occupy Ethiopia from 1936 until 1941, but it would be considered one of the most brutal and repressive occupations of the 20th century, with Italian atrocities best detailed and chronicled by A. J. Barker’s *The Rape of Ethiopia*.⁷⁸⁷ These experiences continue to inform modern Ethiopian thinking in the government and military, who are not only wary of Italians, but also retain an astute belief in retaining an Ethiopian identity and way of doing things that is autonomous of Western influence. This is important for understanding current Ethiopian official thinking about security force assistance and their ideas about professional behavior. They readily accept material assistance, but insist that it be on their own terms, wary as they are about the perils of too-close a connection to a foreign power and the risk that this will subordinate them to the benefactors’ interests. As one Western official relayed about conducting security force assistance

⁷⁸⁵ Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia (Eds.), *The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia's historic victory against European Colonialism* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005); Charles Molesworth (ed.), *The Works of Alain Locke* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 396-398.

⁷⁸⁶ John G. Jackson, *Introduction to African civilizations* (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2015), 79-100; Leroy, Paul E. "Slavery in the Horn of Africa." *Horn of Africa* 2, no. 3 (1979): 10-19.

⁷⁸⁷ Arthur James Barker, *Rape of Ethiopia, 1936* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971).

with the Ethiopian Chief of Defence, “he [Samora] has a policy of once you give it to me, don’t tell me how to use it.”⁷⁸⁸

Given the rich history of Ethiopia, one might assume that Ethiopia’s state-building ability was predestined to have an institutionally effective military, much as a devout Calvinist was predestined for heaven. However, upon closer inspection that was not always the case. The modern Ethiopia (1991-present) did not build a strong state or professional political army, known as the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), just because of its supposedly favorable topography (defense of a mountainous stronghold, much like the Swiss) relative to neighbors as suggested by Christopher Clapham.⁷⁸⁹ Such topographic tales identify advantages that some states possess, but do not take account of the agency of various actors involved in state-building and the politics of creating institutions. It overlooks the politics of the region, and the contingency of actors involved in putting a state together, of which establishing power sharing within a framework of civil-military relations is generally necessary. Afghanistan provides a good case for evaluating this argument. It too is a mountainous country that faced challenges from neighbors. While Afghan armies have been effective at temporarily coalescing to beat back invaders (such as in the First Anglo-Afghan War or 1839-1842 and the Second Afghan War of 1878-1880, the anti-Soviet War of 1979-1989, and the Taliban war against the American Coalition from 2001 to the present), these successes have never translated into the construction of effective state institutions.⁷⁹⁰ These Afghan armies, at least to now, have not maintained an

⁷⁸⁸ Interview, August 6, 2017.

⁷⁸⁹ Clapham refers to Ethiopia as Africa’s first “Developmental State.” Christopher Clapham, *Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay* (London: Hurst Books, 2017).

⁷⁹⁰ Ali Ahmad Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan: From the Great Game to the Global War on Terror*. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2017).

effective command structure or internal institutional cohesion after their victories against foreigners.

Indeed, as argued by Sven Rubenson in *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence*, the way Ethiopian leadership has been able to consistently mobilize resources internally and externally to resist foreign intrusions – no matter the cost – has allowed Ethiopia to remain staunchly independent.⁷⁹¹ His study of Ethiopian diplomatic history and politics suggests an institutional preference for strong political commitments on the part of the country's armed forces that are followed through after military victories. This feature has shaped the state-building capabilities of Ethiopia under its Emperors, and later on when the TPLF came to power in 1991. Contrarily, the Derg Regime (military junta) from 1974 to 1991 appeared to be an aberration in how Ethiopia traditionally conducted politics and military affairs.

Indeed, there has been much trial and error in creating an Ethiopian state. Finding the optimal balance of relations between the government and military has occurred alongside the issues of creating legitimacy and authority in a region with numerous ethnic groups that are linguistically and politically distinct. While there is a strong case that the political and economic institutions of Ethiopia have always been dominated by absolutism (e.g. no pluralistic institutions), as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson in *Why Nations Fail*, part of Ethiopia's under-development stems from it missing the industrialization period that marked the success of absolutist states in Europe.⁷⁹² Such structures and development were similar in Eritrea as well. Yet, we can astutely observe substantial differences between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 21st

⁷⁹¹ Sven Rubenson, *The survival of Ethiopian independence* (Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2003).

⁷⁹² Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty* (New York: Random House, 2012), 235 and 238.

century, of which some historical international processes have driven different institutional practices.

One could contend a pivotal point in Ethiopian-Eritrea state formation and institutional processes came about in the mid-16th century, where the coastal region of Eritrea came under control of the Ottoman Empire. This led to Portugal aligning itself with Ethiopia's army for the purposes of defending the Christian Empire of Abyssinia, as Ethiopia was then known.⁷⁹³ While Ethiopia was eventually able to beat back the Ottomans with the help of Portuguese troops, the port town regions of Eritrea would remain under Ottoman control until being ousted by the Muhammad Ali dynasty (Egypt and Sudan) in the 19th century. Later in 1890, it would switch hands to the Italians during the Scramble for Africa, leading to the territory of Italian Eritrea.⁷⁹⁴

The Ottoman invasion during the mid-16th century was significant for three reasons. First, Portugal intervened to protect an independent state in Africa. Though some of its rationale was to defend Christianity from Islam, it was also motivated because it did not want the Ottomans getting control of all trade in the Red Sea region.⁷⁹⁵ Second, Ethiopia up until that point had been diplomatically isolated from the world. The resulting invasion led to ties being reestablished with Europe and even the Vatican Church in Rome. This interaction however, did not bear fruit for Rome – the Vatican was unable to convince the Ethiopian Church to follow Catholic doctrine.⁷⁹⁶ Even with missionaries in conjunction with the arrival of European culture and technology, many

⁷⁹³ Okbazghi Yohannes, *A Pawn in World Politics: Eritrea* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1991), 31.

⁷⁹⁴ Moshe Terdiman, *Somalia at war: Between radical Islam and tribal politics* (Tel Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center, 2008), 19-23.

⁷⁹⁵ Hagai Erlikh, *The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

⁷⁹⁶ Leonardo Cohen, *The missionary strategies of the Jesuits in Ethiopia (1555-1632)* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009), 187-191.

Ethiopian Emperors and the ruling classes were disinclined to implement these foreign ideas.⁷⁹⁷ Indeed, there was an Ethiopian cultural and structural aversion to outside influences, but considering such interactions, where other nations improved their institutions and societies, there was a “failure of its ruling classes to develop traditions and institutions for the secure ownership and transmission of property and offices.”⁷⁹⁸

This legacy of Ethiopian aversion to adapting foreign technologies and ideas put it at great disadvantage. Indigenous institutions for taxation were overly extractive and there were very few incentives for becoming a skilled craftsman and other capitalist pursuits. Emperor Menelik II (ruled from 1889 to 1913) attempted to modernize the state and military, with some success, as the Ethiopian victory against the Italians at Adwa demonstrated.⁷⁹⁹ This earlier tension between the need for foreign assistance and the desire to assert Ethiopian political autonomy is important for understanding contemporary Ethiopian ideas about proper military tasks and its role in Ethiopian society. Foreign advisors and aid might play a critical role in boosting firepower capabilities and organizational efficiency, but these benefits must be applied in harmony with the political program and vision of Ethiopia’s elites.

Finally, Ottoman occupation was a critical juncture for Eritrea. Under a form of colonial rule, Eritrea was no longer under Ethiopian control and was ruled through distinctive governance

⁷⁹⁷ Korten, David C. "Management, modern organization and planned change in a traditional society: A social systems analysis of cultural transition in Ethiopia." *Academy of Management Journal* 11, no. 4 (1968): 458-459.

⁷⁹⁸ Merid Wolde Aregay, "Society and Technology in Ethiopia 1500-1800," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 17 (1984): 127-147, 127

⁷⁹⁹ Peter Burke and Halil Inalcik (eds.), *History of Humanity: From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 429-440; Sarvepalli Gopal and Sergei L. Tikhvinsky, *History of Humanity: Scientific and cultural development, The twentieth century* (Paris: United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2008), 701-702; David W. Del Testa, *Government Leaders, Military Rulers and Political Activists* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 214.

structures. It later became a jumping off point for the Italians who would slowly take over Eritrea at the end of the 19th century.⁸⁰⁰ These present some historical examples as to why Eritrea and Ethiopia appear to be different countries altogether since officially parting ways in 1993, but it does not mean that political contingencies post-1993 have not had more of an impact.

The culmination of hostiles that occurred during the Eritrean–Ethiopian War (1998-2000) seemed to be unexpected, given the originally close ties of the two leaders. In fact, the liberation of Ethiopia and Eritrea from the rule of the Derg regime (from 1974 to 1991) had begun as a coordinated effort from the late 1970s by secessionists in Eritrea and armed regime opponents from the Tigray province. The Eritreans began their armed struggle in 1961, and later became the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1970. The EPLF joined forces with the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to oppose the Derg regime.⁸⁰¹ As numerous rebel groups emerged throughout the countryside, especially after the famines of 1984-1985, and with increasing military successes against the armed forces of the Derg, in 1989 the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition emerged from a merger of the EPLF, TPLF, and several other groups (to include many Derg military personnel that defected or joined the guerillas after being captured). Each group espoused ideological indoctrination with an emphasis on 'guerilla ways', with the intent of capturing and liberating territories to impact education and new forms of development. Collectively under the same banner, the EPRDF managed to capture Addis Ababa in 1991, ousting the leadership of the repressive Derg

⁸⁰⁰ Niaz Murtaza, *The Pillage of Sustainability in Eritrea, 1600s-1990s: Rural Communities and the Creeping Shadows of Hegemony* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), 56-58.

⁸⁰¹ David Pool, *From guerrillas to government: the Eritrean People's Liberation Front* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2001).

Regime.⁸⁰² Within two years, the respective guerilla fighter leaders of the EPLF, Isaias Afwerki, and TPLF, Meles Zenawi Asres, cordially agreed to actualize the pursuit of Eritrean independence in 1993. The public referendum (overseen by the UN) handily passed, allowed for Eritrea to break off in a *fait accompli*, without international protest.

Despite the initially amicable split between Eritrea and Ethiopia, it became increasingly obvious that political choices by respective political and military elites in each country were more important than historical legacies. Despite Afwerki and Meles both being of Tigrayan descent and having created personalized rebel groups with cohesively structured organizations that were militarily effective during the long civil war, their ‘guerilla’ views for how to rebuild their state were quite divergent. In the case of Afwerki, he pursued strategies of personal control of the government and military, removing anyone that could potentially be seen as disloyal or as an opponent. Afwerki coercively sought “unity” as he replaced the EPLF with the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and then redrew intra-state boundaries in an attempt to transcend traditional ethnic and tribal divisions, alongside implementing land reforms that overwhelmingly benefited Christians.⁸⁰³ These actions drew increasing ire and tensions, such as military mutinies due to lack of pay and EPLF veterans (disabled from the war) protesting demands for war-related benefits. Instead of engaging in constructive political discourse and power sharing, each group was brutally suppressed by Afwerki’s various security agencies.⁸⁰⁴

⁸⁰² Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From empire to People’s Republic* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991).

⁸⁰³ Sandra Joireman, “The minefield of land reform: comments on the Eritrean Land Proclamation,” *African Affairs* 95, no. 379 (1996): 269-285.

⁸⁰⁴ Kjetil Tronvoll, “The process of nation-building in post-war Eritrea: Created from below or directed from above?” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no.3 (1998): 461-482.

Meles on the other hand, while committed to the Marxist vision of strong central control in the formative years, slowly opened up the political space – quite cautiously – and generally allowed for closed democracy to take place within the one-party state that he formed. While the crackdowns that came down with the more open elections in 2005 (and after) were a setback to the early democratization transition, the fact that Mele abruptly died in 2012 without causing a crisis showed that there was some institutionalization of power through political processes, no matter how patrimonial they were.⁸⁰⁵ In fact, the death of Meles illustrated that the EPRDF had built a large enough cadre of disciplined and trusted party officials in the government.⁸⁰⁶ At the same time, ‘guerrilla rule’ from behind the scenes has been a substantial component of Ethiopian stability, as General Samora Muhammad Yunis, the ENDF Chief of Staff, ostensibly has an informal position of power that is comparable to whomever the Prime Minister is.⁸⁰⁷ Thus, to refer to civil-military relations in Ethiopia is a façade, as informal civil-rebel institutional rule informs much of the pragmatic decision-making process behind the formal apparatuses of the state.

Eritrea presents a contrasting hyper-personalist regime under Afwerki’s rule. This regime still relied upon the residual legitimacy as leader of a liberation struggle to mobilize their army and gain popular support. While this trajectory demonstrated some of the same ideas of autonomy and a military role in building a nation, Afwerki’s political strategy lacked a means of

⁸⁰⁵ Jon Abbink, "Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 election crisis in Ethiopia and its aftermath." *African affairs* 105, no. 419 (2006): 173-199; Lovise Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll. "The end of democracy? Curtailing political and civil rights in Ethiopia." *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 120 (2009): 193-207.

⁸⁰⁶ Leonardo R. Arriola and Terrence Lyons, "The 100% election," *Journal of Democracy* 27, no. 1 (2016): 76-88.

⁸⁰⁷ For a profile on General Samora’s background refer to: Daniel Berhane, “General Samora Yenus: Profile, Sudanese award, Expert comment,” *Horn Affairs*, October 11, 2017, <https://hornaffairs.com/2017/10/11/general-samora-profile-sudan-award/>

institutionalizing a strong military role in diverse elements of state-building, and removed the veneer of political legitimacy and processes. Instead, the personalist elements of this regime meant that Afwerki had to resort to non-merit appointments and divide-and-rule tactics to ensure that his newly personalized military did not overthrow him. Events such as the 2013 army mutiny underlined the uncertainty of his control.⁸⁰⁸ Afwerki's behavior conforms more closely to the conventional pattern of regime insecurity, which greatly complicates efforts to create a distinct form of military professionalism and capacity. Indeed, even Afwerki's obvious attempts at 'threat inflation' to protect Eritrea from 'aggression from Ethiopia' allows him to militarize society by enlisting large portions of society and resources into his oversized army. While he has been able to maneuver in such a way, this is an unsustainable way of holding onto power for the long-term, especially if Ethiopia can avoid provocative military actions against Eritrea.

In this chapter, I illustrate the continuities of the Ethiopian Empire that persists in many ways, despite the 'disruption' caused by the communist Derg regime. The 'new' state that emerged after 1991 was one informed by numerous beliefs and values held in a pre-Derg era that have shaped Ethiopian ideas about what constitutes an effective military. These ideas also were influenced by guerilla ways (i.e. TPLF/EPRDF) during the extensive insurgency against the Derg regime, which in some ways simply reinforced the earlier framework. Because of these contingencies of fighting a well-armed regime, the ENDF has come into being as a robust 'military enclave' that – due to its very political nature – is very much attached to the state. Indeed, the armed rebel group was a state, before it formally came to power with the seizure of

⁸⁰⁸ "When mutiny came to Eritrea," *Al Jazeera*, January 13, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2013/01/201312393427987860.html>

Addis Ababa in 1991, organizationally acting as protectors of “liberated zones” under TPLF control during the 1980s. This armed force also had a high degree of institutional effectiveness, which could draw on memories of military greatness when the country was ruled by Emperors.

The rise of the EPRDF coalition of rebels very much mirrored the “golden rules” that Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries followed during their struggle and rise to power.⁸⁰⁹ It should be no surprise then that the ENDF appears to exhibit similar traits to China’s own political army, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially in efforts to achieve Ethiopian state-building. As one of the early members of the TPFL (who later served in the EPRDF/ENDF) put it: “all battles against colonial attempts before and after the battle of Adwa had impacts on how we organized our rebellion and later transformed it into a professional army...this history shaped the value the Ethiopian culture gave to being a soldier and etiquette's associated to it.”⁸¹⁰ There is no doubt that ENDF perceptions of military effectiveness are institutionally embedded with institutional norms and values that were based on a pre-Derg era. Thus, this chapter illustrates the ways in which ethos and identity have been an important aspect of creating an effective military that functions as a ‘military enclave’ despite being a political army.

In early 2018, the future of Ethiopia appears to be coming to its logical conclusion. The prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, resigned in February of 2018, but not before four ENDF officers were promoted to the rank of four-star general to be on par with Samora. This may be part of an effort to show non-Tigrayan Ethiopians that the regime is intent on increasing inclusiveness within the military hierarchy, and power sharing in government as well.

⁸⁰⁹ Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 67-71.

⁸¹⁰ Interview, March 10, 2018.

Hailemariam had been put in a tough position following the death of Meles in 2012 (a former TPLF head guerilla fighter), as he had not participated in the Ethiopian Civil War (1974-1991). From 2012 to 2018, Hailemariam was unable to engage in the reforms and power sharing deals that Meles had done. This may explain the level of political violence that grew under Hailemariam's rule as prime minister. Hailemariam was at a disadvantage in this situation, as he is an ethnic Wolayta and had not participated in the civil war due to his youth and university studies. Thus, according to numerous sources, Hailemariam had minimal informal power and influence in government – to include the ENDF – because he lacked ‘the guerilla credentials’, being perceived as a “dove.”⁸¹¹ However, the need for such credentials are likely why the newly elected PM in March 2018, Abiy Ahmed Ali, despite being an ethnic Oromo (largest ethnic group), had fought against the Derg regime when he was 15 years old, and served in the ENDF. Thus, civil-rebel relations will likely continue to inform the ‘guerilla mindset’ of the state with such new power sharing.

The ‘guerillas’ that recreated Ethiopia after 1991 now realize that many of their political ambitions were too lofty. Ethnic federalism was likely never possible for a state such as Ethiopia, given the cleavages between the country's most powerful ethnic groups: Oromo (34 percent), Amhara (26 percent), Somali (6 percent), Tigray (6 percent), Sidama (4 percent), Gurage (2 percent), and Wolayta (2 percent).⁸¹² In fact, the chief complaint of many Ethiopians is that ethnicity is too salient in their society. They lament that the only good thing about the Derg was

⁸¹¹ Interview, March 7, 2018; International Crisis Group, “Ethiopia: Prospects for Peace in Ogaden,” Africa Report, no. 207, August 6, 2013, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/ethiopia-prospects-for-peace-in-ogaden.pdf>

⁸¹² Benjamin Elisha Sawe, “Ethnic Groups of Ethiopia,” *WorldAtlas*, August 7, 2017, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-ethiopia.html>

that tribal/ethnic identity did not matter because everyone was required to be an Ethiopian.⁸¹³

The centralization attempted, post-Derg, by the minority led Tigrayan coalition seems unable to escape the reality and perceptions of favoritism in the government and military. The likely outcome for future Ethiopian stability will be an opening up of the one-party state that will fracture into ethnically based political parties within the EPRDF and devolution of state authority back to the nine regional states and two city-states. Regardless, the ENDF appears to be unfazed by this new period of uncertainty, and its ability to be militarily effective will likely continue as concessions are made, but allow it to retain its ‘military enclave’ of capabilities and effectiveness.

The ‘Old’ Ethiopia

Up until 1942, Ethiopia benefitted from an effective fighting force but did not have what one would call a ‘modern army’. Before that time, Ethiopian Emperors relied on the *geber* system for their Imperial Army, relying on the activation of the warrior class in society that behaved like a “plunderer army.”⁸¹⁴ With the help of the British military and the King’s African Rifles (KAR), Emperor Haile Selassie was able to reclaim the throne of Ethiopia in 1942. The experience and humiliation of defeat, and Italian occupation led Haile Selassie, like Menelik II before him, to implement new reforms and structures to create a modern bureaucratic state and military. This time the reforms were implemented with British and American assistance.⁸¹⁵ This pursuit became especially amplified as the Cold War took on greater importance in African politics and

⁸¹³ Fieldwork, Addis Ababa, August 1-5, 2017.

⁸¹⁴ Teshale Tibebu, *The making of modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974* (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1995), 110-112.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid*, 112.

affairs, despite Haile Selassie's attempt to appear neutral with the Soviet Union. Regardless, the absolutist state under Haile Selassie, was greatly strengthened economically and militarily because he was considered skillful in absorbing foreign aid, and had the political willpower to maximize gains in state power and military capacity.⁸¹⁶

In accordance with Haile Selassie's internationalist attitude when he facilitated Ethiopia's joining of the League of Nations in 1923, he maintained his cosmopolitan views by joining the United Nations in 1945. Haile Selassie delivered on these beliefs shortly after. When war came to Korea in 1950, he deployed the Kagnew Battalion (drawn primarily from his Imperial Bodyguard known as the Kebur Zabagna) for UN military operations during the Korean War. The unit performed extraordinarily well (1951-1954) against Communist North Korea, losing only 122 Ethiopian troops, and impressing American troops with whom they fought alongside with.⁸¹⁷ Later in 1960, Haile Selassie deployed Ethiopian troops to the Congo for peacekeeping under UN command.⁸¹⁸ The mission in the Congo required very little of Ethiopian troops with their only highlight being the "rescue" of several Canadian peacekeepers who were beaten and detained by angry Congolese troops who were supposed to be allies with the UN force.⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁶ Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: from empire to people's republic*. Vol. 646. Indiana University Press, 1991), 81.

⁸¹⁷ Bahru Zewde, *A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991*. Ohio University Press, 2002), 185-186; Rick Scavetta, "Ethiopia - Kagnew veterans share memories of Korean War," *U.S. Army website*, January 27, 2010, https://www.army.mil/article/33578/ethiopia_kagnew_veterans_share_memories_of_korean_war

⁸¹⁸ Getachew Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States: History, diplomacy, and analysis* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 45-46.

⁸¹⁹ Kevin A. Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 79-81.

Eventually though, the Ethiopian air force was utilized in 1967 against European mercenaries fighting in the secessionist Katanga region of the Congo.⁸²⁰

During this period, Ethiopia was granted control of the Eritrean federation in 1952 by the UN due to Haile Selassie's skillful claims to the international community.⁸²¹ This union was supposed to give Eritrea considerable autonomy, but Ethiopian efforts to slowly integrate Eritrea led to the founding of the Eritrean Liberation Movement in 1959 by exiles in Egypt. This political movement developed an armed wing, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1961, and the ELF attacked an Ethiopian military unit on September 1st.⁸²² This event likely gave Haile Selassie the necessary political cover to outright dissolve Eritrean self-governance and autonomy in 1962, where he made a large show of military force to compel members of the Eritrean parliament to disband.⁸²³ In order to save face, and consolidate his irredentist territorial gains, Haile Selassie funded and created the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (the OAU would later be renamed the African Union (AU) in 2002), with a key principle of freezing African territorial boundaries.⁸²⁴ This shrewd strategy completed his broader annexation strategy of the Eritrean state, which would incidentally lead to three decades of rebellion against Addis Ababa.⁸²⁵

⁸²⁰ G. Techane, *The Former Army (1927–1983): From Former Members of the Ethiopian Ground Forces* (Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing House, 2014), 142.

⁸²¹ Isabel Boavida and Manuel João Ramos (eds.), *On the 50th anniversary of Haile Selassie's 1 state visit to Portugal, 1959-2009: Exhibition Catalogue* (Lisbon: Centro de Africanos, 2009), 40-41.

⁸²² Paul B. Henze, *The Horn of Africa: From war to peace* (London: MacMillan Press, 1991), 204.

⁸²³ Semere Haile, "Historical background to the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict," In Lionel Cliffe and Basil Davidson (eds.), *The long struggle of Eritrea for independence and constructive peace*. (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1988), 28-30.

⁸²⁴ Radoslav A. Yordanov, *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa During the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 22.

⁸²⁵ Ruth Iyob, *The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: domination, resistance, nationalism, 1941-1993* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

With time, Haile Selassie had to give into various reforms as his society modernized and younger classes became educated. This led to him creating a façade of democratic governance by introducing a parliament in 1955 with a new constitution.⁸²⁶ In reality, the Emperor retained power, but had to informally work out compromises with various actors, such as the Church, aristocrats, tribal leaders, and public intellectuals.⁸²⁷ Such modernization led Haile Selassie to grow increasingly suspicious of his troops as they became more educated and upgraded their weapon capabilities. This led him to use a “divide-and-rule policy” with his armed forces.⁸²⁸ At this stage, the state was the enemy of military cohesion and capacity, which presented a classic picture of an ineffective military under the control of a regime that feared coup attempts.

Although the Kebur Zabagna (Imperial Bodyguard) was a favored unit of Haile Selassie, the commander of that unit was one of the coup leaders that attempted to dissolve the Emperor of his power while he was on a state visit in Brazil in December of 1960. This abortive coup attempt happened despite the Imperial Bodyguard being the most privileged and highest paid of all Ethiopian units.⁸²⁹ However, much of the army declared loyalty to the Emperor and quickly crushed the coup attempt.⁸³⁰ Regardless of the failed attempt, it demonstrated the first open challenge to an Emperor’s rule in modern Ethiopian history and was “the year the sky began

⁸²⁶ This replaced the first written constitution introduced by Haile Selassie in 1931, which provided a “modern” framework for Ethiopia setting out objectives to establish: a national tax system (while eliminating local taxation authority), a civil service, a standing national army (while eliminating local armies). Emanuele Fantini, “State formation and capacity in Ethiopia,” Working paper, 2007, Department of Political Science, University of Turin, 3.

⁸²⁷ Theodore M. Vestal, *The lion of Judah in the new world: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and the shaping of Americans' attitudes toward Africa* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 105-106.

⁸²⁸ Tibebu, *The making of modern Ethiopia*, 112-113.

⁸²⁹ Fantahun Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014), 12.

⁸³⁰ Christopher Clapham, “The Ethiopian coup d'Etat of December 1960,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 4 (1968): 495-507.

falling on Haile Selassie [sic].”⁸³¹ Moreover, the Ethiopian military was able to extract concessions from a now weakened Emperor, such as higher wages.⁸³² These events caused Haile Selassie to further tighten his personalist control of the army and government, as any basic administrative, state, or military decision required *fakad* (Emperor Approval).⁸³³ However, it did not completely undermine the effectiveness of his army, as it easily won a border war against the Somali military in 1964.⁸³⁴

On the precipice of the military coup in 1974, Ethiopia was suffering from a severe drought that had caused over two million deaths, and the Emperor appeared increasingly out of touch.⁸³⁵ As a journalist who knew Haile Selassie very well, he noted that leading up to the coup, Haile Selassie was “retreating into a dream world.”⁸³⁶ Moreover, Ethiopian military units were increasingly rebelling and mutinying in Eritrea due to poor pay and living conditions, which was partly caused by attacks from ELF fighters.⁸³⁷ As protests and strikes took over the nation, the Ethiopian military removed the Emperor from power under the belief he was no longer responsive to the demands of the public. This ‘revolution from the top’ was initially supported by the public, as the military junta reduced the power of the aristocratic Amhara and Orthodox

⁸³¹ Harold G. Marcus, "1960, the Year the Sky Began Falling on Haile Selassie." *Northeast African Studies* 6, no. 3 (1999): 11-25.

⁸³² Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate. *Ethiopia: Transition and development in the Horn of Africa* (London: Westview Press, 1988), 39, 47.

⁸³³ Martin Meredith, *The fate of Africa: A history of the continent since independence* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011 [2005]), 210.

⁸³⁴ Jeffrey S. Dixon and Meredith Reid Sarkees. *A guide to intra-state wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014* (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2016), 613.

⁸³⁵ Edward Kissi, *Revolution and genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia* (Landham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 39.

⁸³⁶ John H. Spencer, *Ethiopia at bay: A personal account of the Haile Selassie years* (Hollywood, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2006), 335.

⁸³⁷ Ryszard Kapuściński, *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat* (trans.) William R. Brand and Katarzyna Mroczkowska-Brand (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983 [1978]).

Church in Ethiopia and other reforms.⁸³⁸ However, the junta turned itself into the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), called the *Derg* (an Amharic word for “committee”), and this regime would usher in “major social changes” that are still felt to this day.⁸³⁹

In establishing the military junta and legitimacy, the Derg regime immediately went to work on a campaign to delegitimize the Emperor and his corrupt ways.⁸⁴⁰ The desire to undo the legacy of the Emperor gave way to the Ethiopian Red Terror (*Qey Shibir* in 1977-1978). Over 750,000 Ethiopians were killed through a purposeful genocide based on political orientation and/or affiliation with the Emperor.⁸⁴¹ The level of communist transformation and reinvention of the Ethiopian state even led Cuban President Fidel Castro to remark about the Derg regime:

*they have adopted very radical measures. In a feudal country where the peasants were slaves, they nationalized the land and distributed it among the peasants...they nationalized the principal industries of the country, revolutionized the armed forces, politicized the soldiers, created Political Committees.*⁸⁴²

Despite Castro’s praise in 1977, the ambitious army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, became the Chairman that year in the midst of numerous purges and witch-hunts, which undermined the overall effectiveness of the Ethiopian armed forces. The Soviet Union and Cuban military eventually had to commit significant resources and personnel to save the Ethiopian military from a defeat at the hands of the smaller and weaker Somali military in 1978.⁸⁴³ This was because Mengistu had increasingly built an army around elimination of

⁸³⁸ James Minahan, *Miniature empires: A historical dictionary of the newly independent states* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 104-105.

⁸³⁹ Habibul Haque Khondker, “Bangladesh: Anatomy of an Unsuccessful Military Coup,” In Peter Karsten (ed.), *The Military and Society: A Collection of essays* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 303.

⁸⁴⁰ Kissi, *Revolution and genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia*, 51-52.

⁸⁴¹ Kjetil Tronvoll, Charles Schaefer, and Girmachew Alemu Aneme, *The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials Transitional Justice Challenged* (Rochester, NY: James Currey, 2009)

⁸⁴² Fidel Castro quoted in: Raúl Valdés Vivó, *Ethiopia's revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1978), 5.

⁸⁴³ Ben Parker and Abraham Woldegiorgis, *Ethiopia: breaking new ground* (Oxford, UK: Oxfam, 2003), 13-15.

competent rivals, squarely built around his own personification of the structures of command power within the ranks.⁸⁴⁴ This was best illustrated during the Ogaden War (1977-1978), where Mengistu personally flew to the battlefield near Jijiga to save the “army’s morale,” where the Ethiopian military had mutinied and abandoned the town due to several Somali assaults. Mengistu had the mutinous leaders “bayoneted as cowardly and antirevolutionary elements,” and then oversaw an Ethiopian two-front assault, which recaptured the city.⁸⁴⁵ However, the symbolic capture of the city meant little as Somali artillery pounded his troops, and re-attacked with a much larger force, with Mengistu slipping out in time before as his units were destroyed and the city recaptured by the Somali army.⁸⁴⁶ Incidents such as this would define and typify the military performance of the Ethiopian military during Mengistu’s rule, to include an inability to hold any ground against rebel forces in Eritrea. This was driven by Mengistu’s personalized attempt at forcing “triumvirate command – of commander, commissar and inspector – at each level of the hierarchy...but killed the initiative of the officers and encouraged insubordination and indiscipline.”⁸⁴⁷

In the 1980s, the Derg military struggled to respond to growing insurgencies throughout the country, opting for campaigns of brutalizing the population. A devastating famine in 1984-1985 further eroded Ethiopian confidence in Mengistu. Mengistu’s rule increasingly showed signs of cracking as his government and military looked increasingly paralyzed. The EPRDF

⁸⁴⁴ Andargachew Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian revolution 1974-1987: A transformation from an aristocratic to a totalitarian autocracy*. Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 8.

⁸⁴⁵ Tareke, Gebru. "The Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977 revisited." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000): 635-667, p. 648.

⁸⁴⁶ Arnold, Guy. *Wars in the Third World since 1945*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 190-198.

⁸⁴⁷ Robin Luckham “Radical soldiers, New model armies and the nation-state in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in Koonings, Kees, and Dirk Kruijt, eds. *Political armies: The military and nation building in the age of democracy* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 238-269, p. 248

coalition grew increasingly stronger by capturing and liberating areas, and began receiving military aid and assistance from Sudan, Libya, U.S., UK, and others.⁸⁴⁸ Interestingly, the EPRDF's ability to absorb aid effectively and direct it towards a successful war effort indicated a positive sign for their leadership and organizational competence.⁸⁴⁹ By 1989, most rebel groups under the EPRDF umbrella had transitioned from irregular fighters to a conventional army. This illustrates how closely the guerillas were following Mao's model of three stages revolutionary warfare: phase I (building organizational capability for violence) being established in the 1960s and 1970s, phase II (waging guerilla warfare) in the early 1980s, and phase III (conventional war against the state) by the late 1980s.⁸⁵⁰ Mengistu's problems were further compounded in 1989 as well, when a military coup failed against him, leading him to purge and imprison a large number of his best and most experienced cadre of officers, which further undermined the capability and effectiveness of his military.⁸⁵¹ Such actions by Mengistu led to further delegitimization of the military, and resulted in more conscripts deserting.

Ultimately, the Derg regime brought "Garrison Socialism" to the countryside, leaving an indelible scar on Ethiopian society.⁸⁵² To some scholars, the only positive transformation by the Derg regime was its ability to abolish the extractive economic institution known as *gult* in 1975, which was essentially an Ethiopian styled-form of European feudalism.⁸⁵³ The Derg experience,

⁸⁴⁸ Asafa Jalata, *Fighting against the injustice of the state and globalization: Comparing the African American and Oromo movements*. Springer, 2002), 81-84;

⁸⁴⁹ Martin Plaut, "The Ethiopian Famine: War, Weapons and Aid," *The RUSI Journal* (2018): 1-6.

⁸⁵⁰ Mao Tse-Tung, *On guerrilla warfare* (trans.) Samuel B. Griffith (Courier Corporation, 2005 [1937]), 21-22.

⁸⁵¹ Jalata, *Fighting against the injustice of the state and globalization*, 81.

⁸⁵² John Markakis, "Garrison Socialism: The Case of Ethiopia," *MERIP Reports* 79, (1979): 3-17.

⁸⁵³ Lakew Desta, Menale Kassie, S. Benin, and J. Pender, *Land degradation and strategies for sustainable development in the Ethiopian highlands: Amhara Region* (Nairobi: International Livestock Research Institute, 2000), 26.

however, grew out of a genuine (if violent and coercive) political program to use the army to remake Ethiopia into a modern country. The model at the time was a socialist government that would unify diverse ethnic groups and use close cooperation between the army and the single ruling party to mobilize the country's population.⁸⁵⁴ The army was involved, at least in principle, with all sorts of 'nation-building' projects, such as forcibly relocating large numbers of citizens to new areas to in what was supposed to be a society without concern for ethnic differences and focused instead on "building socialism." Objectionable though this seems with hindsight, this was another example of military capacity being defined in terms beyond the battlefield, to include support for specific political projects, such as overcoming the multifaceted problem of Ethiopian identity. Unfortunately for Mengistu, his attempts at personalizing control over the army undermined the military effectiveness of the Ethiopian military. Mengistu essentially hollowed out the army to the point that it no longer mattered that he had a much larger army and a larger array of weapons (e.g. tanks, fighter-attack aircraft, etc.) compared to the rebel EPRDF coalition. Mengistu's better equipped and highly trained army would 'crack' like a Fabergé egg against Meles' highly motivated and well-organized guerrilla fighting force – the EPRDF – seizing the capital on May 28th, 1991.⁸⁵⁵

The 'New' Ethiopia

Unbeknownst to many, a reduction in Soviet aid to Mengistu's Derg regime was not the pivotal reason why the Ethiopian Civil War (1974-1991) ended the way it did. In fact, the Soviets had

⁸⁵⁴ Bertus Praeg, *Ethiopia and political renaissance in Africa*. Nova Publishers, 2006), 86-87.

⁸⁵⁵ Peter Biles, "Addis Ababa falls to dawn onslaught," *The Guardian*, May 29, 1991, <https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1991/may/29/fromthearchive>; Jahara W. Matisek, "The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and Fabergé Egg Armies," *Defense & Security Analysis* 34, no. 3 (2018): forthcoming

announced in 1989 a reduction in aid and assistance to Ethiopia, clarifying that reductions would take effect in 1991.⁸⁵⁶ However, the tide had turned much earlier against Mengistu. A critical juncture in the rebel war effort came a year prior in March 1988. That is when the EPRDF scored a major victory against the best Ethiopian Army unit (the Third Division) at Afabét, to include capturing several Soviet military advisors.⁸⁵⁷ It literally turned the tide of the civil war as EPRDF rebels captured/destroyed Mengistu's largest garrison of troops, supplies, and weapons; permanently demoralizing the Ethiopian military that marked the beginning of its downfall.⁸⁵⁸ It would provide the EPRDF with the necessary capabilities to transition from a guerilla force to an army capable of waging conventional warfare against the Derg regime.⁸⁵⁹ After this critical battle, the EPRDF had no problem increasing its ranks, and even Derg military officers began defecting to the guerillas.⁸⁶⁰ It was crucial shift in military affairs because Mengistu effectively lost his ability to wage anymore offensive military campaigns, as the remaining loyal Ethiopian units went on the defensive, retreated, and/or quit. This made Meles' capture of the capital in 1991 all the easier, as Mengistu fled the country and found exile in Zimbabwe.⁸⁶¹ The importance of the 1988 Afabét battle cannot be overstated enough as the famous Africanist

⁸⁵⁶ Mark N. Katz (ed.), *The USSR and Marxist revolutions in the Third World* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 113.

