Chapter 1 presents analysis comparing the effectiveness of two mechanisms of regulation enforcement: (1) the frequency of inspections and (2) penalties for violations. Recent policy changes regarding enforcement of mining safety regulations are exploited to quantify the effectiveness of each mechanism. It is concluded that increasing the frequency of inspections best induces compliance with regulations. In chapter 2 a model of bounded rationality is developed in which agents garner information by observing traits of available actions. Skill is defined as the number of action-trait pairs an agent is able to observe. Four applications are presented: trends in the optimal choice of information to process when maximizing expected payoff, the relationship of skill with expected payoff, a model of product differentiation, and the deferred-acceptance matching algorithm. Chapter 3 presents analysis of the historical New Orleans slave market. It is shown that buyers listing residences in New Orleans, and slave traders, purchased slaves at prices that were systematically lower on average. The mechanism of selection is considered and refuted. Other possible mechanisms are proposed and analyzed. It is suggested that bargaining power and market tactics resulted in lower prices.

Creator

• Gmeiner, Michael William

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/n2-2x1x-1086

Subject

• Economics

Language

• en

Alternate Identifier

• http://dissertations.umi.com/northwestern:14716
• etdadmin_upload_668782

Keyword

• Skill
• Bounded Rationality
• Threat Effects
• Slave Market
• Regulation Enforcement
• Bargaining Power

Date created

• 2019-01-01

Resource type

• Dissertation

Rights statement

• In Copyright