⁸⁵⁷ Berhane Woldemichael, "Ethiopian military in disarray," *Review of African Political Economy* 16, no. 44 (1989): 61-63.

⁸⁵⁸ Berouk Mesfin, "The Architecture and Conduct of Intelligence in Ethiopia (1974-1991)." *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* (2010): 39-70.

⁸⁵⁹ Gebru Tareke, "From Af Abet to Shire: The Defeat and Demise of Ethiopia's 'Red' Army 1988-89," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2004, 239-281; Fantahun Ayele, "Operation Flame and the Destruction of the 3rd Division," *The Ethiopian Journal of Social Sciences*, Volume 1, Number 1, May, 2015, 42.

⁸⁶⁰ Interview, March 7, 2018.

⁸⁶¹ Clifford Krauss, "Ethiopian rebels storm the capital and seize control," *The New York Times*, May 28, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/28/world/ethiopian-rebels-storm-the-capital-and-seize-control.html?pagewanted=all>

historian Basil Davidson remarked that the rebel victory was “one of the biggest ever scored by any liberation movement anywhere since Dien Bien Phu in 1954.”⁸⁶²

As Meles set out to rebuild Ethiopia, he had inherited a country that had racked up massive war debts, with an international community hopeful for him to build a new stable state. Meles was then faced with the new challenge of defining the legitimacy of the Ethiopian state in which decades of war had centered around questions of nationality, ethnicity, and tribal affiliations.⁸⁶³ In transitioning from rebel rule to a ‘civilian’ government, the state was reorganized around Ethiopia’s main ethnic groups, and civil-military relations were reconfigured to establish a national army centered on its organizational identity and image as a liberation army.⁸⁶⁴ In those formative years, about 5,000 ex-Derg officers were permitted to join the new Ethiopian military under the condition that they would never be promoted past the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Meles needed ex-Derg officers for their technical expertise, since much of the ‘old’ regime military infrastructure, systems, and weaponry was centered around Soviet plans, administrative logistics and techniques, and technology. It was a new sort of military organization that the EPRDF had to adapt to, but included an implementation of their own ‘guerilla’ way of doing military matters and relations with civil authorities.⁸⁶⁵

Eritrea squandered possibilities for peaceful development, as the revolutionary victors failed to transition from one-man militaristic leadership, choosing not to compromise or provide wider

⁸⁶² Basil Davidson quoted in a BBC interview in: Dan Connell, *Against all odds: a chronicle of the Eritrean revolution: with a new foreword on the postwar transition* (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1993), 228.

⁸⁶³ Michael Woldemariam, *Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and its Discontents* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 64.

⁸⁶⁴ Robin Luckham “Radical soldiers, New model armies and the nation-state in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in Koonings, Kees, and Dirk Kruijt, eds. *Political armies: The military and nation building in the age of democracy* (London: Zed Books, 2002), 238-269.

⁸⁶⁵ Interview, August 9, 2017

inclusion of the populace.⁸⁶⁶ This is because Afwerki, unlike most other victorious rebel groups, chose to jail many of his fellow fighters and rebel commanders out of fear, so as to consolidate his power without them challenging him, which is why one U.S. Ambassador referred to him as a “one-man band” that became an “unhinged dictator.”⁸⁶⁷ In fact, an ENDF officer that had fought alongside Afwerki during the civil war stated that “Afwerki messed up Eritrea by destroying all institutions, and instead brought his ‘jungle institutions’.”⁸⁶⁸ A similar observation was made concerning South Sudan and its inability to create a state or military, where the ENDF official commented that “South Sudan was unable to transform because it is too corrupt and there’s no vision.”⁸⁶⁹ Eritrea’s failure was best highlighted by a 2011 UN report that detailed Eritrea’s complicity in supporting terrorist attacks in Ethiopia, and Eritrean regime and military leaders participating in illicit activities such as human trafficking, smuggling contraband, extortion, money laundering, and many other “shadow state” behaviors.⁸⁷⁰

Meles was able to implement his vision in Ethiopia because he understood the dangers of overly favoring his own minority ethnic group of Tigrayans. While transitioning the EPRDF into the ENDF in 1993, Meles eliminated many of the Tigrayan “political units” and “political officer positions,” knowing that he had to overcome the proportionality problem of TPLF officers being usually higher ranked. Thus, Meles ordered the demotion of some TPLF officers (1-2 ranks) in

⁸⁶⁶ Clapham refers to Ethiopia as Africa’s first “Developmental State.” Christopher Clapham, *Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay* (London: Hurst Books, 2017).

⁸⁶⁷ Murithi Mutiga, “Eritrea: Portrait of a Failed State at Odds with Neighbours,” *Global Policy Forum*, November 5, 2011, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/ethiopia-and-eritrea/50999-eritrea-portrait-of-a-failed-state-at-odds-with-neighbours.html>

⁸⁶⁸ Interview, August 8, 2017.

⁸⁶⁹ Interview, August 8, 2017.

⁸⁷⁰ “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010),” UN Security Council, S/2011/433, July 18, 2011, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433; Reno, William. *Warlord politics and African states* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 2-3.

order to ensure political viability of the new national Ethiopian army. He then filled those positions by promoting officers (1-2 ranks) from the Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (EPDM) and Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO), which had been a part of the EPRDF coalition. Meles and many other TPLF guerrillas understood that “this ‘sacrifice’ truly enabled the transition” after the civil war ended in 1991.⁸⁷¹

The transition from an informal fighting force, EPRDF, to the creation of the ENDF in 1993 was remarkably different than most other victorious rebel groups. For example, the successful liberation armies of South Africa (the ANC, known as the African National Congress) and Zimbabwe (the ZANU, known as the Zimbabwe African National Union) injected themselves into the new armies of the state, instead of starting anew.⁸⁷² Since so many commanders in the EPRDF had served dual military and political roles during the civil war (and after), this resulted in a new post-Derg Ethiopian military infused with some political aspects. With the demobilization of many Tigrayan fighters in 1993 in the shift towards a nationalistic Ethiopian military, the 1995 Ethiopian constitution, specifically Article 87, codified various roles of the ENDF. The Constitution required the ENDF: to have equitable ethnic diversity in the ENDF, a civilian Minister of Defence, only allowed to use force domestically only during a state of emergency, required obedience and respect of Constitution, and to be free of partisanship towards any political parties.⁸⁷³ This transition was not easy however as one of the EPRDF allies, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), left power sharing agreement talks with the transitional

⁸⁷¹ Interview, August 8, 2017.

⁸⁷² Robin Luckham, and Eboe Hutchful, “Democratic and war-to-peace transitions and security sector transformation in Africa,” in Alan Bryden and Funmi Olonisakin (eds.), *Security Sector Transformation in Africa* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2010).

⁸⁷³ “Article 87,” Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, *Federal Negarit Gazeta*, August 21, 1995, http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/ethiopia_constitution.pdf, p. 32.

government. Moreover, a Somali terrorist group, al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), sprang up after 1991 with the intent of establishing a Somali caliphate in East Africa. Each of these new threats required the new Ethiopian army to put down the OLF insurgency (1993-1995) and to stage a daring cross-border raid into Somalia in 1996 to destroy the AIAI organization, which was supporting Ogaden separatists.⁸⁷⁴ Alongside these events, Ethiopia demobilized – through rehabilitation commissions – approximately 475,000 soldiers by the time Eritrean military aggression against Ethiopia began in 1998.⁸⁷⁵

Due to the way Ethiopia had demobilized many fighters, when the border war broke out with Eritrea, Eritrea's ex-combatant social network ties were stronger than Ethiopia's. This allowed Eritrea's army to mobilize more quickly, explaining why Eritrea was so successful in the beginning of the war. As the ENDF struggled against Eritrean troops, the Ethiopian government had to pardon many Derg regime military officers in exchange for their help in the war against Eritrea.⁸⁷⁶ Eventually, the ENDF brought the conflict to a stalemate in favor of Ethiopia (i.e. retook land first taken by Eritrea) in 2000, but at the cost of more ENDF losses relative to the

⁸⁷⁴ Jon Abbink, "Breaking and making the state: the dynamics of ethnic democracy in Ethiopia." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 13, no. 2 (1995): 149-163; Jacqueline Page, "Jihadi Arena Report: Somalia - Development of Radical Islamism and Current Implications," *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, March 22, 2010, <https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1071/Jihadi%20Arena%20Report%20Somalia%20-%20Development%20of%20Radical%20Islamism%20and%20Current%20Implications#gsc.tab=0>

⁸⁷⁵ Daniel Ayalew and Stefan Dercon, "'From the Gun to the Plough': the Macro- and Micro-Level Impact of Demobilization in Ethiopia," in Kees Kingma (ed.) *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 132-172; Terrence Lyons "Statebuilding after victory: Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Rwanda," in David Chandler, and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.) *Routledge handbook of international statebuilding* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 321.

⁸⁷⁶ Tronvoll, Schaefer, and Aneme, 66.

Eritrean army and the imposition of a UN military peacekeeping observer force to prevent future outbreaks between the two, which as of 2018, has not prevented minor border skirmishes.⁸⁷⁷

The Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000) was a turning point for the ‘guerillas’ behind the state.⁸⁷⁸ As one ENDF officer described it, “it was a humbling war for us...we tried to fight like guerillas when we should have fought conventionally...[General] Samora wanted to attack them in the gut.”⁸⁷⁹ This guerilla thinking on attacking the “gut” was why “Ethiopia apparently spent thousands of young lives in human-wave assaults on Eritrea's positions.”⁸⁸⁰ One security analyst contended that Ethiopia lost thirty to fifty thousand troops in just the battle of Badme in March of 1999.⁸⁸¹ The failures of the border war led General Samora to ask for British military assistance in formally creating the needed structures and organization for the ENDF to become a conventional military in the 21st century.

While Article 87 of the Ethiopian constitution directs the ENDF to have equal representation of all ethnic groups in the military, this did not fully come about until 2004-2005. Samora allowed the UK military to help modernize the ENDF beyond the “guerilla mindset,” which many lower ranking generals contended contributed to the problems encountered during

⁸⁷⁷ Kidanu Atinafu and Endalcachew Bayeh, "The Ethio-Eritrean Post-War Stalemate: An Assessment on the Causes and Prospects." *Humanities and Social Sciences* 3, no. 2 (2015): 96-101.

⁸⁷⁸ Jean-Nicolas Bach, “A EPRDF e a construção da nação: Ajustes nas convicções e pragmatism,” *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos* 27 (2014): 103-126.

⁸⁷⁹ Interview, August 7, 2017.

⁸⁸⁰ Ian Fisher, “Peace deal may be near for Ethiopia and Eritrea,” *The New York Times*, August 23, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/23/world/peace-deal-may-be-near-for-ethiopia-and-eritrea.html>

⁸⁸¹ Interview July 27, 2017. In an anecdote from the security analyst who had intercepted communications between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the aftermath of the battle of Badme stated that Eritrea called for a temporary truce to allow Ethiopia to collect the dead bodies. Ethiopian officials refused to acknowledge the dead ENDF troops, telling the Eritreans that they were dead Eritrean troops. The Eritreans responded that the tens of thousands of dead troops near Badme were all wearing black boots, and that Eritrean soldiers only wear sandals. The Ethiopians conceded by collecting all the deceased ENDF troops the following day without incident.

the Ethio-Eritrean war. The decision to seek British help has historical precedent: the UK played a formative role in rebuilding Ethiopian security institutions during the 1940s and 1950s.⁸⁸² To solve many internal issues, the ENDF adopted a 'quota system' and other organization practices and support systems, at the suggestion of British military advisors, that portioned recruiting and promotions more in line with ethnic representativeness in Ethiopia, though ENDF officials did admit that Tigrayans were still slightly favored relative to other ethnic groups.⁸⁸³ Regardless, this was viewed as a major step away from the perception of a minority ethnic group dominating civil-military affairs, and as a way of engendering power sharing with underrepresented ethnic groups.

Such reorganization allowed the ENDF to be much more precise and effective when it invaded Somalia in 2006. The ENDF deployed between 7,000-8,000 troops to oust the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from Mogadishu.⁸⁸⁴ The ICU was a radical Islamist group that behaved similarly to the AIAI, and the ENDF viewed it as a similar threat requiring its destruction. The ENDF force worked with Somali troops loyal to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) throughout the military campaign, and by early 2007, the ICU had been defeated in all urban areas. However, because of Eritrean support of the ICU, many ICU fighters and leadership fled to Eritrea, while others splintered to create a more radical group known as al-Shabaab (with continued material support from Eritrea).⁸⁸⁵ In 2007, the ENDF reduced its Somali deployment

⁸⁸² Alemayehu Habte, "Social Change: A Pedagogic Inquiry of Ethiopian Ethnicity/Tribe/Gossa," *Dissertation*, University of St. Thomas, Minnesota, 2011, 50-51.

⁸⁸³ Interviews, August 7-9, 2017.

⁸⁸⁴ Interview, Ethiopian diplomat, August 8, 2017.

⁸⁸⁵ Aaron Maasho, "Exclusive: Eritrea reduces support for al Shabaab - U.N. report," *Reuters*, July 16, 2012, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-eritrea-somalia-un/exclusive-eritrea-reduces-support-for-al-shabaab-u-n-report-idUSBRE86F0AK20120716>

to about 3,000 troops as there appeared to be no threat to the TFG, but al-Shabaab quickly gained strength in the peripheral areas and was challenging the TFG for control of Mogadishu by May of 2009 as ENDF troops had left several months prior. Despite the establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, al-Shabaab would contest the new Somali TFG and their TFG soldiers, AMISOM troops – composed of personnel from Burundi (2007), Djibouti (2011), Ethiopia (2014), Kenya (2012), and Uganda (2007) – and several ENDF contingents of troops (operating independent of AMISOM command).⁸⁸⁶ It would take an Ugandan AMISOM contingent in Mogadishu in February of 2011 going on the offensive, beyond its authorized peacekeeping mandate, to push al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and out of other urban areas.⁸⁸⁷ ENDF troops would later redeploy to Somalia in December of 2011 to open up a third front against al-Shabaab.⁸⁸⁸ These military actions, as admitted by several ENDF personnel deployed to Somalia, have been more political in nature as they have been helping Somali communities with their ‘politics’ by setting up sustainable local governmental structures to defend against al-Shabaab infiltration.⁸⁸⁹ This renewed military operation still continues in 2018, and will likely continue for the foreseeable future, but ENDF personnel are adamant that they are choosing local level political solutions, instead of trying to militarily defeat al-Shabaab and similar insurgents.⁸⁹⁰

⁸⁸⁶ Paul D. Williams, "Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 12, no. 1 (2018): 172-192.

⁸⁸⁷ Phillip Carter and Ryan Guard. "Upcoming Inflection Point: Tracing and Optimizing the Amisom Trajectory in Somalia." *Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations* 5, no. 2 (2015): 49-59.

⁸⁸⁸ Aaron Maasho, "Ethiopian Troops Quit Somali City, but no Full Withdrawal Planned," *Reuters*, July 22, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-somalia/ethiopian-troops-quit-somali-city-but-no-full-withdrawal-planned-idUSBRE96L0HX20130722>

⁸⁸⁹ Interviews, August 7-10, 2017.

⁸⁹⁰ Field work, August 2017.

The ‘Black Box’ of Military Institutions: What makes the ENDF Effective?

According to a 2010 U.S. State Department report, the ENDF “is one of, if not the most, capable military force in sub-Saharan Africa, and has clearly established itself as the dominant military power...the ENDF has been our most effective partner in the Counterterrorism (CT) fight within the region.”⁸⁹¹ To the Western observer, one might assume the ENDF achieved this by receiving substantial aid and assistance since the EPRDF seized the capital in 1991 or because of the War on Terror initiated after the events of 9/11. However, ENDF effectiveness has come about because of purposeful decisions made by EPRDF leadership in the formative years when they formally established the ENDF in 1993; an organization heavily influenced by a guerilla mindset. At the same time, the ENDF has “borrowed” certain aspects from the Derg regime (1974-1991) and the Imperial Army (1942-1974). This guerilla mindset is based on instilling discipline, which was crystalized during the formative years of the civil war – and which carried on into the ENDF – where strong organization and doctrine were developed through political education.⁸⁹²

The ENDF’s status as a political army does not mean that it is politicized or personalized by government officials. The opposite is true if we consider conventional academic ideas of principal-agent theory. In most civil-military literature the principal (the government) is supposed to have authority over the agent (the military). In Ethiopia, there is an informal relationship that is institutionalized along principal-principal lines, where political leaders are informally on equal footing with military leadership, making it a sort of 21st century *de facto*

⁸⁹¹ “Volume I Section III-I - Africa,” U.S. State Department, 2010, p. 22, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/155990.pdf>

⁸⁹² During the civil war, EPRDF forces would transmit their political education and message as well.

rebel government. This harkens back to the guerilla mindset, and the wartime organization of a strong liberation movement (and political party) that was integral to the armed struggle. This translates into a postwar ENDF that, while supportive of Ethiopian constitutionalism, is not politically neutral nor allows civilian authorities to reign supreme over it.⁸⁹³ Thus, civil-military relations in the Ethiopian context reflects the sort of jointness in civil-rebel relations that continues to influence decision-making and power sharing between officials in government and the military. Accordingly, the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence (MoD) contends that the ENDF is a “symbol of our people's constitutional structure, a symbol of our national identity.”⁸⁹⁴ Incidentally, it reinforces the tight connections between the government and military.

For example, there is no instance of the ENDF making announcements or proclamations on who to support during an election. This stands in contrast to the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF), which also is a political army, but one that exhibits sign of partisanship. In 2002, ZDF General Vitalis Zvinavashe and Air Marshal Perence Shir made formal announcements during elections that the military would not support elected leaders that lacked experience fighting in the liberation war (i.e. Rhodesian Bush War from 1964 to 1979).⁸⁹⁵ It should be no surprise that such over political behavior ossified partisanship within the ZDF, leading them to remove President Mugabe in late 2017. This showed the risks of an unmanaged political role for a military that then is able to develop its own perspectives and capabilities against regime interests. Thus, ZDF

⁸⁹³ Abdulnasir Bereket Adem, “The role of the military in fostering constitutionalism: A comparative study of Ethiopia, Turkey, and the USA,” *Thesis*, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, April 2015, http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2016/adem_abdulnasir.pdf

⁸⁹⁴ “Vision, Mission and Values,” የኢ.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ ሙከላከያ ሠራዊት (The FDRE Defense Force), Ethiopian Ministry of Defence website, 2018, <http://www.fdremod.gov.et/info>, (translated by author)

⁸⁹⁵ Knox Chitiyo and Martin Rupiya, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980-2005,” in Martin Rupiya (ed.) *Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2005), chapter 13, 352.

personnel came to feel differently about who should be politically in charge of Zimbabwe. The ENDF however, seeks out informal discussions on how the Ethiopian government should be put together, and understands the dangers of becoming too partisan, as it can lead to the sort of civil-military problems that plague most of the African continent.

This orientation of the ENDF is a paradox in light of conventional views based on Western militaries. In Jim Storr's *The Human Face of War*, the retired British infantry officer notes that successful Western armies are full of leaders that exhibit non-democratic traits, primarily centered on authoritarian or autocratic behaviors.⁸⁹⁶ Storr notes the irony of this because democratic societies appear to create militaries that are antithetical to the liberal principles of the state. This leads us to reconsider the remarks by the ENDF General in the epigraph of chapter 3 about it being "dangerous" for the ENDF to model its military after the U.S. or other Western militaries. Besides indicating an understanding for resource constraints, his comments illustrate a consciousness of the Ethiopian military as a "political animal" that is engaged domestically. This reinforces the view of the comments of the Ethiopian official in the epigraph from this chapter, as he described the ENDF as being the most democratic institution in Ethiopia. This is at odds with evaluations of the Ethiopian political system as undemocratic by most observers because it is ruled by one party: the EPRDF.⁸⁹⁷

This situation illustrates the importance of understanding context and political strategy when examining what Ethiopian leaders consider to be appropriate military capacities and its relationship to the state. The interlocutor's remarks about "dissent and criticism" being

⁸⁹⁶ Jim Storr, *The Human Face of War* (London: Continuum, 2009), 3, and 172-199.

⁸⁹⁷ "Freedom in the World 2017: Ethiopia," *Freedom House*, 2018, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/ethiopia>

“encouraged” are a part of the guerilla spirit of ‘dialogue’, known as *megenanya*.⁸⁹⁸ It is an informal institutional practice dating back to the roots of the rebellion in which democratic-like discussions (with guidance from the political wing of the liberation movement) resulted in the development of military operations, hierarchies, and promotions. This ‘dialogue’ up and down the military hierarchy and between troops informs how the bravest ENDF troops are selected for promotion and other prominent positions. In what may seem unusual to a Western military observer, the principle of ‘dialogue’ is so important that even the lowest ranking troops are permitted the ‘space’ to engage in consultations and discussions with ‘leaders’ about military decisions.⁸⁹⁹ In conventional Western armies, it is verboten for junior officers and young enlisted troops to question their superiors, yet this is the norm in the ENDF. Finally, according to several ENDF officers, this spirit of dialogue means that “military rank” disappears when discussions are had between superiors and subordinates, truly making military decision-making a democratic process.⁹⁰⁰ This process has the effect of socializing members of the military into this ‘guerilla’ mindset while providing superiors with important information about the perspectives of subordinates.

There are several ‘old’ Ethiopian military feats that shape the institutional narrative of the ENDF. Many ENDF personnel consider the Ethiopian victory at the Battle of Adwa in 1896 and Ethiopian army participation in the Korean War (1951-1954) – to include other peacekeeping

⁸⁹⁸ Dialogue in Amharic: መገናኛ

⁸⁹⁹ Interviews, August 7-10, 2017.

⁹⁰⁰ Fieldwork, August 2018

missions – as a formative part of the political indoctrination and tradition of Ethiopian military effectiveness.⁹⁰¹ As one of the first members of the TPLF put it:

*Being a soldier was associated with love for collective wellbeing and dedication to sacrifice one's life for sovereignty. Dedication to duty, courage in battle, and respect to civilians without whose support the success in the anti-colonial wars was not possible were ingrained in the Ethiopian culture. The shining performance of the Ethiopian contingent with the UN Mission for Korea was very much influenced by this culture.*⁹⁰²

These beliefs reinforce the nationalistic identity of Ethiopia, and serve as a mechanism of cohesion, in terms of moving beyond simplistic attachments to tribal and ethnic identities. It is also an important component in creating a ‘military enclave’ for the ENDF by creating a common narrative for Ethiopian state-building. This is how the balancing act between being a professional in a political army comes into place. As one ENDF official put it “the army not only should have a proper understanding of the national constitution, its history, and how its appropriate implementation is measured but also believe in it. Without this an army [ENDF] cannot serve a democratic institution.”⁹⁰³ Such comments portray the idea that a political army should be made conscious of its role to play, especially in support of a democratic institution, regardless of how tenuous this proposition may be in Ethiopia in the 21st century. In any event, this process is real to the people who live in it. The Ethiopian regime succeeds in controlling the military’s definition of its interests in ways that allow the regime to direct ENDF capabilities toward state-building tasks, even if these are not conventionally associated with military pursuits.

⁹⁰¹ Interview, March 10, 2018.

⁹⁰² Interview, March 10, 2018.

⁹⁰³ Interview, January 31, 2018

When it comes to using military force domestically, the ENDF has a rationalized process. Outside of using their special forces (*Agazi*) to deal with threats that cannot be solved by police forces, the ENDF is rarely used domestically for repression. Doing so would compromise “the political neutrality of the ENDF” because this would challenge the idea that the military was a force of liberation and protects the people.⁹⁰⁴ This is important because many ENDF personnel do not want to be involved in civil-defense duties like putting down riots. In fact, according to a Western military officer stationed in Ethiopia, “there is much confusion amongst the diplomatic and international community as to which are soldiers and which are police in Ethiopia.”⁹⁰⁵ Thus, the ENDF cannot deploy without being commanded by civilian authorities. The regional administrator must formally request ENDF assistance during a crisis (i.e. only under extreme circumstances), and the request must dictate how local and federal police are unable to adequately help the situation. This request is then forwarded to the Ethiopian PM (not the CHOD), and the PM alone makes the final decision whether to authorize the use of the ENDF for assistance in supporting police duties.⁹⁰⁶

In thinking about military effectiveness in an Ethiopian context, ENDF officers broadly described what they thought made their army effective. I have created a drawing (Figure 9-1) to

⁹⁰⁴ “Ethiopian National Defence Force – Synopsis,” Official – Draft as at 03/10/16, official UK document obtained during fieldwork in 2017.

⁹⁰⁵ “A brief guide to the Ethiopian security sector and its uniforms,” July 2016 (V3), official UK document obtained during fieldwork in 2017.

⁹⁰⁶ Interview, August 8, 2017.

show where there was agreement in aspects of making their military institutions so strong.




Figure 9-1. Ethiopian military officers describing what influences ENDF militarily effectiveness.

The “purpose” aspect is the most important component of Figure 9-1 in how ENDF personnel view their role. On one hand, many see intangible value in peacekeeping – beyond materialist gains – in their region and bringing “conscious political objectives” to the communities to which they have deployed. On the other hand, “purpose” drives many ENDF personnel to believe that they have a domestic role to play in developing and defending the objectives of the state. This is reinforced by the opinion of one ENDF officer that “an army could be made aware and indoctrinated on national constitution without being partisan and continuing to be professionally qualified for a pluralist democratic system.”⁹⁰⁷ Thus the ENDF is an army that can be

⁹⁰⁷ Interview January 31, 2018.

professionally focused on military power, but also views tangential ways of strengthening the Ethiopian state and society. The Ethiopian MoD views such activities as important and believes that the ENDF should play “a pivotal role in the continental and international arena,”⁹⁰⁸ which further contributes to Ethiopian state development. Such efforts have contributed to Addis Ababa becoming the ‘capital’ of Africa that hosts offices of numerous international institutions, which has been a cornerstone of Ethiopian state formation as continental politics (and aid) flow through Ethiopia.

The most defining aspect of the Ethiopian military, that differentiates it from all other militaries in the world, is that the ENDF does not have a direct entry system for becoming an officer. This crucial Ethiopian difference is a major contrast to the rest of the world. All modern ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ styled militaries have two ways of joining the military. The first track is for enlisted personnel and conscripts. This is the most common entry point, and they are generally the lowest paid, and depending on the development of society, completion of high school is required for advanced countries and less developed states require completion of middle school (and usually do not require literacy).

The second track is for officers. The primary way of becoming an officer is through attendance of ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) classes at a college or university, and then the cadet is commissioned upon graduation of university studies. In other cases, one can just attend officer school as a cadet after graduating with a bachelor’s degree, without having to attend ROTC, and then commission as an officer after. Then the other common way is by

⁹⁰⁸ “Vision, Mission and Values,” የኢ.ፌ.ዲ.ሪ መከላከያ ሠራዊት (The FDRE Defense Force), Ethiopian Ministry of Defence website, 2018, <http://www.fdremod.gov.et/info>, (translated by author)

attending a military academy (i.e. college studies mixed with the rigors of military cadet life) for 1-4 years (length dependent on education requirements of that military) and the cadet graduates as an officer. In rarer circumstances, ‘battlefield commissions’ have been utilized by Western and Eastern militaries under extreme circumstances (e.g. high combat attrition rates).

In the case of the newly reconfigured Ethiopia, the guerilla background means the ENDF puts political indoctrination and egalitarian ideology first. This also reflects the use of the informal means of vetting and liberation movement party structures noted above. This is a major shift from ‘old’ Ethiopian military practices, where the Imperial Army and Derg regime had a military system similar to the West and East, where civilians (with a university education) were selected to be cadets for officer school. With the EPRDF in charge of Ethiopia, before one can become an officer in the ENDF, one must first start out as a lowly private, making 1900 Birr a month (about \$70).⁹⁰⁹ This is where the role of informal institutions takes hold with selecting the best enlisted troops to eventually become officers. This process for the ENDF is derived from its EPRDF heritage as a political institution that uses its guerilla ideology to be militarily effective in a context that required it to defeat a regime, but that now is engaged with strengthening the state. Inculcating new recruits with the requisite political consciousness allows the ENDF to exhibit greater control over incoming personnel, and allows them to mold and create informal officers before ever attending a military academy to formally become an officer. As one ENDF General put it “we don’t want them going to college first and being indoctrinated...we can’t control how they act after...we need to indoctrinate and train them first, and if they show the

⁹⁰⁹ Fieldwork, Ethiopia, August 6-12, 2017.

qualities to lead, then they can go to officer school.”⁹¹⁰ Such exertion of ‘control’ is an effective way of creating an officer corps for the ENDF that has the necessary political education and indoctrination to understand the role and position of the army in Ethiopia. More importantly, this reduces the likelihood of a coup threat emanating from the ENDF officer corps because indoctrination, control, and monitoring has been instilled since the beginning.

Much like how the various rebel groups decided who would lead their military units, young enlisted troops in the ENDF are selected to become officers if they show high levels of these three traits: *jeginineti* (bravery)⁹¹¹, *mesiwa ‘iti* (sacrifice)⁹¹², and *rasi wedadineti* (selfless).⁹¹³ Many ENDF officers also indicated that their behavior and interactions with others, to include how they operated in a combat effective manner while deployed, was subject to perceptions of *ifiretini/asafari* (shame).⁹¹⁴

This idea of “shame” seems to be the most influential informal institution in the ENDF. This is because every ENDF member appears to view their legitimacy and cohesion as dependent upon whether they are deemed brave, and if not, shameful behaviors result in a lack of respect, creating indiscipline. Conceptions of what ‘is’ and what ‘is not’ shameful in the ENDF impacts how they conduct military training as well. For example, a commanding ENDF officer pulled his unit out of peacekeeper training with the Kenyan military when he discovered that the Kenyans were teaching his ENDF troops how to ‘retreat’. To the ENDF commanding officer, ‘retreating’ is shameful behavior that he contended ruins military discipline. He believed that his troops

⁹¹⁰ Interview, August 8, 2017.

⁹¹¹ Bravery in Amharic: ጅግንነት

⁹¹² Sacrifice in Amharic: ሞስዋዕት

⁹¹³ Selfless in Amharic: ራስ ወዳድነት

⁹¹⁴ Shame in Amharic: እፍረትን. Shame in Tigrinya: ኣኸፈረረ (*ahifere*).

would always fight to the end and never be taken prisoner, of which he alluded to the bravery of the Kagnew battalion during the Korean War, in which not a single Ethiopian soldier was ever captured.⁹¹⁵

Understanding that the ENDF has their own institutional interpretation of being militarily effective means that they have a distinctly Ethiopian ‘military enclave’ in how they become institutionally effective within their own context. This can also explain why the Ethiopian military has an exemplary troop-to-General ratio in Africa (about 1,200 - 1,500 soldiers per General) in the 21st century, as ENDF officers said it would be “shameful” to ask for more flag officer positions than is necessary for the military to function.⁹¹⁶ This is remarkable in an African context, as most African armies have a ratio of 500 troops per General, which makes the military top-heavy and inefficient, whereas NATO militaries generally have a ratio of one General for every 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers.⁹¹⁷ This Western ratio should not be considered the sole metric in evaluating military efficiency, as the U.S. military has a ratio of about one flag officer for every 1,500 personnel.⁹¹⁸ Regardless, the ENDF ratio may be changing to accommodate new power sharing agreements in early 2018, as over 60 individuals were promoted to the rank of General, as a way of reducing perceptions of Tigrayan dominance in the flag officer ranks. It also included the promotion of three generals (one Amhara, one Oromo, and one Tigray) to the rank

⁹¹⁵ Interview, August 8, 2017

⁹¹⁶ Interview, August 8, 2017; Interview, March 7, 2018.

⁹¹⁷ Emile Ouédraogo, “Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa,” *Africa Center for Strategic Studies Research Paper No. 6*. July 2014, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA609337>, p. 27.

⁹¹⁸ James Clark, “Does the US Military Have Too Many Generals?” *Task & Purpose*, May 16, 2016, <https://taskandpurpose.com/us-military-many-generals/>; Lawrence Kapp, “Military Officer Personnel Management: Key Concepts and Statutory Provisions,” *Congressional Research Service*, May 10, 2016, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44496.pdf>

of full General, attaining a position of power similar to General Samora as CHOD.⁹¹⁹ Such efforts are a plausibly effective civil-military relations tactic in hopes of restoring what is viewed as domestic legitimacy and internal ENDF organizational legitimacy.

The ENDF and Ethiopian government have a standoffish attitude with many foreign militaries, especially the U.S. This is driven by the fact that ENDF leadership has been annoyed by the U.S. military for trying to “win Ethiopian hearts and minds” in parts of Ethiopia where the government is not as present (e.g. ethnic Somali areas). Ethiopian officials lamented American military engagement in state-building projects (e.g. building wells, schools, etc.) made the Ethiopian government look weak.⁹²⁰ This is why the Ethiopian government, on numerous occasions has expelled the U.S. military. Similarly, the Ethiopian government and military welcome relations with any governments that provide assistance, to even include military, economic, and diplomatic ties with North Korea (though Ethiopia has tried to make such a partnership more covert).⁹²¹ As a central hub of Africa, Ethiopia finds that it is a conduit for security force assistance from various actors, and Ethiopia sees great benefits in providing security assistance to other African militaries, hence there are numerous multilateral military organizations in Addis Ababa (e.g. Eastern Africa Standby Force, African Centre for Peace and Security, etc.).

⁹¹⁹ Daniel Berhane, “Ethiopian military gets new deputy Chief of Staffs, 4 Full Generals and 57 General officer promotions,” *Horn Affairs*, February 3, 2018, <https://hornaffairs.com/2018/02/03/ethiopia-military-new-deputy-chief-of-staffs-general-officer-promotions/>; For an accurate assessment and breakdown of ethnic groups in the ENDF see: Berhane Zikarge, “Public and Self-Perceptions of the FDRE Defence Force in Addis Ababa,” *Thesis*, Addis Ababa University School of Graduate Studies Institute for Peace and Security Studies, June 2016, <http://etd.aau.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/11394/1/6.Berhane%20Zikarge-Thesis%20CD.pdf>

⁹²⁰ Interview, August 8, 2017.

⁹²¹ Samuel Ramani, “North Korea's Military Partners in the Horn of Africa,” *The Diplomat*, January 6, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/north-koreas-military-partners-in-the-horn-of-africa/>

State-building efforts of the ENDF go beyond the normal behavior of other militaries in Africa. The ENDF plays a pivotal role in the economy of Ethiopia as it oversees the Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC), which is a military-industrial organization that oversees over 70 companies that produce war matériel (e.g. ammo, weapons, vehicles, etc.) and civilian products (e.g. manufacturing, agricultural goods, etc.).⁹²² While many might consider army involvement in economic development and projects to be counterproductive, inefficient, or corrupt, the ENDF runs METEC in a very responsible and effective fashion.⁹²³ METEC is viewed by many observers as a very competent and capable organization that significantly contributes to Ethiopian economic growth and development.⁹²⁴ According to the World Bank, Ethiopia “experienced strong, broad-based growth averaging 10.5% a year from 2005/06 to 2015/16,”⁹²⁵ a rate that is among the highest in the world and produces a doubling of GDP about every seven years. The World Bank also found that 42 percent of residents in urban areas benefit from improved infrastructure and services.⁹²⁶ Many of these tasks involve the ENDF in infrastructure development, which solidifies its role and purpose in Ethiopian state-building.

The positive role of the ENDF running METEC is a part of the guerilla mindset, in how the army views a need to contribute to development by using its most talented officers to oversee

⁹²² “Metal & Engineering Corporation (MetEC),” *Addis Fortune*, June 23, 2013, <https://addisfortune.net/columns/metal-engineering-corporation-metec/>

⁹²³ Some interviewed stated that METEC is a form of patronage, since Tigrayan officers generally get METEC jobs. Regardless, many still admitted that they are still well-run organizations. Fieldwork, August 2017.

⁹²⁴ Fieldwork, August 6-10, 2017; Desta Gebrehiwot, “METEC: centrepiece for Ethiopia’s industrial sector,” *The Ethiopian Herald*, November 19, 2015, <http://www.ethpress.gov.et/herald/index.php/technology/item/2857-metec-centrepiece-for-ethiopia-s-industrial-sector>

⁹²⁵ “The World Bank in Ethiopia,” *The World Bank*, October 30, 2017, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>

⁹²⁶ “Ethiopia Urban Local Government Development Project,” *The World Bank*, 2011, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23159979~menuPK:141310~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

and manage different parts of the economy to contribute to overall growth. This is a defining factor of the ENDF that makes it different from the Egyptian army. The Egyptian military is overly involved in the Egyptian economy, behaving as a military business (commonly referred to as “Milbus”) for its own survival and to maintain its hegemony in the Egyptian political system.⁹²⁷ Its rent-seeking role is greatly at odds with the constructive ENDF vision of using its skills to contribute to Ethiopian development and industrialization. The Egyptian army uses “Milbus” for the parasitic purposes of patronage and is a reflection of regime coup-proofing strategies of using rent-seeking opportunities to buy support, with predictably negative impacts on efforts to make the Egyptian economy more efficient and productive.⁹²⁸ Beyond METEC, to support the financing and construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the ENDF imposed a “voluntary tax” on all military personnel to ensure completion of the self-funded GERD project.⁹²⁹ Other efforts by the ENDF to contribute to Ethiopian government revenues also include training other African militaries, such as a 2018 deal from the government of Equatorial Guinea that pays Ethiopia to train its army.⁹³⁰ These practices all indicate the particular ‘military enclave’ the ENDF has fostered that is capable of producing military power, but also in Ethiopian state formation.

Conclusion

⁹²⁷ Amanda Zeidan, “Egypt’s military is hijacking its economy,” *Business Insider*, March 2016, 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/egypts-military-hijacking-its-economy-2016-3>

⁹²⁸ Zeinab Abul-Magd, “Egypt’s Military Business: The Need for Change,” *Middle East Institute*, November 19, 2015, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/egypt%E2%80%99s-military-business-need-change>

⁹²⁹ Interview, August 10, 2017.

⁹³⁰ “The army sells its services to boost the state coffers,” *Africa Intelligence*, February 3, 2018, <https://www.africaintelligence.com/ion/corridors-of-power/2018/03/02/the-army-sells-its-services-to-boost-the-state-coffers,108296664-bre>

The ENDF and its ability to be militarily effective is a byproduct of historical processes, ranging from the time of Emperors, the Derg regime, and the rebels (e.g. TPLF, EPRDF, etc.), and of contemporary political strategies. The guerillas that came to power in 1991 took many of their institutional practices and organization principles to recreate a ‘new’ Ethiopian government. With it, they installed their distinct alternative to the Derg regime, bringing a guerilla mindset to how the state was reconfigured, especially along the lines of power sharing and civil-military relations. After seizing the capital in 1991, Meles led the EPRDF and split it into a political wing and an armed wing that became the ENDF in 1993. The failure of Eritrea is an illustration of a leader, Afwerki, making bad choices, and deciding to forego power sharing. The Eritrean military is thus a personalist army surrounding the manifestation of Afwerki, and while it showed itself to be initially effective, it was unable to maintain its effectiveness in the long-term conflict, because it is an unsustainable entity. This divergence shows the importance of political strategy. Antecedent conditions are important, but not sufficient for the creation of military effectiveness in an otherwise relatively weak state and turning this into a state-building resource.

By its very nature the ENDF continues to be a political army despite constitutional declarations and MoD mission statements that it is not partisan. It just happens to be that the ENDF is a benign political army that sees itself as being a formative part of Ethiopian state development and its economy. This ‘purpose’ drives how the ENDF makes itself militarily effective, while the government (i.e. EPRDF) gives the ENDF the ‘space’ necessary to foster a ‘military enclave’. The EPRDF is able to permit this because there is ideological unison along the guerilla mindset in how the state and army complement one another, but also the roles that each must take in protecting the state, and the hard-fought gains made since winning the civil

war in 1991. With the recent 2018 upheavals in Ethiopia, the “guerilla-style” institutions appear to slowly be adapting to the reality that the perception of Tigrayan rule is unsustainable.

Attempts to mend this through new power sharing agreements appear likely to reduce tensions, contributing to the durability of the Ethiopian state, and also ENDF military effectiveness.

Chapter 10 – Conclusion: The Past and Future of African Militaries

On the eve of independence, African soldiers had been grossly underestimated as a political force. Even after military mutinies had occurred in 1960 in the former Belgian Congo, African elites were slow to recognize the short distance from an army mutiny to an army coup.

Ali A. Mazrui⁹³¹

It's hard to overcome indigenous military culture and institutions... makes us wonder whether we are doing any good if we can't build self-sustaining institutions and change the politics.

*Group of U.S. Marines
(Recently returned from a training mission with West African militaries)
Interview
August 3, 2017*

The pursuit of military effectiveness contributes to state-building projects in contemporary Africa, but only under specific conditions. These conditions, often at variance to Western notions of military effectiveness, include a willingness on the part of regimes to repurpose informal institutions into mechanisms for asserting control over the recruitment and socialization of members of the military. It also includes a capacity on the part of leaders to accept and manage risks that militaries will develop their own perspectives and interests at odds with their governments. These conditions point to the centrality of political strategies. Leaders thus have to possess the political will and command the capacity to define and execute such strategies, of which, these conditions are generally lacking in many African states.

⁹³¹ Ali A. Mazrui “Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future,” *Development Policy Management Network Bulletin* 9, no.1 (February 2002), 18.

The process in which regimes in otherwise weak states are able to foster military capacity points to an alternative contemporary path to build stronger states. If past efforts at creating effective armies in Africa are an indication of the future, this is likely to be a very difficult but potentially very rewarding pathway towards greater state capacity and political stability. There is no guarantee, but with some degree of order and stability brought about by a professional army – be it political, apolitical, or personalist – it is crucial that politicians do not politicize their militaries in ways that fragment them and draw them into day-to-day politics. Providing armies with a ‘military enclave’ to be effective despite the inefficiencies of the patrimonial state provides an alternative form of civil-military relations. This gives the military an opportunity to focus on repurposing its abilities towards state development and their military capabilities, as defined within the political milieu. This pathway provides army leaders with alternatives to engaging in overly partisan activities as they pursue personal objectives. Any transition or transformation of the state will require cooperation from the military, a more feasible proposition with this pathway to military effectiveness.⁹³²

Should African states abolish their militaries, given the historically negative role they have played in African development? Countries such as Seychelles, Sao Tome, Cape Verde, Mauritius, and Botswana, did not create a typical standing military at independence and are among the few African states that consistently do very well on development indices.⁹³³ When

⁹³² Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle. *Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 217.

⁹³³ Mo Ibrahim, “2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Index Report,” *Mo Ibrahim Foundation*, November 20, 2017, http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.267146378.5079439.1521994567-1898816084.1521994567#page=15; J. J. Messner, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, et. al., “Fragile States Index Annual Report 2017,” *Fund for Peace*, May 10, 2017, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2017/05/14/fragile-states-index-2017-annual-report/951171705-fragile-states-index-annual-report-2017/>

these countries did eventually create armies, it was a slow process. Their militaries remained very small and underfunded, and with an orientation towards civil-defense, to essentially act as more capable versions of police units. These countries made their critical juncture early in the formative years, and armies were left out of the compact of the state; hence, their militaries have been relegated to peripheral mission sets centered on maritime duties such protecting ports, shipping lanes, and search and rescue. In the case of landlocked Botswana, the army is responsible for defending wildlife in their vast preserves, of which Botswanan military personnel see an importance in the role they play in state development as their actions help support tourism, thereby helping the economy.⁹³⁴

These cases are the exception. These states, many of them small islands, have been an anomaly in African politics. They have been relatively peaceful since independence, having little to no reason for investing in the development of a military. Ridding militaries from the African continent is not a tenable solution, as many states have a legacy and history of them being an integral part of the state and how it operates. To remove militaries from the state in a 21st century Africa would only be to ask for more problems. African history is replete with disbanded military personnel forming rebel groups in the jungles and deserts to only fight their way back into power. This cycle merely results in a further merging of the army into the political processes of the state. Attempting to remove the power and role of military leaders and other combatants is even more dangerous during a democratic transition, especially if these actors – with their networks and capacity to organize and project violence – are not given a stake in the new

⁹³⁴ Botswanan military personnel contend that they are now taking up the mission set of “water security” whereby they are having to resolve water disputes internally and with neighboring states. Interview, February 14, 2018.

government that is reflective of their current stature.⁹³⁵ This will be a tough pill to swallow for many internationalists that espouse idealistic beliefs for security sector reform (SSR) in African states and the desire to reduce the role and power of militaries, militias, and other formal and informal organizations capable of deploying violence. Formally and informally, local “big men” will continue to wield power for the foreseeable future; whether or not the United Nations and other foreign donors try their best to stop it or circumvent these powerful actors.

The logic of politics in Africa shows that armies are a major part of the political process and power sharing for various actors and groups. Thus, the question remains: How can the typical government in Africa break the cycle of civil wars, coups, and other forms of political violence? Having an effective military with a political perspective dedicated to the long-term state building project will be crucial in providing the necessary “political space” for political and economic liberalization. Lacking an ideology and strategic vision for the future, most African armies will revert to predatory behaviors and overt involvement in politics, much to the detriment of the state and society. This means countries such as the CAR, DRC, and Somalia, will likely continue to struggle because they are still dealing with fragmented political systems. Their respective leaders are so focused on short-term survival, that patronage and politicization of the armed forces remains the primary tool. From the perspective of leaders, there does not seem to be an alternative, as their opponents and adversaries are vying for influence in their government and army.

⁹³⁵ Anders Themnér (ed.), *Warlord democrats in Africa: Ex-military leaders and electoral politics* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2017).

Foreign assistance in the form of military aid, education, and training, can play a substantive role in the state-building process, but it requires two acknowledgements. First, as noted by the U.S. Marines in the epigraph, there are some institutional aspects that cannot be overcome or altered by external actors providing short-term assistance. As many Western military trainers humorously noted, many African military personnel would admit that their participation in Western led training and military exercises was their only way of getting fed.⁹³⁶

Second, and more importantly, it requires long-term commitments from external donors and the international community so that regime leadership in weak and fragile states can take risks, such as reforms to the political system, without fearing removal by the army or political opponents that perceive reforms as political weakness.

While it could be argued that the formative rules of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 moved to abolish interstate war, it did not mean that African states would give up on creating reliable and effective military institutions. While the international politics of the Cold War drove some African countries to build up oversized militaries, some political leaders genuinely saw their armies as an important part of the state-building process, such as defending their territory and acting as a force of development on society (e.g. building infrastructure, providing alternative public goods and services, etc.). Unfortunately, for most African countries, the 1960s and 1970s were an era of African armies being overly involved in politics, acting almost as an independent political actor – with their own special interests – in their societies. Mutinies, coups, and other predatory behaviors by militaries, led to political turmoil, whereby

⁹³⁶ Fieldwork, September 2015 – August 2017.

certain patterns of behavior between the polity and society, set many of these countries on path dependent civil-military relations. Breaking these path dependent trajectories has been almost impossible without a rebel group coming to power and completely transforming the state. This includes new forms of civil-military relations that can either adapt to the 'old' regime institutions, or that bring 'new' regime and organizational practices. In other cases, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, their post-civil war orders have held, to include some improvement in the professionalization of their armed forces under the watchful of UN peacekeepers and Western military forces. However, one must wonder if the political and military systems of Sierra Leone and Liberia would hold if they stopped being maintained as international trustees? Without such tutelage, would they quickly fragment and disintegrate along political and ethnic cleavages? Only time will tell.

Effective Militaries in Africa: Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia

The survey of African armies in this dissertation showed that there are ways for leaders of weak states to promote military effectiveness. Some of these leaders were able to direct this capacity to assist in making their own states more capable. The militaries also pursued their own ways of improving their military effectiveness, while ensuring proper internal controls to demonstrate loyalty to the state and populace. In each case, these armies created 'military enclaves' that had their own sense of identity, role, and purpose in society, which created their respective forms of professionalism and own way of contributing to state-building efforts by political leadership.

Senegal showed itself capable of retaining the colonial structure and system after independence, to include keeping an apolitical military with considerable capabilities. This was not the product of French tutelage, Senegalese culture, or Sufi Islam. It was through purposeful

decisions by Senegalese political leadership in its formative years. They avoided politicization and personalization of the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF), which might have led to partisanship, leading to delegitimized civil-military relations. Similarly, SAF leadership sought ways of making the state stronger through their own resources and capacity under the ideological auspices of *Armée-Nation*. This included a focus on developing the army through education initiatives, leading to the SAF engaging in infrastructure projects and other domestic activities that improved the livelihood of Senegalese citizens. Moreover, the SAF found ways of leveraging partnerships and foreign military assistance and aid in a way that contributed to the strength of the military and state. Each of these aspects has fostered the development of a ‘military enclave’ for the SAF to be effective through reliance on informal institutions, such as *Djobot* (familial relations), that strengthened military capacity and improved professionalism, while not posing a threat to the political system. This pathway was further reinforced through participation in various peacekeeping missions, which served as an important element of professionalization and rationalization of the army.

Such regional and international security efforts have made the ‘military enclave’ important in maintaining Senegalese military effectiveness despite the state not having much capacity (or resources). Neighboring countries in West Africa struggled with their armies because their political leadership did not resolve tensions in their respective political systems, and relied on their armies in ways that removed them from the sanctity of their respective ‘military enclaves’. In the case of Senegal, there have been four presidents that peacefully transitioned power, and did not rely on the military for political protection, or to repress political

opponents, allowing the SAF to retain its colonial apolitical identity that is removed from partisan battles seen in neighboring Francophone militaries.

At the outset of Ugandan independence, the apolitical army became quickly politicized, serving as a major actor in the political system. The rise of the military dictator Idi Amin showed the perils of an army built around personalist control, with increasing ruthlessness to remain in power undermining the state and military. This problem further persisted in successive Ugandan regimes during the Bush Wars, until Museveni's rebel movement captured the capital, and brought his "Bush" institutions to the state. In many ways, Museveni reversed the course of the Ugandan state by rebuilding a 'new' state with an identity revolving around *pan-Africanism* that required less coercion, but control was now established and exerted through patronage. For those that did not willingly join the fold of the 'new' Ugandan state, Museveni had to rely on his rebel army that transitioned from a personalist army to a national military, known as the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF), to defeat peripheral insurgencies.

For all intents and purposes, the UPDF is a political army, that tries to portray itself as an apolitical military, since UPDF personnel believe that their professionalism is dependent upon not acting in a partisan fashion. The "Bush" fighter mentality continues to inform the UPDF as the ethos from the Bush Wars continues to informally influence the military in providing it a sense of identity and purpose in defending the people, while remaining militarily effective. This has contributed to the creation of a 'military enclave', alongside other behaviors that contribute to Ugandan state-building as UPDF personnel can be tasked with completing state funded projects without Museveni worrying about corruption. However, as of late, Museveni appears to be increasingly re-personalizing the army to suit his needs to remain in power. His recent coup-

proofing efforts have not undermined the ‘military enclave’ as UPDF troops are heavily involved in African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions under the ideological resolve of *pan-Africanism*, proving themselves to be a very professional fighting force. Substantial U.S. military assistance has allowed the UPDF to remain effective and capable, which has further cemented the Ugandan ‘military enclave’. However, this may be a perilous strategy, as UPDF troops may begin to resent Museveni, as Zimbabwean troops did with Mugabe in 2017 (e.g. *coup d’état*). If Museveni cannot find a credible way of setting up long-term institutions that transition the state away from his personalist rule in a way that matches the political objectives and ideology espoused when he first came to power in 1986, then there is a danger that the UPDF will possibly intervene politically to protect the state.

Rwanda has managed to emerge from the devastation of the 1994 genocide in a position much stronger in the 21st century than anyone would have believed at the time. This is a surprising turn of events because Rwanda and Burundi both came to independence in 1962 with similar structural problems, especially in terms of ethnic strife between the politically powerful Tutsi minority and the disenfranchised Hutu majority. Their divergence however is indicative of a shrewd political strategy by Kagame when he and rebel army (full of “patriots”) took over Rwanda in 1994, ousting the ‘old’ militant Hutu regime. Burundi on the other hand, attempted political negotiations, stalled with power sharing, and integrated various rebel factions, which continue to undermine the durability and stability of Burundi. Kagame’s reconfiguration of a ‘new’ Rwandan state, relied on *Ingando* (a form of political and ideological indoctrination) that facilitated a reduction in societal tensions, which served as a critical junction that departed from how Burundi has been unable to escape such tensions. *Ingando* has operated in a positive way of

supporting civil-military relations, while facilitating state-building. Kagame's strategy included the risky decision to transition his personalist rebel army, full of Tutsis, to a nationalized apolitical army that integrated Hutus, eventually known as the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF).

The integration of Hutus required *Ingando*, but was also done for the purposes of regime survival as the RDF faced substantial internal and regional threats. This has been a purposeful strategy of creating a 'military enclave' for the RDF, an army that is considered one of the most professional armies on the African continent, despite a lack of resources. Moreover, the RDF is also heavily influenced by "patriots" in the RDF and the sort of organization and discipline they continue to exert leads this apolitical army to behave in a more political fashion, despite the constitution identifying the RDF as apolitical and non-partisan. Finally, the RDF under the guidance and personal control of Kagame is extensively involved in economic and commercial development, which is an alternative form of effectiveness. The RDF remains militarily powerful because it faces classic threats, thus Kagame cannot afford the problems associated with trying to coup-proof his army like Museveni does. The only question that remains is how Kagame will transition power. His ability to sustain strong economic growth and development in Rwanda has allowed Kagame to constitutionally stay in power for the foreseeable future (at least until 2034). Long-term state formation will require Kagame to pass the reins of control to another Rwandan politician that can maintain harmonious civil-military relations, especially as the "patriots" leave government and the RDF, requiring more formalized institutions to take their place.

Ethiopia occupies a prominent role in Africa due to its special place in history as the only African country never colonized, which forms a substantial part of contemporary Ethiopian identity. The rebels known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),

under the leadership of Meles (an ethnic Tigray), seized the capital of Ethiopia in 1991, bringing with them a pragmatic Marxist-Leninist ideology. The 'new' Ethiopia state created by Meles resulted in numerous institutions being informed by a 'guerilla' mindset, of which much of the 'old' Derg regime was discarded. However, the 'new' state brought back some nostalgic elements of the older Ethiopian Empire (980 BCE – 1974 AD), that had been ruled by royal dynasties. As Meles set out to rebuild Ethiopia, Afwerki set out to build his own 'new' state in Eritrea. While Afwerki and Meles shared similar traits and background as rebel leaders from the Ethiopian Civil War against the Derg regime, Afwerki chose to centralize power under his own personalist control, excluding fellow rebel commanders. Meles, on the other hand, pragmatically pursued a one-party state with some semblance of democracy within the party along ethnic federalist lines. The result was Afwerki creating a one-man state in Eritrea based on his 'jungle institutions', whereas Meles established political party control over Ethiopia, relying on fellow guerilla allies from the EPRDF to contribute to Ethiopian state-building. This strategic leadership enabled Meles to smoothly transition his personalized rebel army into a formalized political army, known as the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF). The ENDF was specifically created around the identity of the guerillas that defeated the larger and more powerful Derg regime, which was reminiscent of the Ethiopian military defeating the Italian army in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa. The active political role of the ENDF means that personnel view their relationship to the state as vital for the long-term success of Ethiopia, which has resulted in its active engagement in economic development for the betterment of Ethiopia. This facilitated the creation of a 'military enclave' with an orientation towards Ethiopian modernization and deploying ENDF troops for UN and AU peacekeeping purposes, which reinforced the

capabilities of the state and military. These capabilities have made the ENDF militarily effective, and given it the capabilities to engage in state-building projects with a high degree of competency.

With many former guerrillas serving in the Ethiopian government and ENDF, civil-military relations can only be best described as civil-rebel relations, as they are so tightly bound to one another. The evidence of this cohesive relationship between political and military leaders was evident when Meles suddenly died in 2012. Political control had been so firmly established and institutionalized in the Ethiopian government and ENDF that a new prime minister (PM), Hailemariam as an ethnic Wolayta that lacked guerilla credentials, was elected and given power without overt civil-military strife. However, because of Hailemariam's lack of experience in the guerilla movement, the Ethiopian Chief of Defense, General Samora, supposedly wielded more informal power in negotiations. This appears to be an accurate assessment as Hailemariam was unable to broker deals and share power as Meles had done. Domestic strife increased under his tenure, eventually leading to his resignation in 2018. The promotion of dozens of ENDF officers to higher general ranks weeks before his resignation indicates the pragmatic power sharing by the Tigray guerillas behind the state. Moreover, the March 2018 decision by the EPRDF to select Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, an ethnic Oromo, as the new PM indicates that the government and ENDF understand the need to make concessions. However, Ethiopia appears to remain path dependent on its 'guerillas' behind the state ethos. PM Abiy fought as a guerrilla when he was 15 years old against the Derg Regime, and served in the ENDF, to include being responsible for setting up the Ethiopian spy institution, known as the Information Network Security Agency. His future rule

will be dependent upon maintaining the ENDF's 'military enclave' as a coequal partner in state development, and an army capable of projecting military force.

The Western Path and the African Path: Path Dependent Civil-Military Relations?

The U.S. (and many other NATO member states) have been fortunate enough to have created staunchly apolitical armies that do not engage in partisanship and are subservient to the political process. All too often in the U.S., we tend to forget that the American nation was established by rebels in their own context. The successful rebel leader of that movement, General George Washington, later took off his uniform to become elected the first president of the fledgling republic. In what was a surprise to many at that time, President Washington simply walked away from his position. He retired to his farm, even though many wanted him to stay on indefinitely as a 'king'. Washington's decision was partly driven by him and many other founders idealizing Roman General Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus (5th-4th century BCE), who had retired to his farm after a great Roman victory, despite calls for him to be in-charge of the country indefinitely.⁹³⁷ Washington's decision to retire, set up numerous enduring norms and values, have continued to be emulated in the American political system (and other Western governments) into the 21st century. This includes a model of civil-military relations that no other nation in human history has ever replicated: a hegemonic military that continues to be subservient to political authorities.⁹³⁸

⁹³⁷ Christopher Woolf, "Why the US military is supposed to stay out of politics," *PRI*, August 2, 2016, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-08-02/why-us-military-supposed-stay-out-politics>

⁹³⁸ Jahara W. Matisek, "American Civil-Military Relations since George Washington: Has Donald Trump Changed the Dynamic?" *Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law* 10, no. 3 (2017): 54-67.

This outcome in the U.S. and Western Europe has not been the story in Africa. Since the independence movements of the 1960s and 1970s, many African countries have seen ambitious military officers step in to rule the state, out of the belief that they could govern more effectively than the political authorities. However, such sanguine thoughts on military rule being better only worsened the condition of most states,⁹³⁹ setting up ruinous path dependent civil-military relations. This has created tendencies for some armies to mutiny or engage in coups whenever they view slights against them or society (such as democratic backsliding), even though it violates universalist notions of armies needing to be subservient to their civilian authorities. The solution to such problems for African civil-military relations, based on the particular context of most African states, is a need for the military and government to seek more equal relations in addressing issues of national importance. This alternative form of civil-military bargaining requires the West to acknowledge that for some African states to be viable, they will need a military that is more politically engaged, but ideally in a constructive fashion that facilitates legitimacy and power sharing.

Many militaristic rulers have eventually seen themselves defeated at the hands of rebels, and in some cases, these new rebel groups sought to break the perverse civil-military relations of the 'old' state. Some of these reform rebels implemented 'new' forms of control and authority that made civil-military relations more in line with the political ideologies of the state and its development. This removed the tendency of the military to formally interject itself into partisan activities, but also made it a prominent actor in government affairs; sometimes in a positive way

⁹³⁹ Earl Conteh-Morgan, "The Military, Militarism and State Integrity in Africa," In George Klay Kieh Jr. (ed.), *Contemporary Issues in African Society* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 83-105.

(e.g. South Africa, Rwanda, Ethiopia, etc.), but also in a negative way (e.g. Zimbabwe, South Sudan, etc.).

This now sets many average African countries in a precarious situation. Many rebel movements that came to power in the 20th century have not adapted their institutions or updated power sharing relations much for the pending (and eventual) transition of power to the next generation of Africans who might have been lucky enough to be born and grow up in an era without the perils of a civil war, coup, etc. One-man rule by a “big man” is no longer a viable long-term state-building solution in many African states, especially societies with a substantial number of cleavages centered on identity. It will be up to the leaders of Chad (Idriss Déby), Cameroon (Paul Biya), Rwanda (Paul Kagame), Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), and many others, to decide if they want to suffer the same fate as Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi, or leave power disgraced such as Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, with their legacy in tatters. The better alternative is setting up viable power sharing frameworks that ensure slow but stable transitions between successive governments. If done correctly, this could allow leaders such as Kagame and Museveni to “retire” to their farms, hopefully setting up their legacies and a path dependent future for their countries.⁹⁴⁰

[Write about how many African leaders showed this inclination. But very few then thought that they could walk away and retire back at their farms.]

Policy Implications

⁹⁴⁰ African rulers that meet several standards of “democratic criteria” are eligible for a sizeable monetary prize from the Mo Ibrahim foundation, which awards former African heads of state for their positive legacies and for leaving power gracefully. “Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership,” *Mo Ibrahim Foundation*, 2018, <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/prize/>

To better understand the problem of African militaries and the puzzle of creating a strong security institution that is not a threat requires us to understand the features of the political choices and organizational decisions of actors in their specific contexts and particular environments in Africa. These realities are often at odds with the prescriptions of those who provide military assistance from a Western point of view. This is because so many Western security advisors think one dimensionally about providing security force assistance to militaries in weak states without understanding the political context, and how military power is exercised under conditional civil-military pretexts.

As it stands now, many Western countries struggle with implementing security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict countries in transition, but SSR failures do not fall squarely on the feet of Western donors. In fact, the majority of Western facilitated SSR in many weak African states has less to do with how it is done and the resources committed, and more to do with how political actors and elites with access to the tools of violence come to negotiated settlements on power sharing. Many times, this can be a product of an army behaving like the 'old' predatory military, because these informal institutional behaviors are so difficult to disrupt.

With the West and other international organizations concerned about safety and security in the "ungoverned" spaces of Africa, there is a need to refocus on the ways in which effective militaries are created. This is especially important in states where democratic institutions and norms are lacking, and where other informal structures of power (e.g. patronage, social networks, etc.) dominate how politics play out. This generally informs how various security agencies are organized and rationalized.

It is vital to learn how actors in these political systems interpret their own contexts. This means moving beyond simplistic views that many African militaries are used primarily for rent-seeking purposes, when in fact, such participation may fit into the broader ideological and political goals of the state. This is because experience in such peacekeeping operations can contribute to the development of ‘military enclaves’, which contribute to overall state-building, albeit in an alternative way. Institutions and the active pursuit of a political strategy are driving some countries to deploy their militaries more than others, and individual aggrandizement is not a primary motivating factor. Additionally, the fact that some countries, such as Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, use their militaries so much provides an indicator that their propensity to do this illustrates a high modicum of bureaucratic capacity. But if they were truly rent-seeking, they would not invest time and resources in their ability to deploy their best units for peacekeeping. This means that unlike most patrimonial regimes in Africa, where militaries are primarily used for domestic repression or deployed on UN peacekeeping missions to obtain revenue, the SAF, UPDF, RDF, and ENDF, all appear to be militarily effective, especially in the pursuit of overarching goals of their respective governments.

Understanding Armies in Africa

There are two worlds in which to view and analyze militaries in Africa. The first group are full of “armchair” academics and underlings that work for thinktanks. They sit around the Washington Beltway looking up articles on the internet about African politics and their militaries. Then they interview other “experts” in the Beltway to confirm their findings. Of the few that actually go “downrange” (i.e. visit and interview) they operate in ‘transmit’ mode, instead of allowing osmosis to take place. They sell such “findings” to the highest bidder in

glossy packaging, devoid of any real analysis, but with the intent of justifying a policy or future program.

The best example of such a report written by rent-seekers was a *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (CSIS) report published in 2018.⁹⁴¹ In their “analysis” of security assistance to Nigeria they broadly write of Nigerian corruption, proscribing the need for reforms and other measures to improve human rights and governance. The problem of course is that there is nothing new in their report and they do not even bother to describe the ‘stickiness’ of corruption, failing to even mention the *godfatherism*⁹⁴² and *prebendalism*⁹⁴³ that is at the root of all the corruption in the Nigerian political system and military. They act as if American power could be deployed more ‘smartly’ and with “more accountability” in a country like Nigeria, that they (and other corrupt states) would spontaneously clean up their act. This first group can essentially be called the ‘mirage seekers’ as they seek out what they want, not the reality that is.

The second group are the ‘doers’. They go to the countries in which they seek to understand and evaluate the numerous maladies facing such a military. They discover the context of civil-military affairs, institutions, and essentially unpack the ‘black box’ of the military they want to understand and explain. They do not worry so much about the outcome of their analysis and studies, and worry more about integrating all the variables that seem to be influencing a certain outcome. True researchers in this group visit a country because there is a known problem,

⁹⁴¹ Melissa G. Dalton, Hijab Shah, Shannon N. Green, and Rebecca Hughes, *Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018)

⁹⁴² Mustapha, Mala. "Corruption in Nigeria: Conceptual and empirical notes." *Information, society and justice journal* 3, no. 2 (2010): 165-175.

⁹⁴³ Joseph, Richard A. "Class, state, and prebendal politics in Nigeria." *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 21, no. 3 (1983): 21-38.

and seek to identify it from ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. They seek out as many interviews they can with people within the institution that they are investigating, just as much as they seek out those outside the organization to understand their perceptions.

Groups such as the *International Crisis Group* (ICG) do precisely this because they identify a problem and seek to describe its various causes. For example, a 2016 ICG report on Nigeria identifies the inner problems of the Nigerian military by interviewing dozens of current and former soldiers to paint a clearer picture of all the pathologies facing that army.⁹⁴⁴ Such report though, is the antithesis of the CSIS report, because it does not have a glossy finish and it provides a lot of historical background and political context to show the sort of nuanced policies needed to reform the Nigerian military. The only problem with this category of research and the reports they create is that they are not ‘flashy’ enough and their recommendations do not sound easy to policymakers (i.e. cannot solve by throwing more money at it) in Western capitals; hence, such reports are generally ignored or dismissed.

As my analysis has shown, I prefer the second category of ‘doers’, that has sought out time in various African countries, and interviewed various Western and non-Western actors associated with military affairs. Doing so has allowed me to understand what makes these militaries think and act in a certain way. It also provides a perspective on what security force assistance by the West can achieve, and the limits of such help being constrained by the political context in which that military operates.

⁹⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, “Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform,” Africa Report No. 237, June 6, 2016, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5756664c4.pdf>

To really make Western security assistance beneficial, it must also be tied to improving the political context and configuration of a state and its development. This is a similar finding from Marla Karlin's book, *Building Militaries in Fragile States*, where she contends that foreign assistance is effective when it helps solve "key political issues."⁹⁴⁵ Thus, the U.S. military (and her allies) need to understand the ramifications of their security assistance in weak states, and seek to leverage these relationships to enable long-term state-building. Simple technical military assistance does little good in many of these societies, where "knowledge" is viewed as an informal tool of power. This is evident in my dozens of interviews with Western security advisors who found themselves being frustrated every time they would re-visit a military, to only find that the person they trained had been transferred to a different unit and/or that individual did not share his knowledge and skills with anyone else.⁹⁴⁶

Finally, as should be clear by now, this dissertation was not intended to describe the way democratization plays into military effectiveness. The various shades of authoritarianism throughout Africa, indicates that there are different pathways to creating an effective military and institutions that are part of the state-building 'soup mix'. That being said, in Zoltan Barany's *The Soldier and the Changing State*, he contends that a consolidated democracy can only come about with military elites actively supporting such a transition. This suggests that the success of creating an apolitical army that is loyal, democratic, and effective, requires the overcoming of several significant contextual challenges.⁹⁴⁷ Many African military officers interviewed

⁹⁴⁵ Mara E. Karlin, *Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

⁹⁴⁶ Fieldwork, September 2015 – March 2018.

⁹⁴⁷ Zoltan D. Barany, *The soldier and the changing state: building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

genuinely believed democracy was important to their state and society, and to the future progress of their respective countries. However, many indicated that a Western form of democracy emerging in their country was only possible with long-term stability and economic development. This suggests that many African armies have time horizons that are much longer than what Western donors may want to hear when they idealistically think of the prospects of short-term democratization. Regardless, Western donors will have to accept that some contemporary African militaries will play an active role in the development of their state, and sometimes in the politics.

Appendix A: Method and Critiques

Conducting research in Africa with militaries that are rarely transparent is a difficult prospect. Regardless of the difficulties in trying to gain access, it is an important venture. There is a wide gap in understanding how many militaries operate and function, since so little is known about African militaries due to the secretive nature of most African states.⁹⁴⁸ They have every reason to deny access or mislead, especially an individual like me that is an active duty U.S. military officer. Regardless, I was able to build trust and gain access to the militaries in Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, through the process of “snowballing.” This technique meant I had to rely on my ability to convince individuals to open up their networks to me, allowing me to interview them, and move on to others in their own respective networks.⁹⁴⁹ Many of these interviews started out semi-structured using the questions shown in *Appendix B*. I would usually try to take a life-history approach in trying to develop an intimate history of the individual and how they ended up in military service. Finally, an important technique I developed in getting a person to describe a concept about military matters was by prompting them to describe the phenomena in another country, so that they could compare how their military was better or worse.

As Maggie Dwyer notes from her numerous interviews with current and former soldiers in West African armies, developing trust with interviewees is crucial, as discussions about military affairs are very sensitive.⁹⁵⁰ Thus, due to the nature of my discussions and questions regarding relations between armies, policy makers, and political authorities, I do not name these

⁹⁴⁸ M. Debos and J. Glasman, “Politique des corps habillés. État, pouvoir et métiers de l'ordre en Afrique”, *Politique africaine* 128, no. 4 (2012): 5-23.

⁹⁴⁹ Jeff Ferrell and Mark S. Hamm (eds.), *Ethnography at the edge: crime, deviance and field research* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998), 163 and 192

⁹⁵⁰ Maggie Dwyer, *Soldiers in Revolt: Army Mutinies in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

individuals out of respect.⁹⁵¹ It is my hope that I have portrayed the experiences and viewpoints of the various military personnel and government officials interviewed.

Interviewee Information

Between 2015 and 2018, over 130 interviews were conducted with individuals that had experience in government and/or the military from these countries:

United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, South Korea, Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Botswana.

Admitting Faults and Critiques to my Analysis

The overall argument of this dissertation is about how some countries in Africa have managed to create rational-legal organizations – namely militaries – in countries that are lacking bureaucratic abilities by Western standards, and how various domestic constraints and international norms usually make this unlikely. From this point of view, I try to explain the way in which these processes have occurred and identify critical junctures in which robust civil-military relations developed in context of personalist and informal norms, leading to the creation of relatively strong militaries in an African context. For simplicity, I primarily evaluate militaries – with most focus on the ground component (i.e. armies) - as they tend to place a greater role in societies. That is not to say that other security actors (i.e. police, gendarmerie, etc.) are unimportant. In *Police in Africa: The Street Level View*, the authors of this edited volume show how police in most African countries must constantly adapt to shifts in military power, while trying to balance legitimacy with the need for resources, and that such police usually find themselves working

⁹⁵¹ Confidential/not-for-attribution basis

between *high policing* (i.e. defending the regime) and *low policing* (i.e. protecting citizens from other citizens).⁹⁵²

I do not intend to “whitewash” history nor am I attempting to excuse or overlook the behavior of some of these militaries I am conducting case studies on. In fact, there are many recent reports by *Human Rights Watch* regarding the inappropriate behavior of the UPDF,⁹⁵³ RDF,⁹⁵⁴ and ENDF.⁹⁵⁵ In the case of the SAF, there are no *Human Rights Watch* reports identifying that military for behaving inappropriately, although a 2016 U.S. State Department report noted a lack of transparency with the finances of that institution and that observers were denied access to SAF detention sites to evaluate conditions.⁹⁵⁶ Moreover, a 2011 Amnesty International Report noted how the SAF regularly behaved with impunity, abusing, and torturing individuals captured.⁹⁵⁷ This was followed up by a 2012 report, that identified the SAF as committing atrocities for decades in the Casamance region without consequence.⁹⁵⁸

While I am not trying to trivialize these aspects of their unprofessional actions of these militaries, I still believe it is necessary to *compare them developmentally* to the American military and not engage in any sort of ethnocentrism. If the U.S. military was scrutinized today for its genocidal conduct against Native Americans in the 18th and 19th century by the same

⁹⁵² Jan Beek, Mirco Göpfert, Olly Owen, and Jonny Steinberg, *Police in Africa: The street level view* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁹⁵³ For Uganda see: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/central-african-republic-ugandan-troops-harm-women-girls>

⁹⁵⁴ For Rwanda see: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/16/rwanda-spate-enforced-disappearances>; <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/rwanda>

⁹⁵⁵ For Ethiopia see: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/15/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests>; <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/ethiopia>

⁹⁵⁶ For U.S. State department report see: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2016/af/265294.htm>

⁹⁵⁷ Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 2011: The State of the World's Human Rights* (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2011), 280. http://files.amnesty.org/air11/air_2011_full_en.pdf

⁹⁵⁸ Gaëtan Mootoo, “Senegal: An agenda for human rights,” *Amnesty International*, June 2012.

standards applied in the 21st century context, then we would surely consider the American military as being unprofessional and organizationally inept.⁹⁵⁹ However, it is generally accepted that the American Armed Forces are a very bureaucratic organization, and considered the most combat effective and hegemonic military on the planet. When there is ‘bad behavior’, such as the Kunduz Hospital AC-130 strike that killed 42 civilians (to include *Doctors without Borders* staff)⁹⁶⁰ in Afghanistan or the U.S. sergeant that went on a rampage in Panjwai district, killing 16 Afghan civilians methodically in each of their homes,⁹⁶¹ these are typically to be blamed on confusion, error chains, or simply the actions of a ‘bad apple’. Even the American military actions during the *My Lai* Massacre, where it is estimated that over 300 Vietnamese civilians were killed by an infantry brigade out of sheer frustration,⁹⁶² did not indicate a ‘weak’ or ‘ineffective’ U.S. military, but merely a reflection of a superpower lacking a cogent strategy in the Vietnam war.

My biggest critique about most reports that detail improper behavior by military members in Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda, or Ethiopia, is that these appear speculative since they lack complete information. Based on numerous interviews with Western military officials, I came to the conclusion that many could not distinguish between the various components of security forces. By this I mean that there is an important theoretical, empirical, and legal distinction

⁹⁵⁹ Jahara W. Matisek "The “Goldilocks Zone” of War and Peace,” *Peace Review*, 2018, forthcoming

⁹⁶⁰ Matthew Rosenberg, "Pentagon Details Chain of Errors in Strike on Afghan Hospital," *The New York Times*, April 29, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/world/asia/afghanistan-doctors-without-borders-hospital-strike.html>

⁹⁶¹ Taimoor Shah and Graham Bowley, "U.S. Sergeant Is Said to Kill 16 Civilians in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, March 11, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/asia/afghanistan-civilians-killed-american-soldier-held.html>

⁹⁶² Kendrick Oliver, *The My Lai massacre in American history and memory* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2006).

between police, militias, paramilitaries (also referred to as gendarmerie), intelligence agencies, conventional militaries, and unconventional military units (such as presidential guards and special forces). Each type of security institution has their specific role and there are many implications when they tread into the domain of another security institution. Many of these security institutions in African countries sometimes wear different variations of camouflage and carry assault rifles (i.e. AK-47 “Kalashnikov”) just like the police. Unfortunately, to the untrained eye, most associate camouflage uniforms and AK-47s with the military, but as I discovered in a place such as Ethiopia, the regional police were posted all over the streets in the capital city, wearing blue camouflage fatigues and carrying AK-47s, and federal Ethiopian police in the capital city wore a camouflage that looked very similar to the ENDF.

Since there is so much variation in uniforms, it is likely that some mistake the actions of the police and other non-military forces as being committed by the regular army of the state. For example, a *Human Rights Watch* report attributed blame to the Ugandan military for the Kasese Massacre (hundreds of civilians were killed) in November of 2016.⁹⁶³ However, after interviewing numerous folks in Uganda, I discovered that it was a special operations mission directed by President Museveni against a disobedient king (Omusinga) at his compound in the Rwenzururu kingdom. This leads us to the next point, which is that – based on my interviews at least – the conventional militaries (i.e. non-special forces) in many African militaries have zero institutional or organizational incentive to engage in unprofessional conduct or inappropriate behavior, especially against civilians. The rationale that many African officers proffered from

⁹⁶³ For the report on the Kasese killings in Uganda see: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/15/uganda-ensure-independent-investigation-kasese-killings>

my interviews was that this undermines good order and discipline at the operational and tactical levels, essentially undermining their definitions of what it means to be combat effective.

Thus, it seems likely that much of the ‘bad behavior’ perpetrated by otherwise more professional military forces is a product of the principle-agent problem within the army. Perhaps the principal (i.e. military commander) is unable to prevent bad behavior among some of their agents (i.e. enlisted foot soldier). In other cases, the killing of civilians can be a result of accidents or this can be an intentional act as a way of signaling to observers. It is possible that a ‘civilian’ may not be as ‘innocent,’ since there is such a blurring of warfare and insurgency in Africa. This is not to exonerate those who participate in such acts; rather, it is to point to the importance of recognizing and taking seriously the efforts of many members of militaries in Africa to build more professional armies. This recognition also points to the importance of studying how these members of militaries define and pursue the professionalization of their forces.

Issue with most Scholarship on Militaries

Not knowing the specificities of a military is a major problem in most societies, especially in the U.S., which is ironic given how confident citizens are in their trust of the American military.⁹⁶⁴ For example, in my time lecturing classes on military interventions to students at the prestigious Northwestern University, almost none of these students knew the difference between officers and

⁹⁶⁴ Since the Gallup Survey began in 1975, the American military has always been the highest regarded institution in the U.S., see their annual report: <http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx>. Hall, Lynn K. "The importance of understanding military culture." *Social work in health care* 50, no. 1 (2011): 4-18.

enlisted, and the way in which one becomes either.⁹⁶⁵ This is problematic as it reflects a lack of knowledge of how militaries are generally created, organized, and maintained.⁹⁶⁶

Nevertheless, it is important to remind readers that in almost every military, an enlisted soldier typically joins with nothing more than a high school education (or equivalent) or less. Whereas, officers must attend a university or service academy first, where they spend between two to four years as cadets, and upon completion of this, they enter their respective military branch as an officer that is automatically higher than any other enlisted rank.⁹⁶⁷ As a rule of thumb, historically and in contemporary times, the officer corps of practically every military generally comes from the upper echelons of society and strata, whereas the enlisted personnel (aka “the foot soldiers”) typically come from the lower socioeconomic segments of society. Thus, militaries are typically internally divided on social and economic grounds, by virtue of various privileged and educated classes usually ending up as officers who make more money. Whereas the enlisted corps is generally the least educated and has sometimes been referred to as ‘cannon fodder’ in war. In most militaries, enlisted soldiers are typically unskilled and paid very little.⁹⁶⁸ Thus, it is my hope that this dissertation will provide further clarity on the study of armies in Africa and the role they play in their respective societies.

⁹⁶⁵ Jahara W. Matisek “The Danger of Trump to Civil-Military Relations,” *Cicero Magazine*, June 19, 2016.

⁹⁶⁶ Snider, Don M. "An uninformed debate on military culture." *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (1999): 11-26.

⁹⁶⁷ In every single military, the enlisted soldier is always subordinate to any officer, no matter their age, education, training, etc. This formal structure does blur somewhat in each military, nonetheless, this hierarchy is basically an expected standard in all modern military institutions.

⁹⁶⁸ Christos Frentzos and Antonio Thompson (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: 1865 to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

Appendix B – Interview Questions (English and French)

B – 1: Semi-Structured English Interview Questions

I, Jahara “FRANKY” Matissek, am conducting a research project on militaries in Africa. I am working with Professor Will Reno in the Political Science Department at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, USA. If you have any questions regarding my research, please contact him at reno@northwestern.edu.

Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw from my interview at any time. To participate, you will be asked to complete an interview that should take approximately 60 minutes.

Interview Questions:

Professional positionality

1. What is your role and position in your organization?
2. Does your rank and job title accurately capture your real role in this organization?
3. How long have you been working in this job, and what other positions have you held?
4. What sort of education and training have you participated in and completed?
5. Has military training been beneficial for you in terms of career development, and if so, how?
6. What are your thoughts on the foreign militaries that visit and provide training and assistance?
7. Can you provide me with a model of an ideal career trajectory in your organization?
8. What do you envision doing after your service in the military?

Organizational perspective

[This section focuses on how the individual conceptualizes the armed forces as an organization. If possible, the researcher will encourage the interviewee to think in comparative terms about his / her organization.]

9. Imagine that you have the power to make your military the best that it can be, given the resources reasonably available to it. How would you think about making your military stronger and better?
10. Is there any foreign military that offers a viable model for your military to emulate?
11. What relationship do you have with other institutions of the state?
12. What policies and techniques do people in this military rely on to maintain discipline and morale?
13. What sort of recruitment techniques do you rely on? Do you pursue any strategies to retain the best qualified military personnel?

Deployment

[This section is about defining the bounds of military operation. In some countries, military forces may play roles that are not conventionally assigned to armed forces in developed countries.]

14. Have you ever been deployed? [Collect details of time / place / purpose if affirmative.]
15. What is a “humanitarian mission”?

16. What is “counterinsurgency”?
17. Is this military an effective learning organization? [Inquire about techniques, materials]
18. What does your military do best during deployment?
19. What is the biggest operational challenge for your military during deployment?
20. How does the military in this country sustain itself in deployments?

B – 2: Semi-Structured French Interview Questions

Je suis Jahara "FRANKY" Matissek, et je mène un projet de recherche sur les militaires en Afrique. Je travaille avec le Professeur Will Reno au département de science politique de Northwestern University à Evanston, Illinois, États-Unis. Si vous avez des questions concernant mes recherches, contactez-le à reno@northwestern.edu.

Votre participation est volontaire et vous pouvez vous retirer de mon entretien à tout moment.

Pour participer, vous devrez compléter un entretien qui devrait durer environ 60 minutes.

Questions d'entrevue:**Positionnalité professionnelle**

1. Quel est votre rôle et votre position dans votre organisation?
2. Votre classement et votre titre d'emploi capturent-ils précisément votre rôle réel dans cette organisation?
3. Pendant combien de temps avez-vous travaillé dans ce métier et quels autres postes avez-vous occupés?
4. Quel type d'éducation et de formation avez-vous participé et complété?
5. La formation militaire a-t-elle été bénéfique pour vous en termes de développement de carrière, et, dans l'affirmative, comment?
6. Quelles sont vos pensées sur les militaires étrangers qui visitent et fournissent une formation et une assistance?
7. Pouvez-vous me fournir un modèle de trajectoire de carrière idéale dans votre organisation?
8. Qu'est-ce que vous envisagez de faire après votre service militaire?

Perspective organisationnelle

[Cette section se concentre sur la façon dont l'individu conceptualise les forces armées en tant qu'organisation. Si possible, le chercheur encouragera l'interviewé à penser en termes comparatifs à propos de son organisation.]

9. Imaginez que vous avez le pouvoir de rendre votre armée le mieux possible, compte tenu des ressources qui lui sont raisonnablement disponibles. Comment pensez-vous que votre armée sera plus forte et meilleure?
10. Existe-t-il des militaires étrangers qui offrent un modèle viable pour que votre armée puisse imiter?
11. Quelle relation avez-vous avec d'autres institutions de l'État?
12. À quelles politiques et techniques les gens de cette armée comptent-ils pour maintenir la discipline et le moral?
13. Quelles sont les techniques de recrutement dont vous comptez? Poursuivez-vous des stratégies pour conserver le personnel militaire le mieux qualifié?

Déploiement

[Cette section traite de la définition des limites de l'opération militaire. Dans certains pays, les forces militaires peuvent jouer des rôles qui ne sont pas classiquement attribués aux forces armées dans les pays développés.]

14. Avez-vous déjà été déployé? [Recueillir les détails de l'heure / lieu / but si affirmatif.]
15. Qu'est-ce qu'une «mission humanitaire»?
16. Qu'est-ce que la «contre-insurrection»?
17. Cette armée est-elle une organisation efficace pour l'apprentissage? [Renseignez-vous sur les techniques, les matériaux]
18. Qu'est-ce que votre armée fait de mieux au cours du déploiement?
19. Quel est le plus grand défi opérationnel pour votre armée lors du déploiement?
20. Comment les militaires dans ce pays se soutiennent-ils dans les déploiements?

Appendix C – Deployments of soldiers from African countries (2000-2016)

Country	Year	Troops	Mission	Special Notes
Benin	2016	750	MNJTF (Chad)	Lake Chad Basin Commission
Burundi	2016	5432	AMISOM	6 inf bn
Djibouti	2016	1850	AMISOM	2 inf bn
Egypt	2016		Operation Restoring Hope (UAE)	6x F-16C Fighting Falcon
Egypt	2016	800	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	4 units w/ tanks
Eritrea	2016	400	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	Embedded with UAE units
Ethiopia	2016	4395	AMISOM	6 inf bn
Kenya	2016	3664	AMISOM	3 inf bn
Morocco	2016		Operation Restoring Hope (UAE)	5x F-16C Fighting Falcon
Morocco	2016	1500	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	also includes a small team of paratroopers
Nigeria	2016	160	ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Nigeria	2016	160	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Somalia	2016	500	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	Working with UAE forces
South Africa	2016		Mozambique Channel	1x FFGHM
Sudan	2016		Operation Restoring Hope (Saudi Arabia)	3x Su-24 Fencer
Sudan	2016	950	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	mech BG; BTR-70M Kobra 2
Uganda	2016	6223	AMISOM	7 inf bn
Burundi	2015	5450	AMISOM	6 inf bn
Djibouti	2015	1850	AMISOM	2 inf bn
Egypt	2015		Operation Restoring Hope (UAE)	6x F-16C Fighting Falcon
Egypt	2015	800	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	4 units w/ tanks
Eritrea	2015	400	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	Embedded with UAE units
Ethiopia	2015	4400	AMISOM	4 inf bn
Kenya	2015	3650	AMISOM	3 inf bn

Morocco	2015		Operation Restoring Hope (UAE)	5x F-16C Fighting Falcon
Nigeria	2015	160	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Senegal	2015	200	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Somalia	2015	500	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	Working with UAE forces
South Africa	2015		Mozambique Channel	1x FFGHM
Sudan	2015		Operation Restoring Hope (Saudi Arabia)	3x Su-24 Fencer
Sudan	2015	950	Operation Restoring Hope (Yemen)	mech BG; BTR-70M Kobra 2
Uganda	2015	6200	AMISOM	7 inf bn
Uganda	2015	3000	Uganda Army (South Sudan)	
Burundi	2014	5432	AMISOM	6 inf bn
Djibouti	2014	960	AMISOM	1 inf bn
Ethiopia	2014	4395	AMISOM	4 inf bn
Kenya	2014	3664	AMISOM	3 inf bn
Nigeria	2014	160	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Senegal	2014	200	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Sierra Leone	2014	850	AMISOM	1 inf bn
South Africa	2014		Mozambique Channel	1x FFGHM
Uganda	2014	6223	AMISOM	7 inf bn
Burundi	2013	5432	AMISOM	6 inf bn
Cameroon	2013	500	AFSIM (CAR)	
Chad	2013	800	AFSIM (CAR)	
Congo (Republic)	2013	500	AFSIM (CAR)	
Djibouti	2013	1000	AMISOM	1 inf bn
Equatorial Guinea	2013	200	AFSIM (CAR)	
Ethiopia	2013	8000	Ethiopian Army (Somalia)	
Gabon	2013	500	AFSIM (CAR)	
Kenya	2013	3664	AMISOM	3 inf bn
Morocco	2013	169	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	1 inf coy
Nigeria	2013	160	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	

Senegal	2013	200	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Sierra Leone	2013	850	AMISOM	1 inf bn
South Africa	2013	808	Operation Cordite (Sudan) w/ UNISFA	16 obs & 1 ifn bn
South Africa	2013		Mozambique Channel	1x FFGHM
Uganda	2013	6223	AMISOM	7 inf bn
Burundi	2012	5	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 5
Burundi	2012	4800	AMISOM	5 inf bn
Cameroon	2012	19	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 19
Chad	2012	117	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 117
Congo (D. R.)	2012	118	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 118
Congo (Republic)	2012	123	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 123
Djibouti	2012	850	AMISOM	1 inf bn
Ethiopia	2012	5700	Ethiopian Army (Somalia)	
Gabon	2012	160	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 160
Ghana	2012	1	IMATT (Sierra Leone)	
Kenya	2012	3150	AMISOM	3 inf bn
Morocco	2012	168	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	1 inf coy
Nigeria	2012	160	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Senegal	2012	200	ECOWAS - ECOMIB (Guinea Bissau)	
Sierra Leone	2012	850	AMISOM	1 inf bn
South Africa	2012		Mozambique Channel	1x FFGHM
Uganda	2012	6700	AMISOM	6 inf bn
Angola	2011	200	MISSANG (Guinea Bissau)	(providing trg and assistance with SSR)
Burundi	2011	5	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 5
Burundi	2011	4400	AMISOM	5 inf bn
Cameroon	2011	19	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 19
Chad	2011	117	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 117
Congo (D. R.)	2011	143	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 143
Congo (Republic)	2011	123	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 123
Gabon	2011	160	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 160

Kenya	2011	1600	Kenyan Army (Somalia)	2 inf bn
Kenya	2011	12	EUTM (Uganda)	
Libya	2011	3	IMTT (Phillipines)	3 obs
Morocco	2011	158	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	1 inf coy
Nigeria	2011	1	IMATT (Sierra Leone)	
Sierra Leone	2011	5	AMISOM	
Uganda	2011	5200	AMISOM	6 inf bn
Burundi	2010	8	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 8
Burundi	2010	3000	AMISOM	3 inf bn
Cameroon	2010	146	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 146
Chad	2010	126	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 126
Congo	2010	22	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 22
Congo (Republic)	2010	108	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 107 + 1 non-MICOPAX
Equatorial Guinea	2010	7	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 7
Gabon	2010	142	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 142
Kenya	2010	9	EUTM (Uganda)	
Libya	2010	6	IMT (Phillipines)	6 obs
Morocco	2010	210	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	1 inf unit
Nigeria	2010	1	IMATT (Sierra Leone)	
Uganda	2010	4250	AMISOM	5 inf bn
Burundi	2009	2550	AMISOM	3 inf bn
Cameroon	2009	120	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 120
Chad	2009	121	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 121
Congo (Republic)	2009	60	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 60
Equatorial Guinea	2009	60	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 60
Gabon	2009	139	ECCAS (CAR)	MICOPAX 139
Libya	2009	6	IMT (Phillipines)	6 obs
Morocco	2009	222	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	1 inf unit [Joint Enterprise]
Nigeria	2009	1	IMATT (Sierra Leone)	
South Africa	2009	417	AUSTF - Operation Curriculum (Burundi)	AU Mission
South Africa	2009	54	Operation Vimbezela (CAR)	primarily training and engineer personnel
South Africa	2009	17	Operation Teutonic (DRC)	Supporting SSR

Sudan	2009	200	MAES (Comoros)	AU Mission
Tanzania	2009	150	MAES (Comoros)	AU Mission
Burundi	2008	1700	AMISOM	2 ifn bn
Ethiopia	2008	3000	Ethiopian Army (Somalia)	Suported Somalia's TFG & Pulled out of Somalia in DEC 2008
Libya	2008	6	IMT (Phillipines)	Army 6 obs
Morocco	2008	216	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	1 inf det [Joint Enterprise]
Nigeria	2008	1	IMATT (Sierra Leone)	
South Africa	2008	1024	AUSTF - Operation Curriculum (Burundi)	AU Mission
South Africa	2008	2	Operation Bongane (Uganda)	AU Mission ; 2 Obs
Sudan	2008	200	MAES (Comoros)	AU Mission
Tanzania	2008	150	MAES (Comoros)	AU Mission
Uganda	2008	1700	AMISOM	2 ifn bn
Algeria	2007	2	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	2 obs (another 8 obs a part of UNMEE)
Algeria	2007	13	AUMIS (Sudan)	13 obs
Benin	2007	1	AUMIS (Sudan)	1 obs
Botswana	2007	20	AUMIS (Sudan)	20 obs
Burkina Faso	2007	4	AUMIS (Sudan)	4 obs
Burundi	2007	10	AUMIS (Sudan)	10 obs
Burundi	2007	1700	AMISOM	Arrived in DEC 2007
Cameroon	2007	30	AUMIS (Sudan)	30 obs
Chad	2007	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Congo (Republic)	2007	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Congo (Republic)	2007	14	CEMAC (CAR)	14 obs
Ethiopia	2007	5000	Ethiopian Army (Somalia)	Supporting Somalia TFG
Gabon	2007	140	CEMAC (CAR)	
Gambia	2007	200	AUMIS (Sudan)	

Ghana	2007	3	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	3 obs (another 3 troops & 10 obs a part of UNMEE)
Ghana	2007		Ghana Helo's (South Africa)	2x Mi-171 V
Ghana	2007	23	AUMIS (Sudan)	23 obs
Kenya	2007	60	AUMIS (Sudan)	60 obs
Lesotho	2007	10	AUMIS (Sudan)	10 obs
Libya	2007	9	AUMIS (Sudan)	9 obs
Madagascar	2007	9	AUMIS (Sudan)	9 obs
Malawi	2007	24	AUMIS (Sudan)	24 obs
Mali	2007	15	AUMIS (Sudan)	15 obs
Mauritania	2007	20	AUMIS (Sudan)	20 obs
Morocco	2007	229	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	Joint Enterprise
Mozambique	2007	15	AUMIS (Sudan)	15 obs
Namibia	2007	24	AUMIS (Sudan)	24 obs
Nigeria	2007	2	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	2 obs (another 1 troop1 & 8 obs a part of UNMEE)
Nigeria	2007	2040	AUMIS (Sudan)	
Nigeria (850) & Malawi (1000)	2007	0	AMISOM	Both countries agreed to deploy military troops, but never followed through. Nigeria did eventually send 200 police
Rwanda	2007	3272	AUMIS (Sudan)	
Senegal	2007	538	AUMIS (Sudan)	
South Africa	2007	36	Operation Vimbezela (CAR)	bilateral support - primarily training and engineer personnel
South Africa	2007	2	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	2 obs (another 5 obs a part of UNMEE)
South Africa	2007	620	AUMIS (Sudan)	Operation Cordite - 1bn gp; 1 Engr tp (P1); 1 EOD Team; 18+ APCs
South Africa	2007	1	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	AU Mission - Operation Espresso
South Africa	2007	736	AUSTF - Operation Curriculum (Burundi)	AU Mission
Tanzania	2007	20	AUMIS (Sudan)	20 obs
Togo	2007	16	AUMIS (Sudan)	16 obs & 1 ifn bn
Tunisia	2007	1	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	1 obs (another 3 troops & 5 obs a part of UNMEE)
Uganda	2007	1500	AMISOM	1st to deploy under AMISOM banner in MAR 2007
Zimbabwe	2007	45	AUMIS (Sudan)	45 obs

Algeria	2006	2	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	2 obs
Algeria	2006	13	AUMIS (Sudan)	13 obs
Benin	2006	1	AUMIS (Sudan)	1 obs
Botswana	2006	20	AUMIS (Sudan)	20 obs
Burkina Faso	2006	4	AUMIS (Sudan)	4 obs
Burundi	2006	10	AUMIS (Sudan)	10 obs
Cameroon	2006	30	AUMIS (Sudan)	30 obs
Chad	2006	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Chad	2006	71	AUMIS (Sudan)	40 troops + 31 obs
Congo (Republic)	2006	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Congo (Republic)	2006	14	AUMIS (Sudan)	14 obs
Egypt	2006	34	AUMIS (Sudan)	34 obs
Ethiopia	2006	7500	Ethiopian Army (Somalia)	Invasion Force
Gabon	2006	140	CEMAC (CAR)	
Gabon	2006	22	AUMIS (Sudan)	22 obs
Gambia	2006	216	AUMIS (Sudan)	196 troops + 20 obs
Ghana	2006	3	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	3 obs
Ghana	2006	23	AUMIS (Sudan)	23 obs
Kenya	2006	1	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	1 obs
Kenya	2006	53	AUMIS (Sudan)	53 obs
Lesotho	2006	10	AUMIS (Sudan)	10 obs
Libya	2006	9	AUMIS (Sudan)	9 obs
Madagascar	2006	9	AUMIS (Sudan)	9 obs
Malawi	2006	24	AUMIS (Sudan)	24 obs
Mali	2006	15	AUMIS (Sudan)	15 obs
Mauritania	2006	20	AUMIS (Sudan)	20 obs
Morocco	2006	135	EUFOR (Bosnia- Herzegovina)	Operation Althea - 1 mot inf bn
Morocco	2006	279	NATO KFOR (Serbia)	Joint Enterprise
Mozambique	2006	15	AUMIS (Sudan)	15 obs

Nigeria	2006	2	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	2 obs
Nigeria	2006	2101	AUMIS (Sudan)	2,031 troops + 70 obs
Rwanda	2006	1790	AUMIS (Sudan)	1,756 troops + 34 obs
Senegal	2006	573	AUMIS (Sudan)	538 troops + 35 obs
South Africa	2006	2	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	AU Mission - Operation Espresso
South Africa	2006	39	AUMIS (Sudan)	Operation Cordite - 39 obs
Togo	2006	16	AUMIS (Sudan)	16 obs
Tunisia	2006	1	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	1 obs
Zambia	2006	367	AUMIS (Sudan)	350 troops + 17 obs
Algeria	2005	13	AUMIS (Sudan)	13 obs
Benin	2005	1	AUMIS (Sudan)	1 obs
Botswana	2005	10	AUMIS (Sudan)	10 obs
Burkina Faso	2005	4	AUMIS (Sudan)	4 obs
Burundi	2005	10	AUMIS (Sudan)	10 obs
Cameroon	2005	30	AUMIS (Sudan)	30 obs
Chad	2005	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Chad	2005	71	AUMIS (Sudan)	40 peacekeepers + 31 obs
Congo (Republic)	2005	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Congo (Republic)	2005	14	AUMIS (Sudan)	14 obs
Egypt	2005	34	AUMIS (Sudan)	34 obs
Gabon	2005	140	CEMAC (CAR)	
Gabon	2005	34	AUMIS (Sudan)	34 obs
Gambia	2005	216	AUMIS (Sudan)	196 peacekeepers + 20 obs
Ghana	2005	25	AUMIS (Sudan)	25 obs
Guinea	2005	25	AUMIS (Sudan)	25 obs
Kenya	2005	99	AUMIS (Sudan)	60 peacekeepers + 39 obs
Lesotho	2005	5	AUMIS (Sudan)	5 obs
Libya	2005	9	AUMIS (Sudan)	9 obs
Madagascar	2005	9	AUMIS (Sudan)	9 obs
Malawi	2005	24	AUMIS (Sudan)	24 obs

Mali	2005	15	AUMIS (Sudan)	15 obs
Mauritania	2005	10	AUMIS (Sudan)	10 obs
Morocco	2005	132	EUFOR II (Bosnia-Herzegovina)	Operation Althea - 1 mot inf bn
Morocco	2005	279	NATO KFOR I (Serbia and Montenegro)	
Mozambique	2005	14	AUMIS (Sudan)	14 obs
Namibia	2005	23	AUMIS (Sudan)	23 obs
Nigeria	2005	2099	AUMIS (Sudan)	2,040 peacekeepers + 59 obs
Rwanda	2005	1791	AUMIS (Sudan)	1,756 peacekeepers + 35 obs
Senegal	2005	572	AUMIS (Sudan)	538 peacekeepers + 34 obs
South Africa	2005	7	OLMEE (Eritrea/Ethiopia)	
South Africa	2005	329	AUMIS (Sudan)	258 peacekeepers + 44 obs
Togo	2005	8	AUMIS (Sudan)	8 obs
Zambia	2005	45	AUMIS (Sudan)	45 obs
Zambia	2005	45	AU (Sudan)	45 obs
Chad	2004	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Congo (Republic)	2004	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Gabon	2004	140	CEMAC (CAR)	
Morocco	2004	800	EUFOR II (Bosnia-Herzegovina)	1 mot inf bn
Morocco	2004	279	NATO KFOR I (Serbia and Montenegro)	
Namibia	2004	25	AU (Sudan)	AU control
South Africa	2004	248	AU (Sudan)	AU control
Benin	2003	250	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3820 troops deployed from: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
Benin	2003	272	ECOWAS (Cote d'Ivoire)	Total of 1510 troops deployed from 5 countries
Chad	2003	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Congo (Republic)	2003	120	CEMAC (CAR)	
Ethiopia	2003	980	AMIB (Burundi)	Taken over by ONUB

Gabon	2003	140	CEMAC (CAR)	
Gambia	2003	150	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3820 troops deployed from: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
Ghana	2003	243	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3820 troops deployed from: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
Ghana	2003	256	ECOWAS (Cote d'Ivoire)	Total of 1510 troops deployed from 5 countries
Guinea Bissau	2003	650	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3820 troops deployed from: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
Mozambique	2003	290	AMIB (Burundi)	Taken over by ONUB
Niger	2003	258	ECOWAS (Cote d'Ivoire)	Total of 1510 troops deployed from 5 countries
Nigeria	2003	120	AU (Sudan)	
Nigeria	2003	1500	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3820 troops deployed from: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
Rwanda	2003	150	AU (Sudan)	
Senegal	2003	200	ECOWAS (Cote d'Ivoire)	Total of 1510 troops deployed from 5 countries
South Africa	2003	1600	AMIB (Burundi)	Taken over by ONUB
Togo	2003	150	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3820 troops deployed from: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo
Togo	2003	272	ECOWAS (Cote d'Ivoire)	Total of 1510 troops deployed from 5 countries
Angola	2002	2000	Angolan Military (DRC)	
Angola	2002	2000	Angolan Military (Congo Rep.)	
Ethiopia	2002	980	AU (Burundi)	
Libya	2002	300	Libyan Military (CAR)	
Morocco	2002	800	SFOR II (Bosnia)	
Morocco	2002	279	KFOR (Serbia & Montenegro)	

Mozambique	2002	990	AU (Burundi)	
Nigeria	2002	1500	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3,250 ECOWAS troops
Senegal	2002	170	ECOWAS (Liberia)	Total of 3,250 ECOWAS troops
South Africa	2002	900	AU (Burundi)	1 inf bn
Uganda	2002	1500	Uganda Army (Sudan)	
Zimbabwe	2002	2400	Zimbabwe Military (DRC)	
Zimbabwe	2002	12000	Zimbabwe Military (DRC)	Zimbabwe pulls out of DRC in OCT 2002
Libya	2001	300	Libyan Military (CAR)	
Morocco	2001	800	SFOR II (Bosnia)	
Morocco	2001	279	KFOR (Yugoslavia)	
Namibia	2001	1400	Namibia Military (DRC)	pro-gov't [withdrawl on 31AUG 2001]
South Africa	2001	150	SASPD (Burundi)	
South Africa	2001	14	OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros	14 observers from South Africa
Zimbabwe	2001	12000	Zimbabwe Military (DRC)	
Angola	2000	8000	Angolan Military (DRC)	pro-gov't
Angola	2000	500	Angolan Military (Congo Rep.)	
Angola (UNITA)	2000	2000	UNITA Army (DRC)	support opposition
Burundi	2000	1000	Burundi Military (DRC)	support opposition
Morocco	2000	800	SFOR II (Bosnia)	
Morocco	2000	279	KFOR (Yugoslavia)	
Namibia	2000	2000	Namibia Military (DRC)	pro-gov't [withdrawal on 31AUG 2001]
Rwanda	2000	20000	Rwanda Military (DRC)	support opposition
Uganda	2000	2000	Uganda Army (DRC)	support opposition
Zimbabwe	2000	11000	Zimbabwe Military (DRC)	pro-gov't--Zimbabwe initially deployed to DRC on 2 AUG 1998

Data coded and sourced from various online outlets, interviews, and with some reference to these databases for general info:

K. Soder, "SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database: 2000-2010." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*, 2017,

<http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/pko/databases/pko>

Chapters "Middle East and North Africa" and "Sub-Saharan Africa" compiled from *The Military Balance*, 2000-2017.

Appendix D – State and Military Data for African countries (2000-2014)

Sources: Coded from various open sources, with substantial reliance on annually published military assessments from *The Military Balance* (<https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance>) to tabulate military budgets and personnel.

Country	Year	GDP (\$Bil)	Population	GDP_per_capita (USD)	Mil_Budget (\$Mil)	Mil_Personnel	Mil_Personnel_per_Capita (1K)	Mil_spending_per_capita (USD)	Mil_Spending_per_troop (USD)	Foreign Aid	Foreign Aid_per_Capita	US_Sec_aid (\$USD)
Algeria	2014	\$213.52	3893434	\$5,484	\$9,724.38	317200	8.147050878	\$250	\$3,066			\$3,259,476
Angola	2014	\$126.78	2422754	\$5,233	\$6,841.86	117000	4.829218207	\$282	\$5,848			\$6,586,636
Benin	2014	\$9.71	10598482	\$916	\$92.99	9450	0.891637123	\$9	\$984			\$453,486
Botswana	2014	\$15.88	2219937	\$7,153	\$378.78	10500	4.729863956	\$171	\$3,607			\$1,726,241
Burkina Faso	2014	\$12.26	17589198	\$697	\$204.17	11450	0.650967713	\$12	\$1,783			\$10,437,553
Burundi	2014	\$3.09	10816860	\$286	\$62.18	51050	4.719484213	\$6	\$122			\$18,379,812
Cameroon	2014	\$32.05	22773014	\$1,407	\$401.53	23200	1.018749648	\$18	\$1,731			\$6,380,494
Cape Verde	2014	\$1.88	513906	\$3,658	\$10.05	1200	2.335057384	\$20	\$837			\$1,228,380
CAR	2014	\$1.70	4804316	\$354	\$60.00	8150	1.696391328	\$12	\$736			\$10,000,000
Chad	2014	\$13.92	13587053	\$1,025	\$392.38	39850	2.932939174	\$29	\$985			\$7,064,169
Comoros	2014	\$0.65	769991	\$841	\$18.14	500	0.649358239	\$24	\$3,628			\$326,916
Congo (DRC)	2014	\$32.78	74877030	\$438	\$341.22	134250	1.792939704	\$5	\$254			\$14,638,661
Congo (Republic)	2014	\$14.18	4504962	\$3,147	\$704.89	12000	2.663729461	\$156	\$5,874			\$3,389,494
Cote d'Ivoire	2014	\$34.22	22157107	\$1,544	\$521.26	25000	1.128306146	\$24	\$2,085			\$1,310,070
Djibouti	2014	\$1.59	876174	\$1,812	\$122.00	12950	14.78016924	\$139	\$942			\$2,534,016
Egypt	2014	\$301.50	89579670	\$3,366	\$5,085.12	835500	9.326893033	\$57	\$609			\$1,306,435,627
Equatorial Guinea	2014	\$21.46	820885	\$26,145	\$166.54	1320	1.608020612	\$203	\$12,617			\$0
Eritrea	2014	\$3.86	5110444	\$755	\$78.00	201750	39.47797882	\$15	\$39			\$0
Ethiopia	2014	\$55.61	96958732	\$574	\$393.78	138000	1.42328594	\$4	\$285			\$1,584,135
Gabon	2014	\$18.18	1687673	\$10,772	\$208.12	6700	3.969963376	\$123	\$3,106			\$4,285,694
Gambia	2014	\$0.85	1928201	\$440	\$14.60	800	0.414894505	\$8	\$1,825			\$304,393
Ghana	2014	\$38.62	26786598	\$1,442	\$178.25	15500	0.578647576	\$7	\$1,150			\$4,608,751
Guinea	2014	\$6.62	12275527	\$540	\$254.77	12300	1.001993641	\$21	\$2,071			\$4,810,841
Guinea Bissau	2014	\$1.11	1800513	\$616	\$21.47	1320	0.733124393	\$12	\$1,627			\$0
Kenya	2014	\$61.40	44863583	\$1,368	\$819.04	29100	0.64863299	\$18	\$2,815			\$49,523,688
Lesotho	2014	\$2.54	2109197	\$1,204	\$47.69	2000	0.948228165	\$23	\$2,385			\$295,384
Liberia	2014	\$2.01	4396554	\$458	\$14.38	2050	0.466274268	\$3	\$702			\$21,938,176
Libya	2014	\$41.14	6258984	\$6,573	\$3,288.82	35000	5.59196189	\$525	\$9,397			\$6,161,717
Madagascar	2014	\$10.67	23571713	\$453	\$69.68	21600	0.916352579	\$3	\$323			\$92,404
Malawi	2014	\$6.06	16695253	\$363	\$53.91	6800	0.407301405	\$3	\$793			\$480,874
Mali	2014	\$14.00	17086022	\$820	\$218.12	13800	0.807677761	\$13	\$1,581			\$2,995,000
Mauritania	2014	\$5.44	3969625	\$1,371	\$150.32	20850	5.252385301	\$38	\$721			\$17,608,476

Mauritius	2014	\$12.80	1260934	\$10,154	\$32.87	2500	1.9826573	\$26	\$1,315			\$777,331
Morocco	2014	\$109.88	33921203	\$3,239	\$4,048.61	245800	7.246205272	\$119	\$1,647			\$15,053,402
Mozambique	2014	\$16.96	27216276	\$623	\$173.75	11200	0.41151846	\$6	\$1,551			\$2,759,578
Namibia	2014	\$12.85	2402858	\$5,349	\$545.95	15200	6.325800359	\$227	\$3,592			\$205,284
Niger	2014	\$8.25	19113728	\$431	\$68.00	10700	0.559807066	\$4	\$636			\$37,804,382
Nigeria	2014	\$568.50	177475986	\$3,203	\$2,357.67	162000	0.912799549	\$13	\$1,455			\$8,632,683
Rwanda	2014	\$7.91	11341544	\$698	\$90.94	35000	3.085999578	\$8	\$260			\$7,462,680
Sao Tome	2014	\$0.35	186342	\$1,870	\$3.41	300	1.609943008	\$18	\$1,138			\$336,920
Senegal	2014	\$15.28	14672557	\$1,042	\$239.89	18600	1.267672704	\$16	\$1,290			\$9,139,600
Seychelles	2014	\$1.42	91400	\$15,564	\$34.44	840	9.190371991	\$377	\$4,100			\$268,224
Sierra Leone	2014	\$5.02	6315627	\$794	\$49.91	8500	1.345867956	\$8	\$587			\$11,728,553
Somalia	2014	\$5.65	10517569	\$537	\$76.22	17000	1.616343092	\$7	\$448			\$202,198,026
South Africa	2014	\$351.30	54058647	\$6,499	\$3,893.48	82250	1.521495719	\$72	\$4,734			\$7,070,665
South Sudan	2014	\$13.28	11911184	\$1,115	\$1,298.29	185000	15.53162137	\$109	\$702			\$65,477,348
Sudan	2014	\$82.15	39350274	\$2,088	\$2,800.00	264300	6.716598721	\$71	\$1,059			\$0
Swaziland	2014	\$4.49	1269112	\$3,540	\$81.36	8403	6.621165035	\$64	\$968			\$211,796
Tanzania	2014	\$48.20	51822621	\$930	\$496.24	28400	0.548023227	\$10	\$1,747			\$8,166,242
Togo	2014	\$4.48	7115163	\$630	\$83.08	9300	1.307067737	\$12	\$893			\$647,040
Tunisia	2014	\$47.60	10996600	\$4,329	\$921.79	47800	4.346798101	\$84	\$1,928			\$34,353,168
Uganda	2014	\$27.76	37782971	\$735	\$325.66	46800	1.238653255	\$9	\$696			\$23,391,357
Zambia	2014	\$27.15	15721343	\$1,727	\$443.60	16500	1.049528657	\$28	\$2,689			\$502,441
Zimbabwe	2014	\$14.20	15245855	\$931	\$368.10	50800	3.332053204	\$24	\$725			\$0
Algeria	2013	\$209.70	38186135	\$5,492	\$10,405.41	317200	8.306679898	\$272	\$3,280	\$563,847,139.00	\$14.77	\$3,365,359
Angola	2013	\$124.91	23448202	\$5,327	\$6,090.75	117000	4.9897216	\$260	\$5,206	\$440,080,063.00	\$18.77	\$6,488,613
Benin	2013	\$9.16	10322232	\$887	\$86.00	9450	0.915499671	\$8	\$910	\$640,840,689.00	\$62.08	\$495,979
Botswana	2013	\$14.81	2176510	\$6,807	\$298.46	10500	4.824236967	\$137	\$2,842	\$113,272,603.00	\$52.04	\$947,083
Burkina Faso	2013	\$11.93	17084554	\$698	\$159.53	11450	0.670196014	\$9	\$1,393	\$1,259,236,795.00	\$73.71	\$6,737,349
Burundi	2013	\$2.71	10465959	\$259	\$60.86	51050	4.877718325	\$6	\$119	\$601,388,857.00	\$57.46	\$8,577,053
Cameroon	2013	\$29.57	22211166	\$1,331	\$392.84	23200	1.04451968	\$18	\$1,693	\$869,016,063.00	\$39.13	\$2,181,213
Cape Verde	2013	\$1.85	507258	\$3,647	\$9.82	1200	2.365660078	\$19	\$818	\$464,888,305.00	\$916.47	\$1,338,175
CAR	2013	\$1.52	4710678	\$322	\$59.00	8150	1.73011886	\$13	\$724	\$240,951,044.00	\$51.15	\$23,400,000
Chad	2013	\$12.95	13145788	\$985	\$726.46	34850	2.651039253	\$55	\$2,085	\$457,471,739.00	\$34.80	\$8,102,913
Comoros	2013	\$0.62	751697	\$823	\$17.32	500	0.665161628	\$23	\$3,464	\$121,700,690.00	\$161.90	\$128,456
Congo (DRC)	2013	\$30.01	72552861	\$414	\$374.48	134250	1.850374998	\$5	\$279	\$2,165,868,758.00	\$29.85	\$19,711,361
Congo (Republic)	2013	\$14.09	4394334	\$3,205	\$367.06	12000	2.730789239	\$84	\$3,059	\$117,331,802.00	\$26.70	\$85,258
Cote d'Ivoire	2013	\$31.26	21622490	\$1,446	\$430.00	20729	0.958677747	\$20	\$2,074	\$1,864,309,235.00	\$86.22	\$1,012,657
Djibouti	2013	\$1.46	864554	\$1,683	\$111.00	12950	14.97882145	\$128	\$857	\$324,650,482.00	\$375.51	\$1,633,233
Egypt	2013	\$286.01	87613909	\$3,264	\$4,359.83	835500	9.536157096	\$50	\$522	\$8,664,124,938.00	\$98.89	\$1,243,539,399
Equatorial Guinea	2013	\$21.94	797082	\$27,529	\$307.20	1320	1.656040407	\$385	\$23,272	\$12,898,165.00	\$16.18	\$0

Eritrea	2013	\$3.44	4998824	\$688	\$71.90	201750	40.35949255	\$14	\$36	\$34,637,891.00	\$6.93	\$0
Ethiopia	2013	\$47.65	94558374	\$504	\$345.06	138000	1.459415958	\$4	\$250	\$3,161,148,521.00	\$33.43	\$1,389,642
Gabon	2013	\$17.59	1650351	\$10,659	\$282.16	6700	4.059742443	\$171	\$4,211	\$119,310,267.00	\$72.29	\$1,081,889
Gambia	2013	\$0.90	1866878	\$484	\$10.38	800	0.428522914	\$6	\$1,297	\$165,129,933.00	\$88.45	\$285,484
Ghana	2013	\$47.81	26164432	\$1,827	\$255.00	15500	0.59240728	\$10	\$1,645	\$1,335,666,924.00	\$51.05	\$2,514,841
Guinea	2013	\$6.23	11948726	\$522	\$192.53	12300	1.029398448	\$16	\$1,565	\$761,786,556.00	\$63.75	\$580,661
Guinea Bissau	2013	\$1.03	1757138	\$584	\$21.71	1320	0.751221589	\$12	\$1,645	\$90,222,046.00	\$51.35	\$0
Kenya	2013	\$55.10	43692881	\$1,261	\$860.56	29100	0.666012388	\$20	\$2,957	\$3,226,405,557.00	\$73.84	\$73,656,322
Lesotho	2013	\$2.50	2083061	\$1,200	\$47.94	2000	0.960125508	\$23	\$2,397	\$199,612,296.00	\$95.83	\$21,910
Liberia	2013	\$1.95	4293692	\$453	\$15.11	2050	0.477444586	\$4	\$737	\$784,175,495.00	\$182.63	\$23,459,317
Libya	2013	\$65.51	6265987	\$10,455	\$3,124.50	35000	5.585712195	\$499	\$8,927	\$185,073,190.00	\$29.54	\$33,719,968
Madagascar	2013	\$10.60	22924557	\$462	\$71.88	21600	0.942221043	\$3	\$333	\$580,523,647.00	\$25.32	\$0
Malawi	2013	\$5.43	16190126	\$336	\$68.60	6800	0.420009085	\$4	\$1,009	\$1,488,021,838.00	\$91.91	\$325,512
Mali	2013	\$12.81	16592097	\$772	\$153.83	11800	0.711181956	\$9	\$1,304	\$2,454,230,826.00	\$147.92	\$12,602,000
Mauritania	2013	\$5.65	3872684	\$1,458	\$144.22	20850	5.383862975	\$37	\$692	\$748,527,737.00	\$193.28	\$26,144,519
Mauritius	2013	\$12.13	1258653	\$9,637	\$23.20	2500	1.98625038	\$18	\$928	\$443,003,460.00	\$351.97	\$415,373
Morocco	2013	\$106.83	33452686	\$3,193	\$4,065.55	245800	7.347691005	\$122	\$1,654	\$5,385,117,347.00	\$160.98	\$48,144,852
Mozambique	2013	\$16.02	26467180	\$605	\$157.89	11200	0.423165596	\$6	\$1,410	\$2,723,181,508.00	\$102.89	\$4,117,306
Nambia	2013	\$12.71	2346592	\$5,418	\$389.96	15200	6.477478829	\$166	\$2,566	\$609,600,628.00	\$259.78	\$135,018
Niger	2013	\$7.67	18358863	\$418	\$73.10	10700	0.582824764	\$4	\$683	\$1,090,048,943.00	\$59.37	\$12,286,203
Nigeria	2013	\$514.97	172816517	\$2,980	\$2,418.76	162000	0.937410398	\$14	\$1,493	\$3,767,429,921.00	\$21.80	\$10,856,937
Rwanda	2013	\$7.52	11078095	\$679	\$82.48	35000	3.159387963	\$7	\$236	\$1,425,556,468.00	\$128.68	\$987,836
Sao Tome	2013	\$0.30	182386	\$1,661	\$2.97	300	1.644863093	\$16	\$990	\$53,392,96.00	\$292.75	\$469,518
Senegal	2013	\$14.81	14221041	\$1,041	\$236.74	18600	1.307921129	\$17	\$1,273	\$1,352,634,767.00	\$95.12	\$3,243,602
Seychelles	2013	\$1.41	89900	\$15,696	\$13.77	840	9.343715239	\$153	\$1,639	\$88,013,739.00	\$979.02	\$464,555
Sierra Leone	2013	\$4.92	6178859	\$796	\$31.68	10500	1.699342872	\$5	\$302	\$589,880,611.00	\$95.47	\$436,334
Somalia	2013	\$5.35	10268157	\$521	\$32.95	11000	1.071273063	\$3	\$300	\$833,783,350.00	\$81.20	\$192,328,458
South Africa	2013	\$367.59	53192216	\$6,911	\$4,118.21	77150	1.450400186	\$77	\$5,338	\$1,923,363,357.00	\$36.16	\$8,912,188
South Sudan	2013	\$13.26	11453810	\$1,157	\$981.98	185000	16.1518307	\$86	\$531	\$1,911,003,647.00	\$166.84	\$60,119,919
Sudan	2013	\$72.07	38515095	\$1,871	\$2,800.00	264300	6.86224453	\$73	\$1,059	\$1,355,084,611.00	\$35.18	\$0
Swaziland	2013	\$4.61	1250641	\$3,687	\$86.04	8403	6.71895452	\$69	\$1,024	\$89,691,865.00	\$71.72	\$105,914
Tanzania	2013	\$44.33	50213457	\$883	\$443.38	28400	0.565585437	\$9	\$1,561	\$3,524,141,032.00	\$70.18	\$3,929,215
Togo	2013	\$4.08	6928719	\$589	\$72.42	9300	1.342239453	\$10	\$779	\$298,203,942.00	\$43.04	\$585,745
Tunisia	2013	\$46.26	10886500	\$4,249	\$759.36	47800	4.390759197	\$70	\$1,589	\$1,538,391,543.00	\$141.31	\$34,583,056
Uganda	2013	\$24.99	36573387	\$683	\$300.08	46800	1.279618975	\$8	\$641	\$2,136,191,368.00	\$58.41	\$24,330,700
Zambia	2013	\$28.05	15246086	\$1,840	\$381.35	16500	1.082244977	\$25	\$2,311	\$1,483,322,988.00	\$97.29	\$563,196
Zimbabwe	2013	\$13.49	14898092	\$906	\$356.70	50800	3.409832615	\$24	\$702	\$550,282,958.00	\$36.94	\$500,000
Algeria	2012	\$209.05	37439427	\$5,584	\$9,326.29	317200	8.472351887	\$249	\$2,940	\$313,461,896.00	\$8.37	\$2,813,165
Angola	2012	\$115.40	22685632	\$5,087	\$4,144.63	117000	5.157449438	\$183	\$3,542	\$262,040,288.00	\$11.55	\$7,971,949

Benin	2012	\$8.15	10049792	\$811	\$78.22	9450	0.940317969	\$8	\$828	\$633,795,779.00	\$63.07	\$684,831
Botswana	2012	\$14.69	2132822	\$6,886	\$333.44	10500	4.923054995	\$156	\$3,176	\$209,301,015.00	\$98.13	\$1,262,690
Burkina Faso	2012	\$11.17	16590813	\$673	\$147.73	11450	0.690140983	\$9	\$1,290	\$1,214,822,309.00	\$73.22	\$548,086
Burundi	2012	\$2.47	10124572	\$244	\$58.97	51000	5.03724997	\$6	\$116	\$571,830,803.00	\$56.48	\$849,721
Cameroon	2012	\$26.47	21659488	\$1,222	\$354.45	23200	1.071124119	\$16	\$1,528	\$1,085,291,725.00	\$50.11	\$1,527,158
Cape Verde	2012	\$1.75	500870	\$3,494	\$9.74	1200	2.395831254	\$19	\$811	\$489,414,358.00	\$977.13	\$1,149,951
CAR	2012	\$2.18	4619500	\$473	\$58.00	8150	1.764260201	\$13	\$712	\$358,374,248.00	\$77.58	\$133,222
Chad	2012	\$12.37	12715465	\$973	\$657.11	34850	2.740757023	\$52	\$1,886	\$649,912,893.00	\$51.11	\$639,866
Comoros	2012	\$0.57	733661	\$778	\$15.98	500	0.681513669	\$22	\$3,196	\$91,282,764.00	\$124.42	\$218,649
Congo (DRC)	2012	\$27.46	70291160	\$391	\$332.49	134250	1.909912996	\$5	\$248	\$2,836,432,122.00	\$40.35	\$25,017,799
Congo (Republic)	2012	\$13.68	4286188	\$3,191	\$164.14	12000	2.799690541	\$38	\$1,368	\$188,206,158.00	\$43.91	\$98,368
Cote d'Ivoire	2012	\$27.04	21102641	\$1,281	\$407.60	20825	0.986843306	\$19	\$1,957	\$3,103,253,426.00	\$147.06	\$413,335
Djibouti	2012	\$1.35	853069	\$1,587	\$90.00	12950	15.18048364	\$106	\$695	\$277,028,275.00	\$324.74	\$1,966,826
Egypt	2012	\$276.35	85660902	\$3,226	\$4,557.75	835500	9.753574624	\$53	\$546	\$3,402,711,375.00	\$39.72	\$1,306,911,312
Equatorial Guinea	2012	\$22.39	773729	\$28,937	\$403.01	1320	1.706023685	\$521	\$30,531	\$17,663,645.00	\$22.83	\$1,835
Eritrea	2012	\$3.09	4892233	\$632	\$64.58	201750	41.23883715	\$13	\$32	\$99,435,729.00	\$20.33	\$0
Ethiopia	2012	\$43.31	92191211	\$470	\$366.54	138000	1.496888895	\$4	\$266	\$4,947,194,297.00	\$53.66	\$5,619,568
Gabon	2012	\$17.17	1613489	\$10,642	\$278.14	6700	4.152491898	\$172	\$4,151	\$140,905,937.00	\$87.33	\$516,558
Gambia	2012	\$0.91	1807108	\$505	\$11.17	800	0.442696286	\$6	\$1,397	\$276,864,191.00	\$153.21	\$311,374
Ghana	2012	\$41.94	25544565	\$1,642	\$337.26	15500	0.606782695	\$13	\$2,176	\$2,025,497,293.00	\$79.29	\$3,091,785
Guinea	2012	\$5.67	11628767	\$487	\$168.91	12300	1.057721769	\$15	\$1,373	\$465,115,307.00	\$40.00	\$484,396
Guinea Bissau	2012	\$1.00	1714620	\$581	\$24.49	1320	0.769849879	\$14	\$1,855	\$67,025,388.00	\$39.09	\$4,716
Kenya	2012	\$50.41	42542978	\$1,185	\$840.07	29100	0.684014175	\$20	\$2,887	\$4,694,568,428.00	\$110.35	\$15,220,330
Lesotho	2012	\$2.67	2057331	\$1,296	\$53.24	2000	0.972133313	\$26	\$2,662	\$170,478,449.00	\$82.86	\$197,395
Liberia	2012	\$1.74	4190155	\$414	\$15.18	2050	0.489242045	\$4	\$740	\$848,268,005.00	\$202.44	\$30,540,846
Libya	2012	\$81.91	6283403	\$13,036	\$2,987.41	35000	5.570230017	\$475	\$8,535	\$196,913,159.00	\$31.34	\$15,326,909
Madagascar	2012	\$9.92	22293720	\$445	\$68.64	21600	0.968882717	\$3	\$318	\$738,367,959.00	\$33.12	\$71,087
Malawi	2012	\$5.98	15700436	\$381	\$49.53	6800	0.433108991	\$3	\$728	\$1,706,243,685.00	\$108.67	\$1,174,545
Mali	2012	\$12.44	16112333	\$772	\$148.87	7800	0.484101216	\$9	\$1,909	\$648,182,782.00	\$40.23	\$128,663,266
Mauritania	2012	\$5.23	3777067	\$1,385	\$142.30	20850	5.520156248	\$38	\$682	\$506,170,321.00	\$134.01	\$8,306,400
Mauritius	2012	\$11.67	1255882	\$9,291	\$16.66	2500	1.990632878	\$13	\$666	\$327,031,869.00	\$260.40	\$565,353
Morocco	2012	\$98.27	32984190	\$2,979	\$3,402.70	245800	7.45205506	\$103	\$1,384	\$4,450,746,455.00	\$134.94	\$66,646,917
Mozambique	2012	\$14.53	25732928	\$565	\$139.10	11200	0.435240016	\$5	\$1,242	\$1,834,501,506.00	\$71.29	\$3,125,302
Namibia	2012	\$13.02	2291645	\$5,680	\$412.16	15200	6.632789983	\$180	\$2,712	\$262,069,303.00	\$114.36	\$193,018
Niger	2012	\$6.94	17635782	\$394	\$69.80	10700	0.60672104	\$4	\$652	\$1,174,404,645.00	\$66.59	\$12,484,737
Nigeria	2012	\$460.95	168240403	\$2,740	\$2,316.48	162000	0.962907822	\$14	\$1,430	\$3,167,156,651.00	\$18.83	\$15,539,940
Rwanda	2012	\$7.22	10817350	\$667	\$79.79	35000	3.235542901	\$7	\$228	\$901,628,605.00	\$83.35	\$930,202
Sao Tome	2012	\$0.25	178484	\$1,415	\$2.48	300	1.680822931	\$14	\$825	\$57,084,899.00	\$319.83	\$349,529
Senegal	2012	\$14.19	13780108	\$1,030	\$196.66	18600	1.349771714	\$14	\$1,057	\$1,139,440,396.00	\$82.69	\$3,240,524

Seychelles	2012	\$1.13	88303	\$12,845	\$9.92	840	9.512700588	\$112	\$1,181	\$34,657,945.00	\$392.49	\$627,580
Sierra Leone	2012	\$3.80	6043157	\$629	\$29.76	10500	1.737502435	\$5	\$283	\$463,960,045.00	\$76.77	\$497,301
Somalia	2012	\$2.53	10033630	\$252	\$70.84	20000	1.993296544	\$7	\$354	\$913,958,967.00	\$91.09	\$198,634,363
South Africa	2012	\$396.34	52356381	\$7,570	\$4,489.59	62100	1.186101843	\$86	\$7,230	\$1,277,445,243.00	\$24.40	\$6,661,190
South Sudan	2012	\$10.37	10980623	\$944	\$988.23	210000	19.12459794	\$90	\$471	\$1,809,644,611.00	\$164.80	\$83,767,405
Sudan	2012	\$68.13	37712420	\$1,806	\$2,800.00	264300	7.008301244	\$74	\$1,059	\$1,117,276,639.00	\$29.63	\$1,114,410
Swaziland	2012	\$4.87	1231694	\$3,953	\$90.64	8403	6.822311386	\$74	\$1,079	\$80,554,460.00	\$65.40	\$164,967
Tanzania	2012	\$39.09	48645709	\$804	\$359.74	28400	0.583813055	\$7	\$1,267	\$2,593,134,533.00	\$53.31	\$4,098,230
Togo	2012	\$3.87	6745581	\$573	\$62.93	9300	1.378680354	\$9	\$677	\$348,753,551.00	\$51.70	\$937,327
Tunisia	2012	\$45.04	10777500	\$4,179	\$681.23	47800	4.435165855	\$63	\$1,425	\$2,492,266,709.00	\$231.25	\$64,714,730
Uganda	2012	\$23.51	35400620	\$664	\$351.84	46800	1.322010744	\$10	\$752	\$1,634,656,791.00	\$46.18	\$4,298,040
Zambia	2012	\$25.50	14786581	\$1,725	\$346.30	16500	1.115876618	\$23	\$2,099	\$1,097,453,044.00	\$74.22	\$416,366
Zimbabwe	2012	\$12.39	14565482	\$851	\$318.27	50800	3.487697832	\$22	\$627	\$976,375,486.00	\$67.03	\$0
Algeria	2011	\$200.01	36717132	\$5,447	\$8,652.24	317200	8.639018973	\$236	\$2,728	\$309,349,080.00	\$8.43	\$2,253,798
Angola	2011	\$104.12	21942296	\$4,745	\$3,639.50	117000	5.332167609	\$166	\$3,111	\$346,996,330.00	\$15.81	\$7,923,608
Benin	2011	\$7.81	9779391	\$799	\$75.00	9450	0.966317841	\$8	\$794	\$528,234,467.00	\$54.02	\$749,822
Botswana	2011	\$15.68	2089706	\$7,505	\$369.80	10500	5.024630259	\$177	\$3,522	\$129,566,292.00	\$62.00	\$1,429,702
Burkina Faso	2011	\$10.75	16106851	\$667	\$138.85	11450	0.710877626	\$9	\$1,213	\$743,946,379.00	\$46.19	\$1,769,765
Burundi	2011	\$2.36	9790151	\$241	\$55.00	51050	5.21442417	\$6	\$108	\$468,642,200.00	\$47.87	\$17,808,481
Cameroon	2011	\$26.59	21119065	\$1,259	\$347.48	23100	1.093798423	\$16	\$1,504	\$663,377,544.00	\$31.41	\$1,930,265
Cape Verde	2011	\$1.86	495159	\$3,756	\$9.76	1200	2.423463978	\$20	\$813	\$184,900,487.00	\$373.42	\$1,906,586
CAR	2011	\$2.21	4530903	\$488	\$57.53	3150	0.695225654	\$13	\$1,826	\$211,189,998.00	\$46.61	\$504,272
Chad	2011	\$12.16	12298512	\$988	\$609.71	34850	2.833676139	\$50	\$1,750	\$542,478,309.00	\$44.11	\$1,105,073
Comoros	2011	\$0.59	715972	\$819	\$16.42	500	0.698351332	\$23	\$3,283	\$35,938,600.00	\$50.20	\$268,476
Congo (DRC)	2011	\$23.85	68087376	\$350	\$238.79	134250	1.971731147	\$4	\$178	\$4,889,253,597.00	\$71.81	\$29,340,832
Congo (Republic)	2011	\$14.43	4177435	\$3,453	\$140.04	12000	2.872576114	\$34	\$1,167	\$267,081,744.00	\$63.93	\$154,484
Cote d'Ivoire	2011	\$25.38	20604172	\$1,232	\$357.33	20393	0.989751008	\$17	\$1,752	\$1,552,082,942.00	\$75.33	\$153,534
Djibouti	2011	\$1.24	841802	\$1,472	\$75.01	12950	15.38366504	\$89	\$579	\$132,285,460.00	\$157.15	\$3,000,382
Egypt	2011	\$236.00	83787634	\$2,817	\$4,463.97	835500	9.971638536	\$53	\$534	\$1,969,849,508.00	\$23.51	\$1,311,677,763
Equatorial Guinea	2011	\$21.33	750918	\$28,404	\$1,500.66	1320	1.757848394	\$1,998	\$113,686	\$20,833,992.00	\$27.74	\$0
Eritrea	2011	\$2.61	4789568	\$544	\$79.16	201750	42.12279688	\$17	\$39	\$33,015,124.00	\$6.89	\$0
Ethiopia	2011	\$31.95	89858696	\$356	\$332.44	138000	1.53574452	\$4	\$241	\$2,612,427,513.00	\$29.07	\$4,385,397
Gabon	2011	\$18.19	1577298	\$11,530	\$265.97	6700	4.247770554	\$169	\$3,970	\$77,842,973.00	\$49.35	\$717,209
Gambia	2011	\$0.90	1749099	\$517	\$28.76	800	0.457378342	\$16	\$3,596	\$98,793,094.00	\$56.48	\$690,309
Ghana	2011	\$39.57	24928503	\$1,587	\$234.33	15500	0.621778211	\$9	\$1,512	\$1,335,781,107.00	\$53.58	\$3,254,071
Guinea	2011	\$5.07	11316351	\$448	\$111.54	12300	1.086922808	\$10	\$907	\$253,985,157.00	\$22.44	\$69,180
Guinea Bissau	2011	\$1.11	1673509	\$661	\$17.52	1320	0.788761817	\$10	\$1,327	\$76,283,356.00	\$45.58	\$103,828
Kenya	2011	\$41.95	41419954	\$1,013	\$646.68	29100	0.70255993	\$16	\$2,222	\$3,151,560,281.00	\$76.09	\$25,263,944
Lesotho	2011	\$2.80	2032950	\$1,375	\$58.17	2000	0.983792026	\$29	\$2,908	\$235,030,032.00	\$115.61	\$439,131

Liberia	2011	\$1.55	4079574	\$379	\$13.27	2050	0.502503448	\$3	\$647	\$717,790,280.00	\$175.95	\$29,374,998
Libya	2011	\$34.70	6288652	\$5,518	\$3,310.00	35000	5.565580668	\$526	\$9,457	\$378,861,006.00	\$60.25	\$4,020
Madagascar	2011	\$9.89	21678867	\$456	\$71.99	21600	0.996362033	\$3	\$333	\$350,366,069.00	\$16.16	\$213,383
Malawi	2011	\$7.98	15226813	\$524	\$52.80	6800	0.446580647	\$3	\$777	\$809,625,676.00	\$53.17	\$589,073
Mali	2011	\$12.98	15639115	\$830	\$161.06	12150	0.776898181	\$10	\$1,326	\$1,055,214,240.00	\$67.47	\$2,491,794
Mauritania	2011	\$5.17	3683221	\$1,403	\$350.96	20850	5.660806126	\$95	\$1,683	\$363,669,671.00	\$98.74	\$32,378,921
Mauritius	2011	\$11.52	1252404	\$9,197	\$17.51	2500	1.996160983	\$14	\$700	\$134,955,735.00	\$107.76	\$663,776
Morocco	2011	\$101.37	32531964	\$3,116	\$3,342.70	245800	7.555645887	\$103	\$1,360	\$2,266,716,636.00	\$69.68	\$13,739,893
Mozambique	2011	\$13.13	25016921	\$525	\$118.87	11200	0.447696981	\$5	\$1,061	\$1,821,321,141.00	\$72.80	\$4,304,473
Namibia	2011	\$12.41	2240161	\$5,540	\$443.59	15200	6.785226598	\$198	\$2,918	\$235,667,669.00	\$105.20	\$261,123
Niger	2011	\$6.41	16946485	\$378	\$83.95	10700	0.631399373	\$5	\$785	\$731,913,746.00	\$43.19	\$398,298
Nigeria	2011	\$411.74	163770669	\$2,514	\$2,384.94	162000	0.989188119	\$15	\$1,472	\$2,202,097,068.00	\$13.45	\$3,672,606
Rwanda	2011	\$6.41	10556429	\$607	\$75.38	35000	3.315515124	\$7	\$215	\$834,584,297.00	\$79.06	\$1,673,756
Sao Tome	2011	\$0.23	174646	\$1,335	\$2.36	300	1.717760498	\$13	\$785	\$50,243,702.00	\$287.69	\$265,600
Senegal	2011	\$14.35	13357003	\$1,074	\$230.19	18600	1.39252795	\$17	\$1,238	\$816,219,943.00	\$61.11	\$5,318,491
Seychelles	2011	\$1.07	87441	\$12,189	\$8.71	870	9.949565993	\$100	\$1,001	\$8,070,804.00	\$92.30	\$893,244
Sierra Leone	2011	\$2.94	5908908	\$498	\$25.48	10500	1.776978081	\$4	\$243	\$309,977,874.00	\$52.46	\$1,760,258
Somalia	2011	\$2.10	9806670	\$214	\$50.99	3200	0.326308523	\$5	\$1,593	\$1,214,244,585.00	\$123.82	\$77,348,090
South Africa	2011	\$416.42	51549958	\$8,078	\$4,594.15	77582	1.504986677	\$89	\$5,922	\$1,158,674,833.00	\$22.48	\$5,470,032
South Sudan	2011	\$17.83	10510122	\$1,696	\$1,052.72	210000	19.98073857	\$100	\$501	\$1,148,652,181.00	\$109.29	\$70,569,246
Sudan	2011	\$67.33	36918193	\$1,824	\$2,775.60	264300	7.159071951	\$75	\$1,050	\$1,440,180,459.00	\$39.01	\$3,100,000
Swaziland	2011	\$4.96	1212458	\$4,091	\$106.63	8403	6.930549347	\$88	\$1,269	\$293,356,805.00	\$241.95	\$536,649
Tanzania	2011	\$33.88	47122998	\$719	\$307.47	28400	0.602678123	\$7	\$1,083	\$2,368,547,461.00	\$50.26	\$2,335,068
Togo	2011	\$3.76	6566179	\$572	\$59.02	9300	1.416348838	\$9	\$635	\$455,095,709.00	\$69.31	\$791,634
Tunisia	2011	\$45.81	10673800	\$4,292	\$715.24	47800	4.478255167	\$67	\$1,496	\$2,007,751,788.00	\$188.10	\$38,010,214
Uganda	2011	\$20.47	34260342	\$598	\$607.14	46800	1.366010882	\$18	\$1,297	\$1,533,429,558.00	\$44.76	\$34,840,497
Zambia	2011	\$23.46	14343526	\$1,636	\$309.11	16500	1.150344762	\$22	\$1,873	\$968,845,962.00	\$67.55	\$484,618
Zimbabwe	2011	\$10.96	14255592	\$769	\$198.44	50800	3.563513883	\$14	\$391	\$596,488,177.00	\$41.84	\$0
Algeria	2010	\$161.21	36036159	\$4,473	\$5,671.31	317200	8.802269964	\$157	\$1,788	\$316,699,205.00	\$8.79	\$2,416,929
Angola	2010	\$82.47	21219954	\$3,886	\$3,500.79	117000	5.513678305	\$165	\$2,992	\$536,252,032.00	\$25.27	\$7,980,826
Benin	2010	\$6.97	9509798	\$733	\$73.00	7250	0.762371609	\$8	\$1,007	\$657,681,564.00	\$69.16	\$519,217
Botswana	2010	\$12.79	2047831	\$6,244	\$348.67	10500	5.127376234	\$170	\$3,321	\$138,902,899.00	\$67.83	\$1,450,205
Burkina Faso	2010	\$8.99	15632066	\$575	\$123.70	11450	0.73246876	\$8	\$1,080	\$947,371,442.00	\$60.60	\$1,761,760
Burundi	2010	\$2.03	9461117	\$214	\$52.00	51050	5.395768808	\$5	\$102	\$655,843,973.00	\$69.32	\$973,337
Cameroon	2010	\$23.62	20590666	\$1,147	\$354.05	23200	1.126724119	\$17	\$1,526	\$874,617,239.00	\$42.48	\$2,451,523
Cape Verde	2010	\$1.66	490379	\$3,385	\$8.24	1200	2.447086845	\$17	\$687	\$296,780,656.00	\$605.21	\$317,341
CAR	2010	\$1.99	4444973	\$447	\$51.59	3150	0.708665722	\$12	\$1,638	\$261,062,378.00	\$58.73	\$142,379
Chad	2010	\$10.66	11896380	\$896	\$615.82	34850	2.929462576	\$52	\$1,767	\$560,775,256.00	\$47.14	\$2,079,970
Comoros	2010	\$0.53	698695	\$759	\$14.85	500	0.715619834	\$21	\$2,970	\$126,842,243.00	\$181.54	\$251,353

Congo (DRC)	2010	\$20.52	65938712	\$311	\$183.68	159000	2.411330085	\$3	\$116	\$3,719,851,082.00	\$56.41	\$28,905,835
Congo (Republic)	2010	\$12.01	4066078	\$2,953	\$218.39	12000	2.951246877	\$54	\$1,820	\$1,501,566,590.00	\$369.29	\$267,145
Cote d'Ivoire	2010	\$24.88	20131707	\$1,236	\$387.69	20000	0.993457733	\$19	\$1,938	\$846,853,505.00	\$42.07	\$452,135
Djibouti	2010	\$1.13	830802	\$1,358	\$62.00	12950	15.58734813	\$75	\$479	\$139,112,933.00	\$167.44	\$15,042,990
Egypt	2010	\$218.89	82040994	\$2,668	\$4,407.29	835500	10.18393317	\$54	\$528	\$5,944,688,503.00	\$72.46	\$1,307,191,875
Equatorial Guinea	2010	\$16.30	728710	\$22,366	\$399.31	1320	1.811420181	\$548	\$30,251	\$90,682,189.00	\$124.44	\$23,518
Eritrea	2010	\$2.12	4689664	\$451	\$133.00	201750	43.02013961	\$28	\$66	\$106,364,097.00	\$22.68	\$0
Ethiopia	2010	\$29.93	87561814	\$342	\$303.62	138000	1.576029478	\$3	\$220	\$3,325,135,849.00	\$37.97	\$2,924,734
Gabon	2010	\$14.36	1541936	\$9,312	\$268.74	6700	4.34518683	\$174	\$4,011	\$223,468,310.00	\$144.93	\$1,172,446
Gambia	2010	\$0.95	1693002	\$563	\$10.00	800	0.472533405	\$6	\$1,250	\$171,014,609.00	\$101.01	\$429,154
Ghana	2010	\$32.17	24317734	\$1,323	\$122.48	15500	0.637394915	\$5	\$790	\$1,549,957,625.00	\$63.74	\$4,557,420
Guinea	2010	\$4.74	11012406	\$430	\$176.20	19300	1.752568876	\$16	\$913	\$133,948,934.00	\$12.16	\$787,000
Guinea Bissau	2010	\$0.85	1634196	\$518	\$17.13	1320	0.807736648	\$10	\$1,298	\$154,260,890.00	\$94.40	\$158,588
Kenya	2010	\$40.00	40328313	\$992	\$622.05	29120	0.722073348	\$15	\$2,136	\$3,817,319,289.00	\$94.66	\$23,180,261
Lesotho	2010	\$2.39	2010586	\$1,190	\$70.66	2000	0.994734868	\$35	\$3,533	\$315,952,855.00	\$157.14	\$578,464
Liberia	2010	\$1.29	3957990	\$327	\$8.46	2040	0.515413126	\$2	\$415	\$1,344,600,552.00	\$339.72	\$39,340,484
Libya	2010	\$74.77	6265697	\$11,934	\$2,500.00	76000	12.12953643	\$399	\$3,289	\$48,143,888.00	\$7.68	\$773,380
Madagascar	2010	\$8.73	21079532	\$414	\$56.92	21600	1.024690681	\$3	\$264	\$341,755,304.00	\$16.21	\$143,708
Malawi	2010	\$6.96	14769824	\$471	\$49.98	5300	0.358839753	\$3	\$943	\$1,134,898,169.00	\$76.84	\$503,525
Mali	2010	\$10.68	15167286	\$704	\$146.79	12150	0.801066189	\$10	\$1,208	\$1,217,457,563.00	\$80.27	\$10,592,952
Mauritania	2010	\$4.34	3591400	\$1,208	\$132.30	20870	5.811104305	\$37	\$634	\$359,511,412.00	\$100.10	\$8,967,545
Mauritius	2010	\$10.00	1250400	\$8,000	\$14.87	2000	1.599488164	\$12	\$744	\$365,075,004.00	\$291.97	\$860,936
Morocco	2010	\$93.22	32107739	\$2,903	\$3,160.80	245800	7.655475211	\$98	\$1,286	\$4,234,300,187.00	\$131.88	\$18,115,234
Mozambique	2010	\$10.15	24321457	\$418	\$99.19	11200	0.460498728	\$4	\$886	\$2,274,243,841.00	\$93.51	\$2,919,710
Namibia	2010	\$11.28	2193643	\$5,143	\$396.54	15200	6.929112896	\$181	\$2,609	\$365,590,762.00	\$166.66	\$258,173
Niger	2010	\$5.72	16291990	\$351	\$66.89	10700	0.656764459	\$4	\$625	\$629,802,079.00	\$38.66	\$842,000
Nigeria	2010	\$369.06	159424742	\$2,315	\$1,990.10	162000	1.01615344	\$12	\$1,228	\$1,741,154,339.00	\$10.92	\$5,213,333
Rwanda	2010	\$5.70	10293669	\$554	\$74.51	35000	3.400148188	\$7	\$213	\$1,155,189,621.00	\$112.22	\$1,683,841
Sao Tome	2010	\$0.20	170880	\$1,156	\$1.65	300	1.755617978	\$10	\$550	\$64,516,556.00	\$377.55	\$679,661
Senegal	2010	\$12.91	12956791	\$997	\$195.73	18620	1.437084229	\$15	\$1,051	\$1,560,244,323.00	\$120.42	\$3,689,278
Seychelles	2010	\$0.97	89770	\$10,805	\$7.16	650	7.240726301	\$80	\$1,101	\$79,261,803.00	\$882.94	\$449,299
Sierra Leone	2010	\$2.62	5775902	\$453	\$25.06	10500	1.81789788	\$4	\$239	\$447,973,799.00	\$77.56	\$16,623,690
Somalia	2010	\$1.89	9581714	\$197	\$17.01	2000	0.208730922	\$2	\$851	\$384,124,114.00	\$40.09	\$104,387,000
South Africa	2010	\$375.35	50771826	\$7,393	\$4,188.17	77153	1.519602624	\$82	\$5,428	\$5,868,814,018.00	\$115.59	\$3,786,274
South Sudan	2010	\$15.73	10056475	\$1,564	\$650.91	140000	13.92137901	\$65	\$465	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$40,527,038
Sudan	2010	\$65.63	36114885	\$1,817	\$2,600.00	126800	3.511017687	\$72	\$2,050	\$2,438,247,221.00	\$67.51	\$24,787,200
Swaziland	2010	\$4.53	1193148	\$3,794	\$102.03	8403	7.042713896	\$86	\$1,214	\$137,065,746.00	\$114.88	\$498,934
Tanzania	2010	\$31.41	45648525	\$688	\$282.73	28400	0.622144965	\$6	\$996	\$2,980,995,934.00	\$65.30	\$4,507,233
Togo	2010	\$3.17	6390851	\$496	\$56.83	9300	1.455205261	\$9	\$611	\$551,526,827.00	\$86.30	\$360,966

Tunisia	2010	\$44.05	10547100	\$4,177	\$571.19	47800	4.532051464	\$54	\$1,195	\$1,647,963,153.00	\$156.25	\$21,318,227
Uganda	2010	\$20.19	33149417	\$609	\$608.69	46800	1.411789535	\$18	\$1,301	\$2,046,455,598.00	\$61.73	\$20,051,921
Zambia	2010	\$20.27	13917439	\$1,456	\$280.19	16500	1.185562947	\$20	\$1,698	\$842,030,063.00	\$60.50	\$578,964
Zimbabwe	2010	\$9.42	13973897	\$674	\$98.29	50800	3.635349538	\$7	\$193	\$612,689,611.00	\$43.85	\$0
Algeria	2009	\$137.21	35401790	\$3,876	\$5,280.59	334200	9.440200623	\$149	\$1,580	\$299,370,870.00	\$8.46	\$1,741,132
Angola	2009	\$75.49	20520103	\$3,679	\$3,311.19	117000	5.701725766	\$161	\$2,830	\$894,110,975.00	\$43.57	\$6,778,708
Benin	2009	\$7.10	9240982	\$768	\$70.00	7250	0.784548655	\$8	\$966	\$678,783,662.00	\$73.45	\$804,918
Botswana	2009	\$10.27	2007212	\$5,115	\$330.15	10500	5.231136522	\$164	\$3,144	\$2,818,075,165.00	\$1,403.97	\$1,236,630
Burkina Faso	2009	\$8.15	15165856	\$537	\$127.33	11450	0.754985409	\$8	\$1,112	\$1,829,820,716.00	\$120.65	\$546,660
Burundi	2009	\$1.74	9137786	\$190	\$47.00	51050	5.586692444	\$5	\$92	\$979,096,076.00	\$107.15	\$1,502,504
Cameroon	2009	\$23.38	20074522	\$1,165	\$343.27	23100	1.150712331	\$17	\$1,486	\$910,795,565.00	\$45.37	\$1,793,613
Cape Verde	2009	\$1.71	486673	\$3,514	\$8.40	1200	2.465721337	\$17	\$700	\$361,797,069.00	\$743.41	\$997,865
CAR	2009	\$1.98	4361492	\$454	\$35.99	3150	0.722229916	\$8	\$1,143	\$415,635,614.00	\$95.30	\$280,826
Chad	2009	\$9.25	11510535	\$804	\$738.90	35030	3.04329903	\$64	\$2,109	\$670,334,943.00	\$58.24	\$1,658,389
Comoros	2009	\$0.52	681845	\$769	\$14.68	500	0.73330449	\$22	\$2,936	\$123,226,091.00	\$180.72	\$348,337
Congo (DRC)	2009	\$18.26	63845097	\$286	\$122.38	159000	2.490402669	\$2	\$77	\$3,030,589,688.00	\$47.47	\$45,322,979
Congo (Republic)	2009	\$9.59	3950786	\$2,428	\$212.00	12000	3.037370285	\$54	\$1,767	\$359,252,017.00	\$90.93	\$349,621
Cote d'Ivoire	2009	\$24.28	19684909	\$1,233	\$420.06	18550	0.942346241	\$21	\$2,264	\$3,620,605,802.00	\$183.93	\$2,972,086
Djibouti	2009	\$1.05	820097	\$1,279	\$50.00	12950	15.79081499	\$61	\$386	\$190,371,066.00	\$232.13	\$6,662,216
Egypt	2009	\$188.98	80442443	\$2,349	\$4,017.40	865500	10.75924559	\$50	\$464	\$2,889,898,568.00	\$35.93	\$1,305,210,348
Equatorial Guinea	2009	\$15.03	707155	\$21,251	\$371.93	1320	1.866634613	\$526	\$28,176	\$18,751,596.00	\$26.52	\$87,081
Eritrea	2009	\$1.86	4593549	\$404	\$117.00	201750	43.92028908	\$25	\$58	\$231,972,309.00	\$50.50	\$0
Ethiopia	2009	\$32.44	85302099	\$380	\$339.63	138000	1.617779652	\$4	\$246	\$4,338,218,118.00	\$50.86	\$12,569,500
Gabon	2009	\$12.07	1507428	\$8,004	\$260.00	6700	4.444656727	\$172	\$3,881	\$368,422,158.00	\$244.40	\$510,365
Gambia	2009	\$0.90	1638899	\$550	\$7.10	800	0.488132582	\$4	\$887	\$146,459,664.00	\$89.36	\$338,462
Ghana	2009	\$25.98	23713164	\$1,096	\$118.29	15500	0.653645376	\$5	\$763	\$2,078,125,193.00	\$87.64	\$2,536,228
Guinea	2009	\$4.61	10715770	\$430	\$137.72	19300	1.801083823	\$13	\$714	\$220,822,259.00	\$20.61	\$412,456
Guinea Bissau	2009	\$0.83	1596832	\$517	\$13.74	1320	0.826636741	\$9	\$1,041	\$142,759,445.00	\$89.40	\$506,681
Kenya	2009	\$37.02	39269988	\$943	\$578.07	29120	0.741533203	\$15	\$1,985	\$3,337,474,004.00	\$84.99	\$32,621,293
Lesotho	2009	\$1.87	1990413	\$940	\$47.40	2000	1.004816588	\$24	\$2,370	\$240,424,088.00	\$120.79	\$490,231
Liberia	2009	\$1.16	3821498	\$302	\$7.19	2040	0.533822077	\$2	\$353	\$1,062,014,101.00	\$277.91	\$49,841,327
Libya	2009	\$63.03	6208680	\$10,152	\$1,439.90	76000	12.24092722	\$232	\$1,895	\$20,514,707.00	\$3.30	\$783,637
Madagascar	2009	\$8.55	20495706	\$417	\$70.99	21600	1.053879286	\$3	\$329	\$917,888,645.00	\$44.78	\$264,625
Malawi	2009	\$6.20	14329056	\$432	\$58.80	5300	0.36987782	\$4	\$1,109	\$755,087,618.00	\$52.70	\$692,941
Mali	2009	\$10.18	14694565	\$693	\$144.43	12150	0.826836317	\$10	\$1,189	\$1,544,230,981.00	\$105.09	\$5,725,515
Mauritania	2009	\$3.66	3501927	\$1,046	\$114.82	20870	5.959575971	\$33	\$550	\$520,242,598.00	\$148.56	\$8,122
Mauritius	2009	\$9.13	1247429	\$7,318	\$15.32	2000	1.603297663	\$12	\$766	\$1,392,560,833.00	\$1,116.34	\$457,526
Morocco	2009	\$92.90	31714958	\$2,929	\$3,055.07	245800	7.750286158	\$96	\$1,243	\$2,935,488,461.00	\$92.56	\$17,969,397
Mozambique	2009	\$10.91	23647815	\$461	\$84.30	11200	0.473616696	\$4	\$753	\$2,450,274,895.00	\$103.62	\$602,861

Namibia	2009	\$8.88	2152357	\$4,124	\$299.52	15200	7.062025491	\$139	\$1,971	\$452,237,230.00	\$210.11	\$331,364
Niger	2009	\$5.40	15672194	\$344	\$53.00	10700	0.682737848	\$3	\$495	\$586,208,987.00	\$37.40	\$442,830
Nigeria	2009	\$169.48	155207145	\$1,092	\$1,504.49	162000	1.043766381	\$10	\$929	\$3,799,867,779.00	\$24.48	\$7,726,093
Rwanda	2009	\$5.31	10024594	\$530	\$75.28	35000	3.491413218	\$8	\$215	\$1,498,778,111.00	\$149.51	\$821,501
Sao Tome	2009	\$0.19	167196	\$1,123	\$1.11	300	1.794301299	\$7	\$369	\$65,964,085.00	\$394.53	\$644,492
Senegal	2009	\$12.77	12581624	\$1,015	\$214.82	18620	1.479936135	\$17	\$1,154	\$1,508,004,956.00	\$119.86	\$2,904,146
Seychelles	2009	\$0.85	87298	\$9,707	\$8.65	650	7.445760499	\$99	\$1,331	\$123,247,555.00	\$1,411.80	\$181,811
Sierra Leone	2009	\$2.49	5647194	\$441	\$26.41	10500	1.859330492	\$5	\$251	\$473,558,801.00	\$83.86	\$1,743,683
Somalia	2009	\$2.01	9356827	\$215	\$18.09	2000	0.213747673	\$2	\$905	\$650,567,806.00	\$69.53	\$246,600,000
South Africa	2009	\$295.94	50020918	\$5,916	\$3,592.69	77153	1.542414715	\$72	\$4,657	\$4,419,811,842.00	\$88.36	\$1,786,002
South Sudan	2009	\$12.23	9623176	\$1,271	\$609.90			\$63		\$0.00	\$0.00	\$29,249,140
Sudan	2009	\$53.15	35297298	\$1,506	\$1,800.00	126800	3.592342961	\$51	\$1,420	\$2,869,434,441.00	\$81.29	\$2,475,870
Swaziland	2009	\$3.58	1173529	\$3,047	\$75.91	8403	7.16045364	\$65	\$903	\$114,220,362.00	\$97.33	\$504,932
Tanzania	2009	\$28.57	44222113	\$646	\$219.48	28400	0.642212641	\$5	\$773	\$5,229,881,574.00	\$118.26	\$1,176,903
Togo	2009	\$3.16	6219761	\$509	\$55.13	9300	1.495234302	\$9	\$593	\$708,112,093.00	\$113.85	\$231,430
Tunisia	2009	\$43.45	10439600	\$4,163	\$564.78	47800	4.578719491	\$54	\$1,182	\$1,792,970,239.00	\$171.75	\$23,896,450
Uganda	2009	\$18.16	32067125	\$566	\$293.53	46800	1.4594386	\$9	\$627	\$2,378,119,532.00	\$74.16	\$16,088,434
Zambia	2009	\$15.33	13507849	\$1,135	\$220.96	16500	1.221512026	\$16	\$1,339	\$1,051,135,283.00	\$77.82	\$557,540
Zimbabwe	2009	\$8.16	13720997	\$594	\$107.00	50800	3.702354865	\$8	\$211	\$1,206,228,779.00	\$87.91	\$13,368
Algeria	2008	\$171.00	34811059	\$4,912	\$5,172.34	334000	9.59465209	\$149	\$1,549	\$255,426,652.00	\$7.34	\$1,778,755
Angola	2008	\$84.18	19842251	\$4,242	\$3,163.59	117000	5.896508415	\$159	\$2,704	\$777,677,638.00	\$39.19	\$7,888,338
Benin	2008	\$7.13	8973525	\$795	\$64.72	8000	0.891511418	\$7	\$809	\$681,650,667.00	\$75.96	\$257,652
Botswana	2008	\$10.95	1967866	\$5,562	\$332.40	11000	5.589811501	\$169	\$3,022	\$845,995,893.00	\$429.91	\$1,374,516
Burkina Faso	2008	\$8.35	14709011	\$568	\$117.00	11250	0.764837282	\$8	\$1,040	\$1,328,088,727.00	\$90.29	\$274,261
Burundi	2008	\$1.61	8821795	\$183	\$43.86	51000	5.781136379	\$5	\$86	\$683,516,073.00	\$77.48	\$655,143
Cameroon	2008	\$23.32	19570418	\$1,192	\$346.59	23000	1.175243165	\$18	\$1,507	\$1,299,855,648.00	\$66.42	\$682,424
Cape Verde	2008	\$1.79	483824	\$3,700	\$10.76	1000	2.066867291	\$22	\$1,076	\$279,486,466.00	\$577.66	\$830,799
CAR	2008	\$1.99	4280405	\$464	\$31.51	3000	0.700868259	\$7	\$1,050	\$304,677,165.00	\$71.18	\$165,782
Chad	2008	\$10.35	11139740	\$929	\$611.43	35000	3.141904569	\$55	\$1,747	\$564,373,226.00	\$50.66	\$626,072
Comoros	2008	\$0.52	665414	\$786	\$14.65	500	0.751411903	\$22	\$2,930	\$40,181,016.00	\$60.38	\$998,941
Congo (DRC)	2008	\$19.21	61809278	\$311	\$160.00	151000	2.44299893	\$3	\$106	\$2,044,458,044.00	\$33.08	\$17,102,859
Congo (Republic)	2008	\$11.86	3832771	\$3,094	\$207.72	12000	3.130894071	\$54	\$1,731	\$522,965,582.00	\$136.45	\$905,617
Cote d'Ivoire	2008	\$24.22	19261647	\$1,258	\$368.91	19000	0.986416167	\$19	\$1,942	\$1,101,786,887.00	\$57.20	\$140,461
Djibouti	2008	\$1.00	809639	\$1,234	\$36.27	13000	16.05653878	\$45	\$279	\$256,444,613.00	\$316.74	\$7,578,200
Egypt	2008	\$162.82	78976122	\$2,062	\$3,779.88	866000	10.96533963	\$48	\$436	\$3,391,320,590.00	\$42.94	\$1,295,576,357
Equatorial Guinea	2008	\$19.75	686223	\$28,781	\$292.75	1000	1.457252234	\$427	\$29,275	\$122,924,078.00	\$179.13	\$44,033
Eritrea	2008	\$1.38	4500638	\$307	\$86.95	202000	44.88252554	\$19	\$43	\$101,132,744.00	\$22.47	\$0
Ethiopia	2008	\$27.07	83079608	\$326	\$388.19	138000	1.661057428	\$5	\$281	\$3,957,824,595.00	\$47.64	\$17,306,458
Gabon	2008	\$15.51	1473741	\$10,523	\$260.00	7000	4.749816962	\$176	\$3,714	\$230,094,898.00	\$156.13	\$275,868

Gambia	2008	\$0.97	1586749	\$609	\$17.16	1000	0.630219398	\$11	\$1,716	\$108,255,844.00	\$68.22	\$207,297
Ghana	2008	\$28.53	23115919	\$1,234	\$113.67	14000	0.605643237	\$5	\$812	\$2,447,381,821.00	\$105.87	\$2,755,602
Guinea	2008	\$4.52	10427356	\$433	\$133.95	19000	1.822130174	\$13	\$705	\$778,432,987.00	\$74.65	\$550,566
Guinea Bissau	2008	\$0.86	1561293	\$553	\$11.00	1000	0.640494769	\$7	\$1,100	\$134,646,073.00	\$86.24	\$968,000
Kenya	2008	\$35.90	3824442	\$939	\$580.01	29000	0.758280118	\$15	\$2,000	\$1,629,347,099.00	\$42.60	\$20,012,903
Lesotho	2008	\$1.88	1972194	\$951	\$27.35	2000	1.014099019	\$14	\$1,368	\$473,259,210.00	\$239.97	\$254,968
Liberia	2008	\$0.85	3672782	\$231	\$3.91	2000	0.544546341	\$1	\$195	\$1,782,208,369.00	\$485.25	\$56,616,244
Libya	2008	\$87.14	6123022	\$14,232	\$1,100.07	76000	12.41217164	\$180	\$1,447	\$75,103,902.00	\$12.27	\$1,071,803
Madagascar	2008	\$9.41	19926798	\$472	\$103.27	22000	1.1040409	\$5	\$469	\$1,312,057,150.00	\$65.84	\$894,676
Malawi	2008	\$5.32	13904671	\$383	\$44.46	7000	0.503427949	\$3	\$635	\$895,389,974.00	\$64.39	\$543,230
Mali	2008	\$9.75	14223403	\$686	\$142.92	12000	0.843679955	\$10	\$1,191	\$1,305,071,592.00	\$91.76	\$1,489,101
Mauritania	2008	\$4.03	3414552	\$1,181	\$123.32	21000	6.150147955	\$36	\$587	\$624,324,218.00	\$182.84	\$3,023,682
Mauritius	2008	\$9.99	1244121	\$8,030	\$15.58	2000	1.607560679	\$13	\$779	\$225,886,801.00	\$181.56	\$269,666
Morocco	2008	\$92.51	31350544	\$2,951	\$2,944.96	246000	7.846753792	\$94	\$1,197	\$3,848,134,772.00	\$122.75	\$9,900,004
Mozambique	2008	\$11.49	22994867	\$500	\$83.71	11000	0.478367629	\$4	\$761	\$3,011,622,759.00	\$130.97	\$491,001
Namibia	2008	\$8.49	2115703	\$4,011	\$266.25	15000	7.089842005	\$126	\$1,775	\$349,203,623.00	\$165.05	\$72,239
Niger	2008	\$5.40	15085130	\$358	\$53.63	10000	0.662904463	\$4	\$536	\$950,081,688.00	\$62.98	\$438,407
Nigeria	2008	\$208.06	151115683	\$1,377	\$1,615.53	162000	1.072026389	\$11	\$997	\$2,537,560,392.00	\$16.79	\$8,369,114
Rwanda	2008	\$4.80	9750314	\$492	\$67.66	35000	3.589627985	\$7	\$193	\$979,832,412.00	\$100.49	\$626,712
Sao Tome	2008	\$0.19	163595	\$1,149	\$0.76	300	1.833796876	\$5	\$253	\$65,328,725.00	\$399.33	\$187,016
Senegal	2008	\$13.38	12229703	\$1,094	\$216.87	19000	1.553594556	\$18	\$1,141	\$1,557,957,558.00	\$127.39	\$2,086,245
Seychelles	2008	\$0.97	86956	\$11,123	\$11.12	450	5.17503105	\$128	\$2,472	\$45,429,953.00	\$522.45	\$284,053
Sierra Leone	2008	\$2.51	5521838	\$454	\$23.65	11000	1.992090315	\$4	\$215	\$475,871,006.00	\$86.18	\$485,210
Somalia	2008	\$2.60	9132589	\$285	\$23.40	2100	0.229945747	\$3	\$1,114	\$873,212,578.00	\$95.62	\$5,576,000
South Africa	2008	\$286.77	49296223	\$5,817	\$3,285.93	62000	1.257702847	\$67	\$5,300	\$1,710,375,042.00	\$34.70	\$3,415,936
South Sudan	2008	\$15.55	9208598	\$1,689	\$896.39			\$97		\$0.00	\$0.00	\$61,065,000
Sudan	2008	\$54.53	34470138	\$1,582	\$1,900.00	127000	3.684348464	\$55	\$1,496	\$3,396,058,369.00	\$98.52	\$36,329,000
Swaziland	2008	\$3.24	1153750	\$2,809	\$66.66	8403	7.283206934	\$58	\$793	\$112,371,571.00	\$97.40	\$233,150
Tanzania	2008	\$27.37	42844744	\$639	\$194.00	28000	0.653522402	\$5	\$693	\$3,201,579,067.00	\$74.73	\$684,153
Togo	2008	\$3.16	6052937	\$523	\$57.01	9750	1.610788283	\$9	\$585	\$825,396,582.00	\$136.36	\$222,130
Tunisia	2008	\$44.86	10328900	\$4,343	\$578.91	48000	4.64715507	\$56	\$1,206	\$1,881,511,191.00	\$182.16	\$20,562,359
Uganda	2008	\$14.24	31014427	\$459	\$311.86	47000	1.515423774	\$10	\$664	\$2,327,132,828.00	\$75.03	\$5,864,528
Zambia	2008	\$17.91	13114579	\$1,366	\$278.06	16000	1.220016289	\$21	\$1,738	\$1,757,176,347.00	\$133.99	\$564,088
Zimbabwe	2008	\$4.42	13495462	\$327	\$116.00	51000	3.779048098	\$9	\$227	\$658,499,325.00	\$48.79	\$0
Algeria	2007	\$134.98	34261971	\$3,940	\$3,945.82	334000	9.748417568	\$115	\$1,181	\$475,364,851.00	\$13.87	\$3,656,114
Angola	2007	\$60.45	19183907	\$3,151	\$2,032.43	117000	6.098861926	\$106	\$1,737	\$495,880,724.00	\$25.85	\$5,237,382
Benin	2007	\$5.97	8707637	\$686	\$50.00	8000	0.918733751	\$6	\$625	\$575,925,662.00	\$66.14	\$751,749
Botswana	2007	\$10.94	1930431	\$5,667	\$306.45	11000	5.698209364	\$159	\$2,786	\$315,769,676.00	\$163.57	\$897,794
Burkina Faso	2007	\$6.76	14264002	\$474	\$107.82	11250	0.788698712	\$8	\$958	\$898,268,325.00	\$62.97	\$324,283

Burundi	2007	\$1.36	8514578	\$159	\$46.31	51000	5.989727265	\$5	\$91	\$506,986,530.00	\$59.54	\$640,212
Cameroon	2007	\$20.43	19078100	\$1,071	\$296.70	23000	1.205570785	\$16	\$1,290	\$2,086,650,447.00	\$109.37	\$2,207,120
Cape Verde	2007	\$1.51	481278	\$3,137	\$7.94	1000	2.077801188	\$17	\$794	\$238,047,551.00	\$494.62	\$958,604
CAR	2007	\$1.70	4202104	\$404	\$19.11	3000	0.71392807	\$5	\$637	\$295,612,626.00	\$70.35	\$288,677
Chad	2007	\$8.64	10779504	\$801	\$389.14	35000	3.24690264	\$36	\$1,112	\$507,787,794.00	\$47.11	\$9,422,307
Comoros	2007	\$0.46	649404	\$712	\$12.95	500	0.769936742	\$20	\$2,590	\$84,273,739.00	\$129.77	\$222,833
Congo (DRC)	2007	\$16.36	59834875	\$273	\$205.22	143000	2.389910566	\$3	\$144	\$1,887,342,656.00	\$31.54	\$1,919,513
Congo (Republic)	2007	\$8.39	3715665	\$2,259	\$168.08	12000	3.229569942	\$45	\$1,401	\$178,564,375.00	\$48.06	\$300,721
Cote d'Ivoire	2007	\$20.34	18862172	\$1,079	\$323.62	19000	1.007307112	\$17	\$1,703	\$524,964,827.00	\$27.83	\$253,249
Djibouti	2007	\$0.85	799309	\$1,061	\$34.52	12000	15.01296745	\$43	\$288	\$168,118,456.00	\$210.33	\$13,598,992
Egypt	2007	\$130.48	77605327	\$1,681	\$3,306.91	866000	11.15902778	\$43	\$382	\$3,180,003,030.00	\$40.98	\$1,335,541,463
Equatorial Guinea	2007	\$13.07	665798	\$19,633	\$196.31	1000	1.50195705	\$295	\$19,631	\$34,373,827.00	\$51.63	\$89,668
Eritrea	2007	\$1.32	4406299	\$299	\$220.00	202000	45.84346183	\$50	\$109	\$188,673,442.00	\$42.82	\$0
Ethiopia	2007	\$19.71	80891968	\$244	\$360.14	138000	1.705979016	\$4	\$261	\$2,996,513,210.00	\$37.04	\$12,981,061
Gabon	2007	\$12.44	1440902	\$8,633	\$254.00	7000	4.858068071	\$176	\$3,629	\$684,412,055.00	\$474.99	\$1,302,330
Gambia	2007	\$0.80	1536424	\$520	\$4.55	1000	0.650862002	\$3	\$455	\$98,412,711.00	\$64.05	\$271,101
Ghana	2007	\$24.76	22528041	\$1,099	\$126.08	14000	0.621447733	\$6	\$901	\$2,016,542,385.00	\$89.51	\$2,926,530
Guinea	2007	\$4.13	10152521	\$407	\$120.00	19000	1.87145636	\$12	\$632	\$468,056,121.00	\$46.10	\$664,702
Guinea Bissau	2007	\$0.70	1527342	\$455	\$9.50	1000	0.654732208	\$6	\$950	\$143,762,771.00	\$94.13	\$744,785
Kenya	2007	\$31.96	37250540	\$858	\$494.68	29000	0.778512204	\$13	\$1,706	\$2,856,894,985.00	\$76.69	\$9,682,909
Lesotho	2007	\$1.83	1955656	\$933	\$39.83	2000	1.022674744	\$20	\$1,992	\$258,495,185.00	\$132.18	\$353,773
Liberia	2007	\$0.74	3522337	\$210	\$3.49	2000	0.567804841	\$1	\$174	\$1,290,244,690.00	\$366.30	\$61,691,159
Libya	2007	\$67.52	6017794	\$11,219	\$639.14	76000	12.62921263	\$106	\$841	\$19,279,625.00	\$3.20	\$11,809
Madagascar	2007	\$7.34	19371031	\$379	\$81.94	22000	1.135716524	\$4	\$372	\$1,903,374,598.00	\$98.26	\$523,946
Malawi	2007	\$4.43	13498377	\$328	\$33.60	7000	0.518580863	\$2	\$480	\$658,975,646.00	\$48.82	\$677,825
Mali	2007	\$8.15	13759226	\$592	\$110.38	12000	0.872142081	\$8	\$920	\$1,607,475,112.00	\$116.83	\$7,149,080
Mauritania	2007	\$3.36	3328285	\$1,009	\$91.00	21000	6.30955822	\$27	\$433	\$483,435,787.00	\$145.25	\$11,151,050
Mauritius	2007	\$8.15	1239630	\$6,575	\$11.63	2000	1.613384639	\$9	\$582	\$259,542,512.00	\$209.37	\$905,512
Morocco	2007	\$79.04	31011322	\$2,549	\$2,408.35	246000	7.932586686	\$78	\$979	\$2,801,118,888.00	\$90.33	\$18,660,064
Mozambique	2007	\$9.37	22359637	\$419	\$68.63	11000	0.491957897	\$3	\$624	\$2,335,140,281.00	\$104.44	\$2,211,367
Namibia	2007	\$8.74	2083174	\$4,196	\$228.17	15000	7.200550698	\$110	\$1,521	\$270,206,827.00	\$129.71	\$123,622
Niger	2007	\$4.29	14527631	\$295	\$45.00	10000	0.688343475	\$3	\$450	\$465,550,156.00	\$32.05	\$7,310,090
Nigeria	2007	\$166.45	147152502	\$1,131	\$971.32	162000	1.100898713	\$7	\$600	\$2,814,918,243.00	\$19.13	\$5,602,975
Rwanda	2007	\$3.78	9481083	\$398	\$55.58	35000	3.691561397	\$6	\$159	\$822,459,580.00	\$86.75	\$857,771
Sao Tome	2007	\$0.15	160064	\$911	\$0.58	300	1.8742503	\$4	\$193	\$152,918,234.00	\$955.36	\$705,473
Senegal	2007	\$11.28	11897230	\$949	\$192.81	19000	1.597010397	\$16	\$1,015	\$852,077,724.00	\$71.62	\$9,142,439
Seychelles	2007	\$1.03	85033	\$12,155	\$15.18	450	5.292063081	\$178	\$3,373	\$14,526,078.00	\$170.83	\$391,823
Sierra Leone	2007	\$2.16	5391108	\$400	\$29.08	11000	2.040396891	\$5	\$264	\$689,522,877.00	\$127.90	\$2,259,611
Somalia	2007	\$2.48	8909015	\$278	\$22.32	2100	0.235716294	\$3	\$1,063	\$459,733,576.00	\$51.60	\$74,600,000

South Africa	2007	\$299.42	48596781	\$6,161	\$3,525.68	62000	1.275804667	\$73	\$5,687	\$2,288.393,269.00	\$47.09	\$185,627
South Sudan	2007		8815495		\$587.97			\$67		\$0.00	\$0.00	\$31,064,000
Sudan	2007	\$45.90	33637960	\$1,364	\$1,700.00	127000	3.775496493	\$51	\$1,339	\$2,219.917,386.00	\$65.99	\$210,046,000
Swaziland	2007	\$3.36	1134853	\$2,963	\$61.88	7304	6.436075862	\$55	\$847	\$95,266,192.00	\$83.95	\$372,305
Tanzania	2007	\$21.50	41522004	\$518	\$166.22	28000	0.674341248	\$4	\$594	\$3,336.909,992.00	\$80.36	\$3,449,405
Togo	2007	\$2.52	5890414	\$428	\$30.00	9750	1.655231704	\$5	\$308	\$209,187,604.00	\$35.51	\$231,534
Tunisia	2007	\$38.91	10225100	\$3,805	\$490.65	48000	4.694330618	\$48	\$1,022	\$1,703.591,857.00	\$166.61	\$11,784,741
Uganda	2007	\$12.29	29991958	\$410	\$252.12	47000	1.56708675	\$8	\$536	\$2,324.490,194.00	\$77.50	\$5,352,245
Zambia	2007	\$14.06	12738676	\$1,103	\$232.28	16000	1.256017501	\$18	\$1,452	\$1,151,540,983.00	\$90.40	\$522,126
Zimbabwe	2007	\$5.29	13297798	\$398	\$125.00	51000	3.83522144	\$9	\$245	\$483,254,705.00	\$36.34	\$0
Algeria	2006	\$117.03	33749328	\$3,468	\$3,093.98	334000	9.896493346	\$92	\$926	\$605,947,005.00	\$17.95	\$1,671,146
Angola	2006	\$41.79	18541467	\$2,254	\$1,970.31	110000	5.932648156	\$106	\$1,791	\$349,090,535.00	\$18.83	\$6,622,746
Benin	2006	\$5.14	8443717	\$609	\$46.79	8000	0.947450039	\$6	\$585	\$940,854,845.00	\$111.43	\$562,672
Botswana	2006	\$10.13	1895671	\$5,342	\$272.93	11000	5.802694666	\$144	\$2,481	\$99,413,281.00	\$52.44	\$1,723,233
Burkina Faso	2006	\$5.84	13834195	\$422	\$72.63	11250	0.813202358	\$5	\$646	\$858,782,677.00	\$62.08	\$266,988
Burundi	2006	\$1.27	8218070	\$155	\$44.72	51000	6.20583665	\$5	\$88	\$719,149,261.00	\$87.51	\$509,801
Cameroon	2006	\$17.95	18597109	\$965	\$256.93	23000	1.236751368	\$14	\$1,117	\$2,887.720,853.00	\$155.28	\$1,784,388
Cape Verde	2006	\$1.11	478265	\$2,321	\$6.99	1000	2.090891033	\$15	\$699	\$171,630,740.00	\$358.86	\$345,029
CAR	2006	\$1.46	4127112	\$354	\$17.00	3000	0.726900554	\$4	\$567	\$453,401,584.00	\$109.86	\$105,000
Chad	2006	\$7.42	10423616	\$712	\$222.99	35000	3.357759917	\$21	\$637	\$342,361,518.00	\$32.84	\$3,432,192
Comoros	2006	\$0.41	633814	\$641	\$11.37	500	0.78887497	\$18	\$2,274	\$46,189,573.00	\$72.88	\$604,963
Congo (DRC)	2006	\$14.30	57926840	\$247	\$205.10	104630	1.806243876	\$4	\$196	\$2,385,586,031.00	\$41.18	\$4,468,212
Congo (Republic)	2006	\$7.73	3604595	\$2,145	\$126.57	12000	3.329084127	\$35	\$1,055	\$538,669,346.00	\$149.44	\$357,270
Cote d'Ivoire	2006	\$17.80	18486392	\$963	\$267.36	19000	1.027783031	\$14	\$1,407	\$492,573,366.00	\$26.65	\$198,795
Djibouti	2006	\$0.77	788941	\$975	\$49.52	12500	15.84402382	\$63	\$396	\$133,290,948.00	\$168.95	\$4,567,171
Egypt	2006	\$107.48	76274285	\$1,409	\$2,952.52	866000	11.35376097	\$39	\$341	\$5,162,507,854.00	\$67.68	\$1,289,862,897
Equatorial Guinea	2006	\$10.09	645718	\$15,621	\$152.00	1000	1.548663658	\$235	\$15,200	\$59,402,777.00	\$91.99	\$70,388
Eritrea	2006	\$1.21	4304440	\$281	\$220.00	202000	46.928288	\$51	\$109	\$163,377,899.00	\$37.96	\$400,000
Ethiopia	2006	\$15.28	78735675	\$194	\$345.69	160500	2.038466045	\$4	\$215	\$2,899,174,167.00	\$36.82	\$3,427,838
Gabon	2006	\$10.15	1408920	\$7,207	\$130.24	7000	4.968344548	\$92	\$1,861	\$215,904,480.00	\$153.24	\$652,232
Gambia	2006	\$0.66	1487731	\$440	\$2.79	900	0.604948072	\$2	\$310	\$100,424,242.00	\$67.50	\$180,872
Ghana	2006	\$20.41	21951891	\$930	\$75.73	8300	0.378099545	\$3	\$912	\$1,813,038,367.00	\$82.59	\$1,747,966
Guinea	2006	\$2.93	9898301	\$296	\$120.00	16000	1.616439023	\$12	\$750	\$294,726,962.00	\$29.78	\$2,825,777
Guinea Bissau	2006	\$0.59	1494603	\$396	\$9.50	1000	0.669073995	\$6	\$950	\$98,028,699.00	\$65.59	\$163,351
Kenya	2006	\$25.83	36286015	\$712	\$375.81	29000	0.799205975	\$10	\$1,296	\$1,849,822,049.00	\$50.98	\$5,412,219
Lesotho	2006	\$1.80	1940345	\$928	\$35.22	2000	1.030744533	\$18	\$1,761	\$163,349,614.00	\$84.19	\$117,635
Liberia	2006	\$0.60	3384804	\$178	\$3.93	2000	0.590876163	\$1	\$196	\$406,294,267.00	\$120.03	\$32,578,260
Libya	2006	\$54.96	5907149	\$9,304	\$614.36	76000	12.86576655	\$104	\$808	\$41,671,663.00	\$7.05	\$0
Madagascar	2006	\$5.52	18826129	\$293	\$53.91	22000	1.168588614	\$3	\$245	\$744,780,164.00	\$39.56	\$465,199

Malawi	2006	\$4.00	13112383	\$305	\$31.09	7000	0.533846517	\$2	\$444	\$962,986,871.00	\$73.44	\$647,322
Mali	2006	\$6.90	13309942	\$518	\$96.00	12000	0.90158169	\$7	\$800	\$992,102,321.00	\$74.54	\$1,622,330
Mauritania	2006	\$3.04	3241762	\$938	\$81.91	21000	6.477958592	\$25	\$390	\$447,830,619.00	\$138.14	\$274,889
Mauritius	2006	\$7.03	1233996	\$5,696	\$10.81	2000	1.620750797	\$9	\$541	\$135,154,223.00	\$109.53	\$1,367,708
Morocco	2006	\$68.64	30691434	\$2,236	\$2,134.59	246000	8.015265758	\$70	\$868	\$3,038,563,399.00	\$99.00	\$21,477,700
Mozambique	2006	\$8.31	21737860	\$382	\$57.44	11000	0.506029572	\$3	\$522	\$1,728,161,799.00	\$79.50	\$3,202,156
Nambia	2006	\$7.98	2053915	\$3,885	\$199.56	15000	7.303125981	\$97	\$1,330	\$299,762,193.00	\$145.95	\$25,295
Niger	2006	\$3.65	13995530	\$261	\$45.00	10000	0.714513848	\$3	\$450	\$661,733,996.00	\$47.28	\$1,781,960
Nigeria	2006	\$145.43	143318011	\$1,015	\$776.15	162000	1.130353393	\$5	\$479	\$14,598,134,664.00	\$101.86	\$3,666,275
Rwanda	2006	\$3.11	9231041	\$337	\$54.56	44000	4.766526332	\$6	\$124	\$872,644,784.00	\$94.53	\$532,886
Sao Tome	2006	\$0.13	156584	\$859	\$0.58	300	1.915904562	\$4	\$193	\$34,075,814.00	\$217.62	\$481,706
Senegal	2006	\$9.36	11578430	\$808	\$148.56	19000	1.640982413	\$13	\$782	\$1,293,801,860.00	\$111.74	\$4,215,925
Seychelles	2006	\$1.02	84600	\$12,014	\$14.37	450	5.319148936	\$170	\$3,193	\$52,952,546.00	\$625.92	\$403,170
Sierra Leone	2006	\$1.89	5243214	\$360	\$28.02	11000	2.097949845	\$5	\$255	\$373,237,336.00	\$71.18	\$498,160
Somalia	2006	\$2.39	8686939	\$275	\$2.15	2100	0.241742229	\$0	\$102	\$493,484,687.00	\$56.81	\$0
South Africa	2006	\$271.64	47921682	\$5,668	\$3,506.14	103000	2.149340251	\$73	\$3,404	\$1,175,305,070.00	\$24.53	\$97,270
South Sudan	2006		8445659		\$551.45						\$0.00	\$20,246,000
Sudan	2006	\$35.82	32809056	\$1,092	\$1,537.17	125000	3.809923699	\$47	\$1,230	\$2,287,168,606.00	\$69.71	\$186,775,000
Swaziland	2006	\$3.18	1118204	\$2,844	\$58.52	7639	6.831490497	\$52	\$766	\$43,701,899.00	\$39.08	\$320,541
Tanzania	2006	\$18.61	40260847	\$462	\$147.42	28000	0.695464753	\$4	\$526	\$3,085,379,442.00	\$76.63	\$2,899,025
Togo	2006	\$2.20	5732175	\$384	\$30.00	9750	1.700925042	\$5	\$308	\$99,737,263.00	\$17.40	\$310,123
Tunisia	2006	\$34.38	10127900	\$3,394	\$497.21	48000	4.739383288	\$49	\$1,036	\$1,235,057,378.00	\$121.95	\$11,412,820
Uganda	2006	\$9.94	29000925	\$343	\$218.53	47000	1.620637962	\$8	\$465	\$1,433,622,392.00	\$49.43	\$1,598,616
Zambia	2006	\$12.76	12381509	\$1,030	\$205.85	16000	1.292249596	\$17	\$1,287	\$2,081,810,358.00	\$168.14	\$398,815
Zimbabwe	2006	\$5.44	13127942	\$415	\$161.70	51000	3.884843489	\$12	\$317	\$393,815,409.00	\$30.00	\$0
Algeria	2005	\$103.20	33267887	\$3,102	\$2,924.82	319000	9.588826606	\$88	\$917	\$828,207,652.00	\$24.90	\$1,540,121
Angola	2005	\$28.23	17912942	\$1,576	\$1,365.06	118000	6.587415959	\$76	\$1,157	\$656,461,954.00	\$36.65	\$6,676,026
Benin	2005	\$4.80	8182362	\$587	\$44.71	8000	0.977712792	\$5	\$559	\$708,943,221.00	\$86.64	\$153,494
Botswana	2005	\$9.93	1864003	\$5,328	\$283.84	11000	5.901278056	\$152	\$2,580	\$150,331,170.00	\$80.65	\$1,344,780
Burkina Faso	2005	\$5.46	13421929	\$407	\$73.84	11250	0.838180563	\$6	\$656	\$1,197,529,159.00	\$89.22	\$216,919
Burundi	2005	\$1.12	7934213	\$141	\$49.56	82000	10.33498849	\$6	\$60	\$629,062,104.00	\$79.28	\$107,685
Cameroon	2005	\$16.59	18126999	\$915	\$223.08	23000	1.268825579	\$12	\$970	\$662,823,710.00	\$36.57	\$923,069
Cape Verde	2005	\$0.97	474224	\$2,045	\$7.08	1000	2.108708121	\$15	\$708	\$410,547,043.00	\$865.72	\$254,172
CAR	2005	\$1.35	4055608	\$333	\$15.40	3000	0.739716462	\$4	\$513	\$129,924,106.00	\$32.04	\$0
Chad	2005	\$6.65	10067932	\$660	\$55.49	35000	3.476384227	\$6	\$159	\$625,761,955.00	\$62.15	\$4,917,612
Comoros	2005	\$0.38	618632	\$615	\$11.41	500	0.808234944	\$18	\$2,282	\$75,446,087.00	\$121.96	\$610,068
Congo (DRC)	2005	\$11.96	56089536	\$213	\$165.21	65000	1.158861432	\$3	\$254	\$2,590,769,725.00	\$46.19	\$512,842
Congo (Republic)	2005	\$6.09	3503086	\$1,738	\$100.92	12000	3.425551071	\$29	\$841	\$2,348,443,206.00	\$670.39	\$236,172
Cote d'Ivoire	2005	\$17.08	18132702	\$942	\$249.87	19000	1.047830599	\$14	\$1,315	\$342,572,326.00	\$18.89	\$53,843

Djibouti	2005	\$0.71	778406	\$910	\$44.85	13000	16.70079624	\$58	\$345	\$111,924,420.00	\$143.79	\$4,896,584
Egypt	2005	\$89.69	74942115	\$1,197	\$2,659.44	799000	10.66156193	\$35	\$333	\$2,546,966,583.00	\$33.99	\$1,291,722,229
Equatorial Guinea	2005	\$8.22	625866	\$13,130	\$152.00	1000	1.597786108	\$243	\$15,200	\$55,637,667.00	\$88.90	\$101
Eritrea	2005	\$1.10	4191273	\$262	\$220.00	202000	48.19538121	\$52	\$109	\$364,921,470.00	\$87.07	\$3,113,811
Ethiopia	2005	\$12.40	76608431	\$162	\$342.07	183000	2.388771022	\$4	\$187	\$2,804,637,522.00	\$36.61	\$8,034,102
Gabon	2005	\$9.46	1377777	\$6,865	\$118.11	7000	5.080648029	\$86	\$1,687	\$118,147,226.00	\$85.75	\$530,818
Gambia	2005	\$0.62	1440542	\$433	\$2.99	800	0.555346529	\$2	\$373	\$180,326,301.00	\$125.18	\$321,873
Ghana	2005	\$10.73	21389514	\$502	\$64.20	7000	0.327263163	\$3	\$917	\$1,617,176,588.00	\$75.61	\$1,595,296
Guinea	2005	\$2.94	9669023	\$304	\$120.00	13000	1.344499853	\$12	\$923	\$265,551,893.00	\$27.46	\$630,456
Guinea Bissau	2005	\$0.59	1462784	\$401	\$12.12	1000	0.683627931	\$8	\$1,212	\$94,425,208.00	\$64.55	\$175,919
Kenya	2005	\$18.74	35349040	\$530	\$316.80	29000	0.82039003	\$9	\$1,092	\$1,313,067,895.00	\$37.15	\$5,378,030
Lesotho	2005	\$1.68	1925844	\$874	\$33.62	2000	1.038505715	\$17	\$1,681	\$107,041,664.00	\$55.58	\$88,818
Liberia	2005	\$0.55	3269786	\$168	\$8.03	15000	4.587456182	\$2	\$54	\$275,864,149.00	\$84.37	\$7,976,000
Libya	2005	\$47.33	5801543	\$8,159	\$690.93	76000	13.09996323	\$119	\$909	\$18,884,613.00	\$3.26	\$0
Madagascar	2005	\$5.04	18290394	\$276	\$54.02	22000	1.202817173	\$3	\$246	\$1,824,617,161.00	\$99.76	\$1,294,938
Malawi	2005	\$3.66	12747846	\$287	\$38.21	7000	0.549112376	\$3	\$546	\$1,215,659,654.00	\$95.36	\$512,000
Mali	2005	\$6.25	12881384	\$485	\$86.45	12000	0.931576918	\$7	\$720	\$1,225,486,101.00	\$95.14	\$1,596,698
Mauritania	2005	\$2.18	3154087	\$693	\$66.66	21000	6.658028139	\$21	\$317	\$372,082,002.00	\$117.97	\$1,741,165
Mauritius	2005	\$6.28	1228254	\$5,116	\$10.89	2000	1.628327691	\$9	\$544	\$97,251,885.00	\$79.18	\$733,216
Morocco	2005	\$62.34	30385479	\$2,052	\$2,031.13	251000	8.260524707	\$67	\$809	\$2,641,735,038.00	\$86.94	\$30,797,715
Mozambique	2005	\$7.72	21126676	\$366	\$62.25	11000	0.520668751	\$3	\$566	\$1,819,248,184.00	\$86.11	\$3,269,457
Namibia	2005	\$7.26	2027026	\$3,582	\$192.07	15000	7.400003749	\$95	\$1,280	\$136,241,954.00	\$67.21	\$195,571
Niger	2005	\$3.41	13485436	\$253	\$32.80	10000	0.741540726	\$2	\$328	\$866,839,000.00	\$64.28	\$3,395,988
Nigeria	2005	\$112.25	139611303	\$804	\$674.21	161000	1.153201758	\$5	\$419	\$7,764,195,020.00	\$55.61	\$2,466,117
Rwanda	2005	\$2.58	9008230	\$287	\$45.00	53000	5.883508747	\$5	\$85	\$905,019,540.00	\$100.47	\$449,848
Sao Tome	2005	\$0.13	153146	\$824	\$0.58	300	1.958915022	\$4	\$194	\$30,117,824.00	\$196.66	\$266,710
Senegal	2005	\$8.71	11268994	\$773	\$124.40	19000	1.68604225	\$11	\$655	\$1,304,484,923.00	\$115.76	\$2,413,279
Seychelles	2005	\$0.92	82900	\$11,087	\$14.73	450	5.428226779	\$178	\$3,273	\$17,955,089.00	\$216.59	\$538,520
Sierra Leone	2005	\$1.63	5071271	\$321	\$23.55	13000	2.563459929	\$5	\$181	\$490,445,627.00	\$96.71	\$312,736
Somalia	2005	\$2.32	8466938	\$274	\$20.88	2100	0.248023548	\$2	\$994	\$263,987,188.00	\$31.18	\$0
South Africa	2005	\$257.77	47270063	\$5,453	\$3,566.96	56000	1.184682153	\$75	\$6,370	\$1,425,337,172.00	\$30.15	\$2,611,497
South Sudan	2005		8099908		\$100.00			\$12			\$0.00	
Sudan	2005	\$26.52	31990003	\$829	\$1,165.00	123000	3.844951187	\$36	\$947	\$2,924,800,208.00	\$91.43	\$137,460,000
Swaziland	2005	\$3.11	1104642	\$2,813	\$59.47	5273	4.773492226	\$54	\$1,128	\$118,774,556.00	\$107.52	\$368,764
Tanzania	2005	\$16.93	39065600	\$433	\$139.49	28000	0.716743119	\$4	\$498	\$2,378,082,867.00	\$60.87	\$1,012,071
Togo	2005	\$2.12	5578219	\$379	\$33.24	9750	1.747869705	\$6	\$341	\$140,326,120.00	\$25.16	\$224,064
Tunisia	2005	\$32.27	10029000	\$3,218	\$468.46	47000	4.686409413	\$47	\$997	\$1,588,728,946.00	\$158.41	\$13,180,808
Uganda	2005	\$9.01	28042413	\$321	\$216.67	47000	1.676032658	\$8	\$461	\$1,650,226,584.00	\$58.85	\$2,751,890
Zambia	2005	\$8.33	12043591	\$692	\$139.51	16000	1.328507419	\$12	\$872	\$2,981,338,267.00	\$247.55	\$381,000

Zimbabwe	2005	\$5.29	12984418	\$408	\$131.40	51000	3.927784826	\$10	\$258	\$266,709,342.00	\$20.54	\$0
Algeria	2004	\$85.32	32817225	\$2,600	\$2,802.22	318000	9.690033207	\$85	\$881	\$489,249,686.00	\$14.91	\$1,005,749
Angola	2004	\$19.64	17295500	\$1,136	\$817.53	118000	6.822583909	\$47	\$693	\$1,368,772,678.00	\$79.14	\$5,829,712
Benin	2004	\$4.52	7922796	\$571	\$41.78	6000	0.757308405	\$5	\$696	\$679,341,206.00	\$85.75	\$183,654
Botswana	2004	\$8.96	1835750	\$4,879	\$314.04	10000	5.447364837	\$171	\$3,140	\$120,538,418.00	\$65.66	\$1,479,361
Burkina Faso	2004	\$4.84	13028039	\$371	\$65.68	10250	0.786764608	\$5	\$641	\$823,998,409.00	\$63.25	\$143,798
Burundi	2004	\$0.92	7661613	\$119	\$44.87	81000	10.5721863	\$6	\$55	\$799,405,094.00	\$104.34	\$135,634
Cameroon	2004	\$15.78	17667576	\$893	\$221.11	23000	1.301819786	\$13	\$961	\$1,194,249,958.00	\$67.60	\$826,898
Cape Verde	2004	\$0.92	468985	\$1,962	\$6.45	1000	2.132264358	\$14	\$645	\$159,168,424.00	\$339.39	\$234,978
CAR	2004	\$1.27	3987896	\$318	\$15.10	2000	0.501517592	\$4	\$755	\$120,964,358.00	\$30.33	\$0
Chad	2004	\$4.41	9710498	\$455	\$50.54	34000	3.501365223	\$5	\$149	\$366,818,604.00	\$37.78	\$1,934,078
Comoros	2004	\$0.37	603869	\$610	\$11.60	500	0.827994151	\$19	\$2,320	\$52,552,926.00	\$87.03	\$213,418
Congo (DRC)	2004	\$10.30	54314855	\$190	\$137.64	64000	1.178314846	\$3	\$215	\$3,834,048,753.00	\$70.59	\$400,943
Congo (Republic)	2004	\$4.65	3412592	\$1,362	\$124.30	12000	3.516388716	\$36	\$1,036	\$382,056,177.00	\$111.95	\$136,438
Cote d'Ivoire	2004	\$16.55	17802516	\$930	\$250.81	18000	1.011093039	\$14	\$1,393	\$469,838,649.00	\$26.39	\$28,533
Djibouti	2004	\$0.67	767644	\$868	\$37.36	11000	14.32955901	\$49	\$340	\$134,264,405.00	\$174.90	\$7,097,520
Egypt	2004	\$78.85	73596068	\$1,071	\$2,369.74	798000	10.84297058	\$32	\$297	\$2,565,573,672.00	\$34.86	\$1,304,172,936
Equatorial Guinea	2004	\$4.41	606201	\$7,276	\$838.05	1000	1.649617866	\$1,382	\$83,805	\$40,492,607.00	\$66.80	\$28,867
Eritrea	2004	\$1.11	4064958	\$273	\$232.90	201000	49.44700536	\$57	\$116	\$391,012,564.00	\$96.19	\$1,766,571
Ethiopia	2004	\$10.13	74506974	\$136	\$311.04	182000	2.442724355	\$4	\$171	\$3,240,340,956.00	\$43.49	\$3,225,736
Gabon	2004	\$7.76	1347524	\$5,756	\$125.12	6000	4.452610863	\$93	\$2,085	\$371,382,828.00	\$275.60	\$381,143
Gambia	2004	\$0.58	1394727	\$415	\$1.93	800	0.573588953	\$1	\$241	\$115,385,644.00	\$82.73	\$212,673
Ghana	2004	\$8.88	20840493	\$426	\$56.35	7000	0.335884569	\$3	\$805	\$3,212,680,570.00	\$154.16	\$1,862,714
Guinea	2004	\$3.67	9464771	\$387	\$81.02	11000	1.162204558	\$9	\$737	\$326,986,734.00	\$34.55	\$521,580
Guinea Bissau	2004	\$0.53	1431816	\$371	\$16.46	1000	0.698413763	\$11	\$1,646	\$84,814,753.00	\$59.24	\$0
Kenya	2004	\$16.10	34437460	\$467	\$259.81	29000	0.842106241	\$8	\$896	\$1,811,857,862.00	\$52.61	\$11,032,370
Lesotho	2004	\$1.51	1912042	\$790	\$31.39	2000	1.046002128	\$16	\$1,569	\$126,055,587.00	\$65.93	\$44,207
Liberia	2004	\$0.47	3184643	\$149	\$3.18	15000	4.710104084	\$1	\$21	\$331,130,169.00	\$103.98	\$160,000
Libya	2004	\$33.12	5703224	\$5,808	\$685.07	76000	13.32579608	\$120	\$901	\$181,335,144.00	\$31.80	\$0
Madagascar	2004	\$4.36	17763367	\$246	\$54.47	21000	1.182208305	\$3	\$259	\$1,509,714,708.00	\$84.99	\$433,232
Malawi	2004	\$3.48	12407618	\$280	\$21.97	6000	0.483573882	\$2	\$366	\$568,347,143.00	\$45.81	\$469,252
Mali	2004	\$5.44	12474857	\$436	\$77.42	11000	0.881773635	\$6	\$704	\$952,215,540.00	\$76.33	\$417,547
Mauritania	2004	\$1.83	3064882	\$598	\$69.70	20000	6.525536709	\$23	\$349	\$669,267,329.00	\$218.37	\$399,123
Mauritius	2004	\$6.39	1221003	\$5,230	\$10.94	2000	1.637997613	\$9	\$547	\$50,305,955.00	\$41.20	\$222,432
Morocco	2004	\$59.63	30093109	\$1,981	\$1,937.52	250000	8.307549745	\$64	\$775	\$2,735,789,003.00	\$90.91	\$20,038,012
Mozambique	2004	\$6.83	20523159	\$333	\$77.63	11000	0.535979865	\$4	\$706	\$1,589,707,606.00	\$77.46	\$1,751,955
Namibia	2004	\$6.61	2002745	\$3,299	\$167.00	15000	7.489720359	\$83	\$1,113	\$508,056,495.00	\$253.68	\$43,963
Niger	2004	\$3.05	12996012	\$235	\$31.61	10000	0.769466818	\$2	\$316	\$660,756,275.00	\$50.84	\$187,943
Nigeria	2004	\$87.85	136033321	\$646	\$639.99	160000	1.176182415	\$5	\$400	\$4,234,302,132.00	\$31.13	\$2,524,687

Rwanda	2004	\$2.09	8828956	\$237	\$41.22	53000	6.002974757	\$5	\$78	\$619,544,972.00	\$70.17	\$396,246
Sao Tome	2004	\$0.11	149732	\$704	\$0.70	300	2.003579729	\$5	\$233	\$55,568,777.00	\$371.12	\$298,969
Senegal	2004	\$8.03	10967016	\$732	\$107.55	18000	1.641285104	\$10	\$598	\$1,496,982,607.00	\$136.50	\$3,244,748
Seychelles	2004	\$0.84	82500	\$10,174	\$15.93	650	7.878787879	\$193	\$2,450	\$10,643,825.00	\$129.02	\$128,305
Sierra Leone	2004	\$1.43	4870467	\$294	\$22.96	13000	2.669148564	\$5	\$177	\$452,725,362.00	\$92.95	\$745,213
Somalia	2004	\$1.98	8251054	\$240	\$17.82	2100	0.254512939	\$2	\$849	\$249,283,511.00	\$30.21	\$0
South Africa	2004	\$228.59	46641103	\$4,901	\$3,099.07	55000	1.179217395	\$66	\$5,635	\$1,091,745,707.00	\$23.41	\$3,075,223
South Sudan	2004		7784488								\$0.00	
Sudan	2004	\$21.46	31176209	\$688	\$1,240.77	121000	3.881164641	\$40	\$1,025	\$1,707,437,885.00	\$54.77	\$7,858,000
Swaziland	2004	\$2.76	1094775	\$2,523	\$42.70	4751	4.339704505	\$39	\$899	\$29,218,768.00	\$26.69	\$158,889
Tanzania	2004	\$12.83	37935334	\$338	\$127.57	28000	0.738098154	\$3	\$456	\$2,728,315,104.00	\$71.92	\$998,166
Togo	2004	\$1.94	5428552	\$357	\$31.72	8750	1.611847874	\$6	\$363	\$93,041,448.00	\$17.14	\$431,897
Tunisia	2004	\$31.18	9932400	\$3,140	\$444.65	47000	4.731988241	\$45	\$946	\$1,306,605,473.00	\$131.55	\$12,208,496
Uganda	2004	\$7.94	27114742	\$293	\$196.02	55000	2.028416866	\$7	\$356	\$1,924,442,222.00	\$70.97	\$2,949,033
Zambia	2004	\$6.22	11725635	\$531	\$98.35	16000	1.364531644	\$8	\$615	\$1,443,640,384.00	\$123.12	\$587,737
Zimbabwe	2004	\$5.76	12867828	\$447	\$256.10	50000	3.885659647	\$20	\$512	\$197,568,325.00	\$15.35	\$0
Algeria	2003	\$67.86	32394886	\$2,095	\$2,206.40	308700	9.529281875	\$68	\$715	\$1,131,998,685.00	\$34.94	\$713,713
Angola	2003	\$14.19	16691395	\$850	\$670.02	130000	7.788444285	\$40	\$515	\$829,304,750.00	\$49.68	\$4,176,213
Benin	2003	\$3.91	7665681	\$509	\$34.54	7100	0.926206034	\$5	\$487	\$586,264,402.00	\$76.48	\$442,285
Botswana	2003	\$7.51	1810438	\$4,149	\$301.01	10500	5.799701509	\$166	\$2,867	\$125,074,302.00	\$69.09	\$1,694,860
Burkina Faso	2003	\$4.10	12651596	\$324	\$50.76	15000	1.185621166	\$4	\$338	\$1,095,742,099.00	\$86.61	\$64,060
Burundi	2003	\$0.78	7401215	\$106	\$43.41	56000	7.566325259	\$6	\$78	\$274,263,423.00	\$37.06	\$80,851
Cameroon	2003	\$13.62	17218591	\$791	\$188.50	32100	1.864264039	\$11	\$587	\$1,393,465,722.00	\$80.93	\$1,004,655
Cape Verde	2003	\$0.81	462675	\$1,751	\$5.78	1300	2.809747663	\$12	\$445	\$199,150,136.00	\$430.43	\$192,471
CAR	2003	\$1.14	3923294	\$291	\$15.02	3600	0.917596285	\$4	\$417	\$199,391,646.00	\$50.82	\$13,000
Chad	2003	\$2.74	9353516	\$293	\$40.95	34800	3.720526057	\$4	\$118	\$507,659,662.00	\$54.27	\$788,691
Comoros	2003	\$0.32	589500	\$539	\$9.53	500	0.848176421	\$16	\$1,905	\$21,922,503.00	\$37.19	\$49,805
Congo (DRC)	2003	\$8.94	52602208	\$170	\$78.71	97800	1.859237544	\$1	\$80	\$7,920,852,017.00	\$150.58	\$0
Congo (Republic)	2003	\$3.50	3331564	\$1,049	\$93.78	12000	3.601911895	\$28	\$781	\$128,491,535.00	\$38.57	\$122,065
Cote d'Ivoire	2003	\$15.31	17491539	\$875	\$213.01	17340	0.99133644	\$12	\$1,228	\$608,825,505.00	\$34.81	\$0
Djibouti	2003	\$0.62	756656	\$822	\$41.76	12300	16.25573576	\$55	\$340	\$156,607,964.00	\$206.97	\$14,239,718
Egypt	2003	\$82.92	72247626	\$1,148	\$2,383.91	780000	10.79620249	\$33	\$306	\$2,715,732,258.00	\$37.59	\$1,335,235,637
Equatorial Guinea	2003	\$2.48	586772	\$4,235	\$472.10	1300	2.215511306	\$805	\$36,316	\$30,564,302.00	\$52.09	\$0
Eritrea	2003	\$0.87	3928408	\$222	\$181.58	202000	51.4203209	\$46	\$90	\$419,787,028.00	\$106.86	\$2,781,000
Ethiopia	2003	\$8.62	72432290	\$119	\$278.67	162400	2.242093961	\$4	\$172	\$2,385,794,811.00	\$32.94	\$4,901,611
Gabon	2003	\$6.50	1318093	\$4,929	\$108.40	6700	5.083101117	\$82	\$1,618	\$183,815,815.00	\$139.46	\$268,966
Gambia	2003	\$0.49	1350345	\$361	\$2.00	800	0.592441191	\$1	\$250	\$41,043,695.00	\$30.39	\$128,496
Ghana	2003	\$7.63	20305396	\$376	\$53.24	7000	0.344735951	\$3	\$761	\$1,972,456,387.00	\$97.14	\$1,663,318
Guinea	2003	\$3.45	9281572	\$371	\$84.13	12300	1.325206549	\$9	\$684	\$333,160,514.00	\$35.89	\$300,368

Guinea Bissau	2003	\$0.48	1401716	\$340	\$7.51	1300	0.927434659	\$5	\$577	\$158,223,912.00	\$112.88	\$322,821
Kenya	2003	\$14.90	33551079	\$444	\$245.94	29100	0.867334252	\$7	\$845	\$1,402,891,511.00	\$41.81	\$2,857,317
Lesotho	2003	\$1.16	1898778	\$610	\$27.36	2000	1.053309023	\$14	\$1,368	\$195,359,122.00	\$102.89	\$77,485
Liberia	2003	\$0.42	3124222	\$133	\$1.20	15000	4.801195306	\$0	\$8	\$225,872,835.00	\$72.30	\$200,000
Libya	2003	\$26.27	5609166	\$4,683	\$541.40	76500	13.63839116	\$97	\$708	\$135,339,620.00	\$24.13	\$0
Madagascar	2003	\$5.47	17245275	\$317	\$72.52	21600	1.252516994	\$4	\$336	\$1,046,613,337.00	\$60.69	\$298,751
Malawi	2003	\$3.21	12090476	\$265	\$13.12	6800	0.562426161	\$1	\$193	\$835,299,589.00	\$69.09	\$360,175
Mali	2003	\$4.70	12088867	\$389	\$66.76	12200	1.009193004	\$6	\$547	\$813,258,824.00	\$67.27	\$1,514,260
Mauritania	2003	\$1.56	2974686	\$525	\$62.45	20700	6.95871766	\$21	\$302	\$406,485,178.00	\$136.65	\$220,096
Mauritius	2003	\$5.61	1213370	\$4,623	\$10.88	2000	1.648301837	\$9	\$544	\$351,999,588.00	\$290.10	\$187,557
Morocco	2003	\$52.06	29812685	\$1,746	\$1,819.23	246300	8.261583953	\$61	\$739	\$2,188,801,050.00	\$73.42	\$26,169,267
Mozambique	2003	\$5.60	19928496	\$281	\$59.77	8200	0.411471091	\$3	\$729	\$1,593,181,062.00	\$79.94	\$2,895,860
Namibia	2003	\$4.93	1980531	\$2,490	\$129.45	15000	7.57372644	\$65	\$863	\$209,041,418.00	\$105.55	\$799,923
Niger	2003	\$2.73	12526725	\$218	\$24.60	10700	0.854173776	\$2	\$230	\$873,575,954.00	\$69.74	\$174,181
Nigeria	2003	\$67.66	132581484	\$510	\$587.46	160500	1.210576282	\$4	\$366	\$852,302,971.00	\$6.43	\$2,188,961
Rwanda	2003	\$1.85	8686469	\$213	\$45.20	61000	7.022416128	\$5	\$74	\$803,831,766.00	\$92.54	\$630,829
Sao Tome	2003	\$0.10	146357	\$658	\$0.50	600	4.099564763	\$3	\$83	\$34,092,203.00	\$232.94	\$707,423
Senegal	2003	\$6.86	10673320	\$643	\$96.86	18600	1.742663014	\$9	\$521	\$866,285,191.00	\$81.16	\$2,191,743
Seychelles	2003	\$0.71	82800	\$8,523	\$12.24	800	9.661835749	\$148	\$1,530	\$15,649,018.00	\$189.00	\$155,462
Sierra Leone	2003	\$1.37	4647701	\$295	\$28.47	13000	2.797081826	\$6	\$219	\$727,833,446.00	\$156.60	\$417,611
Somalia	2003	\$1.52	8039104	\$189	\$18.90	2100	0.261223141	\$2	\$900	\$360,223,613.00	\$44.81	\$450,000
South Africa	2003	\$175.26	46034026	\$3,807	\$2,574.18	55700	1.209974552	\$56	\$4,622	\$1,560,898,238.00	\$33.91	\$9,670,143
South Sudan	2003		7499695								\$0.00	
Sudan	2003	\$17.65	30365586	\$581	\$398.11	114500	3.770715968	\$13	\$348	\$609,664,694.00	\$20.08	\$896,000
Swaziland	2003	\$2.17	1087949	\$1,995	\$31.93	3763	3.458801837	\$29	\$848	\$301,197,278.00	\$276.85	\$125,015
Tanzania	2003	\$11.66	36866228	\$316	\$125.25	28400	0.770352747	\$3	\$441	\$2,195,079,521.00	\$59.54	\$263,031
Togo	2003	\$1.67	5283246	\$317	\$28.83	9300	1.760281463	\$5	\$310	\$150,345,197.00	\$28.46	\$185,903
Tunisia	2003	\$27.45	9839800	\$2,790	\$407.39	47000	4.776519848	\$41	\$867	\$1,692,329,208.00	\$171.99	\$7,973,177
Uganda	2003	\$6.34	26217760	\$242	\$152.38	61800	2.357180781	\$6	\$247	\$1,359,086,465.00	\$51.84	\$1,183,202
Zambia	2003	\$4.90	11426006	\$429	\$42.60	19500	1.706633096	\$4	\$218	\$1,587,604,892.00	\$138.95	\$787,328
Zimbabwe	2003	\$5.73	12774162	\$448	\$194.80	50800	3.976777498	\$15	\$383	\$255,764,468.00	\$20.02	\$0
Algeria	2002	\$56.76	31990387	\$1,774	\$2,100.60	317900	9.937360245	\$66	\$661	\$1,953,231,956.00	\$61.06	\$84,015
Angola	2002	\$12.50	16109696	\$776	\$438.69	110000	6.828185957	\$27	\$399	\$635,521,479.00	\$39.45	\$2,936,435
Benin	2002	\$3.05	7414744	\$412	\$26.00	7100	0.957551603	\$4	\$366	\$377,989,121.00	\$50.98	\$583,282
Botswana	2002	\$5.44	1786672	\$3,044	\$223.55	10500	5.876848129	\$125	\$2,129	\$112,794,782.00	\$63.13	\$1,942,056
Burkina Faso	2002	\$3.21	12290984	\$261	\$42.47	14400	1.171590493	\$3	\$295	\$1,037,146,165.00	\$84.38	\$30,976
Burundi	2002	\$0.83	7159918	\$115	\$44.91	51000	7.122986604	\$6	\$88	\$409,804,202.00	\$57.24	\$43,964
Cameroon	2002	\$10.88	16779434	\$648	\$145.63	32100	1.913056185	\$9	\$454	\$1,270,092,421.00	\$75.69	\$466,757
Cape Verde	2002	\$0.62	455396	\$1,361	\$4.52	1300	2.854658363	\$10	\$348	\$210,343,068.00	\$461.89	\$167,686

CAR	2002	\$0.99	3859784	\$257	\$10.68	3550	0.919740587	\$3	\$301	\$79,769,792.00	\$20.67	\$195,306
Chad	2002	\$1.99	9002102	\$221	\$34.29	34900	3.876872313	\$4	\$98	\$302,491,708.00	\$33.60	\$679,174
Comoros	2002	\$0.25	575428	\$429	\$6.00	500	0.86891844	\$10	\$1,200	\$21,523,607.00	\$37.40	\$48,322
Congo (DRC)	2002	\$8.73	50971407	\$171	\$96.10	81400	1.59697377	\$2	\$118	\$3,535,927,065.00	\$69.37	\$62,143
Congo (Republic)	2002	\$3.02	3256867	\$927	\$70.70	12000	3.68452258	\$22	\$589	\$233,370,947.00	\$71.66	\$186,711
Cote d'Ivoire	2002	\$12.35	17185421	\$718	\$140.00	14334	0.834079072	\$8	\$977	\$3,048,298,048.00	\$177.38	\$51,111
Djibouti	2002	\$0.59	745459	\$793	\$33.25	12300	16.4999014	\$45	\$270	\$156,386,455.00	\$209.79	\$2,113,625
Egypt	2002	\$87.85	70908710	\$1,239	\$2,902.77	773000	10.90134061	\$41	\$376	\$3,337,076,860.00	\$47.06	\$1,301,467,151
Equatorial Guinea	2002	\$1.81	567664	\$3,183	\$343.30	2300	4.051692551	\$605	\$14,926	\$27,370,258.00	\$48.22	\$0
Eritrea	2002	\$0.73	3788532	\$193	\$150.76	172200	45.45296173	\$40	\$88	\$301,134,949.00	\$79.49	\$1,969,450
Ethiopia	2002	\$7.85	70391170	\$112	\$288.93	252500	3.587097643	\$4	\$114	\$2,355,345,277.00	\$33.46	\$4,541,982
Gabon	2002	\$5.31	1289192	\$4,119	\$94.69	6700	5.197053658	\$73	\$1,413	\$252,192,370.00	\$195.62	\$207,138
Gambia	2002	\$0.58	1307674	\$442	\$2.26	800	0.611773271	\$2	\$282	\$153,685,406.00	\$117.53	\$97,893
Ghana	2002	\$6.17	19788181	\$312	\$36.98	7000	0.353746512	\$2	\$528	\$1,153,494,387.00	\$58.29	\$1,674,691
Guinea	2002	\$2.95	9114287	\$324	\$98.08	19300	2.11755456	\$11	\$508	\$425,563,220.00	\$46.69	\$415,275
Guinea Bissau	2002	\$0.42	1372367	\$303	\$6.36	2300	1.675936539	\$5	\$277	\$140,226,894.00	\$102.18	\$99,557
Kenya	2002	\$13.15	32691980	\$402	\$213.89	29400	0.899303132	\$7	\$728	\$483,880,040.00	\$14.80	\$15,529,477
Lesotho	2002	\$0.78	1885488	\$411	\$19.56	2000	1.060733349	\$10	\$978	\$83,905,64.00	\$44.50	\$157,027
Liberia	2002	\$0.54	3070673	\$177	\$7.80	15000	4.884922621	\$3	\$52	\$77,500,771.00	\$25.24	\$0
Libya	2002	\$20.48	5518341	\$3,712	\$452.51	76500	13.86286204	\$82	\$592	\$134,849,104.00	\$24.44	\$0
Madagascar	2002	\$4.40	16736029	\$263	\$57.74	21600	1.290628739	\$3	\$267	\$557,629,032.00	\$33.32	\$307,703
Malawi	2002	\$3.50	11788731	\$297	\$14.82	6800	0.576822051	\$1	\$218	\$666,465,849.00	\$56.53	\$557,705
Mali	2002	\$3.89	11723017	\$332	\$49.36	15200	1.296594554	\$4	\$325	\$699,403,122.00	\$59.66	\$464,472
Mauritania	2002	\$1.32	2884672	\$459	\$36.28	20700	7.175859162	\$13	\$175	\$339,539,472.00	\$117.70	\$877,696
Mauritius	2002	\$4.77	1204621	\$3,958	\$9.50	2000	1.660273231	\$8	\$475	\$158,570,610.00	\$131.64	\$196,050
Morocco	2002	\$42.24	29535591	\$1,430	\$1,474.87	246300	8.33909164	\$50	\$599	\$2,210,976,953.00	\$74.86	\$17,799,046
Mozambique	2002	\$5.03	19348715	\$260	\$53.51	11000	0.568513206	\$3	\$486	\$3,734,411,190.00	\$193.01	\$2,573,495
Namibia	2002	\$3.36	1957749	\$1,717	\$87.99	15000	7.661860637	\$45	\$587	\$192,415,598.00	\$98.28	\$395,371
Niger	2002	\$2.17	12075991	\$180	\$20.66	10700	0.886055645	\$2	\$193	\$447,246,751.00	\$37.04	\$165,752
Nigeria	2002	\$59.12	129246283	\$457	\$896.91	160500	1.241815209	\$7	\$559	\$1,879,852,468.00	\$14.54	\$10,517,435
Rwanda	2002	\$1.68	8539029	\$196	\$51.12	80000	9.368746728	\$6	\$64	\$622,905,843.00	\$72.95	\$397,384
Sao Tome	2002	\$0.08	143085	\$563	\$0.40	600	4.193311668	\$3	\$67	\$51,393,81.00	\$359.18	\$144,810
Senegal	2002	\$5.33	10389457	\$513	\$74.36	15200	1.4630216	\$7	\$489	\$742,819,843.00	\$71.50	\$3,465,031
Seychelles	2002	\$0.70	83700	\$8,334	\$11.70	800	9.557945042	\$140	\$1,462	\$18,353,980.00	\$219.28	\$69,227
Sierra Leone	2002	\$1.24	4422154	\$280	\$27.13	13000	2.939743844	\$6	\$209	\$533,263,596.00	\$120.59	\$198,903
Somalia	2002	\$1.22	7827203	\$156	\$17.00	2100	0.268295073	\$2	\$810	\$227,621,150.00	\$29.08	\$1,200,000
South Africa	2002	\$115.48	45448096	\$2,541	\$1,766.08	60000	1.320187319	\$39	\$2,943	\$1,116,687,210.00	\$24.57	\$10,382,244
South Sudan	2002		7233237								\$0.00	
Sudan	2002	\$14.80	29569978	\$501	\$484.61	124000	4.193442416	\$16	\$391	\$1,230,187,802.00	\$41.60	\$0

Swaziland	2002	\$1.41	1082195	\$1,300	\$18.34	3130	2.892269877	\$17	\$586	\$106,456,075.00	\$98.37	\$122,688
Tanzania	2002	\$10.81	35855480	\$301	\$140.75	28400	0.792068604	\$4	\$496	\$2,041,757,005.00	\$56.94	\$355,218
Togo	2002	\$1.47	5142419	\$287	\$26.54	10300	2.002948418	\$5	\$258	\$116,771,902.00	\$22.71	\$230,162
Tunisia	2002	\$23.14	9748900	\$2,374	\$345.42	47000	4.821056735	\$35	\$735	\$1,807,379,688.00	\$185.39	\$10,547,915
Uganda	2002	\$6.18	25355794	\$244	\$142.19	56800	2.240119162	\$6	\$250	\$1,603,936,308.00	\$63.26	\$93,372
Zambia	2002	\$4.19	11139978	\$376	\$33.46	23000	2.064636034	\$3	\$145	\$932,608,380.00	\$83.72	\$1,642,884
Zimbabwe	2002	\$6.34	12691431	\$500	\$677.00	57800	4.554253969	\$53	\$1,171	\$340,869,019.00	\$26.86	\$34,156
Algeria	2001	\$54.74	31590320	\$1,733	\$2,091.63	305200	9.661187351	\$66	\$685	\$1,645,139,025.00	\$52.08	\$140,076
Angola	2001	\$8.94	15562791	\$574	\$404.30	145500	9.349222771	\$26	\$278	\$443,528,843.00	\$28.50	\$2,853,667
Benin	2001	\$2.68	7174911	\$374	\$13.11	7300	1.017434223	\$2	\$180	\$354,296,537.00	\$49.38	\$1,536,909
Botswana	2001	\$5.49	1762531	\$3,115	\$210.32	10000	5.673659073	\$119	\$2,103	\$88,009,548.00	\$49.93	\$2,432,694
Burkina Faso	2001	\$2.81	11943740	\$235	\$36.83	14200	1.188907327	\$3	\$259	\$904,747,140.00	\$75.75	\$13,715
Burundi	2001	\$0.88	6946720	\$126	\$53.23	51000	7.341594306	\$8	\$104	\$212,799,546.00	\$30.63	\$8,243
Cameroon	2001	\$9.63	16349364	\$589	\$124.30	31100	1.902214667	\$8	\$400	\$1,137,801,751.00	\$69.59	\$491,193
Cape Verde	2001	\$0.56	447357	\$1,252	\$4.64	1300	2.90595654	\$10	\$357	\$189,006,380.00	\$422.50	\$131,749
CAR	2001	\$0.93	3794677	\$246	\$12.60	4200	1.106813571	\$3	\$300	\$121,975,145.00	\$32.14	\$123,992
Chad	2001	\$1.71	8663599	\$197	\$26.19	34900	4.028348958	\$3	\$75	\$466,040,869.00	\$53.79	\$647,622
Comoros	2001	\$0.22	561525	\$392	\$6.16	500	0.890432305	\$11	\$1,233	\$62,124,112.00	\$110.63	\$7,889
Congo (DRC)	2001	\$7.44	49449015	\$150	\$81.20	81400	1.646139969	\$2	\$100	\$520,505,946.00	\$10.53	\$0
Congo (Republic)	2001	\$2.79	3183883	\$878	\$54.45	12000	3.768982717	\$17	\$454	\$162,339,533.00	\$50.99	\$93,652
Cote d'Ivoire	2001	\$11.19	16865376	\$664	\$111.00	8000	0.474344598	\$7	\$1,388	\$368,245,271.00	\$21.83	\$13,166
Djibouti	2001	\$0.57	734088	\$780	\$26.05	12600	17.16415471	\$35	\$207	\$130,829,544.00	\$178.22	\$640,519
Egypt	2001	\$97.63	69599945	\$1,403	\$2,834.26	768000	11.03449148	\$41	\$369	\$3,313,180,475.00	\$47.60	\$1,300,303,436
Equatorial Guinea	2001	\$1.46	549007	\$2,661	\$277.60	1600	2.91435264	\$506	\$17,350	\$34,672,553.00	\$63.16	\$0
Eritrea	2001	\$0.75	3655006	\$206	\$166.55	171900	47.03138654	\$46	\$97	\$415,172,984.00	\$113.59	\$1,216,492
Ethiopia	2001	\$8.23	68393128	\$120	\$349.81	252500	3.691891384	\$5	\$139	\$1,877,058,678.00	\$27.45	\$14,281
Gabon	2001	\$5.02	1260435	\$3,982	\$90.04	6700	5.315625161	\$71	\$1,344	\$259,605,314.00	\$205.96	\$234,606
Gambia	2001	\$0.69	1267103	\$543	\$2.45	800	0.63136146	\$2	\$307	\$172,387,410.00	\$136.05	\$13,529
Ghana	2001	\$5.31	19293804	\$275	\$32.35	7000	0.362810776	\$2	\$462	\$1,448,790,934.00	\$75.09	\$1,013,164
Guinea	2001	\$2.83	8955756	\$316	\$87.72	17300	1.931718551	\$10	\$507	\$941,863,482.00	\$105.17	\$3,368,010
Guinea Bissau	2001	\$0.39	1343646	\$292	\$6.18	1600	1.190789836	\$5	\$386	\$98,046,372.00	\$72.97	\$557,974
Kenya	2001	\$12.99	31863280	\$408	\$195.37	29400	0.922692202	\$6	\$665	\$899,647,746.00	\$28.23	\$3,971,841
Lesotho	2001	\$0.83	1871489	\$441	\$23.39	2000	1.068667783	\$12	\$1,170	\$183,120,308.00	\$97.85	\$101,844
Liberia	2001	\$0.52	2998770	\$174	\$7.80	15000	5.002050841	\$3	\$52	\$72,909,399.00	\$24.31	\$0
Libya	2001	\$34.11	5428303	\$6,284	\$819.75	76500	14.09280212	\$151	\$1,072	\$14,040,267.00	\$2.59	\$0
Madagascar	2001	\$4.53	16235767	\$279	\$65.04	21600	1.330396032	\$4	\$301	\$1,150,316,014.00	\$70.85	\$232,254
Malawi	2001	\$1.72	11491824	\$149	\$12.68	6800	0.591725039	\$1	\$186	\$676,356,739.00	\$58.86	\$1,205,365
Mali	2001	\$3.47	11376094	\$305	\$44.88	15200	1.336135232	\$4	\$295	\$878,174,591.00	\$77.19	\$1,553,519
Mauritania	2001	\$1.30	2796502	\$463	\$51.85	20600	7.366345527	\$19	\$252	\$747,171,422.00	\$267.18	\$497,092

Mauritius	2001	\$4.54	1196287	\$3,792	\$8.98	1600	1.337471694	\$8	\$561	\$337,788,655.00	\$282.36	\$143,192
Morocco	2001	\$39.46	29250983	\$1,349	\$1,470.32	246500	8.42706722	\$50	\$596	\$3,007,186,487.00	\$102.81	\$6,579,840
Mozambique	2001	\$4.77	18792357	\$254	\$50.62	11000	0.58534435	\$3	\$460	\$1,996,122,402.00	\$106.22	\$2,380,000
Namibia	2001	\$3.55	1931005	\$1,837	\$96.76	15000	7.767975743	\$50	\$645	\$279,502,481.00	\$144.74	\$242,467
Niger	2001	\$1.95	11642308	\$167	\$24.83	10700	0.919061753	\$2	\$232	\$655,879,167.00	\$56.34	\$116,104
Nigeria	2001	\$44.14	126014935	\$350	\$570.63	160500	1.273658555	\$5	\$356	\$1,131,217,800.00	\$8.98	\$15,478,158
Rwanda	2001	\$1.67	8329113	\$201	\$56.89	79000	9.484803484	\$7	\$72	\$652,942,532.00	\$78.39	\$408,933
Sao Tome	2001	\$0.07	140003	\$516	\$0.40	600	4.285622451	\$3	\$67	\$196,246,901.00	\$1,401.73	\$108,517
Senegal	2001	\$4.88	10118078	\$482	\$68.89	15600	1.541794795	\$7	\$442	\$847,905,924.00	\$83.80	\$5,070,431
Seychelles	2001	\$0.62	81202	\$7,663	\$11.07	500	6.157483806	\$136	\$2,213	\$32,807,094.00	\$404.02	\$133,128
Sierra Leone	2001	\$1.08	4220198	\$256	\$29.91	6000	1.421734241	\$7	\$499	\$762,764,198.00	\$180.74	\$37,644,651
Somalia	2001	\$1.30	7610053	\$171	\$16.00	2100	0.275950772	\$2	\$762	\$180,945,818.00	\$23.78	\$1,400,000
South Africa	2001	\$121.52	44909738	\$2,706	\$1,802.26	67000	1.491881338	\$40	\$2,690	\$1,461,028,979.00	\$32.53	\$2,245,900
South Sudan	2001		6967817								\$0.00	
Sudan	2001	\$13.18	28805142	\$458	\$388.09	124000	4.304786972	\$13	\$313	\$474,842,081.00	\$16.48	\$0
Swaziland	2001	\$1.52	1074765	\$1,418	\$19.67	3223	2.998795085	\$18	\$610	\$153,850,238.00	\$143.15	\$188,843
Tanzania	2001	\$10.38	34899062	\$298	\$150.73	28400	0.813775453	\$4	\$531	\$2,724,461,653.00	\$78.07	\$222,329
Togo	2001	\$1.33	5006223	\$266	\$24.65	10300	2.057439311	\$5	\$239	\$76,328,131.00	\$15.25	\$65,074
Tunisia	2001	\$22.07	9650600	\$2,287	\$335.65	47000	4.870163513	\$35	\$714	\$2,523,787,775.00	\$261.52	\$9,488,642
Uganda	2001	\$5.84	24534668	\$238	\$136.16	56800	2.315091445	\$6	\$240	\$1,531,277,842.00	\$62.41	\$9,282
Zambia	2001	\$4.09	10861238	\$377	\$30.00	23000	2.117622319	\$3	\$130	\$858,485,746.00	\$79.04	\$1,471,471
Zimbabwe	2001	\$6.78	12603988	\$538	\$286.70	60800	4.823870032	\$23	\$472	\$199,183,213.00	\$15.80	\$595,000
Algeria	2000	\$54.79	31183658	\$1,757	\$1,881.16	305200	9.78717763	\$60	\$616	\$1,411,420,157.00	\$45.26	\$115,000
Angola	2000	\$9.13	15058638	\$606	\$583.62	117500	7.802830508	\$39	\$497	\$489,524,226.00	\$32.51	\$3,110,422
Benin	2000	\$2.57	6949366	\$370	\$14.50	7300	1.050455538	\$2	\$199	\$713,394,613.00	\$102.66	\$1,184,422
Botswana	2000	\$5.79	1736579	\$3,333	\$184.72	10000	5.758448075	\$106	\$1,847	\$56,596,776.00	\$32.59	\$589,422
Burkina Faso	2000	\$2.63	11607944	\$226	\$36.66	11300	0.973471271	\$3	\$324	\$936,160,329.00	\$80.65	\$14,422
Burundi	2000	\$0.87	6767073	\$129	\$42.32	45500	6.723734176	\$6	\$93	\$228,237,733.00	\$33.73	\$7,462
Cameroon	2000	\$9.29	15927713	\$583	\$123.03	22100	1.387518723	\$8	\$557	\$1,180,101,778.00	\$74.09	\$805,562
Cape Verde	2000	\$0.54	438737	\$1,231	\$6.80	1200	2.735123776	\$16	\$567	\$142,616,762.00	\$325.06	\$137,422
CAR	2000	\$0.91	3726048	\$245	\$16.27	5400	1.449256692	\$4	\$301	\$183,001,429.00	\$49.11	\$109,960
Chad	2000	\$1.39	8343321	\$166	\$21.35	34600	4.147029702	\$3	\$62	\$1,332,334,701.00	\$159.69	\$1,019,067
Comoros	2000	\$0.20	547696	\$372	\$5.71	500	0.912915194	\$10	\$1,141	\$39,197,601.00	\$71.57	\$7,462
Congo (DRC)	2000	\$19.09	4804864	\$397	\$132.88	92900	1.933456464	\$3	\$143	\$294,504,244.00	\$6.13	\$0
Congo (Republic)	2000	\$3.22	3109269	\$1,036	\$48.30	15000	4.824285065	\$16	\$322	\$81,292,078.00	\$26.15	\$14,422
Cote d'Ivoire	2000	\$10.72	16517948	\$649	\$90.00	8000	0.48432166	\$5	\$1,125	\$796,188,914.00	\$48.20	\$1,736,422
Djibouti	2000	\$0.55	722562	\$763	\$26.03	12600	17.43794996	\$36	\$207	\$168,111,441.00	\$232.66	\$1,293,428
Egypt	2000	\$99.84	68334905	\$1,461	\$2,627.70	678500	9.929039925	\$38	\$387	\$2,258,618,274.00	\$33.05	\$1,326,020,442
Equatorial Guinea	2000	\$1.05	530896	\$1,970	\$198.70	1600	3.013772942	\$374	\$12,419	\$257,288,499.00	\$484.63	\$7,462

Eritrea	2000	\$0.71	3535156	\$200	\$230.67	200000	56.57458964	\$65	\$115	\$559,720,155.00	\$158.33	\$541,422
Ethiopia	2000	\$8.24	66443603	\$124	\$617.54	352500	5.305251132	\$9	\$175	\$1,590,308,328.00	\$23.93	\$409,462
Gabon	2000	\$5.07	1231548	\$4,115	\$91.30	6700	5.440307645	\$74	\$1,363	\$333,765,267.00	\$271.01	\$61,422
Gambia	2000	\$0.78	1228863	\$637	\$3.32	800	0.65100829	\$3	\$415	\$87,217,202.00	\$70.97	\$14,422
Ghana	2000	\$4.98	18824994	\$265	\$50.88	8000	0.424966935	\$3	\$636	\$1,191,014,491.00	\$63.27	\$464,422
Guinea	2000	\$3.00	8799165	\$340	\$45.97	19300	2.193389941	\$5	\$238	\$301,613,283.00	\$34.28	\$264,422
Guinea Bissau	2000	\$0.37	1315455	\$281	\$9.53	1600	1.216309186	\$7	\$596	\$317,227,936.00	\$241.15	\$135,422
Kenya	2000	\$12.71	31065820	\$409	\$165.58	27200	0.875560343	\$5	\$609	\$2,028,025,394.00	\$65.28	\$436,442
Lesotho	2000	\$0.89	1856225	\$478	\$30.56	2000	1.077455589	\$16	\$1,528	\$78,987,491.00	\$42.55	\$100,422
Liberia	2000	\$0.53	2891968	\$183	\$7.80	15000	5.186779383	\$3	\$52	\$34,380,261.00	\$11.89	\$6,960
Libya	2000	\$38.27	5337264	\$7,170	\$1,085.53	76500	14.33318644	\$203	\$1,419	\$127,894,705.00	\$23.96	\$0
Madagascar	2000	\$3.88	15744811	\$246	\$47.21	28500	1.810120172	\$3	\$166	\$635,055,412.00	\$40.33	\$207,929
Malawi	2000	\$1.74	11193230	\$156	\$11.73	6000	0.536038302	\$1	\$195	\$1,034,698,353.00	\$92.44	\$1,322,422
Mali	2000	\$2.95	11046926	\$267	\$43.68	15200	1.375948386	\$4	\$287	\$1,071,742,645.00	\$97.02	\$937,813
Mauritania	2000	\$1.29	2711421	\$477	\$37.88	20700	7.634373268	\$14	\$183	\$459,298,788.00	\$169.39	\$475,422
Mauritius	2000	\$4.58	1186873	\$3,861	\$9.36	1800	1.516590233	\$8	\$520	\$133,000,423.00	\$112.06	\$118,508
Morocco	2000	\$38.86	28950553	\$1,342	\$859.15	240500	8.307267913	\$30	\$357	\$1,578,719,219.00	\$54.53	\$13,650,945
Mozambique	2000	\$5.02	18264536	\$275	\$55.36	6100	0.333980562	\$3	\$908	\$2,703,196,307.00	\$148.00	\$4,200,422
Namibia	2000	\$3.91	1897953	\$2,059	\$92.40	9100	4.794639277	\$49	\$1,015	\$220,552,190.00	\$116.21	\$674,422
Niger	2000	\$1.80	11224523	\$160	\$20.08	10700	0.953269907	\$2	\$188	\$645,206,532.00	\$57.48	\$14,422
Nigeria	2000	\$46.39	122876723	\$378	\$368.64	106500	0.866722333	\$3	\$346	\$2,966,618,007.00	\$24.14	\$26,221,929
Rwanda	2000	\$1.73	8021875	\$216	\$61.33	76000	9.474094273	\$8	\$81	\$761,681,923.00	\$94.95	\$819,206
Sao Tome	2000	\$0.08	137164	\$583	\$0.40	1000	7.290542708	\$3	\$40	\$84,904,106.00	\$619.00	\$52,462
Senegal	2000	\$4.68	9860578	\$475	\$62.36	15400	1.561774573	\$6	\$405	\$1,211,273,157.00	\$122.84	\$3,754,047
Seychelles	2000	\$0.61	81131	\$7,579	\$10.33	500	6.162872392	\$127	\$2,065	\$24,375,952.00	\$300.45	\$251,000
Sierra Leone	2000	\$0.64	4060709	\$157	\$23.31	3800	0.935797172	\$6	\$613	\$478,216,192.00	\$117.77	\$18,006,960
Somalia	2000	\$2.05	7385416	\$278	\$15.30	50000	6.770099342	\$2	\$31	\$150,740,683.00	\$20.41	\$1,400,000
South Africa	2000	\$136.36	44000000	\$3,099	\$1,891.73	71600	1.627272727	\$43	\$2,642	\$1,440,122,453.00	\$32.73	\$1,210,936
South Sudan	2000		6692999								\$0.00	
Sudan	2000	\$12.26	28079664	\$437	\$587.27	119500	4.255748929	\$21	\$491	\$614,078,469.00	\$21.87	\$0
Swaziland	2000	\$1.71	1063715	\$1,603	\$24.47	3000	2.820304311	\$23	\$816	\$41,562,152.00	\$39.07	\$119,422
Tanzania	2000	\$10.19	33991590	\$300	\$135.06	35400	1.041434072	\$4	\$382	\$2,738,786,258.00	\$80.57	\$181,422
Togo	2000	\$1.29	4874735	\$266	\$25.63	7800	1.600086979	\$5	\$329	\$132,714,109.00	\$27.22	\$764,422
Tunisia	2000	\$21.47	9552500	\$2,248	\$332.39	47000	4.920177964	\$35	\$707	\$1,645,551,878.00	\$172.26	\$8,137,712
Uganda	2000	\$6.19	23757636	\$261	\$141.30	50600	2.129841538	\$6	\$279	\$2,741,106,673.00	\$115.38	\$261,422
Zambia	2000	\$3.60	10585220	\$340	\$30.00	23000	2.172840999	\$3	\$130	\$1,835,017,656.00	\$173.36	\$370,422
Zimbabwe	2000	\$6.69	12499981	\$535	\$346.30	61800	4.944007515	\$28	\$560	\$345,600,580.00	\$27.65	\$2,374,480

Appendix E – Data, Tables, and Figures from Chapter 4

	GFP	CPI	GDP	GDP per capita	(log) GDP per capita	Avg. GDP	Mil. Budget	Mil. Budget per capita	(log) Mil. Budget	Mil. Personnel	Mil. Bdgt per troop	M Score	COW (CNC)	Troops per sq. mile	% Mil. of Population	Total troops deployed	Total UN Troop Deployed	Int'l Aid	U.S. SFA (\$USD)	U.S. SFA (Troops Trained)
GFP	1	-0.195	649**	-0.127	0.111	651**	631**	0.150	915**	625**	0.004	0.232	761**	-0.093	0.167	0.258	479**	745**	310**	313*
CPI	-0.195	1	-0.019	0.305	0.370**	0.014	-0.076	0.038	-0.204	-0.145	0.041	-0.148	-0.113	0.183	-0.154	-0.125	0.199	-0.038	0.011	0.061
GDP	649**	-0.019	1	0.122	0.311	960**	608**	0.070	592**	640**	0.053	0.043	921**	-0.023	-0.003	0.076	587**	649**	451**	404**
GDP per capita	0.000	0.890	0.000	0.379	0.022	0.000	0.613	0.000	0.861	0.000	0.757	0.000	0.869	0.000	0.884	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002
(log) GDP per capita	0.360	0.020	0.379	0.000	0.219	0.283	0.000	0.651	0.063	0.022	591**	-0.018	0.001	0.185	0.049	-0.161	-0.102	-0.176	0.041	-0.195
Avg. GDP	0.111	0.370**	311**	0.871**	1	383**	367**	611**	322**	0.182	612**	0.080	0.167	0.067	0.109	-0.183	-0.007	-0.040	0.125	-0.191
Mil. Budget	0.426	0.006	0.022	0.000	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.000	0.077	0.188	0.000	0.587	0.227	0.631	0.432	0.066	0.862	0.777	0.367	0.166
Mil. Bdgt per capita	0.651**	0.014	960**	0.170	363**	1	674**	0.170	629**	570**	0.169	0.099	879**	-0.051	0.010	0.043	522**	570**	364**	307**
(log) Mil. Bdgt	0.000	0.918	0.000	0.219	0.007	0.000	0.219	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.223	0.477	0.000	0.712	0.944	0.757	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.024
M Score	0.000	-0.076	608**	0.155	367**	674**	1	480**	712**	688**	0.249	494**	825**	-0.043	0.178	-0.029	0.139	302**	371**	0.003
Mil. Personnel	0.000	0.896	0.000	0.283	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.069	0.000	0.000	0.758	0.197	0.634	0.315	0.026	0.006	0.894
Total troops deployed	0.150	0.038	0.070	0.497**	0.611**	0.170	490**	1	440**	0.120	762**	409**	0.017	-0.022	292**	-0.144	-0.202	-0.229	0.002	-268**
(log) Mil. Bdgt	0.278	0.783	0.613	0.000	0.000	0.219	0.000	0.001	0.386	0.000	0.002	0.904	0.874	0.032	0.299	0.144	0.096	0.887	0.050	0.050
Mil. Bdgt per troop	915**	-0.204	592**	0.063	322**	629**	712**	440**	1	574**	296**	364**	648**	-0.184	0.176	0.136	301**	555**	271**	0.130
Mil. Personnel	0.000	0.139	0.000	0.651	0.017	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.007	0.000	0.182	0.204	0.328	0.027	0.000	0.646	0.339
Total UN Troop Deployed	0.625**	-0.145	640**	0.022	0.162	570**	688**	0.120	574**	1	-0.136	0.151	790**	0.190	0.341	0.047	288**	531**	815**	0.157
Int'l Aid	0.000	0.297	0.000	0.872	0.188	0.000	0.000	0.386	0.000	0.000	0.325	0.276	0.000	0.168	0.012	0.738	0.028	0.000	0.000	0.257
U.S. SFA (\$USD)	0.004	0.041	0.053	0.591**	0.612**	0.189	0.249	762**	296**	-0.136	1	0.125	-0.071	-0.197	-0.017	-0.202	-0.159	-0.207	-0.105	-274**
U.S. SFA (Troops Trained)	0.977	0.767	0.703	0.000	0.000	0.233	0.069	0.000	0.030	0.325	0.387	0.610	0.387	0.154	0.902	0.142	0.250	0.133	0.451	0.645
	0.232	-0.146	0.043	-0.018	0.080	0.099	494**	409**	384**	0.151	0.125	1	0.064	0.000	0.322	0.025	-0.125	-0.065	-0.060	-0.131
	0.091	0.294	0.757	0.895	0.567	0.477	0.000	0.002	0.007	0.276	0.367	0.648	0.648	0.665	0.018	0.858	0.369	0.641	0.563	0.343
	0.000	-0.113	921**	0.001	0.167	879**	625**	0.017	648**	790**	-0.071	0.064	1	0.023	0.122	0.131	589**	780**	563**	340**
	0.000	0.417	0.000	0.995	0.227	0.000	0.000	0.944	0.000	0.000	0.610	0.648	0.648	0.871	0.379	0.346	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012
	-0.093	0.183	-0.023	0.185	0.067	-0.051	-0.043	-0.022	-0.184	0.190	-0.197	0.060	0.023	1	493**	309**	0.077	-0.104	0.155	306**
	0.506	0.184	0.869	0.179	0.631	0.712	0.758	0.874	0.182	0.168	0.154	0.865	0.871	0.000	0.023	0.579	0.452	0.263	0.025	0.025
	0.167	-0.154	-0.003	0.049	0.109	0.010	0.178	292**	0.176	341**	-0.017	322**	0.122	493**	1	-0.036	-0.135	-0.145	0.204	561**
	0.227	0.266	0.881	0.723	0.432	0.844	0.197	0.032	0.204	0.012	0.902	0.018	0.379	0.000	0.015	0.784	0.329	0.295	0.381	0.379
	0.258	-0.125	0.076	-0.161	-0.183	0.043	-0.029	-0.144	0.136	0.047	-0.202	0.025	0.131	309**	-0.036	1	329**	0.251	-0.044	496**
	0.000	0.368	0.884	0.245	0.186	0.757	0.654	0.299	0.328	0.738	0.142	0.859	0.346	0.023	0.794	0.015	0.067	0.752	0.000	0.000
	0.479**	0.199	597**	-0.102	-0.007	522**	0.139	-0.202	301**	298**	-0.159	-0.859	589**	0.077	-0.135	329**	1	683**	0.204	561**
	0.000	0.149	0.000	0.461	0.962	0.000	0.315	0.144	0.027	0.028	0.250	0.369	0.000	0.579	0.329	0.015	0.000	0.138	0.000	0.000
	0.345**	-0.038	649**	-0.176	-0.040	570**	302**	-0.229	566**	531**	-0.207	-0.065	780**	-0.104	-0.145	0.251	663**	1	378**	429**
	0.000	0.788	0.000	0.204	0.777	0.000	0.026	0.096	0.000	0.000	0.133	0.841	0.000	0.452	0.295	0.067	0.000	0.005	0.001	0.001
	0.022	0.696	0.001	0.766	0.367	0.007	0.006	0.867	0.048	0.000	-0.105	-0.080	963**	0.155	0.122	-0.044	0.204	378**	1	0.150
	0.313*	0.061	-0.044**	-0.195	-0.191	307**	0.003	-268**	0.130	0.157	-274**	-0.131	340**	306**	-0.122	486**	561**	429**	0.150	1
	0.021	0.061	0.022	0.157	0.166	0.024	0.884	0.650	0.350	0.257	0.045	0.343	0.012	0.025	0.379	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.278	0.278

Table E-1. Pearson Correlation on various determinants of military power. Notes: N=54, *italicized* represent two-tailed significance tests. “*” and “**” indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level and 0.01 level (2-tailed) respectively.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
GFP	.4898	.23690	54
CPI	3.2259	1.21052	54
GDP	41.9926	89.36719	54
GDP_per_capita	2401.8249	3201.23992	54
log_GDP_per_capita	3.1270	.44703	54
Avg_GDP	27.5671	55.80527	54
Mil_Budget	840.4790	1757.01188	54
Mil_Bdgt_per_capita	55.7935	86.08091	54
log_Mil_Bdgt	2.2938	.77576	54
Mil_Personnel	64671.1667	132800.3282	54
Mil_bdgt_per_troop	17721.0771	17177.24513	54
M_Score	.0350	.05397	54
COW_CINC	.0014	.00211	54
Troops_per_sq_miles	.6777	1.20596	54
Pct_Mil_of_pop	.0044	.00690	54
Total_troops_deployed	5428.1667	11988.47831	54
Total_UN_Troop_Deployments	89793.2222	165839.3451	54
Intl_Aid	14.2400	14.06169	54
US_SFA	532403328.2	3010645073	54
US_SFA_Troops_Trained	6071.2593	9141.75222	54

Table E-2. Descriptive Statistics for Table E-1 (N=54).

	GFP	CPI	GDP	GDP per capita	(log) GDP per capita	Avg. GDP	Mil. Budget	Mil. Bdg't per capita	(log) Mil. Bdg't	Mil. Personnel	Mil. Bdg't per troop	M Score	COW (CNC)	Troops per sq. mile	%Mil. of Population	Total troops deployed	Total UN Troop Deployed	Int'l Aid	U.S. SFA (\$USD)	U.S. SFA (Troops Trained)
GFP	1	-0.135	577	-0.092	0.133	585	634	-0.015	850	657	-0.082	0.149	745	0.027	0.101	325	462	755	0.076	322
CPI	-0.135	0.388	1	0.088	0.200	-0.132	-340	0.180	-0.143	-634	0.135	-0.135	-0.252	0.014	-0.157	-0.085	0.269	-0.037	-437	0.146
GDP	577	-0.131	1	0.084	0.243	997	578	-0.033	493	503	-0.011	-0.008	872	-0.067	-0.092	0.119	593	615	0.082	473
GDP per capita	-0.092	0.088	0.084	1	864	0.111	0.145	602	0.166	-0.048	715	-0.054	-0.084	-0.130	0.008	-0.122	-0.103	-0.209	-0.126	-0.163
(log) GDP per capita	0.556	0.575	0.594	0.000	0.479	0.354	0.000	0.287	0.758	0.085	696	0.053	0.043	-0.181	0.068	-0.129	-0.010	-0.099	-0.111	-0.147
Avg. GDP	0.000	0.400	0.000	0.479	0.076	1	601	-0.002	520	494	0.024	0.022	863	-0.082	-0.090	0.038	0.410	0.850	0.526	0.346
Mil. Budget	634	-340	578	0.145	371	601	1	350	774	688	0.168	387	559	-0.110	0.067	0.078	0.130	307	0.208	0.027
Mil. Bdg't per capita	-0.015	0.180	-0.033	0.021	734	-0.002	350	1	407	0.056	850	0.333	-0.155	-0.093	0.242	-0.127	-0.255	-338	-0.059	-305
(log) Mil. Bdg't	0.850	-0.143	493	0.186	440	520	774	407	1	575	0.284	308	549	-0.152	0.081	0.171	0.227	484	0.100	0.090
Mil. Personnel	657	-434	503	-0.048	0.085	494	688	0.056	575	1	-0.245	0.206	701	0.222	440	0.170	0.220	396	0.288	0.080
Mil. Bdg't per troop	-0.082	0.387	0.944	0.000	0.783	0.000	0.881	0.000	0.065	0.114	0.114	0.166	0.000	0.152	0.003	0.277	0.157	0.009	0.061	0.811
M Score	0.149	-0.135	-0.008	-0.054	0.053	0.022	387	333	308	0.206	-0.001	1	0.049	0.167	324	0.064	-0.074	-0.017	0.099	-0.115
COW (CNC)	0.340	0.388	0.961	0.732	0.738	0.887	0.010	0.029	0.044	0.166	0.996	0.224	0.757	0.283	0.004	0.682	0.639	0.916	0.527	0.464
Troops per sq. mile	745	-0.252	872	-0.084	0.043	863	559	-0.155	549	701	-0.189	0.049	1	0.004	0.054	0.197	581	791	0.146	371
%Mil. of Population	0.027	0.014	-0.067	-0.130	-0.181	-0.082	-0.110	-0.093	-0.152	0.222	-0.305	0.167	0.004	1	560	411	0.109	-0.139	-0.100	385
Total troops deployed	0.865	0.937	0.677	0.406	0.246	0.863	0.482	0.555	0.330	0.152	0.046	0.283	0.881	0.000	0.006	0.006	0.485	0.373	0.522	0.071
Total UN Troop Deployed	0.101	-0.157	-0.092	0.008	0.068	-0.090	0.067	0.242	0.081	440	-0.128	0.324	0.054	556	1	-0.028	-0.172	-0.251	0.013	-0.141
Int'l Aid	0.521	0.314	0.556	0.960	0.663	0.967	0.669	0.117	0.608	0.003	0.414	0.034	0.731	0.000	0.000	0.858	0.270	0.105	0.933	0.367
U.S. SFA (\$USD)	0.076	-0.085	0.119	-0.122	-0.129	0.088	0.078	-0.127	0.171	0.170	-0.206	0.064	0.197	0.411	-0.028	1	325	0.271	-0.027	490
U.S. SFA (Troops Trained)	0.002	0.081	0.000	0.512	0.959	0.000	0.406	0.100	0.143	0.157	0.312	0.639	0.000	0.485	0.270	0.034	1	618	-0.075	548
	0.000	0.816	0.000	-0.209	-0.099	601	307	-0.336	494	386	-0.166	-0.017	791	-0.139	-0.251	0.271	618	1	0.079	411
	0.076	0.062	0.062	-0.126	-0.111	0.051	0.208	-0.059	0.100	0.288	-0.200	0.099	0.146	-0.100	0.013	-0.027	-0.075	0.079	1	-0.087
	0.627	0.003	0.692	0.420	0.480	0.744	0.180	0.709	0.522	0.061	0.198	0.527	0.349	0.922	0.833	0.865	0.631	0.616	0.616	0.579
	0.035	0.350	0.007	0.297	-0.147	0.654	0.027	-0.305	0.090	0.080	-0.252	-0.115	371	385	-0.141	490	548	411	-0.087	1
						0.002	0.865	0.047	0.586	0.611	0.104	0.464	0.014	0.011	0.367	0.000	0.006	0.006	0.579	0.579

Table E-3. Pearson Correlation on various determinants of military power. Notes: N=43, *italicized* represent two-tailed significance tests. “*” and “**” indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level and 0.01 level (2-tailed) respectively.

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
GFP	.4887	.18112	43
CPI	3.0349	1.14785	43
GDP	29.4660	74.32336	43
GDP_per_capita	1733.1086	2577.38297	43
log_GDP_per_capita	3.0110	.39391	43
Avg_GDP	16.9724	37.71954	43
Mil_Budget	435.0406	733.26631	43
Mil_Bdgt_per_capita	39.2958	56.25788	43
log_Mil_Bdgt	2.2591	.57700	43
Mil_Personnel	44737.7442	69882.80161	43
Mil_bdgt_per_troop	15105.2989	14415.02538	43
M_Score	.0332	.04979	43
COW_CINC	.0012	.00160	43
Troops_per_sq_miles	.5445	1.19876	43
Pct_Mil_of_pop	.0041	.00748	43
Total_troops_deployed	6412.5814	13205.11562	43
Total_UN_Troop_Deployments	90399.2558	173032.8918	43
Intl_Aid	13.9214	12.94178	43
US_SFA	127356330.6	263593337.8	43
US_SFA_Troops_Trained	6797.4651	9871.74926	43

Table E-4. Descriptive Statistics for Table E-3 (N=43).

Summary of specific correlations from Chapter 4

Significant Correlation Overlaps between Table E-1 and E-3

(Note: These are significant positive correlations unless otherwise noted as negatively correlated)

- 1) GFP correlated: GDP, average GDP, military budget (and *(log)* military budget), military personnel, COW (CINC), total UN troops deployed, international aid, and U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- 2) GDP correlated: average GDP, military budget (and *(log)* military budget), military personnel, COW (CINC), total UN troops deployed, international aid, and U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- 3) GDP per capita correlated: *(log)* GDP per capita, military budget per capita, and military budget per troop.
- 4) *(log)* GDP per capita correlated: GDP per capita, military budget, military budget per capita, *(log)* military budget, and military budget per troop.
- 5) Average GDP correlated: GFP, GDP, military budget (and *(log)* military budget), military personnel, COW (CINC), total UN troops deployed, international aid, and U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- 6) Military budget correlated: GFP, GDP, *(log)* GDP per capita, average GDP, military budget per capita, *(log)* military budget, military personnel, M-score, COW (CINC), and international aid.
- 7) Military budget per capita correlated: GDP per capita, *(log)* GDP per capita, military budget (and *(log)* military budget), military budget per troop, M-score, and a negative relationship with U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- 8) *(log)* military budget correlated: GFP, GDP, *(log)* GDP per capita, average GDP, military budget, military budget per capita, military personnel, M-score, COW (CINC), and international aid.

- 9) Military personnel correlated: GFP, GDP, average GDP, military budget (and (*log*) military budget), COW (CINC), percent of military personnel to general population, and international aid.
- 10) Military budget per troop correlated: GDP per capita, (*log*) GDP per capita, and military budget per capita.
- 11) M-score correlated: military budget, military budget per capita, (*log*) military budget), and percent of military personnel to general population.
- 12) COW (CINC) correlated: GFP, GDP, average GDP, military budget, (*log*) military budget, military personnel, total UN troops deployed, and international aid.
- 13) Troops per square miles correlated: percent of military personnel to general population, total troops deployed for non-UN purposes, and U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- 14) Percent of military personnel to general population correlated: military personnel, M-score, and troops per square mile.
- 15) Total troops deployed for non-UN purposes correlated: Troops per square mile, total UN troops deployed, and U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- 16) International aid correlated: GFP, GDP, average GDP, military budget, (*log*) military budget, military personnel, COW (CINC), total UN troops deployed, and U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- 17) U.S. SFA (troops trained) correlated: GFP, GDP, average GDP, negative relationship with military budget per capita, COW (CINC), troops per square mile, total troops deployed for non-UN purposes, total UN troops deployed, and international aid.

Significant Correlations that are Distinct for Table E-1

(Note: These are significant positive correlations unless otherwise noted as negatively correlated)

- (1) GFP correlated: U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) received.
- (2) Low Corruption (CPI) correlated: GDP per capita and (*log*) GDP per capita.
- (3) GDP correlated: (*log*) GDP per capita and U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) received.
- (4) Average GDP correlated: U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) received.
- (5) Military budget correlated: U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) received.
- (6) Military personnel correlated: Total UN troops deployed and U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) received.
- (7) Military budget per troop correlated: Negatively correlated with U.S. SFA (troops trained).
- (8) U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) correlated: GFP, GDP, average GDP, military budget, military personnel, COW (CINC), and international aid.

Significant Correlations that are Distinct in Table E-3

(Note: These are significant positive correlations unless otherwise noted as negatively correlated)

- 1) GFP correlated: Total number of troops deployed for non-UN purposes.
- 2) Low corruption correlated: Negative relationships with military budgets, military personnel, and U.S. SFA (U.S. Dollars) received.
- 3) Military budget per capita correlated: Negative relationship with international aid.
- 4) Military budget per troop correlated: Negative relationship with troops per square mile.
- 5) COW (CINC) correlated: U.S. SFA (troops trained).